The Battle of Hilli- A Narration by Pakistani Bde Commander
Maj Gen (Retd) Tajammal Hussain Malik
Brigade Commander of 205 Pakistani Brigade deployed at Hilli and Bogra
INTERVIEW BY Major Agha H Amin (Retd)-SEPTEMBER 2001 Regarding the 1971 War and specially Battle of Hilli
In the first week of Jan 1948, we landed at Chittagong by the sea route. I stayed in East Pakistan up till June 1950. It was a wonderful experience. The East Pakistanis treated us with love and affection. I had developed great liking for those people. I wish those feeling had continued but it was our own fault. We treated them as Negroes were treated in the United States of America. We considered East Pakistan as our colony. We had to pay dearly for our follies twenty-five years later.
From 1947 up till 1958, Pakistan Army was a small Army but highly competent and dedicated to the profession. We had very simple living but took pride in the profession and being men in uniform. Therefore, all its efforts were concentrated on professional training and loyalty to the Constitutional Government. However, after the proclamation of Martial Law in 1958, its priorities changed. Martial law changes the very outlook of a soldier towards his profession or his duty to the state. Loyalty to Ayub Khan and the ruling junta was given the top priority whereas training in the Army and its obligation to the State were relegated to the second position. Our senior officers started indulging in accumulation of wealth and building palatial houses. The higher leadership was mostly incompetent. Thus the seed for the disintegration of Pakistan was sown. And after about ten years or so it resulted in the break-up of Pakistan in the 1971 war. Had we not lived under martial law from 1958 onwards and remained a professional army, as in the past, I have no doubt that we would have decisively defeated the Indian Army both in 1965 and 71 wars.
In 1948, my unit 3rd Baluch was in East Pakistan. Then Major General Ayub Khan was the local Log Area Commander. Another unit of that formation was a battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment, perhaps the 8th FF Regiment. That was the total force under the Command of General Ayub. He very frequently used to visit the combined Unit Officers Mess and informally spend the evenings with the officers like our Commanding Officer. One day during informal conversation he said, Before partition anyone who had a bit of brain preferred to join the services. They either got commission in the Army or joined Class One Civil Services. Only junk was left behind.
In fact, one of the main reason why democracy could not take roots in Pakistan was that the Army had started indulging in Politics in the very early stages of its creation. The first Martial Law was proclaimed at Lahore in 1953. And the first constitutional government of Khawaja Nazim ud Din was dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad in 1954 with the connivance of General Ayub Khan, then C-in-C Pakistan Army.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd):
You volunteered for service in the East Pakistan when many people already thought that it had been lost. What were your reasons for doing so?
In Oct / Nov 1971, I was holding the appointment of Director Staff Duties at GS Branch, General Headquarters. I used to see reports of at least 30 to 40 own troops being killed everyday. One got the impression that if that state of affairs continued, East Pakistan would slip into Indian hands. I am a devoted Muslim and I became very emotional. I sent a personal letter to Brigadier Baqar Saddiqi, Chief of Staff Eastern Command, who was an old friend, saying we would not let East Pakistan become Spain in the History of Islam. In those days, officers posted to East Pakistan often used to remain on Sick Report or got themselves admitted in Hospitals. The MS had to issue a letter throughout the Army saying that in future posting to East Pakistan would not be cancelled on the grounds of admission in hospitals. The officer would have to move to East Pakistan even on stretcher and if it was a genuine case he would be admitted in hospital in Dacca.
Regardless of the prevailing situation I asked for interview with General Hameed, then Chief of the Army Staff and requested him for posting to East Pakistan for command of a Brigade. He highly appreciated my volunteering for service in East Pakistan and in a few hours my posting order was issued by the Military Secretary to take over the command of 205 Brigade at Bogra.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd):
Please tell us something about your experiences as a Brigade Commander in the East Pakistan in 1971?
The battle of Hilli Bogra sector in 1971 war can rightfully be regarded as a classic example of defence in the history of warfare. Against my one brigade, Indians had deployed four infantry brigades i.e 202 Brigade, 66 Brigade, 165 Brigade and 340 Brigade, one armoured bridge i.e 3 Armoured Brigade, 471 Engineer Brigade and two artillery brigades augmented by 33 Corps Artillery, yet when the war ended on 16th September, the battle was still going on in the streets of Bogra. The Indians could not succeed in breaking through that sector till the very end. The Indian General, Major General Lachman Singh in his book, The Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan described this battle in detail. He has devoted at least two chapters on it. After the war the Indians had sent a team of experts to study the battle on the ground and determine reasons why such a heavy force as described above could not break through that sector till the end.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd),
You have stated in your book that atrocities were committed by many units / individuals in East Pakistan. You have also stated that you tried to curb these. What was the extent / magnitude of the alleged atrocities vis-a-vis alleged atrocities committed by the Mukti Bahini ?[/I]
I took over the command of 205 Brigade on 17th of November 1971 and about 4 days later the Indians had started the attack on our positions. During the period of my command, on one occasion, it was reported to me that one of my units 8 Baluch had captured about 8 civilians. The brigade headquarter was informed for their disposal. I was told that as a routine all such persons who were captured were to be shot without any investigation. I passed orders that in future no such shooting would take place unless I had seen them myself. When I visited the unit, they produced them before me. As I was meeting them, one of them fainted. The CO of that unit said, he is malingering. On further inquiry I found out that they were not in fact muktis but were the local people working in the fields, grazing cattle. I ordered that they be released.
I learnt through many other officers that during the earlier operations against the Mukti Bahinis thousands of innocent people were killed.
In one of my defensive position at Santahar, large number of people were massacred. General Tikka Khan & Lieutenant General Jahanzeb Arbab had earned their reputation of being Butchers of East Pakistan. So were many other Brigadiers and Generals. Mukti Bahinis too, may also have done so in retaliation but it was very negligible as compared to the atrocities committed by the West Pakistani troops against the East Pakistanis. Despite the fact what we had done to them, I personally found the local people very sympathetic towards us. In fact after the war, when I was moving from Bogra to Naogaon to link up with 13 FF of my brigade, I and a team of another officer with 17 other ranks were captured by Mukti Bahinis and the locals who not only saved our life but put bandages on the wounds I had sustained during the process of my capture.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd),
How would you sum up the root cause of the failure in East Pakistan from the pure military point of view?
We had enough resources in way of equipment and manpower to continue the war at least for six months. There was absolutely no justification for surrender. It was, perhaps, the guilt conscious weighing heavy on the minds of the Commanders, who had committed atrocities during the cleaning up operations. Had General Niazi and his team of Generals and Brigadiers decided to stand and fight, the Indian Army would never have succeeded in reaching even the fringes of Dacca. Even in the Hamood ur Rahman Commission it has been brought out that there was no justification for surrender. I do not consider it necessary to go into further details. For, it will become very lengthy.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd):
[I]We understand that you refused to surrender in East Pakistan. Please tell in detail what you felt about the whole issue.
Hilli Bogra sector was the only sector where Indians used an Armoured Brigade. For, in December the terrain represented the plains of Punjab. As I said before in this sector the Indians used 4 Infantry Brigade, one Armoured Brigade, one Engineer Brigade, one Mukti Brigade and yet could not break through this sector to the end and when the war ended the fighting was still going on in the streets of Bogra. The Battle of Hilli Bogra received the maximum publicity through the world media. I was mentally attuned to resist the Indians in the same manner as I had done on Wagha Sector in 1965 War. I could not conceive of surrender. On 15th and 16th December, when Bogra was surrounded from all sides, I was moving about in the battle area in my jeep, with the flag and stars uncovered, and announcing on the loud speaker, We shall fight from the rooftops, the windows and in the streets but we shall not surrender.
I was inspiring them with the Quranic Ayat that a Muslim soldier does not surrender on the battlefield. Anyone who turns his back will go to hell. I could see that almost everyone whom I addressed was prepared to die. They responded to my speech with slogans of Allah Ho Akbar. It was most thrilling scene. These words, which I have uttered, were later confirmed in the Indian Books published after the war. Some of the excerpts I would like to quote here. General Palit, in his book, The Lightening Campaign had said, In Hilli Bogra sector the Pakistani troops fought for every inch of ground.
Dr Monkakar in his book Pakistan cut to size had said, the Battle of Hilli was the toughest battle of Indo-Pak War, General Aurora, GOC-in-C Indian Eastern Command, in his interview with the Illustrated Weekly of India, published in 1973 had said, The battle of Bhaduria (which was fought within Hilli Bogra sector) was the bloodiest battle fought in East Pakistan.
General Lachman Singh in his Book, The Indian sword strikes in East Pakistan described the battle in this sector in great detail. He was a brave general, who had the courage to praise his opponents. He admired my fighting capabilities and went to the extent of saying, Most of the senior officers preferred to surrender as soon as a threat developed to their Headquarters or their lives. Brigadier Tajammal was the only exception in my sector. He showed fanatical will to fight even at the cost of his life. I was happy to take him prisoner. I was glad to learn that he was the first senior officer to be promoted by the Pakistanis out of those who had surrendered in Bangladesh.
He almost wrote my ACR, wherein he said, when in all other sectors, Pakistani troops were laying down arms, a group of officers and JCOs came to him and advised him to surrender. He refused to do so. He was no doubt a very brave and capable commander. He was in fact, prepared to die rather than surrender on the battlefield. His troops followed his example and resisted till the end.
In fact he said much more than what I have said. I have only given a brief gist of it. Imbued with such a spirit how could I possibly think of surrender. The examples of Muslim commanders in the history of Islam who had fought against overwhelming Christian armies were ringing in my ears. At that critical moment those examples became a source of strength for me to continue to fight till the end.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd):
Was the failure in East Pakistan related to Niazis incompetence or also to the Pakistani GHQs poor initial planning and assessments which dated to the period before the 1971 war broke out?
General Niazi had a brave record of service. In the past, whether during the Second World War as a company commander or in the 1965 War as a Brigade Commander, he had fought for mundane gains as a mercenary soldier.He is not the type who was guided by spiritual or moral convictions. In East Pakistan had he decided to stand and fight, he would have created example of bravery and dedication to the cause of Islam surpassing many Muslim commanders of the past.
He would have been compared favourably with Musa Bin Ghasam who had refused to surrender in the last Battle of Granada (Spain), wherein at the time King Abdullah and his cabinet were laying down arms against the enemy forces of King Fernandez and Queen Isabella, he mounted his horse, drew his sword and broke through the enemy lines who had surrounded the palace. In this process he was so heavily wounded that his dead body was found on the riverbank about 20 miles away. I do not entirely blame him. Most of the senior Brigadiers and General Officers at that time were brought up in mercenary traditions and they were fighting for mundane gains. At the time when final surrender took place on 16th December, there were about 4 other Generals, one Admiral and about 30 Brigadiers. They could have forced him not to surrender, had anyone of them had the courage to do so.
In all armies of the world, it is the inherent right of a soldier to refuse to lay down arms on the battlefield. Field Marshal Manstein in his book, The Lost Victories had said No General can vindicate his loss of a battle by claiming that he was compelled against his better judgement to execute an order that led to defeat. In this case the only course open to him is that of disobedience for which he is answerable with his head. Success will usually decide whether he was right or not.
The higher leadership was mostly incompetent. Thus the seed for the disintegration of Pakistan was sown. And after about ten years or so it resulted in the break-up of Pakistan in the 1971 war. Had we not lived under martial law from 1958 onwards and remained a professional army, as in the past, I have no doubt that we would have decisively defeated the Indian Army both in 1965 and 71 wars
The East Pakistanis treated us with love and affection. I had developed great liking for those people. I wish those feeling had continued but it was our own fault. We treated them as Negroes were treated in the United States of America. We considered East Pakistan as our colony. We had to pay dearly for our follies twenty-five years later.
Mukti Bahinis too, may also have done so in retaliation but it was very negligible as compared to the atrocities committed by the West Pakistani troops against the East Pakistanis. Despite the fact what we had done to them, I personally found the local people very sympathetic towards us. In fact after the war, when I was moving from Bogra to Naogaon to link up with 13 FF of my brigade, I and a team of another officer with 17 other ranks were captured by Mukti Bahinis and the locals who not only saved our life but put bandages on the wounds I had sustained during the process of my capture.
and they call us traitors……………………….
TAJAMMUL HUSSAIN MALIKS EPIC STAND AT HILLI 1971 DESCRIBED BY HIS INDIAN OPPONENTS
The Battle of Hilli or the Battle of Bogra was a major battle fought in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and Bangladesh Liberation War. It is generally regarded as the most pitched battle that took place in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. The battle of Hilli took place between 23 November 1971 and 11 December 1971,though the final surrender took place on 18 December, 1971.
The main objective of the Indian Army was to control Bogra, thereby cutting off Pakistan forces in the north from the rest of East Pakistan. The best way of getting to Bogra was through Hilli. The frontal assault on the Pakistan fortifications took a huge toll on both sides – the Indian Army suffering the greater number of casualties – before Indian forces finally broke through by establishing a block in the read of Pakistani forces in Hilli, upon which the 4FF Battalion in Hilli was withdrew for the defence of Bogra.The Indian side consisted of the 20 Indian Mountain Division led by Maj-Gen. Lachhman Singh. The constituent units of this division were 66 Brigade, 165 Brigade, 202 Brigade and 340 Brigade (all infantry units), 3 Armoured Brigade, 471 Engineer Brigade and two artillery brigades augmented by 33 Corps Artillery. The ground troops were aided by aerial support provided by the Indian Air Force which had acquired air superiority in the east and were armed with rockets, guns and 100 lb bombs.
On the Pakistan side, the Area of Responsibility (AOR) was on 205 Brigade of Pakistan Army led by Brigadier(later retired as Major General) Tajammul Hussain Malik. He had joined the brigade 4 days ago, when he volunteered to leave GHQ, Rawalpindi and command troops in the East Pakistan. He put up a stiff resistance that earned praise from many quarters.He had placed screens along the railway line nearby and at the Railway Station complex in the area. The defensive positions were sited in depth to cover all routes leading into East Pakistan.
They fought the entire Indian division and the Mukti Bahini soldiers till the Indians decided to bypass Hilli and establish a block in its rear. Brig. Malik then withdrew the forces in Hilli to avoid being cut off and to defend for the Bogra itself. Bogra was surrounded from all sides by the greater numbers of the Indian army and the Mukti Bahini.
Brig. Malik’s resistance continued even after the Pakistani Eastern Command surrendered in Dacca on 16 December. He, in his staff car with flags and stars uncovered went around the streets of Bogra motivating his soldiers to keep fighting. The Indian army had by then, surrounded the city of Bogra. The Brigade Major along with some 50 ORs surrendered but the Brigadier still full of vigour refused to give up. Brig. Malik ordered the rest of his brigade to break out in small groups to Naogong, where one of his units was still fighting on. However en-route, his jeep was ambused, severely injuring him and his orderly. Muktis captured both of them and subjected them to torture. They broke his arms and split his head after which he was taken semi-conscious to an Indian army hospital. Major General Nazar Hussain Shah, was especially flown in from Natore for the surrender of this brigade on 18 December 1971, due to the refusal of Brigadier Malik. Upon return from captivity, he was the only brigadier out of 32 or so who fought the 1971 War in East Pakistan to have been promoted to Major General rank.The battle was a significant one as it involved great personal valour on both sides. This is highlighted by the fact that soldiers on either side won their nation’s highest military honours. This battle was also unique in that it had started before the official start of the India Pakistan war but continued right until the formal surrender of Pakistan. Unlike other battles in the East where the Indian army dominated, Pakistan forces gave a very good account of themselves before the combined might of the Indian military managed to occupy the area. The Indians were so impressed by General Tajammul Hussain Malik’s fighting tactics that after the war the Indians had sent a team of experts to study the battle on the ground and determine reasons why such a heavy force as described above could not break through that sector till the end.
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