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Bangladesh Constitutional Quest for Autonomy 1950-1971 Moudud Ahmed

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Bangladesh Constitutional Quest for Autonomy 1950-1971

 

Moudud Ahmed

 

University Press Limited

The University Press Limited

Red Crescent Building

114 Motijheel C/A

P.O. Box 2611

Dhaka 1000

Bangladesh

First Published for a limited circulation by the

South Asian Institute of the Heidelberg

University, Germany, 1976.

First UPL Edition, 1979

Second revised edition, 1991

@ Moudud Ahmed, 1976

Cover desigend and produced by Tofazzal Hossian.

Endpapers illustrations drawn by Shamarukh Mohiuddin.

Motifs adapted from ‘Purbabanga Gitika’ by Syed Hashem Khan.

This book was set in Times Roman by MNS Computer Printers, Dhaka

Designer : Sazzad Khan Milky; Supervisor : Parvez Ahmed.

Published by Mohiuddin Ahmed, The University Press Limited,

Red Crescent Building, 114 Motijheel C/A, Dhaka. Printed at

Elora Art Publicity, Fakirapool Dhaka-1000

Preface

I am happy to note the since its first publication in 1979, the book has been useful to the students of politics and history as it has been included in the reading list of some courses in the universities of Bangladesh and also for courses on South Asian studies in many countries in the West.

In the preface to the first edition of the book I have explained the background to the writing of this book. Because of my personal involvement certain aspects of our history has found a detailed exposition in the book. The topics are : The Six Point Formula, the Agartala Conspiracy Case, the Round Table Conference, Mujib’s proposed Constitutional Amendment Bill of 1989, the negotiations at different levels between different leaders and parties and their respective role from January to March 1971 and above all the role of the Bengalis as a people in different spheres of their struggle for emancipation. Although many writer have written fine accounts of some part of our history, for some reason they have not directly linked these events and movements to our national independence.

I shall appreciate if the readers would bear in mind that this work was completed in 1976 when both Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mrs. Indira Gandhi were in power in their respective countries.

I thank the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung of the Federal Republic of Germany for granting me a research scholarship which enabled me to visit Germany for four months in summer 1976, and the South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University for providing me with the facilities to do this work. I am immensely grateful to Dr. Dieter Conrad of the Department of Law of the South Asia Institute for his encouragement and detailed comments on the different aspects of the book. My very sincere thanks to Professor Dietmar Rothermund, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and History, Heidelberg University, who despite his many preoccupations was kind as to go through the manuscript and make valuable comments.

Finally I thank Professor Emajuddin Ahamed of Dhaka University and an authority on South Asian affairs for assisting me in carrying out the revisions and my publisher Mr. Mohiuddin Ahmed of University Press Limited who encouraged me to work on the second edition of the book.

Dhaka, January 1991                                                                 Moudud Ahmed

Contents

 

Preface v

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Beginning of the Constitutional Conflict 16
Chapter 3 The Constitution of 1956 42
Chapter 4 The Proclamation of the First Martial Law and the Constitution of 1962 59
Chapter 5 The 6-Point Formula 79
Chapter 6 The Agartala Conspiracy Case : a Case for Seperation 91
Chapter 7 The Great Mass Upsurge 1968-69 122
Chapter 8 The first Constitution based on the 6-Point Formula 150
Chapter 9 The Scheme Frustrated : Imposition of the Second Martial Law 173
Chapter 10 The Break-up of Pakistan 189
Chapter 11 The War of Independence and Birth of Bangladesh 233
Chapter 12 Epilogue 249
Appendix 1     255
Appendix 2     299
Index     303

 

Chapter 1

 

Introduction

The demand for autonomy in the peculiar geo-political structure of the Indian sub-continent is quite old.

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Because of the existance of the various kinds of people with diferent ethnical, linguistic and cultural heritage, the demand for autonomy has develop into a historical tradition. The Bengalis also, because of their distinct cultural and ethnical characteristics, has enjoyed political autonomy in the past for a long time before the British took over the rule of India.

Although the British during the later part of their rule divided it into East and West for administrative and representational purposes, Bengal was considered politically as a single unit.1 The Bengalis as an ethnic group had the reputation of having a rich culture and were known to be an intelligent and articulate people. They were also the first to initiate the nationalist movement against the British Rule in India. When the partition of India took place in 1947 the territory of East Bengal along with a part of Aasam being a Muslim majority area, became a part of Pakistan, later known as East Pakistan and West Bengal continued to be a province the Union of India.

The historical reasons leading to tbe partition of India and the creation of Pakistan resulted in the re-grouping of the Bengalis on religious basis. The division of the territory of Bengal in 1947 led two groups of people to govern in two different ways and in the process of history they developed two different cultural patterns, although they speak the same language and belong to the same ethnic group. As in Norway and Sweden, having the same ethnic background they have developed two different nationalities. This fact of being in a separate state however, did not in any way change the urge of the Bengalis in East Pakistan to maintain an autonomous status.2 Previously, it was as urge within the structure of India under British Rule and now within Pakistan with a new a status of a ‘full province.’ The fact that the central administration of Pakistan was situated about 1000 miles away, dividing her two broad territories by another sovereign state, made the demand for autonomy logical and strong. One of the fundamental reasons that inspired the Bengali Muslims to support and spearhead the cause of Pakistan was the prospect of fulfilling their historical urge of having an independent state. They could achieve both the objectives-Islam and independence through the partition of British India.

Even the Six-Point Movement, which ultimately led to the disintregration of Pakistan and birth of independent Bangladesh after a heavy blood bath, was predicted upon the belief that the Bengalis would be much better off within the framework of autonomy. The demand for autonomy was the cornerstone of the Six-Point Movement.

Autonomy has been used in this study to imply a responsible government in the first place. In this sense political power should be exercised by the elected representative within the framework of a Constitution.

But since the Government of British India and that of Pakistan since 1947 were federal in structure, autnomy also implies freedom from the Central Government of India Act 1935 and the Constitution of Pakistan. The demanded for autonomy from that perspective has remained the rallying point for the Bengalis since the first quarter of this century.

  1. The Government of India Act, 1935

Towards the later part of the British Rule the pressure for decentralisation became more acute and the concept of provincial autonomy was finally accepted by the Government of India Act, 1935. Article 5 of this Act proclaimed India to a be ‘a Federation of Provinces and States’ and the subjects of Administration between the federal and provincial governments were distributed statutorily. This pattern of distribution of power between the centre and provinces was reflected later on in both the Indian Constitution of 1949 and the Pakistan Constitution of 1956. The 1935 Act enumerated a federal list giving

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the central legislature exclusive power in respect of certain important matters. Article 8 of 1935 defined the extent of executive authority of the Federation. The Seventh Schedule of the Act gave out these lists and the federal list included industries and establishments relating to defence, external affairs, currency, communication, import and export, customs, including duties. Railways other than minor railways, maritime shipping and navigation, major ports including declaration and delimitation of such ports, fisheries and fishing beyond territorial water, trading, financial and banking corporations, development of industries, insurance, banking and taxation on major heads etc. The federal list had 59 items, the provincial list 54 and the concurrent list 25. Despite the fact that the federal legislative list included all the major heads of state power, the provinces were also allowed exclusive power in certain matters and thereby the concept of autonomy as the guiding principle of administration was finally adopted in this after World.

  1. The Lahore Resolution

Whe the independence movement in India was taking shape, the Mulims of Bengal took a leading role in mobilising to achieve ‘Pakistan’ as the homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. They supported the cause of ‘Pakistan’ as they were assured by the Lahore Resolution not only of economic and religious freedom from Hindu domination, but the political independence too. The historic Lahore Resolution which was moved by A.K. Fazlul Huq, a Bengali leader, adopting the resolution for the creation of Pakistan, was as follows :

That it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so consituted with such territorial adjustments as may be neccessary, that the area in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituted units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the Constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

That this session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be neccessary.

This Resolution was passed in the Annual Conference of The All-India Muslim League in 1940 in which Muslim League delegates of all the provinces of India attended. It not only envisaged ‘autonomous and sovereign states’ but also declared how the rights of the minorities would be safeguarded in the future constitution. The Conference also authorised the working committee to ‘frame a scheme of constitution’ providing for the assumption by the respective regions ‘of all the powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters.’

There has been lot of controversies over the interpretation of Lahore Resolution because of its somewhat peculiar wording. The fact remained however that the Muslims of India, particularly of Bengal

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without whose support the cause of dividing India on a religious basis could not achieve its momentum, had to be united and a resolution to that effect only could achieve that unity. As far as the intention of the Muslim leaders was concerned it was clear from the third paragraph of the Resolution that complete autonomous and sovereign states were contemplated beyond any doubt. What was actually meant by ‘independent states’ or ‘autonomous and sovereign’ in the first paragraph and the word ‘finally’ in the third paragraph may provide scope for interpretation but if the Resolution is reat as a whole and considered in a geo-political context of the circumstances them prevailling, the intention of the authors of the Resolution would give a clearer meaning. It is quite probable that both the Cripps Mission and Cabinet Mission who recommended complete autonomy for the provinces were inspired by the spirit of Lahore Resolution. The fact that the Muslim League did not oppose this part of recommendations, further substantiated the actual aspiration of the Muslims in India.3 The Muslim League’s main objection was to the creation of ‘one India’ as it feared that in such case Muslims would ultimately be subjugated by the Hindu majority in the federal structure and the whole purpose of creating a ‘homeland’ for Muslims would be frustrated.

The Lahore Resolution was however, subsequently sidetracked in the sense that another resolution was passed in a meeting of the elected representatives of the Muslim League in the federal and provincial legislatures on April 9, 1946 in the following terms :

This Convention of the Muslim League Legislators of India, Central and Provincial, after careful consideration hereby declares that the Muslim nation will never submit to any Constiutition for a United India and will never participate in any single constitution-making machinery set up for the purpose, and that any formula devised by the British Government for transferring power from the British to the people of India, which does not conform to the following just and equitable principles calculated to maintain internal peace and tranquillity in the country, will not contribute to the solution of the Indian problem. That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely, Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent state and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay.4

It is evident from the above that the Lahore Resolution was not touched nor was it amended or repealed. The ruling elite of Muslim League of Pakistan’s early days who mainly came from India and the Punjab, now had realised that ‘independence States’ for the Muslims in India would not be realistic and held that there should be one state for all the Muslims in India. According to them, Lahore Resolution was a mistake and should have been ignored completely. The fact was that the elections were now over and the Muslims had given the overwhelming support in favour of the referendum for the creation of Pakistan, and therefore the main purpose of having the ‘homeland’ was served. The argument placed in this regard was that having discoverd that Bengal and the Punjab were going to be divided Jinnah had thtought that smaller region like East Bengal could not survive as sovereign state at the initial stage and therefore, the Muslim majority areas should constitute ‘one sovereign independent state.’ It was further argued that the fear of the British leaving India in the lands of the Congress quite early made the Muslim leaders feel that the demand for one Pakistan would put further pressure on the British to appreciate the strength of the Muslims. But none of these arguments was tenable in view of the fact that the resolution in April, 1946 was passed even before the Cabinet Mission had arrived in India. Moreover, Muslims had already demonstrated their unity through the elections and once the concept of Pakistan was accepted by the British, it was an internal matter of the Muslims, how they would decide to govern their own regions. The validity of the 1946 resolution was also challenged on the ground that the Lahore Resolution passed by the general body of the Muslim League could not be amended or modified by a resolution of a mere parliamentary body.

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It is true that the Lahore Resolution was not a law nor that it could not be altered or changed. Whatever might have been its validity as a resolution in the context of the subsequent resolution in April, 1946, the fact remained that there was a consensus amongst the Muslims that the regions, because of their deep-rooted diversecharacteristics, were to be autonomous. It was the desire of almost all the people of all the regions of the Indian sub-continent, notwithstanding their religious affiliation, that considerable political independence would be guaranteed to the respective regions. The wholebasis of the Pakistan movement was that the Muslims of different regions would have a homeland where they would be able to improve their conditions which were otherwise not possible because of the Hindu exploitation. The Muslims required a place of their own where they could practice their own culture and ideology in an environment free from Hindu domination. Muslims were majority in the whole of Bengal and they supported the cause of Pakistan not considering whether the whole or part of Bengal would become part of Pakistan as long as they could manage and control their own affairs and retain their own culture and ideology.5

It was the Muslims of Bengal and the Bengal Muslim League who strengthened the cause of Pakistan. When the Bengali Muslims lent full support to the creation of Pakistan, the other regions in the North-west including the Punjab were still sceptical about the whole thing. It was only in 1946 onwards that the real support from the Punjab came for Pakistan. Ironically, although Bengal was the heart-core of the struggle for Pakistan, the leadership of the Muslim League gradually concentrated in the hands of the Muslim landlords of India and the Punjab, the rising Muslim businessmen and the civil servants. When Pakistan was at last achieved in 1947 these classes of people constituted its ruling elite and almost all of them either were already in West Pakistan or migrated from India to West Pakistan. This helped West Pakistan to gain all the economic and political advantages of the ‘promised land’ and the neglect to East Pakistan started from that very day. The very few Bengali Muslim landlords who could occupy marked positions either identified themselves with the new ruling elite of Pakistan or were ineffective because of their lock of commitment for the development of the region they belonged to.

  1. The Indian Independence Act, 1947

The Indian Independence Act, 1947 passed on 18th July of the same year was enacted by the British Parliament to make provisions for setting up in India of two independent dominions : Union of India and Pakistan. The regions were demarcated to constitute the dominion; on the basis of Muslim and Hindu majority areas and in the process Bengal and the Punjab were divided. By Section 3(1) the Province of Bengal as constituted under the Government of India Act. 1935 had ceased to exist and in lieu thereof, two new provinces were constituted to be known respectively as East Bengal and West Bengal. Similarly, by Section 4(1) the province of the Punjab had ceased to exist and in lieu thereof, two new provinces namely, East Punjab and West Punjab were constituted. East Bengal now became a full province and so was West Punjab within the new state of Pakistan. The district of Sylhet of the province of Assam also decided to join Pakistan and became a part of the province of East Bengal under Section 3(3) of the Act.

The Indian Independence Act however retained the federal character for both the dominions as laid down by the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 8 of the Independence Act provided temporary provinsions for the statutory functioning of each of the new dominions. The powers of the legislature of each of the dominions ‘shall for the purpose of making provision as to the constitution of the dominion’ would be exercised in the first instance by the constitutent assembly of that dominion and reference in this Act to the legislation of the dominion would be construed accordingly. Section 8(2) specifically provided that unless it is inconsistent the provision of the Act of 1935 will be applicable to the new dominions.  Section 8(2) read as follows :

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This executive authority of the Ruler of a Federal State shall not withstanding any thing in this section, continue to be exercisable in that State with respect to matters to which the Federal Legislature has power to make laws for that State except in so far as the executive authority of the Federation becomes exercisable in the State to the exclusion of the executive authority of the Ruler by virtue of a Fedral law.

  1. Pakistan : Its Geo-political and Socio-economic Structure

Before I begin to discuss the lengthy and arduous constitution making process of Pakistan, the geo-political and socio-economic condtions of different regions and peoples of the newly born country would require at least a brief introduction. The constitutional aspect of the autonomy movement that started much before the creation of Pakistan itself, requires to be examined in the right perspective. Although the urge and aspirations of the people of different regions of Pakistan were identified with the cause of Pakistan to achieve a ‘homeland’ for the Muslims, the enthusiasm had soon dissipated as it was found that all the promises made during the election in 1946 and after, were no more talked about. As soon as Pakistan was established the touch of freedom in terms of an autonomous economic and political existance for the regions slipped away from the hands of the provincial leaders. East Pakistan, being the province of the majority people of Pakistan and its people being more conscious of their rights, was again the first to assert its position vis-a-vis the ruling elite of Pakistan. As the leaders of Pakistan showed no more interest in the establishment of ‘autonomous and sovereign states’ as contained in the Lahore Resolution, movement for regional autonomy in East Pakistan could start the day Pakistan was born. The act of 1935 provided a federal structure for a British colony and the provincial legislative list contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Act could never be sufficient for the province of a ‘free Pakistan.’

The first major conflict between the two provinces arose on the issue of language. As early in March, 1948 Jinnah while speaking at the Dhaka Race course and subsequently at the convocation of Dhaka University, declared, ‘Make no mistake about it. There can only be one state language and that can only be Urdu.’6

This was a strange statement made by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the architect of Pakistan. He suffered from over self-confidence drawn from his popularity enjoyed during the last phase of the Pakistan movement. Jinnah with all his brilliance was still unaware of the life and culture of the majority population in Pakistan. He was either completely misguided by his advisers or was liniving in a utopia of an illusive ‘strong Pakistan.’ Urdu, although it was commonly understood by a large number of people in Pakistan and had familarity with some of the languages of West Pakistan was not the mother tongue of the people in any of the regions of Pakistan. A little over three per cent people spoke Urdu in Pakistan as against over fifty six per cent speaking Bengali. The explanation of this attempt to impose Urdu as the only state language of Pakistan was given to suggest that Urdu as a language had more affinity with Arabic and Persian and ought to be therefore, the language of the citizens of Pakistan whose ideological basis was Islam and who derived their historical tradition from the Mughal rule. The fact was that the ruling elite of Pakistan, comprised of the persons including Jinnah himself, used to speak Urdu at home, and this was considered as a language of upper class ‘Musalmans.’7 The civil servants, the politicians and the rich immigrants from India and some Punjabi landlords who spoke Urdu were responsible to make this dangerous mistake at the very initial stage of Pakistan. They attempted to impose Urdu as the state language against the wishes of the majority people of Pakistan.

Besides the language, culture and the distance of 1000 miles between the two wings, there were from the begining some imbalances in the socio-economic structures between the two wings of Pakistan. East Bengal had more population and less land while the western wing had more land and less population.

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Although West Pakistan comprised of three other less developed regions, Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, the Punjab was both numerically and economically developed and used traditionally to dominate the western wing as a whole. Starting from the land tenure system down to the geo-physical conditions, the two wings were different from each other. Unlike West Pakistan, East Pakistan had no upper class in traditional sense. The few landlord or zaminders it had were mostly Hindus who selected Calcutta more for their sociopolitical activities, and for obvious reasons most of them opted for India at partition. The remaining ones also left gradually or at least sent their families away with all the wealth they had. The Muslim land owning families who were very few in number were unable to form any strong class by themselves and as a result had to rely upon the well-to-do peasantry and urban lower and middle class for any political role they wished to play. So the influence of the landlords as a whole gradually waned from the political arena and as a class they were finally buried with the abolition of the zamindary system-a land reform legislation passed by the East Bengal Provincial Assembly in December, 1950. So in East Bengal, the political scence was completely dominated almost from the beginning by middle and lower middle class family members deriving their roots and support from the rural population.

On the other hand in West Pakistan, the land tenure system was highly feudal in character. There was hardly any middle class strong enough to play any important political role. It had vast territory but mostly dry and unarable for agricultural purposes. There was already some industrial infra-structure, a business community, large port and big cities compared to eastern wing. In a way, West Pakistan had a better start in economic terms and their per capita income was higher than that in East Bengal in 1947. Added to these factors were the wealth and expertise brought by the rich immigrants from Muslim minority areas of India : a civil service and an army which already belonged to their own territory. All these only lead to the rational and logical conclusion that the authors of the Lahore Resolution were far more realistic in their appreciation of the imbalances between the different regions that were to constitute ‘Pakistan’ than those who decided to go the other way in the name of ‘Islam and strong centre’ once Pakistan was established.

Pakistan had all the ingredients to allow concentration of both the political and economic power in the hands of a coterie of leaders. She had an elite comprised of the feudal lords, wealthy immigrants, civil servants and army, all located in the western wing centering round the Punjab, to decide the future destiny of Pakistan. For the well-being of this small class or coterie of families it was found congenial to press the slogan for a ‘strong centralised Pakistan’ to maintain East Bengal as raw material supplier and market for finished goods. The attitude and policies were the same as Britain pursued towards its Indian colony. The class interest of those people mentioned above not only widened the gap between East and West but also seriously geopardised the democratic processes in Pakistan. The constitution making process in Pakistan was again and again thwarted and hindered by the same group of people having no roots in the masses. Palace intrigues and drawing-room conferences had more political significance than the proceedings of the constituent assembly. The virgin land of Pakistan, the ‘promised land’ of 70 million Muslims to flourish Islamic culture and ideology soon was turned into a paradise for only a handful of families to make money. The future of Pakistan as a single state soon became less important to them than the budgetary provisions for tax holidays and issue of permits and licences. East Bengal’s hard earned foreign exchange from jute which constituted the major earning of Pakistan, was diverted for their own utilisation. Massive dams and barrages were built in the West outside the budget provisions creating more imbalances.

That East Pakistan had the majority of population or that on its foreign exchange earning the existence of Pakistan depended or that it was the core of the struggle for Pakistan failed to receive any consideration for the development purposes of that region. The ruling class was scared of democratic aspirations of the people of East Pakistan. It was not the distribution of power between the centre and province but the fear of having an election or to face people or any kind of accountability which hindered

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the development of democratic institutions in Pakistan. Any kind of election or constitutional government would have destabilised the class interest of the ruling elite and it was from this apprehension Pakistan could not attain a viable political system based on democratic principles.

The initial disparities would have demanded more care and attention for a balanced development of all the regions of Pakistan. A federation could not exist or survive without a spirit of partnership and co-operation between the states and centre. Equitable treatment and mutual respect are the basic requirements for the success of any federal structure. Considering the geo-political and socio-economic structure of Pakistan, the diverse culture, tradition and the distance of one wing from the other, Pakistan could only survive through democratic institutions where power could be shared by the people of the two wings on an equitable basis. In Pakistan, politicians who advocated for a centralised administration neither served Islam nor the people; they only served their own interest and the class interest of the ruling elite. In the process it was not only East Pakistan, the largest province of Pakistan that suffered humiliation but the other smaller regions like Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province also went through the same process of neglect and exploitation. Because of the geographical situation East Pakistan’s position was somewhat different but the basic principles of federal structure were applicable to all the regions.

Some tables are presented to show the imbalances that existed in different spheres between East and West Pakistan in the initial years of Pakistan.

Table 1

Population and Literacy

  Total Population (millions) Population Density (Persons per sq.ml.) Literacy (Percentage)
  1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961
East Pakistan 41.9 50.8 701 922 21.1 21.5
West Pakistan 33.7 42.9 109 138 16.4 16.3

Source : Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, vol.1, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan.

Table 2

Language

 

  East Pakistan West Pakistan Pakistan
Languages 1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961
Bengali 89.16 98.42 0.02 0.11 56.40 55.48
Punjabi 0.02 0.02 67.08 66.39 28.55 29.02
Pushtu — 0.01 8.16 8.47 3.48 3.70
Sindhi 0.01 0.01 12.85 12.59 5.47 5.51
Urdu 0.64 0.61 7.05 7.57 3.37 3.65
English 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Baluchi — — 3.04 2.49 1.29 1.09

 

Source : Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, vol.1, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan.

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Table 3

Religion

 

­ East Pakistan West Pakistan Pakistan
Languages 1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961
Muslim 76.8 80.4 97.1 97.2 85.9 88.1
Hindu 22.0 18.4 1.6 1.5 12.9 10.7
Christian 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.3 0.7 0.8
Others 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4

 

Source : Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, vol.1, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan.

Table 4

Size of Landholdings

 

  Size of Holding (Areas) Percentage of Owners Percentage of Land Owned
West Pakistan 5 or less 64.5 15.0
5 to 25 28.5 31.7
25 to 100 5.7 22.4
100 to 500 1.1 15.9
500 or above 0.1 15.0
East Pakistan 0 to 0.4 13.0 1.0
0.5 to 0.9 11.0 2.0
1.0 to 2.4 27.0 13.0
2.5 to 4.9 26.0 26.0
5.0 to 7.4 12.0 19.0
7.5 to 12.4 7.0 19.0
12.5 to 24.9 3.0 14.0
25.0 to 39.9 — 3.0
40.0 or above — 2.0

 

Source : West Pakistan-Appendix 1, Land Reforms Commission Report, 1959. East Pakistan-Pakistan Census of Agriculture, East Pakistan, vol.1, Ministry of Food and agricultural Census Organisation.

 

Table 5

Per Capita Income

 

Year Total Income Difference Per Capita Income Disparity
  E.P W.P E.P W.P E.P W.P
1949-50 (GNP) 12360 12106 +254 287 338 18%
1959-60 (GNP) 14489 17253 -2764 278 366 13%
1967-68 20235 28652 -8417 302 530 75%

Source : i) Third Five-Year Plan of Pakistan.

  1. ii) Economic Survey of East Pakistan.

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Table 6

Infrastructure 1947

 

  East Pakistan West Pakistan
All weather roads 240 miles 5,050 miles
Railway line 1,618 route miles 4,999 route miles
Canal irrigation — 10 miles hectares
Power : Installed capacity, Public undertakings 10,700 kw. 68,800 kw.

 

Sourec : Quoted from Hussain Mullick : Underdevelopment of East Pakistan; getting out of an unfortunate legacy, Impact, International Fortnightly 12-15, November 1971, p.7.

Table 7

Higher Ranks in Civil Service up to 1955

 

Rank East Pakistan West Pakistan East Pakistan % of Total
Secretary — 19 —
Joint Secretary 3 38 7.3
Deputy Secretary 10 123 7.5
Under-Secretary 38 510 7.0

Sourec : Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates, January 17, 1956, vol.1, p. 1844.

Table 8

Number of Officers in Armed Forces in Pakistan up to 1955

Service East Pakistan West Pakistan
Army 14 894
Navy 7 593
Air Force 60 640

Source : Dann, Karachi, January 8, 1966.

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Notes

  1. Between 1905 and 1911 Bengal was divided into two separate provinces with Assam as a part of Eastern province.

  1. Muslims were also in majority in Bengal as a whole.

  1. The Recommendations of the Cabinet Mission for one Federal India were as follows :

  1. i) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the Indian states, which should deal with the following subjects : foreign affairs, defence and communications. It should also have the power

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necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.

  1. ii) The Union should have an executive and a legislature constituted of British Indian and States representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should required for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major commuities as well as a majority of all members present and voting.

iii) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the provinces.

  1. iv) The States would retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.

  1. v) Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives and legislature and each Group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common.

  1. vi) The constitution of the Union and of the Groups should contain a provision whereby any province could, by a majority vote of its legislative assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at a ten-yearly intervals thereafter.

  1. Gwyer/Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the indian Constitution 1921-47, vol. II (1957), 569 ff.

  1. Efforts were made up to the last moment by the Muslim leaders of Bengal to keep Bengal undivided and as an independent state. The attempt to establish Bengal as an independent state was frustrated by the Indian Congress in collaboration with the British Regency in india.

  1. The Events in East Pakistan, 1971. A legal study by the Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, Genevas, 1972, p.10

  1. Muslims.

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Chapter 2

 

Beginning of the Constitutional Conflict

 

  1. The Major Issues

 

The national leadership in Pakistan faced three major issues in the constitution-making process : (i) Basis of representation in the federal legislature, (ii) Quantum of autonomy for provinces and (iii) Status of the provinces in West Pakistan i.e. whether they would remain separate or would be merged into one unit. It took a long time for the national leadership of Pakistan to deal with two apparently simpler but complicated problems; one, the amount of autonomy required by the provinces; two, whether provinces of Western wing would be treated as one unit or not. Then came also the question of representation in the federal legislature—whether it would be on regional basis or population basis. On both counts the Punjabi ruling class was in a disadvantageous position. If it was on regional basis, East Bengal along with three other provinces of West Pakistan could have been in majority and if it was on population basis, East Bengal alone could constitute the majority. In order to avoid this situation the regions or provinces of West Pakistan were turned into one unit and the concept of ‘parity’ between East and West Pakistan was evolved. The manifestation of this solution was found in the first Constitution of Pakistan enacted in 1956.

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The most important problem Pakistan faced in respect of its viability as a state was related to its federal organization. She was born with a federal structure under the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 reaffirmed the same by establishing the ‘Federation of Pakistan’ which included (i) the four provinces of East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind and North West Frontier Province; (ii) Baluchistan; (iii) any other areas that might with the consent of the federation be included therein; (iv) the capital of the federation, Karachi and (v) such Indian states as might accede to the Federation. Whether Pakistan was to be a federation or not was not questioned any more, but the problem was to determine the quantum of autonomy which the provinces could be guaranteed under the constitution in order to make the Federation of Pakistan a success.

  1. First Constituent Assembly

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 (Section 8) provided the first working constitution for Pakistan. A Constituent Assembly was formed with the members elected in 1946, from the areas that subsequently constituted Pakistan to the Federal Legislature of India under the Government of India Act, 1935. These sixty nine members subsequently increased to seventy four were elected to decide the destiny of the new Nation. The creation of the new state provided them the opportunity and privilege of framing the constitution. According to the Indian Independence Act, the Constituent Assembly had a dual function; one, to act as a federal legislature and two, to frame the constitution with the power to amend any provision of the Indian Independence Act and Government of India Act to suit the need and requirements of the country. It took the Constituent Assembly about nineteen months to make the first major step towards framing the constitution. It passed in March 1949 a resolution—popularly known as the Objectives Resolution.

The basic principles laid down in the Objectives Resolution were that the State would exercise its power and authority through the chosen representatives of the people; principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam would be observed; minorities would be free to profess and practise their religion and develop their own culture and that Pakistan would be a Federation wherein the units would be autonomous with such limitations as may be prescribed.

The Constituent Assembly then took the same amount of time in setting up committees and sub-committees to report on the various subjects to enable them to frame the constitution. These lengthy methods were partly deliberate and partly due to contradictions the leaders were suffering from. As the Muslim League was only a political platform used primarily to unite the Muslims and achieve Pakistan, it had no social or economic policy. Nor was it aware of what political system would be suitable for the geo-political complex of Pakistan. The Constitution makers also lacked the perception of reconciling the ideology of Islam with the administration of the state. Gunnar Myrdal wrote on this point : ‘That mass appeal to religious faith could be used to incite Muslims against Hindus and vice versa—was tragically proved by the events preceding and following partition. But its positive value in creating a sense of national identity and purpose was to prove rather illusory.’ He further wrote : ‘The campaign for Pakistan also left confusion about the aims and policies to be pursued by the new state—what the new state should do for its citizens other than free them from Hindu domination—was left vague and uncertain—this unresolved contradiction concerning the kind of state that was being created accounts in part for the long delay in producing a constitution.’1

  1. Basic Principles Committee (BPC) Recommendations

 

The main committee set up by the Constituent Assembly was called the Basic Principles Committee

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which was entrusted to make the necessary recommendations on the basic principles for the future constitution of Pakistan based on the Objectives Resolution. The Basic Principles Committee then set up three sub-committees :

  1. Sub-committee on federal and provincial constitution and distribution of powers
  2. Sub-committee on franchise
  3. Sub-committee on the judiciary.

The committee on its turn took again another eighteen months to submit is report and at last what it submitted proved only to be counter-productive. As soon as the report was made public in September, 1950, a political storm took place in East Bengal. For the first time Bengalis organized themselves on political issues and outright rejected the proposals of the Basic Principles Committee. The major recommendations of the Committee were as follows :2

  1. A bicameral legislative system having two Houses—House of Units (Upper House) to be constituted with equal number of representatives from each unit; House of the People to be elected by the people. The Committee did not mention the number of members in the House of the People. Both Houses would enjoy equal powers but in case of conflict a joint session would decide the issue. The Budget and Finance Bill would be placed before the joint session. The election and removal of the President and no-confidence motion against the Cabinet would be placed and moved before the joint session.

  1. The executive authority of the Federation would vest in the President and his term of office would be five years. The President could be removed by the vote of two-third majority in the joint session. Appointment of Provisional Governors would be made by the president who would also have supreme power at the time of emergency.

  1. Pakistan would continue as a federation with three legislative lists in the constitution—federal, provincial and concurrent. The report however, did not define the quantum of autonomy but it was more or less in the line of the 1935 Act giving nothing more to the provinces. On the contrary it suggested that the powers of the provinces would not be such as to hinder the administration of the Federation.

  1. Emergency—If the President considered the situation to be grave for the security of Pakistan, he could declare a state of emergency and could suspend the constitution.

  1. The Prime Minister would be appointed by the President. Any person who in the opinion of the President enjoyed the confidence of the majority members of the joint session would be appointed as Prime Minister and Ministers would be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Ministers would be responsible to both the Houses.

  1. A person who enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the Provincial Assembly would be appointed as Chief Minister by the Governor.

  1. The state language of Pakistan would be Urdu.

The main criticism against this Report was that it was a mixture of parliamentary and presidential system allowing too many prerogatives to the President. The report also did not offer any effective autonomy to the provinces. The power of proclaiming emergency and suspending the constitution and recommendation of Urdu as the only state language of Pakistan were the most unacceptable proposals for the Bengalis.

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  1. Anti-BPC Movement in East Pakistan :

Birth of New Political Organizations

 

In East Bengal the anti-BPC Report movement brought a great unity amongst the people and the movement for autonomy took its first concrete shape in political terms. By this time several powerful organizations were already agitating with the demand for a full provincial autonomy. The East Pakistan Muslim Student’s League, subsequently known as Student’s League was formed as early as on January 4, 1948 with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (then a student of Dhaka University) as its Organising Secretary. The League mainly consisted of young students who took active part in the Pakistan Movement and subsequently were disappointed at the attitude of the central Leadership towards East Bengal. They were mainly the youths who belonged to Suhrawardy’s faction of the Muslim League as opposed to Nazimuddin’s, who now had identified himself with the class interests of the ruling elite and became the President of Pakistan after Jinnah’s death. The Student’s League was the first student organization to launch a movement for the recognition of Bengali as a state language. It started with all progressive elements behind it who were vocal and ready to participate in the national politics and a senior group of this organization soon led to give birth to a political party under the leadership of Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani.

The new party, East Bengal Muslim Awami League (Subsequently dropped the word ‘Muslim’ and became known as Awami League) was formed on 23rd June, 1949 to be the first opposition political party in Pakistan with Moulana as the President and Sheikh Mujib as one of the two Joint Secretaries (the other Joint Secretary was Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed).3 Of the 42-point manifesto of the newly formed political party, the first two demands were (i) regional autonomy for East Bengal in the spirit of the Lahore Resolution leaving Defence, Foreign affairs, Currency and Coinage with the Federal Government and (ii) recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan. To have autonomy for the majority people of Pakistan and to have Bengali, a language spoken by the majority, as a state language were forceful and legitimate demands. So these demands quickly gained support of the middle class and the Awami League’s support base started to spread into the district towns of the province.

At this stage when the BPC recommendations were published the opposition to the report was found to be more organised than expected. The dimension of protest took such a shape that a large number of Muslim Leaguers of East Bengal also started criticising it openly. Even the East Pakistan Muslim League Working Committee in a meeting held on October 29, 1950 took note of widespread feeling among the people of ‘this province’ on certain recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee and suggested drastic amendment of the Report. The Pakistan Observer, a Dhaka English daily summed up the reaction by saying : 4

The citizens of Dhaka, mostly East Bengalis, were rudely shocked when local dailies carried to them the full text of the Basic Principles Committee Report with regard to the future Constitution of Pakistan. It came from all walks of life, high officials, professors, teachers, lawyers, students, medical men, police personnel, etc. Their first reaction was that of bewilderment.

  1. Counter Proposals to BPC’s Recommendations

Grand National Convention, 1950

 

In Dhaka in the first week of October, 1950 a group of political workers, journalists and lawyers of all opposition shades and groups formed a ‘Committee of action for Democratic Federation’ to mobilise public opinion for establishing full provincial autonomy. The Committee later on came to be known as Democratic Federation suggesting that the Federation of Pakistan must be a democratic one so that the

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rights of the majority could not be taken away and the interests of the majority were protected. They held a meeting at Armanitola Playground on October 13 and decided to hold a National Grand Convention on November 14. The Committee also decided to draft an alternative constitutional proposal for Pakistan as opposed to the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee. The Central Committee of the Democratic Federation also published a leaflet under the title—‘Will Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan answer the following questions (?)’ in which they raised certain fundamental points on the report of the Basic Principles Committee. The Grand Convention was presided ovey by Mr. Ataur Rahman Khan. The Convention announced that they had determined the basic principles of their constitutional proposals on the basis of the historic Lahore Resolution. In his inaugural speech on November 4. Mr. Khan also pointed out that the 1946 election was a referendum on the Pakistan issue and the members who were elected were not competent to frame the constitution and there ought to be a fresh election to select people to frame the constitution of the country. The Convention also approved the constitutional proposals which were in brief as follows : 5

Name of the State : The name of the State ‘shall be United States of Pakistan.’ It would have two parts—East and West Pakistan.

Head of the State : There would be a President for the United States of Pakistan. He would be elected by the majority of the Federal Parliament. The President could be removed from office for treason and misconduct by two third majority of the members in Parliament. On his death or removal and till a new President was elected, the Speaker of the Parliament would function as the President. The new President would be elected within 90 days of the vacancy.

Powers and Functions of the President : (a) He would delegate powers. (b) He would act as the C-in-C of the armed forces of the United States of Pakistan. (c) He would appoint the Election Commissioner, Judges of the Supreme Court and Auditor General. (d) A person having the confidence of the majority members in Parliament would be appointed by the President as the Prime Minister, and other Ministers would be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. (e) The President would receive the credentials of the foreign ambassadors and would represent the state on all formal occasions.

Federal Parliament : The United States of Pakistan would have only a unicameral legislature. The Session of Parliament would sit in consecutive terms once in the Federal capital and once in the capital of East Pakistan. The members of the Parliament would be elected on population basis. The election would be on the basis of universal adult franchise and the electorate would be joint (no election on communal basis). The voters of each constituency would have the right to call back the elected member from his seat in Parliament.

The President ‘shall assent to the Finance Bill within 3 days of its presentation before him and all other Bills within 30 days.’ The members of Parliament would not hold any office of profit. The Election Commissioner, Judges of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General could be removed by two-third majority in Parliament on the ground of treason or misconduct.

On urgent national issues the President could dissolve the Parliament on the advice of Prime Minister in order to ascertain public opinion. If no government enjoyed the confidence of Parliament, in such event President could dissolve the Parliament but the fresh election would be held within 45 days.

Central Cabinet : The ministers would be individually and collectively responsible to the Parliament. Any member of Parliament could be eligible to become a Minister. If a Minister was not a member he would need to be elected within six months, otherwise he would cease to continue as a Minister.

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Supreme Court : There would be a Supreme Court in Pakistan and the Court would sit in turn in the Federal Capital and the Capital of East Pakistan.

State Language : Bengali and Urdu would be the state language of the United States of Pakistan.

Federal Subjects : Defence and foreign affairs. Defence would have two units of armed services—one stationed in East and the other in west Pakistan. These units would be controlled by the regional commanders under the direction of the C-in-C in the Federal capital.

Amendment of the Constitution : Any provision of the constitution could be amended by two-third majority in Parliament but any amendment relating to the relationship between the Centre and the Units would require to be passed by two third members of that particular provincial Parliament and then to be passed by two-third of the federal Parliament. Any other amendment would require two third majority of the concerned provincial Parliament.

Suspension of Constitution : Under no circumstances the constitution could be suspended by anyone.

Regional Government : There would be two separate Governments for East and West Pakistan. Each would have a Governor elected by the majority members of the State Parliament. The Governor could be removed for betrayal or misconduct by two-third majority of the State Parliament. If the Governor was removed for any reason, the Speaker of the State Parliament would function as the Governor and in such event the State Parliament would elect another Governor within 90 days. The Governor would appoint a person having the confidence of the majority as the Prime Minister and other Ministers would be appointed by him on the advice of the Prime Minister.

The region or State would have one house of legislature and would be elected for 5 years on the basis of joint electorate and universal adult franchise. Before the expiry of 5 years, the Governor could dissolve the State Parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister but in such event there would be fresh elections within 60 days. The Ministers individually and collectively would remain responsible to the State Parliament.

Smaller regions of West Pakistan : Because of certain special peculiarities of the smaller regions of West Pakistan, the Convention suggested that they would hold a Convention themselves in order to decide their own framework of administration.

On the question of fundamental rights and civil liberties the Convention declared the following to be the fundamental rights incorporated in the constitution.

  1. (i) Equality before law.

(ii) No one to be detained without trial in a court of law.

(iii) Voting age eighteen years, and twenty one years for becoming a member of Parliament.

(iv) No provision to repeal the right of Habeas Corpus.

  1. Right to

(i) Life

(ii) Education—up to a certain stage free and compulsory

(iii) Employment and livehood

(iv) Medical aid

(v) Shelter—accommodation

(iv) Equitable wages on the basis of cost of living

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(vii) Strike for collective bargaining and trade union and trade secretarial establishment.

  1. The State would guarantee citizens in respect of the following :

(i) Freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of movement, freedom of thought, conscience, expression, work, association and religion—all other social, economic and political rights.

(ii) Equal opportunity

(iii) Dignity

(iv) Old age provision

(v) Maternity facilities

(vi) Nationalisation of means of production

(vii) No law will be made which would provide any scope to exploit workers, peasants and common people.

The impact of the counter constitutional proposals made by the Democratic Federation was tremendous. It gave, to a large extent, a sense of direction to the people involved in the constitutional movement in Pakistan. Although it carried some contradictory and impractical suggestions, the document as a whole was the first of its kind, and sufficiently clear and concrete. It made the issues more open to determine what kind of constitution would be suitable to a state like Pakistan. When I discuss the Six Point formula at a later stage which ultimately led to the break-up of Pakistan we shall see the amazing similarities between the two schemes. The Constitutional proposals made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to General Ayub Khan in March 1969 also included many provisions of what the Grand Convention drafted  in 1950. These proposals reflected the most genuine aspirations of the Bengalis, right from the time of independence in 1947 or even before, to enjoy full autonomy within the framework of Pakistan. The Convention proposed the name East Pakistan in place of East Bengal.

The Support the Democratic Convention received after the agitation against the BPC recommendations was unprecedented. At its call the entire province observed strike on 12th November 1950 and in many meetings, resolutions were passed approving the constitutional proposals. All schools, colleges, universities including the Madrasas (religious institutions) observed the strike and held protest meetings. The meeting held in Dhaka University was supported even by the Nikhil East Pakistan Muslim Student’s League and the student’s Association (right wing student fronts). The Awami League and the Student’s Federation took the leading role in this movement although Moulana, Sheikh Mujib and other leading members were in jail. Some leading members of East Pakistan Muslim League also publicly condemned the recommendations of BPC.

The Central Government, on such strong adverse reaction all over the country decided to postpone in discussions on the recommendations of BPC on November 21. This delayed the constitution-making process further and in the name of inviting public suggestions it took a long time to take up the issue again. It took another two years before a second draft was produced before the Constituent Assembly on December 22, 1952. The second draft was undoubtedly an improvement over the first one. The most significant contribution of the second draft was insertion of the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan, which was acceptable to the Bengali leaders at the prevailing circumstances. But the second draft this time was criticised by the Punjabis who were not happy with some of the recommendations. The leaders of the Punjab argued that if the principle of parity was accepted, East Pakistan would be given a special position compared to other provinces of Pakistan whereas in a federation all the provinces should be treated equally. They feared that East Pakistan would enjoy a dominating position on its own strength in the future parliament. As a result of this opposition from the Punjabi leaders the Second draft was also ultimately shelved.

But in the meantime, the Democratic Federation, not being a political party by itself and having

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had consisted of heterogenous elements soon lost its organization capacity. Mainly dominated by the leftists and nationalists led by Toha, Tajuddin and others the Federation could at best be a platform for the campaign for autonomy and nothing more. The Awami League lost interest sooner than others from the time they disagreed over the panel of executives who formed the new Action Committee on the concluding session of the Convention on November 5, 1950. Being more oriented to capture power the Awami League leaders gave more emphasis on their own organisational work than on an organization belonging to none. Moreover, the Democratic Federation could not spell out anything in respect of the economic programme excepting the mention of a vague ‘nationalisation of means of production’ and so the inspiration of the militant youths soon died down. Nevertheless, it is the leftists and progressive forces who continued to give the leadership in the movements for autonomy and to establish Bengali as state language—the seeds of Bengali nationalism.

  1. Formation of the Youth League

 

In East Pakistan, besides the Student’s League and their political wing, the Awami League, one new powerful organization came into being at the time when the movements for autonomy and language were reaching their climax. The communists who were so long guided by the Indian Communists Party (ICP) office in Calcutta and working under ground decided to work openly by forming their own organizations. As a part of implementaion of the ‘Rajshahi Jail thesis’ the communists now formed an organization called Youth League in 1951 to ‘mobilize maximum number of people of all classes on the minimum programme of secularism, anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, world peace, unfettered democracy and employment opportunities for all people within the country.’6 The youth League played a very dominant role in the state language movement culminating in the historic Shaheed Day of February 21, 1952 and as a part of their policy, some of their workers continued to work from within the Awami League and the Student’s League. They maintained their influence in both the organizations till they finally broke away from the Awami League and formed their own frontal political party.

With the emergence of the Youth League the politics in East Pakistan were again rejuvenated and this time with an element of ideological tilt. The organization having had some dedicated workers gained quick prominence but most of their leaders soon landed in jail by February, 1952.7 By emphasising more on the cultural and intellectual aspects of the new rising nationalism in East Pakistan, the members of the Youth League soon became the vanguard of the democratic movements of the Bengalis based on their demand for full autonomy and Bengali as a state language. As against Pan-Islamism and the attempt to Islamise the Bengali language, they advanced the cultural heritage of the Bengalis by emphasising on the use of Bengali language in all national affairs, observing national day on Pahela Baishak, holding literary functions on various occasions and observing birth and death anniversaries of Tagore, Nazrul, Sukanto and others.8

  1. The Language Movement

 

By the time the anti-BPC movement started losing its force due to lack of organization and suspension of the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly, another movement was growing rapidly : The historic language movement. Jinnah made a statement on February 25, 1948 in the Constituent Assembly held in Karachi saying ‘Pakistan being a Muslim State, Urdu will be its state language’; the Bengalis immediately raised slogans for the recognition of Bengali as a state language. When Nazimuddin, a Bengali Chief Minister of East Pakistan in order to support Jinnah made a statement saying that ‘excepting a few persons none in East Bengal demands Bengali as a state language of Pakistan’ a large scale protest was registered by calling a strike on March 11 which achieved a spontanenous success.

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A series of demonstrations, meetings and processions took place in Dhaka and other towns mainly organised by the Student’s League and the Studednt’s Federation. The issue was aggravated again by the end of March when Jinnah on his first visit to East Pakistan declared once more that Urdu would be the state language. This only confirmed that the Government was determined to impose Urdu as the only state language of Pakistan. This had provoked the students sentiments further and when Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister again tried to pronounce the same on November 27, 1948 in a meeting held at the playground of Dhaka University, there was so much of protest that he could not finish his speech, Like this, on many occasions people mainly led by students were mobilising public opinion throughout the province for the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan and in the course of such strikes and demonstrations a large number of students and political workers were arrested at different stages.9

The state language movement led to an open struggle between the Bengali nationalists and the central elite of Pakistan. The forces of nationalism began to consolidate and people’s unity was achieved more than ever before. Through the demand for recognition of Bengali as a state language the flower of Bengali nationalism blossomed. The Language Movement has been momentuous in that it not only brought about a solid sense of identity among the people irrespective of class, colour and creed on the language issue but also generated a deep sense of pride among the people after its logical conclusion. Khawaza Nazimuddin who now became the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in a public meeting on January 26, 1952 took up the lead to champion the cause of Urdu and declared again that Urdu should be the state language of Pakistan. The speech this time led to an explosion of public resentment in the form of strikes and demonstrations all over the province. On January 30 a meeting of Dhaka University students was held and all educational institutions of Dhaka city were on strike. The day ended with a big procession following a meeting at the University campus.

The politicians could no more keep silent and an All Party Committee of Action was formed to take part in the movement. A province-wide strike was called on February 21 and on that day Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was violated.10 Some students were killed by police firing and on February 22 it turned into a full fledged mass movement.11 The demand for Bengali language no more remained as a slogan of urban middle class or some politicians as a vehichle to share power in the central administration. Through this movement, the leadership of which was dominated by the leftists, a large number of students and youths came in touch with the active communists of the country and in less than two months time they formed their students wing, ‘East Bengal Student’s Union.’

With the formation of the Youth League and the Student’s Union the ideological differences between the workers of different organizations became more distinct. Although the Awami League remained to be the only political party and enjoyed the support of the liberal leftists, the communists needed their own ideological base-organizations to proceed in their own line. This gradually drew a line dividing the Awami League : between the workers having leftist ideological orientation and guidence and the others belonging to the middle of-the-road liberal stream. The general stream in the Awami League was more interested in pressing for an election to go to power as they though that only by going to power they could solve both the problems of language and autonomy. Whereas the leftists having an ideological bias were more interested in economic emancipation of masses—these created the obvious differences between the two groups. The influence of the leftists in the early organizations and movements of East Pakistan was deep-rooted and had far reaching consequences, despite the fact that at a later stage they moved away from the very nationalist movement which they initiated.12

The mass support the language movement drew now, made clear at last one thing to the constitution makers of Pakistan that Bengali had to be one of the state languages in the country. This was one of the reasons why the second draft of BPC was so much of an improvement over the first draft.

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Although the Urdu speaking elite of Pakistan Government continued to delay the recognition of Bengali and played all sorts of tricks in frustrating the democratic processes in the country, the subsequent constitutional proposals made inside the Constituent Assembly including the one by Mohammad Ali of Bogra now more or less achieved a consensus on the issue of recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages. The proposals of Mohammad Ali of Bogra briefly were as follows :

That Pakistan would be a federation : there would be four units in west Pakistan; but there would be parity in legislative and executive representation between East and West Pakistan. Bengali and Urdu were to be the state languages of Pakistan. But yet no constitution could be framed for the country as the ruling elite discovered in the Bengali unity a positive threat to the preservation of their class interest.

  1. Elections in East Pakistan, 1954 :

The 21-Point Programme

 

In the meantime the date of elections was being postponed again and again. The repeated postponement of general elections was due partly to the ruling elite’s fear of being defeated and partly to opposition’s increasingly growing popularity, demonstrated in unambiguous terms in the victorious return of the opposition candidate in the bye elections held since the partition in 1947. At the end it was decided that in East Pakistan elections would be held in the early part of 1954. In East Pakistan, people’s unity was demonstrated by the formation of an electoral alliance between the major political parties of the province at the initiative of the leftists both from within and outside the Awami League. The left forces took the initiative mainly with a view to bringing in a secular character to the incoming constitution of Pakistan. The left forces morevoer wanted to get themselves rehabilitated under the shadow of the nationalist forces represented mainly by the Awami League. The sole aim of this proposed alliance was to crush the Muslim League which was by this time identified to be anti-Bengali by the nationalist forces. The Ganatantri Dal, an open political party formed in 1953 by a section of the communist cadre and Youth League, working through their followers within the Awami League, created the major pressure for such electoral alliance against the ruling Muslim League. Thus, under the leadership of three veteran politicians of Bengal, A.K. Fazlul Huq, Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and H.S. Suhrawardy, the alliance in the name of United Front adopted the famous 21-point programme as their manifesto. The programme had a farreaching political impact although the alliance itself broke up within a few months after their victory in the elections.

In the elections, the United Front won 228 out of 237 Muslim seats and on April 3 A.K. Fazlul Huq formed the first elected Government in the province. But not even two months had passed when the provincial government was dissolved by the Governor-General who was still enjoying all the prerogatives of the 1935 Act in the absence of any constitution in the country. (Article 92A of the Act authorised the Governor General to impose the Central Government’s rule over the province through its appointed Governor). Thus the Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad, a former member of the Audit and Accounts service of India in the name of ‘integrity of Pakistan, and Islam’ frustrated the administration of a duly elected Government, without himself having much of a constitutional legitimacy to preside over the country. On the dismissal of A.K. Fazlul Huq, Mohammad Ali of Bogra, a non-descript Bengali Prime Minister inducted by the West Pakistanis, accused the elected leader of East Pakistan of conspiring to secede East Pakistan from West Pakistan.

However, the 21-point programme continued to remain as a very important political charter for the Bengalis in their struggle for equal treatment. Some of the new demands such as nationalization of jute and fair price the for growers reflected the influence of the left in the new alliance. Besides certain

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demands and proposals for the upliftment of workers and peasants, the important problem of autonomy was prominent in the programme. Point nineteen called for the establishment of full regional autonomy for east Pakistan on the basis of the Lahore Resolution allowing the federal government to retain only three subject i.e. defence, foreign and currency. Point one called for the recognition of Bengali as one of the national languages of Pakistan. The other important features were : nationalization of jute and fair price for the jute growers (point 4); construction of irrigation facilities for flood and famine control (point 7); introduction of Bengali language as a medium of educational instruction (Point 10); abolition of Dhaka and Rajshahi University Acts to establish autonomy of the Universities (point 11); minimising gap of the income disparity between the high and law salaried employees (point 12); repeal of Security Acts under which political workers were jailed (point 14); erection of memorial for the martyrs of the language movement (point 17); declaration of February 21 as a national day in memory of the martyrs who laid down their lives on the same day in 1952 (point 18). The demands also included the release of political prisoners, safeguarding of fundamental rights, democratization of administrative apparatus and repeal of all repressive laws. Thus the 21-point Programme broadly vindicated the frustrations of the people accumulated during the past seven years of the Muslim League rule in East Pakistan. The Programme laid down the foundation of Bengali nationalist movement in a more concrete form, which was supported by 90 per cent of the electorate.

  1. The Beginning of an Unconstitutional Era :

The Constitutional Crisis

 

The defeat of the Muslim League in East Pakistan flabbergasted the Central Government and created a sense of panic in the minds of the ruling elite. The role of the civil servants was now fully exposed, power having been concentrated in the hands of two of their members—Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza. While the former was the Governor-General, the latter came to East Pakistan at the new Governor The ruling class had to adopt new strategies in order to cope with the situation in East Pakistan. The first action they took was to dissolve the elected government on May 30, 1954 only one day after Iskander Mirza arrived in Dhaka. With this, the era of unconstitutionalism in Pakistan was set to continue almost unhindered till the country itself broke up. The election results of East Pakistan were taken as a threat to the rule of the Governor-General.

The impact of the East Pakistan election also had a direct bearing on the members of the Constitution Assembly particularly those who were representing the Eastern wing on behalf of the Muslim League. The members of the Assembly for their own survival and image realised that they could not delay the constitution-making any further and adopted a scheme in line of the revised draft of the BPC prepared earlier. Although the scheme did not elaborate the quantum of autonomy, a constitution was now set to be adopted on December 25, 1954 on the basis of parity between East and West Pakistan as two single units. In order to put a check on the unconstitutionalism already set by the Governor-General13, Constituent Assembly first passed on September 24, 1954 three bills of substantial importance. One curtailed the power of the Governor-General and made the Constituent Assembly a Sovereign body. The second bill provided that the Prime Minister and other Ministers before his or their appointment must be a member of the Constituent Assembly and other Ministers were to be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet would be collectively responsible to the Assembly. The third one proposed to repeal the PRODA-Public Representatives and Officers (Disqualification) Act, which was mainly used for suppression of political opponents. The reaction of the Governor-General to these bills was a maddening one. He was still acting under the provisions of the 1935 Act as adopted by the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and exercised the powers which could be exercised by the Governor-General of British India on behalf of the Crown. He took up the position for the first time, and for obvious reasons, that without his assent the bills passed could not become law in order to have any legislative efffect. This

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led to a direct conflict between the Governor-General and the Constituent Assembly. He then simply dissolved the Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954 by issuing a proclamation saying :

The Governor-General having considered the political crisis with which the country is faced, has with deep regret come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has broken down. He therefore, has decided to declare a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function.

The ultimate authority vests in the people who will decide all issues including constitutional issues through their representatives to be elected afresh. Elections will be held as early as possible.

Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan who was the President of the Constituent Assembly challenged the validity of the action of the Governor-General in the Chief Court of Sind. The Court declared the action of the Governor-General illegal and ultra vires since the assembly was ‘subject to no agency or instrument outside itself to effect its dissolution or to give its laws validity except such as it itself chooses to create’ and that the Governor-General had ‘no power of any kind to dissolve the Constituent Assembly,’14 But the case was then taken up on appeal on behalf of the the Federation of Pakistan by the Federal Court which turned down the decision of the Chief Court of Sind on the technical ground that the power of issuing writs of mandamus which was incorporated in the Government of India Act. 1935 by inserting Section 223-A by a resolution of the Constituent Assembly was itself not valid without having obtained the assent of the Governor-General under Section 6(3) of the Indian Independence Act. So the application of Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan for a writ of mandamus restraining the implementation of the proclamation issued by Ghulam Mohammad dissolving the Constituent Assembly was not maintainable. Although no such assent of the Governor-General was taken from any of the three Governor-Generals including Ghulam Mohammad himself for any Act passed by the Constituent Assembly and laws whether general or of constitutional nature of far reaching consequence passed by the Constituent Assembly were being implemented and given effect to since 1947, the Federal Court by four to one majority delivered the judgment on March 21, 1955 without actually touching the main point whether the Governor-General had  the power under the Indian Independence Act, 1947 to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.15 The Chief Justice of the Court, knowing the disastrous consequences the judgment would have, asserted no strictly legalistic argument by saying that, ‘It had the right to expound the law in complete indifference to any popular reaction’ and that ‘We are not concerned with the consequences, however beneficial or disastrous they may be, if the undoubted leagl position was that all legislation of the legislature of the dominion under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act needed the assent of the Governor-General.’16

On the principle of assent the Court went back to the British tradition of the concept of the Crown as a ‘constituent part of the Parliament in the United Kingdom and of all dominion legislatures either because it is expressly so stated in the constitutional statutes or because the Crown appoints the Governor-General who is empowered to give or withhold assent to the legislation of the dominion.’ The Federal Court ignored Rule 62 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constituent Assembly which was adopted when the founder of Pakistan Mr. M.A. Jinnah was still alive as President of the Assembly and Governor-General of Pakistan, providing that when a bill was passed a copy only would be sent to the Governor-General for his signature and it would become law on being published in the official Gazette. Rule 62 provided :

When a bill passed by the Assembly, a copy thereof shall be singned by the President and it shall become law on being published in the official Gazette of Pakistan under the authority of the President.

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According to this rule created by the Assembly itself which was the supreme law making body of the country, the assent was merely a formality and was accepted to be so for nearly seven years.

The Federal Court further ignored that (i) Pakistan was now an independent State for all practical purposes and the British Crown or Parliament had nothing to do with her affairs [Sec. 7(a) of 1947 Act], the Act of British Parliament had ceased to extend to the Pakistan Dominion (Sec. 6(4) of 1947 Act) and Pakistan would be completely under her own sovereign authority to be exercised by the Constituent Assembly, which could annual any of the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 or the Government of India Act, 1935 and make any law for its own governance (Sec. 6(1). (ii) It became almost a tradition and an established practice of the law making procedure of Pakistan that no assent of the Governor-General was necessary for any law to become operative and that all institutions, legislative, executive and judiciary had accepted this position including the sitting Government-General himself. (iii) The Statutes and laws both of constitutional and general nature passed in the last seven years by the Constituent Assembly were acted upon, numerous laws, regulations and rules were passed under these statutes, elections were held and rights and obligations were created and all these would stand to be invalid. (iv) The danger of invalidating these statutes would only create chaos and would cause the collapse of the constitutional machinery of the country. (v) The law of supreme necessity embodied in the maxim salus populi est suprema lex which could be applied in this case. (vi) The fundamental question was whether the Governor-General had the power to dissolve the Constituent Assembly at all.

The effect of the Federal Court’s judgment was more stultifying than the Judges could perhaps contemplate. The constitutional scenario that followed the judgment only showed one disaster after another. A situation arose when the country was standing on invalidated laws and the entire constitutional and administrative machinery was on the verge of collapse. In the absence of the Constituent Assembly the constitution making authority had also disappeared.

In order to bring some constitutional machinery into effect and to validate the past laws the Governor-General now proclaimed an emergency by Emergency Powers Ordinance No. 9 of 1955 and thereby assumed certain powers including making provisions for the framing of the constiution and validating the past laws which became invalid without the assent of the Governor-General. The ordinance also gave the Governor-General some power to turn West Pakistan into one unit and rename East Pakistan, all having high constitutional importance. But now this Ordinance itself was challenged on the ground that the Governor-General had no authority to enact or frame constitutional provisions which authority was only vested in the Constiuent Assembly under the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. The full Bench of the Federal Court being trapped by its own judgment in Tamizuddin Khan’s case and having created great controversies, now came out with the judgment in Yusuf vs. Patel. The Crown that the Ordinance was an invalid act as the Governor-General had no constitution-making authority under the Independence Act of 1947.17 What it amounted to was that no authority other than the Constituent Assembly which was earlier dissolved was competent to legislate any law of constitutional nature and so the statutes passed by the Constituent Assembly since 1947 now could not be validated by the Governor-General with retrospective effect.

This made the situation even more uncertain. Suhrawardy who was the law Minister under Mohammad Ali of Bogra commented that the country was faced with a grave situation.18 This created a void of the most serious nature, there being no Constituent Assembly, no alternative Constitution-making authority and no validation of the laws on which Pakistan could stand. In an impasse like this the Governor-General invoked the advisory jurisdiction of the Federal Court by turning to it for guidance in Reference No. 1 of 1955. The Court now had to solve the crisis created by itself. It recommended that the Governor-General should constitute a new Constituent Assembly in order to put the country on its rails. The Court invoked the principle of ‘supreme necessity’ as there was no law under the Act of 1935 or

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1947 by which such an Assembly could be constituted by the Governor-General. It only proved the irrationality or bias applied by the Court in the case of Tamizuddin Khan. The Court went out of its way to bail out the Governor-General who had acted illegally in dissolving the Constituent Assembly. Although the Court in this Reference Case held that the Governor-General had the authority to dissolve the Constituent Assembly under the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, it would be clear from the reading of the Act that no such authority was there. The Court went through an ardous course of interpreting the Indian Act and took great pain in concluding that the Governor-General under the circumstances had the authority of dissolving the Constituent Assembly.

However, the Constitution-making process was now revived again in Pakistan. The evil effect of the judgment in Tamizuddin Khan’s case however continued to remain on the question of assent for the validity of any law that also meant that any future constitution of Pakistan would require the assent of the Governor-General; without whose assent Pakistan could continue without any constitution for an unlimited period. The formula given by the Federal Court in the Reference Case also strengthened the hands of the Governor-General more than ever before. The new Constituent Assembly was brought into being with a clear authority for the Governor-General to be able to dissolve the same along with many other prerogatives for him. What the law could not do or create, the Federal Court of Pakistan did by creating a Constituent Assembly without any authority of law. As the first Constituent Assembly was dissolved unconstitutionally by the Governor-General, so was the Second Constituent Assembly constituted unconstitionally by the order of the Federal Court. In the process however, now with the sanction of the Federal Court, the Governor-General became the most important person in the country. The political and constitutional effect was nothing but disastrous. From these days onward whatever constitutional developments took place in Pakistan always aroused questions as to their legal validity.

In this connection it would be worthwhile to quote from the judgment of Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman in Asma Jilani vs. Government of the Punjab,19 two relevant pages showing how the constitution making process in Pakistan up to the Martial Law Proclamation in 1958 was stifled by one or two civil servants having no political roots :

The disaster, which was apprehended in the case of Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan had occurred. The Governor-General had unconstitutionally dissolved the the Constituent Assembly. Proceedings taken to question the validity of the Governor-General’s action by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 223-A of the Government of India Act were held to be incompetent, because, that section itself had been incorporated in the Government of India Act by a resolution of the Constituent Assembly which had not, according to the practice up to that time prevailling, been foramlly put up for the assent. Thereafter, when the Governor-General attempted to validate a vast body of such constitutional legislations, which had been passed between 1947 and 1954, retrospectively by an Ordinance, the Ordinance itself was struck down. In desperation the Governor-General in his turn invoked the advisory jurisdiction of the Federal Court under section 213 of the Government of India Act vide Governor-General’s reference No. 1 of 1955 and asked the Court to find a solution for the constitutional impasse created by the judgments of the Court itself. The Federal Court again came to his rescue and although no ‘law’ of any kind could be found to meet the situation, invoked in aid ‘the supreme principle of necessity’ embodied in the maxim salus populi est suprema lex and on the basis thereof evolved a new political formula for the setting up of a new Constituent Assembly, even though this very maxim when used in support of the contention of Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan that the invalidation of a large number of constitutional laws merely on the ground of want of formal assent of the Governor-General would cause ‘disaster’ and create a ‘Constitutional impasse,’ had not found favour with the Court.

The object of the learned counsel in referring to these decisions is presumably to suggest that

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from this day onwards whatever constitutional developments took place were not strictly legal. The 1956 Constitution, under which the principle of parity was accepted and the country was divided into two provinces of East and West Pakistan, was, it is alleged, a constitution framed by an illegally Constituted body which was, under the threat of refusal of assent, also coerced into electing General Iskander Mirza as the first President of Pakistan under the Constitution. The process of illegality thus set in motion led in its turn to the illegal usurpation of power by the President so elected under the said Constitution abrogating the Constitution and declaring Martial law on the 7th of October, 1958. This was followed three days later by the promulgation of the Law (Constitunance in Force) Order on the 10th of October, 1958.

  1. The Second Constituent Assembly

 

It is, however, true that the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan had by that time proved to be a failure. It also lost its representative character in view of the elections held in East Pakistan in 1954. The effect of the dissolution of the assembly was thereofore good in one sense that the new leaders who defeated the Muslim League and were now the pioneers of the cause of the Bengalis would sit in the new Constituent Assembly. But since the dismissal of the cabinet in East Pakistan in May, 1954 there was no elected govenrment in that wing and the United Front was broken up as each constituent party was racing to have the taste of Power. The Awami League, the major component of the United Front came out of the Front mainly because of Suhrawardy who on the strength of his support in East Pakistan was now bargaining for power in the centre. The ruling class of West Pakistan was also to choose their respective partners from the East wing and they took the maximum advantage of the weaknesses of Bengalis leaders by offering them money and portfolios. As factionalism grew in the united Front, the position of the vested interests of West Pakistan became better as they had found that the new leaders not that much of a threat as they had earlier thought. More so, they had found these leaders more useful now being the elected representative of the people. What they could not sell previously through the unrepresentative character of the Muslim League, they could do the same now through the elected repre-sentatives. This happened because the foremost aspiration of the Bengali middle class who constituted the bandwagon of the United Front, was to share the administration and resources of the central government and by going to materialise that, they undermined the cause itself for which they were voted to power.

The cause of autonomy and the Bengali nationalist movement therefore, suffered a major setback during this period. There was a pause in the nationalist movement from the period soon after the election in 1954 to 1965. For various reasons, such as, lack in the sense of direction of the leaders, greed, self-interest, closeness to power, ideological moves and political frustrations, the real problem of Pakistan could not be solved. The Awami League in course of seeking power betrayed the cause of autonomy particularly from 1954 to 1958 and the leftists led by Moulana in pursuit of their ideological and international bias had abandoned the same in 1960’s. When in East Pakistan the Governor’s rule was still in operation H.S. Suhrawardy joined the central cabinet as the Law Minister under Mohammad Ali of Bogra, who at one time served him as a secretary prior to the partition of India. Suhrawardy joined Mohammad Ali Bogra’s Cabinet against the unanimous decision of the Awami League Central Working Committee held in December, 1954.20 The ruling class of vested interests had found in Suhrawardy a close ally for the time being. It was through Suhrawardy that the question of autonomy was temporarily buried. The principles of parity between East and West Pakistan and the creation of West Pakistan as one unit were made acceptable to East Pakistan although the Awami League believed in regional autonomy of all the provinces of West Pakistan. East Bengal’s name was officially changed to East Pakistan and the military Pacts Between Pakistan and the U.S.A. were made to be endorsed by the Bengali leaders. Suhrawardy after joining the Cabinet in December, 1954 compromised the position of the Awami League to the extent of declaring that the provinces of 1956 constitution guaranteed East Pakistan 98 per cent of

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the autonomy. When we discuss at a later stage the constitutional provisions of the 1956 Constitution relating to autonomy it will not show much of improvement over the 1935 Act.

The second Constituent Assembly was formed with 80 members-40 from the East and 40 from the west, the party position being as follows :

Muslim League 26
United Front 16
Awami League 13
Noon Group 3
Pakistan Congress 4
Scheduled Caste Federation 3
United Progressive Party 2
Independent Muslim 1
Others 12

From East Pakistan only one Muslim League member was elected and it was Mohammad Ali of Bogra who just managed to get elected by the handful Muslim League members in East Pakistan Assembly eligible to sent only one person to the Constituent Assembly. Mohammad Ali otherwise had no real base in East Pakistan. The United Front having split, the Muslim League with all but one seat in West Pakistan became the single majority party but none enjoyed the majority in the Constituent Assembly. Suhrawardy and A.K. Fazlul Huq now belonging to two separate forums played independent roles, each trying to collaborate with the West Pakistan leaders in order to gain or retain power. West Pakistanis also played one against the other as far as their two leaders were concerned. Under these circumstances, a political settlement between the leaders of East and West was reached, each requiring the other’s support, to share the power of the central government. The agreement popularly known as Murree Pact took place in July, 1955 prior to and during the proceedings of the inaugural session of the Second Constituent Assembly. In exchange of allowing East Pakistani leaders to share power in the centre and withdrawal of the Governor’s rule in the Eastern wing, the leaders of the Eastern wing agreed to the formation of one unit in the West and give support for the security pacts. The question of parity in all spheres and Bengali as one of the state languages were almost settled matters. In other words, the balance of power in the central administration remained basically the same. The key question relating to the quantum of autonomy however remained unresolved.

The support of the Awami League for such and arrangement particularly for compromising the question of autonomy and supporting the security pacts, let it to face severe cricticism both in East and West Pakistan. The leftists who were still the forerunners of the Bengali nationalist movement now branded the Awami League leaders as opportunists and started creating pressure both from within and without. To the people at large the Awami League earned the reputation of being a selfseeking power-hungry organization. In west Pakistan also the smaller provinces felt to have been betrayed by the Awami League as they till recently preached for regional autonomy for all the provinces of Pakistan. But this alliance between the West Pakistani elite and East Pakistani leaders had no ideological basis and therefore, did not last long. As the primary object was to get to or remain in power this alliance broke many times in order to accommodate different groups at different stages. But the net result was that in East Pakistan the cohesive force of the autonomy movement was considerably destroyed and the chance of achieving any workable constitutional partnership between the regions within the framework of Pakistan became more remote. The autonomy movement which galvanised through the 21 point programme was frustrated due to the Bengali political elite’s betrayal led by the Awami League under the leadership of H.S. Suhrawardy.21

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Notes

  1. Gunner Myrdal, Asian Drama. vol. 1 (Pantheon : New York, 1968), pp.307-8.

  1. Popularly known as BPC (Basic Principles Committee).

  1. Mr. Ataur Rahman Khan was elected the senior Vice-President and Mr. Shamsul Huq, the general Secretary of the Awami League.

  1. G.W. Chowdhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, (2nd edition, Longman, London), p.72.

  1. Badrudding Omar, Purba Banglar Bhasa Andolan o Tatkalin Rajniti (Bengali) (Language Movement and contemporary Politics in East Bengal) 2nd volume (Mowla Brothers, Dhaka), PP. 400-4.

  1. Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical politics and the Emergency of Bangladesh, (Books international Ltd., Dhaka, 1975) p.6. Mujib claimed to have formed a youth organization as long back as on December 11, 1947. See his speech made in Dhaka on January 18, 1974.

  1. Talukder Maniruzzaman, ibid., p.7.

  1. Talukder Maniruzzaman, op. cit., p.7.

  1. During the initial stage of the Language movement Mujib was first arrested on March 11, March 1948 for a few days.

  1. Under See. 144 Cr.P.C. a magistrate can prohibit an assembly of more than four persons. See. 144 was violated by leftist students led by Toaha and Oli Ahad, President and General Secretary, of Youth League respectively, Gaziul Huq, Ebarar Sangram Sadhinatar Sangram (Bengali) (This Time our Struggle is the Struggle for Independence) (Puthiparta Prakashani, Dhaka), p. 38.

This became the most historic day for the Bengalis, which is observed as ‘Shaheed Day’ (Martyr’s Day) every year.

  1. Sheikh Mujib was in jail at that time but he claimed that he planned February 21 from Hospital bed. See Mujib’s speech made in Dhaka on January 18, 1974.

  1. Leftist pressure for secularism forced the Student’s League and the Awami League to drop the word ‘Muslim.’

  1. Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Nazimuddin on April 17, 1953 summarily and appointed Mohammad Ali as Prime Minister who was Pakistan’s Ambassador to U.S.A. and not a member of the Constituent Assembly. The Governor-General also dissolved the elected cabinet in East Pakistan on May 30, 1954.

  1. Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan (2nd edition, Karachi). p. 34. See for details of the case, Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan vs. Federation of Pakistan (Chief Court of Sind) DLR Supplementary Issue vol. VIII, 1955, p.p. 121.

  1. The Federation of Pakistan vs. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, P.L.D. Federal Court, 1955, p. 240.

  1. Ibib., p. 184.

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  1. P.L.D. Federal Court, 1955, p. 387.

  1. Quoted from G.W. Chowdhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan. 2nd edition, London, p. 88.

  1. P.L.D. Supreme Court, 1972, p.139.

  1. Abul Mansur Ahmed, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bachar (Bengali) (Fifty Years of Politics as I saw it), (Nawroz Kitabistan, Dhaka), p. 556.

  1. Read how Mirza played with the Awami League Leaders in Abul Mansur Ahmed’s Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bachar, op. cit., pp. 561-562.

০০০

 

Chapter 3

 

The Constitution of 1956

 

At last, after nine years, there was a constitution for Pakistan on March 23, 1956. The country was set in motion for development through a democratic process. The standard fundamental rights embodied in the human rights charter were guaranteed by the constitution and the nation achieved to have in the constitution Bengali as one of the two state languages of Pakistan. What was being more or less accepted by the ruling class of bureaucrats, feudal lords and big businessmen of West Pakistan since the anti-BPC movement in East Pakistan were now incorporated in the Constitution excepting the question of one unit which was resolved in October, 1955 by an Act passed by the Constituent Assembly. The principle of parity in the representation to the federal legislature and to share political power with the Bengalis in the central cabinet was also to a great extent practiced earlier excepting that this time it was more legalised and the leaders who were sharing power were newly elected from East Pakistan. The full provincial autonomy as mentioned in the 21-point programme was not achieved nor was there any provision by which jute could be nationalised which had been the demands of the leftist elements in the Awami League.

The essential condition for a workable federation in Pakistan was to accommodate East Pakistan in the power structure on a realistic basis. The fact that the 1956 Constitution was enacted by an illegally constituted Constituent Assembly and the representation of West Pakistan to the Assembly was not on the basis of fresh election could be considered as irrelevant points provided the members particularly those of West Pakistan in whose hands the actual leadership of Pakistan was resting had really wanted to keep Pakistan on the basis of a workable partnership between East and West Pakistan. The impression one gets from this constitution-making phases that the ruling class of Pakistan had perhaps, from the day Pakistan was created, concluded that East Pakistan sooner or later would leave Pakistan. They therefore, decided from the very beginning to make the best out of it. As long as East Pakistan was good for them economically, they would retain it, if necessary by force, and then leave it when it had nothing more to offer. According to their calculations East Pakistan could perhaps have left Pakistan in 1950s rather than 1971. As mentioned earlier the delay was caused mainly due to the betrayal of the United Front leaders after the 1954 elections and the role played by the leftists in the 1960s—the original forces of Bengali nationalism. After the 1954 elections the East Pakistani leaders attempted to give their all-Pakistan orientation a trial. Of the three most prominent East Pakistani leaders, Moulana Bhashani decided to work for the all-Pakistan Awami League, A.K. Fazlul Huq wanted to remain in East Pakistani politics and Husain Shahid Suhrawardy was to play a national political role. The left forces also decided to get

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involved in national politics.

Being victorious in the 1954 elections the United Front leaders attained a new height of self-confidence, and probably they began thinking, that from that time onward they would be able to play their due role in national politics. That speaks why their activities seemed to be uplifted from the narrow grooves of provincial politics.

  1. The Distribution of Subjects

The degree of provincial autonomy under the 1956 Constitution virtually remained the same as it was under the Government of India Act, 1935 with slight improvement here and there. The major subjects in more elaborate form were retained by the federal government. Although the number of items in the federal legislative list was reduced from 59 to 30 but the control over the actual important subjects was more consolidated (Article 106). Besides, the naval, military and airforce, the industries connected with defence, nuclear energy and mineral resources necessary for its production, and the manufacture of arms, fire arms, ammunition and explosives were included in the federal list. As the defence took around 60 per cent of the total budget contributed heavily by East Pakistan in taxes and foreign exchange and in return virtually given no share in defence investment, works, industries, installations, employment and contracts, the economic benefit of the entire 60 per cent budget went right away to West Pakistan. In foreign affairs the jurisdiction was made more wide by inserting ‘including all matters which bring Pakistan into relation with any foreign country.’ In respect of trade and commerce the federal government took overt the power to regulate the same even between the provinces besides imports and exports across country’s frontiers. Besides currency, coinage and legal tender, the entire foreign exchange and negotiable instrument and institutions including the State Bank of Pakistan became part of the federal list.

In matters of finance and revenue resources, the distribution was almost the same as it was in the 1935 Act, the bulk retained by the federal government and making the provincial government a beggar in perpetuity and completely dependent on the centre. Duties and taxes on all major heads went to the federal fund. Duties of customs including export duties, duties of excise including duties on salt, corporation taxes, and taxes on income other than agricultural income, estate and succession duties in respect of properties other than agricultural land, taxes on the capital value of assets exclusive of agricultural land, taxes on sales and purchases, terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by sea or air, taxes on their fares and freights and taxes on mineral oil and natural gas—all went to the centre.

The source of income for the provinces was left on some minor heads, such as taxes on agricultural income and on the capital value of agricultural land (which was good for West Pakistan but not for the East because of the size of the land holdings in that wing), duties in respect of succession to agricultural land, stamp duty including stamp duty on negotiable instruments and insurance policies etc. The concurrent list was reduced to nineteen items from thirty six of 1935 Act whereas the provincial list was increased from fifty four to ninety four without however, any substantial improvement in terms of power and resources.

Whereas on the question of distribution of subjects the 21 point programme suggested an autonomy envisaged by the Lahore Resolution allowing the central government to retain power over three subjects defence, foreign affairs and currency. The National Grand Convention held in November, 1950 in its constitutional proposals excluded the subject of currency and in respect of defence, suggested two units of defence forces—one for the East and the other for the West to be directed by respective regional commanders under the Commanders-in-Chief at the centre. In foreign affairs East Pakistan would have regional ministry of foreign affairs. In matter of taxation the Convention recommended that only on

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some specified heads and subject to the acceptance by the province, the centre would impose taxes.

In respect of the legislative powers over the concurrent list, the federal legislature had precedence over the province and the order of precedence was same as in the 1935 act. Under Article 105 of the constitution the power of the federal legislature extended to make laws including laws having extra-territorial operation, for the whole or any part of Pakistan; the provincial legislature could make laws for that particular province or part thereof. The federal parliament had also the power to make laws for the whole or any part of Pakistan in order to give effect to international treaties, agreements and conventions in which Pakistan would be a party. In the event of any conflict or inconsistency between the Act of Parliament and any provincial legislation relating to a subject, parliament was competent to enact on or to any matter in the concurrent list and the Act of the Parliament was to prevail.

The only notable improvement over the 1935 Act in the distribution of legislative powers between the centre and the provinces was in respect of the residual matters. In Article 104 of the 1935 Act the Governor-General enjoyed the discretion of empowering either the federal or provincial legislature to make laws on any subject which was not included in any of the three lists in the Seventh Schedule whereas Article 104 of the 1956 Constitution provided that this power would be enjoyed by the provincial legislature subject to article 107 and 108 of the Constitution. Another favorable aspect was, unlike the Indian Constitution of 1950, the federal legislature had no power to make laws on provincial matters ‘in national interest.’ But in case of emergency, which was common in Pakistan, parliament could make laws in any provincial matter. Another essential feature of a workable federation was retained by Article 129 of the Constitution. In a federation disputes are likely to arise between the federal government and the provincial government or between two provinces or between the centre and one of more provinces. In order to resolve such disputes which were not within the jurisdiction of the supreme court, Article 129 provided that any of the governments involved in such dispute could refer the matter to the Chief Justice of Pakistan who would appoint a tribunal to settle the disputes. The article also provided a procedure to follow.

In the administrative relationship between the centre and the province, the province was made subservient to the centre in the line of the 1935 Act. There had been more consolidation of power and authority in the hands of the federal government than before. The constitution laid down that it was the duty of the federal government to protect each province against external aggression and internal disturbance and ensure that the government of every province was carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Article 125). This had vested a wide responsibility in the Central Government not only to protect the province from any internal disturbance but to ensure also that it carried out the obligations under the constitution. The executive authority of the province would be exercised in such manner as to ensure that it complied with the Acts of Parliamment and the laws appliable to that province and also not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the Federation [Article 126 (1)]. Article 126 which was almost similar to Article 126 of the 1935 Act also provided that the executive authority of the Federation ‘shall extend to the giving of such direction to a province as may appear to be federal government to be necessary for the purposes of clause (i) above.’ The federal government under the same Article could give similar directions to the provincial administration in the following matters :

  1. a) as to the construction and maintenance of means of communication declared in such direction to be of national and militray importance;

  1. b) as to the measures to be taken for the protection of railways within the province;

  1. c) as to the manner in which the executive authority of the province was to be exercised for the purpose

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of preventing any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity or economic life of Pakistan or any part thereof;

  1. d) as to the carrying into execution in the province of any Act of Parliament which related to a matter enumerated in Part II of the concurrent list and authorized the giving of such directions.

So the colonial federal structure of the 1935 Act was fully maintained by bringing the provinces under complete control of the centre in the administrative field. Even though the Fifth Schedule had granted the provinces some executive powers over a list of items, the central administrative machinery set up by the 1956 Constitution made those little exclusive powers insignificant in the over all context. The amount of autonomy that was provided in the provinces of the undivided India under the 1935 Act was now after 21 years provided to East Pakistan which was separated by 1000 miles from the other wing with another sovereign country in middle. The claim that some decentralisation could be achieved in the administrative spheres under the new constitution was also completely shattered by the provision of appointment of any person as governor of a province by the president.

Article 70 provided that ‘there shall be a Governor for each province who shall be appointed by the President and shall hold office during the pleasure of the President’ and further that ‘A Governor shall not be a member of the National or Provincial Assembly.’ In order words, the Governor, although head of the administration of the province, was not accountable to any one in the province. The provincial cabinet will only ‘aid and advise’ the Governor (Article 71) and the Governor ‘shall in his discretion, appoint from amongst the members of the Provincial Assembly, a Chief Minister, who, in his opinion, was most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Provincial Assembly.’ The other ministers, deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries ‘shall be appointed and removed from office by the Governor, but the governor shall not exercise the powers under this clause unless he is satisfied that the Chief Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Provincial Assembly.’ Excepting the point that the cabinet would be collectively responsible to the provincial legislature, which in itself did not mean much, all the provisions relating to the administration of the province were in effect same as in the 1935 Act. The power and discretion of the Governor made his position above the provincial legislature as he was neither appointed by it nor accountable to it. Not only that, the executive authority of the province vested in the Governor and the Governor ‘could summon, prorogue or dissolve the Provincial Assembly’ (Article 83). The Governor was therefore, only responsible to the President and none else. Excepting Khawja Nazimuddin (1948-51) no Bengali was ever made the President of Pakistan.

  1. The Executive Power of the President

Similarly the President was made the most powerful person, compound the person of the cabinet or the parliament. The President, once elected by a majority vote through an electoral college consisting of the members of the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies (Article 32) was above the parliament and the cabinet. The executive authority of the federation was vested in the President (Article 29) and the ‘cabinet of Ministers with the Prime Minister as its head’ was to ‘aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions.’ The President in his discretion would ‘appoint from amongst the members of the National Assembly a Prime Minister’ who in his opinion’ was most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly. Other ministers of state or deputy ministers could be ‘appointed and removed’ from the office by the President. Although the cabinet was to be collectively responsible to the National Assembly, the Prime Minister was to ‘hold office during the pleasure of the President’ [Article 37(6)]. The President was however, not to exercise his power unless he was ‘satisfied’ that the Prime Minister did not command the confidence of the majority of the members of

31

the National Assembly. Here also there had been a slight improvement over the interim constitution in the sense that the Prime Minister had to be a member of the National Assembly. But if the National Assembly stood dissolved the President could appoint any person as Prime Minister. Although the President was to act ‘in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet’ [Article 37(7)] in practice, the result was opposite. It was found that on most occasions the cabinet acted at the direction of the President as he could be ‘satisfied’ without any challenge that the Prime Minister’ does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly.’ The Prime Minister in relation to the President had to perform also certain statutory obligations under Article 42 which were as follows :

  1. a) to communicate to the President all decisions of the Cabinet relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposals for legislation;

  1. b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposals for legislation as the President might have called for; and

  1. c) if the President so required, to submit for the consideration of the Cabinet any matter on which a decision had been taken by a Minister but which had not been considered by the Cabinet.

The President under Article 50(1) could not only summon or prorogue but dissolve the National Assembly at his own will. This unconditional power to dissolve the parliament made the status of the parliament subordinate to the President. In effect, the Constitution of 1956 provided with a federal Presidential system under the cover of a parliamentary one with all the powers of finance and administration in the hands of the federal government. This was contrary to the quantum of autonomy and decentralisation demanded by the people all over Pakistan.

The essential pre-condition of a parliamentary system is to have the executive authority vested in the Cabinet with the Prime Minister at its head and a sovereign parliament to decide whether a government enjoys the confidence of the people or not. The satisfaction of the parliament and not of the President would be the principle to determine whether the Prime Minister enjoyed the commad of the majority inside the parliament or not. In a parliamentary system the role of the President is usually a nominal one being titular in nature unlike what was provided in the Constitution of 1956. Some argued that considering the circumstances of Pakistan and the nature and number of its political parties, there was not much of an alternative but to have such kind of supervisory restrictions to enable the parliamentary government to work and that the President would exercise his discretion and prerogatives extremely cautiously and only when it was needed. If that was to be so, then nothing required at all to be in writing. As the experience showed in Pakistan, written words giving power to the President were used fully by the person in office to his own advantage and the scope for the ‘parliamentary system grows through practice’ was hardly allowed to operate.

Even back in 1954 the final draft of the Constitution by first Constituent Assembly dropped the words to hold office during the pleasure of the President apprehending that any wording like those would only give the President a scope to frustrate the working of a parliamentary system. It was not a long time ago that Khawja Nazimuddin was removed summarily and replaced by Mohammad Ali of Bogra who was not even a member of the Constituen Assembly. At subsequent stages also similar things happened on several occasions. Towards the end of 1954, before the first Constituent Assembly was dissolved, a bill was passed to provide that the Prime Minister prior to his appointment must be a member of the Assembly, other ministers to be appointed on the Prime Minister’s advice, the cabinet would be collectively responsible to the Assembly and the Governor-General would function in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. On the same day another bill was passed making the Constituent Assembly absolutely sovereign curtailing the powers of the Governor-General. The Grand Convention

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of Democratic Federation in 1950 in their constitutional scheme limited the powers of the President on the following line :

On being elected by the majority members of the parliament

  1. He would grant pardon.

  1. He would be the C-in-C of the Armed Forces of the United States of Pakistan.

  1. He would appoint the Election Commissioner, Judges of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General.

  1. He would appoint a person as Prime Minister who enjoyed the confidence of the majority members of Parliament and on the advice of the Prime Minister he would appoint other Ministers.

  1. He would receive the credentials of foreign ambassadors and would represent the State in all ceremonial matters.

  1. The Members of the Cabinet would individually and collectively be responsible to the Parliament.

  1. He could dissolve the Parliamment on the advice of the Cabinet to hold referendum on urgent national issues. He could also dissolve the Parliament if no party or group could form the Government by holding support of the majority of the Members in Parliament but within 45 days news election was to be held.

With regard to the appointment of the provincial governors the Convention suggested that the Governor would be a person elected by the majority of the members of the Provincial Assembly and he would act on the advice of the Prime Minister who would be appointed by him but on the condition that he (Prime Minister) would enjoy support of the majority members of thie Provincial Assembly. The Provincial Assembly could only be dissolved on the advice of the Prime Minister of the province.1

Keeping in line with the theory of having a strong centre for Pakistan, the constitution also provided elaborate emergency provisions which provided some added means of controlling the provinces without any challenge. If the President was satisfied that a grave emergency existed in which the security or economic life of Pakistan or any part thereof was threatened by way of external aggression, or by internal disturbance beyond the power of a provincial government to control, he could issue a proclamation of emergency. In such a situation the National Assembly could make laws in provincial matters, the executive authority of the federation would extent to the giving of direction to a province as to the manner in which the executive authority of the province was to be exercised and the President could assume to himself or order the Governor to assume all or any of the functions of the government of the province and some such other powers. The proclamation of emergency or taking over the administration of the province on similar grounds was not an uncommon feature in Pakistan’s constitutional history. The proclamation dismissing the new cabinet of A.K. Fazlul Huq in 1954 elected with 96 per cent support in the province within two months of its swearing-in would serve as a classic example of how emergency provisions could be exercised only for internal political purposes. The Grand Convention of 1950 in its constitutional proposals was fully justified in suggesting that the constitution would not be suspended under any circumstances.

  1. The Role of Iskander Mirza

 

With all such powers, the Presidency became the most functional office within the framework of the

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1956 Constitution. The ruling class of West Pakistan with the collaboration of Iskander Mirza got what they wanted, a federation with a ‘strong centre.’ The theorists of a ‘strong centre’ argued on the same grounds as the autonomists did. The distance of East Pakistan, from the rest of Pakistan, cultural conflicts and the socio-economic imbalances between the two wings were more the reasons, they argued, why Pakistan should have had a strong centre under the concept of ‘millat’ (oneness)-one God, one country, one government, one people, one language and definitely one leader—the President. One of such theorists, Mr. A.K. Brohi, a former Minister of Pakistan argued that if there had been geographical contiguity between East and West Pakistan then the principles of decentralisation of power might have been the basis of the Pakistan constitution. But in order to overcome this mutual difficulty in the way of achieving unity of the people of Pakistan and in the distance that separates the two wings, there was no alternative but to provide for a strong central government.2 This only reflected the irreconcilable position of two groups of people of two different regions and the lack of understanding of the real issues that existed between them.

With regard to the enactment of 1956 Constitution the fact is that the document was prepared more to suit the liking of Iskander Mirza who became the Governor-General of Pakistan on the retirement of Ghulam Mohammad in August, 1955 than to suit the liking of the majority members of the Constituent Assembly or the needs and requirements of the country. Iskander Mirza was still enjoying all the powers of the Governor-General of the 1935 Act including the powers added by virtue of the decision of Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan’s case and Reference Case No. 1 of 1955. Before the constitution was enacted he was in a position to blackmail the members of the Constituent Assembly on the ground that he would withhold his assent if the constitution in his opinion was not the right one. He also made it sure that he was elected as the first President of Pakistan. As a result, politics and constitution making during this period centred round Mirza with all sorts of intrigues and bargaining.3

Once the constitution came into being Mirza played even more a villainous role taking the fullest advantage of the powers given to him as President under the constitution. Ayub Khan in his book Friends not Masters commented, ‘Shrewd as he was, he (Mirza) could see how the Constitution could be used to promote political intrigues and bargaining. No one knew any longer who belonged to which political party, it was a question of swapping labels, a Muslim League today, a Republican tomorrow.’4

Neither the Prime Minister at the centre nor the Chief Minister at the province was outside the direct political influence of the President. The removal of Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy from the prime ministership by President Iskander Mirza and the Judicial decision of Dhaka High Court regarding the dismissal of the Chief Minister, Mr. Abu Hussain Sarkar, by the governor Mr. Hamid Ali, just a few minutes after his becoming Governor of East Pakistan, substantiated the fact that the tenure of office of the Prime Minister or of a provincial Chief Minister under the 1956 Constitution was no safer than under the interim constitution.5

  1. The Role of the Awami League and the

Birth of the National Awami Party

In September, 1956 as soon as Mirza appointed H.S. Suhrawardy, the most influential Bengali leader as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, he (Suhrawardy) declared that the 1956 Constitution provided 98 per cent provincial autonomy to East Bengal. The betrayal was complete and the purpose of Mirza was served. Within thirteen months Suhrawardy was out of office and Mr. I.I. Chundrigar was appointed as the Prime Minister who could not stay in power even sixty days when Mr. Firoz Khan Noon was appointed. So in the course of two and half years of the existence of the 1956 Constitution Mirza appointed four Prime Ministers for Pakistan. In East Pakistan almost the same thing happened. Mirza through his appointed

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Governor played the most important political role keeping Fazlul Huq and Suhrawardy against each other in the centre. Fazlul Huq as the Governor of East Pakistan dismissed Ataur Rahman Khan’s cabinet of the Awami League in March, 1958. Later that night Fazlul Huq himself was dismissed by Iskander Mirza. Ataur Rahman was succeeded by Abu Hussain Sarkar, who was in turn dismissed within tewelve hours of assuming office and Ataur Rahman’s cabinet was again back in power. In June, 1958 Ataur Rahman’s cabinet fell and Sarkar came back to power who after four days had to leave again. The province remained under President’s rule for two months and thereafter Ataur Rahman was reinstated as Chief Minister.

This is how the 21-point programme was frustrated. The 1956 Constitution neither provided any reasonable autonomy for East Pakistan nor a free parliamentary system. The intrigues of Iskander Mirza, the ill-balanced constitution, the recklessness and selfishness of the West Pakistani as well as the Bengali leaders were responsible for this frustration. Only one hopeful aspect was that the constitution still promised a scope for a democratic system to develop. No one should have expected that the people of Pakistan would adopt and start practicing the democratic norms and principles in a perfect manner overnight. For any institution or system time has to be allowed for its existence and growth. After nine years of partition and since many years before Pakistan was created, the people were guaranteed fundamental rights and democratic institutions for the first time and it was natural that excesses would take place. It was upon the constitution-makers and leaders of the country to make efforts to reduce these excesses and act with restraint. But unfortunately, with Iskander Mirza as the President of Pakistan, it was not possible to reduce the excesses and so the necessity of holding election became a matter of great urgency. Because of repeated demands from all over Pakistan at last February, 1959 was set for the first general election in Pakistan under the Constitution of 1956 and it was expected that the real test of democracy would start from then on. Elections were first promised for November, 1957, then postponed to 1958 and lastly to Februray, 1959.

On the other hand, in East Pakistan, the Awami League led by Suhrawardy, having abandoned the cause of the Bengalis, was split. The leftists led by Moulana who could prevail upon the Awami League till 1953 could no more find any common ground to remain together. The split could have come earlier if the East Pakistan cabinet was not dismissed in 1954 and the province had not remained under the Governor’s Rule, which provided still some common cause to fight against the deprivation of the Bengalis. Some of the underground communists who were still supporting the Awami League as a mass front however, were successful earlier through Moulana and their workers to make it adopt the path of secularism by dropping the word ‘Muslim’ from its name in 1955. This was perhaps the last common political action the Awami League took primarily under the influence and initiative of the left faction within the party. The division in the party was made open following widespread resentment over Suhrawardy’s joining Mohammad Ali’s (Bogra) cabinet and later on becoming Prime Minister to declare that the 1956 Constitution provided ‘98 per cent autonomy’ for East Pakistan. The leftists thereby identified themselves with the grievances and sentiments of the people of East Pakistan on this issue. On the international front, Suhrawardy’s open support for Pakistan’s military pacts, CENTO and SEATO, was in complete violation of the 21-point programme which pledged a ‘non-aligned and neutral foreign policy’ for Pakistan. This switch-over the Awami League in the central government could not be supported by their leftist allies any longer and this conflict led to an imminent split.

On Ferbruary 7, 1957 the Awami League held a historic Annual Conference at Kagmari. In its council session the issues that dominated the conference were : Full autonomy for East Pakistan and non-aligned foreign policy which naturally included opposition to any kind of military alliance. The meeting was presided over bhy Moulana Bhashani ans attended by his compatriot and leader of the Awami League parliamentary party, H.S. Suhrawardy who was now the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the Awami League ticket. While Moulana was championing the cause of neutral foreign policy and criticising the

35

exploitation of East Pakistan by the ruling class of West Pakistan, Suhrawardy asserted that 98 per cent autonomy was achieved and defended the military pacts and the central government’s economic policies. In this conference Moulana while dealing on the point of economic exploitation of the East by West Pakistan made his historic declaration ‘it you carry on with your exploitation in East Pakistan, if you do not accept full autonomy for East Pakistan, the ruling class of Pakistan should know one thing—Assalamu alaikum (farewell)—you go in your own way and we will go in our own.’ Immediately Moulana was branded as a communist, a secessionist and a pro-Indian element by the government-backed newspapers and a massive propaganda was launched to eliminate Moulana from the national politics. Awami League and its government in the centre took an active part in this operation. The left students led by the Student’s Union who were supporting Moulana were mercilessly beaten up by a combined force of students led directly by the Student’s League and supporters of the Awami League following a meeting held in Dhaka University. In this campus fights, the Student’s League received support from the other rightist organisations including that of the Muslim League and the Jamat-i-Islam followers and tried to extricate the left students as supporters of secessionist movement from the University area. They were called ‘secessionist,’ ‘anti-Pakistanis’ and ‘agents of India.’ So the autonomists within the Awami League were now divided into two factions, one supporting Moulana and the other Suhrawardy. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman continued to be the right hand man of Suhrawardy by supporting the latter in all his moves and actions.6 So Suhrawardy and the main stream of the Awami League became the defenders of the ‘national integrity’ of Pakistan.

As a result, Moulana the founder President of the Awami League along with eight other executive committee members resigned from the organization and planned to form a new political party to provide a broad platform for all the progressive elements in both the wings of the country. With this came the end of the communist association with the Awami League. Suhrawardy and Sheikh Mujib tried their best to undermine the strength of Moulana and the leftist forces; they took all measures to see that the new political party did not have a smooth start. The National Convention ‘of all progressive forces’ convened by Moulana at Rupmahal Cinema Hall in Dhaka, where the National Awami Party (NAP) was formed on 25 the July, 1957 was held in the face of an organised attack by the Awami League from outside the hall. Under the direct order of Sheikh Mujib, his associates organised bus loads of students from the University and College dormitories with sticks, stones and eggs to attack the Convention. It was an Awami League government both at the centre and the province. The Awami League police and the Awami League demonstrators were engaged against the ‘anti-state convention’ of Moulana Bhashani who was according to them forming a party ‘to break up Pakistan’ and so bricks were pelted and eggs were thrown at the delegates who were attending the convention. The police did not move from their position and allowed the demonstrators to do the mischief. The next day when the newly formed NAP was holding its first public meeting at the Paltan Maidan, the same thing happened. The meeting was ruptured by the Awami Leauge workers without a single action being taken by the police.

The ruling class of Pakistan and the rightists took the maximum advantage of this situation. At the centre, Suhrawardy identified himself with the ruling elite and was being used to weaken the autonomy movement in East Pakistan. The Awami League now having strongly gone for one unit in West Pakistan, it also lost the faith of the autonomists of Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. They no longer wanted to support Suhrawardy at the central government. But the Awami League now gained a new group of business community, rightists and feudel lords to support them in that region and helped Suhrawardy to create his ‘national image.’ So with the creation of the NAP not only the cause of autonomy was weakened, the split itself gave a new opportunity to the ruling class to manoeuvre further for a ‘strong centre’ for the ‘integrity of Pakistan.’

The NAP however, continued with the popular demand for autonomy both in East and West Pakistan. In its first manifesto the NAP called for full regional auntonomy for both wings leaving control

36

over defecne, foreign affairs and currency to the centre. In West Pakistan it suggested the creation of a sub-federation within the federation of Pakistan by reorganising all provinces on the basis of culture, language and geography. The NAP was also in favour of secularism and a non-aligned, neutral and anti-military-pact foreign policy. As a result the Awami League had lost it mass support in West Pakistan particularly in the provinces of Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province and a substantial support in East Pakistan and the NAP emerged as the single largest national political party having broad support in East and West Pakistan. The NAP also to a great extent was successful in bringing into its fold a large section of the progressive forces in the country who were so long working in different forums. Besides the demand for full autonomy the NAP now gave an equal emphasis on the economic proposals like abolition of jotdari (tenure-holding) and ownership of land by the tillers, nationalization of jute industries, guarantee of fair prices for growers etc. This bond with other smaller provinces of West Pakistan and commitment to establish socialist economy in the entire country caused difficulties for the NAP at a later stage to go all out only for the autonomy of East Pakistan alone.

  1. The Proposed Elections in 1959

 

In this context politics in Pakistan were taking new shape marking a qualitative change. Although the split in the Awami League had temporarily strengthened the hands of the ruling class and particularly that of Iskander Mirza and tghe autonomy movement had suffered a major setback, the country was entering into a democratic process under a written constitution. True, there were excesses and defaults on the part of the politicians and imbalances and deficiencies in the constitution itself, but it was expected that the general election would bring in new blood and leadership to remove these undesirable features from politics so long dominated by Iskander Mirza and a handful of coterie of West Pakistan having no popular support. Despite the defects discussed earlier, the 1956 Constitution could still work to achived the participation of the Bengalis in the national affairs on an eaual basis provided democratic principles, conventions and precedents were honoured and practiced.

The prospect of an election being held all over Pakistan had frightened the leaders and institutions of West Pakistan. Besides the Army’s fear of having to face budget cut or at least a reallocation in expenditure and recruitment, the civil bureaucracy including the diplomatic corps which were mainly manned by Punjabis and immigrants from India enjoying substantial power and privileges had the same problem. An election all over Pakistan, i.e. held, would also expose the exploitation of not only East Pakistan but of Sind, North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan at the hands of the central administration. All these thoughts rapidly increased the anxieties of the people who had remained in power virtually unaccountable so long. The Prime Ministers and other Ministers were changed so frequently that power had gradually concentrated in the hands of the civil servants. Morevoer, having had Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza as Presidents for seven years, the civil servants managed to entrench deeper into the state machineries. The authority and privileges to enjoyed by them led to constitute another vested group in the country. So there was strong opposition from the senior civil servants to the holding of the election. Representatives of these vested groups started vilifying the politics and predicted that elections would only produce chaos and confusion. The Government’s massive propaganda machineries were engaged all over the country to create fear about the elections in the mind of the people.

If the elections had been held in February, 1959 all over Pakistan it would have had the following immediate effect :

  1. a) The political leaders and institutions in general would have gained both respect and strength and could establish themselves as organised forces. Power would have gone into the hands of the politicians.

37

  1. b) The Bengalis would have shared at least half of the central administration—as for the first time Bengalis on their constitutional right would have formed the Cabinet and have a President of their choice.

  1. c) In industries, civil administration and Army, policies as to the allocation and recruitment would have changed the prevailing irrational basis. Besides, the Bengalis would have entered into the policy making bodies dealing with finance, defence, currency and into all national and international bodies and agencies. They would also for the first time have got an opportunity to re-examine and review the central budget, 5-year plan, defence expenditure, foreign exchange allocation and all vital issues affecting the entire nation. Employment in Central Government administration would also have been rationalised, causing a threat to the jobs of many West Pakistanis particularly the Punjabis.

  1. d) The elections, if held, were going to disrupt the existing alliance between the major institutionalised forces within the state hierarchy i.e. civil and military bureaucracy, and would have disclocated the position of the respective privileged groups which none of them was willing to sacrifice.

All these caused a somewhat genuine fear amongst the ruling class of Pakistan. The bureaucracy, the army, the neo-capitalists and feudal elite of the Punjab who had considerably improved their fortune and consolidated their position in the last 12 years—to anyone of them, the proposed election in February, 1959 became a great threat, a matter of great apprehension. They worked hand in hand in the conspiracy to frustrate the democratic processes in Pakistan.

Note

  1. The details of the proposals made by the Grand Convention has been discussed at pp. 25-29.

  1. Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. XV, No. 12, p. 249.

  1. P.L.D., 1972, Supreme Court, p. 240.

  1. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 54-55.

  1. G.W. Chowdhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, 2nd ed., Longman, England, p. 121.

  1. Although Mujib continued to be inspired by the ideals of Moulana up to early fifties, at the end he actually sided with Suhrawardy. The style of life of Suhrawardy as an upper class liberal politician attracted Mujib more than the idealism of Moulana to fight for the downtroddens. Mujib’s background and class character went well with Suhrawardy’s urge to uphold bourgeois democratic values. Mujib obtained lessons on western parliamentary system from Suhrawardy.

০০০

 

Chapter 4

 

The Proclamation of the First Martial

Law and the Constitution of 1962

 

  1. The Emergence of Ayub Khan and the Introduction of a New Administrative System

 

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So, before the flower of democracy could blossom, the system was tilted. And with that Pakistan began to set itself into a different system altogether. Mohammad Ayub Khan, a former officer of the Royal Army and now the Commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, the architect of the first successful military coup in Pakistan was actually planning for a considerable time to take over the power. With the emergence of the rising industrial capital and the larger needs of the even-expanding armed forces a close alliance became necessary beteween the Punjabi civil and military bureaucrats to evolve a system which could provide stability for the preservation and growth of their vested interests. The politicians and the political institutions were not going to serve the purpose. The fear of having to face a democratic leadership after the elections scheduled to be held in February, 1959 prompted them to take a quick action. The proposed elections were also considered a threat to the army, as their massive expenditure budget at the cost of East Pakistan’s development had already provoked wide range resentment. Using this apprehension as a weapon, the senior civil servants of Pakistan began to instigate the army officers to take over the power.

From a constitutional point of view, the process of illegality thus set in motion with the dissolution of the First Constituent Assembly and to which the Judges of the Federal Court of Pakistan had also made their due contribution, led in its turn to the illegal usurpation of power by the President so elected under the Constitution of 1956, abrogating the Constitution and declaring Martial Law on October 7, 19581. This is how Ayub Khan finally took over the power on October 27, 1958 calling it a ‘bloodless revolution.’ With this the autonomy and the democratic right to share political power, two most essential factors to make the federation of Pakistan successful became non-existent.

Ayub blamed Iskander Mirza and the politicians for the state in which the country was thrown into. He justified his coup-d’etat in the following manner :

The President had thoroughly exploited the weaknesses in the Constitution and had got everyone connected witht the political life of the country utterly exposed and discredited. I do not think that he even seriously wanted to hold general election; he was looking for a suitable opportunity to abrogate the Constitution. Indeed, he was setting the state for it….From a soldier’s position it was quite clear to me that the general election were going to be stand-up fights. There would be large scale disturbances all over the country, and civil authority already groaning under the heels of the politicians would be incapable of dealing with the situation. Whether the Army liked it or not, it would get embroiled, because in the final analysis, it would become a question of maintianing some semblance of law and order in the country. The army could not remain unaffected by the conditions around it; nor was it concurable that offcers and men would not react to all the political chicanery, intrigues, corruption and inefficiency manifest in every sphere of life. They had their relatives, they read newspapers and some had their contacts. Being a patriotic and national army, it was bound to respond to the thinking of the people in the country.2

It is true that the political situation created by Iskander Mirza provided sufficient scope for any ambitious army general to intervene. People at large were also getting fed up at the way the governments were changing. They wanted justice and stability. So the common man was happy when Ayub Khan took over power, thinking that corruption would go and many of their problems would now be solved.

But in reality it did not happen that way. In the course of time it was found that corruption was spreading unchecked under the authoritarian rule and wealth was concentrating in the hands of the few. With the fundamental rights suspended and political parties banned, power continued to concentrate in the hands of even fewer people. The Bengali’s democratic right to share political power was no more there and as a result the worst exploitation of the East by the big business houses of the West took place during this period. Ayub’s growth oriented economy made the rich richer and the poor poorer and the disparity between East and West Pakistan widened more then ever before. In the course of Ayub’s rule the famous

39

‘22 families’ emerged, all belonging to West Pakistan controlling 80 per cent of banking, 90 per cent of the insurance industries and 60 per cent of the total industrial wealth of the country.

With the promulgation of Martial law, Moulana Bhashani, Sheikh Mujib and a few thousand political workers were arrested. For nearly four years there was virtually no political activity in the face of a ruthless military administration. In the absence of any democratic right to share the political power, the public opinion in East Pakistan was growing stronger for autonomy. The authoritarian rule of Ayub also helped the nationalist forces to consolidate their position which otherwise would have become difficult as the Awami League and the NAP continued to fight each other in open constitutional politics. On February 14, 1960 a referendum was held without the participation of any opposition authorising Ayub to frame a constitution for the country.

  1. The Second Constitution of Pakistan (1962)

 

On February 17, 1960 Ayub Khan appointed a Constitution Commission to examine why the parliamentary form of government had failed to function in Pakistan and recommend proposals for the future constitution of the country. As was expected the Constitution Commission came to the conclusion that the parliamentary form of government had proved to be a failure. This was strongly contested by the politicians on the ground that the system was never given a chance to function. This would be evident from the first two out of the three grounds noted by the Commission which appeared to be very interesting and revealing.

  1. Lack of proper election and defects in the late constitution.

  1. Undue interference by the heads of the state with the ministeries and political parties and the central government with the functioning of the government of the provinces.

  1. Lack of leadership of well organised and disciplined parties, the general lack of character of the politicians and their undue interference in the administration.

In its recommendation the Commission suggested that Pakistan should be a federation but at the same time it advocated for a ‘strong central government.’ It rejected the idea that the centre should have only three subjects—defence, foreign affairs and currency. The Commission came to the conclusion that the citizens of Pakistan, who brought the country into existance, were not fit to elect its President or members of the legislature and therefore, rejected the idea of universal adult franchise for the election of higher offices. It suggested a form of restricted franchise and holding of the first election by the vote of basic democrats. The Commission however recommended a presidential form of government in the line of the American system with a powerful legislature having considerable control over the exercise of power by the executive. It suggested a bicameral legislature and a provision to have the President and Vice President elected from the two wings of Pakistan.

The Commission, however, included a long list of fundamental rights and the directive principles in the line of the 1956 Constitution. The principle of parity was also adpoted by the Commission on the question of representation between East and West Pakistan in the central legislature and it rejected the principles of representation on population basis. The distribution of subjects for legislation between the centre and the provinces were maintained more or less in the same form as in the 1956 Constitution. Like all other dictators, Ayub accepted only the recommendations which suited him and rejected the other ones. He rejected the idea of having a bicameral legislature with the House of People to check the executive and the concept of a Vice-President. But the main theme, which was a presidential form with a

40

strong central government was incorporated in the constitution enacted in his own name in June, 1962. Neither the recommendations nor the Constitution did arouse much enthusiasm amongst the people and the politicians called both of them ‘undemocratic.’

  1. Non-federal Character

 

So with the emergence of Ayub Khan, the possibility of developing a constitutional framework to provide a realistic federal structure based on democratic principles had almost disappeared. If the Constitution of 1956 took Pakistan one step forward towards a rational basis of existence the Constitution of 1962 took her three steps back. The President was made the all-powerful person under the Constitution of 1962 making the legislatures subordinate institutions. The most astonishing aspect of the 1962 Constitution was that it provided a central rather than a federal structure, a system more close to a unitary form of government. This was the major deviation from all that was developed and found desirable in the course of history of constitution-making in Pakistan and for her survial. The Government of India Act, 1935 proclaimed under Article 5 a ‘Federation of India’ and provided statutory provisions to maintain the federal structure of the administration. Article 1 of the 1956 Constitution provided that ‘Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic.’ The Constitution of India declared it to be a ‘Union of states’ keeping in line with the Canandian Constitution. In 1962 Constitution the word ‘federation’ was not used at all. Rather the word ‘federation’ was substituted by the word ‘centre.’ In the definition of the Republic the Constitution of 1962 only declared that ‘The state of Pakistan shall be a Republic under the name of the ‘Republic of Pakistan.’3

The concept of a federation evolved from the historical fact that small states having some distinctive characteristics and problems desire to form a union of states to achieve certain common goals and objectives. It is a partnership of states of the basis of eqaulity and mutual respect where the states would like to manage their affairs to flourish their own culture and economy and at the same time attain a kind of broad unity between themselves on some common issues. The basic characteristics of a federal structure which are found in the modern constitutions were absent in this constitution. There was no distribution of powers between the federal and state legislatures enumerating the subjects on which the province would have exclusive power. Nor was there any provision for settlement of disputes between the federal and the provincial governments on any issue. On the contrary Article 133 provided that ‘the responsibility of deciding whether a legislature has power under this Constitution to make law is that of the legislature itself.’ It further provided that ‘the validity of a law shall not be called in question on the ground that the legislature by which it was made had no power to make the law.’ Article 131 laid down that the central legislature ‘shall have exclusive power to make laws (including laws having extra-territorial operation) for the whole or any part of Pakistan with respect to any matter enumerated in the Third Schedule.’ Unlike other federal constitutions, this constitution provided only one list of 49 items as subject to central legislation, as against 30 of the 1956 Constitution, and there was no provincial or concurrent list. In other words, the constitution provided that the provinces had authority to legislate on all the matters which were not in the Third Schedule. But again, this did not mean that the province had exclusive powers as its authority was restricted by Article 131 (2) saying that ‘There the national interest of Pakistan in relation to (a) the security of Pakistan including the economic and financial stability of Pakistan; (b) planning or co-ordination or (c) the achievement of uniformity in respect of any matter in different parts of Pakistan, so requires, the central legislature shall have power to make laws (including law having extra-territorial operation) for the whole or any part of Pakistan with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Third Schedule.’

Further, on the question of inconsistency between a central  and provincial law, Article 134 without any ambiguity or any provison like in the 1956 Constitution, provided that the ‘Central law shall

41

prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.’ By Article 131 (4) the central legislature also had the power (but not exclusive) to make laws for the Islamabad and Dhaka Capital territories with respect to any matter other than a matter enumerated in the Third Schedule. So whatever minor subjects were given to the provinces for legislation by one hand, Article 131 (1), Article 131 (2), Article 131 (4) and Article 134 had taken them away by the other hand. In addition of those, under Article 135, the executive authority of the central government was also to extend to the execution of the laws made in the matters outside the list enumerated in the Third Schedule. In other words, it was up to the central government or the President to really decide what power they would allot to the provincial legislature. Once the central legislature passed a law under Article 131 (2) saying that a particular law was passed in relation to the security of Pakistan or planning or co-ordination or for the achievement of uniformity in respect of any matter in different parts of Pakistan, the provincial legislature could not pass any law contrary to that and if it had already been passed, such law would not prevail. There was no way to challenge the validity of such legislation nor was there any provision to resolve any conflict. Article 133 clearly debarred the jurisdiction of the Court leaving some ambiguity as to who would decide if any question of inconsistency between the two laws ever arose. By these provisions the 1962 Constitution reduced the status of the provincial legislatures only to a subordinate position in relation to the centre.

There were no statutory provisions establishing the administrative relationship between the centre and the provinces. But again these provisions were not necessary in the 1962 Constitution in view of the supreme authority already given to the central legislature under Article 131 (2), (3) and (4), Article 135 (b) and also in view of the extent of authority the President had in the administration of the province.

The executive authority of the province was vested in the Governor (Article 80) who would appoint a council of ministers at his own discretion from among the persons qualified to be members of the Provincial Assembly (Article 82) but the Governor ‘shall be appointed by the President’ and he would act ‘subject to the directions of the President’ (Article 66). So the Governor could not act against the direction of the President who could in other words, control the entire administration of the province through the executive authority of the Governor. The President could also dictate who to appoint a minister and who to dismiss. Neither the Governor nor his council of ministers was responsible to the provincial legislature and in the event of a conflict between the Governor and the legislature the matter was to be decided by the National Assembly subject to the concurrence of the President. The Governor’s power was restricted to such an extent that he could not exercise power in any important matter independently. The Governor was also made the constituent part of the provincial legislature (Article 70) without being responsible to it. In the matter of the annual budget and money bills, which were consisdered the most important function of the legislature, its powers were drastically curtailed. It is the Governor who ‘shall cause to lay before the provincial legislature the Annual Budget statement’ and there was no provision in the constitution to reject the statement. If it was a money bill, the bill could not be placed before the legislature without the recommendation of the Governor.

  1. The Power and Function of the President

 

The presidential system envisaged by the 1962 Constitution was unique in character. Unlike the American or French system of election, it provided an indirect election of a President by an electoral college of 80,000 members (40,000 in each province) elected on the basis of adult franchise. But as fat as the powers were concerned, the President of Pakistan undoubtedly enjoyed more than the French or the American President. The suggestion of the Constitution Commission to have a strong legislature to put a check on the exercise of authority by the executive was not accepted by Ayub Khan. As a result the constitution which was enacted by Ayub in his own name in effect provided a constitutional dictatorship. The President once elected became a constituent part of the National Assembly without being responsible to it.

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The President was not accountable to the legislature for his acts. The executive authority of the Republic vested in the President (Article 31) to be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him. He could regulate the allocantion and transaction of the business of the central government and establish ministries, divisions, departments, of that government. The supreme command of the defence services of Pakistan vested in the President (Article 17) with the power of raise and maintain the defence services and resources of those services, to grant commission in those services and appoint the Chief Commander of those services, and determine their salaries and allowances. The President could at any time dissolve the National Assembly (Article 23) subject to two minor limitation : (1) he could not dissolve the same when the unexpired portion of the term of the Assembly was less than 120 days. (2) If a notice of resolution was given to the Speaker of the National Assembly under Article 13 (impeachment of President) and Article 14 (incapacity of the President) after such resolution had been voted upon and after the expiry of 30 days after the expiry of the period within which it could he moved. In such event there would be however a fresh election of the President within 120 days [Article 165 (3)]. In a conflict over any matter between the President and the National Assembly, the President could refer the matter to a referendum in the form of a question that was capable of being answered either by ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The referendum however, was to be conducted amongst the members of the clectoral college only (Article 24). The President could address the National Assembly and send messages to the Assembly.

On the question of assenting to Bills (Article 27) the President had more powers than in the 1956 Constitution. He had ample scope to hinder the law-making process of the legislature casting a further aspersion on the sovereignty of the legislature. If the President declared that he was withholding assent from a Bill and if the National Assembly on reconsideration with or without amendment has passed the bill by two third of the total number of members of the Assembly, the Bill would still require the assent of the President. In the like manner, if the President, had returend the Bill to the National assembly and if the Assembly passed the Bill by at least two-third votes of the total number of members of the Assembly with or without amendment or with such amendment not approved by the President, such Bill required the assent of the President. In none of these cases the assent was automatic. The President could either assent to the Bill or refer the matter for referendum on the question whether such Bill ‘should or should not be assented to’ under Article 24 of the Constitution.

The President also could make laws where the National Assembly stood dissolved or was not in session (Article 29). The President could have a council of ministers to assist him from amongst persons qualified to be elected as members of the National Assembly. But a Governor, a Minister or a Parliamentary Secretary appointed by the President and likewise the Attorney General was to hold office ‘during the pleasure of the President’ and could be removed from office ‘at any time by the President’ without any reason being assigned for such removal (Article 118). Similar power was given to the Governor of a province excepting that the Governor could not remove a minister without the concurrence of the President (Article 119).

Besides the administrative and legislative control which the central government through the President exercised in the matters of the province mentioned earlier, the provision of emergency made in Article 30(b) of the Constitution gave the President also power to proclaim emergency if he was satisfied that ‘a grave situation exists in which the security or economic life of Pakistan is threatened by internal disturbances beyond the power of the previncial government to control.’ In such event the President could also make ordinances (within the legislative competence of the National Assembly) whether the Parliament was dissolved or in session and such ordinances ‘could not be disapproved by the National Assembly.’ Both the proclamation or ordinance made thereunder required to be laid before the National Assembly but it had no time limit. So whether the National Assembly was in session or not, or in existence or not, the president had the supreme authority to make laws and such laws could continue to be in operation as long as he wanted them to be.

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The other interesting aspect of the 1962 Constitution was the matter of financial powers given to the executive instead of the legislature. Article 40 by which the President was empowered to cause the laying of the Annual Budget statement before the National Assembly made different categories of expenditures, such as, recurring, non-recurring and new expenditures. On recurring and non-recurring expenditures the National Assembly would have no power to reject or vote for the items although it could discuss them. The legislature had been given power only with regard to new expenditures and new taxes. By this new procedure the authority of the legislature in financial matters of the state was severely restricted and a completely unchecked authority was granted to the Executive. As far as the money bills were concerned a bill or amendment thereto could not be introduced or moved in the National Assembly except on the recommendation of the President. The financial powers of the State had therefore, been concentrated fully in the hands of the President.

Some supporters of Ayub’s constitution advanced the theory that although the Constitution did not provide much of political autonomy, the concentrated power of the Executive could enable the President to do more justice to East Pakistan in the economic field than under a parliammentary system. They cited the sincere efforts made by Ayub at different stages after 1961 to reduce the economic disparities between East and West Pakistan and particularly reallocation of revenue resources made between the East and West giving 11 crores more to East Pakistan in 1962 on the recommendation of the National Finance Commission. Some other measures were also taken during the regime in the Second Five Year Plan.

In January, 1962 the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was bifurcated and subsequently the railways also. Most of these measures were taken in order to pacify the Bengalis who were opposed to the major recommendations of the Constitution Commission. In the political context these were minor steps and could not be considered as satisfactory solutions from the point of view of the Bengalis. Knowing that the constitution he was proposing to enact was going to raise public opposition the first action Ayub took was to arrest Suhrawardy, the only recognizable leader having influence in both East and West Pakistan, towards the end of January, 1962, five weeks before he enacted the constitution.

Although most of Suhrawardy’s party men in East Pakistan were already in jail and the Awami League was not officially functioning, the reaction of his arrest was nonetheless bitter. In England, the same group which subsequently started the Independent East Pakistan Movement held the biggest ever demonstration in London condemning Ayub’s authoritarian rule. Prior to the demonstration they held a mass meeting at St Pancras Hall and formed the ‘Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan.’ The organization made tremendous impact and was the first one to have been formed immediately after Suhrawardy’s arrest. Being inspired by the successful demonstration in England the youths at home also reacted sharply against Ayub’s proposed constitution.

It is true that during these years and after there had been some industrial development in East Pakistan but the economic disparities between East and West Pakistan were widening more than ever before. The exploitation reached its climax with the establishment of 22 families in West Pakistan under the patronage of the executive authority of Ayub Khan. Moreover, such ‘concessions’ could not be any substitution for the right to participate in the nation’s political and economic life. For example, the National Finance Commission used to be presided over by the Secretary of Finance, a post which no Bengali ever held and after 1951 no Bengali ever occupied the post of the President in Pakistan. So the efforts made by Ayub Khan in the development field of East Pakistan might have had some good results but the basic issues which led to widen the disparities between the two wings remained unresolved.

  1. Failure of the 1962 Constitution

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The 1962 Constitution instead of achieving national harmony brought further disunity between the people of East and West Pakistan, as with its enactment began the process of disintegration of Pakistan as a politically single state. Ayub Khan’s theorists which included mainly a handful of bueraucrats and big businessmen looked at the question of integration of Pakistan as one nation from a completely opposite point of view. To them, instead of distributing the powers between the centre and the province, concentration of powers in the hands of the centre was considered to be more rational. An unrealistic idea that ‘only a strong centre can keep Pakistan together’ was dominating their thoughts. But these theorists either never knew East Pakistan well or they were representing the class of the vested interests. A few academics of East Pakistan were also given jobs by the central government and the big business in different ministries and institutions to propound the same theory. The tragedy of Pakistan was that nobody in power really cared to keep Pakistan together.

In the absence of any constitutional machinery for the participation of the people of different regions of Pakistan to achieve some common political goals and objectives, the essential forces of national integration could no more consolidate. The necessary political understanding regquired for a national unity was now missing and the people of the two regions began to move away from each other very fast. Taking the geopolitical and socio-economic circumstances of the two regions into consideration, Pakistan as a single state could only survive on two fundamental conditions : (1) a political machinery to enable the people of the two regions to take an effective part in the political institutions of the country; and (2) maximum decentralization enabling East Pakistan to run and manage its own economic and cultural affairs. The differences between the people of the two wings could be bridged by taking these two basic measures which the rulers of Pakistan either failed to understand or ignored deliberately.

As a reaction to Ayub’s enactment of the 1962 Constitution in East Pakistan massive students agitations took place all over the province and continued for months raising various demands at different stages. The students burned several hundred copies of the constitution in the course of their demonstrations in the year 1962 demanding the repeal of the constitution and restoration of democracy.4

  1. The First Open Movement of Independence

Seeing the attitude and the policies of the new regime in Pakistan, the Bengalis faced a new reality. Their unfulfilled demands rose since the partition caused an utter frustration. Some even started talking about separation. One of the first groups of people who came forward to openly advocate for a ‘independent East Pakistan’ were the leftist students studying in England. A group originating from an organization called the ‘Uttarshuri’ initiated to form an organization called the ‘East Pakistan House’ propagating for an independent East Pakistan. The group purchased a house with the contribution of the Bengali working community in U.K. at Highbury Hill of North London and named it ‘East Pakistan House.’ Centering round this house other political organizations developed and it soon made an impact both at home and abroad. The house was used for meetings and discussions, publications of the weeklies Asian Tide and Purba Bangla and the rest of the building was used as a hostel for needy students. One of their first booklets published in London preparatory to the formation of this organization was entiled ‘Unhappy East Pakistan.’ It was published by the end of 1962 without any of the initiators’ names on it and it started by saying :

A causal glance at the political development of East Pakistan since independenec convinces any observer about its being in a state of unrest and unhappiness. Indeed, the recent student strike, mass protest and successive demonstrations throughout East Pakistan seem to suggest that its unhappiness had reached a point of climax. Events of momentous significance with a pointer to

45

the future. The causes of unhappiness are no doubt more than one. Besides its dislike for authoritarian rule, its economic condition vis-a-vis that of West Pakistan seems to be the key point to an understanding of the real causes of its unhappiness. ‘Neglect,’ ‘injustices’ and ‘exploitation’ are the symbolic expression that have gained wide currency in enlightened quarters i.e. newspapers, academic circles, people in trade and industry and in the legal profession etc. These slowly crystalizing opinions appear to have had an impact on the Central Government of Pakistan which so far, stubbornly denied these charges. At present even President Ayub himself seems to admit the economic injustice done to East Pakistan.

As a result of the development of these political organizations in U.K. Ayub’s visit to attend the Commonwealth Conference in 1966 was marked with massive protests and demonstration by the Bengali students led by the leaders of the ‘Independent East Pakistan Movement.’ Some of the active workers of this organization were not allowed to come back home for several years after finishing their studies abroad.5

  1. The Role of the Opposition 1962-65

With the war in 1962 between China and India, the balance of power in the sub-continent in relation to international politics was changed. India, the enemy number one of Pakistan was supplied with massive military hardware by the U.S. which was Pakistan’s most trusted ally. Pakistan had to look for atlernative friends and changed its foreign policy towards China. With Ayub’s better relationship with China, the leftists led by Moulana started lending him support and in the process they moved away from the strong position they were holding for the cause of East Pakistan’s autonomy.6 When a political party directly or indirectly supports the government in power it alienates itself from the people who are not happy with the government. In such a case, its role weakens and its support diminishes by the sheer dynamics of politics in any developing country. The NAP was also going through a crisis of inner disputes due to the division in the international communist movement.

Besides Bhashani, therefore, the only other person who could lead the Bengali’s cause was Suhrawardy. But Suhrawardy was a ‘national leader,’ a believer in the integration of Pakistan and as long as he was alive the Awami League’s demands, although predominantly Bengali-oriented, were restricted to the development of Pakistan as a nation. In a way, Suhrawardy was the last person who could link the two wings of Pakistan politically through a constitutional machinery. Because of these two leader’s effective role during that period, the movement for autonomy in East Pakistan suffered from lack of strength and mobilization. The student’s upsurge in 1962 eventually died down as it could not be channelised politically under any national leadership.

Suhrawardy’s role as a constitutional leader representing both the people of East and West Pakistan, therefore, came virtually to an end with the enactment of Ayub’s constitution on March 1, 1962. In 1963 when Suhrawardy came to London for medical treatment he still believed that Ayub’s constitution would go and that a democratic system would be restored in Pakistan and the Awami League would form the government in the centre on an all Pakistan basis. When the members of the ‘East Pakistan House’ went to see him, he scolded them for their secessisionist politics and brushed aside their arguments of exploitation of East Pakistan resourecs to be a ground for separation. In the same year Sheikh Mujib also came to London to look after his leader and take his directions. At this time the students working for an ‘Independent East Pakistan’ had a series of discussions with the latter. Mujib was no doubt more committed for the provincial autonomy than anybody else in his party. But whenever the discussion led to the point of independence, Mujib refused to proceed further. In the end he said ‘as long as the leader (Suhrawardy) in alive I cannot raise any demande for East Pakistan alone. We have to think

46

on an all-Pakistan basis,’ He further said ‘Awami Legaue is a constitutional political party, our demands will be realized through constitutional means. I may be for autonomy but not for independence.’

With the death of Suhrawardy a great political vacuum occurred. The Awami League became almost a regional political party having its main support base in East Pakistan. The NAP was still going through the confusion of international communist movements based on ideological polemics. Inside the country it was however advocating socialism for the whole of Pakistan and continued to lend their support for Ayub Khan for his improved relationship with China. None of the other Political parties had any national base. In a vacuum like this Ayub declared to hold elections for the second term based on the electoral college of the basic democrats. The institution of basic democracy which was introduced long before the consitution was enacted (the law was promulgated on October 26, 1959) had already earned a reputation of being corrupt and self-patronising. Although the Rural works Programme of Ayub’s administration implemented through the basic democrats, achieved some success in the field of development of infratructures in the rural areas, the political insitution he contemplated to develop was a failure. Through this institution a new class of local vested groups was created whoes main job was to make some money for themselves and support the continuation of the very institution on which they were thriving.

The system which Ayub introduced did not allow much scope to other political parties to secure any foothold. It was a strong presidential system based on an indirect franchise exercised by 80,000 basic demoicrats. Ayub being the President himself was in the most advantageous position. The opposition political parties were all opposed to this system and they wanted the restoration of a parliamentary system based on universal adult franchies. So when Ayub announced the Presidential election scheduled for January, 1965 the opposition political parties faced two major problems. One whether to participate in the election at all on the basis of something which according to them, was undemocratic. Two, whether there was any national leader who could fight Ayub Khan within the framework of the electoral college of basic democracy.

After long negotiations, the major opposition political parties at last decided that they had to represent the cause of democracy and therefore, in order to restore democracy it was necessary for them to participate in the so-called election. They formed a ‘Combined Opposition Party’ (COP) to challenge the leadership of Ayub Khan. In order to put up a strong fight, they pursuaded Miss Fatema Jinnah, the sister of the founder of Pakistan, to contest the election for the office of the president. Despite the fact that the presidential election was held on an indirect basis, the campaign showed overwhelming mass support for the opposition. People at large were opposed to Ayub’s autocratic system and considering the public mood many people expected that Ayub would lose the election. But it did not happen because the basic democrats who were the voters (only 80,000 all over Pakistan) and who mattered, had grown a vested interest of their own in the system itself. They could not have voted in favour of Miss Fatema Jinnah as she was campaining for the restoration of democracy and the abolition of the system of basic democracy itself. They could not vote Miss Jinnah to liquidate their own privileged existence.

So Miss Jinnah might have had the support of the people but not of all the basic democrats. But nevertheless, despite all the disadvantage she faced in the system of basic democracy she did quite well. She secured majority votes in Karachi, and in East Pakistan she got majority votes in Dhaka, Sylhet, Comilla and Noakhali. She did better in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan. In West Pakistan Ayub won majority by securing 73 per cent and in East Pakistan 53 per cent. Although Miss Jinnah was from West Pakistan it is interesting to note that she secured 45 per cent votes of the basic democrats in East Pakistan.7

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With the elections over, the Combined Opposition Party, an alliance of the major political parties of Pakistan, however, soon lost its entity. This was the last exercise of mobilising the people of Pakistan on some sort of national basis but because of the inherent defects in the constitution itself, it failed to produce any fruitful result. The defeat in the elections only increased the frustration of the people, particularly in East Pakistan to whom it was considered as the last constitutional scope to take part in the national affairs of the country.

  1. The Widening Disparities

 

By the time exploitation of the resources of the Bengalis was reaching its climax and the economic disparity between the two regions marked the widest gap. Many economists in East Pakistan started proposing a two-economy theory for Pakistan. Behind the widening disparities between East and West Pakistan, the forces of nationalism amongst the Bengalis were taking deeper roots and with political suppression, the urge for a national consolidation was becoming stronger.

The sense of insecurity of the Bengalis arising mainly out of a feeling of being deprived was further aggravated during the war between India and Pakistan in 1965. Pakistan had only half a division of soldiers stationed in the East, a region surrounded by the ‘enemy country’ from three sides. Bengalis were terrified by the thought that India could run over them any time—this made them feel more neglected than ever before. East Pakistan was making the major contribution for the up-keep of the country’s armed forces whereas at the time of war it was left to the mercy of India. India, however, did not attack the eastern province of Pakistan for their own strategic reasons. But the Bengalis now became more aware of the fact that not only 95 per cent of the budget allocation was going to the benefit of West Pakistan but the entire economic benefit of defence employment, industries, workshops, was also being enjoyed by that region.

In East Pakistan the nationalist forces were gradually consolidating their position in the Awami League. Through the election campaign for Miss Jinnah in 1964-65 Mujib realised the depth of Bengali opposition towards Ayub’s constitution and government and the increase in the nationalist sentiments amongst the Bengalis. Economic disparity between the two wings became house-hold topics. In every middle class Bengali family the ‘injustice’ was discussed and resented at dinner time or at breakfast table. Bengali officers mainly belonging to the provincial cadre (EPCS), clerks, teachers, lawyers, engineers, traders, businessmen—all felt and talked about this ‘injustice.’ The Bengali CSPs (officers of highest cadre) and the business community had alreday discovered that the demand for autonomy was bringing quick benefit for them. The stronger the autonomy movement was, the quicker came the promotions, increment in salarise, business licences and sanctions.8 So the students, workers or politicians who were organising meetings and demonstrations were drawing their initial support from the middle class and the rising bourgeoisie emerged mainly during Ayub regime.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Tables Showing the disparities

Table 1

Foreign Exchanges Earning and Trade Balance Between East and West Pakistan (Rupees in crore)

  Foreign Balance Interwing Balance Overall Balance
  East West East (-) West (+) East West
1948-49 14.68 -64.83 12.05 2.63 -52.78
1949-50 24.41 -34.70 18.51 5.90 -16.19
1950-51 75.82 +17.54 20.85 74.97 +38.39
1951-52 32.31 -55.20 18.77 13.54 -36.43
1952-53 26.71 -14.99 6.92 20.69 -8.07
1953-54 35.19 -18.33 23.50 11.69 +5.17
1954-55 41.14 -29.16 10.68 30.46 -18.48
1955-56 68.06 -22.21 9.55 58.51 -12.66
1956-57 9.09 -81.78 19.77 -10.68 -52.01
1957-58 25.25 -88.07 43.29 -18.04 -44.78

Source : Anisur Rahman, “East and West Pakistan : A Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning” Cambridge : Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1968, p. 12.

Table 2

Development Expenditure in East and West Pakistan

 

Period Development Plan Expenditure Outside Plan Expenditure Total Expenditure Development Expenditure in Regional as % of all Pakistan
  Total 1 Public 2 Private 3 Works 4 Programme 5 Programme 6 7 8
East Pakistan
1950/51-1954/55 1,000 700 300 – – 1,000 2,710 20%
1955/56-1959/60 2,700 1,970 730 – – 2,700 5,240 26%
1960/61-1964/65 92,506 250 3,000 – 450 9,700 14,040 32%
1965/66-1969/70 16,560 11,060 5,500 – – 16,560 21,410 36%
West Pakistan Indus Basin Works Programme
1950/51-1954/55 4,000 2,000 200 – – 4,000 11,290 80%
1955/56-1959/60 7,500 4,640 2,930 – – 7,570 16,550 74%
1960/61-1964/65 18,400 7,700 10,700 2,110 200 20,710 33,550 68%
1965/66-1969/70 26,100 10,100 16,000 3,600 – 29,770 51,950 64%

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Source : Report of Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five-Year Plan, Vol. 1, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July 1971.

Table 3

Distribution of Foreign Aid and loans, 1947-48 to 1959-60

 

  East Pakistan West Pakistan Centre Total taka in Crore
Rs. in Crore % of Total Rs. in Crore % of Total Rs. in Crore % of Total
Foreign Development Aid 93.89 17 3335.22 62 113.03 21 542.14
U.S. Community Aid 129.00 30 262.00 64 18.00 6 409.00

Source : Economic Disparities between East and West Pakistan, (1963) Planning Department, East Pakistan, p. 21.

Table 4

Net Resource inflow of Foreign Aid

 

  East Pakistan Rs. m West Pakistan Rs. m Total Rs. m
Second Plan (4 years) 1961-1965 2,582 767 10,255
Third Plan 1965-1970 4,481 6,904* 11,385

* This amount excludes Rs. 1,900 million of foreign assistance received by Pakistan for the Indus Basin Replacement Works in West Pakistan.

Source : Planning Commission, Islamabad, Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Five Years Plan, Vol. 1, July, 1970, p. 110.

Table 5

Central Government Development Outlay 1947-48 to 60-61

 

  East Pakistan

Total (Rs. in Per Capita crore)

 West Pakistan

Total (Rs. in Per Capita crore)
Investment 172 38 430 117
Loans 184 40 224 61
Grants-in-aid 76 15 101 28

Source : Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan, op.cit., p. 18

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Table 6

Distribution of Revenue Expenditure 1947-48 to 1966-61

 

  East Pakistan West Pakistan Unallocable
Rs. in Crore % of Total Rs. in Crore % of Total Rs. in Crore % of Total
Revenue expenditure including working expenses of commercial departments 269 12 995 45 952 43
Revenue expenditure including working expenses of Commercial departments 86 5 616 34 1,138 61

Source : Economic Disparities between East and West Pakistan, op. cit., p. 17.

Table 7

Defence Expenditure (in million of rupees)

 

Year Total Expenditure Defence Expenditure Percentage
1949-50 856 625 73
1959-60 1,847 1,044 55
1965-66 4,498 2,886 64
1966-67 3,776 2,294 60

Source : Pakistan Budget 1968-69, Ministry of Finance

Table 8

Health Services

  Number in East Pakistan Number in West Pakistan
(a) Hospital 76 393
(b) Dispensaries 489 1,754
(c) Beds of Hospitals & Dispensaries 6,984 26,200
(d) Population/Bed ratio 9,000 : 1 2,000 : 1

Source : 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, C.S.O.

Table 9

Per Capita Income

  Total Income

 

 Difference Per Capita Disparity
  E.P.

E.P.

 W.P.

W.P.

 E.P.

E.P.

 W.P.

W.P.

 E.P.

E.P.

 W.P.

W.P.

  
1949-50 (GNP) 12360 12106 +254 287 338 18%
1959-60 (GDP) 14489 17253 -2764 278 366 31%
1967-68 20235 28652 -8417 302 530 75%

Source : Third Five-Year Plan of Pakistan and Economic Survey of East Pakistan.

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Notes

  1. Read P.L.D. 1972, Supreme Court, p. 161.

  1. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1967, pp. 56-8.

  1. The word ‘Islamic’ was added subsequently by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963.

  1. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration, Oxford University Press, Dhaka, p. 158.

  1. The author was the Secretary of this Movement in 1966-67 and was also advised not to return home after completion of the studies.

  1. Bhashani was sent to China by Ayub Khan and in the 1964 election although the NAP joined the CCP, in actually supported Ayub.

  1. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration, op.cit., pp. 151-153.

  1. Following the brutal killing of Asad, a student leader, by police in front of the Dhaka University Campus, five Bengali civil servants were promoted to the rank of central secretary.

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Chapter 5

 

6 Point Formula

 

  1. The Charter of the Autonomy Movement

 

Having considered the weakening position of the NAP, the Awami Leauge’s only riaval party with mass base, Sheikh Mujib decided to capture the public support in the existing vacuum by raising the popular demand for autonomy in more radical and concrete terms. He wanted to take the fullest advantage of the objective conditions of the country. Other than Moulana, all other potential Bengali leaders had lost their contact with the masses. They had alienated themselves from the grass-root organizations. The Jamat-i-Islam had a good organization but failed to gain mass support due to their stand on a ‘strong centre’ and  certain extreme religious views. With the support of the middle class and the rising business community in hand, Mujib proceeded to win the support of the Masses. In February, 1966 in the Awami League Council meeting held at Dhaka, a Six Point Formula for autonomy of East Pakistan was adopted. In the same meeting Mujib was also elected President of the Awami League. In March, 1966 he was in Lahore, the same month and the same city where the famous Lahore Resolution was passed in 1940. In a meeting of the leaders of various political parties, he placed the Formula claiming to have been based on the principles of the Lahore Resolution, to save Pakistan from disintegration. He distributed the few hundred copies of the booklets he carried with him from East Pakistan with an explanatory note in reply to the criticisms already raised from different quarters. The Formula containing the explanatory note was circulated with the sub-title ‘our right to live’ in the name of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the President of the East Pakistan Awami League.1…..

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……measures taken by the government public expression on Six Point died down and the situation became quiet. To the government it appeared that its policy of crushing the Awami League’s Six Point programme was more than successful and the integrity of Pakistan could now be preserved without any hindrance.

Notes

  1. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Six Point Formula, Our Right to Live. Pioneer Press Dhaka, March 23, 1966. The following discussion of the Six Point Formula including the arguments of Mujib is based very closely on this document.

  1. Mission appointed by the U.K. Government to prepare a Constitutional scheme for the decolonization of India.

  1. Pakistan Observer, Dhaka, February 15, 1966.

  1. Pakistan Observer, Dhaka, February 17, 1966.

  1. The Eastern Examiner, Chittagong, March 6, 1966.

  1. Pakistan Observer, Dhaka, February 18, 1966.

  1. Manik Mia was a very powerful and courageous journalist of that time. He was very close to Suhrawardy and used to exercise a lot of political influence on Sheikh Mujib.

  1. The Awami League still observe this day every year.

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Chapter 6

 

The Agartala Conspiracy Case :

A Case for Separation

 

In the early part of 1967 when the political situation appeared to be ‘quiet’ and the country was under ‘complete control’ of the Ayub Government, Monem Khan, Ayub’s Bengali Governor in East Pakistan in collaboration with the central intelligence agencies was probing how the autonomies in the eastern wing could be crushed and eliminated once for all. Secret investigations were conduced for months against some people who were found to be working for the separation of East from West Pakistan with the support of India. A report was finally placed before Ayub Khan in the later part of 1967 with the suggestion that a conspiracy case be formally initiated against certain persons who were up to destroy Pakistan.

It was then argued within the government whether the institution of such a case would serve any substantial purpose by implicating some unknown persons without involving Sheikh Mujib, the arch pioneer of the autonomy movement. According to the investigation of the case some evidence was found to suggest that Mujib also took part in the alleged offence. At last however, at the instance of Monem Khan it was decided that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman should be directly implicated and the central

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government was of the view that the case would expose Mujib and finish him as a political force. Once the people would come to know that Mujib was conspiring to separate East Pakistan with the collaboration of India, he would lose his political ground for good and once that was achieved, the Six Point programme would die its natural death.

The government however, did not come forward to disclose anything to the public till a writ petition was moved on behalf of one Kamaluddin with the allegations that he was detained in military custody and tortured inhumanly. It was also alleged that Kamaluddin’s brother-in-law, Sultanuddin was similarly detained and tortured. For a long time no habeas corpus petition like this one was moved before the High Court and on hearing the application the Division Bench issued a Rule upon the government and subsequently oredered to constitute a medical board consisting of physicians, neurologists and ear specialists to examine the detenu who was to be removed to the Medical College Hospital from government custody at the direction of the court. This petition was first moved on December 11, 1967 and the following day all the newspapers carried some details about the kind of torture that was inflicted uopn the detenu. The news created further alarm and sensation when a second petition was moved by Hasina Kamal, wife of Kamaluddin alleging that her husband was never produced before the Medical Board and submitted that independent doctors not in the employment of the government should be appointed to examine her husband. She also sought direction for the X-raying of arms and hands of the detenu for examination.

When this habeas corbus petition was pending for final hearing the Home Ministry of the central government made an announcement on January 6, 1968 in Rawalpindi saying that 28 persons including two senior CSP officers had been arrested in connection with an anti-national plan unearthed in East Pakistan last month and that they had been conspiring to bring about the secession of East Pakistan. In the list of the 28 persons the name of Kamaluddin appeared at serial no. 9 and Sultanuddin at no. 10. The Press Note issued in Rawalpindi read as follows :2

Twenty-eight persons were allegedly conspiring to bring about the secession of East Pakistan. Some of them were in touch Mr. Ojha, who is the First Secretary of a diplomatic mission in Dhaka and some visited Agartala where they discussed their plans with Lt. Col. Misra, Major Menon and some others.

Their alleged object was to secure a sizeable quantity of arms and ammunition and funds to promote their plan. Evidence has also been obtained that these persons were allegedly in receipt of substantial sums of money which were being routed through some of the arrested persons including Mr. Bhooshan Chowdhury alias Manik Chowdhury who is the Treasurer of the District Awami League, Chittagong.

During investigation most of the persons under detention have confessed the respective part played by them. A large number of documents including a list of arms which were to be secured as a result of the discussion in Agartala have also been seized.

The attempt which these elements were trying to make in order to create chaos has been quashed. Government is conscious of the indignation with which people of both wings of the country have naturally viewed this nefarious design. Government will keep the people informed on the development as the investigation, which is nearly complete, progresses and the case comes up for trial.

On the same day Pakistan Government ordered the immediate withdrawal of Mr. Ojha, First Secretary, Indian High Commissioner on summoning the Indian High commisssioner to the Ministry of

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Foreign Affairs.

On January 18, 1968 another Press Note was issued in Rawalpindi by the Home Ministry saying that all the 28 accused persons who were so far detained under the Defence of Pakistan Rules had now been arrested under Army, Navy and Air Force Acts for ‘substantive offences committed by them under these Acts’ and that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was involved in planning and guidence of this conspiracy. So it took the Pakistan Government some time to decide whether Mujib should be implicated in the case or not. By this press note the Government indicated that there was a case called ‘Agartala Conspiracy Case.’ About Mujib it said, ‘investigation in the case is continuing. Evidence having come to hand about the involvement of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the planning and guidence of the conspiracy, he is also among the arrested persons. He was already in jail under the Defence of Pakistan Rules.3

At a later date the government announced the names of another six persons including Khan M. Shamsur Rahman, a Bengali C.S.P. making the list of 35 persons in total. The addition of Sheikh Mujib’s name to the list changed the character of the proposed trial. As soon as his name appeared the case drew the attention of the people who became curious to know what actually happened and what were the specific charges.

The government took a long time to prepare the case. A large contingent of officers were employed secretly to collect papers, records, documents and any kind of evidence that could be used against the accused persons. Before the government made its first announcement in January, most of the accused persons were already in detention. Excepting only a few, all were tortured in different ways, physically and mentally in order to extract confessional statements and information about other accused persons from them. Government intelligence agents were planted to watch the family members of every accused person and to collect as much information as possible about them. These secret agents went in plain clothes to remote village homes of some of the accused persons and passed days after days to collect incriminating information. More than a million rupees were spent by the Government of Pakistan only to prepare the grounds of the case.

Since the crushing of the Six Point movement in June, 1966 the political situation in the country had become very calm. The western newspapers honoured Ayub Khan by calling hims ‘the strong man of the East.’ At home also the feeling was the same. There was not much of criticism of Ayub Khan in the middle and upper midlle class circles. The Bengali businessmen, although occasionally screaming for more privileges, were getting sufficient to enjoy good life for the first time in Pakistan’s history. University teacher or government officers earning not even Rs. 1000/- a month could afford to buy a brand new Volkswagen with the loan facilities offered by the banks. Ayub’s massive Works Programme infused a hopeful prospect of prosperity in the rural life of Bengal.

The political scene at the national level was clearly under the domination of Ayub’s Convention Muslim League. A few drop-outs of the Awami League had formed the PDM out of frustration but failed to invoke any support from the people. The very few Awami Leagurers who were outside jail were also passing their days in fear. Ayub’s constitutional system created a total political vacuum where politicians and political parties had little role to play in national affairs. In a situation like this when the government announced that it would prosecute Sheikh Mujib and 34 others for conspiring to divide Pakistan and that they would be put on trial, the charge of which claimed up to life, people who were supporting the Six Points became scared. It was feared that more repression would now start and many of the businessmen who helped Mujib and the Awami League at the time of launching the Six Point Formula now withdrew their support. His party workers outside jail who till then used to meet secretly now stopped that also and many of them did not come out of their homes for several weeks.

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In the High Court Bar the situation was the same. Most of the lawyers particulaly those who knew Sheikh personally or were connected with the Awami League showed the least interest in the matter. As a result when the government announced that a special tribunal would be set up for the trial of the accused persons, no lawyer was found to sign for the defence of Sheikh. At last, three young lawyers who had nothing to do with the Awami League of Sheikh Mujib decided to act for his defence.5 We were interested to defend Sheikh primarily because of his sacrifice for the cause of the Bengalis. No senior lawyer came forward to defend Sheikh for several months.

We thought we should first talk to Mrs. Mujib. It was an evening towards the end of January, 1967 when we went to call on her. Her house looked desolate in dim lights and she appeared to be very lonely. When we proposed that we would like to engage a British lawyer for the defence of Sheikh, Mujib’s wife could not believe it. Having seen our earnestness she burst open in tears. She said, ‘even a crow does not fly now over our house. Our friends and relatives avoid going through this road we live in. I do not know anyone of you, why are you taking so much risk?’ Mujib’s wife was convinced that her husband would be finished this time and she would perhaps not see him again. Since Mujib was taken out by the Army on January 18, nobody knew where he was, not even his family members. So our proposal was something which she did not expect to hear. She was more interested to know whether Mujib was still alive or not. We called no Mrs. Mujib several times and at last with the intervention and support of Manik Mia we could obtain her consent to organise her husband’s defence. After nearly four weeks Mujib’s wife finally authorised me to go ahead with the scheme. She came to my house one day very late at night and handed over a signed uakalatnama (Warrant of Attorney). The sole responsibility of engaging a British lawyer therefore fell on me.

Mr. Thomas Williams (now Sir Thomas) Q.C., M.P. was engaged through a reputed firm of solicitors, ‘Bernard Sheridan,’ of London, with the active co-operation of some Bengalis residing in England. Once again it was the leftist students associated with the East Pakistan House and ‘Independent East Pakistan’ movement, who took the initiative and made the engagement of Tom Williams possible. The whole matter of engaging a British lawyer which took several months to finalise was kept secret till The Times of London published the news.

So once again the attitude of the left in England differed with those who were in leadership at home. At home the left was supporting the Ayub Government for its China policy and many of them openly criticised the Six-Point movement. When the proposed trial was announced some of them were happy thinking Mujib would now be eliminated from politics for good which would enable them to dominate the political scene. The left abroad were more nationalistic in approach and thought that progress would only be made by going through the bourgeois democratic revolution arising out of Bengali nationalism.

  1. The Constitution of a Special Tribunal

In the meantime the government promulgated the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Tribunal) Ordinance, 1968 on April 21 laying down the law and procedure under which the trial was to take place. It provided the constitution of a Special Tribunal consisting of one chairman being a judge, sitting or not, of the Supreme Court and two members, being a Judge or having been a Judge of a High Court. The most distinctive feature of this Ordinance was that it created some special rules of evidence by excluding certain provisions of the Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code which were part of the established law for about a century6 Section 9 of the ordinance provided that the Special Tribunal could receive in evidence :

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(a) any statement recorded by a Magistrate being a Statement made by any person who, at the time of the trail, is dead, or whose attendance cannot be procured without any amount of delay or expense which is unreasonable in the circumstances; and

(b) any statement made by a person who is examined at the trail whether as a witness or as an accused person which has been recorded by a police officer in the course of the investigation of the case under trial.

These not only changed the established law but put the accused persons in a position of great disadvantage. It raised doubt as to whether there would be any fair trial. These provisions aroused wide-spread criticism in the Bar Associations of both the wings of the country and resolutions were passed to amend the provisions in order to ensure a fair trial. Peter Hazelhurst sent a despatch from Dhaka published in The Times of London containing the criticism of the provisions of the law relating to the trial and with that the matter for the first time came to the notice of the outside world. In the face of such severe criticisms, Section 9 was subsequently amended by Ordinance VI of 1968 on June 6, 1968. The statement made before a police officer during the investigation would no more be admissible evidence but still a statement made before a Magistrate during investigation was made admissible in evidence if that person was dead at the time of trial or whose attendance could not be procured without an amount of delay or expense which was unreasonable in the circumstances.

Besides Section 9 there were other provisions also in the ordinance which were different from the normal law and procedures, such as, right to bail, appeal, trial by jury, disjoinder of parties, etc. and criticism of all these were published in newspapers discreetly bringing them to the notice of the public. With all the these activities and press reports more lawyers came forward to show interest in the case and the public at large became more curious to know about its development. The fact that the government was yet not coming forward with the specific charges and not fixing a date for hearing also created some doubts as to whether the trial would be held at all.

  1. The Case of the Prosecution :

Government’s Formal Charge

At last however, the trial commenced on June 19, 1968 before a Special Tribunal constituted under Ordinance V of 1968 with Justice S.A. Rahman (former Chief Justice of Pakistan) as the Chairman and Justice M.R. Khan of the supreme Court and Justice Muksumul Hakim of the East Pakistan High Court as members. Mr. Manzur Quadir, once a Foreign Minister of Pakistan and an eminent Punjabi lawyer was appointed as the Chief Prosecutor. The Court Room was set up inside Dhaka Cantonment sorrounded by army barracks. It was as army canteen now plastered and painted with air conditioners and fans fitted in. A space separated by a thick round wooden bar was marked for the accused persons to sit with 35 chairs in it. The atmosphere gave a compact and solemn look. The press was allowed to cover the proceedings all through the trial and the accused persons had the opportunity of appointing lawyer of their own choice.

The government submitted a 42-page formal charge with two heads and some annexures giving lists of the accused persons, of witnesses, documents, articles and the code names of the accused persons. The charges were that the accused persons had conspired ‘to deprive Pakistan of a part of its territories, mainly the province of East Pakistan, by an armed revolt with weapons, ammunition and funds provided by India and to establish therein an independent government recognised by India’ which was contrary to Section 121A of Pakistan Penal Code, and that they abetted ‘the committing of a mutiny’ by members of the armed forces by seducing them from their allegiance and duties, contrary to Section 131 of the Pakistan Penal Code :7 the said offences where alleged to have been committed between 1964 and 1967.

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According to the prosecution, documents produced by or recovered from some of those persons, contained code names of some of the important participants in the conspiracy, specifications and quantities of the arms and ammunition required for the purpose of the conspiracy, instructions for the task to be done before the ‘D’ day, instructions for the ‘D’ day and other memoranda. The main plan of action was to capture ‘the armouries of military units so as to paralyse them and the actions was to be carried out in commando style and surprise was to compensate for the lack of man power.’ The prosecution maintained that the task to be performed in this connection included;

(i) enlisting of men from among the armed forces, ex-servicemen and civilians who could be effectively subverted to build up an armed spearhead.

(ii) securing of arms and funds from local sources in addition to those to be provided in India.

(iii) creating of general political dissatisfaction by propaganda; and

(iv) fixing an opportune moment as the ‘D’ day to take over strategic points by force.

In paragraph 4, the prosecution submitted that in pursuance of their objective, a meeting was arranged between the representatives of those who had to conduct the operations in Pakistan with the representatives of India who were to supply the funds, arms and ammunition. This meeting took place at Agartala in India on July 12, 1967. The government submitted a list of II persons as approvers who were pardoned under Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a list of 82 documents out of which 12 were letters, 2 were copies of telegrams, one piece of paper on which the words ‘Bangladesh,’ ‘Betar Bani’ etc. were written dated nil, one piece of paper containnig the words ‘Bengal Air Force’ dated nil, one provincial map of East Pakistan mounted and folded, some hotel bills, cheques, vouchers, etc., four sheets of paper giving description of arms and ammunition, a list of 10 articles and a list of 200 witnesses. Kamaluddin who was arrested and tortured in December, 1967 was now made a witness. After the opening session the proceedings were adjourned for about four weeks allowing the defence to prepare the case.

  1. Defence Committee

The case of the government was now clear. On the following day the press at home and abroad gave a leading coverage, some of which furnished details of the facts on which the charges were based, creating a good deal of interest in the minds of the people. The engagement of Tom Williams was confirmed and made public which also increased the interest of lawyers in the case. Mr. Salam Khan, a distinguished lawyer in criminal law was now engaged to lead the defence with the local lawyers. In order to achieve some cohesive line of action the lawyers formed a defence committee for the accused persons of the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The arrival of Tom Williams in the third week of July, 1968 generated more courage and enthusiasm among the lawyers and the people started showing support for the accused persons. Altogether about 25 lawyers were engaged in the conspiracy case including Tom Williams, some accused being defended by more than on lawyer. Most of the lawyers were engaged by individual accused persons and some acted without any remuneration at all. It was decided that as it was not possible for Tom Williams to attend the entire trial, he would mainly take up the constitutional aspects of the trial and Mr. Salam Khan would lead the defence in the rest of the trial.8

Accordingly, Tom Williams challenged the validity of the proceedings before the Tribuanl on the ground that the ordinance’s under which the Tribunal was supposed to function was ultra vires of the constitution. The Tribunal however, did not accept the contention of the defence on the ground that to

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challenged the ordinance’s vires other constitutional procedures were available. As far as this Tribunal was concerned, it could not entertain objections to its own jurisdiction as raised by Tom Williams.

  1. Writ Petition Challenging the Validity of the Tribunal

The next step was therefore, to move a writ petition in the High Court under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution challenging the validity of the proceedings pending before the Tribunal.

In this petition which was moved on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the provisions of the Ordinance V of 1968 were pointed out to be contradictory to the established law and the constitution. The main grounds taken in the writ petition were as follows :

That the ordinance purporting to set up the Tribunal and govern its powers and procedures was null and void being in part offensive to the general intension of the constitution, in part extra constitutional and in part ultra vires.

(i) the ordinace were beyond the scope and purview of the provision of Article 30 of the constitution which related to legislative powers of the President in an emergency arising out of certain specified conditions and to meet certain specific conditions. Promulgating an ordinance like this to set up a Tribunal to try the accused persons of offences which could otherwise be tried by courts already established by law under due process of law was not legislation which could be said to be necessary to meet the emergency as the preamble of the ordinance suggested.

(ii) the ordinance was in gross violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 2 and article 6 of the Constitution. Article 2 of the 1962 Constitution guaranteed the right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law. It was the inalienable right of a citizen to annoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law. Article 6 provided that any law inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights was to be void.9

(iii) the ordinance was retrospective in nature purporting to authorise the punishment of the accused person who was not punishable at the time of offence alleged to have been committed and it purported to inflict punishment which was likely to be greater and different both in nature and kind violating the provisions of Article 4 of the Constitution.10

(iv) the ordinance purported to take away the rights of the accused person to be tried by a jury and the right to prefer application for bail, appeal or review and other right which were available to him at the time of offence alleged to have been committed by him.

The High Court in Dhaka presided over by the Chief Justice admitted the application by issuing a Rule Nisi calling upon the respondents including the Government of Pakistan to show cause why the proceedings pending before the said Tribunal purporting to try Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others under Ordinance V of 1968 would not be declared illegal, being without lawful authority and of no legal effect and why a direction would not be made quashing the entire proceedings. The Rule was, however, never heard as the hearing was not pressed by the lawyers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for strategic reasons. The Court would generally be reluctant in interfering in such proceedings of a special nature. The country was still under emergency and it was a matter of great legal controversy whether the fundamental rights which were suspended during the emergency could be invoked to declare a piece of legislation Ultra vires of the constitution and whether the President could promulgate Ordinance V of 1968 under the garb of emergency.

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However, the issue of the Rule on the writ petition itself had gained wide publicity and gave confidence in the minds of the lawyers who were engaged in the defence of the accused persons. The public also became more aware of the case and the visit of Tom Williams made a tremendous impact both from the political and the publicity point of view. After Tom Williams had left, the attention of the press was again focussed on the proceedings of the main case at the cantonment. Everyday for months the newspapers were publishing the proceedings of this conspiracy case. The case of the prosecution, the examination and cross-examination of witnesses were read by the public with keen interest. The people gradually came to realise that some of their countrymen were being prosecuted for something they wanted to do for the people of East Pakistan. Through these proceedings they came to learn how the accused persons tried to end the exploitation of the East by West Pakistan, how they planned to organise and armed revolt and what risk some of them took in procuring arms and ammunition. It was almost like a re-orientation course for the Bengalis on a national scale—everyday they were reading the stories of exploitation and injustices done to them and what all these accused persons wanted to do to stop them.

To some people it was an alibi, a farcical trial designed only to suppress the Bengalis and kill the nationalist movement in East Pakistan for good. Excepting Sheikh Mujib, the others were unknown people having no political roots and a plan like the one alleged could not be materialised by these individuals. They neither had the leadership nor the manpower to perform such a stupendous work. Most of the accused persons were lower-category personnel having not much knowledge of politics or revolution. To them it might have been at best an act of patriotism to organise something to liberate East from West Pakistan. In the absence of any democratic process this was the only way some Bengalis thought they could get rid of the West Pakistani domination. There was an element of adventurism also—they got the idea that through arned revolt the West Pakistan government in East Pakistan could be overthrown and in order to achieve that they could procure arms and ammunition with the assistance of India. Whatever might have been the view of different sections, the overall public reaction was one of sympathy towards the accused persons who appeared committed to advance the cause of the Bengalis. Sentiments grew more in their favour because of the prevailing economic and political conditions in the country. Through these proceedings a new wave of nationalism reached the minds of the people of East Pakistan. For the government, the whole effort of staging the trial became counter-productive.

Involvement of the Indian government in the alleged conspiracy became merely an ancillary matter in the context of the ultimate cause. Technically, taking the facts into consideration, the prosecution case was not a very strong one and evidence against Mujib and some others was so weak that they could be exonerated from the charges if the trial was concluded fairly and without any pressure from the government. Compared to the publicity given, the money spent by the government and the importance that was attached to it, the case was more a peripheral one.

  1. Money Transaction

According to the prosecution’s own statement the money shown to have been actually realised for the party fund during the entire conspiracy period of 1964-67 amounted to only Rs. 40,400. Out of this amount P.N. Ojha, First Secretary of the Indian High Commission stationed in Dhaka paid Rs. 15,000 in total in two instalments. The alleged money transaction was as follows :

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Para No

in Formal Charge

 Amount Date Source
10 2000 Aug. 65 Sultan
13 700 Sept. 1, 65 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to St. Mujib
14 4000 Sept. 9, 65 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to St. Mujib
20 3000 Feb. 66 Manik Chowdhury to Amir Hossain
21 300 Feb. 66 To pay Samad—Muazzam writing Amir Hossain from group fund
24 700 Feb. 66 Mohsin to St. Mujib at the direction of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
31 5500 March 31, 66 Ahmed Fazlur Rahman to Amir Hossain
32 4000 April 3, 66 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to St. Mujib in Presence of Amir Hossain
33 2000 April 4, 66 Ruhul Quddus to St. Mujib
37 1500 April 4, 66 Manik to Sultan at the direction of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
39 8000 April 6, 66 Amir to Muazzam from group fund
59 5000 Aug. 66 Muazzam to Rameez from group fund
64 2000 Oct. 66 Mohsin to St. Mujib
69 5000 March 10, 67 Ojha to Muazzam, Manik, Sayedur
70 10000 March 31, 67 Ojha to Muazzam, Manik, Sayedur
73 25000 March, 67 Muazzam to Rameez from group fund

The total amount was Rs. 78,700 including all transactions which included funds both received and paid. Actual amount realised for the party fund was only Rs. 40,400. The rest Rs. 38,300 shown as transacted presumably came out from the fund as realised above.

  1. Arms and Ammunition :

Preparation of the Conspirators

As far as the arms and ammunition were concerned one dummy hand grenade was shown to have been in the possession of the conspirators, although a list of arms and ammunitions was shown in a document recovered from the alleged conspirators.

There was a lot of talking about the purchase of small arms and supply of arms and ammunition by India but in evidence nothing was shown other than the dummy hand grenade. In paragraph 56 it was alleged ‘P.N. Ojha, assured Muazzam, accused No. 2, that he would forward the arms list to the Indian government for their approval.’ In paragraph 61 the prosecution stated ‘P.N. Ojha told Muazzam, accused NO. 2, that the Indian government had agreed to supply arms to the conspirators and that he would inform Muazzam, accused No. 2. in due course of the date on which the arms and ammunition would be delivered.’ In paragraph 89 it alleged ‘P.N. Ojha informed them that till the election of the Prime Minister of India, the date for the supply of arms and ammunition could not be fixed.’11 In paragraph 70, it stated that ‘P.N. Ojha disclosed that Indian government felt that prior to the supply of arms and ammunition, a meeting between the conspiratorial group and some officials was necessary,’ (March 3, 1967) and lastly in paragraph 70, the prosecution stated ‘P.N. Ojha pretended to Muazzam, accused No. 2, that he had not received the result of the Agartala meeting from his government till then’ (July), 1967. He however,

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quietly confided in Manik Chowdhury, accused No. 12, that the Indian officials were not satisfied with the calibre of the delegates. And that was the end of the story of supply of arms and ammunition from India.

As far as the armed preparation of the group was concerned the only relevant statement made was in paragraph 78. At the conclusion of the meeting12 Mahfizullah, accused No. 7, took out a dummy hand grenade from his pocket and gave a demonstration of its throwing. He asked the group members to practise the same. He left the had grenade for that purpose in the house of Jalil, accused No. 29. He said that he would start training in the use of small arms on receipt of the same. In paragraph 16, Ahmed Fazlur Rahman, accused No. 6, ‘undertook to procure transistorised transmitters, from the United Kingdom.’ In the entire formal charge there was not even one statement saying that the group had actually procured any arms.

  1. Role of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the Conspiracy

As far as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was concerned, his name was added for political reasons. Although he was alleged to be the leader and accused No. 1. in the conspiracy, the prosecution’s statement itself showed that Lt. Col. Muazzam Hossain, accused No.2 played the most important role and he (Sheikh Mujib) was only a secondary character in the organisational set-up of the alleged revolutionary group. Long before Sheikh Mujib came into the picture Muazzam along with a few others like Steward Mujib13, accused No. 3. Sultanuddin, accused No. 4, Noor Muhammad, accused No. 5, were already in the ‘process of forming an organization to work for the independence of East Pakistan.’

The main allegations against Mujib were :

  1. i) Between September 15 and 21, 1964 Mujib while on a visit to Karachi was invited to attend a meeting convened by Muazzam who earlier had decided to consult him (Mujib) in connection with a plan to form a revolutionary organization for taking over East Pakistan. Muazzam claimed to have already formed a militant force comprising East Pakistan elements in the Navy ‘for making East Pakistan an independent State.’ Muazzam in this meeting sought support and co-operation of the political leaders and civil service officials. Sheikh Mujib not only agreed but said that his own idea was the same. When Ahmed Fazlur Rahman, accused No. 6, said that he was not sure as to what the reaction of India would be Mujib said that ‘that was his concern.’ Mujib however, advised them to go ahead because such action might not be necessary if the opposition won the presidential election. Persons present were Muazzam, Steward Mujib, Sultanuddin, Noor Mohammad, Ahmed Fazlur Rahman, and Muzammil Hossain witness No. 1.

(ii) When Mujib was again in Karachi in Janurary, 1965 he attended a meeting at the house of Muazzam. In this meeting Mujib said that ‘the only way in which the people of East Pakistan could live honourably was to separate themselves from West Pakistan.’ He promised full support and monetary assistance and urged Muazzam to shift his headquarters to East Pakistan and to expedite the activities of the revolutionary group.14

(iii) Muazzam in consultation with Sheikh Mujib through St. Mujib, accused No. 3, and Sultan, accused No. 4, arranged to have a meeting on August 29, at Mujib’s Dhanmondi residence. In the meeting Muazzam claimed that under the guidence and blessings of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman he had enlisted a larged number of serving and released personnel of the armed forces who had undertaken to make East Pakistan an independent state. Muazzam stressed the need of funds and arms and ammunition and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman ‘assured them of the requisite help from

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India.’ Mujib undertook to provide for the time being one lac rupees to Muazzam in instalments of Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 4,000 to be collected by St. Mujib and Sultan.15 Persons present were Muazzam, St. Mujib, Sultan, Ruhul Quddus and Amir Hossain.

(iv) On September 1, 1965 St. Mujib, accused No. 3 obtained a sum of Rs. 700 from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at this Dhanmondi House.16

(v) On September 9, 1965 (in the middle of the war between Pakistan and India) St. Mujib obtained Rs. 4,000 from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.17

(vi) In a meeting of the group held in December, 1965 the progress made was discussed and the role played by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was praised.18 Out of five who attended the meeting Amir Hossain, witness No. 3 was present.

(vii) Muazzam gave Amir Hossain, witness No. 3 a map and a list of arms and ammunitions to be handed over to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on his demand.19

(viii) On February 6, 1966 in a party meeting held at Miska Hotel, Chittagong, in the room of Amir Hossain, witness No. 3, Manik Chowdhury, accused No. 12, and Sayedur Rahman, witness No. 7,20 told Amir Hossain, witness No. 3 that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had directed them to extend their whole-hearted support to the group.21

(ix) In a letter dated February 25, 1966 allegedly written by Muazzam to Amir Hossain, witness No. 3, Muazzam wrote that ‘he had discussed everything with ‘Parash’ (code name of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) and that there was nothing to worry about.’

(x) On February 25, 1966 after addressing a public meeting in Chittagong Lal Dighi Maidan, Mujib convened a meeting of the group at 12, Rafiquddin Siddiqui Lane, Enayet Bazar, Chittagong and asked Sayedur Rahman, witness No. 7 to provide a place for holding the meeting of the group. This meeting was attended by St. Mujib, Manik Chowdhury and Sayedur Rahman.

(xi) In the same month (February, 1966) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman tapped another source for financial assistance for the group, Mohsin, witness No. 11, was providing funds to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman previously and now Mujib asked him (Mohsin) for money for the group. Accordingly, after two or three days St. Mujib obtained Rs. 700 from Mohsin in two instalments.22

(xii) On March, 12, 1966 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called another meeting of the group at the residence of Tajuddin23 who was not present himself. Sheikh Mujib collected most of those who had to attend the meeting from a bus-stop in a van. The meeting was attended by Muazzam, St. Mujib, Ruhul Quddus and Amir Hossain, witness No. 3. In the meeting Muazzam expressed the hope that on the ‘D’ day the entire public of East Pakistan would be behind them. All the participants agreed that the stage had arrived when the members of the conspiracy should be provided with and trained in the use of arms. Arrangement for sending some of their representatives to India to discuss the arms deal with Indian officials were also considered.24

(xiii) On April 3, 1966 St. Mujib, accused No. 3 and Md. Amir Hossain, witness No. 3, went to the residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and told him that more funds were needed to purchase small arms and ammunitions for the group. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman gave Rs. 4,000 to St. Mujib who delivered the same amount to Amir Hossain, witness No. 3.25

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(xiv) Muazzam in a letter dated April 6, 1966 asked Amir Hossain, witness No. 3, to prepare a budget. Amir Hossain not being conversant with the technical details of arms decided not to prepare the budget until it was demanded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.26

(xv) Manik Chowdhury, accused No. 12, in April, 1966 called at the residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who asked Manik Chowdhury to give money to Sultan, accused No. 4, who was already there. Three days later, Sultan called on Manik Chowdhury at Chittagong who gave the latter Rs. 1,500 for the purpose of the conspiracy.27

(xvi) On May 6, 1966 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested under section 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules28 in connection with certain activities which were unconnected with the conspiracy.29

In the rest of the statement of the prosecution which runs up to 100 paragraphs Mujib’s name was not mentioned nor any allegation was recorded against him excepting one that in a meeting held after his arrest in June/July.30 Corporal Zamil, witness No. 14, said that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and some high ranking civil officers had vitalized their activities. So allegations against Mujib ended for all practical purposes in paragraph 41 of the formal charge. Moreover, according to the prosecution case the meeting between the conspirators and the Indian officials took place on July 12, 196731 when Mujib was already in jail for over a year.

It should not be difficult to see for any person having knowledge of criminal law and practice in the sub-continent that such allegations as stated generally do not lead to conviction. Hearsay and indirect evidence do not constitute good evidence and mere statements recorded through hearsay do not constitute a conspiracy in law. Mujib allegedly attended two meetings in Karachi, two meetings in Dhaka and on in Chittagong in which he made some statements and promises; gave some money himself and asked some others like Manik Chowdhury and Mohsin to pay money to the group. In the first two meetings in Karachi, Muzammil, witness No. 1, was the only witness. In the Chittagong meeting, Sayedur Rahman witness No. 7, and in the Dhaka meeting Amir Hossain, witness No. 3, were the only witnesses respectively. About actual payment by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (which amounted to Rs. 8,700) 32 witness No. 3, Amir Hossain was allegedly present on only one occasion and the rest was stated by way of mere statements. In his cross-examination, however, Amir Hossain said ‘I myself never got any money from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.’ About arms and ammunition there was no statement made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman directly.

As far as documentary evidence against Sheikh Mujib was concerned there was (i) a diary allegedly given by Muazzam to Amir Hossain, witness No. 3, where a list of code names33 was found with Mujib’s name appearing at No. 6 as ‘Parash’ and (ii) a letter written to Amir Hossain in which Muazzam wrote ‘he had discussed everything with ‘Parash’ and there was nothing to worry about.’34 Against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman other than Muzammil, Sayedur Rahman and Amir Hossain, Mohsin was the other witness. Out of these four, Mohsin’s deposition did not help the prosecution35 and the first three were approvers who were pardoned under Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code36 from prosecution for making in effect, favourable statements testifying the involvement of other accused persons. The defence asserted that these witnesses were procured by blackmail, intimidation and force and their statements were false. Amir Hossain, the main prosecution witness in his cross-examination said : ‘I know that if I do not stick to my statement made to the Magistrate while giving evidence in the court I will have to forteit my pardon and go to jail.’ In their deposition upon cross-examination not much credibility was left and their statements were turn into pieces by Abdus Salam Khan, the versatile advocate in criminal law. Prosecution’s strongest witness in this conspiracy case was Amir Hossain, witness No. 3 but in the cross-examination he was exposed to a lot of contradictions. On arms and

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ammunition Amir Hossain confessed : ‘I never saw any arms and ammunition during my association with the organisation.’ The other important witness for prosecution, Kamaluddin, witness No. 2 was declared hostile as his deposition went against the prosecution.

In his statement to the Tribuanl Mujib pleaded not guilty.37 He called the case ‘a conspiracy against me, my party and the rights of the Bengalis to live honourably.’ Mujib denied to have anything to do with this so-called conspiracy. He narrated his entire political background and the political system he believed in. He never saw the accused persons before coming to this court excepting the three civil servants he came to know when he was a Minister, but said : ‘I never discussed politics with them, and the ‘two Awami Leagurers Manik Chowdhury and Sayedur Rahman were just ordinary workers as the hundreds of them I have.’ Before coming to this court, Mujib claimed, ‘I never met Muazzam Hossain, Amir Hossain, Sultanuddin Ahmed, Kamaluddin Ahmed, St. Mujibur Rahman, St. Sergent Hafizullah and the personnel of armed forces who are accused in this Case.’ Mujib denied to have gone to the house of Muazzam Hossain and Kamaluddin at Karachi or to any meeting at their houses.

I had never any discussion with anyone in connection with this so-called conspiracy. None of these men ever came to my house and I never paid any money to anyone connected with the conspiracy. Never I asked Manik Chowdhury or Sayedur Rahman to help the so-called conspiracy. In my party I have three Vice Presidents, 44 executive committee members, one General Secretary and 8 Secretaries. I have in my party ex-Ministers, Members of Legislative Assembly, Parliament; in Chittagong also, among the city and district President’s Secretaries there are members of Assembly and Parliament, some of them are wealthy and influential. It is impossible that I would ask an ordinary businessmen like Manik Chowdhury or a LMF38 doctor Sayedur Rahman for any help. Moreover, Sayedur Rahman has been expelled from the party in 1965 for contesting against the Awami League nominated candidate. I never went to Sayedur Rahman’s house.

In his statement Mujib further emphasised :

The Awami League is a constitutional democratic political party and I am the President of that party. I hold no faith an unconstitutional politics. We have a political and economic programme. I wanted justice for both the wings of Pakistan through my Six-Point Formula. Whatever I thought would be good for the country I disclosed it to the public in a constitutional manner. I have always been harassed by the rulers and self-seekers. By suppressing me and my party the ruling class wants to continue with their exploitation of people of Pakistan and particularly that of East Pakistan. In April, 1966 I was arrested three times. In May, I was arrested under DPR and since then I am in jail. I was kept in military custody in complete isolation for long five months. I have been implicated in this case out of vengeance. It has been done only to defame, insult and humiliate my party in public eye. The main purpose of this trial is to disrupt and suppress the demand for justice made by me through Six-Point programme. This is a conspiracy against me.

With his long statement published in the newspapers the following day, Mujib, who was to be transported for life for waging a war against the Pakistan Government, emerged to have committed no crime. As far as the Bengalis were concerned he was now regarded as honourable as a martyr.

Mujib’s statement when published, made an extra-ordinary political impact although he did not speak the whole truth. It was not true that Mujib did not know Lt. Commander Muazzam Hossain, Sultanuddin, Kamaluddin, Steward Mujib and some other leading members of this group prior to his arrest. It was also not true that he did not meet them in some meetings or he did not discuss politics with the three senior Bengali civil servants. There was not much of doubt in the fact that Mujib also knew the

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the plan of this group39 Mujib reportedly went to Agratala also secretly some time in 1966 but it is not known whether the visit had anything to do with the conspiracy.40

In conclusion as far as Mujib’s personal involvement in the conspiracy it concerned, it was evident that even if the prosecution case is taken as a true story, he played a role of only a politician and not of a revolutionary committed to organise as armed revolt. His political background and the class character of his relatively strong political party in existence did not suggest so Lt. Commander Muazzam Hossain of Pakistan Navy was the architect of the plan.

  1. Role of India in the Conspiracy

 

Besides some loose and uncorroborated statements made in relation to the help from India in certain paragraphs, India’s participation directly appeared first in paragraph 42 and that was after the arrest of Mujib. The prosecution stated that there was an emergent meeting of Awami League at his (Mujib’s) residence. Before attending the meeting Manik Chowdhury took Sayedur Rahman, an approver and witness No. 7 to P.N. Ojha, First Secretary of the Indian High Commission stationed in Dhaka at his office and Ojha noted down the particulars of Sayedur Rahman and asked him to visit him afterwards. Sayedur Rahman came out of office and Manik Chowdhury stayed behind for some time.

In July, 1966 Muazzam disclosed to Sayedur Rahman, witness No. 7 that Manik Chowdhury before his arrest (Manik was arrested on May 21, 1966 under the Defence of Pakistan Rules in connection with certain activities unconcerned with the conspiracy)41 had promised to deliver a list of arms to P.N. Ojha for procuring arms for the conspiracy. Muazzam asked Sayedur Rahman if he knew P.N. Ojha when Sayedur Rahman answered in the affirmative. Muazzam requested him to deliver the arms list to Ojha but Sayedur Rahman expressed his inability to do so, on account of the surveillance imposed upon him.42

After a few days one morning Ojha appeared at the residence of Sayedur Rahman at Chittagong and complained to him that in spite of his request, Sayedur Rahman did not call at his office in Dhaka. On that occasion Sayedur Rahman conveyed to Ojha the message of Muazzam regarding the arms list which Manik Chowdhury was to deliver to Ojha.43

The next day under the instruction of Ojha, Sayedur Rahman obtained the list from Muazzam and delivered the same to Ojha at Chittagong railway station.44 At that time Ojha gave a code word to Sayedur Rahman for contacting him in Dhaka and asked that Muazzam should visit him at Dhaka.45

A few days later, Muazzam, accused No. 2, Through Sayedur Rahman arranged a meeting with Ojha at the official residence of the Deputy High Commissioner for India at Dhanmondi.46 Ojha assured Muazzam that he would forward the arms list to the Indian Government for their approval. He (Ojha) however, expressed his inabilitiy to deliver any money to the conspirators for the time being.47

In September, 1966 for the second time, Sayedur Rahman arranged a meeting between Muazzam and Ojha at the latter’s residence in Dhanmondi. Ojha told Muazzam that the Indian Government had agreed to supply arms to the conspirators and that he would inform Muazzam in due course of the date on which the arms and ammunition would be delivered.48

In October, 1966 Sayedur Rahman arranged a third meeting between Muazzam and Ojha at the latter’s residence at Dhanmondi, Dhaka. Ojha regretted that due to the impending general election in India, the date for supply of arms and ammunition could not be fixed. Ojha advised the conspirators to wait for the supply of arms till the conclusion of the general election of India.49

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In March, 1967 Muazzam arranged his fourth meeting with Ojha through Manik Chowdhury (who was released from detention on January 23)50 at the residence of Ojha in Dhaka. On March 10, Muazzam Manik Chowdhury and Sayedur Rahman met Ojha who informed them till the election of the Prime Minister of India, a date for the supply of arms and ammunition could not be fixed. Ojha enquired about their progress. At the conclusion of the meeting Ojha gave them Rs. 5,000 in cash.51

On March 31, 1967 Muazzam along with Manik Chowdhury met Ojha for the fifth time at Ojha’s residence in Dhaka. In that meeting Ojha disclosed that the Indian Government felt that prior to the supply of arms and ammunition, a meeting between the representatives of the conspirational group and some officials from India was necessary. Ojha suggested Agartala (India), which was not far from the Pakistan border in the Eastern wing, as the venue for the meeting. He asked Muazzam to propose the names of three representatives. Ojha gave Rs. 10,000 on this occastion also.52

In the third week of June, 1967 Muazzam sent Manik Chowdhury to Dhaka and gave him an envelope for delivering the same to Ojha which Manik did in the same evening. The envelope contained the code word names of the crossing places and the names of the delegates—Muhammad Ali Reza and Steward Mujibur Rahman,53 Reza as the leader.

On July 11 the two nominated delegates along with three other accused persons reached Feni and stayed in Hotel Denofa located near Feni railway station. In the same evening St. Mujib asked Rameez, witness No. 12 on the telephone (who was working with PIA in Chittagong) to come to Feni and accordingly, Rameez along with Anwar Hossain, witness No. 20 reached Feni in PIA staff car.54

On July 12 between 2.30 and 4.30 p.m. Rameez, witness No. 12 along with Anwar Hossain, witness No. 20 drove Reza and Steward Mujib in the PIA staff car and dropped them on the main road near the Indo-Pakistan border and after doing so, both of them returned to Chittagong the same night. Jalal, witness No. 17 supervised the crossing of the delegates into the Indian territory.55

On July 13, 1967 some time at night the two delegates returned to Denofa Hotel from Agartala in a truck.56

Later the same month, in July, 1967 Muazzam along with Manik Chowdhury and Sayedur Rahman met Ojha for the sixth time at the latter’s residence at Dhaka. Ojha pretended to Muazzam that he had not received the result of the Agartala meeting from his government till then. He, however, quietly confided to Manik Chowdhury that Indian officials were not satisfied with the calibre of the delegates.

With this concludes India’s involvement in the Agartala conspiracy according to the case made out by the Government of Pakistan.

As far as India’s role is concerned it should be analysed in the context of India’s attitude towards Pakistan and vice-versa. As Pakistan’s main weakness was in her own viability as a single state it was only natural that India would have her eyes on the conflict between East and West Pakistan and take advantage of the same whenever possible. No country should do it but the hard reality is that they all do, if it is possible and desirable from her own national interest. It is difficult to assess, how much and to what extent or depth India was actually involved in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The Bengali nationalists who knew the relationship that existed between India and Pakistan also perhaps tried to take advantage of it by seeking India’s assistance in order to accomplish their own objective. In international politics and power conflict and in the struggle for the right to self-determination such kind of mutually beneficial assistance is not something unknown. But to suggest that he aspirations of the Bengalis to establish their democratic rights and to realise their right to self-determination stemmed from an Indian

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design would be equal to negating the existence of today’s Bangladesh and yesterday’s all the sufferings, sacrifices and struggles. No Bengali would ever accept such a self-destructive and degenerating proposition.

  1. Merit of the Prosecution Case

In the statement of the prosecution there were descriptions of as many as thirty-two meetings other than six meetings with Ojha, the Indian High Commissioner’s First Secretary. These meetings did not disclose much, other than that these people occasionally discussed why they wanted the separation of East Pakistan and the funds they required for their organization. In 22 of these meetings six or less persons attended. The maximum number of people attended was 10 when Muazzam convened a meeting at his residence at Nasirabad Housing Society, Chittagong in June, 1966.

In a meeting held in December, 1965 at Karachi, Muazzam claimed to have received 3,000 volunteers but there was no evidence or record to substantiate the claim. It is not disclosed by the prosecution exactly how many persons were active in this organisation or whether there was an membership system at all. On the record it appeared that approximately 60 names including untraced persons could be said to have anything to do with the conspiracy and half of them got involved only in the last 18 months prior to the commencement of the trial.

Out of approximately 53 to 54 named persons as to have been active, 35 were accused, 11 were approvers and 8 names as ordinary witnesses, the seven persons who took part in the conspiracy by attending meetings and became witnesses were Naik Subedar Ashraf Ali Khan, Warrent Officer Zahur Ahmed and Squadron Leader (Rtd) Muazzam Hossain Chowdhury. But the major witnesses for the prosecution came from the list of the approvers who were pardoned under Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under this Section a First Class Magistrate (obviously on the recommendation of the prosecution) would tender :

a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof.

In general the prosecution, in order to strengthen its case would pursuade some of the accused persons to make favourable statements on the condition that they would not be prosecuted. Such persons are detained in custody until the trial concludes. A pardon granted under this section could be withdrawn and the approver could be tried if the prosecution thought that he did not comply with the condition on which the pardon was tendered. The approvers therefore, ran the risk of being prosecuted if they did not stick to the confessional statement made earlier before the Magistrate. Whereas a person advanced as a mere witness did not run that risk.58

As the case was of a judicial nature and was being adjudicated before a Tribunal under certain laws it is impossible to say what would have been the result ultimately. As many technical aspects of law would have been involoved it will perhaps not be proper to guess what the judge’s view was going to be about the case as a whole. May be, all the accused persons would have been acquitted, or some convicted or all convicted. As judges are not infallible, innocent people could also have been convicted. Similarly, guilty people could have been acquitted. Out of 200 more than 148 witnesses had been examined and considering the materials produced before the Tribuanl it would not have been unlikely that a large number of the accused persons would have been acquitted.

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In the prosecution case there was lot of incohesiveness and so it gave an impression that a lot of it was fabricated and concocted. Moreover, evidence based on mere hearsay could never make a story strong enough for conviction of all the accused persons. The question is then why did the government go for an open trial of a case on a subject of this nature? With the political motive behind it, the government was perhaps confident that their case was good and all the persons, particularly Sheikh Mujib, could be convicted notwith-standing the technicalities of law. The paramount importance of this case, however, lay in the involvement of Sheikh Mujib as accused No. 1. If Mujib’s name was not there the case would not have drawn one quarter of the attention it attracted and it would not have gathered so much historical importance.

  1. Organisation and Leadership of the Conspirators

Notwithstanding what would have been the verdict of the Tribunal or how far the prosecution fabricated the story or whether some or all of the accused persons were guilty or not under the law, it can be presumed with all the facts and materials taken into consideration that some arm personnel under the leadership of Muazzam Hossain tried to organise a revolt in East Pakistan to separate it from the rest of Pakistan. Whether they had the ability to do so is a different matter. As far back as in 1963 seeing Ayub’s centralised administration with no hope of achieving an autonomy for East Pakistan through the democratic process. Lt. Muazzam Hossain (subsequently Lt. Commander) of Pakistan Navy wanted the Bengali personnel in the armed forces to be united. He first recruited Steward Mujibur Rahman, a dedicated worker who subsequently deserted the Navy to become a full-time worker and leading Seaman Sultanuddin Ahmed, accused No. 4 and leading Seaman, Noor Muhammad, accused No. 5 with these four, the revolutionary group was formed which, till the last day of its existence, had no name, no constitution or by-laws and no organisational structure or hierarchy. Steward Mujib used to call Muazzam as the ‘Chief Leader’ and introduced him to Sayedur Rahman in that designation.59 There was no president or secretary as such excepting that ‘Muazzam told Amir Hossain to be the treasurer and authorised him to collect and receive funds for the group and asked him to send the amounts received to him (Muazzam)’ by a letter dated February 2, 1969.60 Subsequently or simultaneously, Kamaluddin (witness No. 2 but declared hostile), Sultanuddin’s brother-in-law, Lt. Muzammil Hossain (witness No.1) were inducted into the group. In this way, with a few East Pakistanis in the Navy, Muazzam had formed a group to turn East Pakistan into an independent state. The object was to induct Bengali personal of Army, Navy and Air Force into this group to stage the armed revolt ‘which was the only answer to the disparity existing between the two wings of Pakistan.61

According to Muazzam ‘for the successful propagation of the project the support and co-operation of political leaders and civil service officials from East Pakistan was needed.’ So they got in touch with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, an ardent autonomist, and some Bengali civil servants for political support. Sheikh Mujib, as usual, knowing that his strength was much bigger than this group, gave them his blessings in order to maintain s sort of political influence over them. As they were talking for East Pakistan, Mujib could not but support them. He used to help them financially with the object of having political influence over their activities.62 Mujib thereby acted as a restraining force over the group keeping his own political objective in sight. Mujib was arrested in May 1966, before the major activity of the group started, like going into negotiations with Ojha, preparing the arms list, hiring house for training and holding meetings, etc. Although Mujib denied before the tribunal to have known any of these persons, he subsequently confided that he knew them and helped them but had little to do with their organisation.

From the same point of view, A.F. Rahman and Ruhul Quddus, two senior Bengali civil servants were contacted and they gave their support and assistance. Subsequently, though Rameez, witness No. 12 Shamsur Rahman, the third senior civil servant, at a later stage joined the group. All these three officers

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were more attached to Mujib and his party than to this group. Muazzam wanted to broaden his base but at the same time wanted to retain the leadership in his own hand. Soon Flight Lt. Mahfizullah, accused No. 7, Havilder Daliludding, accused No. 9, Ex-corporal Abdul Bashar Adbus Samad, accused No, 8, Ex-Corporal Md. Amir Hossain Mia, witness No. 3, joined the group and it was the personnel of the armed forces which formed the hard core of the ‘group.’ According to them, ‘East Pakistan could be saved only by separateing it from the Central Government’63 and the object would be ‘all properties to be acquired by the Stae, industry was to be nationalised and currency was to be replaced by coupons.’ Muazzam drew ‘Bangladesh’ and he showed the national flag of the new state which was in gold and green. The group had three main tasks (i) enlistment of army personnal belonging to East Pakistan for the cause (ii) procurement of arms and ammunition and (iii) finance. In the enlistment of army personnel, they made quite a good progress as most of the Bengalis would have sympathised with them in the prevailing politico-economic circumstances. Some members of the group travelled to different army cantonments and camps soliciting support and also hired two houses in Dhaka to hold meetings, etc. Muazzam claimed to have recruited 3,000 volunteers and the only needed to be equipped. This, however, did not mean that all of them actually joined the group and it is difficult to say how many of them would have actually  taken part in the revolt. In the procurement of arms and ammunition the group failed miserably as perhaps they relied too much on outside sources particularly Indian. In respect of funds they collected some money locally but it was not sufficient at all for the kind of mission they planned to implement.

However, it was also nothing new that Bengalis were by that time thinking in terms of secession. There were many people and groups thinking in the same line. Leftist students in London had already formed a powerful organisation for the same purpose.

It is therefore, not unlikely that some members of the conspiracy group were in touch with the Indian Government or vice versa for support, particularly for funds, arms and ammunition. The Indian High Commission had assured them of such support and might have actually helped them. But no support in the form of arms and ammunition came through because the organisation did not have the desirable leadership. In short, it was a small group who had the sincere intention but no organisation and leadership to wage a revolt.

Why was then trial held in such a manner? Why was it blown up so much by the government?64 Why was Mujib implicated—to kill him politically or to make him the undisputed leader of the Bengalis? Or was it just ignorance or arrogance on the part of the Ayub Government? The trial without Mujib would have been like any other trial. These questions will continue to remain a mystery in the pages of Bangladesh history till proper and adequate answers are found.

In brief, the Agartala Conspiracy case had some grains of truth in it. Quite a large number of people in East Pakistan began thinking in terms of secession since the mid-1960s. Many intellectuals also lent their support to this cause. But the way the case was handled, especially by linking Sheikh Mujib and the Indian High Commission to it, proved dysfunctional. The proceedings of the case thus helped surface the feelings which had so long been nurtured secretly.

০০০

Notes

  1. Officers of the highest cadre service called ‘Civil Service of Pakistan.’

  1. Pakistan Observer, Dhaka, January 19, 1968.

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  1. Pakistan Observer, Dhaka, January 19, 1968.

  1. Pakistan Democratic Movement.

  1. K.Z. Alam, Sakhawat Hussain and the author were the first 3 lawyers who took the decision to organise Mujib’s legal defence.

  1. The normal procedure is contained in Section 32 and 33 of the Evidence Act, 1872

  1. ‘121A. Whoever within or without Pakistan conspires to commit any of the offences punishable by section 121, or to deprive Pakistan of the sovereignty of her territories or of any part thereof, or conspires to overawe, by means of criminal force, or the show of criminal force, the central government or any provincial government, shall be punished with transportation of life or any shorter term, or with imprisonment of either description which may extend to ten-years, and shall also be liable to fine.’

Explanation : To constitute conspiracy under this section it is not necessary that any act or illegal omission shall take place in pursuance thereof.’

‘131. Whoever, abets the committing of mutiny by any officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy or Air Force of Pakistan, or attempts to seduce, any such officer, soldier, sailor or airman from his allegiance of his duty shall be punished with transportation for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten-years, and shall also be liable to fine.’

  1. Tom Williams also cross—examined the prosecution’s principal witness, Amir Hossain.

  1. Articles 2 and 6 read as follows :

‘2.—(1) To enjoy the protection of the law, and to be treated in accordance with law, and only in accordance with law, is the inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan.

(2) In particular—(a) no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation of or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law; (b) no person shall be prevented from, or be hindered in, doing that which is not prohibited by law; and (c) no person shall be compelled to do that which the law does not require him to do.’

‘6.—(1) Any law, or any custom or usage having the force of law, in so far as it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by this Chapter, shall to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.’

  1. Aticle 4 read as follows :

‘4.—Protection against retrospective punishment. No law shall authorize the punishment of a person

(a) for an act or omission that was not punishable by law at the time of the act or omission, or

(b) for an offence by a penalty greater than, or of a kind different from, the penatly prescribed by law for that offence at the time the offence was committed.

  1. March, 1967.

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  1. Held in May, 1967 in Karachi.

  1. No family connection with Sheikh Mujib.

  1. Para 7 of the Formal Charge submitted by the gorenment.

  1. Para 12, Ibid.

  1. Para 13, Ibid.

  1. Para 14, Ibid.

  1. Para 16 of the Formal Charge.

  1. Ibid.

 

  1. Both were members of Sheikh Mujib’s Party, the Awami League.

  1. Para 20 of the Formal Charge.

  1. Para 24, Ibid.

  1. Tajuddin Ahmed was Mujib’s most trusted General secretary of Awami League who at a later stage acted as the Prime Minister of the Government in exile in 1971.

  1. Para 28 of the Formal Charge.

  1. Para 32, Ibid.

  1. Para 35, Ibid.

  1. Para 37 of the Formal Charge.

  1. A provision for preventive detention in the Defence of Pakistan Rules promulgation in 1965 during the war with India.

  1. Para 41 of the Formal Charge.

  1. Para 51, Ibid.

  1. Para 4, Ibid.

  1. According to Amir Hossain, witness No. 3, it was Rs. 10,700 as recorded in his deposition.

  1. Code Names were as follows :

Alo—Lt. Comdr. Muazzam Hossain, Accused No. 2

Ulka—Muhammad Amir Hossain Mian, Witness No. 3

Tubin—Catering Lt. Mozammil Hossain, Witness No. 1

Kamal—Ex.-L/S Sultanuddin Ahmed, Accused No. 4

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Murad—Steward Mujibur Rahman, Accused No. 3

Parash—Steward Mujibur Rahman, Accused No. 1

Tushar—A.F. Rahman, C.S.P. Accused No. 6

Sabuz—L/S. Noor Muhammad, Accused No. 5

Shekhar—Ruhul Quddus, C.S.P. Accused No. 10

  1. Para 21 of the Formal Charge.

  1. See (vol. IV) page 645 of Agartala Conspiracy Case proceedings.

  1. Provision for tender of pardon to an accomplice. See page 144 for further discussion.

  1. All the accused persons pleaded ‘not guilty.’

  1. Licentiate in Medical Faculty, a kind of Diploma in medicine.

  1. This information was obtained by me by interviewing some of the accused persons after their release.

  1. I was told this by someone whose husband accompanied Sheikh up to the border.

  1. Para 43 of the Formal Charge submitted by the government.

  1. Para 53, Ibid.

  1. Para 54, Ibid.

  1. In his cross-examination Sayedur Rahman said ‘the arms list was in an envelope but I did not take it out to see it. There was no address on the envelope. I had not seen it when it was written. I do not know how many pages the list covered. I had no time to see the list in the envelope. I was handed over the envelope at the residence of Muazzam Hossain at 9 or 9.30 p.m. I handed over this list to Mr. Ojha on the following day at about 7 p.m.

  1. Para 55 of the Formal Charge.

  1. In his cross-examination, Sayedur Rahman said, ‘I do not know where the residence of the Indian High Commissioner is in Dhaka. I never visited the house of the Deputy High Commissioner for India.’

  1. Para 56 of the Formal Charge.

  1. Para 61, Ibid.

  1. Para 63, Ibid.

  1. Para 65, Ibid.

  1. Para 69, Ibid. In cross-examination, Sayedur Rahman however, said ‘any movement in collaboration with India would be bad. Pakistan was created as a homeland for Muslims.’

  1. Para 70 of the Formal Charge.

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  1. Para 84, Ibid.

  1. Para 85, Ibid.

  1. Para 86, Ibid.

  1. Para 87 of the Formal Charge.

  1. Para 89, Ibid.

  1. In conducting this case and in order to procure evidence the prosecution used all the means at their disposal. The allegations of torture, blackmail, intimidation etc. had substantial truth in them. This aspect of the behaviour of the prosecution was exposed at one stage in the following proceedings.

During his cross-examination Dr. Sayedur Rahman who was also an approver and pardoned under Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was handed over an application of his own handwriting by the defence (which) he admitted addressed to the Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of East Pakistan. In this letter he wrote ‘I was kept there (Rajarbagh—an interrogation centre of Special Branch) in a closed room and some persons began constant questioning on various points, of which I had no knowledge and continued this till midnight. All of a sudden they became furious and started together, to beat me recklessly with stick, arm of chair and by fisting, slapping causing severe injury on different parts of my body and continued till I became unconscious. They inflicted such kind of inhuman torture on me several times for three days. These inhuman tortures were so severe that my life was always at danger. I was kept sitting on the same chair all the time and was not allowed to sleep for a moment so long as I was conscious. In all there was an atmosphere of threat, resumption of further torture and over and above, fear of death every time. During this time of inhuman torture and state of semi-consciousness and unconsciousness, they took some signatures on some papers, took handwriting of their dictation and specimen signatures. Injuries due to this heavy and continued torture were so serious that they could not return me to jail and had to arrange for medical treatment there. Thus keeping me there for 18 long days, after considerable improvement I was sent back to the Dhaka Central Jail on the last day of January, 1968.’

Lastly, he wrote, ‘As regards my political affiliation I am a member of Awami League. I do not know nor I can guess even, why had I been detained, first to police cusdody, undergone so heavy tortures endangering my life, forced to put signatures on some papers. I am a loyal and innocent citizen of the state, like to draw your sympathetic attention to the above inhuman torture and injustic done to me and request you to release me.’

On question by the Court, however, Sayedur Rahman said he wrote all his ‘but the allegations about the torture are not correct.’

  1. See cross-examination of Sayedur Rahman, Witness No. 7

  1. Para 19 of the Formal Charge.

  1. Para 6, Ibid.

  1. This information was gathered from some of the active members who were accused in the case. After the independence of Bangladesh Mujib, however, asserted that he had direct links with this group and it was his creation. But this assertion of Mujib had little substance. After independence Mujib started

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making such and many other assertions only to cover the fact that he did not take part in the independence war and did not clearly declare independence. To assert his psosition further Mujib once told me after the independence that he even had a clandestine office in New Delhi for several years. This also had no truth in it. Every Awami League leader I talked to including Tajuddin denied this propaganda as to be true.

  1. Para 18 of the Formal Charge.

  1. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case was held in 1951 in camera and no foreign lawyer was allowed to appear. Whereas both lawyers and press from abroad were allowed to take part in the proceedings of the Agartala Case.

০০০

 

Chapter 7

 

The Great Mass Upsurge 1968-69

 

  1. Effects of the Conspiracy Case

 

Although the proceedings of the Agartala Conspiracy Case continued for nearly eight months the trial itself could not be completed. As mentioned earlier, the proceedings of the case during this time only helped in rejuvenating the nationalistic feelings of the Bengalis. The sufferings of the Bengalis, their deprivations, exploitations and injustices constituted the central theme of the proceedings. The reading of the proceedings in the newspapers only inspired the Bengalis more than ever to establish their rights as citizens of the majority population of Pakistan. What the people were thinking or discussing secretly for so long now became an open matter—whether Bengalis could survive without separating from West Pakistan. The involvement of Indian in the conspiracy case did not invoke the hatred as was expected by the Pakistan Government. In the context of the whole case India’s involvement was not taken much into account by the Bengalis.

In West Pakistan, over the cease-fire following the Indo-Pakistan was in 1965 Ayub’s personal position already started weakening mainly because in the Ayub itself there was a sharp division on this issue. During this time although Ayub lost his image, but because of his overall command the situation did not go out of control. Although during Ayub’s 10-year rule a noticeable economic grwoth took place in Pakistan and brought certain reforms and increased the GNP from 2 per cent to 6 per cent, this growth was largely segmented having had no relation with the living conditions of the masses. The emergence of the notorious ‘22 families’ at the patronage of Ayub’s administration only proved that gross injustice took place in the distribution of national wealth.1 All the 22 families having belonged to West Pakistan the reaction in East Pakistan to such concentration of wealth naturally took a more bitter shape. This is why, when the government spent approximately 100 million (10 crorers) rupees in 1968 celebrating the ‘Decade of Reforms’ and ‘Decade of Development,’ the year-long publicity campaign attracted more criticism than appreciation. Particularly in East Pakistan, the campaign became counter-productive as it invoked further resentment against the ‘Punjabi’ exploitation. This massive propaganda programme was launched in order to publicise Ayub’s achievements before the presidential election scheduled in 1969.

If any single factor was responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan, it was Ayub’s ten-year administration through an anti-political system. By the sheer process of its operation, the two wings of Pakistan moved away from each other. Ayub’s economic policies not only widened the disparities

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between the two wings of Pakistan but also widened the gap between the rich and the poor. The worse part of it was that Ayub’s administrative system did not provide any mechanism through which these disparities and gaps could be discussed and resolved politically. Whatever little political power the Bengalis had enjoyed prior to 1958 had disappeared during Ayub’s administration. Prior to 1958, a semblance of parity was maintained through appointment of ministers on the basis of equality from the two wings, but the military rule since 1958, having been unmistakably a rule by the generals and bureaucrats where the Bengalis had minimal representation, raised the Bengali’s demand for equal participation in the polity to its highest pitch. The military rule in Pakistan turned in fact the Government of Pakistan into the Government of West Pakistan in general and particularly into the Government of Punjab.As a result all the frustrations, political as well as economic, were getting accumulated for an explosion. The proceedings of the Agartala Conspiracy Case added the necessary fuel to the fire.

Due to the war in 1965 Pakistan also suffered an economic set-back. In order to replenish the losses the army suffered in the war, many development projects were curtailed and obviously the projects in East Pakistan were the first ones to be stopped from execution. As a result the speed of development declined and the development investment in East Pakistan never regained the momentum expected at the end of the Third Five Year Plan. The support Ayub gained among the business community and upper middle class in East Pakistan also started declining gradually. The people in the basic institutions wanted a change in the government : the army, the politicians and the business community’ each from its own view of self-interest. The people at large who were oppressed and did not gain anything from Ayub’s ten-year rule were in any case favouring a change. The difference however between the public mood for a change in East and West Pakistan was that in the West the change was sought mainly to remove Ayub and establish a government through direct election but in East Pakistan, a change in the government alone was not the only thing desired. The two decades of dispartities and exploitations made the demand for autonomy more deep-rooted and along with the change in the government, the Bengalis wanted more autonomy.

Since the election experiences in 1964-65 public opinion was also running in favour of a direct election. Excepting Ayub’s own Convention Muslim Legaue all the major political parties both in East and West had developed a common cause in favour of amending the constitution for holding elections on the basis of universal adult franchise and this feeling grew strong even in the Punjab. So in the middle of 1968 after recovering from his illness when Ayub decided to hold the presidential election in the usual course at the expiry of the 5 years term, the political parties decided to boycott it and engaged in mobilising public opinion in that direction. The opposition demanded election on the basis of universal adult franchise but Ayub ignored the demand of the politicians and went along with his own strategy mainly at the advice of some civil servants like Altaf Gauhar and Fida Hasan.

The proceedings of the Agartala Conspiracy trial helped in resurrecting the political activities in both the wings of Pakistan. It had a direct bearing on the political thought-processes of the leaders of all shades and as a reaction to such a trial, political frustrations began to surface rapidly. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was already engaged in his war of vengeance against Ayub Khan. Since he was thrown out by Ayub after thf Tashkent agreement Bhutto kept alive his slogan of ‘thousand-year-war’ against India. With that posture Bhutto was successful in making an inroad into the army barracks of Pakistan and gained considerable support from the Punjab. He continued to maintain his link with some senior army officers who did not like Ayub’s appeasement policy with India in 1965. Bhutto who was brought into politics by Ayub from a total obscurity and served him for about eight years now became the latter’s bitterest contender both inside and outside the army. With his rhetorics and intellectual approach Bhutto attracted a large number of urban elite and with his socialistic promises for the workers and peasants he soon gained support amongst the students and general masses. Knowing the situation inside the cantonment to be not very favourable for Ayub, Bhutto was now waiting for a suitable opportunity to finish his former boss.

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Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the retired Chief of Pakistan Air Force was the first person to come out with a scathing statement in October, 1968 criticising Ayub’s Government. He was known to be a man of integrity and immediately became a national figure in Pakistan politics. He had no political affiliation as such and this made his demand for change in the governmental system more effective. While Asghar Khan’s statement was still generating further criticism, there was a student-police clash over a very ordinary matter in Rawalpindi in November. Some students, while traveling by bus were stopped by police and an altercation took place resulting ultimately in brick-throwing by students and firing by police, causing the death of a young student. Immediately, in protest of police firing, students called a strike in Rawalpindi in the heart of Pakistan’s military power. The strike was at once supported by Bhutto who was waiting for such an opportunity. To the surprise of many people, the strike turned out to be a complete success. By aligning himself to the side of the students Bhutto discovered that overnight he gained wide range support from all over West Pakistan. A series of demonstrations and strikes against the regime took place in West Pakistan. These widespread demonstrations against the regime bewildered most of the politicians who had already lost grass root contact with the people. Because of Ayub’s peculiar political system they too failed to realise the depth of public resentment. In a panic at the end Ayub ordered the arrest of Bhutto and by doing so, made him a hero of the young students in West Pakistan.

East Pakistan was already in a boiling situation with the proceedings of the conspiracy case still continuing every day. The leaders of the Awami League being in jail, the opposition leaders were either supporting Ayub indirectly or lacked organisation to sustain opposition against the government. Many of the leaders were in fact only individuals without a party following. The only sustaining group which remained free were the students and the entire responsibility of mobilising the movement therefore fell upon the student leaders of Dhaka University. The students reacted quickly and held meetings and demonstrations on December 1 and 2 and the public resentment against the government was found to be overwhelming. Moulana Bhashani who was so long tacitly supporting Ayub, called upon the people to observe anti-repression day on December 6 and addressed a huge public meeting at Paltan. Following the meeting Moulana led a procession up the Governor’s House and called for a general strike on December 7. Despite government’s efforts the strike turned out to be a complete success.

Moulana Bhashani also held a meeting of the executive committee of the East Pakistan NAP at Pachbibi, Bogra on January 2 and the NAP was the first political party to declare that ‘it would not take part in any election on the basis of Ayub’s basic democracy. Till full democracy was restored, NAP would not allow holding such election.’ Moulana’s decision to boycott the election had its political impact in West Pakistan, too, where he still had a considerable foothold.

  1. All Parties Students Action Committee

From December, 1968 to February, 1969 an unprecedented mass upsurge took place in Pakistan. In East Pakistan the upheaval could be called a revolution. The government machinery was completely paralysed and the country was virtually run by the young students of the universities and colleges. In early December the progressive and the nationalist students formed an All Parties Students Action Committee (SAC)2 under the leadership of the Dhaka University Central Students Union. This Committee was headed by Tofael Ahmed, a 26 years old spitfire orator who emerged as the pioneer of this historically important movement in East Pakistan. The Action Committee subsequently declared an 11-point programme3 which galvanised not only the students but also the masses of the province. The programme gained a treamendous support all over East Pakistan and received approval in thousands of meetings both of the students and public held during these three months.

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In order to embrace all sections of the masses the student leaders while formulating the 11-point programee gave importance to the demands of the students, workders and peasants. The first point related to the various demands of the students and teachers which made the programme popular among the students at once. The demands were contained in (a) to (n). Point two was for parliamentary democracy on the basis of universal adult franchise. Point three required federal government’s powers to be confined to defence, foreign policy and currency. Point four suggested a sub-federation of Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province and Sind with regional autonomy for each unit. Point five recommended nationalisation of banks, insurance companies and all big industries. Point six demanded reduction in rates of taxes and revenues for peasants. Point Seven claimed fair wages and bonuses for workers. Point eight demanded effective flood control measures for East Pakistan. Point nine was for the withdrawal of all emergency laws, security acts and other prohibitive orders. Point ten demanded the withdrawal of Pakistan from SEATO, CENTO and Pakistan-US military pacts and point eleven was the demand for release of all political prisoners including those tried under the Agartala Conspiracy Case.

The 11-point programme of the students soon became the rallying point of a historical nationalist upsurge backed by a spontaneous support of the people. The programme drew the support of the industrial workers who by that time became a strong social force in East Pakistan as it demanded fair wages and bonuses for them. By raising a long standing demand for reduction in rates of taxes and revenues which were among the main sources of exploiting the poor peasants, the students could spread their support in the rural areas, too. By demanding nationalisation of banks, insurance companies and big industries the SAC enjoyed the support of the leftist students who played an important role in drafting and leading the 11-point programme. The support of the general students all over the province was secured by putting forward the demand for 50 per cent reduction in tuition fees, train and bus fare concessions, etc. Similarly, support of the lower and middle class was sought by demanding an increase in salaries of all teachers of schools, colleges and universities and a guarantee of job opportunities for all unemployed.

In the context of the prevailing political circumstances points 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 11 became the demands of more immediate importance and some of them introduced certain qualitative changes in the nature of demands which were to an extent socialistic.

Points three and four symbolised the Six Point Programme. Although in the Six Point Formula currency could or could not be a central subject and the matter of a sub-federation in West Pakistan was not clearly spelled out, the student’s programme was complimentary to the Formula. The 11 point programme was neither a well-drafted document nor did it contain any detailed constitutional proposal. It raised certain demands which were already in the minds of the people for a long time. It only helped organising the people to express their long accumulated frustrations and grievances. It was more of a symbolic document representing the undercurrent of resentments against the political repression in, and economic exploitation of, East Pakistan during the last two decades.

  1. The Democratic Action Committee

In the meantime the politicians who were lagging behind at last decided to act and formed an organisation called the Democratci Action Committee4 on January 7, 1969 comprising all the opposition political parties excluding Bhashani’s NAP and Bhutto’s People’s Party. The latter two leaders did not join the DAC for two different reasons. While Bhutto being solely interested in getting into power declined to join the DAC for his own strategic reasons. Moulana was interested in social and economic changes in the system and believed that the DAC could not solve the problems the country was facing. However, the DAC comprised the leaders of both East and West Pakistan, with the Awami League as the major component. This alliance between the Awami Leauge which was committed to autonomy on the basis of

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the Six Point Formula and the parties and leaders of West Pakistan who were basically opposed to the autonomy of East Pakistan on the basis of the Six Point was viewed as a marriage of convenince. This fundamental contradiction was the cause of the DAC’s inability to provide the necessary dynamism required during that period. As a matter of fact, the Awami League and rest of the members of the DAC were working together on their respective strategies. Almost all the leaders of the Awami League were still in jail and it was not known to what extent the Awami League was popular organisationally. So joining in a broader forum was found politically more expedient for those who were outside the jail. The right wing political parties and the leaders of West Pakistan thought that by joining the Awami League they would be able to restrain the demand for Six Point based autonomy and at the same time demonstrate a national leadership having considerable influence in East Pakistan through the Awami League. The DAC was also more acceptable to the ruling regime to negotiate with. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan who was at one time President of the All Pakistan Awami League and later formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) actually took the initiate in forming the DAC in consultation with Ayub Khan at the instance of the West Pakistan vested interests. Thus a moderate and acceptable forum was created to facilitate a political settlement, if nedded.

The DAC adopted an 8-point programme5 rendering more importance to the restoration of democratic rights and a parliamentary system than to autonomy. The West Pakistani leaders of the DAC argued that once democracy was restored the issue of autonomy would be easier to solve. But the 8-point programme of the DAC was not acceptable to the students of East Pakistan who had already launched a fullscale movement for autonomy.

Although the DAC’s desicion to boycott the elections based on basic democracies and an indirect presidential election attracted some mass support, due to a lack of cohesion in the leadership it could not make much headway particularly in the face of a strong radical leadership from the students in East Pakistan. So at one stage there was a competition for leadership between the DAC and the SAC but in East Pakistan ultimately the SAC won because of the student’s unity and grass-root support for the nationalist demands. As a result although the DAC made considerable impact in West Pakistan, in the Eastern wing they had to surrender to the domination of the student’s 11-point programme.

During these months Moulana played the most radial and violent role. He continued with his famous gherao6 movement which gained popularity amongst the industrial workers. Moulana gave a call to bring down the institutions of exploitation. This approach was considered as Moulana’s pressure against any kind of back-door settlement of political issues by the right-wing parties. Moulana was so long supporting Ayub Khan and had considerably alienated his party from the people, now adopted such violent methods that people looked at his action with some amount of suspicion. He nevertheless regained his position to a great extent during this period.

  1. Movement Intensified

During this time some incidents helped creating further momentum to the student’s 11-point movement and eventually turned it into a mass movement. Firstly, on January 20 when the SAC held a student’s demonstration defying Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 7 Asad, a Marxist student was shot dead by police firing from a distance of less than 10 yards. It sparked off the students of Dhaka city who immediately honoured Asad as a martyr and called for a strike on January 21, 22 and 23. The incident evoked a great public emotion and on January 24, the students observed a ‘Mass Upsurge Day’ with a vow that without realising the 11-point demands they would ‘not stop the movement and sacrifice the last drop of their blood’. On this day Matiur, a school boy, and Rustom, another young man were killed by the police. The following day Babul and Anwar were killed. Following these killings, strikes and

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demonstrations became the order of the day. On February 11, the government in order to reduce the tension, decided to release all the political prisoners detained under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. This decision of the government was taken as victory for the student’s 11-point programme.

Secondly, when the DAC found that the students had advanced a lot, they wanted to share the popularity by calling a strike on February 14 and holding a public meeting at Paltan. On that day, the DAC leaders could not hold the meeting. The rightist leaders like Nurul Amin, Farid Ahmed and others who were blamed to have betrayed the cause of the Bengalis in the past were not acceptable to the people. They could not even get on to the platform to deliver their speeches because of a spontaneous public protest. Soon the dais was taken over by the student leaders on public demand and when Tofael asked which programme they wanted to support, the people one to all raised their hands in favour of the 11-point programme against the 8-point programme of DAC. This was a tremendous victory for the nationalist forces. Since then the 11-point programme no more remained limited to the students, the SAC leadership spread over the workers, peasants and the general masses.

Thirdly, Sergeant Zahoorul Huq, accused No. 17 of the Agartala Conspiracy Case was killed before dawn on February 15 while in military custody in the cantonment. The government gave the explanation that he was trying to escape, but the public did not believe it. The in-mates of Sgt. Huq’s cell claimed that it was an act of provocation with a design to kill all the accused persons as the army was not willing to accept the defeat of the government in all spheres including freeing the accused persons without conviction.8 Lastly, on February 18 Dr. Shasuzzoha, a popular Reader of the Rajshahi University science faculty was killed by an army officer when the teacher was only trying to save the student who were being assaulted by the troops during a demonstration. The news of Dr. Zoha’s killing spread like wild fire all over East Pakistan and the public emotion rose to its height. All the university, college and school teachers all over East Pakistan came out in processions protesting the killing.

Each one of these incidents aggravated the situation further. Each time an incident of this kind occurred, the cause of Bengalis nationalism gained more public support. These incidents aroused emotional ferment amongst the public and helped considerably to bring unity among the masses. The death of these martyrs particularly that of Asad, Dr. Zoha and Sergeant Zahoorul Huq created unprecedented source of energy for Bengali nationalist movement.

  1. Role of the Lawyers

The lawyers also played their role. During January and February 1969, day and night imposition of curfew bacame a common feature and the army was called in to assist the civil administration under Chapter IX of the Criminal Procedure Code. There were some firings also on people at different places of the city for violation of the curfew orders. A writ petition was moved before the High Court bench presided over by the Chief Justice B.A. Siddiky challenging the announcement of the government through radio and newspapers that ‘during curfew hours anyone seen in the street will be shot at sight.’9 Justice Siddiky called the Advocate-General of the province for his opinion who in open court said that there was no law authorising the government to shoot anyone at sight in a situation when the army was only assisting the civil administration and the government was functioning under a constitution. Justice Siddiky, however, decided not to issue a Rule even on such important constitutional point involving the life and death of the people.

These efforts of the members of the legal profession helped in boosting the morale of the students and workers who were taking an active part in the movement. Chief Justice S.M. Murshed who was earlier forced to resign in order to make room for Justice B.A. Siddiky was one of the first few non-

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political personalities to give support to the 11-point programme of the students. His active participation in the movement helped bringing unity amongst the intelligentsia against the Ayub government.

In the process of the movement, however, the leadership went fully into the hands of the nationalist forces and the status of the accused persons who were tried for conspiracy against the state was now openly termed as ‘political prisoners.’ The implication was that the Agartala Conspiracy Case was considered to be a trial of persons who were persecuted for their political acts and beliefs and not for any crime committed by them. As the existing government was not able to meet all the demands contained in the 11-point programme only those which could be met immediately were raised with more vigour in slogans, posters and pamphlets. The demand for atutonomy, restoration of democracy, withdrawal of the emergency and release of all political prisoners including those tried under the Agartala Conspiracy Case were given more prominence in the streets :

The 11-point programme however could not continue as an independent movement for long. It was soon found to be a complimentary force to the Six Point movement. In the absence of any alternative national political leadership the entire benefit of the 11-point movement was ultimately reaped by Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League. During those months of phenomenal mass upsurge, Mujib still in jail emerged as the symbol of Bengali nationalism. His imprisonment in military custody facing trial for allegedly conspiring against the Pakistan Government to seaparte East from West Pakistan only enhanced his popularity further. The student leaders of the 11-point programme leaned towards his as their natural leader and subsequently, bestowed on him the title ‘Banga-Bandhu’ in a huge public meeting at Dhaka.

  1. Withdrawal of the Agartala Conspiracy Case

At the initial stage of the upsurge Ayub under estimated the depth of the public resentment against his regime and he refused to talk to the politicians. He adopted a tough attitude and in places deployed troops to bring the situation under control. But gradually he discovered that the situation was going out of his control and he was advised by his civil and army colleagues to try to solve the problem politically. In doing so he had no other alternative but to go for a settlement with the same politicians he used to hate most. But the main obstacle in talking to the politicians in a Round Table Conference which Ayub proposed to hold, was the trial Mujib was facing. In the face of the demand from all quarters Ayub withdrew the emergency and released most of the political prisoners including Bhutto but he refused to release the accused persons of the conspiracy case. The Awami League being a powerful component of the DAC earlier had forced the latter to take the decision that ‘no conference of the politicians could be held without the participation of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.’ Bhashani and Bhutto having already declared their boycott of the conference, no effective political settlement could be achieved without some kind of arrangement with the Awami League and that could only be achieved through Sheikh Mujib. But the question was how Mujib could attend a conference of that kind when he was facing a trial on a charge of treason.

From the third week of December, 1968 Kamal Hossain,12 Amirul Islam and myself were visiting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the military custody almost every day and we used to discuss the political development at length. Mujib at first without realising the strength of the upheaval outside became very eager to come out of the custody to play his due role. He also apprehended that the leadership could go into the hands of some other people in his absence. The Communists who have been operating under the Shadow of NAP and some extremists in his own part were some of the elements of the seriously disapproved of. He apprehended that the might create a situation where his role as the nationalist leader would not fit in. This increased his eagerness to arrive at a political settlement with the government. With this end in view Kamal Hossain was sent to West Pakistan to talk to the senior army officers and to

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impress upon the Generals that Mujib was a patriot and would be agreeable to negotiate for political settlement.

When Ayub first proposed to hold a round table conference and the DAC refused to attend without the participation of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Ayub had to postpone the conference giving recognition to Mujib’s political importance. Different political parties were making different suggestions as to how to meet the situation.13 This in turn helped Mujib in gaining some self-confidecne. We discussed the situation with Mujib in detail and Mujib was agreeable to attend the meeting on bail or parole. Accordingly, Kamal Hossain and Tajuddin Ahmed who were released by this time, went to West Pakistan for the second time to negotiate with the army generals and the senior members of the government. When they came back they reported that the Agartala Conspiracy Case could not be withdrawn bacause of strong army feelings about the case. We discussed the matter again and Mujib requested us to arrange a parole for him as he became impatient to join the conference. For Ayub also it was the best possible solution. By granting parole Mujib’s participation in the proposed Round Table Conference could be secured and at the same time the Conspiracy Case could continue. Thus the last condition of the DAC for attending the conference was also met. Ayub sent Khwaja Shahabuddin and Admiral A.R. Khan, his Information and Defence Ministers respectively to discuss the matter directly with Mujib in the military custody at Dhaka cantonment. During all these days, till the arrival of the Ministers, Major General Muzaffaruddin, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of East Pakistan was playing the role of the go-between through us between Mujib and the central government. The General used to take us some times at night during curfew hours to Mujib to discuss these matters.

I was personally opposed to the idea of procuring a bail or parole right from the begining. When Manik Mia, at one time the mentor of Mujib, came to learn that Mujib agreed to go on parole he was also very disappointed and this made two of us oppose the scheme of taking Mujib to attend the Conference on such condition. How could Mujib alone come out of custody leaving the other 34 accused persons behind? The idea itself appeared to be ludicrous. If a man becomes so important, without whom no political settlement could be reached in a country embroiled in chaos, how could he be asked to attend the Round Table Conference on parole or bail with the charge of treason hanging over his head. How could the man who was at the same time facing a trial for conspiring to overthrow the central government be considered to be omnipotent? Ironically to save the political situation in Pakistan, Ayub today needed the same man he wanted to eliminate from politics by instituting the conspiracy case. These were the contradictions difficult to reconcile. Was the Agartala Conspiracy Case a farce, a make-belief story or a political gamble?

Anyhow, this scheme also failed. The reality outside the cantonment was completely different. The students 11-point programme turned into a full-scale mass movement and there was no semblance of administration in East Pakistan. Hundreds and thousands of people would converge every day at different places of the city. They would hold meetings, demonstration and processions chanting slogans and carrying banners.14 The student leaders would give out directions which were obeyed both by the government officers and the public. The most nationalistic slogans which inspired millions of Bengalis were introduced during this movement. Slogan like ‘Joy Bangla,’15 ‘Tomar Amar Thikana, Padma Megna Jamuna,’16 ‘Dhaka Na Pindi, Dhaka Dhaka,’17 ‘Punjab Na Bangla, Bangla, Bangla,’18 ‘Amar Desh Tomar Desh, Bangladesh, Bangladesh,’19 which were used extensively at a later stage in January-March, 1971 were originally introduced during this movement.

A treamendous pressure was built up by the masses demanding the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and all other accused persons of the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The public attacked the house where S.A. Rahman, Chairman of the Conspiracy Case Tribunal, a former Chief Justice of Pakistan, was residing and set it on fire. Justice Rahman somehow escaped through the kitchen door. Almost similar

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thing happened to Manzur Quadir, the Chief Prosecution Counsel. Both of them left Dhaka in such a hurry that they had no time to collect even their personal belongings. As a matter of fact, the last demand for the people was now the ‘withdrawal of Agartala Conspiracy Case.’ Whether deliberately or not, Ayub Khan kept one demand unfulfilled and that was the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The entire energy of the movement was now directed to secure the release of a man who became a hero by being in jail. It appeared at that time to be the only thing left for the people to achieve.

On February 20 inside the cantonment the stage was set to release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on parole. At six in the evening the Judges were present, the necessary application was drafted to be placed before them. The two ministers of Ayub spent the whole day in the cantonment working on the scheme of taking Mujib to West Pakistan the same night. A plane was standing by at the Dhaka Airport to fly the leader out before he could meet the people. All efforts were made to keep Mujib away from his colleagues and people. Excepting a couple of lawyers no one was allowed to see him during these days. Outside the cantonment area, the entire road up to the airport was filled with at least 100 thousand people chanting slogans ‘Jeler tala Bhangboo, Sheikh Mujib ke Anboo.’20 They would never have been happy to see their leader coming out on parole and go to West Pakistan without even seeing them. They ready to give blood and sacrifice their lives for his unconditional release.

That evening I was very depressed thinking Mujib was going to commit a mistake by accepting a deal like that. Thousands of people who were in the street leading to the cantonment would be very frustrated and Mujib’s image would go down immediately. I did not want to take part in what was happening inside the cantonment. I was waiting at the airport in order to meet Mujib, who in December, 1968 while still in military custody requested me earnestly to act as his Secretary. I did not say no as the work would be an honorary one and I wanted to help him. I thought I would at least tell him not to go to West Pakistan in such a manner without meeting his people.

But Mujib had very rich instincts and so did his wife. Manik Mia and I had a word with her the same morning saying that we did not like Mujib’s release on parole. Hundreds of students including her nephews and other relatives also visited her the same day and most of them opposed the idea of parole. Among the outsiders, other than the lawyers, Mujib’s wife was the only person who was allowed to talk to him. In the evening Mujib’s wife arrived at the cantonment and told him what the outside reaction would be if he went on parole. Mujib understood the situation at once. Just at the time when the application for parole was ready to be moved, Mujib turned back and refused to sign the paper. He refused to go on parole and demanded the wihdrawal of the case as a whole. The entire scheme collapsed like a house of cards. The ministers, the army officers, the judges and the prosecution lawyers all were flabbergasted. Ayub’s scheme to discredit Mujib ended in a fiasco.

As soon as I heard Mujib had declined to go on parole I immediately rang up Manik Mia from the airport who was extremely happy hearing the news. The ministers and the army officials inside the cantonment immediately contacted Ayub Khan on the telephone and described the situation. Ayub Khan had no other alternative now but to consider the withdrawal of the Conspiracy Case as a whole.

Dhaka was aflame. When the people came to learn that Mujib did not accept parole and fought for the withdrawal of the whole conspiracy case, their adoration for the leader took him to the position of a demi-god. His refusal to compromise with the government inspired the people further. The whole populace rose like a rock defying all the orders of the government. Law and order completely broke down and the situation went out of Ayub’s control. The only person who could help in restoring peace was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

So on February 21, Ayub declared that he would not contest in the presidential election and this

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decision of his was ‘final and irrevocable.’ This might have pleased some army officers and West Pakistan leaders whose main purpose was to overthrow Ayub Khan but it had little impact in East Pakistan.

The same night Ayub decided to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy Case on the condition that Mujib would attend the proposed Round Table Conference. The following morning (February 22) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and all other accused persons were released. On that day an undisputed leader representing the cause of the Bengalis was born. Mujib, who was in jail for nearly three years at that time and facing a trial which could cost him his life and political career, today came out of prison as a superhero of 75 million people. He all of a sudden found himself without any political rival in East Pakistan and in a unique position of command and authority. His party, the Awami League, was shattered due to non-activity for long three years but through his personal popularity it was at once rejuvenated and it emerged as the largest political party of the country.

In the course of this great upheaval, the political dynamics also took a very radical turn. Mujib’s Six Point programme was not sufficient to meet the basic aspirations of the people. Some of the slogans he started hearing for the first time from his own supporters. The slogans like ‘Swadhikar’21 and ‘Krishak Sramik Raj’22 were no more only political jargons. The movement which ultimately freed him was led by young students and workers and not by the politicians. A massive influx of younger elements of rural background came into the forefront and the movement gathered its main strength from the lower middle class low-income groups, farmers and industrial workers.23 Social and economic justice was the rallying demand of the millions of people who took part in this great movement. It was no more a class of supporters limited to urban middle class and rising bourgeoisie. With the changed complexion of the political circumstances a new kind of leadership with a much deep-rooted aspiration fell on Mujib’s shoulders. The people rested all their dreams and hopes with Mujib to realise. It was a dangerous responsibility.

  1. The Round Table Conference

The arrangement was that the proposed Round Table Conference would begin on February 25 at Rawalpindi allowing Mujib sufficient time to meet his people and consult his colleagues.24 The conference would then adjourn on the same day for Eid and resume on March 10, 1969. The decision to begin the conference early for only day was made to cool down the people’s emotion and restore peace and civic life. On February 23, 1969 Mujib adderssed the largest public meeting ever held in East Pakistan at Dhaka Race Course. Here in this meeting, which was again organised and controlled by the students and workers, Mujib declared the acceptance by the Awami League of the 11-point programme together with his 6-points, Mujib also justified his attendence at the conference by asserting that he believed in constitutional methods to achieve his political objectives. He would, therefore, attend the conference but would denounce it if he failed to realise the demands. He said, ‘I believe in achieving these demands through negotiation and constitutional means.’ He assured the public : ‘by sitting in the Round Table Conference I will realise the Six Point and 11-point demands and if I can not I will abandon the Round Table Conference.’

In East Pakistan there was a lot of pressure on Mujib from within his own groups to boycott the Round Table Conference. Outside his party the main pressure came from the leftists under the leadership of Moulana who had already declined to attend the conference. To the left, attending the Round Table Conference was considered to be a conciliatory move by Mujib and they claimed that Mujib was going to betray the cause of the people. According to them, the Round Table Conference was a trap laid by the conspirators in West Pakistan to defeat the cause of the Bengalis as they would never accept the demands

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of the Bengalis. On the other hand, Mujib was released on the condition that he would attend the Conference and so he had to honour his commitment. Mujib contained both the forces by saying that he would attend the Round Table Conference but would abandon it if the 6 and 11-point demands were not realised. Mujib carried the people with him on that day by adding a further demand for representation to the parliament ‘on population basis.’ So long, parity i.e., equal representation between the two wings in the National Assmebly was in practice. Both the 6 and 11-point programmes demanded parliamentary democracy on the basis of universal adult franchise but none directly advocated representation on population basis. This new demand raised formally by Sheikh Mujib in this public meeting ensured that Bengalis would hold a majority of seats in the national parliament. It would give a clear edge to the Bengali nationalists over their West Pakistani counterparts in deciding national policies in the parliament. This was further evidence to show that Mujib had to go forward with the rising aspiration of the people. In this unprecedented mass meeting Mujib was conferred the titles ‘Banga Shardul’ and ‘Banga Bandhu.’25

On February 24, Mujib accompanied by 17 of his colleagues and advisers arrived in Rawalpindi with a much enhanced image. He was given a tumultuous public reception both at Lahore and Rawalpindi. In the same evening Mujib met the West Pakistan leaders of the DAC, many of whom were not happy with the firm commitment he made for the 6 and 11-points in the meeting at Dhaka. Most of the West Pakistan leaders in the DAC, particularly those of the Punjab were opposed to the Six-Points and they tried to parsuade Mujib to modify his stand. Mujib in order to accommodate his counterparts used to maintain in his private discussions that the Six Point demand was negotiable and allowed discussions on the Formula. But Mujib knew he could not go very far with those heterogenous politicians and the DAC as whole could never accept the Six Point as a basis for constitutional rearrangement. He therefore, concentrated more on the leaders of the smaller provinces like Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province and Sind with whom there was lot of common interest to share. He was able to draw considerable support from them.

The opening session on February 25 was only a formal occasion. Ayub, on receiving the leaders made a speech hoping the crisis faced by the country would be solved through their participation in the conference. No actual business took place on that day. On February 26, Mujib and his party returned to Dhaka where the real political negotiations and consultations between Mujib and others took place. During the following two weeks a series of meetings were held between Mujib and leader like Bhutto, Wali Khan, Asghar Khan, Doultana, Showkat Hayat Khan, Bejenjo, G.M. Sayeed, Moudoodi and others.26

The Conference again resumed on March 10, 1969 at the same President’s Guest House in Rawalpindi. About 35 leaders attended the Conference, some of whom were invited on individual basis, like Justice S.M. Murshed and Air Marshal Asghar Khan. This time Mujib went to West Pakistan a few days earlier and stayed at Lahore for two days (March 7 and 8). Elaborate and protracted meetings were held between the different factions of the DAC and series of discussions took place between individual leaders. But the leaders of the DAC could not reach any agreement. The West Pskistani leaders were interested only in restoration of a parliamentary system and election on the basis of universal adult franchise. They were not ready to touch the most vital issue facing the country—the question of autonomy, solution of which could only ensure the viability of Pakistan as a single state. They undermined and ignored the forces of nationalism developed in the Eastern wing and failed to understand that Mujib’s power to negotiate the Six-Points on the question of autonomy became limited in view of the public pressure built up in East Pakistan. The suggestions and amendments made by them in respect of the Six Point Formula amounted to going back to the 1956 Constitution and this  it what they were at best ready to suggest to Ayub Khan. The West Pakistani leaders of the DAC agreed that Pakistan would be a

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federation but were not willing to spell out the character of the federation. At the end however, there was as apparent consensus that (a) One unit in West Pakistan should be dismembered and a sub-federation should be established in West Pakistan and (b) autonomy for the regions should be granted. It was, however, agreed that the members of the DAC would be at liberty to present further proposals. In other words, there was no agreement among the members of the DAC as to the quantum of autonomy.

In the morning of March 10 when the Round Table Conference resumed Mujib made his inaugural speech prepared by his aides. He was still generally nervous and had not fully recovered from the fatigue of a three-year long imprisonment. He was to some extent also confused about the political situation and was yet to evaluate the dimension of the responsibility he had undertaken. He needed briefing every day to make a correct assessment of the situation as a whole. When his speech was drafted and finalised throughout the night of 9 and 10, Mujib read the speech several times so that he could place it properly. The subject in the speech was the language of his heart and Mujib showed his unwavering commitment to go along with the wishes of the people. Mujib’s dedication for the cause of the Bengalis did not deviate for a second.

Mujib wanted to tackle the problems at their source and according to him the basic issues facing the country were as follows :27

The first is that of deprivation of political rights and civil liberties.

The second is the economic injustice suffered by vast majority of the people, comprising workers, peasants, low and middle income groups, who have had to bear the burden of the costs of development in the form of increasing inflation while the benefits of such development are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few families, who in turn are concentrated in one region.

The third is the sense of injustice felt by the people of East Pakistan, who find that under the existing constitutional arrangements their basic interests have consistently suffered in the absence of effective political power being conferred upon them.

The former minority provinces of West Pakistan feel similarly aggrieved by the present constitutional arragngements.

In this conference Mujib placed his statement based on both the 11-point programme of the student and the Awami League’s Six Point programme. As far as vital aspect of autonomy was concerned, the two programmes contained and almost identical scheme with a minor variation which has been discussed in the preceding chapter. Mujib emphasised the need for necessary constitutional change to provide for representation on the basis of population in the federal legislature as well as for granting full regional autonomy as outlined in the Six-Point programme. Mujib argued that the demand for representation in the federal legislature on the basis of population stems from the fundamental principle of democracy viz. One man one vote. In the national forum as envisaged in the Six-Point scheme, only national issues would be raised for consideration and the representatives would therefore, be called to deal with matters from a national point of view and hence the voting would not be on a regional basis.

He reminded that despite being a majority, East Pakistan accepted the principle of parity. It was painful to record that partiy so far so representation in the legislature was concerned was promptly implemented, but the benefit of parity in representation in the other organs of the state including the civil, foreign and defence services was never extended to East Pakistan. Being a majority in population in the last 21 years, it was East Pakistan which always subordinated its regional interest to the overriding

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national interest. Mujib further argued that East Pakistan had even acquiesced in the federal capital as well as all the defence headquarters being located in West Pakistan. This meant that the bulk of the expenditure on defence and civil administration amounting to about Rs. 270 crores or over 70 per cent of central budget was made in West Pakistan. He pleaded that if ‘our West Pakistani brethren persist in refusing representation on a population basis in the Federal Legislature, East Pakistanis will feel constrained to insist on the shifting of the Federal Capital and defence headquarters of East Pakistan.’

On the question of economic disparities Mujib mentioned how the centralisation of economic management had steadily aggravated the existing economic injustices on East Pakistan and the minority provinces of West Pakistan. The disparity in the real per capita income had been steadily increasing and went much higher than 60 per cent. The power generating capacity in West Pakistan went 5 to 6 times higher than in East Pakistan. The number of hospital beds in 1966 in West Pakistan was estimated to be 26,200 while in East Pakistan it was estimated to be 6,900 between 1961-66; only 18 polytechnic institutes were established in East Pakistan against 48 in West Pakistan. More than 80 per cent of all foreign aid was utilised in West Pakistan in addition to transfer of East Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings to West Pakistan. This made it possible for West Pakistan over the last 20 years to import Rs. 3,109 crores worth of goods as against its total export earnings of Rs. 1,337 crores while during the same period East Pakistan imported Rs. 1,201 crores worth of goods as against its total export earnings of Rs. 1,650 crores. All these facts underlined the gross economic injustice done to East Pakistan. Mujib argued that ‘the centralisation of economic management has thus failed miserably to meet the objective of attaining economic justice. It has failed to meet the constitutional obligation to remove economic disparity between region and region.’28 Mujib called upon the political leaders to adopt a bold and imaginative solution to this challenging problem and claimed that ‘the federal scheme of the Six Point programme is, in my view, such a bold and imaginative solution.’ The unique geography of the country, resulting in lack of labour mobility, as we as the different levels of development obtaining in the different regions required that economic management ought not to be centralised. The substance of the constitutional proposals made by Mujib was as follows :

(a) With regard to currency, measures should be adopted to prevent flight of capital from one region to another and to secure control over monetary policy by the regional governments. This can be done by adoption of two currencies or by having one currency with a separate Reserve Bank being set up in each region, to control monetary policy, with the State Bank retaining control over certain defined matters. Subjcet to the above arrangements, currency would be a federal subject.

(b) With regard to foreign trade and aid, the regional governments should have power to negotiate trade aid, within the framework of the foreign policy of the country, which shall be the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(c) The foreign exchange earnings of each region should be maintained in an account in each Regional Reserve Bank and be under the control of the regional Government; the Federal requirements of foreign exchange would be met by appropriations from the two regional accounts on the basis of an agreed ratio.

(d) With regard to taxation, it is proposed that the power of tax levy and collection should be left to the regional governments, but the federal government should be empowered to realise its revenue requirements from levies on the regional Governments. It should be clearly understood that it is not at all contemplated that the Federal Government be left at the mercy of the regional governments for its revenue needs.

Mujib reminded the leaders at the Round Table Conference that the Awami League ‘was a party of the freedom-fighters for Pakistan. Its founder, Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy was indeed one of the

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founders of Pakistan. I recall with some pride that under his leadership, my colleauges and I were in the vanguard of the struggle for Pakistan.’ His proposals presented beofore the Conference were based’ on the conviction that they are absolutely essential in order a preserve and indeed strengthen Pakistan.’ According to Mujib ‘a strong, united and vigorous Pakistan’ could only be acheved with these constitutional change. He appealed to ‘strive together to lift our beloved Pakistan out of the tragic situation in which she is placed and to lay the constitutional foundatioin for a real, living federal parliamentary domocracy which will secure for the people of Pakistan full political, economic and social justice.’

In the Conference when Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as the leader of the all Pakistan DAC made his statement on the same day, he did not mention anything about the quantum of regional autonomy or the enconomic problems the country was facing. His main theme was to go back to the 1956 Constitution. He presented a formula consisting of the following two points :

  1. A federal parliamentary system of government with regional autonomy.
  2. The Assemblies should be elected on the basis of direct adult franchise.

The other West Pakistani and Bengali right wing leaders made various suggestions in their statements and their definition of federal parliamentary system varied from eache other. Some additional demands were also tabled which included the dismemberment of One Unit in West Pakistan.

The following day, March 11, I suddenly met Mr. Manzur Quadir who was responsible for drafting the 1962 Constitution and was now acting behind the scene as Ayub’s chief constitutional adviser, in the lobby of Hotel Intercontinental, Rawalpindi. Ayub had invited Manzur Quadir, who was not holding any office in the government to stand by for any constitutional advice he needed. He was at one time Ayub’s Foreign Minister and then Chief Justice of the West Pakistan High Court. He belonged to the hard-core of the Punjab elite. He was also the chief prosecution counsel in the Agartala Conspiracy Case in Dhaka from where he returned in the third week of Februaray with a very bad personal experience.

He was delighted to see me and said he was looking for me and invited me to have dinner with him in the evening. At the dinner, Manzur Quadir narrated to me his experience and what he saw in the mass upsurge in Dhaka. A man of about 60 was telling me that now he saw what were the difference between the Punjabis and the Bengalis and that Pakistan did not constitute a nation with one people. The Punjabi elite was indoctrinated by the concept of ‘millat’—oneness, one god, one people and one country. Iqbal and Ghalib were the philosophers and pioneers of their culture and heritage. Whereas Bengalis had Tagore, Nazrul Islam, Jasimuddin and so many others. He said, ‘you are completely different from us. So long I thought you were also guided by the thoughts and works of Iqbal and Ghalib.’

Manzur Quadir suggested that the constitutional aides of both sides should meet to see whether the 1962 Constitution could be amended to meet the needs of the situation in view of the statement made by Mujib the previous day. The following day, March 12, when the Conference was still continuing we met at the hotel suite of Manzur Quadir. S.M. Zafar, Ayub’s Law Minister also attended. From Mujib’s side, Kamal Hossain, Amirul Islam and myself were there. We had a general discussion first and as soon as we started going through the pages of the 1962 Constitution with suggested amendements, S.M. Zafar started objecting saying that they would not be acceptable to the President. What they actually wanted us was to agree to finalise the amendments on the basis of what the President had decided to offer the next day. The meeting did not last even for an hour. Manzur Quadir who showed some sympathy to our suggestions felt sorry at the result of the meeting. It seemed that Ayub had already decided what he wanted to do notwithstanding what deliberations took place in the Conference. A deadlock therefore

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became imminent.

  1. Yahya’s Proposal

Following this fruitless meeting something else also happened. Mr. Amanullah Khan, who was at one time in the Pakistan Army and a brother-in-law of Kamal Hossain, brought the news that General Aga Mohammad Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army wanted to meet the lawyers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. As it was going to be a meeting on a private basis none else was informed and at 7 in the evening of March 12, Kamal Hossain, Amirul Islam and myself accompanied by Amanullah Khan went to the residence of the C-in-C in Rawalpindi which was not very far from the President palace and the Guest House where the Round Table Conference was being held. This was the first time I saw Yahya Khan. He received us warmly in his living room decorated in a colonial style with all sorts of swords and tiger skins hanging over the walls. He first expressed his surprise that such young lawyers were advising a very important leader like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, obviously with a complimentary tone. He looked confident of his position but expressed concern over what was happening in the country. In the course of the discussion he tried to impress upon us that the present state of affairs could not be allowed to continue as the army had a special responsibility to protect the country from ruin and disintegration. He reminded us that ‘army could not sit back’ and repeated the same words for at least five times in the course of that evening’s discussion. We tried to talk about the political and economic situation in East Pakistan but he gave the impression that he had not much of knowledge of the political and economic dynamics of the country and his grasp over the situation was extremely poor.

Yahya appeared still very loyal to Ayub and wanted to give Ayub a last chance. He said unless there was a political settlement at this Round Table Conference, the army would have to do the needful. He finally suggested that ‘let the old man (meaning Ayub) remain as President, Mujib, the Prime Minister and Doultana be the Finance Minister or something like that.’ This was not a suggestion but a threat. He clearly indicated that if a settlement like the one he suggested was not materialised, the Army would take over. As a matter of fact, he gave the impression that the Army was already prepared to take over and was now only waiting to see what happened at the Round Table Conference. It also became more than clear that it was no more Ayub Khan but the Army who was dictating the terms. As the political terms between East and West Pakistan already became irreconcilable, the army wanted to move in to hold East Pakistan as long as they could.

Yahya said, time was too short and he could pick up the telephone and tell Ayub about this arrangement and the suggested one of us to go to Mujib and propose the ‘only solution’ to save the situation. They all suggested that I should go to Mujib with the proposal and I had no alternative. A maroon coloured car was provided by a staff of Yahya Khan for me to take this message to Mujib. With much reluctance I rushed to East Pakistan House29 where Mujib was in his room deeply engrossed in a discussion with the Baluchi tribal leaders. I took him into the bathroom and locked the door from inside. I told Mujib what discussion we had with Yahya and communicated his (Yahya’s) proposals. Mujib’s lips were trembling and he wanted to know my opinion. We discussed the matter for a few minutes and came to the conclusion that it would not be wise for him (Mujib) to accept such a proposal. People would think he had betrayed them for power. It was perhaps a trap to destroy Mujib’s image. Mujib’s constituency was the people and he could go to power only through them. He could not have achieved anything nor solved any problem by merely becoming the Prime Minister of the country sorrounded by the Punjabi bureaucrats in the capital of Islamabad. Moveover, Mujib could not rely on the Pakistan Army which was as a political partner almost an alien force to him.

I went back to the residence of the C-in-C and as decided with Mujib reported that I could not get

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hold of him (Mujib) who must have been busy somewhere in the city holding political discussions. At a subsequent stage we came to know that Yahya Khan through his intelligence service came to learn within less than an hour after we left his house that Mujib was in East Pakistan House at the relevant time and I must have met him. So the logical conclusion for Yahya was that his (Yahya’s) proposal was not acceptable to Mujib and my reporting otherwise that night was only a polite way of saying ‘no’ to his ‘last

solution’.

We remained with Yahya Khan for another 15 to 20 minutes and as soon as we came out of his residence we were sure that the Army was ready to take over and on the same night perhaps they decided the date of taking over. I remarked that night on the way back to East Pakistan House, ‘God save us, if the country goes in the hands of a person like him (Yahya Khan) Pakistan will be finished.’ This is exactly what happened. Yahya Khan might have been a good soldier but he was utterly impractical and know nothing about politics.

  1. Ayub’s Proposal and the Failure of the

Round Table Conference

On March 13 at the concluding session Ayub made his final statement. He made the following proposals :

  1. a) The representatives of the people would be elected on the basis of direct adult franchise.

  1. b) The country would be run under a federal parliamentary system.

This meant that the principle of parity and the existing distribution of powers between the centre and the provinces was to remain intact.

Ayub argued that in the absence of unanimity between the leaders, he had found consensus only on the above two points. He told the leaders that in the circumstances prevailing and the time available to them, the most appropriate procedure would be to leave the unresolved issues to be settled by the representative of the people to be elected under direct adult franchise. He argued ‘once the new representatives of the people meet in a sovereign assembly they can deliberate on the specific problems and demands which have been raised in this conference and decide them on behalf of the people. I believe in a united Pakistan with a strong stable centre.’

What it meant was that the army, bureaucracy and the ruling class of vested interest of East Pakistan would only allow the country to go back to the administrative structure of 1956 Constitution without trying to realise what amount of water had flown in the last 13 years. They again avoided to solve the real issue facing the existance of the country. They adopted the same old attitude, nothing seemed to wake them up to see the reality. This was nothing but a deliberate act of arrogance. They should have known that a parliament based on parity was no more acceptable to the Bengalis. The offer of Ayub was disappointing as it did not meet the existing expectations of the Bengalis. Soon after Ayub finished his speech, Mujib pointed out that for the people of East Pakistan his (Ayub’s) proposal was not sufficient and it did not ‘meet the requirements of the majority people of Pakistan.’ Mujib left the conference room with a note of dissent saying that Ayub’s proposal would not be acceptable to the Bengalis.

Mujib took a crucial decision. He now thought that the DAC was of no help to him as its principal leaders did not appreciate the real issues involved and would never support the Six-Point Formula. So Mujib decided to dissociate from the DAC. It was done in the afternoon of March 13 when Mujib read out

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a written statement in the midst of a few hundred local and international media reporters declaring the Awami League’s decision to dissociate from the DAC. As a result, without the Awami League, the DAC died its natural death and the Round Table Conference failed to produce my positive result.

The decision to dissociate from the DAC scored two points for Mujib, One, he maintained his leadership in East Pakistan by nullifying the criticism of the radical forces that he went to the Round Table Conference to compromise the cause of the people. He kept his promise made in the public meeting on ‘February 23 and returned to Dhaka as a hero once again. Two, he now secured a position to bargain and negotiate with the leaders of the government on his own strength. One interesting aspect of the Round Table Conference was that Islam was not brought into politics. In their speeches no leader said this time that Islam was at stake. The issues were so hard and real that the bogey of religion could not play any role in resolving them.

Some people, particularly the leaders of East Pakistan still thought that Mujib could be maneuvered into a position to accept power. It ought to have been possible in view of Mujib’s class character which was known to them. As soon as Mujib was released from custody, Haroons30 were the first who gained an immediate access to him (Mujib) and took up a mediatory role between Mujib and the West Pakistani leaders Ayub Khan. But they did not realise what change had taken place in the character of the mass movements in East Pakistan. Mujib’s only source of power was his support from the people. Mujib was no more leading the people as before. He was there because people wanted him to lead them. Mujib now symbolised the wishes and aspirations of the people. He was strong to his people by a deep-rooted pledge. How could Mujib go back to Dhaka saying that he was satisfied with the Proposals made by Ayub in the Round Table Conference?

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Notes

  1. This was narrated to me in detail by a friend from Lahore who was close to Ayub’s administration.

  1. The main architect of the SAC and the 11-point programme was Sirajul Alam Khan from behind the scene.

  1. The Programme was formally amended on January 17, 1969.

  1. The Committee became popularly known as DAC.

  1. Translated from : Dr. Mazharul Islam, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib, pp. 423-4.

The 8-Point programme was :

(i) Federal Parliamentary from of Government.

(ii) Direct election on the basis of adult franchise.

(iii) To lilft Emergency with immediate effect.

(iv) To declare void all black laws, specially all detention with out trial and University Ordinance and restore civil liberties.

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(v) To release students, workers, journalists and politicians including Sheikh Mujib, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; withdraw all political cases pending before the Court and Tribunal and all warrants of arrest issued.

(vi) To withdraw all orders issued under Section 144.

(vii) Withdraw all censorship on press issue new declaration, withdraw confiscation of daily and weekly papers, and restore declaration of ‘Ittefaq’ and ‘Chattan’ and return Progressive Papers Ltd. to its previous owner.

(viii) To call upon the people to abandon election and declare not to participate in the next elections.

The Programme was declared on January 8, 1969.

  1. Generally means encircling the employers, a technique used as a means to realise the demands of the workers.

  1. Imposition of Section 144 prohibits assembly of more than four persons.

  1. By that time it became almost clear the conspiracy case proceedings would be discontinued in the face of the mounting public pressure. At a Paltan meeting held on February 16 immediately after the ‘Janaza of Sgt. Zahoorul Huq, Moulana Bhashani was the first to demand unconditional release of all the 35 accused persons of the Agartala Conspiracy Case.

  1. This petition was moved by Dr. Kamal Hossain assisted by Amirul Islam and the author and a large number of lawyers took interest in this case.

  1. Justice Siddiky’s appointment as Chief Justice superceding another judge and his subsequent refusal to issue a Rule Nisi on the application against Government’s order to shoot at sight for violation of curfew order created a lot of resentment both amongst the lawyers and public. The relationship between him and the lawyers deteriorated so much that at one stage a High Court Bar Association meeting passed a resolution condemning the behaviour of the Chief Justice in Court. In retaliation the Chief Justice issued a sue motu rule to draw up contempt proceedings against some of the office bearers of the Bar Association. At a later stage the matter was however, dropped.

  1. See also page 172.

  1. Dr. Kamal Hossain, after the independence of Bangladesh, held the Ministries of Law, Parliamentary Affairs, Prtroleum, etc. at different times.

  1. The DAC actually accepted the invitation with some preconditions which included withdrawal of the Emergency and release of all political prisoners.

  1. During all these weeks in West Pakistan also thousands of meetings and demonstrations were held demanding restoration democracy.

  1. Victory for the Bengalis.

  1. ‘Yours address and mine, Padma, Meghna and Jamuna,’ identifying three major rivers in East

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Pakistan and indicating this is the place where Bengalis belong to and not the other part of Pakistan.

  1. Asserting that the Round Table Conference should be held in Dhaka and not in Rawalpindi.

  1. Asserting that the people were for Bengal and not for the Punjab.

  1. To declare that ‘my country and your country’s is Bangladesh and only Bangladesh.

  1. ‘We will break open the jail to bring Mujib out.’

  1. Right to self-rule.

  1. Rule of peasants and workers.

  1. See Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence in Bangladesh, Bangladesh Books International Limited, Dhaka, p. 38 on the class character of the movement.

  1. Some West Pakistani leaders also arrived in Dhaka for discussion with Mujib. Bhutto met Mujib twice on February 23 at 12.30 p.m. and 7 p.m. I was present in both the meetings. Bhutto traveled with Mujib up to Lahore on the same plane on February 24.

  1. Banga Bandhu means Friend of Bengal and Banga shardul means Tiger of Bengal. Mujib preferred the title Banga Bandhu which became more popular and the title Banga Shardul was not used subsequently at his own instruction.

  1. The author was present in almost all these meetings.

  1. Address by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the Round Table Conference held at Rawalpindi. Published by Abdul Momin, Publicity Secretary, East Pakistan Awami League.

  1. Principle of Policy No. 16 and Article 240 of the Constitution of 1962.

  1. An Official hostel in Rawalpindi. It had nothing to do with the East Pakistan House in London.

  1. Haroons belonged to one of the 22 richest families in Pakistan. At one stage, Yousuf Haroon, used to patronize Mujib by paying him a monthly salary for working in his Alpha Insurance Company at Dhaka.

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Chapter 8

 

The First Constitution Based on the 6-Point Formula

 

Before Mujib left Rawalpindi efforts were however made to bring Ayub and Mujib together for a direct negotiation. So some ray of hope was seen once again when Ayub Khan through Yusuf and Mahmood Haroon invited Mujib privately to a dinner the same evening (March 13). It was not publicised and no person of Mujib’s team knew it other than myself. I left Sheikh Mujibur Rahman accompanied by the two Haroon brothers at the entrance of the President’s House. At the dinner Ayub discussed about the Six Point Formula and wanted to know from Mujib whether with the Six Point incorporated in the

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constitution Pakistan could remain together. He is told Mujib that he had yet not seen any constitutional scheme in writing and would certainly consider it if any such scheme could be sent to him before the ensuing parliament session. Mujib accepted this challenge and promised Ayub that he would present a constitutional scheme which would incorporate the Six-Points within the framework of one Pakistan. Mujib went to the extent of assuring Ayub that the scheme would be based on the existing 1962 Constitution.

Mujib looked very happy after the dinner and thought that the Army perhaps had realised the gravity of the crisis and changed its mind. They wanted to preserve Pakistan by consent and not by force. Mujib thought Ayub was authorised by the Army to negotiate with him. As soon as we returned to Dhaka, the work on the amendment of the 1962 Constitution based on the Six Point formula began. In 6 days working day and night, the draft was completed by going through every article of the constitution. As a result, an amended 1962 Constitution incorporating the Six-Points within the framework of Pakistan as a single sovereign state was prepared.1

On the 7th day, A.H.M. Qumaruzzaman, Secretary General of the All Pakistan Awami League was sent to West Pakistan with four sets of the draft constitution to be placed before the authorities there.

This was the first constitutional draft of its kind incorporating the Six-points within the framework of Pakistan. The subsequent drafts prepared in February, 1971 prior to the scheduled session of the new parliament, which was never held and the one prepared during the talks in the second half of March, 1971 were primarily based on the draft prepared in March, 1969 excepting that the draft in 1969 was in the form of a Constitution Amendment Bill under the 1962 Constitution whereas drafts in February and March, 1971, were in the form of a new constitution as Ayub’s Constitution of 1962 was already abrogated.2

  1. Statement of Objects and Reasons

In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Constitution Amendment bill drafted in 1969, it was stated that the ‘bill embodies detailed amendments to the constitution which are aimed at giving effect to the basic constitutional demands of the people of Pakistan as these have been given clear expression in the course of the mass movement which has taken place in the country.’ The basic constitutional demands mentioned in the statement were as follows :

  1. a) Representation in the Federal Legislature on the basis of population.

  1. b) Grant of full and effective regional autonomy on the basis of Six Point programme of the Awami League and 11-point programme of the students.

  1. c) Dismemberment of one unit and the establishment of a sub-federation in West Pakistan.

  1. Major Features of the Amendment Bill :

Islamic Republic of Pakistan Retained

Although the Awami League was committed to establish a secular state in the amendment bill the title of ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ was retained keeping in view the strong sentiments of the West Pakistani leaders and army generals had over the matter. This would also help to maintain the ‘oneness’ of Pakistan. Similarly, all the provisions contained in Part X of the Constitution (Articles 189 to 207) under

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the title Islamic Institutions were retained intact in the Amendment Bill and nothing was changed as regards the constitution of the Advisory Council of Islamic ideology and the Islamic Research Institute by the President. On enactment, the bill would have become the Constitution (Nineth) Amendment Act, 1969. 100 amendments were proposed to the 1962 Constitution which had 250 Articles, in order to bring the necessary changes.

Amendment 2 of the draft created the federation of Pakistan consisting of the States of East and West Pakistan with a sub-federation in West Pakistan. 

 

  1. States and Provinces could Assure New Names

The amendment in No. 2 further defined the territories constituting the provinces of West Pakistan by sub-clause (3) and (4). Sub-clause (5) provided that each State and province could select a name by which it wanted to be designated by a resolution adopted by a majority of the total number of members of the State or provincial legislature concerned. In the absence of such selection, the existing names would continue. This clause would have enabled East Pakistan to assume the name ‘Bangladesh’ as a component state of Pakistan.

  1. Sub-federation in West Pakistan

The scheme of having a sub-federation in West Pakistan was provided keeping in view the historical deamands and requirements of the minority provinces of West Pakistan. Under the scheme the State of West Pakistan would have one state legislature and government with four provincial legislatures. As the Six Point programme was based on the theme of ‘development in diversity’ and ‘decentralised management of economic resources’ the scheme would have provided the different regions with a scope to develop their own culture and resources. But as the provinces in West Pakistan were contiguous and might not have needed the same amount of autonomy as East Pakistan, it was left with the provinces of West Pakistan to decide the quantum of autonomy they required.3

  1. Preventive Detention

By Amendment No. 3 fundamental right No. 2 of the constitution was radically changed with regard to preventive detention. Sub-para (3) of Right 2 which was a proviso to exclude the right of a person arrested under preventive detention law from enjoying the cosntitutional safeguard was now substituted by the words : ‘No law shall authorise preventive detention.’

Accordingly, sub-para (5) of Right No. 2 which regulated the procedure of preventive detention was deleted. Likewise, by Amendment 15, Article 26 which dealt with the power of the President relating to introduction of any bill on preventive detention was removed. Preventive detention laws like Public Safety Acts or the Security of Pakistan Act were mainly used to arrest political opponents and keep them in detention without any trial for a unlimited period in the name of security, national interest or maintenance of public order etc. The amendment proposed to remove this misuse of power for the persecution of political opponents.

  1. Representation in Federal Services on Population Basis

Amendment No. 5 provided substitution of principles of policy No. 16 and 17 by the following, main

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empahsis being on the population ratio namely :

  1. Representation in Federal Government

Every effort shall be made to ensure that within the shortest possible time persons from all parts of Pakistan are represented, on the basis of population, in all spheres of the Federal Government.’

  1. Service in the Defence Service

Every effort shall be made to ensure that within the shortest possible time persons from all parts of Pakistan are represented on the basis of population, in the Defence services of Pakistan.’

Amendment 66 substituted Article 138 and laid down an obligation on the federal government to ensure representation in all the services under the federation on the basis of population within a period of ten years.

  1. President must be a Muslim

No amendment was proposed to Article 10 of the constitution which provided the qualifications for the office of President. By retaining the provision that the President must be a ‘Muslim’ the traditional concept of an ‘Islamic Pakistan’ was maintained. In the 1962 Constitution of President enjoyed enormous power as the executive authority vested in him and he acted as the Chief executive having both executive and legislative powers. Under the new scheme the President was made only the figure-head and therefore, all necessary amendments were proposed to that effect. The whole scheme was for a federal parliamentary structure where the President acts only on the advice of the Prime Minister who in turn remain responsible to the sovereign parliament and must enjoy its confidence. The President was to be elected by an electoral college consisting of the members of the Federal Legislature and the State Legislatures of East and West Pakistan.4

  1. The Federal Legislature

By amendment 10 (1) the composition of the federal legislature and the basis of its election was determined. In place of a National Assembly of 218 members elected indirectly on the basis of parity between East and West Pakistan, the amendment to Clause 1 of Article 20 provided that there would be a federal legislature ‘composed of 300 members directly elected by the people of Pakistan on the basis of universal adult franchise. The number of members directly elected to represent East Pakistan, the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan shall be in proportion to the respective number of their people.’

Article 22 (1) of the Constitution gave the President also power to summon the National Assembly and except when it was summoned by the Speaker, to prorogue it. Keeping in line with the parliamentary system of government Amendment 11 substituted Clause 1 of Article 22 by providing that the President could summon the federal legislature but only on the advice of the Prime Minister and if not summoned by the Speaker he could also prorogue it, but again only on the advice of the Prime Minister. But however, if a notice of no-confidence was given to the speaker, the President would not prorogue the federal legislature before the notice was voted or before the expiry of 30 days after the expairy of the period within which it was to be moved, whichever occurred first.

  1. Dissolution of Parliament

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Amendment 12 changed the provision relating to the dissolution of the National Assembly. Aritcle 23 gave the President the menacing authority to dissolve the National Assembly ‘at any time’ subject to two minor conditions. In Pakistan no democratic process could ever develop bacause of the exercise of this power by some Presidents in the past, the last example being the dissolution of Parliament by Iskander Mirza in 1958 at the instance of Ayub Khan. Clause 1 of Article 23 was substituted by Amendment 12 (1) which provided that the President could only dissolve the National Assembly on the advice of the Prime Minister. Amendment 12 (ii) deleted Clauses 4, 5 and 6 of Article 23 but retained Clauses 2 and 3.

Amendment 12 deleted the entire Article 24 of the constitution which provided a special power to

the President to go for referendum in case of difference of opinion between the President and the National Assembly. This provision had been inserted as the National Assembly was not a sovereign body under the 1962 Constitution.

  1. Assent to Bills

Amendment 16 related to the assent to Bills. Article 27 provided a dilatory procedure by which the President could exercise a lot of pressure on the legislative process and enjoyed the right to go for referendum etc. The entire Article Which had 6 sub-clauses was substituted in the line of Article 57 of the 1956 Constitution, where the President had to assent to Money Bills. As regards other bills he could return the same to the federal legislature. But if such bill was passed again, with or without amendment, whether suggested by the President or not, and presented before the President, the President had to assent thereto.

The legislative powers of the President when the Assembly was not in session as embodied in Article 29 of the Constitution were fully retained, except that by Amendment 17 the period up to which an ordinance passed under this Article could remain valid if not placed before the National Assembly earlier was reduced to 90 days from 180 days.

  1. Emergency Provisions

By Amendment 18, emergency provisions and the legislature powers of the President in an emergency were retained but drastic modification. In the constitutional history of Pakistan emergency provisions were always laid down elaborately. The provisions in the 1956 Constitution were also as much in detail (Article 191 to 1962) as in the Act of 1935. These were some of the powers every President took care to retain and use, as Iskander Mirza in 1956 and Ayub in 1962. It became almost an established precedent that on proclamation of emergency the President would also suspend the enforcement of fundamental rights by the Courts and pass orders inconsistent with fundamental rights. It had also become a practice that once emergency was proclaimed it was not revoked till forced by strong political opposition. The emergency which was proclaimed in 1965 war was not withdrawn till the mass upsurge took place in 1969 whereas the war was over in three weeks. These provisions gave extraordinary powers to the President, used mostly to suppress political opposition inside the country.

In order to remove these dangers Amendment 18 retained the emergency provision only for a situation relating to an external aggression or war. It was no longer possible to proclaim emergency on the ground that the security or economic life of Pakistan was threatened by internal disturbances beyond the power of the provincial government to control. The power to suspend the enforcement of fundamental rights and to make laws inconsistent to fundamental rights were omitted by deleting clauses 9 and 10 of the Article 30. There was no emergency provision of any kind in the Bangladesh Constitution on its

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enactment in 1972.5 In case of war or the actual or imminent invasion of Bangladesh, the President would summon the parliament and the law provided that ‘War shall not be declared and the Republic shall not participate in any war except with the assent of Parliament’ (Article 63 of 1972 Constitution).

  1. The Executive

 

Article 31 of the Constitution vested the executive authority of the Republic in the President. Amendment 19 substituted this Article by as many as 17 clauses creating provisions to suit the working of a parliamentary system. It provided that the federal government would consist of a cabinet of ministers with the Prime Minister at its head and of minister of states and deputy ministers and the executive authority would be exercised by or on the authority of the federal government either directly or through officers subordinate to it; that the cabinet would be collectively responsible to the federal legislature and the Prime Minister would keep the President generally informed on matters of domestic and foreign policy; the President would appoint a member of the federal legislature as Prime Minister who commanded the confidence of the majority of the members of the federal legislature and would appoint other ministers on the advice of the Prime Ministers; that the President in exercise of his function, would act in accordance with the advice of the federal government except in cases where he was expressly empowered by the constitution to act in his discretion; that the resignation or termination of a minister would be given effect to by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister and the cabinet wuld continue in office until their successors were appointed etc. Similarly Article 32 was substituted by suitable provisions relating to the executive instruments of federal government and making of rules for the allocation and transaction of business of the federal government by Amendment 20.

  1. Seat of the Supreme Court

Amendment 24 related to Article 56 of the Constitution which dealt with the seat of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. At one time the Federal Court of Pakistan used to sit only in Karachi causing great suffering to the people of East Pakistan and other regions. The Constitution of 1956 (Article 155) provided that the seat of the Court would remain in Karachi but it would sit at least twice in every year in Dhaka. Article 56 of 1962 Constitution made Islamabad the permanent seat of the Supreme Court but provided that it would sit in Dhaka at least twice every year. The Supreme Court could sit in any other place, but was not given the freedom to select a place without the approval of the President. This caused a lot of resentement among the people not only of East Pakistan but of all other regions of West Pakistan also. It deprived a large majority of people from seeking remedy in the Supreme Court. Amendment 24 shifted the seat of the Supreme Court from Islamabad to Dhaka with the provision that would sit in Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar at least twice every year, and left it with the Chief Justice to select any other place he would like the Court should sit.

  1. The State and Provincial Legislature and Government

The West Pakistan legislature was to comprise members representing the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. But the distribution of seats among the different provinces of West Pakistan was left to be finalised after consultation with the representatives of all the provinces of West Pakistan. It was however, presumed that representation would be on the basis of population keeping in line with the principle of representation envisaged in the Statement of Objects and Reasons.

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Amendment 37 sbustituted Article 80 by providing 17 clauses for the functioning of the state and provincial government of a parliamentary form, similar to provisions made in Amendment 19 for the functioning of the federal government.

Article 66 of the Constitution provided that the President would appoint a Governor for each province and the Governor would function subject to the direction of the President. Amendment 26 substituted the entire Article by providing that there would be a Governor for each of the two states of East and West Pakistan and a Governor for each of the provinces of West Pakistan, to be appointed by the President but on the advice of the Prime Minister who would tender advice only after consultation with the Chief Ministers of the state or provinces concerned.

  1. High Courts

In Pakistan a tendency developed to induct civil servants into judiciary. The authors of the draft wanted to avoid that and sought to ensure independence of the judiciary from the executive. By amendment 44 the provinsions of appointing a member of the civil service as a judge of the High Court as contained in sub-clause (b) and (c) of Clause (2) of Article 92 were deleted.

Amendment 45 substituted Article 97 which related to the seats of the High Court by providing that the permanent seats of different High Courts would be situated at the following places :

High Court of East Pakistan Dhaka
High Court of Punjab Lahore
High Court of North West  
Frontier Province Peshawar
High Court of Sind Karachi

The High Courts could sit at other places of the respective states or provinces as the Chief Justice of the Court would appoint with the approval of the Governor.

The extraordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce the fundamental rights and issue directions in the nature of writs were embodied in Article 98 of the Constitution. Amendment 46 gave more power to the Courts by inserting new words and deleting sub-clause (b) of the Clause 3 and 4 of Article 98 of the Constitution. By deleting Clause 4, the restriction on passing interim orders by the High Court in certain cases was removed. This extraordinary jurisdiction was given to the Supreme Court also by inserting a new Article 6-A under Amendment 4. By amendment 46 (4) sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause 5 of Article 98 were also substituted to define ‘local authority’ which was otherwise not defined. Amendment 47 deleted Article 99 which dealth with the transfer of judges of the High Court.6

  1. Cessation of Membership in the Legislature

Under Amendment 50 new provisions were made substituting Article 104 adding the ground of cessation of membership in the legislature. The past experiences showed that members could be tempted to cross the floor and join a party which was closer to power. Both in the centre as well as in East Pakistan this was one of the principal causes of instability resulting from frequent changes of the government. In order to stop this kind of occurrence it was suggested in this amendment that if a person having been elected to a legislature as a candidate or nominee of a political party withdrew himself from it or was expelled by his political party for violation of the party’s mandate in respect of any matter relating to his activities as a

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member of the legislature or voted or abstained from voting against the direction of such a political party upon any legislative measure or any motion put to vote in the legislature ‘shall cease to be a member of the legislature for the unexpired period of his term, unless re-elected at a bye-election occasioned by the vacancy created by such cessation of membership.’ The same principle was to apply to a person who having elected as an independent candidate then joined a political party within the legislature.

The cessation of such membership was to take effect on serving a notice upon the Speaker under the signature of the leader of the parliamentary party concerned. Although it was a restriction on the freedom of an elected member of the Parliament particularly when a question of ‘vote on conscience’ arose, this was found to be the only way to ensure party discipline and political stability of the government.

  1. Relations between the Federation,

States and Provinces : Federal Subjects

The title of Part VI of the Constitution of 1962 read ‘Relations between the Centre and the Provinces.’ Amendment 58 substituted the words as ‘Part VI : Relations between the Federation, the States and the Provinces.’ This part dealt with the most crucial question of law-making powers of the federal, state and provincial governments and the distribution of subjects between them. By amending the Third Schedule, the Federal subjects were specified but for the State subjects a new Schedule (substituted Fourth Schedule) was proposed, the contents of which were to be determined after consultation with the representatives of the provinces of West Pakistan. The matter of the state provincial legislative lists was therefore, kept open for further negotiation as for as the quantum of autonomy for the provinces of West Pakistan was concerned.

Clause (1) of Article 131 relating to the federal law-making powers was retained giving the federal legislature exclusive power to make laws (including laws having extraterritorial operation) for the whole or any part of Pakistan with respect to any matter enumerated in the Third Schedule.7

Amendment 59 (1) deleted Clause 2 of Article 131 which extended the central law-making power virtually to all aspects of national life, making the provinces completely dependent on the centre for any economic progress or development. Under Clause 2, the centre had the power to make laws for the whole or any part of Pakistan where the national interest of Pakistan in relation to the security of Pakistan, including the economic and financial stability of Pakistan, planning or coordination or the achievement of uniformity in respect of any matter in different parts of Pakistan so reuqiured. Clause 4 of Article 131 was substituted by Amendment 59 (2) which related to the law-making authority of the federal legislature for the Islamabad capital territory and Dhaka capital territory with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Third Schedule.

It further provided that in the event of any inconsistency arising between a federal law and a state law or a provincial law relating to the said capital territories the ‘federal law shall prevail.’

In the Constitution of 1962 there was only one legislative list and that was of the centre contained in the third schedule and the provincial law-making power exteneded to any matter other than a matter enumerated in the third schedule. The new constitutional scheme provided two separate schedules of subjects for the federal and state legislatures. The third schedule of the Constitution was drastically shortened to give the federal legislature only those subjects as envisaged necessary under the desired federal scheme. A list of 49 subjects was reduced to 12. The power to make laws in relation to certain matters in ‘national interest’ under Article 133 was also deleted.

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  1. Legislative Power of the Provinces of West Pakistan

The new Fourth Schedule proposed to contain a list of subjects which would be determined after consultation with representatives of the provinces of West Pakistan. One the list was finalised in consultation with the leaders of the provinces, the quantum of autonomy the provinces of West Pakistan would enjoy vis-a-vis the state of West Pakistan could be determined. This special arrangement was made so that the smaller provinces of West Pakistan could decide what amount of autonomy they wanted in their relationship with the state government. Due to the geographical contiguity and special problems of communication, waterways and irrigation, it was argued that the provinces of West Pakistan did not need the same quantum of autonomy as the historical and geo-political factors of East Pakistan could demand, the most fundamental of all differences being that East Pakistan was separated from the rest of Pakistan by a distance of nearly 1200 miles with India in the middle. So the matters which could be commonly regulated for mutual benefits between the provinces of West Pakistan under the federal authority could not be so regulated in respect of East Pakistan. No railway line, gas, line, waterways, canals etc. ran from East through West Pakistan. The mobility of labour could take place between the provinces of West Pakistan but not between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. But at the same time, apart from those common factors the provinces of West Pakistan required to be sufficiently independent in managing and developing their own economy and culture. The concept of having a sub-federation in West Pakistan was developed in the light of this perspective.

The proposal to keep the determination of subject under the fourth schedule open was made to give the leaders of West Pakistan, particularly of the Punjab, also a scope to negotiate with the smaller provinces on the list of subjects the state of West Pakistan would retain and administer. The leaders of the provinces of West Pakistan, if agreed, could have the entire list made for the state government of West Pakistan with subjects other than those enumerated in the new third schedule. It also provided a scope for West Pakistan to retain itself as a unit having sufficient economic and administrative powers over its provinces. In substance the matter of autonomy for the provinces of West Pakistan was left with the people of West Pakistan. It was therefore, suggested under the amended Article 133 (2) that a provincial legislature in the state of West Pakistan would have exclusive power to make laws for the province or any part thereof with respect to any matter other than a matter enumerated in the third and fourth schedule. In other words, no separate list was proposed for the provinces of West Pakistan.

  1. Legislative Powers of the State of East Pakistan

As far as East Pakistan was concerned its legislature would have exclusive power to make laws for the state or any part thereof with respect to any matter enumerated in the fourth schedule and any matter other that a matter enumerated in the third schedule. The fourth schedule, which was yet to be prepared would, thereof, apply to both the East and West Pakistan state legislatures, but unlike the West Pakistan state legislature, East Pakistan would outrightly exercise power with respect to any matter not enumerated in the third schedule. In other words, the autonomy of East Pakistan would extend to exercising power in all matters not included in the federal list (Third Schedule) without requiring any further consultation.

Article 134 of the Constitution provided that if a provincial law was inconsistent with a central law the latter would prevail and the former to the extent of inconsistency would be invaild. Amendment 62 substituted this Article by providing that ‘any enactment made by a legislature in respect of a matter which is not within its law-making power shall be void.’ The power of the federal legislature to make laws outside the amended third schedule was, therefore, categorically excluded. Accordingly, Article 135 which related to the extent of executive authority the central government would have was modified by Amendment 63 and Article 136 by Amendment 64 keeping the legislative power of the federal legislature

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and state legislature of province limited to their respective schedule and defined powers.

  1. Taxation

Amendment 65 provided a new clause under Article 137 (2) to suggest how the source of revenue of the federal government would be determined. In the amended third schedule, taxation no more remained a federal subject. The constitutional scheme provided that the state would meet the revenue requirements of the federal government under fundamental consitutional obligation and the proportion of the contribution would be determined by the National Finance Commission. The amendment did not impose any restriction on the requirements of the federal government. What it envisaged was that the revenue requirements of the federal governments would be met proportionately according to the resource abilitly of each state to be determined by the National Finance Commission and that the responsibility of collecting taxation would lie with the states and not with the federal government. It would, however, be a funda-mental constitutional obligation of the States to pay such amount to meet the federal requirements. This went with the fundamental theme of autonomy based on the Six Point Formula that each of the component parts constituting the federation would enjoy the right to manage and control its own economy and that the resources of one region would not be used for the development of the other. This was one of the steps suggested to stop the exploitation of one region by the other. Under this scheme the federal government would impose taxes on the States and not on the individuals, firms or companies. Point 4 of the Six Point Formula provided that a certain percentage of the revenue collection on all heads would automatically be credited to federal fund by the Reserve Bank on which amount the ‘Unit Government shall have no control.’

  1. Currency

In the amended Third Schedule currency was shown as a federal subject as the 11-point programme of the students suggested. In the Six Point Formula, point 3 recommended two alternative proposals. 3-A was for two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings and 3-B was for one currency provided effective constitutional safeguards were made to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan were two different economic units for all practical purposes. Keeping in view the different aspects of this connection made in the Six Point Formula, amendment 68 substituting Article 141, provided the establishment of Regional Reserve Banks and the function of State Bank and Regional Reserve Bank.

Under this amendment currency remained as a federal subject but as contemplated in the Six Point Formula the Regional Reserve Bank would maintain the custody of the foreign exchange earnings and holdings of the state thereby giving the full authority to the State Government to control and manage its own foreign exchange earnings. The State Bank of Pakistan would, however, determine the external foreign rate and issue currency besides maintaining the foreign exchange account of the federal government. Under this arrangement the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan would stop to a large extent and two separate accounts of all monetary transactions including trade balances were to be maintained to remove the economic anomalies that existed in the financial relationship between the two wings.

  1. Inter-State and Inter-Provincial Trade

On the question of inter-provincial and inter-state trade, amendment 69 retained Clause I imposing

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restriction on the legistation of a state or province to make laws in respect of certain matters of inter-provincial trade but amended Clause 2 to provide that a State could impose reasonable restrictions in order to prevent removal from the state of any goods which was exportable to foreign countries.

  1. National Finance Commission

Amendment 71 changed the entire character and purpose of the National Finanace Commission as contained in Article 144. Under the amended Article 144, the National Finance Commission became a very important public body with a lot of power and responsibility. The Commission was to be constituted of 12 members, from East Pakistan, 5 from West Pakistan and one federal minister to be nominated by the

President within 30 days of the new arrangement coming into operation. If the President nominated a federal minister from West Pakistan the Commission would consist of an equal number of members from each wing. The duties and functions of the Commission were to determine once in three years the ratio of contribution each state government would make to meet the revenue and foreign exchange requirements of the federal government on the basis of ability to pay and location of expenditure. The Commission would also keep in view the objective of removing regional economic disparity within the shortest possible time. So in determining the ratio of state contribution, the Commission would not only consider the resources but location of the bulk of expenditure and the existing regional disparities. Under the new constitutional scheme the federal government would still continue to have the largest budget and 70 per cent of the total revenue earnings. The Armed Forces being located in West Pakistan and the bulk of personnel in federal services belonging to West Pakistan, most of its expenditure would take place in that region. The Commission would take them into consideration before determining the ratio of contribution. The Commission would also determine the ratio of foreign exchange and gold reserves for the respective Regional Reserve Banks to back the currency issued by the State Bank of Pakistan and the Commission’s order in respect of the ratios fixed for the above matters be binding on the federal, state and provincial governments.

Another important task given to the Commission was to apportion powers, rights, properties, duties and liabilities between the federal, state and provincial governments as would be required to give effect to the new federal arrangement proposed in the Amendment Bill. The Commission would also apportion liabilities arising out of foreign loans on the basis of the place of their utilisation. It meant that the foreign loans utilised in West Pakistan had to be returned from the resources of West Pakistan and East Pakistan would take the responsibility of repayment of loans utilised in East Pakistan.8 The Commission would also make new administrative arrangements and reorganise the State Bank of Pakistan to give to the new federal arrangement and would remove difficulties arising in connection with the introduction of the new arrangements.

  1. Disputes between the States and

the Federal Government

In every federal scheme, disputes are likely to arise between the states and between the state or states and the federal governments regarding their power and jurisdiction and an essential feature of such federal scheme is that constitutional provisions are made to resolve such disputes. In the federations of the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Canada and Australia the function to resolve such disputes is performed by the Supreme Court. One of the common cause of disputes arises out of the exercise of power of a legislature to make laws on a subject which is not within its jurisdiction. The Constitution of 1962 did not provide any machinery to resolve such a matter probably because Pakistan was not a federation in the true sense under that Constitution. On the contrary by Article 133 the validity

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of a law could not be called in question on the ground that the legislature by which it was made had no power to make such law. Article 133 gave the legislature the entire responsibility to decide whether it had the power under the constitution to make a particular law. This meant that the federal legislature had the supreme authority to make laws for the whole of Pakistan. In the Amendment Bill provision was made to resolve such disputes by Tribunal appointed by the Chief Jusctice of Pakistan as was provided by the 1956 Constitution.

  1. Federal Capital and the Seat of

Federal Legislature

Amendment 95 brought a very significant proposal of establishing the capital of the Republic in Dhaka and the principal seat of the federal legislature at Islamabad. This was another measure suggested by which the disparities between the two wings could be removed. There was a great demand in East Pakistan that having suffered 22 years of exploitation the seat of the capital of Pakistan should be in East Pakistan. According to the Six Point programme this would also prove the bonafide of West Pakistanis sense of brotherhood and national integrity for which they were so concerned.

  1. Features in Relation to the

6-Point Formula

With these amendments the Constitution of 1962 was retained and at the same time the necessary features were changed so as to transform it to provide a workable federal scheme within the framework of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The challenge of Ayub Khan that incorporation of the Six Point into the constitution could not provide a scheme to keep Pakistan together was thus met. With the amendments incorporated, the consitution looked more moderate and workable than the reading of the Six Point Formula by itself. The argument that under a constitutional scheme based on the Six Point, the federal government and legislature would have little to do was not correct.

Under the scheme proposed by Sheikh Mujib in the Amendment Bill, the federal list contained in the Third Schedule incorporated 12 subjects including all matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in that schedule instead of only three subjects mentioned in the Six Point Formula. It was argued that defence included the defence of each part of Pakistan and foreign affairs included powers in connection with admission of persons into and departure of persons from Pakistan, citizenship, naturalisation and aliens. ‘Currency’ obviously included the minting, printing and maintenance of the same and legal tender thereof. Besides determining matters pertaining to the federal legislature (remuneration, powers, privileges of its members and remuneration of Speakers and Deputy Speakers), the federal legislature had exclusive power over the election laws and Election Commission, likewise over constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court including regulations determining as who could practise before that Court. The federal legislature would also have exclusive power over any matter relating to the federal Public Service Commission, foreign and defence services and other services specifically connected with federal subjects. With regard to any matter ancillary or incidental to any federal subject, power to make laws thereto could increase the number of items further for the federal legislature.

The federal scheme under the Amendment Bill was designed to provide an equal participation in the federal legislature by the people of all the regions of Pakistan on a democratic basis. This participation alone which was totally lacking during the last two decades would ensure Pakistan’s stability as a sovereign state. The federal legislature would determine the policies and resolve the issues of highest

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national importance and would leave the rest with the respective regions. The amendments visualised a scheme of decentralisation of the administrative system in which no region would have any grievance against the other. If there was any dispute between them the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would play his role to resolve the issue. There would have been no scope of exploitation of one region by another and yet the relationship in all spheres including trade would continue as usual and the federal government would retain the control over the vital subjects relating to the country’s security and integrity, i.e. defence and foreign affairs.

With the defence and foreign affairs completely in its hands and there being no restriction on its budget requirements, the federal government could continue to play the most dominant role in the field of finance and employment including appointments of high offices like Judges of the Supreme Court, Election Commissioners, Public Service Commission, Ambassadors, Councils and Commissions, etc. Its budget would still be the largest covering 60 to 70 per cent of the total revenue expenditure and it could employ hundreds and thousands of citizens in its services. The provision that the federal government would remove the disparities in the employment of its services within ten years meant that for a long time all the federal services of Pakistan would have been under the dominance of the personnel from West Pakistan. To meet its budget requirements the state government was made liable to taxation under a federal law.

Besides the defence budget and employment, the defence industries, contracts, establishment, work-shops and cantonments would have been under the control of the federal government. In the Six Point Formula, Six Point recommended the establishment of a para-military force in East Pakistan and demanded the setting up of an ordnance factory, a military academy and the Naval Headquarters in East Pakistan. In the Amendment Bill no statutory provision to this effect was made. Article 17 of the Constitution was not amended which vested in the President the Supreme Command of the Defence Service of Pakistan. He was empowered to raise and maintain the Defence Services and Reserves of those services, grant commission in those units and appoint Chief Commanders of those services. So in respect of defence of Pakistan and of any part thereof unconditional power and authority was given to the federal government and the security of Pakistan remained to be the absolute responsibility of the federal government.

In respect of Foreign Affairs also the jurisdiction was unconditional. Although in the Third Schedule of the 1962 Constitution few items were specifically included, in the Amendment it was not found necessary to mention them as Foreign Affairs was considered to be a comprehensive subject. In the Six Point Formula under point 5 (5) the demand was made that the constitution should empower the unit governments to establish ‘trade and commercial relations with, set up trade mission in and enter into agreements with foreign countries.’ No such constitutional provision was made in the Amendment Bill as it was privately admitted by Sheikh on several occasions that establishment of a trade mission by a unit government of its own could jeopardise the foreign policy of the country. In his discussion with Ayub, Mujib also reaffirmed the same. In our discussion with other political leaders of West Pakistan, this point was never pressed hard. This is why the provision was not incorporated in the proposed constitution. Although the provision relating to utilisation of foreign exchange earning with a Regional Reserve Bank completely under the control of a state government could give rise to the point of having the authority to establish trade relationship with another state independently, this aspect was also kept open to suggest that no such mission could be established without the concurrence of the federal government. In the Grand Convention of 1950 it was suggested that a regional Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to be set up in East Pakistan, but no such provision was made in the Amendment Bill either.

On the question of currency the Six Point Formula mentioned that the currency for ‘East Pakistan’ shall be issued through the East Pakistan Bank’ marked as Dhaka, similarly West Pakistan

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currency ‘shall be issued through the West Pakistan Bank and shall be marked West Pakistan’ or simply ‘Lahore.’ No such provision was made in the Amendment Bill and the State Bank of Pakistan had the absolute control over the issue of currency notes. But taking the whole scheme of the banking system as visualised under the Amendment Bill into consideration, it would have been quite possible to achieve the same goal, as the Regional Reserve Bank had the power to take any measure necessary for preventing flight of capital from one state to another. In the constitutional proposals of the Grand Convention in 1950 and in the Cabinet Mission Plan of the British Government in 1946, currency was not kept as a federal subject at all.

The Amendment Bill was rather a moderate application of the Six Point Formula and this was possible becaues Mujib was still in a position to carry the people with him on constitutional issues. That the federal government would retain Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency was almost universally accepted through all the movements and demands including the 11-point programme, and in working these out Mujib would therefore made concessions and at the same time contain the popular will.

Mujib was even willing to make further concessions on the question of taxation which was one of the crucial subjects which the ruling class, particularly the Army was apprehensive about. Already in the Amendment Bill, the state government was made liable to taxation under a federal law a meet the revenue requirements of the federal government determined by a federal budget passed by the federal legislature. As contained in the Six Point Formula Mujib was agreeable to provide a constitutional guarantee for a certain percentage of the revenue collection on all heads which ‘shall automatically be credited to the federal Fund by the Reserve Banks on which the unit governments shall have no control.’ Mujib was also agreeable to allow a federal government tax directly on certain specified heads which would meet the federal requirements in case there was a deadlock on this subject alone.9 Mujib would have no objection if constitutional provisions were made empowering the federation to raise funds to meet the increased defence expenditure at a time of war including expansion of federal jurisdiction in such emergencies.

On the question of maintaining separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings through Regional Reserve Banks, the proposal was not an unknown one. On this point however, not much objection was raised by West Pakistan leaders because its export earnings became by that time almost equal to that of East Pakistan.

All these were left to be settled through negotiations. It was never expected that all proposals made in the Amendment Bill were going to be accepted by the parties. Similarly, some proposals beyond the 6-points and some from a strategic bargaining point of view, were also made. Although there was no scope to negotiate on the question of representation on population basis which was raised by Mujib on February 23, 1969 after his release from military custody, the question of the seat of capital was certainly negotiable. The name of Dhak as Federal Capital was suggested knowing fully well that Ayub Khan or the ruling class of West Pakistan would never accept it. In exchange of conceding to have seat of federal capital and administration in West Pakistan, the seat of the federal legislature and the Supreme Court could be established in Dhaka. On the other hand if the seat of the federal capital and administration in West Pakistan, the seat of the federal legislature and the Supreme Court could be established in Dhaka. On the other hand if the seat of the federal capital and administration and headquarters of armed forces were placed in Dhaka along with the right of representation on population basis East Pakistan could forego all other demands made in the Six Points. The whole conflict boiled down to the economics of staying together within the framework of Pakistan. The proposal to reduce the voting age was made mainly to enable the Awami League to get more votes particularly from its younger supporters in case there was an election, but the same could also be negotiated. So some issues were kept open for negotiation and some were made to strengthen Mujib’s own bargaining position.

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It is true that in the modern federal structure, the federal governments tended to exercise more power and authority, but in the geopolitical context of the sub-continent such concentration of authority was neither realistic nor desirable for the running of a country separated by about 1200 miles over another sovereign state. Still the powers left with the federal government as discussed in the preceding paragraphs would not have made the federal government less powerful than any existing federal government of the world. The federal government along with the powers and prerogatives enjoyed by the President and the federal legislature under the scheme of the Amendment Bill could still be considered as the most powerful organ of the new federation of Pakistan.

  1. Criticism of the 6-Point Formula

The main criticism against the 6-points was made to the effect that it was going to weaken the central authority so much that it would disintegrate Pakistan. The ruling class expressed the fear that the scheme was designed to dismantle Pakistan. It was more an apprehension than a criticism. Besides the vague argument that Pakistan could not survive without a strong centralised government, the ruling elite did not put forward any concrete constitutional scheme to contain the growing demand for autonomy. On the other hand, almost all the political parties in West Pakistan could not ignore this reality. Ayub’s own Muslim League (Convention), although it was basically in favour of a strong centre demanded ‘guarantee of full autonomy of the provinces.’10 None other than Sheikh Mujib really ever outlined in concrete terms what constitutional formula was suitable to maintain a workable system in Pakistan.

In private discussions and sometime in newspapers, questions were raised how the federal government could survive as an authority without the power to tax people. It was argued that taxation generally brings a sense of purpose and belonging and without such power, the relationship between the citizens and the federal government would be almost non-existent. The question was asked ‘how could the federal government depend on the donations of the state governments? This would make the federal government subservient to state governments.’ These criticisms arose mainly from the underlying fear that the Pakistan Army, which by that time constituted the heart-core of Pakistan, could no more feel secured financially if such scheme was to be implemented. The colossal expenditure of the Army comprising about 60 per cent of the total budget had to be seen to be guaranteed under their own authority. The Army elite could not be reconciled with the thought that for their ration, they could be required to look for contributions from the state governments, particularly from the Bengalis of East Pakistan. These were, however, mere apprehensions arising mainly from the lack of appreciation and trust. With the Amendment Bill sent to Ayub Khan it was expected that those fears and apprehensions would now be removed through political dialogues and discussions.

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Notes

  1. Persons who took active part in preparing this draft constitution were Kamal Hossain, Amirul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmed, Rahman Sobhan, Prof. Muzaffar Ahmed Chowdhury and the author.

  1. For the following discussion see the full text of the Constitution Amendment Bill in the Appendix.

  1. See Amendment 100.

  1. See Amendment 84.

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  1. For subsequent developments see the chapter on 1972 Constitution in the next volume of the author ‘Constitutional Development in Bangladesh 1972-75.’

  1. Mujib went in the opposite direction when he introduced the Fourth Amendment to his Constitution of 1972. The Power of the High Court Judges to grant any interim relief in writ jurisdiction was taken away and the security of service of the Judges was withdrawn. For further discussion see Author’s next volume ‘Constitutional Development in Bangladesh 1972-75.’

  1. See Amendment 99 by which Third Schedule was cut from 49 to 12 subjects at page 362f.

  1. The raito of this would come to West Pakistan two thirds and East Pakistan one third approximately.

  1. In series of discussions with his aides in which I was present, Mujib expressed this willingness.

  1. Item 3 of 1970 Election Manifesto of Convention Muslim League.

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Chapter 9

 

The Scheme Frustrated

Imposition of the Second Martial Law

 

  1. Yahya Khan takes over Power

 

Once the Constitution Amendment Bill was prepared it was expected that negotiations would now take place between Ayub and Mujib on different aspects of the Amendment Bill more concretely. While the Six Point Formula outlined only the principles of autonomy, the Amendment Bill produced a comprehensive constitutional scheme for establishing a workable federation for Pakistan. The Bill made if easier now to negotiate sitting across the table and resolve the fundamental issues facing the country.

But what happened at the end was a different story. In accordance with the understanding reached between Ayub and Mujib on March 13, over the secret dinner, the latter sent four sets of the draft Constituion Amendment Bill to his counterparts in West Pakistan. A.H.M. Quamruzzaman, Secretary General of the Pakistan Awami League carried the draft personally and one set was handed over to Ayub Khan also. Within four days after receiving the draft Amendment Bill incorporating the new constitutional scheme, Ayub instead of calling Mujib for negotiations decided to hand over the power to the Army on March 24, 1969. Further, the Amendment Bill which was prepared at this invitation and challenge, was now used by him as an excuse to invite the army to save Pakistan from ‘disintegration.’

In a letter on the same day addressed to General Yahya Khan, Ayub wrote referring to the amendments that they would ‘liquidate the central government, make the maintenance of the armed forces impossible, divide the…..

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Chapter 11

 

The War of Independence and Birth of Bangladesh

 

As a reaction to the Pakistan Army’s indiscriminate shooting and killing in Dhaka and elsewhere in the province a spontaneous resistance grew overnight all over the country involving people of all walks of life. On the same night the Pakistan Army attacked, Bengalis plunged into a war to liberate their territory, which by this time had already assumed the name ‘Bangladesh’ as against the rest of Pakistan. The reaction was so spontaneous and overwhleming that it even surprised the Awami League leaders, not to speak of the army. The first and immediate resistance came from those Bengali personal of the armed forces who were still free from the central control of Pakistan authorities; the East Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles, Police and Ansars. They were relatively more organised and had already in their hand some arms, ammunition and trained men.

The best position at that time was enjoyed by the 8th East Bengal Regiment personnel stationed at Chittagong which was already in confrontation with the Pakistan Army over the unloading of arms and ammunition from the vessel MV Swat. At least half a million people converged to resist the unloading with the active support of the Bengali army personal. The people led by Major Ziaur Rahman were in control of the Radio Station and the port areas till the first week of April.

On hearing that the Pakistan Army had launched their attack on the Bengalis at Dhaka and elsewhere Major Ziaur Rahman1 took a quick and courageous decision. At around six in the afternoon of March 27, Zia declared over the Radio : ‘Bangladesh is a sovereign and independent state’ and the assumed the responsibility of the Head of the state of the new nation he proclaimed. The young valiant army officer called upon the people to ‘resist the treacherous enemy in every corner of Bangladesh.’ With that historic call to fight the enemies and liberate the motherland began the arduous but heroic chapter of a newly born nation.2

The same happened elsewhere also. Wherever the personnel of the East Bengal Regiment could make it possible, they immediately organised and started fighting the Pakistan Army. The brave sons of the new nation came forward gallantly to lead the people to fight the enemies. Major Khaled Musharraf led the 4th East Bengal Regiment in the Comilla-Sylhet sector. Major Safiullah led the 2nd East Bengal Regiment from the Joydebpur Cantonment and took control of Tangail and Mymensingh area. Major Jalil took control of Barishal and declared the district as liberated. Similarly, on March 26 Naogaon was also declared liberated. Wing Commander Major Nazmul Haque and Captain Gias led the East Pakistan Rifles and Police forces and fought the Pakistan army at Bogra and Rajshahi. On March 26 the police force and the public resisted the attack of the Pakistan army at Pabna and on March 27 they declared the district as liberated. At Chapai Nawabganj the East Pakistan Rifles personnel occupied the Pakistan army camp. In this way, in almost all the district towns and many rural areas, Bengali army personnel, men from East Pakistan Rifles, Police, Ansars and Mujahids at once formed into groups spontaneously to resist the Pakistan army and in their own way initiated the independence war. They immediately opened camps of their own in their respective areas of control and gave the first lead in the war of independence. Only a high sense of patriotism could inspire all these young men to take such risks in life.

Within a week after March 25 the question arose as how to create some form of central leadership to conduct the operation of the freedom fighters. The Awami League leaders were not in the scene. It was not clear to the people where they were and none knew what happened to Sheikh Mujib. On April 5 Khaled Musharraf who had established a camp at Teliapara giving a tough resistance to the Pakistan Army in the Commilla, Sylhet and Brahmanbaria area, told me that if the politicians were not able to come forward to give the leadership they (the army officers) were going to form a Revolutionary Council. By that time the officers in the Eastern Sector were in touch with each other. They appeared desperate as

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they had already revolted and committed treason by deserting the army as far as Pakistan was concerned. The wives and children of almost all these Army officers were by this time in the captivity of the occupation army—many of them tortured and some killed. These officers and ranks had not alternative but to fight hard and win the war. They needed legal sanction and logistic support which required a formal leadership to get recognition both inside and outside the country. The army officers at that state were seriously thinking of forming a revolutionary council comprising the senior majors like Zia, Khaled and Safiullah along with some civilian citizens who had actively joined the struggle. In the meantime, however, the news came that Tajuddin and some other Awami League leaders were alive and were in touch with the Indian Government.

  1. Mujib Termed as Enemy of Pakistan :

The Controversial Draft Proclamation

In his broadcast on March 26 Yahya called Mujib obstinate and alleged that Mujib and his partymen were ‘enemies of Pakistan’ who wanted ‘East Pakistan to break away completely from the country.’3 Yahya termed the proposed proclamation prepared and submitted by the Awami League as nothing but a trap. Earlier when the negotiations were going on the basis of the agreement between Yahya and Mujib, Bhutto persistently argued that handing over power by a Presidential Proclamation without the existance of Martial Law would suffer from legal sanction and in a situation like that, once the power was handed over to East Pakistan, the central government would cease to operate there, enabling the region to be independent through a mere declaration by Mujib. Yahya and the Army Generals were apparently conviced by this argument and Yahya feared that once the Martial Law was withdrawn he would have no sanction to carry on as the Head of the State. Yahya claimed that in the garb of the proclamation Mujibur Rahman was trying to liquidate the central authority. In the White paper published by the Government of Pakistan in August 1971 Yahya summed up the position vis-a-vis Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in these words :

It became quite evident that the intention of Sheikh Mujib and his advisors was not to come to an understanding on the basis of one Pakistan, but was somehow to extract from me a proclamation which would in effect divide the National Assembly into two separate constituent Assemblies, give birth to confederation rather than a Federation and by the removal of the authority of Martial Law, create complete chaos int he country.

Through this plan they expected to establish a separate state of Bangladesh. That needless to say, would have been the end of Pakistan as created by the Father of the Nation.

This was the excuse used by the Army to put their ‘contingency plan’ into operation on March 25. The question of the legal cover for the proposed Presidential Proclamation could have raised a fine argument of law and could be debated either way. The fact that Yahya agreed to issue the Proclamation as would be evident from the White paper itself and Bhutto’s Press conference at Dhaka on March 22 is sufficient to suggest that the point was examined by the experts and there would have been no problem in giving effect to the procla-mation.4 If on the other hand, as the Government of Pakistan suggested in the White Paper, this point was already raised by Yahya’s sides right at the beginning of the negotiation which started on March 16 then on what else the negotiations were going on for long ten days? Does it mean that the facade of negotiation was put up by the Army only to buy time to launch the onslaught as alleged by the Awami League subsequently?

Moreover, any one acquainted with the constitutional history of Pakistan would know how much the rulers of Pakistan cared about the legality of their actions in dissolving the parliament or in constituting one, or in removing the Prime Ministers or in handing over to taking over power. Chief

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Justice Hamoodur Rahman’s illustrious judgment in Asma Jilani’s Case5 would give an insight to the series of illegalities committed by the same class of people who administered the affairs of Pakistan since 1947. This however, does not suggest that the army junta should have committed another illegality. The fact that the power was being handed over to the representatives of the people elected in a ‘free and fair’ election on the basis of universal adult franchise would have given the Proclamation sufficient legal sanction. If the earlier proclamations issued at different stages were considered legal and given effect to, this proclamation could only be more effective as the case here was the other way round. In other cases, power was usurped by an individual or a group of people from the established constitutional government. Here the usurpers were to hand over power to the legitimate leaders of the people. Both national and international laws and precedents would have provided sufficient and effective sanction for such a proclamation.

On the question of suggesting to have two constitutional conventions comprising members of the two different wings before summoning the National Assembly, the back-ground has already been discussed. This could not be the only point of difference that created the deadlock leading to the massacre

of hundreds and thousands of innocent people. There was no reason on earth for the Awami League not to agree to sit jointly in the national Assembly in which they not only had the absolute majority but with the support of the representatives of other regions of Pakistan could even muster almost a two third majority. The Awami League under the provisions of the Legal Framework Order could on their own strength ligitimately frame any constitution that would suit the requirements of Pakistan. It is precisely out of this fear that Bhutto refused to attend the National Assembly Session on March 3 and subsequently persisted in the theory of ‘two Majority parties’ in Pakistan.

It was neither the question of the legal sanction of the proclamation nor the proposal to split up the National Assembly that turned the army wild. It was fundamentally the same old issue of autonomy for East Pakistan on which the deadlock took place. If Mujib had agreed to compromise the rights of the Bengalis these two questions would not have been raised. The interesting point is that Mujib’s constitutional proposals were not something new to the ruling elite of Pakistan. The Six-Point Formula was announced as long back as in Februaray, 1966 and since then it was debated in different forums. In March, 1969 a full constitution incorporating the 6-points was sent to Ayub. The elections of 1970-71 were publicly announced as to be a referendum in East Pakistan on the 6-and 11-point programmes and Mujib administered an oath to all his elected members on January 3 in a public meeting at the Dhaka Race Course affirming that they would stick to their election mandate. In February, 1971 the 30-member constitution committee of the Awami League had finalised the Constitution Bill on the basis of the 6 and 11-point programmes. Then and only thereafter came the overwhelming demand for independence of East Pakistan in March, 1971 in reaction to Yahya Khan’s decision to postpone the National Assembly session.

Through the passage of time and events Mujib’s hands were getting more tied and his authority to make concessions was shrinking. As a matter of fact, compared to the pressure that generated in East Pakistan, Mujib was negotiating for less than what the people were demanding. He had not courage to tell Yahya that the Six-Point Fourmula was no more going to work and that now a true confederation was the only answer. And yet the Army failed to reconcile to the mood and aspirations of the people in East Pakistan who constituted the majority population in Pakistan.

Mujib’s proclamation presented in the last round of talks with Yahya was drafted in a hurry. It gave the impression that it was prepared only to get somehow a leagl sanction for an autonomous East Pakistan. In the face of the consolidated position of the radical nationalist forces within Mujib’s rank and file, the solution could lie either on a very loose federation or a confederation in which the state of Bangladesh would have a regional flag of its own and perhaps a regional national anthem. One could even

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say that if the army was able to accept these terms and Mujib played his role with prudence, the severance  of all links with Pakistan could be avoided and the country could perhaps stay as one sovereign state. Mujib really believed upto the last moment that it would be possible to realise these demands—through a negotiated settlement. This was the fundamental reason why Mujib preferred to be arrested rather than remain with the people, he ordered ‘to build fortresses to fight the enemies.’

Mujib’s decision to surrender to the Pakistan Army or allow himself to be arrested by the army, whatever one may call it, was a deliberate and well-calculated act on his part. Firstly, he was not a person of the type to engage himself in an armed struggle against an organised army. He neither had the orientation nor any philosophical urge for this kind. His political and class barckground would not suggest that either. Secondly, Mujib could not comprehend the nature and extent of the army’s impending operation. He perhaps thought that at the most the army would arrest the politicians, ban the political parties and kill some people who would try to resist them, but at the end would go for a political settlement. Thirdly, he firmly believed that he would not be killed.6 Mujib therefore, thought that being in jail he would maintain his popularity (which turned out to be correct again) and at the same time could keep the door open for a political settlement through negotiation, be it for a federation or con-federation or independence. This policy was pursued by Mujib throughout his life. He hardly ever confronted the authorities in the street. He would normally get arrested before such an occurrence would take place. Lastly, he was not sure whether he wanted the full independence and he left the events to lead him rather than himself leading the events.

In the eyes of many people this action of Mujib was considered as an act of betrayal. He pushed the whole nation into a bloody war without himself facing the curnage. He should have led the war instead of surrendering to the enemy voluntarily.

  1. The Historical Inevitability

The break between East and West Pakistan was perhaps historically inevitable. Besides the geographical distance, linguistic, ethnical and cultural differences between the people of the two wings, the inherent imbalances in their respective socio-economic structure reached such a stage that they could no more be held together. Some of these imbalances were there on the day Pakistan was created7 and through the passage of two long decades they only got widened and multiplied. At no stage any genuine attempt was made to reduce these imbalances to enable the two wings to live together. On the contrary, economic exploitation of East Pakistan through the machinery of the central government dominated by West Pakistani bureaucracy, big businessmen and the army widened the gap to such an extent that any attempt to reduce the disparities only meant slowing down the pace of development in West Pakistan and thereby causing harm to her growth momentum. This would have caused a major setback to the development interests in West Pakistan and they were not prepared to make such concession. So the imbalance further enhanced by the disparities between the two wings in the economic field was something impossible to retrieve. The exercise for improved allocations purportedly made in the Third and then in the Fourth Plan by the economists of the central government was a theoretical one. The nature of economic growth in the given circumstances as prevailed in West Pakistan compared to the stagnating, impoverished and neglected East Pakistan would not have allowed the theory to materialise in any effective manner. For example, the attempt to narrow down the gap between per-capita income of the two wings during Ayub’s regime showed that the gap only widened and that the West Pakistan’s per-capita income in real terms became 100 per cent or more than East Pakistan.8

These imbalances between the two wings were further aggravated by the class character and vested interests of the political forces of the two regions. In West Pakistan politics still continued to be

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feudal-based with big landlords of the Punjab and Sind in collaboration with the rich merchant class, bureaucracy and the army dominating the scene. In East Pakistan where virtually no upper class existed, the bureaucracy being weak and the army non-existent, politics were dominated by the middle and lower middle class groups having direct roots in the rural peasantry. This made the social and philosophical bias of the politicians and political parties of the two wings different from each other creating different levels of political consciousness and producing conflicting aspirations.

In East Pakistan, politics continued to stimulate radical concepts and the major political forces were committed to introduce socialism. Unlike in West Pakistan the major political forces in East Pakistan were subjceted to an inherent compulsion to change the socio-economic structures of the society on an ideological basis. This rise of radical and ideological politics in East Pakistan was also a threat to the existing socio-economic structure of the ruling elite in West Pakistan which was thriving on the concentration of political power and economic privileges.

Added to these imbalances was the racial attitude of the ruling class of West Pakistan towards the

people of East Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan were of ‘down-troden races’ wrote Ayub Khan when he was the President of Pakistan. About the Bengalis Ayub wrote :

East Bengalis, who constitute the bulk of the population, probably belong to the very original Indian races. It would be no exaggeration to say that up to the creation of Pakistan, they had not known any real freedom of sovereignty. They have been in turn ruled either by the caste Hindus, Moghuls, Pathans, or the British. In addition, they have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence. As such they have all the inhibitions of down-trodden race and have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom. Their popular complexes, exclusiveness, suspicion and a sort of defensive aggressiveness probably from this historical background.

On West Pakistan, Ayub Wrote :

The population in West Pakistan, on the other hand is probably the greatest mixture of races found anywhere in the world. Lying on the gateways to the Indian subcontinent, it was inevitable that each successive conquering race should have left its traces there. Consequently, this formed mixture of races has brought about fusion of ideas, outlook and culture, despite the linguistic variety that obtained.

Out of indignation resulting from this attitude of the West Pakistani ruler Ataur Rahman Khan once said in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan :

Leaders of the Muslim League thought that we were a subjcet race and they belong to the race of the conquerors.

A considerable section of the ruling class of West Pakistan used to maintain an attitude of contempt towards the ‘converted Bengalis.’

So there was no more any common goal between East and West Pakistan. The social, economic and geo-political conditions became utterly irreconcilable both in context and reality. The question then was how to resolve the issues. By the end of 1970 there were only two alternatives left for the ruling elite of West Pakistan : (1) Make the necessary arrangement through a political dialogue to retain Pakistan as one sovereign state in the existing centralised form or (2) Use force to maintain the status quo as long as possible. As I have mentioned earlier the ruling elite of Pakistan, although always talking about the

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‘integrity and ideology’ of Pakistan, did not really care about such things as these were used as slogans only to protect their vested interest. To them, Pakistan had to remain either in the same form under more or less the same political structure of centralised administration or it has to be divided. As I have earlier maintained, because of the factors and imbalances mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, for the ruling class division of Pakistan was preferable to one Pakistan with the power structure and existing equilibrium destroyed by any new constitutional scheme based on the Six-Point Formula. But the rulers of Pakistan failed to take cognizance of one fundamental point and that was that Pakistan could not survive without East Pakistan because of the geo-political power balance structure of the subcontinent.

So the army opted for the second alternative knowing fully well that from a distance of 1000 miles in the last part of the 20th century they would not be able to rule East Pakistan by mere force. The intelligent section of the ruling elite knew that they would have to leave one day East Pakistan for good. If they knew the inevitable, why did they do it? The answer is, like the eternal urge of any colonial ruler elsewhere the ruling elite of Pakistan suffered from a racial chauvinism. Their attitude towards East Pakistan and their policies of discrimination in the economic and political field manifested an element of racio-colonial obtrusiveness which they maintained till the last days. The decision to retain East Pakistan by military forces arose from such a racial psychosis. They wanted to establish their racial superiority over the ‘down trodden’ race in East Pakistan.

The attack of Pakistan army on the Bengalis was launched with some sort of vengeance reflecting primarily the racial arrogance of the ruling military-bureaucratic elite. The attempt was to liquidate the forces of nationalism amongst the Bengalis and bring the people under their subjugation. If that was not possible then to destroy them as a people, so that they remained as slaves of others for a long time. A sympathetic army officer from Baluchistan told me 3 to 4 days before the crackdown, ‘this time if the army acts, they will destroy you for good : they will take you back to the middle ages.’ For months the army ranks were motivated to kill the Bengalis who were ‘converted Muslims from low caste Hindu’s and were kafirs11. As the Pakistan Army’s basic orientation made them identify Pakistan with Islam, anyone opposed to Pakistan was considered equally opposed to Islam. For the ordinary ranks of Pakistan army, to fight against the enemies of Islam would amount to a Jehad (religious war).12 So the Hindus and the nationalist Muslims were put the same category and both were equal targets for physical elimination. The meticulous plan to exterminate the Bengali intelligentsia executed up to the last days of the occupation was also motivated by the orientation to destroy all the strength of a people who were no more willing to remain subjugated. The victims of this act of genocide were the political leaders and workers who were identified with the Bengali nationalist movement, the followers and sympathisers of the Awami Leauge, the intelligentsia, lawyers, teachers, students, industrial workers, civil servants, doctors, journalists and any educated man who was a suspect nationalist. It was a ‘kill and burn mission.’ When the defeat came nearer to them they became more desperate and their pattern persecution and torture assumed a more naked design.

Besides the indiscriminate air attacks, the use of chemicals and napalm and the killing of thousands of innocent poeple who had nothing to do with the activities of the liberation forces and the cruelty practised by the occupation army was beyond comprehension in the context of modern civilization. There were thousands of incidents of burning people alive, shooting school children and pregnant women, shooting babies in mother’s arms, raping wife in front of husband, daughter in front of father and mother in front of son. Thousands of young girls were kept by force and made pregnanat in different cantonments and army camps. In their operations the army used to burn a few villages at a time and kill people in groups with hands tied and eyes covered.

  1. Formation of the Bangladesh Government in Exile

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Most probably, on April 1, Tajuddin and Amirul Islam who had crossed the border earlier with the assistance of the senior officers of the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) arrived in Delhi escorted by Indian Intelligence men. Tajuddin went to Delhi to seek Indian assistance. He had to wait for a couple of days before an interview could be granted to him by the Indian Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi gave a patient hearing when Tajuddin narrated the story of what had happened in the last two weeks not knowing about the spontaneous resistance that was being put up by the people inside the country. He did not know the fate of his other colleagues and so was not in a position to give a correct picture about the reaction on the Pakistan Army’s attack. He did not know whether Mujib was alive or dead. When asked what he actually wanted Tajuddin fumbled and could not outline any plan. His answers were vague and at the end when Mrs. Gandhi asked him about his locus standi to seek assistance Tajuddin did not know what to say.

After the meeting with Mrs. Gandhi, Tajuddin sitting in Delhi formed a government making himself the Prime Minister and naming Sheikh Mujib as the President.  He submitted the same to the Government of India seeking their assistance. Having a signal from the Indian Central Intelligence to co- operate Indian Civil Servants started advising Tajuddin about his next steps and from then on a working relationship commenced between the Awami League leaders and the Indian Government. Tajuddin was in Delhi for about 7 days or so and prepared a statement to broadcast addressing the people of Bangladesh on 10th April13 with the assistance of the Indian officers. By the time the broadcast was finalised Indian Intelligence sources provided him with the information that all the senior members of the Awami League other than Sheikh Mujib were safe and already crossed the border at different points.

Tajuddin was flown by an India Airforce Cargo Plane to Agartala where most of the Awami League leaders assembled on April 10. Without their leader Sheikh Mujib there was immediate rivalry over the leadership and for three days they locked themselves in Room No. 5 of the Agartala Circuit House to fight between themselves over the whole strategy and the distribution of portfolios. Tajuddin was accused why he had already named himself as the Prime Minister. He explained the circumstances that without such formation of a government the Indian Government was not willing to talk to him. The main critic Khandaker Mustaque Ahmed who had reservations over the involvement with India and who was earlier hesitant to enter into the Indian territory. Anyhow once they discovered that there was no way to retract from the political position already taken and they had no alternative but to stay in India at least for the fear of life in Bangladesh, the discussion bogged down over the leadership. In the menatime when they were in the middle of this leadership struggle the already prepared statement by Tajuddin as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh was broadcast over Free Bangladesh Radio situated in India. This also infuriated the rivals in the race. When thousands of people were being butchered and thousands of others giving their lives resisting the attack of the occupation army inside Bangladesh, the Awmai Leauge leaders were busy in fighting for porffolios of a Government of whatever worth it was. Tajuddin suggested Syed Nazrul Islam’s name ad Acting President which kept him happy. Quamruzzaman being the General Secretary of the All-Pakistan Awami League and Mustaque Ahmed being the senior-most member of the Awami League were the main contenders for the Prime Ministership. But Tajuddin, having already taken the initiative and established contact with the Indian Government was in a stronger position. At the end Mustaque settled for Foreign, Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Quamruzzaman for Interior, Supply, Relief and Rehebilitation. Mansur Ali got Finance, Commerce and Industries. In the same meeting Col (Retired) M.A.G. Osmani was made Chief of Staff of the Liberation Army and Col. (Retd) Rab, the Deputy Chief.14

As soon as the differences over the distribution of portfolios were resolved the ‘cabinet’ of a government engaged in an armed struggle started its journey to its hideout in Calcutta in a cargo plane from Agartala. On April 17, at Meherpur which was still within the control of the spontaneously raised freedom fighters under the leadership of a young civil servant, Towfic Elahi Chowdhury, the cabinet was formally installed near the historic mango grove where the last battle was fought with the British to retain

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the independence of Bengal in 1757. A guard of honour parade was arranged by the local freedom fighters initially known as Mukti Fouz under the guidence of Mahbubuddin Ahmed, a young police officer and the whole ceremony was witnessed by more than one hundred foreign and Indian mediamen. This place was named Mujibnagar. The same day the ‘cabinet’ also returned to Calcutta. The Bangladesh Government never sat at Mujibnagar but the name earned a symbolic significance. The actual seat of the ‘government’ was established in Calcutta.15

  1. The Proclamation of Independence

In order to legalise the Government and the freedom war a ‘Proclamation of Independence’ was finalised along with a ‘Laws Continuance Enforcement Order,’ but both of them were published dated back on 10th April, 1971 naming Mujibnagar as the place of issue. This had to be done to keep consistency with Tajuddin’s earlier declaration of the formation of the government in New Delhi and the statement he made on April 10 as the Prime Minister. Without this Proclamation he could not form the Government and so it had to be legally covered, although all these were decided after the meeting of the leaders at Agartala between 10 and 12 April. When the Proclamation was issued the ‘government’ was in contact with only about 35 MNAs and MPAs16 and all the these were done it Calcutta.

With the establishment of Bangladesh as a sovereign state after the surrender of the Pakistan Army on December 16, 1971 the Proclamation of Independence gained significant importance both from the historical and the constitutional point of view. The preamble of the Proclamation started that free elections were held in Bangladesh to elect representatives for the purpose of framing a constitution and the people of Bangladesh elected 167 out of 169 representatives belonging to the Awami League; Yahya Khan sommoned the representatives to meet on March 3, 1971 for the purpose of framing a constitution but the Assembly so sommoned was arbitrarily and illegally postponed for an indefinite period; thus instead of fulfilling their promise and while still conferring with the representatives of the people of Bangladesh the Pakistan authorities declared an ‘unjust and treacherous war’ and in the facts and circumstances of such treacherous conduct Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed leader of 75 million people of Bangladesh in due fulfillment of the legitimate right of self-determination of the people of Bangladesh’ made a declaration of independence of March 26, 1971 and urged the people of Bangladesh to defend its honour and integrity; that  the Pakistan Government levied an unjust war and by committing genocide andy by other repressive measures made it impossible for the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh to meet and frame a constitution and ‘give to themselves a government’ and that the people of Bangladesh buy their heroism, bravery and revolutionary fervour ‘have established effective control over the territories of Bangladesh.’

In these circumstances the elected representatives ‘as honour bound by the mandate given by the people of Bangladesh whose will its supreme’ constituted Assembly Order to ensure for the people ‘equality, human dignity and social justice’ declared and constituted Bangladesh to be a ‘sovereign People’s Republic.’

The Proclamation served as a Provisional Constitution providing for a presidential system giving the President absolute power in view of the war situation. It made Sheikh Mujib the President and Syed Nazrul Islam the Vice-President and till the cosntitution was farmed the President was made the Supreme Commander of all the armed forces of the Republic and was to exercise ‘all the executive and the legislative powers of the Republic’ with power to appoint a Prmie Minister and other Ministers, grant pardon, levy taxes and expend monies-summon and adjourn the Constituent Assembly and ‘do all other things that may be necessary to live to the people of Bangladesh an orderly and just Government.’ But as Sheikh Mujib was in Pakistan captivity the Proclamation provided that the Vice-President would exercise

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all the powers, duties and responsibilities of the President in the event of there being no President, or the President being unable to enter upon his office or being unable to exercise his power due to any reasson whatsover.

The scheme was to keep Sheikh Mujib in the forefront and to carry on the struggle in his name. This was the only way the people could be rallied. There was none in the Awami League who could replace him in any sphere and the leaders knew that they could only enjoy the people’s support it they worked in the name of Sheikh Mujib. It was indeed surprising that although Mujib failed to resist the Pakistan Army and got himself arrested his popularity and image remained intact. A war was carried out for 9 months in the name of a person who was not present and perhaps was never to return to the soil. This was the peak of Mujib’s success in life and the maximum he could ever achieve.

The other part of the scheme of the Proclamation was to formalise the machinery to control the independence war and to establish the chain of command. This was most important both from the Awami League’s and the Indian point of view. The acitivities of the freedom fighters had to be channelised in the desired direction and as legal cover was necessary to do so.

In order to secure the support of the community of nations the elected representatives also undertook to observe and give effect to ‘all duties and obligations that devolve as a member of the family of nations and to abide by the charter of the United Nations.’ The Proclamation was also made effective from March 26, 1971 keeping in view that the attack of Pakistan Army took place on March 25. In the Proclamation Professor Yusuf Ali was appointed as the constituent potentiary to give effect and to the instrument of independence and to administer the oath to the President and the Vice-President.

On the same day, April 10, the Acting President issued a ‘Laws Continuance Enforcement Order’ in exercise of the powers conferred by the Proclamation, legalising all the existing laws subject to the Proclamation and all the consequential changes as would be necessary on account of the creation of Bangladesh as a sovereign state formed by the will of the people.’ It further provided that all government officials, civil, military, judicial and diplomatic who would take the oath of allegiance to Bangladesh would continue in their offices on terms and conditions, of service so long enjoyed by them. The administration of such oath of allegiance was to be arranged by all District Judges, Magistrates and the diplomatic representatives within their respective jurisdiction, this Order was also made effective from March 26, 1971.

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Notes

  1. Popularly called Zia.

  1. The Awami League during the period of the independence war and after tried to undermine the call for independence given by Major Zia on March 27 claimed that Sheikh Mujib declared the independence on March 26. Dr. Mazharul Islam in his book Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib (Bengla Academy, Dhaka) has written that Mujib signed declaration of war of independence around midnight of March 25-26 (pp. 808-809). According to him this declaration was also recorded by Mujib and transmitted over the Radio on March 26 morning. Dr. Islam further states that on March 27 Major Zia announced about the war of the independence of Bangladesh over the Chittagong Radio (p. 834). Dr. Rounaq Jahan also in her book Pakistan, Failure in National Integration, Oxford University Press, Dahka (page 197) states that the indepependence of Bangladesh was formally declared in the name of the Awami League and its leader

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Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on March 26.

The truth however is that Mujib neither made nor signed any formal declaration of independence. What has been claimed subsequently by Mujib and his supporters was only to cover the fact that Mujib instead of making a declaration and joining the people, decided to give in to the Pakistan Army in order to achieve a negotiated settlement. It is not known whether the wireless message claimed to have been sent in the name of Sheikh Mujib was actually recorded in Mujib’s voice. Furthermore, on March 25 Mujib instead of going for independence called for a province wide strike scheduled for March 27. The White Paper Published by the Pakistan Government in August, 1971 also did not record an allegation to say that Mujib made any such declaration on March 25. This controversy however, should not lead to undermind Mujib’s overall role as the pioneer of Bengali nationalism.

On March 30 Zia again went on the air and this time, without knowing what had happened to Sheikh Mujib and without any contact with him, he declared that he was acting on behalf of Sheikh Mujib and he

assumed the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the liberation army. This was done by Zia in order to keep alive the morale of the people to whom Mujib was on idol. These declarations of Zia inspired the Bengali Army Officers to fight the Pakistan and became a great source of inspiration for the Bengalis in every sector.

  1. Mujib’s action of starting the non-cooperation movement was described as an act of treason.

  1. Tajuddin Ahmed’s statement of April, 17.

  1. P.L.D. 1972 Supreme Court 139, quoted supra p. 46.

  1. It was rumoured at that time that Mujib was advised by a diplomat of a supper power to remain in the military custody where his safety would be ensured. On March 24 in the early evening Mujib was telling Tofael and others in my presence that if he was arrested there would be people to look after his safety, the army could not kill him as international pressure would be there. He was known to the world. Mujib continued to say ‘but if you are arrested your safety is not ensured, you could be killed or tortured as the army this time is not very happy with us. So don’t arrested easily, leave the town as soon as such a situation arrives.’

  1. At the time of partition there was only on Bengali officer in the Superior Civil Service. The Army was almost fully manned by people from the Punjab, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. The merchant Class from central India, Gujarat, Bombay, etc. had migrated to West Pakistan. The economic infrastructure in Western wing was considerably better than in East Pakistan.

  1. Professor Anisur Rahman, South Asian Review, Vol. No. 3, April, 1970, page 235. See also the reports on disparities and the almost irreconcilable recommendations made by the East Pakistani and West Pakistani Economists and their divergent views published in the Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan, 1970-75 Vol. I and II by Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July, 1970.

  1. M. Ayub Khan, op. cit, p. 18.

  1. Quotation taken from K. Callard : Pakistan. A Political Study (London), 1957, p. 172-173.

  1. A non-believer.

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  1. A sacred war in which anyone would be a martyr and have a place in heaven.

  1. Subsequently broadcast of April 11 also.

  1. Both had got elected to the National Assembly on an Awami League ticket.

  1. The office of the Prime Minister and the Secretariat was situated at 8, Theatre Road and the Foreign Office including the External Publicity Division at 9, Circus Avenue, Calcutta.

  1. Members elected to the National Assembly (MNA) and members elected to the Provincial Assembly (MPA).

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Chapter 12

 

Epilogue

 

The Awami League was neither prepared for nor capable of leading and conduction a ‘liberation’ war in any classical sense. It neither had the orientation nor any ideological basis to inspire and mobilise and armed struggle. Most of the leaders, MNAs and MPAs of the Awami League crossed the border more for personal safety than to fight for the independence of the country. Not a single Awami League central leader took up arms to actually confront the Pakistan Army or has given life while fighting or taking part in it. At least 70 per cent of them resided in and around Calcutta, around 15 per cent hi hill stations like Shiliguri, Shillong and other Indian towns. Another 15 percent took interest by way of staying in the youth camps and helping in organizing logistics for the freedom fighters in the border areas.

Excepting a very few, all of the Awami League leaders were forced into a situatin for which they were not prepared.3 Most of them belonged to middle and lower middle class family groups. They got elected on the Six-Point programme in order to establish the right of the Bengalis through constitutional means within the frame work of Pakistan. They were not prepared to leave their homes and families and take refuge in a foreign country to wage a war for a complete independence.

The class character of the Awami League leaders suited their counterpart in India, the Indian Congress which was ruling the Government in Delhi under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. In the absence of Sheikh Mujib the Awami League leadership was weak and divided and the Indian Government exploited this situation to their fullest advantage. Their leadership in Calcatta relied on the Indian Government for taking all the major decisions and they wanted the Indians to win the war for them.3 In a psychological sense, to most of the Awami League leaders the struggle was not for the independence but for the restoration of their right to enjoy power. They wanted to be restored to the position which they were entitled to as the elected representatives of the people.4 The struggle was for restoration rather than independence.

For the Awami League Government in exile the fear of the MNAs and MPAs silpping into the hands of the Pakistan Army was a constant worry. To ensure the support and loyalty of the elected representatives the Government decided to pay them a monthly salary of Rs. 500/- and both the Government tried to provide most of them with accommodation and other facilities. The Ministers and

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other important members of the Government were provided with comfortable apartments, telephones and other facilities. Most of the MNAs including all the ministers and important members of the Government had their families with them.

Some of the elected representatives derived considerable benefits from bank loots and border businesses.5 A large number of them involved themselves openly in business with their Indian counterparts. Although, there were some who worked hard and lived in austerity, the vast majority of the leaders lived a life which did not reflect the ‘bloody war’ that was going on inside the country. Some of them behaved in such a deplorable manner that it made many of their countrymen ashamed. The criticism of the behaviour and the way of life of a large number of Awami League leaders became known to many Indians who were trying to help the people of Bangladesh. When the young and innocent men and women were laying their lives inside the country and millions were suffering in the Indian refugee camps, many Awami League leader’s wives were seen shopping jewelleries and other expensive items at Calcutta’s fashionable New Market.

And yet the fact remains that the Awami League played the most historical role in bringing about the independence of Bangladesh. It is under its leadership that Bangladesh gained world support for its right of self-determination. Through historical process and in the given circumstances, the Awami League as a political party attained a position where Bengalis could only be represented by them before the world community. It was a party which won 167 out of 169 seats in the National Assembly based on universal adult franchise and therefore, could claim to represent almost the entire population of East Pakistan.

Due to the fact that the elected representatives of the Bengalis were not allowed to share power by the Pakistan Army and that they now had decided to move from the stand of autonomy to independence, the struggle for the freedom of Bangladesh gained such a momentum. Without the Awami League victory in the elections and their formal participation in the independence war, Bangladesh could not have become an independent state so soon. In the international context the psychological impact of such a solid support from the elected representatives of the people was phenomenal.

While the central leadership of the Awami League took a role of passivity and threw themselves completely at the mercy of the Indian authorities, their supporters and workers in the rural areas took a strong and active part in the war. Particularly, the young radical forces led by the students played a very dynamic role. Also generally, the Awami League workers, supporters and sympathisers in both urban and rural areas were the major victims of the Pakistan Army’s atrocities.

India’s support for Bangladesh basically emanated from its negative approach towards Pakistan. For political, historical and economic reasons, it was India’s natural desire to see that her rival power structure in the subcontinent is weakened. It was not so much for her love for democracy or sense of brotherhood for the people of Bangladesh that Indira Gandhi decided to support the Bengalis in their war to achieve independence. The then Government of India acted on its own calculations in order to achieve its own national and international objectives. Once India got involved she became greatly interested in seeing the struggle of the Bengalis remain in its complete control. The Indian Government wanted to ensure that following the removal of the West Pakistani authority and effective government of its own liking was established in Bangladesh.

The Bengali people’s determination to exercise their right of self-determination and the desire of the Indian Government to weaken Pakistan coincided and helped in arriving at a mutually convenient arrangement. The Bengalis required sanctuary, war logistics, food, shelter and other necessities and the Indian Government wanted to establish its superiority and influence over the sub-continental region.

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The influx of 10 million refugees to India from Bangladesh helped in building up the world sympathy for India. The Awami League’s election as a majority party in Pakistan and the spontaneous support of the people of Bangladesh for their independence appealed to the western democratic nations and attracted the overwhelming support of the world press in favour of Bangladesh. All these together offered a unique opportunity to India to destroy her enemy number one.

However, notwithstanding what might have been the intentions and policies of the Indian Government, the support of the general people of India towards the cause of Bangladesh was spontaneous and overwhelming. Hundreds and thousands of Indian citizens helped in various ways in mitigating the sufferings of the Bengalis during that 9-month period. Anyone coming to India from Bangladesh enjoyed a special status and was generally offered hospitality by the ordinary people of India. Without this support of the Indian people their Government could not sustain the assistance of such monumental and internationally complicated nature. The massive support of the people of India helped their Government in taking the risk of a full-scale war with the possibility of even involving the super powers.

In the course of the war, knowing the weaknesses of the Awami League leadership in exile, the Indian civil servants and army officers faced no difficulty in bringing the new Government under their own terms. In supplying arms and ammunition to the freedom fighters, in the recruitment of boys for training, in supplying logistics, in going into guerilla operations inside Bangladesh, in finance and in every other matter a rigid control was maintained by the Indian authorities.6 Even foreign correspondents who helped greatly in advancing the cause of the Bengalis were not allowed to enter Bangladesh from the Indian side to cover the activities of the Bengali freedom fighters without India’s prior permission.7 This big brotherly treatment of the Indian officers on many occasions made the operations more hazardous causing a great deal of annoyance amongst the freedom fighters. Every Bengali army officer or member of the Mukti Bahini I met during that time expressed their extreme resentment to the interferences of the Indian authorities. This was the reason why the spontaneously raised guerillas and the members of the Mukti Bahini who operated from inside Bangladesh proved to be more effective as Indian authorities had very little control over them.

Despite India’s control and the Awami League’s weak leadership the Bengalis of all walks of life fought the war to achieve their independence.8 Hundreds and thousands of men and women gave their lives and sacrificed their homes and families. Although initially the Mukti Bahini comprised of the Bengali personnel of the former Pakistan army and other para-military forces and the urban youths, in course of the struggle the largest section of the freedom fighters emerged from the peasantry. The students, workers and the youths of the rural areas constituted the real vanguard of the independence war. Excepting for very few every Bengali took part in this war directly or indirectly whether they were inside Bangladesh or outside. Although without India’s support it would have been difficult to liberate the land within such a short time, but the independence would have been achieved one day as the cause manifested the genuine aspirations of the entire people of Bangladesh. The Bengalis would have won the war even without the direct involvement of the Indian Army, only perhaps it would have taken a longer time.

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Notes

 

  1. My personal assessment made on the basis of interviewing some Awami League leaders during the war in 1971.

  1. Amongst the Awami League leaders Tajuddin was the most serious one. In course of his duty as the

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Prime Minister of the government in exile he proved to be a leader of conviction and dedication. In the absence of Sheikh Mujib, Tajuddin emerged as the guiding force of the Awami League Government in exile.

  1. Because of their inherent weaknesses the Awami League Government also failed to change its policy towards China. Despite the fact that there was considerable pressure upon the Awami League from the side of the freedom fighters to seek Chinese support over the issue the Government in exile remained silent. They simply followed an Indo-Soviet line as far as China was concerned.

  1. In order to maintain their leadership for restoration and to secure a total support from India, the Awami League Government in exile had to sign certain agreements with the Indian Government.

  1. At the early stage of the war a large number of banks were looted both by freedom fighters and miscreants.

  1. In recruitment, training and supply of logistics the Indian Government employed very strict methods. No Bengali could avail these opportunities unless he was a supporter of the Awami League or was recommended by an Awami League leader, similarly, students and workers who had the recommendation from the respective organizations i.e. the Students League and Sramik League, were allowed to have the training and take part in the war. This ill-conceived policy was bitterly criticised by all the nationalist forces or both from within the Awami League and outside. This method of recruitment for participating in the independence war led to arouse considerable hatred and criticism against both the Awami Leauge and the Indian Government amongst the people who were deprived of availing the opportunities offered by the latter. The Awami League failed to appreciate that a national independence war could not be kept confined to the participation of only political party. The Awami League and the Indian Government deliberately adopted the above policy in order to see that the war did not go into hands of the leftist forces. Despite this policy the independence war was won and it succeeded because it derived the support of the people of various political shades who fought the war on their own and without any Indian assistance.

  1. When I took John Pilger, the reputed international correspondent of Londons Daily Miror to a camp of freedom fighters inside Bangladesh, Indian Government objected and Bangladesh Government ensured my effort in a Cabinet meeting. John Pilger’s two famous dispatches, one in July under the heading ‘Death of a Nation’ and the other in December, 1971 under ‘Birth of a Nation’ did immense good to Bangladesh. Similar thing happened when I took Michael Charlton of BBC to make a documentary on Bangladesh for his influential ‘Panorama’ Programme.’ On many other occasions the author faced such obstructions, some of more serious nature, from both the Bangladesh and Indian Government when he was working as a volunteer during that period.

  1. A deeper study is necessary to evaluate the true nature and character of the independence war. It will require a full investigation into different aspects of the wartouching subjects like the character and composition of the Mukti Bahinis (freedom fighters), the role of the consultative committee comprising the Awami League, the pro-Moscow NAP and the pro-Moscow Communist Party, the role of Moulana Bhashani and the pro-Peking NAP and other political parties, ideological and non-iedological character of the forces who worked for the independence and who worked against the independence, effect of the influx of refugees the role of world press, the role of the big powers, the role of the United Nation, and other world bodies, the trial of Sheikh Mujib and his release and finally the role of the Indian Government and the Indian Army and bureaucracy.

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Appendix 1

 

Draft Constitution Amendment Bill, 1969

Statement of object and Reasons : This Constitution Amendment Bill embodies detailed amendments to the Cosntitution which are aimed at giving effect to the basic Constitutional demands of the people of Pakistan as these have been given clear expression in the course of the mass movement which has taken place in the country.

The basic Constitutional demands include :

  • Representation in the Federal Legislature on the basis of population;

  • Grant of full and effective Regional Autonomy on the basis of the Six-Point progrmme of the Awami League and the 11-point programme of the students;

  • Dismemberment of one unit and the establishment of Sub-Federation in West Pakistan.

Further extensive Amendments are embodied aimed at removing the many undemocratic features which exist in the present Constitution. Provisions are also made for direct elections on the basis of universal adult franchise.

Provisions have also been made which would ensure that the Parliamentary form of Government which is sought to be introduced is one which is truly Parliamentary in form and does not leave with the President such powers as would enable the Parliamentary form to be undermined.

Detailed provisions have also been made to enable Federal arrangements based upon granting full and effective Regional Autonomy on the basis of the six point, to be expenditiously implemented.

Provisions have also been made whereby Amendments cap be made to the Constitution by the total majority of the Members so that the Constitution should be a flexible one and should be constantly responsive to the aspirations of the people.

This Constitution Amendment Bill is being presented to the Legislature with a view to providing it with the opportunity of meeting the basic Constitutional demands of the people of all parts of Pakistan and to what is right by them.

It is believed that only by effecting such Amendments can the Constitutional foundation be laid for an effective working of Federal Parliamemtary Democracy in Pakistan, which will secure for its people political, economic and social justice.

A Bill to amend certain provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Whereas it is expedient to amend certain provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the purposes and in the manner hereinafter appearing;

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Appendix 2

 

Directives

 

A non-violent non-cooperation movement began throughout Bangladesh from March 8, 1971 following Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s call in the Race Course meeting on March 7.

On March 15, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman took over the administration of Bangladesh by issuing some 35 directives. The statement, issued on March 15 by Mujib in connection with the taking over the administration is as follows :

‘The heroic struggle of the people marches forward. All those who cherish freedom and are struggling for it the world over, should regard our cause as their own. Our people have proved how a determined and united people can be a bulwark of freedom against those who conspire to rule by force.

The people of Bangladesh, civil servants, office and factory workers, peasants and students, have demonstrated in no uncertain terms that they would die rather than surrender. It is deplorable that even at this stage some unthinking people are trying to intimidate a section of civilian employees by promulgating Martial Law orders.

Today the entire people are united in their determination not to submit to the Martial Law. I, therefore, urge those at whom the latest order has been directed not to yield to the threat that has been levelled against them. Seventy-five million people of Bangladesh are behind them and their families.

The spirit of freedom in Bangladesh cannot be extinguished. We cannot be conquered because each of us is determined to die, if need be, to ensure that our future generations can live in freedom and with dignity as free citizens of a free country.

The struggle shall, therefore, continue with renewed vigour until our goal of emancipation is realised. I appeal to the people to remain ready for any sacrifice, and should force he unleashed against them, to resist it by all means possible.

I am taking over the administration to deal with the affairs of the seventy-five million population in Bangladesh on the basis of my party’s absolute majority in the Provincial Assembly and its dominant position in the National Assembly. This is aimed at emancipation of the people of Bangladesh.’

  1. Secretariats of Central and Provincial Government and semi-Government offices, autonomous bodies, High Courts and all other courts throughout Bangladesh shall observe hartal, subject to specific directives set out below and such exemptions and clarifications as may be issued from time to time.

  1. All educational institutions throughout Bangladesh shall remain closed.

  1. The Deputy Commissioners and the Sub-Divisional Officers should handle what work they could to maintain law and order without reopening their offices.

  1. Police, if necessary, should be assisted by the Awami League Volunteers.

  1. The Warders and Officers in the jails should reamin active. The Ansars should carry on their duties.

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  1. The port authorities should function in all respects relating to incoming and outgoing ships except that no cooperation shall be extended for mobilization of forces or materials which may be utilised for repression against the people.

  1. The incoming ships should be off-loaded without any delay. The relative branch of the Excise Department should function and permit the off-load of goods. The excise duty collected from that should be deposited with the Eastern Banking Corporation or the Eastern Mercantile Bank Ltd. by opening a special account. This account shall be operated by the Collector of Excise Department under directives from the Awami League. This money shall not be deposited with the Central Government.

  1. Railways should function normally. But only those offices which are involves in smooth running of the trains shall open. No cooperation should be extended to mobilization of troops or arms for the repression of the people.

  1. Post and Telegraph offices shall function only for purpose of letters, telegrams and money orders within Bangladesh. But foreign mail service and foreign telegrams of all categories may be sent direct to the countries concerned. Interwing teleprinter channels shall remain open for one hour between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, only for the purpose of enabling banks to send and receive by teleprinter such messages as are permitted under Directive 25.

  1. Only local and inter-district trunk telephone within Bangladesh shall function. Necessary sections required for repair and maintenance of the telephone system shall function.

  1. Radio, television and newspapers shall function and shall give a complete version of all statements and news about the people’s movemnets; otherwise those working in these establishments shall not cooperate.

  1. All hospitals, health centres, sewerage words, jail hospitals, T.B. Clinics and Cholera Research Institute shall function normally. Medical stores will also remain open and supplies to all hospitals, mofussil hospitals and village hospitals and rural hospitals shall continue.

  1. Those departments of EPWAPDA which are necessary for electric supplies including repairs and maintenance, shall function.

  1. Gas and water supplies including maintenance and repairs shall function normally.

  1. Coal supplies for brick fields and other places shall continue.

  1. Import, supply, storing and carrying of foodgrains shall he made on priority basis.

  1. Functioning of power pumps and movement of other tools and necessary fuel shall contiune.

  1. Work on tubewell sinking and irrigation shall go on.

  1. East Pakistan Cooperative Bank, Central Cooperative Bank and other recoginised Thana and Central Cooperative organisations shall function.

  1. The relevant department of EPADC may function in accordance with the earlier directives.

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  1. Agricultural Development Bank and other banks should give loans without interest to peasants in the cyclone-affected areas.

  1. The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan should arrange immediate loans for storing onions.

  1. The Government organizations and relevant autonomous bodies shall give money as before to the contractors for all flood control and other projects of EPWD and EPWAPDA.

  1. All development and construction works of government or Semi-government bodies shall continue.

  1. Banks shall carry on their operations, including receiving deposits of any amount, inter-bank clearances without any limit within Bangladesh, inter-bank transfers within Bangladesh and drawings by T.T. or mail transfers form West Pakistan and cash transactions subjcet to various restrictions. The State Bank and the National Bank of Pakistan shall continue to discount T.T. throughout Bangladesh on the basis that reimbursement shall be effected at Dhaka.

Banks with head offices in West Pakistan shall obtain necessary funds to reimburse the State Bank and National Bank of Pakistan, Dhaka.

Foreign traveller’s cheque may be encashed by authorised dealers and diplomats may freely operate their accounts and foreign national may operate their foreign exchange accounts and may deal with foreign exchange remittances received by them.

There shall be no operation of lockers. No remittances shall be effected outside Bangladesh through the State or otherwise.

Letters of credit may be opened against licences including those issued on surrender of bonus vouchers for imports from foreign countries. Barter documents (where goods have already been shipped) shall be valid. Pending export bills shall be collected through the Eastern Mercentile Bank and the Eastern Banking Corporation which banks shall comply with such directives as are issued to them in this regard.

  1. The State Banks shall observe the same banking and office hours as other banks and shall remain open for taking all necessary steps for smooth functioning of the banking system of Bangladesh within the framework of restrictions defined above.

p-Forms may be functioned and all approved remittances to foreign countries for students and other approved recipients may be permitted.

  1. All private commercial and industrial organizations shall function as before

  1. All travel agents and foreign airline offices may functions.

  1. Sale proceeds realised by them should be deposited in any bank within Bangladesh.

  1. To keep the inland riverports functioning, relevant employees of East Pakistan Shipping Corporation, and IWTA shall work.

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  1. (a) Until further directives are issued no land revenue shall be realised, no excise duty shall be realised on salt produced in Bangladesh, handloom weavers shall be entitled to purchase cotton yarn at non-duty-paid price.

(b) subject to above, all provincial taxas, including amusement tax, toll in respect of hats, bazars, bridges and ponds shall be realised and credited to the account of the Government of Bangladesh.

(c) All local taxas including octroi shall be paid.

(d) All direct central taxas, including customs duty, excise duty, sales tax hitherto collected and realised by the Central Government shall hence forward be collected by the collecting agencies, but shall not be credited to the Central Government account or be transferred or remitted to the Central Government. Such realizations shall be deposited in ‘special accounts’ in the Eastern Mercentile Bank and the Eastern Banking Corporation which banks shall comply with directives issued to them in this regard. All collecting agencies shall implement these directives and such other directives as may be issued from time to time.

(e) Direct central taxas, such as income tax, shall not be realised till further directives.

  1. Pakistan Insurance Corporation shall function. All insurance companies including Postal Life Insurance shall function.

  1. The workers shall not join their factories, but they should go there to collect their wages on the 30th of this month.

  1. Hoisting of black flags on all houses tops shall continue.

  1. The relevant authorities shall do their duties keeping close contact with the Awami League Action Committee.

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