[How Pakistan Got Divided – Part 2]
Was military action absolutely necessary?
No. If the political leadership of East and West Pakistan had treated each other better, reaching a settlement or consensus with tolerance and the spirit of sacrifice, there would have been no need for military action.
Military action became necessary after the West Pakistani leadership refused to go to Dacca (Dhaka). The president (Yahya Khan) postponed the National Assembly session for drafting the constitution without giving a new date for the next session; a rebellion was triggered in East Pakistan, and an unconstitutional government was installed. There were two options: either the army should have returned to West Pakistan, or an attempt should have been made to reinstall a constitutional government (based on the democratically elected assembly).
The actual injustice was meted out it by the West Pakistani leadership—they had created an environment that led to East Pakistan’s confrontation with the army, both of whom suffered. As a result, Pakistan was dismembered and a ‘new Pakistan’ was created. If the assembly session of 3 March 1970 had been held, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s party would not have rebelled and the secession of 1971 would not have happened.
Additionally, some people in the army feel that immediate political action right after the military action could have controlled the situation. The truth is that the impact of any positive political action takes a long time to change people’s mindset. There is no magic wand that can be waved to instantly make a positive impact on the thoughts and feelings of a nation, nor can one achieve this by flipping a switch as one would an electric bulb. Hearts must be won, and that takes a long time, especially where people have been affected by military action. For example, even after a child is beaten, he rejects all reconciliatory attempts by his mother. And one talks of presenting a political solution to a people after military action? Impossible. Especially since the only solution acceptable to them was that the next Prime Minister of Pakistan be from East Pakistan. But, a prime minister from East Pakistan was not acceptable to the people of West Pakistan. Even Noorul Amin, who had won the elections, was unacceptable to them.
The solution was to accept Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party as the majority party of Pakistan. Unfortunately, we in West Pakistan persistently stated that there were two majority parties in the country.
The fact is, we did attempt some political action in East Pakistan, but it was small and insignificant, and therefore ineffective. In fact, some attempts were counterproductive. For example:
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was captured to facilitate a political solution through discussions with the West Pakistani leadership. Instead of negotiations, President Yahya Khan and his advisors sent him to jail and filed a case of treason against him, later handing him a death sentence. All the while, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had been telling his lawyer, Brohi, that a political solution was possible.
Recommended amnesty for military units, consisting of East Pakistanis who were still in East Pakistan, but the military commanders ridiculed and laughed off the suggestion Amnesty was announced for civilians in East Pakistan who were against the government but were either abroad or in the country through a directive from General Tikka. But the GHQ issued a letter which distorted it in a way that killed its spirit.
After the appointment of a civilian governor in September 1970, a general amnesty was announced again. This was too little too late-India had already been given sufficient time to complete its preparation for invading East Pakistan. In my personal capacity I tried, and Begum Suleiman Suhrawardy helped to send as many East Pakistani MNAs as possible to West Pakistan (to increase contact between the two Wings and somehow restore normalcy between the two peoples). Whenever an East Pakistani political leader was arrested by the army for unjustifiable reasons, we rallied to have him released.
All this was in an attempt to win over at least some of the political leadership in East Pakistan.Even though the Bengalis had turned against West Pakistan prior to any aggression, the military action added fuel to the fire, and after six months of guerrilla warfare, the strategically significant political decision of handing over power of both Wings to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was the only option left. But that would have upset the majority party leadership in West Pakistan.
Source: How Pakistan Got Divided – Rao Farman Ali