GENERAL YAHYA’S BROADCAST
Coming confrontation with Bhutto
By Dilip Mukerjee
PRESIDENT YAHYA KHAN’S broadcast on Tuesday—his third in three months is designed essentially to do a public relations job for his military regime. This is evident from the effort put into it to project an image of reasonableness vis-a-vis India, and to assure the world at the same time that the junta does mean to transfer power to at civilian government a home.
In the broadcast he made on June 28, he blamed the trouble in the east wing on the “collusion” among Awami league extremists, rebels, and “our hostile neighbour.” He spoke of collusion this time too, but only in passing. An unmistakable shift of emphasis is evident from his assertion that “all major sabotage activities are being conducted by Indian infiltrators in the name of the secessionists.” This is intended to make the world believe that the upsurge in East Bengal would have already come to an end but for India.
Equally noteworthy is the fact that the General is no longer making a claim that the army has liquidated the resistance in Bangla Desh. On June 28, he declared that his troops were “in full control” and had “crushed” the mischief mongers saboteurs and infiltrators. With scores of foreign observers now in position in the East, a claim of this kind will not wash. It was all the more necessary, therefore, to put the blame for the continuing guerilla actions on so called infiltrators deployed by India.
HOSTILTY
Consequently, India’s “hostility” towards Pakistan is played up in the broadcast, but it is quite clear from the several pleas made to “friendly countries” to restrain New Delhi that the Generals in Pakistan do not at the moment relish the idea of taking in India in direct combat. This explains their readiness to consider “any initiative from any quarter” to work out ways and means of reducing tensions with India. The stance now is certainly less bellicose than some weeks ago when General Yahya Khan threatened “total war” against this country every time he met a foreign correspondent.
This is not because the junta has suddenly become more peaceable. The only possible explanation is that Islamabad is less inclined to engage in rash adventures in its present situation. For one thing, the army in Bangla Desh is far from having achieved its objective of “pacification”, as dramatically demonstrated by the assassination of one the principal Bengali quislings, Mr. Abdul Monem Khan, at his home with in sight of the local military headquarters.
For another, Islamabad can scarcely be sure that China will intervene on Pakistan’s behalf on the 1965 pattern. The conciliatory statement made by Mr. Chou Enlia apropos the Indo-Soviet treaty, and the earlier invitation to an Indian table tennis team to participate in a Peking tournament, are straws on the wind that the junta has undoubtedly noted, of course, peking’s “friendship and support” have been dutifully lauded by General Yahya buy he has hedged his bets by making a more specific reference to the “understanding” shown by the United States.
Viewed in its domestic context, the time table set for installing a civilian government suggests a bid to placate restive west wing politicians, particularly Mr. Bhutto. In a speech on September 22, Mr. Bhutto had delivered an ultimatum that he would have recourse to“ other processes” if the National Assembly was not restored before the end of the year. According to the broadcast, the Assembly is to meet on December 27, and the Central government will be formed soon after the inauguration.
TIME TABLE
Not only Mr. Bhutto but other politicians have also been asking for an early end to the martial law regime. Mr. Momtaz Daultana, head of the Council Muslim League splinter, raised the demand after a meeting of the party executive on September 13; so did Mr. Nurul Amin, the veteran East Bengal politician after a meeting with General Yahya. Mr. Wali Khan’s National Awami Party has, like Mr. Bhutto’s group, taken the position that Pakistan’s grave difficulties can be resolved only by popular representatives. Only Mr. Qayyum Khan the junta’s principal political ally, continues to oppose an early transfer of power.
But even though the Generals have now agreed upon a time table, there is little reason for Mr. Bhutto to rejoice. The 79 seats declared vacant in East Bengal, by disqualifying Awami League members, are now in the nature of pocket boroughs which the junta will use for putting complaisant men onto the Assembly. These will most likely be from the parties whose representatives have been included in the civilian Ministry installed in Dacca on September 17. Mr. Bhutto has announced that his People’s Party will contest the by-elections, but given East Bengal’s allergy to him and his colleagues it would be surprising if he won a single seat.
In the 313-member National Assembly, Mr. Bhutto may thus find himself hopelessly outmanocuvered. His party won 82 out of the 300 elective seats and he has, since the events of March, tried to rope in some of the Awami League members who still retain their seats. He had expected that this would put him in a strong position. But there are growing sings that the junta will frustrate his hopes by rising up a majority against him through doctored by-elections in East Bengal.
This intention was implicit in the effort mounted under military patronage by Mr. Qayyum Khan to bring about a merger of the three League splinters which among them had won only 19 seats in the National Assembly-ten from Punjab, eight from Sind and one from the NWFP. These together with the seats the junta is in a position to assign at its discretion from the east wing, could put the League men well ahead of Mr. Bhutto’s party in the National Assembly.
As it happens the merger has not taken place largely because Mr. Daultan cannot reconcile himself to accepting Mr. Qayyum Khan’s hegemony. But even this may not help Mr. Bhutto much if, as seems likely, the junta were to sponsor a coalition to cut the People’s Party down size. Such a coalition should be able to draw upon the support of most, if not all of the Ulema splinters which hold 17 seats among them. There is no love lost between Mr. Bhutto and the Jamaat-e-Islami, which is certainly the most powerful among these splinters even though this was not fully reflected in the election results.
What Mr. Bhutto will do if he is denied a share in power is difficult to judge from this distance. He will certainly make a bid to secure support from within the armed forces in which he is reputed to have sympathisers among the younger elements, the colonels and Majors. The attempt would be to create a division of opinion within the junta itself in which some men like Lt.-Gen. Gul Hasan. the chief of General Staff, are believed to be more inimical to him than others.
In any event, the inauguration of the National Assembly (if it is inaugurated), is bound to set interesting developments in train, highlight the fissures within the West Pakistani political and military clite.
This is why General Yahya was according to foreign observers, most reluctant to cal the Assembly into session before he could see some light at the end of the tunnel in Bangla Desh.
WESTERN AID
But he obviously had no choice, partly because of the pressures building up in the west wing and partly because he has an imperative need to create a civilian facade to qualify for the aid Western donors are still denying. A brief meeting of the aid-Pakistan club held on October 2, in Washington found all donors, except the U. S. demanding tangible progress towards a political solution as a precondition for any further accommodation.
President Yahya is, however, taking ample precautions to ensure that the army retains the whip hand even after a civilian government is constituted. In the first place, there is the announcement made in June, that the governments constituted at the Centre and in the provinces will operate under the “cover” of martial law for a period of time, the duration of which remains unspecified. Secondly, the governments will operate under a new constitution dictated by the junta which will undoubtedly institutionalise the army’s role in political life. This is foreshadowed in speculation appearing in semi-official dailies like Pakistan Times which have waxed eloquent on the merits of the Turkish model for Pakistan. Thirdly the junta has specified that this constitution is not open to amendment except with the concurrence of the President. Even Dawn a pillar of the establishment, now takes the view that the new constitution, as ratified by the new constitution, as ratified by the new Assembly, will lack democratic sanction , while the leader of Karachi has said that the whole process of constitution-making is a negation of the sovereignty of the people.
In sum democracy is out as far as Pakistan is concerned because the junta has no intention of parting with power. The east wing is already paying with blood for its democratic aspirations: it only remains to be seen how long it will be before the common people in the West decide that they have had enough of the military overload.
Reference: Hindustan Standard 20.10.1971