15th AUGUST A NATIONAL TRAGEDY by Major General K M Safiullah, BU, psc. (Retd.)

বিশেষ দ্রষ্টব্যঃ কপিরাইট সমস্যা যাতে না হয় সেকারণে সকল লেখা শুধুমাত্র ‘only Readable’, ‘non-downloadable’ ও ‘non-clickable’ রাখা হয়েছে। সংগ্রামের নোটবুকের সকল নথি-পত্রিকা-দলিল-সংকলন-বই থেকে নেয়া তথ্য-ছবি-ভিডিও শুধুমাত্র গবেষণার কাজে ব্যবহার্য। বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা সংগ্রাম ও মুক্তিযুদ্ধ গবেষণার জন্য সংগ্রামের নোটবুক একটি অলাভজনক অবাণিজ্যিক বিজ্ঞাপনমুক্ত ডোনেশনমুক্ত স্বেচ্ছাশ্রমে গড়া প্রচেষ্টা।

15th AUGUST A NATIONAL TRAGEDY
Major General K M Safiullah, BU, psc. (Retd.)

The book had been contemplating to write down the incident of 15th August 1975 and reveal the facts for the posterity. This incident has created enough confusion in the minds of the people. The Author also need to clear his conscience by telling exactly what had happened.
This incident was not only a tragedy for Bangabandhu’s family, but also it was a National Tragedy for all of us The Bengali’s. In Bangladesh nobody ever imagined that a tragedy of such nature and magnitude could take place in our country, particularly with regard to Bangabandhu.
When an incident of such nature takes place concerning the national leaders, The people also has the right to know about its details. The Author to the best of his ability narrated the details as it happened It is now up to the readers to say what else. The Author could have done to combat the situation that he faced.
The Author in his write-up might have been a bit impolite on some involved person in but he does not regret that he mentioned them the way he did because what he wrote about them is what he believe they weary. The people should also know the truth. This was what the Author aimed at. Unfortunately he has been prosecuted in The people’s court and was convicted without a trial in his absence The Author would like The readers to go through the details in this book and give their judgement thereafter. In any case The Author shirked his responsibilities and never disowned his failure.

Preface

I had long been contemplating to write down the incident of 15th August 1975 and reveal the facts for the posterity. This incident has created enough confusion in the minds of the people. I also need to clear my conscience by telling exactly what had happened. The other reason I felt to do this is because this incident has been presented to the people by some uniformed officers of the time mostly blaming me. The concerned officials of that time narrated the account to the media in a way that suited them. When these misleading stories were being narrated and circulated through the media, I was then out of the country. The printed accounts contained venomous propaganda against me which remained unchallenged.
The journal that printed those stories were the weekly Meghna and some others papers. During this period, as I was out of the country so these write-ups did not come to my notice and it remained unchallenged. The people however, took those versions to be true. I came to know about this after my return from abroad. From then on I started to dig those out and challenged those versions through the print media.
This incident was not only a tragedy for Bangabandhu’s family, but it was a National Tragedy for all of us-the Bengali’s. In Bangladesh nobody ever imagined that a tragedy of such nature and magnitude could take place in our country, particularly with regard to Bangabandhu. Even Bangabandhu had that belief. Whenever I asked him and said, “Sir your security arrangement is not adequate,” he used to tell me, “Safiullah don’t worry, Bengalis will not kill you or me”. That was his mental strength. Bangabandhu had

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complete trust in me and I have the conviction that before Bangabandhu breathed his last, he left knowing that Safiullah did not betray him. But he must have breathed his last with the agony of betrayal by some.
My wife and children were most eager to see that I write down the details of the incident. They were also eagerly looking forward to see that I do it. They know and saw what I went through and also thought that the people should also know the details of the incident. This was one of the reasons that I sat down to write about this. When an incident of such nature takes place concerning the national leaders, the people also has the right to know about its details. Ito the best of my ability narrated the details as it happened. It is now up to the readers to say what else I could have done to combat the situation that I faced. I thought I played all my cards in handling the situation. ‘

I in my write-up might have been a bit impolite on some involved persons, but I do not regret that I mentioned them the way I did, because what I wrote about them is what I believe they were. The people should also know the truth. This was what I aimed at. Unfortunately I have been prosecuted in the people’s court and was convicted without a trial in my absence. I would like the readers to go through the details in this book and give their judgement thereafter. In any case, I never shirked my responsibilities and never disowned my failure. I

It may not be out of place to mention that the chief commands the Army during peace time as well as during war, but he does not command the troops directly. He commands them through his subordinate commanders, who failed their Chief on that day. Although I had no part to play on that incident, yet whether I like it or not, the uniformed soldiers had committed the crime on that day and I was their Chief.

Major General K M Safiuilah, BU, psc. (Retd) The Former Chief of Staff, Bangladesh Army

THE BACKGROUND

In the history of Bangladesh, 15th August 1975 will always be remembered as the blackest day for the entire nation. The tragic incident that took place on that day couldn’t but stir the conscience of the people who has the slightest feeling. No one with rational mind supported this appalling act that took place on that day. On that tragic day apart from the Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, his family members including his minor son, who was hardly nine years old, were brutally murdered. The only survivors were his two daughters who were luckily out of the country on that day. The ruthless murderers also gunned down some very close relations of Bangabandhu on the same day in their own houses in Dhaka.

The incident on that day was just not only a brutal action of some disgruntled military officers; but there was a big conspiracy behind this tragic event. The hands behind this conspiracy extended beyond the borders of Bangladesh. The involvement of the uniformed personnel’s was only a tool to accomplish their mission. Some ambitious political leaders were deeply involved in this conspiracy. To attain and accomplish their mission they took into confidence some disgruntled military officers in their fold. Their agents infiltrated the army and meticulously worked to enlist their support. In the armed forces they picked up the disgruntled ones for their job. This plan Was conceived within the premises of power in such a way that no one doubted them. As subsequently revealed, the mastermind behind this plan was Khandaker Moshtaque. He was a very trusted and very

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close associate of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who could not be doubted. Khandaker Moshtaque was a hypocrite. and worked on this plan sitting beside Bangabandhu. He was assisted by Mr. Taher-ud-din Thakur and Mr. Mahb-ub-ul Alam Chashi the two very close and trusted aides of his along with some other associates.

As I said before, there was a deep conspiracy to change the leadership in Bangladesh. So to detect and unearth such conspiracy, it was primarily the responsibility of the intelligence agencies. But the agencies operating in the country then apparently either failed to detect the incident of 15th August ’75 before it took place or they connived with it. To me it appeared strange when so much was happening around centring Bangabandhu, nothing came to the notice of the intelligence agencies. Is it possible to believe that? In any case, if this came to their notice they did not divulge it to any one, particularly to the concerned people.

Of the concerned people, I was the first person who should have been informed but I was not told about this by any one; in fact I was kept in complete darkness. The intelligence agencies that were in, existence then were either incapable of acquiring such intelligence or they were party to this conspiracy. In the context of the emergence of Bangladesh and the circumstances under which the military Putsch that took place on 15th August 1975, both the assumptions [incapability or connivance] needs to be examined threadbare.

In the case of first assumption, as these agencies were new, so by then they may not have been able to spread their tentacles all over to acquire such intelligence. The conspirators therefore, might have taken the advantage of this shortfall. However, if the latter part is true i.e. connivance; in that case, my inkling is that if not all, there must have been a strong section of them who were party to this conspiracy. I strongly believe that the latter part is not

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only a probability, it is the truth. There were quite a few intelligence agencies working for the Government then, yet how is it possible that all of them failed to notice such heinous act about to take place. No one so far asked them why it had to be so, but every one straight away points their finger at the Chief of Staff – that he could not save the President.

After the war we allin uniformed service, acted as ones but unfortunately this unity of ours were dented by an element of discontentment unwittingly initiated in the Army. The reasons for discontentment in the army were mainly due to two important reasons. Those were first the absorption of repatriated officers and men in the armed forces without scrutiny and the second one was the retention of a superseded and highly ambitious aspirant in the service, who was also vying to become the Chief of Army Staff. However, I do not believe that these two decisions were taken intentionally to create confusion in the army but it could have been avoided if these decision were taken after thorough deliberation. If it was so, we would not have faced the problem that we faced later. I therefore, feel that after independence if the government had taken any wrong decision regarding the armed forces, these were the two decisions that were not right. I am going to elaborate on these two aspects in details.

It is difficult to make the people understand that the security and protection of the President is not the responsibility of the Chief of Staff. There are agencies that had this responsibility. But so far no one asked them as to what they did. By this statement I am in no way trying to shirk from my responsibilities. In any case the troops who Were involved in this carnage belonged to the army and I Was their Chief when this tragic incident took place. This act was committed by some disgruntled serving as well as angry retired army officers. Despite the fact that I had no

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part to play in this carnage, yet people would not understand and made me responsible as those participants belonged to the army and I was their Chief. It is true that they belonged
to the army and l was their Chief. It is also true that some one in the army has to take the responsibility for this carnage and accept the failure to tackle this incident.

The people by-and-large have no idea about the command structure of the army and as such they do not know how the army’s command functions. So for the understanding of those, may I say that the Chief of Army Staff is a commander who commands the army during the war as well as during the peace time but he does not command the troops directly. He commands them through his subordinate commanders. Unfortunately on that day his immediate subordinate commanders failed their Chief by not acting on his orders to move troops and oppose the rebels.

15th August will appear in the calendar every year and every time when there is a discussion about the death of Bangabandhu; I will figure in the scene in some form or the other. In the process naturally lot of questions will arise in the minds of the people. What was the Chief doing when this barbaric act was being committed? Why couldn’t he stop this action and what did he do to quell this? Why didn’t he move troops to oppose this action? I in my subsequent narration will try to answer these questions and clear the doubts. However, in short the Chief did take some action by ordering his immediate subordinate commander to move troops and oppose the rebels, but his immediate subordinate commander did not act or react on his orders on that day. The question is why? We will have to find the answer.

The national and international conspiracies were on to destabilize the government of Bangabandhu. On top of it, a hypocrite like Khandaker Moshtaque who while enjoying the complete confidence of Bangabandhu plotted against him. It was said that some international leaders had warned

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Bangabandhu that there might be an attempt on his life but Bangabandhu did not give credence to those warnings. Again, in spite of being informed, Bangabandhu overlooked the growing frustration and resentment within the army. It is least to say that in this regard he was most apathetic. The shrewd Khandaker Moshtaque snooped on those resentment and dissatisfaction in the army. Those who sided with Khandaker Moshtaque include those who felt for some reason ignored and deprived thus harboured grudge against Bandabandhu’s government. There was also element that was waiting to seize power. The military Putsch, therefore, should not be seen in isolation.

It may not be out of place to mention here that amongst the lower rank uniformed soldiers, many were very rank/class conscious. The soldiers from JCO’s and below did not like the supremacy of the officer’s class. This mind-set of the troops was seen not only in the army, it was also noticed in the air force as well as in the navy. After the independence, an element of rowdism was noticed within the troops of all the three services. The first such incident took place in the air force in 1972. By then the air force was not properly organized. I had to send troops to quell this uprising and brought them to some sort of order. The next incident took place in 1973 in the navy. Captain Nurul Haque was the Naval Chief then. He came to me for help and I provided him the required help by sending troops from Chittagong Garrison. While providing this assistance to the Naval Chief, I asked Captain Nurul Haque that if similar incident takes place in the army, who would help me then? Alas no one could help me, when it really happened!

The incident of 15th August ’75 though not the same, yet it had that element. The troops felt that they were being used by the officers to achieve and enhance their positions. However, the 3rd November ’75 incident was a counter-action to 15th August incident. The troops main grievance

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came to light after 7th November ’75 uprising, when the slogan was ’Sepoy Sepoy Bhai Bhai, Subedarer Uporey Kono Rank Nai’ (Sepoys are brothers and there is no rank above Subedar). This slogan indicated their rank consciousness and how they disliked the officers as a class. On that day quite a few officers were killed by the troops. From the British time, an officer was allowed to have a Sepoy as his runner i.e. Batman. After 7th November ’75 uprising, there was a demand from the rank and file that the officers should not have Batman from amongst the soldiers, resulting in the withdrawal of batman facilities from the officers. All these that I mentioned here deserve thorough study because in a well knit combat force officers and troops relationship remains above-board.

Having said all these, finally may I say that the key players of the 15th August 1975 conspiracy as per my estimate were from outside the country. In any case, the entire episode surrounding the 15th August 1975 event centred on Bangabandhu. He being the main target, the planners picked up the operators who harboured bitterness against him. The element of assassination might have been incorporated as a last resort. The cause of bitterness in the armed forces mentioned in the next chapter might have also given an impetus to what followed thereafter.

RESENTMENT IN THE ARMY

Soon after independence, we all got together and got busy in our respective fields. Our main aim was to rebuild a war-torn, devastated country from the ashes of ruins into a new and a prosperous Bangladesh. We in uniform without wasting any time strove to organise a newly born army properly and give it a proper shape. To this end, we dedicated our entire energy and our heart and soul in our respective domain. As we achieved independence with limited resources, so we had strong conviction that we were capable of organizing the army with available resources. With that conviction of ours we went ahead to do our job and felt that we were capable of achieving anything. Bangabandhu on return from Pakistani custody told us that the stranded officers and men on return from Pakistan would be absorbed into the newly formed armed forces of Bangladesh. Bangabandhu, himself, had just returned from the Pakistani captivity. As such, the decision to absorb the repatriated uniformed officers and men into the Bangladesh armed forces must have resulted from the pain of confinement that he had experienced in the Pakistani custody. It is, therefore, my belief that this decision of his must have been because of this experience of his. His wish at that stage was therefore, an order for me. The decision to integrate the repatriated officers and men was in complete contrast to that of the Pakistan army, as none of their men including senior officers, who had surrendered in the then

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East Pakistan, were retained in service after repatriation. Instead, all of them were sent on retirement.

The officers and men who participated in the Liberation War (freedom fighters[FF]) were mentally and psychologically poles apart from those who did not (Repatriated). By this comment I am in no way trying to undermine or overestimate the value of any one group. The fact is that the first group were dashing, quick thinking, capable of quick decision making and were ready to risk their lives. The second group included most of those who were calculative, cautious and slow in reaction, unless of course that reaction was self-promoting. Furthermore, the first group (FF) suffered from superiority complex whereas the second (Repatriated) group from inferiority complex. Hence, the forging together of these two complexes was very difficult especially at a time when the army was just in the process of being raised.

To create confusion, there were black-sheep in both these camps. Since the Armed Forces were a very sensitive organization, the handling of these groups needed careful considerations. As Chief of Staff it was my responsibility to bring these two groups together. Admittedly I had my own limitations, primarily because of my age and length of service. On top of this, I was given a huge responsibility to raise an army from the scratch. In spite of these heavy responsibilities, I made my best and sincere efforts to integrate these two groups. But with all my sincere efforts the mismatch between these groups could not be blended. This mismatch was not healthy for the day-to-day running of the armed forces. I feel sorry that I did not have enough time to achieve a complete integration of these groups.

So for the interest of the service and to avoid discontentment, one of the group should have been sent home. One might ask why I did not raise this question before. The truth is that I did put forward my views but in front of a towering

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personality like Bangabandhu, it was not possible to go against his desires. The Freedom Fighters‘ group being sensitive and overreactive, in the long run they suffered the most due to their air of arrogance, which led to a number of court-marshals and death sentences. Consequently, most of them did not last long in the armed services.

The second mistake that the government made was in the selection and appointment of the Chief of Army Staff. I was appointed as the Chief superseding General Zia, who was senior to me. I should be the last person to complain but I did argue against my appointment with the then highest executive of the country. The government took this decision with political consideration at the back of their mind but this gave rise to discontentment. It could have been avoided. I said before that I was not in a hurry to become the Chief. This is a position which I would have attained in my own turn. Here the mistake that the government made was that on the one hand I was made the Chief superseding General Zia and on the other General Zia was retained in the service. The reason for which General Zia was thought to be ineligible to become the Chief, for the same reason he should not have been retained in the army. The other mistake that the government made was by creating a post of Deputy Chief and appointing General Zia in that post. General Zia being an ambitious person could not accept this decision and started to conspire, which ultimately resulted in the disaster like 15th August ’75.

General Zia was my batch-mate but he was a senior to me. His appointment as Deputy Chief in fact gave him an opportunity to exercise some sort of command in the army. If General Zia was required to be retained in the army, he should have been made the Chief. In other words, the retention of General Zia in the army as well as making him Dy Chief was the greatest mistake that the government could have made, which they did. I would have had no problem to work with him but he voiced his aversion right

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on the first day when I spoke to him. He started the intrigue in the army right from the day he sat on the Deputy’s chair. This was an unhealthy and an unnecessary creation.

At the national level after the war, Mujibnagar government on return from Kolkata decided to form National Militia, incorporating the Freedom Fighters. This decision of the government was promulgated through radio and TV, but later this programme was abandoned. The decision to abandon the programme of National Militia was apparently taken after the return of Bangabandhu and this was not taken well by the Freedom Fighters. Bangabandhu might not have had any part to play in this decision making, yet the anti-Bangabandhu elements, cashed on this issue and spread a hate campaign against him. Nevertheless, after nine-months bloody war for the liberation of Bangladesh, this sort of hate campaign did not go well for the newly formed government.

On independence, the government found that the road, rail, industrial infrastructure, economy and riverine communication system of the country was completely damaged. On top of that a huge quantity of arms and ammunitions were floating in the countryside. Some of it in the hands of genuine Freedom Fighters and some in the hands of Razakars i.e. non-believers of independence. These weapons were required to be retrieved and put back in the safe custody. Furthermore, the young, youthful and energetic Freedom Fighters were loitering aimlessly and were seeking direction. Along with the attainment of independence, the expectation of the people also increased. Therefore, when the expectation is high and the achievement does not commensurate with the expectation, frustration grows. As a result it gives rise to Law and Order issues. After the independence, that was what had happened in Bangladesh. Therefore, in a developing country like ours, it was very difficult to keep every one satisfied, especially

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when the country had just become independent and was yet to recover from the battle fatigue.

The proverb an Idle mind is the devil’s workshop’, was very much appropriate in the war-ravaged Bangladesh. After independence, as it was taking time for the economic activities to move forward, the unemployed youths were getting frustrated. Unemployment, therefore, was a major factor in the Law and Order situation of the country. Furthermore, rumours were rife and had infiltrated into the cantonment that the army was being disbanded. When the Jatyo Rakkhi Bahini (JRB-National Security Force) was formed in 1973, there was a rumour that this force was being raised to replace the army. Although there was no truth in this rumour, yet the low-income group soldiers were getting panicky as they were concerned about their job security. In any case, truth or no truth, the formation of JRB was one of the main reasons for the rumour spreading fast within the army thereby causing resentment. The anti-government elements took full advantage of these rumours and thereby poisoned the minds of the soldiers.

The questions in the minds of most people were that in presence of the army why it was necessary to raise another force like JRB. The answer to this was that JRB was raised to assist the Police to combat Law and Order situation in the country. My assessment of this was that the problem was not in the force but in the name, JRB. It could have been called something like the Reserve Police Battalion or Reserve Police Force. If that was the case then nobody would have raised any question about it. The question arose only when it was called ‘Jatyo Rakkhi Bahini’, which the gossipers claimed was superior to or parallel to the army. It is an irony that the Police force that resisted the Pakistani onslaught on 25th March 1971, found it difficult to perform its own task after independence. It was probably because after 25th March ’71 the original police force that fought so courageously had been disintegrated and was replaced by Pakistani chosen

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ones. Hence, after independence this police force failed to command respect from the public resulting in the need for another force.

During the war, although most of the police officers might have worked against their will, yet the people by and large felt that they worked willingly; especially the Freedom Fighters who operated in those areas thought so. This police force therefore, was morally weak to face the public and control Law and Order situation. As a result, every time there was a problem, I had to send troops to support the Police action. Our role was different and we were still in our adolescence and had to keep our troops ready for different purposes. The army could be used infrequently in aid of civil power to quell disturbances, but the need for its use had become excessive. In view of this and to allow us to concentrate in our own field, the government decided to spare us from the police role. Thus, the JRB was formed, same as RAB now.

To implement this decision, necessary government orders were issued. The recruitment of manpower for raising this outfit did not pose any problem. The reason being, a large number of Freedom Fighters, who were being held in various army camps for absorption in the National Militia were readily available. Hence, the recruiting agencies from JRB HQ had just to go to these camps and pick those who fulfilled their pre-requisites. As this was a new outfit, everything was new. This included their weapons, clothing, accommodation and vehicles etc. There was again another rumour that the government was equipping JRB with new and modern weapons, whereas the army was being neglected. The truth was that the army was holding the weapons which they used during the war and naturally those weapons looked old. On the other hand JRB being a new outfit, whatever they were provided with naturally had to be new. This was the truth and nothing more

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The rumour that was being spread about JRB was so strong that the soldiers in the army by and large started to believe that JRB was given preference over the army and those in the army might lose their jobs. The propagandist targeted the low income group soldiers who did not want to lose their government service. So the rumour that the JRB would be replacing the army was really gaining ground. It, therefore, became very difficult for me to contain this rumour. It was alleged that the then leadership of Jatyo Shamajtantrik Dal (JSD) was the main proponent behind this rumour. They were alleged to have recruited and planted their agents in the army to sow the seed of hatred against the government. Colonel Taher was one such agent. He in spite of being in the army clandestinely was an active member of this party. .

Colonel Taher was the AG and one of his responsibilities was to look after the morale of the troops; but his activities in the service were not helpful for the newly formed army. He was not in favour of conventional army; he was for people’s army. The armed forces were in a formative stage and the rumour that was in the air was against the interest of the army. In the army, my Deputy General Zia encouraged Colonel Taher to spread rumours causing mistrust in the government to destabilize my authority. Colonel Taher was General Zia’s promoter but not for long, because both were ambitious. General Zia later became Colonel Taher’s deadliest enemy. A time came when Colonel Taher was tried on a trumped-up seditious charge in a Martial Law Court in which he was found guilty and was sentenced to death by hanging. General Zia was the CMLA when Colonel Taher was tried. General Zia was also the approver of the sentence. Colonel Taher was hanged but he did not beg for mercy.

The raising of the Army as well as JRB was going on side by side. So far as the instructional staff support for the training of the new recruits of the JRB was concerned, the

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army could not spare the instructional staffs for JRB. The reason being the army itself was short of these personnel; as such it was not possible for the army to provide that support. Bangladesh government therefore, sought help from the Indian government. The Indian government in response agreed and showed their readiness to provide this support to JRB. They in a way willingly took this task. The government of India thereafter provided them not only the instructional staff support but also arms, ammunitions, equipments, clothing, wireless sets and transports etc.

The Manpower as instructional staff support that was given by the Indian army to JRB was mostly of South Indian origin. The complexion of those troops was dark. The uniform that the Indian army provided to JRB was Olive Green (OG). The reason they provided OG uniform was probably because those were readily available to them as ordnance supply. Our boys were though not that dark, yet with the OG uniform on them they looked dark. The rumour, therefore, was that the JRB was being manned by the soldiers of the Indian army. This rumour persisted and if this was really true, in that case after the assassination of Bangabandhu in 1975, when the JRB was merged into the army, where did those Indians go?

There were also rumours that JRB was being equipped with artillery guns and anti-tank weapons. When these rumours were being spread, during those days even the army units like artillery and armour did not receive any artillery-guns or tanks from outside. This rumour, therefore, was having a bad impact on the morale of the troops, especially amongst the armoured and the artillery soldiers. The soldiers of these two arms were, however, doing their training with dummy guns and cannibalized tanks. Despite this rumour being untrue, when they heard that the JRB was being equipped with artillery guns and anti-tank weapons, they naturally became frustrated and demoralized. In order to remove the doubts from their minds, I personally had to go

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round and speak to the troops. It became almost a one man crusade of mine to dispel these rumours. However, after August ’75 when the entire JRB was merged with the army, it became quite clear to every one that JRB possessed only infantry weapons. Sadly enough, it was too late when the troops saw the reality.

When the rumours were having an adverse effect on the armed forces, at that time in 1974 a sensitive bill was passed in the Parliament in which vast powers were given to JRB. The powers included the power of arrest without warrant. Considering the enormity of the situation prevailing then, the powers given to JRB was justified. Nonetheless, the connivers used this bill to further inflame the soldiers’ mind against the government saying that JRB was becoming a dominant force over the army. Regarding this sensitive issue of the power of arrest without warrant to JRB, it was not necessary that the same power be given to the army when they were not deployed in aid to civil power. However, as JRB was required to assist the civil authorities they needed to have these authorities. This necessarily did not make them more dominant a force as propagated. Furthermore, there were some stray incidents in which the JRB soldiers transgressed their limit and manhandled some army personnel including an officer. These actions aggravated the situation further. Disciplinary actions against the offenders were taken but the injury inflicted could not be healed.

In addition to the above, there was a feeling amongst the troops that the political leaders did not trust the army. They saw that the politicians interfered in the military issues and tried to influence their decisions. The troops therefore, felt that the army would not be able to function neutrally. This impression started to gain ground after the declaration of emergency on 24th April ’74. The operation was code-named ‘Operation Silver Lining’. Its objective was to recover arms and ammunitions from the unauthorised holders. The army while carrying out its responsibilities, in

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aid to civil power, was unwittingly getting into trouble with political leaders. The politicians close to higher authority probably expected that the army would do whatever they wanted them to do. However, they were unsuccessful as the officers and men did not succumb to their pressure and would not compromise with what they had been ordered to do. As a result some difficulties were being faced and new situations were created.

During this operation, our problem first started at Koshba-Comilla when the army contingent with definite information went to search an area that happened to be the premises of a Lady MP. During the search, a huge quantity of arms, ammunitions and powdered milk were recovered. The powdered milk and weapons were recovered from under the ground. The place from where these were recovered could not have been there without the knowledge of the Lady MP. As per government orders, no one was allowed to retain any weapon they acquired during war after 31st January 1972. Yet these weapons were recovered from the backyard of the Lady MP’s house some time in April ’74. There was no reason for the Lady MP to own such huge arsenal, unless those were for ill purposes. She being a public representative could always possess relief items like powdered milk for her needy constituents. However, when those were found under ground, suspicion arose about the intent. I personally visited the place and was satisfied about the way the information was sifted and the seized items were recovered. I was also satisfied about the conduct of the operation.

The then Commerce Minister, Khandaker Moshtaque, who was from Comilla did not like the army’s tough action in his area, during the ‘Operation Silver Lining’. He complained against me and my troops to the Prime Minister (PM) saying that the army illegally trespassed into the house of the Lady MP, thereby belittled her in the eyes of her constituents. For this he demanded that the Chief be sacked

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by the government or be asked to submit his resignation letter. The Prime Minister called me at his office to have my explanation about the allegations that Khandaker Moshtaque made.

I explained to the Prime Minister that my troops entered the premises of the Lady MP with definite information and recovered the weapons and powdered milk hidden underground in her backyard. Luckily the then Finance Minister Mr.Taj-ud-din Ahmed was present there. He having heard my explanation suggested that this must be investigated by a neutral body to ascertain as to who was at fault. In the investigation, if it was found that the troops had crossed their limits and were at fault in that case action could be taken against the troops or their Chief. However, if the Lady MP was found to be at fault, in that case she should be asked to resign from the Parliament. Knowing fully well that my troops had acted appropriately I was quite satisfied with that decision. The investigation committee was, however, never formed. Khandaker Moshtaque was not the person to forget this and avenged it after the incident of 15th August ’75 and dismissed me from service.

During the same ‘Operation Silver Lining,’ Major Shariful Haque Dalim along with his troops were deployed in Comilla area. While conducting this operation he created a crisis in the area which brought bad names for us. The problem was that Major Dalim in his college days was an active member of a right-leaning progressive student front. This student organization had government blessings and was harbouring some rowdy elements within it. He was part of that group before joining the army. Major Dalim as an active member of this front had some serious disagreements with some of the students of the opposing faction. Those disagreements probably remained unresolved.

During this emergency, he took the opportunity to settle his old score with his ex-colleagues and sent his troops to

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bring some of those former students to his headquarters for questioning. There in his headquarter those student leaders were man-handled on his direction and at then called the Police to take them into custody. The Brigade Commander Brig Mash-hu-rul Haque came to know about this and informed me that Major Dalim had acted inappropriately and misused his authority against some innocent people. I told him to verify the facts and if found guilty, he should take strong disciplinary action against him. The Brigade Commander verified the facts and having been satisfied about Major Dalim’s guilt, severely reprimanded him. He also took step to get the victims released from the Police custody.

Apart from these incidents there were also some problems in Barisal and Khulna areas. The problem there was different in nature. My officers and men there were intimidated by some who were close to the higher authorities. As a result the troops who were operating there found it difficult to work. When my troops were carrying out the task given to them, some political leaders of the area tried to put undue pressure on them to do things as per their desire. These officers, therefore, found it difficult to work properly. Those local political leaders tried to interfere and influence the conduct of the operation, which could not be accommodated. This infuriated some of them who even threatened my officers of dire consequences. This was when the problem started.

Those local leaders due to their relationship or close association with the top leadership of the country had the nerve to threaten my officers. I was given to understand that they were capable of influencing the authority and were capable of causing harm to my officers. If a person like Khandaker Moshtaque could go and complain against me and my men and request the Prime Minister to sack me and punish my troops, in that case anything could happen. When my troops were doing their job properly and earnestly, in

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that case interference by political leaders was not acceptable to me. However, at that time anything was possible. I felt that if it could happen to me, in that case it could happen to my officers or men. Therefore, before it went out of my hand, I at one stage pulled out one or two officers from certain areas. I did this to protect them. This, however, back fired as they felt insulted and were quite aggrieved.

Unfortunately the discontentment was initiated from my Deputy’s office, who instead of giving me a helping hand aggravated it further. Even the officers for whom I took those steps began to misunderstand me. The transfer of those officers from their post was one of the reasons for them to become disgruntled. Consequently, discontentment started to spread amongst the rank and file, resulting in resentment against the government. All the times I kept Bangabandhu informed about this unrest. Anti-government forces including the elements around me, most notably my Deputy, capitalized from these issue and aggravated it further. Later the whole situation was further complicated by a hasty action executed directly by the Ministry of Defence. Major Shariful Haque Dalim, Capt AYB Noor and few other officers were dismissed from service without assigning any reason and without the knowledge of the Chief of Staff. These actions ignited the events leading to the tragic incident of 15th August 1975.

Major Dalim might have been an indisciplined officer, but not the others. The offence committed by the other officers named above were not serious enough that warranted punitive action like dismissal from service. The offence that these officers committed was that they voiced their resentment against the injustice done to their colleague Major Dalim, which was loud. For this act of theirs they did not deserve such severe punishment like dismissal from service. Instead they at the most could have lost seniority for promotion or could have been severely reprimanded. It is true that Major Dalim was an indisciplined officer. Everyone

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including Bangabandhu knew his character traits, yet Bangabandhu liked him. The reputation of Major Dalim’s indisciplined nature was probably one of the reasons that hastened his departure from the service.

These officers had joined the liberation war without knowing what was in their fate. They were young and youthful and full of patriotism. They needed sympathetic handling. I felt gross injustice had been done to these boys by dismissing them from service. This was one of the reasons for the troops to become so anti-government who became convinced that the Awami League government did not like the army. I will now elaborate on the incident that led to their dismissal from service. .

It was on Saturday the 22nd June 1975; a wedding reception was organized for Lt Col Reza at New Eskaton Ladies Club. This officer married a relative of Major Dalim, probably a cousin. On the occasion of this wedding reception Major Dalim and his family invited many guests including the Red Cross Chairman Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa and his family. Mr. Gazi did not attend this function but his wife along with two of their sons attended. In that function, a distant relative of Major Dalim who was a resident of either Switzerland or Canada was present. This gentleman supported long hairs. As the guests took their seats, Mr. Gazi’s sons along with their friends happened to be seated in a row which was just behind him. These teenagers were a bit naughty and were commenting about his long hair fairly loudly. The comments were “Is he wearing a wig or is it real hair” or words to that effect. At one point one of the boys pulled his hairs. The gentleman turned a round and asked the boys to behave. They thought it to be a fun and pulled his hairs again. This time the gentleman got up and slapped one of the boys. This boy happened to be Mr.Gazi’s youngest son. The boy then ran to his mother and complained that he had been slapped by Major Dalim’s brother-in-law, which enraged her

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Major Dalim and his family were the hosts. The moment Major Dalim came to know about this incident he went straight to Mrs. Gazi and begged apology on behalf of his relative. She apparently was not satisfied and asked her sons to go home and report this to their father. So the boys left for home and approximately three quarter of an hour later Mr. Gazi appeared near the reception venue in a Red Cross Micro Bus with about half a dozen armed men. The armed guards got down from the Micro Bus and without asking any question got hold of Major Dalim and were pushing him towards the Bus, when he cried for help. No one came forward to help him as the crowd were probably fearful of the armed guards.

When Major Dalim’s wife saw the scene she ran to protect her husband and tried to prevent them from dragging him away. When she failed to stop them, she in her desperate bid clung on to him, in order to prevent them from dragging him into the vehicle. In the scuffle, her blouse was ripped off and her sari was almost removed yet she did not leave her husband. The armed men finally pulled both of them in to the vehicle; which was discretely parked away from the full view of the wedding guests. Mr. Gazi was sitting on the front seat of the Micro Bus. The majority of the guests only came to know about this hijacking after the vehicle had pulled away. This incident was so sudden and fast that no one could help them and those who saw it did not dare to protest as the hijackers were fully armed. One of the eye–witness, Dr.Rahim (Dental Specialist) having watched the scene rang up the Provost Martial Lt Col (later Major General) MA Samad from the Ladies Club and informed him of the incident. Lt Col Samad tried to get this verified from the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Mr. Nurul Islam; he however, appeared to have no knowledge about this incident.

The Provost Martial Lt Col Samad immediately tried to contact the Adjutant General (AG) Colonel (later Lt General) H M Ershad but failed to get in touch with him. He

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having failed to get in touch with the AG and fearing the worst ordered the OC MP unit Major (later Brigadier) Aminul Islam to move to Mr. Gazi’s house to retrieve Major Dalim and his wife. When these troops were moving towards Gazi’s house, another truck-load of JRB soldiers were following them It was not known who ordered to move JRB troops and why. The OC MP unit through wireless was informed about this and was instructed to react if the JRB did anything unprovoked. However, the situation did not come to that. Lt Col Samad after giving necessary orders to the OC MP unit informed Colonel Jamil Ahmed-the MS (P), about this incident and had also told him about the action that he had taken. The orders to the Military Police were to take Mr. Gazi hostage until Major Dalim and his wife were safely rescued.

The news that Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa and his armed gang kidnapped Major Dalim and his wife spread like wild fire in the cantonment. On hearing this news many officers on their own initiative rushed to Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa’s house on their motor bikes. This show of spirit-de-corps was misconstrued, as if Gazi’s house was being raided by the army officers. These actions of the officers were not appreciated by the President and he took it negatively. It was alleged that while Major Dalim and his wife were being driven away, Major Dalim then allegedly shouted at the top of his voice and told Mr. Gazi that he should not dare kill them as hundreds of people had witnessed the hijacking. Furthermore, if he killed them then he would also be killed the same way. Apparently on hearing this, Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa asked the driver to change the direction of the vehicle and move to a different destination. As a result the driver turned the vehicle and went to Bangabandhu’s residence at 32 Dhanmondi.

At the residence of Bangabandhu, Mr. Gazi Golam Mostafa parked the vehicle in front of the house and went upstairs to inform/brief Bangabandhu. There at

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Bangabandhu’s house Mr. Gazi allegedly complained to Bangabandhu that Major Dalim ill-treated his son and slapped him at the marriage function organized by them. Mr. Gazi must have been wrongly informed by his sons as it was not Major Dalim who slapped Gazi’s son but it was his brother-in-law, who slapped the boy on being teased. In fact, when Major Dalim came to know about this incident he on behalf of his brother-in-law had apologized to Mrs. Gazi. However before Bangabandhu came down from upstairs, Dhaka Brigade commander Colonel Shafaat Jamil was also present at Bangabandhu’s house. Colonel Shafaat Jamil must have been summoned to be present at Bangabandhu’s house, so he was there.

Major Dalim on seeing Bangabandhu expressed his complete innocence but he did not explain exactly what had happened. On the other hand Mr. Gazi had briefed Bangabandhu in his own way, so Bangabandhu came to know only one side of the story which was Mr. Gazi’s version. The President, therefore, did not get the real story. On the other hand Major Dalim being aggrieved and feeling safe in front of the President reacted very aggressively against Mr. Gazi by shouting at him in an abusive and threatening manner. This insolent behaviour of Major Dalim in front of Bangabandhu was not appreciated by him rightly. Again given the circumstances under which Major Dalim was in front of Bangabandhu and if he had behaved rudely with Mr. Gazi, in that case how much could we blame him? In any case, from this rude outburst of Major Dalim and Mr. Gazi’s primary briefing about the incident, Bangabandhu formed a bad impression about Dalim. The President therefore, must have been prejudiced while he took the decision to dismiss Major Dalim from service.

While the altercation between Mr. Gazi and Major Dalim was taking place, the MS (P) Colonel Jamil-ud-din Ahmed informed the President that Mr.Gazi’s house was under siege by the Military Police. The President on hearing

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this allegedly became very furious. I do not know whether the President looked for me at that time or even wanted my presence there, but Colonel Shafaat Jamil the Dhaka Brigade Commander was present there on that day. That Colonel Shafaat was summoned was not known to me. Colonel Shafaat neither informed me before going to the President’s house, nor even after his return from there. By summoning Colonel Shafaat Jamil at the President’s house on that day, the chain of command had been broken. The effect of this was seen thereafter which was devastating. I do not know why Colonel Shafaat was called instead of me, but I came to know about this incident the following morning.

The Provost Martial Lt Col (later Major General) MA Samad, having failed to get in touch with the Adjutant General, Colonel (later Lt Gen and President) HM Ershad, took some immediate steps and informed the AG thereafter. The Adjutant General did not inform me about this serious incident on that very day. Colonel Ershad being the Adjutant General was responsible for the disciplinary aspect of the entire army. But on that day he neither took any step in handling this matter nor be directed the Provost Martial as to what was to be done. The following day he leisurely came to inform me about this incident when it was already at a boiling point and known to the entire army. Two days after the incident i.e. on 24thJune 1975, the atmosphere was very tense at the Army HQ. Every one was talking about this event and wanted the government to take severe action against Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa and was waiting to see what I do. Having realised that it was affecting the morale of the officers and men in the army, I quickly made an appointment with the President to apprise him of the situation and seek direction. At that stage my Deputy was not very helpful. On the contrary he was adding fuel to the fire by inciting the officers. When I briefed the President what exactly happened, General Zia and Colonel Shafaat were present

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We were with the President for about an hour. The President was very furious when we met him and he almost charged me in an accusing tone saying, how the Military Police dared go to the civilian area without any authority. I explained to the President and said that the army officers and the Military Police personnel did not go there with any malicious intent. They went there to rescue an officer and his wife who were kidnapped by Mr.Gazi and his armed men. What Mr. Gazi did was unacceptable by any standard, but the President would not listen. At one stage I said to the President, “Sir, Gazi Golam Mustafa has committed a serious crime and he must be punished, otherwise it is affecting the morale of the troops”. At this point the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became very irritated.

The President at one stage addressed me in a loud voice and said, “Safiullah do you know you are talking to the President”? It was impertinent on my part to have responded the way I did, yet I said, “Sir, I know I am talking to the President”. I also said to the President, “Sir, I came here not to Speak for me; I came here to speak for you Sir. What Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa did in front of hundreds of people cannot be condoned. He must be punished for what he did. He picked up an officer and his wife probably to kill them. This action of Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa is affecting the morale of the troops. In any case Sir, why should you take blame for some one else’s misdeed”. However, the President probably did not fathom the enormity of the crisis and did not listen to me at that time. I finally left the President’s house with a strong plea that Mr. Gazi must be punished for what he did.

Before I left the President’s house, again asserted strongly that some action must be taken against Mr. Gazi. He had committed an unpardonable offence. Unfortunately .even two days after my last plea to the President, no action against Gazi appeared to have been taken. Severely

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distressed, Major Dalim came to me on the third day and enquired whether any action had been taken against Mr. Gazi I told him that after my last meeting with the President, I have a feeling that some action would be taken soon. However, as nothing was done till then, Major Dalim was quite upset. He while expressing his grief, at one stage became so emotional that he thumped on my table. I shouted at him for this act and ordered him to get out of my office which he did immediately.

After another two days of this incident, the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called me to his office and almost in an accusing tone asked me what action did I take against Major Dalim when he thumped on my table. I was taken by surprise with the type of question that the President asked me. I therefore said to the President, “Sir Major Dalim became emotional in my office while expressing his anguish and what he was going through. Any way, what he did in my office was an outburst of that emotion”. I did reprimand him and ordered him to get out of my office. I was, however, surprised and perplexed as to how the President came to know about this episode .

Having begged pardon from the President, I took liberty and enquired, “Sir, how did you come to know about this episode?” The President told me, “Safiullah, you may not be knowing many things that happens in your headquarter but I do come to know”. He then posed a question at me and said, “Do you know, some of your officers keeps live ammunitions in their living-rooms?” Having Mr.Gazi Golam Mustafa’s episode at the back of my mind, when I went to the President I was in some sort of aggressive mood, but with this type of question the President put me on the defensive. I did not expect this type of question from him! He caught me off-guard and was on the offensive.
Although the question that the President posed had no relevance to the case of Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa, yet I

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assured the President that I would look into this immediately. Before I left the President’s office, I once again reminded and requested the President not to delay in taking action in this case. I also stated to the President that this incident was having a very bad impact on the morale of the entire army. It might be beyond my control if no action was taken against Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa. He, however, did not make any comment about Mr. Gazi or give me any hint as to the action that he might take. I was not satisfied when I came out of the President’s office.

On my way back I was trying to visualize who could have informed the President about this incident that Major Dalim thumped on my table. I came to know later that this information was given to the President by two sources. One was from the Army HQ i.e. through my Deputy’s office and the other by DGFI. The information supplied from the Army HQ reached President the same day and the DGFI the next day. The information regarding the live ammunitions was provided by DGFI and it was Brig. Rouf who informed the President about this, but he did not inform me. Brig Rouf – a repatriated officer mentally could not accept us over them; as a result a person like him too might have infused dissatisfaction within the force.

Regarding the second incident i.e., the live ammunition, I on return to my office got this information verified through FIU and found that Captain Matin, the 21C Army MP unit, displayed a belt of live ammunition on the wall of his living room. He retained this as a souvenir of the liberation war. While displaying this item he never thought about its serious implications. The youthfulness and exuberance overtook the rational thinking. Of course, there was no ill motive behind this, because the ammunition belt was displayed publicly on the living room. The source that informed the President should have scrutinised this matter logically before reporting about this to the highest authority. Brig. Rouf himself could have talked to the officer directly or his immediate superior

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officer, instead of reporting this to the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib. By reporting this to the President his main intention could have been to malign the Freedom Fighter officers and in the process it was an effort to dent my image in the eyes of the President.

After the liberation war, some of the young officer, took fascination for the military arsenal and kept some such items as war memento. They never realized that retaining such items might land them into trouble. Lieutenant, later Foreign Secretary, Shamsher Mubin Chowdhury was one such officer. After having had his treatment in East Germany he was on his way back home. He on his wrist watch strap had fixed four 9 mm bullet shells which he kept as war mementos. While returning home when he was going through the security check at the airport, those items were noticed by the security personnel; he was then in a major problem. It was not their. fault; they were the victims of age and had no ill motive or ill intention. However, after having got the information concerning the live ammunitions at Captain Matin’s living room, I went back to the President and informed him about the true picture. There I humbly submitted to the President and said that the source that informed him about the live ammunitions should have also informed me. I should have known about this before it came to his notice, because this officer was under my command. Thereafter, before I left, I once again requested the President to take some action against Mr. Gazi .Golam Mustafa for what he did.

However, to be absolutely sure about the incident, relating to Mr. Gazi Gholam Mustafa, I double -checked the facts narrated above which were found to be correct. Having talked to the President, while I was waiting to hear the government action against Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa, a letter from the Ministry of Defence was delivered to my office. To my utter surprise the letter contained the dismissal order of Major Dalim. I could not accept this decision and

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immediately went to the President to have this decision repealed. Unfortunately. I did not succeed. By this order my command had been completely shattered. This dismissal order made me small and I was belittled in the eyes of my subordinates. Consequent to this, i had been contemplating to resign but that in no way would have served any useful purpose. My mission was to go ahead to attain success in future.

I therefore, had no alternative but to convey the same to Major Dalim. Major Dalim asked me what he did to deserve this treatment. I could not respond to his queries. This news regarding the dismissal order of Major Dalim added more fuel to the fire. As a reaction, some officers made some derogatory comments about this action, where General Zia’s PS Major AYB Noor was most vocal. I do not know how, but this incident was instantly reported to the President. The result was that the next day I received another letter, again from the Ministry of Defence, in which dismissal order of Major AYB Noor and few others were communicated to me. With this action the final nail was driven on the coffin. Unfortunately I had been used as a tool. I, therefore, had no moral or ethical right to rally the troops around me as I failed to give them shelter. My Deputy General Zia took full advantage of this issue and instantly became their champion. My subordinates lost faith in me. I was thus wronged for no fault of mine!

Finally, unintentionally or otherwise, the injustice done to these officers was one of the reasons for resentment in the army. Major Dalim thereafter must have been recruited by the anti-Bangabandhu elements Who used him for 15th August 1975 incident. It was Major Dalim who was in the air over Radio Bangladesh to announce the fall of Bangabandhu’s government. On that morning, in Spite of my orders to Colonel Shafaat to oppose them, he did not even resist Major Dalim from entering the cantonment. Colonel Shafaat might not have been surprised about Major Dalim’s

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action when he was in the air to announce the fall of Bangabandhu’s government. It may be that Colonel Shafaat was sympathetic towards him and as such did not take any action against him. In spite of his role on 15th August 1975, Major Dalim subsequently, along with his troops, not only came inside the cantonment but even entered my office with his troops without any Opposition.

As far as I was concerned the persons on whom I could rely had failed me because of their selfish motive. The reason I make this comment is because the Dhaka Brigade Comd Colonel Shafaat Jamil who was supposed to be my only strength did not come forward to give me that support. He on the other hand disobeyed my command when I ordered him to oppose the rebel soldiers. He instead of carrying out my orders went to the Deputy Chief for orders. This was a gross violation of the normal channel of command. The other person was Brig. Khaled Mosharrof the CGS, on whom I had complete trust, but he too had acted in a manner which was not like him. Before I could bring the situation under my control, he on 15th August 1975 at noon issued tank ammunitions to the rebel soldiers. He took the decision to issue ammunitions to the tank regiment without my knowledge. How could I then have full faith in him? From then on I became a lonely person. Khandaker Moshtaque cashed in on this weakness of mine by isolating me from the rest of the officers and men and detained me at Bangabhaban on some pretext or the other for over 72 hours.

In spite of my specific orders to suppress the rebellion, Colonel Shafaat did not take any action against them. The rebel officers (Maj Dalim and Maj Rashid) were not at all worried while roaming about in the cantonment in plain view of him without being challenged. The reason for this could be, he was either collaborating with them or he was following some one else’s orders sympathetic to the rebel cause. It is true that the rebel officers had earned some sympathy from amongst the troops, but surely the crime that

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they had committed did not deserve any sympathy. If Colonel Shafaat after having received my orders had acted earnestly, in that case it would have been possible to confront the rebel soldiers and even prevent them from taking control of the situation. When I went to 46 Brigade area, I found that the troops were unmoved. I could not collect troops to oppose them. Apart from the various reasons mentioned above to pinpoint the cause of resentment in the army, the injustice done to some of the officers could be one of the reasons for them to become anti-government.

Khandaker Moshtaque was made to believe that his Presidency was not safe as long as I was the Chief of Staff. If he was cautioned in that way, they were probably not very wrong. I was in fact trying to remove the armour and the artillery units from Bangabhaban to the barracks and take them under my control. If I was successful in that venture, in that case I would have made him face the court of law. His strength was armour, artillery units and the rebel officers. On the other hand, my strength was supposed to be the Dhaka Brigade Comd. his troops and rest of the officers and men in Dhaka cantonment. Khandaker Moshtaque’s allies were united for their survival. Whereas, my allies were derailed right from the morning of 15th August 1975, especially the Dhaka Brigade Comd. He wittingly or unwittingly supported the rebel’s right from the morning of 15th August 1975. This was true as the rebel leaders Major Rashid and Major Dalim entered the cantonment without any impediment and were moving around freely. In any case they were the tools of a bigger gambit and in Bangladesh’s history 15th August 1975 will remain as the blackest day for the entire nation

ASSASSINATION OF BANGABANDHU

The word assassination is a mild word for the act that had been committed on that day. It was sheer brutality which was beyond comprehension. Whatever may be the reason for the officers to feel aggrieved about, it did not justify the action in response. The operators were brutes and they were given to understand that if Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib remains alive, their existence would be at stake. It was probably because of this mind-set of the assassins that they assassinated Bangabandhu. If Bangabandhu was their only target in that case why did they massacre the rest of the family members? The reason probably was that the hate campaign against Bangabandhu was very strong and the executioner’s brain was also thoroughly washed as such their hands did not shake when they massacred the entire family.

After the carnage of 15th August 1975, the channel of command was completely dislocated in Dhaka. In other words the command channel was broken. On that day in the army, certain things had happened bypassing the Chief. Colonel Shafaat knew it fully well that when the Chief was in the station, in that case there was no other authority in the army who took precedence over him. Yet Colonel Shafaat Jamil the Comd Dhaka Brigade instead of acting on the orders of the Chief to move troops to oppose the rebel troops, went to Deputy Chief for orders (This is his own statement which he made during an interview published in

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the book Facts and Documents by Prof Abu Sayed). Colonel Shafaat Jamil had no right to go to Deputy Chief to seek direction when the Chief had already ordered him to oppose the rebels. This was a serious violation of the normal channel of command.

Colonel Shafaat, in spite of receiving specific orders from the Chief, why did he go to seek direction from the Deputy Chief? That he went to seek direction from the Deputy Chief was in his own statement; On the other hand the Deputy Chief on that day instructed him to remain alert and nothing more! Was that an appropriate order on such circumstances, when the President of the country was assassinated? With this order, the Deputy made Shafaat inactive. Unfortunately the commander of Dhaka brigade defying the Chief’s order opted to obey the instruction given by the Deputy Chief thereby preferring to remain inactive. Why did he choose to remain inactive? Was it threat or was it connivance with the rebel troops? Shafaat had not clarified his position, but it did not take an expert to understand why!

When the crime of such magnitude take place, the people also has the right to know the account of the incident. I therefore, in this write up to the best of my ability would try to present to the people, what I could do and what I couldn’t. In order to recount the actual episode I need to relate some background events which are relevant to the issue. This incident took place a long time back, naturally there could be some minor error in terms of date and time but definitely not the facts. The reason being there are some events which gets implanted in the memory in such a way that it does not get erased. However, I would try my best to present to the people from my memory whatever I remember as accurately as possible and from the note that I kept since then. To me, the incident of 15th August ’75 was a complete failure of the intelligence agencies and the following are some of the reasons why that was so.

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The Chief must have complete picture about the activities of the troops that he commands and especially those activities which are detrimental to the interest of the state as well as for the service. To remain in picture about such activities of the troops, the Chief must have the agencies to feed him those informations. Concerning the information regarding the incident of 15th August ’75, the Chief was totally devoid of information from the agencies who could feed him that information. That these agencies were not available to the Chief was known to the highest executive of the country. The reason why those agencies were not made available to the Chief is stated below. I did try to acquire those but due to lack of cooperation from the Ministry of Defence, especially the Deputy Defence Minister, I could not get them!

It was some time in June 1975, an FIU of Dhaka detachment under MI Dte caught an NCO of Comilla Garrison, who was in possession of some subversive documents. Those documents contained the message of uprising in the army. This incident came to light accidentally and there was no intelligence effort behind it to collect this information. Incidentally this incident came to light during the time when the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was out of the country to attend the CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting) at Kingston, Jamaica. The leaflets that were being circulated contained certain grievances against the government. In short, those alleged that the government was treating the army unfairly and it was about time that they all stood up and Opposed it. The reason being that the process was on to replace the army by JRB. I was also informed that the leadership of this group was not higher than the rank of NCOs and the inspiration behind this effort was JSD. However, whatever might be the level of leadership it was surely an ominous signal

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The army till then was not properly organized for its role and not at all equipped to acquire such intelligence to counter it. In fact the entire army till then was functioning as an ad-hoc organization. It is pertinent to mention here that when we first raised the Directorate of Forces Intelligence (DFI), we intended that this outfit should be directly under Army HQ (because of the size of the force) and provide intelligence cover to all the three services Chief’s. So right from the beginning when we started to raise the army, the DFI’s outfit was located under Army HQ. This establishment in fact was raised and tasked to acquire and provide intelligence cover for the three services. This was done to make sure that the Chiefs remain in picture about the activities of their troops. From then on the intelligence that the DFI acquired used to be communicated by its DG to the respective Services Chiefs first and thereafter, to the President if required, either through the Chiefs or by the DG directly.

This process continued till late 1973. But after the repatriation in 1974, a time came when the DFI’s outfit was taken away from the Army HQ to the President’s Secretariat. As a result from then on the channel of reporting to the Chiefs by the DG changed. The DG from then on, started to report to the President directly, bypassing the Services Chiefs. The Service’s Chiefs thereafter became handicapped as the DG from then on intentionally or otherwise failed to report to the Chief’s. This was the time when the problem started.

The reason we initially established the DFI outfit in the Army HQ was mainly because of the budget constraint and to avoid duplicity. Initially we did not want to have too many similar outfits in the services; as a result we located the DFI outfit in the Army HQ. This we did for the convenience of the Chief to get a prompt briefing. The MI Dte of the Army HQ was then not equipped to acquire such intelligence and they were also not organized or equipped to

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do this job. Consequently with the withdrawal of the DFI’s outfit from the Army HQ, the eyes and ears of the Chiefs were taken away. Once this outfit was taken away to the President’s Secretariat, so to take care of this shortfall I in the new organogram enlarged the activities of the MI Dte. The papers relating to the new organogram that I drew up remained with the Ministry of Defence for approval. For some unknown reasons this was not getting through and I remained in complete darkness about the affairs around me. God only knew where the stumbling block was!

As we had DFI’s outfit in the Army HQ, so while preparing the new TO&E we initially did not enlarge the task of the MI Dte. We planned and submitted the organogram of the army in divisional concept for approval of the government. But when the DFI’s outfit was taken away from the Army HQ, we became blind and deaf. So in order to overcome this shortfall, I enlarged the field of operation of the MI Dte in the new organogram submitted to the Ministry of Defence. The approval of the organogram was getting delayed for no reason, but in the absence of government approval, I could not proceed and organize the MI Dte. In spite of my forceful presentation of the proposal, it was not getting through. Therefore, to overcome the immediate difficulty, I thought of getting the approval of at least the MI Dte part of the organogram. With that in mind, I met the Deputy Defence Minister Prof. Nurul Islam in the Ministry of Defence and explained to him the situation and the problems that I was facing. I also showed him the leaflet that was recovered from an NCO.

Prof. Nurul Islam having recognized the seriousness of the incident right away made an appointment with the President. Soon after, we both drove to ‘Gano Bhaban’ to meet the President. During this meeting I explained to the President and said that I have no intelligence agency to feed me with information relating to the troops. Without any intelligence agency with me, it had become difficult for me

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to know what was happening around me. These agencies were supposed to be my eyes and ears and without them I remained in complete darkness. The incident, about which I came to report had come to our knowledge by accident. There was no intelligence effort behind it. This may be a minor plot but there could be a bigger plot behind it. I therefore, requested the President that if the approval of the main TO&E took more time for scrutiny, in that case I would like the MI Dte part of the TO&E be approved right away. This was required immediately to select men for this purpose, which would then be organized and trained before they could be deployed.

Considering the emergency nature of the problem that I experienced, I during this meeting requested the President to allow the DFI’s outfit to revert back to Army HQ temporarily so that the immediate requirements were met. At the same time at least the part of the organogram concerning the MI Dte be approved immediately. Once the MI Dte took its place, the DFI outfit could go back to its present position. But to my surprise the urgency with which I approached the President to get his approval, the response from the President was not reciprocal. He probably did not take the matter as seriously as I expected him to. I therefore, had to say to the President, “Sir if you want me to be effective I need these units because they are the vital organ in my day-to-day activities. Right now I really do not know what is happening around me”.

After hearing what I had to say, the President looked at me and said, “Doesn’t Rouf (meaning DGFI -Brig. Rouf) give you the information that he collects?” In reply I told the President : Sir if he did in that case I would not have requested you to revert them back to the Army HQ. I feel the DG Brig. Rouf intentionally keeps me in dark and does not give me the complete picture. For example I do not know ‘Sir’ whether Brig. Rouf informed you about the incident that I have now brought to your notice. If he did, in that case

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he is intentionally keeping me in dark. This is why I am worried ‘Sir’. Since the President did not make any comment, I took it that DGFI did inform the President. Prof. Nurul Islam also argued in favour of my proposal and suggested that MI Dte part of the organogram could be sanctioned. The President then told Prof. Nurul Islam to sort it out immediately.

The Deputy Defence Minister Prof. Nurul Islam on 26’th March ‘94 wrote an article regarding this meeting with the President in ‘Daily Azadi’ published from Chittagong. He in this article wrote that General Safiullah intentionally withheld some information about this meeting while giving interview with the newspapers. This article was subsequently published on 15th to 19th August ’94 in Bangla Bazaar Potrika and on 15‘th to 18‘th August ’94 in ‘Bhorer Kagoj’. It is true that I did not give the verbatim details of what transpired between the President and us while giving an interview with the newspapers, but I told them the gist of our conversation. However, the revelation of all the information to the media at that time would not have served any useful purpose. I only told them the portion that was appropriate. Prof. Nurul Islam also did not mention in his write-up the portion that I was alleged to have withheld. He also wrote that this meeting of ours with the President took place some two or three days before 15’th August ’75. Here I think his memory might have ‘faded a bit, because this meeting took place sometime in early July ’75.

The readers might question here why the Chief is now talking about the problem relating to the organization of the army in the year 1975 when we had an established army then. Here I would like to say that Bangladesh never had an army of its own before 1971. It was never an established army before. What we see today was not what we had in 1972. Today’s army is the product of the Liberation War. We fought the war along with those who could handle the

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weapons. In the process there was a collection of assorted bodies of different arms and services of Pakistan army, EPR, Mujahids and Freedom Fighters. They were formed together and were given training to fight but one could not call it an organized army. A time came when they had to be put under some command. We, therefore, put our heads together and prepared a TO&E and presented that to the government for approval. To prepare this TO&E, it took us over a year and this was what I was talking about in the preceding pages. The first DG of the DFI was Group Captain (later AVM) Aminul Islam. He was replaced by Lt Col (later Brigadier) A Rouf after repatriation from Pakistan. Till 15th August ’75, the day the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated, Brig. Rouf was the DGFI. Colonel Jamil Ahmed the MS (P) to the President was to replace him. Brig. Rouf was supposed to hand over his responsibilities to Colonel Jamil Ahmed on 15″th August ’75, but he (Jamil) was also killed by a rebel officer on that day.

Here is a little background about Brigadier MA Rouf and how he was picked up as DGFI. During the late Sixties Brig (then Major) Rouf was Pakistan’s ISI Det Comd in Dhaka. This was the time when Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur-Rahman was arrested for his six-point programme. About the same time the fartious ‘Agartala Conspiracy’ a seditious case came to light, where some junior army, navy officers and some other ranks of all the three services were alleged to have been involved. They were all arrested and were tried for treasonable offence. This gave a chance for the Pakistanis to include Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in this seditious case and silence him for good. Sheikh Mujib’s six-point programme was not appreciated by the West Pakistanis especially President Ayub Khan. Pakistanis thought that he was asking too much.

In order, therefore, to silence him for good, they implicated him in the so-called ‘Agartala Conspiracy’ case. He was thus

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charged along with the Bengali uniformed officers and men for treasonable offence. For this offence, if he was found guilty the mandatory punishment would have been death. ISI Directorate was then handling this case and this was where Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman got associated with Brig (then Major) Rouf.

When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was implicated in the ‘Agartala Conspiracy’ case, the people straightaway understood that he was being framed to be eliminated. They therefore, started to agitate about the fabricated charges against Sheikh Mujib that resulted in a mass upsurge, which engulfed the whole of the then East Pakistan. The agitation was so vigorous that the government at one stage had to abandon the trial and had to set Sheikh Mujib free. The people having got him freed from the prison conferred him the title of ‘Bangabandhu’. From then on Sheikh Mujib became Bangabandhu to us.

With the removal of the case against Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib, the uniformed officers and men were also set free. All the officers and men were later administratively dismissed from the service. After the withdrawal of the case, changes had also taken place in the ISI Det in Dhaka. Major (later Brig.) Rouf, thereafter, on promotion to the rank of Lt Col was transferred to Sialkot. At Sialkot he was given the command of 5 East Bengal Regiment, which was stationed there. Throughout the period of Liberation War, Lt Col Rouf remained posted in this battalion in Sialkot in the then West Pakistan. However, he along with this battalion was later repatriated from Pakistan in the year 1973.

On repatriation from Pakistan, almost all the officers and men were retained in the newly formed Bangladesh army. So far as the retention or otherwise of these repatriated officers and men were concerned, we worked on the basis of formula approved by the government for retention. On the basis of those formulae they were screened. As far as possible with available information, a list was prepared for

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those who were to be retained. Lt Col Rouf and many others on repatriation were retained in the army and were posted to various units and formations After they were absorbed, some of them found that their juniors (pre-seventy-one seniority) were holding senior ranks and appointments, with which they could not reconcile. Outwardly they were very polite but in their heart-of-heart they looked at the ‘Freedom Fighters’ with disdain.

Before the repatriation was to start, we on the basis of the guidelines given to us planned the absorption of all the repatriated officers and men in the army in such a way so that officers who were being repatriated were not placed under someone who was their junior before the war. Despite our best intentions, it was not possible to achieve this in all cases. Please note for rational purpose that the so-called junior officers became at par or senior to some of them because of the two years antedated seniority given to the Freedom Fighters. On the other hand in the context of the Pakistan army, many of the repatriated senior officers, specially the Lieutenant Colonels and above including Lt Col Rouf reached their ceiling and would not have been promoted any further. We on the other hand could not start with disgruntled elements. While planning their absorption in the army we even planned to promote some of them the moment they reached Bangladesh to a rank higher than the rank they were holding in Pakistan army. This was done to give them a morale boost as well as to achieve cohesiveness.

During the period when I was planning to adjust these officers in various units and formations, I was told by the Prime Minister Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman to adjust Lt Col Rouf in place of Group Captain (later Air Vice Martial) Aminul Islam as DGFI. As I mentioned, before, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman came to know Lt Col Rouf when he (Bangabandhu) was in military custody in Kurmitola during ‘Agartala Conspiracy’ case. During those days Lt Col (later Brig) Rouf might have impressed

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Bangabandhu in some way and earned his trust. Therefore, Bangabandhu’s decision to appoint Lt Col Rouf as DGFI was probably the manifestation of that trust.

On repatriation from Pakistan, Lt Col (later Brig) Rouf became DGFI. This was an independent and a very important appointment. On matters of intelligence, he had direct access to the Chiefs as well as to the President (point to note here is that Rouf was an 181 officer of Pakistan). On assumption of his office as DGFI, Lt Col. Rouf had been quite regular in reporting intelligence matters to us, the Chiefs. As long as this outfit was in the Army HQ the DG had been quite regular in reporting to us but his frequency of reporting became less and less when this outfit was taken away from the Army HQ to the President’s Secretariat. Later on, a time came when I had to tell the President that Brig Rouf is not reporting to me as frequently as he should have. I had to call him to get briefed.

The incident of the plan of uprising by the lower ranking troops, about which I went to report to the President, appeared to be known to him. My question is how could the President know about this incident before I did? The subject being army related I should have been the first person to know before the President knew. The sources which were likely to inform the President about this incident were either DGFI or NSI. The incident being army-related, DGFI was the most likely source. But it was the Field Intelligence Unit (FIU) who happened to intercept this plot and informed me. In any case they did not report to the President. The President therefore, must have been informed by the source other than the FIU. I do not know why I was not informed by the source which informed the President. Would I be wrong if I doubt the intention of that source, which could not be other then DGFI?

If it was NSI’s report to the President, it was understandable, because they do not report to the services Chiefs. It was the responsibility of the DGFI. Since the DG

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intentionally or otherwise failed to report this incident to me, surely I had the reasons to be concerned about. If I say that it was a deliberate attempt to insulate me from this very sensitive information, would I be wrong? Therefore, to overcome this predicament I needed a separate and an independent source to remain informed and be in picture about the activities of the troops. This was why I went to meet the President and to request him to approve at least the part of the organogram concerning MI Dte. The Deputy Defence Minister Prof. Nurul Islam was with me.

There at President’s office the Principal Secretary to the President Mr.Ruhul Quddus told me that the final approval of the proposed TO&E (Organogram) was then a matter of formalities only and would be approved any day. The President on that day, on my request, right in front of me, ordered the Deputy Defence Minister to approve the proposed organogram without furtherloss of time. But the final nod of the ministry did not come till I was the Chief till 24 August ’75. I do not know why the approval was being delayed. Was Prof Nurul Islam taking orders from someone else too? If it was not, then what was stopping the Ministry of Defence from taking the final decision? To ascertain this I sought an appointment with the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

It was during that meeting the President told me that he had asked General Zia to resign. I was taken aback and enquired : Sir why it had to be so? The President then told me that General Zia through various channels, had been requesting and pestering him not to approve my second tenure as Chief any further (My first tenure of three years ended on 7th April ’75). General Zia however, having failed to convince the President through via-media, approached the President personally. During this personal meeting of his he allegedly requested the President to remove me and make him the Chief in my place. He even gave the President an assurance that he would be able to serve him better. I did not

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know what better service he was going to render to the President, which I could not provide.

The President probably finally got fed-up and asked him to resign. The President took this decision sometime in the month of July ’75 and asked General Zia to submit his resignation letter. The President thereafter instructed the then Deputy Defence Minister Prof. Nurul Islam to receive General Zia’s resignation letter and implement the decision right away. The Secretary, Ministry of Defence Mr. Mujibul Haque also knew about this decision of the President. Bangabandhu’s Deputy in the Ministry of Defence Prof. Nurul Islam on the other hand was not earnest enough to implement the President’s decision. He was waiting for General Zia to take the initiative and submit his resignation letter. Prof. Nurul Islam, the Deputy Defence Minister thus in a way was helping General Zia to kill time.

When the President gave me this news I was already on my second tenure. In spite of the fact that my second tenure as Chief was approved in the month of April ’75, yet somehow someone assured General Zia that I was being removed and he was becoming the Chief. After hearing what the President told me I thought someone was playing with General Zia because I was already on my second tenure. Any way, when the President told me what General Zia was up to, I naturally felt most uncomfortable to hear what my Deputy was doing behind my back and that too with none other than the highest Executive of the country. So when the President told me that he had asked General Zia to resign, I was surprised but did not say anything. Till then whenever there was any adverse comment about General Zia, especially by the superiors, I always tried to defend him, but this time I remained quiet. It therefore, became quite clear to me who was working behind the scene to subvert my proposal of raising the army and why the organogram submitted by me was not getting through

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When Bangabandhu told me about his decision to sack General Zia, I could not tell him to execute the decision right away, because in this decision I was also linked. Once Bangabandhu made his decision to sack General Zia public, he should have stuck to it to remove him right away or else he should not have made it public. Once he expressed his decision to sack General Zia, he should not have taken time to implement it. General Zia by knowing the mind of Bangabandhu had no love-los for him. In other words, a disgruntled element was imposed on me to oversee my activity and take counter measures sitting by my side.

General Zia must have been encouraged by someone who matters; otherwise he would not have gone that far. The new organogram was the key to the salvation from uncertainty. So he took step to make sure that the army did not get organized as per the proposed TO&E under my command. To delay the process he must have sought the help of Prof. Nurul Islam. In order to help General Zia, Prof. Nurul Islam laid out a deception plan and told the President that there were two proposals from Army HQ in front of him — one was in Division concept and the other in Brigade concept. He was therefore taking time on which one to accept. In fact there was no existence of brigade concept proposal from the Army HQ. This was a deception plan just to delay the approval and make sure that the organogram did not get through during my tenure as Chief. In this deception plan, the Deputy Defence Minister Prof. Nurul Islam’s hand was obvious as he was trying to promote Zia’s cause.

The reference of Prof. Nurul Islam’s article in this context is quite pertinent here. He in his article said that while approving the TO&E he found that there were two separate proposals in front of him. One was submitted by the Army Chief, General Safiullah, which was in Divisional concept and the other by the Deputy Chief, General Zia, in Brigade concept. So he was in a dilemma as to which one to accept. Very funny! Are we all kids? How was it possible to

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submit two different proposals from the same HQ and that too by none other than the Chief and the Deputy Chief? As if Prof. Nurul Islam did not know who these two individuals were! If this is the case then how could he make such statement? With that statement of Prof. Nurul Islam he became a partisan here? Interestingly no one in the Army HQ knew about the existence of the so-called second proposal and that too in brigade concept.

As Prof. Nurul Islam took up on himself the assignment to promote General Zia’s cause, he then had to do something. He, therefore, coined the so-called second proposal, which was just a ploy to mislead the President and delay the process of approval. If Prof. Nurul Islam was not a party to General Zia’s scheme, he should have thrown out the so-called proposal then and there. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that Prof. Nurul Islam played politics in. the army and sowed the seed of discontentment in the forces. For this venture of his, the country paid very heavily, of course ultimately Bangabandhu and his family paid the most.

The new TO&E if approved in time, would have fulfilled the expectations of the officers and men in the army, thereby the cause of frustration and discontentment would have been rooted out. This was what General Zia did not want to see. Consequently the step that he took was primarily to delay the approval of the new TO&E so that the frustration in the force continued to grow. To do so he took the help of Deputy Defence Minister Prof. Nurul Islam to delay the approval process. He did this to keep something in his hand so that he could show to the officers and men what he could get for them as Chief. Having read the article of Prof. Nurul Islam, I am now quite convinced that he was the one who was party to General Zia’s mission in delaying the approval of the proposed TO&E. Till the publication of this article I was not sure as to who else were there in that mischief. I can now point my finger at him

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For the information of the readers, to organize the army properly the proposal that I presented to the government was in Divisional concept. When I presented my proposal, in the Presidents Secretariat, the Deputy Chief General Zia and all the PSO’s of the army HQ were present in that meeting. If General Zia the Deputy Chief had different views regarding this proposal, in that case it would not have been presented for approval in that form, because it was our collective effort. I am really surprised with the revelation of Prof. Nurul Islam regarding the second proposal. I do not know who coined the term second proposal. Prof. Nurul Islam should have known General Zia before making such comments in the paper. The person who allegedly planned to organize the army in Brigade concept, how could he have ordered the raising of a Division in September 1975 (9’th Division was raised in September ’75) which was only a month after my removal from the army. In the changed circumstances, Prof. Nurul Islam was also a cabinet member in the next government.

Once again for the benefit of the readers, I would like to say that behind the raising of today’s army there had been lot of hard work to prepare the papers. These papers were then waiting for the approval of the government. When the government changed and General Zia became the Chief of Army Staff and later Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), the mood of the administration also changed. What General Zia had to do then was to take out those papers from the shelf of the Ministry of Defence and order the raising. Being at the helm of affairs he even did not have to wait for orders; he had that authority and used it. This was exactly what he did to raise the first Division i.e., the 9 Div.

To raise 9 Div so quickly, may I say that there was no ‘Aladdin’s Lamp’ in the Army HQ which worked after my departure. It was the hard work of all of us for over a year and a half, in which General Zia was also involved. With the raising of a new Division, the officers and men were

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relieved of the anxiety of retrenchment. Had this decision come only about a month before 15’th August ’75, probably history would have been different. Prof. Nurul Islam is not alive today, I wish I could ask him where is General Zia’s Brigade concept now, for which he delayed the approval of the TO&E submitted by me. As far as I am concerned, he betrayed the confidence reposed on him by Bangabandhu.

My comments about Prof. Nurul Islam may sound a bit harsh but I feel I am right while saying that he betrayed the trust bestowed on him by Bangabandhu. If he played his part loyally and helped to approve the proposed organogram for the raising of the army in time, probably we would not have faced the tragic incident that occurred on 15‘th August ’75. Moreover in the month of July ’75, when the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman asked Prof. Nurul Islam to receive the resignation letter from General Zia and remove him from service, things would have been different. He did not show respect to the order of the President. Instead it was Prof. Nurul Islam who pleaded to the President to give him (Zia) some more time and allow him to submit his resignation letter in the month of September 1975. This reference is from Prof. Nurul Islam’s own article published in the newspaper Daily Azadi on 26th March ’94. Was there any link with regard to the incident of 15’th August 1975?

Prof. Nurul Islam corroborated this statement of mine in his article published in ’Daily Azadi’, on 26’th March ’94 and subsequently published in ‘Bangla Bazaar Potrika’ and ‘Bhorer Kagoj’ in the same year. He in his article categorically mentioned that the President had asked General Zia to resign and had asked Prof. Nurul Islam to take the resignation letter from General Zia. Prof. Nurul Islam, however, because of his close association with General Zia during the Liberation War had some soft corner for him right from Chittagong days. He probably did not pursue this in right earnest to collect the letter of resignation

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from General Zia. Interestingly enough, in spite of the President’s specific orders, Prof. Nurul Islam instead of implementing the decision right away i.e. in July ’75, pleaded to the President to allow him time to submit his resignation letter in the month of September 1975.

This is Prof. Nurul Islam’s own version in the above referred article. The question here is, was there any connection with the incident of 15‘th August ’75 while seeking time up to September ’75? Surely it provokes some food for thought. So when the military Putsch took place, General Zia had no love-loss for Bangabandhu. Looking on hindsight, I now feel that the failure of intelligence and indecision were the two main reasons for the 15‘th August disaster. In the absence of my own intelligence outfit, I had no alternative but to depend on what I was being fed by the then DGFI Brig. Rouf. Mind you, Brig. Rouf was a repatriated Ex-ISI officer. I may not be wrong but my hunch is that Bangabandhu’s trust was betrayed here too!

Dhaka University convocation was to take place on 15’th August ’75. Everyone associated with it were very busy as the President in his capacity as Chancellor was going to inaugurate the occasion and present certificates to the students. In the University Campus it was a festive occasion. When the festivities were on in the University area, suddenly on 14th August ’75 some explosions occurred in the campus area, particularly in the vicinity of the podium from where Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was to address the convocation and present certificates to various recipients on 15th August ’75 the next day. It was said that JSD had planned a violent and massive rally in the campus area during the ceremony. There was also a rumour that they might make an attempt on the life of the President thereby causing a serious Law and Order situation in the University area. JSD’s armed wing was the prime suspect for this evil doing.

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When all these arrangements were in full swing, suddenly on 14th August ’75 noon an incident took place, where an Indian helicopter that was attached to us for our operational use in Chittagong Hill Tracts met an accident at Feni. Chittagong Hill Tracts being an inaccessible area by road, we needed some heli-lifting capability, which we did not have then. On our government’s request, the Indian government placed a helicopter (Russian MI-4) with us with a small group of ground crew and pilot at our disposal. I placed this helicopter at the disposal of Chittagong Garrison for operational use in Chittagong Hill Tracts. For the purpose of servicing and maintenance, this helicopter used to go to Calcutta every month. 15th August is India’s Independence Day. Keeping this day at the back of their mind, the Indian officers and men combined their programme of servicing and maintenance of the helicopter with the occasion to celebrate their Independence Day in Kalkata.

This helicopter, therefore, was on its routine monthly maintenance flight to Calcutta. According to preliminary report, on 14th August ’75 while this helicopter was flying over Feni it met an accident. An eye witness reported that while this helicopter was flying over Feni a vulture hit the rotor arms of the helicopter. Due to this collusion, the rotor arms of the helicopter were badly damaged; as a result the helicopter dropped from the sky like a stone. All its occupants were thus killed. The news of this accident straight away dampened every ones’ mood, especially in the Army HQ. They were our guests. Naturally it was a very sad news for all of us. We therefore got busy to bring the bodies to Dhaka for their onward despatch to Calcutta. Feni was under the operational jurisdiction of Comilla Garrison. The moment I was informed about this incident, I instructed the Comilla Garrison Commander Colonel (later Major General) Amjad Chowdhury, psc, to send some officers and men to

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cordon the place of occurrence, assist in rescue operation and investigate the cause of accident.

On the other hand, the incident of explosion in the Campus area turned out to be a very serious concern for all the law enforcing agencies, as Bangabandhu was going to be there the next day. The then IGP Mr. Nurul Islam approached me for assistance. Police in those days did not have the capability or the expertise to search and make the area safe from explosive substances. Keeping in View the sensitiveness of the occasion, I instructed CGS Brig. Khaled Mosharraf to send few detachments of demolition experts from the Engineer Battalion to assist the Police. At the same time I also ordered DMI to alert the FIU to keep an eye on the area. Colonel Jamil Ahmed the incoming DGFI inducted them in the overall intelligence plan. In view of the tense situation prevailing then, the Police as well as Intelligence agencies made a massive protective arrangement in the whole area. The incoming DG Colonel Jamil Ahmed then the MS (P) was co-ordinating this security arrangement. Brig. Rouf the out-going DG was to hand over his responsibilities to Colonel Jamil the next day i.e. on 15‘th August ’75. He too became actively involved with this intelligence operation.

14th August ’75 was thus a very hectic day for me. I was very busy till late night with the dead bodies of the Indian pilots and crews. I went to bed very late that night. The next day i.e. on 15th August ’75, sometime around quarter past five or five-thirty in the morning, the DMI Lt Col Salah-uddin came to my house. I was still asleep when he came. My batman Hav Haider Ali called me and knocked at the door to wake me up. As I opened the door, I saw Lt Col Salah-uddin, meaning DMI with him. Lt Col Salah-ud-din was in uniform, unshaven and was carrying a Sten gun. I on seeing him enquired why he was dressed like that. He instead of answering the question enquired from me whether I ordered the armoured and the artillery units to move to the city

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When I expressed my ignorance and said ‘no’, he told me that these two units have moved to the city and were occupying key installations like ‘Gano Bhaban’, Radio and TV Stations etc. Some tanks and artillery pieces had also been moved towards Bangabandhu’s house at 32 Dhanmondi area.

On hearing this, what was I supposed to do and what action should I have taken? The quick answer was, alert possible victims and immediately send troops to oppose the impending action. To implement this, first of all I thought of alerting the President about the incident that was about to take place and order Dhaka Brigade Commander who was the Commander of the Force, to send troops to oppose this action. My subsequent actions were based on these two premises.

On aclling this information from DMI I had no difficulty in understanding as to what was going on and felt a chill in my spine. I enquired from DMI, did Colonel Shafaat (meaning Dhaka Brigade Commander) know about this move? He said that he was not sure. He also said that on getting this news, he came straight away to my house. I therefore, quickly sent DMI to Dhaka Brigade Commander, Colonel Shafaat Jamil with the instruction that he (Shafaat) should immediately confront them with 1, 2 and 4 East Bengal Regiments. These three battalions were stationed in Dhaka under his command for such eventualities.

After giving instructions to DMI to go to Colonel Shafaat Jamil, I immediately tried to get in touch with Bangabandhu over Red telephone to warn him about the impending danger but alas I could not get through to him. His telephones were engaged. I dialled several times over Red as well as civil telephones but failed. As the President 5 Red telephone as well as his house exchange remained continuously engaged, so to save time I asked my wife to keep on dialling the President’s Red telephone number. After this, the next person that I rang up was Dhaka Brigade

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Commander Colonel Shafaat Jamil. His telephone was engaged too. So I asked my house exchange to get me through to Dhaka Brigade Comd Colonel Shafaat right away. While my wife was dialling the President’s number and my house exchange was trying to get me through to Colonel Shafaat, I spoke to other officers through my direct civil telephone.

In this process I got in touch with Colonel Jamil, the outgoing MS (P), who told me that the President rang him up and asked him to reach his house immediately because he was sensing danger. I told him what I heard from DMI Lt Col Salah-ud-din and said that I had been desperately trying to get in touch with the President to warn him but I could not get through to him as all his telephones were engaged. Now that you are going there please do inform the President that I have already sent orders through DMI to Colonel Shafaat Jamil (till then I could not speak to him) to oppose this action. In the mean time, if possible, try to take the President out of his house to some safer place. He told me that he on reaching Bangabandhu’s house will try to do that.

After speaking to Colonel Jamil I tried to ring up Dhaka Brigade commander Colonel Shafaat Jamil when my house operator got him through to me. Colonel Shafaat’s voice was a bit funny, probably worrying voice or drowsy. This was what the impression I got from his response over telephone. I without wasting any time asked him whether he knew anything about the move of the armoured and the artillery units to the city. He expressed his ignorance. So I told him what I was informed by Lt Col Salah-ud-din, the DMI and ordered him to move all the three Infantry battalions’ (1,2 and 4 East Bengal Regiments) under his command immediately to confront them without any loss of time. His response appeared to me that he understood my orders. Colonel Shafaat subsequently in an interview said that I did not give him any orders or any instruction on that morning. He, however, at least accepted that he got a call from me on

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that morning. If I did not give him any Orders on that morning, in that case why did I ring him up so early in the morning? Did I call him not to give orders? Having given necessary orders to Dhaka Brigade commander, the next person that I rang up was the Air Chief, Air Vice Martial AK Khandker and the Navy Chief Rear Admiral MH Khan. While talking to them I got an impression that till then they did not know what was happening. Thereafter, I spoke to Deputy Chief General Zia. When I told him what I heard from the DMI and Colonel Jamil Ahmed the MS (P), his response was, is it so! With that response of General Zia I got an impression that he too got this news from me and for the first time. I asked him to come to my house right away. Brig. Khaled Mosharaf the GSC was the next person that I spoke to. He also appeared to have got this news from me. I asked him too to come to my house right away. Brigadier Rouf was the outgoing DG of DFI. I tried to contact him, but his house telephone kept on ringing but no one picked up the phone. It appeared that there was no one in the house.

While I was speaking to the officers mentioned above over telephone, simultaneously my wife had been dialling the President’s red telephone number ceaselessly. At one stage I took the red telephone from my wife and dialled the President’s number. Luckily this time I got through. The time was probably few minutes before six. I do not remember to have looked at the watch, but this is a near guess. The moment I got through, the President on hearing my voice, in an angry and agitated voice told me, “SAFIULLAH TOMAR FORCE AMAR BARI ATTACK KORSEY-a KAMALREY BODH. HOY MAIRA FELSEY – TUMI JOLDI FORCE PATHAO” [safiullah your force has attacked my house. Kamal (meaning his son) might have been killed, you quickly send force]. I could only say to the President, “Sir, I am doing something, can you get out of the house?” The President did not respond to my suggestion and remained

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quiet but I kept on saying hello, hello, hello. I later felt that there was someone with him and so he did not respond. It also appeared to me that he left the handset on the table and not on the set because after about 30 to 40 seconds I heard the sound of automatic fire over the telephone. Thereafter, within about a minute or so, the telephone got disconnected.

The moment I was informed by DMI, I without any loss of time tried to warn the President about the imminent danger that he was in, but I could not do so in time. His telephones were all engaged. By then the President also might have been seeking help from some of his colleagues but he did not contact me. It may also be that if and when he tried to contact me, my telephone by then could have been engaged. However, if he really wanted to speak to me he could have got me through his operator. It was also possible that, behaving seen the army soldiers in his house, might have lost faith in me and so he did not try to contact me. DMI reported to me around five thirty in the morning. From on with non-stop efforts I could talk to the President just few minutes before six. It took me almost about twenty to twenty-five minutes to get through to the President. All this time I was restless as I wanted to warn him to get out of his house. I did speak to him but alas it was too late when we spoke! Bangabandhu might have been assassinated soon after we spoke? . .

After I finished talking to the President, I wanted to be sure that Colonel Shafaat Jamil had moved troops to confront the rebels. So I rang him up to know about it. But I could not get through to him. His telephone was engaged. I thought then that he might be busy in giving instructions to his subordinates. So having failed to get in touch with him, I asked my house Operator to get me through to Colonel Shafaat immediately and if that meant disconnecting his telephone with whosoever he might have been speaking to. The operator after a while reported to me that Colonel

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Shafaat’s telephone was hung-up. The reason for this probably could have been, due to panic situation, Colonel Shafaat might not have placed the receiver on the set or the rebel troops might have neutralized him so that he did not act or react. Alas! His subsequent actions proved that both my assumptions were wrong. The reason I make this comment is because his subsequent actions made me think that he was not on the right track. He instead of mobilizing his troops remained inactive. He thereby disobeyed my orders as he did not order his troops to move.

I came to know later that Bangabandhu spoke to Mr. Sayed Nazrul Islam, Mr. Mansoor Ali, Brig. Mash-hoor-ul Haque the incoming MS (P), CoIonel Jamil and possibly some more, but I did not get a call from Bangabandhu. (Somehow there is a rumour in the air that Bangabandhu rang me up in the morning of 15th August and sought help from me when I allegedly regretted and told him I was sorry. This is totally false and a malicious propaganda against me. The truth is that Bangabandhu did not ring me up). The circumstances under which the President was seeking help and when he saw that the army troops were in rampage in his house, I could not have been the person to get a call from the President for help. The President having seen the act of the army personnel in his house must have lost faith in me. As a result I could not have been the person to get a call from him. On the other hand I had been frantically trying to get in touch with the President to warn him about the imminent danger. I did speak to him; alas it was too late when we spoke!

I do not know what time the President spoke to the others, but in any case he must have been aware of what was happening around him much before I did. Because he had been seeking help from Others. Unfortunately neither the President nor anyone he spoke to informed me about the incident before six in the morning. On that morning except for the then Prime Minister Mr. Mansoor Ali, I do not

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remember to have got any telephone call from any one. Mr. Mansoor Ali asked me to send troops to oppose this action. I informed him that I already ordered Dhaka Brigade Comd to send troops immediately to confront them. This conversation of ours (Between Mr. Mansoor Ali and me) took place after I spoke to the President.

I am in no way trying to blame anyone for not getting in touch with me during those crucial periods. No one probably got enough reaction time to inform me either. Moreover, the group that went for this brutal action were all from the army. It was, therefore, natural for them to think that these troops could not have gone for such action without the blessings of their Chief. As a result, it was possible for them to think that it might not be useful to talk to me; so for this reason they might not have got in touch with me. If, however, someone had taken that step and contacted me while the rebel troops were moving towards their targets, I probably would have got a bit more reaction time. When I was informed by DMI Lt Col Salah-ud-din about this incident, the rebel troops were on their way to strike. So I also did not have reaction time to counter this action. The President had complete faith in me, but on that day he too appeared to have lost faith, because when his house came under attack he did not look for me.

Bangabandhu probably realized about my non-involvement in this affair only after I got in touch with him and asked him to get out of the house if possible. It was too late when we spoke and probably I was the last person spoke to. Sooner or later we all will die and my only satisfaction is that before Bangabandhu died, he at least became aware that General Safiullah did not betray him. I feel aggrieved that I could not protect my President.

The Deputy Defence Minister Prof. Nurul Islam in one of his write-ups wrote in a complaining tone that I never mentioned about him that he spoke to me on that morning. The conversation, if at all, had taken place a long time ago

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and it was not unlikely that it could have slipped out of one’s mind; but there was no reason to hide that fact intentionally. If the call was just a routine call it was more than likely that it was not registered. Since he claimed that he spoke to me, so he must have. I did not forget about Mr. Mansoor Ali’s call because that call was with some concern and not a routine call. On that day many things happened, some of which remained permanently imprinted in my mind but some incident just vanished from the memory, such as the claim of Prof. Nurul Islam. If he had spoken to me during the early hours of the day, it would not have vanished from my memory. He must have spoken to me when everything was over. I however, cannot recall that I spoke to him.

Prof. Nurul Islam in his write-up mentioned that when he spoke to me, I allegedly assured him that the rebellion would be crushed within half an hour. According to his own write-up, by the time he spoke to me Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was dead. If the situation was under my control, the killing would not have taken place. Naturally the situation by then was tense and beyond my control. Under such circumstances, how could I have assure him with such an authority that within half an hour the rebellion would be crushed, when my own command was at stake. On that day, at that time, it was impossible for me to have given him such assurance. Prof. Nurul Islam is not alive today. If I comment on him it would not be palatable. I would, therefore, refrain from commenting as he cannot defend himself now.

In any case, I would like to highlight some important facts relating to the subject under discussion. Prof. Nurul Islam was Deputy Defence Minister. As Defence Minister he too had some responsibilities. In the context of what happened on 15th August ’75, just by giving me a call did not absolve him of his responsibilities. What happened on 15th August ’75 was the outburst of discontentment in the forces.

He being the Deputy Defence Minister was in a position to eliminate the cause of dissatisfaction. He instead of

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removing those irritants allowed it to spread like cancer. It was he, who in collaboration with my Deputy General Zia, created bottleneck to organize the army properly, thus injecting frustration within the force. Had he taken step to approve the TO&E in time, there would not have been any discontentment. Alas it is too late to blame him now! Immediately after August ’75, the same TO&E without any change was approved by the Ministry of Defence. Secondly in the month of July ’75, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman ordered Prof. Nurul Islam in front of me to remove General Zia from the service right away. But Prof. Nurul Islam instead of taking immediate action convinced the President to give General Zia some more time i.e., till the month of September ’75. (This reference is from Prof. N urul Islam’s article). Whose interest he was trying to promote? What a forward planning! If he (Prof. Nurul Islam) was living today, I would have asked him, why General Zia was retained in the service in spite of ‘the President’s definite instruction to remove him right away. Whose purpose he was serving?

Prof. Nurul Islam through his write-up wanted to establish that as Deputy Defence Minister he did his duty by ordering the Chief to crush the rebellion immediately. When he Spoke to the Chief he knew that the President was dead (he said this in his write-up). It is interesting to note that he became too eager to crush the rebellion after the death of the President and not before! That he contacted me after the death of the President was his own statement. Was he waiting to see the obstacle removed? When he allegedly spoke to the Chief, things were very messy and were out of my control. It was not a matter of minor incident. None other than the President was assassinated. Things were that bad. To bring sanity from that situation, it was not that easy.

I knew what I was going through. I feel sorry that I had to bring this up. I also wish Prof. Nurul Islam was alive to challenge this thinking of mine.

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He also hinted in his write-up that we as soldier had been trained to die, but I failed. I wish he was alive to hear what I have to say, “I am not afraid of dying while fighting with the enemy. This part of soldiering I did exhibit during the war, while fighting against the enemy”. Where was the enemy in this case? He should not have reminded me of my training! To the readers, may I say that we had been trained to kill the enemy while fighting in the battle field and in the process remain prepared to get killed? But the situation here was different. Where was the enemy here, it was the infighting of the ambitious politicians. It should not be lost sight of that after the assassination of Bangabandhu; army did not take over power. It was the politicitians who formed the government and in that government Prof. Nurul Islam was one of the cabinet ministers.

Immediately after I spoke to the President in the morning, one of my batmen brought a radio to me to listen to the announcement. It was Major Sharif-ul Haque Dalim who was in the air. He was making an announcement that a Coupd’état had taken place and a new government had been installed. As I was trying to digest what he was announcing, General Zia arrived. The time was around quarter past six to six-twenty. He was properly dressed in uniform, cleanshaved and was driven by his chauffeur in his official car. As I was talking to General Zia, Brigadier Khaled also arrived, driving himself in his personal car. He was still in his pyjamas and was unshaven. I told General Zia and Brig. Khaled that I ordered Colonel Shafaat to move all the three infantry battalions to confront the rebels but I neither saw any movement nor got any feedback from him. I could not even get through to him then. The operator told me that Colonel Shafaat’s telephone was hung-up. I did not know what he was doing and what was stopping him to move the battalions. . .

Colonel Shafaat Jamil in an interview in 1986 (please refer pages 294 -295 of the book Facts and Documents by

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Prof. Abu Sayeed) said that on the morning of 15th August ’75, when he went to General Zia’s house to seek orders he saw him shaving and when I saw General Zia at my house, he had a clean shave. On the same morning, when I was talking to General Zia and Brig. Khaled and was anguished to know what Colonel Shafaat Jamil was doing, General Zia did not even mention that Colonel Shafaat went to him to seek orders. Here either Colonel Shafaat was not telling the whole truth or General Zia was trying to hide something. He must have had something else in his mind. If General Zia had no other role to play, in that case why he did not mention that he met Colonel Shafaat before he came to my house? It is now for the readers to judge what role General Zia was playing on that day.

Having ordered Colonel Shafaat to move troops to confront the rebel soldiers without any loss of time and there after as I did not notice any activity of the troops, I was getting worried. Since it was getting late I became restless. As I could not influence the course of action by being at home, I decided to go to the office to take steps so that the troops move. I therefore, told Brig. Khaled to get into uniform and go to 46 Brigade area to activate Colonel Shafaat and his troops to confront the rebels. Having sent .Brig. Khaled, I went inside my room to change into uniform. By the time I got ready my ADC Captain Humayun Kabir came to the house with the car.

The moment I was about to leave for my office, Brig. Rouf (the then DGFI) came to my house scaling over the rear boundary wall. He was wearing Lungi (Loin-cloth) and vest and met me on the corridor where we briefly spoke. I was rushing for the office so I was in a hurry. During our brief conversation, Brig. Rouf was trying to suggest that I should not keep General Zia with me. I did not understand what he meant by this, he did not spell it out either. General Zia was my Deputy. How could I stop him to be near me without knowing the reason? Brig. Rouf probably knew

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something that I was not aware of. He was trying to prevent me from keeping General Zia with me. General Zia was in my living-room and was waiting to accompany me to the office. I therefore, told Brig. Rouf to go home, change and come to the office quickly. Brig. Rouf having failed to convince me approached my wife and asked her to stop me from going to office or keep General Zia with me. Without knowing as to what Brig Rouf had in mind, I could not act or react on this suggestion at that time. So I left for my office and General Zia followed me in his car.

General Zia was my Deputy; he on that day was rather extra-courteous to me. Since morning he had been addressing me as ‘Sir’ a bit too frequently. General Zia in private used to call me by name and on official occasions use to address me as Sir, but not as frequently as he did on that day. However, immediately on reaching the office, I sent my ADC Captain Humayun Kabir to find out quickly about the latest situation. At the same time I was waiting for Brig. Khaled to inform me about the situation in 46 Brigade. Since I did not notice any activity or movements of troops in the cantonment area, I was becoming anxious. The Brigade Comd Colonel Shafaat Jamil was avoiding me and did not report back to me as to what action he had taken till then or what was he doing.

In the morning when I ordered Brig. Khaled to go to 46 Bide area, General Zia very strongly opposed this action of mine and was vigorously insisting that I should not Send Brig. Khaled to 46 Bide area. After Brig. Khaled left, General Zia atone stage murmured and said to an extent that he was going to spoil it! However, General Zia might have had his reasons why Brig. Khaled should not have been sent there. But I could not wait and remain in suspense any longer and therefore, in spite of his strong opposition, I sent Brig. Khaled to 46 Brigade area. I also instructed Brig. Khaled to make sure that my orders were complied with and

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he should inform me about the latest situation soonest possible.

On reaching my office I got in touch with the Formation Commanders (Fmn Comd) who were outside Dhaka and whosoever I spoke to, I informed them about the happenings in Dhaka. I told them to remain prepared and wait for further instructions personally from me. I did not have to say much about the happenings in Dhaka, they appeared to be in picture about it. The main source was probably the radio. I however, specifically mentioned to every commander I spoke to, that whatever had happened in Dhaka had happened without my knowledge and consent. This I said to dispel any doubt if they had. I also informed them that I had ordered Comd 46 Brigade Colonel Shafaat Jamil to send troops to counter this action. While I was talking to the Fmn Comd’s over phone, General Zia was sitting in front of me. He was very quiet at that time. As I was still in the process of talking to the an Comd’s, General Zia said that I should call back Brig. Khaled quickly. He should immediately sit down to prepare an Operation Order (Ops Order), so that the troops get ready to move towards the border and be prepared to meet any Indian offensive.

Having sent Brig. Khaled to 46 Brigade, I was anxiously waiting for some information about the movement of troops, when a call came. It was Brig. Khaled. I wanted to know from him what action Colonel Shafaat had taken till then. He instead of answering the question asked me to come to 46 Brig area. When I insisted to get an answer he told me that they would not allow him to speak about it over telephone. I asked him who was preventing him and why he rang me up. In reply he said that they asked him to get in touch with me only to say that I should go there. I then enquired who were they? He said that they were preventing him to Speak any more. Thereafter, I said to Brig. Khaled that I did not know how but he must come to the office right away and tell me what was happening. Having said this I still held on to the

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receiver when Brig. Khaled said that they were allowing him to come to my office only for a short while. I did not know what he meant by this but I told him to come anyway.

Immediately before Brig, Khaled Mosharraf returned from 46 Brigade area, my ADC came and told me that the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman has been killed. Till then I could not imagine that the rebel troops could even kill Bangabandhu. The information that my ADC brought was very distressing for me. The news being very painful, it made me emotional; so I was sitting with a gloomy face when Brig. Khaled came. He too looked very tired and worried. General Zia was still sitting in front of me when Brig. Khaled came. I enquired from Brig Khaled, has Colonel Shafaat moved his troops? He said. no Sir and added that the entire Garrison appeared to have revolted apparently on ‘your’ (Chief‘s) orders, meaning me. He had no idea who was behind this order or who spread this rumour. He further said that a general impression in the Garrison was that the entire army had revolted against the government; as such it was not possible to move troops to oppose this action.

General Zia was present in my office when Brig. Khaled was reporting. Hardly Brig. Khaled finished his reporting when General Zia said that the CGS should not go out anywhere now. He should immediately sit down to prepare an, ‘Ops Order’ to counter any Indian offensive. Warning orders must go to the Fmn Comd’s straight away so that the troops remained prepared to move at a short notice. I agreed with him and told him that such possibilities could not be ruled out but we should not jump to conclusion. Let us observe the development so that we could take appropriate step. Right then I had a very serious situation at hand. Our first task would be to control the indiscipline situation before we could embark on something serious. I however, told Brig. Khaled that considering this eventuality he should keep an ‘Ops Order’ ready and for this he should take some directions from me.

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While we were still talking about the issue of 46 Brigade and its troops, I heard the rumbling of tanks and some heavy vehicles outside the Army HQ. Soon after, two vehicles entered the Army HQ and stopped right in front of my office. A moment later the door of my office room flung open. Major Dalim having forced opened the door entered my office with a contingent of troops, numbering about 15 to 18 and shouted ‘where is the Chief. Having entered my office room, all of them were pointing their guns at me. I was thoroughly outraged at their behaviour and shouted at Major Dalim while touching the barrel of his gun with my index finger which he was aiming at me and said, “Dalim I am used to seeing and using these weapons. If you came here to use these weapons, then use them right now; or if you came to speak to me for something, in that case, take your troops and weapons out of my office and then speak”.

When Major Dalim with his troops entered my office and was pointing their guns at me, at that time, General Zia and Brig. Khaled were sitting in front of me on the opposite side of my table and Colonel (later Lt General) Nasim, the MS was standing on my left. Interestingly enough, when so many officers were present in my office room, I was the only target of Major Dalim and his troops because all of them were aiming and pointing their guns at me. By the grace of God I was not at all nervous; instead I was quite firm with Major Dalim.

When I commanded Major Dalim to use his weapon, he then slowly lowered his gun and said, Sir the President wants you to see him at the radio station. I said : whom are you talking about? I know the President is dead. He then told, “Sir by now you should have known that Khandaker Moshtaque is the President now”. I told Major Dalim, “Khandaker Moshtaque may be your President but he is not ‘ mine”. In response he said, “Sir, I came here to take you to the radio station. But you are forcing me to do something, for which I did not come”. I told him, “you can do anything

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you want, but I am not going anywhere with you”. I also told him that I was going to my troops and would decide there what I did next.

I was really very upset with the distressing news about the tragic demise of Bangabandhu when Major Dalim came in. Having heard his announcement over radio and the contemptuous way he entered my office, I lost my temper and shouted at him, challenging him to use his weapons. In retrospect, I now feel that my challenge was rather foolhardy. These fellows were prepared to do anything. They came to my office after killing Bangabandhu. If they had the nerve to kill the President and that too none other than Bangabandhu, in that case their conscience would not have pricked at all to kill me.

In retrospect, I now believe that it was not for love or respect that Major Dalim did not kill me on that morning, but they needed to keep me alive for their own survival. On that morning, they spread a rumour that the Coup’detat that had taken place had the blessings of the Army Chief. Brig. Khaled also brought the same news to me from 46 Brigade area. Since they deceived the uncommitted troops in the cantonment that the Coup’detat allegedly had my blessings, so thereafter, they had to keep me alive in their own interest. To consolidate their position they needed to show to the troops that the Chief was with them. Had they killed me on that day, probably it would have been difficult for them to keep the situation under their control? This may be one of the reasons why Major Dalim became a bit polite when we had hot conversation in my office.

After this hot and unpleasant dialogue of mine with Major Dalim, I got up from my seat and then almost pushing my way through Major Dalim’s contingent, came out of my office to go to 46 Brigade area. As I came out of my office they too followed me. The moment I was about to leave, all my office staffs started to shed tears. Having watched the behaviour of Major Dalim and the way they entered

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office, my staff thought that I was being driven away to be killed. Therefore, before I got into the car I consoled them, and drove straight to 46 Brigade area. Major Dalim and his troops followed me. The moment I entered 46 Brigade area, I noticed that all the troops were in a mood of carnival as if something great had happened. The troops on seeing me became more jubilant and their jubilation was quite noisy and to some extent rowdy. Having watched the scene there, what to talk of telling them that I had nothing to do with this, I could not even open my mouth there. These were Major Rashid’s troops who had rebelled.

In the Brigade area an officer escorted me inside an office. I expected to see Colonel Shafaat there but he was not there. It were his BM Major Hafiz along with Major Rashid who was there to conduct me. When I asked Major Hafiz about his commander he could not tell me about his whereabouts. In this location Major Rashid was doing most of the talking. In the morning I ordered Colonel Shafaat to confront the rebel troops. So here in 46 Brigade area when Major Rashid was doing most of the talking in presence of Major Hafiz, the BM 46 Brigade, I could not even imagine that Major Rashid was one of the actors in this escapade. If Major Rashid was the ring leader, in that case, how could he (a rebel commander) be with Major Hafiz, whom they were supposed to confront? As such I had no reason to suspect Major Rashid there who was roaming freely in the area. In the brigade area both of them (Major Rashid and Major Hafiz) had been requesting me to go to the radio station.

During my stay in the brigade location, I could guess the mood of the troops; so I was under no illusion. What to talk of changing the course then, I could not even tell the troops that I had no role to play in whatever had happened on that day. The atmosphere was such that I could not even open my mouth. It was really difficult to change the course then when all the troops stationed in Dhaka garrison had already sided with the rebel troops. In other words they too became rebels

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When Major Rashid and Major Hafiz kept on requesting me to go to the radio station, I told them that before I took any decision I must go to my office to consult with the other Chiefs. They were probably waiting to hear this from me and quickly put me through to the other Chiefs. When we Spoke they told me that they would join me soon in 46 Brigade area, which they did soon after.

When I was waiting for the other Chiefs to come, I had been mentally debating as to what course of action I should take? By then the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was dead. To tackle this situation then, I had no troops available to me in Dhaka. If I could get out of Dhaka towards any direction, say towards Comilla, being nearest, I could take some stand. This possibility was also not there as Major Dalim along with his troops was trailing me wherever I went in the cantonment and outside. It was not unknown to anyone in the cantonment that Major Dalim was a rebel officer and in spite of his active involvement in this military Putsch, he was continuously trailing me and was freely moving in the 46 Brigade area as well as in the Army HQ area.

The rebel troops by then had named Khandaker Moshtaque as President. Since morning, General Zia was very respectful to me and Brig. Khaled was maintaining a distance from me. God only knew what was in their mind. In any case however, I felt except Brig Khaled I could not trust anyone. I felt that I was a lonely person then. I was confused. [However, so far as I was concerned, there were two courses open to me then. One: come what may, survive or perish, fight it out with whatever troops I could master or two: accept the situation as it was. I had been making my mental appreciation of these two courses and debating their merits and demerits]. In the case of first course i.e. for confrontation, the troops that I needed were not available in Dhaka. The reason being the rebel units (Armoured and
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Artillery) tricked the uncommitted troops in Dhaka and got them on their side, so they became rebel sympathizers. As a result, they were not available to me.

For this purpose the nearest cantonment was Comilla, but the possibility of reaching there was also remote. If I could go to Comilla then there was a possibility of staging a showdown /comeback. This showdown would have been violent as the armed forces would have been pitched against each other. The end result would have been bloodshed, which could even drive the entire country into a civil war situation. In this process it was also likely that there would be opposing groups from within the army. There was a definite dissatisfaction amongst the armed forces and it was difficult to say who would side with whom. I saw its evidence right there in 46 Brigade area.

In any case, no amount of bloodshed at that stage would have helped to bring back Bangabandhu. In the case of second course, I could avert bloodshed as well as possible civil war and more importantly the split in the army. In the second option I would possibly be able to establish my authority as well as channel of command, once they were under my control and thus would be in a position to discipline the indisciplined lot, In any case the purpose for which I was to fight has been lost, i.e., the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was dead. If he was alive in that case it would have been worth fighting for and taking that risk. That he was not alive, it was not worth pushing the country into a civil war situation. These aspects largely influenced my decision to opt for the second course of action.

When I was making my mental appreciation of the options that I had, the other Chiefs arrived. We spoke briefly in 46 Brigade location and soon after we were taken to the radio station. As we reached there, we were conducted to the room where Khandaker Moshtaque was waiting for us. For

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me it was for the first time that I went there. As I entered the room I saw Khandaker Moshtaque dressed in white National Dress and sitting behind a table with a microphone on tap of it. On his left was Mr. Taher-ud-din Thakur who was wearing white Pyjama-Punjabi and was standing. The moment Khandaker Moshtaque saw me he said, “Congratulation Safiullah, your troops have done a wonderful job and now go and do the rest”. When I enquired what rest, he said, “You should know that better”. I therefore told him, “In that case leave that to me”. Having said that I stepped back to come out of that room.

The moment I was about to step out of the room, Mr. Taher-ud-din Thakur asked Khandaker Moshtaque to stop me from leaving the radio station. Major Dalim with his troops were standing outside, blocking our way. They stopped us. We were then escorted to a room in the radio station to extract our allegiance to the newly installed government. A proclamation to that effect was required to be broadcast over the radio and television. As we waited, Mr. Taher-ud-din Thakur hurriedly prepared a script, showing our allegiance to the government installed by the rebel troops. We had to read that out which was recorded for broadcasting soon after.

This was done to consolidate the authority of the government that they formed. While owing allegiance I had been largely guided by the factors that I discussed in the paragraphs above in my mental appreciation. After the recording was done Khandaker Moshtaque told us that he wanted the Services Chiefs at Bangabhaban before Jumma Prayer during oath-taking ceremony. Thereafter, as I was not required there any more, I left the radio station for my office. On my way back to Army HQ, Major Dalim and his troops again followed me.

After I returned to my office, I hurriedly assembled the officers in the conference room for my address. I had to
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Show that I am still in command. So in my brief address to the officers I apprised them about the latest situation. I told them that by the time I came to know about the incident that had taken place, it was too late because by then the rebel troops were on their objectives. In any case, the moment I was informed about this incident, I immediately ordered commander Dhaka Brigade Colonel Shafaat Jamil to move troops to oppose this action. Ironically Colonel Shafaat, for reasons only known to him, did not act or react on my orders. ..

It is true that he probably did not get enough reaction time to foil the incident but it is also true that he did not react at all. Since he did not act or react, how do I then say that he did not have enough reaction time? The truth is that he did not order his troops to move. If he had activated his troops, that would have at least prevented the rebel troops entry/exit in the cantonment?

Had he alerted his troops, especially the infantry battalions who till then were uncommitted and ordered them to restrict any entry or exit in the cantonment right then, things would have been different? Major Dalim and Major Rashid could not enter or go out of the cantonment so easily. Their free movement within the cantonment gave an impression to the uncommitted troops that whatever had happened was acceptable. This was probably the reason why the rumour in the cantonment was established that this. Putsch was backed by the army. However, in the absence of any resistance the rebel troops found an easy entry into the cantonment and even entered my office without any resistance or opposition.

I said to the officers that as I could not prevent the incident from taking place, shedding more blood thereafter would not have served any useful purpose. Therefore, before we lost grip on our men and destroyed everything that we worked for, we should first of all strive to establish proper

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channel of command and bring back discipline in the army. I did not want to dwell beyond this at that stage. I had to be cautious in my deed. My main aim was to bring those rebel troops back to the barracks before I could take any disciplinary action against them. I could be wrong in my assessment, but during my address to the officers, I got a feeling that some of the officers did not disapprove of what had happened, except of course the part of killing. After this brief address to the officers, I left for Bangabhaban to attend Khandaker Moshtaque’s swearing-in-ceremony. Major Dalim and his troops again followed me up to Bangabhaban.

Since morning, the rebel troops had been moving freely in the cantonment without being challenged. If Colonel Shafaat was sincere how could that happen? Was there a dual command working in the army? If it was so, on whose command Colonel Shafaat was acting? If he acted on my command, at least the cantonment would have been under his control. On that day what to talk of defending the cantonment from the rebel troops, his own as well as my headquarter remained undefended and went under the control of the rebel troops. I even saw his BM Major Hafiz actively working with a rebel officer Major Rashid.

Having received my orders, had Colonel Shafaat acted and ordered his troops to move, Major Dalim and Major Rashid could not have dared to come into the cantonment. He instead of acting on my orders went to Deputy Chief General Zia for orders, who asked him to remain alert. This was Shafaat’s own statement. What did this order mean? It means be prepared and stay-put and nothing more. What was he going to achieve by remaining alert/inactive? Having seen the cantonment undefended, the rebel troops not only came to the cantonment, they even forced me to go to the radio station right from Colonel Shafaat’s brigade area, When Major Dalim was trailing me (Chief) in the cantonment area and forced me to go to the radio station

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Colonel Shafaat did not make any effort to prevent them from doing so. In such circumstances how could I have trust on him?

Before the swearing-in ceremony of Khandaker Moshtaque, when we were in the hall room at Bangabhaban, the Acting MS (P) Lt Col (later Major General) Amin Ahmed Chowdhury told me that General Osmany wanted to speak to me. The moment I picked up the phone, General Osmany felicitated me, expressed his satisfaction about my actions and told me not to lose heart. He also commended me for my handling of the situation. I felt embarrassed on his praise because I did not expect any praise from anyone at that time, least of all from General Osmany. When he praised so much, I thought he was trying to ridicule me and therefore I said, “Sir, do I really deserve this praise?” He replied saying, “Old boy don’t you know that you have saved the country from disaster”. I did not understand the cryptic remarks of General Osmany, but I did not respond.

I really do not know till today whether General Osmany was earnest in his felicitation on that day or he meant something else. I also knew that in spite of his difference of opinion with Bangabandhu, General Osmany had tremendous respect for him. I am sure that he did not do or say anything to show disrespect to Bangabandhu or Undermine him at a time when he was not alive. In any case I will do injustice to General Osmany if I say that his felicitation was not genuine and therefore, looking at the brighter side I am sure that he meant what he said. His sympathy during that crisis period was probably to encourage me as an elder. He might have congratulated me for avoiding a confrontation between the troops and thereby avoiding a blood-bath. The escalation of conflict had all the potentials towards a possible civil war. However, what bothered me later was his joining with Khandaker Moshtaque as his Defence Adviser so soon (24th August ’75)

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after the assassination of Bangabandhu. Why he had to join Khandaker Moshtaque so hastily and what was the compulsion?

The Acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice AB Mahmood Hossain administered the oath of office to Khandaker Moshtaque as President at Bangabhaban. The Chief Justice Abu Sadaat Mohammad Sayem was out of the country during this period. While Khandaker Moshtaque was being sworn in as President, his representatives i.e., Major Rashid, Major Dalim, Major Farook, Major Shahryar and company were out to pick up the Ministers of Bangabandhu’s cabinet for the swearing in ceremony. The swearing-in of the cabinet took place in the afternoon.

Khandaker Moshtaque immediately on assumption of office as President, in his own words said to have taken two very important decisions. First, the appointment of Mr. Mahb-ub-ul Alam Chashi as the Principal Secretary to the President and second, the dismissal of the Red Cross (now Red Crescent) Chairman, Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa. In place of Mr. Gazi Golam Mustafa, Justice BA Siddiqui was appointed as the Red Cross Chief on the same day. Khandaker Moshtaque, by appointing Mr. Mahb-ub-ul Alam Chashi as Principal Secretary right on the very first day, made it abundantly clear that he too like Mr. Taher-ud-din Thakur was a party to the conspiracy against Bangabandhu. Mr. Mahb-ub-ul Alarn Chashi was also deeply involved in this episode. However, his second decision to dismiss Mr.Gazi Golam Mustafa from the chairmanship of the Red Cross was definitely a right decision.

After attending General Osmany’s telephone call when I returned to the hall room, I saw Colonel (later Major General) M A Manzoor there too. I was surprised to see him at Bangabhaban on that day. He was the Military Adviser to our mission in New Delhi. I did not expect him to be in Dhaka on that day and on my query he said that he came to

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Dhaka just a while ago on my further query as to who asked him to come and how he came, he said that on hearing the news he came by road I do not know whether it was possible for someone to come from Delhi to Dhaka in such a short time when all inward traffic to Dhaka was closed. Most Important question was why he had to come? Was he aware of what was happening or what was to happen in Dhaka? How could he come so quickly?

Colonel (later Major General) Manzoor had to be moved out of Jessore Garrison during the period when ‘Operation Silver Lining’ was underway. I had to keep him out of sight for a while, therefore, posted him as Military Adviser to our mission in New Delhi. He took this as personal affront. He never forgave me as well as the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for this posting. So Colonel (later Major General) Manzoor’s presence at Banga Bhaban on that day could not be taken as a routine or an isolated matter. But my question is, did he come on his own, if so why and if not then who asked him to come?

After I finished talking to Colonel Manzoor, Major Farook came to tell me that the Indian army was massing troops near our border. I asked him how did he get this information. He told me that his source of information was very reliable. However, in this concern of Major Farook, I fond General Zia’s reflection. In the morning General Zia also expressed similar concern. When I ordered Brig. Khaled to go to 46 Brigade to ensure Colonel Shafaat implemented my orders, why was General Zia preventing me from sending Brig. Khaled there? It was not that Brig. Khaled was incapable of implementing my instructions. Why then was he so worried? Did he have any hand in this affair? Why General Zia was insisting that Brig. Khaled prepare ‘Ops Order’ right from the start of the incident? Was that to keep Brig. Khaled occupied in his office so that he did not get the clue of what General Zia was up to?

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General Zia was sitting in front of me when I instructed the other an Comd’s to be ready to act on my orders. He must have been thinking from then on how to offset this move. if I decided to confront this group with outside Fmn’s. The so-called Indian troops manoeuvre therefore, must have been his brain-child and this was indeed a fairly plausible scenario. He however, made up this imaginary story so that my attention got diverted from the killing of Bangabandhu to the Indian offensive. So when I sat down to attend the conference, I was burdened with these intrigues around me.

Any way, when Major Farook informed me that the Indian army was massing troops near our border, I knew he was trying to distract me from the main event. General Zia had also expressed similar concern about the Indian design in the morning. Major Farook, however, in the process was trying to impress upon me about his source and concern. I told him to give this information to CGS and said that it would be helpful in preparing the ‘Ops Order’. Thereafter, I entered the office of the President for the conference. As I stepped in, I found Khandaker Moshtaque and Colonel Manzoor locked in deep conversation. I had no doubt then with whom Colonel Manzoor had been keeping in touch with. I was his Chief, if he had any information, those should have been communicated to me first. Moreover, Khandaker Moshtaque became President only few hours ago, he was not supposed to be in contact with him unless there were other motives for them to be in contact with.

Seeing Khandaker Moshtaque and Colonel (later Major General) Manzoor so intimately engrossed in their conversation, I had sudden flashback of the day’s events. Colonel Manzoor without prior knowledge could not have been in Dhaka so quickly. General Zia since morning had been extra polite and over-respectful to me. In the morning when I asked him and Brig Khaled to come to my house quickly, both of them arrived within fifteen to twenty minutes. General Zia arrived dressed in uniform, properly

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shaved and driven by his chauffeur in his official car. On the other hand, Brig. Khaled arrived in pyjama, unshaven and driving himself in his personal car. Naturally the question arose, how General Zia could do all these, which Brig. Khaled could not. How could he call for his car, wash, shave and dress up in uniform to come to my house in such a short time, unless he was already ready with the car standing for him. If so, why was he ready so early in the morning? Was he waiting for someone else’s call? If so, whose call he might have been waiting for?

It was President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who ordered me to remove Colonel Manzoor from the command of Jessore Garrison. Colonel Manzoor knew about this too. General Zia had been pestering the President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to remove me and make him the Chief, but the President instead of making him the Chief asked him to resign. General Zia and Colonel Manzoor therefore, had no love-los for Bangabandhu. Both of them were ambitious, so for a while their immediate aim was also the same and therefore, joined hands. To them the death of the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was not a cause for concern. In fact his death cleared a major obstacle from their path.

After Khandaker Moshtaque’s oath-taking as President was over, the CGS Brig. Khaled informed me that a very serious incident had taken place at the JRB HQ’s at Savar. The incident in brief was that a Rakkhi (JRB soldier) on hearing the news about the assassination of the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had committed suicide. In view of this a tense situation was prevailing there. This was indeed a very serious development and it required an immediate and compassionate handling. Later I was told that the advisers of Khandaker Moshtaque (Major Rashid, Major Farook and Major Dalim etc) advised him that it was only General Safiullah who could calm the

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situation. So after the oath taking ceremony, Khandaker Moshtaque asked me to go to Savar to speak to the Rakkhis.

l had no option but to go to Savar to talk to the Rakkhis. The DG BDR Brig. (later Major General) Khalil-ur-Rahman also accompanied me to Savar on that day. The atmosphere at JRB HQ in Savar was very fluid and tense. As we reached there, Mr. Anwar-ul Alam (Shaheed) and Mr. Sarwar Molla, the two Deputy Directors of JRB received us. The Putsch being sudden, all the Rakkhis were stunned. They looked puzzled and confused. They did not know what to do. During those tension-ridden periods and being overwhelmed by the sad demise of Bangabandhu, one of the Rakkhis shot and killed himself with his own weapon. The motivation of these boys must have been so great that at that moment he probably could not think of anything else but to take his own life. Thus he shot himself and committed suicide.

In the JRB HQ, after having a briefing by their officers, I and Brig. (later Major General) Khalil-ur-Rahman addressed them in their parade ground and advised them to remain calm which probably helped. Thereafter, we were again driven back to Bangabhaban to attend the swearingin of the cabinet members of Khandaker Moshtaque. On return to Bangabhaban from Savar, I came to know that of the entire cabinet of Bangabandhu, Khandaker Moshtaque isolated four senior Minister’s/members of the party at Bangabhaban and got them arrested to consolidate his position. The arrested personalities were Mr. Sayed Nazrul Islam, Mr. Tajsud-din Ahmed, Mr. Mansoor Ali and Mr. Quamr-uz-zan. These four leaders were all senior to Khandaker Moshtaque in the party ranking. While all other Ministers were asked to join Khandaker Moshtaque’s cabinet, these four senior Ministers as well as Mr. Abdus Samad Azad were sent to Dhaka Central Jail for protective custody. Mr. Abdus Samad Azad though junior to Khandaker Moshtaque, yet he became a victim as he, during

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the War of Liberation, was made the Foreign Minister replacing Khandaker Moshtaque.

These senior leaders were first brought to Bangabhaban before they were sent to Central Jail. While they were at Bangabhaban, they were asked by Khandaker Moshtaque to denounce Bangabandhu and his government, which these self-respecting personalities refused. They were also asked by Khandaker Moshtaque to join his cabinet, which they declined. Naturally it was a question of prestige for all of them to work under a junior colleague. Mr. Mansoor Ali was the Prime Minister. He was grilled for another two days but Khandaker Moshtaque could not extract any commitment from him. He refused to yield to his pressure and stuck to the point that they were all party to whatever good or bad was done by the past government. It was ethically wrong to blame the leader alone. He asserted that we all should have the courage to accept this fact. He allegedly reminded Khandaker Moshtaque that he too was a member of Bangabandhu’s cabinet. There was also rumour in Bangabhaban that Khandaker Moshtaque offered the portfolio of the Prime Minister to Mr. Mansoor Ali. He allegedly turned down that offer.

The swearing in of the cabinet continued till very late -in the evening. During this period, Dr. Kamal Hossain the Foreign Minister was out of the country. Khandaker Moshtaque in his cabinet integrated all the members of Bangabandhu’s cabinet, except those who were under custody or out of the country. In this swearing -in ceremony, apart from many civil and military officers, many diplomats also attended the ceremony on invitation. General Zia and Brig. Khaled were also present. On such occasions, normally the wives of the dignitaries were also invited. That day’s ceremony surely was not an auspicious occasion for our wives to be present. However, of the military officers’ wives, only Major Rashid’s wife was present who was quite active and prominent on that occasion

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Earlier during the day, I enquired from Khandaker Moshtaque to have his opinion about the burial of the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The reason I asked him was to be sure about the place of burial. I wanted to know whether the President would be buried in the premises of the New Parliament building or near old High Court where four national leaders were buried. If I had the option to suggest the place of burial, it would have been at the new Parliament building premises. The Air Chief Air Vice Martial AK Khandker was also present when I asked this question to Khandaker Moshtaque. To my utter surprise on my query, Khandaker Moshtaque suddenly flared up and said, “So many people die every day, do I have to take care of every one? Bury him anywhere but not in Dhaka” was his answer.

I was not in a position to express my reaction about this response of Khandaker Moshtaque but I just became numb. Bangabandhu was just not anybody that we bury him anywhere. Leaving aside everything else, he was the President and the Head of State. The burial of the Head of State entailed lot of formalities. In whatever way the President expired, it was obligatory for us to provide proper protocol to his last remain and bury him with proper ceremonies. The ceremony for the last remain of the President included carrying the coffin on gun carriage and guard of honour, etc. Khandaker Moshtaque was not willing to provide him his dues. He wanted him to be buried anywhere and that too not in Dhaka. Seeing the attitude of Khandaker Moshtaque, I looked at the Air Chief, Air Vice Martial AK Khandker, who gave me a nod with his head, meaning thereby we would take care of it. Till today I curse myself as to why at all I sought permission of Khandaker Moshtaque about the burial?

What could we do now? Khandaker Moshtaque does not want that the President be buried in Dhaka. We on the other hand could not burry the ‘Father of the Nation’ just

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anywhere and therefore, decided to fly the last remain of Bangabandhu to Tungipara, his village home, and lay him by the side of the last resting place of his father. It was beyond my imagination and it never even crossed my mind that Khandaker Moshtaque would not allow the burial of Bangabandhu in Dhaka. He might have had difference of Opinion with Bangabandhu, but not when he was dead. If I had slightest inkling about this intention of Khandaker Moshtaque, I would not have even asked him about it. The problem occurred when I asked Khandaker Moshtaque about the burial and he gave specific instruction. What a vicious person he was !

Bangabandhu sacrificed everything for this country including his life. He in his political career reached his pinnacle here in Dhaka but we the ungrateful few could not give him a place in the Capital as his last resting place. It could not be done because of Khandaker Moshtaque. What an unkind and heartless person Khandaker Moshtaque was! Politics is so strange, so cruel and so inhuman! I feel sorry for Bangabandhu that he failed to recognize a hypocrite like Khandaker Moshtaque and considered him to be his closest friend. However, soon after AVM Khandker got a helicopter ready and from the army under the supervision of Brig. Khaled Mosharraf, a contingent was prepared to escort the last remain of the President to Tungipara for burial. Bangabandhu’s body was then flown to Tungipara, his village home and was buried by the side of his father’s grave. I was told that before the President’s last remain was laid to rest, all religious rites were observed. So far as the others were concerned, they were all buried at the Banani graveyard.

In the context of the burial of the President, it reminds me of the occasion when Bangabandhu’s father Sheikh Lut-fur-Rahman died. Sheikh Lut-fur-Rahman was an old man and he died of natural cause due to old age on 16th March ’75. The President was very attached to his father. The death

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of his father was definitely a very sad occasion for him. He was thus very upset and rightfully so. To perform the religious rites for his father, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman left for his village home Tungipara the same day by a steamer. During his departure from Dhaka, his cabinet colleagues, many distinguished personalities and we, the three Chiefs, were present to see him off at Pagla Steamer Ghat. The occasion being sombre, everyone was quiet but interestingly enough Khandaker Moshtaque was the most loudly aggrieved person. He became so grieved that he could not control himself and started to cry so loudly that even Bangabandhu, whose father was dead, must have felt embarrassed for not becoming as upset as Khandaker Moshtaque was.

Tungipara was quite a far-flung area from Dhaka. The road communication to Tungipara was almost non-existent then. The river route was the only way to commute between Dhaka and Tungipara. During the month of March, the water level in most rivers were quite high; as a result it was quite convenient to reach Tungipara by waterways. On this occasion the President took his entire family members who were staying in Dhaka and some very close friends with him to Tungipara by steamer. Khandaker Moshtaque was one of them who accompanied the President on that day.

Tungipara falls within the jurisdiction of Jessore military garrison. I ordered Jessore garrison commander Colonel (later Lt General) Mir Shawkat Ali to provide assistance to the President’s party at Tungipara. We the Chiefs also went to Tungipara the next day by helicopter to attend the Janaza (Religious rites before burial). At Tungipara Khandaker Moshtaque was still a very visible mourner. The same Khandaker Moshtaque, what to talk of repentance for the death of Bangabandhu, even did not want to give him a decent burial. What a hypocrite he was! It was sad to see that an immoral person like Khandaker Moshtaque became a close associate of Bangabandhu!

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After the oath-taking ceremony of the ministers, was over, General Zia asked Brig. Khaled if the ‘Ops Order’ was ready. The moment Brig. Khaled said that it was not yet ready, General Zia very rudely charged him saying what was he doing in Bangabhaban when he was still to complete the ‘Ops Order”? I did not like the way General Zia censured Brig. Khaled in front of me. I had to tell him that he should not have talked to a senior officer like that and that too in front of me. I therefore, got a feeling that General Zia did not like that Brig. Khaled remain near me. This impression I got right from the morning. After the ceremony, when I was about to leave Bangabhaban, Khandaker Moshtaque told me that he was going to hold a conference of the Chiefs later in the night and I should not leave Bangabhaban as yet. So I had to hang around there at Bangabhaban to attend the conference.

During the conference Khandaker Moshtaque wanted to know whether it was necessary to declare Martial Law in the country then. I asked why raise this question now? Martial Law had already been declared through radio and TV. The only requirement now was to formalize it by issuing gazette notification. Khandaker Moshtaque wanted to know who would issue Gazette notification. I said surely the government would issue the notification on the order of the President. Khandaker Moshtaque angrily said why the notification be issued in the name of the President when the army declared Martial Law? I had to say that in presence of a government in power, the army had no right to declare Martial Law; it was government’s responsibility. He raised his voice and said, “Since your troops (meaning the army) made this announcement, so it should be your responsibility”.

I told Khandaker Moshtaque that I was not afraid of my responsibilities and disgustfully said that if they were my troops, they would have taken my name while declaring Martial Law; but they did not do so. They took your nameis

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khamdak. Uosktgin’s name, meaning the President. Thereafter he apparently softened his voice and said that he was trying to argue how to take care of the legal aspect of the Martial Law. He then said that he initiated this discussion to come to an agreed draft on Martial Law order. With the passage of time Khandaker Moshtaque and his cronies might have guessed what I had in mind. As the conference progressed, it became clear to me that this conference was merely a ploy to tie me down at Bangabhaban. They took this step to make sure that I did not get an opportunity to do anything opposing the authority of Khandaker Moshtaque. So far as I was concerned, what I wanted was to get these boys back to the barracks and then discipline them. To do that at that stage, I was to be seen not too eager to force them back to the barracks. I therefore allowed Khandaker Moshtaque to have his way and tried not to give vent to what I had in my mind. Unfortunately I had no one to confide with to discuss my plan. By then I felt that I could not completely trust anyone who mattered. On the other hand, Major Rashid, Major Farook and Major Dalim etc being Khandaker Moshtaque’s close advisers met with him regularly in Khandaker Moshtaque’s room at Bangabhaban and were taking various steps to consolidate their positions.

The armoured and artillery units having staged a successful Putsch straight away became an elite force and got deployed in and around Bangabhaban for the protection of Khandaker Moshtaque. Apart from the officers of these two units, there were also officers who took part in this rebel action along with armoured and artillery units, but they did not belong to any of these two units. They were from other arms or services but were not in active service then. They were then either retired prematurely or dismissed from service by the government. They, therefore, harboured bitter grudge against the government. So for me to establish proper channel of command and discipline in the army, my first

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task was to separate these officers from the rebel units. To do that I tentatively allocated units to these retired and dismissed officers. In the afternoon of 16th August ’75, I ordered these officers to leave Bangabhaban and join their new units. This was a bombshell for them. They did not expect such orders. They, therefore, for a while appeared to have been shaken and looked at each other with blank faces. The shock was such that some of them even started to shed tears. I left them there to attend the conference, which was to start soon.

Immediately after I left them and before the conference was to start, these officers apparently without any loss of time rushed to Khandaker Moshtaque and communicated this news to him. They were worried and did not want to leave Bangabhaban right then. In the conference room before I could sit down for the conference, Khandaker Moshtaque took me to a corner and asked me to leave these officers at Bangabhaban for a little while longer. He said that they also needed protection now. The people by now knew who had done what, therefore, the lives of these boys were also at risk. I told Khandaker Moshtaque that until and unless we quickly established the proper chain of command and discipline, we would have problem. He still insisted to give them some more time. At this stage I could not exert beyond this, lest he doubted me. After the conference I therefore called the officers once again and told them that they might stay at Bangabhaban for some more time and also said that I would let them know when to join their new units.

The next day i.e., on 17th August ’75, Brig. Khaled came and told me that the armoured unit that staged the rebellion did not have main gun ammunition with them. On getting this information, I felt as if an electric current had passed through my body. This was very welcome news to me. I really became happy to know that the tanks were without live ammunitions. Without main gun ammunitions, these

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tanks were nothing but Pill boxes. I felt that I was in a stronger position to deal with them more firmly than before and to be sure I once again asked Brig. Khaled : is it really true? He said, “Yes Sir it is true” and further added that he issued them the ammunition the day before yesterday (i.e. on 15th August). I was shocked and while expressing my annoyance told him, “How could you issue ammunitions to the rebel troops and that too without my permission?” He said, “I thought everything was over and there was no harm in issuing them the ammunition then, so I did”.

I knew Brig. Khaled well; he was not an irresponsible person. I had full confidence in him but I was surprised with this action of his. It was not like Khaled. Naturally I was shocked. So the way I became exalted with the first part of the news, the same way I became equally disenchanted with the second part of the news. Brig Khaled must have realized his mistake, so he apparently looked remorseful. If it really was a mistake, it was a very costly mistake. However, Brig. Khaled was not a fool. He could not have issued the ammunition without any purpose behind. Whatever might be the purpose, good or bad, if I knew about this in time I would not have allowed him to issue ammunition to the rebels. It was unthinkable to issue ammunitions to the rebel troops and that too when they were still not under our control. If without the ammunitions these fellows could go for such venture, now with live ammunitions in their hand they were going to be my headache.

After Brig. Khaled left me, I was sitting alone and was feeling dejected and was thinking did Brig. Khaled betray me? I was quite upset and was wondering whom to trust now. About this time Major Rashid came and sat on the sofa opposite me. In the context of military Putsch that had taken place, Major Rashid was one of the masterminds, in fact the main one. On the one hand he was the CO of the artillery unit that rebelled and on the other he was a distant nephew of Khandaker Moshtaque. The other rebel unit was

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armoured and its Second-in-Command /Acting Commander was Major Farook-ur-Rahman. Major Rashid and Major Farook were related. They were brother-in-laws. Their wives were two real sisters. When Major Rashid was sitting in front of me, I asked him and said, “How could you do a thing like that?” He said, “Sir it is a long story”. I said, “I have time”.

He then started to narrate and said that they undertook this mission with hardly any chance of success. For them it was just a gamble. He further said that had they failed in their mission and were alive, in that scenario, before they were taken to the gallows, they would have told everyone that all the senior officers were behind this effort. They also would have said that they went for this action only to execute the orders of the senior officers. I interrupted him and asked what did you mean by all the senior officers? On this query, he said that in Dhaka except ‘you Sir’ most of the senior officers were approached and were informed about their intention. I was shocked at this disclosure of Major Rashid. He further said that he did make an attempt to tell me too, but did not have the courage to talk about this to me.

To elaborate this remark he said, “Sir, do you remember, me and my wife called on you at Shena Bhaban (chiefs official residence) during the last Eid day (Eid-ul-Fitr—a Muslim religious festival)”. I said, “Yes I remember”. He then said, “Sir, if you remember, on that day I talked about many things including the course that I did in India. But the purpose for which I went to your house could not be achieved”. That was the day I went to tell you what we had in mind. I asked him if that was the purpose then why didn’t? He said, “Sir although I stayed long enough with you, yet I couldn’t pick up enough courage even to broach the subject with you”. I then asked him who the other seniors were whom he approached and what were their responses? I also enquired whether they approached the

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junior officers. If so, what sort of response they got from them? Finally I also asked him the level of junior officers they approached for support and their approximate number. He then said that first of all they discussed about this with mid-ranking and junior officers i.e., Lt Cols and Majors. According to his version, they apparently welcomed this idea and opined that the senior officers must also be associated in this venture. Without the support of the senior officers, they might not be able to accomplish this mission. With that suggestion in mind, they approached the senior officers. While naming the senior officers, he mentioned the names of Deputy Chief General Zia, CGS Brig. Khaled Mosharraf and Dhaka Brigade Comd Colonel Shafaat Jamil. On hearing these names, I almost fell from the sky. Whom do I trust now? I asked him what response he got ,from these officers.

On this query of mine, he said that the first person he approached with this proposal was Brig. Khaled. The day he went with this proposal to Brig. Khaled in his office, Colonel Shafaat Jamil, the Dhaka Brigade Comd was also present there. He, therefore, approached both of them with their proposal to overthrow the government. According to him, Brig. Khaled did not take him seriously and brushed aside his proposal saying ‘‘Get away and don’t be childish”. Thereafter, he went to General Zia with the same proposal, who allegedly said that he (General Zia) being a senior officer could not be overtly associated with them. He, however, allegedly told him to go ahead and assured him that if their action succeeded he would give them a helping hand. The most surprising thing was that none of these officers who were approached by Major Rashid ever brought this to my notice.

Major Rashid allegedly had been encouraged with the positive response from my Deputy, General Zia. Having responded favourably to Major Rashid’s proposal, it was not expected that General Zia would report this to me. But what

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about Brig. Khaled or Colonel Shafaat Jamil? They had no reason to hide this from me! None of these officers reported to me about the proposal of Major Rashid, even if those proposals were childish or even uttered jokingly. Hearing from a person who staged a successful military Putsch, how could I have confidence in those officers whom he named? Although I did not believe him straight away thinking that he was trying to poison my mind about the senior officers, yet would I be wrong if I did think differently about them?

So after this disclosure of Major Rashid, everything in front of me was becoming clearer. In spite of my specific orders to move troops to oppose this action, Colonel Shafaat Jamil did not order his troops to move in the morning of 15th August ’75. Colonel (later Major General) MA Manzoor arrived from New Delhi on the same afternoon without any permission to confer with Khandaker Moshtaque. General Zia since morning was trying to divert my attention from the killing of the President to the supposed Indian invasion on our territory. Everything was then getting vividly clear to me. I was surrounded by a bunch of conspirators and selfseekers hence could not trust anyone any more. The person whom I could rely on was Brig. Khaled Mosharraf, but he too appeared to be not on the right track. I had no idea if he had different strategy in mind. Otherwise why did he issue tank ammunitions to the rebel troops during that crises-ridden period without keeping me informed? Please note that these tanks had participated in this military Putsch without the main gun ammunitions. I could not comprehend what was the compulsion to issue live ammunitions to rebel troops when they were still out of his actual control.

The marathon conference continued till very late on the night of 17th/18th August ’75. On that night while conducting the meeting, Khandaker Moshtaque told us that he would produce a draft Martial Law Order in the morning. After he left us (Air Vice Martial AK Khandker, Rear Admiral MH Khan, Brig. Khalil-ur-Rahman and I), we ordered for tea and

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spent another night at Bangabhaban. Early in the morning after ‘Fazar’ prayer (Morning Prayer), Khandaker Moshtaque came down from his room and joined us.

Khandaker Moshtaque having taken his seat took out a folded piece of paper from his right pocked and extended that to me. As I was sitting on his right, so he handed that over to me. It was that promised draft. I in the process of going through the draft told Khandaker Moshtaque to go and take rest, so that we could go through it and see if there was anything wrong. The moment I uttered these words, Khandaker Moshtaque’s facial expression changed and he gave me a nasty and irritated look. I soon realized that I must have done something to offend him.

True I did injure the pride of his Law profession when I said that we would see if there was anything wrong. Hardly had I finished the sentence when Khandaker Moshtaque suddenly flared up and said, “General Safiullah, I had been working on this for the last three months”. I could not believe my ears what I heard. I was stunned and said, “In that case it must be right” and passed that piece of paper over to Air Vice Martial AK Khandker who was sitting next to Khandaker Moshtaque. I did not know whether Khandaker Moshtaque realized what he said. It may also be that by then he became too confident of what he was doing and cared little what we might think. I, therefore, had no illusion as to who was behind all these. The same draft ‘Martial Law Order’ was later gazetted on 20th August ’75.

From 15th August onwards with the pretext of conference, I was not allowed to get out of Bangabhaban, till the morning of 18th August ’75 i.e., for a period of over 72 hours. In other words technically I remained under close surveillance during this period and therefore, on some pretext or the other, I was not allowed to go out of Bangabhaban. During those three days at Bangabhaban, I was wearing the same clothes that I wore on 15th August ’75.

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However, after this session. I was allowed to leave Bangabhaban for my office. By the time I left Bangabhaban, Khandaker Moshtaque must have been assured of the consolidation of his position, because when I left for the Army HQ no one followed me. Otherwise till then, Mr. Taher-ud-din Thakur remained my constant companion at Bangabhaban and Major Rashid, Major Farook and Major Dalim had been shadowing me all the time.

The moment I returned to my office, my ADC told me that a strong discontent was prevailing amongst the troops of 46 Brigade especially the troops in the Infantry battalions. The reason for this discontent was that the armoured and artillery troops having been successful in overthrowing the government had been bragging about their performance. They, therefore, started to feel superior to the other troops, especially the Infantry. The Infantry soldiers were thus subjected to taunting and jeers. By the time the Infantry soldiers realized that they had been deceived to believe that the military action on that day took place on the orders of the Chief of Army Staff, it was too late for them to correct it. They, therefore, had been repenting for their mistake.

Khandaker Moshtaque by that time had consolidated his position in the country as well as abroad. He quickly formed his government consisting almost entirely of Bangabandhu’s cabinet. Since there was no apparent outcry or sign of backlash in the country at the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family, he looked fairly confident. In the diplomatic arena Khandaker Moshtaque received US blessings. Saudi Arabia and China formally recognized Bangladesh. These two countries along with Pakistan quickly proposed to establish their resident diplomatic mission in Dhaka. However, in order to assess the overall situation, I on return to my headquarter had a brief meeting with DCOS General Zia and CGS Brig. Khaled in my office and decided to hold a conference with all the concerned people on the same evening of 18th August

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’75. The Chief of other services were also invited to attend to have their views.

The same evening around 7.30 pm. we all gathered in my Ops Room. Those who attended this conference were the Air Chief AVM AK Khandker, the Naval Chief Rear Admiral Mli Khan, DCOS General Zia, PSOs of the Army HQ, DG-BDR Brig. Khalil-ur-Rahman, DG DFI Brig. Rouf (Brig. Rouf was still holding the charge of DG as he did not hand over to Colonel Jamil before he was killed) and IG Police Mr. Nurul Islam. Apart from the officers mentioned above, Colonel MA Malek the DMO and Lt Col (later Lt General) Nur-ud-din Khan the GSO-l (Ops) were also in the Ops Room.

The moment I initiated the discussion, Brig. Rouf said that it had been observed during the last few days that many of us could not keep secret to ourselves, and therefore, some of us might not feel free to speak out their mind. Today surely we were here to discuss matters that were secret or at least confidential in nature. Therefore, before we start the discussion, every one of us must take fresh oath of secrecy. Brig. Rouf must have had someone in mind in our present company; otherwise there was no reason for him to raise this question there. Taking of oath was not necessary because we as service-persons routinely took oath as per official secrets act and this I thought was enough for any self-disciplined officer. But I suppose the subject being very sensitive in nature, someone amongst the participants might not open up and therefore, no one opposed the proposal made by Brig. Rouf for a fresh oath.

In that meeting, we reviewed the entire situation including the trans-border development, but the most important point of our discussions was the death of Bangabandhu and the breakdown of channel of command in the army. It was thought that until and unless we quickly established our authority and enforced discipline in the forces, our discussion would be futile. Some of

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participants in this conference strongly condemned the action of 15th August ’75. Almost everyone abhorred the carnage and opined that disciplinary action must be taken against those who violated the military code of conduct. It was also stressed that before taking any disciplinary action against these boys, a sense of confidence should be installed in them so that they were brought under control gradually. After the incident of 15th August I did not get an opportunity to meet the Fmn Comd‘s. I therefore instructed CGS to arrange a conference on the next day i.e., on 19th August. Keeping in view the points that we discussed in my Ops Room on 18th August, I told Brig. Khaled to ask Major Rashid and Major Farook to remain present in the Army HQ on 19th August and be available to be called in during the conference if I thought it was necessary.

The next day i.e., on 19th August, before the start of the conference, the Comd 46 Brigade Colonel Shafaat Jamil wanted to see me urgently. Since there was still some time for the conference to start, I asked my ADC to escort him in. He came in along with his BM Major Hafiz. Having taken his seat, Colonel Shafaat hesitatingly started the conversation and came to the point and said, “Sir, don’ t trust your Deputy General Zia. He is behind the whole conspiracy”. Major Hafiz also joined with Colonel Shafaat Jamil in branding General Zia as conspirator. I did not know whether they really meant what they said about General Zia, but one thing was certain that at least for once they were trying to give me a correct picture. The question was why so late realization and why not before?

In any case, I could not straightaway take them into confidence. The reason being, on the morning of 15th August in spite of my clear and definite instructions to Colonel Shafaat Jamil to launch the Infantry battalions to oppose the rebels, he did not act or react. He in fact disobeyed my orders and did not order his troops to move. After the incident on that morning, if he was sincere he did not need

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to wait for any body’s order. The moment he came to know about the incident from whatever the source might be, he only had to act and then report to me what he was doing. He had that authority inbuilt in his command, which he did not exercise or did not want to exercise. Mind you, Major Rashtd‘s revelation was also working in my mind that Colonel Shafaat Jamil was also present when Major Rashid made his proposal about their intention to Brig. Khaled. That night be one of the reasons he consciously or unconsciously did not react and his mind-set might have been with them.

I would not have disbelieved Colonel Shafaat if I thought that he was sincere. The reason I made this comment was because he did not act on my orders. On the contrary he in spite of my orders to oppose the rebels went to Deputy Chief General Zia to take orders. I know when I ordered him he did not have enough reaction time to save the President. But again when I ordered him, none of us knew that there was not enough time to save the President. Had he acted on my orders, only then I could have said whether he had enough time to save the President or not. The fact was that in spite of my orders, he did not order his troops to move. My orders were to oppose the rebels. It was not the time factor that prevented him to move troops. I suppose he might not have ordered to move troops for entirely different reason and that reason could be absolutely contrary to my orders. Had he been sincere, he would have kept me informed about his activities, which he did not do till the morning of 19th August ’75.

I came to know about this incident only after the rebel troops were moving to their objectives. Immediately after I was informed about this ominous design, I ordered Colonel Shafaat Jamil to move his troops to oppose that action without any loss of time. The time was probably around twenty minutes to six or quarter to six when I ordered him. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated probably around six or past six in the morning. So when I

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ordered Colonel Shafaat to move troops to oppose that action, he hardly had twenty to twenty-five minutes reaction time to order and dispatch the troops to save the President. On the other hand, the attackers were already on their way or on the objectives to strike. For Colonel Shafaat Jamil, it was practically impossible to save the President in such predicament.

We became aware that it was an impossible task to save the President only after his death and not before. The question therefore, arises what did Colonel Shafaat Jamil do or what steps did he take before he found that it was too late to save the President? What I saw on that day was that Colonel Shafaat Jamil did not order his troops to move. How do we say then that he did not have enough reaction time? Why didn’t he order his troops to move? Did anyone bar him to take that step? It was only Colonel Shafaat who could answer these questions. When I ordered Colonel Shafaat to mobilize his troops, till then I was also unaware exactly what was happening in Bangabandhu’s house or elsewhere, except what DMI, Lt Col Salah-ud-din and Colonel Jamil Ahmed, MS (P) told me. Colonel Shafaat kept me in complete darkness about his activities. In fact he did not inform me anything about his activities on that day and thereafter.

Colonel Shafaat came to tell me about General Zia and the rebel troops almost four days after the incident. Why did he take such a long time to tell me this? Was it to clear his conscience or was it that he was being cold- shouldered by the rebel troops? By then the rebel troops too might have lost the usefulness of Colonel Shafaat and thus they might have distanced themselves from him. I suppose this may be one of the reasons why he came to tell me all these after such a long time! Since I did not notice any activity of Colonel Shafaat or the movement of his troops to oppose the rebels even fifteen to twenty minutes after my orders, became apprehensive. I therefore, tried to get in touch with

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him over telephone to know what he was doing. Unfortunately he could not be reached. His telephone was hung up. I thought it then that due to panic situation Colonel Shafaat might not have put the hand-set properly on the set. It was also possible that Colonel Shafaat in a hurry may not have kept the receiver on the set or it could also be that the rebel troops had neutralized him. Otherwise there was no reason for Colonel Shafaat to do this intentionally.

Till then this was the impression that I had about Colonel Shafaat Jamil. It did not cross my mind till then that he could also be in league with the group that took part in the military Putsch. (Colonel Shafaat Jamil was Bangabandhu’s pick to command this brigade). If he did not have anything to do with this Putsch, then why did he avoid me till 19th August ’75, the day I called for a conference. He was the Brigade Commander and the commander of the troops. He was the one to act and on whom everything hinged. He knew it too. But then why did he take four days to come to me to speak about this? If he could approach me four days after the incident, then what was stopping him to approach me earlier? By then many things happened. Mind you. on 17th August ’75, Major Rashid told me that amongst others they had also approached and informed Colonel Shafaat J arnil what they had in mind and what they wanted to do. I therefore, had all the reasons to doubt his sincerity on that day i.e., on 19th August ’75 and he gave me that chance to doubt him.

I could not be sure about Major Hafiz either, because on the morning of 15th August ’75 I found Major Hafiz and Major Rashid together. On that day in the morning at 46 Brigade area, I saw both of them very intimately associated with each other. Till then I did not have the faintest idea about Major Rashid that he was the mastermind behind this military Putsch. But Colonel Shafaat and Major Hafiz knew about it in the morning. Yet on that day Major Hafiz and Major Rashid jointly requested me to go to the radio station

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So how could I be sure about Major Hafiz’s fidelity either? In the light of these circumstances would I be wrong for not taking them into my confidence? Anyway, before Colonel Shafaat took leave from me, I told him that I would be ordering the armoured and the artillery units to all back in the unit lines, so that I could send them for some assignment towards the border. So if he felt that the rebel troops had violated the channel of command, he would have then ample opportunity to discipline them. To take this step, they must be under his effective control.

After the incident of 15th August 1975, this was my first meeting with the an Comd’s where I could talk to them personally. In this conference, I told them under what circumstances I had to own the rebel troops. There was a lively discussion and a thorough post-mortem of what had happened on that day. While briefing everyone about the incident, I narrated to them the whole events. Thereafter, before I went into detailed discussions on my future plan, I asked CGS to call in Major Rashid and Major Farook. Earlier they were asked to remain available in the Army HQ, so that they could be called in. After giving the overview of the past few days, I dwelt on two important issues. First, the state of discipline and the break down of channel of command; second, the trans-border developments. While dwelling on the first issue, I expressed my complete and total disappointment about everything (this tick-off was primarily aimed at 46 Brigade Comd). I said that if this was the state of command and control and the state of discipline, we would not be able to fulfil our primary obligations i.e., protect the country from foreign aggression.

Impressing on the second issue, I said that there were reports that the Indian army was massing troops near our borders. In the context of what had happened in the country, these manoeuvres couldnot be taken lightly. (In actual fact there was no abnormal movement of troops beyond our borders, yet I gave more stress on this aspect. This I did with

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some purpose behind). Since General Zia and Major Farook had been showing extraordinary concern about the Indian troops manoeuvre near our border right from the first day, I dramatized this issue to bring home the importance of command and control. (My main aim was to bring the rebel troops under my control). This way I also wanted to give a feeling to my Deputy that I did take him seriously about the reported manoeuvre of the Indian troops. Concluding my briefing on the operational aspect, I told the Fmn Comd’s that the ‘Ops Order’ was under preparation and would be sent to them the moment it was ready. In the meantime they should go ahead with the preparation to move to their Operational areas.

By raising the India bogey, the crucial point that I wanted to bring home was that unless and until we established proper channel of command and enforced discipline in the forces quickly, we would not be able to encounter what we were about to face. The danger was knocking at our door. We still had time to act. Thereafter, addressing Major Rashid and Major Farook, I said to them that before they lost grip on their men, they must establish proper channel of command (there had been some stray incidents amongst these troops). We were now faced with serious challenges and we should not let down the country for personal gains. Finally, I concluded the meeting ordering Major Rashid and Major Farook to pull out their troops from Bangabhaban immediately, so that they could be regrouped for their next assignment in their operational area. My primary aim of this conference was to withdraw the rebel troops from Bangabhaban to the cantonment. Till I could bring them back to the barracks, I was not in a position to take any action against them. They were out of my reach. The moment I concluded the meeting, the Dhaka Brigade Comd Colonel Shafaat Jamil suddenly flared up and addressing Major Rashid and Major Farook said that these

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two officers and their men had violated the normal chain of command. so they must be punished. While shouting at them, he further said that he would see to it that these two officers were “Court Martialled’. It was a sudden and unexpected outburst. I had to order Colonel Shafaat Jamil to stop and told him that he should have taken precaution in time so that his under-command did not violate the normal channel of command. With this outburst of Colonel Shafaat, Major Rashid and Major Farook were visibly upset. I immediately felt that Colonel Shafaat had sabotaged my chance to consolidate my command without a bloodbath. I still wonder why Colonel Shafaat had to act the way he did! Was that a guilty feeling or an intentional act to sabotage my effort? If so, who’s cause he was serving?

Colonel Shafaat was the Dhaka Brigade Comd. Everyone’s eye was on this brigade. Whether it was military circle or civilian, everyone had been watching the performance of this brigade keenly, especially during the crisis period of 15th August ’75. Colonel Shafaat knew it well that Bangabandhu picked him up personally to command this brigade and unfortunately it was his troops who assassinated Bangabandhu. He was naturally very upset with this tragic incident. During the conference when the postmortem was on, Colonel Shafaat was seen to be a very frustrated commander. His under-command had violated the normal channel of command and staged a military Putsch, which he could not prevent. As commander of the force, naturally, he was likely to be very upset.

The entire incident must have been haunting Colonel Shafaat. He, therefore, had to voice his resentment somehow and somewhere. His sudden outburst was probably an act to put up a brave face in front of his colleagues. This may be the reason that he flared up and threatened to ‘Court Martial’ Major Rashid and Major Farook. In any case, the conference table was not the right place to do this. If he really wanted to ‘Court Martial’ them, then why was be waiting all these

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days? Why didn’t he put them under arrest earlier when they were freely and singly moving in the cantonment? If he could not take any action then, in that case he should have waited for an opportune moment to take action when they were under his control. In fact, I was preparing that ground for him This conference was merely for that reason.

The rebel troops target was out side the cantonment area and when they were on their targets, at that time Colonel Shafaat had three infantry battalions under his command in the cantonment area. The troops of these battalions were waiting for his orders. Colonel Shafaat did not give them any order. Thereby, he at the initial stage lost the ground for not taking any step against the rebels. But later what he at least could do was to stop them from entering the cantonment. For that he had ample time and troops. If he did so, in that case the rebel troops could not have dared to come inside the cantonment. In presence of so many troops in the cantonment with Colonel Shafaat, I wonder how could Major Rashid and Major Dalim come in and move freely in the cantonment without being challenged. Why he had to wait four days to say that he would ‘Court Martial’ them? Who stopped him earlier? If he was unable to take any action earlier, then who prompted him to threaten them with ‘Court-Martial’ on the conference table? What was he likely to achieve by this threat?

Did he act on his own or was he prompted to act this way? To clarify his position, these were some questions, which Colonel Shafaat needed to answer. If Colonel Shafaat really wanted to take some action against the rebel group, in that case the best time for him was in the morning of 15th August ’75. Had he acted on my orders, in that case he would not have been in this position. He lost that opportunity by not reacting on my orders and by trying to take orders from my Deputy. For whatever reason till then, since he did not take any action against them, then in that case he should have waited for an opportune moment. These

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fellows were still not under his control, so his outburst and threat on that day instead of improving the situation deteriorated it further. In the process he even spoiled my chance of consolidation.

To discipline this group, my first task was to bring them back to the barracks. They were out of my grip and were also a scared lot. They knew what they had done and what would be the consequences if they failed. So before they could be brought under control they had to be kept under good humour. It was therefore, not an easy task to win their confidence and bring them back within our fold. In order to lessen their tension, I made some concessions to this group, as a result they felt somewhat reassured and were about to respond to my call. Before the start of the conference, when Colonel Shafaat was in my office. I told him what I intended to achieve out of this conference In the conference he also heard me loud and clear when I ordered Major Rashid and Major Farook to pull out their troops from Bangabhaban and return to barracks. His outburst during the conference, therefore, was out of line. What did he gain by this threat? He should have waited to see the outcome of my orders. But his threat made them scared and they on return to Bangabhaban hardened their position.

To understand the command structure of these two rebel units, here are the details. 1 Bengal Lancers–the armoured regiment–being the only unit of its kind was raised in Dhaka under the direct control and supervision of the Army HQ, in particular under CGS. For the purpose of its training, this unit was under Army HQ, but for the purpose of administrative support they were under Station HQ. So far as 1 Field Regiment–the artillery unit–was concerned, they were the direct support unit of 46 Brigade. (Direct Support Unit means–for the purpose of operation they were an integral part of the brigade i.e., under direct command of the brigade). Their training and administration were the responsibility of 46 Brigade. The activities of these two

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units, therefore, under normal circumstances, were supposed to be in the knowledge of the command channel mentioned above However. any unusual activity of any of these two units should normally attract the attention of their immediate superiors.

During the war we did not have any tank but we had a good number of officers and men from various armoured units of Pakistan army. After the independence, therefore, to retain the identity of these armoured personnel, we did not post them to any other arms or services. With these trained soldiers, we raised an armoured regiment without tanks. Before the war. Pakistan army had about 80 tanks in the then East Pakistan. Of those roughly 30 were M-24 medium tanks and the rest were PT-76 amphibious tanks.

After the surrender of Pakistan army, we could lay hand on only four M-24 medium tanks. The rest were either destroyed during the war or taken away by the Indian army. So to keep these troops busy and in good humour we could equip them only with four tanks. The armoured troops thus without the tanks were a very demoralized group. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was appraised of this situation. He having realized the low morale of his troops did not hesitate to raise this issue with the Egyptian President Mr. Anwar Sada’t, when the latter came to Dhaka on a goodwill visit. The President Mr. Anwar Sada’t subsequently offered 30 tanks as gift to Bangabandhu and arranged its dispatch to Bangladesh at an earliest opportunity. On arrival of these tanks, this unit started to organize themselves with new vigour. Who knew then that one day these tanks would be the main instrument to overthrow him (Bangabandhu)?

As far as the training of this unit was concerned, CGS was made responsible for its planning and training. Major Farook, an armoured officer, was made its Acting Commanding Officer and was given the responsibility to train them up. Right then we could not think of raising any

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more armoured unit due to resource and fund constraint. Keeping in mind a large number of senior armoured officers were stranded in Pakistan and who was waiting to be repatriated. I decided to appoint Major Farook as its Acting Commanding Officer. On repatriation from Pakistan, when those ofticers were available, a new Commanding Officer was appointed and Major Farook was made the Second-in-Command of this regiment. Since then he became the most unhappy person. There was another reason for him to be unhappy about. He was not given two years ante-dated seniority which was given to the Freedom Fighters. The reason he was not given this honour, was because he did not qualify for it.

During the liberation war, when we were fighting against the Pakistanis, Major Farook was serving in an armoured regiment in the then West Pakistan. From there he was sent to Abu Dhabi on deputation to serve with the Gulf Forces. When every patriotic officers and men, including those who were under surveillance, were defecting from Pakistan army to join the liberation war, Major Farook was enjoying a rare freedom and a lucrative foreign assignment with the Gulf Forces. He, however, came to join the liberation forces when the war was almost over and he was recalled by Pakistan army from his foreign assignment. He then had to decide which army he wanted to serve and finally came to join Bangladesh army. After the war, the government gave, two years ante-dated seniority to the Freedom Fighters in recognition of their contribution in the war. To qualify for this ante-dated seniority, one had to have a minimum period of service with the liberation forces. Since Major Farook did not fulfil that prerequisite, he was not given that ante-dated seniority. As a result he always grumbled.

As the CGS was made responsible for the training of the armoured regiment, the Commanding Officer of this unit was required to maintain a close and frequent contact with

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the CGS. However, apart from the official relationship between CGS Brig Khaled and acting CO Major Farook, they were also related Major Farook was Brig. Khaled’s distant nephew After repatriation and even after Major Momen became the Commanding Officer of this regiment, Major Farook continued to maintain the same level of official contact with the CGS. This created some command problem. The problem was that Major Farook taking advantage of his relationship with CGS at times used to get things done from the Army HQ over the head of his CO, thereby undermining the authority of the CO. When this came to my knowledge I advised Brig. Khaled to be more prudent.

During the course of issuance of training directive, night training as usual was incorporated for all units in their training syllabus. In the training syllabus of armoured unit too, the directive was that they should do night training at least once every fortnight. On receipt of this order, this unit had regularly went doing night training on every alternative Thursday/Friday night, (Night 14th/15th August ’75 was Thursday/Friday night). Similar instructions for night training were also issued for all other units. The training area in Dhaka cantonment was very limited and it was kept under the control of the Station Commander.

In so far as the allotment of these training areas to various units and Formations were concerned, the Station Comd in consultation with the CGS used to make the allocation. In view of this, CGS in particular had to know where the armoured and 46 Brigade troops went for training. They had to know about this for another reason and it was the coordination, allocation and demarcation of the training areas between the Operational Comds and the Station Comd. During the collective training period, the armoured and the artillery units were doing their night training jointly. That these two units were doing night training together was not unknown to CGS and the Comd 46 Brigade, because they

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belonged to two different Formations and the commanders of those Formations had to know about their activities.

According to Major Rashid and Major Farook, they had been conspiring to overthrow the government for quite some time. To achieve their goal they needed some trusted, dedicated and trained soldiers. So in the guise of night training they had been taking out their troops from the unit lines and had been preparing them for this purpose. Except for few hardcore soldiers especially motivated by Major Rashid and Major Farook in their respective units, the rest of the troops were kept in complete dark, about their real intention. According to Major Rashid’s disclosure, when he broached this subject with the like-minded officers, he got encouraging response. But most of them, who gave him positive response, wanted to remain as covert supporter and did not want to do anything overtly. Major Rashid claimed that he approached Brig Khaled and Colonel Shafaat Jamil with their plan but they did not take him seriously and brushed aside his proposal as childish. They took him so casually that the preparations Major Rashid and Major Farook were making right under their nose went unnoticed.

Dhaka is the capital of the country and stationing of Armed Forces HQ in the capital i.e., near the ‘Seat of Power’ was not an unusual arrangement. But locating an active brigade near the capital probably needs careful consideration. When this brigade was located in Dhaka no one including me ever thought about its long term implications. They were located there with no ill motive behind. The reason this brigade was located at Kurmitola was because, before the partition of India a military cantonment was located at Kurmitola. After partition in 1947, even Pakistan army retained Kurmitola as military cantonment. We inherited this from Pakistan where troops accommodations were readily available and that partially solved our initial problem when we were raising the army. However, stationing a regular brigade at Kurmitola—almost

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right in the capital later became a very important factor. This was why this brigade assumed a very special status, so was its commander. The commander of this brigade. therefore, had to be a professional soldier with no political ambition.

Dhaka being the ‘Seat of Power’, it was naturally the focal point of all the national activities. All the Formation Commanders. therefore, aspired to become commander of this brigade. Consequently a sort of friendly professional rivalry/jealousy existed amongst the Brigade Commanders to be the chosen one for this station. The government naturally wanted a commander who was dependable and loyal to the authority. At the same time some ambitious ones clandestinely worked to place a commander of their choice, who would be their protégé. During the liberation war, Colonel Shafaat Jamil had served under Brig. Khaled as well as General Zia. Both of them, therefore, were his promoters. As a result, in the selection of this Fmn Comd’s there were lot of politics involved. A professional soldier was likely to get mixed up here. Colonel Shafaat’s war-time commanders took initiative to introduce him to the PM.

I was the first brigade commander of Dhaka Brigade. Once I became the Chief in April ’72, the command of this brigade fell vacant. Of the battalion commanders, Major (later Lt Col) Zia-ud-din was the senior-most. He was a natural choice and was thus appointed as the commander of this brigade. From the point of view of professionalism, Major Zia-ud-din was an excellent choice but regrettably his service ended abruptly. The reason being he was dismissed from service for writing an article against the government in a weekly periodical Holiday. He was asked to apologize for that write-up, but Zia-ud-din did not do so. As a result he was dismissed from service. After his dismissal, the next senior officer available was Lt Col (later Major General) Moin-ul Hossain Chowdhury. He was then made the commander of this brigade.

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Lt Col Moin because of his demeanour, blunt and over-candid views antagonized some people, but his sincerity, so far as I knew, was never in question. There was a quiet smear campaign against him and it became difficult for me to retain him in his post. This propaganda appeared to have reached Bangabandhu, who at one stage desired to see a change in the command of Dhaka brigade. His desire naturally was an order for me. The net result of this smear campaign against Lt Col Moin was that he had to be moved from the command of this brigade. I have a feeling that some one amongst us played a part in poisoning the mind of Bangabandhu against Lt Col Moin. Once it was decided that Colonel Moin be shifted, a search was on to find a suitable officer to replace him.

This search was probably just a show. I tried to convince Bangabandhu not to shift Colonel Moin from his post, but he appeared to have made up his mind. During this period Colonel Shafaat Jamil had done some good work in tackling ‘Naxalite’ uprising at Chapainoabganj Rajshahi. He thus came to the notice of Bangabandhu, who ordered me to appoint Colonel Shafaat Jamil as Dhaka Brigade Comd. Though apparently it looked as if Shafaat was the personal choice of Bangabandhu, yet I felt that it was his war-time commanders who had put in their input in the selection of Colonel Shafaat Jamil as Dhaka Brigade Comd. This was how Shafaat became the Comd 46 Brigade. Naturally, now the question arises did Colonel Shafaat rise up to the expectation of Bangabandhu or did he stray? Some of colonel Shafaat’s actions on 15th August ’75 appeared to be not on the right track. My observation about Colonel Shafaat is that on that day his actions did not reflect the trust bestowed on him.

During the conference on 19th August ’75, I gave orders to Major Rashid and Major Farook to pull out the troops from Bangabhaban to the barracks and was waiting for them to move. As there was no reaction from their side till 22nd

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August, so I went to Bangabhaban to make sure that they moved. There in Bangabhaban. Khandaker Moshtaque asked me to allow them there for a few more days. I told Khandaker Moshtaque that I needed them to be regrouped and send them out towards the border. In spite of my assertion, Khandaker Moshtaque insisted to retain them at Bangabhaban for some more time and told me that by another few days’ time things would become normal and their fear of being persecuted would be over. The reason for this was probably Colonel Shafaat‘s threat of ‘Court Martial‘ I could not pressurise Khandaker Moshtaque further than this at that time, lest my plan got frustrated.

On 22nd August ‘75 when I went to Bangabhaban, I on that day did not see Major Rashid. Someone later confidentially told me that Khandaker Moshtaque had sent Major Rashid to West Germany to bring back Group Captain Towab. Khandaker Moshtaque probably could not have full confidence in AVM AK Khandker, as he was Bangabandhu’s appointed Chief. He needed someone around him, who would tow his line, so he sent for Group Captain Towab from West Germany. During the liberation war when we were fighting, Group Captain Towab was in Germany. He was free to move anywhere and had the freedom to join us. But when he was asked to join the liberation forces, he wanted to know what post would be given to him if he joined. The Prime Minister Mr. Taj-ud-din Ahmed rightfully did not like the attitude of Group Captain Towab, so he did not respond. Khandaker Moshtaque, therefore, found a well wisher in him, so he sent for him.

Having taken control of state power, Khandaker Moshtaque on the one hand sent Major Rashid to fetch Group Captain Towab from West Germany and on the other hand, summoned General Osmany for discussion. Before General Osmany met Khandaker Moshtaque, there was already a quiet whisper in the air that he had been tipped as the Defence Adviser to the President. 24th August ’75 was

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Sunday and I tuned the radio to listen to the news. It was only five minutes news bulletin. In this news bulletin, amongst other news it was also said that General Osmany had been appointed as the Defence Adviser to the President. Hardly this bulletin was over, my red telephone rang up. It was Khandaker Moshtaque on the other end. He enquired if I had listened to the radio news. When I said yes I did, he wanted to know whether I liked this appointment. What could have been my answer? After having appointed General Osmany as his Adviser, he did not need anybody’s views, so I said : yes I liked it. He then told me that he wanted to see me at Bangabhaban at 5.30 in the afternoon. As desired by Khandaker Moshtaque, I went to Bangabhaban in the afternoon to meet him. But before I could reach him, I was intercepted by MS (P) who told me that General Osmany wanted to see me before I went to see Khandaker Moshtaque. So I went to the office of General Osmany first. By then General Osmany had been given an office at Bangabhaban. When I reached Bangabhaban, I saw General Zia and Brig. Khalil leave Bangabhaban in a hurry. It looked as if they had been assigned certain tasks and that might be the reason for them to leave Bangabhaban in such a hurry. The moment I was with General Osmany, it appeared that he was anxiously waiting for me.

As I entered his office, General Osmany welcomed me and offered me a seat. The moment I sat down he started the conversation and said, “Safiullah, as Army Chief your contribution towards building this army has been remarkable. You have built this institution brick by brick from nowhere. I know what I left behind for you and today we have a very fine army”. You can be proud of it. I said, “Sir, thank you for your compliments. Sir, I not only feel Proud, I feel that this institution is part of me. I gave my heart and soul to raise this Army”. He then gradually started to break the news. I was not ready for the bombshell that he was about to come out with. I still did not realize that
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General Osmany was making a farewell speech to me. I thought having taken over as Defence Adviser, General Osmany was trying to be friendly and keep the Army Chief in good humour. Little did I realize that my command had been ceased and I had been dethroned.

He then suddenly came to the point and said, “Safiullah, certainly you have made a remarkable contribution for this country during the war of liberation as well as afterwards. The country now needs your service abroad. The President wants you to take up an Ambassadorial assignment in any country you want to go”. For me it was a bolt from the blue. On hearing what he said, I gave him a blank look. I was not prepared to listen to this. So I enquired, “Who is replacing me?” He said, “Zia”. I enquired, “Does Zia know?” He replied, “Yes, he has been told”. Thereafter what could I have said? I enquired, “When this changeover would take place?” He replied, “It would be effective from today and right now”. I said then, “Khandaker Moshtaque had asked me to see him”.

At this stage, a messenger came and said that Khandaker Moshtaque was looking for me. As I got up to go to Khandaker Moshtaque, General Osmany also accompanied me. Khandaker Moshtaque on seeing me greeted me with his usual courtesy and made me seat next to him. He then made some sort of coded signal to General Osmany, probably to know if I had been informed. General Osmany nodded, which was probably an affirmative signal. Khandaker Moshtaque also broached on the same subject as was done by General Osmany. Here again Khandaker Moshtaque also started to give me a lot of morale-boosting sermon. Like General Osmany, he too started to eulogise me for my deeds. I knew all those high sounding words Khandaker Moshtaque used for praising me, were mere words. It did not mean a thing. In other words I had just been dumped and Khandaker Moshtaque virtually planned to send me on exile and wanted to gauge my reaction

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In response to Khandaker Moshtaque‘s proposal, I said that right now I have no intention to go on a foreign assignment. He probably did not expect this response from me. On this response of mine his reaction was quite rude. He told me, “Don’t you want safety for you and your family? Haven’t you seen what happened to Sheikh Mujib and his family?” He then told me that he made this proposal for my own and my family’s safety. In other words this was a threat to me as well as to my family. I was young then and was hardly forty years old. On this threat of his, my blood pressure rose and I told Khandaker Moshtaque that I am a fatalist and firm believer of God. While saying so, I pointing! my left hand index finger towards the sky told him that it was He who looked after me and my family during the war. I am sure He is still there; again it would be He who would look after me and my family and no one else. Having said that I got up from my seat, picked up my cap and left Bangabhaban with regret that I had been out-manoeuvred by Khandaker Moshtaque and I was denied the pleasure of taking action against these criminals.

Khandaker Moshtaque knew that I did not accept him as President and never addressed him as such. He on his own way was planning to remove me as soon as possible because I was Bangabandhu’s appointed Chief. In the present circumstances therefore, he could not have faith in me. He must have been waiting for an opportune moment to take this action. My continued insistence to remove the armour and artillery units from Bangabhaban area probably helped him to make up his mind to replace me without any further delay. Major Rashid, Major Farook, Major Dalim and rest of the gang might have also contributed to his decision making. They might have insisted to strike fast before they were taken care of.

General Osmany told me at Bangabhaban that General Zia had been appointed as the Chief of Army Staff in my place. On top of it, a new post as Chief of Defence Staff

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(CDS) was created on 24th August ’75 and Brig. Khalil the DG BDR was appointed as CDS. Brig. Khalil on his appointment as CDS was also promoted to the rank of Major General the same day. The creation of this post must have been General Osmany’s brainchild. After lndepcndence during the first Forces/Sector Commanders conference, General Osmany was very keen to introduce the Chief of Defence Staff system in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. His idea about this appointment perhaps was that the CDS being the senior appointment over the three services Chief, would be able to exercise control over the Chiefs. We opposed this post as superfluous, so he could not proceed further. However, as Defence Adviser, when General Osmany got the chance and authority, he introduced it straight away without wasting time. This later proved that we were right and General Khalil the CDS had become a cipher.

From the list of promotees on that day, it would be seen that all the new promotees were repatriated officers. Brig. Khalil-ur-Rahman was promoted to the rank of Major General and was appointed as CDS. Brig. HM Ershad (He was doing ‘ndc’ course in India) was promoted to the rank of Major General and was appointed as Deputy Chief of Army Staff and Brig. Kazi Golam Dastgir was promoted to the rank of Major General and was appointed as DG BDR. All promotions and appointments were made on 24th August ’75 and were to be effective from the same day. Of all the appointments, General Ershad’s appointment as Deputy Chief was most surprising. He was made Deputy Chief without any command experience.

In any case, having declined Khandaker Moshtaque’s offer of an assignment abroad and knowing that I had been dumped, I returned home with a very heavy heart. On that day before I could even reach my home, I was told that General Zia had already taken over the command as Chief. He was in a hurry! When I was at Banga Bhaban, he rushed

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to the Army HQ and addressed the officers as new Chief. I did not even get a chance to hand over to General Zia and was not allowed to bid farewell to my troops. After I returned to my residence I was informed not to leave ‘Shena Bhaban’ the official residence, of the Chief. On the same night, a letter from the Ministry of Defence was delivered to me, which contained dismissal order for me. Khandaker Moshtaque on the ninth day of his Presidency took the decision to dismiss me from service. Interestingly on that day l was the only one against whom Khandaker Moshtaque took this decision, whereas the rest were either given promotions or higher appointments.

The next day i.e. on 25th August ’75, General Osmany rang me up to console me and requested me not to turn down the offer of foreign assignment. I knew General Osmany’s call was not an insincere call. Yet I told him that I am not going anywhere. He requested me not to say ‘no’ and think it over. Thereafter, General Osmany occasionally used to ring me up to know if I had changed my mind. I kept on saying ‘no’ and a time came when I had to say ‘yes’. I changed my mind after the incident of 3rd November ’75, when four national leaders (Mr. Sayed Nazrul Islam, Mr. Taj-ud-din Ahmed, Mr. Mansoor Ali and Mr. Quamr-uzzaman) were brutally murdered in the government’s protective custody at Dhaka Central Jail. In spite of the dismissal order, I had been asked to stay in ‘Shena Bhaban’ and was told not to move out of the house. My order of dismissal was not made public. Even the troops did not know that I had been dismissed from service. I also felt embarrassed to give this news of dismissal to others. The troops probably knew that I was going on a foreign assignment.

I’was staying at ‘Shena Bhaban’—the official residence of the Army Chief, even after I was eased out of service. Apparently though, it looked as if I was a free man, but the truth is that in a way I was also in protective custody. My

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situation was no better than those leaders in Central Jail. Mind you, on 24th August ’75, when I refused the offer of Khandaker Moshtaque to go on a foreign assignment, he reminded me about the fate of Bangabandhu and his family. Thereafter, I saw the fate of four national leaders who were brutally murdered when under protective custody. Consequent to the incident of 3rd November ’75, I had no option but to give my consent to go on a foreign assignment. So these were the circumstances under which I had to go on a foreign assignment. One may call it a cowardly act, well if that was so, I would like to know, how many could have taken such stand? To me then the well-being of my family ranked supreme. I was forced to take this decision and did it for the safety of my wife and children.

On receipt of my consent to go abroad, the Ministry of Defence issued two letters. The first one was to cancel the dismissal order and the second one made me Officer on Special Duty (OSD). My services were later placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for permanent absorption as well as for an assignment abroad. The Foreign Office thereafter sought the ‘Agreement’ from the government of Malaysia. On receipt of the ‘Agreement’ from Kuala Lumpur, I was allowed to move out and was even allowed to go and bid farewell to my troops. A hurried visit under escort was arranged and I was flown to all the four cantonments in a helicopter in two days. Thereafter I left Dhaka for Kuala Lumpur on 3rd January ’76 and remained out of the country till 9th July 1991. About a year after I joined the Foreign Service, I was permanently absorbed in the Foreign Service cadre.

While narrating the circumstances under which Bangabandhu was assassinated, my narration might have been a bit long but to understand the total scenario and the reason how and why such an evil act was committed, this background was necessary. I would also like to mention here that whenever I told Bangabandhu, “Sir your security is not

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adequate.” his response used to be “Safiullah don‘t worry, Bengalis will not kill you or me.” This was his mental strength. The irony was that a very trusted friend of Bangabandhu planned to assassinate him sitting right by his side. It was none other than Khandaker Moshtaque. Bangabandhu made me the Chief but he tied my hands by placing an intriguer by my side. The army that I built would not have gone against him if I had free hands and Bangabandhu did not retain General Zia in service.

Regarding the assassination of Bangabandhu, when the people say that what did the Chief do when such a sinister act was being committed, the answer to that question is in my narration above. Under the circumstances mentioned above, what could the Chief do? I was the Chief but many of my activities were interrupted. On the one hand I did not have a free hand, and on the other a disgruntled element was thrusted on me. Last but not the least Bangabandhu’s big heartedness was another reason for someone to take undue advantage. Bangabandhu at times used to call junior commanders to know things. He probably did not do it to undermine the Chief intentionally, it was probably his habit. But the person whom he called should have known what he was supposed to do. When I was the Dhaka brigade commander, the President used to call me in his office. I made it a point to inform General Osmany the C-in-C immediately before going to the President and after my return, but Colonel Shafaat never told me that he met the President or the President called him. This indulgence made Colonel Shafaat indisciplined and the end result was disaster.

Some people say that the Chief was informed around quarter past five in the morning and Bangabandhu was probably killed around six in the morning. The Chief had forty-five minutes to save the President. Why couldn’t he move troops by that time? One has to understand how the army channel of command functions and how the troops

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movement takes place. There are few stages of preparedness for the troops to move. The preparedness of a soldier varies from situation to situation. First of all, during the war-time each soldier is issued with arms and ammunitions and they remain ready to move to their objectives at a short notice, say fifteen to twenty minutes. Second situation is during emergency. At this stage, the troops remain ready to move at a short notice, yet they are to collect arm, and ammunitions from the Kote (Armoury). In this situation too, it takes about an hour or so to move the troops. The third situation is the peace time. This is the time when things are relaxed.

In peace time, it takes time to move troops. Though the troops remain in the barracks and the time being peace time, they remain in casual mood as no one is mentally or psychologically prepared for such emergency as that of 15th August ’75 or for that matter the crisis in BDR on 25th February ’09. To tackle this situation, the troops have to be ordered to get ready, It takes time as they are to get into uniform. Thereafter, they are to collect weapons. This is a time consuming affair, as the key of the armoury is in the quarter guard and to take out those keys, Duty officers/Duty JCO needs to be called. These takes time. Thereafter, the troops can be moved. This whole process takes no less than two hours. So when someone says that why the Chief could not move troops immediately, the answer to this is that 15th August ’75 was peace time situation. I am now quite sure that the people will understand why the troops could not be moved at such short notice, because it was peace time situation.

Here I would like to draw an analogy regarding the incident of 15th August ’75 with that of the incident of 25th February ’09. In both the cases, the incident of killing took place. But the people blame the head of institution/the authority for not being able to save the affected persons. In both the cases, the agencies who were supposed to keep the authorities informed failed in their duties. The authorities

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came to know only when the attackers were on their targets and the victims were on the gun-point.

In the case of 15th August ’75 incident, the attackers went to their targets which were outside the cantonment. They apparently went to their targets eluding/deceiving the intelligence agencies. This is where the intelligence agencies failed. The victims on being attacked sought help from all the places but none could go for their help/rescue. In the case of 15th August ’75 incident, the attackers probably did not go to eliminate their victims but later they probably took on-the-spot decision to eliminate the victims for their own survival. On that day, the uncommitted troops in the cantonment who could support the action of the Chief also became sympathetic to the attackers; as such the Chief in spite of his sincere efforts could not muster strength to rescue the victims. As he could not muster support for his action, all his efforts failed.

Now let us analyse the incident of 25th February ‘09. The victims and the attackers were at the same place. The attackers had planned to eliminate their captives, as such when the victims were under their grip, they eliminated them without any loss of time. In this case, the supporting elements i.e. the army and the air force were eager to support, but the authorities could not use that support immediately. On the other hand, the victims sought help from all over, but no one went for their help. In both the cases, i.e. 15th August ’75 and 25th February ’09, the victims were murdered. The circumstances under which the victims were in both the cases, they could not be rescued. However, in the 15th August ’75 incident, the troops could not be moved, whereas on 25th February ’09 incident troops were willing to move but they were not used.

It is rumoured and some people say that on 15th August ’75, Bangabandhu rang me up and sought help from me when I allegedly said sorry. It is a complete lie and a fabricated story. Whosoever said this are out to discredit me

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in the eyes of the people? I explained in the previous para that it was not Bangabandhu who called me but it was me who called Bangabandhu. It took me almost about 20 to 25 minutes time to get through to him to warn him that he was in danger. During this 20 to 25 minutes time, Bangabandhu must have been seeking help from someone or the other, but no one came forward to rescue him.

When I spoke to Bangabandhu, the assailants were probably with him. If I had to say sorry to Bangabandhu, in that case why did I ring him up for? I did not ring him up to abandon him. I rang him up to help him. In the Peelkhana incident, General Shakil called the Prime Minister for help, which the Prime Minister recognize to have received his call. Here too, the assailants had taken General Shakil under their grip. To rescue him from that situation, it was an impossible task because the attacked were under gunpoint. In both the cases, the circumstances were such that the victims could not be rescued. In order to call a halt to the blame game, I drew this analogy.

AN ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS 0N 15th AUGUST 1975

Almost immediately after the overthrow of the government of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, I was forced to go on a diplomatic assignment and was kept out of the country till July 1991. During my long absence from the country, many people wrote many things about the incident of 15th August ’75, but I was not aware of what was being written about the incident or about me to contradict the statements that were not true. Consequently those falsehoods were becoming a part of history. In some of those write-ups, I have been portrayed in a very humiliating manner. This was simply a planned conspiracy to do character assassination by some quarters. Whatsoever those quarters may say or do, I have the mental strength to accept my failure and trust that history will judge me whether my actions in those crisis ridden periods were right or wrong.

In the preceding chapters I, to the best of my ability, have tried to put down for the posterity the exact picture of what I did, saw and experienced during those days. Anyone has the right to differ from what I said, but after such a long time there is no reason for me to tell the people other than the truth. It is true that after such a long time there could be some fading of memory, but there are some events that gets imprinted in the memory in such a way that those normally does not get erased. Having explained my personal experience in the preceding chapters, in this chapter, I would like to critically analyze some of the statements made by

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some concerned officers of that time and give my comments on those.

It has not been possible for me to dig out all that has been written about the incident or about me. However I would like to comment on some of the published materials which have come to my notice. The important statements on which I would like to comment on first were of Brig. Rouf and Colonel Shafaat Jamil. The former was DGFI and the latter was the commander of Dhaka Brigade. These two officers were holding key appointments during the period when Bangabandhu was assassinated. Their statements, therefore, need to be analyzed properly. The interviews Of these officers were initially published in a weekly magazine ‘Meghna’ and the same were subsequently compiled and published in a book titled ‘Facts and Documents of the Assassination of Bangabandhu by Prof. Abu Sayeed’. Brig. Rouf’s statements appeared in that book as Annx-Bho, in the pages from 267 to 283 and Colonel Shafaat’s statements appeared as Annx-Raw, in the pages from 293 to 298 of the same book.

Brig.Rouf in that interview made lot of irrelevant remarks about the incident and me. Unfortunately he is not alive today and I really feel sorry to comment on the statements made by a person who is not alive. Under normal circumstances, I would not have bothered to comment on those statements but I am left with no alternative as above referred compilations are now being used for reference purposes. Dr. Hasan-uz-zaman of Dhaka University in his research works referred this book as base material. I therefore, had to take the step to scrutinize his statement and put the facts in their proper perspective. The reason why the incident of 15th August ’75 could not be stalled or prevented or tackled was primarily because of intelligence failure and thereafter because of inaction by the commander of the troops.

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I know Brig. Rouf was a humorous person and he used to impress his audience by telling concocted and humorous stories. But I never realized that on matters of national importance too he would do mockery. Regarding the statement that he has made, my first observation is that he harboured hatred against me as FF, which he reflected in his statement. Most of the officers after repatriation expressed lot of humility towards the FF’s, but some of them hated us most. Brig. Rouf was one of them. My observation about him is that he displayed insolence in his narration. In the Armed Forces, there is no scope to become insolent against one‘s superior. Brig. Rouf was a subordinate officer and the way he narrated his conversation with the Chief of Staff (meaning me) to the media was most objectionable. From his narration, one is likely to get an impression as if he was the Chiefs boss. His tone of narration implied as if he was ordering the Chief. Though the alleged conversation between Brig. Rouf and the Chief never took place (I will prove that he did not speak to me), yet in reality he could not have dared to speak like this with the Chief of Army while in service. He, however, vented out his aversion through this interview when I was not in service.

My first impression about his statement is that he was a very confused person and was talking nonsense. He in his narration said many things; some of it did not make any sense to me. However, I in my scrutiny would try to comment only on the relevant portion. The gist of what he said about 15th August ’75 was as follows:

“On the night of 14th/15th August ’75 around two third at night, one of the counter-intelligence officer of DGFI reported to him that the troops and the tanks planned to go on some mischievous mission on that very night”. Brig. Rouf in his narration said that while the counter-intelligence officer was reporting to him, at that time he even allegedly heard “the sound of automatic fire over the telephone”. He on getting this news as well as hearing the sound of fire over

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the telephone said to the officer that he is not their DG anymore because he (Brig. Rouf) would be formally tanding over his responsibilities to Colonel Jamil the next day i.e., 15th August ’75. Brig. Rouf then directed the officer to go and inform about this incident to his new boss, meaning Colonel Jamil-ud-din Ahmed (then MS-P). The officer then informed Brig. Rouf that he tried to contact his new boss but failed and therefore, he was reporting about this to him. Brig. Rouf thereafter directed the officer to give this information to the President. The informer being a very junior officer apologetically told Brig. Rouf that he couldn’t do that. Brig. Rouf then allegedly rang me (Army Chief) over Red telephone and allegedly informed me about the incident. According to him, after a while he came to my house clad in Lungi and Vest. scalin, over the rear boundary wall. Once he was inside the perimeter of my house, he Brig. Rouf saw General Zia’s car under the porch and exclaimed “What are they (meaning General Zia and me) doing in such late hour of the night?”

In the context of the military Putsch that took place on 15th August ’75, the above-referred statement of Brig. Rouf needs to be carefully and critically analysed. More I go through his statement angrier I become; If one goes through his statement carefully, it would be seen that there are lots of inconsistencies in what he said. I will prove those one by one. For example according to his own statement he (Brig. Rouf) was informed by his counter-intelligence officer around two-thirty on the night of 14th/15th August ’75 that the tanks were moving out of cantonment and were going towards the city, may be towards ‘32 Dhanmondi (incidentally this was the residence of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman). He also said that he even heard the sound of automatic fire from those tanks over telephone at that time of the night, meaning around two-thirty at night.

Let me now compare Brig. Rouf’s statement with that of Major Farook’s and see whether it was possible on the part

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of his informer to give him the news about the movements of tanks at two-thirty at night. According to Major Farook, the tanks did not move out of their unit lines till 4.30 in the morning. If that was the case, then how could Brig. Rouf’s counter-intelligence officer see them moving at two thirty at night and how could Brig. Rouf hear the sound of automatic fire from those tanks at that hour of the night. Please refer to pages 273 to 274 of the book ‘Facts and Documents’.

Now hear the version of the Coupd’etat plotter Major Farook, who ordered the tanks to move to their targets in the civilian area. Major Farook said that he ordered the tanks to move from the cantonment at 4.30 in the morning, but due to some technical reason they could not start in time and as the time was fast running out, he was getting restless. He then said that finally when the tanks started to move from the unit line, which is within the cantonment, ‘Fazar Azan’ (Morning Prayer Call, which is much after 5.00 a.m.) was going on at the cantonment Central Mosque. This was Major Farook’s own statement, which he gave to a reporter of Bangla Bazaar Potrika and the same was published in that paper on 15th August 1993. Let us now look at the other scenario in which Mr. Anthony Mascarenhas while interviewing Major Rashid and Major Farook, the two Coupd’etat plotters questioned them and asked, “On the morning between 5 and 5.30 you sent your teams out to their allotted targets. What did you do? What role had you assigned yourself?” Mind you the rebel troops were assigned their mission to be on their targets between 5 and 5.30 in the morning, so they were not likely to move out of cantonment area before 5 a.m. in any case. So they could not have been seen to be moving or firing at that hour of the night. Whom to believe now? The Coup plotter or the story —teller (Brig. Rouf)?

From the above scrutiny, it would be seen that the tanks had moved out of the cantonment after ‘Fazar Azan’ which was around quarter past five in the morning. Secondly,

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Major Rashid and Major Farook instructed their team leaders to be on their objective between five and five-thirty in the morning. In the light of these two observations, would it be wrong to assume that the troops and the tanks moved some time around quarter past five in the morning. Since the troops were instructed to be on their objectives between five to five-thirty, so it is also reasonable to assume that troops would not have opened fire before they were on their targets and not before. In view of the above, Brig. Rouf could not have heard the sound of automatic fire over the telephone before quarter past five in any case. If he really heard the sound of fire over the telephone, in that case the time must have been after five thirty in the morning and not before, and if he came to my house after hearing the sound of fire, that must have been in the morning and not at night.

Brig. Rouf through his narration proved himself to be an irresponsible officer who shirked his responsibility. According to his own statement (please refer to page 274, last paragraph of the above referred book) when one of his counter-intelligence officer informed him about the design of the tank regiment, he tried to avoid the officer by asking him to report this matter to their new boss or to the President. Mind you, a very serious incident was about to take place which he was trying to sidetrack and avoid. Till then he did not handover his responsibilities to his reliever Colonel Jamil. As such it was his responsibility which he was trying to shirk and pass it on to the junior officer; He even said that he informed me over Red telephone about this sinister design of the tank regiment, which was a blatant lie.

How do I now prove that Brig. Rouf did not ring me up or speak to me on that fateful night? According to his own statement he appeared to have informed me about the movements of the tanks after he was informed by his counter-intelligence officer around two-thirty at night. I have already proved that he could not have got the information of the movement of tanks and the sound of fire at that hour of

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the night, because the tanks did not move out of the cantonment before quarter past five in the morning. So if I say that he lied, would I be wrong? I am sure by now the readers must have understood that Brig. Rouf was capable of taking the shelter of falsehood i.e. lying. Therefore, I would now live it to the readers to judge whether Brig. Rouf was really telling the truth or he was lying.

Brig. Rouf in his statement said that he came to my house climbing over the rear boundary- wall of the house, wearing ‘Lungi and Vest’. I also saw him in that dress. May I ask why he had to come to my house scaling over the rear boundary wall and why he had to be in that outfit? Since morning, when everyone had been coming in and going out of my house through the main gate then why Brig. Rouf had to choose that route? He did not say why but I know why! I will explain it later. Let me first prove that he came to my house in daylight hours and not during dark hours.

Brig. Rouf in his statement said that he on entering my house by sealing over the wall saw General Zia’s car standing under the porch at my residence and exclaimed what are they doing at such late hour of the night. Please refer page to 276 of the book ‘Facts and Documents’. On page 294 of the same book, Colonel Shafaat Jamil in his statement said, “At 6.10 a.m. Major Rashid came and told him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib”. Shafaat thereafter went to General Zia’s house where he saw General Zia shaving. This must have been after 6.10 a.m. in the morning. When I saw General Zia, he had a clean shave. I told General Zia to come to my house after I was informed by DMI, which was around 5.30 in the morning. So General Zia could not have been in my house earlier than quarter past six, which was broad daylight. Therefore, Brig. Rouf’s exclamation, “what are they doing at such late hours of the night”, was mere twisting of facts to confuse people, so that people believed that I was told at night. As far as I am concerned, it is a blatant lie.

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I hope I have been able to prove that Brig. Rouf lied. He lied when he said that he spoke to me on that night. Mind you, if I could react after I was informed by DMI in the morning. in that case why shouldn’t I have reacted at night if it was true? If he really told me at night in that case I would have had more reaction time to deal with this incident. The truth is that on that night I went to bed very late because I was busy with the deadbodies of the Indian pilots and crews who met an accident at Feni. After I went to bed on that night, I did not receive any call from anyone. The first person who came to inform me about this imminent threat was DMI and that too not at night but in the morning after ‘Fazar Prayer’ was over.

Brig. Rouf in his narration said that he informed me on that night, which I proved that he did not but the person whom he should have alerted immediately as to what was happening was the President. He being the intelligence Chief should have known what it was for. His establishment (DFI) dealt this subject directly with the President. So the President should have been the first person to know about this from him. Did he alert the President? No, he did not. On the other hand, he wanted to escape his responsibility by saying that he informed the Chief. Since his establishment was directly under the President, shouldn’t he have informed him about this first? On that night, Colonel Jamil Ahmed the MS (P) was handling the intelligence operation. It might also be that Brig. Rouf had intentionally tried to keep his successor in dark to let him down and when the incident took a serious turn, he panicked and fled from his house. Later on, to cover up his lapses he made false statements and narrated concocted stories to the reporters.

Now let us see why Brig. Rouf did not inform the President or his successor. Brig. Rouf was posted out from DFI, sometime during early ’75 and he was to hand over to Colonel Jamil-the MS (P). Brig. Rouf was not happy about this posting and did not want to leave this coveted post

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of DGFI. He, therefore, had been delaying his handing over to Colonel Jamil. That he was unhappy about this posting was also evident from the conversation that he had with his counter-intelligence officer. Therefore, I may not be wrong to say that this was one of the reasons why he did not inform the President.

Next, let us see what did he do after he got this significant information. On receipt of this vital information, Brig. Rouf told the officer that he was not DGFI any more and directed him to go and inform about this to his new Boss, meaning Colonel Jamil. Mind you, Brig. Rouf was yet to hand over charge to Colonel Jamil. as such he was still the DGFI. As holder of such an important post, was this the action expected of a responsible officer? In fact he immediately should have contacted and warned the President. Thereafter, he should have also gone to the President and apprise him about the impending action. But surprisingly he did nothing. The question is why?

Brig. Rouf might have been unhappy about his transfer from DGFI but was that the time for him to show his animosity. Doesn’t this show his casual and irresponsible attitude in dealing with such an important matter? Isn’t this a glaring example of irresponsibility? In view of this, does his statement carry any weight? Should he be believed? Let us suppose on that day he was not in his post as DGFI but he was at least the outgoing DGFI. On getting such crucial and sensitive information, how could he have taken this so casually? The moment he came to know about this, it became his moral responsibility to inform the President, but alas what to talk of informing the President, he did not inform anyone!

On getting this information, had Brig. Rouf alerted the President immediately, the President then naturally would have become careful and would have contacted me or someone else straight away for taking precautions. The president probably became aware only after his house was

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attacked. It must have been too late even to seek assistance. Having got this information so early at night, had he informed the president or even Dhaka brigade commander, Colonel Shafaat Jamil, who was his next door neighbour, this national tragedy probably could have been avoided and the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman probably would have been alive today.

I was informed about this incident by the DMI Lt Col Salah-ud-din in the morning, after ‘Fazar Prayer’ (Morning Prayer) was over. The time was around (plus/minus) five-thirty in the morning. The time that I have mentioned is an approximate time. However, I on this information immediately reacted by ordering Dhaka Brigade Comd Colonel Shafaat Jamil to oppose this move with the three infantry battalions that he had under his command in Dhaka cantonment. After a reasonable lapse of time, when I did not see any activity of the Dhaka Brigade troops, I sent the CGS Brig. Khaled Mosharraf to 46 Brigade area to speed up the orders that I gave to Colonel Shafaat Jamil to oppose them.

Brig. Rouf luckily corroborated that Brig. Khaled had gone there and came back to report to me. Doesn’t this indicate my concern about this information? What did Brig. Khaled do there is not the point I want to highlight here. The point that I want to impress upon here is that I sent Brig Khaled to 46 Brigade to help and activate Colonel Shafaat Jamil. Brig. Khaled came back and reported to me what he could do; thereafter, I also went there to make sure that his troops moved. Doesn’t this show my concern about this incident? If I could react and do all these in the morning after the rebel troops had launched their offensive and were on their way to the objectives, in that case why shouldn’t I have reacted earlier at a stage when they were preparing to go for action. Does this claim of mine sound reasonable? If it was so, in that case doesn’t this prove that Brig. Rouf did not tell the truth to the media and misled the people telling

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that he had informed me (Chief) about this impending action around two-thirty at night? Let us now examine whether Brig. Rouf really informed me at two-thirty at night. Brig. Rouf in his statement said that after he was informed by his counter-intelligence officer, he informed me over Red telephone and after a while came to my house. If that was so, in that case he should have been at my house within ten to fifteen minutes time, say around quarter to three or at the most three in the morning. This was because his house was almost ten to fifteen minutes walking distance from my house. According to his own statement, he on reaching my house saw General Zia’s car standing under the porch and exclaimed what wre they (meaning General Zia and me) doing so late at night? Let me now prove that he lied. My arguments are as follows: I probably spoke to Colonel Shafaat between five-thirty to five-forty in the morning.

* Colonel Shafaat in his statement at page 294 in the book ‘Facts .and Documents’ said that in the morning at 6.10 a.m., Major Rashid came and told him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. He also said that at about the same time, he got a call from me. Colonel Shafaat after a brief conversation with Major Rashid went to General Zia’s house where he saw that General Zia was shaving.

* When General Zia came to my house, he had a clean shave and the time was roughly past six-fifteen in the morning.

* Brig. Rouf came to my house much after General Zia and Brig. Khaled came to my house. They came by car whereas Rouf came climbing over the rear boundary wall.

With these above facts before me, I am now quite sure at Brig. Rouf could not have been in my house before six fifteen in the morning. Whereas he was trying to stablish at when he came to my house it was late at night. The time

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when he saw General Zia’s car under my porch could not have been a dark hour, it was broad daylight. Yet he in his narration uttered with exclamation, what were they doing so late at night! I am sure everyone would agree with me that in the month of August by six-thirty in the morning sun rises on the eastern horizon. So it could not have been dark hours then. On the other hand, if he had left his house around two thirty to three at night, then where was he for so long? I know where he was!

The distance between Brig. Rouf’s house and mine was hardly ten to fifteen minutes walking distance? So he should have been at my house around quarter to three at night. If that was the case, then where was he between two-thirty to six-thirty in the morning? He did not account for this time but I can! During this period he along with some members of his family fled from his house and took shelter in the Golf course. God only knows why he had to flee from his house and took shelter there. My houseguard saw them and informed me through my batman that they saw Brig. Rouf sitting under a tree in the Golf course along with some members of his family with their belongings. However, as he lied about the time and his activities during this period, I had to prove that he was capable of taking the cover of falsehood.

However, it may also be that the counter intelligence informer of DGFI correctly got the information about this sinister design of the armoured and artillery units much before the troops and the tanks moved out. It was also possible that Brig Rouf did not believe him or did not take his reporting seriously and therefore, did not take any action on that information. My assumption is based on the fact that he was probably worried if this delicate news came out to be not true, in that case he would be in trouble. This fear of his had also been reflected by him in his own statement. Please refer to page 274 of the book ‘Facts and Documents’, where he said that if this information happened to be not true in

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that case he would be in trouble. However, had he reacted on this information and alerted the concerned people (including the President), these units could have been intercepted and stepped much before they could even cross the cantonment limit. His residence was adjacent to Colonel Shafaat Jamil. He could at least inform his next door neighbour, which I am sure he did not.

I don’t think I will be wrong if I say that the moment Brig. Rouf realized that the armoured and the artillery regiments were really moving, he panicked and fled away from his house, as if he was the target. The reason I say that he panicked and fled from his house is because my batman Havildar Haider Ali told me so on that day. My house guards, who were posted on the Golf course side, told him that Brig. Rouf apparently along with some members of his family took shelter under a tree in the Golf course during the dark hour of the morning. (This accounted for his absence from his house and my call remaining unanswered). Since they assembled there at an unearthly hour and were very casually attired i.e., in Lungi and Vest, and as the sentries could not make out who they were, they kept a vigil on them the moment they assembled under the tree. The sentries however, recognized Brig. Rouf in the morning when he approached them and sought help to climb over the wall to come inside my house. This was how he came to my house in the morning and this was what he referred to in his statement in a dramatic way. Please refer to page 275 of the book ‘Facts and Documents’.

I may not be wrong to say that Brig. Rouf was more worried about his own safety rather than the person for whom he was to provide security. He even said to an extent that he too was in danger (according to his own statement). He in his narration said that he came to my house scaling over the rear boundary wall. I don’t know why he had to choose that hazardous way to come to my house when he could come to my house through the main gate. Coming

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through the main gate was easier than the way he came in. This created a doubt in my mind why he chose to come to my house that way. The sentries would not have been the barrier as they helped him to climb over the boundary wall to come in. In the morning, the DMI Lt Col Salah-ud-din came to my house through the main gate. He was even carrying a weapon. He did not face any difficulty to enter my house.

I feel the moment Brig. Rouf became aware that the armoured and artillery regiments were moving to an unstipulated destination, he panicked and fled away from his house. While fleeing, he attired himself in Lungi and Vest to avoid detection and took shelter in the Golf course. From the Golf course he kept on observing the developments and came to my house after the break of dawn and only when he felt safe. This I think exactly what had happened and this is what Brig. Rouf referred to in his statement in a dramatic way how he entered my house. He presented this fact in a funny manner so that no one asked him question why he had to enter my house the way he did. I wish someone asked him why he had to choose that difficult route and why he did not enter through the main gate. After crossing over the wall, he casually said that my housedoor was locked. Please refer to page 275 of the book ‘Facts and Documents’. The way he mentioned about the housedoor as if it was the main gate. The door about which he casually mentioned was the opening to take out the waste and not for normal entry.

Finally, I would like to say that Brig. Rouf in spite of being in a very responsible position acted very irresponsibly. He did not have the moral courage to own up his failure. My comment on Brig. Rouf’s statement might appear a bit unkind but I could not help it. He in his statement made some impolite comments about the Army Chief which was me. He lied about his supposed conversation with me on the night Of 14th/15th August ’75. In view of his statement, the people by and large appeared to have believed that I was

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informed about this sinister design very early at night but I did not take any action to stop this. This is far from truth and people must know the truth. The truth is that I came to know only when the assailants were on their targets to strike. From then on I was desperately trying to counter it but failed. My regret is that on the one hand I was outwitted by the assailants and on the other my immediate subordinate commander did not come up to my expectation.

Having scrutinized the statement of DGFI Brig. Rouf, I would now like to scrutinize and comment on the statement of Colonel Shafaat Jamil, who was the commander of 46 Brigade during the crucial period When the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated. Colonel Shafaat’s statement appeared in some national dailies and subsequently the same statements were published in the book ‘Facts and Documents of the Assassination of Bangabandhu’ by Prof. Abu Sayeed as Annx-Raw from pages 293 to 298. I in this write-up would again confine myself only to the published statement of Colonel Shafaat Jamil.

The Chief of Staff is responsible for what happens within his command and he carries out his responsibilities through his subordinate commanders. The success or failure of any commander depends on how sincere and capable his subordinates are. Of the two qualities mentioned here, sincerity plays a vital role. The Chief of Staff is responsible for what happened to the President on 15th August ’75 because it was his under-command that carried out the outrageous act. While the Chief bears the moral responsibility, his subordinate commanders who are directly responsible for the conduct of their troops must also account for their action. Colonel Shafaat was the field commander and the troops who went to assassinate the President belonged to the units who were directly and indirectly under his command. Though I do not directly associate Colonel Shafaat with the group that staged the Putsch, yet my

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question is what did he do after I ordered him to move his troops to oppose this group. He denied that I gave him that order.

Colonel Shafaat Jamil during his interview with the media said that on the morning of 15th August ’75 at 6.10 am, Rashid came running to his house and informed him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. He then said that at about the same time, a telephone call came and I (the Chief) happened to be on the other end of the telephone. According to him, I alleged to have spoken to him in an emotionally chocked voice–to the point of crying. I alleged to have told him that Bangabandhu rang me up and told me that some people are shooting at his house. He (Bangabandhu) therefore, did not trust me then. Colonel Shafaat also said that when we spoke, I only expressed my emotion over telephone and did not give him any orders to take any action or did not give him any instruction as to what he should do. Again, according to him, since I did not give him any orders, so he went to the residence of Deputy Chief to seek direction. When Colonel Shafaat Jamil went to General Zia’s house, he allegedly was having a shave. There at the residence of General Zia, when Colonel Shafaat informed him (General Zia) as to what had happened, he (General Zia) apparently said, “So what, if the President is dead, the Vice President is there. You alert your troops” Please refer to pages 294 to 295 of the book ‘Facts and Documents’.

Let us now examine this part of his statement. Colonel Shafaat at least accepted that I rang him up. Now the question is, why did I ring him up so early in the morning and what transpired between us over the telephone. I say that I rang him up, first of all to know if he was aware of what was happening and then to tell him what I heard from DMI and under the circumstances what he was to do. From his response over the telephone, I got an impression that he did not know anything as to what was happening. So I told him what DMI had told me and also instructed him to

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immediately move 1, 2 and 4 East Bengal Regiments to oppose the action that was about to take place. My orders to move the infantry battalions were to stop the rebel troops form their evil design and if necessary confront them. When I gave him these orders the time was probably 5.30 to 5.40 in the morning.

In the morning when I spoke to Colonel Shafaat, at that time I could not have given him any information about Bangabandhu because till then neither I could get in touch with him nor Bangabandhu got in touch with me. As per Colonel Shafaat’s narration, for the sake of argument, let us see what was there in the alleged dialogue between me and Bangabandhu that I became so emotional that I had to cry. Colonel Shafaat said and I quote, ‘The moment I picked up the telephone I heard Safiullah Sahib’s emotionally chocked crying voice. He said Bangabandhu rang me up and told me that someone was shooting at his house and he (Bangabandhu) did not trust me then, so his voice was emotionally chock ”. If this was the dialogue with Colonel Shafaat Jamil, in that case what was there to be so emotional about that I had to cry? Wasn’t he trying to humiliate and belittle me in the eyes of people? By doing so, whose cause was he trying to promote? On the other hand, why should I have told Colonel Shafaat Jamil that Bangabandhu rang me up when he did not?

So whatever Colonel Shafaat Jamil narrated during the interviews as our dialogue, it was an imaginary story or it was to undermine me in the eyes of the people. I do not know why he had to make up the story of emotionalism. Is it just to let me down and make me small in the eyes of the public? If that was the intention, in that case he probably achieved his goal. However, it was definitely unbecoming of an officer and was not expected from Colonel Shafaat Jamil. Colonel Shafaat Jamil during his interview totally sidetracked the conversation that I had with him and completely.

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denied that I gave him any orders or instructions. I do not know why he lied and denied those facts. However, I am sure he did so to cover up his guilt. Luckily he stated that he received a telephone call from me.

My question here is, if I did not give him any orders then why did I ring him up so early in the morning? Why the Chief of the Army rings up his subordinate commander during such crisis—ridden period? Was that not to give orders? Does he want to say that I rang him up only to express my emotion? If my telephone call to Colonel Shafaat Jamil was only to express my emotion, in that case why should I have rang him up and that too so early in the morning? Having given him the orders when I did not notice any activity of his troops in the cantonment area, I sent CGS Brig. Khaled Mosharraf to activate Colonel Shafaat Jamil to expedite the movement of troops. When Brig. Khaled also failed, I went there myself to move them. That I went to his brigade area was corroborated by Colonel Shafaat as well as Brig. Rouf. Are these the indications of my inaction? If I did not give him the orders in the morning to move troops and confront the rebels, in that case why did I go to his brigade area? I could have stayed back in my office and remain unconcerned. Did my actions indicate that I had some other intention other than tackling the crisis in hand? If these arguments are accepted as reasonable, in that case Colonel Shafaat’s claim that I did not give him any orders to oppose the rebel troops does not hold good.

There could not have been any doubt about the time when I spoke to Colonel Shafaat. It was surely not at 6.10 a.m. in any case. Anyway, luckily Colonel Shafaat admitted that I rang him up on that morning. DMI came to my house to report about the incident around 5.30 in the morning. Colonel Shafaat being the commander to act, then why should I have waited till 6.10 a.m. to ring him up? When we spoke, the time was probably around 5.30 to 5.40. whereas Colonel Shafaat said that he got my call at 6.10 a.m. when

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Major Rashid went to report to him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. He remembered the exact time when Major Rashid came to report to him. but the other part of his assertion that he spoke to me at that time is surely not correct. If that was the case, then why didn’t he mention to me that Major Rashid came to tell him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib? Major Rashid must have gone to report to him much after I spoke to Colonel Shafaat. Thus the time mentioned by Colonel Shafaat in his statement about our conversation was to distort the facts and mislead people.

As far as I was concerned, I could not have told him what he narrated during the interview, because till then I could not get through to Bangabandhu. If I could not get through to Bangabandhu before I spoke to Colonel Shafaat Jamil, then how could I have given him all those details? I, in fact, Spoke to Bangabandhu much after I spoke to Colonel Shafaat Jamil. Colonel Shafaat Jamil, in his narration, said that Major Rashid went to him at 6.10 in the morning to report that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. So when I spoke to Colonel Shafaat, till then I did not know the fate of Bangabandhu, because I spoke to Bangabandhu much after I spoke to Colonel Shafaat. If Colonel Shafaat knew the fate of Bangabandhu when he spoke to me, in that case why didn’t he tell me about this? He in his narration nowhere mentioned that he spoke to me about the fate of Bangabandhu. If he really knew about this when we spoke, his narration would have been different.

Colonel Shafaat Jamil in his statement said that having received no orders from me, he went to the residence of General Zia to seek direction. Mind you, he went to seek direction from General Zia after Rashid came with the news that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. After getting such information what direction did he need? According to Colonel Shafaat, General Zia directed him to remain alert. What does this order mean? To remain alert means to remain

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prepared for action. It did not mean to move out and put down the rebellion. It means to be prepared and remain ready in the lines. Was that a proper order by a senior officer when the Head of State of the country had been assassinated? On the other hand, what were my orders? My orders were to oppose them, which meant confrontation. If Colonel Shafaat executed my orders, in that case there were chances of spilling of blood, whereas in General Zia’s order there was no such possibility. Do I then take it that Colonel Shafaat took the course that was not risky and therefore denied to have received any orders from me?

It was not unknown to Colonel Shafaat Jamil that when the Chief is present in the station, he had no right to go to Deputy Chief for orders. Deputy Chief was not an executive commander. He acted only when the Chief was absent and that too when authorized. By going to the Deputy Chief for orders, Colonel Shafaat Jamil on the one hand had undermined the authority of the Chief of Staff, and on the other violated the normal channel of command. How could he have then checked his subordinate officers for such violation? The incident of 15th August ’75 was a violation of normal channel of command. Again if he could walk up to the residence of Deputy Chief General Zia to seek direction/instruction, in that case what stopped him to go to the Chief. In the light of what happened on 15th August, all these deserve careful consideration and proper evaluation.

The next point that I want to emphasize here is that I spoke to Colonel Shafaat only once in the morning of 15th ‘ August ’75. When I spoke to him, at that time I had no idea as to the extent of trouble, except what I was informed by DMI Lt Col Salah-ud-din Ahmed and thereafter by Colonel Jamil Ahmed—the MS (P). Having got the news from DMI, Bangabandhu was the first person that I tried to talk to but I failed. Thereafter, the next person that I rang up was Colonel Shafaat. I could not reach him either. Colonel Jamil, the MS

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(P), was the next person whom I rang up and spoke to. After I spoke to Colonel Jamil. I again rang up Colonel Shafaat and spoke to him. Till then except these two officers I did not speak to anyone else. So his narration about our alleged dialogue with Bangabandhu was nothing but misinformation. How could I have told him all these when I did not speak to Bangabandhu till then. I had only brief information from Colonel Jamil that Bangabandhu wanted him in his house. So the dialogue of ours that he narrated was just to humiliate me. To cover up his failure, Colonel Shafaat went too low to belittle me. His narrations in the paragraphs on page 294 of ‘Facts and Documents’ were nothing but disgrace.

The reason I said Colonel Shafaat humiliated me is because, he through his narration presented me to the people in that manner. His narration implied as if I had no character. I instead of getting hold of the situation started to vent out my emotional feelings. This was a hit below the belt, which was unbecoming of a soldier. So far as the emotion was concerned, there was nothing wrong to be emotional about. It is the murderers who do not have the feelings or emotion. People become emotional when near and dear ones pass away. The news about the sad and brutal demise of Bangabandhu did upset me but that news came to me when I was in my office. After I was informed about this sad demise, there was no occasion for me to speak to Colonel Shafaat. After I ordered him to confront the rebels, he had been maintaining a distance from me. I got this sad news when I was waiting to hear from Brig. Khaled, whom I sent to 46 Brigade to help Colonel Shafaat to move troops for action.

Now let us analyze a very important part of Colonel Shafaat’s statement. He said and I quote “In the morning at 6.10 a.m.Major Rashid came running to my house and said they had killed Sheikh Mujib”. Let me analyse what this news imply. First of all, let us see who Major Rashid was

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and who was Sheikh Mujib? Major Rashid was the CO of 2Field Regiment artillery that was directly under the command of Colonel Shafaat Jamil and Sheikh Mujib was none other than the President of the country and the Father of the Nation. Let us now see on getting this news, what Colonel Shafaat should have done and what he did?

The moment Colonel Shafaat was informed by Major Rashid that they had killed Sheikh Mujib (Bangabandhu) his first action should have been to arrest him and then inform me about his action. If he could not do so right then, in that case he should have done it soon after when he could take that action. But he in spite of my orders, without taking any action against the rebels went to Deputy Chief to seek orders. May I ask, after I ordered Colonel Shafaat to move troops to oppose the rebels, why he had to go to Deputy? It may also be that after I ordered Colonel Shafaat to take action against the rebels, Major Rashid went to report to him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. Colonel Shafaat thereafter went to General Zia to seek direction. I have a feeling that Colonel Shafaat went to General Zia along with Major Rashid. May I ask how Major Rashid dared to go to Colonel Shafaat to say that they had killed Sheikh Mujib? He did not come to me; he went to Colonel Shafaat. After killing such a person, how could Major Rashid go to his commander to report that they had killed Sheikh Mujib? I would now leave it to the readers to judge what my subordinate commander was up to? .

Colonel Shafaat was Dhaka Brigade Comd and he knew that he was the personal choice of the President to command this brigade. The question now is, did Colonel Shafaat rise up to the expectation of the President or did he stray? Some of his actions on 15th August ’75 indicate that he was not on the right track. In view of what I noticed during those fateful days, I am sure I am not wrong to form this opinion. In the morning when General Zia and Brig. Khaled came to my house, I told them that after I ordered Colonel Shafaat to go

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for action he appeared to have vanished. His telephone‘ was also hung-up. I couldnot even get through to him then and I also did not know what he was doing then? Colonel Shafaat in his statement said that he went to General Zia for instruction. After Major Rashid reported to him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib, what instruction did he need? But General Zia on my anxiety did not even mention that he met or talked to Colonel Shafaat before he (General Zia) came to my house. Did Colonel Shafaat tell the whole truth or was my Deputy has something to hide?

Colonel Shafaat in an interview with ‘Bhorer Kagog’ on 4th September ’93 claimed that DMI Lt Col Salah-ud-din informed the Chief about this incident at 4.30 in the morning. But the Chief instead of alerting him right away, had been talking to others and informed him at six in the morning. The Chief thereby wasted about an hour and a half before he was informed. Lt Col Salah-ud-din is still alive. He can ascertain when he came to my house. I said before and still maintain that after I was informed by DMI, I within five to ten minutes time ordered Colonel Shafaat over telephone to counter this move. The time was probably five-thirty in the morning and this was the time when I was informed. I still maintain that Colonel Shafaat was the second person that I spoke to over telephone and no one else (If his telephone was not engaged when I rang him up, he would have been the first person). He was the commander of the troops on whom everything hinged. So the question of wasting time by talking to others before giving instructions to Colonel Shafaat did not arise. Why should I have wasted valuable time?

I do not know what Colonel Shafaat wanted to suggest through this interview. Did he want to imply that the rebel troops had my blessings? If that was the case, why then immediately after the assassination of the President, Major Rashid went to Shafaat; he did not come to me. I would like to refresh the readers’ memory by saying that after the

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incident of 15th August ’75, I was the only one who was penalized and dismissed from service by Khandaker Moshtaque, whereas the rest were either promoted or rewarded. This also applied to Colonel Shafaat who was nor touched and remained in his post as Dhaka Brigade Comd. So he cannot mislead people by such insinuation. After giving orders to Colonel Shafaat, I did speak to others, such as Air Chief, Naval Chief, DCOS and CGS, etc. This I did to consult with them to know how we should tackle the situation and not to waste time as alleged by Shafaat. After I ordered Shafaat to confront the rebels, he what to talk of moving his troops, did not even order the troops to move.

On the question of me being informed by DMI at 4.30 in the morning, I gave my explanation why DMI could not have informed me at 4.30 am. My reasoning appears to have not been taken rightly by some quarters. Dr. Hasan-uzzaman of Dhaka University did not appreciate my reasoning. He appeared to have become so prejudiced and vindictive in his opinion against my arguments that he instead of offering counter argument against mine, made some very derogatory and sarcastic remarks about me in his write-ups. This does not speak very high of an intellected and I am very sorry to say that a person of his calibre do not possess the acumen to accept a sound argument. I through logical arguments and available facts proved that it was not possible on the part of DMI to inform me at 4.30 in the morning, which Colonel Shafaat claimed he did. If I knew about this at 4.30 in the morning, then why should I have wasted so much of valuable reaction time? Did ,I have any other plan? The answer is no”. However, for the benefit of the readers, I would like to repeat those reasoning once again why the DMI could not have informed me at 4.30 in the morning.

Major Farook was one of the rebel leaders who initiated the incident of 15th August ’75. He during an interview with Bangla Bazaar Potrika on 15th August ’92 said that at about mid-night on 14th/15th August ’75, he instructed his troop

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leaders to move out of the barracks with the tanks at 4.30 am. But they were delayed because of some technical difficulties. Major Farook said, “Since the tanks did not move out of the unit lines in time, so he became tense to an extent as if he was having a heart attack”. He later said that when the tanks started to roll out the ‘Fazar Azan’ call was going out from the cantonment Central Mosque. So if those tanks had moved out in time, in that case Major Farook would not have become so tense. Therefore, would it be wrong to say that the tanks moved out after 5.00 am, and that too when ‘Fazar Azan’ call was on. (In the month of August the ‘Fazar Azan’ call is around quarter past five in the morning). Therefore, by the time the tanks moved, it must have been sometime after quarter past five.

Thereafter, before these tanks could move out towards their objectives, they must have taken some time to assemble at an RV (rendezvous) somewhere within the cantonment area. Mind you, as long as they were manoeuvring within the cantonment limits, no one was likely to doubt about their ulterior motive (including the Intelligence outfit). On that particular night (Thursday/Friday night) it was the usual night training schedule for these two units i.e. the tanks and the artillery regiments. Night 14th/15th August ’75 was Thursday/Friday night. In spite of the fact that these tanks moved out with an ulterior motive, yet till after ‘Fazar Prayer’ no one was likely to doubt about their intention, as they were within the cantonment limits, seemingly for the night training. As a result, no intelligence information was likely to flow, unless the intelligence agencies had acquired the information about their intention before. Thus no one was likely to doubt their training schedule. The intelligence agencies must have started to doubt about their intention only when they went outside the cantonment limit and were moving towards the city.

The informer who informed the DMI also had to be sure as to what he was reporting. This must have taken some

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time. So by the time the informer became sure that some unusual activities were taking place, the time could not have been earlier than quarter past five in the morning. The DMI must have been informed thereafter. The DMI surely was not waiting for this information. So before he came to me, he had to grasp the information, change and then come to my house. By the time he was in front of me, the time in any case could not have been earlier than five-thirty in the morning. This is why I said that the DMI could not have informed me at 4.30 in the morning and Prof. Dr. Hasan-uz-zaman would not accept this argument. He in this context also made some sarcastic remarks about me in his write-ups. I had to do this exercise to prove that it was not possible for the DMI to inform me at 4.30 in the morning. But Colonel Shafaat claimed that the DMI did inform me at 4.30 in the morning and Dr. Hasan-u-z zaman also tried to justify Colonel Shafaat’s claim.

Colonel Shafaat in his narration at page 295, paragraph 5 of the book ‘Facts and Documents’ said and I quote, “The whole day I remained ready to put down the rebellion”. In the same page at para 2 & 3 he said that he had hot exchange of words with Major Dalim when he was in his brigade HQ area. Aren’t these two accounts contradictory? On the one hand Colonel Shafaat said that he was ready to put down the rebellion, and on the other he said that he had hot exchange of words with Major Dalim–a rebel leader who was in his brigade area. Mind you, Colonel Shafaat had three infantry battalions under his command in the cantonment then when Major Dalim was with him and had hot exchange of words. If this was true, in that case what sort of preparedness Colonel Shafaat talked about?

Didn’t Colonel Shafaat know who Major Dalim was and what they had done? By the time Major Dalim was with him, the whole nation knew what Major Dalim and his group did. Yet Colonel Shafaat needed instructions! Major Dalim having had those credentials, how could he dare to go

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to Colonel Shafaat’s brigade area, quarrelled with him and still came out safe! If Colonel Shafaat could not detain Major Dalim in his own brigade area when he had a small contingent of troops, then how could he deal with two regiments of rebel troops? What sort of story are these! Who was he trying to fool? If this was the state of his preparedness, then what could I expect from him?

Colonel Shafaat Jamil said that he remained prepared the whole day to put down the rebellion. If he was really prepared, then why didn’t he act? Why didn’t he confront the rebel troops? Why didn’t he stop the rebel troops entry in the cantonment? Who stopped him from doing that? He was required to move out and challenge them, which he did not do. It was the only way to counter their action, and precisely those were my orders. My orders were violated. If Colonel Shafaat really wanted to act, then there was enough time for him to do so before the rebel troops consolidated their position. Had he acted in time and moved his troops, he at least could have prevented the rebel troops from entering the cantonment; but he remained dormant. He did not order his troops to move.

Thank God, Colonel Shafaat at least accepted that I was in his brigade area in the morning. Why did I go to his brigade area at that hour of the morning? Where was my strength? My strength to oppose this action was the troops of Dhaka brigade and it’s Commander. It was Colonel Shafaat Jamil who had to provide that strength. I could not move Colonel Shafaat Jamil for this action. When I was in his brigade area, he avoided meeting me. In that case what were my options? What could I have done? I could have died like Colonel Jamil–the MS (P). Could that have helped? If the answer was ‘yes’, in that case it was my failure. He said that he saw me in his brigade area at 8.30 in the morning, but stlll he did not meet me? In order to help him move his troops to oppose, I sent the CGS to help him ; thereafter, even I went to his brigade area to help him; but Colonel

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Shafaat was not to be found. He avoided me. I do not know why? What could I then do from there?

Having explored and exhausted all the possibilities, I found that I was alone and saw no other option. What followed thereafter was nothing but destiny and I had to accept that. On the other hand, Colonel Shafaat Jamil did not hesitate to say that I without telling him anything left his brigade area and owed allegiance to the illegal government. What were my options then? Could I have stopped it alone? It was not true that I went to the radio station on my own will. The truth was that I was forced to go to the radio station by Major Dalim and his troops from Colonel Shafaat’s brigade area. Thereafter, I had no alternative but to owe allegiance to the government that was installed. The time was around 10 to 10.30 am. when we owed allegiance.

Let us for the sake of argument accept that the Chief did not give any orders or instructions to Colonel Shafaat Jamil. But Colonel Shafaat was a very senior officer and was holding a very senior appointment the command of Dhaka Brigade. He being the metropolis Formation Commander was the strongest man. After Major Rashid told him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib, did he need anyone’s order? He was required to act. In such situation any responsible commander would have done that. He had that authority inbuilte in his command. But Colonel Shafaat chose to remain inactive with the orders of Deputy Chief and blamed his Chief that he did not give him any order/instruction.

At the end, I would like to ask Colonel Shafaat, what prevented him to take any action against Major Rashid on the morning of 15th August ’75, when he (Rashid) went to tell’ him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib (Bangabandhu)? Colonel Shafaat subsequently during an interview with the national dailies said that Major Rashid had a contingent of troops with him. So if it was difficult to hold him then, couldn’t he have taken some action against him later? Major

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Rashid was not with him all the time. Was he afraid of him? Apart from Major Rashid, Major Dalim also went to his brigade area where, according to Colonel Shafaat, they had hot exchange of words. In the morning, I saw Major Rashid moving freely with Colonel Shafaat’s BM Major Hafiz in his brigade area in a manner as if he (Rashid) was one of them. I did not get any impression there that Major Rashid was a rebel leader. He was moving with Major Hafiz freely as if he (Rashid) was one of them. What did these signify? Finally, the moment Colonel Shafaat —the commander of Dhaka Metropolitan Garrison was told by Major Rashid that they had killed sheikh Mujib, he then had no other option but to arrest him straight away and inform me as to what he had done. A responsible commander would have done exactly that. If it was not possible to arrest him right away when Major Rashid and his troops were with him, in that case he‘ should have sent out a message to his unit commanders to do so. But unfortunately he did nothing. However, if Colonel Shafaat thought that the Chief was behind this Putsch and he (Shafaat) was not in favour of what the Chief was doing, in that case it would have been well within his rights to take the Chief into custody and take control of the situation. It is not that he was not capable of doing such thing. During the liberation war he arrested his CO, a Pakistani officer, at Brahman Baria and later during the Coupd’etat on 3rd November ’75, he pointed his gun at Khandaker Moshtaque, who was the President then. Whose cause was he serving this time?

On 15th August ’75, if Colonel Shafaat thought that the Chief should not have gone to owe allegiance to an illegal government, in that case he was within his rights to go against the decision of the Chief. If Colonel Shafaat could point his gun at Khanadaker Moshtaque to enforce his will, in that case he was capable of forcing his will on the Chief too. In view of my above analysis, I would now leave it to

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the readers to judge what role Colonel Shafaat had played on . that day. Why did Major Rashid go to inform Colonel Shafaat that they had killed Sheikh Mujib‘? Shafaat being the commander of the troops must answer these questions and bear some responsibility. It is easy to blame others, but it requires courage to accept failure.

Having analysed two very important interviews, I would now try to comment on some of the remarks that had been incorporated in the book “Facts and Documents of the. Assassination of Bangabandhu” by Prof. Abu Sayeed. I happened to be a target of vilification by Prof. Abu Sayeed in this book. The antagonistic view against me was probably because, many of the officers of that time whose actions were questionable made motivated utterances about the incident of 15th August ’75 and about me. But the writer did not verify those. As those versions remained unchallenged and my side of the account were not there in any of the printouts, people also took those versions to be true and made me a principal accused. In the people’s court, therefore, I had been convicted without a trial. On the other hand, I came to know about these write-ups only after my return to the country in 1991.

I, thereafter, started to write in the papers challenging those versions. During this period I did face people who wanted to have clarification on points where they had doubts. So I had to explain to them and say all that I did and what I could not do. I am in no way-blaming anyone for confronting me with those questions, because those who questioned me were all Bangabandhu’s admirers and were distressed about the unfortunate incident on that day. On the question of assassination of Bangabandhu, they formed an opinion about me on the basis of narrations by the military officers. On the other hand, since those versions were not challenged and remained un-responded, they took those as genuine. As I was away from the country for long 16 years, those accounts did not come to my notice and thus remained

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un-responded. I on my return started to correct those to vindicate my honour.

In the book ‘Facts and Documents’, there are some very unfair remarks about me, where I had been castigated as coward. The author should have known whom he was commenting/writing about. He should have been careful before penning those. His criticism about me is very unfair and without any justification. He did not have the courtesy even to ask me if I had anything to say. Doesn’t the author have responsibility to verify the facts before printing such defamatory stories? The author being gullible had been befooled by some of the narrators in such a way that whatever they had said were taken as gospel truth. It was the writer’s responsibility to make sure that whatever they wrote must at least be nearer to the truth. They must realize the impact of their pen. Recording an incident and printing those without verification is an offence.

The author was very impressed about Colonel Shafaat’s action and had some very high—sounding words while praising him. For example he in his book ‘Facts and Documents’ at page 139, paragraph 9 has documented and I quote, “Colonel Shafaat Jamil a strongwilled person, was the commander of Dhaka Brigade. He ordered all his units to go to their defensive positions. Every unit had armed guard. The dazzling shine of their rifles as if wanted to speak in a “new language” so on and so forth. The author’s narration is very eye-catching. He in his estimate put Colonel Shafaat right at the summit without realizing that he did not deserve such accolade. From his narration, one was likely to be swayed towards Colonel Shafaat-the Dhaka Brigade Comd. They are also likely to get an impression that it was only Colonel Shafaat who staged some sort of opposition on that day and he at least ordered his troops to go to the defence. On the other hand, I have been pictured by the writer as insincere and castigated me as coward.

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My regret is that no one asked me if I had anything to say and no one questioned Colonel Shafaat Jamil why he had to go to a defensive position in the cantonment when he was required to confront them. By taking up a defensive position how was he going to tackle the rebels? Did the rebel troops go to the city to attack his position? If not then what was he going to achieve by taking up a defensive position in the cantonment? What was he likely to gain out of it? The rebel troops had gone to the city to take control of the key points and overthrow the government. There should not have been any doubt about their intention. So they had to be prevented from doing so. To prevent them from such act, if necessary he was required to attack them and not go to a defensive position. Mind you, since morning the Coupd’etat plotters i.e., Major Rashid and Major Dalim were freely roaming in his so called defensive position. In that case, may I ask what was in his mind? In the light of the above, taking up of defensive position in the cantonment was nothing but mockery. But the people did not realize that behind these stories there was an effort to undermine and humiliate me.

By this statement of Colonel Shafaat, one of my doubts about him has been clarified and that is right from the morning of 15th August ’75 he was taking direction from General Zia. He in his statement had already said that after I spoke to him in the morning, he went to General Zia for direction. Mind you, according to his own version he went to General Zia after Major Rashid went to him to say that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. Colonel Shafaat thereafter, went to General Zia for direction. Was there any link between Major Rashid’s reporting to Colonel Shafaat and then Colonel Shafaat going to General Zia for direction? What direction he got from him? General Zia asked him to remain alert, in other words ‘don’t move’. My orders were to confront them,
which could mean spilling of blood. By this statement of his, it is quite clear that he did not want to confront the rebel

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troops, .so he took defensive position. Interesting-what a brave action!

In the book ‘Facts and Documents’ at page 141, paragraph 12, Colonel Shafaat’s narration of the dialogue that allegedly took place in the Army HQs’ conference room on 19th August ’75, has been depicted as per Shafaat’s version. From this account, it appeared that the total discipline of the army had collapsed. The way the Army Chief’s control in the conference room has been pictured, it shows that the Chief had no say or had no control on anything. It is true that during those days some people had out-stepped from normal channel of command, yet Colonel Shafaat could not have behaved the way he narrated.

I would like to say that whatever had happened on 15th August ’75, Bangladesh Army was very much a disciplined force. Colonel Shafaat dared not speak the way his narration has been documented in this book. The truth is that, during the conference when the post-mortem of the incident of 15th August ’75 was on, all accusing fingers were pointing at Colonel Shafaat and he was seen to be a very frustrated commander. His under-command had violated the normal channel of command and staged a military Putsch that he could not prevent. This failure of his was pricking him and he had to voice his resentment somewhere. Colonel Shafaat therefore, at one stage burst out and threatened to Court Martial Major Rashid and Major Farook. This outburst of his was an act to put up a brave face in front of his colleagues. But the way his version has been documented in this book exceeded all limits of decency. Prof. Abu Sayeed also added a lot of spices in his write-up adding shameful adjectives!

I would now like to dwell on few more lines from this book at page 142, paragraph 13 and I quote, “General Safrullah stood up from his chair as coward personified. He will be remembered in the history as a burning example of an irresponsible Comrnander-in-Chief who during a national

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crisis failed to discharge his duties and protect national interest”. May I ask the author of the book what are the characteristics of a coward? The word ‘coward’ means having little or no bravery and the word ‘brave’ means able to face danger. I do not want to claim that I am brave but surely I am not a coward. I, therefore, would like to put on record for the information of the author and say the following:

¤ A soldier, who takes up arms against his government, commits a treasonable offence and the mandatory punishment for such offence is to face the firing squad or get hanged. Knowing the consequence of such act, if a soldier still opts to take up arms against his government because of patriotic feelings and revolts to stand by the side of his own people, would that soldier be called a coward? I was that soldier. I would like to ask the professor how many of them had ventured to take that step.

¤ To be at war is a very dangerous situation and more so when one is in the front lines. A commander, who had the option to remain at the rear, elects to remain with his troops in the front-line and encounters the enemy where he even had to fight in hand to hand combat. Would that commander be called a coward? I was that commander. I would not wish anyone to face such encounter.

¤ A soldier, who during the war of Liberation spent the entire period with his troops in the front-lines fighting the enemy, would that soldier be called a coward? I was that soldier. I would like to ask the professor how many of them were in such situation.

The portrayal of the Army Chief in his book is very humiliating. By such portrayal, it not only does disservice to the individual but also to the nation as a whole. Because the person who has been humiliated so badly in this book is one of the war-heroes. I do not mean to say that they are beyond

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reproach or above criticism no I do not say so. There would have been some solace had there been some truth in those accounts. Therefore, I would like to say that before making such offensive cements on any person, it is wise to verify the facts and allow the other person to give his side of the story.

Without ascertaining the facts, calling names is very unethical/immoral and it does not reflect very well about the writer. I might have failed in some way but surely I am not a coward. It has also been said in this book that I will be remembered in the history as a burning example of an irresponsible Commander-in-Chief who during the national crisis failed to discharge his duties and protect national interest. I did give my explanation to answer this allegation in the previous chapters as to the steps that I had taken to combat that situation. Nothing appeared to have worked. My question to the author is that, when he condemns the Chief as an individual, may I ask him what did they do as a body? Is it an irrelevant question?

Under the circumstances, when I was surrounded by unpredictable elements, my options were limited. My options were to accept what had happened or fight it out. In order to put my second option into operation, my strength was Dhaka Brigade Commander and his troops, who is the author’s hero; they failed me right at the start. In spite of this handicap, I did not totally rule out the possibility of mounting an offensive with the help of the other Formations. To do that, I needed to sneak out of Dhaka but in the face of Dalim’s continuous trailing; I could not venture to do that. I had no one to consult with either. Having failed to take this step and visualizing the outcome of this venture, at a stage when Bangabandhu was dead, I could not push the country into a civil war. So I decided to accept them thinking that the punitive action could be taken against the rebels once I am in control of the situation. Hence, I made an effort to achieve it. Was this an irresponsible act? Let this be debated whether

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I acted responsibly or otherwise during the crisis – ridden period.

Interestingly, the hero of the author is Colonel Shafaat Jamil who played a dubious role right from the beginning and during the entire period. On the other hand, for the lapses in the security arrangements of the President, it was not the responsibility of the Chief. The agencies that were responsible for the intelligence and personal security of the President should account for their action and not the Chief of Staff. But unfortunately, he is being persecuted unjustifiably by some quarter right from the beginning. Did anyone ask those agencies what did they do before and after the President’s house was attacked?

Army had provided some troops as security guards to the President. Their deployment was the responsibility of the agencies that took care of the security aspect and not the Chief of Staff. Those troops must have been adequately briefed by the agencies that deployed them. Apparently no laxities were noticed in the performance of their duties. It was evident from the fact that in Bangabandhu’s house there were also casualties from amongst the army personnel who were providing security to the President. Therefore, the loyalties of those security guards could not be in question. Whatever had happened in Bangabandhu’s house cannot be condoned, but before gunning down someone, responsibilities should have been fixed.

I am not afraid of my responsibilities and still feel that I acted rationally to combat the situation that I was confronted with; and took correct and rational decisions as per my judgement. It is now up to the historians to judge under those circumstances whether my decisions were right? I feel I saved the country from a possible civil war. However, I still maintain that I might have faltered but I am not a coward. After I returned home from abroad, I did speak to Prof. Abu Sayeed with regard to the comments that he made about me in his book. To me it appeared that he still believes

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in whatever he wrote about me was correct, because he did not withdraw his comments from his book. My above comments are in response to those comments of his.

Dr. Hasan-uz-zaman of Dhaka University in one of his articles in Bangla Bazaar Potrika on 22nd August ’93 said that Abul Kashem Bhuyan of Dhashudhan village, Kishoreganj was in the house of Bangabandhu on the fateful night of 15th August ’75. He while reminiscing the incident of that day said that he overheard the telephonic conversation of Bangabandhu with someone, in which the last dialogue of Bangabandhu was, “Is it that you can do nothing?” Dr. Hasan-uz-zaman questioned who did he (Bangabandhu) say this to? He then said further in a suggestive manner that from all available sources, it appears that General Saflullah was the last person with whom Bangabandhu spoke over the telephone.

From the contents of the above paragraph, it is apparent what Dr. Hasan-uz-zaman is trying to hint at. I understand he is doing research work. This way he cannot do justice to the subject. He has to approach this with open mind and not with preconceived idea. Before ascertaining whether that person was me or someone else, he pointed an accusing finger at me. If this is the state of mind of the researcher, in that case can we expect a non-biased analysis from such person? So far as my telephonic conversation with Bangabandhu was concerned, I also think that probably I was the last person with whom Bangabandhu spoke. But how could Dr. Hasan-uz-zaman ascertain that the dialogue which Abul Kashem Bhuyan overheard was with the last person. This is why I say that the premise from where our learned researcher started is wrong. If this is how he intends to do his research and produces a thesis, then how could we expect a worthwhile output from his work?

However, from this write-up, one thing has come to light and that is that at one stage Bangabandhu sought help from someone who told him that they could do nothing.
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Otherwise, Bangabandhu would not have uttered the sentence, “Is it that you can do nothing?” From this sentence it goes without saying that Bangabandhu sought help from someone when his house was under attack or in the process of being attacked. Let us now see who the person or persons were from whom Bangabandhu could have sought help.

Bangabandhu must have sought help from someone when he was in the process of being attacked. He, therefore, must have sought help from those who had the capability to help him. Who were those who had that capability? Firepower-wise, those who could try and rescue the President were Army, BDR, JRB, Air Force, Navy and Police in that order. I would now discuss about each force separately:-

Army — Bangabandhu had complete trust in me. It was expected that he would call me the moment he was in danger. But I did not get any call from him. I do not know whether Bangabandhu tried to contact me or not, and I think he did not. In any case, if he did after I was informed about this incident, he could not have got through to me, because the moment I was informed, from then on my telephones remained continuously engaged as I was trying to get in touch with Bangabandhu or give instructions to my undercommand to combat this situation. As a result, he probably could not have got through to me. So he could not have had that dialogue with me.

On the other hand, the moment I was informed, I had been anxiously trying to get in touch with Bangabandhu. I ultimately did get through to him. It took me almost about twenty to twenty-five minutes before I could get through to him. I think probably I was the last person to speak to Bangabandhu. But what transpired between us or what we talked was not known to anyone except Bangabandhu, me and my version was heard by my wife who was sitting beside me. I surely could not have said those words to

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Bangabandhu, which Dr. Hasan-uz-zaman was trying to imply. If I had to have that dialogue with Bangabandhu and say those words to him in that case there was no reason for me to ring him up so anxiously or eagerly. The reason I was trying to get through to him was to warn him and not to abandon him.

An important factor that might have worked here in the mind of Bangabandhu was that the troops who went to his house were from the army, so a natural reaction of Bangabandhu would have been that they could not have ventured to do this without the knowledge of the Chief of Army Staff. It would, therefore, be futile to seek help from the Chief. That may be one of the reasons that he did not look for me. So in all probability, he might not have tried to contact me or anyone in the army.

Did Bangabandhu ring up Colonel Shafaat for help? This was a possibility, because Colonel Shafaat was Bangabandhu’s choice to command this brigade and he used to call him directly to his office. So if Bangabandhu had called him and sought help from him, in that case Colonel Shafaat could not have said those words to Bangabandhu. However, the reason for which Bangabandhu did not get in touch with me, may be for the same reason he might not have tried to get in touch with Colonel Shafaat Jamil. I, therefore, rule out the possibility of this dialogue with Colonel Shafaat too.

BDR — The strength and fire-power — wise the next force that could have mustered some troops to help Bangabandhu was BDR. But because of the army’s involvement in this action and BDR’s strength and fire-power being comparatively less than the army, it was possible that this dialogue could have taken place with Brig. (later Maj or General) Khalil —the DG BDR.

As per General Khalil’s statement in the book ‘Facts and Documents’, he was informed about this incident in the

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morning of 15th August ’75. He then alleged to have gone to his office after sunrise, which was within the BDR compound.

However, an interesting point has come to my notice and that is about an article in ‘Shongbad Chitra’ dated 12th November ’92. This article was written by Mr. Waresat Hossain Belal, BP (Colonel Taher’s brother). [Who in this article claimed that on 15th August ’75 at 4.00 in the morning, he saw General Khalil at the radio station? However, in view of General Khalil’s statement that he came to know about this incident in the morning of 15th August ’75, I really do not know why Mr. Belal should have claimed this? If he really did not see General Khalil there in the radio station then why he said so? General Khalil is dead now. I do not know whether he saw this article before he died. I find no reason why General Khalil should have been in the radio station, at 4 am, unless he had connived with them] In any case, I cannot comment on this. However, Bangabandhu was killed around six or past six in the morning. If he really was associated with them, in that case he could have said ‘sorry’ to Bangabandhu. However, his subsequent actions did not look to me that he had anything to do with what had happened. ‘

JRB — It is more than likely that Bangabandhu contacted them. It is difficult to say whether the answer from them was positive or negative. The probability was that they would have said ‘yes’. But they were-handicapped for one important reason and that was that they were not holding live ammunitions then. Their ammunitions were under the protective custody of BDR in their armoury. On top of it, when they (JRB) saw the tanks standing in front of them and they (JRB) were without ammunitions, the chances for them to say ‘no’ to Bangabandhu were quite possible.

Air Force — The possibility of contacting the Air Chief was less, because Bangabandhu needed immediate help, which he could not have provided. However, when I

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contacted the Air Chief in the morning he appeared to have known nothing. So I rule out this possibility.

Navy — Same as Air Force. I don’t think that the Naval Chief was contacted because when I spoke to him, he too appeared to have known nothing. So I rule out this possibility too.

Police — It was possible that Bangabandhu sought help from Mr. Mansoor Ali–the Home Minister. With the involvement of the army in this episode, the IG Police Mr. Nurul Islam could not have given any positive response to Mr. Mansoor Ali. Had Mr. Mansoor Ali got positive response from the IG Police, in that case he would not have rang me to send troops to Bangabandhu’s house in the morning? So this dialogue could have been with the Home Minister Mr. Mansoor Ali.

Amongst the political leaders, Mr. Tofael Ahmed was the Political Secretary to the President Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had some connection with JRB. Mr.Tofael Ahmed as the Political Secretary to the President had been looking after the affairs of J RB, who were capable of putting up resistance. Once the incident started, the JRB officers must have contacted him and apprised him about their position. In view of their limited capabilities and being handicapped due to absence of live ammunitions, which was then under the custody of BDR, they must have also expressed their inability. Consequently, when Bangabandhu sought help from Mr. Tofael Ahmed, he too could not have given him that assurance. So the dialogue, “Is it that you can do nothing” could have been uttered by Bangabandhu while speaking to Mr. Tofael Ahmed.

Finally, Bangabandhu could have sought help from some of his political colleagues, other than Mr. Mansoor Ali the Home Minister and Mr. Tofael Ahmed, who had direct or indirect access to the JRB troops and were capable of coming forward with help, yet could not have given that assurance to Bangabandhu. So this dialogue could have been

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with any one of the Bangabandhu colleagues whom he might have approached for help. The above is my observation in response to Dr. Hasan-uz-zaman’s implied comments.

Having analyzed the statements of various officers, I would now try to discuss about the activities and actions of some of the senior army officers who could have helped me to combat the situation that I faced. Though there were some discontentments amongst the troops because of a rumour that they were being replaced by JRB, yet the entire army did not believe in this rumour and was not involved in 15th August’s incident. Except the few who masterminded this incident, the entire army should not be blamed for what happened on 15th August ’75. However, on that day except for the armoured and the artillery units, the rest of the troops in Dhaka Garrison were not initially involved. They were however, tricked into the rebels’ side by spreading a rumour that the Putsch that took place had the blessings of the Army Chief. Meaning the entire army was involved in this escapade, which was not the case. But by the time they realized that they had been misled, it was too late for them to switch back.

However, during that crises–ridden period, if all the senior officers were on the same frequency i.e., if everyone wanted that this rebel incident must be resisted, then there was a possibility and it could have been prevented from taking place or at least their further activities could be stalled. I would now try to place before the readers a brief summary of the activities of the officers on that day, those who mattered. The historians would be able to judge how sincere they were to put down this rebellion that had taken place.

¤General Zia¤
General Zia was my Deputy. In such situation it was expected that I would get my Deputy’s assistance and he

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would come forward on his own to help me. On the first two days of the incident, I had no reason to doubt about his integrity. But later on, when I was told by one of the rebel officers-(Major Rashid) that they had gone for this action with complete understanding with my Deputy, I was taken aback. Therefore, from the day one whatever action he took and whatever assistance that he tried to give me was all to help the rebel troops. I will now highlight those:-

a. On the morning of 15th August ‘75 sometime before six when I asked General Zia to come to my house, he came within 15 to 20 minutes time dressed in uniform, properly shaved, in his official car and driven by his official chauffeur. Whereas at about the same time I also asked CGS Brig. Khaled to come to my house right away. He came dressed in Pyjama (Night dress), without a shave and driving himself in his personal car. During that crisis-ridden period, these differences did not strike me as to how, in such short time, one was so officially dressed and the other was in so casual outfit. Although both of them were in front of me within about 15 to 20 minutes time, yet these differences did not strike me then. I was then more engrossed as to how to put down the rebellion than to notice these minor details. When I had time to think, then only I realized who was doing what!

b. In the morning when General Zia and Brig. Khaled was in my house, I told them that after I ordered Colonel Shafaat Jamil to move troops to oppose this action, he appeared to have vanished. I did not know what actions he had taken. I couldnot even get through to him then. (In this context please refer to Colonel Shafaat Jamil’s statement at pages 294 to 295 of the book “Facts and Document’s” which is quite pertinent here). In this paragraph, Colonel Shafaat stated that he went to Deputy Chief General Zia’s house to take orders from him. Here at my house in spite of my acute anxieties,

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General Zia did not even mention that he met Colonel Shafaat Jamil before he came to my house. If Colonel Shafaat’s statement was correct, in that case wasn’t it natural for General Zia to say that he met Colonel Shafaat Jamil before he came to my house? Moreover, according to Colonel Shafaat, he went to seek direction and take orders from General Zia in the morning. Why should not he have told me what direction he gave him? Now, would I be wrong to say that both of them were in league with the rebels!

c. In the morning after I ordered Colonel Shafaat Jamil, I expected hectic activities in the cantonment. Since I did not notice any activity of the troops, I ordered CGS Brig. Khaled to go to 46 Brigade area to help Colonel Shafaat to move troops. But the moment I ordered Brig. Khaled to go to 46 Brigade area, General Zia vehemently opposed it. During this period, he (General Zia) had been addressing me as ‘Sir’ rather too often, which he did not do in the past. (Normally General Zia in private used to address me as Safi and in front of others as ‘Sir’. But on that day, he had been addressing me as ‘Sir’ rather too frequently). In spite of his opposition, when I sent Brig. Khaled to 46 Brigade, he (General Zia) made an utterance and said, “He is going to spoil it”. When I try to recollect those moments now, the question arises what Brig. Khaled was going to spoil for which General Zia was so worried. Was those action in 46 Brigade area likely to go against the plan that he made? Otherwise I find no reason for him to be so worried about Brig Khaled’s action.

d. The moment I reached my office in the morning, General Zia also followed me; he came in and sat in front of me on the other side of the table. When I was instructing the other an Comd’s to be prepared to move on my orders, General Zia was there. After Brig. Khaled returned from 46 Brigade to report to me, what

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he saw and what he could do, General Zia was still there. The moment Brig. Khaled finished his reporting, General Zia suggested that the CGS should not go out now and should sit down to prepare an Operations Order (Ops Order) for the army to move towards the border to face an Indian offensive. Though this could be a possibility, there was no such indication till then. The most important task for me then was to handle the death of Bangabandhu. There was no such information regarding the Indian troops movement towards or around our border. I, therefore, told General Zia that let me handle this delicate situation first. My observation about General Zia’s proposal was that he probably did not want any interference in whatever was happening and whatever he was doing.

e. Major Rashid’s revelation about General Zia was becoming true. He told me that General Zia had assured Major Rashid that if they succeeded in their scheme, in that case he would give them a helping hand. The rebel troops were thus going ahead as per their plan and with the blessings of General Zia. To achieve this goal, Brig Khaled’s action could put their plan in jeopardy. In that case their entire plan might become spoiled. So General Zia’s apprehension of so called Indian aggression was nothing but a deceitful way to divert my attention. His insistence, therefore, to prepare an ‘Ops Order’ by CGS was just to keep Brig. Khaled office-bound, so that he couldnot interfere with the actions of the rebel troops who were then consolidating their positions.

f. On 24th August ’75, I was removed from the position of Chief of Army Staff and General Zia was made the Army Chief. General Zia on receipt of this order could not even wait for me to handover to him. He took over as Chief of Army Staff before I could even return from Banga Bhaban to the cantonment. In fact, when I was in Banga Bhaban and was being told that a new Army

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Chief had been appointed at about the same time General Zia after taking over as Army Chief was addressing the officers in the Army HQ as new Chief of Staff.

g. General Zia had been harbouring ill will against Bangabandhu and his government right from the time when I was made the Chief. Khandaker Moshtaque knew about this and he became his ardent sympathizer. Khandaker Moshtaque thereafter, picked up General Zia to serve his cause. During the incident of 15th August ’75, it was General Zia who gave him support from within the army. After the assassination of Bangabandhu, Khandaker Moshtaque with the active support of the rebel officers appointed General Zia as the Chief of Army Staff, who was their choice. General Zia finally achieved what he wanted and started his activities to achieve his final objective!

¤Brig. Khaled¤
Brig. Khaled was the CGS. He was my right-hand man. I had full trust and confidence in him. But some of his actions from 15th August ’75 onwards were such that my confidence was shaken. The reason for my loss of confidence in Brig. Khaled was as follows:-

a. On the morning of 15th August ’75, I sent Brig. Khaled to help activate Colonel Shafaat to move troops to oppose this action. But Brig. Khaled could not make him move. However, I am not blaming Brig. Khaled for not being able to activate Colonel Shafaat or his brigade, but my regret is that when he returned from 46 Brigade, he did not give me any idea about the brigade and its staff that they had become rebel sympathisers? After he returned from 46 Brigade area, I went there too. There I found that Major Rashid was playing a leading role along with Colonel Shafaat’s BM Major Hafiz. So I did not doubt

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about Major Rashid’s activity there. From 46 Brigade, Brig. Khaled rang me up to come to the brigade area and also said that they were not allowing him to speak anymore. He did not tell me who they were? It could not be Colonel Shafaat or Major Hafiz. It must have been Major Rashid, but he did not give me any idea about Major Rashid. However, I would give Brig. Khaled the benefit of doubt that till then he too probably did not know that Major Rashid was one of the rebel leaders, as I did not know.

b. On 17th August ’75, when I was in Bangabhaban, I was told by Major Rashid that before they undertook this operation, they approached Brig. Khaled Mosharraf for his consent. When Major Rashid proposed Brig. Khaled in his office, Colonel Shafaat Jamil was also there. As per Major Rashid, Brig. Khaled told him not to be childish and asked him to get away. Whether that was a childish suggestion or not, it was to be proved later but neither Brig. Khaled nor Colonel Shafaat brought this to my notice. However, their subsequent actions after 15th August ’75 forced me to think that they were not on the right track right from day one and afterwards.

c. However, after Major Rashid’s suggestive utterances, anyone would have kept their eyes and ears open about their activities, which apparently they did not do. On the contrary, they took them so casually that they overlooked their activities completely. Consequently, when these boys succeeded in their endeavour, both Brig. Khaled and Colonel Shafaat Jamil quickly wanted to be on their orbit. Therefore, from then on they directly or indirectly started to appease and assist them. When Brig. Khaled was informed that the rebel troops of the tank regiment did not have main gun ammunition in their tanks, that was the time he should have acted and hold them. He instead of taking any action to hold

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them, issued ammunitions to them without even consulting me. Thereby Brig. Khaled earned their goodwill. Am I wrong to hold this view? These troops were still rebel soldiers and how could CGS issue ammunitions to the rebel troops? Therefore, would I be wrong to say that Brig. Khaled also wanted to be on their side?

d. On the moming of 15th August ’75, I sent Brig. Khaled to 46 Brigade area to assist Colonel Shafaat Jamil to move troops. Only he (Brig. Khaled) knew what he did or what he could do there. He either did not get enough time to brief me properly or did not brief me intentionally. But after I got stuck at Bangabhaban, Brig. Khaled moved to 46 Brigade area and started to brief the other forces as to what they should do. In the process, he also called JRB’s two Deputy Directors, Mr. Anwar-ul-Alam Shaheed and Mr. Sarwar Molla, to brief them as to what they were supposed to do under the circumstances. During that briefing, Brig. Khaled Musharraf made a remark which Mr. Anwar-ul-Alam Shaheed told me sometime in 2008, and gave me in writing which I have attached as Exhibit A.

¤Colonel Shafaat¤
Jamil Colonel Shafaat Jamil was the Brigade Commander and he held the key to solving this issue under discussion. Beside the rebel units i.e., the armoured and the artillery regiments, he had three seasoned infantry battalions (1, 2 and 4 East Bengal Regiments) under his command (Roughly 2,500 to 3,000 Infantry soldiers) in Dhaka cantonment. In spite of my clear instructions to Colonel Shafaat to move troops, he did not even order the troops to move. Why didn’t he do anything can be answered only by Colonel Shafaat Jamil. My strength in Dhaka was 46 Brigade but I could not move this brigade for taking any action. The Brigade Comd

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apparently blamed me for not giving him any orders. In the previous pages, I have explained at length whether I ordered him to confront them or not. I am now leaving it to the readers and the historians to judge what Colonel Shafaat did to quell this incident.

a. On 17th August ’75, while I was at Bangabhaban, Major Rashid (one of the Coup leaders) told me that Colonel Shafaat was told what they had in mind and what they were going to do. After their action on the morning of 15th August ’75 and Colonel Shafaat’s no-action on that day, made my beloc more stronger that whatever Major Rashid told me on 17th August ’75 about Colonel Shafaat was true. The true reflection of some of his claims can be seen from his statements at page 294 of the book ‘Facts and Documents, where he said that Major Rashid came to report to him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. How dare could he go and say this to his commander?

b. Who was Major Rashid? He was the commanding officer of 2 Field Regiment artillery, which rebelled on that morning. He was directly under the command of Colonel Shafaat Jamil. Having committed such a heinous crime how Major Rashid dared to go to his commander and tell him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib (Bangabandhu). Who was Sheikh Mujib? He was none other than the President of the country. May I now pose a question? After Major Rashid informed Colonel Shafaat that they had killed Sheikh Mujib, did he (Shafaat) need anybody’s order to take action against him? Why didn’t he take that action? Was it due to fear or was he on their side? This needs to be carefully analysed.

c. Colonel Shafaat Jamil in his statement said that he took up defensive position in the cantonment. This was surely against the rebels. My question is why he had to

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take up defensive position in the Cantonment when he was required to confront them? If it was against the rebel troops, in that case how did the rebel leaders Major Rashid and Major Dalim freely moved in the 46 Brigade area since morning. Major Dalim even came to my office in the Army HQ with a small contingent of troops. If he was sincere to put down the rebellion, then how Major Dalim came to my office? He could have easily held them in the cantonment if he desired, which he did not do. Colonel Shafaat Jamil had three battalions of Infantry soldiers under his command in the cantonment. Mind you, according to his own statement, he went to General Zia for instructions after Major Rashid came to tell him that they had killed Sheikh Mujib. Why he had to go to General Zia after receiving this information? Colonel Shafaat Jamil did not clarify this. So far as my knowledge goes, I do not think Colonel Shafaat Jamil was initially associated with them, yet why he had to go to General Zia for orders? Was it due to Major Rashid’s insistence or was there any underground link? His subsequent actions were questionable.

d. On the morning of 15th August ’75 when I was in Colonel Shafaat’s brigade area, he knew that I was there (He in his statement said that he saw me there), yet he avoided me and did not meet me when I was in his brigade area. Why did I go there? My strength was Colonel Shafaat and his brigade. I do not know why he avoided me then and why he came to complain against General Zia on 19th August ’75, which was four days after the tragic incident. It might be that after the rebel troops consolidated their position, they might have thought that the usefulness of Colonel Shafaat’s was over, so they might have abandoned him. He probably became worried when he realised that he was being abandoned.

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So, four days after the incident he came to tell me that I should be careful about my Deputy. If he could come to me on the fourth day of the incident, then who stopped him from coming to me earlier?

e. On the morning of 15th August ’75, Colonel Shafaat went to take orders from Deputy Chief General Zia; thereby he violated the normal channel of command. He said that I did not give him any orders, so he went to the Deputy Chief for orders. If I did not give him any orders, in that case why did I ring him up so early in the moming? Why did I go to his brigade area in the morning? He should have known that even if I did not give him any orders, yet he had no right to go to Deputy Chief for orders when the Chief was present in the station. Colonel Shafaat appeared to be happy with the instructions that he got from General Zia but what were the instructions that he got? He was asked to remain alert, meant stay put. Was that an appropriate order on that occasion? This order meant no confrontation and Colonel Shafaat was happy to get that order.

f. Having done nothing after the incident of 15th August ’75, Colonel Shafaat Jamil came to tell me (on 19th August ’75) that I should not trust my Deputy General Zia because according to him General Zia was behind this Putsch. It appears to me that the reason he came to tell me this was probably because by then he must have realised that General Zia and his group had abandoned him. Otherwise why it took him all those days to tell me this?

h. I held the Formation Commanders conference in my office on 19th August ’75. The main reason to hold this conference was to consolidate my position. To achieve that, I needed, to bring the rebel troops back to the barracks. I also gave the outline of my plan to Colonel Shafaat as to how I intended to achieve this. So I made

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Shafaat Jamil and Major Hafiz came to complain to me against General Zia that he was behind this Putsch!

¤Brig. Rouf¤
Brig. Rouf was the DGFI. So far as intelligence gathering was concerned, it was a very senior and important appointment. He was Bangabandhu’s pick to head this outfit. In performing this sensitive task, did Brigadier Rouf live up to the expectation of Bangabandhu? If I am to comment on his performance, I Would say that he did not. It was too big a responsibility for him. He was not the right person to hold this post. As the Chief of such important outfit, he not only failed to deliver but even abandoned the person for whom he worked. Following are my comments about his actions:-

a. The incident of 15th August ’75 was primarily an intelligence failure. The incident being uniform-related, it should have been Brig. Rouf and his outflt who should have been vigilant. They failed in their responsibilities to detect this incident before it took place. What happened on 15th August ’75 was not an impromptu effort. Lot of planning must have gone into it before it was launched. But Brig. Rouf’s eyes were not on them. His main effort was to sniff and nose around the Freedom Fighters to find fault with them, rather than keeping an eye on the anti-state elements, who were organizing themselves under his nose. As I said before, 15th August ’75 incident was not an impromptu event and the DFI outfit should have kept their eyes and ears open, which they did not.

b. As per Brig. Rouf’s statement, one of the counter intelligence officer of the DFI informed him on the night of 14th/15th August ’75 that a sinister occurrence was about to take place. He while giving interview to the reporter, narrated the account in a manner as if he informed the concerned people, which in fact he did not. I analysed his statement in the previous pages and

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proved that he did not tell the truth. On getting this information, he instead of taking immediate step to inform the concerned people, tried to pass on the baby to someone else. He instructed his counter intelligence officer to report the matter to the incoming DGFI or even to the President, which was not their jurisdiction. To me it appears that he originally did not believe his source and therefore, did not inform anyone. Thereafter, when the incident was really taking place, he became panicky and fled from his house and took shelter in the Golf course in the cantonment.

c. It is evident from Brig. Roufs statement that he came to my house on the morning of 15th August ’75, negotiating the rear boundary wall of my house, wearing Lungi and Vest. Rouf was a Brigadier and he did not have to come to my house climbing over the rear boundary wall when others came to my house through the main gate. The very fact that he came to my house negotiating the rear boundary wall was by itself a suspicious act. Why he came to my house through the way he did? Secondly, why he had to be in that outfit i.e., Lungi and Vest? That he was in the Golf course was clear from his own statement as well as the version of my house–guards who saw him sitting under a tree along with some members of his family, during late hour of the night.

d. After having got the information from his counter intelligence officer, Brig. Rouf should have been more vigilant and active in alerting the concerned people. Instead, he became more concerned for his own safety and left his house along with some members of his family and took shelter in the Golf course during the dark hours of the night. Otherwise why he had to be . there during such odd hours of the night/morning? After his counter intelligence officer informed him as to what was likely to happen, he should have been more active

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in alerting all concerned. He did not do what he was. supposed to. But when the incident was really taking place, he panicked and fled from his house clad in Lungi and Vest to avoid detection and positioned himself in the Golf course. That’s why I say that he fled from his house the moment he realised that something serious was really taking place. Doesn’t it show how irresponsible he was? What a brave soldier!

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Exhibit A

The statement made by Ambassador Mr. Anwar-ul-Alam Shaheed (Retd) is exhibited below.

It was on the morning of 15m August 1975 Brig. Khaled Mosharraf summoned the two Deputy Directors of Rakkhi Bahini, Mr. Anwar-ul-Alam Shaheed and Mr. Sarwar Molla to brief them as to what they should do under the circumstances. During this briefing, Brig. Khaled Mosharraf made the following comments. The handwritten portion below were the comments made by Brig. Khaled Mosharraf on that morning, which was written in the hands of Ambassador Mr. Anwar-ul-Alam Shaheed (Retd).

[Shaheed, Sarwar,

I know you are patriots, but we had to do it because we do not want this country to be a kingdom.

K.M.]

(Excerpted from books paperback)

Major General K M Sufiullah was born in September 1935 at Rupganj, in the district of Dhaka (Now Narayanganj district). He joined erstwhile Pakistan Army in 1952 as Cadet. After graduation from Pakistan Military Academy, he was commissioned in 1955 as Second Lieutenant. On commission after an initial spell of command of troops in the unit he served as staff ofticer in GHQ as well as an instructor in the School of Infantry and Tactics wnh distinction. In 1968 he attended the Command and Staff College, Quetta and was awarded psc. Thereafter in 1970 he was posted to 2 East Bengal Regiment as Second in-Command for promotion.

When Pakistan Army started to massacre the civil population in the then East Pakistan on the night of 25th March 1971, General Safiullah then as the Second-in-Commnnd of 2 East Bengal Regiment staged a rebellion. He along with his entire battalion defected from Pakistan Army on the same night and pulled out the battalion from its Joydebpur location to Mymensingh on 28th March 1971. Thereafter he actively participated in the war of liberation and fought valiantly against Pakistan Army. During the war of liberation he raised and commanded a Sector, which was known as No 3 Sector, till September 1971. He also raised and commanded a regular infantry brigade during the war, which was known as S Force (With the first initial of his name S). This brigade has the unique honour to defeat the Pakistani brigade at Akhaura on 4th December 1971. General Safiullah while fighting against the Pakistan Army always remained with his troops in the front lines. For his gallant action in the war he was awarded the second highest gallantry award ‘Bir Uttam’. On 16th December 1971 he as member of Bangladesh delegation. Participated in the surrender ceremony when Pakistan Army surrendered to Joint-Command. He was present at the racecourse when General Niazi and General Arora signed surrender document. In April 1972 he was appointed as the Chief of Army Staff. He raised, trained and commanded today‘s Bangladesh Army till September 1975.

After September 1975 General Safiullah was transferred to Foreign Service. There he served as country‘s Head of Mission for 16 years till 1991. He was High Commissioner to Malaysia from January 1976 to July 1981, High Commissioner to Canada from August’81 to July 1986, Ambassador to Sweden from August’86 to July 1987 and finally High Commissioner to UK from August 1987, 1991 to July‘9l. General Safiullah retired from service in 1992 and joined politics in 1994. He was elected as Member of Parliament in the 7th Parliament. In this Parliament he was the Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Ministry of Defense.

General Safiullah has a son and three daughters. His hobby is photography and gardening. He plays golf and at time writes.