Clippings Refugee Relief
…What are the refugees really costing us? The Ministry of Rehabilitation released a pamphalet some time back giving, among other things, itemized break-up of the cost of maintaining the refugees. The pamphlet bears no date but it purports to give the position upto June 22 by when 6 million refugees had registered themselves with the Indian authorities and were living in the refugees for six months and puts the figure at around Rs.300 crores, which works out to Rs. 1,000 per annum per refugee. This compares with India’s per capital income of Rs 589 in 1969-70. Of course, the comparison is invalid since the figure of Rs. 1,000 per annum per refugee includes not merely the refugees consumption expenditure but also capital cost of things like tents, hospitals, transport vehicles, etc. The cost estimates are presented in the pamphlet in two statements. but the basis of classification is obscure since both statements include items involving current a well as capital and recurring as well as non- recurring expenditure. However, a rough selection of items of personal consumption expenditure attempted by Dhandekar and Rath in their study “Poverty in India,” this gives the refugees a standard of consumption slightly higher than that enjoyed by the bottom five deciles (that is, one-half) of the Indian population.
Of course, this is not to say that the refugees are living it up or that we are spoiling them with riches. We are doing nothing of the sort. What the refugees are being given is the bare minimum to keep body and soul together. The squalid conditions of the refugee camps is something that no one who has visited them is likely to forget in a hurry. The purposes of the calculations attempted above are to suggest that (a) the estimates of espenditure on the refugees are exaggerated of (b) not all the money provided for the refugees’ upkeep is in fact being spent on them. Both possibilities are plausible. The estimated expenditure of Rs. 19.33 on cereals per refugee per month, Rs. 5.17 on pulses and Rs. 3.33 on edible oil is definitely high compared to the consumption satandards of the majority of the Indian or Pakistani population. Similarly the estimates of capital expenditure provide for one latrine for every 2 families when in the bawls of Calcutta or Bombay there will be hardly a family which does not have to share a latrine with four others. The estimates also provides for sinking one `tube-well’ per 10 families. If indeed the actual financial provisions are being made on these bases, then almost certainly there are substantial leakages flowing into the pockets of the contractors and other agencies which receive lump-sum allocations from the Government on the basis of the number of refugees under their care. Those who have visited the refugee camps know that in fact such leakage does take place, with estimates of the middlemen’s illegal `cut’ as high as 10 to 15 per cent. Ten per cent of Rs 30 lakhs (roughly the allocation for feeding one lakh refugees for one month) is a cool Rs 3 lakhs. Refugee relief need not be, it seems a labour of love!
The other aspect of the question is the direct draft the upkeep of the refugees constitutes on the Central Budget for the current year. In the calculations that follow we will broadly take the official norms of expenditure per refugee, inflated as they are. Assuming that on an average 8 million refugees have to be maintained in the refugee camps during the financial year 1971- 72, upkeep expenditure on them will amount to about Rs 350 crores to which may be added another Rs 100 crores of expenditure of a mostly capital or non-recurring kind, giving a total of Rs 450 crores. Of this, if Rs 150 crores are taken to be the foodgrains component, that can be met by drawing down foodgrain stocks with the pipeline or already committed is reported to be roughly Rs 100-125 crores, leaving Rs 200 crores or less as the net draft on budgetary resources. Of this Rs 60 crores has been provided for in the Budget. Thus on the whole the Bangaledh refugees can account for a net worsening of the Government’s budgetary positon to the extent of only Rs 140-14 crores. If the budgetary gap of Rs 220 crores is indeed threatening to widen To Rs 600 crores, (as the Finance Minister is reported to have warned) other explanations have to be sought for the development.
There may be some merit in depicting the burden inposed by the infux of refugees in the most somber terms if the Government’s purpose was to extract the maximum assistance out of the international community or to persuade the Indian public to submit to additional resource raising effort. The Finance Minister has repeatedly disclaimed any intention of doing the latter. In the circumstances part of the reason for exaggeration the budgetary cost of the refugees can only be to camouflage the basic collapse of planning and plan implementation. (Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay).
Geared for War?
Dacca carried out black-out exercise on September 24 (The Statesman. 25.9.71). Bombay did the same on October 3 (Times of India, 4.10.71). “Chittagong airport has been made an air base” (The Statesman 22.9.71). Even a layman could come to similar conclusion if he visits Calcutta airport. “camouflaged army cars seen in Rawalpindi” (The Statesman, 2.10.71). In West Bengal or even around Calcutta we are sick of seeing armed forces vehicles of all possible sizes and capabilities (camouflaged of otherwise). Evidently India’s military claws are no less sharpened than those of Pakistan. Our armed forces are ready for the word Go. To cite just one example: Kalyani University hostels have been occupied by armed guardians’. Even the residents of Kalyani are waiting for evacuation orders.
As if all these were not enough, K. Subramanyam. Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyeses (New Delhi) loudly advocated: “India should consider some sort of a situation, preferably short of war, on her western border with Pakistan to deflect the attention of Gen. Yahya Khan from Bangladesh to the western wing of their country” (Times of India, 20.9.71).
Subramanyam’s advice is wrong and militarily unsound. Because India will than have three directly interconnected fronts to handle- one on the west, one in West Bengal and the third on the Assam-Tripura side. Judging from Indian armed forces’ performances in 1965 and 1962 and allowing for present increased potential (marginal though). it is quite inconceivable that they will be able to bear the brunt of all the three fronts As for Pakistan, the west wing will have one front to fight on but the eastern wing will have two. In the event of war, the east wing will have to fight virtually without any materiel link-up with its western wing. In short, the east wing is a `death ground’ for the Pakistan army. But such a situation has an advantage in that it induces fighting with greater determination-even leading to victory. Sun Tzu had cited and almost similar case, wherein a smaller army had no option but to win against a bigger army, since a retreat would have involved crossing a river and the general of the smaller army had thoughtfully and deliberately burnt all his boats well in advance. Such can be the hard reality of hard practice! There have been instances during and after World War II to support such art of war as advocated by Sun Tzu.
Politically, there is no country in the world that supports India on her stand on East Pakistan, not even Russia. Pakistan on the other hand, has scored a diplomatic, victory over India on this issue, though not without condemnation for its army’s brutalities.
Standing thus in an advantageous position it is unlikely that Pakistan would be the first to launch an all-out war. But then, will Indira and her military commanders embark upon such an adventure? It is we Indian people that must answer this grave question.
Frontier, 23 October 1971
সূত্র: আন্তর্জাতিক গণমাধ্যম ও মুক্তিযুদ্ধ ১৯৭১ . ১ম খণ্ড – মুনতাসীর মামুন