GUILT AND DISASTER OVER PAKISTAN
By Peter Hazelhurst
Within the space of a few short weeks both East and West Bengal have suddenly become international trouble spots. Millions of people have been uprooted by civil war, thousands have been killed, famine disease are already beginning to stalk the countryside and a full scale war between India and Pakistan threatens to break out at any moment.
But even more disturbing is the fact that the situation can only deteiorate. World leaders are, of course, talking glibly about the hope that East Bengalis and the West Pakistanis will come to a “political settlement”, But even the most naive student of Pakistan affairs knows that a political settlement is out of the question now.
In the coming months the legal aspects behind this man made holocast will be hotly debated in the capitals of the world and on international platfroms. But many of the issues which precipitated this convulsion have been clouded by the cries of “secession” or “genocide” and other accusations and counter accusations and if an accusing finger be pointed at any single Pakistani leader then one must, at this juncture, take a judcious look at the chronological sequence of events leading up to the rift.
It is worthwhile picking up the threads in January, 1970, when president Yahya Khan, who had promised to hand over power to a popular government, lifted the ban on political activity in both East and West Paistan as the prelude to election of a consituent asembly. To hasten the constitution making process and to assugae the fears of West Pakistanis who believed that integrity of Pakistan might be jeopardized by imagined East Bengali separatists, the President had earlier issued legal framework order (L.F.O.) which gave him the right to ratify to reject the constitution.
It was already obvious that the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto would emerge the most popular leader in West Pakistan and the fiery Bengali leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had already demonstrated his strength on the streets of East Pakistan.
But as the two leaders launched their campaigns is soon became clear that they were fighting the elections on rigid and diametrically opposed grounds and that there would be hardly any common meeting ground in the assembly. Mr. Bhutto, whose whole political base is essentially founded in the militant Punjabis’ obsession over the Kashmir dispute, began stomping up and down the western province talking of a thousand-year war with India. And to maintain this attitude he assured his voters that he stood for a strong central government, a strong army and a new offensive to liberate Kashmir.
As millions of Pakistanis went to the polls in the country’s first free elections last year, General Yahya Khan and his aides waited for the results with bated breath. President Yahya certainly intended to hand over power but had hoped that the results would force East and West Pakistani leaders into an alliance which would preserve the integrity of the country. But the generals had not counted on two factors. At the last moment the Awami League’s major political opponent the left wing National Awami party, decided to boycott the elections leaving the field open to the Awami League.
Almost every Bengali endorsed the Sheikh’s six point programme which turned the election into a referendum. The Awami League swept the polls and claimed 167 of the 169 Bengali seats and with the support of the anti Punjabi regional parties in the western province Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was confident of obtaining the support of more then two thirds of the 313 members of the Constituent Assembly. In West Pakistan Mr. Bhutto and his People’s Party won 82 of the 138 seats allocated to the western wing. The Punjab recoiled in horror for it became blatantly obvious that the Bengalis would be able to draw up their own constitutions the moment the assembly met.
On the night after the elections the flamboyant lawyer revealed part of his plan to me : “What do you think I will do. The Sheikh will push his constitution through with his brute majority and the responsibility will lie on the President’s shoulders. I doubt whether he will sign a document which is unacceptable to West Pakistan.”
In other words Mr. Bhutto had a vested interest in keeping the L.F.O. in force but he had told me that he had heard disconcerting reports that the Sheikh was planning to declrare that the Constituent Assembly was sovereign body the moment it met. In other words the L.F.O. and the Punjabs veto would disappear.
But Mr Bhotto had other ideas. At first he tried to oppose the early sitting of the Assembly but on February 13, President Yahya announced that Assembly would meet on March 3.
The actual point of no return which precipitated the present crisis came two days later on February 15. Mr. Bhutto announced that his party would boycott the Constituent Assembly and at the same time he threatened any other West Pakistani politicians who were planning to travel to Dacca. In short, Mr. Bhutto began to pile up pressure on President Yahya.
At the same time Mr. Bhutto had met several of President Yahya’s generals who were considered hawks on the subject of East Bengal. They included the present governor of East Pakistan, General Tikka Khan.
In the meantime several West Pakistanis had defied Mr. Bhutto’s threat and had travelled to Dacca in the last week of February to participate in the framing of the constitution. In terms of arihtmetic the representatives of two thirds of the country had congregated in Dacca..
But on February 28, Mr. Bhutto flew to Rawalpindi to remind President Yahya of the consequences he would have to face if he ratified a constitution which was unacceptable to the Punjab and subsequently to a Punjabi army.
The President made his first mistake. He succumbed to Punjabi pressures and without consulting Sheikh Mujib, as the leader of the largest party, he postponed the Constituent Assembly on March.
The Bengalis who saw the move as a conspiracy went wild and the Army was called to quell disurbances in Dacca. The Bengalis had lost their faith in the President and the first cries of Bangladesh were heard on the streets of Dacca.
Life in the entire province was disruped and as the cries of Bangladesh become louder the President flew to Dacca on March 16, with two alternative offers. (1) He said he was willing to restore power to the elected representatives of the people immediately if the Sheikh was willing to form a provisional national government at both centre and at provincial level or (2) He would restore power to provines and an interim government led by the President himself would administer the day-to-day needs of the country until a constitution was framed
When president Yahya asked the Sheikh whether he was prepared to take Bhutto, the leader of the largest West Pakistani party, into a central coalition government, the Sheikh cited democratic precedents and said that as the leader of the single larger party he must be allowed to select his own partners. Again his willingness to participate in the central affairs of Pakistan does not suggest that the Sheikh was planning secession. But the President succumbed to Mr. Bhutto’s strident threats again and the propposal for a national government was dropped.
As time began to run out the Sheikh and Yahya Khan agreed to the second compromise formula : immediate restoration of power at provincial leavel. The Sheikh asked the President to issue an immediate proclamation withdrawing martial law, and restoring power to East Pakistan and the four provinces of West Pakistan. The Sheikh agreed to the suggestion that the president could continue to administer an interim central government until a constitution was framed.
As the soldiers supplied into battle dress in the barracks angry and frustrated Bengalis began to raise the flag of Bangldesh in Dacca. It was Bhutto who finally brought the President to take the decision which set East Bengal on fire. When the president put the Sheikh’s proposal to the West Pakistan leader Mr. Bhutto pointed out that if martial law was wihdrawn Pakistan would be broken up into five sovereign States the moment the President restored power to the provinces. He expressed the fear that Mujibur Rahman was trying to liquidate the cental government. Because the president withdrew martial law he had no sanction to carry on as the head of State.
Half convinced the President went back to Mujibur Rahman and expressed these fears. He promised Mujib that he would withdraw martial law the moment the National Assembly met and gave a central government some form of validity. Sheikh Mujib rezierated his demand for the immediate withdrawal of martial law and President Yahya now fully convinced that he was dealing with a traitor, turned to his generals.
Taking events to their logical conclusion there is no doubt that the present holocast was precipitated by President Yahya Khan when he postponed the Assembly without consulting the Bengalis, but even more so by Mr. Bhutto’s deliberate decision to boycott the Assembly on March 3.
Reference : Manila Chronicle, 05.07.1971