Teetering on The Brink
Martial law is pushing East Pakistan towards declaring independence -unless Sheikh Mujib gets the substance of full autonomy.
Just when Dacca seemed quieter at the beginning of this week, the expatriate community there began to pack its bags. The British Government, with others, has arrived those of its nationals whose presence is not essential to leave East Pakistan. There are those who think the worst of the rioting against the reimposition of martial law seems to be over. But the expatriates themselves fear that the lull presages worse to come.
It is true that on Sunday Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not after all – in what he had promised would be an “historic statement” – declare East Pakistan independent. Perhaps President Yahya Khan’s stern reiteration on Sunday that neither he nor the army would brook Stitch a move dissuade him. But Sheikh Mujib did the next best thing. In answer to the president’s invitation to a constituent assembly meeting on March 25th, he laid down four conditions that would have to be met before he and the Awami League would attend. And two of the conditions – the immediate lifting of martial law and the immediate transfer of power to ejected representatives of the people – were virtually impossible for the President to accept. President Yahya is shortly to fly to Dacca for what might be his last meeting with Sheikh Mujib to haggle over these conditions.
So it does little good that Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of West Pakistan says he is now willing to attend the March 25th meeting without preconditions. The effect of martial law in East Pakistan has moved Sheikh Mujib on to fresh ground. And even he is now dragging his feet compared with the extremist inside his own Awami League, who on Saturday night were all for declaring independence. Sheikh Mujib apparently spent some eight hours convincing them that he should instead accept the president’s offer of a new assembly while insisting on strong conditions.
Some semblance of order has returned to Dacca – but no thanks to the army,’ which has now left the running of this and other eastern cities more or less to Sheikh Mujib. The Awami League “peace patrol”, with six silver studs in their green hats to symbolize the six-point programme for East Pakistani autonomy, have done far more to put a stop to the rioting than the police could. The five-day general strike last week was a great success for Sheikh Mujib. On Sunday he announced this week’s programme of protest, which includes the non-payment of taxes, the closure of courts, government offices, schools and universities, and the daily hoisting of black flags on all buildings. And he has warned that he is willing to broaden this programme into a new general strike.
At the moment President Yahya still seems determined to maintain the fiction of martial law. Transport planes have flown army reinforcements, and tanks are reported to have had their tracks replaced by wheels in preparation for possible street fighting. But it is hard to see how Sheikh Mujib is going to be dislodged from the unassailable position in which the popular reaction to martial law has put him. The only realistic course for the president seems to be to acknowledge that in the new situation only Sheikh Mujib is preventing an outright declaration of independence, and to do a deal with him while he is still in control.
What, then, could President Yahya concede? Two of the conditions for Sheikh Mujib’s attendance at the assembly could be met quite easily. They are the return of the troops to barracks, and an inquiry into last week’s killings. The army might as well be in barracks for all the use it is at the moment, and an inquiry into the killings might not reflect too badly on it. But the crucial demands are the formal lifting of martial law and the immediate transfer of power to civilians. Martial law cannot be lifted until there is something to take its place and the civilians cannot assume power until there is a framework within which they could exercise it. So this cannot be done before the constitutional assembly meets, as Sheikh Mujib has demanded. But it might be done as soon as the assembly meets.
This would in effect make the new assembly a sovereign legislature and abolish the President’s right of veto on the new constitution; but that right already looks useless now that Sheikh Mujib has shown how easily he can flout even martial law. The six-point plan for East Pakistan autonomy would then almost certainly be written into the new constitution. Such a loose federation would mean the end of Pakistan as President Yahya sees it; but the only realistic alternative now seems to be complete separation. If the President were to embark on the forcible subjection of East Pakistan. he would have little chance of success. But his public statements, as recently as last Saturday. still implied that he might. If he does, a new civil war in a Commonwealth country could pose particular problems for Britain, which still has extensive economic and other ties with Pakistan.
In the Biafran war Britain chose to supply the Nigerian government with arms with which to crush the secession. In the event of a Pakistani civil war there are reasons why Britain might have to view the situation differently. East Pakistan is a territory whose frontiers already exist. Sheikh Mujib has demonstrably wider support there than General Ojukwu had in the territory claimed for Biafra. The 70 million East Bengalis, culturally distinct from their western partners, not only constitute a nation that qualifies for self-determination by present standards, but actually represent the majority of Pakistan’s whole population. No British government would wish to get involved in a civil war if it could avoid it – and Britain is no longer Pakistan’s main supplier of arms.
Reference: The Economist, 13 March, 1971.