Mukti Bahini – the command and the control
By LT. GEN. L. P. SEN, OUR MILITARY CORRESPONDENT, When Colonel Osmani the Chief of the Bangladesh forces were ready to continue the freedom fight for 20 years or even more, he was far from being a pessimist. He had, perhaps, cast his mind on instances where the people have risen against oppression and tyranny and resorted to arms to gain their liberty. When the martinet has had at his command a well equipped, trained and disciplined force, the type of armed action resorted to against it has invariably taken to a form of guerilla warfare. This is the obvious and most sensible thing to do, as an army trained to meet another in battle is often unable to deal with small mobile irregular columns skilfully avoiding direct combat.
Guerilla warfare is however a type of campaigning that is inevitably a long drawn out affair. It is a phase and will not result in a complete victory. It is only the initial stage in the development of warfare and will undergo many changes and take shape over a period of time until the guerilla force eventually acquires the characteristics of a regular force. When this day arrives, the hardened guerillas backed by the population are in a position to deliver the knockout blow to their regular army opponents.
In Bangladesh the fight for freedom is now 8 months old. Exaggerated reports of casualties inflicted on the Pakistani troops have given the impression to many people that they are wilting under the attacks being delivered on them. This is an incorrect picture. The truth is that the regular forces of Pakistan in Bangladesh have neither reached the point of exhaustion nor have they been incapacitated by a crippling blow. That they have suffered casualties is true, the average per day, according to an authoritative source being 30. That this must have a depressing effect on some of its personnel is more than probable, but morale in a theater of operations is like a thermometer, it rises and falls almost every hour and in accordance with what is happening. If therefore, it is accepted that the reported losses being incurred by the Pakistan forces have been grossly exaggerated, it is evident that the Mukti Bahini has a long and fortuous struggle facing it and is nowhere near approaching final victory.
The recent report in “The People ” an English daily published from Mujibnagar, to the effect that the Mukti Bahini is confident of liberating Bangladesh by December, will, if anything, do more harm than good. The report also quotes the Commander-in-inChief of the Bangladesh forces as stating that over 25,000 West Pakistani regulars had so far been killed and an equal number permanently disabled. In short, of the five Pakistan Infantry Divisions deployed in Bangladesh, the equivalent of three have been “put out of commission”. If Colonel Osmani made this latter statement one can only assume that he did so “with his tongue in his cheek”.
Although a retired officer, and one who had been on the pension list for over 3 years, as the seniormost. A Bengali officer of the Pakistan Army, the responsibility for organizing resistance and conducting the freedom fight fell on the shoulders of Colonel Osmani. There was an officer senior to him. Major General Majid, a product of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst also on the retired list, but nothing has been heard of him, and it is presumed that he was killed by the Pakistan Army soon after attending an exServicemen’s Rally which he attended the day previous to the Army crackdown. Rising, virtually overnight to a position where the limelight is focussed on him, he has inspired many people to ask “What sort of a soldier is Colonel Osmani?”
During his career in the Army, Osmani commanded an infantry battalion, attended various courses of instruction including some in the United States and on the Staff was appointed as Deputy Director of Military Operations. This last appointment clearly indicates that he was very definitely rated as an above average officer. That he was retired in the rank of Colonel was the outcome of a difference of opinion with Field Marshal Ayub Khan. By and large, the rank he attained in the Pakistan Army was high as it is rare for any Pakistani who is not a Pathan or Punjabi Mussalman, these classes filling 95% of the officer cadre to rise any higher.
But, the interesting being evinced in Colonel Osmani is not as an ex officer of the Pakistan Army. It is as the leader of hastily assembled force deployed in widely · separated areas in Bangladesh and over whose tactical battles he can have little or no control. His main role would be to obtain arms and equipment and arrange for the training of further volunteers to the Mukti Bahini. In this he appears to have been very successful as his charge has risen to over 50,000 and aims at being 100,000. It is clear that Colonel Osmani is certainly not a square peg in a round hole, and while he may not emerge as one of the world’s greatest guerilla leaders, he has by dint of hard work and sacrifice, earned for himself the reputation of being an able administrator and an individual who is dedicated to the task that has been allotted to him.
Had Osmani the total number of Bengali personnel in the Pakistan Armed Forces, his task would have been lightened very considerably. But as was normal, there were units of the East Bengal Regiment in West Pakistan, and they remain there to this day, located in areas from which it is not possible for them to move to Bangladesh to join in the struggle. The same situation pertains in the Navy and Air Force. The hard core of the Mukti Bahini is, therefore, limited to about 3,000 personnel of the East Bengal Regiment, a few personnel of the Navy and Air Force, and about 12,000 men of the para military East Pakistan Rifles.
While the personnel from the regular forces are well disciplined and carry the confidence of the local population, the same cannot be said of the personnel of the East Pakistan Rifles. Located on the Indo-Pakistan border, it is said that a large number of personnel of these units were engaged in corrupt practices. Following the example set by the Pakistan army officers who were seconded to the East Pakistan Rifles, all of whom returned to West Pakistan, after a 3 or 4 year tour of duty, with sums ranging from Rs. 50,000 to one lakh for engaging in or turning a blind eye to smuggling, the men in their turn extorted money from the locals to fill their pockets. The result was that they were mistrusted by the local population. As such, they have presented the authorities with serious problems, some even having deserted their units and taken to dacoity.
This picture is brightened by the young men of Bangladesh. They have come forward in their thousands to join the Mukti Bahini and still continue to do so. A very high percentage being highly educated, their ability to absorb instruction in the minimum time has facilitated their training and enabled them to join the ranks of the guerilla units in the shortest possible time. Their morale is high but on occasions a state of despondency creeps in. This is caused by a lack of news about their families and their friends. These young men are eager to get at the enemy, because they realize that the sooner he is evicted from Bangladesh, the sooner family reunions will be possible.
But herein lies the danger. In its eagerness to destroy the enemy, the Mukti Bahini has, on occasions, broken a fundamental principle of guerilla warfare. For guerillas to attempt to engage regular troops in frontal fights is courting disaster, and the casualties suffered will be very heavy, yet this is what has been attempted more than once. Hit and run, wait lie in ambush and hit and run again are the tactics that must be adopted. It is not a negative quality, nor an attitude of retreat, it is based on the tenet that no battle or skirmish must be undertaken unless it will be won. Educated though they may be, enthusiastic young men cannot sometimes see the reason why, what is to them an attractive target is not engaged. This tendency is a dangests the and must be curbed. If it per, will the leadership in the Mukti Bahini setback be undermined and suffer a severe defeat.
The operations in Bangladesh command now reached the stage where it is necessary. In order to achieve this, adequate staff and sound command are necessary. At present the Colonel is operating with a skeleton staff. This is minimum communication channels avail primarily due to the fact that every able regular officer is being utilized. It trains or leads the Mukti Bahini groups but is not a satisfactory state of affairs, so apparently at the moment there is the alternative. The Mukti Bahini is, however, expanding fast and with an expected strength of 100,000 the problems will increase fourfold. The various groups cannot carry on “private warfare”, if the command and control set-up does not undergo a radical change, what has been achieved so far will be erased, as an unco-ordinated services of resistance pockets will emerge only to be put to flight or systematically eliminated by an enemy who will take full advantage of the lack of order and the indecision that will prevail.
Reference: Hindustan Standard, 26.01.1972