Chhamb-little chance of Pak breakthrough
By Lt. Gen. L. P. SEN DSO, Our Military Correspondent, The Pakistani attack in the Chamb area has caused concern in many quarters. Some people are even of the impression that the initial success of Pakistan is a defeat for India. This is far from the truth, and as this is of significance, let us take a look at what happened in 1965 in order to dispel any doubts that may linger.
At (30 in the morning of September 1. 1965) a Pakistani force composed of armor and infantry crossed the international border in the area of Chamb and sped eastwards. So confident was the Pakistani of scoring a great victory that she had arranged for a battery of newsmen and television teams to witness the event. As far as India was concerned she was caught napping and the Pakistani forces very quickly carved a five-mile deep salient into Indian territory.
The aim of the Pakistani attack was quite apparent was the Akhnoor bridge, a vital link with our troops in the north. There were quick deliberations between Army and Air Force chiefs resulting in a visit to the Defence Minister to ask for permission to use the Air Force in its offensive role.
Permission was apparently given after a great deal of thought, because it was just before sunset that 28 aircraft from the Air Force base at Pathankot took off to strike the Pakistani force. There was no doubt that the air strike came as a complete surprise to Pakistan. It was probably imagined that India would never resort to using the Air Force as it had not done so in 1962 when China attacked, nor in early 1965 when Pakistan launched an armored attack into the Rann of Kutch. On both these occasions the hard-pressed ground troops had asked for air support but the Government had turned down the request.
With the opposition from the troops stiffening and the air strikes taking their toll the Pakistani attack was halted and a stalemate resulted. Thereafter for a few days, fighting on the ground and in the air continued in the Chamb-Jaurian sector without any appreciable gains by either side. It was then decided to launch attacks through other sectors. In 1965, the area of Indian territory occupied by the Pakistani troops in the Chhamb sector during the course of the fighting was 190 square miles. This sounds a high figure but when broken down it is an area of about 14 miles in breadth and 15 miles in length. It must however be remembered that the mere occupation of territory makes little difference in such operations.
With the experience gained in 1965 the defense of the Chamb-Jaurian area was the subject of intensive study and instead of the small border posts that had existed mainly for the purpose of observation it was decided to occupy a position in the Deva Mandila area. This is a hill feature only half a mile from the cease fire line. It is really a strong outpost position on the west bank of the Munawar Tawi Nullah, our main defenses being on the east bank. The object of an outpost is to give early warning of an enemy approach and to delay his advance as long as possible. When the enemy mounted a major attack on the outpost position the troops withdrew back to the main defenses.
This is exactly what has happened at Deya Mandila. The initial Pakistani attack was staged by two brigades of infantry and one regiment of armor and when this was held the Pakistanis launched a second attack with two divisions of infantry and three regiments of armor. This is by any standards a massive attack and it is not surprising that our outpost position withdrew.
The loss of ground is of little consequence at this stage and is a normal military maneuver. What one should expect to happen is for the enemy to probe forward and engage the main defenses. It is here that victory or defeat will count and a breakthrough could be serious. But in view of the fact that the area occupied by our forces are heavily bunkered, wired and mined and quite unlike 1965 when there was very little in the form of fortifications, there is little chance of a Pakistani breakthrough.
From now onwards the Pakistani armor will be subjected to heavy strikes by the Air Force, and all moves forward will be subjected to fire from the anti-tank guns. The harder striking India armor has not as yet been employed in strength. By this is meant the medium armored regiments with their heavier guns. The performance of the Vijayanta tank is eagerly looked forward to as this tank mounts a 105 mm quick firing British gun. There is no Pakistani tank with an equivalent gun on it. In fact, there are only two tank guns in the world more powerful than the gun on the Vijayanta-the 120 mm gun on the British Chieftan and the 115 mm gun on the Russian T62 tank.
Because of the presence of the hard-hitting Indian tanks will Pakistan attempt to bulldoze its way forward? Personally I do not think so, not unless they want a repetition of what happened at Khem Karan in 1965. It is more than probable that Pakistan attacked the position occupied by our troops as it was worried over the threat posed to the Marala headworks about eight miles away. This headworks controls the flow of water into the Ichhogil and other canals. Also poised within half a mile or so of the Pakistan border was a definite threat to both Lahore and Rawalpindi.
Having entered the battle in 1971 with a tank fleet which is modern as compared to the World War II tanks such as the Sherman which formed the major part of our tank fleet we can look forward to the first tank battle with confidence. Come it certainly will and the chances are that it will be the Chamb sector.
Reference: Hindustan Standard, 10.12.1971