The Options on Bangladesh-1
Stakes are High Dangers of Adventurism One of the tragic mistakes India committed in recent times surely was to have missed the opportunity to have intervened militarily in Bangladesh immediately after March 26 when the crackdown of the Pakistani Army on the freedom fighters became known.
Had this been done, much of the tragedy that befell East Bengal in the subsequent weeks could have been averted. India would have found a confrontation on land, coupled with a naval blockade to prevent the entry of Pakistani supplies and reinforcements, an entirely manageable proposition at that time and in addition would have been in a position to stabilize the situation in Bangladesh. The steady exodus of millions of refugees towards the Indian borders would have been halted and the very reason for which India today finds herself in the awkward but inevitable situation of protecting the refugees might not have arisen. Having dithered at the most opportune moment, we are now not only burdened with more than six million refugees on our hands but also with the responsibility of bringing about a political settlement acceptable to the people of Bangladesh.
An analysis of how such a mistake was committed can at best be an academic exercise at this stage when the entire country is expecting a lead from the Government in regard to the next step on Bangladesh. The most charitable explanation perhaps is that the leadership was overwhelmed by the quick succession of events and was unable either to evolve a coherent policy towards, or assess India’s real stakes in Bangladesh. However, whatever the reasons might have been for the lack of positive action when it would have been most purposeful and of immediate advantage to the freedom fighters, India has received and continues to receive world encomiums for the restraint she showed in the face of Pakistani provocation. This must be considered a tangible gain in the entire affair. We have at least this measure of international goodwill to bank on in whatever action we may take in the future.
Public opinion in India, however, cannot be expected to be satisfied with certificates of good conduct bestowed on the leadership by foreign Powers, some of whose very sincerity is in doubt. A clamor for some positive action to facilitate both the return of the refugees to their homes and the emergence of a Government acceptable to the people is naturally to be expected. The demand for positive action, through recognition of Bangladesh on the one hand and through armed intervention on the other, is likely to grow rather than diminish in the coming weeks. Opposition political parties are bound to make the most of what apparently seems to be a policy of drift adopted by the Central leadership. Three factors will provide the needed ballast to their arguments : the continued intransigence of General Yahya Khan and the military Junta in Pakistan, the absence of pressure from the international community on Pakistan’s military regime to work towards an acceptable political settlement and the arms supply by the Americans. The unabating Pakistani atrocities and the continuous influx of refugees – whose number may swell to 10 million soon – will strengthen the hands of those favoring armed intervention. The time may well come when India’s patience will be exhausted. When this happens, will the alternative left to us be only a direct military confrontation with Pakistan?
The arguments in favor of armed intervention are many and not all of them are unreasonable or emotionally motivated. The most realistic of these, of course, is that because of a situation which was not of India’s making and because of the tremendous strain imposed on the Indian economy by the burden of looking after the refugees, Pakistan should not be allowed to get away with it. It might be cheaper in the long run, it is suggested, to wage a war and have it out once and for all than pay for the upkeep of the refugees in an atmosphere of uncertainty about their future. However, as the Prime Minister rightly points out, no country goes to war on financial considerations. A war, unless forced on one, is a calculated risk, waged on sole consideration of national interests.
Does the existing situation then call for armed intervention ? Leaving the question of defense preparedness or otherwise aside, would a direct military confrontation with Pakistan at this stage advance India’s cause and further the fulfillment of her objectives vis a-vis Bangladesh? Those who think that an Indo-Pakistan confrontation can be a limited operation restricted only to the eastern wing of the sub-continent are deceiving themselves. What was possible in April is no more so. The very first intrusion into East Bengal will trigger offensive on all geographical sectors of the long borders separating India and Pakistan. It will be a full fledged war with all the connotations the term implies, plus many times more financial investment and liability than in the 1965 confrontation. In that situation one can safely expect a further influx into Central India of millions of more refugees from the country’s eastern States.
It is true that no country goes to war inhibited by considerations of financial commitment or the national capacity of gear itself to the demands of civil defense. A country goes to war when all its other options are closed. In any other circumstance, a war is adventurism indulged in regardless of national giants. True we lost the initiative in the early stages, but we have not yet lost the cause itself. We have made some dent in international public opinion, which, given time, cannot entirely fail in influencing Government policies in countries which have till now treated the tragedy of Bangladesh as Pakistan’s internal problem.
The nation has had repeated assurances of the state of our defense preparedness. We have reason, therefore, to be confident of taking Pakistan on in a total war. But does our confidence extend to the extent of taking on both Pakistan and China – which continues to be an imponderable entity? The Chinese cat may jump on either side of the fence, or not jump at all. Do we have any authentic indication of the Chinese mood?
Again, if past experience is any guide, the hitherto silent voice of U Thant is bound to be heard loud and clear the moment India and Pakistan are locked in war. U Thant might have turned a blind eye to the happenings in Bangladesh till now, but it will take him no time, goaded by the Big Powers, to activate the Security Council and enforce a cease-fire.
The pro-war opinion may, of course, lend to dismiss all these considerations as irrelevant in the context of the humanitarian and ideological stakes India has in the future of Bangladesh and more importantly, in the political and economic stakes she has in her own future. Admittedly, these stakes are high and consistent with our democratic traditions, invaluable to preserve which war is justified. If the ends India has in view can be reached by other means, to that extent she has other options open. It is her responsibility now to strive towards the fulfillment of those ends. It is encouraging that Mrs. Indira Gandhi has succeeded in persuading the Congress (R) Parliamentary Party to be less emotional on the question of recognition. She may still succeed in convincing those clamoring for will to be waged only when neces military intervention that war sary and inevitable. S. VISWAM
Reference: Hindustan Standard, 11.07.1971