Future Of BanglaDesh
Consequences Of A Low Indian Profile
By GIRILAL JAIN, MR. SWARAN SINGH would not have made the kind of statement that he did at the AICC session in Simla last Friday if he had been a little less sensitive to international opinion and a little more concerned with the susceptibilities of the BanglaDesh freedom fighters.
The most charitable interpretation that can be placed on his action is that he was so preoccupied with what he had been told by the foreign dignitaries he had met at the U.N. headquarters in New York that he was unduly anxious to convince them that India had not acquired a vested interest in the break up of Pakistan and that it was willing to co-operate in the implementation of any solution they may be able to persuade the Generals in Islamabad to accept. But even so he need not have gone as far as he did.
It would have been understandable if the Minister for External Affairs had said that a moderate leadership in Islamabad could still hope to preserve the unity of Pakistan but only on the basis of the fullest measure of autonomy for East Bengal and a complete, if phased withdrawl of the West Pakistani troops para-military forces and other agents of terror. But he resorted to a formulation which implied that a solution within Pakistan’s present framework was not wholly inconceivable even after all that had happened in BanglaDesh and that it would be acceptable to India.
JUST CLAIM
Mr. Swaran Singh has justly claimed that he has clearly stated that the settlement has to be reached between the Pakistan Government in Islamabad and the elected representatives of the people of East Bengal which means the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and that he has reaffirmed India’s insistence on the return of refugees. But he is a sufficiently shrewd and experienced politician to have known that this formulation was riddled with contradictions in that the Awami League as a whole will not accept a settlement which falls far short of independence and the vast majority of refugees, who happen to be Hindus, will not go back unless the West Pakistani troops leave BanglaDesh with on right to return.
In the circumstances, he cannot blame others if his statement has created the impression that he is prepared to cooperate with the great powers in defusing the crisis on almost any terms. The manner in which he has interpreted the Indo-Soviet treaty in the past also strengthened the view that, like Mr. Kosygin, he accords such high priority to avoiding war with Pakistan that he is willing to subordinate the return of refugees to this consideration.
Mr. Singh can undoubtedly make a powerful case in support of a low Indian profile if war, except in the unlikely event of a Pakistani attack, is ruled out. He can argue that the Mukti Bahini, like all other guerilla forces, will take a long time to become sufficiently effective to wear down the West Pakistani forces. He can point out that the price of success will be much higher than elsewhere not only for the freedom fighters but also for India because the guerillas are facing an army which does not mind engaging in genocide and driving out milions of people into another country and that India cannot just afford to accept more refugees. But he and others of his persuasion should carefully examine the likely consequences of this approach.
It cannot be said too often that the refugees will go back to their homes only if a sovereign or at least an autonomous Bangla Desh comes into existence. This plainly means that the cost of a patched up solution will be that they will stay on in India. in fact the couple of million Hindus who are still left in East Pakistan will also be either forced out or will leave in panic and thus leave India landed permanently with 11 to 12 million displaced persons.
This will place an intolerable burden on the country’s economy, polity and society, specially in the north-eastern parts. But worse may follow if a settlement is reached which falls far short of independence and keeps the Awami League out of power. It is almost certain that this will produce other equally grave consequences in the long term-an East Bengal which may well be as hostile to India as West Pakistan and as firmly rooted in Islamic ideology.
This assessment is based principally on two assumptions. First, the issue in East Bengal is not so much whether it will achieve its substantive demands in the seventies as whether it will do so under the auspices of the secularist and middle class Awami League leadership which is well disposed towards India. Secondly that if the Awami League fails for whatever reason a new kind of East Bengali nationalism will arise which will be hostile to India by virtue of its deeper commitment to Islam on the one hand and to radicalism on the other.
ABSURD
Anyone who believes that the two cannot be combined should take a careful look at modern Arab history. Even Buddhism can become an ally of radicalism and racialism as recent developments in Ceylon have shown. The Che Guevara Lists there represented a militant anti-Indian and anti-Western Sinhala nationalism.
The first assumpation would on the face of it, appear absurd in view of the continuing reign of terror in East Bengal. But the question should be studied in the perspective of the history of other freedom movements, armed or unarmed, in our times.
Broadly speaking, a freedom struggle serves three purposes. First, it not only gives expression to a community’s newly-aroused sense of self-awareness but also heightens that consciousness of independent and separate identity to a point where the people consider no sacrifice too great for its consummation in an independent State.
Secondly, a freedom struggle, violent or non-violent, seeks to convince the imperial clite that the old relationship is no longer tenable and profitable for it in terms of its own interests. Finally, it throws up an elite of its own which has the mandate of popular support and the necessary organization to take over the country’s government from the previous rulers.
The Awami League has, objectively speaking fulfilled all these functions. It has made the East Bengalis a nation. It has demonstrated that the West Pakistan elite cannot easily run East Bengal as a colony and there can be no doubt that its leaders have the mandate and the organization to rule East Bengal.
The first two gains cannot be wiped out whatever the West Pakistani Generals may do. They cannot destroy the nationhood of East Bengal through terror and they cannot reap profits from there any more. Logically it follows that they should be ready to make concessions to East Bengal. A political settlement should therefore be possible in spite of the bloodbath. But there are two difficulties.
OBVIOUS
The military junta will not transfer power to the Awami Leaguers whom it regards as “secessionists” and “Indian agents”- propoganda has turned into conviction and it will not permit the Hindu refugees to return because it is conviced that they are enemis of Islam and are responsible for East Bengal’s secular nationalism. Thus the interests of the Hindu refugees and India have got linked up with the fortunes of the Awami League.
Some of East Bengal’s demands may, however, be gained even under an administration run by stooges because once Islamabad installs them in power, it will develop a vested interest in their success and is likely, therefore, to make concessions to them. The junta will also find it difficult to resist the pressure of the great Powers, including China, for moderation.
Two points should therefore be fairly obvious. First, in spite of the massive mandate it received at the polls last December the Awami League can assume power only if the armed struggle under its auspices succeeds fairly soon. If it does not, the League will split and a sizable section may try to buy its peace with the ruling junta.
Secondly a new party and leadership is bound to arise to fill the vacuum which will be created by the failure and break-up of the Awami League. This elite will be hostile to India partly because it will be haunted by the fate of the Awami League and party because it will need to work in cooperation with West Pakistani leaders like Mr. Bhutto. The new leadership will also look to Peking for guidance and moral
Reference: Hindustan Standard, 12.10.1971