THE EVOLUTION OF BANGLADESH FORCES
When the Indian subcontinent was divided in 1947, Pakistan received its proportionate share (approximately 1/3 share) of the armed forces as worked out by the Partition Council, chaired by the Viceroy of India. The old Indian Army was a magnificently efficient warfighting machine that had taken nearly two centuries to evolve. On 30 June 1947, the procedure for the division of the Indian Armed forces was agreed upon at a meeting of the Partition Council. On the eve of partition, the strength of this army stood at approximately 11,800 officers – military and civilian – and 4,50,000 other ranks and categories of personnel. These figures do not include the British officers and other ranks serving with the army at the time, and approximately 50,000 all ranks of the Indian State forces, except for eight infantry regts which were Hindu, out of the total of twenty-three, the then Gurkha regts, and a few major and minor units. All units of the various arms and services were mixed. Apart from the above, 7 out of 46 major training establishments of the army were situated in the Pakistan territory.
After the partition, Pakistan became the primary recipient of US aid which was estimated at $1.5 to $2 billion for the period between 1954 and 1965. The assistance included F-104 Starfighters, Patton tanks, armoured personnel carriers and automatic and recoilless infantry weapons.[2] The Eastern Wing of Pakistan, however, did not get a slice of this huge military hardware. It was also not until 5 February 1948 that Bengali companies were raised (two Bengal Muslim companies, in fact, were built on that day). These companies laid the foundation of today’s East Bengal Regt. The Bengali representation, however, continued to remain low. For instance, in 1960, 22nd Pakistan Military Academy Long and 1st Graduate Courses passed out where only 5 out of 118 were Bengalis (related posting order in Appendix E).[3] The deliberate
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neglect towards Eastern Wing continued even after the 1965 India-Pakistan war. This negligence and deprivation appear even vividly from the following statistics representing the officers’ class of West and East Pakistan:
Basing on the statistics reflected in Table 4.1 and 4.2, it is evident that Bangladesh forces did not grow out of colonial regts nor did they receive any ready military aids or expertise from foreign countries. They were born instantaneously after the massacre carried out by the Pakistan military on 25 March 1971. These forces had been quite effective against adversaries and adapted all forms of warfare efficiently – both conventional and unconventional.
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The Evolutionary Process and the Growth of Bangladesh Forces
During 1971, 5 East Bengal was stationed at Sialkot border from where it was possible for Bengali officers of the regt to cross over to India and consequently join the war, but its CO Lt Col Rouf did not show interest. When one of its companies went to attack an Indian BOP, none of its troops returned except the Company Comd Maj Sadequr Rahman Chowdhury. These troops later joined the war in different sectors. After repatriation, Maj Sadeq joined the Bangladesh Army and eventually rose to the rank of Maj Gen. 6 East Bengal was at Peshawar and 7 East Bengal was deployed in the deserts of Rajasthan along India-Pakistan border. Despite keen interest amongst the soldiers of 7 East Bengal to join the war, the then CO Lt Col HM Ershad remained inactive. After repatriation, he joined the Bangladesh Army and later became the Chief of Army Staff (Lt Gen) and a long-time President of the country. After 25 March, officers from 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 East Bengal Regts and EPR rebelled risking their lives and took control of the situation. Since the Awami League had been carrying out a constitutional fight for the rights of the Bengalis, its leaders were not in a position to assume leadership on the battlefield.
The different communist parties were better suited to adapt to battlefield
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situations as they had long been conditioned by the repressive policies of West Pakistan. In 1947, there was one leftist ideological platform in East Bengal, which was set up by former members of the Communist Party of India who had chosen to remain in East Bengal. In 1948-51, the small Communist Party in East Bengal (formally named the East Pakistan Communist Party) inspired peasant revolts among the Hazong peasants in certain areas of the district of Mymensingh and among the Santal tribe in Rajshahi district which the Government effectively thwarted. By 1954, the Government banned the Communist Party throughout Pakistan. The East Pakistan Communist Party, however, continued to exist as an underground party. In 1971, it failed to grab the leadership initiative because of a lack of credible support base among the population.[7]
The military availed this opportunity to steer the war and contributed substantially in shaping the fighting forces. During those early days, the clandestine Radio Station set up at Kalurghat did a splendid job by broadcasting the Declaration of Independence articulated by Maj Zia on behalf of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This declaration spontaneously revived the spirit of the fighting elements and brought all under a common psychological framework for waging war. While the initial resistance had been continuing without orders and any specific area of responsibility, the officers of 2 and 4 East Bengal thought of bringing in some synergy in their efforts. They assembled at Teliapara Tea Garden on 1 April to plan and coordinate future courses of action. Brig VC Pande, DIG, BSF Eastern Command met them. He apprised them about Col Osmani and the activities of 8 East Bengal. Later it was decided to hold a meeting on 4 April so that more officers could join. Brig Pande conveyed the message about the meeting to Col Osmani and 8 East Bengal. He did not participate in the meeting though, provided necessary assistance for making it a success. Accordingly, on 4 April, the meeting took place in the Manager’s Bungalow of Teliapara Tea Garden. Among the participants were Col Osmani, Lt Col Reza, Maj Khaled, Lt Col (retired) Rob, Maj Zia, Maj Safiullah, Maj (retired) Kazi Nuruzzaman, Maj Nurul Islam, Maj Shafaat, Maj Moinul, Capt Abdul Matin etc. Besides, Mr. Rustam the Indian BSF Chief, Tripura District Magistrate Mr Saigol and Brahmanbaria SDO Kazi Raquibuddin Ahmed were present.[9]
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In the meeting, a detailed analysis of the situation was carried out based on which some decisions were taken. Bangladesh forces was formed comprising members of all three services, EPR, police, Ansar and people from all walks of life. World War II veteran Col Osmani took over as the C-in-C.[10] He is also reckoned as the principal architect of Bengal regt. After retirement from Pakistan Army in 1967, he joined politics and became an MNA in 1970. Although Lt Gen Khwaza Wasiuddin had been the senior-most serving officer in the Pakistan Army from East Pakistan, the nation missed his service since he was in West Pakistan. Immediately after the crackdown, the Pakistan Army placed him in confinement.[11]
The fate of 1 and 3 East Bengal was still not very clear. Based on available information and progress made by different units, the country was divided into four regions each under a senior military officer. Maj Zia was in charge of Chittagong district including CHT and eastern part of Noakhali while the greater Comilla district, Dhaka and western part of Noakhali was under Maj Khaled, Sylhet district was placed under Maj Safiullah, and Maj Osman took over the charge of Jessore, Kushtia and Faridpur districts. Maj Khaled stressed on the need for forming the Provisional Government to reaffirm its support for the ongoing war. The meeting also emphasized on rallying international support for the Freedom Fighter’s cause. Despite such an important role played by Teliapara Summit, it remained somewhat unsung in the history. Meanwhile, Tajuddin Ahmed got back to Kolkata around the second week of April and met other political leaders who crossed over to India. Some of these leaders, including MNAs and MPAs, had been stranded at Number 10 Lord Sinha Road – a house provided by the Indian Government for the political leaders.[12] As soon as the Provisional Government came into being on 10 April at Agartala, Tripura, it endorsed many decisions taken in Taliapara Summit. Concurrently, Bangladesh forces HQ began to take shape at 8 Theatre Road, Kolkata. This building is now being used as a charity house titled Sri Aurobindo Bhavan with the renewed address at 8 Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata -700 071.
The Provisional Government made Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the first President of Bangladesh. Syed Nazrul Islam, who was elected as an MNA in 1970 Election, was made the Vice President and Tajuddin Ahmed the
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Prime Minister.[13] Among Cabinet members, Capt M Mansoor Ali was in charge of Finance, A. H. M. Qamar-uz-Zaman in charge of Home, Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry and Khondakar Mostaque Ahmed held the charge of Foreign Ministry. Col Osmani was made the C-in-C of Bangladesh forces with the status of a full minister (organization of Bangladesh forces given in Appendix F). Lt S.H.M.B Nur Chowdhury and Lt Sheikh Kamal worked as his Aide-de-Camp (ADC). The Proclamation of Independence order was issued on 10 April from Mujibnagar and was operative retrospectively from 26 March 1971.[14]
On 17 April, the cabinet formally took oath in a mango grove in Baiddyonathtala village, Meherpur bordering India – a place tactically chosen to evade any air attack. Besides, if the PAF undertook such an attack, it would not be able to violate Indian airspace. A smartly turned out contingent consisting of EPR, police and Ansar presented a guard of honour led by SDPO Mahabub Uddin Ahmed.[15] This venue later came to be known as historic Mujibnagar. The young officers from the Civil Service of Pakistan who crossed over to India following the military carnage added great strength to the newly formed Government. During this time, the State Governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura directed all resources to tackle one of the largest human exoduses in the history which crossed into India from Bangladesh. By mid-May a daily average of 80,700 men, women and children crossed over to India.16] According to Thomas Janeison, Director of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva “This is the biggest refugee problem in history…” Indeed an exodus of refugees on such a large scale from one country to another had never taken place anywhere in the world earlier.”[17] Later on a specific government organization was set up for the construction of camps and reception centres including their maintenance.[18]
Alongside Indian support and sympathies, other people and organizations rendered financial assistance for the management of the refugees. Of those The Concert for Bangladesh alone generated some US$ 2,50,000. This was organized by former Beatle’s lead guitarist George Harrison and renowned Indian sitar maestro Ravi Shankar on 1 August 1971 at Madison Square Garden in New York. Decade later Shankar would say on the overwhelming success of the event; “In one day, the whole world
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knew the name of Bangladesh”:[19]
Youth camps and reception centres set up to recruit Freedom Fighters were flocked by students and farmers. Though the resurgence of nationalist fervour was prevalent among the working classes, their roots being in the countryside, the war drew thousands of youths and peasants from these centres/camps. These youths had also been subject to the brutality of Pakistan military which fanned out from the major townships to the villages in the far-flung areas after 25 March 1971. The social dynamics played an important role as the urban people held a strong psychological bond with those in the countryside and came together to fight the enemy.
Centuries ago, political thinker, Machiavelli had said, once the people take arms against the regime, there will never be a lack of foreigners to assist them. Given the strained relationship between India and Pakistan, support to Bangladesh rebels from neighbouring India was perhaps inevitable.[20] However, for the chaotic crossings of the Freedom Fighters to India, there was no planned transfer of resources. Initially, the Indian BSF used to provide insufficient and informal support to Bangladesh forces. By 15 May 1971, appreciating the increasing activities, BSF was replaced by Indian Army’s Eastern Command to assist Bangladesh forces.[21] BSF elements along the border were placed under the Eastern Command for this purpose, and a separate military establishment was set up. The Indian Army posted Maj Gen Onkar Singh Kalkot under Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, Comd Eastern Command, to handle the Bangladesh forces affairs. Later, he was replaced by Maj Gen BN Sarkar in August 1971. Subsequently, six Indian administrative sectors were set up along the border for providing operational and logistic support.[22] Of these sectors, F Sector was initially based in Rajasthan as such some correspondences were directed to Rajasthan out of confusion. To eliminate this confusion F Sector was suffixed by J (J for Joi Bangla).[23] While equipping the guerrillas, these supporting sectors insisted on a scale of 20% arms for those who were sent inside to operate against the enemy. For the rest of the members, they recommended sending them unarmed (only with two grenades) and to be equipped with enemy’s resources on capture. Such ideas brought miseries for the guerrillas during execution.
The list of Indian administrative sectors with their location, comd and
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dependant Bangladeshi sectors has been tabulated as under:
By June a total of 9 geographical regions were created and named after the areas.[24] Alongside these, 11 administrative regions were also set up to run the administrative functions across the country (Appendix G). Members of the National Assembly and government and semi-government officials who had defected from the Pakistan Government were provisionally integrated with these offices and continued to function until Bangladesh Government took charge on 16 December 1971.[25]
While Bangladesh forces were in the increasing need of support, the Indian approach had been calculative and cautious. The shortage of arms and ammunition continued to slow down the operational activities. This problem remained unresolved for quite some time. Although Bangladesh forces HQ took shape in April, it lacked an operations room, a wireless network connecting the Forces HQ and the sectors along with communications and intelligence cell etc. The situation had been cramped by a lack of space and workforce, yet Col Osmani got his office in a relatively short time. With him joined ten officers including Lt Col (retired) Rob who was offered the post of the Chief of Staff (COS). He had also fought in World War II and joined politics after retirement to become an MNA in 1970. Group Captain (Gp Capt) AK Khandakar was appointed as the Deputy COS.[26] He was serving in Dhaka as the Comd of the Admin Wing of PAF Base in East Pakistan. By
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May 1971, the Forces HQ got some structure.[27] Because of the vast area, the HQ had to cover, an Echelon HQ with the COS was set up in the Eastern region to ensure close political and logistic cooperation and also to deal with all other matters to provide speedy assistance to the Sector Comds. The stream of new orders, regulations and disciplinary controls emanating from the Forces HQ soon brought all elements under its control. Subordinate organizations and units had to furnish periodical reports and returns as asked by the HQ (Appendix H).
The HQ dedicated maximum time for the structuring and shaping up Bangladesh forces. While there was no dearth of volunteers, what would be the right size of Bangladesh forces was a crucial question. Considering the beefed up 4.5 divisions of Pakistan, an army comprising of 15 divisions would have been adequate to defeat the Pakistanis in a conventional war.[28] Appreciating this as impracticable, however, Bangladesh thought of developing a force comprising of conventional and unconventional elements where the guerrillas would be the mainstay. In May 1971, a consensus was built between the Indian Prime Minister and the C-in-C Bangladesh forces to create a force comprising of 20 thousand regulars and 60 thousand guerrillas.[29] Unfortunately, no further discussion took place with the Indian Army to translate this agreement into the workable mechanism.
Subsequently, when the Prime Minister of India met the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, she conveyed her concurrence on the policy decisions sought and approved about the requirement of Bangladesh forces.[30] With an intake of 5 thousand trainees per month, it would have taken an entire year for the induction of the estimated number of guerrillas. However, to meet the increasing demand, the number of recruits increased from 5 to 8 thousand in July and from 8 to 12 thousand in August.[31] These guerrillas were extracted from the youth camps which were set up all along the border on the Indian side. To meet the increasing demands, the number of training camps also grew from 30 in May to 40 in August and 84 in September. [32] Finally, there were nearly 110 such camps controlled by the Ministry of Defence. [33] The list of Youth Training Centres is given in Appendix I and the locations are shown in Fig. 4.1.
While running the Government, Prime Minister Tajuddin could not get
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along very well with the junior leaders. As such, he joined in the Siliguri party council held on 3 July 1971 with some trepidation but was thoroughly prepared. He stated that if he was not the right person to lead the Government, someone capable could replace him who could finish the task at hand. But the elected representatives reaffirmed their confidence in Tajuddin, and he came out of the council with a strong mandate.[34] Meanwhile, a significant conference was scheduled from 11-15 July at the Bangladesh forces HQ. But the discussion started one day later because of an uncalled-for dispute over the formation of War Council. On 12 July, the Bangladesh Prime Minister chaired the meeting where most of the Sector Comds, senior military officers and other civil-military officers of Bangladesh forces HQ were present. He made some crucial decisions on strategy and operating procedure for the smooth conduct of war (minutes of Sector Comd’s conference given in Appendix J).[35] From the beginning various units/groups had been operating within mutually agreed geographical areas which needed clarity. So, the country was divided into eleven operational sectors with specific areas to command as shown in Fig. 4.2 (details of sector boundaries in Appendix K).
Every sector was connected with the Indian border at least in one direction so that it could be supported from across the border. Sector 10 was unique in the sense that it had neither any definite geographical boundary nor any comd. Initially, it was planned to liberate some areas from where the Government administration could function and later be used as the capital of Bangladesh.[36] Though not implemented; then it was intended to place the liberated areas under the jurisdiction of Sector 10. Some also held the view that CHT was earmarked as Sector 10. Probably, considering the steep hills and other hazards involved in fighting in the jungles, the Pakistan military did not explore this region.”[37] Details of the operational sectors are highlighted in the next chapter. During the initial resistance phase when some of our fighters including Mohammad Iddris and Nur Mohammad, MNA and Capt Harun from this area took refuge in Myanmar, where they were arrested.[38] This sector was therefore never made operative; instead, all the maritime areas were placed under the jurisdiction of Sector 10. For carrying out any operations within the boundary of a particular sector, the Naval Commandos used to make early coordination.
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There had been a lot of confusions in identifying different forces as they came from different backgrounds and possessed varied degree of training and motivation. To facilitate their identification, induction, training, command control and liaison, Force HQ issued different nomenclatures.[39] In the beginning, Freedom Fighters were popularly known as ‘Mukti Fauz’ which was renamed as `Mukti Bahini’ replacing the Urdu word Fauz with Bengali word Bahini to give it a nationalistic flavour. Afterwards, the force also changed its character from a solely land-based force to an all services organization.[40] Later on, they were formally named as the Bangladesh forces. The forces comprised of regular soldiers, sailors, airmen of all ranks, members of EPR, police, Ansar and Mujahids who had been operating with regular forces, and other civilians filling specific functions as well as the guerrilla and Special forces. Broadly, there had been Regulars (Niomito Bahini) comprising of members of army (all arms and services), navy and air force and the irregulars (Gono Bahini) comprising guerrillas and Special forces who had received special guerrilla or other training (Appendix L). The Forces HQ brought out a detailed instruction covering organization, equipment and employment of Gono Bahini (Appendix M). Besides, a good number of Irregular forces were also organized by some young leaders who successfully operated within their areas. These forces are described in Chapter 6.
All these forces were brought under the relevant services acts and related regulations, and the Government exercised its command over them through the C-in-C. He dealt with matters relating to policy concerning operations, organization, personnel administration, logistics, control of weapons, equipment, vehicles, communication equipment, appointments, commissions and postings. The command was decentralized with Sector Comds to exercise command in their respective areas while remaining responsible to the C-in-C for exercising their command and implementation of tasks in line with the policies.[41] Shortage of officers and a lack of communication means, however, severely affected HQ functioning.
The Bangladesh forces had the scantiest supply of radios and depended mainly on the few pieces of the police wireless system that survived destruction in the army’s attacks. In addition to these, a few field sets salvaged by the Bengali troops or were seized from the small enemy patrols caught in the
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outlying areas and wiped out in the early days of the fight made the stock.[42] After July the Indians did provide some signal equipment which was meagre considering the requirement.[43] To compensate this Bangladeshi Operational Sector HQs were set up close to the Indian supporting sectors which allowed the use of their communication facilities to ensure links both forward to subsectors and rearward to Bangladesh forces HQ.
Induction of 60,000 guerrillas in stipulated time had been a mammoth task. Based on the discussion between C-in-C of Bangladesh forces and Eastern Command, Supporting forces a list of required arms and ammunition were prepared which included a total of 36,000 rifles, 18,000 SMCs, 6,000 LMGs, 1,000 rocket launchers and 1,20,000 hand grenades to equip 60,000 guerrillas. (At the scale of one LMG, six rifles, three SMCs and two grenades for a group of ten guerrillas) (Appendix N). The estimated expenditure for training 50,000 guerrillas and 18,000 army recruits for the eastern sectors can provide a better picture of the overall spending. It was calculated that Rupees 1.25 crores over a period of six months would be needed at Rupee 1 lac per month for each camp of 500 trainees (estimated cost of expenditure for youth training camp management given in Appendix O).[44] This expense was borne by the Government of India, Tripura and Bengal Assistance Committee. In some areas, the Freedom Fighters collected truckloads of gold and currencies from the banks and treasuries which were later utilized for the development of the Mukti Bahini. For example, while leaving Brahmanbaria, the Freedom Fighters collected two truckloads of cash and Maj Osman’s men in Chuadanga accumulated another 4.5 crore taka and 19 kilograms of gold.[45] Besides all these, we can now imagine, how much was the fund spent for nearly 1.5 million Freedom Fighters including 80,000 trained in India.[46]
After all these investments each raw recruit was placed as an effective member of a team, and in deploying him, preference was given to the region he belonged to. A section was considered as the fundamental guerrilla unit comprising one leader and seven guerrillas. Ideally, these leaders emerged out of the organization. Since the evolution of leadership was a lengthy process and needed years to be effective, the immediate leadership in most cases was made up through induction. Leaders and deputy leaders were elected by the members of the section (Appendix P). The leader and deputy leader usually
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carried one 9-mm pistol while others carried four 9 mm SMC, two rifles and one LMG. A Company leader used to command a guerrilla company and had a Political advisor to motivate the guerrillas. At platoon and company levels there were delegated intelligence staff to provide intelligence inputs.
In addition to the above limitations, specificissues affected the performance of the guerrillas. Among the prerequisites for success in guerrilla operations is the selection of right materials, but here the political leaders seemed to have compromised.“Consequently, many first recruits seemed to have joined the war only to have a means of living or in case of some to get arms for carrying out anti-social activities. Later on, as the Sector Comds exercised their control and judgment, things became better. Changes also came in the operational strategy and tactics. The Sector Comds replaced the set-piece battles with daring raids and ambushes. To avoid detection, our forces frequently changed their bases. Although Sub-sector Comds carried out daily operational activities, their plans used to be coordinated at the sector/ battalion level by fortnightly task plans. While the guerrillas were inducted into small groups inside Bangladesh for carrying out guerrilla activities, regular forces held defensive positions and tried to create free zones.[48] During the early days of our war, except 8 and 1 East Bengal, other battalions nearly had their authorized manpower, arms and ammunition. In some cases, they even had more weapons than authorized. This happened as most of the units were upgrading their 303 rifles with the small arms of Chinese origin. Some battalions quickly organized training by themselves and made up the strength as required, for example, Maj Safiullah started training for 700-800 youths from 4 April in Teliapara camp. [49] Anyway, Bangladesh forces needed ammunition replenishment of Chinese origin. Since the Indians used 7.62 mm self-loading rifle (SLR) ammunition of both Indian and Russian origin and were somewhat compatible with the Chinese type, they could arrange the supply.[50] Bangladesh forces continued to use the Chinese weapons until Indian weapons replaced these in August. Indian Ordnance Factory played a significant role in fulfilling our requirements of arms and ammunition. Arms were also obtained from Poland, Yugoslavia and even America. 57 mm RRs and limpet mines from Russia and wireless set from Israel formed part of the contribution from Pakistan’s adversaries. [51] The Indian Army stationed
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at Aijol, capital of the Indian State of Mizoram bordering the CHT, also provided arms to the Freedom Fighters of CHT which were meant to fight the Mizo insurgent groups.[52] Some Burmese Rebel groups that had taken shelter in CHT also supplied weapons.[53]
Cannibalization, innovations and modification – all had been tried depending on the need and opportunities. Until brigade-sized forces were organized, these battalions remained within the sector areas and operated independently. Every sector would operate within its boundary. Depending on the size of the area of responsibility, the number of companies was determined.[54] The Sector Comds commanded both the sector troops and the battalions. Initially, the sector troops had been operating reasonably well, but after detaching the better lots for the formation of brigades, their effectiveness declined. Some members of the EPR, Mujahid and Ansar while going inside Bangladesh indulged in loot and even rape. These operations had therefore been counterproductive and alienated a large section of people in the border regions, and consequently, they operated against Bangladesh forces. The sector troops could be utilized in defensive role provided they were not subjected to massive enemy offensive.[55] While the guerrillas operated inside, sector troops kept the border alive by tying down the Pakistani forces so that they were unable to pull out forces.
It was felt that Bangladesh would sooner or later substantially annihilate the Pakistanis through guerrilla warfare with assistance from regular forces to defeat them. Accordingly, a few lodgement areas were earmarked within sector 4, 5 and 7 areas.[56] For controlling and expanding these areas, conventional forces were needed. In any case, without armour, it would be impossible to launch major offensives, and therefore the idea of lodgement area did not gather momentum. The author had an extensive discussion with Lt Col (retired) Sajjad Ali Zahir who was a Freedom Fighter and had candid conversations with Col Osmani on this point. According to Col Osmani, in case of non-availability of foreign support Bangladesh might have to fight a prolonged war, but conventional forces would have been needed towards the end to capture the ground. Accordingly, ‘Z Force’ was raised on 12 July 1971. It was titled after the first letter of the name of the Comd, Lt Col Zia and comprising 1 East Bengal, 3 East Bengal and 8 East Bengal. It also included
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a field battery (also known as Rowshanara Battery) and a Signal company. These battalions had only 50% or less of the original troops. Therefore, the shortfall had to be made up by inducting troops such as EPR, Mujahids and Ansar members from the different sectors. Later on, these battalions were dispersed in various locations. The Brigade started its training in July and continued training for three months. With the brief training and shortage of officers, the operational efficiency of the brigade could not be assessed as very high. Bangladesh had two other brigades named after Maj Khaled (K Force) and Maj Safiullah (S Force). Corresponding artillery resources had also been developed to support these conventional brigades in their operations which has been discussed in a subsequent chapter.
The growth of these battalions under different brigades suffered a great deal. Regular battalions were organized to provide them with flexibility in operation and with the organic firepower to operate against a superior enemy. Our Supporting forces suggested a lesser scale of weapons including close support weapons with far less effectiveness and range. This view was probably for the fact that they held similar kinds of infantry battalions and anything more advanced than theirs would cause heartburning amongst their soldiers.[57] The scale suggested by our Supporting forces would substantially weaken our battalions’ operational capability and further accentuate our imbalance with the enemy by making our firepower much weaker than the enemy’s (50% in LMGs). Bangladesh forces HQ also formed both naval wg and air wg successfully and described in the next chapter.
Nearly 100 additional army officers, 38 air force officers and 28 retired officers participated in the liberation war of Bangladesh. To add to those who were in Eastern Wing, a few deserters from Pakistan including cadets from Kakul also joined the war. [58] Due to the shortage of officers, some 130 cadets were recruited in 2 batches and were put through a crash training programme. In June, Wg Comd Mirza and Maj AN Nuruzzaman went around different sectors and selected the first batch of cadets. [59] They were trained at the Murti training camp. It is a place situated three thousand feet above the sea level under Metly PS of Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal. The camp was famous for guerrilla and commando type of training in entire India. Since May this camp was training the freedom fighters and was popularly known as Mujib
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camp to them. To train Bangladeshi officers, the Indian authority turned Murti camp as a temporary Officers Training Centre. Brig BK Joshi of the Indian Army became the Commandant; Lt Col PK Das Gupta was the CI and Maj AS Thapa was the OIC. Other instructors were brought from Indian Military Academy, Dehradun to make up the training team. For smooth administrative support, Indian 12 Maratha Regt was made responsible. A fourteen weeks long extensive training module was devised consisting of training on small arms, tactics, explosives, command and leadership, guerrilla warfare etc. As the training set up was ready, first batch of cadets joined for training on 28 June 1971. On completion of training, they passed out on 9 October 1971. These officers were posted to different infantry battalions and sectors as officers. Based on their usefulness, the Government started training another batch of cadets that started in the first week of November 1971, but before they could pass out, the country got independence.[61]
Many Bengali officers stationed in West Pakistan fled from their duty stations to join the war. Sixty-two of these officers assumed several staff appointments at the Bangladesh forces HQ including command responsibilities in the sectors.[62] There had been an acute shortage of military maps. Maps available with different units were collected and pieced together to generate the entire geographical area of responsibility. Later on, the Indians reproduced those for further distribution. However, the Indian maps showed distances in meter and could not be efficiently utilized.[63] The Bangladesh forces had a few vehicles which they could collect from civilian sources. Even most of the jeeps seen at the BOPs were private gifts, bearing the clasped hands symbol of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). There was virtually no gasoline to run them. 4 In spite of a lot of constraints, the growth of Bangladesh forces had been done in the fast pace, and it played a significant role in 1971.
ANALYSIS
Operational strategies are formulated based on the perceived threat which ultimately dictates the size, types, number of formations including categories of military hardware necessary to make them battle-worthy. After the partition, Pakistan got its due share of the armed forces, and with US aid it even grew stronger. But, when Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
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Declared Independence in 1971, East Pakistan had nothing.
There was no rapid way to build the armed forces. So, we had to depend on the Bengal regts. Out of total 8 regts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 East Bengal was located in East Pakistan which led the rebellion. Without these units, it would have taken much longer to organize Bangladesh forces. Since Awami League had been fighting the issue constitutionally, it was not in a position to assume leadership in the field. Because of their experience in extreme conditions, the communists could better adapt to this situation, but they failed to explore this opportunity due to a lack of contact with the people.
So, the mid-level Bengali officers of the ranks of Maj and Capt from Bengal regts including EPR assumed leadership in the field. Initially they relied on the arms they had brought from their units, but later on, they raided various armouries and also snatched weapons and ammunition from the enemy soldiers. On 4 April 1971, these officers held a meeting in Teliapara with Col Osmani in the chair and took some major decisions. By then most of our forces had crossed over to the Indian territory and added to the increasing burdens of refugees on the Indian soil. It was a welcome opportunity for India to clinch a victory against Pakistan in a relatively advantageous war setting.[66] India was still sceptical, and at the same time cautious about the likely international response it might attract.[67] It was otherwise tricky for India where a substantial proportion of people were earning less than two rupees per day to incur that expenditure on foreign citizens over an indefinite period.[68] As such, it took time for organizing various support systems for Bangladeshi forces to continue with the war.
However, India set up six administrative sectors each under an army officer of the rank of Brig to support the Bangladesh forces. Bangladesh Government also set up 11 administrative regions across the country primarily for taking over the administration of new regions as and when they would be liberated from Pakistani control. Gradually, the Forces HQ came into being and was staffed with repatriated officers from Pakistan Army and Air Force. Simultaneously, discussions continued to draw the right balance between our means and ends. For defeating the Pakistan military with 4.5 to 5 divisions in a conventional war, roughly 15 divisions would have been adequate.
Considering the weak economic base, overwhelmingly superior adversary,
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favourable geographic conditions and availability of numerous diehard volunteers provided the perfect opportunity for blending conventional and unconventional warfare in Bangladesh. Thus, a concept of mix force comprising the regulars and the guerrillas was preferred. In May 1971, a more pragmatic size of force comprising 20,000 regulars and 60,000 guerrillas was organized. Accordingly, 110 training camps were set up all along the border. Initially, it was estimated that these would recruit 5,000 soldiers, but considering the growing demand, the number of recruits increased from 5 to 12 thousand. Conditions were favourable for the growth of guerrilla outfit which reflected what the Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Tse Tung had said about such units in a guerrilla warfare. In July some critical decisions were taken after the comprehensive meeting.
Initially, the Freedom Fighters were known as Mukti Fauz which was renamed as Mukti Bahini to give it a nationalistic flavour. Later on, they were transformed from a land-based force to all arms forces. Bangladesh forces mainly comprised the regular and irregular forces. The regulars consisted of military and paramilitary forces while the irregulars or Gono Bahini consisted of the guerrillas. The Forces HQ brought out detailed instructions laying down the organization, authorization of arms and ammunition, operation and a list of do’s and don’ts. Both these forces had their organogram based on the roles and capabilities. Although India suggested fewer automatic weapons with lesser range for the infantry, the local comds, however, opted for modern weaponry to match those in possession of Pakistan military. The necessary fund was provided by the Governments of India, Tripura and Bengal Assistance Committee. Several non-formal sources and volunteers also joined in fund-raising efforts. Regarding the armaments, except 1 and 8 East Bengal Regts, other regts had their integral Chinese weapons. Weapons from Poland, China, India, Russia, Israel and Yugoslavia were also used. Though, it was difficult to maintain gadgets of different versions; but there was no choice.
Besides assisting Bangladesh forces, RAW remained concerned about the emerging power structure of independent Bangladesh and worked covertly to contain Mr Tajuddin including the military leadership.[69] To do the job; they organized a more fundamental and pro-Mujib entity titled Mujib
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Bahini, recruiting educated youths from Chhatra League. A good number of Irregular forces also came up during the same time and worked efficiently. The regular forces engaged themselves in conventional battles while the guerrillas followed the hit and run tactics. Final victory, however, is never achieved without conventional forces which can only hold the ground. Bangladeshi think tanks appreciated the matter rightly and organized three brigade-sized forces out of the sector troops with a slice of artillery. Alongside land forces, Bangladesh forces HQ also took every effort to raise naval wg and air wg.
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5. Ibid., p. 74.
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16. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
17. Sethi, S. S. The Decisive War. New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1972. p. 64.
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28. Headquarters Bangladesh Forces Field, C/O Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Mujibnagar, Letter No 0010G dated 28 June 1971.
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35. Khandakar, Op. Cit., pp. 110-111.
36. Ibid., p. 111. and Zahir, Quazi Sajjad Ali (Freedom Fighter and Researcher). Telephone Interview. 3 February 2015.
37. Arefin, A. S. M. Shamsul (Freedom Fighter and Researcher). Telephone Interview. 18 May 2015.
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38. Arefin, Op. Cit., pp. 515-516.
39. Headquarters Bangladesh Forces Field Letter No. 00016 dated 28 June 1971.
40. Palit, D. K. The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971. p. 58.
41. Headquarters Bangladesh Forces Field Letter No. 00016, Op. Cit.
42. Woodruff, John E. “Pakistan is Exterminating the Bengalis”. The Baltimore Sun. 10 April 1971: pp. Al-A4.
43. Khandakar, Op. Cit., p. 99.
44. Indian Army, Headquarters Eastern Command GS (X), Fort William, Calcutta, Letter No 103999/23/1/GS(INT)X dated 17 August 1971.
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47. Khandakar, Op. Cit., p. 93.
48. Nasim, Op. Cit., p. 157.
49. Bangladesher Swadhinata Juddha: Dalilpatra (Bangladesh War of Independence: Documents). 15 Vols. Dhaka: Ministry of Liberation War Affairs. p. 9:214. and Safiullah, Op. Cit., p. 109.
50. Hassan, Wakar (Freedom Fighter). Telephone Interview. 21 March 2015.
51. Matinuddin, Kamal. Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis, 1968-1971. p. 231.
52. Maniruzzaman, Op. cit., p. 97.
53. Ibid., p. 86.
54. Khandakar, Op. Cit., p. 112.
55. Headquarters Bangladesh Forces Field Letter No. 00016, Op. Cit.,
56. Osmani, M. A. G, Demi-Official Letter No. 132/133/134 dated 12 September 1971. 57. Headquarters Bangladesh Forces, Letter Proposing Relative Strength of Bangladesh Regular Infantry Battalion and Supporting Forces during Liberation War, n.d.
58. Arefin, Op. cit., pp. 182-202.
59. Bijoyketon Liberation War Museum, Op. Cit.
60. Hasan, Op. Cit.
61. Nasim, Op. Cit., p. 160.
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62. Arefin, Op. cit., p. 464.
63. Bhuiyan, Op. Cit, Telephone Interview. 02 February 2010.
64. Woodruff, Op. Cit.
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68. Sethi, Op. Cit., p. 171.
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Reference:
1971 Resistance, Resilience And Redemption – Major General Sarwar Hossain