THE INDIAN ARMY Reminiscences, Reforms & Romance – H.S.PANAG
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
At the very onset, I must thank and acknowledge the three publications, Newslaundry, the Times of India and The Print that gave me an opportunity to write for them and their kind permission to reproduce my articles in this book without any conditions except the customary source acknowledgement.
Newslaundry’s Editor-in-Chief Madhu Trehan, CEO Abhinandan Sekhri, and their team helped me to switch over from military-style writing, aimed at a restricted audience, to writing about the military for the general public. Madhu encouraged me to ‘disarm’ the military through anecdotes and human interest stories. These proved to be great hits with the public and one amongst those (also featured in this book, see p. 245), ‘I Didn’t Want Pakistani Stray Dogs Eating My Dead Body’ was made into a documentary. The choice of the subject was left to me and so was the length of the column. I must thank Karuna John for introducing me to Newslaundry and Deepanjana Pal and Manisha Pande for editing my column. It was indeed a great experience.
In 2017, Robin David, Resident Editor, the Times of India, Chandigarh, gave me an opportunity to write a fortnightly column – ‘Shooting Straight – on strategic and military affairs for the paper. The choice of subjects was yet again left to me. There was no editorial interference and over a period of one and a half years, I was able to cover a wide range of subjects focussing on reforms that were required with respect to national security and the Armed Forces.
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Writing a weekly opinion column for The Print has been a novel experience. Its editorial team guided me to convey complex strategic and military issues in 800–1,000 words and I would especially like to thank the Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta, Rama Lakshmi and Kritika Bannerji.
The Indian army trained and educated me and gave me an environment to lead a life less ordinary. I thank all my seniors and subordinates for their guidance and support.
My family – Annie Panag, Gul Panag and Sherbir Panag – cajoled and coaxed me to pick up the pen after retirement. I thank them for their support and encouragement.
Last but not the least, I must thank Westland Publications for giving me an opportunity to publish my writings for posterity. A very special thanks to Sudha Sadhanand for her encouragement, and guidance, and tirelessly working to get the book published.
Lt Gen H.S. Panag, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
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It is often said that the army is not a profession but a way of life. For me it was more than that, for I was born and brought up in an army environment. In fact, the day I was born – 4 December 1948 – my father Colonel (then Major) Shamsher Singh was at Kargil which had been captured by his unit on 30 November 1948. My first memories are from the age of four to six, 1952–1954, when my father was commanding 17 Sikh at Agra Cantonment. Two of the pieces in this book, ‘I’m OK, But The Damn Tigress Took My Rifle’ (see, p. 229) and ‘Memories of Cantonment Life’ (see p. 149) cover that period.
I joined the National Defence Academy (NDA) in December 1964 and began a journey which ended forty-four years later on 31 December 2008 when I superannuated as GOC-in-C Central Command. Another four and a half years as a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal (June 2009-December 2013) kept me in regular touch with the army, making my total journey last for forty-nine years.
In these years, I have seen human endeavour at work in a unique environment. Unique because in the military, ordinary human beings are trained to use force in defence and offence at the behest of the State to protect its core values even at the cost of their lives. And yet they are also ordinary human beings who deal with the various aspects of life like anyone else. This vast experience in times of both war and peace, should be a good enough reason for many to tell their stories to the world. And
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the organisation trains us to do precisely that – good written and verbal expression are essential to building military character and are a basic functional attribute.
Hence it is rather surprising why many military personnel do not take to writing after retirement. The reasons may be several – fear of the unknown; lack of familiarity with the environment; and to some extent, even a lack of opportunity. Initially, I had similar such misgivings and apprehensions as well. But gradually, I was convinced that I should familiarise my readers with strategic and military affairs concerning India as well as the reality of life in the army. Additionally, I wanted to make readers aware of an ethical assessment of the state of national security and the Armed Forces.
I joined Twitter in July 2009, and found it to be a good medium as its then 140 letters limit suited the cryptic style of military writing. In a short span of time, I made my mark as a commentator on strategic and military affairs on the platform. Soon I was running short of space and relied upon “Twitlonger’ and ‘Storify’ to convey my views. Starting my own blog was the next logical step.
The mark I made on Twitter, in addition to my reputation in the army, led to my penning articles for leading newspapers, particularly The Indian Express for which I must thank Shekhar Gupta. Karuna John, a young journalist at Newslaundry, urged me to write a regular column and was kind enough to introduce me to the editors. From here on, there was no looking back. I started writing regular columns for Newslaundry and the Times of India, and also for some other newspapers and portals. Now I write a weekly column exclusively for The Print
The year 2014 saw the emergence of neo-nationalism in the country which put national security and the Armed Forces at the centre stage. There was a visible trend towards exploiting the Armed Forces for political gains. On the one hand, the Armed Forces were deified and put on a pedestal and on the other, holistic reforms were given short shrift. There was a revival of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and
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the national mood at times made the army abandon its time-tested people-friendly model of counter-insurgency operations. This period also witnessed India take an aggressive stand towards Pakistan’s proxy war in the form of trans-Line of Control (LOC)/ International Boundary (IB) surgical strikes. These were therefore interesting times for a defence analyst and columnist and I enjoyed every bit of it.
I must thank Westland Publications for publishing The Indian Army: Reminiscences, Reforms & Romance. Sudha Sadhanand and her team worked very hard to select and edit the articles for this collection. This book covers a vast canvas from National Security Strategy to the boots of a soldier, giving a glimpse into the human side of soldiers. Most importantly, it focusses on the reforms required to transform our army into a twenty-first century force.
The book is divided into six sections – Human Rights, Reforms, Leadership, Reminiscences, Conflict, and Unforgettable Heroes – each with a bouquet of articles.
Reminiscences include stories of my personal experiences as an army kid and later as an officer. When I Captured the Man Who Would Be Pakistan’s Air Chief’ (see, p. 111) is based on my personal experience in the 1971 war; “Digging Deep To Answer The Call Of Nature, (see p. 116) is a typical example of humour in uniform; ‘The Love Story Of A Soldier’ (see p. 121) is a tragic real story of a young soldier who fell in love with a Kashmiri girl. Three other stories describe my childhood experiences in my village and in Cantonments.
Unforgettable Heroes comprises articles about ‘heroes’ whom I had the privilege of knowing personally. It includes a true story of the only instance in history when a soldier killed a tiger with the bayonet of his rifle.
The Leadership section is an ethical assessment of the prevailing leadership standards in the Armed Forces and reforms. It also describes my own approach to leadership in the army.
In Conflict, I write about the competitive conflict between India and Pakistan, and China, and also cover the insurgency in Jammu and
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WHEN THE INDIAN ARMY NEEDS
A (HUMAN) SHIELD
Two and a half years is a fairly long time in an insurgency. Elections were due to be held in Jammu and Kashmir in five phases from 25 November to 20 December 2014. There had been relative calm in J&K since the protests following the Machil fake encounter in 2010. The campaigning was on full swing in the state.
On 3 November 2014, at a checkpoint in Budgam area, manned by a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) and eight OR (Other Ranks) of 53 Rashtriya Rifles (RR), a car was fired upon when it failed to stop for checking (as per the version of the soldiers). Two school students were killed and two others were injured. Protests broke out in the area. The J&K Police commenced investigations, and leaks pointed towards the high-handed approach of soldiers manning the checkpoint. 53 RR stuck to its story that they were acting upon specific information on movement of terrorists and had fired only when the car had failed to stop at two previous checkpoints despite being signalled to do so, and had tried to barge through the checkpoint.
Considering the SOPs for manning checkpoints, it appeared to be a clear case of violation of rules of engagement. In such cases, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) protects the soldiers from being charged with murder or manslaughter. But they were guilty of violating the standing orders laying down the rules of engagement and were liable to be punished after due investigation.
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On 7 November, the Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General D.S. Hooda gave a suo moto statement accepting that the killing of the two students was a mistake. The Army Commander said, “We take responsibility for the death of the two boys in Kashmir. We admit that a mistake was made and a transparent investigation will be taken up. We will ensure that such incidents never happen again. The army inquiry will be completed within 10 days. The army also announced a compensation of ten lakhs for those killed and five lakhs for those wounded. In my view, this reflected the model approach of the Indian army in upholding human rights.
Exactly a month later, on 8 December, Prime Minister Narendra Modi echoed the same view during an election rally held in Sher-e-Kashmir Stadium. An excerpt of the original Hindi speech is reproduced below in Roman:
Bhaiyon aur behno, apni jaan ki bazi laga kar ke bhi logon ki raksha karna, yeh hamara mantra raha hai (referring to the sacrifice of soldiers during the Kashmir floods). Ussi mantra ko le kar ke aage badhte hain. Lekin koi galti kare, pehli baar, 30 saal mein pehli baar, yeh Modi Sarkar ka kamal dekhiye. Pehli baar sena ne, press conference kar ke kaha, ki jo do naujawan maare gaye thhe, woh sena ki galti thi. Aur sena ne apni galti mani. Inquiry commission baitha, aur jin logon ne goli chalai thi un par case darj kar diya gaya. Yeh mere nek iradon ka saboot hai. Bhaiyon aur behno, 30 sal mein nahin hua, 30 sal mein nahin hua. Aur isliye mere Kashmir ke bhaiyon aur behno, main aapko nyay dilane ke liye aaya hoon.
(For the first time in thirty years, it is the wonder of the Modi government, that the army admitted at a press conference that the killing of the two youth was a mistake. An inquiry commission probed the matter and those who fired the bullets were charged. This is the proof of my good intentions.)
Two months prior to the above incident, the court martial in the Machil ‘fake encounter’ case of April 2010 had concluded on 7 September 2014. Five army personnel, including the Commanding Officer of the unit, were
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cashiered or dismissed from service and awarded life imprisonment.
The Machil encounter was an open-and-shut case of rogue behaviour. By the end of May 2010, investigations had prima facie established that it was a case of ‘fake encounter’ wherein three civilians were lured with the promise of jobs and killed close to the Line of Control (LoC). The stand of the Unit was that they had killed Pakistani terrorists who had infiltrated across the LoC. The incident led to violent protests, to which security forces had to respond, resulting in even more violent protests – 112 civilians died between June and September 2010. After initial denials, the army ordered a court of inquiry. The case got marred by jurisdiction issues and the army’s own avoidable procedural delays and the sentence was confirmed only in September 2014.
The media coverage at the time implied that the above two were benchmark cases, that most past instances of human rights violations had been brushed under the carpet by invoking the AFSPA. However, the fact was that over the years, more than a hundred court martial trials had been held by the army in cases of human rights violations, with sentences ranging from dismissal to life imprisonment. The army’s track record in investigating and punishing human rights violations had been exemplary and the best in the world. The Indian army conducts the model people-friendly, counter-insurgency campaigns strictly adhering to the law of the land, Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law. This is the reason why we have successfully contained all insurgencies with effect from 1956.
Why have we laboured on these two cases of 2014 and the statement of the PM made on 8 December 2014? The Indian army had once again reinforced its model moral code of conduct in insurgencies and the PM had assured the people of J&K that their human rights will be upheld. The media and public pressure had also contributed towards this end. This was certainly one of the key factors that led to a record voter turnout in the elections and the emergence of a path-breaking coalition. There was optimism in the air and it was hoped that the J&K imbroglio would end soon.
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Fast-forward to April 2017. The opposite has happened. We are drifting towards chaos at a very rapid rate. The coalition is falling apart. Political activity and governance are at a standstill. The writ of the State and its security forces is being challenged, not only by the terrorists who are now predominantly indigenous, but also by the unarmed stone-throwing mobs, both having a death wish. The two by-polls held on 9 April not only saw unprecedented violence but also one of the lowest voter turnouts ever, shattering the image that democracy prevailed in J&K. Rather than fatigue from the last twenty-eight years of insurgency, there seems renewed vigour among the masses to confront the State through endless agitations. This has triggered a chain reaction of action-response-action, and the notions of azadi or a merger with Pakistan has given way to the romantic idealism of Ummah/Pan Islamism!
An insurgency and a counter-insurgency campaign are both driven by political aims and a political strategy on which the military strategy of both the terrorists and the State is contingent. The political aim of both is to win the hearts and minds of the population. The irony of the current situation is that the terrorists have lost or are fast losing the military battle, but are winning the political battle – and the Indian State which has won the military battle is fast losing the political battle.
It is a sad commentary on our strategic thinking that no government has defined the political or the military end state. Yet, despite the political disconnect, the military strategy has been eminently successful. The Indian army, through a model counter-insurgency campaign has brought the conflict (generally judged by the number of terrorists and scale of violence) to sub-critical level. Unfortunately, rather than seizing the political initiative, the State – trapped by ideology and political rhetoric, an excited jingoist media and public emotions fed by orchestrated nationalism – is suffering from inertia and continues to ride on military strategy, which is useless against an alienated mass.
Political, media and public emotional rhetoric has blurred the distinction between terrorists and the masses. It is no longer the misguided few, but the majority of the population of the Valley that is
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waging a war against India. The crudeness of our response in handling unarmed mass agitations, and flash mobs rushing to the aid of terrorists during anti-terrorist operations, has already placed J&K at the centre stage of international conscience.
Suddenly the Armed Forces, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) and the police who were questioned by the media and the public for inefficiency in conduct of operations and brushing human rights violations under the carpet, have been deified and can do no wrong. The Armed Forces, in particular, who had strived for the government, media and public support on merit of their model counter-insurgency campaign, have achieved the same, albeit by default, for the wrong reasons.
Nothing supports my analysis more than Ľaffaire Human Shield. I had to tweet in anguish on 15 April: ‘The image of an alleged “stonepelter” tied in front of a vehicle as a “human shield”, will forever haunt the Indian army and the nation!’
A video showing a man tied to the bumper of an army jeep, trailed by a Rakshak vehicle and a bus, being paraded through villages surfaced on social media on 13 April 2017. On 14 April, at 10:24 a.m. this video was uploaded on Twitter by Omar Abdullah. The video went viral, shared and commented on copiously.
The man, allegedly ‘a stone-pelter appeared to be used as a ‘human shield’ by a military convoy. The video was sixteen seconds in duration and was apparently shot in Gondipora village. No crowds, except two or three bystanders watching the convoy, could be seen in the video. No stone-pelting was visible in the video. A warning – ‘All stone-pelters will meet this fate, or words to that effect can be heard being repeated in Hindi over a loudspeaker from one of the vehicles. A poster stuck on the chest of the ‘human shield’ was later verified to read, ‘I am a stone-pelter
After some time, a photo was also posted of a soldier in battle kit and rifle standing on the ground on the front right side of the static vehicle with the civilian still tied on the bumper. Within minutes, extreme positions were taken on both social and mainstream media with an overwhelming majority supporting the use of a human shield,
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and a lesser number of people questioning the violation of human rights including the Geneva Convention. Television news channels vied with each other in jingoistic frenzy, lauding the unique and novel tactics used to save casualties and ‘to teach the stone-pelters a lesson. A few sane voices were drowned in the din of the majority. Retired Armed Forces’ senior officers, barring a few exceptions, justified the violation of human rights and the code of conduct citing the unique circumstances and the need to save casualties. A number of politicians and even the Attorney General of India justified the use of the ‘human shield’ given the unique circumstances of the incident.
The Indian army, Ministry of Defence and the Home ministry have till date not made any official statement with respect to the incident and its circumstances. On directions of the J&K government, the police had registered an FIR on 13 April against unknown persons. No charges have been filed yet. The Indian army also ordered a court of inquiry on 15 April to inquire into the circumstances of the incident. In the ‘posttruth, the truth may never become public, but before public memory fades, a postmortem is in order.
Over the next couple of days two distinct narratives emerged. One narrative was attributed to “reliable sources’ supposedly from the army that shared a version of the events supposedly narrated by the Commander on the spot, Major Leetul Gogoi of 53 RR. The second narrative was the version of the local people and the human shield, Farooq Ahmad Dar of Chil Brass village who was interviewed by the media.
According to the first narrative, on Election Day – 9 April – a party of the Election Commission comprising 10-12 civilian officials and personnel of JKP/Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) manning a polling booth at Ootligam village was surrounded by a violent crowd of stone-pelters numbering 500 to 900 strong. Fearing lynching by the mob, the polling booth-in-charge sent an SOS call to the army. The Company Base of 53 RR located at Raiyari (sic) responded with a Quick Reaction Team (QRT) of sixteen personnel.
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Upon reaching the spot, Major Gogoi assessed the volatile situation and concluded that any action as per army tactics and SOPs would lead to unacceptable casualties amongst civilians. On the spur of the moment, based on the unique situation, the Commander of the QRT took hostage one of the ‘stone-pelters’ and tied him on top on the spare tyre mounted on the front bumper of the jeep. The mob, on seeing this, stopped stone-pelting, moved aside and the QRT was able to safely rescue the polling booth party.
The second narrative was based on the version of events as narrated by the victim, Farooq Ahmad Dar, and other eyewitnesses. As per this version, the victim is a poor shawl embroiderer, who claimed that he has never pelted stones and had, in fact, voted in the morning at Chil village. He was going on his motorcycle to Gampora village to condole the death of a relative. He was intercepted by the QRT at Ootligam village, where he had halted to watch women protesting the elections. He was thrashed and tied to the jeep and paraded for four hours through nine villages over 26–28 kilometres.
The first narrative was accepted by mainstream media and the majority on social media. No one questioned the narrative or the sequence of events which would not withstand even cursory scrutiny.
How did the QRT pass through a violent crowd of 500-900 to reach the polling booth without firing a shot? Why did the violent crowd not resist the taking of a hostage and his tying up without the QRT not having to use any force? No one questioned the violation of human rights, Geneva Convention 4, customary international law, Supreme Court guidelines on AFSPA, the Indian army’s own rules of engagement and the Chief of the Army Staff or COAS’ Commandments. Why, instead of taking the polling party to the nearest police station for safety, was the ‘human shield paraded for four hours, through nine villages covering 26–28 km?
The action was justified based on the unique situation and need to save lives and the dictum – all is fair in war. Another justification was that terrorists follow no rules of conflict and deserve this treatment,
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therefore making no distinction between people and terrorists. No one even thought of the dignity and rights of Farooq Ahmad Dar, the unfortunate victim. For all purposes, the approach was that he was a stone-pelter and therefore a terrorist. And if he was not a stone-pelter, ‘it was just too bad that he was a victim of circumstances, as lives had to be saved? No one gave thought to the possibility of terrorists shooting the ‘human shield and blaming the QRT/army. The atmosphere was such that one almost expected the highest decoration to be announced for the Commander of the QRT. Curiously, a post allegedly by one Major Gogoi mysteriously appeared on Indian army WhatsApp groups that began with, ‘I am Major Gogoi… and went on to give his version of the events in tune with the narrative discussed above. This post received wide circulation thanks to the emotionally-charged retired fraternity.
According to the second narrative, impliedly, this was allegedly a standalone rogue action taken by the Commander of the QRT to teach a lesson to the people of the area. The story of the ‘novel tactics’ to rescue the besieged Election Commission polling booth team was an afterthought to justify the action. The narrative was rubbished by the majority as the version of terrorists.
The silence of Headquarters Northern Command and its subordinate Headquarters was deafening. The former is fairly active on social media and shares real-time information about encounters taking place. Information of such a unique event would have reached all higher headquarters, including Northern Command, within one or two hours. Based on experience and circumstances of the case, the truth, whatever it be, would have been assessed. A suo moto statement from Northern Command was warranted on 9 April itself to clarify the situation. It should have been clarified that the ‘novel tactics’ used are not the approved tactics of the Indian army. That they are in violation of the Indian army’s rules of engagement and SOPs, Geneva Conventions 4, customary international law and the COAS’ Commandments. That the circumstances of the event would be investigated and action will be taken as deemed necessary.
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That no statement was issued on 9 April and none has been issued till date reflects poorly on the army.
With the ‘reliable sources’ narrative riddled with holes, the Indian army has allowed the terrorists to run away with their propaganda of a brutal army. It has also allowed the frenzied nationalistic public, media and politicians to defend the indefensible.
Violation of human rights is an offence under the law and cannot be justified. Unusual or unique circumstance can only mitigate the offence and not exonerate the offender. To be held guilty or not guilty is a matter of law, and military law in this case. Even at the cost of operational success, human rights cannot be violated. The Indian army is trained to deal with adverse unique situations. No mob sustains its violent ways when minimum force is used for effect, according to rules of engagement. In the future, are we going to march behind the families of terrorists to eliminate them in order to save casualties of soldiers and the stone-pelters rushing to save them? If saving civilian casualties is the principal concern, are we going to deal with stone-pelting youth by using their parents as ‘human shields’? Are we going to allow terrorists to shoot at the ‘human shields’ and put the blame on the army?
Now, backtrack to end 2014. The Budgam ‘9’ found guilty of violating rules of engagement leading to the death of two schoolchildren and wounding another two, are awaiting action/court martial as promised by the prime minister himself? What injustice! After all, the soldiers acting in good faith only inadvertently killed future stone-pelters or terrorists. What wrong was done by the Machil ‘5’ undergoing life imprisonment? How could we not believe their version and believe the version of the ‘terrorists?’ Is there not a strong case for granting Presidential Pardon and restoring the honour of hundreds of officers and soldiers court martialled for violation of human rights in J&K and the North East over the last sixty-one years? Going by the flavour of the day, there is a very strong case indeed.
What a decline in two-and-a-half years. The above notwithstanding, I have no doubts that the Indian army
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will act as per its time-tested traditions, law and moral code of conduct and not let the ‘human shield’ tactics define its image. In a diverse country like ours, the army can only get carried away by nationalistic fervour at its own peril.
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A BOAST, A SMIRK AND TWO VIRAL PHOTOS
Ever since the advent of war, soldiers have desecrated the corpses of their enemies, whether to send a message or exact revenge. However, nations and their armies were also aware that it was wrong and never formally condoned the same.
India and Pakistan fought the conventional wars of 1947–48, 1965 and 1971, generally adhering to the Geneva Conventions. India’s humanitarian handling of 93,000 Prisoners Of War (POW) became a model for the world. However, with the advent of proxy wars and vicious fighting along the Line of Control (LoC), the primitive practice of desecration of the bodies of dead soldiers seems to have been revived.
There have been numerous instances where the bodies of our soldiers have been desecrated by the Pakistan army and the terrorists. What began as carrying body parts as “proof’ of action, seems to have become a routine ritual. The proliferation of mobile phones and an overactive media have led to gory photos and videos making their way into the public domain. An incensed public egged on by nationalistic fervour has been clamouring for ‘ten heads for one head!
Beliefs, norms and honour code of warriors demand that the enemy dead be treated at par with one’s own dead. In classical literature, Homer’s Iliad described the twelfth century BC Trojan War, and captured this essence of the customary laws of war and the reality of battle.
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Incensed at the killing of young Patroclus, Achilles slays Hector, ties his body to his chariot and drags it away as shocked kin and people of Troy watch. In his own camp, he drags it twelve times around the funeral pyre of Patroclus and leaves it face down to rot, to be eventually eaten by dogs. Even the Greek gods are horrified by this immoral brutality. They intervene to preserve the corpse of Hector from being corrupted and Zeus sends word that Achilles ‘tempts the wrath of heaven too far? with his desire to ‘vent his mad vengeance on the sacred dead. Achilles relents and hands over the body to Priam who gives a befitting funeral to his son.
In actual battles, the worst instincts of men come to the fore. Laws have been, therefore, progressively codified over centuries to act as a deterrent. Article 15 of the First Geneva Convention states, ‘At all times, and particularly after an engagement, parties to the conflict shall… and to search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled!
The Indian army prides itself on fighting as per the laws of the conflict. India is a great advocate of ‘rules-based international order? We highlight this every time the Pakistan army or its proxies mutilate the bodies of our soldiers in operations along the LoC. Last year’s ‘humanshield’ incident and two recent events, however, have severely dented this image.
On 15 September, Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman participated in India TV’s show “Aap Ki Adalat (People’s Court) as a mock accused. During the programme, the anchor asked her a loaded question. ‘Lekin sawal hai Pakistan ko theek karne ka. Chunav ke dauran kehte hain ki woh do sar katenge toh hum das sar kat ke layenge. Lekin ab dus toh nahin kat rahe’ (During the election campaign, you people had said that if they cut two heads, we will cut ten heads. But ten heads are not really being cut now).
The then Defence Minister had replied, ‘Nahin. Main yeh bol sakti hoon, kaat toh rahe hain hum, display nahin kar rahe’ (No. I can only say this that we are also cutting heads off, but not displaying them). The statement was followed by a smug smirk.
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The same day, two photographs taken after an encounter in Reasi district in Jammu and Kashmir on 13 September went viral on social media. In the first photo, soldiers are seen dragging the body of a terrorist from approximately two metres with a chain tied to his feet. In the second photo, a saffron-clad person is taking a selfie with the terrorist’s body. Both actions, as seen in the photos, violate the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the army and the Geneva Conventions. The logic of ‘anti-IED/ booby trap drill does not hold good because the rope has to be at least thirty metres long and pulled from behind a safe cover to turn the body.
The media spared the minister, but the ramifications of her naive gaffe are far-reaching. The Defence Minister has incriminated her own army of violating Article 15 of the First Geneva Convention and the Customary International Humanitarian Law. Not even the Pakistan army and its proxies have ever admitted or boasted about mutilation or decapitation of dead bodies of our soldiers. Similarly, with no formal statement on the viral photos, the army, carried away by the mood of the nation, appears to condone the incident.
The government and the army must forthwith issue a formal clarification to dispel the notion that we have fallen to the levels of rogue armies and terrorists. A political boast and a ‘one-off’ violation of the Standard Operating Procedure must not give the impression that the Indian army has lost its ‘moral compass!
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DON’T CELEBRATE ARMY’S DANGARI
COURT MARTIAL
An epitaph at the cremation site in village Dangari, district Tinsukhia, Assam, reads, “We, Prabin, Akhil, Pradip, Debojit and Bhaben, five innocent and unarmed young men, rest here as witnesses of the Indian state’s heartless atrocities. When you go back from here, tell everyone about the barbarianism of the Indian army. It seems like many other epitaphs put up by relatives and supporters of terrorists/insurgents/ militants killed by security forces in the northeast, Jammu and Kashmir, and the Red Corridor.
However, in this case, the chilling words were found to be true by a Summary General Court Martial (SGCM) held by the Army from 16 to 27 July 2018, twenty-four years after the incident. On 13 October, the SGCM awarded life imprisonment (subject to confirmation by the competent authority) to seven retired army personnel – one Major General, two Colonels, two Honorary Captains and two Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) – for extra-judicial killings of five persons in Tinsukhia district, Assam, on the night of 22/23 February 1994.
The only thing worse than the ‘instrument of last resort’ committing deliberate human rights violations is their systematic cover-up with the complicity of the State. This was an open-and-shut case.
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The case
On the night of 17/18 February 1994, nine men, all members of the All Assam Students Union (AASU), were picked up from various parts of Talap area of Tinsukhia district by 18 Punjab, then based at Dhola. The suspicion was about their involvement in the murder of Rameshwar Singh, general manager of Assam Frontier Tea Estate, on 15 February
A habeas corpus petition was filed on 22 February in Guwahati High Court, which asked the army to produce the nine men in front of a magistrate or at the nearest police station.
Rather than obey the high court order, 18 Punjab released four of the nine men at different locations on 23 February and reported that five members of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) were killed in an encounter because they were setting up a militant camp at the Dibru-Saikhowa National Park. The bodies bore marks of torture and extreme brutalisation. The four released men who had also been tortured confirmed the presence of the five victims in the Dhola camp. The boatman who had ferried the soldiers of 18 Punjab and the victims to the encounter site had mysteriously disappeared, but later gave evidence before the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
Two parallel inquiries, one by the army and one by the police, were conducted, which reached two contradictory conclusions. The army called it a legitimate encounter and the police called it a cold blooded extra-judicial killing. The high court ordered a CBI inquiry in 2001, which indicted the Commanding Officer, Colonel A.K. Lal (later Major General), two officers and four other ranks for the murder of five men, and filed a charge sheet on 30 May 2002.
The prosecution could not progress as the army invoked the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act or AFSPA. Finally, the case was heard by the Supreme Court on 1 May 2012, which gave the army the option of trial by a court martial or by a criminal/CBI court after obtaining necessary sanction from the Central government as required by Section 6 of the AFSPA.
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A study in contrast
Assam Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal and senior BJP functionary, Jagadish Bhuyan, as members of AASU and later as part of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) were at the forefront of this prolonged struggle to seek justice for the victims.
Both welcomed the decision and praised the army. Human rights activists hailed the verdict as a benchmark and course correction by the army. Television, print and social media welcomed the SGCM’s verdict.
The attitude of the politicians, the army and the media is in sharp contrast to the one they adopt towards similar cases in Jammu and Kashmir. No one, in this case, came out in support of the ‘victimised soldiers’ who had claimed that they were merely doing their legitimate duty.
The army’s approach towards the Pathribal incident is a case in point. Both the cases (Dangari and Pathribal) were heard together by the Supreme Court on 1 May 2012. As mentioned earlier, the court gave the army the choice to try the accused by a court martial or let the matter be decided by a criminal/CBI court after necessary sanction of the government.
The Pathribal case was closed at the ‘hearing of the charge’ stage itself by the Commanding Officer on 24 January 2014, citing lack of evidence to establish a prima facie case. The army’s sudden decision to hold a SGCM in the Dangari case, after six years of dithering post the Supreme Court’s directions on 1 May 2012, is hard to explain.
While each case is unique, it would be very unfortunate if the army’s approach to human rights violations is influenced by extraneous – regional, political or demographic – factors.
Has the Dangari case reached closure? I am afraid not. The accused have the right to appeal against the verdict of the SGCM to the COAS/ Central government, in the Armed Forces Tribunal and thereafter in the Supreme Court.
This is chimera
More than that, there is a legal issue, which may lead to their exoneration.
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The Army Act 1950, Section 122, unambiguously states that no trial by court martial of any person subject to the Act shall commence after the expiration of three years from the date of the offence; or where the commission of the offence was not known to the aggrieved person or the authority competent to take action, from the first day it comes to be known; or if the identity of the accused was not known, from the first day it comes to be known.
The Army Act 1950 is an act of parliament and the provision of Section 122 is absolute, and has been upheld by the Supreme Court on a number of occasions in favour of the accused. The SGCM thus becomes legally invalid. The case could only have been tried in a criminal court, for which the permission of the Central government is mandatory as the case is covered by the AFSPA.
It is surprising that this was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court during the course of the hearing in May 2012 by the petitioners or the respondents. It is intriguing that neither the convening authority nor the court in the SGCM took note of this. The accused may not have raised the issue as they knew that they have a favourable case at the appeal stage.
It would be a shame if there was a tacit understanding between the army and the accused to abuse the judicial system. In my view, the Dangari SGCM is chimera, where justice has not only been delayed but is likely to be denied too.
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MAJOR GOGOI: IMPLICATIONS OF AWARD
Major Nitin Leetul Gogoi must be congratulated for being awarded the coveted Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Commendation Card. The award, according to the Indian army spokesperson, has been given ‘for sustained efforts in Counter Insurgency (CI) Operations. The award apparently has been given for displaying exceptional initiative, courage and fout of the box’ thinking on 9 April 2017. He successfully rescued election commission personnel on duty at two polling booths from violent stonethrowing mobs baying for their blood, using a civilian, Farooq Ahmad Dar, as a “human shield
The history of the CI campaign in Jammu and Kashmir will never be complete without a mention of his name. Such is the impact of his action, that the term ‘Gogoi Tactics’ may soon be part of the theory of tactics and an accepted norm for the Indian army in CI Operations. Also, anyone using a human shield or doing any other human rights violation in the future in order to avoid casualties, will rely upon the ‘Gogoi Principle’ for his defence. And therein lies the problem.
The COAS who has shown a ‘great sense of judgement and displayed moral courage in announcing the award even before the finalisation of the court of inquiry ordered by the army and the investigations by the J&K Police allegedly ordered due to the ‘counter-narrative’ put forward by so-called ‘anti-nationals, terrorists and bleeding hearts? I have no doubt that he has thought through the fallout of his decision which
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will have far-reaching consequences for the Indian army’s conduct in peace and war.
It must be noted that the COAS Commendation Card is the second lowest award in the hierarchy of gallantry and distinguished awards. It is awarded for ‘Individual acts of gallantry or distinguished service or devotion to duty performed either in operational or non-operational areas which are not of a sufficiently high order to qualify for higher gallantry or distinguished award or for which the higher award is inappropriate? It has been argued that since there ‘was no direct combat, a gallantry award would have been inappropriate. Although in this situation, this logic is open to debate, but surely, given the display of exemplary courage and innovative tactics, Major Gogoi deserved a higher award given for wartime (including CI Operations) distinguished service such as the Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medal, Uttam Yudh Seva Medal, Yudh Seva Medal and Sena Medal (Distinguished). Or was there a reluctance that an inappropriate precedence was being set to be in sync with the ‘mood of the nation’ and any future fallout must be minimised? Or maybe, since the present commendation is for ‘sustained efforts in CI Operations, the Indian army will consider him for a higher award for this specific act on 15 August. Although an award, high or low, is an award, but tokenism in this regard was avoidable.
There are three major implications of this commendation and the virtual exoneration of Major Gogoi for an action which violates the Indian army’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Rules of Engagement, COAS’ Commandments, Supreme Court Guidelines for application of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and is an offence under Army Act Section 63 and Section 69 read in conjunction with the Indian Penal Code (IPC). None of these rules, regulations, guidelines and acts of law make an exception for ‘circumstances’ or the ‘unique situation’ or ‘bona fide actions to save casualties. There is no doubt that ‘intent’ and ‘circumstances’ do matter, but that is a matter of law to decide once the charges are filed and are not decided by emotions.
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First, a bad precedence has been set in the procedure for giving honours and awards. Whenever a citation for an award is forwarded for consideration, a certificate is given that the individual is not facing any disciplinary action. This implies that if an individual is under investigation, he will not be considered for an award. In this case, two investigations were in progress. A court of inquiry was ordered by the army on 15 April 2017, and is yet to be finalised. An FIR had been registered by the J&K Police on 13 April 2017, and the case is still under investigation. Even if one may legally explain away this requirement based on a Supreme Court judgement, it is not ethically right to ignore it. Additionally, instead of waiting for 15 August or 26 January when such awards are normally announced, an ‘on the spot award, conferred in person, was announced. The award was actually announced in absentia on 1 May at Headquarters 15 Corps, even though Major Gogoi was only an hour’s drive away.
Second, the Military Justice System has been flouted with impunity, which will have long-term ramifications. A court of inquiry is a formal fact-finding body of Officers or Officers and JCOs/NCOs that is directed to collect evidence and, if required, to report with regard to any matter that is referred to them. It can be ordered by any officer in command of any body of troops. It is ordered through a Convening Order which is a formal document wherein the Convening Officer or the appropriate military authority in command specifically spells out the character of the information required. The court can be reassembled any number of times by the Convening Officer to reconsider or examine fresh facts.
A court of inquiry records facts and follows the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The proceedings of a court of inquiry are confidential. Neither the Convening Officer nor any other authority is supposed to do or say anything that may influence the mind of the Presiding Officer and members. Anyone doing so commits an offence under the Army Act. This is to ensure absolute impartial conduct and independence. Once the court of inquiry is finalised, the officers in the chain of command record their recommendations
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until it reaches the Convening Officer. He examines the inquiry in detail and records his opinion and issues directions for further action, as deemed necessary.
In this case, the independence and impartiality of the court of inquiry have become suspect and reflect that a sham justice system prevails in the army. On 15 May, according to the media, there were leaks from “reliable army sources’ that Major Gogoi has been ‘exonerated by the court of inquiry. Under pressure, these statements were denied by the army spokesperson. The award was announced on 1 May, although the news of this only broke on 22 May 2017. The court of inquiry ordered on 15 April had been in progress for only sixteen days. It was inquiring into the circumstances under which the events of 9 April involving Major Gogoi had taken place. What message would the Chief’s virtual exoneration of Major Gogoi by announcing the award on 1 May send to the court of inquiry? If that was not enough, the COAS in a formal interview to the Economic Times published on 24 May, went a step further. I quote:
‘What about the Army court of inquiry against Major Gogoi?’
COAS: A court of inquiry is for fact finding. It finds a person guilty/not guilty. The present court of inquiry will come to its conclusion but what I have learnt is that he has not committed an offence that will necessitate disciplinary action. On the face of it, even if he is found guilty of some lapse, no major action will be taken against him. I find no reason for major action to be taken against him?
The COAS clearly acknowledges that the court of inquiry is still in progress. Then he says, “What I have learnt is that he has not committed an offence that will necessitate disciplinary action. Now the proceedings of the court of inquiry are classified, ‘confidential. Not even the Convening Officer is privy to the proceedings. How did the COAS come to know of the details? With confidentiality flouted with impunity, what is the sanctity of the Indian army’s court of inquiries? Can they be considered impartial? Will they ever inspire
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confidence in the accused or the public? If there was any doubt about the confidentiality having been flouted, the COAS again reiterated in an interview to the PTI on 28 May, ‘I know what is happening in the court of inquiry. It is being finalised. What do we punish him for?’ Court of inquiries for long have been under the scrutiny of the courts for lack of legal impartiality and this episode will strengthen the suspicion.
In his interview to the Economic Times, the COAS had said, ‘On the face of it, even if he is found guilty of some lapse, no major action will be taken against him. I find no reason for major action to be taken against him. This statement virtually makes the entire Military Justice System suspect and will be exploited by all accused in the future. Even before the court of inquiry, which is the first step of the legal system, is finalised, the COAS has already given the judgement. What message would it send to the Presiding Officer of the court of inquiry and th members of the court martial if one is held at all? Let there be no doubt that irreparable damage has been done to the reputation of the Military Justice System
Third, the most serious fallout from this incident is that it by default defines, albeit incorrectly, the ‘image of the Indian army’ and more dangerously sets a benchmark for its future conduct. So far, no formal official statement had been given at any level to say that this was a one-off incident and that these are not the tactics of the Indian army and that such an action will never be repeated.
To the contrary, the entire effort has been to justify the action and defend, laud and reward Major Gogoi. He was paraded before the media to further fuel the charged emotions of the nation. The Indian army has defended the actions of its soldiers by issuing formal press statements through official spokespersons and by senior officers. An army does not throw its officers or soldiers to the wolves. The media in this situation was cooperative, but may not be so in the future.
The entire focus is on the large mob baying for blood’; ‘need to save the hostages held’; ‘need to prevent casualties if “force” as per SOP was
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used’; ‘out of the box novel tactics’ dictated by the situation; and “need to give freedom of action to soldiers in war-like situations. Any situation in J&K, except on the Line of Control (LoC), has all or most of these ingredients present. Security forces either face violent stone-throwing mobs or terrorists holed up in houses in the village who inflict casualties on the troops, or a combination of terrorists and active stone-pelting mobs who join the battle to protect them. In all these situations, casualties of protestors and troops take place apart from the terrorists being killed. In the future, ‘hostage situations are likely to be common. The use of ‘human shields’ is the easiest course which might be taken to minimise casualties in every situation. It may even lead to terrorists being captured alive. Even if ‘human shields’ get killed, as might be done deliberately by the terrorists to discredit the army, it will only add ‘unwilling martyrs’ to be lauded, applauded and rewarded.
The unusual emotions and deviations unleashed by this incident will impact the psyche of the soldiers in CI Operations. Less by design and more by default, use of human shields might become the norm. The benchmark of the ‘Gogoi Principle’ with the full backing of the army and the nation is set so high that no counter-argument or legal logic can defeat it. This will be the defence of all those who perpetrate violations of human rights in the future.
A clear official statement issued on 9 April 2017 unequivocally stating that these are not the tactics and rules of engagement of the Indian army and that the matter will be investigated and action taken as deemed necessary, would have settled the issue. Once the investigation of the case was over, Major Gogoi would have been let off with a rap on the knuckles if his version was correct or dealt as per law if the version of Farooq Ahmad Dar that it was a standalone rogue action, was correct.
We have deliberately put a millstone around our neck and caused irreparable damage to the system of awards, Military Justice System and our moral reputation built over sixty-one years of successful counter-insurgency operations.
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The failure of the aim of the ISI, the separatists and the terrorists has been to make their terrorism appear like a war between the people of J&K and the Indian army. Even in the worst of times, people continued to have faith and respect for the army. Our crude handling of the violent mobs in the last one year and the trumpeting of the success of the human shield’, egged on by an emotional nation, has brought us very close to this undesirable situation.
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WHY THE PETITION BY 356 SERVING
ARMY MEN SETS A BAD PRECEDENT
On 14 August, an unprecedented writ petition was filed ‘collectively’ by 356 army officers in the Supreme Court. It may be a coincidence, but the number—356—relates to Article 356 of the Constitution. Under this, the President or the Central government takes direct control of the State machinery, when a State is not able to function as per constitutional provisions.
According to the petitioners, ‘An extraordinary situation of confusion has arisen with respect to their protection from prosecution as defined under Section 6 and 7 of AFSPA (Assam & Manipur) and AFSPA (J&K): The petition focuses on the alleged dilution of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) without specific amendment to that effect.
It highlights the plight of soldiers in counter-insurgency areaswhere on the one hand, they are fighting a difficult battle with the terrorists intermingled with the population, and on the other hand, false cases are being filed against them, and they are being prosecuted and persecuted by the police and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on the directions of the State or the Supreme Court. The petitioners allege that soldiers are being prosecuted without taking the mandatory sanction of the Central government.
The petition comes in the wake of the Supreme Court ordering the
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constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) of the CBI to probe 1,582 alleged cases of extra-judicial killings between 2000 and 2012 in Manipur. The CBI investigation was ordered based on the commission of inquiry headed by Justice Santosh Hegde.
The petitioners specifically focussed on two cases out of these 1,582 cases. The first relates to an FIR filed on 27 January 2017 against Major Aditya Kumar of 10 Garhwal Rifles for an incident in a village in Shopian district, Jammu and Kashmir, in which three alleged stone-pelters were killed. The second case concerns an incident in March 2009 in Manipur, for which an FIR has been filed against Major (now Colonel) Vijay Singh Balhara of 21 Assam Rifles by the CBI for allegedly killing a twelve-year-old boy, Mohammed Azad Khan.
While the petitioners concede that the AFSPA does not provide absolute immunity from prosecution, they seek that the filing of the FIR and investigation must commence only after necessary sanction from the Central government. They want clarity with respect to Section 6 (Section 7 in J&K AFSPA) of the AFSPA. The petitioners seek a virtual review of the Supreme Court judgements of 2016 and 2017 with respect to the investigation of the fake encounters in Manipur. They claim the soldiers act only in good faith, based on the orders of the government and their superiors, and all cases instituted against them are by sympathisers of terrorists. They remain ambiguous on bad faith actions on the part of soldiers.
The specific prayers of the petitioners are:
Laying down specific guidelines to protect the bonafide action of soldiers under AFSPA, so that no soldier is harassed by initiation of criminal proceedings for actions done in good faith in exercise of their duties.
Direction to the State to protect the soldiers from persecution and prosecution by ‘motivated and indiscriminate FIR’s? Declaration that AFSPA is imperative to protect the soldiers engaged with direct and proxy enemy and insurgency and it cannot be diluted without a specific and categoric amendment in law.
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Directions that protection of persons acting in good faith under AFSPA is sacrosanct with the sovereignty and integrity of the Nation and that in accordance with the mandate of the Act, no prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by AFSPA. Directions that any investigation, assessment or adjudication qua the criminality, misuse, abuse, negligence, excessive power, judgement error, mistake, bona fide or mala fide, of actions done in good faith by Soldiers operating in AFSPA areas, in disregard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of insurgency and proxy war, without taking into consideration the Standard Operating Procedures of Indian Army and operational realities, without the aid, advise, involvement and guidance of persons who understand full dynamics of such military operations, is illegal, unconstitutional and non-est (it was not done). Directions to the respondents (the State) to carry out a comprehensive investigation into acts of individuals/organisations to target and attack soldiers in exercise of their bonafide duties of upholding the dignity of Indian Flag, by launching mischievous complaints against them. Directions to the Respondents to desist from engaging in arbitrary exercises of executive power which impairs the normal and bonafide functioning of the Army in the AFSPA.
Directions that adequate compensation is provided to the effected serving personnel and their families, who have been unnecessarily embroiled in mala fide criminal proceedings in discharge of their bonafide duties; and/or
Any other appropriate writ/order/direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
This extraordinary petition raises three issues with respect to the functioning of the military and its relationship with the State and the judiciary:
1. The legal and moral implications of the ‘collective’ petition in the Supreme Court with respect to a service matter.
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2. Abdication of responsibility by the Indian Army and the government with respect to protecting the interests of soldiers operating in counter-insurgency areas under the AFSPA.
3. The ambiguity of the AFSPA and the law laid down by the Supreme Court with respect to its interpretation to investigate the cases of alleged human rights violations by the soldiers, and the need for review.
Under Article 33 of the Constitution and Section 21 of the Army Act, 1950, enacted by Parliament, the Centre is empowered to modify certain fundamental rights with respect to their application to persons subject to this Act and make rules to that effect. Empowered by the Constitution and the Army Act, the Central government vide Rule 19, Army Rules, 1954, clearly laid down that no person subject to the Army Act without the express sanction of the Central government ‘[can] take official cognisance of, or assist or take any active part in, any society, institution or organisation, not recognised as part of the Armed Forces of the Union, or ‘be a member of, or be associated in any way with, any trade union or labour union, or any class of trade or labour unions!
This collective action by the 356 officers and soldiers in filing the petitions prima facie has violated Army Rule 19, and is liable for disciplinary action under Section 63 of the Army Act.
A quasi-association seems to have been formed wherein the 356 officers and soldiers have deliberated collectively to discuss, debate, sign and file the petition. When soldiers are aggrieved, they can seek redress from their immediate superiors, or even approach the Chief of Army Staff or the Central government through non-statutory or statutory complaints.
Was this right exercised by these officers and soldiers? Were the superiors aware of such a ‘collective action? One would have to stretch one’s imagination to absolve the superior leadership of the army of tacit if not formal approval of this action.
Even if we disregard the provisions of the Army Act and Army
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Rules-keeping in view the constitutional right of any citizen to seek redress under Article 32—the propriety of such a ‘collective action militates against the ethos and culture of the Armed Forces. Allowing such a petition to progress without even a frown, let alone disciplinary action, from the army or the Ministry of Defence will open a Pandora’s box. What if defence personnel ‘collectively’ file similar petitions to seek redressal of real or perceived grievances with respect to pay, allowances, conditions of service, or quality of combat equipment?
Since public memory is short, let me remind readers that when the Fifth Pay Commission was announced, agitating technical services personnel of the Indian Air Force and their families had collectively ‘gheraoeď their senior officers at a number of Indian Air Force stations.
It was a virtual mutiny—but since the word ‘mutiny’ is taboo in India, it was downplayed. The agitation continued for a number of days and necessary disciplinary action was subsequently taken. In the past, such petitions have been filed by individual officers, and the Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence formally disassociated themselves from such actions, and opposed such petitions in the Armed Forces Tribunal and the Supreme Court. – The composition of the 356 officers and soldiers itself tells a tale. The prime mover is an officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Branch (legal branch) posted in a Corps Headquarter, who should be well aware of the legal and moral implications of the ‘collective action. He was earlier a member of the Army Headquarters legal cell, assisting the senior government law officers in the Supreme Court.
Most of the officers and soldiers are from the Northern Command with a relatively small number from the Eastern Command, and a minuscule sprinkling from the rest of the army. Curiously, a mechanised infantry unit has 107 signatories, or thirty per cent of the total. Now, a mechanised unit has a very limited involvement in counter-insurgency operations, except individuals serving in Rashtriya Rifles or Assam Rifles (in case of officers).
The grapevine says an FIR has been filed against a senior officer
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of the unit for his tenure in Rashtriya Rifles or Assam Rifles. It spells ominous portents that over a hundred officers and soldiers of this unit were motivated to sign a petition apparently in support of an officer for an alleged offence committed in another unit. The coordination and motivation of the 356 officers and soldiers to collectively sign such a petition also smacks of a conspiracy for ‘collective action. This would qualify for collective insubordination, if not mutiny, in any armed forces.
If this is not enough, the print and television media were apparently contacted well before 14 August and the media was abuzz with rumours of the impending petition. Social media also saw rumours beginning from 8 August about the pending petition.
A prominent Right-wing Twitter handle published a YouTube video dated 13 August, titled ‘Indian Army Potential Revolt. In the video, he lauded the “revolt of the officers and soldiers, comparing them to Mangal Pandey. As per the video, he seems to have been aware of this collective action for quite some time. It seems that some officers and soldiers contacted the mainstream media and Right-wing activists on social media about their petition, which violates Rule 21, Army Rules, 1954, read in conjunction with Section 21, Army Act 1950, and invites disciplinary action under Section 63 of the Army Act.
Grievances of soldiers that cannot be resolved internally are projected by the Army Headquarters to the government, via the Ministry of Defence. Consequently, if officers and soldiers in counter-insurgency areas are facing problems, it was for the Army Headquarters to project their case to the government. It was for the government to take appropriate legal action to redress the problems arising due to the orders of the Supreme Court. A case should have been taken up for the setting up of a constitutional bench to review the application of the AFSPA. Alternatively, the parliament should have been moved to legislate a new act with rules. The inaction of the government has brought the situation to this sorry pass.
Worse than that, the acquiescence of the Army Headquarters and the
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Defence ministry towards the unprecedented ‘collective action of the officers and soldiers—and by default or design, abetment of the same and allowing them to act as an independent pressure group—will have serious repercussions for civil-military relations in the future. There should be no doubt that the Army Headquarters and the government have abdicated their responsibilities with respect to the soldiers’ problems, and allowed the soldiers backed by an emotional public to virtually challenge the Supreme Court and the law of the land.
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INDIAN SOLDIERS DON’T FIGHT IN THE
NAME OF NATIONALISM
As India is in the middle of a high-pitched, national security-driven campaign by the BJP this Lok Sabha election, the real question to ask is – is patriotism or nationalism the primary motivation for soldiers while fighting in battle?
Or, are there other factors that drive a soldier to overcome fear and face shelling and machine gun firing to accomplish his/her mission? The subject is complex, and all armies across the world in the wake of major wars have carried out detailed studies to find an answer to this question. But mostly, US military studies are available in the public domain.
What keeps a soldier going?
The Armed Forces, including in India, go through rigorous training and education to self-actualise and conform to military needs in a battle.
The military takes into account the fundamental individual needs as spelt out by American psychologist, Abraham Maslow – physiological, safety, belonging/love, self-esteem and self-actualisation – and ties them up with military needs – discipline, courage, tenacity, initiative and so on. Codified and enforceable rules, regulations and military law bridge the gap between the ideals of military character and individual shortcomings.
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The American sociologist, Samuel Stouffer, documented the behaviour of the Second World War combat infantrymen in his book, The American Soldier, and found that when soldiers were asked about their sources of support during combat, the predominant reply was, “That you couldn’t let the other men down! Stouffer’s study argued that ideology, patriotism or fighting for the cause were not the driving factors for combat motivation in Second World War soldiers. Cohesion or the emotional bond between soldiers appeared to be the primary motivating factor in combat.
Simply put, soldiers fight because of unit/sub-unit cohesion. They do not want to let down their comrades or appear cowardly. Social cohesion among soldiers strengthens the unit, which finally translates into mission cohesion in a battle.
How Indian Armed Forces interpret it?
The Indian army’s system too is tailored to promote individual, unit and mission cohesion.
It follows the regimental system in infantry, armoured corps and artillery branches, and to some extent in the corps of engineers. Where the units are not organised on the basis of regiment, the army provides regimentation through the corps ‘spirit/ethos! Even the Air Force and the Navy use the ‘service ethos’ in lieu of regimentation.
The regimental system ensures long unit tenures. The infantry and armoured regiments are like a second home to a soldier where she/he spends his/her entire service, barring one or two tenures outside the unit. Even in combat-support arms and services, the minimum tour of duty is three years.
US sociologists, Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz in their study on German soldiers, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II” found that as opposed to the common belief that Nazi nationalism was the predominant motivating factor for soldiers, unit solidarity mattered more.
In India, we have retained the Colonial legacy of fixed class composition
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at unit or sub-unit level in our fighting arms, and to some extent in artillery and corps of engineer units as well. ‘Class, in military terms, implies a single religion or caste. In fixed class composition, religion and caste pride enhance unit cohesion. This concept militates against the idea of India, but has been retained due to the obvious advantages in a battle and is based on a 200-year-old tradition. The overall secular ethos of the Armed Forces compensates the negative fallout.
Role of patriotism
In such a scenario, what role does patriotism play in motivating a soldier in battle?
In the Indian Armed Forces, patriotism is an umbrella concept for motivation. An Indian soldier takes oath on the Constitution. Patriotism is an integral part of the military training curriculum. Culturally, it is omnipresent in our insignia, salutations and ceremonial functions. Our Armed Forces are the epitome of ‘unity in diversity
‘Constitutional patriotism, as opposed to nationalism, is the latent but omnipresent motivational factor for the Indian military in a battle. We fight for our comrades, units and regiments, but the main objective is to ensure that the Tricolour flies high.
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IF INDIA CONTINUES TO POLITICISE THE MILITARY
In the wake of the Balakot air strikes, India is about to witness its first ‘national security’ political campaign, which comes at the cost of numerous economic and social problems.
The political class, however, must remember that sooner rather than later a deified and politicised military can become a law unto itself. In its extreme form, it can lead to the creation of a national security State like Pakistan, in which the military becomes the all-powerful authority that not only ensures external and internal security, but also exerts overriding influence over political and economic affairs of the State.
Media and mood of the nation A recent exchange between Union Minister Piyush Goyal and Rahul Kanwal at the India Today Conclave acutely illustrates the present state of the Indian media, military’s accountability, its deification, and its blatant political exploitation.
‘Do you believe this…. put some pressure on India to convince the world, and the public and the Opposition that indeed the mission was successful?’ Rahul Kanwal asked the obvious question on the conflicting claims about the casualties and the damage inflicted in Balakot.
The question offended the minister and he responded aggressively, Are you convinced first? Are you a part of this narrative that is trying to belittle our Armed Forces? I wonder…. where is this country going
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if you’re going to have this kind of thinking also, that you’re going to accept what Pakistan says, and…. colleagues of yours are going to propagate the Pakistan theory in India. I think it’s a matter of shame, the minister said.
Kanwal, however, argued that a question to a BJP minister doesn’t become a question to the Armed Forces.
But, the media in the last five years has become a party to the politically driven neo-nationalist sentiment, which deifies the military and blurs the distinction between the Armed Forces and the government. Most journalists have stopped questioning the government and the Armed Forces on national security and have gone along with this perceived ‘mood of the nation!
It is indeed poetic justice that media’s servility in the last few years has now come back to haunt journalism.
Armed Forces and accountability
The Armed Forces are as accountable to the people as any other institution in a democratic country. More so, when it’s an essential organisation maintained with the taxpayers’ money. The government, the media and the public must question the Armed Forces with regard to their preparedness for any mission assigned to them, and their performance while executing it.
Had pertinent questions been asked of the government and the military in the 1950s, then we would not have suffered a catastrophic defeat in 1962.
It is ludicrous for the government to advance the logic that the ‘Armed Forces have been given complete freedom’ and one cannot ‘question’ them. It is given political directions with certain limitations and the ‘freedom of action’ is restricted to the execution.
Anti-national criticism
In most societies, people love and admire the Armed Forces. An ideology-driven government often exploits this sentiment. On national
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security issues, criticism of the government becomes criticism of the military, which is deemed to be anti-national.
As per empirical wisdom, the military by nature is a status-quoist outfit requiring external stimulus for reform, which can come from the government, the media or the public. With dissenters and military reformists being labelled ‘enemies of the nation, modernisation of the Armed Forces has been stymied.
Politicisation of the Armed Forces Once no distinction is left between a political government and the military, the next logical step is exploitation of the latter for electoral gains. Military-themed political posters and politicians campaigning in military fatigues post-Balakot are examples of that trend.
Have no doubts that what we are likely to witness in the near future is politicisation of the Armed Forces. Politicisation implies that the Armed Forces identify with a political ideology or a political thought-process and start exercising influence in the affairs of the State. Military advice on national security becomes biased as does its actions with respect to internal security. This does not augur well for a multi-cultural, multilingual and multi-religious society that requires a secular and apolitical military.
A politicised military can then lead the way for the creation of a national security state. Do not let the genie out of the bottle!
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THE ARMED FORCES NEED REFORMS, NOT
YELLING PANELLISTS ON TV SHOWS
On 8 January this year, a media tsunami was triggered by a series of videos posted on social media by Constable Tej Bahadur Yadav of 29 Border Security Force (BSF) battalion, who was then deployed on the Line of Control (LOC) in Punch sector. His videos were picked up by national news channels and soon, everyone in the country was witness to the poor quality of food served at his post. His commentary also insinuated corruption in the supply of rations. Soon, more videos by others posted in different parts of the country surfaced. These ‘soldier reporters’ from the Armed Forces and the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) were highlighting a host of issues that covered the entire gamut of conditions of service.
The Armed Forces and the Central Armed Police Forces, true to tradition, responded by defending the system and with terse statements that the ‘aberrations’ would be investigated. The media took up the issue with a vengeance, implying that these aberrations were the rule rather than exceptions. The retired fraternity, which itself had a divided opinion on these issues (between the officers and the other ranks), joined the debate on TV.
These debates were acrimonious and circled around three core issues. The poor conditions of service with respect to rations, habitat and redressal of grievances. There were allegations that the relationship
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between ‘privileged officers and ‘suffering’ soldiers is skewed. Related to this was the issue of sahayaks (known as batmen), who it was alleged were being misused as personal help.
As the debates got louder, it seemed as though the Armed Forces had been pulled down from the pedestal on which they had been placed by the same media and public. So much so that on 13 January, former Chief of the Army Staff General Shankar Roychowdhury told Times Now’s Anand Narasimhan, “Thank you, Anand, for slapping the Army so hard. You have done enough damage to the institution of Armed Forces tonight
These are serious issues that require serious thought, rather than headline-making statements alone. I shall primarily focus on the Indian army, but the same would generally hold true to a great extent for the other two services and the Central Armed Police Forces.
No army can fight and win battles if the officers do not lead and the men do not willingly follow them. To this end, the officersoldier relationship of the Indian army is of the highest order. Like all hierarchical organisations, the officer has a higher status, better pay and allowance and better quarters than the soldiers. This is equally true in civil life. Egalitarianism is a goal of all societies, and over the centuries the Armed Forces have also strived to give better conditions of service to the soldiers. All soldiers understand this and I have never seen any soldier begrudge the same. The Armed Forces have a good system of administration and at the worst of times, soldiers are well looked after. However, there is always scope for reform in the pursuit of excellence.
What ails the system?
Are these videos the manifestation of disgruntled soldiers exploiting the social media or are there genuine problems being brushed under the carpet? In my view, the truth lies in between. The Armed Forces, being non-productive organisations funded by the tax payer, generally have absolute standards enforced by equally absolute rules, regulations and military law. Yet all leaders and the led are individuals with their
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own limitations of emotional quotient. Enforceable rules and regulations bridge the gap to ensure an organisational ethos/culture. Our current problems are due to the relative shortfall in leadership standards and interdependent shortfall in enforcement, which is the responsibility of the same leadership.
There is no gainsaying that as far as the physical needs for a battle are concerned, there should be no difference between the officers and soldiers. Yet, until a few years ago, there was a major difference in the protein content and variety of rations between these two categories. The meat scales of soldiers was less than half of officers. They were not entitled to eggs and a number of other items like cheese, butter and coffee, etc. Soldiers were compensated by higher carbohydrate content. For over a century, this was explained away by citing rural food habits and the nature of physical work. As late as 2007, my recommendation that rations must be the same was unanimously rejected at the Army Commanders Conference, which is the highest army forum. Credit must go to A.K. Antony for having bridged this gap up to eighty per cent. In my view, there should be no difference in rations between the officers and soldiers.
The ration supply system in the Armed Forces is centrally controlled by the Ministry of Defence and Army Headquarters for dry items and Command/Corps/Area/Divisional Headquarters for perishables. The executing agency is the Army Service Corps. There is rampant corruption in the system of supplies leading to 20–25 per cent loss of quality/quantity. For example, the minimum weight of eggs laid down is forty-eight grams per egg and a dozen eggs weighing not less than 600 grams. The ones supplied generally weigh 25–30 grams. Forty per cent of the loss of weight for a million eggs per day supplied to Northern Command means 4,00,000 less eggs per day. That is nearly two lakh rupees at current prices. I have just highlighted one aspect as the issue was personally investigated by me in 2007. Of course, there are checks and balances and units are not supposed to accept less or substandard supplies, but the enforcement is poor; the higher leadership
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is responsible for this unpardonable lapse. The entire chain of supply of rations needs to be cleansed of corruption. This is one aspect that the Defence minister and the higher leadership cannot afford to neglect.
The infrastructure of the cook houses and soldier messes also leaves much to be desired. Cook houses are primitive and in the field, nonexistent. Modern appliances are limited and hygiene conditions very poor. The food lacks variety and is not menu-based. This is primarily due to a lack of supervision and enforcement. There is a glaring difference between the messes of other ranks and officers, which needs to be bridged. As compared to a Western Army, the infrastructure, quality and quantity of food is barely sixty per cent. There is ample scope for improvement.
Have I painted a bleak picture? Let me say that despite all the shortcomings, food in the Indian army is wholesome and tasty. I have shared the same food as the soldiers for long and it was no different from what I ate at home. Yet, as I have highlighted, the scope for reform exists.
On the issue of sahayaks, it should suffice to say that in battle, operational areas and field exercises, these soldiers are a necessity for officers who need assistance in administrative and battle tasks. This enables officers to reconnoitre, plan and lead the troops. In peace stations, the misuse and abuse for household chores is rampant and the sooner the sahayak system, in its present form, is done away with, the better it would be.
The proposal of civilian stewards in my view is a retrograde step. The concept of ‘followers’ was done away with to reduce the tail and having the burden of non-combatants in the battle zone. Even in peace stations, there is no need to reintroduce it. It should not take an officer more than twenty minutes to get his uniform ready. Alternatively, the existing sahayaks should strictly work for a fixed duration per day only for the upkeep of an officer’s uniform. This is to avoid sudden change which is necessary when units are in the field for training or to mobilise for war from peace stations. Officers are quite capable of and should hire servants for household chores.
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Let me give you an example from the 1950s to mid-1960s. My father’s pay varied from 1,100 to 1,500 rupees, from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel. The following servants were employed:
Cook @ Rs 40-50
Dhobi @ Rs 40-50
Safaiwala @ Rs 20–30
Mali @ Rs 20–30
Roughly a hundred rupees in the 1950s and 150 rupees in the 1960s, i.e., ten per cent of the pay was spent on personal servants. Today, a Colonel gets paid approximately 1.6 to 1.8 lakhs per month. Ten per cent of his pay can be used to hire (at least) two full-time servants at the national minimum wages. For the juniormost officer, it would be possible to hire one full-time servant. The misuse of sahayaks in peace stations for household chores is not an exception and must stop forthwith.
The idiot box
The media rubbished the redressal system within the Armed Forces, which is incorrect and unfair. A very robust redressal system exists from a platoon right up to the centre and thereafter is the Armed Forces Tribunals for all personal and service-related grievances. By and large, the system is good and functional. The only flaw is the inordinate delay in decision-making, which needs radical reforms. A period of six months has been laid down for decision-making when representations are made to the Central government and the Chief of Army Staff. In actuality, no decision is arrived at before one and a half years and more often than not, it takes longer. The system needs to be streamlined with automation and decentralisation.
On the issue of airing grievances or exposés on social media or through anonymous complaints, as per Armed Forces’ rules and regulations and the Army Act duly approved by parliament, it is forbidden and is a punishable offence. It is mostly resorted to by
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disgruntled soldiers to get even with the organisation. All such cases must be investigated both for the complaint/grievance per se and to assess whether the existing redressal system was utilised or not. Remedial and disciplinary action against those that failed the system to redress the grievance/complaint must be initiated, if the complaint was genuine. However, if the soldier did not utilise the redressal system, he must be punished. This is no shooting of the messenger, but the very basis of military discipline.
At the best of times, the Armed Forces all over the world have had a ‘love-hate relationship with the media and India is no exception. From the days of Waterloo and Crimea, militaries have felt that the media does not adequately support the war/conflict effort, interferes with mission accomplishment, lowers the morale and needs to be ‘managed The last thing the media wants is to be controlled and managed, notwithstanding its own biases, influence of the financiers/owners and the indirect pressures of the governments. The media tends to propose that the Armed Forces are a non-productive organisation, financed by the tax payer and must be investigated and held accountable, warts et. al.
Until up to the 1990s, mainstream media (print and TV), while treating the Armed Forces with kid gloves, struck a fine balance. But as the public became news-hungry and TV channels proliferated, there started a trend of good news’ being ‘no news. The Armed Forces started getting a lot of negative coverage and responded with ‘rationing of information’ and opacity. In balance, I would say that our mainstream media remained benign to the Armed Forces, which over the years developed too many warts in their character, efficiency and functioning in peace and conflict.
With the dawn of the twenty-first century, and the proliferation of computers, laptops, tablets and smartphones, a new, real ‘badass’ medium – social media – has emerged. Because of its potentially infinite reach, it empowers the common citizen to be a role player in the information domain. It also drives the information flow, shapes opinions, politics and governance. In fact, it also drives mainstream media, which often
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picks up information posted by ‘citizen journalists’ and now ‘soldier journalists, and then turns it into an ‘exclusive’ by picking the brains of overeager, publicity-hungry panellists.
This was exactly how the story of ‘privileged rogue officers and suffering jawans’ played out. Each panel discussion became more irrational with new storylines emerging each day. These were seized by eager and aggressive anchors who went overboard and even insulted retired Generals and a retired Chief of the Army Staff.
The original story questioned whether these were genuine grievances from soldiers or false narratives, but this was lost in the cacophony. At no stage did the media give the impression that it was rationally trying to focus the attention on the reforms required in the Armed Forces.
The conduct of the media is more disturbing on one more count. For a couple of years, the media (along with nationalistic political establishment and public) has been responsible for a deification of the Armed Forces. It reached such ridiculous levels that when well-meaning people advocated for urgent reforms – including those being trumpeted now with respect to national security and the Armed Forces – they were branded anti-national.
After such deification, how does the media expect to suggest reforms in the Armed Forces? By pulling its ‘rogue leadership’ down from the pedestal and dragging it in the dirt? This is exactly what the media did to the Officer Corps of the Armed Forces which invited the lament of General Shankar Roychowdhury.
The way forward
Empirical wisdom is that the Armed Forces rarely reform themselves from within. It is normally the government, parliament, media and the public that force the reforms. This has been the experience of all modern states. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which led to radical reforms in the USA, was the result of a relentless pressure from the media, the public, and an enlightened Senate. Sadly, all these elements or their
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equivalents in India are behaving like ‘The Six Blind Men of Hindostan’ with respect to national security and the Armed Forces.
My advice to the mainstream media is to first educate itself regarding the reforms with respect to the Armed Forces and national security, and then launch a relentless attack to force the same through rational coverage/debate; and not by a quixotic, ignorant attack.
My advice to the Armed Forces is to initiate reforms from within before the ‘ignorant’ run away with them. My former comrade-in-arms Captain Raghu Raman says, ‘The Army is not the nation’s conscience keeper! I say, “We are the best, let us reform, measure upto our own high standards and actually be the conscience keepers of our wretched country!
My advice to the government is to set up an empowered commission and bring about a Goldwater-Nichols type of act. My advice to the parliament is to force the government to be serious about national security and reforms in the Armed Forces.
Last but not the least, my advice to the Generals and other veterans appearing on news channels is to avoid doing so unless the ground rules of the debates are rationally framed. In their present form, these debates serve no purpose and certainly don’t help the Armed Forces to evolve into an institution that the country needs them to be.
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POLITICISATION OF THE ARMED FORCES?
While speaking at an event organised by the United Service Institution on 6 December, the Army Chief made an unusual statement. He said, ‘The military should be somehow kept out of politics. Of late, we have been seeing that politicisation of the army has been taking place. I think we operate in a very secular environment. We have a very vibrant democracy where the military should stay away from polity
The Army Chief also lamented that the norm in the ‘good old days’ was never to discuss women and politics in the forces. However, these subjects were gradually ‘inching their way into the discourse and should be avoided. The Chief emphasised, Whenever an issue linking any military establishment or military personnel with a political entity comes in then… that is best avoided! When questioned by the press, the Army Chief declined to elaborate on the statement.
That the Chief decided to say this at the United Service Institution established in 1870 – the oldest think tank of India – in the presence of the press rather than address only the Armed Forces fraternity applying the Chatham House rules, spells ominous portents. What does politicisation of the Armed Forces imply? Broadly it implies that the personnel of the Armed Forces are identifying themselves with political ideologies or political parties. The actions, conduct and ownership of the Armed Forces are part of the political discourse and political parties invest in cultivating the personnel of the Armed Forces to exploit public sentiment.
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In such an environment, military promotions and appointments get mired in political considerations. Professional judgement gets compromised; advice and actions of the Armed Forces become politically partisan, which is a very dangerous trend in affairs of national security. In weaker democracies, a politicised army becomes a stakeholder in political power and policy and the political control over the Armed Forces comes under threat. In its most extreme form, the military usurps political power.
Indian Armed Forces have always been apolitical and secular. They remain firmly under the civilian control. The first and successive prime ministers and the Service Chiefs have reinforced this principle and the Armed Forces have adhered to the Constitution and stayed clear of the political ideology of the parties in power.
In India, the Armed Forces are held in high esteem by the public and generally accepted as the best institution by far. Instinctually, the politicians want to exploit this sentiment.
Of late, the Indian military is at the centre stage of national politics for more reasons than one. On the one hand, the military is being lauded and deified for professionally securing India against external and internal threats, and on the other, there is a simmering discontent in the military and its large community of veterans with respect to status, pay, pensions and allowances.
The irony of the situation is hard to miss. A military put on the pedestal of nationalism as never before is unhappy about its remunerations and status! Both aspects are being exploited by the political parties for political purposes.
Our political system has been unable to envisage a genuinely inclusive democratic process de-linked from caste and religion-driven identity politics. The effects of a virulent identity-based political system are to a large measure counterbalanced by the model of secular identity preserved in the Armed Forces. This model sustains the faith of the Armed Forces in the ideals of the Indian State as enshrined in the Constitution to which they swear an oath of allegiance.
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The Armed Forces have always functioned through impartial rational action determined by military necessity within the framework of the Constitution and have never been swayed by any political ideology or communal sentiments. However, relentless communalisation of politics and ideology-driven governance is causing it serious damage.
It is beginning to effect the values by means of which the citizen adheres to the State. The State itself is promoting its own brand of nationalism and the patriotism of those questioning it is not only ridiculed but rubbished as anti-national. The Armed Forces have been identified in totality with this brand of nationalism and is clearly at the risk of being affected by the growing mismatch between the ideals they adhere to and the practice they witness.
The Chiefs have an onerous task ahead. They have to reinforce the apolitical ethos of the Armed Forces and ensure that it adheres to the values enshrined in the Constitution. The time-tested rules and regulations must be strictly enforced and exemplary disciplinary action taken where necessary. The Chiefs and other senior officers must act as role models in this regard, because in a hierarchical system all take their cue from them. If they violate the service norm for salutations and greet the politicians with ‘folded hands, their subordinates will prostrate themselves in front of them by doing a sashtang pranam!
Politicisation of the Armed Forces is a self-defeating exercise in a democracy and political parties who attempt it, do so at their own peril. Once the Armed Forces are politicised, they become a law unto themselves!
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BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY
The first-ever Param Vishisht Seva Medal of the Indian army was awarded to Lt Gen B. M. Kaul in 1960, notably for the successful completion of Operation Amar – the construction of 1,450 barracks/family quarters for troops in Ambala – which was inaugurated by the Prime Minister on 20 August 1958. This project was the brainchild of the then Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon. To save on cost, the project entailed using troops as labour for the construction. Gen Thimayya, the Chief of Army Staff, was opposed to the project, but during his absence for a visit to the USA, Maj Gen B. M. Kaul, then General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 4 Infantry Division at Ambala, directly approached the Defence Minister and got the necessary approvals. The famous Red Eagle division rose to the occasion under his dynamic command and successfully completed the project in a record seven months.
During his command tenure, in 1956, he had also given a firepower and manoeuvre demonstration by an infantry battalion to the visiting Chinese delegation led by Prime Minister Chou En-Lai at the Naraingarh field firing ranges. Our army and air force had put all their might on display – troops had rehearsed the demonstration for months to achieve perfection. The Chinese were awestruck and a visiting General was compelled to ask, ‘General, would such immense resources be available to a battalion in war?’ Thus 1956-1959 was spent by 4 Infantry Division in organising great spectacles to showcase
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nationalistic spirit by constructing housing using troop labour and in impressing the Chinese by using disproportionate assets in support of a battalion attack.
In end-1959, 4 Infantry Division was despatched to NEFA. Lt Gen B. M. Kaul, having earned his PVSM, was now the Quarter Master General responsible for army housing. War clouds were looming, but the General was still obsessed with his pet projects. Rather than staying in tents and focussing on preparing defences, the ever-efficient 4 Infantry Division was tasked to construct bashas (temporary mud and tin-roofed accommodation) under Operation Amar 2. Representations were brushed aside and construction began on a war footing. Operation Amar 2 was inaugurated by none other than the prime minister on 14 April 1960.
In the early 1960s, the unit lines, messes and bungalows were also used for the ‘grow more food campaign for wheat and other crops. It was a common sight in Meerut Cantonment to see troops engaged in farming. Bullocks and ploughs had been bought from regimental funds and old Persian wells had been reactivated. A still older method of drawing water out of conventional wells using a buffalo hide as a water bag and pulled by bullocks or male buffaloes was also put to use. Once, during a locust attack, it was a sight to see troops in hundreds beating empty peepas (metal canisters) to frighten the locust away from the wheat!
In 1961, it was clear to all that war with China was imminent. However, the government at this juncture decided to throw the Portuguese out of Goa. Operation Vijay to liberate Goa was a classic tri-service operation against a very weak enemy and was all over in two days. However, great publicity was given to this ‘feat of arms’ with highpitch political rhetoric and public adulation. The only sour note was that some units indulged in looting and were forced to march on foot on the way back. The liberation of Goa was long overdue but in hindsight, the timing, by design or default, led to public attention being diverted from what was happening on the northern borders. Also, it brought a false sense of complacency about our military prowess.
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Such was the prevailing environment, ethos and culture in the Armed Forces during the Fifties and early Sixties. Grassroots training, the primary preoccupation of an army in peace time, had been neglected; generals were bending backwards for political favours; the Chief of Army had resigned due to reckless political orders for taking over the northern borders to execute the forward policy without requisite infrastructure; he was, of course, cajoled into withdrawing his resignation but was later humiliated during discussions in parliament.
Note the irony, when war came in October-November 1962, it was the 4 Infantry Division that faced the brunt in the Kameng Division. 4 Corps, responsible for the defence of NEFA, was commanded by none other than Lt Gen B. M. Kaul. During the final conference held by the Chinese Politburo on 6 October, Marshal Ye Jianying informed all present that during his 1957 visit to India, he had met General Kaul, the Indian Commander in NEFA. He said that though Kaul had served in Burma (now, Myanmar) during the Second World War, he had no actual combat experience. He added that Kaul seemed, “to be very rigid, even if an impressive looking soldier. Still, he was one of India’s most outstanding commanders. Mao cut him short and sarcastically said, ‘Fine, he’ll have another opportunity to shine!
Alas, the rest is history. The Indian army with 200 years of unblemished history was routed in just eight days of fighting, four days each in October and November 1962. Of course, we have come a long way. It took us three years of concerted training and detoxification’ to keep our heads above water in 1965 and another six years of hard work to redeem our reputation in 1971.
With the above backdrop, I appeal to our political leaders and our generals, that while participation in non-military ‘national causes’ is a noble effort, do not forget that our primary mission is to safeguard the nation.
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ARMED FORCES MUST ENSURE BODY BAGS FOR FALLEN SOLDIERS
Armed Forces must continuously strive to pursue excellence, change and reform to cope with the dynamic security challenges and new technologies. For this, first, they need a culture that promotes intellectual thought to flourish and a leadership with a strong will for reform. Second, they require a political leadership that is well-versed in the military aspects of national security, is receptive to advice, guides, finances and at times forces reform. Third, they need public respect and support. Finally, they need a media that reports and acts as a watchdog in a non-partisan manner.
On Sunday, 8 October, a tweet that I posted created quite a furore on social media.
The accompanying photograph was probably taken at the Guwahati air base and posted on WhatsApp by Army/Air Force personnel on 6 October. These photos were in the public domain and the damage had been done. My decision to post this tweet was deliberate, in order to highlight the current shortcomings that plague all the four players that have a say in military reform. More so, because we have reached a stage when reforms will take place only when we shame ourselves.
The unfortunate accident took place during a supply dropping mission in the Northeast, close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), most probably owing to the tail rotor detaching, as highlighted by the
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Air Chief himself. Ever since the Kargil war, bodies of soldiers killed in action or on duty are sent home in ceremonial caskets draped in the national flag. Formal respect is paid by the Armed Forces at a military base and then the bodies are dispatched to the hometown or village where the funeral rites are performed by the kith and kin and traditional military honours given by the Armed Forces. This procedure is on par with most modern armies.
Generally, facilities to make caskets are only available at unit headquarters or bases. Herein lies the dichotomy. No military body bags are authorised in our Armed Forces. This is standard military equipment authorised in the Armed Forces across the world, except ours.
This is a most unsatisfactory arrangement as packing material, blankets, bed sheets and even gunny sacks are used for initial transportation of the bodies, which is an insult to the fallen soldiers. Military body bags cost a pittance and can easily be stored at all posts and in units. This initial insult to fallen soldiers stands out in sharp contrast to the ceremonials at the military bases and during cremation/burial. In earlier times, the soldiers killed in action were cremated or buried in the field area itself and only the ashes were sent back home. In fact, the Armed Forces had a Grave Registration Unit that was responsible for maintaining a record. Nearly a decade ago, the Army Headquarters had taken up a case with the Ministry of Defence for authorisation of body bags. Given our warped bureaucratic procurement system, it never fructified.
These days with almost every soldier possessing a mobile phone, either photos are taken or videos made of all the activities. In this case, either by default or design by a ‘soldier journalist, the photos found their way into the public domain.
The ‘alert’ PROs of the Ministry of Defence and the public information officers of the Armed Forces failed to respond to the disturbing photos for forty-eight hours. It is only when my tweet went viral and led to a “Twitter war’ between the ‘nationalists’ and ‘antinationalists’ that the Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence
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issued a clarification on its website and the ADGPI on Twitter. Sadly, the perception battle had been lost. While they did try to highlight the problem of difficult terrain, they accepted that the transportation of bodies of fallen soldiers in the manner done was an ‘aberration’ and in the future, body bags or coffins will be used. The irony is that military body bags are not authorised in our Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence should have clarified that body bags will be purchased on fast-track and given a timeline.
The only thing worse than ignoring or disrespecting the Armed Forces by the public is their deification. And if the public identifies the Armed Forces with extreme nationalism, it only compounds the problem. Any suggestion for reform or criticism of the Armed Forces is viewed as anti-national or anti-government. All aberrations are overlooked and reforms stymied. The tenor of the public debate on Twitter was a testament to this in all its crudity.
Once my tweet was posted, the bugle was sounded by the Lord Cardigan(s) – defence journalists/analysts known for their ‘nationalist credentials – and the Charge of the Light Brigade began. Like the Light Brigade pumped up with adrenaline and high on emotion, they galloped headlong into the irrefutable evidence of photographs and facts. Ceremonial photographs at Palam were displayed, the bravery of the rescue team and the degree of difficulty of remote posts was highlighted. The messenger was not only shot but literally blown to smithereens by abuse and whataboutery. His military credentials and patriotism were questioned. But in doing so and using the clinching evidence of photographs, they ended up drawing attention to the glaring contrast between the photo op display at Palam and the initial crude reality; and above all, highlighted the sad but hard fact that when military body bags are not authorised, only crude and makeshift methods will be used for initial transportation.
The Battle royale continued until the ADGPI clarified at 19:09 hours and the Ministry of Defence at 21:08 hours that the shoddy and crude initial transportation was an ‘aberration’ and that in the future ‘carriage
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of mortal remains in body bags, wooden boxes, coffins will be ensured!
About the media watchdogs, the lesser said the better. All TV channels and newspapers had copies of the photographs on 6 October itself, but none broke the story. What they are afraid of only they know. Even after the news went viral, only one TV channel, the whipping boy of the nationalists, NDTV, covered the news in detail. But I must place on record that a fair number of journalists, despite the deafening silence of their channels, rationally participated in the Twitter debate and supported the ‘anti-nationalists. On 9 October, most newspapers covered the story in detail.
The government had little role to play in this event. But since politicians are always high on rhetoric about military matters, the least that was expected was an apology for the sordid episode and an assurance that military body bags would be procured on a fast track.
My advice to the Armed Forces is to reform from within before they get forced by debacles or are shamed to do so. To the public, I urge that you respect and support the Armed Forces, but do not deify them or identify them with extreme nationalism or the government since that will stymie reform. To the media, I would say that please pull your tails out from between the legs, at least on matters military, and act as a responsible watchdog to ensure reform. Finally, my advice to the government is that the Armed forces are not a tool for domestic politics but your instrument of last resort. They must be owned, directed, financed, looked after and forced to reform when necessary.
As a veteran, I salute our fallen comrades and apologise for the disrespect shown to them on the way to Valhalla. In the first innings, as an Army Commander, I may not have done enough, but in the second innings, as an activist for reform, I will not fail you.
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WOMEN IN COMBAT CAN FIGHT
ON EQUAL TERMS
Women in the Indian Armed Forces don’t need token representation, but equal status on equal terms. And, induction in combat roles is the last frontier women seek to conquer.
General Bipin Rawat’s remark last month that the Indian army may not be ready for women in combat roles stirred a hornet’s nest. The Army Chief said that women in combat would have to be ‘cocooned from the prying eyes of subordinate soldiers; commanding officers of fighting units might require long maternity leave which the army can ill afford; our soldiers are not ready to accept women leading them; and the society is not ready for women coming back in body bags.
Women activists, social media and print/electronic media rubbished the Army Chief’s statement as patriarchal and biased. A minority, however, supported the Army Chief, highlighting the physical rigour that combat roles need and how biologically women could be at a disadvantage.
The ‘physical argument Women were first inducted into the Armed Forces in 1992 as officers. Over the years, they have been inducted into various branches and arms of the three services. In the Indian Air Force, women have been inducted as fighter pilots and the Indian Navy has decided in principle
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to induct women as sailors as soon as training ships and battleships are ready to cater to them.
The Indian army has inducted women officers in all arms and services, except infantry and armoured corps, which predominantly engage in close combat. Artillery also remains an exception as most of its officers operate alongside the fighting arms.
There should be no doubt that in today’s India, there cannot be and should not be any discrimination on the grounds of gender. Women are equal to men in almost every aspect. However, due to biological factors, they may not be physically as strong as men.
And despite various advancements in weapon technology, close ground combat remains predominantly a physical endeavour. Some women with extraordinary physical prowess can be better than men, but all women are not. As per studies carried out by Centre for Military Readiness in the United States, female soldiers, on an average, are shorter and smaller than men, with 45–50 per cent less upper body strength and 25-30 per cent less aerobic capacity, which is essential for endurance.
Equal standards, equal role
The experience of Indian Armed Forces is limited to women officers. Barring a few exceptions, we have not inducted women as soldiers, air warriors or sailors. The reasons for this are mostly social and patriarchal. The induction of women officers has been primarily to maintain a veneer of gender equality in the forces. The approach is condescending and accommodative. The physical fitness standards are kept lower than desirable and the terms and conditions of service not adequately codified, which leads to organisational problems at a later stage.
Women officers perform well when young and single. But postmarriage and post-pregnancy, many officers, owing to various social and patriarchal pressures, tend to neglect fitness and seek transfers/postings that affect the army’s organisational strength. The Armed Forces have so far been able to cope with these problems because the number of
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women officers is relatively small. But the way ahead is to revise the physical standards and bring them at par with those for men, and review the terms and conditions for women in service.
While some can argue that women, in general, may not be able to cope with the rigour of combat due to the sheer physical strength required, why deny the opportunity to those who can? In my view, the right of a woman to serve in any role in the Armed Forces must be equal to a man’s as long as the physical and qualitative standards are not compromised.
Women should be gradually allowed in all branches, arms (including fighting arms), and services. Necessary infrastructure must be created for women soldiers. As a first step, the Armed Forces must lay down physical fitness standards that are necessary for women in service. These must be equal to the average standards set for the male soldiers. When it comes to fighting arms, the standards should be at par with the male soldiers.
The terms and conditions of service for women must be codified keeping in view the organisational interests. Military law, rules and regulations to address gender crimes and problems must be laid down. To begin with, a five per cent quota can be fixed for women, without lowering the standards for induction. Only volunteer women officers/ soldiers must be allowed to join fighting arms subject to meeting the psychological and physical fitness standards.
The only problem I foresee is a lack of will on the part of the government and the Armed Forces to take the decision.
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BALAKOT SHOWS THE WAY
The air skirmishes between India and Pakistan on 26–27 February following the Pulwama attack had a very interesting fallout, which can bring a transformation in the Armed Forces – one that has long been overdue. The post-mortem of the Balakot strike and the air battle the next day, brought the Indian public face to face with military technology and its decisive role in modern warfare.
Capabilities of rival aircraft, their beyond-visual range missiles, Electronic Warfare (EW) packages to neutralise enemy missiles and the support aircraft/systems in the form of Airborne Warning And Control (AWAC) aircraft, tethered Aerostat systems (a large balloon with radars and EW systems), EW aircraft and ground controllers were discussed both in technical terms and in layman’s language. And it was clear to even the general public that victory in a future conflict will be contingent on technology exploited by a highly trained human resource.
That the ninety-hour military conflict ended in a stalemate with both sides proving their resolve and capabilities is a cause of serious concern for India, which is a larger power with a much bigger economy and a much higher defence budget. While a national security-driven Lok Sabha election campaign may obfuscate the issue temporarily, the next government will sometime have to face up to reality. Until we create an overwhelming technological military edge over Pakistan, our strategy to force compellence on Pakistan will remain indecisive.
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Nuclear weapons and the international environment foreclose the option of a conventional decisive war in which absolute defeat is imposed on Pakistan. Apart from a quid pro quo counter Fourth Generation War in Pakistan, we have two broad hard options – operations below the threshold of war without major ground operations, or a limited war. At the recent Army Commanders Conference, the latter was discussed in the form of ‘swift and sustained retaliation of 10 days’ duration? In my view, being a responsible world power and the world’s third largest economy, it is not in India’s interests to impose a reactive or proactive limited war on Pakistan. Economically, we have everything to lose visà-vis an impoverished Pakistan. At best, limited war should remain a Plan B option with Plan A being based on sustained operations below the threshold of a limited war. The success of this strategy will remain incumbent on an overwhelming technological military edge.
Over the last two decades, Pakistan has bridged the gap as far as our relative technological edge is concerned. We still have a numerical edge, which would come into play only in a war of longer duration. Our Armed Forces require a holistic quantum jump in technology and this costs money. A two-pronged approach would be prudent. First would be to increase the defence budget (not including the pensions) to three per cent of the GDP from the existing 1.44 per cent; and second would be to optimise the size of the army.
The technological edge should be so overwhelming that Pakistan is unable to match it economically. Its principal ally, China, will support it only up to a point because apart from bad economics of free military aid, Beijing desires peace around the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Once India’s superiority is evident, simple economics will compel Pakistan to adopt the easier option: stop its interference in the internal affairs of India.
Fast forward to 2022. After a major terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, the international media reported that multiple terrorist targets had been hit by armed drones in Pakistan which claimed to have shot down one armed drone. India denied having launched the
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attack. The following night, India shot down two intruding Pakistani armed drones. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) also engaged multiple targets with standoff missiles/bombs being fired by aircraft flying in its own air space. India responded by using its long ranges air defence systems and shot down two aircraft 40-50 km inside Pakistan. Thereafter, all was quiet on the western front. Over the next one year, one more flare-up took place with similar results. Covert talks began between India and Pakistan and the security situation in Jammu and Kashmir underwent a turn for the better.
In the hypothetical scenario described above, I focussed on only two aspects of military technology – armed drones like the Predator and long-range air defence systems like the S 400. Both are well within our reach in the near future. Weapon systems using precision guided munitions backed by state of the art EW packages can be extended selectively across our land, air, and sea capability.
Of course, Pakistan can procure similar systems, but modern technology is contingent upon economy. India’s GDP is eight times that of Pakistan and its defence budget five times larger. Holistic national security reforms, ‘optimal right sizing’ of the Armed Forces, and increase of the defence budget to three per cent of the GDP will ensure that we create an overwhelming technological military edge that Pakistan cannot match.
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DEAR GENERAL RAWAT, THIS IS WHAT’S WRONG WITH YOUR MILITARY REFORMS
While Indian army Chief General Bipin Rawat has planned a virtual transformation with ambitious military reforms, they may misfire, given the fundamental flaws in his approach. Such reforms have been pushed after four decades—and deserve course correction in order to succeed.
In this piece, I discuss the flaws and how General Rawat can prevent his transformation from being a non-starter.
What is military reform?
The process of military reforms is a continuum with reviews necessitated by emerging threats, changing patterns of conflicts and new technology. When the change in these factors is very radical, it calls for transformation or Revolution in Military Affairs (RIMA)—an all-encompassing military theoretical hypothesis about the future of warfare connected with technological, structural and organisational changes to enable the Armed Forces to fight wars of the future.
General K.V. Krishna Rao and General Sundarji planned transformational reforms in the late 1970s which were largely executed in the 1980s. The political and military leadership were on the same wicket and the required budget was made available. What the Indian army is today is based on these reforms, even though due to subsequent budgetary constraints, 15–20 percent of the objectives are still to be achieved.
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The Rawat RIMA
General Rawat has taken it upon himself to ‘sell the reforms not only to the army’s rank and file, but also to the media, defence analysts and veterans.
He has tasked his top brass with discussing, analysing, formalising and, where necessary, testing the envisaged reforms.
In his own words, the aim of the reforms is ‘to be better prepared for future warfare by strengthening our capabilities, become more efficient and better manage our budgetary allocations?
Four time-bound studies are nearing finalisation to make recommendations with respect to the creation of an agile and operationally effective field force capable of fighting a hybrid war across the entire spectrum of conflict. The agenda includes the restructuring of the Army Headquarters, maintaining a youthful profile for the officer cadre, and formulation of optimum terms of engagement and colour service for Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Other Ranks (ORs).
It is premature to speculate about the final recommendations, but the hierarchy is committed to downsizing/rightsizing the army by shedding 1,00,000–1,50,000 soldiers to reduce the burden on the revenue budget.
By far, the most far-reaching reform is envisaged in restructuring of the field formations. Divisions and Brigades, part of the conventional armies for 200 years, are being merged to create mission and terrain specific all-arms Integrated Battle Groups which will operate directly under the Corps Headquarters.
Taking it from the top Logically, reforms with respect to national security are a top-down process—they begin with a strategic review’ carried out by the government. This leads to the formulation or revision of the National Security Strategy encompassing all measures, diplomatic, economic and military, that the government needs to undertake to secure the nation.
The government then budgets and creates the wherewithal to implement the National Security Strategy. For the military, it formulates
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the force development strategy. In consultation with the Armed Forces, the government decides the broad size and composition of the force, budgets for it, and leaves it to the military to develop the strategy.
Transformational reforms for our elephantine army have been a subject close to my heart, in and out of the army. I salute the Army Chief for initiating the process for RIMA. However, there is a fundamental flaw in his approach and all his efforts will come to naught if there is no course correction.
RIMA threatens to be a non-starter
If RIMA is to succeed, it must be government-owned, tri-service in nature and the Defence Minister should be its prime mover.
Without a formal National Security Strategy on which is contingent the force development strategy and firm long-term financial commitment from the government, RIMA is a non-starter. In our case, none of these aspects is formalised and, financially, RIMA is not on the government’s radar.
When you downsize/rightsize to reduce manpower, it has to be replaced with high-end technology-a costly exercise. Therefore, in the absence of the above prerequisites, General Rawat’s plan will remain a standalone exercise for internal restructuring/reorganisation without technology infusion and nothing more.
In the last six months, despite endless coverage of the RIMA in the media, not a word has been spoken on the subject by the otherwise outspoken Defence Minister or the Defence Secretary who virtually functions as de facto Chief of Defence Staff and is ‘responsible for the defence of India and the Armed Forces, as per the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules 1961.
Fixing RIMA
However, there is a silver lining. Militaries rarely initiate reforms to reduce their size, even though they continue to clamour for higher budgets to modernise. The three Chiefs must work together to make the
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RIMA a tri-service venture and prevail upon the government to own it. General Rawat’s earnest endeavour has also provided the media, public, defence analysts and the veterans an opportunity to exert pressure on the government to initiate national security reforms.
We must not let this opportunity slip by.
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CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF’S BOLD STEP, BUT…
Prime Minister Narendra Modi appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is not an incremental change superimposed on an archaic and inefficient system. The bold ‘political move must be utilised to bring radical reforms in higher defence structure and the Armed Forces. The challenge, however, will be the execution, and preventing political apprehensions, bureaucracy-military and inter-service rivalry from scuttling these reforms.
The appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff will necessitate farreaching changes in the functioning of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The command and control of the Armed Forces and their structures too have to be reformed.
Logically, the CDS should be the highest-ranked military officer and the principal military adviser to the prime minister, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the NSC, the Defence minister and the Home minister (in relation to disturbed areas and border management). He should also command and control the future tri-/bi-service theatre commands and the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) responsible for LoC and LAC management.
The wish list
The Chief of Defence Staff should be a five-star general and the seniormost Armed Forces officer. His status must be equal to that of the Cabinet Secretary.
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• He must be the principal military adviser to the Prime Minister, the CCS, the NSC, the Defence minister and the Home minister (on internal security in disturbed areas and border management).
* He must assist the NSC to formulate and review the National Security Strategy and execute it.
• He must exercise direct operational command over the Armed Forces through tri-/bi-service theatre commands as well as the CAPF managing the Line of Control (LoC) and the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
*The CDS must be responsible for capability development and modernisation of the Armed Forces. He should draw the plans for budget management and long-term force development in consultation with the Chiefs of the three services and the Defence Secretary.
*The Ministry of Defence must be integrated with the headquarters of the Armed Forces. The integrated MoD must be headed by the CDS with an Armed Forces headquarters under the vicechief of defence staff and a department of defense under the Defence Secretary. The latter must also act as the secretariat of the Defence minister. Armed Forces headquarters should be modelled on the structure of the present Integrated Defence Staff with addition of relevant directorates of the three services. The headquarters of the three services headed by their Chiefs, in truncated form, must be a part of the Armed Forces headquarters to ensure better capability development, administration and training of the three services. There should be seamless crossappointments between the military officers and civilian officials to avoid duplication, particularly with respect to financial management and procurement.
*With the appointment of the CDS, the charter of the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the functioning of the NSC will require a review. Currently the NSA, who heads the Defence Planning Committee and the Strategic Planning Group, is the de
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facto CDS. He has both advisory and executive functions. The roles of the Defence minister, the CDS, the Cabinet Secretary and the NSA need to be clearly defined.
The reform process
Execution is all about focussing on details, without compromising on the intent. The appointment of the CDS will have a far-reaching impact on the political-military-bureaucracy relationship. It would be a folly to follow the usual procedure of the Cabinet or Defence Secretary heading an ‘executive committee with token military representation, to work out the details of the higher defence structure and Armed Forces’ reforms.
Ideally, an empowered committee under the Defence minister – with the Home minister and the NSA as the political members and a balanced representation of the military, bureaucracy and domain experts – should work in a time-bound manner to finalise reforms. The CCS must give a political directive to the empowered committee. The CDS, with a provisional charter, should be a member-secretary of the empowered committee.
The approved recommendations of the committee need to be translated into a ‘National Security Bill, which can then be tabled in parliament. (The Goldwater-Nichols Act is an excellent example of how national security reforms were implemented in the US in 1986.) The reform process will be slow and arduous, and is likely to take five years to fructify.
A trigger for reforms
The prime minister has taken the first big step towards defence modernisation by announcing the appointment of a CDS. He now has to ensure that these reforms are not derailed due to several reasons mentioned earlier.
The all-powerful ‘man on the horseback’ in India is not ‘the usurper of power, but only carries the Tiranga as per the directions of the government.
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Such instances are rare when a momentous decision triggers a chain reaction of reforms. The decision to appoint the CDS is one such moment, which can trigger holistic national security reforms. The opportunity must not be lost.
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DEIFIED AND EXPLOITED, BUT NEITHER
REFORMED NOR MODERNISED
With the coming of the new government in 2014 led by a party ideologically committed to making India a great power and, by implication, reforming national security and modernising the Armed Forces, hopes were raised sky-high. Despite the musical chairs in respect of the Defence minister’s appointment, the nation anxiously waited for the National Security Strategy, force development strategy and urgent reforms with respect to the Armed Forces. But all has come to nought in fifty months.
The government, no doubt, was tactically aggressive in dealing with internal and external security threats. It deified and enmeshed the Armed Forces with neo-nationalism and exploited them politically. But, without national security reforms and modernisation of the Armed Forces, it has strategically exposed itself.
It was left to the Vice Chief of the Army Staff (VCOAS) Lt Gen Sarath Chand during his briefing to the Parliamentary Committee on Defence on 13 March 2018 to innocently say, ‘But he (the emperor) isn’t wearing anything at all!
The VCOAS stated emphatically that there was no money for modernisation of the Armed Forces and, with the current budget allocation, only status quo could be maintained. Most of the muchtouted ‘make in India’ projects would have to be foreclosed, the future
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of strategic partnership projects was uncertain and even shortages for ten days of intense fighting could not be made up. He carefully chose his words and his deposition was blunt to a fault, highlighting the state of our national security and the yawning gap between political pronouncements and the budget for execution.
In the month of July, some of the news in the public domain symbolically highlighted the current state of affairs. A high-level delegation has gone abroad to scout for a state of the art rifle after ten years of dithering, painting a gloomy picture of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), our indigenous capacity and the basic weapon systems for the soldier.
The raising of the Mountain Strike Corps in progress for five years, has gone into suspended animation due to a lack of budgetary support and the army’s focus on optimisation, reflecting poorly on our longterm force development strategy and our approach to restructuring and reorganising our ‘bloated’ army.
In 2003, as the Director General of Military Training, I was hosting a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) delegation led by the Commandant of one of their three war colleges. They made persistent queries about our inter-services integration and candidly confessed that they were in the process of taking baby steps towards the same. Knowing the sordid state of our tri-service integration, I was forced to give them wishy-washy answers. Fast forward to July 2018.
The PLA adopted comprehensive tri-services integration in the form of theatre commands controlled by a joint headquarters in Beijing in February 2016. As a follow-up to the Wuhan summit, it was decided to establish direct contact between the two militaries to manage the friction on the Line of Actual Control or LAC. The PLA proposed that their Western Theatre Command dealing with the entire LAC would be dealing with the issue. This put us in a quandary as we have three Indian army commands and three Indian Air Force commands located at different geographical locations, dealing with the subject. We cannot have the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of our entire army dealing with only the
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Chief of Staff of a PLA Theatre Command. All modern armies have gone in for tri-services integration. This was mostly enforced by an enlightened political leadership. Our squabbling services and ignorant politicians have ensured that the Defence Secretary, who, as per the warrant of precedence, is junior to the three Chiefs, but as per the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules 1961 is responsible for the Defence of India, continues to be the de facto Chief of Defence Staff.
There is little doubt that the probability of a conventional state-on-state conflict, particularly between nuclear nations, is very low. Yet any degradation of the conventional deterrent tempts the adversary to take a chance, putting the onus of a nuclear response on us. Moreover, the probability of border incidents and even a limited war are higher today. There is also a need for manning the unsettled borders. It is for the government, advised by the military, to decide the threats we face and the capabilities that the Armed Forces must have to safeguard the nation. The government must then allocate the budget for the Armed Forces to create the capability.
Logically, the new government in 2014 should have immediately carried out a strategic review to formally lay down the National Security Strategy and the long-term Force Development Strategy that must be based on the capabilities desired and not ‘numbers and size?
The government should then have allocated the budget based on a long-term perspective to create the capability desired. Overseen by the government, the Armed Forces should have reviewed their structures and organisations, and created an optimum tri-service capability-driven conventional deterrent to operate over the entire spectrum.
As highlighted above, ‘ignorance’ and ‘inaction’ have marked the approach of the present government, which has lost a historic opportunity by treating national security as part of its political gimmickry. If the political establishment and the Armed Forces continue with the business, as usual, we will be saddled with a poorly-equipped elephantine Armed Forces unfit to fight the wars of the twenty-first century.
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ASHOK CHAKRA TO HEMANT KARKARE—INDIA MUST OVERHAUL ITS GALLANTRY AWARD SYSTEM
Pragya Singh Thakur’s controversial remarks about former Joint Commissioner of Police and Maharashtra ATS chief Hemant Karkare, who was killed in a chance encounter with the terrorists during the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, had a disturbing fallout. Pragya Thakur’s supporters as well as some independent observers questioned the Ashok Chakra award given to Hemant Karkare. Sample some of the tweets:
Sushant Sareen; @sushantsareen: The only man who really, truly deserved the Ashok Chakra for 26/11 was Tukaram Omble. The honour is given for displaying extraordinary courage, not for getting killed without even firing a shot. Madhu Purnima Kishwar; @madhukishwar: And Karkare did not fire one single bullet. How the hell can he be credited with combating terrorists?
Madhu Purnima Kishwar; @madhukishwar: Bang on, right, the whole country saw on TV that Karkare was fumbling & seemed clumsy handling his bullet proof vest. It’s an open secret he was dead drunk that evening when he was called to attend the terror attack. Col. Ashok; Veteran; @ashokkmrsingh: My full respect to Hemant Karkare… But I am not convinced of he being given gallantry award Ashok Chakra? I think he was killed in a chance encounter with
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terrorists. Where was act of Gallantry? I can not forget he torturing Col Purohit?
Recently, the mother of late Major Akshay Girish, who was killed in action in the Nagrota encounter, sought a review of the award of ‘Mention-in-Despatches’ for a higher gallantry award. Fifty-seven years ago, in the 1962 India-China war, two of the three Param Vir Chakra (PVC) awardees were Prisoners Of War (POW), which raises serious questions about the award.
For long, there have been rumblings within the Armed Forces that the system under which medals, gallantry awards and special pension to battle casualties are decided is flawed. These rumblings have now found their way into the social media. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Armed Forces must seize this opportunity to bring about reforms and transparency.
The problem is not unique to the Indian Armed Forces. America too witnessed numerous exposés on false awards and claims in the last four decades before it finally brought reforms and transparency into its system.
The award procedure
In India, the procedure laid down by the MoD for deciding the gallantry awards seems to be foolproof, at least on the face of it. However, like with all systems, the problem occurs in execution with human factors in full play.
In respect of the Armed Forces, a case for the gallantry award is initiated by the unit and forwarded to the service headquarters with recommendations of all commanders in the chain of command, immediately after the act of gallantry is performed. All such proposals are then considered by the Awards Committee at service headquarters before the proposals are forwarded to the MoD with the approval of the respective Chiefs. In practice, these recommendations are made twice a year. – in March and August – for declaration of the list of awardees on Independence Day and Republic Day, respectively.
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In respect of civilians, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) receives recommendations from all state/Union Territory governments, Central ministries/departments, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), and Railway Protection Force etc. A sub-committee in the MHA goes through the recommendations and forwards them to the MoD with the approval of the Union Home Secretary.
Recommendations are then considered by the Central Honours and Awards Committee comprising Raksha Mantri, three Service Chiefs and the Defence Secretary in respect of military personnel, while Home Secretary is one of the members for the cases of civilian citizens.
Thereafter, recommendations of the committee are submitted for approval of the Prime Minister and the President, followed by their announcements on the occasion of Republic Day and Independence Day.
Shortcomings in the system
Gallantry awards have been an essential feature of combat since time immemorial. It recognises individual courage and also adds to the prestige of the unit. The criteria for various awards are too generic, which leads to varied interpretations.
There are no procedures laid down in terms of an inquiry that records the gallant act with formal evidence. The judgement is subjective and begins with the citation, which is a brief account of the act of gallantry, made by the unit. In a regimented system like ours, the units strive to get maximum gallantry awards. This leads to exaggeration and false claims. Commanders in the chain do try and strike a balance but also succumb to formation and regimental loyalties, and personal glory. More personnel under their supervision with awards increases their own chances of getting an award.
Moreover, the system does not allow them to foreclose the recommendation even if they give negative recommendations. This results in a large number of award recommendations reaching the Service headquarters. Units and formations compete with each other in writing highly exaggerated and imaginary citations of the act of
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gallantry. At Command and Service headquarters, an attempt is made to strike a balance but due to gross exaggeration and large numbers, the system ends up becoming a lottery.
Judging it wrongly In present-day combat with high technology and standoff weapon systems, the old style hand-to-hand combat is passé. Hence, acts of gallantry are difficult to define and tend to merge with mission accomplishment or getting killed in action, irrespective of the circumstances. | Since personnel also benefit professionally and monetarily, there is an individual tendency to tweak the system and make trumped-up claims.
At times to cover major failures, commanders present an imaginary account of the battle and back it up with a large number of awards. Something similar happens when the focus is on a major success with or without an intense battle. Valour as such becomes a secondary issue, I have observed.
The problem is further compounded by an emotional nation that confuses loss of life in battle with gallantry – more so in high-profile actions. With due respect for individual gallantry, the award of three Ashok Chakras and five Kirti Chakras for the terrorist attack on parliament on 13 December 2001, and six Ashok Chakras and five Kirti Chakras for 26/11 Mumbai attack raises disturbing questions about the entire award system.
At times, the Armed Forces and the government succumb to the temptation of using gallantry awards for psychological warfare. While justifiable in national interest, it adversely effects the morale within the organisation. I have personal knowledge of two such Ashok Chakra awardees.
Need of the hour The Defence ministry and the Armed Forces must lay down detailed yardsticks for each award. Mission accomplishment or ‘sacrifice’ –
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getting killed or wounded in action – must not be confused with acts of gallantry. The latter two categories can be recognised with a different category of awards. To obviate parochialism, it must not be left only to the unit to make the initial recommendation. An impartial independent inquiry, with evidence on record, should be mandatory for deciding gallantry awards. Helmet-mounted video cameras have gone a long way in refining the system in the US armed forces. False claims must be strictly dealt with under military law and the law of the land.
What I have said above is merely the tip of the iceberg. There is an urgent need for reforms to cleanse the award system of the ills inflecting it in recognising noble acts of gallantry in action. Otherwise, we will end up proving the barrack dictum: the only real heroes are the unsung ones.
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BIPIN RAWAT’S PLAN
Army Chief Bipin Rawat inaugurated the Young Leaders Training Wing (YLTW) at the Officers Training Academy (OTA) in Chennai last week. The belated attention to personnel training is a laudatory effort that addresses several issues the army is facing – the shortage of officers and stagnation. It is also an admission that despite the extra focus on nationalism, the army is not getting, retaining and upgrading the quality of officers, and that it needs to rebrand and market itself again.
Tackling twin issues
The Young Leaders Training Wing at the Officers Training Academy aims to better the prospects of jawans through a structured ‘personality enrichment programme, so that they are better equipped to clear the tough Services Selection Board (SSB) and join the military academies to become officers.
There are three schemes in vogue – regular entry through Army Cadet College/Indian Military Academy; Special Commissioned Officers; and Permanent Commission (Special List). For each of these schemes, there is a written examination. Selected candidates have to then clear the SSB tests and interviews, which the soldiers find tough to crack, resulting in intake shortfall.
Earlier, such training was carried out in an ad hoc manner within the formations and in a semi-structured manner at the Army Education
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Corps Training College, Pachmarhi, Madhya Pradesh. Not only were the results not up to the mark, the soldiers also resorted to attending private institutions run by retired officers and paid hefty fees to improve their prospects.
General Bipin Rawat emphasised the dual benefit of YLTW: ‘We will get more officers and there will be a further promotion opportunity for JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) and NCOs (Non Commissioned Officers). The Army Chief also made an interesting observation when asked about the shortage of 7,680 officers: ‘Promotion within the Army is very tough. This shortage is actually helpful because otherwise the promotion will become even tougher. The Army is managing very well!
The establishment of YLTA and the Chief’s observation with respect to the shortage of officers raises two important, interlinked issues – the empowerment of soldiers and junior leaders and the management of the officer’s corps.
Empower junior leaders, build academies
For the last three decades, the shortage of officers has been a major issue in the army, adversely affecting the operational efficiency in counterinsurgency areas. The situation was such that it was made mandatory for young officers commissioned into the services to do a three-year stint with infantry/Rashtriya Rifles units in operational/insurgency areas. The Parliamentary Committee on Defence had also raised this issue on several occasions.
The shortage of officers is a result of rapid expansion of the army, inadequate capacity of military academies, poor quality of candidates, increase in authorisation of officers in units to compensate for nonempowerment of junior leaders, and poorly managed short service commission. A related problem is poor career prospects for the officer corps due to the hierarchy in the army – the more the number of officers, the greater the frustration due to supersession. A lopsided rank-related pay structure as well as a strict premature retirement policy have only compounded the problem.
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However, with concerted efforts on increasing the capacity of the military academies, the shortage has been reduced from an alarming twenty per cent to a manageable fifteen per cent, which, as the Chief said, actually ‘helps the rest. All other things being equal, and based on the capacity of military academies, it shall take fifteen years at the rate of one per cent per year to completely wipe out the deficiency.
The army needs to have a visionary approach towards management of the officer cadre, and the linked issue of empowerment of soldiers and junior leaders.
During the Second World War, an infantry battalion fought the war in Burma, with eleven officers and twenty-four JCOs authorised in a unit. Today, we have twenty-one officers and fifty-five JCOs authorised in a unit. A similar situation persists in other arms and services. Grassroots fighting still takes place at the section and platoon level and both these are commanded by NCOs/JCOs. If officers have to step in to ‘lead them from the front’ in the battle, then it reflects poorly on the calibre of the junior leaders. We need to optimise the authorisation of officers in the units and not view them as a tool to compensate for poor junior leadership.
To empower our junior leaders, we need to raise the standard of educational qualification from matriculation to 10+2 and graduation at the time of recruitment. (Graduates are required for technical operations and high technology weapons and support systems.) Dedicated junior leaders’ academies must be set up. No one must become a section or a platoon commander and equivalent without the requisite formal training in a junior leaders’ academy.
Deal with stagnation
About fifteen years ago, it was decided that to deal with the stagnation issue, the inclusion of regular and short service commissioned officers must be in the ratio of 45:55. We have failed to make the short service commission attractive. Neither does the Indian government absorb them laterally in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) nor give them any weightage for selection in the civil services.
« 85 »However, with concerted efforts on increasing the capacity of the military academies, the shortage has been reduced from an alarming twenty per cent to a manageable fifteen per cent, which, as the Chief said, actually ‘helps the rest. All other things being equal, and based on the capacity of military academies, it shall take fifteen years at the rate of one per cent per year to completely wipe out the deficiency.
The army needs to have a visionary approach towards management of the officer cadre, and the linked issue of empowerment of soldiers and junior leaders.
During the Second World War, an infantry battalion fought the war in Burma, with eleven officers and twenty-four JCOs authorised in a unit. Today, we have twenty-one officers and fifty-five JCOs authorised in a unit. A similar situation persists in other arms and services. Grassroots fighting still takes place at the section and platoon level and both these are commanded by NCOs/JCOs. If officers have to step in to ‘lead them from the front’ in the battle, then it reflects poorly on the calibre of the junior leaders. We need to optimise the authorisation of officers in the units and not view them as a tool to compensate for poor junior leadership.
To empower our junior leaders, we need to raise the standard of educational qualification from matriculation to 10+2 and graduation at the time of recruitment. (Graduates are required for technical operations and high technology weapons and support systems.) Dedicated junior leaders’ academies must be set up. No one must become a section or a platoon commander and equivalent without the requisite formal training in a junior leaders’ academy.
Deal with stagnation
About fifteen years ago, it was decided that to deal with the stagnation issue, the inclusion of regular and short service commissioned officers must be in the ratio of 45:55. We have failed to make the short service commission attractive. Neither does the Indian government absorb them laterally in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) nor give them any weightage for selection in the civil services.
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Compounding the problem, the army itself is liberal in giving permanent commission as a ‘welfare measure, defeating the aim of reducing stagnation. The Chennai-based OTA, which trains cadets for short service commission, has a capacity of 750 cadets but is functioning at 500 due to poor intake. This reduced capacity of 500 is itself undersubscribed by sixteen per cent.
Even the Indian Military Academy (IMA) is functioning at eleven per cent below its capacity. There is a need to make it mandatory for students passing out of the State-subsidised Sainik schools and military schools to apply for the National Defence Academy (NDA).
The army should look at reducing the contractual liability to reduce stagnation. All western armies have taken this route – reduced contractual period with attractive incentives for a second career. There is a strong case for reducing the contractual period to fifteen years in our case. The rule for premature retirement also needs change.
It is not the gun but the ‘man behind the gun’ that matters. The more we invest in human resource, the better would be the dividends. The shortage of officers was a bogey call. While a reformed short service commission, reduced contractual obligation and liberalised premature retirement will help, the key to better manage the officer cadre is through empowerment of soldiers and junior leaders.
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OUTDATED COURSES TO RAMPANT RAGGING: NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY
NEEDS URGENT HELP
It is empirical wisdom that leaders are not born, they are made. For the Armed Forces, the foundation of leadership is laid at the military academies.
The Chief of Staff Committee has given a clear directive to the Commandant of the National Defence Academy (NDA) – the cradle of military leadership in India – to develop leadership qualities in the cadets and in doing so, impart foundation military education and training, and make them graduates with a BSc/BA degree.
But has the National Defence Academy delivered on this?
From ragging to suicide
Disturbing reports from the National Defence Academy have emerged over the years. In 2014, a video of a junior cadet being beaten with a hockey stick went viral. Much earlier in 1975, a senior cadet was lynched to death by his juniors. There is a dropout rate of 16–20 per cent annually, primarily due to ragging and use of ‘illegal ways to punish cadets in the barracks on the pretext of ‘toughening and leadership development. Two years ago, a cadet committed suicide allegedly after ragging. A Commandant of the NDA was removed from his post for alleged corruption.
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.The defence academy is in desperate need of reforms. The issue is relative, but in matters of leadership, ‘good is not good enough.’
Who becomes a Commandant?
The executive, administrative and instructional staff in the NDA are selected from the Armed Forces on the basis of a flawed and inflated appraisal system instead of their aptitude. The first available, and not the best, Lieutenant General or equivalent is appointed as the Commandant.
There is a tendency among the younger officer instructors, themselves ‘groomed by the flawed leadership development programme of the NDA, to replicate their own experience with respect to their cadets. This not only condones and encourages the unethical ragging and illegal punishments, but also scuttles the reforms attempted by the system.
This selection system needs a review. Only the best must be selected after an aptitude test and training, which is how it’s done to pick officers for the Services Selection Board. Instead of appointing just any Lieutenant General, who retires after his tenure, it would be prudent to appoint the best role model Major General with 6-7 years residual service and who is likely to be selected for higher ranks, as the NDA Commandant. Imagine the impact of a corrupt Commandant’s sacking on 1,800 young minds.
The quality of the academic civilian staff also leaves much to be desired. In the 1950s, the best in the country were part of the faculty. The UPSC selection system needs to focus both on character and academic qualifications. The civilian officers also must be role models for the cadets as seventy per cent of the time is devoted to academics.
Like the armies of developed nations, retired military officers who are role models could be employed to teach military subjects at the NDA.
Outdated academic curriculum
In the twenty-first century, making future leaders earn a basic BSc or a BA degree serves no useful military purpose. The focus should shift to
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teaching subjects relevant to the military, and cadets should graduate in the theory of war, military history, military psychology, aeronautical/ naval science, space science, weapon technology, nuclear physics, management, and so on. The system of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ subjects must be ensured.
A cursory look at the curriculum of the United States Military Academy at West Point, considered one of the best, should prove the point.
The mandatory Foundation Course that covers military history and geography, weapon systems and armaments, geopolitics, human rights, laws of armed conflict, and environmental sciences is too cryptic. A lot of time is wasted during courses of instruction after commissioning to learn the same in a graduated manner linked to years of service.
How can theoretical knowledge be linked to length of service? After three years at NDA and one year at one of the service academies of choice, an officer’s theoretical military education must be complete and s/he should be focussing on refining and applying the theoretical knowledge, and not on learning fundamentals.
Bullying & killing individual creativity
The practical aspects of leadership are covered through mentoring by ‘role model instructors and senior cadets, and by giving leadership positions to cadets (both for day-to-day functions and during military training camps).
The leadership development programme is inspired by the outdated traditional military culture of breaking the will through subjugation to ensure discipline, uniformity and adherence. A large part of this is done in the barracks by senior cadets who are products of the same flawed system. Bullying and illegal ways of punishments amounting to physical abuse are rampant. Junior officer instructors too become complicit in upholding the flawed ‘traditions:
‘Ends justify means, ‘survival of the fittest, beg borrow or steal, ‘never volunteer’, ‘never own up or report a wrong, and ‘never snitch, are part
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of the barrack culture. Integrity is given short shrift when senior cadets usurp the uniform/kits and bicycles (a necessity in the vast campus) of juniors starting a chain reaction of theft codified as ‘maroing, involving the entire academy as the juniors ‘maro’ the same from others.
Individual creativity and initiative are considered a taboo. An unusual form of initiative, which focuses on avoiding the draconian system, is developed. The NDA should be producing self-actualised and creative leaders driven by military ideals, but ends up producing ‘adherent under supervision’ leaders whose ‘NDA traits’ remain latent and come to the fore when they get higher independent commands.
This seriously impinges on the organisational mission. In 1999, at an informal social gathering in Jodhpur, Major Jaswant Singh, a Cabinet minister in the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led BJP government and an NDA alumnus (1954–56), had told me that the academy ‘destroyed my soul and free spirit, and that he somehow ‘retained sanity through reading and music.’
Decaying infrastructure
When the defence academy was established in 1954, it possibly had the best infrastructure and habitat in the world. Over the years, it has decayed and only maintains a façade, particularly with respect to the cadets’ living accommodation. The ‘NDA Cabin, an eight-by-ten foot small room, was a unique example of economy of space complete with a sturdy teak wood bed, chest of drawers-cum-cupboard, a study table with a study chair and an old style easy chair.
Today, the cabin does not match even a good boarding school room. Teakwood furniture has been replaced by cheap steel furniture, apparently due to presence of bed bugs. This ridiculous excuse itself explains what is wrong with the NDA. World-class toilets and community bathing rooms have been replaced by substandard amenities.
The way forward
To say that our cradle of military leadership is not up to the mark
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is stating the obvious. The three Chiefs must look beyond the glitter of the passing-out parades that they review. An empowered panel of committed serving and retired officers must be set up to push holistic reforms in our military academies and subsequently act as a supervisory board. The matter is too important to be wished away.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING INITIATIVE
In end December 1964, at the age of sixteen years, I was leaving home to join the National Defence Academy (NDA), when my father Colonel Shamsher Singh handed me a moth-eaten, four-page booklet, in archaic print, titled A Message to Garcia. He said, ‘I was given this booklet by my Platoon Commander in the Indian Military Academy in 1940. It contains the essence of leadership. Study it, follow it and enforce it when you are in a position to do so!
While having my breakfast in the dining car of the Frontier Mail (complete with starched, white linen and good china), I read A Message to Garcia for the first time. It took me no more than five minutes. I read it twice more to digest it. By the time I reached Khadakwasla, I had memorised it. To date, I consider it the most important lesson of leadership I have ever learnt: in the field of human endeavour, the key to success is initiative and its bane is inaction.
A Message to Garcia was written by Elbert Hubbard in the March 1899 issue of the magazine, Philistine. It is the most read essay in the world. Hubbard was a writer, publisher, artist, philosopher and a selfconfessed philistine. He wrote this essay in one hour after a dinner time discussion with his family about the Spanish-American War over Cuba in 1898. Hubbard was to recall later:
The thing leaped from my heart, written after a trying day. The immediate suggestion came from a little argument over tea cups, when my boy Bert
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[17-year-old Elbert Hubbard Junior) suggested that Rowan was the real hero of the Cuban War. Rowan had gone alone and done the thing: carried the message to Garcia. It came to me like a flash! Yes, the boy is right! The hero is the man who does his work – who carries the Message To Garcia. I got up from the table and wrote A Message to Garcia.
Inspired by the message of the essay, George Daniels of the New York Central Railroad, sought permission to reprint and distribute 5,00,000 copies. Prince Hilakoff, Director of Russian Railways, read one of Daniels’ reprints and had it translated into Russian, and distributed it to every one of his employees. During the war between Russia and Japan in 1904, every Russian soldier who went to the front was given a booklet containing A Message to Garcia. The Japanese found the booklet in possession of every Russian prisoner and had it translated into Japanese. Thereafter, on an order from Mikado (the Japanese emperor), a copy was given to every Japanese soldier and member of the government. Ultimately, forty million (some say a hundred million) copies in thirtyseven languages of A Message to Garcia were published. At one time, more copies of this essay were in print than any other publication except the Bible. It was made into two films, the first was a silent one, produced by Thomas A. Edison and the second a talkie made in 1936.
Hubbard wrote this as an inspirational essay on leadership and work culture. It’s based on a fictionalised version of the exploits of Lt Andrew Summers Rowan who, in April 1898, was tasked by President McKinley through Colonel Arthur Wagner, head of Bureau of Military Intelligence, to deliver a message to General Calixto Garcia, head of the Cuban rebels fighting against the Spanish rule. The President was anticipating a war with Spain over Cuba and wanted to open communications with the Cuban rebels.
Here is an excerpt:
In all this Cuban business there is one man who stands out on the horizon of my memory like Mars at perihelion. When war broke out between Spain and the United States, it was very necessary to communicate
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quickly with the leader of the Insurgents. Garcia was somewhere in the mountain vastness of Cuba – no one knew where. No mail nor telegraph message could reach him. The President must secure his cooperation, and quickly.
What to do!
Someone said to the President, ‘There’s a fellow by the name of Rowan who will find Garcia for you, if anybody can!
Rowan was sent for and given a letter to be delivered to Garcia. How ‘the fellow by the name of Rowan’ took the letter, sealed it up in an oilskin pouch, strapped it over his heart, in four days landed by night of the coast of Cuba from an open boat, disappeared into the jungle, and in three weeks came out on the other side of the Island, having traversed a hostile country on foot, and delivered his letter to Garcia, are things I have no special desire now to tell in detail.
The point I wish to make is this: McKinley gave Rowan a letter to be delivered to Garcia; Rowan took the letter and did not ask, “Where is he at?’ By the Eternal! there is a man whose form should be cast in deathless bronze and the statue placed in every college of the land. It is not book-learning young men need, nor instruction about this and that, but a stiffening of the vertebrae which will cause them to be loyal to a trust, to act promptly, concentrate their energies: do the thing – Carry a message to Garcia!’
General Garcia is dead now, but there are other Garcias….
My heart goes out to the man who does his work when the boss’ is away, as well as when he is at home. And the man who, when given a letter for Garcia, quietly takes the missive, without asking any idiotic questions, and with no lurking intention of chucking it into the nearest sewer, or of doing aught else but deliver it, never gets ‘laid off, nor has to go on a strike for higher wages. Civilization is one long anxious search for just such individuals. Anything such a man asks shall be granted; his kind is so rare that no employer can afford to let him go. He is wanted in every city, town and village – in every office, shop, store and factory. The world cries out for such: he is needed, & needed badly – the man who can carry a message to Garcia.
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I learnt the theory of command and leadership at the National Defence Academy, Indian Military Academy (IMA) and subsequently in Service through formal instruction at courses, guidance by superiors and practical experience of command. The scope of the subject is vast as no matter what you equip the men with, they have to be inspired, ordered and led into battle. Thus, every commander is seized of the need to improve the development of the human resource. I was no different and spent long hours to master the intellectual aspects and putting them into practice.
In the initial stages of Service, to bring about uniformity, discipline and instant obedience to orders, initiative, independent thought and out-of-the-box thinking are discouraged by design or default. All soldiers start waiting for orders for action to be initiated. As Major Jaswant Singh, former Defence Minister, lamented in his memoirs, “The rigidity of the National Defence Academy, killed my free spirit! Sooner rather than later, all leaders realise that initiative is one of the core traits required for success in a battle.
The method of decision-making, mission selection, issue of orders and manner of execution reflects the command ethos of an army. Over the centuries, two distinct styles have emerged – Directive Style of Command and the Restrictive or Detailed Order Style of Command. Directive Style of Command is inspired by the German concept of Auftragstaktik or Mission Type Orders, also known as Mission Command in NATO forces. This style of command was evolved over 300 years of war fighting by the German Army. Directive Style of Command lays down the higher commander’s overall intent, specific mission/tasks (a slice of the intent) of the subordinate commanders, earmarks the resources, specifies the enemy and operational situation, and leaves the execution largely to the subordinates with maximum freedom of action. The lower chain of command always knows what is to be done in the absence of orders, as the intent of the higher commander is known to all. The Detailed Order Style of Command, as opposed to the ‘intent, gives a detailed mission to the higher commander, specifies subordinate missions/tasks in detail,
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and also lays down the detailed method of execution, giving little or no freedom of action to the subordinates. The former are brief and to the point, and the latter are in as much detail as humanly possible.
The Detailed Order Style of Command is a legacy of the British Colonial system wherein the soldiers of the colonised armies were considered illiterate and incapable, and whose actions had to be controlled with detailed orders. This system suited the British and prevented the subordinates from thinking and exercising initiative. An army without initiative was most suitable to fight primitive wars without posing a threat to the Colonial masters.
Directive Style of Command is an intrinsic essential of the Manoeuvre Warfare culture while the Detailed Order Style of Command generally prevails in the Attrition Warfare culture. The former thrives on mutual trust, carefully cultivated over the years, and acceptance of genuine mistakes. The latter prevails in an environment where mistakes are unacceptable and there is a lack of faith and trust between the leaders and the led. Directive Style of Command facilitates decentralisation and permits maximum initiative. The lower rung always knows what is to be done in the absence of orders. In the Detailed Orders Style of Command initiative can only be exercised in violation rather than in adherence to orders. Lower rung commanders thrive on inaction and keep waiting.
The basic ingredients of Directive Command are:
Common military thought running across the entire chain of command and high standards of intellectual education and training.
Mutual faith and trust between the Commander/ leaders and the led at all levels. The former has trust that his intent will be carried out and the latter believes that he has the freedom to execute his mission and any mistakes in execution will be acceptable. Trust in operations translates into truthful reporting from lower to higher levels. In addition, trust also implies that good faith actions will be supported whereas bad faith actions will not be condoned.
Exercise of maximum initiative by all ranks and especially Junior
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Leaders to generate appropriate action under the umbrella of the next Higher Commander’s overall intent and more focussed action based on the specific mission assigned. In the absence of an assigned mission the subordinate sets the mission for himself drawing inspiration from ‘intent of the Higher Commander and generates appropriate action. Seizing fleeting opportunities in battle is entirely dependent upon initiative.
Setting of terminal and enabling objectives by commanders and subordinates for all operational, training adm and personal tasks/ activities. These are classified as short term, mid-term and long term or daily/weekly, monthly and trimonthly. *
Cultivation and maintenance of Regimental Spirit and upholding of basic military values.
All modern armies of the world strive to adopt the Directive Style of Command and our army has also been in the process of adopting and institutionalising the same for the last two decades. Ethos and culture take a long time to reform and it is a continuous process. In counter insurgency/terrorist operations, the Directive Style of Command has been successfully applied to a large extent and most of the operations are conducted by small teams operating independently within the ambit of the overall intent of the Higher Commander.
As highlighted earlier, seizure of initiative to generate action is the most important ingredient of the Directive Style of Command. Initiative, in war or any other field of human activity, is essentially a psychological advantage. Couched in terms like ‘momentum’ or ‘ascendance, it really always comes down to who is doing what to whom, and a sudden change in that equation will have a stronger effect than that of a gradual building to the same set of circumstances. The expected, when replaced by the unexpected, has a lingering effect. As for the doers, they can get on to other tasks towards achievement of their aim
Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart used to say that the only thing harder
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than getting a new idea into the military mind was to get the old one out. As we were struggling to switch over to Directive Style of Command, I realised that A Message to Garcia was its ultimate manifestation. Exactly ninety-seven years after it was written, in early 1996, I personally translated it into Hindi/Roman Hindi and enforced that every soldier under my command always carries a copy of the abridged version of A Message to Garcia in his pocket. The simplicity of the essay appealed to the soldiers. Carrying it in their pockets ensured a psychological commitment for initiative towards positive action, particularly in the absence of orders.
In the last twelve years of my service as a Brigade/Division/Corps/ Army Commander (of two Commands), I have commanded nearly 6,75,000 troops. A Message to Garcia became a buzzword in my formations. The nickname ‘Rohan’ (the troops’ version of ‘Rowan’) became very popular in sub-units. The ‘Rohan of the week’ became a trend and part of the units’ culture. I awarded 3,000 Army Commander’s Commendation Cards to the outstanding Rowans.
‘Inaction is the most serious crime against the spirit of an army, said the renowned military thinker, Major General J.F.C. Fuller. The motheaten A Message to Garcia, which was given to me in 1964, went a long way in ensuring that no such crime was ever committed by my troops.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP
In one of my columns, I had said that while the fundamentals of leadership have remained constant, these have to be applied keeping in view the leadership challenges of the twenty-first century. Our crisis in leadership stems from the fact that on the one hand, we have compromised with these fundamentals due to leadership development programmes not having kept pace with the times and on the other hand, we have failed to bridge the gap between the omnipresent individual and organisational failings and idealistic requirements of military leadership by strict application of rules, regulations and military law.
The Indian officer corps has acquitted itself creditably both in peace and war. Our officers and men are held in high esteem by the society. The officers have led from the front and performed exceptionally in war, and are the envy of all armies. The high causality ratio of officers to soldiers signifies their courage and bravery, though ironically it also reflects poorly on the leadership in not empowering their subordinates. So, what I am going to say is relative. Over a period of time, a lot of shortcomings have set in that impinge upon the performance of our leadership. As Major General Wingate would often say in respect of military leadership – ‘Good, but not good enough!
The directive of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Commandant of the National Defence Academy (NDA) is simple – you shall develop leadership qualities in the cadets. What then is the problem?
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The leadership development programme at the NDA is inspired by the principles evolved by the British Army a century ago. If not in concept, then in application it is based on breaking the will through subjugation to ensure discipline, uniformity and adherence. Apart from the rigid unimaginative leadership development programme, a large part of the ‘leadership development is done in the barracks by senior cadets where bullying and illegal punishments amounting to physical abuse are rampant. A practice done away by all modern armies.
Individual creativity and initiative are killed. A curious form of initiative focussed on avoiding the draconian system is developed. A trait that impinges on the organisational mission in later years. The academic programme at the NDA lacks imagination and is based on a standard BA/BSc degree rather than on militarily relevant academic subjects like man-management, military history, military psychology, aeronautical/naval science, space science, weapon technology, nuclear physics and so on.
Instead of producing self-actualised and creative leaders driven by military ideals, we end up with ‘adherent under supervision’ leaders whose inherent and acquired shortcomings due to the flawed environment remain latent and come to the fore when they get higher independent commands. The situation in other service academies is no different.
The in-service leadership development is done through self-actualisation and organisational support in terms of self-study, mentors, appraisal system, counselling by superiors, unit/army ethos and application of rules, regulations and law. There are no further formal leadership development programmes and only a limited time is devoted during courses. Critique of military academies notwithstanding, the young officer still comes out with a reasonable degree of idealism. This gets shattered when he faces the reality of unit life. He is faced with below par duplicitous mentors/superiors, a flawed appraisal system and an environment where mediocracy rules the roost. He ends up either flowing with the tide or becoming a cynic. Of late there has been a tendency to give short shrift to the application of rules, regulations and military law. The reason for this is
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compromised leadership, particularly in higher ranks, which lacks moral courage. This has had the most serious impact on leadership standards as this was the final check that works when everything else fails.
Of course, the issue is relative. Military leadership probably still stands out as compared to other institutions. But I repeat that our leadership is ‘Good, but not good enough’ as the military profession deals with life and death. An honest assessment of leadership standards vis the military ideals shows that fifty per cent of the officers measure up only to the average standard; thirty per cent are high average; ten per cent are above average and outstanding and the remaining ten per cent are below average. Yet so flawed is the appraisal system that 80-90 per cent of the officers are assessed as above average and outstanding, making no difference between the good, the bad and the ugly. This not only stymies reform but also leads to a flawed selection system and further dilution of leadership standards in higher commanders.
Due to compromises with leadership traits and principles, most leaders do not qualify as role models for their subordinates. This has a cascading effect on the junior leadership. Integrity, morals and ethics, particularly among senior officers have become suspect. Abuse of privileges is rampant and cases of moral turpitude are on the increase. That two Army Chiefs and one Naval Chief by inquiry and admission were part of the Adarsh scam and by implication involved in perpetration and cover-up, tells the whole story.
Intellectual military education deals with the “why’ of matters military and involves a wider study of the theory of war and military history. Training deals with the ‘how’ of matters military. Our army neglects military education, leaving it to the individual and primarily focusses on training. Without the former, the latter hangs in mid-air. We were shocked when one Chief removed the military history paper from the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) entrance exam. With great difficulty, it was reintroduced a decade later. The performance of the officers in DSSC entrance examination has been pathetic. Out of 1,000 officers who appear, the number passing remains in double digits against
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250 vacancies. For the balance vacancies, the best are selected from the worse. The performance in promotion examinations is no better. The assessment has been diluted to avoid embarrassment and loss of seniority. In a nutshell, the intellectual military education of the officers is high on emotions and low in substance. The Armed Forces have been brushing this issue under the carpet.
What is most disturbing is that the first requirement of military character-bearing and fitness – have been given short shrift. Fifty per cent officers and Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) cannot pass their physical fitness tests. A large number of officers, Colonels and above are a public embarrassment because of poor bearing due to oversight.
Moral courage to stand up for what is right has been diluted to the extent that we have become an army of ‘yes-men. The current sorry state of civil-military relationship where rather than apprise the political leadership of the real state of the Armed Forces to force reforms, the hierarchy has simply joined them to fool the nation.
Will and initiative are the hallmark of creative leadership. What is left of these fundamentals after the military academies is killed by the autocratic rigid and ‘no mistake’ approach of the commanders. A noncreative leadership can only produce average results.
Non-empowerment of junior leadership is probably the biggest shortcoming of the army. Consequently, there is a call for more and more officers. Whereas the JCOs and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) should be the mainstay in the grassroots battle, in our army the officers have to fill the void.
There is an urgent need for the Armed Forces to revamp their leadership development programmes both in the military academies and in Service. Rules, regulations and law must be strictly applied to prevent dilution of the fundamentals and bridge the gap between military ideals and individual failings. The appraisal and selection system must be overhauled to select the best for higher command as the rot begins with the head.
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COMMAND RESPECT, LEAD BY EXAMPLE!
If I were to give one principle of leadership that never fails, it would be that the leader must be a role model and lead by example. Leading by example is tough. To inspire and lead the poor masses of India to achieve freedom, Gandhiji gave up everything to live like them and controlled all his worldly desires. That is why the masses identified with him and followed him. He did nothing that he did not expect his followers to do. Similarly, a military leader has to place more demands on himself in both personal and professional life to live up to this principle.
The ultimate test of a leader is in battle when the chips are down and fear is omnipresent. He has to inspire his command by saying, ‘follow me’ and be the first to move forward under fire to accomplish the mission. But in the approach to battle, over a prolonged period, he has to train and administer his command to make it combat worthy and maintain a high state of operational readiness. This is a very hard and never-ending process. In a rules and regulations bound organisation dealing with life and death, subordinates are always watching their leader. They note his professional capabilities, leadership traits and the principles he follows and above all, they note his adherence to absolute military rules and regulations that he enforces on them.
When leaders say one thing but do another, they erode trust – a critical element in military leadership. When subordinates become cynical and distrustful, they never give their best and this leads to a
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leadership deficit. The officer corps in general and senior officers in particular are not walking the talk! This is a major challenge for leadership in our Armed Forces and the main cause of falling standards. More so, the dichotomous conduct of leaders morally bars them from enforcing rules and regulations that bridge the gap between the ideals of military leadership and omnipresent human failings. When the conduct and actions of the leaders are in alignment with what they say and what they ask their subordinates to do, they inspire their commands to willingly follow them. This is more so with respect to difficult, unpleasant and physically demanding tasks. Soldiers say, ‘If he can do it, we can do it!
Rommel used to tell his commanders, ‘Achtung! You are under the scrutiny of your command! If you fall in their eyes, you can never lead them in battle? Field Marshal Slim said, ‘An officer must be able to do everything better than his men and if he cannot do so, then he must go behind a wall and learn until he can. Thus a leader not only has to master the profession to command at various levels, but he also has to be a role model for his subordinates in all spheres of military activity, particularly with respect to his moral conduct and adherence to rules, regulations, and the ethos of the army. The leader can never let his guard down. Any deviation is not only frowned upon by the men but it is also taken as licence for themselves to take the easy course out.
Beginning with the command of a battalion until I retired, I started wearing a badge with a motto on my uniform pocket that read – ‘Don’t do anything that I don’t do, do like me, do better than me and do it now! The intent was to place a moral bind on myself and to inspire my command. It worked wonders.
In the 1965 war, 2 Sikh was given the task to capture the formidable Raja Post of Pakistan. At 05.35 hours on 6 September, the attack had stalled, the sky was brightening and combat inertia was setting in. Looking at the scenario around him, the Commanding Officer, Lt Col N.N. Khanna concluded that he must either rally the battalion and charge uphill, or pull back to reorganise and attack again or call off the attack. He stood up on a rock, took off his green and white jersey
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(issued to instructors at High Altitude Warfare School) and started waving it to attract the attention of his troops. Shouting the unit war cry, Jo bole so nihal, Sat Sri Akaľ – he started climbing towards the Raja Post. First, a few men around him got up and started moving with him to renew the attack. Then the ones adjacent to them got up and followed suit, and soon a chain reaction set in. In a short while, 300 soldiers in small teams were assaulting the Raja Post using fire and movement tactics. For the next two-and-a-half hours, one of the fiercest battles of the war ensued. Lt Col Khanna led from the front despite being wounded by a grenade splinter.
His action galvanised the junior leaders – young officers, JCOs and NCOs commanding platoons and sections – who took charge and pushed ahead, against all odds. At this juncture, at 05.50 hours, a burst of machine gun hit Lt Col Khanna and he was seriously wounded. He died while being evacuated to the regimental aid post. The troops, seeing their Commanding Officer fall, pressed home the attack with renewed determination. No quarter was asked, none was given. Soldiers fought like men possessed, the wounded continued to fight and those who died, ‘died hard? Raja Post was captured at 07.00 hours on 6 September. What converted an impending failure into success was the personal example set by the leader – Lt Col N. N. Khanna, MVC.
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WHEN I CAPTURED THE MAN WHO WOULD
BE PAKISTAN’S AIR CHIEF
August 1971 onward we were living in interesting times. Talk of war was in the air and for young officers like me, in their early Twenties, those were heady days. I was the Adjutant of 4 Sikh, which as 36 Sikh in 1897 had fought the epic battle of Saragarhi on the Samana Ridge, where twenty-one soldiers had fought to the last man while defending a post.
On 11 November 1971, my battalion commenced operations in East Pakistan. We advanced north from the Boyra salient, which is thirty km west of Jessore and secured an area around Makapur village, six km inside East Pakistan.
We had some patrol clashes, but no worthwhile engagement took place. The main defences of Pak 107 Infantry Brigade were in a compact arc around Jessore, thirty km to the east. Since Pakistani troops were not offering battle, it was decided to advance further. On 19 November, a squadron of brand new T 55 tanks of 63 Cavalry (CAV) joined us. On 20 November, 4 Sikh advanced towards Chaugacha, along with the squadron of tanks of 63 CAV. One infantry company was mounted on the tanks and three other companies moved behind them on the trot. We were engaged by forward elements of Pak 107 Infantry Brigade. These were quickly scattered by tank and artillery fire. Our jawans were full of josh (enthusiasm) and were cheered by the locals with Joy Bangla!
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Cries of ‘Jo bole so nihal, the battle cry of 4 Sikh, also rent the air. Dust plumes were going high up in the air due to artillery fire and tank movement. The scene was reminiscent of Second World War movies like Battle of the Bulge.
By evening, we had advanced twenty kilometres in the north-east direction. We hit the Kabadak River at Chaugacha. Our D Company with tanks tried to rush to the bridge, but it was blown up by the enemy. One of our tanks got bogged down in the loose earth at the western end of the bridge. Heavy fire was coming from entrenched enemy positions located on high ground, east of the river. We firmed in on the western bank and began planning for the attack across the river.
The same night, 14 Punjab, along with a squadron of PT 76 tanks of 45 Cavalry, had crossed the Kabadak River to the East of Boyra Salient and taken up defences around Garibpur village. This position was ten kilometres south-west of Chaugacha. At night, artillery and mortar duels continued.
At first light on 21 November 1971, Pak 107 Infantry Brigade attacked 14 Punjab with one infantry battalion and a squadron of Chaffee tanks. A fierce battle had ensued, but the Pakistani attack failed. Eight Chaffee tanks lay smouldering at loss of our three. Three tanks were abandoned by the Pakistanis. Major ‘Chiefy’ Narang, our Squadron Commander of 45 Cavalry, was killed in action. Captain Teji Sidhu his second in command, had a tank shell pass through his legs as he was directing tank fire, standing in his cupola. He was badly injured, but lived. These officers along with those of 14 Punjab led from the front.
As soon as the winter fog lifted, the Pakistani Air Force came down hard on us. During the day of 21 November, around sixteen sorties were flown primarily against the positions of 4 Sikh. The visible target for the Pakistani Sabres was our stranded tank on the demolished bridge. We repeatedly requested for fighter aircraft cover, but no clearance was given as war had not yet been declared.
On 22 November, strafing by enemy Sabres continued. Four sorties
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each were utilised at 08:11 hours and 10:28 hours. Since the Indian Air Force was not allowed to operate, we engaged the aircraft with light machine gun and machine gun fire. At midday, I had gone four kilometres to the rear to check on our logistics base. I was coming back in a jeep at about 15:00 hours when I saw three Sabres coming in for the last sortie before sunset. The Sabres homed in on our positions and were carrying out high dive attacks, climbing up to 1,800 feet and coming down to 500 feet for weapon release, like the Stukas one saw in the Second World War movies.
Suddenly I saw a mission of four fighter aircraft come from the east and fly over me at tree-top level. My jeep swayed. At first, I thought that the PAF had thrown its entire 14 Squadron into battle to deter our impending attack on Chaugacha. I could also hear the clatter of our medium machine gun and light machine gun fire engaging the aircraft. Then, the four fighters peeled out of formation and headed for the Sabres, which were oblivious to their presence and were continuing with the dive attacks. I realised that our Gnats had joined the battle. I stopped the jeep and stood watching wonderstruck.
Three Gnats chose one aircraft each and closed in. The Gnats fired long bursts of 20mm cannon and I saw flames erupting from the three Sabres and they plunged towards the ground. Having done their job, the Gnats gave a wing salute to us and headed back to Kalaikunda
Now to the most interesting part of the story: two of the flaming Sabres plunged towards the ground and two parachutes opened up. The third Sabre limped back towards Jessore and made it to Dhaka. One of the parachutes with the pilot drifted towards our defences. Our boys rushed out of the trenches towards the descending parachute. Sensing that in the heat of the moment, our jawans might harm the pilot, I also ran towards him as fast as I could. When I was fifty yards away, two of our jawans had knocked the pilot down and were hitting him with rifle butts. I shouted at them to stop. In the meantime, more jawans joined the fray. I had to physically move them away and shielded the pilot by standing in front of him. I calmed down the jawans and told the pilot
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that he was safe. A tall and fit man, shaken up, he was nevertheless putting up a brave face.
We walked to the Battalion Headquarters and the doctor dressed the cut that the pilot had sustained on his forehead. I ordered a cup of tea for him and commenced his interrogation. His name was Flight Lieutenant Parvaiz Qureshi Mehdi aka Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi or P.Q. Mehdi. He was the Squadron Commander of 14 Squadron PAF based at Dhaka, and a Sword of Honour from the PAF Academy. His wife’s photo was in his pocket. I made a list of all of his items, which included his watch, 9 mm pistol, 20–30 rounds of ammunition and his survival kit. By this time, he was relaxed as he’d realised that he was safe. I told him that he was now a Prisoner Of War (POW) and would be treated as per Geneva Conventions. Surprisingly, he had not seen the Gnats and neither had our troops or other officers, as they had all ducked into trenches.
When my Commanding Officer asked him about the event, Flt Lt P.Q. Mehdi said that some fire had hit him from below – actually, he was climbing up for the dive when the Gnat had got him. Our officers and jawans however claimed that our machine gun fire had brought the Sabre down. I was told to prepare an immediate citation for an award for the machine gunner. I whispered in my Commanding Officer’s ear that it was our Gnats and that I had seen the dog fight or the ‘Gnat Pounce?
He was taken aback, but insisted on the citation. I packed away Flt Lt P.Q. Mehdi to our Brigade Headquarters. He did not say anything before going, but looked at me as if to say, ‘Thank you. His conduct, despite the shock of being shot down and taken POW, was stoic and dignified.
Eventually, our Gnat pilots and the flight controller were deservedly decorated. Our machine gunner was also decorated with a Sena Medal for his offensive spirit if not for the Sabre! Flt Lt Parvaiz Qureshi Mehdi was a POW for one and a half years and had an illustrious subsequent career to become an Air Chief Marshal and Chief of Pakistani Air
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Force (1997–2000). His cockpit seat, parachute and some parts of his Sabre are still held by 4 Sikh as war souvenirs. He was the first POW of the 1971 war and I, Captain H.S. Panag of 4 Sikh, had been the one to capture him.
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DIGGING DEEP TO ANSWER THE CALL OF NATURE
In the 1950s, Reader’s Digest had a column called “Humour in Uniform”. Being an army brat (born, raised and transferred), it was interesting to see in print something that was part of our everyday life. Military life is too regimented and stereotyped. For civilians, the military way of life itself is amusing and over the centuries, thousands of military anecdotes have kept people regaled. Let me add to the library by narrating two anecdotes from my life with the Gurkhas.
By a quirk of fate and also due to my rather non-conformist ways, at six years of service, I was transferred to the 5th Battalion, the Fifth Gurkha Rifles (5/5 GR). My first battalion was 4 Sikh, the Saragarhi Battalion, and 5/5 GR was no less. In the 1944 battle of Mogaung, in Burma (now, Myanmar), as part of the Chindits, the unit had won two Victoria Crosses in a day. As a professional, it did not take me long to earn the respect of my troops, but it took much longer to adapt to the Gurkha way of life. Everything was in sharp contrast to what I was used to. The first lesson was learnt within two days of my joining the unit.
I reported to the unit at Jindrah, which is in the Shivalik Hills and about sixty kilometres from Jammu. The unit was in the process of moving to this location from the Valley and was to be located in a tented camp. As the camp was being established, the Commanding Officer (CO) held a conference. I was introduced to the CO for the first time and he welcomed me with a snide remark, “So, the scum of
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the Sikh Regiment has been sent to pollute the great 5/5 GR?’ I had no option, but to respond curtly, “Sir, I have been posted to 5/5 GR by the Army Headquarters; and Lieutenant General Z.C. Bakshi, the Military Secretary, and Colonel of the Fifth Gurkha Rifles would certainly have examined the “scum” part of it!
That sealed a temporary truce and the conference began. There was only one agenda: toilets! The CO settled the issue by declaring that the Gurkhas eat a lot and consequently shit a lot. The toilets’ design, thus, will deviate from the laid-down specifications and will be made as deep as possible. In order to make this mundane job more interesting, he decided that there would be an inter-company toilet digging competition and a new trophy would be instituted for the same.
Noting the look of surprise on my face, he remarked, “Young man, you will soon get used to the Gurkha way of life?
Empirical wisdom along with the experience of a large number of soldiers dying due to dysentery and cholera has taught the armies to never take chances with camp hygiene. In the camps, two types of toilets are used. The Shallow Trench Latrine (STL) and the Deep Trench Latrine (DTL). The former is meant for emergencies (one or two-time use) and consists of a simple trench one-and-a-half to two feet long, one foot wide and one foot deep.
The DTL is a more elaborate affair, for longer duration use. It consists of a trench 10-12 feet long, three feet wide and six to eight feet deep .The top is kept a little wider and it tapers down to above specifications at the bottom to prevent caving in. The trench may be reinforced to make it stronger. The trench is covered with wooden planks or metal sheets over a frame or concrete slabs with four holes, per DTL. Superstructure for screening is made with local material or jute cloth.
Next morning, the bugle was sounded at 06:00 hours for the competition to begin. Five DTLs were to be constructed per company and the competition was to be in two parts: the trench and the superstructure. Part one was to be judged at 13:00 hours. The troops worked at a feverish pitch. To my chagrin, I noticed that the focus was
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more on symmetry and depth of the trench, i.e., keeping the wall at right angles rather than a reverse pyramid design. I quickly called the platoon and section commanders and despite their protests about losing the competition, gave them firm directions regarding the correct design of the trench. The ground was firm but I restricted the depth to eight feet. Other companies not only maintained the symmetry, but went down to ten feet. In my view, symmetry was of no consequence since the trench was to be covered by a wooden plank frame. At 13:00 hours, the team led by the CO came for an inspection. Symmetry and depth were the principal criteria. As feared by my junior leaders, my company came last and our neighbouring company came first.
The CO gave me a dressing-down in front of the entire unit and said that I better learn the Gurkha way of doing things. He went on to say that I should refrain from imposing the ways of desi paltans’ on the Gurkhas. He further directed that the DTL should be at least fifteen feet deep so that they could be used for a longer duration. He again reinforced the need for symmetry. He specifically directed me to learn from the others and stay back to improve the standard of my trenches. My feeble protest about the depth of fifteen feet without reinforcement was met with a volley of expletives.
In the blazing sun, the work commenced again after lunch. Being an army brat, having taken part in the 1971 war and with a coveted foreign posting under the belt, I was determined not to follow the quixotic orders and much to the annoyance of my junior leaders, I told them to do only cosmetic improvement to our trenches. Suddenly, from the neighbouring company, there were cries of ‘maryo, maryo!’ I rushed to the spot and found that two of the trenches of the company that had been declared first had collapsed, as they had been dug down to fifteen feet. Five soldiers were buried under the mud. Galvanising everyone into action, I organised the rescue. We quickly dug their heads out to enable them to breathe, and after a frantic effort of an hour, pulled the men out.
Luckily all had survived, only two soldiers had broken their legs and
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two had severely injured their backs. The CO and other officers soon arrived on the scene. He gruffly asked me to narrate the incident. I gave him the facts and then, the reason for the fiasco. The DTL specifications had been violated, I added. You can dig a narrow trench not more than six to eight feet without reinforcement of the sides. Without batting an eyelid, he gave a benign smile and said, ‘Digging deep did not mean ignore the safety. All other Company Commanders got a dressing-down. In a dramatic decision, my company was declared first and the company whose trenches had collapsed was declared last!
The orders with respect to the depth remained unchanged, but the side walls were to be suitably reinforced. My company celebrated the victory with a barakhana. I had arrived with the Gurkhas and never looked back! I found that most junior leaders knew about the correct DTL design, but in the Gurkhas, the leader’s orders override all rules and regulations.
The officers’ living tents have a bathroom tent attached. Normally a single hole DTL was made and a wooden commode was placed over it. It was popularly known as a ‘thunder box? We were out on field exercises and were to break camp at 08:00 hours. Officers’ tents are normally dismantled last and that day the time given was 06:30 hours. In the army, 10-15 minutes are added by each rung of command and by the time it reaches the lowest rung, an hour generally gets added. Everything in the Gurkhas is done silently except for a small hand gesture or a hissing signal. The troops detailed to dismantle the officers’ tents reached the location at 05:30 hours, an hour before the scheduled time. They began their work with the bathroom tents. Silently, the ropes were untied and as per drill, the tents were lifted in one go. Two of the officers, unaware of the silent drills going on outside, were sitting on their thunder boxes and were caught like rabbits in headlights.
The Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) in charge of the working party rose to the occasion and tersely called out, ‘Party, savdhan!’ (Party, stand to attention) and saluted the officers smartly. And then, realising the plight of the officers, ordered the working party, Jaise ththe (As you
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.were before). Promptly the tents were placed over the officers again. Such were the ways of the Gurkhas!
Thirty-two years after the DTL digging competition, as the Northern Army Commander I was visiting Jindrah, which was now a sprawling military logistics base with hundreds of storage sheds. The CO was intrigued when I dismounted and walked to a nullah close to one of the sheds. Lo and behold, the DTLs were still there and in use by the civilian labour working at the base! In hindsight, the CO of 5/5 GR was probably right!
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THE LOVE STORY OF A SOLDIER
Spring was in full bloom in the Vale of Kashmir and sitting in the hundred-year-old Chinar Hut, as the Northern Army Commander, I looked back upon the first five months of my tenure with mixed feelings. Two hundred terrorists had been eliminated; summer posture for counter-infiltration was in place; the snow-damaged fence was being repaired at a feverish pitch; but allegations of human rights violations were a matter of concern.
Insurgency had been on the wane since 2004 and with a concerted effort by commanders at all levels, there had been no human rights violations from either deliberate or ‘rogue’ operations. However, due to tension, over-enthusiasm and at times panic, there had been inadvertent violations leading to resentment amongst the people. There were allegations galore. A 2005–2006 case of ‘fake encounters’ in the Ganderbal area pinned on the Indian army turned out to be the handiwork of a rogue police officer, for instance.
As the Army Commander, I had addressed the maximum number of troops at a number of places and sent out a personal message, which was conveyed to the 3,70,000 personnel of Northern Command emphasising the upholding of human rights. In those days, there was an unwritten code of conduct followed by the people of Jammu and Kashmir – the killing of terrorists, whether Pakistan nationals or locals, by the security
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forces evoked no protests. There were protests only when there were human rights violations.
Suddenly the midday calm was shattered by a breaking news on TV. Massive protests had broken out in the small town of Kangan on the Srinagar-Sonamarg Road. It was alleged that a soldier had raped a young girl and killed a man. There were also confusing reports about the soldier being killed and his body being dragged on the main street. I got through to the Commanding Officer of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) Battalion in thirty seconds and was informed that the incident had taken place about an hour ago. The body of the soldier had been retrieved and the matter was under investigation. The protests in Kangan continued and started a chain reaction leading to more protests in neighbouring small towns and villages. The BBC and CNN were also carrying extensive coverage, while ridiculing the Indian army and the local government.
Noting the gravity of the incident, we decided that this should be investigated within twenty-four hours to assuage public sentiments and punish the guilty. The J&K Police, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the RR Battalion cooperated to get to the bottom of the incident. In addition, the profile of the soldier was pieced together to draw appropriate conclusions. What came out was a tragic story of human emotions.
Sowar Ranjit Singh was from a small village in Punjab and had joined 63 Cavalry (CAV) – an armoured regiment – after his training. ‘Sowar’ (the one who rides) was a term used for a sepoy in cavalry units and continues to be used by the armoured regiments even today. (It was also once used as the moniker by the Swiss West End Watch Co. for a line of watches.) Ranjit was a handsome Sikh, who joined the army at the age of seventeen, in 2000, after finishing school. He was an allround sportsman, and excelled in basketball. A gunner by trade, he was appointed the gunner on a tank with only two years’ service, which was an exception. His mother was pressing him to get married, but he insisted that he would get married after his J&K tenure.
RR units were specifically raised to fight insurgency in J&K in the early 1990s. Today, we have sixty-two RR Battalions under 15 Sector
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Headquarters and five Force Headquarters. The composition of the RR is based on fifty per cent troops from an Infantry Regiment and fifty per cent drawn from all arms. The RR forms the mainstay of our Counter Insurgency Grid and is a success story of the Indian army.
Ranjit was very excited about his RR tenure, but was also apprehensive about the predominantly infantry operations in J&K for which he had only the basic training that is applicable to non-infantry arms.
With these thoughts, he arrived at the Corps Battle School (CBS), which conducts the most comprehensive and realistic training for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism in the world. As the Director General of Military Training, I had also made a contribution for refining the three CBSs. As the Army Commander, I visited the CBSs at least twice a month. At any time, 3,000–4,000 soldiers were under training at one CBS. Every soldier/officer inducted into J&K had to undergo four weeks of training at the CBS under realistic conditions to simulate situations that the troops may encounter during operations.
Ranjit did very well in the training at the CBS and was adjudged the best student of his batch. That is when I met this young soldier and presented the Best Student award to him and remembered him for his excellent bearing and fitness, and also because he was from 63 CAV, which had served under my command when I commanded 43 Armoured Brigade at Patiala.
The young soldier joined his unit after the tough training, hoping for some respite. But he soon found that life at Company Operating Base (COB) was even more gruelling. Indian army follows the grid pattern of deployment and response in the hinterland of J&K. Each RR Battalion deploys 5–6 COBs. A COB, depending on its composition, can have 60–80 troops. Out of these, one-third are engaged in administration and security, one-third are out for patrolling or operations and one-third are resting and training. During a big operation or in an emergency, all hands are on deck for as long as 24-72 hours. On an average, a soldier gets only 5-6 hours of sleep in a twenty-four-hour cycle, and that too not at a stretch but in two or three intervals.
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Human Intelligence is the mainstay in counter-insurgency. Each COB has an Intelligence Cell that develops sources amongst the local population. Ranjit acquitted himself well in operations and in the next six months, he became a member of small teams that took part in a number of operations killing seven terrorists. He was enjoying his work and liked the challenging life. After one year, he was selected to be part of the Intelligence Cell.
The members of the Intelligence Cell would go to villages with medical teams and also as part of the Sadbhavna Projects. Gradually, Ranjit developed a number of sources based on whose information successful operations were launched. On a visit to one of his sources, he met the source’s cousin who was a college-going girl. It was love at first sight, straight out of folklore. A handsome young Sikh soldier and a beautiful Kashmiri girl met reluctantly at first, but then found ways to meet openly despite societal restrictions and Indian army rules and regulations. Soon, they were madly in love, oblivious of religion, cultural backgrounds and the raging proxy war. Ranjit knew he was violating orders, but who can resist the call of the heart? Since their meetings were infrequent and that too virtually in public, the two spoke for long hours on the phone and in so doing, Ranjit had to forgo his rest time, which he did not begrudge.
When he went on leave, he bought a ring and quietly gave it to her at a medical camp. His tenure of two years was getting over. He volunteered and got an extension of six months. At the end of it, he went to meet his soulmate to reassure her that he would be coming back on leave from his place of posting to take her away to get married.
Ranjit coordinated with her to meet in Kangan town. Since he was to move on posting the next day, he had not been assigned any duties and hence could not go out of the COB. He saw an area domination patrol moving out of the COB and joined its tail without either informing his immediate superior or the patrol leader. As the patrol reached near Kangan town, he quietly peeled off. He was armed as all soldiers are in J&K, all the time. As he moved towards the spot of the rendezvous, an
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abandoned house on the outskirts of Kangan, he was aware of the risk he was taking. But in matters of love, caution is thrown to the winds. The meeting was brief, but both were in a state of bliss. He promised he would be back in a few days to take her back with him. Needless to mention that in the given circumstances, the relationship was platonic and there had been no intimacy beyond holding hands.
After the meeting, as he came out of the house, he was surrounded by an angry crowd, which accused him of molesting/raping the girl. He tried to reason with them and tried to tell them the truth. The girl also arrived on the scene and screamed his innocence. But when tempers are high, who listens?
Soon, the pushing and shoving began. Ranjit cautioned them that he was armed. On hearing this, one enraged man, wielding an axe, came charging towards Ranjit. Left with no choice, Ranjit shot the man. The crowd parted and Ranjit walked away. He had barely gone fifty yards when an even bigger crowd came towards him from the opposite side. Soon he was in the centre of the street, surrounded by a crowd of 150 people. He fired in the air to warn the crowd, but it had only a temporary effect. The crowd started stoning him. He tried to use his mobile to contact the base, but it got knocked out of his hand. He was in a dilemma. He could resort to firing and throwing grenades to make a getaway, but it would result in four to five people being killed. He was probably already feeling guilty of having had to kill one man in self-defence and would have known that he was likely to be court martialled for this violation of law. He looked beyond the crowd, searching for his friend. He saw her weeping helplessly and held back by the crowd. Not wanting to cause more loss of life and overcome with perceived guilt, he put his forehead on the muzzle of his AK-47 and pressed the trigger.
The police retrieved his mobile and through it got to his friend. The brave girl stood by Ranjit and gave full details of the incident. The village elders were called and the girl narrated the tragic story. The protests ended. The family of the man killed by Ranjit was suitably compensated
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by the government. The girl was adopted by the Indian army and her education was sponsored.
And Ranjit Singh? How would we handle the death of this young soldier in unusual and tragic circumstances? After a lot of deliberation, we decided that since he committed suicide to save innocent lives, he would be declared ‘killed in action!
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TO BE AN ARMY KID IN THE FIFTIES
I live on Titar Lodge Farm, named so due to the abundance of black and grey partridges that once nested there and still do in smaller numbers. The landscape is typical of ‘rurban’ Punjab – dotted with tubewells, crisscrossed by power lines, extensively cultivated with a limited number of trees, well-developed link roads and villages at par with developed cities except for the central sewerage system. As I cycle through my village for my daily thirty km cycling on link roads, I marvel at the progress that has taken place over the last sixty years since my childhood in the Fifties. My thoughts are also flooded with a swell of memories of an idyllic pastoral way of life lost forever.
In the newly-independent Indian State, there was no provision for separated family accommodation for the army personnel who were deployed in field areas and they had to make their own arrangements. Limited pay allowed only our older brother to be sent to a boarding school. So, every 1.5 to two years when our father moved to forward areas, our mother and three siblings (all born between August 1947 and May 1950) were dispatched to the village. This was a blessing in disguise as we spent those idyllic years tasting and savouring the sights and aromas of country life in the Fifties. –
Ours was a small village built on the ruins of Sirhind, a flourishing preBC town with a diameter of three kos or ten km, which was razed to the ground by the Khalsa Army in January 1764. There were 150 households
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and a population of nearly 600. The houses of the landowning Jat Sikhs were single-storied, part-brick and part-mud with mostly earthen floors and roofs plastered with a paste of cow dung, mud and wheat chaff. The others were landless workers who did agricultural labour and other menial jobs and lived in mud-house clusters as per their castes. There was no electricity, and kerosene lanterns and lamps were the source of light. The two popular brands were ‘Goodman’ for lanterns and ‘Coleman’ for lamps. The poor used open flame divas/diyas or a bottle with a wick to which water was regularly added to push up the kerosene. Early to bed and early to rise was the norm. When my father came on leave and lit a Petromax – a pressurised kerosene lamp – on the roof of our house, the whole village would light up due to the prevailing relative darkness.
Eight wells under huge banyan, peepul or neem trees were the source of drinking water. Drawing of water from the wells by the ladies, peppered with laughter and gossip was a colourful spectacle. As children, under the guidance of our grandfather, we poured potassium permanganate in the wells every week to keep the bacteria away. Each landowner had a well on his land with a Persian Wheel for drawing water, which was operated by using bullocks or camels. Around these wells, shady fruit trees had been planted over the years. The village was connected to other villages and small towns by zigzagging cart tracks with the surface reduced to powdery sand thanks to bullock hooves and carts, making them unfit for movement on foot for which footpaths along farm wells were used.
Life in the village was of total abandon, freedom and novelty. Our country cousins and other village urchins looked forward to our arrival as for them it was a novel experience to hear about city life, train and motor vehicle travel and cinema etc.
We were always so keen to do everything fast, so we just ran and never liked walking. Running to and fro to school and back home for lunch created a keen competitive spirit. During the evening, we crisscrossed through the village many times, playing patikka (handicap). Team A was given a handicap of fifty yards and Team B chased them
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with blood-curdling shouts till all were tapped. No wonder all of us became good athletes.
During the long summer afternoons, we would look for big shady trees to climb or rest under. The rainy season meant enjoying huge swings strung thirty feet high on neem or peepul trees. There were vast stretches of tree-and bush-covered scrubland to explore. There was ample wildlife too. Peacocks, partridges, sandgrouse, tiliar (starlings), rock and green pigeons, other common birds and a variety of migratory birds were a common sight, and so were black buck (deer), rabbit, fox, jackal and wild boar. Hyena laughter could be heard at night. Snakes of all types were common and so were a variety of lizards and iguanas. In the summer, we slept under the skies with mosquito nets with swarms of fireflies settled on the nets.
We played endless rounds of chor-sipahi (catch), Tippy Tippy Tap, addi-tappa, pithoo (seven stones), five stones, Kotla chapaki, kho-kho, dog in the manger, heights, marbles, gulli-danda, kabbadi and so on. Another summer game was – leekan kadhna (drawing lines) – played by two teams of four to six each, where one team waited for five minutes, while the other team drew as many small lines as it could with charcoal pieces, on stones, bricks and walls of ruins which the first team had to search, and cancel out. The number of lines which remained undiscovered was the winning score. None of these games required any equipment; in any case we had none.
Studies were not to be neglected, so we were promptly admitted to the village primary school which functioned from the Dharamshala. The school had only a single teacher for all the five classes, so the students were often supervised by the class monitor for inculcating leadership qualities. One table, a chair and four to five rolls of dusty canvas was all the furniture the school owned. We had one portable blackboard which was carried from class to class whenever the schoolmaster asked for it. We had to carry our phati – a wooden board plastered over with gachni (Fuller’s earth), a kalam (reed pen), an inkpot and one’s own mat if one was particular about hygiene. The round inkpot was called chor
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dwat as it was spill-proof due to a hole in the centre and higher sloping sides. The last period was used for reciting ‘tables’ in sing-song Punjabi, led by a choir of bright students. Most of us knew tables up to twenty by heart. Even today, sixty years later, I do my calculations based on Punjabi tables. Corporal punishment was common. Notable of which was catching the nose with the left hand to prevent turning of the head, while slapping with the right. The counter trick was to blow one’s nose into the hands of the tormentor.
The teacher did not have a watch and the school did not own a clock. Every fifteen days, my grandfather’s timepiece used to be borrowed to make a sun clock on the ground to coordinate the school routine. Since the lines were etched on the ground, we often tricked the teacher by modifying them for longer breaks or early closure.
Food was simple and wholesome – daal, roti, milk, curd, butter, buttermilk, occasional vegetable or meat and plenty of homemade sweets in winter because milk was in abundance. Soupy chana dal with roti, chutney and raw onions for a summer evening meal and saag and makki ki roti in winter was standard fare. Jaggery and ghee was available to us through the year; we just needed to tiptoe to the wire-mesh cupboard and filch it. On rare occasions, when she felt particularly loving, mother even made a cake in the cow dung cake-fired oven called harra, which was otherwise used to heat milk, and let it simmer for long hours so that it could be set with curd and churned in the matka in the morning to make butter and lassi.
Fields surrounded the village on all sides and extended as far as the eye could see. Beyond that were the village-grazing ground, 2,000 acres of scrub forest. All the cattle of the village numbering around 300 were taken early in the morning for grazing. The cattle spent summer afternoons in the village ponds with us riding them. The return of cattle in the evening with dust plumes kicked up was a sight to behold. Once in a while, there was a stampede which could be fatal if one came in the way.
Thanks to the guidance of my father, there were forty serving jawans
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from our village. At any one time, two to three were on their twomonth leave. The jawans organised team games. Hockey sticks were fashioned out of kikar tree branches and a ball was made of a round stone wrapped with old rags. Under the leadership of the jawans, raids were launched on the orchards and cane-fields of neighbouring villages. The soldiers also taught us social equality. All taboos of caste discrimination were sent packing. Swach Pind (Clean Village) campaign was vigorously pursued. Prabhat Pheris singing, ‘Kadam, kadam badhae jaa…and ‘Vande Mataram’ went on processions on 15 August, 26 January and all weekends under the leadership of a retired soldier who had served in the band of the Azad Hind Fauj and had brought back a bugle.
I consider myself singularly lucky to have savoured and experienced the village life. When I narrate the stories of village life in the Fifites to the children at the village school today, the question-and-answer sessions of the curious children last for over an hour. Like all people at my age say, ‘I am ready to give up all that I have achieved to relive my childhood. But, alas, that way of life has been lost forever.
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ON BOARD A SPECIAL TRAIN FOR THE ARMY
Railways transformed warfare in the nineteenth century. Large-scale mobilisation became possible and innovative use was also made of railroad cars as weapon platforms. In the twentieth century, motor and air transport improved immensely, but even today, the railways are the cheapest and most efficient means of large-scale military movement.
During mobilisation for war, military special trains get ‘White Hoť priority over goods and passenger trains, but in peacetime, they have a lower priority status and move at a leisurely pace of 250–300 km per day. Travel by a military special train is a unique experience, complete with military pomp and show.
Let me take the readers through the experience by narrating the movement of an Infantry Battalion by a Military Special Train from Pathankot to Ramgarh Cantonment (Cantt.) near Ranchi, covering 1,800 km in seven days.
My unit, 4 Sikh, was located in the operational area of Punch and in April 1971, we had to move to our peace station at Ramgarh Cantt.
The preparation for the rail move began two months in advance. A demand was placed on the Army Headquarters for various types of rail bogies for troops, kitchens, stores and vehicles. A draft schedule was forwarded for meal halts, collection of supplies and to meet and greet our veterans and sister units on the way. As soon as the unit concentrated at the base, complete ‘dress rehearsals’ were carried out for train travel.
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A full-scale ‘plan view of the train was drawn on the ground to rehearse entraining/detraining at halts, seating in troop compartments and loading of heavy baggage. Letters were sent out to veterans and widows who would meet the unit in Punjab. Presents were prepared for them.
The unit concentrated at Pathankot, which was the railhead for Jammu and Kashmir, in the first week of April. At Pathankot, the families of officers and jawans who were to travel with us joined us. When the train arrived at Chakki Bank military siding, it was formally taken over after due checking for breakages/damages. Under the unit Quartermaster, the entire train was marked and signposted for distribution to sub units. Telephone line communications were established with the engine and guard compartments. The engine driver, guard and maintenance staff travelling with us were won over with rum and food for cooperation in ‘bending the rules’ as per our needs, a process to be repeated whenever they changed. A similar action was taken with station masters at scheduled halts to control the duration.
Officers and JCOs had first class bogies of old style with built-in toilets and individual entry/exit. One bogey each was earmarked for officers’ mess and JCOs’ mess. Each company had a kitchen car and vacant bogey as dining car apart from old style second/third class compartments for seating/sleeping. The accommodation was surplus due to excess demand placed by bending the rules. This is a military tradition to ensure that we do not repeat ‘for want of a nail….
I was the Adjutant of the unit with two-and-a-half years of service and had six junior officers under my command. To give us experience, the Commanding Officer handed over virtual command to me for the duration of the move. Duty officers, JCOs and NCOs were earmarked, security ensured and the rest were directed to enjoy the train journey, except for mandatory daily fitness training at halts and lectures to counter Naxalite operations in the moving train.
The loading and entraining went through like clockwork. Tons of ice had been loaded in each compartment both for cold water and to create the AC effect with fans. Sentries were posted for a set of bogies,
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bugles were sounded and the steam engine gave its screaming whistle to commence the move.
As per the plan, the first forty-eight hours were for parties and festivities. We had sister units at Jalandhar and Ambala and our Regimental Centre was at Meerut. Halts were planned to have lunch/ dinner with them. There were a number of other halts to meet veterans and widows. Some veterans got into the train to enjoy the hospitality of sister units. I will describe just one event at Ambala.
We chugged in at 7:00 p.m. into the Ambala railway station. Our sister unit had taken over the entire platform. Shamianas had been set up for bars and food. The unit band was playing. We were dressed in crisp uniforms. At the sound of the bugle, we dismounted and formed up on the platform. Our band came out in their ceremonial dress. We smartly marched to the tune of the regimental march to reach the enclosures. Both the Commanding Officers addressed the troops and the regimental battle cry – Jo bole so nihal, Sat Sri Akal – rented the air. Then the party began. When sister battalions met on such occasions, old rivalries based on hard-fought battles on sports fields and military reputation came to the fore. One way to settle the score was to ‘bust the bars of the host to send them scurrying for reinforcing them from the unit lines. On one such occasion, the scheduled halt was of three hours and it was time to wind up. But the festivities were in full swing. The station master, a wizened veteran of pre-Partition days, was attending the function and was many rum pegs down when he heard me barking orders. He walked up to me and broke out in chaste Urdu, “Jab saiyaan bhae kotwal phir darr kahe ka? (Why worry when the enforcer is one of your own?) The halt was extended indefinitely.
After three such events in forty-eight hours, on the third day, we settled down to a typical military special routine. A morning halt for physical training and breakfast, one or two lectures and arms cleaning in the moving train, followed by lunch and dinner halts. Halts were scheduled for one-and-a-half hours but could be extended with the cooperation of the engine driver, guard and railway staff. We were selfcontained and supplies were replenished from military stations. Only
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partial cooking was done in the kitchen cars. As soon as we halted, there was frantic activity as open-air cook houses were set up to prepare delicious army fare. Everything worked like clockwork to bugle calls. Military efficiency is not only in battle but it is a way of life. A coordinating party was sent ahead in passenger trains to liaise with the station staff. Areas were earmarked for all activity and for the duration of the halt, the platform looked like an extension of a military cantonment.
The most interesting part was the physical training or drill we organised on the platform and adjoining open areas on wayside stations. On one occasion, we had a long morning halt of three hours for breakfast. We arrived pre-dawn and while the breakfast was under preparation, 700 soldiers, in squads of thirty each, went for a short cross-country run. Since it was still dark, we caught the village folks literally with their ‘pants down. This was long before the era of ‘a toilet in each home’; the people panicked on seeing sprinting soldiers in their “jungle pani” area. It was quite some time before order was restored. Luckily, we had ventured into the area reserved for men, otherwise, there would have been an embarrassing situation to handle.
There was never a dull moment. The band played during lunch and dinner halts and we organised small demonstrations to familiarise the public with the army. The present move was not during the hunting season, on other occasions we had even ventured out for partridge shooting during wayside halts. As per an old tradition, the unit Gurudwara was always established in an old style sixth-berth first class bogey. Round the clock recitation of the Gurbani continued for a safe journey and the well-being of the unit. The concluding bhog ceremony was held during a long halt on a railway platform.
After seven eventful days, we arrived at our destination. As per tradition, the unit marched into Ramgarh Cantt. in ceremonial uniform to the beat of drums. In three days all this was history, as we were deployed for anti-Naxalite duties in Burdwan, West Bengal. In six months’ time, we were in the thick of battle in erstwhile East Pakistan.
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THE AMMUNITION DUMP BLOWS UP!
On 11 August 2007, after the morning operational conference, I was sitting in my office and pondering over the prevailing situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Counter-terrorism operations were progressing well, counter-infiltration required greater focus and the first signs of ‘Intifada’ type of agitations were discernible. The morning calm was shattered by the shrill ring of the telephone. It was a ‘zero call – a procedure through which anyone could contact the Army Commander directly. The Commandant of 21 Field Ammunition Depot (FAD), Khundru, 10 kilometres south-east of Anantnag, was on the line. He told me agitatedly that an explosion had been heard from inside the ammunition depot and he was going to investigate and take countermeasures. This spelt ominous portents. Spread over five square km, 21 FAD had 21,000 tons of ammunition – TNT equivalent to a twentykiloton nuclear bomb! Over the years, the area around the FAD had got densely populated and the one kilometre ‘no construction zone’ around the depot had been encroached upon. The depot held the bulk of the war reserve ammunition for 15 Corps.
An ammunition depot is laid out after taking due precaution. The first is the distance between the sheds/stacks which is such that even if one shed/stack gets blown up, it does not trigger a sympathetic explosion in other sheds/stacks. Secondly, the high explosive (explodes instantaneously), low explosive (deflagrates), projectiles, fuses, detonators
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and incendiary ammunition are stored separately to prevent accidents. Thirdly, fire tenders and firemen are part of the depot establishment and each shed has fire extinguishers. Ideally, all ammunition must be stored in underground shelters. (Overground sheds with baffle wall are also acceptable.) Due to the limitation of sheds, stacks in the open covered by tarpaulins are also used. In 21 FAD, the ammunition was stored in overground sheds and stacks in the open.
I had my fingers crossed and hoped that the ‘safety measures’ will prevent a disaster. Yet the military mind was already planning for the worst-case scenario. Ammunition reserves had to be moved up, civilian population had to be evacuated and damage controlled. I did not have to wait long. The Commandant made a ‘zero call’ again within ten minutes and ominously announced, “Sir, the entire depot is on fire, massive explosions are taking place, many soldiers, civilian labour and firemen are missing? And he added in a tone of resignation, ‘As per procedures for ammunition depot fires, post the first explosion/detonation, we can do very little except wait!’ After giving me the information, he evacuated his office.
I met the staff in the operations room. Orders were issued for ammunition reserves to be moved up from other depots. The stock of ammunition in forward dumps, gun positions and at the posts was taken. Due to the perennial volatile situation along the Line of Control (LOC), chances of a war at short notice, and the army’s panache for overinsuring, there was enough ammunition available for seven-ten days of war. By evening, the convoys were on the move, carrying forward reserve ammunition from other FADs. Ammunition trains had started moving during the night from base depots to make up the stock of the FADs – 21,000 tons of ammunition meant 7,000 truckloads of ammunition.
In conjunction with the civil administration, orders were issued to evacuate all villages within five km distance from the depot. Civilians were warned not to touch ammunition debris. Security of the area was placed under the command of 1 Sector Rashtriya Rifles (RR). The depot was cordoned off by 7 RR. Relief camps were established for the evacuated
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population and community kitchens were opened; 25,000-30,000 civilian population was evacuated to safety.
There was unanimity amongst my staff that this was a clear-cut terrorist action. Speculation varied from infiltration by terrorists into the depot’s civilian labour and firemen, a missile attack by the terrorists or a suicide attack by the “fidayeen? All these possibilities were discussed. However, intellect and experience-driven coup d’oeil told me that this was an accident. I firmly announced that this was an accident and we must get to the bottom of it. Eight Generals and a score of Brigadiers/ Colonels looked at me with incredulity assuming my statement to be the typical idiosyncrasy of the numero uno.
Within an hour, the visuals of the disaster were being shown on TV screens around the world. Two terrorist organisations had claimed to have initiated the fire and detonation by firing missiles. I ordered a press statement to be issued, rubbishing the claims and stating that all indications pointed towards an accident. The press release also said that 21 FAD stored only ten per cent of the reserve ammunition for 15 Corps.
Over the years, a number of mysterious fires had engulfed our ammunition depots all over India, destroying thousands of crores worth of ammunition. The exact causes were never established. Sabotage by terrorists, spontaneous combustion caused by high temperatures, deterioration of physical or chemical conditions and dry grass catching fire due to windblown ambers coming from fires in civilian areas, were popular reasons. Since accountability in the Armed Forces is absolute, so is the cover-up to save the good name of the organisation. We never got down to the fundamental problems of inadequate infrastructure, negligence and violation of rules and regulations. I was determined to get to the bottom of the cause of this fire.
After fifteen minutes of the first explosion, I rang up the Commandant of the depot once again to ascertain the sequence of events. Since nothing could be done until the ammunition stopped blowing up, all personnel had taken cover in bunkers outside the depot. The Commandant said that an inspection of the Sub Area Commander was scheduled at 10:00
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hours and last minute preparations were afoot. It was customary to give a demonstration about the various types of ammunition stored in the depot. Major X, who was responsible for the demonstration had gone to the site, near Shed Number (No) 18, with a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) of the Ordnance Corps and a civilian labourer. Soon thereafter, the first explosion was heard from the general area of Shed No 18. On further inquiry, he told me that the various types of ammunition to be demonstrated was kept in Shed No 18 and the demonstration was normally held outside or inside the shed depending on the weather. This was a fundamental violation as various types of ammunition i.e., including high/low explosives, projectiles, fuses and incendiary ammunition were being stored together. To compound the problem, Shed No 18 was being used for storage of ‘propellant charges’ of Bofors gun shells. This component consists of fibrous explosive material packed into a cylindrical shape. The charge itself is a low explosive, i.e., it burns (deflagrates) instead of detonating—but when ignited in the gun chamber, it propels the high explosive shell. When it catches fire, it deflagrates into a fireball in the same manner as petrol. For the ease of the demonstration, the various types of ammunition were permanently stored in Shed No 18. And given its contents, it was a disaster waiting to happen. On further inquiry, it emerged that the ‘Flame Thrower’ was also part of the demonstration ammunition.
Most readers would have seen the classic flame thrower in war movies, on the back of a German soldier. It consisted of inflammable liquid and gas under pressure, in a container with a tube and nozzle. It could shoot a tongue of flame up to a distance of thirty to forty feet. The flame thrower was one of the most dreaded weapons in the Second World War. However, what we had was a one-time use incendiary rocket launcher of Russian origin – RPO A Shmel – which is fired from a discardable tube and has a range of 600–1,000 metres. The weapons produced a back blast when fired and it arms after twenty metres. This weapon system is easy to handle with necessary precautions. Since it produces a back blast, no personnel/incendiary material must be within
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twenty metres to the rear within an angle of thirty degrees. Secondly, once armed, great care had to be exercised while disarming it with all the precautions of actual firing.
Based on my experience, I had a hunch that the ‘villain of the piece in blowing up the depot was the ‘flame thrower? I was also certain that there would be survivors inside the depot as there were many safety trenches and broken ground. I directed Commander 1 Sector RR that all survivors must be segregated for questioning. Little could be done about the exploding and burning depot as per procedures. I directed that photographic and video recording must be done, including by helicopters and UAVs. The visuals were similar to the effects of a nuclear explosion. Every time a shed/stack blew up, mushroom cloud hundreds of metres high would be formed; the raging fires looked like a huge volcano erupting.
The explosions subsided after thirty-six hours. There were 30-40 personnel inside the depot. We lost one officer, one soldier from the Defence Security Corps (DSC) and thirteen brave firemen who were local civilian employees who had rushed into the depot to control the initial fire. Luckily, only two civilian casualties took place as the curfew had been strictly enforced and the area evacuated.
By late evening, I got the news that the NCO and the civilian labourer who were with Major X in Shed No 18 had survived. I directed that both the individuals be placed under ‘preventive security’ for the inquiry. The labourer, who had been had been sent back to his village, was brought back.
On 13 August, at 09:00 hours, I flew down in a helicopter and did an aerial reconnaissance of the depot. I found approximately fifteen sheds blown up along with a large number of stacks in the open. The bulk of the ammunition sheds remained intact. There were speculations galore about the causes, number of casualties and the extent of the military and civilian damage. Since the depot stored 21,000 tons of ammunition, there were rumours spread that an area of ten-km diameter had been flattened killing thousands of civilians.
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I held a no holds barred press conference for national/international media to squash the rumours. I gave out details of the casualties, the measures taken by us to prevent further loss of life and the compensation being given. The press did not believe a word. I took a bold decision. Five helicopters were immediately arranged and the entire print and TV media were taken up for an aerial view to kill the rumours for good.
By late evening, another crisis loomed. The kith of the firemen were trying to force entry into the depot to retrieve the bodies. The last explosion had taken place while I was flying over the depot and the minimum waiting period was forty-eight hours. A crowd of 2,000–3,000 had gathered at the gates. I decided to take the risk and directed the Commandant of the depot to retrieve the bodies. At great risk, young officers led three teams to retrieve the dead bodies.
At night I sat with Commander 1 Sector RR and Commandant of the depot to resolve the mystery of the fire. After putting the pieces together, it emerged that the demonstration of various types of ammunition was a regular feature during inspections. Major X was responsible for the demonstration along with an NCO and a civilian labourer. For the sake of convenience, the ammunition for the demonstration was kept in Shed No 18 which housed the ‘propellant charges’ of the Bofors ammunition. This was a gross violation of the segregation norms wherein incendiary, high explosive, low explosive and fuses cannot be stored together. The shed was also used for the demonstration during bad weather. On 13 August, Major X and his team went to Shed No 18 to lay out the exhibits. While the NCO and the civilian labourer were busy carrying the ammunition out of the shed for display, Major X decided to check the RPO A Shmel incendiary rocket launcher/flame thrower. He ‘armed’ the launcher by moving the ‘safe’ mechanism. He was standing behind the launcher – another cardinal mistake. As he was bringing the launcher back to ‘safe’ position, his fingers fumbled and the launcher fired. The back blast dismembered one leg of Major X from the thigh. The rocket pierced the metal sheet wall and fell outside. Since it had met with an obstruction before twenty metres, which is the arming range, it did
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not explode and was surprisingly found intact by the detailed court of inquiry after fifteen days. The back blast not only dismembered the leg of Major X, it set fire to the ‘propellant charges. The NCO and the civilian labourer made a desperate effort to pull Major X out of the shed, but the fast-spreading fire forced them to abandon him and rush out.
As the fire spread with the propellant charges, within 3–4 minutes, five tons of low explosive went up with a loud ‘whoosh! The blast, although of low intensity, blew up the roof of the shed and the debris fell on white phosphorous incendiary ammunition stored in the open under tarpaulin covers. The distance norms between Shed No 18 and white phosphorus ammunition stacks had been compromised. In the army, we have a saying that once white phosphorus ammunition catches fire, even god cannot extinguish it. The thirteen brave firemen who rushed to extinguish the fire on hearing the first explosion, were charred beyond recognition. As the incendiary ammunition exploded, it triggered a sympathetic explosion in the ammunition kept in other sheds and open stacks. Within ten minutes, the entire ammunition dump was on fire and exploding. Barring Major X, one soldier of DSC and fourteen firemen, the balance of the thirty personnel working in the depot survived by jumping into trenches or broken ground.
All these aspects were confirmed by the detailed court of inquiry. It also emerged that apart from the segregation norms being flouted, the distance norms were flouted due to non-utilisation of additional land acquired years ago as the permission to cut trees had not been given by the concerned ministry.
It was a long haul to sanitise the area inside and outside the depot. Resources from the entire army were moved and the area sanitised in two months. There were only two fatal civilian casualties when the depot exploded. However, there were 3–4 more due to tinkering with shells for metal scrap. When the final stock was taken, 700 tons i.e., 3.3 per cent of the total stock, 21,000 tons was destroyed. Rest was checked, repaired and made serviceable.
For the first time, the cause of the mystery fires’ at our ammunition
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depots had been established. It was the violation of the fundamental norms of safety and storage with respect to segregation in respect of demonstration ammunition and distance in respect between the sheds and the stacks of incendiary ammunition. That 20,300 tons of ammunition was saved also reflects that adherence to safety norms pays.
The infrastructure of most of our ammunition depots is well below the ideal. We still do not have underground storage sheds which are required for both safety as well as protection during war. Ammunition beyond the laid-down capacity is held by most depots. Despite constant complaints, the civil administration has failed to enforce the one-km ‘no construction’ zone around depots. The Armed Forces also need to strictly enforce the safety norms.
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MY TRYST WITH AMMUNITION BOOTS
The other day while browsing through TV channels, I watched the 1973 movie Yaadon Ki Baaraat for a few minutes. The scene showed gangster Ajit distributing the spoils to his henchmen after a brutal armed robbery Ajit is sitting on a chair with his feet on the table. One of the henchmen notices that the soles of the typical white and brown gangster shoes showed a different size for each foot-sizes 8 and 9. The henchman comments on it, and Ajit frowns with disapproval.
This scene brought back a flood of memories going back half a century. Do humans have different foot sizes? Is it common? Can one function normally wearing a different shoe size?
Leonardo da Vinci said, “The human foot is a work of art and a masterpiece of engineering. Surprisingly, eighty per cent of humans have different sizes and shapes for each foot. So long as the difference is of half a size, it does not matter. If it’s more than that, it necessitates a different shoe size for each foot. People affected with such problems either get their shoes handmade, or buy two pairs of different sizes. Nowadays there are shoe companies catering to such special needs.
Now I’m blessed with feet exactly of the same size. Being an army kid, I was among military boots from the moment I started crawling. There was no end to the number of shoes my father had: half-Wellingtons with spurs for mess dress; Oxford pattern black and brown shoes for formal wear; Peshawari chappals in black and brown for casual wear; sambar
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shoes and python shoes made from skins of shikar kills; brown ankle boots for ceremonial affairs with a Sam Browne belt; and ammunition boots, as the combat boots of the army were popularly known.
My mother told me that as a toddler, I had licked and bitten all the shoes of my father, but I was particularly fond of the ammunition boots. Despite this obsession with army shoes, including their upkeep, I spent four critical years of my training at the National Defence Academy (NDA) and the Indian Military Academy (IMA) wearing a different size ammunition boot on each foot!
There is an old proverb, “The Army marches on its stomach; to highlight the importance of food and logistics. But while the army needs food to survive and fight, it literally marches on its feet wearing combat boots. Without the boots, a soldier is useless. The first thing that we do when we capture Prisoners Of War is to ‘disarm’ their feet to prevent escape.
The first known use of military footwear was by the Assyrians in twenty-fifth century BC. Their use by the Romans is well documented; the Romans became one of the first civilisations to regularly use footwear. According to the website Authorised Boots:
Leather sandals or thongs were most commonly worn by the middle and upper class. Caligae, while similar in appearance to modern day sandals, were boots worn by Roman legionary soldiers and auxiliary for battles and marches. They were made from vegetable tanned cow or ox hide, with an open design made for comfort and ventilation. The adjustable nature of the straps led to fewer blisters and foot related injuries. The hobnails in the leather soles provided good traction for uneven ground, and hobnailing was practised until end of the 20th century.
The military combat boot (as comfortable as the best hiking boot) has continuously evolved, and is today considered the most important item of a soldier’s personal kit.
Being ‘tradition’ bound and starved of funds, the Indian army continues to use a combat boot introduced in the late 1880s, with the only variation being the introduction of the Directly Moulded Sole (DMS) in the 1980s, a hundred years after the hobnailed leather sole.
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Wikipedia has this to say on the boots:
Ammunition Boots, also known as Boots, Ankle, General Service, were the standard footwear for the British Army and the Indian Army from the late 1880s. The term ‘Ammunition boots’ comes from the original unusual source of the boots. They were first procured by the Master Gunner and the Munitions Board at Woolwich, the Regiment of Artillery’s headquarters, rather than Horse Guards as the headquarters of the British Army was known then. Ammunition Boots were unlined ankle-boots with leather laces, iron horseshoe heel-plate and toe-plate, and a leather sole with 15 hobnails which were later reduced to 13. The vamp (front) and quarters (sides) were often made of a contrasting type of leather than the toe case (toe cap) and counter (heel cap), one made of ‘pebble-grained (dimpled) leather and the other of smooth leather. They were designed to be hard-wearing and long-lasting rather than comfortable. Ammunition boots soon began to be manufactured in India from buffalo hide, and exported to all armies of the empire.
As soon as I reported to the NDA, all cadets were huddled into the Quartermaster’s Fort to be kitted for training. We were asked to pick up our size of boots from the huge pile. The laces of each pair were tied together to avoid mixing up. I quickly pulled out a size 8 boot to try on.
Trying or wearing a buffalo hide boot is a Herculean task. The foot had to be literally forced into the hard raw leather. The heel and toe portion were two-layered and rock hard, and created a painful vice-like grip. I somehow managed to force my left foot in. The size seemed to fit and I collected the pair. The shoes were soon taken away by the bearer to prepare them for the drill parade. Hot wax was poured on the shoe’s toe and heel to create an extra shine. The shoes were shone to perfection, a process repeated every day.
As I forced my feet into the boots for the drill parade, I realised that my left and right shoes were of a different size-sizes 8 and 9. I panicked, but it was too late. In minutes I was at the drill square, trying to adjust and adapt to the different sizes, that too in the most uncomfortable boots that could possibly be designed.
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By the time the drill period ended, all of us had blisters and there was excruciating pain in the heel and the toe, due to the vice-like grip of the hard leather. NDA training is enslaved to time. Ask a cadet for anything but time. I neither found the time nor the courage to ask for a replacement for my boots. Moreover, having used this one I would have to pay for the new one. Since our kits was self-financed, I thought that fifteen rupees was too much to pay for the boots.
It took us one month to ‘break in, or I should say ‘break into our ammunition boots. Innovative remedies were tried. The boots were put into hot water to soften them. Army folklore says that in the bygone era, even urine was used. Even hammers were used to break the hard portion. All this made only a marginal difference, and eventually our feet hardened. The thought of ‘breaking in a new pair further deterred me from ever changing my boots.
The difference in the pair was noticeable to the discerning eye, but then, those who may have noticed never said a thing. Who could imagine a cadet drilling in boots of a different size? Of course, I added an inner sole to the right foot to make myself comfortable. I marched out of the NDA as the Academy Cadet Adjutant wearing a different size shoe on each foot.
As one arrives in the IMA, life begins afresh. We were juniors once again for the first six months. Once again, we were at the Quartermaster’s
It was a perfect fit for the hardened foot. Despite my experience at the NDA, I did not check the size—which is engraved on the sole—for the left foot.
History was to repeat itself. As I forced my way into the boots for drill parade, to my horror, I realised that my left boot was size 9. Once again, it was too late. This time, it was the opposite foot with the larger size. The agony of breaking in’ and ‘breaking into’ the boots was repeated once again. I passed out of the IMA, third in the order of merit, yet
It might be hard to believe, but the only fact that I may have gone
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wrong with is the extent of discomfort of our ammunition boots. The discomfort continues to date to a lesser degree, with the DMS Boot introduced in the 1980s. India manufactures some of the best shoes in the world, but the Indian army wears the worst combat boots in the world, which has remained unchanged in design for 130 years, except for the DMS sole. That it costs only 500–600 rupees in the open market is a reflection on its quality!
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MEMORIES OF A CANTONMENT LIFE
Military cantonments have been in the news due to the opening of some roads which had been closed to civilian traffic for years, due to security concerns. Cantonments were established as composite military-civilian townships, beginning with Danapur (originally known as Bankipore) on the outskirts of Patna, Munger (abandoned), Allahabad and Barrackpore in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. There is a controversy as to which was the first cantonment to be established, Barrackpore or Danapur. Both claim to have been in continuous existence since August 1765. Within the cantonments, the military areas were exclusively on Type-A land. These townships also had bazaars, civilian zones and other municipal infrastructure. As the population grew, the isolated cantonments were surrounded by new or expanding older townships. The civilian population within the cantonments also grew. This led to the demand for thoroughfares through the cantonments both from within and without, which impinged upon the security of the military areas.
Common sense dictates that a balance needs to be struck. One cannot have an absolutist approach either way – unrestricted access to civilians or a complete denial of passage over security issues.
The Cantonment Board which manages a cantonment is an elected body. The president of the Cantonment Board is the ex officio station commander, known as the local military authority. However, the real executive authority lies with the Chief Executive Officer, who is
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appointed by the defence estates department, which is directly under the Defence ministry. He is not in the military chain of command. For efficient functioning, the CEO must be placed under the direct command of the local military authority, as was the case a decade and a half ago.
To strike a balance, the control of the cantonment can be revised. Military stations can be created based on Type-A land. These areas should be exclusively military areas to be managed by the Armed Forces, with no thoroughfare allowed. The rest of the cantonment can be managed as is being done now with the CEO being placed under the local military authority. Another alternative is to create cocooned flyovers and underground roads for movement of civilians.
As an army kid and later as an army officer, I have lived in or visited almost all the major cantonments in India. Let me sketch for the readers the life in a cantonment in the 1950s. Agra Cantonment was established in 1805 after the Bengal Army defeated the Marathas. It was a relatively small cantonment laid out to the south-west of the Red Fort and the Taj Mahal. In 1950, Agra was much smaller, with a population of 3,68,000, as compared to 17,60,300 in 2011 census. The population of the cantonment was approximately 5–6 thousand concentrated around the railway station to the west and Sadar Bazar to the east. There was a distinct separation of the city from the cantonment.
In 1952, my father was commanding 17 Sikh at Agra. From the age of four to six, 1952–1956, I along with the family stayed in a huge bungalow on the Mall, adjoining the Grand Hotel which still exists, a kilometre away from the Agra Cantonment railway station. The mall roads were an essential feature of all cantonments in the British era. Literally meaning a sheltered walk or promenade, but named to remind the British about ‘The Mall, the tree-lined boulevard in St James Park, London. Most of the mall roads were renamed as Mahatma Gandhi road after Independence, but in Agra, it is now called Prithviraj Road.
The memories are still vivid and have been rejuvenated by a number of visits with the last being in 2008 as an Army Commander.
The cantonment, like all others, was well laid-out with wide roads
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and state of the art infrastructure. The drainage system was unique. It had huge underground open drains with a roof, running alongside the main roads. There were six-foot by three-foot entry/exit points every 200 yards, with steps for cleaning the drains. It was a great adventure to get into the tunnel from one entry/exit point and walk along the drain and come out of the next. Even today, I marvel at the engineering and the hygiene standards maintained. Dry sanitation was extremely wellmanaged by Cantonment Board workers in dungarees, wearing gloves and gumboots.
The Sadar Bazar at the eastern end was well planned and the army personnel enjoyed great respect. Credit was readily extended to us naughty children by the ice cream and confectionery shops as they knew that their dues would be cleared once the parents were presented the monthly bill. The bazaar was tailor-made for the needs of the garrison and kept spotlessly clean. Once, my father ordered a bicycle for my brother. We were amused to see the overweight Lalaji (shop owner) huffing and puffing while carrying the bicycle on his shoulders from the Sadar Bazar to our house two kilometres away. To our naughty queries, he replied, ‘Colonel Sahib ka cycle hai na, agar tyre gande ho jate toh main kahin ka na rehta’ (It is the Colonel’s cycle, if the tyres got dirty, I would have lost face). Such was the prestige of the army those days.
To the south were the military barracks with precise symmetry you find only in cantonments. On the Mall was also located the Military Hospital where the Military Nursing Officers still dressed in spotless white almost like Florence Nightingale did a hundred years ago. Most officers lived in independent bungalows. A number of churches dotted the cantonment. There were still a fair number of English folks who were yet to emigrate, as also a large Anglo-Indian community. The ladies still wore skirts with old style stockings with a seam at the back. As children, we used to wonder how all the English and Anglo-Indian ladies had similar injuries and scars behind their calves.
The main mode of conveyance was the tonga and there were regular tonga stands like the taxi stands today. The cycle rickshaws were very
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few. The tonga stands had their own charm. Apart from two or three tongas that remained in readiness, others were parked in neat rows with untethered horses munching grain from canvass-buckets around their necks. It was the children’s duty to fetch the tongas when the family had to travel anywhere.
Officers generally commuted on bicycles. Soldiers could not afford to buy bicycles and hired them from the Sadar Bazar at the rate of four annas (twenty-five paise) per day. The Cantonment Board had by today’s standards, draconian enforcement of rules with respect to hygiene and sanitation and other municipal functions. All cycles, rickshaws and tongas had to display municipal tax tokens prominently. Tongas and rickshaws also had to have dippers and kerosene lamps to ply at night. Stray dogs were ruthlessly culled with poison. All civilian bungalows and houses had to have a specific approved design and no modifications were allowed.
Sports were a major preoccupation of the military those days. Over the years, a large number of sports teams also emerged from the civilian population of the cantonments. The great Dhyan Chand and his brother, Roop Chand were products of the Jhansi Cantonment. The inter-unit or open tournaments were held with great pageantry, complete with unit bands and cheering spectators.
Sunday was a day for picnics in the numerous gardens of Agra, of which the Company Bagh – named after the East India Company – another notable feature of all cantonments, was the most popular.
The Taj Mahal and the Red Fort stood in splendid isolation on the banks of the Yamuna. Barring a cluster of old buildings of Taj Gunj to the south, the Taj Mahal had no other construction in its vicinity. A fortnightly visit to the famous monuments of Agra was a ritual. I have visited the Taj Mahal at every time of the day and during the full moon. As children, we memorised the narrations of the tourist guides and at times literally replaced them to the amusement of the visitors. Times were liberal. Every three months or so, the officers of the entire garrison on full moon nights partied on the rooftop of one of the sarais just
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across the road from the main entrance of the Taj Mahal. The revelry continued until the wee hours of the morning with the white dome and minarets of the Taj Mahal providing the backdrop.
Shikar or hunting was another preoccupation of the officers of that era. The countryside around Agra was full of wildlife. There was plenty of black buck and chinkara deer. Gharial (Indian river crocodile) could still be shot on the banks of the Yamuna. Partridge and duck hunting on the wing were extremely popular. Officers would venture out in pairs on their bicycles with their Cocker Spaniel hunting dogs sitting in the bicycle baskets, with saddle bags hanging from the rear carrier. They rendezvoused with an old village shikari who organised the day’s shoot. Sometimes, the unit officers hired a small military truck at the rate of four annas (twenty-five paise) to a mile (1.6 kilometres) for a larger shikar party. As children, we accompanied such shikar parties and were taught the nuances of hunting. I learnt my shooting with my father’s .22 Rifle in the large compound of our bungalow. At the age of six, I became a marksman and remain one till date.
Apart from the shop owners of the Sadar Bazar and their staff, the rest of the population of the cantonment were either employers of the Cantonment Board or working as cooks, ayahs, maalis, dhobis and safaiwalas. Wages were low and for 140 rupees, one could employ a complete set who stayed either in the servant quarters of the bungalows or in the nearby dedicated areas. The cantonment had a number of dhobi ghats with old style, raised, cement-washing boards and bhatties (mud-based, improvised steaming ovens) for ‘steam-washing’ the white clothes which were the universal dress for summers – both for the rich and the poor. The good khansamas (cooks) who were paid 40–50 rupees per month would give a five-star chef the run for his money.
The entire cantonment functioned like a utopian small town. Alas, nothing like this exists anywhere in India today. Even the modern-day, exclusive military station is a poor cousin of the vintage cantonment. Needless to say, all this was too good to last as India progressed. What we see today is a mere shadow of what life in the cantonments was up
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till the Seventies. The cantonments have adapted and will continue to do so in the future. However, it would be a pity if these oases are subsumed by the advancing urban desert.
In 2008, as an Army Commander, I inspected Agra Cantonment. All I could say, at the end of the visit, with due apologies to John Milton, was – ‘paradise lost!
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GHOST OF THE BUNGALOW
The term bungalow’ originated from Bengal, implying a “house in Bengal style’. The Colonial bungalow evolved by the early eighteenth century for accommodating the officers of the Raj. Every cantonment was dotted with numerous bungalows with their size corresponding to the ranks of the officials.
The style—which eminently suited the hot climate of India-was characterised by wraparound verandas and four to six large-size rooms built around a central gallery. The veranda and the outer and inner rooms had roofs at different heights—of ten, fifteen, and twenty feet, respectively-creating enough space for ventilators for sunlight and hot air elimination. The roof of older bungalows had tiles with a false ceiling inside the rooms. More recent bungalows had reinforced cement concrete roofs.
The compound varied from an acre to four-six acres, depending on the rank. Each bungalow invariably had three to four servant quarters and a well for irrigation. Water was drawn with a 500-litre mashak (bucket of buffalo hide) pulled by a jhotta or katta (male buffalo) along a descending path, with the process being repeated after every drawl. The jhotta and the servants were handed over to the next incumbentthe former for a nominal charge. The bungalows had a huge lawn, a vegetable garden large enough to sustain the occupants, and a fair number of fruit trees.
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In the 1950s-60s, it was quite common to find bungalows a hundred years old or more, with tales going back to 1857. Colonial history was there to be discovered. Almost all older bungalows had a ghost tale associated with the cruelty or debauchery of the British occupants, or their deaths, and at times preceding them when the land was usurped or acquired. Mathura Cantonment (Cantt.), established in 1804 after the defeat of the Marathas, had five to six hundred-year-old bungalows, and one of these was allotted to my father in 1957.
Mathura Cantt. was home to 43 Lorried Brigade which was part of the 1 Armoured Division, the balance of which was located at Jhansi and Babina. The brigade had an illustrious history. Originally raised as 3 Indian Motorised Brigade, it had taken part in the battles of Mechili on 3-8 April 1941, and Ghazala from 26–27 May 1942. It was then based on three famous Indian armoured regiments—2 Lancers, then 2 Royal Lancers (Gardener’s Horse), 18 Cavalry, then 18 King Edward’s Own Cavalry (KEO) and 11 Cavalry (now with Pakistan), then 11 Prince Albert Victor’s Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) (PAVO).
For the Battle of Mechili, they were equipped with high mobility Fordson trucks and for the Battle of Ghazala, with Indian Pattern Carrier Mk IIA (a wheeled armoured personnel carrier). In both the battles, the brigade was routed by Rommel’s Africa Corps. In January 1943, it was reconstituted as 43 Indian Lorried Brigade with regular infantry battalions—2/8 Gorkha Rifles, 2/6 Gorkha Rifles and 2/10 Gorkha Rifles—and became popular as the Gorkha Brigade during the Italian Campaign in 1944-45.
In 1957, it had three other illustrious infantry battalions: 18 Sikh, 2 Rajputana Rifles, and 4 Guards. The units were equipped with the Dodge Power Wagon, a high mobility 1.5 ton truck, at the scale one per section. Each unit had 60 Power Wagon, and it was a treat to see the 200 vehicles of the brigade manoeuvre as a formation on the plains around Mathura. Each of these units had a number of national-level sportsmen, and the competition was fierce. It was cantonment life at its best-hard training, hard play, and hard partying!
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We arrived at Bungalow No. 1, Mandir Marg, on a rainy night in July 1957. There was no electricity. As I was about to settle down in the twenty by twenty feet bedroom lit by a candle, my father casually mentioned that there were silly rumours about the bungalow being haunted by the ghost of a Pir Baba (a Muslim holy man), whose mazaar (grave) had been demolished during the construction of the house about a hundred years ago. It was alleged that he often visited the house in the shape of strange animals.
My father was an atheist and areligious, and did not believe in all this mumbo jumbo and neither did I. Having lived in the village for prolonged periods, I had explored the wilds, been on shikar, and could handle the darkness. My father jokingly asked me, ‘I hope you are not afraid?’ With all the arrogance an eight-and-a-half-year-old could muster, I replied, “I know no fear! Wishing my father goodnight, I settled down for the night.
A little before dawn, I woke up to strange noises from the chimney of the fireplace. A little later, there was a pitter-patter of feet on the false ceiling, and the sound of scratching on the wire mesh around the ventilator. A strange, foul smell was emanating from the chimney. Soon it was dawn, and things returned to normal. I dismissed the issue, as it was common for old bungalows to be infested with rats.
During the day, rat traps were placed at various spots. However, my ordeal did not end. Over the next fifteen days, the strange noises and the foul smell did not stop. In fact, it increased manyfold.
My room was close to a number of large trees with branches overhanging the roof. I climbed up a tree and went to the roof to investigate. I saw faint footprints that appeared to be that of a young boy, or an animal which had bear-like paws. For the first time in my carefree young life, I was afraid.
Arrogance and pride prevented me from talking to my father or anyone else. Every day my father would jokingly ask me, ‘Have you had an encounter with the Pir Baba?’ I would arrogantly reply, ‘Who is afraid of the Pir?’ Yet I would spend sleepless nights waiting for the dawn
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to break. I started keeping a hockey stick on my bed. Torches were a luxury, so I stole a box of matches from the kitchen and kept a candle handy to light up the room whenever the electricity went off. as I had to wait for another week before coming face to face with Pir Baba’s avatar. It was a full moon night and the maali had compounded my fears by mentioning that the Pir Sahib normally appeared on full moon nights. With a thumping heart, I tucked my mosquito net around me and waited anxiously. I heard one of the unit’s Quarter Guard gong being sounded twelve times to announce midnight.
Suddenly, I heard footfalls on the roof, and the now familiar noises and foul smell emanating from the fireplace chimney. I tightly gripped my hockey stick and waited.
Two shadowy animals—the size of a midsize dog-emerged from the fireplace. I could see their silhouettes in the moonlight coming through the ventilators and the window. I sat up with a start and struggled to switch on the light. Noticing my sudden movement, the strange creatures with one leap were on the mosquito net, which collapsed. I was being bitten and scratched all over. Panic gripped me but by reflex, I fought back. Somehow I freed myself from the mosquito net, stood up, and swung wildly with the hockey stick. One of the creatures got a severe blow and collapsed with childlike moans. Emboldened, I shouted for my father and waited for the attack by the second creature.
My father came rushing in and switched on the light. In a jiffy, the second animal disappeared up the chimney. My bed was a gory site. I was bleeding from the bites on my legs and arms, and the dead creature was on my bed with a bashed skull. The smell emanating was overpowering. It was the strangest creature I had seen in my young life or seen by my father in his forty years.
The ghost of the Pir Baba turned out to be the notorious honey badger, locally known a kabar bijju.
The honey badger is a ferocious nocturnal animal measuring about a foot (thirty cm) tall at the shoulders, 20–30 inches (55–77 cm) in length, and with a foot-long tail. It is generally grey to dark
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grey in colour with a whitish band running across the back, though some experts say it is absent in the species found in India. It has a remarkably loose skin, allowing it to turn and twist freely within it. It is known for whining and has bear-like paws with five toes and long nails. A legendary digger, it lives in burrows and can dig tunnels into hard ground in ten minutes flat. It’s an intelligent animal, and has been recorded as the only wild animal capable of using tools in the form of sticks, logs and stones.
The animal is notorious for its strength, ferocity and toughness. According to Wikipedia, “They have been known to savagely and fearlessly attack almost any kind of animal when escape is impossible, reportedly even repelling much larger predators such as lions.
It is both a carnivorous and herbivorous animal. As per folklore, it allegedly digs up fresh graves to eat the corpses, hence the name kabar (grave) bijju. It has an anal pouch to collect excreta and lets out a stink bomb when frightened. The smell is overpowering and suffocating-as I had experienced over a couple of weeks.
Large Indian civet cat
The local name, kabar bijju is also used for the large Indian civet cat which has some similar characteristics as the honey badger. As per an eminent wildlife expert and a dear friend, the animal I encountered was probably the large Indian civet cat. However, from what I can remember after sixty-one years, I think that the animal in question was a honey badger as the large Indian civet cat is not known to attack human beings and it does not emit stink bombs!
To cut a long story short, I had to have a course of anti-rabies shots and became a celebrity of sorts for having killed a kabar bijju. The local press covered the incident. The chimney was sealed and the bungalow was rid of the kabar bijju by thinning out the thick trees.
In 2001, forty-four years after this incident, I visited Mathura Cantt. A dear friend was staying at Bungalow No. 1. I mentioned to him that I too had stayed in the same bungalow as a child. He mentioned strange
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noises at night accompanied by an overpowering foul smell from the same bedroom that I had occupied. He also spoke about the legend of the ghost of the Pir Baba. A quick examination showed that the kabar bijjus were still around and had made their way into the false ceiling!
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INDIA-CHINA
IT’S TIME INDIA STOPPED SEEING CHINA’S
BORDER MOVES AS SALAMI SLICING
As the Mamallapuram summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded last week, two things became clear. First, China is in no hurry to settle the boundary dispute and India is relatively too weak to force the issue. However, the days of China asserting its hegemony by triggering embarrassing border incidents are over. Second, the preferred phrase used for China by military scholars as well as Army Chief General Bipin Rawat in relation to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) – ‘salami slicing’ – is a misnomer.
From the strategic point of view, China had secured all the Indian territory it needed to before 1962. Following the 1962 war, it vacated all captured territory, barring some strategically important areas in Ladakh, as per its claims, in Depsang, Sirijap-Khurnak Fort, Kailash Range and Demchok areas, made prior to the war. Since then, apart from the historic territorial claims and the perceived threat to Tibet emanating from India, the confrontations along the Line of Actual Control have been more about China asserting its hegemony by embarrassing India. There has been no permanent ‘salami slicing?
It mainly stepped up ‘intrusions’ by patrols in areas of differing perceptions’ about the alignment of the LAC or triggered a ‘border
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incident’ as in Depsang and Chumar in 2013 whenever Beijing perceived a diplomatic or security challenge from India.
All Indian prime ministers until May 2014 responded to Chinese aggression by following a policy of ‘strategic restraint’ – focussing on economic relations while putting the contentious boundary dispute on the back-burner. A number of confidence-building measures were put in place through various border defence cooperation agreements (1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013) to this effect.
But things changed in 2014 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power. While he generally sustained this policy, Modi adopted a tougher stance with respect to border incidents.
China’s ‘salami slicing’ – a misnomer
Over the years, China has managed to create twenty-three areas of ‘differing perceptions’ to gain tactical military advantage and to needle India. Of these, nine areas are disputed where intrusions or incidents have taken place, while fourteen are considered sensitive. There are two types of border incidents. One is the routine patrolling up to the respective claim lines by both sides in areas of differing perceptions. Technically, these can be termed as intrusions and both sides lodge protests at border meetings and through diplomatic channels. The media, particularly in India, blows up these ‘intrusions, which number 400–500 every year.
Tough posture on LAC
Since Prime Minister Modi’s arrival at the helm of affairs, there has been a visible change in India’s strategic response, both diplomatic and military. Modi set things off by openly playing the ‘Tibetan card when he invited the head of the Tibetan government-in-exile for his swearingin in 2014. During President Xi Jinping’s visit in September that year, when China attempted to embarrass the new government by intruding into Demchok and Chumar sector, India responded aggressively by camping opposite the Chinese troops and to the flanks to isolate the intrusion. Modi even took the unusual step of diplomatically cautioning
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China during the joint press conference. The situation was however diffused by the end of that month.
India’s opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the ‘semi-official status accorded to the Dalai Lama’s Arunachal Pradesh visit in April 2017 annoyed China. The Chinese responded by blocking India’s move to have Masood Azhar designated as a global terrorist by the UNSC and its quest for entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This competitive conflict led to the Doklam crisis lasting seventy-four days between June and August, when China and India came closest to an actual military confrontation since the Nathu La incident in 1967.
Taking note of the risk of an escalation between two nuclear states, both sides mutually agreed to diffuse the situation. India officially distanced itself from the activities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. China too responded with a conciliatory attitude, paving the way for the Wuhan informal summit in April 2018.
Informal summits and border management
The seriousness of the Doklam crisis led Beijing to conclude that despite the economic and military asymmetry, India had the will and capability to stalemate China in a limited conflict below the nuclear threshold. It also concluded that any assertion of its hegemony through border incidents will be aggressively contested by India even at the risk of an escalation like it happened during 2014 Demchok and Chumar, and 2017 Doklam standoffs.
Consequently, both sides agreed at the Wuhan summit to issue ‘strategic guidance to their respective militaries to strengthen communication in order to build trust and mutual understanding and enhance predictability and effectiveness in the management of border affairs. It was also agreed to earnestly implement various confidencebuilding measures agreed upon between the two sides!
Since Wuhan, the border management has improved. The ‘intrusive’ patrolling in areas of differing perceptions by both sides is better
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managed. All incidents and confrontations have been mutually settled at border meetings between local commanders.
At the Mamallapuram informal summit held on 11-12 October, the Wuhan agreement on border management was reiterated: ‘…efforts will continue to be made to ensure peace and tranquility in the border areas.
Prognosis
There is a huge difference between India and China in terms of economic and military components of Comprehensive National Power. However, India is the fifth largest economy and fourth largest in terms of military strength ranking. It possesses the military capability and the will to stalemate China and give it a bloody nose in a border conflict. As a great power, China cannot risk such a confrontation.
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DOKLAM CRISIS: A POST MORTEM
China sees itself as Chung-Kuo – the Middle Kingdom, the centre of the universe and the world’s oldest culture and society. Even when it was at its weakest in the nineteenth century, it never lost sight of this utopian ideal. To the south of Tibet, across the Himalayas rests another great civilisation – India – whose dormant great power ambitions have been given an impetus by the present government. A ‘clash of civilisations’ was inevitable. At stake is the balance of power in South Asia. This, in my view, is the cause of the renewed friction on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and once again proves the principle that nations, in general, and neighbouring nations, in particular, remain in a state of perpetual competitive conflict primarily to assert political and economic hegemony.
India is the only country in the region that does not accept the political, economic and military hegemony of China. India directly threatens two Chinese vulnerabilities – Tibet and the strategic Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) through the Indian Ocean. China perceives India as the principal instigator of the Tibetan struggle for freedom. The Tibetan government-in-exile functions from Dharamshala and the Dalai Lama remains the driving force for Tibetan dissent. Not only does the rapidly increasing qualitative and quantitative improvement of the Indian Navy threaten the SLOC, India’s opposition to the alternate – One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative through Pakistan and Myanmar – adds insult to injury. India’s strategic partnership with the USA and
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its expanding diplomatic/military relationship with Japan, Australia and Vietnam are also perceived as a direct threat.
The Doklam incident, as also other border incidents in the past, has nothing to do with the territorial disputes per se. Nations with credible conventional and nuclear deterrent cannot be forced to part with territory under their control or forced to allow a tactical vulnerability to be created through a neutral territory, whatever be the nature of the dispute. China is well aware of this, but selectively initiates such confrontations to make ‘political statements to keep India on the edge. Such incidents always take place to coincide with major diplomatic events or as a response to perceived Indian actions that are contrary to the Chinese worldview.
The Doklam crisis was notable for the neutral venue, an extremely belligerent Chinese stand, India’s firm diplomatic and military response and being anticlimactically defused, though unresolved with both sides claiming victory. A host of other issues have come to the fore and deserve a detailed analysis.
The Chinese politico-military aims
The last two major Chinese intrusions preceding Doklam had taken place in 2013 at Depsang, and in 2014 at Chumur. In Sub Sector North, where Depsang is located, India had built two new roads and the Daulet Beg Oldi airfield had been reactivated. This gave India a new launch pad for operations into Aksai Chin, the other being via Kongka La. In Chumur, India had built a road and deployed troops to deny a launch pad to China. Thus, both places had strategic/tactical significance from the military point of view. Both incidents were also linked to the high profile visits of Premier Li Keqiang in 2013 and President Xi Jinping in 2014. One view is that China was making a political point to highlight its superiority while simultaneously engaging in diplomacy. The other less accepted view is that it was the rogue People’s Liberation Army (PLA) trying to embarrass the communist hierarchy which had led President Xi to take measures to assert the supremacy of the Communist Party of China.
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Apart from the ongoing competitive conflict, the immediate political reasons for Doklam could be India’s and Bhutan’s opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); the Dalai Lama’s high profile visit to Arunachal Pradesh; driving a wedge in Indo-Bhutan relations to test India’s resolve to defend its ally; forcing Bhutan to trade off the two western areas of dispute, i.e., Doklam and Sinchulumpa-Giu-Darmana, twenty km to the north of Doklam, with the two northern areas of dispute, i.e., Pasamlung and Jakarlung; and to secure the strategic area of Doklam to compromise Indian defences in Sikkim and threaten the Siliguri corridor.
Militarily, the selection of Doklam was double-edged. I had discussed in detail the strategic and tactical military significance of the Chumbi Valley and Doklam in one of my earlier columns. In both these areas, the Indian army has an overwhelming strategic and tactical advantage.
If the Chumbi Valley/Doklam Plateau imposed severe terrain disadvantages on the PLA, then why was the area selected for precipitating a crisis? The possible explanation is that as per the Chinese’s assessment, since the dispute was between Bhutan and China, India was unlikely to get involved. The Chinese were attempting to exploit Bhutanese sentiments by wanting to exchange the western areas of dispute with the northern areas. However, keeping in view the strategic interests of India, they did not do so. Hence, it was a risk worth taking. China alleges that India was informed about the proposed road building, although it was neither confirmed nor denied by India. It is quite likely that the lack of a response from India may have lulled China into complacency.
Some analysts have once again suggested that Doklam too was a rogue action by the PLA. To the contrary, the belligerence of the Chinese Foreign and Defence ministries, and the State-controlled media seems to suggest that the government and the PLA were on the same page. However, the fact that no sooner Xi fired the Chief of Joint Staff Department, General Fang Fenghui, than a deal was clinched with India. This suggested that the topmost General was resisting ending the standoff.
It has also been suggested that Doklam was probably a low-end
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tactical action aimed at strengthening the border infrastructure that got precipitated into a bigger conflagration. I do not buy this argument because had it been so, then the matter would have been settled very early based on border management agreements.
The Doklam incident had all the four ingredients of the now timetested Chinese strategy for competitive conflict and border disputes. Firstly, develop a larger or more permanent physical presence in disputed areas using military power where necessary. Secondly, resort to coercive diplomacy complete with military threats and actions to persuade the relatively weaker target State to acquiesce and put the onus on it to risk confrontation. Compel the weaker State to negotiate, using its advantageous position to secure favourable settlement. Thirdly, using legal rhetoric and principles to present its position as legitimate and lawful, thereby staking a claim to a broader legitimate principle in territorial disputes. Fourthly, resort to information warfare through its governmental organs and to highlight its narrative and issue threats. This is replete with nuances about adversaries underestimating the Chinese resolve to protect its sovereignty just because it has exercised restraint so far.
The Indian politico-military aims
Given the experience of embarrassing standoffs over the years, the Indian government came to the conclusion that the Chinese bluff had to be called. At Chumur in 2014, the Indian response was militarily and diplomatically aggressive forcing status quo ante. The government had decided that in the future, border incidents triggered by China must be confronted diplomatically and militarily even at the risk of an escalation to a possible use of force. This is exactly what India did. India’s credibility as an emerging power was at stake, the world was watching and so were India’s neighbours. India had to stand by its ally, Bhutan, and protect its strategic and tactical interests in Doklam and the Sikkim sector.
This was a critical moment in Sino-Indian relationship. Any sign of weakness would have had serious repercussions for the entire border question. Today, it was Doklam and tomorrow, it would be somewhere
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else. Acceptance of the Chinese position in Doklam would have led to unacceptable ‘loss of face domestically and internationally.
China understands only one language and that is the language of strength. Our own experience of the 1967 confrontation in Sikkim and the Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986–87 had proven this point. India decided to not back down unless it was a mutual withdrawal to restore status quo ante pre-June 2017 and upholding of the 2012 agreement with respect to Trijunction points, and the Sino-Bhutanese agreements of 1988 and 1998, to maintain status quo with respect to border disputes.
India and Bhutan let China and the world know their legitimate stand based on past agreements. India continued to engage the Chinese diplomatically. Prime Minister Modi met President Xi on the sidelines of the Hamburg G20 summit; NSA, Ajit Doval, met his counterpart and President Xi during the preparatory conference for the BRICS summit; diplomats in Delhi and Beijing had several dialogues. Simultaneously, while India militarily positioned its forces for a possible confrontation, it maintained a cool front which was in sharp contrast to the crude and belligerent stance of China. A difference the world noted.
Chinese military strategy
The actual details of military movements and precautions are not in the public domain. However, a reasonable assessment can be made based on available information. Despite its belligerent stand, China did not carry out any large-scale mobilisation. There were some indications of an increase in troop strength at Yatung and Phari Dzong in the Chumbi Valley; military demonstrations by the Rapid Action Forces were carried out in the hinterland.
Did that mean that the Chinese military threat was not credible?
In my view, given past experience, China must have presumed that India being a status quo power, it will not initiate any military action beyond what was happening locally in Doklam. Hence, in case its coercive diplomatic and military strategy failed to force a favourable outcome, it did have a Plan B for use of force. The PLA had adopted and
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adapted to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) for the last three decades particularly in the field of Cyber Warfare and Precision Guided Munition (PGM) technology. It is now only second to the USA in highend military technology. There is a marked and increased asymmetry between China and India with respect to these capabilities and overall military capability. The Chinese decided not to get involved in close infantry combat’ over unfavourable terrain. It is likely that its strategy was based on technological warfare with overwhelming use of PGMs and Cyber Warfare. It would have restricted its initial offensive to the Indian troops in the Doklam Plateau and the Sikkim Sector but would have been prepared for escalation to other sectors.
Such an attack would have been carried out in winter when conventional ground operations get severely restricted. However, the PLA probably carried out minimal mobilisation to cater for the unlikely tactical offensive by India in the winter. A large scale PGM attack would have been launched on our troops at Doklam and Doka La using cruise missiles and artillery after pulling out its own troops to safety. Simultaneously, a massive cyber attack would also have been launched to neutralise our command and control systems and our fire power means. The strike would have been declaratory with the limited aim of evicting us from Doklam. Depending upon our strategic and operational response, the PLA would have escalated with similar attacks on more defensive positions in Sikkim and other sectors. Given its rapid mobilisation capabilities due to excellent infrastructure, it would have catered for a possible Indian counter-offensive next summer.
Indian military strategy How did India respond? Noting that the PLA had not mobilised, it is likely that India correctly assessed its intentions. A high technology attack as mentioned above is defeated by hardened defences, deception, dispersion, kinetic/electronic shield, similar counter-strikes and, above all, by preempting the enemy with an offensive.
While I am not privy to the actual military plans, it is my assessment
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that despite the limitations of the prevailing asymmetry, we adopted an operational strategy encompassing all or most of these aspects. The Armed Forces were mobilised under the deception cover of annual operation alert’ and offensive formations were postured to pre-emptively threaten Sinche La (the PLA entry point into the Doklam Plateau) at the tactical level and threaten Yatung and Phari Dzong in the Chumbi Valley from the west and the east. A similar operational strategy was put in place for Ladakh to pre-emptively threaten to seize the Kailash Range and areas across the Pangong Tso. At the lower level, since our formations were deployed, the plan was simple – all along the front, capture the next ridge line! The IAF and the Indian Navy were on high alert and prepared for a limited war. Our conventional cruise missiles and other strategic assets were moved to battle locations. At the strategic level, diplomatically and militarily, India acted like a mature emerging power and did a classic Sun Tzu, who said, that the acme of skill is to win without fighting!
Has the crisis been resolved?
The standoff came to an anticlimactic end on 28 August. Diplomacy prevailed; Prime Minister Modi met President Xi after the BRICS summit. Both agreed to put Doklam behind and move forward.
Ambiguity remains with respect to the actual agreement reached between India and China with respect to Doklam. The statements emanating from Delhi and Beijing are shrouded in diplomatic language allowing both sides to claim victory. Indian statements focussed on ‘simultaneous disengagement; the Chinese spoke of Indian troops ‘withdrawing first and their troops having made ‘adjustments. The Chinese emphasised they would continue to ‘maintain their sovereignty’ over the area and in doing so carry out necessary military activities.
My take is that the crisis has been defused but not resolved. The troops on both sides have disengaged from eyeball contact and moved back some distance but still remain in the area. The situation still remains tense. Indian formations are still deployed for ‘operational alert. In case
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the situation precipitates in any manner, both sides can still exercise the options given by me.
Prognosis
Two points must be made. Firstly, the PLA is unlikely to resume road construction. This was the reason for India’s intervention. Secondly, since complete withdrawal has not taken place, the PLA may resort to a permanent presence in the area; the onset of winter will settle the issue. If the PLA does not create permanent infrastructure and withdraws its troops, then status quo ante pre-16 June would be restored. If it does not, then Doklam will remain an area for future confrontations.
China may or may not have lost face, but India has gained international stature. Doklam will be the new normal in LAC intrusions/ confrontations. The border management and demarcation talks will be more meaningful and may lead to LAC demarcation.
I hope India seizes the Doklam opportunity to initiate comprehensive reforms with respect to national security, Armed Forces and border infrastructure to bridge the rapidly increasing asymmetry in military capability.
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NOT CHINA, 1962 WAR CALLED INDIA’S BLUFF
India must not forget the catastrophic defeat of the 1962 war with China. So complete was our defeat that for the next twenty-four years, we did not dare to deploy our army on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Not until the mercurial General K. Sundarji forced the issue after the Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986.
The responsibility for this Himalayan debacle rests squarely with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Most historians and military analysts blame him for not creating the military capability and border infrastructure necessary to ensure our territorial integrity and prepare for the threat posed by China.
Given the abject poverty of India, there was no way Nehru could have created the military capability to counter the seasoned People’s Liberation Army or PLA, armed with the best Russian weaponry. It had demonstrated its capability by imposing a stunning defeat on the US in Korea. The only option was to become a subservient ally of the US to get the desired military aid and let the guns take priority over bread.
India decided not to do so due to the collective idealism of Nehru and our political leaders, all of whom had taken part in the freedom struggle. And, also because our strategic assessment was that despite the territorial dispute, the probability of war was very low. Moreover, poverty alleviation was a national goal.
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Even fifty-seven years after 1962, our border infrastructure is still around thirty per cent of what China has created and well short of even what we ourselves desire, and our military can barely keep its head above the water against the PLA. To expect Nehru to have done it with far fewer sources is unrealistic.
‘Frontier, border’ and ‘international boundary’ are geostrategic terms used to describe the in-between space between contiguous nation states in ascending order of legitimacy and international acceptance.
What we inherited in the upper Himalayas was a frontier region shaped by the Himalayan chapter of the Great Game. Imperial Britain used the dysfunctional Tibet as a buffer state after subjugating it militarily in 1903–04, and thereafter maintained a token military presence at Yatung and Gyantse primarily to safeguard the trade route.
The frontier region was not physically occupied. In the eastern sector, the boundary was demarcated by the McMahon Line under a tripartite agreement between British India, Tibet and China. In the western sector, the reliance was placed on the 1842 Sikh/Dogra Empire-Tibet treaty.
However, the boundary of the Aksai Chin area along the Kunlun Mountains was shown as un-demarcated.
Conventions and treaties are given short shrift by nation states in the frontier regions where physical, political and military control decides the eventual delimitation of an international boundary. This was the backdrop when the Sino-Indian frontier dispute began in the early 1950s.
Once China occupied Xinjiang and Tibet and made its preliminary territorial claims, Nehru evolved a strategy to deal with the situation. Our military was weak and we did not have any border infrastructure; it was also virtually impotent with respect to the northern borders. Consequently, the strategy adopted was to rely on diplomacy and avoid conflict. Simultaneously, it was decided that using the traditional doctrine
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of Forward Policy, our ‘flag’ must be planted in the frontier regions at the earliest to be in a better negotiating position for a final settlement. China began a similar exercise on the southern borders of Tibet.
In North-Eastern Frontier Agency or NEFA, India pre-empted China and secured the areas up to the McMahon Line by 1951 using the Assam Rifles. This was a remarkable feat because until then Tibet had exercised virtual control over Tawang and parts of Lohit Division. In the western sector, China pre-empted us and secured a major part of Aksai Chin and built a road through it linking Xinjiang to Tibet. However, elsewhere, we managed to plant our ‘flag’ using the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB).
By mid-1959, we had reached little beyond the present day LAC in the western sector and the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, and our police/paramilitary came face to face with the Chinese border guards. Due to the revolt in Tibet and India granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959, China hardened its position and came out with a new claim line in Ladakh. Nehru had to then decide whether to accept the actual ground positions as a mutually acceptable border without giving up our claims for a final settlement or to continue with the brinkmanship on the premise that war would not take place. He chose the latter option.
The first two clashes took place on 25 August at Longju in Lohit Division and on 21 October at Kongka La in Ladakh. Until now, the goings-on in the frontier regions had been secretive and not in the public domain. However, the border clashes and casualties led to immense pressure from the public and in parliament. Nehru lost his nerve and abandoned a fairly successful strategy despite China offering a status quo settlement. Although all his subsequent actions were panic-driven and tactical, they were bereft of strategic thought. NEFA and Ladakh were placed under the control of the army in August and December 1959 respectively.
Diplomacy was abandoned. The pragmatic frontier- flagging Forward Policy’ adopted so far was replaced by a more aggressive ‘Forward
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Policy, which actually became ‘forward movement of troops, to call the Chinese bluff. Less by design and more by default, Nehru blundered into a military confrontation on an unfavourable terrain and with an army that was ill-prepared for the task. Rather than calling the bluff of the Chinese, our own bluff was called.
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INDO-PAK
HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM
LIKE PAKISTAN?
Let me at the onset settle the core issue that worries every Indian. Nations with stable democratic governments, professional Armed Forces and nuclear weapons do not part with their territory. The state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is an inalienable and inseparable part of India. It is and will remain central to the idea of India. The only issue before us is to thwart the challenges and threats to this idea. The problem in J&K has an external and an internal dimension. The external dimension is Pakistan and the internal dimension is the insurrection in J&K. Both are interdependent.
Pakistan’s strategy
Pakistan, due to primordial religious emotions, the deprivation of J&K in 1947 and its dismemberment in 1971, considers India an adversary State. It has an unambiguous India-centric National Security Strategy backed by a political, public and military consensus. Its essential features are: • Wage a deniable Fourth Generation War (4GW) in J&K and
hinterland of India exploiting its fault lines. Deter/dissuade the Indian threat with conventional and nuclear capability. Avoid a conventional war and if it is forced upon it, stalemate India
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with conventional capability, ‘irrational nuclear brinkmanship, and actual use of tactical nuclear weapons if required.
* Quid pro quo response to Indian threat below threshold of war in the form of surgical air/drone/missile strikes and Special Forces (SF) operations.
* Control India-sponsored 4GW (as Pakistan perceives it) in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the hinterland and expose it diplomatically.
* Neutralise India’s influence in Afghanistan by facilitating Taliban’s return to power.
* Back the above strategy with diplomacy and special relationship with China, Islamic countries and USA.
Analysis of Pakistan’s strategy
Pakistan has been eminently successful in implementing its strategy. With effect from 1990, it has continued with its 4GW in J&K, which peaked in 1998–2003. The Indian army has successfully controlled the military situation through a protracted model campaign. However, Pakistan considers this as a tactical setback and is confident that it can revive the 4GW. Its influence on the masses due to religious affiliation, anger over poor administration, bloodshed of the last twenty-six years, frustration of a failed movement and resented presence of security forces, is largely intact (as is evident from the recent protests).
In the past, Pakistan has exploited ‘intifada’ and based on recent experience, it will exploit it even more to deny India the moral space it occupies internationally. Pakistan has successfully launched major terrorist strikes in the Indian hinterland using Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-controlled non-state actors or Indian terrorists. International pressure following the 26/11 attack and Indian internal security measures have forced Pakistan to review this strategy, but it retains the capability and will continue to exploit the same in a calibrated manner. The insurrection in Balochistan/FATA/Karachi and persecution of minorities by vigilante Sunni groups with perceived active Indian involvement, is
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considered the most dangerous threat. However, Pakistan is confident that it can control the situation. It has successfully deterred India from waging a limited war, exploiting its relative conventional superiority by a combination of diplomacy, upgradation of conventional capability and nuclear brinkmanship.
A proactive limited war initiated by Pakistan in Kargil, based on the premise that the nuclear backdrop will prevent a major Indian military response and its resultant humiliation, was a one-off situation and Pakistan is unlikely to repeat this blunder again. It has initiated and responded in a quid pro quo manner to all operations below the threshold of war. India’s aggressive diplomacy has, to some extent, isolated Pakistan and forced economic setbacks, but not enough to deter its strategy. Using China and the Islamic countries card, Pakistan has been able to limit the damage. Its Afghanistan policy, despite forcing the USA to pull out, has suffered a setback but it hopes to make amends by assisting the Taliban to seize power. In a nutshell, Pakistan continues to pursue its strategy and is prepared for a prolonged struggle to achieve its political and military aims.
India’s strategic options
India’s political aim with respect to Pakistan is very simple – prevent Pakistan from interfering in internal affairs through a 4GW and if it does so, maintain good relations for common good. Despite India’s best efforts, Pakistan has adopted an absolutist and uncompromising approach. There is extreme public resentment in India against Pakistan which has been compounded by political rhetoric and jingoism, without taking into account the strategic compulsions. Governments, including the present one, have wisely refrained from hasty strategic actions driven by tactical events. However, lack of a declared National Security Strategy and resultant ambiguity without official clarifications continues to fuel public imagination and clamouring for punitive action against Pakistan. This has ominous portents and may deny the government strategic freedom in the future.
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Two fundamental points must be made. First, nuclear weapon-armed States do not and, I dare say, cannot fight a full-scale conventional war of annihilation or even absolute defeat of the adversary. However, space exists for a limited war – limited in time, space and aims – before nuclear weapons and international pressure comes into play. Second, wars and even covert or overt operations below the threshold of war are waged to achieve political aims. A war of retribution, if it does not compel the adversary to accept peace on your terms, is a war without a political aim, and best avoidable. The above notwithstanding, India has the following strategic options with respect to Pakistan:
Engage Pakistan diplomatically to work out a mutually acceptable solution within India’s constitutional framework and without change in territorial sovereignty. Simultaneously, use diplomacy and soft power offensive to isolate Pakistan and expose it as a sponsor of terrorism, leading to adverse and unacceptable diplomatic and economic cost.
Surgical strikes on targets related to prosecution of 4GW by Pakistan.
Wage a counter-4GW exploiting Pakistani fault lines.
Wage a proactive limited war to compel Pakistan to stop 4GW in India. The above options can be exercised in a standalone mode or as a combination.
Analysis of India’s strategic options
Diplomacy has been the mainstay of India’s strategy as far as Pakistan is concerned. Successive governments, irrespective of their ideology, have continuously engaged Pakistan directly and covertly. The biggest stumbling block in this regard is the Pakistani military and the emotions of Indian politicians, media and public. We take one step forward and are forced to take two steps backwards. It is prudent that we continue to engage Pakistan. We may not find a solution, but will have a framework for the same when the strategic situation changes. We must continue to pursue ‘peaceful compellence using our diplomatic clout.
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Operations below the threshold of war are always a tempting option to punish an adversary waging 4GW. These can be in the form of surgical strikes using precision guide munitions delivered by aircraft, cruise missiles or drones. The selected targets are related to terrorist infrastructure and leadership. The same could also be launched from the sea. Trans-International Boundary/Line of Control (LoC) raids with SF is another method. Such strikes can be as a response to terrorist action or initiated with moral surprise. The intent of such limited action can also be declared. A prerequisite for such an action is overwhelming technological military edge that prevents quid pro quo or makes a response prohibitive in cost. The USA has this edge and has effectively used this option in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. India does not have it and Pakistan is capable of and will respond in a quid pro quo manner for which we have to be prepared. The danger of escalation is omnipresent. However, this is a low cost option and a good bet to assuage public anger and punish an adversary. If India can create the technological military edge necessary, this is a viable option.
Waging a counter-4GW exploiting the adversary’s fault lines always remains a viable option and is as old as the history of warfare. This option hurts the adversary the most, but since it cannot be publicised, it rarely satisfies an emotional public fed by political jingoism. With turmoil in Balochistan, FATA and the persecution of Shias, Ahmadiyas and other minorities, Pakistan is tailor-made for 4GW. Since this subject is in the covert domain, it is beyond the scope to discuss whether India can or should exercise this option. However, a cursory glance at Pakistani media shows that India is the villain for all internal troubles. All that is required is organisation, funds and the attack is directly at the Achilles heel! In my view, this is the best option.
The scenario of a limited war under a nuclear backdrop between India and Pakistan worries the world the most. For India, this would be an option of last resort. We have already experienced one such war (Kargil in 1999) and in it, India restricted its political aim to the restoration of status quo. India did so with a declared intent, enhancing
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its international prestige. Nuclear brinkmanship was preempted. But can India, with its international standing as a moral emerging power, be seen as proactively waging a limited war?
We did mobilise after the attack on Parliament in 2001, but did not go to war. With Pakistan in disarray, it was a great opportunity to punish it. Coercive Diplomacy’ was a mere fig leaf to cover a strategic fiasco. We could not go to war due to a combination of international pressure, political dithering, slow mobilisation and an unsure military. We again did not exercise this option after the 26/11 attack. We did not exercise this option when 4GW was at its peak. What is it that can make us exercise this option now? A major terrorist action can trigger this option, but that trigger is under Pakistani control. So why would it oblige India? I do not visualise the situation in J&K going out of hand to give us a casus belli. Be that as it may, a war has to be fought for political aims and not to satisfy an emotional public.
In the context of Pakistan, our political aim is simple: stop interfering in our internal affairs. To achieve this, we must capture sizeable territory and destroy Pakistani economic and critical combat potential. All this has to be done in 10-15 days and the nuclear threshold has to be kept in mind. If we want to exercise this option, our higher decision-making has to be reformed with greater sync between the Armed Forces and the government. Major structural and organisational reforms would be required in the Armed Forces. This option is best exercised based on strategic moral surprise – the adversary does not expect that you will attack – and not as an immediate response to an incident. It must be executed with a high tempo-based on material surprise – the adversary knows everything but is psychologically paralysed due to multiplicity, simultaneity, speed and intensity. If we exercise this option without enacting reforms, it will lack finesse and is unlikely to achieve the political aims. However, the probability of even a limited war in the current strategic environment is very low.
India must prepare to exercise all its options. Diplomacy and soft power remain fundamental. Deniable 4GW is a low cost quid pro quo
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option and the strategic situation prevailing along Pakistan’s borders with Iran and Afghanistan border as well as internally in Pakistan makes it the most viable option. Surgical strikes and SF operations, and limited war, are progressive options of a last resort. Last but not the least, India needs a formal National Security Strategy to prevent emotions from running away with national decision-making.
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#SURGICALSTRIKE AND WHY IT WAS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER ARMY OPERATIONS
The situation after the ‘surgical strikes’ on the intervening night of 28–29 September is surreal and bizarre. India conducted deliberate trans-Line of Control (LOC) Special Forces (SF) operations, one to three km deep, to destroy about seven terrorist ‘launch pads’ on a 250-km arch from Kel to Bhimber, inflicting ‘significant casualties. India also declared that it had done so through a formal briefing by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) – a first apart from the three wars of 1947–48, 1965 and 1971. Even in 1999, India maintained the ‘sanctity of the LoC.
Pakistan, which is extremely sensitive to any unusual movement of the Indian army even within India let alone across the LoC, categorically denied that any trans-LoC operations had taken place. Director General Inter Services Public Relations, Lieutenant General Asim Bajwa, said only heavy trans-LoC firing had taken place in which two Pakistani soldiers were killed in action. One Indian army soldier belonging to 37 Rashtriya Rifles (RR) who had ‘inadvertently strayed across the LOC’ (according to the Indian army) was apprehended as stated by the Pakistan army.
Pakistan went to the extent of taking domestic and foreign correspondents to the supposed launch pads to prove its point. Despite the DGMO, and the Indian army having given only a terse statement
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in standard military language bereft of any details, the Indian media went berserk speculating how the operations were conducted and the immense damage inflicted. Pakistan responded by ridiculing the claims and asked for evidence to be furnished. The international media reported both the Indian ‘claims’ and Pakistani ‘doubts!
Indian public and politicians celebrated the benchmark ‘surgical strikes’ and raised the jingoistic rhetoric to a new high. Posters (allegedly put up by the ruling political party at the Centre) highlighting the retribution inflicted on Pakistan appeared in poll-bound Uttar Pradesh. In response, while unequivocally supporting the surgical strikes, the Opposition parties highlighted that similar strikes had been carried out covertly in the past under the policy of ‘strategic restraint, and further put the ruling party in a bind by asking it to release the evidence to counter Pakistan’s malicious propaganda and international scepticism.
If that was not enough, since 28/29 September, three terrorist attacks and a couple of infiltration attempts have taken place in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
So, what does one make of this situation?
It is ‘Information arfare’ in full play by the strategic decision-makers and Armed Forces on both sides. The media, which revels in scoops, ‘inside information and free access, had no choice but to report the official version and speculate. On either side, military spokesmen have been economical with words and followed a planned script. The media, including the social media and the public at large, took the bait, hook line and sinker. The resultant confusion notwithstanding, the fallout is that both sides have retained enough manoeuvre space to pursue their long-term strategy.
I had earlier written two pieces: ‘How To Solve A Problem Like Pakistan’ and ‘How Should India Respond To 18/9’ on 21 September. The former focussed on likely long-term strategies of India and Pakistan in generic terms and the latter in more specific terms after the Uri attack. I recommend that the readers scan these pieces while reading this.
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Pakistan caught off guard
Pakistan, owing to its birth on religious grounds, the deprivation of J&K, including the control of river waters and its dismemberment in 1971 considers India as an adversary State. It follows an unambiguous Indiacentric National Security Strategy backed by military, political and public consensus. Its essential features as I have mentioned earlier in the book, are:
Wage a deniable Fourth Generation War (4GW) in J&K and hinterland of India exploiting its fault lines.
Quid pro quo response to Indian threat below threshold of war in the form of surgical air/drone/missile strikes and Special Forces (SF) operations.
Control India-sponsored 4GW (as Pakistan perceives it) in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the hinterland, and expose it diplomatically.
Avoid a conventional war and if it is forced upon it, stalemate India with conventional capability, ‘irrational nuclear brinkmanship, and actual use of tactical nuclear weapons if required.
Neutralise India’s influence in Afghanistan by facilitating Taliban’s return to power.
Back the above strategy with diplomacy and special relationship with China, Islamic countries and the US.
Is Pakistan’s conduct after the surgical strikes in consonance with this strategy? The answer is an unambiguous yes.
Pakistan is used to the Indian army’s undeclared retributive, transLoC operations. It noted with concern the symbolism and import of India’s declared trans-LoC ‘surgical strikes’ on terrorist launch pads. It realised that India was targeting the domestic and international constituency, and also aimed at forcing an irrational response from Pakistan to show that it controls and sponsors the ‘non-state actors.
Pakistan was taken by surprise. It was focussing on defending its posts and military installations after 18/9. But India struck at unlikely targets. No Indian soldier was killed, no body was left behind. No Prisoner Of
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War (POW) was taken except the RR soldier who was either part of the support operations or simply a victim of the fog of war. India had also showcased its world-class capability to meticulously execute Special Forces operations.
Casualties suffered were substantial – thirty to fifty terrorists had been killed (author’s assumption). Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) also noted the anger of the leadership of its proxies, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM ) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).
Keeping the above in mind, the Pakistan army re-calibrated its strategy. Bodies of terrorists, all of whom were from Punjab, were removed in haste to be buried later in nondescript villages. The local population, which is either ideologically committed or dependent upon the Pakistan army for jobs, was taken into confidence. The surgical strikes were outrightly denied to prevent India from taking any domestic and international advantage.
Pakistan ridiculed the entire operation and termed it a ‘hoax. The same line was followed by the Pakistan media and public. To add insult to injury, it orchestrated three terrorist strikes in J&K and stepped up infiltration, daring India to respond again. In a nutshell, Pakistan has adhered to its strategy and retained all the strategic options as mentioned earlier. It has prevented the situation from escalating and diffused the post-18/9 stand-off by not immediately resorting to a quid pro quo. It perceives that it has called India’s bluff and denied it any domestic or international strategic advantage, and has put it on the back foot to provide evidence of the strikes.
Be that as it may, Pakistan from now on will have to take note of the change in India’s strategy – that India will not hesitate to raise the ante by pre-emptively or reactively countering Pakistan’s 4GW in India, in a calibrated manner with punitive operations across the LoC or the international boundary – a watershed moment, a paradigm shift in strategy!
India changes the game
In one of my columns, I had highlighted India’s options after the 18/9 terrorist attack at Uri:
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Punitive operations below the threshold of war focussed on targets related to prosecution of 4GW by Pakistan.
Wage a counter 4GW in Pakistan exploiting its fault lines.
Wage a pre-emptive J&K-centric limited war to compel Pakistan to stop 4GW in J&K and the hinterland of India.
I had also highlighted that the first option is a short-term option and the latter two are long-term options. I further emphasised that carrying out punitive operations below the threshold of war was a strategic compulsion to assuage public rage and for the sake of national morale and had to be carried out at the earliest but not later than ten days.
On the intervening night of 28/29 September, exactly eleven days after 18/9, the Indian army SF struck across the LoC on six/seven terrorist launch pads, destroyed the terrorist infrastructure and inflicted significant casualties’ on terrorists. The operation was meticulously planned and professionally executed. All SF teams de-inducted safely and suffered only one SF soldier who was wounded owing to a mine blast.
Needless to mention that to enable the SF operation, supporting operations were conducted by troops manning the LoC in the form of firing and physical containment using patrols and Ghatak Platoons. Having read in detail about all major SF operations over the last hundred years, I have no hesitation in saying that this operation had professionalism written over each and every aspect – political aim, political and military decision-making, Intelligence, secrecy, choice of targets, conduct and the official statement.
War or use of force as an instrument of policy is always in pursuit of a political aim. India’s long-term political aim is simple – prevent Pakistan from interfering in the internal affairs of India through a 4GW and if it does so, maintain good relations for the common good. A war of retribution, if it does not compel the adversary to accept peace on your terms, is a war without an aim and serves no purpose. The political aims of the surgical strikes were, however, limited in scope:
To send a clear signal to the international community that the threshold of India’s patience had been reached to warrant the
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exercising of hard options and that the onus of exerting diplomatic pressure on Pakistan was on the international community.
To send a clear signal to Pakistan with respect to the change in India’s strategy and that India will respond to the 4GW in a calibrated manner with punitive operations across the LoC/IB.
Retribution on Pakistan for the terrorist attack on 18/9 with targets restricted to terrorists and their infrastructure.
Force Pakistan to respond in an irrational manner and raise the ante to inflict more retribution.
Demonstrate India’s capability for world-class SF operations.
Assuage public anger and uplift national morale.
Reap domestic political dividend.
Since 1990, a fair number of proactive or reactive operations have been conducted across the LoC with or without government sanction. However, keeping in view the stated government policy of ‘strategic restraint, all these operations remained classified. ‘Alea iacta est – the die is cast said Julius Caesar on crossing the Rubicon.
The import of this operation is not in the number of enemy casualties and the infrastructure destroyed or the depth and frontage of the operation or the type of weapons used. It lies in the declaration of India’s intent for dealing with the 4GW perpetrated by Pakistan in the future.
Therein also lies the burden of expectations from the public and the media, which would want a punitive response to every 4GW action of Pakistan. By all counts, this operation so far appears to have been a standalone and a one-off operation as a signal of strategic intent and for retribution, and not part of a strategy for progressive escalation to a limited war. This operation was also contingent upon Pakistan’s outrage and irrational response wherein more retribution would have been unleashed on it. However, Pakistan did not oblige.
So, what has India achieved?
• A clear signal of strategic intent to Pakistan that India will respond to the 4GW by punitive operations across the LoC/IB.
• A signal to the international community that India’s threshold
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of patience has been crossed and the onus is on them to exert
economic and political pressure on Pakistan.
• A demonstration of Indian military prowess and ability to conduct world-class SF operations.
• Assuaged public anger and uplifted national morale.
* Demonstrated political will to take hard decisions.
Baton passes from Indian army to politicians
As opposed to the brilliant SF operation, the political management of the aftermath was an unmitigated disaster. Jingoistic political and public emotions were allowed to run wild. No effort was made to rein in the more-than-compliant media.
To the contrary, it was egged on by the credible and not-so-credible leaks to raise war hysteria knowing fully well that sooner rather than later, it will emerge that it was a one-off operation to signal a strategic intent. A junior minister commented on the use of helicopters leading to more speculation. The Raksha Mantri, of all people, said the Indian army like Hanuman had awakened to rediscover its prowess. Without any complementary mobilisation of the Armed Forces, the evacuation of villages in Punjab up to ten km from the international border, made the action politically suspect.
In such situations, only the prime minister or the Defence minister should make a terse and clear political statement and leave it at that. Political capital was already on the table. Now it is lost in the shrillness of election rhetoric. Pakistan’s smart response and our political frenzy have diluted the gains of this watershed SF operation.
Prognosis
So, are we back to business as usual? The answer is yes, but with a rider that now our response to 4GW will be in the form of calibrated transLoC/IB operations. These will continue to be at a ‘time, place, and scale of our own choosing’ and calibrated according to the situation.
Pakistan’s strategy will see no change. In fact, it perceives the events
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from 18 September to 29 September as a tactical victory. The probabilities of a limited war that may alter the current impasse are very low. Neither India nor Pakistan has so far shown any inclination to further raise the ante. We are likely to see a quiet period before Pakistan responds in the form of a major terrorist strike. However, in J&K, Pakistan will continue with business as usual, daring India to respond again.
For India, it has gained precious time to formalise its National Security Strategy and initiate long overdue structural and organisational reforms in the Armed Forces, Central Armed Police Forces and the State Police to cater for internal and external threats.
Last but not the least, it was heartening to note the political, public and media support for the Armed Forces. I only hope that it translates into removing the anomalies of the Seventh Pay Commission.
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ON SURGICAL STRIKES AND PAKISTAN, THIS EX
ARMY GENERAL HAS SOME ADVICE FOR MODI
Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave a wide-ranging interview to the news agency ANI on 1 January 2019. Three questions (Q31-Q33) pertained to the surgical strikes. Given the controversy related to the political and military aims of the surgical strikes, the results achieved and the politicisation of the event, the prime minister’s answers merit a critical analysis.
When a nation decides to use force in pursuit of national interests against another nation, it is done to achieve a political aim. The military aims and objectives are contingent upon it. The interviewer’s query was relevant and specific:
Q33: What were the objectives of this surgical strike? Terrorism has not abated, there is still cross-border terrorism. Was it used just as a deterrent? Is there now a policy of hot pursuit?
This was the most important question and the PM dodged it by taking shelter under ‘executive privilege’ with respect to national security—’I don’t consider it appropriate to talk about such things in the media?
If this was so, where was the need to make a public declaration? Even if it was necessary to send a message to Pakistan about our intent and firm resolve, then it should have stopped at the Director General of Military Operations’ (DGMO’s) cryptic statement. The prime minister himself, his
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ministers, his party and the Army Chief have endlessly talked about the surgical strikes relating them to ‘change in strategy’ to deal with Pakistan.
Once the matter is in the public domain, the nation has the right to know about the changed strategy. It is common sense that our National Security Strategy should diplomatically—and if need be militarily–force compellence on Pakistan to stop the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and acts of terrorism in the hinterland of India.
Logically, the ‘surgical strikes’ should have been in pursuit of this aim. That Pakistan has been continuing with business as usual and we have done nothing more than the surgical strikes, indicates that these were only a standalone tactical retributory action and no more.
The prime minister’s wishy-washy answer has only confirmed what was concluded by even rookie defence analysts. More than that, his elaboration—Whatever strategy is to be adopted, how to do, is ongoing at appropriate levels, has been happening. 1965 war, war during Partition…. If after one war if we think Pakistan will behave, then this is a mistake. Pakistan will take some time to behaver-only reflects the naivety of our political class with respect to strategic affairs.
His comparison of surgical strikes to ‘war’ confirms that we do not have a comprehensive National Security Strategy to deal with Pakistan.
Unmitigated politicisation
On the issue of politicisation of the surgical strikes (Q31), the prime minister concurred that there should not be any politicisation of such operations. He was prompt in blaming the Opposition for politicising the operation and belittling the army, but covered his own and his party’s actions as ‘hailing the courage of the army? Why did the prime minister not take the Opposition into confidence, if not before for security reasons then after the operation? This has been done in the past as a result of which there always was a consensus on national security.
Once the surgical strikes had been declared, owned and claimed to have never been done before, it was logical for the Opposition to ask for details. More so, when Pakistan had denied the operation.
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The ‘praising-and-hailing-the-army’ logic is only a fig leaf to cover blatant political exploitation. Posters highlighting the retribution inflicted on Pakistan appeared in poll-bound Uttar Pradesh.
Without any complementary mobilisation of the Armed Forces, the evacuation of villages in Punjab up to ten km from the International Border (IB), made the action politically suspect in another poll-bound state.
As opposed to the brilliant Special Forces operation, the political management of the aftermath was an unmitigated disaster. Selective leaks about the operation were given to friendly channels who raised the jingoistic pitch to a new high. The Defence minister, of all the people, said the Indian army-like Hanuman—had awakened to rediscover its prowess. So much for belittling the army.
The prime minister himself has missed no opportunity to use the surgical strikes in each and every political rally that he has addressed after the operation. Mega celebrations organised on the second anniversary of the surgical strikes were at par with Vijay Diwas which commemorates India’s victory in the 1971 war.
I know of no other tactical action in history that has been politicised in this manner.
While answering the question (Q32) about the state of his mind during the operation and his accountability in the event of failure, the prime minister was in his element. He candidly confessed about his bechaini (restlessness) and rage, and the anger within the army. He talked in detail about his own involvement in the detailed planning, including the training. He also described in detail his concern for the life of the soldiers and the anxious moments when they went out of communication.
One is actually waiting for the ‘leak’ of the Obama moment-type of video/photograph, showing him sitting with his advisors watching the live streaming of the operation. Full marks to him for his emotional answer to the question.
My recommendation to him is that in the many ‘wars’ (his words)
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that he would be waging to rein in Pakistan, he should focus on the strategic level with a clearly defined political aim, and avoid getting involved in the tactical-level planning and be prepared for setbacks in terms of casualties and failures.
We look up to him to force compellence on Pakistan at the strategic level and not through the success of standalone brilliant tactical operations.
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IAF STRIKE SIGNALS INDIA IS PREPARED TO GO TO A LIMITED WAR WITH PAKISTAN
The Indian Air Force struck at Jaish-e-Mohammed’s (JeM’s) ‘biggesť terrorist training camp at Balakot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan early Tuesday. Pakistan’s Director General, Inter Services Public Relations, Major General Asif Ghafoor, was the first to break the news on Twitter and followed it up with some more information later.
Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor; @OfficialDGISPR: Indian Air Force violated Line of Control. Pakistan Air Force immediately scrambled. Indian aircrafts gone back. Details to follow.
As per speculative reports, terrorist training camps at Muzaffarabad and Chakothi were also attacked. It is not clear whether the Indian aircraft crossed the Line of Control (L0C) or whether this was a ‘stand off’ attack from our side. The IAF has the capability to launch stand off attacks at ranges of 100–150 kilometres. As per various sources, twelve Mirage 2000 aircraft were used in the strikes.
A meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) was held Tuesday morning. Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale formally confirmed that a ‘pre-emptive air strike had been launched at the JeM terrorist training camp in Balakot. He highlighted that it was a ‘non-military’ intervention to pre-empt further terrorist attacks by the JeM about which there was credible Intelligence.
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Gokhale stated that the strike only focussed on the JeM camp at Balakot run by Yusuf Azhar, the brother-in-law of JeM chief, Masood Azhar. Substantial casualties have been caused to the leaders of these terrorist camps and significant infrastructure has been destroyed. Gokhale asked Pakistan to adhere to its commitment made in January 2004 to prevent its territory from being used to launch terrorist attacks on India.
A damage assessment has not yet been given by the IAF. Given the nature of the layout of the terrorist training camps, the import of the air strikes is not in the number of casualties caused or the number of buildings/huts flattened, but in the symbolism of the message — a warning to Pakistan, or a bait, to make it retaliate to precipitate the situation in order to punish it.
How is Pakistan likely to respond? How will the situation unfold? After the ‘one-off’ surgical strike following the Uri attack in September 2016, which while being a tactical success produced no strategic results, it is logical to assume that this time, the strategy is holistic to force compellence on Pakistan. This implies that India is prepared to go up the escalatory ladder all the way to a limited war.
In fact, as per our proactive strategy, the air strikes can be launched in twenty-four hours and the first ground action can begin in fortyeight hours from the time a decision has been made. These actions then continue to progress reaching the full spectrum in ten days’ time – twelve days would have given us the time for full spectrum conventional operations. Alternatively, to maintain surprise, we could still exploit the progressive action.
The ball is now squarely in Pakistan’s court. It can opt for denial, as it did after the surgical strikes, or it can respond militarily in a manner it deems fit. While we can morally justify the strike on a terrorist camp, Pakistan will call it a facade and justify its retaliation by terming the IAF strikes a violation of its sovereignty. My assessment is that Pakistan will respond militarily. It has the capability to exercise all the military options as highlighted by me earlier.
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Alea iacta est – the die is cast, said Julius Caesar on crossing the Rubicon. India has used its air power in Pakistan for the first time since 1971. We can only wait for the situation to unfold.
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90-HOUR CONFLICT WITH PAKISTAN ENDED IN A STALEMATE AND THAT’S A DEFEAT FOR INDIA
Just ninety hours proved enough to bring about a radical shift in how strategic competitive conflict between India and Pakistan would play out in the future. Unlike the tactical ‘one-off’ operation in Uri, which was Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first attempt to alter the status quo but produced no strategic results, Balakot was different.
Post-Pulwama, India’s immediate political aim was to set a new normal – to strike pre-emptively against terrorism-related targets anywhere in Pakistan – for its response to Pakistan’s proxy war driven by terrorism under the cover of an irrational nuclear strategy, and shape the international opinion against its use of terrorism as a State policy. Its military aim was to demonstrate its capability for the same, neutralise Pakistan’s response with heavy costs and be prepared for escalation.
Pakistan’s immediate political strategy was to preserve its sovereignty, retain its international relevance and deter India from exploiting the new normal.
Overall, the ninety-hour conflict, from 26 February to 1 March, ended in a stalemate, with both sides partially achieving their political and military aims. This should be a cause of concern for India as it raises questions about a lack of a comprehensive national security and military strategy.
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Gains for India
Politically, India succeeded in shaping international opinion, to some extent even China’s, against Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a State policy.
Diplomatically, India managed to isolate Pakistan post-Pulwama during the ninety-hour crisis. Backdoor diplomacy, led by the US, diffused the situation and prevailed upon Pakistan to release IAF Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.
International community has put Pakistan on a notice and has forced it to initiate action against the ‘proscribed terrorist organisations. Pakistan’s track record in this regard does not inspire confidence. One can only hope that Imran Khan’s ‘Naya Pakistan’ walks the talk.
However, given Pakistan’s geo-strategic location, its alliance’ with China and Islamic countries, and its indispensability vis-a-vis American exit from Afghanistan, India’s diplomatic gains may only be temporary
Cause for concern
Militarily, the conflict ended in a stalemate due to the quid pro quo aerial strikes by the Pakistan Air Force and the drawn’ aerial engagement, thus blunting the psychological fear regarding India’s conventional superiority.
The reasons are not hard to fathom. Rather than promptly implementing contingency plans based on a long-term formal strategy, Indian response strategy has been ad hoc and event-driven. We neither have a comprehensive strategy nor have we created the overwhelming technological and military edge, which is a prerequisite for the success of this strategy.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, carried away by political rhetoric, inadvertently admitted this inadequacy. At the India Today conclave on 2 March, he said: ‘India is feeling the absence of Rafale. The entire
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country is saying in one voice today, if we had Rafale, probably the result would have been different… He only stated the obvious.
Why just Rafale, Prime Minister, even modern rifles would make a difference. You laid the foundation stone for a rifle manufacturing unit on 3 March in Amethi at the fag end of your tenure.
Similarly, a comprehensive National Security Strategy and reforms in higher defence management, Armed Forces’ structure/organisations, and modernisation have been pending. There has been no forward movement in this regard for the last twenty years, which includes ten years each of the Congress and the BJP rule.
Stalemate is a defeat
In the last few days, Pakistan stole a march over us in perception management, which was directed at the domestic and the international audience, including India’s. In today’s transparent world, one cannot solely rely on cryptic statements by the government without credible evidence. Once politicians start managing perception through political rhetoric at rallies/public functions, sooner rather than later they score self-goals as has been evident from the contradictory statements of the BJP leadership.
Despite politically driven neo-nationalism having dominated public debates for the last five years, our threshold for pain is very low and certainly much lower than Pakistan’s. The plight of the captured air warrior became a national obsession, which in turn influenced political and military decision-making. In my view, raising the ante with more air strikes would have put us in a better strategic situation.
Warmongering in the last few weeks must not let us forget that there is a far more cost-effective option available – winning the hearts and minds of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Forcing ‘compellence’ on Pakistan is going to be a long haul. If the present diplomatic efforts fail, India may have to exploit the new normal and go up the escalatory ladder, right up to a limited war. And for
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that, a National Security Strategy and other highlighted reforms aimed at building an overwhelming technological-military edge are a prerequisite. Else, we will always be militarily stalemated and a stalemate is a defeat for India.
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KASHMIR
“DEAR PRIME MINISTER, WALK THE TALK AND HUG THE KASHMIRIS’
It has been evident for the last four years that politically-sponsored macho nationalism has impinged upon the government’s strategic flexibility in dealing with Pakistan, China, and handling of the situation in J&K. Even a pragmatic course correction is seen as a ‘setback’ or looked at with suspicion by the government’s own ‘nationalist supporters and a jingoistic media. The Opposition remains cynical and views the government’s efforts as lacking in sincerity. Consensus on major aspects of foreign and internal security policy has been lost.
This was evident when the Union Home Minister announced via Twitter on 16 June 2018 the unilateral suspension or cessation of military operations during the holy month of Ramzan in J&K. Over the last one week, the issue has been discussed threadbare. A host of issues were thrown up, and the opposition ironically came from the government’s own supporters.
The initiative was quickly termed as a ‘ceasefire’ which it is not as the unilateral suspension of military operations came with a caveat that the security forces will respond to any terrorist-initiated action or even its anticipated imminency against security forces, people or public property.
Comparisons were made with the 2000 ‘ceasefire’ which allegedly gave respite to terrorists, handicapped the security forces, and resulted
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in heavy casualties. In the year 2000, the insurgency was peaking, four to five major encounters took place every day, and the number of terrorists killed in one year was 1,500–2,000 and the numbers operating varied from 3,000–4,000. There were a number of terrorist organisations/ groups, both Pakistani and indigenous. Vajpayee had announced the ceasefire to break the impasse with Pakistan, Hurriyat, and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) – the principal indigenous terrorist organisation. Talks were held with all three. Pakistani terrorist organisations worked overtime to scuttle the negotiations by engaging the security forces and killed Majid Dar, the HM negotiator. The foreign, i.e., Pakistani terrorists did not stop their operations and security forces continued to suffer casualties. Yet the impasse was broken and earnest negotiations began with Pakistan leading to the 2003 ceasefire on the Line of Control (LoC) and establishment of a framework for negotiations which was further pursued by Manmohan Singh. The confidence of the people was regained, and the back of terrorism was broken over the next few years.
The situation now is very different. The number of terrorists is only 200–250. The number of Pakistani terrorists is negligible and indigenous terrorists have taken the lead. Training is carried out in-house and lacks quality. Due to a better counter-infiltration grid, infiltration has reduced and the availability of arms and ammunition is limited. Yet the bloodshed of the last three decades without any tangible achievement and lack of any political initiative has led to anger and frustration which has manifested into a virtual ‘fidayeen’ culture among the youth and more dangerously among the unarmed people. More common people who rush to ‘rescue’ their ‘boys’ get killed than the number of terrorists. The people now are more alienated than they were at the peak of the insurgency. Pakistan, in fact, is riding piggyback on the wretched and despondent people of Kashmir. Troops are not likely to suffer any more casualties than what was happening before 16 June 2018. These may well be less as most action is in any case initiated by the security forces. The fear of terrorist regrouping etc is ill-founded as most operations are Intelligence driven and surgical in nature. Cessation of the rather
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limited cordon and search operations will bring marginal relief to the beleaguered people.
What then is the ‘unilateral suspension of operations’ going to achieve? The answer is simple. If it is part of a larger peace initiative that includes a meaningful dialogue with all stakeholders which is sustained despite setbacks, then it is a welcome bold first step that will go a long way in assuaging the grief and despondency of the people. If not, then it will be another cosmetic step probably taken to make the PM’s visit of 19 May a success.
The PM did visit all the three parts of the state on 19 May 2018. His speeches were most appropriate. He repeated his now famous words which he had spoken from the ramparts of the Red Fort – ‘Na goli se, na gaali se, Kashmir ki samasya suljhegi gale lagaane se’ (Kashmir’s problems can be solved only by embracing the people of Kashmir, not with bullets or abuses).
Come on, Mr Prime Minister, seize the moment and walk the talk. The Indian army can maintain the status quo indefinitely, but what is the use of controlling the land without the soul of the people? And status quo implies your political failure. You are known for realpolitik and ‘hug diplomacy? The nation has placed you on a pedestal. Forget the local politicians, interlocutors and administrators, just step out and hug the people of Kashmir and the tide will turn.
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HOW ‘GUESTS’ BROUGHT TERROR TO KASHMIR
Wasim was a carefree sixteen-year-old who had cleared his class X and lived high above the gorge of Chenab, in the Kishtwar district of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Apart from trekking eight kilometres to school in Kishtwar, he had to help in his parents’ fields and tend to the livestock. He was determined to study hard and make it in life. His parents had worked hard to enable him to study and his beautiful nineteen-year-old sister doted on him.
One day, news arrived that some ‘guests’ (Kashmiri nickname for Pakistani terrorists) had arrived from Pakistan to assist the Kashmiris to fight for their cause. The elders passed the word that these guests’ must be given all assistance and no information must be given about their presence to the police and the army.
While grazing his sheep, Wasim encountered the ‘guests’ at a dhok (a temporary shelter). There were four from Punjab and one Kashmiri from Kokernag. All five were armed with AK-47 rifles and grenades. On learning that his house was at a little distance from the village, they said they would be visiting Wasim soon.
Over the next three months, these ‘guests’ became frequent visitors to Wasim’s house. They came for meals and often asked for grain and chicken. Despite not being wealthy, the family somehow coped with the situation.
Soon indecent proposals were made to Wasim’s mother and sister.
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Wasim did not want his mother and sister to meet the fate of some other women from the village and asked his father to go to the police. His father explained his majboori (helplessness) and admonished him.
Wasim was smart enough to understand the situation and the helplessness of his father and rest of the village. But Wasim was made of sterner stuff. One day, after school, he made his way to the base of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) Company and demanded to meet the Company Commander. After the meeting, Wasim went and announced to his parents that he was going to join the ‘guests’ to fight for the cause.
Wasim went to the dhok and offered his services to the ‘guests. The leader laid a condition that unless he proved his commitment by an action against the army, they could not trust him. Wasim readily agreed. He was given a grenade to attack the army. After a few days of watching a patrol coming out of the base, Wasim lay in wait in a forested patch and threw the grenade. The patrol responded with firing, but Wasim managed to get away. Soon the area was rife with news that one soldier had been killed and two wounded. An ambulance was seen evacuating the dead and the injured.
After a few days, Wasim was formally inducted into the terrorist group. He won their trust and was even detailed as a lookout sentry to enable the others to rest. However, he was not yet trusted enough to be given a weapon. One day, he was asked to arrange the nikah (marriage) between one of the terrorists and his sister. The date for the nikah was fixed.
Two days before that date, Wasim was on sentry duty at the dhok. Suddenly he saw a message on his mobile and went into the forest. He emerged along with a number of shadowy figures. The dhok was surrounded and the five terrorists were overpowered and killed using commando knives. The bodies were carried away and not a trace was left behind. Wasim returned home and told the village that the ‘guests’ had left the area for another mission.
Wasim finished his schooling and joined the army. His sister was suitably married. The remote village where they lived had a RR post
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established nearby to prevent the area from being dominated by the ‘guests’ in the future.
In another part of Kashmir, there was another village in which a very different story played out. Here too there were ‘guests’ and a young Kashmiri, along with the army, but the ending was very different.
Here, in this village, was a young woman who was the proverbial village belle. Good-looking and educated, the daughter of the sarpanch, and – according to Intelligence received – in a relationship with a ‘guest! A Brigadier who also happened to be the RR Sector Commander had a chat with the girl’s father. The father expressed his helplessness, both on account of a ‘fear of the gun’ and due to social pressure since most of the people in the area had committed themselves to the ’cause!
When the father was asked to explain the ’cause, he said, ‘I am not clear. Some say, it is azadi, but azadi from whom, and how will it change our life? Some say we have to join Pakistan. I am not clear why I must join people on the other side of the Pir Panjal when I have nothing in common with them. Some say, “Islam is in danger”. I do not see the danger. I pray, and I am able to practice Islam as per the Prophet’s tenets. In fact, the only danger that I see at the moment is to my izzat (dignity)?
Assuming the girl was being forced into a relationship against her will, the Brigadier decided to have a chat with her. He found her to be articulate and confident. When she said she was committed to the ’cause, the Brigadier asked her to explain the ’cause!
“Sahib, you know the cause is the way to a better life, she told him. Better education, better job opportunities, better standard of living, and last but not least, a life of dignity. The Brigadier countered by asking her what was the guarantee that those forces fighting for the ’cause would ensure these conditions, presuming that the state hadn’t. “What kind of leaders are these who live in fortresses guarded by scores of security men?’ she asked. “Azadi, Pakistan and Islam are only another name for Inquilab. That is the real “cause”. Aur hamein yeh Inquilab lana hee hai’ (And we will have to bring about this revolution).
Taken aback by her tirade, the Brigadier said that similar problems
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existed in other parts of India, but there, people have not taken up arms. She said that they do not have an opportunity, but Kashmiris do. Finally, the Brigadier asked her, what was the need to associate with a terrorist? She replied, ‘Yeh mamla toh dil ka hai’ (This is a matter of the heart). The Brigadier warned her that life of terrorists was short. She thumped her chest and said, ‘Inquilab zindabad!
A few days later, news reached the Brigadier that the girl and her terrorist friend, along with two more terrorists, had been killed in an ambush.
Both these stories are from 2007, both of them are about Kashmiri villagers who were young, vivacious and committed to their beliefs. Yet, ultimately, it turned out, they have nothing in common. Their stories act as a reminder that we’re all motivated by myriad emotions that – despite how much we may have in common – make us individuals, with actions that can have starkly different reactions.
(This article was originally published in Newslaundry, 11 November 2016)
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AFTER ARTICLE 370, MODI’S FIRST TEST IN J&K WILL BEGIN ONCE CURFEW IS LIFTED
The irony is hard to miss. While the nation celebrates the Narendra Modi government’s move to abrogate Article 370 and bring about the ‘final merger’ of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India, people of the state are in quarantine imposed by unprecedented deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). The state itself has been divided and its status reduced to two Union Territories of J&K and Ladakh.
The Modi government will face its first big test in J&K when the curfew is lifted and people hit the streets to vent their frustration. The protests will be unprecedented with separatists and mainstream political parties of J&K joining hands. The heavy deployment of security forces is anyway unprecedented and, therefore, there is every chance that the situation may spiral out of control.
How the government and the security forces handle these protests will determine the future course of events in J&K.
Opting for the crude way T
he writ of the Constitution prevails over the territory, but not necessarily in the hearts and minds of the people. The abrogation of Article 370 is nothing more than an ideological and emotional victory for the BJP government. It is likely to give impetus to the insurgency in Kashmir.
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Articles 370 and 35A had outlived their life and deserved to be abrogated. But as a responsible constitutional democracy, we should have done it with finesse and constitutional propriety. We should have secured the willing cooperation of the people rather than pushing it in a crude manner.
Upholding the Kashmiri identity The merger of J&K – the only Muslim-majority state to willingly merge with India – was a result of the ‘Kashmiri identity’ prevailing over the ‘Muslim identity. Articles 370 and 35A symbolically upheld the ‘Kashmiri identity’ and ensured that the religion of the majority did not occupy centre stage in the state. It was the political failure of successive governments at the Centre that led to religious identity becoming the primary motivation for the insurgency in J&K since 1989.
While political parties in the state and at the Centre have always tried to politicise Article 370, people of Kashmir have always seen Article 370 as an emotional bond with the rest of India. · Recall the thunderous applause received by the then Prime Minister Vajpayee when he coined the slogan, Insaniyat, Kashmiriyat and Jamhooriyat’as part of his Kashmir policy. People of Kashmir welcomed Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he invoked Vajpayee’s Kashmir vision during the 2014 assembly election campaign.
The Vajpayee vision for Kashmir, once the pride of the BJP, has been flouted with impunity on all three counts – Insaniyat, Kashmiriyat and Jamhooriyat.
A deliberate insult Now with Article 370 set to be abrogated, the ‘Muslim identity’ will permanently prevail over the ‘Kashmiri identity and fuel insurgency. To reduce one of the largest pre-Partition princely states of India into a Union Territory will be seen by the state’s majority as a deliberate insult.
This will polarise the state’s Muslim population. In the last decade, insurgency was restricted to the Valley. Now, I foresee a return of the
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insurgency in the Muslim-majority areas in the southwest and southeast of the Pir Panjal range.
Further, in the last five years, the regional parties in J&K have been politically sidelined by the BJP. With Article 370 gone, there is little to distinguish them from the separatist political entities. Cadres of both are likely to join forces to emerge as the political face of the revived insurgency.
Push from Pakistan
As an ‘honest broker’ in Afghanistan, Pakistan is back in favour with the US. Far from being isolated, as it appeared post-Balakot, it is now in a pivotal position in the region, enjoying the support of the US, China, Russia and the oil-rich Islamic nations. Pakistan will seize the opportunity created by the abrogation of Article 370 to upgrade the proxy war.
I foresee infiltration of better-trained Pakistani terrorists and smuggling of arms and ammunition in greater quantities in J&K to give a boost to the proxy war. The religious polarisation will also be exploited by pan-Islamic terrorist organisations, like the Al-Qaeda and the ISIS.
Stick to time-tested model
Given the ease with which the BJP-led government was able to ‘scrap’ Article 370, backed by an emotionally-charged nation, it will be tempted to come down on terrorism with a heavy hand, making no distinction between terrorists and sympathisers, as seen in the recent past.
But it would be prudent for the Indian army to continue with its timetested people-friendly model in Kashmir. The Armed Forces must gear up for the long haul to deal with revived insurgency. The government, instead of riding on military strategy, must begin the political process to win people’s trust.
(This article was originally published in The Print, 6 August 2019)
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HOW THIS GENERAL SAW KASHMIR 50 YEARS AGO
As India is caught between two conflicting narratives on Kashmir – ‘all is well or a ‘tragedy is unfolding’ – I hark back to my first visit to the Valley more than fifty years ago.
As a Second Lieutenant, I was on my first independent assignment as an umpire in the annual counter-infiltration exercise conducted in the Valley. Infiltration in December 1968 meant 400-500 strong columns of Pakistani regulars/irregulars exploiting the vast gaps, due to paucity of troops, along the Cease Fire Line (CFL), now the Line of Control (LoC).
The CFL was manned by 19 Infantry Division and the interior of the Valley was the responsibility of the Victor Force – an ad hoc division size force consisting of one brigade and 5-6 BSF battalions. The director of the counter-infiltration exercise was none other than Brigadier Z.C. Bakshi (later Lt Gen) whose brigade had captured the Haji Pir Pass in August 1965. The duration of the exercise was ten days. After the coordinating conference, Brigadier Bakshi gave us another four days for ‘rest and refiť (army jargon for a paid holiday) for sightseeing. Impetuously, I requested for another week as it was my first visit, which was granted.
For the next few weeks, I explored Kashmir, from Verinag (source of Jhelum) to Kupwara and Sonamarg to Gulmarg. The experience gave me an insight into the life in Kashmir.
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The question of identity & autonomy
Kashmiris are very conscious of their identity. It has less to do with religion, and more to do with culture. My first impression was that Kashmiris perceived the ‘special status’ as a way to preserve their identity and culture.
At that time, there was a deep resentment among Kashmiris over the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 and the gradual dilution of the state’s autonomy.
Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir, a religio-political organisation which advocated Kashmiri self-determination, was fast making inroads into the Valley. The Plebiscite Front patronised by Sheikh Abdullah, which called for a referendum under the UN, was also gaining popularity.
The corruption and misrule under successive governments in the state only fuelled the demand for self-determination.
Chance encounter with Sheikh Abdullah
During my exploration of the Valley, I had a chance encounter with Sheikh Abdullah. I was buying apples at a wayside shop close to the Dal Lake when the tall, well-dressed Abdullah came and stood next to me. I greeted him and we soon got talking. I enquired about his health and we discussed the larger political situation in the Valley. In between his ambiguous remarks, one comment stood out – ‘Fortunes keep changing in politics, but the resentment among the people is only increasing?
I reminded him about a reception he’d hosted for 1 Patiala (now 15 Punjab) in December 1948 when my father was the second-incommand. He immediately remembered – ‘Sukhdev (Brigadier Sukhdev Singh), Shamsher (Colonel Shamsher Singh), and Hazura (Major Hazura Singh). How are they?’ With great pride, he said, ‘Hum sabh sath-sath ladey thhe’ (We all fought together).
Even as a twenty-one-year-old it was evident to me that Sheikh Abdullah was no separatist (unlike the general impression in India then) and that as a nation we had politically failed to consolidate the integration of the Valley with India.
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No signs of fundamentalism
There were no visible signs of fundamentalism in Kashmir. The congregations at the Sufi shrines were as large as those at the traditional mosques, and I saw many Hindus praying there. Muslims visiting Hindu temples was also a common sight, and tourism was booming in the state.
Army enjoyed people’s confidence
Security was a non-issue in Kashmir and I could travel anywhere, in uniform or casuals, without carrying a weapon.
The volunteers of the Jammat-e-Islami and the Plebiscite Front never missed an opportunity to stage protests, but their numbers were still small to make an impact.
In the absence of pucca roads, the army was the largest employer, and enjoyed the confidence of the people.
Once en route to Chinamarg Gali (located at a height of 14,000 ft above sea level on the Pir Panjal range), my radio operator and I lost our way. At sunset, we stopped at a Bakarwal hut for directions. We realised that the men had taken the livestock for grazing and only two young women were present. Taking note of the delicate situation, I apologised and started walking back.
Such was the confidence of the people in the army that the women walked up to us and said, ‘Bhai, kya baat hai?’ (Brother, what’s the issue?)
I explained the situation and the two women volunteered to guide us. It was dark but they walked with us for a kilometre to show us the way.
Betraying the trust
It should be clear that it is the political leadership in the Valley and at the Centre that has betrayed the trust of the Kashmiris. And, we in the rest of the country are only compounding the problem by linking the fate of an entire region with a couple of hundred terrorists.
(This article was originally published in The Print, 5 September 2019)
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PM MODI NEEDS TO MAKE AN EMOTIONAL APPEAL TO KASHMIRIS-LIKE VAJPAYEE
AND MANMOHAN DID
At the joint press conference with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in France, Prime Minister Narendra Modi conveyed one message unambiguously. He made it clear to America and the world that all issues between India and Pakistan are bilateral and ensured the international community accepts India’s viewpoint on abrogation of Article 370.
In the three weeks between Jammu and Kashmir losing its special status and the Modi government making the international community, barring China, endorse its stand, the developments prove that India’s short-term strategy has been very successful. The situation on the ground in Kashmir is under control. The unprecedented deployment of security forces, the Valley’s curfewed streets and the ‘information blackout have ensured there are no mass protests – violent or peaceful – and there is no loss of life.
But while the Modi government has achieved its immediate political aim, India’s long-term strategy remains unclear. Except for vague political rhetoric, one has heard little about the government’s plans for Kashmir in the long run. Have we reconciled to the idea of controlling the territory of J&K without the ‘soul of its people?
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If the Modi government intends to win the hearts and minds of Kashmiris, then it has an endless ‘to-do list to follow, which has been discussed ad nauseam. Here are some recommendations based on my experience.
Us versus them
‘People of India’ versus the ‘Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir’ is the predominant narrative. The politicians, the public and the media have fallen prey to it. Little or no distinction is made between the Kashmiris and the terrorists. This narrative is against the norms of a civilised society.
Of course, violence in Jammu and Kashmir to a large extent has been the principal cause for tensions, but are we going to punish 8.5 million people for the crimes of 250-odd terrorists? If this narrative percolates down to the Armed Forces, the early signs of which, in my view, are discernible, the consequences will be horrendous.
This narrative has to change. As a nation, we cannot lose our moral compass.
Appeal to emotions
It is empirical wisdom that no matter how aggrieved the people may be, an emotional appeal by the highest authority can bridge the gap to a great degree. That is exactly what former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his successor Manmohan Singh did, paving the way for the situation in Kashmir to be brought to near-normal by 2012.
So far, the Modi government hasn’t, either in its first tenure or in the second, taken any such action. Prime Minister Modi should go beyond a televised gesture and make a direct emotional appeal to the people of Jammu and Kashmir explaining his political strategy, plans for their development and well-being, and his approach to reconciliation.
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Development plans
The short-term and the long-term development plans must be spelt out in concrete terms detailing when and how they will be carried out instead of being simply announced as rhetorical promises.
The short-term development plans and welfare measures must fructify fast and their impact must be visible for the people to see in the near future.
Rope in the youth
The key to Jammu and Kashmir’s future are the post-1989 youth who have seen nothing but violence. Many of them are educated and aspirational. Lack of jobs and the prevailing circumstances have resulted in frustration and ‘anti-national sentiments among the youth. When these sentiments fester for far too long, the gun is only one step away.
As a nation, we must take affirmative action to employ the youth of Jammu and Kashmir. The Modi government must guarantee them the right to work and launch a stipend scheme as per qualifications as soon as possible.
Education and health
Good education and healthcare are basic rights of the country’s citizens. Improvement in both never fails to touch the hearts of the people. We must transform these two sectors in Jammu and Kashmir and make it a model for the whole country.
A large segment of the population has been psychologically affected by violence for years. This problem has to be specifically addressed.
National effort
Let there be no doubt that Jammu and Kashmir or any part of it is not going anywhere. It was and will remain an inalienable part of India. The choice is ours whether we would like to keep it with or without the ‘hearts and minds of the people who live there. This is not the time for triumphalism but for reconciliation.
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If we the people and our elected government show the wisdom and the will, Jammu and Kashmir can be a model for the rest of the country in five years.
(This article was originally published in The Print, 29 August 2019)
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MODI GOVERNMENT IS RIDING
A TIGER IN KASHMIR
The Indian State has been containing, managing and resolving, wholly or partially, insurgencies for the last six decades. Nagaland, Assam, Mizoram and Punjab are stellar examples.
Over the years, a time-tested strategy has been evolved, which entails absolutely no compromise with the unity and territorial integrity, people-friendly military operations, adhering to the law of the land, and respect for human rights. It also involves militarily reducing the insurgency to manageable levels to facilitate persuasion and political dialogue, negotiating with both overt and covert leadership, giving concessions within the Constitution, and signing a formal accord to restore democracy.
This strategy is based on the theory that people seek dignity and well-being above everything else. In a democracy, as long as the State does not use its powers indiscriminately, the romanticism associated with the separatist cause withers away with the passage of time. Finally, people come around to compromise on the ideals for a better future.
In Jammu and Kashmir, every government has followed this strategy till 2014.
Failing to provide a political solution
Despite containing insurgency and restoring democracy in J&K in 1996,
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the powers that be failed to find a lasting political solution.
The insurgency once again peaked during 2000–2003 and thereafter witnessed a decline, hitting a real low between 2011 and 2015. Post-2015, Pakistan (as well as separatists) has strived to resurrect the insurgency in the Valley, but the scale has remained within manageable limits – currently, about 250 terrorists are active in J&K.
There are many reasons for India’s political failure to resolve the Kashmir issue. The active support of Pakistan, which has kept the hopes of the separatist leadership alive; the over-reliance on mainstream political governments/parties, which have failed to satisfy the aspirations of the people; the failure of the Central government to evolve a consistent political strategy to engage with the separatist leadership; and making Pakistan a party to the problem.
Adopting a ‘muscular’ approach
The Modi government initially followed the time-tested policy, but with a ‘muscular’ approach, to deal with terrorists and the separatist leadership. In J&K, the BJP formed a coalition government with Mehbooba Mufti’s Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), but it failed to provide the much-needed healing touch to go along with the political process.
There was no worthwhile political engagement. Ideology and nationalism were over-emphasised and special status of J&K was questioned. Political and public jingoism led to the security forces deviating from the time-tested people-friendly operations.
The people resorted to violent mass protests out of frustration and even started disrupting anti-terrorist military operations. The government in New Delhi lost patience and imposed Governor’s rule with effect from 20 June 2018.
Ideology trumps political wisdom
On the brighter side, the Modi government managed to diplomatically isolate Pakistan and aggressively carried out operations across the Line
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of Control (LOC and/or the International Border or IB) in the form of surgical strikes. This government no longer considered Pakistan as a stakeholder in Kashmir, treating it only as a perpetrator of terrorism.
With this backdrop, expectations were running high when the Modi government came back to power with a bigger mandate in 2019. Everyone hoped that the government would go back to the time-tested national strategy to find a political solution to Kashmir.
Post Pulwama, the security forces through sustained operations had created the right environment for holding fresh elections. Pushed to a corner and facing criminal investigations, the separatist leadership was also amenable to the idea of renewing the political process to find a lasting solution for J&K.
However, the success of a high-pitched national security-driven campaign emboldened the BJP, and ideology trumped political wisdom. Article 370 was nullified on 5 August under the cover of massive deployment of security forces and a ‘communication blackout
Alienation and urge to resist
There was no logical reason other than political ideology for revoking the moth-eaten Article 370. And by so doing, the symbolic hope for political reconciliation has been shattered.
The situation in the Valley has since gone from bad to worse. People in Kashmir feel that their culture and identity are now under threat. The hope of the silent moderate majority for a political solution has given way to despondency and people are more alienated than ever. They believe they have been ‘cornered and have no option left but toʻresist. In view of the massive deployment of the paramilitary forces, the resistance has manifested into ‘civil disobedience’ and non-cooperation – against which the State is powerless.
More violence likely
Let there be no doubt that the Modi government is riding a tiger in Kashmir. The massive presence of security forces has ensured that
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peaceful/violent mass protests cannot take place. But the sword of Damocles is hanging over Kashmir’s future. The international community has pointed at the ‘humanitarian crisis’ in Kashmir.
The absolute alienation of the people is being exploited by separatists and Pakistan to resurrect insurgency. Violence has been on the rise in October, with people from outside the state being targeted in terror attacks – the latest incident took place in Kulgam district on 29 October in which five labourers from West Bengal were killed.
I foresee an increase in Kulgam-like violence and terror activity.
How to get off the tiger?
In my view, there is no other option but to revert to the time-tested counter-insurgency strategy that India has been following since 1956.
Release all political leaders and let normal political activity begin. Stop the ‘us versus them’ narrative – the separatist Muslims of Kashmir versus a nationalist India – in politics and the media. Draw a clear distinction between citizens and terrorists. Under no circumstances should the security forces deviate from people-friendly operations and the principle of using minimum force.
The prime minister must go to Kashmir and make an emotional appeal to the people in the presence of the political leadership of J&K, leaders of the Opposition and the corporate community.
This is a fail-safe approach to heal the scarred psyche of the people. He must announce the following steps:
A time-bound, scheduled restoration of pre-5 August ‘normalcy?
Resumption of political activity and holding of elections.
Broad outline of a development package with public and private commitment.
A stipend scheme for unemployed youth and affirmative legislation to employ them with the private industry in other states.
Broad outline of the dialogue process with all stakeholders, including separatists.
Concessions within the Constitution to maintain the culture and
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identity of J&K – it could be a modified version of Article 370.
*Outlining an education and healthcare package since these aspects
are always the closest to people’s hearts. The prime minister has the oratorical skills and a proven track record to not just promise, but also deliver. I have no doubt that he can convince the people of Kashmir.
(This article was originally published in The Print, 31 October 2019)
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I’M OK, BUT THE DAMN TIGRESS
TOOK MY RIFLE
The year was 1954, 17 Sikh was located at Agra and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shamsher Singh, whose outstanding leadership and exploits in the 1947–48 war in Jammu and Kashmir were part of regimental lore. The unit was out on a training camp in a forest near Shivpuri, which was to culminate in a test exercise.
One day, Sepoy Fauja Singh, who was part of the officers’ mess staff, went to collect firewood for the kitchen. Suddenly, a tigress jumped out from a thicket and pounced on him. Instinctively, he tried to fight her off with his bare hands. After a brief struggle, the tigress caught Fauja Singh’s turban in her mouth and thinking that she had got the kill, disappeared back into the thicket. Fauja Singh was badly mauled and he was evacuated to the military hospital immediately, but more to the point, he was extremely upset about the loss of his turban.
More reports poured in about the tigress with four cubs, which had turned into a man-eater – she had killed two persons from a village nearby – or so it seemed. True to the Indian army tradition, this didn’t stop the training, which continued as per plan, and the test exercise was cleared with honours.
At the end of the exercise, Lt Col Shamsher Singh proposed to his Brigade Commander, Brigadier Danny Misra, that since the tigress
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had turned into a man-eater and the area was used by the brigade for training, it would be prudent to kill the tigress. Back in those days, shikar was allowed and a hobby for some in the country. Brig Danny Misra agreed to the proposal, but with a rider. ‘Shamsher, he said, “killing a tiger with rifles is too easy. Can the Sikhs do it with bayonets?’ Never one to shy away from a challenge, Singh said, “So shall it be, sir! | The die was cast. Shamsher returned and briefed his unit. He pepped his soldiers up by telling them stories of how Hari Singh Nalwa, commander-in-chief of the Sikh Khalsa army, had once killed a tiger with his bare hands by catching hold of its tongue and choking it.
It was decided that the unit would assault the general area where the tigress was suspected to have ‘hidden’ in the traditional infantry manner. Once the tigress attacked an individual, he must use the bayonet to counter-attack while the personnel on his flanks would turn inwards to attack the tigress with bayonets and finish the task. This drill was rehearsed to perfection. Next morning, two companies of 17 Sikh formed an assault line 200 yards long, with the Commanding Officer’s party in the centre. Bayonets were fixed on the Enfield .303 rifles and the assault commenced.
It was a surreal scene: bayonets glinted in the morning sun with soldiers of 17 Sikh shouting, “Jo bole so nihall, out to kill a man-eating tigress with only bayonets! On the far side of the suspected area, the Divisional Commander, General Dargalkar and Brig Danny Misra, sat on a machan with sporting rifles. Misra didn’t believe the tigress could be killed with bayonets. His plan was that the assault by 17 Sikh would drive the tigress towards the machan, where Gen Dargalkar and he would kill her.
The movement of the assault line was laborious due to the broken terrain but after twenty minutes, the den of the tigress was located. She had fled, but her three cubs were found, captured alive and later presented to the Agra zoo. Fauja Singh’s turban was also found in the den.
The assault line formed again and moved forward with the regimental war cry. After ten minutes, the roar of the tigress was heard. Singh
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shouted to his boys, ‘Tagde ho jao! (Gird up and get ready for action!) And then, suddenly, the tigress leapt out of the thicket and attacked the assault line. Sepoy Sucha Singh was directly in front and he adopted the traditional bayonet fighting stance, meeting the tigress’ assault head on with his weapon. As she came at him, he plunged his bayonet into her chest. It got buried to the hilt, inside the tigress’ chest, but the momentum of her charge knocked Sucha Singh down as well as the tigress who fell ten yards forward. As per the rehearsed drill, the soldiers on the flanks turned inwards and pounced on the tigress, pinning her down with their bayonets. It wasn’t necessary. Sucha Singh’s bayonet had already pierced her heart. u It was then that the sound of a rifle shot was heard. Shamsher was livid with anger, thinking one of his men had disobeyed his orders. He rushed to the scene and asked who had fired the shot. The soldiers assured him that no shot had been fired and the report had come from the direction of the machan. Shamsher ordered the success signal be fired with the Very Light Pistol and 500 voices joined him in the long jaikara (celebratory cry) of ‘Jo bole so nihal!
Then Shamsher rushed to Sucha Singh, who was badly mauled, but on enquiry about his wounds said, “Saab ji, main tan theek haan, par woh sali sherni meri rifle lai gayee’ (Sir, I am ok, but the damn tigress has taken off with my rifle). The loss of a weapon is a very serious lapse in the army! Sucha Singh was assured that the rifle had been recovered and that he was now nearly at par with the great Hari Singh Nalwa for having single-handedly killed a tigress. He was later evacuated to the military hospital.
A telegram was despatched to Fauja Singh: ‘Revenge taken! Tigress killed! Turban recovered!’ Sepoy Sucha Singh was immediately promoted to Lance Naik and on that day, 17 Sikh was rechristened the Tiger Battalion.
The bayonet of Sucha Singh had developed a ten-degree curve due to the force of the impact with the tigress. A most unusual occurrence, as bayonets are usually made of brittle metal designed to pierce and
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break when it hits a hard surface. Shamsher directed that Sucha Singh’s bayonet be kept as a trophy. The Quartermaster in his enthusiasm to get Sucha Singh a replacement for his bayonet, sent it back to the ordnance depot. Fortunately, it was located and brought right back to the unit. The bayonet, along with the skin of the tigress and newspaper coverage of the event, still adorns the officers’ mess of 17 Sikh – the Tiger Battalion.
While Sucha Singh was being taken to the military hospital, Shamsher went to the machan to report the success of the mission to Misra and Dargalkar, who were still on the machan. To his amusement and the embarrassment of the VIPs, Shamsher learnt that in the excitement of the whole action, one of the rifles from the VIP machan had accidentally got fired. That was the rifle shot Shamsher had heard!
Later, Misra along with Shamsher went to meet Sucha Singh in hospital. The Brigadier asked Sucha Singh, ‘Kya aapne hee sherni ko mara tha?’ (Are you the one who killed the tigress?) A peeved Sucha Singh replied, “Asli bayonet toh maine hee mara tha, sir, par bad mein aur bhi maarte gaye. Aur maine suna ki dar ke marey VIP machan se kisi ki rifle nichhe gir kar fire ho gayee (I’m the one who got her with the bayonet first, but others attacked the dead tigress too. And I heard that up in the VIP machan, someone got so scared that he dropped his rifle by mistake and fired it).
Nine years later, Colonel Shamsher as the Centre Commandant of the Sikh Regimental Centre at Meerut Cantonment was interviewing soldiers going on pension when he heard the familiar voice of Havaldar Sucha Singh. He reported that he was going on pension. Shamsher took a quick decision and directed the pension orders to be cancelled. Instead, Sucha Singh was promoted to the rank of Jemadar. There were objections from higher headquarters, but Shamsher had a simple reply: ‘Sucha Singh is probably the only man in history to have killed a tigress with a bayonet. He deserves to be a JCO!
I was six years old, living in Agra Cantonment, when all this happened. I remember when the Commanding Officer’s jeep came back from the
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exercise, spread across the bonnet was the tigress, and it seemed like all of Agra was lined up on Mall Road to welcome the unit.
But the story with all its details and glory was told to me by someone who was there and had seen the whole thing: Colonel Shamsher Singh, my father.
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THE STORY OF ‘SHER BACHHA: BRAVEHEART
SOLDIER WHO SAVED POONCH
Nestled between the Betar Nala to the west and Poonch river to the south, Poonch is a historical town along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. It’s a place that occupies an important place in our military history and also one that has produced some legendary characters, including two unforgettable members of the Indian army, who were in their own way the Rajas of Poonch.
Our logistics base for 4 Sikh in Poonch was near the old palace of its former king that was designed like a European castle. Our officers’ mess was called Joginder Mahal and was located in the house of a former jagirdar (landowner). Outside Joginder Mahal, under a chinar tree, were the quarters of Havaldar Raja Singh, the unit mascot of 4 Sikh – a sixfoot tall (when standing), 250 kg Himalayan black bear!
Raja’s original home was in the forested Loran Valley at the base of the Pir Panjal, where one of our long-range patrols had rescued him from a pack of jackals. He was just two or three months old then and had apparently been separated from his mother. Raja was brought back to the unit and enrolled as the unit mascot. As per military tradition, he was given a regimental number and also authorised rations, uniform and veterinary services. Kalu Ram, our barman, was made his keeper and instructor.
Raja was a fast learner and was soon learning a new trick every
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fortnight. He also grew up fast and in two-and-a-half years, he was a fully-grown, handsome animal. His rations increased to the equivalent of five soldiers and rules had to be bent to feed him.
And why not? After all, Raja did everything along with the soldiers at the logistics base. He was up for physical training at 6.00 a.m., did three to four hours of training and one hour of games in the evening. He learnt the basic military drill movements of savdhan (attention), vishram (at ease) and salute. A dummy rifle was obtained for him and apart from rifle drill movements, he could also adopt the prone firing position. He would salute us whenever we came out or went into the mess.
Raja was always on parade with officers and Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) for introduction to the VIPs during inspections and visits. He kept the visitors engaged and happy, leaving them with little time for inspection and ‘fault finding’ – a peculiar trait of senior officers.
When not chained – his chain was merely a token – Raja would frequent two places. The first was the mud huts of officers to look for biscuits, a habit for which officers were themselves responsible. More frequently, he would head for the officers’ mess bar to look for beer – a brew of which he became fond of owing to the indulgence of Kalu Ram. Raja had to be disciplined and allowed only one bottle a week. And being a bear with standards, he liked it chilled and refused warm beer. Once, as a cub, Raja had raided the mess kitchen an hour before a party and eaten up all the cooked food. The party had to be turned into a virtual drinking orgy to gain time and restock the food. Raja was punished – with extra drill parades.
Pranks apart, Raja’s good training made him rise rapidly within the ranks. In three years, he rose from sepoy to havaldar, which was prominently displayed on his uniform coat. However, despite all this, the career of Havaldar Raja Singh the Bear was doomed.
As Raja stepped into adulthood, his libido roared into action and he started doing what all boys do – self-gratification. In the predominantly male environment, this would have been a non-issue, but one day he
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indulged himself during the visit of the spouse of a government official. The lady in question (who would later rise to prominence in national politics) probably understood it as a normal facet of animal behaviour, but our Commanding Officer was very embarrassed.
As a first step to discipline him, Raja’s court martial was ordered and a mock court martial was actually held. The Commanding Officer was in favour of demotion to the rank of naik, but after other members prevailed upon him, he let Raja off with a severe reprimand but with a rider – Raja would be neutered because the unit was moving back to a peace station.
There were no tranquilliser guns for animals those days and Raja had to be held in place during the operation by soldiers. Having been a free animal all his life, Raja panicked and experienced tremendous stress at being restrained and died of a cardiac arrest. A military burial with gun salute marked the end of Raja Singh who was buried near the officers’ mess and a commemorative marble plaque was installed to honour him.
About 1.5 kilometres to the south west of Raja’s grave, across the Betar Nala, stands the Poonch War Memorial commemorating the siege of Poonch, 1947–48 and its brave defenders led by Lt Col (later Brigadier) Pritam Singh, MC – a military legend in his lifetime who faced an ignominious end to his military career.
Brigadier Pritam Singh was known as sher bachha (son of a tiger) because of his outstanding leadership during the siege of Poonch that continued from 22 November 1947 to 21 November 1948. Singh’s career was full of dramatic stories. As a young officer, Brig Pritam Singh was wounded in the battle of Singapore in 1942 and was taken Prisoner Of War (POW). He escaped from the POW camp and after a gruelling journey of six months through the forests of Burma (now, Myanmar), landed in Manipur. He was awarded the coveted Military Cross for his great escape.
Years later, as a Lieutenant Colonel, on 30 October 1947, he went to the Army Headquarters while on leave. When he heard of the grave
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situation in J&K, he volunteered to take his unit, 1 Kumaon, to Srinagar. The same evening, he was given his posting order and Lt Col Singh landed up with his unit at Srinagar the next day, on 31 October 1947.
The unit quickly joined the battle at Shallteng along with 1 Sikh. This battle was the turning point in the Valley and in the next three weeks, the enemy was chased back beyond Uri. But there was no rest for 1 Kumaon – Pritam Singh was tasked to relieve Poonch, which was under siege, via the Haji Pir Pass. After a gruelling march, 1 Kumaon fought its way into Poonch on 21 November 1947, with 419 men. However, soon the unit itself got besieged. Poonch was held by 1,400 men of J&K forces who had withdrawn from Mirpur, Kotli and Jhangar. There were 40,000 refugees who had escaped the massacres in these towns. All the surrounding heights around Poonch were held by the enemy; rations for soldiers and civilians were just enough for one week and ammunition was down to a few rounds per soldier.
This is when Singh proved Napoleon’s maxim that, ‘In war it is not men, but the “man” who counts. The man in question was Lt Col Pritam Singh. J&K forces garrison was preparing for withdrawal and 40,000 Hindus and Sikhs were awaiting certain death. Pritam Singh cancelled the orders for withdrawal, immediately reorganised the defences, and took charge of the administration. He attacked the enemy positions in the immediate vicinity to secure the town. With the help of civilians, he constructed an airstrip on which the legendary pilot of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Air Commodore ‘Baba’ Mehar Singh, MVC, DSO, Commander No 1 Operations Group (which was responsible for air operations in Jammu and Kashmir) along with Air Vice Marshal (later Chief of Air Staff) Subrato Mukerjee landed in a Harvard aircraft on 12 December 1947.
On the same day, Dakota aircrafts started landing. Mehar Singh soon established an ‘air bridge’ to Poonch with the Dakotas carrying in supplies, guns and ammunition and taking back refugees. The IAF coined the term ‘Poonching’ – the technique of flying in the narrow valleys with transport aircraft. Mehar Singh also modified Dakota aircraft to bomb enemy positions. Pritam Singh raised two militia battalions, 11
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and 8 J&K Militia, from able-bodied men of Poonch. One more unit, 3/9 Gorkha Rifles, was air landed in January-February 1948. Singh was promoted to the rank of Brigadier.
For the next one year, a fierce struggle continued at Poonch. Ground was being taken, lost, to be retaken again; blows were being absorbed and delivered back with greater ferocity; where cries came with every dawn; the battle to push the enemy further and further away and capturing the heights surrounding Poonch being pursued relentlessly. In one year, Singh, cut off from the rest of the country, attacked and secured all the hill features that were threatening Poonch, organised the civil administration and saved the lives of 40,000 Hindus and Sikhs. He was also very fair to the Muslim population. The civilians named this daring officer ‘sher bachha. He was finally relieved on 20 November 1948, when the road to Poonch from Rajouri was forced open by a twobrigade size force under Brig Yadunath Singh.
The siege of Poonch, by all standards, is one of the greatest sieges in which the defender was victorious. Unfortunately, in 1951, Poonch’s ‘sher bachha’ was court martialled and dismissed from service for alleged moral misdemeanours. With his dismissal was also buried the story of the siege of Poonch. After his court martial, Brig Pritam Singh said: “Sometimes serious doubts assail me whether it would have been better to have let the State Forces garrison to slip out and followed it, than to have put up a tenacious fight, but I dispel them with my conviction that I have done my duty to India and that one day the truth will come out!
We have no such traditions, but the case of Brig Pritam Singh is a fit case for Special Presidential Pardon to restore his honour. Nations that treat their heroes shabbily do not produce them in great numbers!
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WINNING THE RAJA POST FROM PAKISTAN
In 1947–48, India wasn’t able to hold on to the Uri-Poonch link via the Haji Pir Pass and the resultant ‘bulge in the Line of Control (LOC) gave Pakistan access to the Pir Panjal Range, much to the chagrin of the Indian army. This area was also one of the major infiltration routes into the vale of Kashmir. In 1965, it was decided to capture the Haji Pir Pass and the adjoining heights to open the road to Poonch.
The Poonch-Haji Pir Road was dominated by two enemy posts called Raja and Rani. Raja Post was 1.5 kilometres to the north of our post, which was known by its number, 405. The distance between forward defences was only one kilometre. Rani Post was one kilometre further to the north west of Raja. To establish the Poonch-Uri link, it was critical to capture these two posts. After the Haji Pir Pass was captured on 28 August 1965, the focus of effort shifted to the capture of Raja and Rani. The operation’s code name was ‘Faulad
In 1969, as a newly-commissioned officer, I was the post commander of 405. Having heard of the battle of Raja Post while at the National Defence Academy (NDA), I now had the chance to study the battle in detail. The 1.5 kilometre ridge connecting 405 to Raja was full of chakor (also known as the chukar ‘partridge’) and a favourite haunt of mine along with my shotgun. I used to be watched with binoculars by both sides and must have inspired great
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amusement. The Cease Fire Line (CFL), as the LoC was known then, passed through the centre of the ridge marked by two trees known as bhai-bhai. After the 1965 war, the CFL was not very active and our moral ascendency was predominant.
One day I was shooting near bhai-bhai when a covey of chakor flushed out. Instinctively my shotgun went up and I got what is called a wing shooter’s dream: a classic ‘right and left shot, i.e., shooting two birds (both being in the air) on the wing, one with each barrel of a double barrel shotgun. Suddenly I heard clapping and a voice said, ‘Nishana achha hai, Laftain sahib! (You are a good shot, Lieutenant, sir!). A Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) of the Pakistani army, from across the CFL, was standing there. We got talking and after routine soldier talk, I asked him, Subedar sahib, ’65 mein Raja kyun chhod diya?’ (Why did you let go of Raja in 1965?) He said that in 1965, he was not in this sector, but from what he had heard, his assessment was that the battle was going very well for the Pakistan army defenders of the Raja Post. It was getting to be daylight and the attackers – the Indian army – were pinned down 200 or 300 metres below the post, at the wire obstacles and minefields. Suddenly, everything changed and the attacker was galvanised into action and started moving up in small teams from multiple directions, disregarding the fire and casualties taking place, and closed in to destroy the bunkers. The troops at Raja, despite the best efforts of the commanders and a determined fight up to that time, had collapsed psychologically
What he’d told me were the barebones of one of the most remarkable and heroic infantry attacks in our military history. Here’s the story of how India wrested the Raja Post from Pakistan.
Most posts or defended localities in the mountains are located on dominant features, forcing an attacker to attack uphill – probably the most difficult tactical operation for the infantry. The attacker tries to overcome the disadvantages by establishing a firm base, multi-directional attacks at night, use of overwhelming direct and indirect fire, isolation by cutting off escape routes and higher ratio of manpower. However,
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combat is a battle of wills. Whoever is able to create the conditions to bring about the psychological collapse of the other, wins.
The 2 Sikh (originally, 15 Ludhiana Sikhs) were raised on 1 August 1846 from the remnants of the Khalsa army and witnessed action as part of the British Indian army. At Independence, it was one of the most decorated units of the Indian army. However, the unit saw no action in 1947–1948 and 1962. In 1965, led by Lieutenant Colonel N.N. Khanna, 2 Sikh was very eager for combat. It was initially operating in Chamb-Jaurian Sector, where it captured a number of small enemy posts between 18–23 August. The regiment was specifically asked for by General Officer Commanding of 15 Corps, and was earmarked for Operation Faulad and ordered to move to Poonch.
As part of Operation Gibraltar, Pakistan had occupied the heights dominating the Rajouri-Poonch Road and were interfering with the traffic. Apart from sending out patrols to protect the road, 2 Sikh used the Khalsa war cry from the convoy vehicles to psyche out the enemy and was safely inducted into Poonch on 30 August 1965.
Initially, 2 Sikh was tasked to capture Rani by 10:00 hours on 3 September, while 3 Dogra was to capture Raja by the midnight of 1 September. However, the attack on Raja Post on the night of 1 September did not succeed due to the stiff opposition. Both the battalions marched for four hours, back to Poonch, by first light on 3 September. While taking stock at the Brigade Headquarters, it was concluded that Raja indeed was a hard nut to crack and the mood was gloomy. Lt Col Khanna put everyone out of their misery by saying, ‘Give it to me, sir. 2 Sikh will give you Raja!
Khanna asked for time for reconnaissance and the attack on Raja was scheduled for the night of 6 September, with 3 Dogra attacking Rani simultaneously. Simultaneity has its advantages, but it also meant division of meagre artillery support. Due to pressure from the Corp Commander, the attack was brought forward by one night, to 5 September, giving 2 Sikh less time for planning and preparation. It didn’t dampen Lt Col Khanna’s conviction. He told his entire battalion, ‘I am sure 2 Sikh is
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going to capture Raja today! (“Today’ was used symbolically as the attack was actually launched after twenty-four hours.)
Both units again marched back five and a half hours to their assembly areas for the attack by 09:30 hours on 5 September.
Khanna’s 2 Sikh launched the attack from two directions: along the southern ridge connecting 405 with Raja with one company, and along the relatively gradual south-eastern slopes with two companies. The Commanding Officer’s party was in the centre to control the battle. Due to the difficult terrain, the movement from the forward assembly area to the forming up place got delayed and instead of 04:00 hours, the attack commenced at 05:05 hours, when dawn was just breaking.
Raja was held by a company of 4 Azad Kashmir Battalion and one platoon of Zhob militia. The post was alert and soon a heavy onslaught of small arms and artillery fire engaged the attackers. The company attacking along the southern spur encountered heavy fire and suffered many casualties. By default, it drifted eastwards towards the two companies to the right, but this area was also under heavy fire and casualties were mounting. At 05:35 hours, all three companies of 2 Sikh were pinned down by heavy small arms and artillery firing, short of and below the Raja Post along the wire obstacles and minefields.
The attack had been stalled, the sky was brightening and combat inertia was setting in. Looking at the scenario around him, Lt Col Khanna concluded that he must either rally the battalion and charge uphill, or pull back to reorganise and attack again or call off the attack. He stood up, took off his green and white jersey (issued to instructors at High Altitude Warfare School), stood on a rock and started waving it to attract the attention of his troops. He also shouted the unit war cry of ‘Jo bole so nihal, Sat Sri Akal! and started climbing towards Raja Post.
First, a few men around him got up and started moving with him to renew the attack. Then the ones adjacent to them got up and followed suit, and so on. A chain reaction set in and very soon, 300 soldiers in small teams were climbing up towards Raja Post using fire and
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movement tactics. Led by Khanna, the Commanding Officer’s party forced open the wire obstacle, ran across the minefield and attacked the first bunker which was lobbing grenades. Khanna was wounded in the upper arm by a splinter, but the Commanding Officer’s example had galvanised the unit. The junior leadership – young officers, JCOs and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs), commanding platoons and sections – took charge and pushed ahead, against all odds. The enemy’s advance positions were pushed back and the unit closed up to the top of the Raja Post
At this juncture, at 05:50 hours, a burst of .30 Browning machine gun hit Lt Col Khanna and he was seriously wounded. He died while being evacuated to the Regimental Aid Post. The troops seeing their Commanding Officer fall, pressed home the attack with renewed determination. For the next one hour, some of the fiercest fighting of the 1965 war took place. No quarter was asked, none was given. The soldiers fought like men possessed; the wounded continued to fight; and those who died, ‘died hard!
Notable was the action of Naik Chand Singh, the javelin champion of the unit, who with his section cleared ten enemy bunkers. Naib Subedar Darshan Singh, a national level sprinter, known by the nickname ‘Anheri’ (dust storm’) did the only thing he knew how to do: he ran uphill leading his platoon and single-handedly cleared a machine gun bunker before being wounded. The limitation of space constrains me from recounting many other heroic actions of this saga.
Raja was finally captured at 07:10 hours on 7 September 1965. The body of the Pakistani platoon commander of the Zhob militia platoon was found and close to his corpse, lay the body of Sepoy Jarnail Singh. Apparently both had shot each other simultaneously. Jarnail had represented the Indian army in basketball and was known for scoring impossible baskets. He had actually been left behind at the forward assembly, despite his vehement protests, because he was delirious with fever and had been singing loudly. However, he had disobeyed orders and joined the reserve company and entered the battle at 06:15 hours,
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singing. Suddenly, disregarding the immediate battle, Jarnail had darted forward to the top of the post and engaged the Zhob militia platoon commander of Raja in what was virtually a duel. Both were killed in action, almost simultaneously.
Earlier, 3 Dogras had surprised and captured Rani Post and the Uri-Poonch link-up was completed on 9 September 1965. Lt Col N. N. Khanna was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (Posthumous). The battle was aptly summed up by a soldier of 2 Sikh who said, ‘Raja litta, raja ditta: (We won a Raja and we lost a Raja).
It had always intrigued me as to what had brought about the dramatic change from failure looming large at 05:35 hours to a stupendous success by 07:10 hours. I found the answer when I went into the details. It was all due to the leadership of the man’ – Lt Col N.N. Khanna, MVC (P) the Commanding Officer of 2 Sikh.
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I DIDN’T WANT PAKISTANI STRAY DOGS
EATING MY DEAD BODY
In 1971, 9 Sikh (the unit was raised in 1963) was manning the Cease Fire Line (CFL) – as the Line of Control (LoC) was known then – along the Shamshabari Range, extending from Tutmari Gali to Nastachun Pass in Jammu and Kashmir. Both these passes are more than 11,000 feet high. It was tasked to attack across the CFL and capture the Kayian Bowl – ‘bowl in military jargon implies a small valley surrounded by steep mountain ridges – which was 3,000 feet below to the south west of Tutmari Gali. Kayian Bowl was defended by a company of Tochi Scouts which held five tactical features dominating the bowl.
Winter had set in and night temperatures were below zero degree when 9 Sikh launched its operations on the night of 5–6 December 1971. Due to the paucity of resources and the absence of road communications to Tutmari Gali, 9 Sikh had no artillery support. It had some of the most dynamic young officers of the Sikh Regiment led by their equally dynamic Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sam Chengappa. To make up for the lack of fire support, 9 Sikh adopted German tactics of infiltration attacks, which were based on the concepts of ‘reconnaissance pull and ‘surfaces and gaps’ – an attacking force is led by the reconnaissance patrols that locate the gaps between the defences. The ‘surfaces, i.e., the defences are avoided and the weaker defences in the rear are attacked
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first, cutting off the routes of logistic maintenance and withdrawal. The stronger main defences are then attacked from the rear.
Through a series of spectacular attacks, the enemy was routed and an area of forty-six square kilometres was captured. Then, 9 Sikh launched raids and set up roadblocks in the Lipa Valley to assist the operations of other units attacking its western frontier from the direction of Tangdhar. On the night of 14–15 December, forty-eight hours before the ceasefire was declared, the Commando Platoon of 9 Sikh led by Captain Karam Singh Virk was going for one such raid to establish a roadblock at Brithwari Gali. The platoon was ambushed on the way, at 19:00 hours on 15 December. The ambush was later successfully broken, but one soldier was killed in action and Sepoy Baldev Singh – the youngest commando – was seriously wounded in both his legs and both arms by a light machine gun burst. This is his story, which was narrated to me by the Commando Platoon Commander Colonel (then Captain) Karam Singh Virk.
Since it was practically impossible to carry him, the Platoon Commander decided to leave Baldev behind with the promise that he would be picked up on their way back. Captain Karam gave his water bottle to Baldev whose water bottle was empty, as well as half a bar of chocolate and two small oranges. In addition, he had some emergency rations in the form of the sweet, shakarparas. Since Sepoy Baldev was incapacitated to handle his rifle, it was replaced with a carbine and he was made to rest against a boulder behind a bush. Initially, he was alert and attentive, ears cocked and weapon ready. With the passage of time, due to intense pain, loss of blood and severe cold, his senses started blurring. His food supplies and water also ran out, so did his strength, but not his willpower.
Meanwhile, the Commando Platoon, due to enemy pressure, was forced to take a different route on the night of 16-17 December, for exfiltration. As a result, they couldn’t pick up Baldev Singh. A pack of stray dogs, sensing that the soldier’s end was near, closed in on him and awaited his death. Initially, Baldev fired with his carbine to keep
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the dogs at bay. Later, unable to even raise his weapon to fire, he took out his commando knife. But the fear of the knife staved off the dogs only for a day. Soon it was difficult for him to even raise his hands. Baldev then kept the index finger of his right hand on his nose and whenever the dogs came near to confirm his death, he would, with Herculean effort, lift the finger straight up. He was acting on what he’d learnt in his childhood-dogs do not eat a living man. Every time he’d raise his finger, the dogs would withdraw and wait for Baldev’s finger to go down
Ceasefire was declared on 17 December and flag meetings between opposing forces commenced. The Pakistani army was given the map reference of the place where Baldev had been left behind and a request was made to try and find him. The first search was done in a routine manner and a negative report was given. In the next flag meeting, a request was made by Capt Karam Singh to Lieutenant Colonel Haq Nawaz Kayani, a brave and chivalrous officer who had been awarded the Sitara-e-Jurrat in 1965 and was now the Commanding Officer of 9 Azad Kashmir Battalion. Lt Col Kayani ordered a thorough search and on 22 December, a Pakistani patrol succeeded in locating Sepoy Baldev Singh. By then, he was barely conscious, but had his finger still on his nose and was surrounded by a pack of stray dogs. On seeing the patrol, the dogs slowly moved away.
Baldev had been lying badly wounded in sub-zero temperatures for six and a half days. He was soon evacuated to Muzaffarabad and then to the military hospital in Rawalpindi. He remained under the care of Pakistani medical authorities for the next six months. Prolonged exposure to severe cold and loss of blood had done tremendous damage to his toes and fingers. All his toes and the fingers of his right hand had to be amputated in order to save him.
When Baldev returned to India after the exchange of prisoners, he underwent another round of hospitalisation. Due to further complications, both his legs were amputated from mid-calf, as was his right hand below the elbow. In 1973, he was at the artificial limb centre
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at Pune when Captain Karam Singh went to meet him and learnt firsthand about this great saga of survival against all odds.
Baldev credited his life to the Pakistani stray dogs and explained, ‘For the first few days, I had the strength, alertness and also ammunition. I kept the dogs at bay by firing at them. Soon my ammunition finished and so did my food. I had to struggle against the chilling cold and excruciating pain even to raise my commando knife. In another couple of days, I started getting fainting spells, but my courage and determination did not flag. Main nahin si chahunda kih Pakistan de awara kutte meri lash nu khajan! (I did not want Pakistani stray dogs to eat my dead body!) I could barely raise my finger, that too with great effort, to tell the dogs that I’m still alive. These dogs had been the angels who kept me alive for six and a half days. I thank these dogs for their patience as they would not eat a living human being!
Of course, his story would not be complete if I do not acknowledge the chivalry of Lt Col Haq Nawaz Kayani who had ordered a thorough search to locate Baldev Singh. Lt Col Kayani was killed in action in the same area on 5 May 1972 while leading his unit in a counter-attack to recover a position lost in the war. He was deservedly awarded a bar to the Sitara-e-Jurrat.
Sepoy Baldev Singh now lives in his village near Ropar. The story of this brave soldier’s survival is indeed a saga of triumph of the human spirit!
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CHANAN SINGH, BATMAN, DESERTER, SOLDIER
Sepoy Chanan Singh was an unusual man, as thin as a reed but as tough as a nail. Obsessively paranoid about the intent of his colleagues, he lived in a world of his own. Forever brooding, he was a loner and kept to himself unless provoked. However, he was a very good soldier. He was an outstanding marksman, lizard-like in field craft and had an uncanny gift for anticipating threat situations. He had five years of service and was appointed my ‘batman’ when I joined my unit fifty years ago.
The word “batman’ – the man who looked after the officer’s battle horse’ – is much maligned. The designation itself has undergone many changes from ‘batman’ to ‘orderly’ in the British Indian army and from ‘orderly’ to ‘sahayak’/’buddy’ in the 1980s to assuage general civilian perception – that the terms batman/orderly were a facade to misuse soldiers as personal servants of the officers/JCOs. Prohibition of misuse is a given and a sahayak cannot be used for duties that contribute only to the officer’s personal benefit and have no reasonable connection with the officer’s official responsibilities. However, a sahayak is essential to perform tasks and details that if performed by the officer, would be at the expense of the officer’s primary military and official duties. More than that he is a comrade-in-arms, particularly for young officers.
Be that as it may, Chanan Singh took charge of me and put me through the paces to ‘break into’the unit and particularly into the hearts of the soldiers. He was blunt, rough and direct in his talk and did not
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hesitate to tick me off when necessary. Within one month of my joining the unit, I was tasked to lead a Long Range Patrol (LRP) to the Pir Panjal Range that separates the Punch Valley from the Kashmir Valley. There was no active insurgency those days. However, given the experience of 1947–48 and 1965 wars when regular/irregular troops were used for infiltration in conjunction with conventional operations, LRPs were used to check remote areas for infiltration and for area familiarisation. Each patrol was of seven to ten days’ duration. We had to carry our rations, arms and ammunition required for the duration on man pack basis. This meant that each soldier had to carry a load of more than thirty kilograms. One of the most difficult loads was atta (wheat flour). A number of standard Army Packs or modified larger packs were filled to the brim and the toughest soldiers were assigned to carry the atta pithoo as the soldiers liked to call the pack.
I spent two days coordinating the various aspects of the LRP and in giving my formal briefing. The start time was 03:00 hours in the morning. On the previous evening, I checked my personal loads, weapon and ammunition. I found that my pack, prepared by Chanan Singh, was rather light and contained no ‘team loads! I asked Chanan Singh why he hadn’t put my share of the team load into my pack. He said that it was a unanimous decision of the patrol. He further added that the soldiers were testing my character. I directed him to get my share of the load. Instead of complying, he said with an air of finality, “You’ll carry the atta pithoo for the duration of the patrol?’ I told him that I could but it might interfere with my duties as a patrol leader. Chanan settled the issue by saying, ‘Leaders lead by example?
The die was cast. Next morning after I’d carried out the final check, I enquired, Whose pack has the least weight?’ There was no answer, but I noticed a smirk on many faces. I then enquired, ‘Who is carrying the heaviest load?’ A number of hands went up. To settle the issue, a weighing scale was used. The heaviest load was an improvised atta pithoo pack weighing thirty-five kilograms. Without much ado, I exchanged my pack with the heaviest. I was mockingly cautioned by some cheeky
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soldiers who said, “Saabji, fallout (a term used for a soldier who gives up during a march) ho jaoge.
To cut a long story short, the going was tough and back-breaking, but I endured the heaviest load for ten days of the patrol. On the way back, as we approached the unit base, suddenly the patrol halted. Before I could enquire, I was literally carried on the shoulders of the patrol into the base. I knew, I had arrived in the unit!
Chanan gave me many more lessons in grassroots leadership and I remain indebted to him to this day. He was my sahayak for three months, but our camaraderie endured. One day, on return from leave, he came straight to my bunker and announced that he had committed a murder to avenge the outraging of his widowed mother’s modesty by the village sarpanch. He had planned it well. On expiry of his leave, he had reported to the Transit Camp at Pathankot in the evening as per orders. However, at night he slipped away, took a bus to his village near Amritsar and beheaded the sarpanch who was sleeping near his tubewell. There were no eyewitnesses. He travelled back to Pathankot and quietly slipped back into the Transit Camp. He had a watertight alibi, but the Punjab police was certain that he was the culprit and had located the conductors of the buses in which he had travelled. They had identified him from the photographs that the police had. The police wanted us to allow an identification parade. We refused and asked for a court order. Luckily for Chanan Singh, the court went by the watertight alibi and he got away.
After two years he approached me again, seeking my assistance in seeking a premature discharge. His mother had died and he had no kith or kin. The disciplined and strict atmosphere of the army was stifling him and killing his spirit. He said, ‘Main ikk azad panchi haan, main khule aasman wich ooncha udna chahunda haan’ (I am a free bird, I want to fly high in the open skies). It was late March 1971 and East Pakistan had imploded. I tried to dissuade him and said, “There is a likelihood of a war. Surely you do not want to miss that?’ He said there is no certainty of war but should one be imminent, he would
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come back. This, of course, was not possible as a ‘discharge’ meant that he ceased to be a soldier. We tried for his discharge, but the authorities did not agree.
At the end of April 1971, Chanan Singh deserted from the unit. I got a letter from him saying he was sorry for his act of desertion, but that if there is a war, he would come back and join the unit. As per rules, the police were informed to arrest him. However, he could not be traced. Apparently, he had sold his land, bought a truck and was plying long routes from Kolkata. After three months, as per rules, he was declared a deserter.
The unit moved to the Eastern Theatre and was deployed close to the East Pakistan border by the end of September 1971. One day, I received a letter written in Bengali (a local schoolteacher translated it for me) from a lady named Amla. Briefly, she wrote that she was a former sex worker in Kolkata and had been rescued by a Sikh truck driver with whom she was now living. She said that her friend was a deserter from the army and wanted to rejoin the unit to fight the war. Amla further added a request: ‘Channu is too embarrassed to write himself. The status quo suits us both, but I feel he will never be at peace if he is not with his unit during the war. I guessed ‘Channu’ was Chanan Singh and promptly replied with the location of the unit. After a few days, I found Chanan Singh standing in front of me. The rules do allow a deserter to rejoin, but he has to be punished for the act of desertion which can include dismissal and rigorous imprisonment.
Chanan Singh declared he had come back to fight the war and not rot in jail. He put the onus on me to sort the matter out. I approached the Commanding Officer, a stickler for rules, who not only admonished me but directed that Chanan Singh would face a Summary court martial. The Commanding Officer said he wanted to set an example to forestall any more desertions before the impending war. As per rules, on Chanan Singh’s request, I was appointed as ‘the friend of the accused’ who could advise but not argue on his behalf. I only gave one advice to Chanan
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Singh: speak the truth. The bugle was sounded and Chanan Singh was marched before the Commanding Officer. He made a cryptic plea in his defence. Main bhagoda jarur hoya si, he said, “par main apna farz nibhaun wastey wapas aya haan. Mainnu ladai wich jaan da mauka ditta jave’ (I am guilty of desertion, but I have come back to do my duty. I should be given a chance to fight in the war). Chanan Singh was awarded a ‘paper punishment and sent to his company.
But there was one more obstacle to his quest for battle. The Regimental Medical Officer found that Chanan Singh was suffering from a sexually transmitted disease, which in the army requires hospitalisation and prolonged treatment. We managed to convince the Regimental Medical Officer to treat him ‘in-house. Amla, back in Kolkata, was also treated on Chanan Singh’s expense. The moment the treatment was done, the war began.
The good soldier that he was, Chanan Singh acquitted himself very well. One day before the impending attack by Bravo Company on 5 December, he came to see me. He told me that he had a premonition that he would be killed in battle. He told me that he had nobody but his partner Amla, whom he described as the only person who cared for him. He said that he wanted Amla to be shown as his wife in official documents. He also told me that he had already transferred his truck on to her name.
Chanan Singh’s premonition came true. He was killed in action on 5 December. Back-dated papers were prepared to show Amla as his lawful wife.
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COLONEL SHAMSHER SINGH AND THE MAKING
OF AN INDIAN ARMY OFFICER
When my father Colonel Shamsher Singh died at the age of ninety-six on 6 August 2012, I became the custodian of his papers, photographs and memorabilia. A few days ago, as I sat down to sort out his papers, I remembered the remarkable life of this outstanding soldier who became a legend in his lifetime.
He was born on 8 July 1916. His father, Atma Singh, was a thanedar in the Patiala State Police. Shamsher’s mother died when he was three years old. He mostly stayed at the village with his grandparents and six uncles and aunts, who were the step-siblings of his father. With limited land holding, life was tough. Atma Singh was an exception – a very honest thanedar. He was the sole breadwinner and his pay was barely adequate to make both ends meet for the extended joint family.
Shamsher had a tough childhood. He had lice in his hair, he wore his sweaters inside out to save them from dirt and his hardened soles were all that he had for shoes. The hard village life made this virtual orphan a survivor and inspired him to succeed in life. His grandfather also motivated him to study. School meant an eight-kilometre roundtrip made on bare feet with his gunnysack mat, takhti (wooden board for writing with a reed pen), primer, chor dawat (spillproof inkpot) and kalam (reed pen).
In summer, he walked/ran the distance twice as he went back to
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school for games in the evening. In later years, his father bought him a second hand BSA cycle for ten rupees. There was no money to replace the worn-out tubes. Shamsher took old pieces of cloth and jute, and twisted them into a round shape to replace the tubes. The tyre was then tied to the rim with strings. He used this contraption for two years.
All his spare time was spent in playing marbles (which, being unaffordable, were replaced with the kernel of Shikakai) and gulli danda. Another hobby was to chase and kill rabbits and partridges for larder. Partridges have short high-speed flights and tire out after three to four such flights and can be nabbed from the bush. Similarly, a rabbit tires out after three to four short high-speed runs. This pastime made Shamsher a natural sportsman and he excelled in all games.
The tough village life also led Shamsher to imbibe sterling characteristics. He realised that to improve his lot, he had to pursue excellence despite all odds; he learnt that to survive, one has to stand up to the bullies; his tenacity, despite his relatively small frame, became the talk of the village. He developed a sense of fair play and always stood up for the weak. His first response to a bully used to be a stern warning by looking him in the eye. If that did not work, he attacked. This was his way of describing his habit of warning before attacking: ‘Pashay se seekhay koi sheva-e-mardangi, jab katey khoon ko aaye toh pahle pukar de, (Learn manliness from the mosquito, despite his small size it makes a buzz/noise before biting).
He noted the respect his father enjoyed for being upright and honest in the rampantly corrupt state police. Like his father, he remained upright and honest all through his life. He used to say that he had deviated from the virtuous path only for the welfare of his soldiers, his unit, the weak and the oppressed, and as a child when pangs of hunger hit him, to steal pinnis (sweet balls made from wheat flour, reduced milk, sugar/jaggery and pure ghee) from his step-grandmother’s peepa (a canister made from a kerosene container).
His will – the faculty for initiating decisive action – was very strong and the fall-out was that he seized and took initiative in whatever he did.
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As a teenager, he lived with his father in various thanas (police posts) and studied in small towns of Malwa. He learnt the use of firearms and became a very a good shikari. His father sent him to a dera of Nihangs to learn riding. He learnt all the riding tricks including standing with one leg each on two horses at full gallop.
Once as a fifteen-year-old, he went out with a posse of police and local people led by his father looking for a notorious dacoit. While the posse searched the sugarcane fields, Shamsher borrowed his father’s shotgun and went hunting in the nearby wooded scrubland. Suddenly, he came face to face with the dacoit mounted on a dachhi (female camel). The dacoit, though armed with a rifle, sensed an opportunity to get hold of a gun and jumped from the dachhi to charge towards Shamsher.
Shamsher kept his wits and shouted a lalkara (a warning/battle cry in loud stern language), warning the dacoit to surrender and when the dacoit did not pay heed, he shot him below the knees. The wounded dacoit was overpowered by Shamsher. He kept the dacoit pinned down for ten minutes until his father arrived with the posse. This action of his made him a local hero.
After clearing his matriculation, he joined the famous Mahindra College in Patiala in 1934. He was average in academics, but excelled in sports and captained the college hockey, football, basketball and athletics teams. When he was in his third year in 1938, the newlycrowned Maharaja Yadvindra Singh of Patiala held a screening board for selecting potential officers for his army. The Patiala State Forces were approximately a brigade strength with two infantry battalions and one cavalry regiment. One battalion and the cavalry regiment were funded by the British and organised like the Indian army. After the initial screening, candidates had to be enrolled as sepoys but the designation given was ‘officer cadet. The candidates then had to pass the Special Class Education examination of the Indian army and face a selection board under the Division Commander at Ambala.
Although the rejection rate was very high, Shamsher topped the screening board. But since he was not from the landed gentry, he was
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enrolled only as a Junior Commission Officer (JCO) Cadet and was not eligible for selection as an officer. After a few months, when the Maharaja came for an inspection, Shamsher boldly approached him and said, “Sir, I am better than all the Officer Cadets, yet I am only a JCO Cadet?
The Maharaja admired the audacity of Shamsher and directed that he should also be allowed to go for the Special Class Examination and the selection board held by the Indian army. Eight candidates appeared in the examination before the selection board and only Shamsher was selected. The Patiala State Army Headquarters was reluctant to send a JCO Cadet for training at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun. Shamsher again sought an interview with the Maharaja who overruled the Army Headquarters.
Shamsher joined the IMA in January 1940 and was commissioned as an officer in June 1941. This was the last regular course to pass out of the IMA as thereafter only emergency/temporary commission was granted during the Second World War. At the IMA, he was a member of the hockey and football teams. And this was a singular achievement as the then IMA hockey team had two Olympians.
In 1968, when I was at the IMA, I was allotted the same room where my father had stayed in 1940–41.
Shamsher was commissioned into the 1 Patiala Rajendra Lancers, the cavalry regiment of the Patiala State, which was then operating under the Indian army and stationed at Loralai in the (then) North West Frontier Province of India. The lice-ridden little village boy had come a long way. But this was just the beginning. He went on to become a legend in his lifetime owing to his sterling character and model performance in war and peace in the Indian army.
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‘THE MAN’ WHO COUNTED IN TIMES OF WAR
Colonel Shamsher Singh was commissioned on 16 July 1941 into 1 Patiala Rajendra Lancers, the horsed cavalry unit of Patiala State. He joined the unit at Loralai in Baluchistan where it functioned under the Indian army. The horsed cavalry units of the Indian army were being mechanised at a rapid pace for the Second World War and were being equipped with armoured cars. On special request of the Maharaja of Patiala, the Patiala Lancers were also selected for mechanisation in end1941 and moved to Quetta for the same.
Shamsher’s leadership qualities had been noticed by Colonel Hillard, the British Commanding Officer of the unit. He selected Shamsher for technical courses on armoured cars at Armoured Fighting Vehicle School at Ahmednagar from January 1942 to April 1942.
Shamsher became the Technical Officer of his regiment and was responsible for its technical conversion to Armoured Cars. At the end of 1943, he was promoted to the rank of Major and became a Squadron Commander. After intensive training at Risalpur, the regiment moved to Khandwa in present-day Madhya Pradesh, in early 1944. From Khandwa, Shamsher also attended advanced technical and tactical courses at Ahmednagar and Pune.
In early 1945, the Patiala Lancers moved to the Middle East, to guard the lines of communications and oil installations in Egypt and Palestine, and maintain peace between the Jews and Arabs. Shamsher
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had a chance to watch the fledgling Jewish Army – Haganah – and its ethos and tactics left a deep impression on him. His unit also took part in suppression of the Arab rebellion in Aman. As part of his duty, whenever on leave, Shamsher travelled extensively in the region. The regiment returned to India at the end of 1946 and Shamsher was transferred to 1 Patiala Rajendra Sikh Infantry (now 15 Punjab).
In September 1947, Shamsher received an unwritten informal order to use machine guns to fire on a refugee train going to Pakistan at Sirhind. Shamsher protested that the order was unethical and was an unlawful command. He was unfairly labelled a darpok (coward), an insult he swallowed, but firmly stood his ground. The order was later cancelled.
On 3 November 1947, 1 Patiala was moved to Jammu to clear Pakistani raiders from Akhnoor-Chamb and Naushera Sectors. Shamsher was first given the task of bringing peace to Ustad Ka Mohalla, an area where large number of armed Muslims were besieged by the mobs. After sighting the Indian army, the mobs were emboldened to attack the locality and massacre the Muslims. True to his character, Shamsher stood firm and safely escorted the 30,000 Muslims to Sialkot, Pakistan.
Around this time, the situation in Naushera was deteriorating and raiders had besieged the town. Shamsher’s company was given the task of recapturing the Beripattan ford/ferry to open the way to Naushera. The ford/ferry was recaptured on 11 November 1947, to pave the way for the 50 Para Brigade to go through and save Naushera. However, to the rear, the enemy attacked and captured Chamb, cut off the road to Naushera and was threatening Akhnoor. To respond to this situation, 1 Patiala was rushed back to secure Akhnoor and recapture Chamb. The plan was to attack Chamb from Mandiala, which was to the north, with two companies on the morning of 11 December 1947.
Once again, Shamsher was at the forefront. His company was the right forward company in the attack. The attack was supported by a troop (three guns) of 11 Field Regiment under Major (later Major
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General) Lachman Singh Lehl. The attack is best described in the following excerpt from an article written by him in 2010:
Wireless silence having been broken, the CO assumed a tight control over the companies on the move towards Chamb. The CO’s party, including my OP party reached Mandiala; the companies, advancing from Mandiala got involved in a firefight with the enemy in Chamb. The CO ordered Major Shamsher Singh, the right Company Commander, to cut-off the enemy behind Chamb village. Soon the company was held up by heavy LMG and rifle fire and I was asked to engage the enemy. On seeing the first ranging (a process of bracketing fire of guns before sustained firing) round, Shamsher spoke excitedly on his wireless set in Punjabi, “Gola dushman di gichy te laga, isi jagah fire karo’ (The shell has hit the nape of the enemy, fire at the same spot). It was planned to bombard the objective for five minutes ‘On Call from Shamsher. On my suggestion, it was agreed that a smoke shell be fired from one gun to indicate the end of fire! As the fire started and the assault company moved forward under the artillery covering fire, the CO ordered his Second-in-Command to attack the enemy in Chamb village with vigour and a bold use of the armoured cars from Palanwala direction. Some of the shells, on hitting the tree tops, produced an airburst effect over the enemy trenches and demoralised him. Soon a Very Light’ signal indicated the capture of the objective. I still remember the attack on Chamb as “a model for a battalion in attack’ under effective control of the CO.
On 15 December the Pakistanis organised a big Lashkar of 10,000 Pathans and Punjabi Musalmans from the area, supported by the regular army, to recapture Chamb. The enemy was in high spirits and surrounded the defences of 1 Patiala. Shamsher’s company was the forward most and deployed on a high ground, in the vicinity of Chamb village. The Lashkar set fire to the crops and dry scrub. To frighten the besieged troops, the Lashkar danced the ludi (a popular dance of Punjab akin to the bhangra). It was a macabre scene.
Such was the psychological impact that Brigadier Lakhinder Singh, Commander 268 Infantry Brigade, advised a withdrawal. There was
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panic all around. The Commanding Officer, who had once called Shamsher darpok, sought his views. Shamsher firmly refused and said, “Sir, we must stay put and fight. The enemy is all around us. If we attempt to withdraw, we will be routed and decimated! As this conversation was going on, the enemy closed up to the defences of Shamsher’s company. The frenzied enemy had entered some trenches and a number of close-quarter duels took place. Shamsher moved from trench to trench to control the battle. For the next one hour, the battle continued but, Shamsher’s company carried the day. The attack was repulsed and Chamb had been saved.
The next morning, nearly 300 from the enemy’s side were found dead around the defences. The Commanding Officer came to Shamsher and said, “Forgive me, Shamsher, for doubting your bravery. The horsed cavalry officer, who had mastered mechanised warfare, had now proved his mettle in the classic infantry battle both in attack and in defence.
Over the next one year, every senior officer sought Shamsher to be part of his command and he remained continuously in battle.
Soon, 1 Patiala was under Brigadier Usman at Naushera and was employed as a mobile reserve for troubleshooting and for keeping the road open from Jammu to Naushera. The enemy recaptured Jhangar on 24 December 1948, and was threatening Naushera by cutting off the Jammu-Akhnoor-Naushera Road at a number of places.
To clear the enemy roadblocks and set up posts that would protect the road, 1 Patiala moved three times on foot from Naushera to Akhnoor. So impressed was Brig Usman with 1 Patiala that he wrote to General Kulwant Singh, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Jammu and Kashmir Division at Jammu, that he either wanted 1 Patiala or two more battalions if Jhangar was to be recaptured.
Next, a two-brigade attack was launched on 15 March 1948 to recapture Jhangar: 19 Brigade advanced along the Northern Ridge and 50 Para Brigade along the Southern Ridge. Tanks and armoured cars of 7 CAV along with one infantry battalion advanced along the road in the valley. An excerpt from Brig Usman’s (Commander 50 Para
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Brigade) order of the day, reproduced below, reflects the greatness of this soldier:
The eyes of the world are on us. The hopes and aspirations of our countrymen are based upon our efforts. We must not falter, we must not fail them….
To every man upon this earth Death Cometh soon or late
And how can man die better
Than facing fearful odds
For the ashes of his fathers
And the temples of his gods … So forward friends, fearless we go to Jhangar. India expects everyone to do his duty.
Jai Hind.
The main battle was fought on the Pir Thil feature overlooking Jhangar, which was attacked with 1 Patiala on the left, and 3 Maratha (Para) on the right, on the night of 16/17 March 1948. The attack by 3 Maratha got stalled due to difficult terrain, but 1 Patiala spearheaded by Shamsher’s company, captured Pir Thil and rolled down to capture Jhangar on 17 March 1948.
On 10 May 1948, 1 Patiala was moved to Srinagar and given the task of defending Zoji La Pass at all costs and hold a firm base for the offensive to relieve Kargil and Leh. The Gilgit Scouts were simultaneously threatening Leh and Zoji La. Shamsher was now the Second in Command of 1 Patiala. A task force of two companies was created and placed under his command to defend Zoji La, while two companies were used to secure the line of communications, i.e., the Srinagar–Baltal road.
The defence of Zoji La was Shamsher’s finest hour. He took over as its Garrison Commander on 19 May 1948, and located himself at Gumri. One company was pushed forward to Machoi, which relieved a company of 5 J&K Infantry under Captain Rachpal Singh on 23 May
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1948. On the same day, a platoon sent forward for reconnaissance towards Mateyan was ambushed by the enemy and suffered twelve casualties, including the platoon commander.
Shamsher organised a counter-attack and recaptured the area known as Island Feature. The attack was led by Major Mohinder Singh. A fierce battle took place. All dead bodies and wounded soldiers from the patrol were recovered. The enemy left behind twenty-one dead bodies. Our casualties included seventeen dead and ten wounded, including those of the patrol. The intensity of the battle can be gauged from the fact that one Maha Vir Chakra and six Vir Chakras were awarded for this operation.
Shamsher’s two companies were now stretched along Zoji La-GumriMachoi Island in Section and Platoon Posts. The enemy infiltrated from the north and occupied higher hill features between the posts. No movement was possible during the day, but at night, troops were resupplied. But soon, due to overstretched positions and the enemy occupying higher features, casualties started mounting at the rate of two or three a day. No more troops were available. The two companies held this isolated sector against all odds for two and a half months.
The enemy launched a number of attacks to dislodge the defenders and many small battles were fought. Shamsher, with a small reserve, was the troubleshooter, rushing to reinforce posts under attack. In these operations, the enemy suffered 200 casualties. Shamsher recommended consolidation into a more compact defence closer to Zoji La, to which GOC Srinagar Division, General Thimayya, reluctantly agreed.
On the night of 1/2 August 1948, the two-company Task Force under Shamsher occupied a more compact defended area on features dominating the Zoji La Pass. Captain Amarinder Singh, in his book on decisive battles fought by the Indian army (post-Independence), wrote that the real hero of Zoji La was Major Shamsher Singh who denied the pass to the enemy for five months against all odds and provided a firm base for the offensive by 77 Para Brigade in end-October 1948.
In end October, 1 Patiala was relieved from the posts to form part
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of the offensive. On the night of 31/1 November 1948, the attack led by Stuart tanks and armoured cars of 7 CAV and followed by 1 Patiala broke through the pass, which was watched by an awestruck enemy from the heights overlooking the pass. Such was the psychological impact of this bold move that the enemy decamped and Gumri was recaptured by noon, and Machoi by the morning of 2 November where a 3.7-inch Howitzer Gun was captured. Then 4 Rajput led the advance upto Mateyan, but was held up there. The progress hereafter was slow. On the night of 13/14 November, 1 Patiala crossed a four-feet deep freezing river at Pindrass to bypass the enemy and made a dash at night for Drass, which was captured on the morning of 14 November. Guru Nanak’s birthday was celebrated there on 16 November and the dinner that night was attended by Major General Thimayya, Brigadier Atal and Lt Col (later Major General) Rajinder Singh ‘Sparrow, Commanding Officer, 7 Cavalry.
Having been in continuous operations for one year, 1 Patiala was to be pulled back, but Brigadier Atal, Commander 77 Para Brigade, requested for two companies of 1 Patiala under Major Shamsher Singh for the advance to Kargil. Shamsher led the advance up to the junction of Drass and Shingo Rivers, which was secured by 23 November. Thereafter 1/5 Gorkha Rifles under Lt Col Mohinder Singh Pathania (later Major General) resumed the advance, but got stuck at Harka Bahadur bridge, which had been burnt down by the enemy.
Brig Atal again sought his troubleshooter and Shamsher was called forward with one company of 1 Patiala. Brigadier Atal’s order was simple: ‘Shamsher, take me to Kargil. Shamsher lived up to his reputation. One company of 1/5 Gorkha Rifles was also placed under the command of Shamsher. Avoiding the enemy in the valley, Shamsher climbed over the ridge to the south and surprised the enemy. Kargil was captured by him on 30 November.
Most readers must be familiar with the Kargil war fought on the rugged high altitude terrain in 1999. The terrain from Zoji La to Kargil is similar with heights varying from 11,500 feet up to 16,000 feet. Shamsher’s troops had no snow clothing or heating resources. Drass,
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which was captured by 1 Patiala on 14 November, is notified as the second coldest place in the world. Until then, this was the highest battlefield in the world. Shamsher was part of each and every major operation in this area from May to November 1948. In fact, he spearheaded most of them.
Seeing my high altitude clothing when I was posted in Ladakh in 1988, he commented that he fought there in 1947–48 with no winter clothing. Nights were spent doing physical exercises to keep warm!
Despite having led his unit in all operations and his unit – 1 Patiala – getting eight Maha Vir Chakras and seventeen Vir Chakras (including the Commanding Officer), Shamsher did not receive any bravery award. All his Commanders swore by him and recommended him, but somehow fate denied him a bravery award. Yet his enthusiasm for the mission in hand never flagged. He remained in battle continuously for thirteen months and became a legend in his lifetime. Shamsher proved Napoleon’s maxim that ‘In war it is not men, but the “man” who counts!
Without doubt, he was ‘the man, a class apart, an exceptional soldier!
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COL SHAMSHER SINGH’S LIFE LESS ORDINARY
The story of Colonel Shamsher Singh would not be complete if I do not narrate some anecdotes that will give you a sense of why he commanded the kind of respect and admiration that he did.
From the period 19 May-31 July 1948, a battle of wits raged between the 1 Patiala Garrison (under Major Shamsher Singh) and the Gilgit Scouts on the heights around Zoji La-Gumri-Machoi Island. Readers will recall that the Garrison was occupying posts held by small teams and the Gilgit Scouts were infiltrating to attack the same in order to reach Zoji La.
One such post in the Gumri area was held by a platoon under a Jemadar (a rank that is now known as Naib Subedar). Sometime in June, the Gilgit Scouts closed up to this isolated post and surrounded it. As a result, the Jemadar lost his nerve and panicked, Major Sahib, hamari akhiri Sat Sri Akal, dushman bahut tadad mein hai aur hum sab marne wale hain’ (Sir, this is our last salutation, the enemy is in large strength and we are all about to die). Shamsher told him not to panic and quickly organised his reserve to move for a counter-attack.
The post was two hours’ march. As Shamsher, along with the reserve, closed up to the post, he saw the Jemadar with ten men running down in panic. The Jemadar was blabbering something about heavy casualties. A tight slap from Shamsher brought him to his senses and he explained the situation. Shamsher knew from experience that in battle, the situation is never as bad as a panicked soldier describes
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it. He decided to counter-attack to recapture the post. The remnants were reorganised and merged with the mobile reserve. After an hour’s climb, the troops started closing up to the post by fire and movement. The post was out of range for mortars and there was no artillery support. This meant they had to rely on only Light Machine Guns to cover the movement.
As the troops closed up to seventy-five yards, the choicest Punjabi abuses were heard from the post. Shamsher wondered if Punjabi Musalman troops had been inducted to assist the Gilgit Scouts. However, on a hunch he shouted the Patiala battle cry, ‘Jo bole so nihal and the response came from the post, Sat Sri Akal. It turned out that the post was still being held by six young jawans who had recently joined the unit from Patiala. The youngsters had been unaware that their Jemadar had bolted. They’d held their ground and defeated the enemy. All six had bullet wounds or shrapnel injuries. When the enemy had attacked, everyone had been struck with fear and had virtually given up. Then the youngest of them unleashed a barrage of abuse on the enemy. His aggressive verbal profanity inspired everyone to rally and save the post!
The Jemadar was taken to task. A Veer Chakra was awarded for this operation. Yes, it went to the young leader who used ‘abuse’ as a weapon to rally his colleagues and thwart the enemy.
Major Shamsher Singh controlled the battle from his Command Post at Gumri. Due to enemy sniping, morning ablutions had to be finished well before dawn. There was no time and the battle situation did not allow for the creation of proper toilets. One day, well before dawn, Shamsher, with his pistol in the canvas holster, took his shovel to dig a shallow pit for the morning routine and ventured a little distance away from the Command Post. As he sat behind a bush on his haunches, he saw a Gilgit Scouts sniper crawling to get into position to fire at the Command Post. The sniper was oblivious of Shamsher’s presence as his back was to him, but Shamsher also had been literally caught with his pants down. The distance was three to five yards. Any movement to take the pistol out of the holster would have alerted the sniper.
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Shamsher leapt on the back of the prone sniper and pinned him down. The sniper fought back and a wrestling match ensued.
In the struggle, the sniper’s rifle got discharged. The shot alerted the protection section from the Command Post who rushed to the scene. The sniper was overpowered and taken as Prisoner Of War (POW). The jawans had a big laugh on noticing Shamsher’s pants and drawers around his ankles. Shamsher retained the .303 No 4 Mark 1 Rifle with the telescope as a souvenir, along with the sniper’s poshteen (sheepskin) jacket. I learnt my firing with this rifle and had many successful shikar kills over the next four decades.
Another interesting tale from Zoji La is about a local villager from Gumri, who was assisting the Patiala Garrison as a porter. It is pertinent to record that the success of the Indian army to a great extent was due to the hardy porters of this area who carried the ammunition and supplies, and evacuated casualties. A number of them lost their lives. In particular, the heroic action of one porter stands out.
During the first week of July 1948, the Gilgit Scouts, now supported by a battery of artillery composed of 3.7-inch Howitzer/4.2-inch Mortars and 3-inch Mortars, attacked a post called Picquet No 1, which was the key to the Gumri defenses. The intention of the enemy was to sever the link to Machoi. The post was held by a platoon less one sec, which meant 20–25 soldiers. An intense battle raged over four days. Many heroic actions were fought. In one particular action, a soldier was badly wounded and fell over a cliff into an area which was under enemy domination. He was given up for dead.
After twenty-four hours, Major Shamsher saw some movement in the area where the soldier had fallen. One of the porters volunteered to investigate and crawled up to the area. His movement immediately drew enemy fire. Disregarding the risk to his life, the porter brought back the wounded soldier. The intestines of the young soldier were falling out of the stomach and he pleaded to be shot to end the agony. He was given a shot of rum. The intestines were thrust back into the stomach and the gaping wound was sealed with an anklet (a canvas contraption worn over
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the trouser bottom and ankle). The same porter carried him down to the road from where he was taken to Sonamarg. I had a chance to meet this soldier some thirty years later when he came to meet Colonel Shamsher Singh. For his heroic act, the porter was awarded a Vir Chakra, the first to be awarded to a civilian. In 1988, when 15 Punjab (1 Patiala) was located at Drass and Zoji La Day was being celebrated, the celebration included a trip to Gumri. Colonel Shamsher Singh described the battle to all the officers of 28 Infantry Division, which was responsible for the area. The old porter was also called to meet the veterans. Shamsher hugged him and took him aside for a private chat. Once out of earshot, Shamsher told the old porter that he was an imposter and not the same braveheart. The ‘imposter’ fell at Shamsher’s feet and confessed that the hero had died a year ago and the family did not want to lose the monthly allowance. Hence, his younger brother had been claiming the award money. Shamsher understood the family’s situation and kept their secret.
On promotion to the rank of Lt Col, Shamsher was transferred to the Sikh Regiment. He commanded 17 Sikh from December 1952 to December 1954 at Agra. In the same year, the Army Headquarters made a decision that all the state forces’ officers who were transferred to the Indian army will forego one and a half years of seniority and those promoted will revert to their substantive rank. Shamsher was brought down to his substantive rank of Major despite having successfully commanded his battalion for two years. This was a major disappointment, but he took it in his stride. He served in 4 Sikh for the next one and a half years as the Second in Command. In 1956, he took over the command of 18 Sikh, which was a notorious battalion. He had taken over after a jawan had been tortured to death for a petty theft. The Commanding Officer, Subedar Major and a few soldiers had been court-martialled and punished.
In the next six months, Shamsher transformed 18 Sikh into an efficient unit and was in the process of restoring its lost glory when the newly-appointed Army Chief, General Thimayya, visited Mathura, where the unit was located in July 1957.
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Shamsher’s association with General Thimayya went back to Zoji La. The General had marched with 77 Para Brigade Headquarters behind the tanks from Zoji La to Drass. At the time, supplies were short and apart from the enemy action, the extreme cold made the going very tough. The administration of the Brigade Headquarters was rather poor, but the General was a tough man and roughed it out with the troops. After a week, one early morning, the General visited 1 Patiala, which was leading the advance. When the General asked about the administration, Shamsher replied, “Sir, it could not be better! Taking it as a subordinate’s exaggerated claim, the General quipped, “Then, I suppose, 1 Patiala can give me a hot breakfast. Shamsher kept quiet, but on his signal, a few soldiers raced forward. At the next halt, General Thimayya was served fried eggs, paranthas and chicken; the jawans apologised to him for the lack of bread. Shamsher explained that 1 Patiala had mastered the art of self-containment after six years in the Second World War and one year’s continuous battle in Jammu and Kashmir.
Anticipating the administrative problems beyond Zoji La, each soldier was carrying ten eggs, one live chicken, ten pinnis and a bottle of pure ghee in addition to three days’ worth of standard rations. This stock was replaced as and when the mule column fetched supplies. General Thimayya was so impressed that he implemented the 1 Patiala model in entire J&K.
The Chief was not aware that Lt Col Shamsher Singh was commanding this unit of 18 Sikh. In his address to the garrison, based on the notorious reputation of 18 Sikh, the Chief mentioned that the unit deserved to be disbanded. Later, in the officers’ mess, General Thimayya warmly met Shamsher and asked about his well-being. Shamsher replied, “Sir, still surviving after your announcement about the disbandment of my unit, without assessing the present state of the unit. I challenge any unit of our army to compete with 18 Sikh in any field. The Chief gave a patient hearing when Shamsher explained the measures taken by him to rejuvenate the unit. General Thimayya, in the presence of all officers of the brigade, apologised to Shamsher.
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However, the Divisional and Brigade Commander were not amused by Shamsher’s impertinence and decided to put him in his place during the test exercise that was due shortly.
The 43 Lorried Brigade was part of 1 Armoured Division and consisted of three Infantry Battalions equipped with 60 Dodge Power Wagon four-wheel drive vehicles. These vehicles had very good crosscountry mobility and each vehicle could carry a fully-equipped infantry section. The units also tracked carriers for carriage of mortars and machine guns. The 43 Lorried Brigade operated in conjunction with 1 Armoured Brigade, which consisted of three armoured regiments equipped with Sherman tanks. The concept of battle groups was being introduced wherein each battle group consisted of one armoured and one infantry battalion. The battle group was generally commanded by the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Armoured Regiment as the infantry battalion played a supporting role. During the test exercise, the CO of the Armoured Regiment was declared a casualty and CO 18 Sikh was ordered to assume command of the battle group. The ulterior motive was based on the assumption that Shamsher being an infantry officer was not well versed in armour tactics and would be put in his place. The Divisional and Brigade Commander were unaware of Shamsher’s cavalry and armoured car background.
Shamsher, always ready to seize an opportunity, took radio control of the battle group and gave crisp radio orders, much to the surprise of both his subordinates and superiors. In the exercise, he manoeuvred the battle group with finesse to the grudging appreciation of his superiors.
The objective to be invested was fifteen kilometres away when the umpires painted a picture that due to an unfordable river, the tanks and wheeled vehicles could only cross once the bridge was constructed, which imposed a delay of four hours. Shamsher directed 18 Sikh to dismount, cross the river with improvised expedients and race for the objective. The unit moving tactically on foot covered the distance in two-and-a-half hours, surprised the enemy and captured the objective. The reputation of Shamsher as a man of action was confirmed once
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again and 18 Sikh was declared the best all-round unit of the Armoured Division.
Within one year, 18 Sikh moved to Punch in J&K. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 25 Division, Major General K. C. Katoch, was not aware that the unit had redeemed its reputation and based on the past, decided to admonish and warn the unit. A sainik sammelan (soldiers’ conclave) was organised during which the GOC launched into a tirade, and rebuked the unit. Shamsher was sitting on the dais next to the GOC. He got up from his chair, moved a short distance away and stood with his back to the GOC. The GOC abruptly ended the sainik sammelan and asked Shamsher to see him in his office. Shamsher entered the office and before the GOC could say anything, he took off his belt (symbolic of being placed under arrest) and placed it on the table. “Sir, I am the CO of 18 Sikh; he said. “You cannot rebuke my men as long as I am in command. I am ready to face a court martial for my misdemeanour!’ The GOC apologised and left the office!
Shamsher went on to command the Sikh Regimental Centre for five years in two spells, from 1959 to 1963 and 1965 to 1966. This was the period of expansion of the Indian army. During his tenure, approximately 25,000 recruits graduated after undergoing training. He retired on 8 July 1966 at the age of fifty. After a five-year spell in the Border Security Force (BSF), he immersed himself in social work. Our village and the surrounding five villages were made model villages with toilets, street lights, proper schools and paved streets. He also used his administrative skills to set up a modern public school and a college at Fatehgarh Sahib.
When he died on 6 August 2012, hundreds of his former army comrades as well as common people turned up to pay their last respects. All were unanimous in their view that he was certainly ‘the man’ in war and peace, and a role model to cherish.
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