Jinnah A Life | Yasser Latif Hamdani

Jinnah A Life | Yasser Latif Hamdani

PREFACE
Mahomed Ali Jinnah is not the easiest historical figure to explain or even write about. He continues to evoke strong emotions on both sides of the Radcliffe border that the British bequeathed to the subcontinent on the eve of their departure. In India, he is universally demonized for having destroyed the unity and for having laid the foundation of a perpetual communal conflict. In Pakistan, at least according to the official version, Jinnah is revered as the great saviour of Islam who created Pakistan and thus saved the Muslims from perpetual slavery to a Hindu majority. Jinnah’s own life and long political career do not sit well with either view.
Years ago, when I was a young undergraduate at Rutgers University in New Jersey and was confronting questions of identity and what it meant to be a Pakistani, the huge collection of books on Jinnah in the library showed me how fascinating and misunderstood the man really was. This was around the time when Akbar S. Ahmad and Jamil Dehlavi’s film, Jinnah, was released. Having seen the film Gandhi earlier, in which the portrayal of Jinnah was quite unfair in my view, I had looked forward to watching Jinnah to understand the man who was said to have created Pakistan and his reasons
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for doing so. The film was very well executed and certainly did go a certain distance in correcting my perception of Jinnah. To me personally, it posed more questions than it answered. Dr Ayesha Jalal’s The Sole Spokesman answered some more of these questions. It explained the demand for Pakistan in terms that would be anathema to both Indians and Pakistanis. However, Jinnah’s early career as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity needed to be showcased far more evidently, connecting it back to the eventual Pakistan movement. Ian Bryant Wells’ little-known book on Jinnah’s early politics did that but it ends in 1934. Jaswant Singh’s book on Jinnah that generated controversy went some distance but it seems to have been a victim to the author’s own politics to a certain extent. More recently, two incredibly readable books on Jinnah came from India. The first one was Jinnah Often Came to Our House by Kiran Doshi, a reimagining of Jinnah as a Shakespearian tragedy hero in the mould of Macbeth. The second was a book on Jinnah’s marriage titled Mr and Mrs Jinnah by Sheela Reddy. Both of these added new colours to Jinnah’s persona.
Coming back to my own journey, I returned to Pakistan after college totally obsessed with Jinnah. Soon after my return, I decided to follow Jinnah’s footsteps and become a lawyer. I enrolled at Lahore’s Quaid-i-Azam Law College. Years later, the same Jinnah obsession led me to become a member of Lincoln’s Inn in London and take the Bar Transfer Test. In 2012, Mr Najam Sethi asked me to write a book on Jinnah’s politics as I understood it. That book was titled Jinnah: Myth and Reality and was not a chronological biography but rather a longish argument on why Jinnah would not have wanted a theocratic state, the kind Pakistan has become over the years. The present work is different. I have provided, in chronology, a holistic picture of Jinnah and the complex political
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problems he faced as he navigated his way through the power corridors of British India. Therefore, the reader will find that at certain points the discussion will go from what was happening on the grand political stage to Jinnah’s legal practice and his personal life.
So intertwined is Jinnah’s political career with his legal career that it is inescapable to keep them parallel to each other, but I also feel that his personal life – especially his relationship with his wife, sister and daughter – fit neatly with the politics of the time. Many authors have wondered what would have happened if Jinnah’s wife, Rattanbai Petit Jinnah, had not passed away so young and have concluded that he may not have turned his back to the Indian national ideal. I certainly hold this view. Jinnah’s sister, Fatima Jinnah, did influence his attitude towards the Muslim community and there is ample evidence of it. His daughter Dina’s marriage to Neville Wadia may have been a collateral damage to Jinnah’s politics. It is incomprehensible to think that Jinnah would have objected to her marriage had it not been for the political expediency as the leader of the Muslims of India.
One can only speculate but one thing is certain: each of the three women in Jinnah’s adult life – Ruttie (wife), Fatima (sister) and Dina (daughter) – was extraordinary in her own way, wielding great influence over the Quaid-i-Azam. Of the three, only Fatima Jinnah followed him into politics and in the 1960s became the main challenger to the military dictator, Ayub Khan. Indefatigable democrat that she was, had Fatima won the 1965 presidential election, which was by all accounts stolen from her, the history of the subcontinent might have been quite different and the wars of 1965 and 1971 would have been improbable. Some of her staunchest supporters came from East Pakistan, and she had the complete
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backing of all democratic forces in the country. Pakistan and India would have evolved towards each other as good neighbours rather than perpetually sniping at each other. Jinnah’s daughter Dina often mourned what Pakistan had become and how disappointed her father would have been in the country. Even though in the early years, she seems to have been a regular feature at the Pakistani consulate’s events in New York, Dina refused to associate herself with the country her father created later on, visiting it only once in 2004. On this occasion, she expressed her fervent hope to return one day to a Pakistan her father would approve of. That was not to be as she passed away on 2 November 2017 at the age of 98. At the time of her death, she was still contesting her right to Jinnah’s palatial Malabar Hill residence through her lawyer Fali S. Nariman. Like the country Jinnah built, the house he left behind also remains bitterly contested as well as is in a state of disrepair.
I am not a trained historian but a lawyer. The study of law is quite useful when it comes to looking at documents and their impact because that is what we do vis-à-vis constitutions and charters. In studying Jinnah, my training as a lawyer helped unearth those elements of his life, that have been overlooked by historians or political scientists. I certainly am not the first lawyer to write on Jinnah; A. G. Noorani, Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of India, has spent a lifetime writing on Jinnah and I am lucky to have read almost everything he has ever written. My conclusions – formed as a result of my own endeavours – are akin to his. .
I truly believe that understanding Jinnah’s story and his motivations may help Pakistan and India lay to rest the ghosts of partition and the acrimonious communal dispute. Obviously, it will
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not resolve all disputes between the two nuclear-armed neighbours because much of what goes on between the two countries is marred by power plays and global politics. Yet, understanding Jinnah’s life may help both sides realize that nothing is final in politics. What I would want Pakistanis to get out of this is that Jinnah at least did not envisage India and Pakistan to be enemies in perpetuity. On the Indian side, one would hope that a realization dawns that Pakistan’s existence is not antithetical to the idea of India but that both countries can exist side by side as pleasant neighbours.
Now more than ever, we need Jinnah’s pre-1937 politics in both India and Pakistan. A pro-minority consociational equipoise is now needed more than ever, given the steady descent of both countries into a cesspool of majoritarian tyranny, constitutional politics aimed at giving a voice to all sections and classes at the centre is a noble objective. Therefore, for me, to write this book is more a political act in itself to resuscitate the politics that almost succeeded before failing in the 1930s, so that a progressive egalitarian Pakistan can exist alongside a progressive egalitarian India.
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The Boy WHO STOOD
UP FROM THE SAND
The history of Mahomed Ali Jinnah, who would one day become the undisputed Quaid-i-Azam of a great majority of Muslims of India and then lead them to an independent majority state of their own, cannot be told or understood without adequate reference to his family’s own heterogeneous religious background.
Before the beginning of the British rule in India, it is clear that the Khojas were not easy to include in a Hindu or a Muslim category. It is also why the future Quaid-i-Azam of India’s Muslims was actually more suited to play the role he embarked upon early in his career, i.e., the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.
Sarojini Naidu had famously written: ‘Hindu by race, Muslim by religion – it might not be wholly idle to fancy something in the Khoja parentage of the child destined to become “an Ambassador of the Hindu-Muslim Unity”. ‘l His father, Poonja Jinnahbhai and his family were Khoja Ismailis, and relatively recent converts from Hinduism. It is not entirely clear when exactly the family converted
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to Islam but like most Gujarati Khojas, their origins can be traced back to the Lohanna caste.
Members of the Lohanna caste were steadily converted to the Ismaili Nizari branch of Islam, starting in the 15th century, but they were Muslim qua Hindu till the 19th century.
Khojas in the 19th century were spread across Bombay Presidency, which also included Sindh. As one historian puts it, they comprised a cluster of castes, heterogeneous in their religious practices and known primarily for their adherence to trade and commerce – two professions from which Muslims generally remained aloof. In terms of religion and religious ideology, they followed a number of religious holy men, both Hindu and Muslim. From the 1840s onwards, the spiritual leadership, and consequently the economic and political leadership, of the Khojas became a subject of intense litigation in the Bombay High Court. Many Muslim pirs who led the community, were the followers of Hasan Ali Shah, a Nizari Ismaili leader from Persia, who had arrived in India as late as the 1840s. He had been sending missions to India to gain followers from as early as the 1820s and in the 1830s, he instituted a suit against those Khojas who were refusing to pay tithes to him.
Shah was the son of the 45th Nizari Ismaili sect within Shias and upon his father’s death, he became the 46th imam of the small though the widely spread Nizari Ismailis. There, he was appointed the Governor of Kerman and given the honorific title of Aga Khan. Later, however, he fell out with the Qajar dynasty. He was forced to flee to Afghanistan after a series of battles and it was there that he came in contact with the British for the first time. He then moved to Sindh and placed his cavalry at the disposal of the British forces for fighting the Talpur rulers of Sindh. So crucial was
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his role in Napier’s annexation of the British that they gave him an annual pension of 2,000 pounds sterling. In 1846, he moved to Bombay, where he claimed the leadership of the Khoja community and the ownership of its communal properties. A minority kept challenging his authority and even got a judgment passed against him in 1847, but most notably, the judgment held that the Khojas were a Mohammedan group with Hindu practices, possessing no translation of the Quran. This part of the judgment later proved crucial in the consolidation of the community.
Somewhere in the 1860s, Shah, now known popularly as His Highness Aga Khan I, required an oath of loyalty and acceptance of Nizari Ismaili beliefs for all Khojas. This led to the famous Aga Khan case of 1866. The plaintiffs, representing a small section of Khojas, argued that the original religion of Khojas was Sunni Islam and that Aga Khan, a Nizari Ismaili leader, had no authority over them. They also argued that Pir Syed Sadruddin Al Husayni, who had converted Khojas to Islam in the 14th century, was a Sunni, and therefore the original faith of Khojas was Sunni Islam. Aga Khan I’s lawyers argued that Pir Al Husayni was a Nizari Ismaili “Dai’ or a missionary of Aga Khan I’s direct ancestors, and thus could not have been a Sunni.
The case ultimately turned on a crucial piece of historical text called Das Avatar or the 10 Avatars taken from Pir Al Husayni’s devotional Ismaili hymns in which the 4th Islamic Caliph Ali, Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law was the Nakalanki or the 10th Avatar. The judgment of the Bombay High Court came down in the favour of Aga Khan I, declaring that Khojas were Ismaili Shias and had nothing to do with Sunni Islam.? The court established Aga Khan’s direct lineage from Ali and effectively made him the undisputed leader of the Khojas in India.
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Khojas were a unique community. They blurred the lines between Hindus and Muslims where customs and local traditions played a huge role in their spiritual and communal matters. Under Aga Khan III, the community further solidified and also, paradoxically, lay claim to the leadership of the Muslim community. Aga Khan III was the founding president of the All India Muslim League in 1906 and a key supporter of the idea of separate Muslim electorates.
The Jinnah family itself broke off in the second great schism in the Khoja community somewhere between 1890 and 1910. A group of dissidents within the community claimed that the original religion of the Khojas was not Ismaili Shiism but Ithna Ashari or Twelver Shiism. In 1908, the second Aga Khan Case once again ruled in the favour of Aga Khan but at the same time, a Khoja Ithna Ashari Shia party seceded. Jinnahs of Karachi had converted to the Twelver Shia creed for a more personal reason, it evolved.
Mariam Peerbhoy, the second child in the Jinnah family, had married a Sunni from Bombay. Aga Khan III excommunicated the Jinnahs from the Khoja Ismaili group, using the powers his grandfather had fought for and won through the 1866 case. From early on, Mahomed Ali Jinnah witnessed fissures and fusions with regard to his faith and community, as was the case with his political career – from an Indian nationalist to the father of a Muslim state.
Jinnah’s origins, including his place and date of birth are also marred in controversies. Mahomed Ali Jinnahbhai, as he was named at birth, was born in either Jhirk, a small town near Thattha or in Karachi, either on 20 October 1875 or 25 December 1876. There is discrepancy in the actual date of his birth because the school record in Jhirk shows the former date but the latter date is what he
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himself claimed to be his birth date throughout his life. The place of birth was hugely controversial in the early years of Pakistan’s existence as a state. One view holds that Poonja Jinnahbhai had settled in Jhirk along with his father, following in the footsteps of Aga Khan I who had made this town his home. In 19th century, Jhirk was a thriving town with an economy sustained by river trade. It is contended that it was here that Poonja Jinnahbhai had gotten married, and his eldest son was also born in Jhirk. The prevalent view now accepted by most biographers is that Poonja Jinnahbhai had moved to Karachi, an emerging port city, and Mahomed Ali Jinnahbhai was born in a house in the Kharadhar neighbourhood of the city. There is corroboration for this view as the records show that Poonja Jinnahbhai actually lived in Karachi between 1872 and 1880.
There are many anecdotes about Jinnah’s growing-up years in Kharadhar neighbourhood of Karachi. The most famous of these, which has passed into a legend, details how young Jinnah had asked his friends to stand up from the sand and play cricket instead of playing marbles. This instance has served as an inspiration. It has been recounted time and again in Pakistan to underscore the achievements of Jinnah, a boy who stood up from the sand in Karachi to create an independent nation state. Another anecdote has Jinnah reading late night under the street lamps. Yet another anecdote tells us of how he was not enthused about school but after his father introduced him to the drudgery of office ledgers, he settled quite well into the system. It is impossible to tell which of these stories is true and which merely a stuff of the legends.
There was obviously something truly extraordinary about young Jinnah. He was a strong-willed and independent young boy since childhood. He had taken some traits of his father, Poonja Jinnahbhai. Still in his teens, Poonja had founded a trading company in Karachi and
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by the age of twenty, he was forging ahead with a successful business. The lessons that young Jinnah had learnt from his father stayed with him for a lifetime. Had he been born in a different household, it would be hard to imagine the man he eventually became.
Karachi in the closing decades of the 19th century was slowly coming into its own as a major seaport and stop for ships travelling to and from Bombay. The Khojas were a savvy business community, and their trade required them to interact with merchants from far and wide. As an enterprising Khoja businessman, Poonja no doubt would have wanted the best for his son. Young Jinnah was enrolled in Sindh Medressah-tul-Islam, a Muslim modernist school modelled after British public schools. Medressah in Urdu means school. Here, Sindh Medressah, founded by Hassan Ali Effendi, was a school with a British headmaster who ensured a rigorous British curriculum for students. Effendi’s own story provides an interesting segue into the rise of Muslim modernism. A British judge had found Effendi by a lamp on a boat reading an English language book. At that time, Effendi was employed by the Indus Steam Flotilla, a company that operated a boat service on the Indus river. The British judge was so impressed by young Effendi that he took him under his wing. Young Effendi had a meteoric rise in his life. He was allowed to practice law and soon became a public prosecutor. Impressed by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s efforts to introduce modern education for Muslims, Effendi travelled to Aligarh and came back to Karachi to start Sindh Medressahtul-Islam. This was in 1885, when young Jinnah must have been either nine or eleven years old, depending on which record is considered authentic.
Jinnah’s father wanted him to be efficient in mathematics so that he could later join the business. Poonja took him out of the
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primary school to admit him to Sindh Medressah-tul-Islam, which was a little far from their residence. This was done mainly to keep Jinnah away from the bad company of his neighbourhood playmates. But that did not work and Jinnah was soon sent to Bombay for a short stint in a missionary school there. He had to soon come back as his doting mother, Mithi Bai, could not bear the parting from her son. It was his father’s friend, Sir Frederick Leigh Croft, the managing director of Graham’s Trading Company, who took young Jinnah under his tutelage and suggested that Poonja send his son to London to make him learn the ways of the world, especially business administration as an apprentice. Plans were made and Poonja deposited the entire amount of Jinnah’s stay with Graham’s Trading Company in London.
Before he could depart, his mother Mithi Bai put her foot down. Already distraught over the prospect of losing her son for three years and the fear that he might bring home an English wife she decided that young Jinnah must be married before his departure. A distant relative in Paneli, the family’s ancestral village, was found for the fifteen-year-old Jinnah to get married to. Jinnah surprisingly acquiesced to marrying a girl he had never seen before and went ahead with the marriage. The marriage took place with fanfare and local customs that went on for days. At some point, though, Jinnah lost patience and took matters in his hands. He showed up at his in-laws’ place, informing them about his family’s and his departure for Karachi and that if his in-laws wished, they could continue the customs and send the bride, Emi Bai, to Karachi after the completion of the customary period for the bride to stay at her house. He also informed them about his departure for England and in that case, Emi Bai would have to wait three years before seeing him next. As it turned out, the in-laws immediately informed Poonja
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and Mithi Bai that they were ready to send Emi Bai with them. Back in Karachi, Jinnah insisted that his wife would not cover her face in front of his father as he felt there was no reason to follow such ageold traditions. There was something extremely modern, rebellious and non-conformist about Jinnah right from the beginning. This side of him was honed more when he travelled to London.
Even though unaccustomed to the cold and rainy weather, this Karachi boy soon settled down in London. What an extraordinary time it must have been for a young man to come of age in what was the de facto capital of the world at the time! Under the influence of the English culture, even his eating habits changed. He preferred the bland English food over the greasy-curried one that he had long been accustomed to. This was the beginning of young Jinnah’s romance with the western civilization and all things English. If Fatima Jinnah’s account in My Brother is to be believed, young Jinnah was still rooted in his culture at this point. When asked by a coquettish girl for a kiss, his sharp retort was ‘This is not acceptable in our society’. Ten months into his great odyssey, his mother Mithi Bai passed away while giving birth to her seventh child. Soon after, his bride also passed away. This news came as a rude shock to him, so far away and alone.
London had a lot to offer with its treasure troves of knowledge from the world over. Young Jinnah cultivated the habit of reading the morning newspaper cover to cover, something he continued doing till the end of his life. As biographers would comment, he had newspapers from all over the world mailed to him. Years later, he would be on the board of directors of Bombay Chronicle and then would go on to start Dawn, which still is Pakistan’s leading
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English language daily. Jinnah also got himself a reading ticket to the London Museum and began attending theatre at the famed Globe. The Globe imbued him with a lifelong love for Shakespeare and in some ways, he seems to have internalized the line: ‘All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players; they have their exits and their entrances.’3 Shakespeare was not the only reading he did. He developed a keen interest in Roman history as well. Jinnah underlined this from Cicero: ‘Whenever you design to break off any friendship or displeasing acquaintance, you should loosen the knot little and little, and not try to cut it asunder, all at once.[4]
Meanwhile, in the political scene, there was a great tumult with the election of the grand old man of India, Dadabhoy Naoroji, to the House of Commons around the time Jinnah was heading to London. Naoroji was probably the most important Indian statesman of his time. He had been the president of Congress and a notable Freemason who rose to prominence because of his drain theory, that is, the British Empire was systematically draining India of its resources. The decision of Liberal Party to support his candidature was a testament to the rise of British liberalism. This was the age of Lord John Morley and William Gladstone. The ideas that Jinnah had imbibed from his readings and his attendance at the House of Commons would come to define his political future. As late as 1941, he advised his young colleagues and associates to read Morley’s On Compromise. Naoroji was his other political role model. In Naoroji’s ideas, Jinnah found a sense of purpose and identity. He also decided that his work as an apprentice at Graham’s was of no use to the life he wanted to lead. Soon afterwards, he decided to shift to law.
from a university and one could become a barrister by enrolling into
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one of the Inns, which would make Jinnah’s success in the profession even more extraordinary. He did not go into the profession by way of Cambridge or Oxford as Nehru and Iqbal did after him. Gandhi before him had gone and studied jurisprudence and law before enrolling to become a barrister. Jinnah was entirely self-taught.
The four Inns of court in London are Lincoln’s Inn, Gray’s Inn, Middle Temple and Inner Temple. Jinnah scouted all the Inns but it was G. F. Watts’ Justice; Hemicycle of Law Givers’, a fresco completed in 1857, that clinched him. In the pictorial representation of great lawgivers from history, Watts had also included the Prophet of Islam. While Jinnah had shown few signs of any religious devotion and would be famously irreligious in his later life, he considered this representation a nod to his own heritage. The fresco is still there today in the Great Hall at Lincoln’s Inn with the portrait of the Prophet in green.
To get into Lincoln’s Inn, he needed to take the Little Go exam, which comprised English history, English language and Latin. He managed to get an exemption from Latin and passed the other two. He later confided in his sister that he had promised himself if he passed the Little Go, he would join Lincoln’s Inn. Even though it was not a university, Lincoln’s Inn had a demanding curriculum. It was only in his fourth attempt that Jinnah, who had never actually matriculated and was only eighteen years old, managed to pass his exams and become the youngest person to pass the bar exam. As he waited for his turn to be called to the bar, he tried his hands at acting. Soon he was offered a chance to act with a theatre company, which he promptly accepted. His acting career was cut short by a curt letter from his father reproaching him for shaming the family. By the time he was called to the bar on 29 April 1896, Jinnah had anglicized his name, dropping the bhai at the end of his surname.
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He was now M. A. Jinnah. By the time he reached Karachi, Jinnah had come into his own element, virtually unrecognizable from the young boy who had left Karachi in a funny, long, yellow coat. He had become a fastidious dresser, though he had not quite reached the sartorial elegance that would later become his second nature.
Returning to Karachi must not have been an easy transition. From all accounts, Jinnah’s father had faced setbacks in business since the passing of his wife. Regardless of how he planned on proceeding, Jinnah quickly realized that his future lay in Bombay, the capital of the presidency and the most important port city in Asia. There, he would stay briefless for years, recounting later that there was never any elevator to the top. To supplement his extremely modest earnings, Jinnah took to wagering on a game of billiards.
His application for enrollment as an advocate in the Bombay High Court of Judicature is dated 18 August 1896. This means that his sojourn in Karachi must have been quite short. Indian historian Ramchandra Guha found a reference to two letters from January and March 1897 from Jinnah to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who at that time was already practising in South Africa. This information led Guha to speculate that Gandhi and Jinnah may actually have established a legal practice. It is unfortunate that the contents of those letters have been lost, but those letters would have clarified that Gandhi and Jinnah were in touch almost immediately after Jinnah entered law as a professional, though they both never referred to this early correspondence anywhere or to anyone.
By this time, Jinnah was already being seen as a Muslim notable. Bombay Gazette reported on 9 July 1897 the meeting of Anjumane-Islam in Bombay High Court presided over by Justice Badruddin Tyabji.? This meeting discussed the murders of two government

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officials in June; despite the newspaper’s report that the murderer was a Hindu, the Muslims of Bombay feared of being branded disloyal. Jinnah too attended this meeting.
The note said, “Jinnah’s role seemed to join in this protest to study and understand socio-political environment around him.’ The same newspaper on 13 August 1897 reported the birthday celebrations of Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, organized and attended by a mixed gathering of various Muslim sects, including, Moguls, Arabs, Khojas, Memons, Bohras and others. It also mentioned in one line that ‘Jinnah also attended this meeting. ‘[8] In December, the newspaper again reported on a meeting presided over by Syedna Burhanuddin, the chief priest of the Bohra community. It also mentioned that ‘Mahomed Ali Jinnah also attended the celebrations and listened to speeches by the Priest and Peerbhoy’. This meeting was apparently arranged by the Bohra community to celebrate the conferring of Adany Peerbhoy as the Shrievalty of Bombay.[9]
Jinnah must have cut an impressive figure about courts. The theatrical talent that was suppressed in him by his father’s stern warning was put to good use. He acted with an arrogant air about him, wearing his stylish suits in courts even when he was earning nothing. Soon, he caught the eye of the Advocate General, Sir John Macpherson, who admitted him to his chambers. Another one of his admirers was Sir Charles Ollivant, the judicial member of the Council of the Bombay Governor, who offered Jinnah the position of an ad hoc magistrate at the Espalanade Police Court. Jinnah’s career as a magistrate turned out to be short when he refused to accept a permanent position, remarking that he would like to earn the salary being offered in a day, an ambition he achieved soon afterwards. His days as magistrate give us a clue about some of
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those extraordinary characteristics that he would later become famous for, that is, incorruptibility, integrity and commitment to the law. During his brief tenure as a magistrate, he presided over many cases dealing with different races, religions and genders, given that Bombay was probably the most important port east of Suez at the time.
Jinnah was unsparing in his task, whether the accused was a European or an Asian and whether the accused was a Hindu or a Muslim. In one case, a Chinese sailor was treated badly by two European crew members. The European crew argued that the refusal by the Chinese sailor to clear the deck, when ordered, gave them the right to assault him, otherwise the Chinese crew would become ill-disciplined. Refusing to accept this as an excuse, Jinnah fined the European crew members.[10]
After returning to practice as an advocate, Jinnah soon came into his own. Meanwhile, his public profile continued to rise. In 1902, he was appointed on a special committee to celebrate the coronation of King Edward and in 1904, he was among the 26 people who were nominated as Justices of Peace in Bombay. However, by this time, it seemed that Jinnah was already thinking of a political career. On 28 July 1904, he attended the Congress reception committee meeting in Bombay.” This was a significant meeting in several ways. First, a resolution seconded by Jinnah proposed that the Congress’ annual session should be presided over by the Liberal Member of Parliament, Sir Henry Cotton, who was supportive to the cause of Indian Nationalism. Meanwhile, Muslim members of the committee, especially Kazi Kabiruddin, wrote to Nawab Viqarul-Mulk, asking him to abandon his plans to form a separate Muslim organization, and instead join Congress because all Indian interests were common. The Parsis dominated Congress despite being a
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minority. The constitution of Congress gave Muslims a communal veto and thus there was no chance of a Hindu majority dominating the organization. Resultantly, a large number of Muslims did attend the December session, including Jinnah, but Viqar-ul-Mulk and Sir Aga Khan significantly did not. For two years, Viqar-ul-Mulk played a pivotal role in the formation of the All India Muslim League, a development that the British viewed as positive because it could counterbalance the influence that Congress had on Indians. This was a development that young Jinnah opposed, denouncing it as nothing less than imperialist perfidy.
In 1905, Jinnah had already begun to take a public stance opposing the government. One such instance was when he attended a meeting in Bombay Town Hall, seconding a resolution of ‘respectful remonstrance’ against Viceroy Lord Curzon’s utterances against Indians at the Calcutta University convocation. In May of the same year, the Bombay Presidency Association elected G. K. Gokhale, the rising star of Deccan, and Jinnah as representatives of Bombay Presidency on a Congress delegation being sent to England at the time of the General Election. The idea was to make the cause of India a party issue in that election. It was during this voyage that Jinnah and Gokhale struck up a friendship that would last till the latter’s death in 1915. Jinnah would later famously express his ambition to become the Muslim Gokhale.
Meanwhile, there were three events that were to shake the Congress circles with respect to the Muslims of the subcontinent. One was the partition of Bengal. Even though it was annulled, this partition, the brainchild of Lord Curzon’s divide and rule policy, was to lay the foundation of the eventual Partition of British India. This event was widely hailed by the Aligarh group of Muslim Modernists who had followed Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s legacy of cooperating
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with the British. There was obviously a good reason for them to support it. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had, during his lifetime, trenchantly opposed Muslim participation in Congress and the Indian Nationalist movement. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had emphasized the ideas of modern education for Muslims, especially from the Ashraf, to compete with Hindus who had surged ahead in adopting the ways of India’s new colonial masters.
In his efforts, Khan was badly affected by the Urdu-Hindi riots of 1867. Urdu and Hindi are basically the same language written in two different scripts. They have a common ancestor, Prakrit, and are based on Khari boli. There were many names for it, including Dehlavi, Kauravi and Hindustani. In 1867, a group of Hindus in Agra and Oudh began to agitate for the installation of Hindi in place of Urdu as the official language that the British were using in lower courts and for administrative purposes. This led to communal violence and a feeling of insecurity among Muslims about their position in a Hindu majority country. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who had till this point considered Hindus and Muslims as two eyes of one beautiful Indian bride, remarked acerbically to his friend, the Governor of Benaras, that he was convinced Hindus and Muslims could never be one nation. From that point onwards, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan focused entirely on the upliftment of the Muslim community. This, in essence, was the beginning of the Two Nation Theory. The British administrators drew their own lessons. The most significant one of them was to keep Hindus and Muslims apart to avoid any significant challenge against their rule over the subcontinent. This was the story of British rule in the subcontinent, leading ultimately to a position that an honest compromise between Hindus and Muslims would become a major stumbling block for achieving Indian independence.
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On the heels of the partition of Bengal came another bombshell. A delegation of Muslim notables met Lord Minto, the new Viceroy who had replaced Lord Curzon. They placed their demands before the new Viceroy, read out by Sir Aga Khan, who emphasized that the importance of the Muslim community should not be judged by their numerical strength only. Expressing their fear of Hindu domination by sheer numbers, the delegation demanded for separate electorates. While the delegation leaders might have been earnest in their demands, it must have sounded like music to the imperialist Viceroy’s ears. He accepted their contentions and assured them that the Muslim community would get its due representation in any constitution dispensation introduced in the country.
At this time, Jinnah was livid with rage. Even before the delegation left for Simla, Jinnah penned a harsh letter in a local newspaper, which deserves to be reproduced here in full:
Dear Sir,
It has been given out in the papers, including yours that a representative deputation of Mahomadans of India is going to wait upon the Viceroy on 1st October. May I know whoever elected the gentlemen who are supposed to represent Bombay? It is such a pity that some people are always assuming the role of representatives without the smallest shadow of ground or foundation for it. I know of no meeting of the Mahomadan community that appointed these worthies to represent Bombay. Then another thing is this: May I know what is the object of the deputation? Nobody up to now knows what the deputation proposed to do. Is this the way to speak in the name of millions without even
16
informing them what is going to be done for them, to say nothing of the fact that nothing has been done to ascertain the real views of the Mahomadans of this city in the matter?[12]
Jinnah was at this time completely opposed to the very idea of reservation of any kind. On 28 December 1906, speaking to the Congress session that proposed to make some concessions to the Muslims as a backward community, he declared that he wished to ‘draw attention to the fact that Mahomedan community must be treated in the same way as the Hindu community. The Indian National Congress is based on the foundation that we are all equal and there should be no reservation for any class or any community and my whole object is that the reservation should be deleted.'[13] This is not to say that Jinnah was completely oblivious to the concerns of his community. A day earlier, he had endorsed the Congress’ resolution asking for the formation of a commission to investigate whether Privy Council judgments on the Muslim institution of Wakf-ul-Aulad – roughly a trust in favour of one’s posterity- had violated the principles of law and sentiments of the Mohamedan people. This was a matter that Jinnah was to take up later as a legislator.
The third major event was the formation of the All India Muslim League, which Jinnah was the first to condemn. He saw the hand of perfidious Albion behind it. What explains Jinnah’s peculiar attitude towards his community was that he had managed to excel without any special favours or on the basis of his faith. Naturally, he viewed with suspicion the activities of Sir Aga Khan, who he saw as a collaborator of the British at this time and who he had a personal animus against Aga Khan’s decision to excommunicate his family. Jinnah’s education in England and his
17
political training with Congress’ nationalist stalwarts, including Pherozeshah Mehta, Dadabhoy Naoroji and Gokhale, helped him avoid Muslim particularism championed by Muslim upper classes from which Jinnah, being a scion of a mercantile family, was in any event excluded.
Meanwhile, Jinnah continued to be involved in a litigation that touched key issues of the day, especially those pertaining to Muslims but also to other communities.
One of these cases was the Kazi Ismail Gulmali Meheri appeal. This involved the publication of pamphlets in which one Kazi Ismail Gulmali Meheri had addressed a religious issue. In response to this, Abdul Vudood Hammad had published a pamphlet that was deemed defamatory by Meheri. The trial court had sentenced Hammad to a month’s imprisonment and Rs 1,000 as fine. Jinnah appeared in appeal and got the fine reduced to Rs 200 and the sentence of imprisonment was set aside.
In another case, he represented two leading Parsis, Jahangir Petit and Sir Pherozeshah Merwanji Mehta in an election matter pertaining to Bombay Municipal Corporation known as the Justices’ Election Case.[14] They were asking for the disqualification of Hajee Sulaiman Wahed and the election of Mehta against Rao Bahadur Nainavati. In this instance, Jinnah was up against the full might of influential Muslim community that wanted to keep Mehta out and elect Wahed. This case lasted for close to two months through various stages and makes for an interesting read for students of electoral laws in this subcontinent. It shows how the British officialdom was hell bent on getting its own people to dominate every elected body in the country. Mehta was an undesirable candidate because he was a leading nationalist of the Congress
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party. Ultimately, Jinnah could not prevail in having the election being set aside as unfair.
Another important case in which Jinnah played an important role was a habeas corpus petition regarding the alleged abduction of a minor Hindu Brahmin girl called Gulbai by her own maternal grandmother and her aunts and uncles. The dispute had arisen after her attempted forcible marriage to a suitor by her paternal aunt. The paternal aunt had filed the petition for habeas corpus. Jinnah appeared for one M. B. Kolaskar, himself a barrister, who had aided the maternal grandmother in helping the young girl escape. The case was ultimately decided with the girl child being returned to her paternal aunt on the condition that she would not be married off.[15] Years later, Jinnah helped get the Child Marriages Restraint Act passed.
Jinnah’s principled opposition to separate electorates can be gauged from a letter he wrote to the Times of India. The letter was published on 10 February 1909. This was a detailed letter tracing the history of the problem. He ended the letter with but there may be circumstances and reasons when we may find that a non-Mahomedan is better able to represent us. Why should we forgo that by a limitation which may work against us under given circumstances?'[16]
The Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, which was officially named the Indian Councils Act 1909, sought to introduce limited franchise in India and can be considered the beginning of parliamentary democracy in the subcontinent. Ironically though, even Lord Morley, one of the most enlightened and progressive Englishmen,
19
would deny such intention when questioned by arch imperialist Lord Curzon.
Curzon strongly objected to the idea of allowing Indians to have a parliament of their own. Nevertheless, the key feature of these reforms was the introduction of separate electorates for the Muslim minority in India. Elections that were held the year after saw Congress putting up Jinnah, then 34 years old, on a Muslim seat against the Muslim League candidate, Rafiuddin Ahmad in Bombay. Jinnah won this seat and was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council on 4 January 1910. On 25 February 1910, Gokhale moved the resolution in Council to prohibit the recruitment of indentured labour for the Colony of Natal in South Africa. Speaking for the resolution, Jinnah declared, ‘If I may say at the outset, it is a most painful question – a question which has roused the feelings of all classes in the country to the highest pitch of indignation and horror at the harsh and cruel treatment that is meted out to Indians in South Africa.'[17] Lord Minto, the Viceroy and President of the Council interrupted him and said, ‘I must call the honourable gentleman to order. I think cruelty is rather too strong a word. The honourable member must remember that he is talking about the friendly part of the Empire, and he must really adapt the language to the circumstances.
Jinnah’s reply to this interruption must have shocked his listeners because till that time, the British were not accustomed to being talked back to. He replied, ‘Well my Lord, I should feel inclined to use much stronger language, but I am fully aware of the constitution of this Council, and I do not wish to trespass for one single moment; but I do say this, that the treatment that is meted to Indians is the harshest that can possibly be imagined and, as I said before, the feeling in this country is unanimous.'[18] He
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then went on to lay down the history of excesses against Indians in Natal and how they were denied all basic fundamental rights, including franchise. The reader will undoubtedly note that this was what Gandhi had been fighting against in South Africa at the same time. In the Council, Jinnah was his biggest ally. Jinnah also pointed out that Mohammadans were barred by legislation to even enter Transvaal. He also mentioned that an Armenian Christian, subject of the Turkish Empire could enter the colony, whereas a Mohammadan, subject of the British Empire could not. Records show that Minto did not reply or interrupt him this time and the word ‘cruelty’ was not retracted by Jinnah. A month into the Council, Jinnah was already establishing his reputation as a young firebrand with a biting tongue that he used fearlessly, some imagined recklessly, even in the face of the sovereign. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Jinnah started the tradition of speaking truth to power in the subcontinent.
The next debate where Jinnah featured was on the Financial Statements of 1910–11. Gokhale moved the resolution, stating, ‘This Council recommends that the amount of loan to be raised during the year 1910–11 should be pound sterling 1,245,900, instead of 1,000,000 and that the sum of 245,900, which is estimated to be surplus for the current year, should be allotted to the several Provincial Governments to be expended by them in assisting local bodies to carry out projects of sanitary improvements.’ Then, Malik Umar Hayat Khan from Punjab rose to repeat the same arguments, eliciting a sharp rebuke from Jinnah, who rose on a point of order to object by referring to the rules. The Punjabi Muslim clique, who usually voted with the British, was quite unhappy with Jinnah. The significance of the clash between Punjabi Muslim opinion and Jinnah was to remain a bane of his political career.
21
On 23 March 1910, Jinnah rose again to speak on the urgent need of technical education in India and in support of the resolution of the establishment of a state-of-the-art polytechnic college. Comparing the situation with Japan, he argued that while the number of pupils in technical institutes stood at 217,000 in Japan in 1906, it stood at only 6,000 in India. Despite Jinnah’s forceful oratory, the motion was defeated 35 to 17.[19] – The December session of the Congress that year took place in Allahabad. As shown earlier, Jinnah had accepted the principle of separate electorates reluctantly. At this session in Allahabad, Jinnah moved Resolution XVI, which read, “The Congress strongly deprecates the extension of or the application of the principle of separate communal electorates to municipalities, district boards or other local bodies.’ Speaking at the resolution, Jinnah made it clear that he did not have a mandate from the Mohammadan community nor did he represent them and what he was stating here was his personal views as an Indian.[20] A few days later, on New Year’s Day in 1911, a mammoth Hindu-Muslim unity conference was attended by the leading names of that time, including the entire leadership of the Muslim League and Congress. Other than Jinnah, in attendance were Aga Khan, Motilal Nehru and Gokhale. [21] This was the first real attempt at achieving a compromise on what was termed as the growing tension between Hindus and Muslims. The central issue was the League’s insistence on separate electorates, which was unacceptable to Congress and to Jinnah personally. Yet this seemed to be the price for Hindu-Muslim cooperation.
Jinnah returned to the Council with fresh ideas on how to achieve Indian identity above the Hindu-Muslim fissure. While deeply conscious of his unique role as a Muslim in the Congress party, he never shied away from taking on his community on
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sensitive issues. He believed that the elected legislature had the absolute right to overrule unreasonable or problematic religious bars so long as religious freedom was ensured. Supporting the Special Marriage Amendment Bill in 1912, Jinnah spoke of why there should be no bar on inter-communal marriages. The law provided for either conversion by one party or renunciation by both. Jinnah sought to amend that by declaring: ‘Nobody has denied this proposition that equity, in the strict sense of the word, is in favour of the measure. Can you deny that there is a certain class of educated and enlightened people who rightly think that the gravest injustice is done to them so long as liberty of conscience is withheld from them? Can that be denied?[22] His own community was up in arms against the proposition.
This is how Jinnah addressed the concern that such a measure would clash with Islamic law: ‘Is this the first time in the history of legislation in this country that this Council has been called upon to override Musalman Law or modify it to suit the time? The Council has over-ridden and modified the Musalman law in many respects.’ Jinnah viewed that legislation ought to allow marriage between people of different faiths. He continued: “[T]he Hindu Law or the Mohammedan Law, whichever you take does create difficulty in Hindu marrying a non-Hindu or a Mohammedan marrying anyone who is not a Khetabia; but is that difficulty not to be remedied by means of legislation? … it does not say that every Mohammedan shall marry a non-Mohammedan and that every Hindu shall marry a non-Hindu. Therefore, if there is a fairly large class of enlightened, educated, advanced Indians, be they Hindus, Mohammedans, or Parsis, and if they wish to adopt a system of marriage, which is in accord with the modern civilization and ideas of modern times, more in accord with modern sentiments, why should that class be
23
denied justice?'[23] Jinnah went on to delineate on how no practical problems of succession arose from such a proposition. The measure was defeated once again by 43 to 11. A grand opportunity of achieving actual inter-communal unity was thus sabotaged by the British officialdom yet again, in active connivance with orthodox Hindu and Muslim opponents of the bill.
Obviously, as a legislator, Jinnah was not just preoccupied with the question of Indian unity and simply opposition to the British. One of his finest speeches was on the issue of elementary education. He slammed the British government by stating that at the pace the British were going, it would take 600 years to get all girls into schools in India. ‘Now sir, this is a very old story that there is no money. All I say is this: find the money. Find the money … it is the duty of every civilized government to educate masses.’ Responding to objections by Nawab Majid who spoke of dangers of socialism arising out of it as a result, Jinnah laid down his own progressive vision for a literate and egalitarian society. “Do you really think education means sedition? … a frank and independent criticism of the Government is the duty of every member of state … are you going to keep millions and millions of people trodden under your feet for fear that they may demand more rights; are you going to keep them in ignorance and darkness for ever and for all ages to come because they may stand up against you and say we have certain rights and you must give them to us? Is that the feeling of humanity? Is that the spirit of humanity?'[24]
Once again the bill was defeated 38 to 13 with Jinnah supporting the bill. The British officialdom backed by feudal aristocracy, mostly Muslims from Punjab, managed to thwart bill after bill that Jinnah and his progressive colleagues tried to pilot in order to achieve a more humane and progressive society.
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An issue that agitated Muslims in the meantime was the issue of wakfs. Essentially, the issue emanated out of a judgment of the Privy Council in 1894, which laid down two fundamental requirement regarding Muslim charitable trusts for their children, that is, Wakf-alal-aulad. The Muslim personal law allowed charitable trusts in favour of one’s descendants so long as the ultimate benefit would be a charitable purpose. The first condition was that for such a wakf to be valid, it should be substantially for charity and second that the reversion to a charitable cause should not be postponed to too remote a time in the future. The Privy Council and High Courts of India had ruled this because this method had been used in the past to defraud the creditors, often Hindus. It had elicited such a strong response from Muslims that even Congress had been asking for a commission to review this law since 1906. Jinnah began working on a fair compromise between the various positions on the issue. The result of his efforts was the Musalman Wakf Validating Bill, which he presented before the house in 1911. The original bill that Jinnah made contained clauses with regards to registration of wakfs as well as testamentary wakfs. Reducing the wakfs to writing and registering them was to safeguard them against frauds, and this resulted in a support from Hindu and Muslim members. By 1913, when the matter finally was passed by the select committee, the bill had been considerably altered and changed beyond recognition. Just as he stood up in 1911 to defend the proposition that registration was necessary to protect Hindu and other creditors, he was now forced to defend the position that the law, even without a registration clause, would effectively protect the rights.[25] He now argued that while oral wakfs were technically possible under the law, without being reduced to writing and being registered, such a wakf would be extremely hard to prove and risky
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for those making them. Therefore, common sense suggested that the people who would actually make the wakf would in any event want to write it down. The central plank of the law after restating the established Muslim law governing Wakfs was Section 4: ‘No such wakf shall be deemed to be invalid, merely because the benefit reserved therein for the poor or other religious, pious or a permanent nature is postponed until after the extinction of the family, children or descendants of the person creating the wakf.’ In other words, Muslims were being given the right to establish family trusts, a right that was denied to them earlier. The bill was passed and it became the Musalman Wakf Validating Act 1913, a law that is still valid and on the statute books of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, without any amendment, nearly 105 years later. There are several cases that have been reported in both Pakistan and India that have consistently upheld the original intent of the law and have also shown that the only way the wakf actually works is by reducing in writing, proving Jinnah’s contention right in the end. The manner in which Jinnah carried this bill through to its ultimate conclusion showed his skills both as a lawyer and a negotiator and was praised by all sections of society. This was actually the first time an Indian legislation effectively overturned a decision from the Privy Council, the highest and mightiest legal forum in all of the British Empire.
Jinnah’s record as a legislator and a lawyer showed a trenchant secular commitment to the idea that a legislature could and ought to overrule all social evils emanating out of religious practices. He believed that religious differences and disputes were exploited by the British to turn Hindus and Muslims against each
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other. Jinnah’s concerns were constitutional, and he exhibited an evolved understanding of how democracy ought to evolve in the subcontinent. He was among the first to state clearly that judicial and executive branches should be separated.[26] In his evidence before the Royal Commission on Civil Service, he refused to suggest any special reservations for Muslims. The Commission asked very specific questions, which need to be considered.
First, the Commission asked: ‘Would a Hindu who got a few more marks than an educated and influential Mohammedan make an efficient administrator in a Mohammedan district than a Mohammedan would?’ Jinnah’s answer was rude and abrupt: As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as a Mohammedan district. There may be districts where there are a large number of Mohammedans but there is no Mohammedan district.’ This statement stands in strange juxtaposition to the career of Muslim India’s Quaid-i-Azam as the sole spokesman for Muslims.
The Royal Commission asked: “Do you think a Hindu who had got a few more marks than an educated and influential Mohammedan would make a better and more efficient administrator when he was in-charge of a population that was largely Mohammedan?’ Jinnah’s reply is extraordinary when considered that this man would one day be denounced as a communal monster: ‘If I may say so with great respect that the question involves more than one question. If you first put all these questions, supposing a Mohammedan gets a few marks less than a Hindu, should he be passed over. My answer would be that he should be passed over certainly because that is the test I lay down, a competitive test. Then you would say, although in principle the answer is with certainty that he should be passed over, having regard to the fact that you may have a district where you have a majority of people who are Mussalmans, would you not therefore
27
select a man who has got less marks, it may be few and who happens to be a Mussalman? I say in that case you will doing the greatest injustice to that Hindu.[27]
In a similar vein, he did not turn his back to genuine concerns of his community, often playing the bridge between Muslims and Hindus. In 1912, Jinnah could still bring together Hindus and Muslims on one platform to take up a purely Muslim international cause, such as the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, urging the British to continue friendly and peaceful relations with that one international symbol of Muslim sovereignty. While Jinnah had been regularly invited to Muslim League meetings as early as 1910, he did not join the Muslim League till October 1913. Much of this had to do with his deep and abiding mistrust of the pro-British Muslim elites who dominated the organization and were often at odds with him in the Council. It was only when Muslim League, earlier avowedly pro-British in its inclination, altered its constitution and changed its goal to self government that Jinnah could finally be persuaded to join it. Even so, he made his membership of the League conditional, saying that his commitment to the Muslim League would only continue so long as it did not hamper in any way his commitment to the ‘larger national cause to which his life was committed. Thus, in 1913, Jinnah was the member of both the Congress and the Muslim League. Congress circles rejoiced at having gained an important avenue into the Muslim League, which they had thought was working at cross purposes to their goal earlier. It was a curtain raiser to Jinnah’s greatest triumph in that earlier period, the Lucknow Pact, earning him the memorable title of the Best Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity, but, paradoxically, was Jinnah’s first step to what he would go down in history for, the creation of Pakistan and Partition of British India. In 1913, though
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it still was in the nascent stage, an ambitious young Jinnah may well have imagined that he would lead both the Congress and the Muslim League together to triumph over the British rulers by achieving self rule for his countrymen, Hindus, Muslims and Parsis alike. His immediate future would add to that optimism. Then would come the tragedy, followed by a parting of the ways and the eventual tragic and violent separation that would both deify and vilify him as the great hero and villain in this subcontinent.
29
AN AMBASSADOR OF
HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY
On 18 April 1914, Jinnah sailed for England as part of the Congress deputation. After spending some time in France and the continent, the Congress deputation finally reached London in May 1914. There, during the meeting with Lord Crewe at the India Office, the discussions seemed to have centered on the amendment of the Constitution of the Council of India 1858, most likely to expand non-official Indian representation within it. The Times London reported on 12 May 1914 about a Congress Resolution in Karachi, which had prompted Lord Crewe to make an announcement to this end.? The salience of this was that by 1914, British were being forced into expanding self-government in India, slowly but surely; yet, the official British fear was of course that if such expansion did happen, Indian nationalists might ask for complete self-government and curiously, the conservative and imperialist minded officialdom was unwilling to contemplate parliamentary form of government for Indians. They were also unwilling to expand the Council of the Secretary of State of India to ensure any representation to
30
non-official Indian membership. On 13 May 1914, Jinnah made his appearance before the House of Commons and addressed his views on how to proceed further with reform.[3]
The next day, he had the opportunity to speak to a gathering of MPs, both members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, at a breakfast meeting held in the Westminster Palace Hotel. After speaking at length about how the reforms would work, Jinnah made it a point to bring up the issue of Indians in South Africa. This shows that Jinnah was at this time working in tandem with Gandhi’s efforts in South Africa.
Before we go into this personal equation between the two future founding fathers, it is interesting to read Jinnah’s press statement on the issue of Council Reform, released on 3 June 1914, after a month of deliberation in London. It started off with this damning indictment of British rule: ‘India is perhaps the only member of the British Empire without any real representation, and the only civilized country in the world that has no real system of representative government.’ He further adds, Now that the Bill to amend the laws as to the Council of India has been introduced and gone through its first reading, I cannot but say that the provisions contained therein are most disappointing, and I feel sure that is how the people of India will receive it. What hope can measures like this inspire in the people of India, who are looking forward to bigger and more substantial reforms in time to come when in matters such as the reform of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, which is, after all more advisory in character than anything else, the just proposals of the deputation appointed by the Indian National Congress have not been accepted.[4] The British were not ready to give 1/3rd representation to Indians. This idea of 1/3rd representation was something Jinnah believed was sine qua
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non to Indian interests being properly represented in the Council. We will discover that this numerical figure, 1/3rd or 33 per cent, is central to Jinnah’s strategy of equipoise or safeguards, not just for Indians against British officialdom but also for Muslims in an independent India. Bombay Chronicle, the paper on which Jinnah exercised considerable influence, wrote a scathing editorial, calling it a friendless bill that will satisfy no one.
Two weeks later, Jinnah gave an interview to Daily Telegraph in which he further enumerated his grievances. The first grievance was related to the Press Act that the British had imposed on India. According to this Act, it was mandatory for newspaper-owning organizations to provide security before getting the permission to publish. This draconian measure also included the right of the Executive to cease the security and that no appeal would lie against it to the High Court. Jinnah called it a severe and unconscionable restriction on freedom of press and speech. Ironically, not only did the British Parliament refuse to consider any of these demands but by the second reading, there was even a motion to reject the bill with even those moderate reforms.
On 7 July 1914, the Parliament voted 96 votes to 58 to reject it. Jinnah wrote a detailed article on the issue, which was published in the Fortnightly Review London, on 1 October 1914. He declared, ‘It seems that there are two alternatives: (1) the Council should be ended; (2) it might be mended. But it cannot last in its present form without serious danger to the good government of India. To have a Cabinet, which lays down the final decisions on matters of paramount importance, composed purely of officials forming a bureaucratic citadel, the sacred precincts of which bar the nonofficial view and the view of the people who are the wearers of the administration shoe, cannot survive, for India has long since
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grown out of such crude methods of Government.’ These appeals for change fell on deaf ears.
World War I broke out in Europe in September 1914. The position of the Congress and other Indians struggling for self-rule was that they were willing to go along with the war as long as there was a clear and definite path to self rule and that Indian soldiers could have the opportunity to serve as fully commissioned officers. Jinnah had by this time become a member of the All India Muslim League (AIML) in addition to being a member of the Congress. As the leading lawyer in Bombay, Jinnah also contributed Rs 1,000, a large sum in those days, to the Congress every month. There is no record of him having contributed any amount to AIML, however. Jinnah had joined AIML with the specific purpose to wrest it from the clutches of the landed aristocracy and men like Aga Khan, whom he considered as a British collaborator. Jinnah at this time was entirely unsympathetic to the ideas of Muslim exceptionalism. He certainly did not associate with the Muslim community in any meaningful way, beyond attending the meetings of AIML on political issues.
Gandhi, the future Mahatma, returned to India in the beginning of 1915. On 13 January 1915, Jinnah, who at this point seems to have looked up to Gandhi as a personal hero, presided over Gurjar Sabha’s event to welcome Gandhi to India. Many biographers of Jinnah have referred to this first meeting as an extremely significant one but hardly anyone has focused on what Jinnah said in the meeting. Jinnah began by speaking of his great privilege and honour to welcome Gandhi back to the motherland after the most ‘strenuous and hard labour in South Africa in cause of the Indians residing there as well as in the cause of India generally’.
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After paying Gandhi tribute for his extraordinary work and sacrifice, Jinnah said that India’s gain was South Africa’s loss but it did not matter where Gandhi was and that undoubtedly Gandhi would not just become a worthy ornament but a real worker whose equals there were few. Then Jinnah proceeded to pay tribute to Kasturba, wife of Gandhi, who he described as an example, not just to womankind in India but to the womankind of the world. He continued: “They have drawn the attention of the whole world and the whole world admires the trials and troubles and sacrifices Mr and Mrs Gandhi underwent for the causes of their country and their countrymen.”5 Jinnah then pointed out that on the issue of South Africa, Hindus and Muslims were unanimous and stood as Indians. Indeed this was the first occasion when the ‘two sister communities stood in absolute union and it had its moral and political effect of the settlement of the question’. Gandhi’s response to Jinnah’s address has been pointed out as the first sour note between the two men.
It is not entirely clear how Jinnah reacted to Gandhi’s speech but in Gandhi’s defence, it may be stated that he might just be responding to Jinnah’s assurance that Hindus and Muslims were on the same page as Indians on the issue of South Africa. Gandhi is reported to have said that when he was in South Africa, every time the word Gujarati was mentioned, it was mentioned only with respect to Hindus and that Parsis and Muslims were generally not thought of as a part of it. Thus, he said, he was glad to see a Muslim member of Gurjar Sabha presiding over its session. Many biographers of Jinnah have seized on this as being the first incident of alienation. Certainly, Gandhi could have seen that other than Jinnah’s name, there was hardly anything Muslim about him. Jinnah firmly stood with Indian nationalism and Gujarati identity at the
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time. Still it is perhaps too unkind to read some kind of parochialism into Gandhi’s comment here. In the same speech, Gandhi referred to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s famous quote that Hindus and Muslims were the two eyes of a beautiful bride. In any event, there is certainly no indication that Jinnah took Gandhi’s comment in a spirit as ascribed to both men posthumously about their first meeting.
A month later, on 13 February 1915, Jinnah addressed the Bombay Muslim Students’ Union.[6] He advised them that their chief object ‘should always be cooperation, unity and goodwill, not only among the different sections of Mohammedans but also between Mohammedans and other communities of this country’. As citizens, he told them, that they would have to share the burden of the work, when their student days were over, with other communities and it would be therefore better if they started at the earliest possible opportunity to understand other communities. That, he said, would be the surest way of progress in this country, and there were sure signs of this progress. If progress was to be made, Jinnah continued, it would not be by dissensions. Unity was absolutely essential. He expressed surprise when he heard educated people saying that they did not take interest in politics. Politics, Jinnah said, did not mean agitation and agitation alone. He urged students to take interest in understanding the politics of India, which was the country’s lifeline. In the end, he advised them to hold fast to their principles and convictions and stick to them even if it led to a sacrifice.
There was no rancor or ill-will towards anybody in him. This was his vision for a united India, based on cooperation and unity, with no room for sectionalism and communal hatred. Tragic that this person was later unjustifiably known as the votary of that very
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sectionalism and communal hatred, which he had so passionately fought against.
On 19 February 1915 came a major personal blow to Jinnah with the passing of his mentor, guide and hero, Gopal Krishna Gokhale. Gokhale, though a Brahmin, came from a relatively humble background. Nevertheless, his family had ensured that Gokhale would receive English education, which he did by graduating from the prestigious Elphinstone College in Bombay. His political education came from reading the speeches of Edmund Burke.
Jinnah’s lifelong admiration for Burke was imbibed from his long association with Gokhale. Indeed, it was Gokhale’s Burkean ideas that pursued him to lead the constitutional moderate camp within the Congress. Along with Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Gokhale was a leader of immense moral authority and had a huge following among Indian nationalists. Unprejudiced and unbiased, Gokhale was foremost a reformer and had taken Jinnah under his wing and groomed him to lead the Congress party. Jinnah’s speech on Gokhale’s memorial in March of that year was uncharacteristically emotional. He said, ‘We mourn the death of Mr Gokhale so deeply with the rest of India that I have no words to adequately express our deep sorrow and grief. He was respected by the Mahomedans and Hindus alike and was trusted by both. He had endeared himself to all India by his singlemindedness of purpose, his earnestness and zeal with which he worked and his absolute devotion to the cause of India as a whole. With these words, Jinnah described not only Gokhale but how he would have liked to be remembered, the ‘Muslim Gokhale’, a voice of reason and moderation, while fiercely and fearlessly critical of the government and the bureaucracy. It
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was a tragedy for the subcontinent that Gokhale was to die aged 59 only. Had he lived a few more years, his two disciples, Jinnah and Gandhi, may well have found a way to cooperate better.
In 1915, the moderates within the Congress were having a tough time as the old guard seemed to be giving way. On 5 November 1915, Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, another of Jinnah’s mentors and a staunch Indian nationalist also passed away. Both Mehta and Jinnah had been great admirers of Gokhale and had been working to keep alive Gokhale’s legacy. In April, a news report showed that the two men had contributed Rs 500 each to the Gokhale Memorial Fund. The moderate wing of the Congress now had only one real leader of national renown and that was Jinnah. To him it was left to negotiate not just with the so-called extremist wing but also to settle terms with the coreligionists in the Muslim League. Things came to a head with the pro-British Muslim opinion on the issue of holding the Muslim League session at Bombay along with Congress. The session, to be held on 31 December 1915, was to be presided over by another staunch Indian nationalist, Mazharul Haque. In an interview in early December, Jinnah tried to allay the fears of his coreligionists by stating that the Muslim League session would not be an embarrassment to the British government. Ultimately, it was through the intervention of the Governor himself that Jinnah was able to secure the session, or so he imagined. On 31 December, the pro-British section created massive disturbance in the pandal. Jinnah immediately went to the Police Commissioner to request him to restore order but the Police Commissioner refused to intervene, stating that on Jinnah’s insistence, the police could clear the pandal altogether but would not intervene in favour of the organizing committee.[8] The meeting was adjourned and was rescheduled for 1 January 1916.
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This meeting was significant also because of the appearance of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, then only twenty-eight years old but already an accomplished Islamic scholar and a journalist in his own right. Decades later, Jinnah and Azad would be pitted against each other on the issue of Pakistan but in 1916, the two great Muslim leaders were still on the same side.
Notably, Azad was a member of the Muslim League only, while Jinnah was the member of both the Congress and Muslim League. Haque, Jinnah and Azad were against the principle of extension of separate electorates to municipal councils. Nevertheless they agreed to go along with the resolution of the Muslim League in the spirit of unity. In his speech though Jinnah made it clear that he was personally opposed to the idea but was only going along with it because a great majority of those present were supporting it. The resolution called for the introduction of scheme of reforms to enable India’s march to self-government. Maulana Hasrat Mohani, another incredible figure in the history of India and Pakistan, who once was a conservative Muslim cleric and a radical communist inspired by the Bolsheviks, moved an amendment to further define the ‘scheme of reforms’ in terms of self-governance, but Jinnah, being mindful of conservative opposition within the League ranks, requested him to withdraw the amendment at that time. This meeting ended with Haque praising Jinnah’s efforts in bringing together various factions within Muslims and ensuring that the meeting could finally take place. For the first time in its history, the loyalist Muslim League was now finally on the same page as the Congress and this was a moment of great triumph for Jinnah, setting the stage for the Lucknow Pact later that year.
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Jinnah’s public profile was ascending. Not only was he one of the leading politicians of the day, but he was also a leading lawyer in the subcontinent, a Rolls Royce lawyer as he was known. Rolls Royce was already a rage in the 1910s, with 40–50 models having been introduced in the early years of the 20th century.'[9] As a motor enthusiast, Jinnah is said to have complained to a client about his fee; that to drive a Rolls Royce, you need to pay for a Rolls Royce. It was this self-confidence bordering on arrogance that often won Jinnah enemies as well as admirers. The problem with most biographies of Jinnah is that they have never focused on his career as a lawyer, even when stating explicitly that Jinnah was one of the greatest lawyers in the British Empire. It has been left to legal historians of South Asia to delineate on this important aspect of his life. To get a full measure of Jinnah, his legal acumen and brilliance cannot be ignored. His practice was wide ranging. At other times, he defended lawyers accused of misconduct and then went on to argue about Cutchie Memons’ inheritance law.
Like most lawyers, he did lose as many cases as he had won, but it was his advocacy that always won the appreciation of both the bar and the bench. The claims of usual Pakistani hagiography, that Jinnah had never lost a case except one, are of course patently absurd and false. Indeed, of all the reported cases in All India Reports for Bombay High Court, Jinnah was often on what would be considered the losing side by a layman. The legal profession of course does not work this way. A good lawyer is primarily a representative to put forth the best case and the judge decides the merits of the issue. As an officer of the court, a lawyer’s responsibility is to see that justice is done. A lawyer’s performance is therefore never judged in the English legal system on the basis of the final judgment but solely depends on the ability to play his or her role in the proceedings.
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The fact that Jinnah would secure ten or more reported judgments in any given year at the Bombay High Court is enough to cement his reputation as a great advocate. However, to claim that he had a 100 per cent record in winning cases is a complete fabrication. If anything, such false aggrandizement does discredit to a lawyer’s record because it actually means that such a lawyer only took those cases that he was sure to win. One of the most interesting cases that Jinnah appeared in was a criminal defamation matter on behalf of his friend Benjamin Guy Horniman, the editor of Bombay Chronicle. Bombay Chronicle had a reputation of being sympathetic to the Indian nationalist cause. Horniman himself was involved in politics and supported the Congress Party, other than being a part of the Home Rule League. Another paper called Briton, with decidedly pro-government proclivities, began attacking Horniman and Bombay Chronicle to “check anti-European tendencies’. One of the imputations made by Briton was that Horniman had improper and ‘unnatural relations with a male journalist.[10] Horniman filed a case against Briton’s proprietor, Alfred Hope Brewin, editor C. S. Menon and printer D. L. DeMello with Jinnah as his lawyer. The trial took place in April 1916.
The defense’s case was to show that Horniman had unnatural relations with a number of young men, including his own servants. According to Jinnah this was an improper and utterly cowardly defense. Not only did he demolish the defense with cutting and precise examination and cross-examination of witnesses, his summation of the case left the defense lawyers, Baker and Godinho, speechless.
The transcript shows that he kept toying with his opposing counsel. At one point, he turned to Baker, before his own redirect on the complainant Horniman, to advise him that the way he
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had conducted the cross-examination was faulty, given that the improper conduct he had been hinting at was never put to him. Baker remained silent, leaving Jinnah to demolish whatever Baker had tried to achieve. At another point, Baker declared that one of his witnesses, Pandu, had made a statement to the effect that the complainant had tried to get a statement signed by him. To this, Jinnah insisted that Pandu must be called in immediately and investigated. In his statement, Pandu confessed that Sergeant Ferguson, a police official, and Hormasji Sorabji Chason, a clerk with a local company, had intimidated him to give evidence against Horniman. Baker declared that the witness had turned hostile. Jinnah in his summation proceeded point-by-point, taking down every single point of the defense, showing malice and aggravation of libel before puncturing holes in the claim that there was a bona fide intent for the sake of public good. The Chief Presidency Magistrate ruled in Jinnah’s favour and the accused were imprisoned and fined.
Most famous of Jinnah’s cases during this period was his defense of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the leader of the so-called extremist group within the Congress, against sedition charges.[11] This was also his most famous victory. Jinnah’s unsuccessful appeal in the matter of Ilam Din of Lahore was his most famous defeat. The case began before the District Magistrate in Poona and pertained to a speech that Tilak had made in Marathi. The prosecution’s case was that Tilak had made statements that amounted to sedition. At one point, the prosecutor remarked that one of the most offensive statements that Tilak made was that there was more peace in the time of the Peshwas than under the British government and that this statement was not correct. Jinnah asked the prosecutor how he knew that this was not the case, to which the prosecutor responded that he
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had read history. Jinnah replied that the opposing counsel had read history written by the British. At one point, the prosecutor admitted, quite candidly, that he did not want to present the translator as a witness because he would not be able to withstand Jinnah’s skilled cross-examination. Jinnah’s argument was that the speeches were translated in a manner that the original intent was murdered and that all of Tilak’s speeches were comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the government with a view to bring about change by lawful means, without exciting hatred or contempt or disaffectation. Jinnah then asked the crucial question, what is a government established by law? ‘Take the army. Is it sedition to attack it?’ Reading Jinnah’s arguments on the question of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code and then considering the jurisprudence developed under this section, both in modern India and Pakistan, it is not hard to conclude that these questions remain unanswered even today.
The magistrate, C. W. Hatch, disagreed in his judgment with Jinnah’s contentions, stating that, “Mr Jinnah’s contention that it is not the government that Mr Tilak is attacking but only the Civil Service will be discarded at once by anyone who reads these speeches through. The speaker refers frequently to the bureaucracy – using the English word, but the context and trend of his argument throughout shows that he is referring to the whole system of government and the whole body of officials in
then proceeded to order Tilak to enter into a bond of Rs 20,000 to ensure good behaviour. Jinnah filed a criminal revision application before the Bombay High Court, arguing that the magistrate had misunderstood Section 124A and had failed to see the exceptions to its application. He argued that Tilak’s intention was not to cause
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disaffectation but was a genuine criticism and that the translations made were not verbatim and, therefore, not legally admissible. Jinnah further argued that Civil Service was not necessarily the government but government strictly meant the King and the Parliament. Quoting Halsbury’s Laws of England, Jinnah stated that there can be no sedition without intention. The division bench presiding over the case ruled that there was no disaffectation and that there was no sedition. The judgment by Poona Magistrate was reversed. This case cemented Jinnah’s reputation as a lawyer and as a hero of the nationalists of Congress’ all wings.
Jinnah’s attempt to play the role of a bridge between the Muslim League and the Congress was not looked upon kindly by certain sections within the Muslim League. He was the darling of the nationalist circles and on 21 June 1916, Bombay Chronicle stated candidly: he stands for the popular causes of not only his own community but in the wider sense of the country at large.[12]
Jinnah won the election, but the Suleman Cassum Mitha group launched a campaign of vilification against him, claiming electoral impropriety. Jinnah’s alleged supporter, Ebrahim Haroon Jaffar, was accused of having bribed a person called Gulam Ahmed, who is curiously described in the court records as a ‘tupenny ha’penny man’ and a dervish without means from the Kadri order, with the intent of influencing one of the electors, a Pathan of dharwar, with Rs 500. The Viceroy ordered an inquiry into the election, which took place from 5 October to 3 November 1916, before the Poona District Judge Perceival. Jinnah decided to represent himself during the inquiry. His old foe Binning represented Ahmad, the objector. At the outset, Binning asked the court to keep the proceedings
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confidential and closed for general public. Jinnah would have none of it. Binning persisted by stating that Ahmad had filed a private petition but Jinnah argued that the matter had already been public and so it made no sense. The District Judge ruled in Jinnah’s favour. The inquiry was, therefore, public from the start and Jinnah was, as he described in his closing address, fighting for his reputation upon which aspersions had been cast. The case for bribery was so utterly weak that it did not proceed any further. What it did show Jinnah was that he had made some powerful enemies in the officialdom as well as in the Muslim community, who would have liked to see his back as soon as possible. Maulvi Rafiuddin, who had consistently been defeated by Jinnah in Bombay, was especially bitter and was a willing ally in the hands of the British bureaucracy against Jinnah.[13]
With his growing reputation, Jinnah was often the toast of many high society parties where the moneyed business elite of Bombay rubbed shoulders. Hailing from a middle-class background and entirely self-made, Jinnah often had to rely on his penchant for the Bard to pose as an aristocrat. He certainly fit the bill, speaking the English language as if he had been educated at Cambridge or Oxford, quoting Shakespeare with ease because that was one piece of literature he had paid very close attention to, dressed in his well-cut stylish suits and driving the best automobiles of the day. Politically, Jinnah had begun to court Muslim elites by this time but his personal circle largely comprised old Parsi families of Bombay.
One of these families was the Petit family. According to the 1911 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, the grand patriarch of the Petit dynasty was Sir Dinshaw Maneckji Petit, an enterprising
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young Parsi businessman, who made a fortune during the American Civil War.
A leading philanthropist, Petit became a part of the Governor General’s legislative council and was knighted in 1887, becoming the first Baronet. Sir Dinshaw Petit (he changed his name to follow the rules of Baronetcy), the Second Baronet, succeeded him to his magnificent fortune in 1901 after his death. In 1900 Sir Dinshaw Petit, the second Baronet, had a daughter who was named Ratanbai Petit.
Jinnah had been a family friend, but at some point, it seems that teenaged Ratanbai or Ruttie, as she was commonly known, took a fancy to him. Even though Jinnah was only three years younger than her father, he looked much younger and was considered extremely handsome, a head turner even in the social gatherings of Bombay.
Ruttie is said to have harboured a silent crush on him since she was twelve or thirteen but by the age of fifteen, she was actively engaging with him on politics and literature. She also made it a point to attend all his speeches and lectures. Meanwhile, as was customary, Ruttie was already receiving enough attention from suitors, eligible Parsi boys and men, who wanted to marry into the Parsi nobility. Ruttie dismissed them all. Her heart was set on Jinnah. For his part, Jinnah seems to have taken liking for her, though not entirely in a romantic sense. Jinnah loved to meet young people from all communities. He encouraged and informed them about the latest developments on the nationalist scene. By the beginning of 1915 or the middle of 1916, it began to blossom into something more. Kanji Dvarkadas, Ruttie’s closest friend writes that the setting of the romance was in Shimla in 1916. Ruttie was much more advanced in her thinking. That could be the reason that she sought out Jinnah’s friend and nationalist icon Sarojini Naidu as a confidante. The topic of discussion, more often than not, was Jinnah.
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Whatever it was, it was serious enough for Jinnah to do what he thought was right and ask Petit for Ruttie’s hand in marriage. This was done in classic Jinnah style, or so we are told. Jinnah began by engaging Petit on the issue of inter-communal marriages, an issue that had been fresh in Jinnah’s mind from the time he had championed the Special Marriages Amendment Bill. Petit was most forthcoming to the idea, describing it as the perfect solution to end inter-communal estrangement in India. By some accounts, he is supposed to have said, “Then the children shall be neither Hindu nor Muslim, the differences shall wither away.’ At this point, Jinnah asked Petit about what he thought of a marriage between a Muslim man and a Parsi girl, making it obvious what was on his mind. Petit was taken aback by the ostensible proposal. He proceeded to throw Jinnah out of his house. These are obviously second-hand accounts and there is no way of knowing exactly what transpired between the two men and when.
The seemingly preposterous age difference of no less than twenty-four years was just one of the issues. For all his anglicized modernity, Petit was by all accounts not ready to take on the Parsi community by marrying his daughter to a Muslim man, even as eminently successful and popular as Jinnah. As a father, one can imagine that he must have been outraged at his somewhat younger friend, but nevertheless a person advanced in age expressing an interest in young Ruttie. That the suitor was from the wrong religion and therefore would be unacceptable to Parsi elders only added to the outrage. Among the more liberal Indians, like Jaisooriya Naidu, Sarojini Naidu’s son, who knew Jinnah, given his mother’s friendship, the issue was always the age. He wrote to his sister in shock that Ruttie wanted to marry Jinnah and wondered what had led to her contemplating marriage with a man old enough
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Whatever it was, it was serious enough for Jinnah to do what he thought was right and ask Petit for Ruttie’s hand in marriage. This was done in classic Jinnah style, or so we are told. Jinnah began by engaging Petit on the issue of inter-communal marriages, an issue that had been fresh in Jinnah’s mind from the time he had championed the Special Marriages Amendment Bill. Petit was most forthcoming to the idea, describing it as the perfect solution to end inter-communal estrangement in India. By some accounts, he is supposed to have said, “Then the children shall be neither Hindu nor Muslim, the differences shall wither away.’ At this point, Jinnah asked Petit about what he thought of a marriage between a Muslim man and a Parsi girl, making it obvious what was on his mind. Petit was taken aback by the ostensible proposal. He proceeded to throw Jinnah out of his house. These are obviously second-hand accounts and there is no way of knowing exactly what transpired between the two men and when.
The seemingly preposterous age difference of no less than twenty-four years was just one of the issues. For all his anglicized modernity, Petit was by all accounts not ready to take on the Parsi community by marrying his daughter to a Muslim man, even as eminently successful and popular as Jinnah. As a father, one can imagine that he must have been outraged at his somewhat younger friend, but nevertheless a person advanced in age expressing an interest in young Ruttie. That the suitor was from the wrong religion and therefore would be unacceptable to Parsi elders only added to the outrage. Among the more liberal Indians, like Jaisooriya Naidu, Sarojini Naidu’s son, who knew Jinnah, given his mother’s friendship, the issue was always the age. He wrote to his sister in shock that Ruttie wanted to marry Jinnah and wondered what had led to her contemplating marriage with a man old enough
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was at that time the most important constitutional pact between two leading all-India organizations.
It is the Lucknow Pact of 1916 that we must turn our attention to, for this is that one brief moment in South Asia’s turbulent history that a great body of Indian opinion seemed united and Hindus and Muslims together seemed to compose their differences not just with each other but within themselves. The Muslim League itself had been deeply divided between what were Muslim majority areas and minority areas. Before the historic December sessions of the Muslim League and Congress, Jinnah made an extremely important speech on 21 October 1916 at the 16th Bombay Provincial Conference which was attended by Gandhi, and was held at Ahmedabad. It was, in fact, Gandhi who proposed, speaking in Gujarati, that Jinnah was eminently qualified to preside over the deliberations. Gandhi said that he believed it was Jinnah alone who could unite the moderates and extremists in the Congress and also bring all communities to the table, describing him as the right man for the right job. Jinnah addressed the gathering starting with ‘Brother delegates, ladies and gentlemen’. He started by paying a tribute to Mehta, Lord Kitchener, the renowned businessman Sir Chimunbhai Madhava, Mr Daji Abaji Khare and Govindrao Appaji Patel who had passed away by then. He then congratulated the British and French for having turned the tide of the Great War and mentioned in particular the defense of Verdun by the ‘gallant French people’. Then he turned to the business at hand, castigating the British bureaucracy for claiming to have run India efficiently and for maintaining a stranglehold over the government. He also asked the British government why the commissioned ranks in the military and naval services were denied to Indians. Speaking about the British Parliament, Jinnah asked if it was possible or natural for the British Parliament to grasp
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or grapple with the questions affecting the internal administration and progress of India? As the soul of young India has been roused and it yearns for political freedom…'[14]
Another question that Jinnah touched was the issue of provincial autonomy. Even though Jinnah was essentially an all India politician, he was nevertheless a champion of a uniform measure of provincial autonomy even at that stage. This would become one of the major contentions in the coming years, but for now, provincial autonomy seemed to appeal to his listeners in Ahmedabad. He proposed a solid internal finance program for each province with a power of taxation and borrowing. He also stressed on the need for local self-government in municipal councils. The irony is that the kind of self-government Jinnah envisaged is something Pakistan is still struggling to achieve.
After delineating at length on the issue of responsible government in India, Jinnah turned his attention to Indians in the Army and Navy. Now to take the question of the Army and Navy, the only two arguments which have hitherto been advanced are that the people of the country are not fit, except some sects or tribes who have followed the profession of arms as a hereditary profession. Now, first of all, how is that a correct hypothesis? At the outbreak of the War, the Princes and people of India of all classes and sections, with one voice, volunteered to support the Empire with their money and blood … Does the profession of soldier require more brains, greater capacity of ingenuity that of a lawyer, a doctor, a poet or a scientist? If Indians are good enough to fight as sepoys and privates, why are they not good enough to occupy the position of officers? The second argument is that an army with a preponderance of the Indian element may be turned against the British Government.’ This is an interesting window into Jinnah’s
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ideas about the Empire. He resented British excesses and rule but saw the British as a vehicle for the creation of liberal self-governing India, which would treat every Indian equally. His enmity to the British bureaucracy, thus, was not religious or racial but principled. Therefore, his appeals were made to the British sense of fairness and justice always. Speaking further, Jinnah denounced the notorious Press Act, calling it the most unwelcome measure from its inception. He then attacked the Draconian Defense of India Act, calling it a dangerous weapon placed in the hands of the executive, arguing that a committee should be formed to review executive orders. He then tackled the British argument that Indians were not educated enough for self-government. He asked, who, if not the British Government was responsible? Jinnah pointed out that Britain had a House of Commons when most people in that country were steeped in ignorance. In comparison, India had about 20 million educated people. Finally, he turned his attention to the question of Hindu-Muslim cooperation, calling the Christmas covenant between Hindus and Muslims an ‘Entente Cordiale”.
Jinnah reminded his listeners that besides the question of cow slaughter and street music, there was only one question that separated Hindus and Muslims. Muslims, Jinnah said, wanted adequate representation in councils and elected institutions. Even though he was against separate electorates, he bemoaned that “This question of separate electorates from top to bottom has been before the country ever since 1909, and rightly or wrongly, the Mussalman community is absolutely determined to insist upon separate electorates.’ The question of separate electorates, something Jinnah had so vehemently opposed initially, therefore became non-negotiable and Jinnah was forced to accept it, though he thought it would be for the time being only.
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The idea was to get self-government and for Jinnah, the question of electorate was at best a minor annoyance. His advocacy, therefore, won the day. As the proceedings went on, various members, including Gandhi, presented resolutions dealing with many of the issues Jinnah had highlighted. Ultimately, Jinnah himself tabled three resolutions, most important of which dealt with the right to trial by jury. It stated that the conference viewed with deepest concern and alarm the action of the Bombay Government in withdrawing the right of trial by jury in Belgaum district. Tragically, hundred years later, there is no trial by jury in any of the three successor states of British India.
Commenting on Jinnah’s address, the Bombay Chronicle wrote on 23 October 1916: ‘Men like Jinnah are not only the trusty exponents of public opinion but true builders of the future constitution of India … ‘[15] Four days later, discussing Jinnah’s proposals again, the same newspaper wrote: “We are more interested in the friendly, if ineffective criticism of Times of India of Jinnah’s proposal for the reform of the Provincial Governments, which has come as a useful corollary to the larger scheme. Jinnah has performed a useful service in putting forward concrete proposals for the reconstruction of the provincial government.’ Ahmedabad Conference and its proposals were under vociferous attack by the official classes as well as by British collaborators. In this situation, Bombay Chronicle, whose editor was beholden to Jinnah, fought back with great verve and vigour.
Equally significant in laying the stage for the Lucknow Pact was the famous memorandum of nineteen. These were nineteen nonofficial members of the legislative council, including Jinnah, who drafted and agreed to an agreement, whereby a reforms program was put before the Viceroy. The document, most significantly,
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laid down the condition for effective and adequate representation of Hindus and Muslims in areas where they were a minority respectively. This was a key moment of triumph for Jinnah, who had not only managed to convince other non-official members the need to push back against British stonewalling of responsible government but had also managed to secure a fair deal for the minorities in each province. In this, he aided greatly by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Motilal Nehru and Annie Besant. Even Tilak, who represented not just the extremist faction of the Congress but also was considered a voice of conservative Hindu, aided Jinnah in his quest to convince Congress that a settlement between the communities was sine qua non to progress on the issue of India.
Jinnah’s efforts were aimed at the principle of a united selfgoverning India and to this end, he saw acceptance of the Muslim demand for separate representation as a temporary but necessary evil.
The details of the Lucknow Pact were actually settled in Calcutta on 17 and 18 November when the Congress and AIML committees met to thrash out the question of representation. Bombay, Central Provinces, Bihar and Madras were easy to sort out. Muslim minorities here were given representation in excess of their actual numbers as a safeguard. In Bombay, Muslims were given 33 per cent representation against a population of 20 per cent. In Central Provinces, where Muslim population was 4 per cent, they received 10 per cent of the seats. In Bihar, where they had a population of 13 to 14 per cent, they were to receive 25 per cent of the seats, and finally, in Madras where they were 7 per cent, they were to receive 15 per cent of the seats. On the Muslim side, in Punjab where they had a majority of 55 per cent, their representation was reduced to 50 per cent. The outstanding questions were Bengal and UP, where
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Hindus were unwilling to give Muslims 50 per cent and 33 per cent representation respectively.
On 29 November 1916, the Bombay Congress elected 15 representatives to the All India Congress Committee. Top of the list was Jinnah. Other members were G. M. Bhurgri, G. K. Parekh, Gandhi, Abbas Tyabji, Harchandrai Vishnidas, N. M. Samarth, C. H. Stelvad, B. G. Tilak, V. G. Kale, G. K. Devadhar, N. V. Gokhale, D. V. Belvi, H. A. Wadya and R. P. Paranjpye. Jinnah would now head to Lucknow, not just as the President of the AIML but also as a leading member of the AICC from Bombay.[16]
On 24 December 1916, Jinnah arrived in Lucknow as the President-elect of AIML and was given a massive reception by a crowd comprising Sunnis, Shias, Hindus and Christians. He was received by his friend Raja of Mahmudabad, accompanied by Pandit Jagat Narayan. Jinnah was then taken to Kaiserbagh to Raja of Mahmudabad’s house.
Jinnah’s moment had arrived. On his birthday the next day, Jinnah attended the joint conference of AIML and Congress presided over by Surendranath Bannerji. The discussion, as expected, revolved around the issue of Muslim representation in Bengal and the United Provinces. AIML had started with the proposal of 50 per cent guaranteed representation, which was rejected by the Hindu members even though Muslims had a slight majority in Bengal. As far as United Provinces were concerned, Muslims wanted 33 per cent representation, while Hindus were willing to give 25 per cent. The conference was adjourned on this note. The terms of negotiation were, however, clear. Ultimately, Bengal Muslims accepted 49 per cent representation against a population of 53 per cent. In UP, Jinnah and Sapru managed to
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get an agreement on 30 per cent, instead of 33 per cent. It was here that Jinnah presented the idea of communal veto, where any community could veto a measure or legislation by 3/4th of its representatives. These numbers were heavily criticized by Muslims in Punjab and Bengal but Jinnah’s effective advocacy at both the Congress and League sessions ultimately led to the inking of the famous Lucknow Pact.[17]
Congress session happened on 29 December 1916, and it reaffirmed its acceptance of separate electorates. The historic AIML session was held on 30 and 31 December.[18] After the welcome address, Jinnah delivered what was arguably the greatest speech of his career. After annual stocktaking, the League President stated, ‘If it were possible to isolate the tangled group of social and political phenomena and subject it to a thorough investigation by reason unalloyed by sentiment, it would be infinitely easier to find a safe and sure path for Indian political development and advance.’ He then turned his attention towards the British bureaucracy: ‘They are naturally conservative, have a rooted horror of bold administrative changes … are reluctant to part with power or associate Indians freely.’ He then spoke of ‘bastard and desperate political maxims’ that were imposed on them. These were, he said, namely that Democratic institutions cannot thrive in the East.’ Why, he asked, was this the case? Jinnah quoted village Panchayats as an example of primordial democratic institutions in India. Echoing the Islamic Modernists who had founded AIML, Jinnah said that Muslims were democratic even in religion. Therefore, Jinnah said that the idea that democratic institutions could not work in the East was a fallacy. Then he listed the second bastard maxim: ‘The only form of government suitable for India is autocracy tempered by English (European) efficiency and character.’ To this, he replied, ‘All nations
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have had to go through the experience of despotic or autocratic government at one time or the other in the history of the world … Is India to remain under the heel of a novel form of autocracy in the shape of bureaucracy for all time to come.’ Next, the League President addressed the idea that the interest of educated classes and masses were different and that the educated classes would oppress the masses if the strong protecting hand of the British were withdrawn. To this, he replied: “This astonishing proposition beats all reason and sense. It is suggested that we, who are the very kith and kin of the masses, most of us springing from the middle classes, are likely to oppress the people if more power is conferred; that the masses require protection at the hands of the English officials, between whom and the people there is nothing in common; that our interests are opposed to those of masses in what respect?’
Even though Jinnah was speaking as the President of AIML, his focus was India and Indians. He spoke of the desire of Indians to stay united and fight for their country as one. Repeatedly, he returned to the theme of British hubris when dealing with democracy in the East. Significantly, there was no rancor and the League President point by point demolished the case of those Muslims who were unwilling to cooperate with Hindus and the Congress.
Sarojini Naidu, who emphasized the need for Hindu-Muslim unity, also addressed the session. This was unprecedented, but Jinnah’s advocacy had transformed the outlook of the League. The resolutions passed by the League were revolutionary for a party that had ten years ago spoken about self-government, emphasizing that Islam itself favoured democratic and republican government. AIML, which had begun in 1906 as a bastion of pro-British conservatism, was being transformed into a thoroughly nationalist and secular body under Jinnah’s leadership and guidance. Resolution I of the
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League adopted the reforms scheme agreed upon by the Congress and the League. Resolution II stated that the reforms scheme must be submitted to the Government of India for its immediate introduction after the war as a ‘first necessary step towards the attainment of complete self government.’ Resolution VI strongly criticized the Defence of India Act and called it a grave menace to the liberties of the subject and called for the formulation of a committee to look into the case of each person tried under it. Before this resolution was adopted, Jinnah asked Bepin Chander Pal, a Hindu Congressman, to address the League session. Pal began by saying that twenty-five years ago or even five years ago, he could not have dreamed of being asked by Muslims to address them. The rest of his speech dealt with the question of Defence of India Act but the significant issue was that of the Entente Cordiale that Jinnah had spoken about.
Congress and the League were acting in unison. Jinnah allowed special permission for Resolution VIII, which ‘Resolved that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad be given trial on charges made against him by the Government of Bihar and Orissa and that the League is of the opinion that orders of internment are unjustified.’
Azad was at the time the editor of Al Hilal, which championed the cause of the Turkish Army in the war and was therefore considered hostile to the British Government. There was also a resolution calling for Urdu as the lingua franca of India. Resolution IX called for the desirability of encouraging Urdu as lingua franca as it was the common heritage of all Indians. Resolution X expressed satisfaction at the acceptance of separate representation in municipals and wanted it to be extended to whereever it had not yet been extended. Resolution XI called for the opening of commissioned ranks to Indians and Resolution XIV called for the separation of executive
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and judicial functions in the country. Resolution XVI called facilities to be granted to Muslims having business in courts to pray Jumma and other prayers.
The Lucknow Pact was a watershed moment for Indian unity. It had established what political scientists would call a consociational compromise between the two major communities of the subcontinent. In retrospect, though, one also sees pitfalls of the resolution because it meant an acceptance of Hindus and Muslims as two entities between whom the compromise had to be reached for constitutional progress. Indian nationalists like Jinnah, Nehru, Tilak and Sapru had been earnest in their desire for a lasting compromise and Lucknow Pact seemed to deliver that but, paradoxically, it also made Hindu-Muslim unity a constitutional bedrock without which there could be no constitutional advance. It is fair to say that in the Lucknow Pact, there was basis for both concord and discord. From this point onwards, Hindus and Muslims could march together if they proceeded from the basis of Lucknow Pact. However, if there was deviation, it would mean an end to unity, which is precisely what happened. The attendant idea of Muslim separatism would not have crossed Jinnah’s mind in 1916, but he did refer to Lucknow Pact decades later when arguing for the Two Nation Theory. How different a course it would take from where he had started as a champion of Indian nationalism, repeatedly declaring that he was an Indian first. For now, this was his moment of glory. He had been called the Best Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity by Gokhale. The Lucknow Pact cemented that sobriquet. He was a veritable link between Congress and the League, primarily as a Congressman but also as the President of the Muslim League. By bringing Congress and the League on the same page through adroit negotiating skill,

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Jinnah had thrown up a major challenge to British rule. Yet, there were voices on all sides that questioned the agreement. It was said that AIML had only agreed because of young and idealistic Indian nationalists like Jinnah. Murmurs of protest came from Punjab and Bengal where influential Muslim politicians were unhappy with the idea of giving up their majorities. Similarly, the Hindu right wing was unhappy about the concessions made for the Muslims. The Lucknow Pact thus created a superficial unity, which ultimately depended on Jinnah’s ability to stay on top and compose those differences, consolidating secular minded Indian nationalists from each community under his leadership. He had many challengers for the position though, most significantly in the form of a force of nature that his greatest future rival Gandhi would be. All this was in the future though, and the Best Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity could at this time savour this extraordinary victory, the highest point in his political career and the point where he probably and legitimately thought of himself as leading India to self-government.
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THE MAHATMA, JINNAH
AND RUTTIE
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was seven years Jinnah’s senior. Much has been written about their rivalry and its impact on the politics of the subcontinent but very little is written about their personal equation. Decades after Jinnah’s death, Dina Wadia, Jinnah’s only daughter, told an interviewer that of all his contemporaries, Jinnah respected Gandhi the most. Various historians have pointed out something of an acerbic nature in their relationship right from the time Jinnah first welcomed Gandhi to India in 1915. Before that, Jinnah had been an ally of Gandhi’s cause in South Africa. Even though both men were Gujarati, born in the same region and had the same native language, what divided them was infinitely greater than what united them. While Gandhi, a Modh Baniya, was born to Diwan Karamchand Uttamchand Gandhi of the princely state of Porbandar, Jinnah was born to a mercantile family in Karachi.
Porbandar was by no means a large state and was not well governed either. Maharana Vikramjiti Khimojiraj Sahib’s rule and
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his mismanagement were so notorious that the British had, in 1869, degraded its status to that of a third class state. Gandhi, like Jinnah, went to England where he was called to Bar at Inner Temple. His approach to English customs and culture, however, was markedly different than those of Jinnah. This may have been the result of two events in his early life. The first was his brief association with a school friend Shaikh Mahtab, a Muslim boy, who coaxed him into eating meat and apparently also attempted to introduce him to the vice of a brothel. The second was the decision by his head of community to outcast him for planning to travel abroad. Much like Jinnah, who was to face excommunication from the Aga Khani Khoja community, Gandhi too had been thrown out of the Modh Baniya community. The impact of the first probably shaped Gandhi’s attitude to non-vegetarians and Muslims, not necessarily in a negative way but more as a demarcation. The second made Gandhi even more resolute in ensuring that he would uphold the promise he made to his mother that he would abstain from meat, women and alcohol. Jinnah too had made a similar vow to his mother but only to the extent of women. Both the future founding fathers of India and Pakistan thus remained faithful to vows they made to their mothers, but Jinnah otherwise integrated more fully into the English lifestyle, returning to India as an Englishman. Gandhi too had adopted English mannerisms but his Hindu identity and culture remained supreme, in so much as even his interaction with the English culture was more focused on seeking out organizations such as the Vegetarian Society and the pacifist vegetarian Henry Salt (1851–1939), who in turn had been influenced by the American Henry David Thoreau (1817–62). Thoreau’s ideas resonated greatly with Gandhi, both in terms of dietary habits as well as the idea of non-violent civil disobedience. There must have been
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a religious reason for it because one of the major influences on Thoreau was the Bhagawad Gita, which he wrote of in his works describing himself as a yogi. In doing so, Gandhi became part of the intellectual milieu that connected Thoreau to Dr Martin Luther King Jr (1929–68), Gandhi’s much older friend Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) and the US Supreme Court Judge William O. Douglas (1898–1980). Of all these great men, Gandhi was to become the most renowned and world famous.
Both Gandhi and Jinnah lost their mothers while in England but while Jinnah had learnt of it during his time there, Gandhi was to discover it as a rude shock upon his return home. Another major difference between the men was their approach to the legal profession. For Jinnah, the law became his lifeblood and infused his British liberalism with the idea of constitutionalism. Gandhi, however, did not do well in the profession in India and had subsequently moved to South Africa, where he ultimately made his name as a community organizer and an agitator. London remembers
other as a great agitator respectively. While Jinnah’s bust adorns the Lincoln’s Inn Library at a prominent place, Gandhi’s famous statue stands outside the British Parliament where protesters gather. As shown earlier, Jinnah backed Gandhi’s activities in support of Indians in South Africa by speaking up in the Imperial Legislative Council in India and welcomed Gandhi back to India with open arms. They worked together again throughout the tumultuous year of 1916 in the Bombay Conference and the Congress. Gandhi, however, had already attempted to coax Jinnah to speak Gujarati and give up his English ways, but Jinnah had been unwilling on this count. For Jinnah, this did strike a sour note at times but the theory often forwarded by various historians about the Gurjar
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Sabha meeting where Gandhi identified Jinnah as a ‘Mohammaden’ as being the actual beginning of a difficult relationship. Gandhi and Jinnah continued to work closely together for several years after that. The real turning point in their relationship came with the Khilafat Movement, which we will return to later in this chapter.
For the moment though, we must return to Jinnah who was at the height of his political career at the conclusion of 1916. A letter dated 11 January 1917 from Sir James Meston to Lord Chelmsford,’ who had replaced Lord Hardinge as the viceroy, makes for interesting reading. The letter described the events at Lucknow in some detail. “The pièce de résistance were the National Congress and the Moslem League. There were over 20 other Conferences – social, religious and communal – but they were ancillary to the two big gatherings. Lucknow was crowded and cosmopolitan beyond all knowledge. I never saw so great a concourse of educated middle-class Indians.’ Writing about the Congress, Meston says: “At that table, for the first time, were grouped all shades of advanced thinking.’ The next part of the letter dealt with a meeting with Jinnah, in particular, where Jinnah quite frankly discussed his opinion of the moderates and the extremist with him. “Jinnah came to lunch with me at the end of the week and had a long talk afterwards. He was perfectly frank about the disappearance of the moderate; what else could you expect, he asked. The extremist has a definite programme, impracticable perhaps, but appealing keenly to the pride of the people. The moderate has no particular creed, except trust in the government. If he goes on the platform and asks his audience to trust government, they immediately challenge him to tell them what government is going to do for them. He is unable to reply, government has not confided its intentions then; and he is shouted to down. The extremist, on the other hand, is
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definite, plausible, and unless he breaks the law, there is nothing to show that the Government disapproves of his propaganda. All this I merely quote from Jinnah, who is, as your Excellency knows, a very plausible person himself.’
If the contents of this letter accurately depict what Jinnah had to say, it gives us an insight into Jinnah’s thinking as well as how he was viewed by the officialdom. Jinnah was by training and inclination a moderate, steeped in British liberalism, who wanted desperately to believe that the British would work to empower Indians by educating them and training them. Yet, he had by this time found himself frustrated by the British bureaucracy and its refusal to engage Indians like him constructively and a clear programme towards constitutional advance. So he wanted to depend on the people’s power. Yet, he was not willing to be an outright populist like Tilak or a revolutionary as some of his colleagues were becoming. The officialdom saw him as an emerging political force and a very plausible person’. Increasingly, they were also coming to view him as an extremist alongside Gandhi and Tilak. What is clear is that Jinnah was not the elitist politician that some have tried to portray him as. His concern first and foremost was political empowerment of all Indians whatever their faith and as a special additional duty, he also wanted his co-religionists to stand up and be counted as equal Indians. Jinnah quite accurately also saw himself as the ideal Indian to lead the people to a compromise with the British in achieving self-rule within the British Empire.
It was accurate because Jinnah had proved his mettle by bringing together not just the moderates and extremists within the Congress but also Hindus and Muslims. Of all the members in any party, it was Jinnah who had proven to be the most skilled at parliamentary debate and legislation and it was he who understood the workings
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of the British bureaucracy. Therefore, it was a legitimate ambition on his part to imagine being the leader of the movement. For such leadership, Jinnah realized that he had to keep the religious passions of all communities at bay because not only would a Muslim like him be unacceptable to a large body of Hindus but as a liberal Muslim from the minority Khoja Shia community, he would be unacceptable to a large number of Muslims as well. It was this point that brought him into sharpest conflict with Gandhi, who instinctively trusted religious people, both Hindus and Muslims, more than irreligious nominal Hindus and Muslims. It also defined their approach to the Hindu-Muslim question as well.
Jinnah’s commitment to that greater national welfare was amply demonstrated in the wide range of subjects he addressed through various forums. Chairing the meeting of ‘Servants of India’ on 21 January 1917, Jinnah spoke at length about the tariff problem. Castigating the British capitalists, Jinnah said, ‘Nobody – whether Indian or Anglo-Indian- have ever suggested that a tariff would not be beneficent to India. The question was whether it was possible and its solution depended upon the strength of the conflicting interests. Hitherto, Lancashire and the Manchester interests had uniformly had the upper hand … the Government of India and the Secretary of State were helpless before powerful anti-Indian interests in the House of Commons.”[2] Even though Jinnah at this time was not formally a member of the Home Rule League, on 23 January 1917, he chaired a meeting of the organization at the Morarji Gokuldas Hall in Kalbadevi on the topic ‘India’s Place in the Empire’ in which the resolution to ensure direct representation of India at the Imperial Conference was unanimously accepted.
With boundless energy and enthusiasm, Jinnah continued to organize meetings while maintaining a busy practice as India’s
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leading barrister. On 24 January 1917, Jinnah appeared in two cases in the High Court, Parewalla V. P. D. Acharya“, a partnership suit and Mody V. Anandibai”,[5] a case that determined the adopted orphan son’s right to inheritance and then met the Bombay Caucus in the evening with Tilak and other major leaders of Bombay. On 27 January 1917, he spoke at the Bombay Students’ Convention, before appearing for the plaintiff in a major suit against Fire Insurance Companies at the High Court on the 29 January.[8]
In early February, he was engaged in another suit; this time as the defendant’s counsel in a matter vis-à-vis Specie Bank Shares in the case of Suival V. Jivraj. This case itself settled an important legal point vis-à-vis the liability of the defendant principal under Section 233 of the Contract Act of 1872 when a separate suit had already been filed against the agent. This section as it was then read ‘Right of person dealing with agent personally liable – In cases where the agent is personally liable, a person dealing with him may hold either him or his principal, or both of them liable.’ Jinnah argued that Section 233 had essentially codified the Law of England. He argued that the provision created joint liability but that the language meant plainly that the plaintiff could have joined both the principal and the agent in one suit. It, however, did not follow that the plaintiff could file two separate suits for the same relief. Therefore, since the plaintiff had already sued the agent, there was a bar against a fresh suit against the principal. In arguing this, Jinnah relied upon Calder V. Dobell, L.R. 6.C.P 486 and Kendall V. Hamilton, a famous House of Lords’ case. The court ruled in favour of Jinnah’s client. The point of visiting this complicated legal case on contract law is to show that Jinnah, while engaging in high politics, was nevertheless a conscientious lawyer who provided his clients with the best defense in law. It
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also underscores his ability as a lawyer and a student of English law despite not having gotten a university degree in the subject. Jinnah had become a barrister through the Little Go exam and was entirely self-taught.
On 7 February 1917, Jinnah was back in the Imperial Legislative Council, speaking on the rules of conduct of legislative business. The government had proposed that for a private member to bring a bill, a prior notice of two months should be given. Jinnah stoutly resisted this proposition.[10] This was obviously the officialdom’s attempt to thwart non-official Indian members like Jinnah to bring legislation. The week afterwards, he was back in Bombay appearing before the High Court on a copyright matter, arguing that no criminal revision would lie against an acquittal – a proposition that now became the rule of the court.[11] After appearing in another criminal matter, Jinnah returned to Delhi to argue in favour of the Indian Defence Force Bill and appealed to the Viceroy to undo the injustice to Indians and allow them to join with commission.[12] In April that year, he presided over a meeting held under the auspices of Home Rule League and tell them that he had now changed his view and that he sought to discourage the recruitment process because the government was essentially using Indians as cannon fodder.[13] Back in February, though, he had been more enthusiastic about the bill. Jinnah also addressed the issue of a resolution for amendment to Defence of India Act, which the treasury benches had refused to entertain. The resolution had essentially called for the right of fair trial through a committee of High Court judges looking at every person accused under the draconian Defence of India Act. Jinnah was once again the loudest and clearest voice asking for the measure: ‘Now what is the ground that the Home Member has given? The only ground given was that if you have a
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committee of this kind and if confidential documents are placed before it, the secret will not remain with it, but leak out. All I can say is that it is a serious reflection to say that secret is not going to remain with high officers like Judges of the High court for which there is no warrant – omit the non-official lawyer if you like and if you have a distaste for him from the Committee, although I venture to say that there are men among the non-official lawyers in every province who can as honourably keep and maintain secrets as the Hon’able Home Minister himself can.'[14] One of the most important issues Jinnah focused on was primary education. A resolution was brought before the house on 28 February, calling for introduction of compulsory primary education, a measure Jinnah had been supporting since his first entry into the council. Responding to Sir Verney Lovett’s argument that ignorant people like labourers and agriculturalists could not be convinced of the idea of education, Jinnah said: ‘How many centuries, Sir, shall we be kept waiting for these “ignorant illiterate people” to be convinced that compulsory education is really for their benefit?’[15]
Another issue Jinnah particularly invested a lot of time and energy in was the Indian Civil Service recruitment. Initially, his view differed from other Indian nationalists because he was opposed to a quota system for Indians that he favoured in terms of political representation. For civil service, he thought the best foot forward was to have competitive selection. However, when the government argued that the entry of too many Indians would change the British character of the bureaucracy, he supported a resolution for a mandatory quota for Indians. Identifying uprightness, honesty, integrity and a high sense of duty as the essential feature required in a civil servant, Jinnah proposed that civil service exams should be taken simultaneously in India and Britain and the best and the fittest
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should be entrusted administration. He argued that some of finest Indians did not get an opportunity to sit for the competitive exam in England and, therefore, it was important to have a level playing field. For all his vaunted Englishness, Jinnah vociferously argued that instead of the Latin component, the Indian exams should have Persian, Sanskrit and Arabic options.[16] This was because Jinnah essentially believed in equality and was unwilling to countenance a situation where British applicants would be at an advantage and Indian applicants at a disadvantage.
Jinnah kept his policy of praising the government where he felt they were doing something right and fearlessly criticizing them where he thought they were wrong. So when asked about the budget, Jinnah replied, “The first impression it left was that the poor were, as far as one could see, thoroughly protected.’ He also welcomed the duty on cotton imports, which he saw as necessary to protect local cotton mills. Some of Jinnah’s backers at the time were leading businessmen who had made their fortunes in cotton but Jinnah’s special interest here seemed to be that local manufacturing should be encouraged, instead of mere cotton production and ginning. In doing so, he was taking on powerful industrial lobbies in Britain.[17]Jinnah got the opportunity to speak on the budget session in the Council on 23 March 1917. He praised the Secretary of State, while his mentor and hero Gokhale was not too far from his mind even two years after his passing: ‘If you want India to care for your government, to stand by you, to cooperate with you, what you want is that the spirit of the government should be Indian, and that on occasions when the interests of India are likely to suffer and are subjected to injustice, our government and those who are at the head of the government should stand up for us and speak for us as any Indian would do.'[18] Another issue that seemed
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to keep Jinnah preoccupied during this time was the question of Indian Civil Service reform. That at this time, Jinnah was still very much a Congressman first and Muslim Leaguer much later is obvious from the names of Indian deputation chosen to depart for England. Reporting on the names of gentlemen who would constitute the Congress deputation, Bombay Chronicle informed its readers that Mr Jinnah would represent Bombay Congress and that ten representatives of All India Muslim League would also join the deputation, the names of the personnel being unknown.[19]
Believing in British profession of the ideals of justice and fair play, Jinnah was as committed as ever to constitutional means but keeping with what he had told Meston, Jinnah also showed the British Government that he was ready to join the so-called extremist camp of Indian nationalists, if the British would press the Congress and movement for self-rule. Inspired by the Irish example, two Home Rule Leagues had sprung up in India. In April 1916, Tilak had started his Home Rule League in Poona and in September 1916, Annie Besant, the formidable British theosophist and socialist, formed her own Home Rule League in Madras. Both organizations were also present in Bombay and largely coordinated their efforts. Jinnah did not immediately join either of the Home Rule Leagues despite sympathizing with their basic purposes. This was because Jinnah abhorred politics of agitation, which both Tilak and Besant seemed to favour. As we have already seen, Jinnah was Tilak’s lawyer. He was also a good friend of Besant. However, in June 1917, Besant was arrested. Jinnah was so furious with the British that he immediately joined the Bombay chapter of the Home Rule League and became its president. Interestingly, it was Jinnah who also persuaded Gandhi to become the president after him a couple of years later.
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On the political scene, a new conflict was brewing in Bombay and this would bring Jinnah face to face with the Governor of Bombay, Lord Willingdon. Denouncing the internment of Annie Besant, Jinnah spoke of government repression, declaring: ‘Is the bureaucracy of India blind? Have they lost their reason to treat loyal India at this juncture in this manner? It is a mistake. It shows an utter want of wisdom and statesmanship. What is his Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, doing? His silence at this moment is most ominous and worse than the most drastic repressive actions already adopted and enforced by some of the provincial governments.'[20] Following his lead, members of the legal fraternity joined the Home Rule League in droves. [21] It must be remembered that Jinnah and Besant did not see eye to eye on methods but her internment was a cause that he committed himself fully to. Owing to his efforts, which led to mass outrage against the Bombay Government, Besant was finally released. For the first time, Jinnah had begun mobilizing the masses but very significantly for the man who would later be accused of using religion in politics during the Pakistan Movement, Jinnah remained committed to keeping the movement completely secular.
Meanwhile, Jinnah’s legislative efforts were also aimed at breaking what he called the three British monopolies. On 31 December 1917, Jinnah declared: “You have a monopoly in this country in the government of the country. You have a monopoly in this country in the army. You have a monopoly in the commerce of this country and we are not going to submit to any of these three monopolies.”[22] This reflected his mood. He was ready to challenge the government and it was around this time that the government’s view of him also began to change.
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By this time, Jinnah had already acquired the house on Mount Pleasant Road in Bombay. Now it was time for Jinnah to move from his bachelor apartment in Colaba in Bombay to the upscale neighbourhood of Malabar Hill. As this area was inhabited by the rich and famous of the Bombay elite, it may be stated that Jinnah was the lawyer for many of them. Hence, Jinnah, now nearing forty years of age, was the ideal new entrant into this community of Bombay elite. He was considered the Rolls Royce of lawyers at this time. Not only was he a dynamo barrister but was also the newly minted hero of the Independence movement. Nobody’s desire for independence was greater than that of Jinnah and that power of personality resonated with the rising new upper-middle and upper classes. Quite instinctively, the who’s who of India’s rich Parsis and leading businessmen wanted to know Jinnah. There was one Parsi in particular who was thrilled at Jinnah’s relocation to Mount Pleasant Road because her house was down the road. Even though Ruttie came from a well-to-do family of a knighted baronet, she was still suspected of conceit and self-love in her relentless pursuit of Jinnah who, it must be stated, was considered a man of great charm, power, and elegance with his dry sense of humour and affability.[23]
Certainly, Ruttie had her own charm and she managed to coax Jinnah to shave off his moustache. This was a change that was easily noticeable by Jinnah’s colleagues and friends. No one quite managed to bend Jinnah to their will like Ruttie did. Here, we must also segue into his relations with his siblings. In Jinnah’s twenties, his father Poonja Jinnah had died, leaving the responsibility of his siblings to him at a relatively early age. While Jinnah married off his sisters Shireen and Mariam, he had special affection for his youngest sister Fatima. He would not have her go through the same old traditional cycle of marriage and domesticity. Fatima was
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sent to a Christian boarding school, an unusual decision for even the Khoja Community, which was considered more advanced than other Muslims. As a product of British liberalism emanating out of the age of enlightenment, Jinnah understood that for progress to be made, women had to play an equal role in national and community development. While the Hindu community already had its share of reformers, his community lagged in terms of reforming education and modernity. He was painfully aware of this fact. Fatima was to receive the best education available for young women in India. No other Muslim leader had the vision or foresight to invest in the education of young women. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the great Muslim reformer, was entirely concerned with the education of upper-class Muslims. It was only much later that women were admitted to his university. As argued in the first chapter, Jinnah had managed to avoid the mainstream trends of the community by associating himself with other Indians partly because he had been educated in London. This was while Aligarh University was largely an elitist concern where upper-class Muslims were being educated and prepared for government jobs and professions. The trend of purely community-related concerns that had motivated the founders of the university and the Muslim League thus escaped Jinnah altogether.
Jinnah’s progressive ideals were no doubt a great factor in what attracted Ruttie to him. He was quite unlike any other Muslim she had met. Indeed, the only thing Muslim about him was the fact that his name was Mahomed Ali Jinnah. For Jinnah too, Ruttie was the perfect fit in terms of identity and ideology. She was an Indian nationalist like him. Jinnah, as a nationalist, would not have countenanced marrying anyone but an Indian. However, there was hardly any Muslim woman at the time that would fit the bill of a
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modern woman of Jinnah’s conception. For Jinnah, the very act of marrying her was a political statement as much as it was for love. Had Jinnah’s first wife, who like him was a Shia Khoja by birth, survived, perhaps things would have been different and like Gandhi, Jinnah may well have developed a more provincial and somewhat parochial view of caste and religion. As it so happened, it would be this outlook that would be the widest gulf between the two great men. Jinnah, at this point at least, was ready to jump over the hurdles and bring about an organic union between communities through inter-marriage, despite his attempts at having the Special Marriages Act amended to allow marriage without conversion or renunciation six years earlier. Gandhi, on the other hand, thought only the religiously pure and chaste of any community can truly cooperate with the other community and was given to trusting those with a religious orientation more than Jinnah, whom he viewed as a typical westernized politician with scant regard for his religion, caste or culture.
In February 1918, Ruttie turned eighteen years old and her father, Sir Dinshaw Petit, couldn’t stop the two from getting married. The marriage ceremony took place at Jinnah’s house, South Court, which was a Goanese-style bungalow built in the second half of the 19th century. A number of Jinnah’s confidants and colleagues from the League and the Congress attended the marriage ceremony. The marriage took place in accordance with Shia Islamic law. Before the ceremony, Ruttie nominally converted to Shia Islam. The reason for this, contrary to the accusation levelled against Jinnah, was not out of any religious conviction but merely a formality because by law, either both parties had to renounce their faith or one party had to convert to the other party’s religion. Since Jinnah was a member the Imperial Legislative Council of India,
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representing the Muslims of Bombay, it had to be her converting to Islam. It was a conversion of convenience and certainly not based on any conviction. In real terms, the couple was almost agnostic or indifferent to faith. She was given the Muslim name Maryam but this name was never used and neither Jinnah nor his equally strongwilled daughter Dina would ever refer to her as that. Interestingly, in Pakistan, one hears of a certain Maryam Jinnah (referring of course to Ruttie) from time to time by hardcore ideologues of the so-called ‘Ideology of Pakistan’, especially Nazria-e-Pakistan Workers Trust. She is presented as a pious Muslim convert but in reality, it was always the contrary.
Some of Jinnah’s Hindu critics in India also use this fact of conversion as an example of an early Muslim love jehad on part of India’s archetypal villain. It seems an ideological appropriation that seems to satisfy communal interests on both sides. In reality, as M. C. Chagla points out in his book Roses in December, life at South Court was as far from a pious and orthodox Islamic lifestyle as possible. From the artwork suited to Ruttie’s eclectic global tastes, English and French classics adorning the shelves, and dietary habits of the couple which included ham sandwiches and pork, to late night dinner parties with whiskey, fine wines and champagne, the Jinnahs lived a cosmopolitan irreligious life in Bombay’s golden age under the Raj. To be sure, Jinnah was always a disciplined drinker, never imbibing more than necessary but he certainly did not share his coreligonists’ fervour for dietary restrictions. Nor did he fast or pray. However, Ruttie was hard at work demolishing any residual sense of Muslim identity in the man. Even in terms of dressing, Ruttie was the farthest thing from the stereotype of an Indian Muslim wife. She wore low-cut dresses and saris of her own design. Sheela Reddy points out that the joke in Bombay was that Ruttie and Gandhi
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were in competition to see who could get away with wearing fewer clothes. Mentioning these facts in modern-day Pakistan, especially after the Islamization of 1980s under a military dictatorship, is a taboo. From its publication in 1982–83 to 1989, Stanley Wolpert’s classic Jinnah of Pakistan remains banned in Pakistan because it mentioned some of these uncomfortable truths for modern-day Pakistanis who want to imagine Jinnah as something of a religious cleric or at best a somewhat modern but pious Muslim. As we will see in the coming chapters, Jinnah’s own ambivalent attitude during the Pakistan Movement greatly contributed to this fallacy.
Interestingly, for the occasion of her conversion, Ruttie wore the most scandalous of saris, designed to shock and awe the conservative old Muslim men present. The wedding had been kept secret for that day. However, the next day, Bombay Chronicle carried a news item mentioning the marriage between Jinnah and Ruttie. It had been carefully planned to the last detail by Jinnah and probably came down on his father-in-law like a ton of bricks.
It was on account of Ruttie’s dress that the mutually hostile relations between Lord Willingdon and Jinnah reached nadir. Mr and Mrs Jinnah had at some point after their wedding been invited to dine with Lord and Lady Willingdon at the Government House. Ruttie wore a beautiful low-cut dress that displeased Lady Willingdon enough to call for a wrap for her to cover her shoulders, suggesting that she might be cold. Jinnah immediately rose up, saying famously, “If Mrs Jinnah feels cold, she will say so and ask for a wrap herself.[24] He then escorted his wife out of the Government House, refusing to dine there again so long as Lord Willingdon was Governor. Around this time, the governor gave Jinnah more reason to dislike him with a passion. Willingdon invited Jinnah and other Home Rule League leaders to a conference and proceeded
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to insult them. Other than Jinnah, all of his colleagues walked out, with Jinnah staying back to still reason with the governor, who he concluded was beyond reasoning at this point. From this point onwards, the personal and the political became the same and Jinnah took the offensive side against Lord Willingdon through newspapers and in public meetings. His most triumphant moment came when a group of pro-British loyalists in Bombay tried their hand at flattery by suggesting a memorial to Lord Willingdon who was to depart shortly back to England.
Jinnah now began to rouse the public opinion against the governor and was aided greatly by Bombay Chronicle and its editor Horniman who had turned the paper into Jinnah’s personal mouthpiece. Around this time, the Parsi newspaper Jam-e-Jamshaid published an interview with S. R. Bomanji, where he claimed that the only reason Jinnah was up in arms against the governor was because the latter had refused to give him a seat on his Legislative Council. It was a strange accusation, given that Jinnah was a member of the Imperial Legislative Council and denied suggestions that he was seeking such a seat, but the paper’s Parsi readers, already quite upset at having lost the ‘flower of Bombay’ to this upstart Muslim lawyer, were ready to buy it. The Parsis more or less as a community then rallied around Lord Willingdon and pressed forth with the idea of a memorial. Suleiman Cassim Mitha, Jinnah’s old adversary both in Muslim League and the Khoja Community, also joined ranks and a large and significant body of Khojas was similarly brought into the mix of the ragtag group that now was baying for Jinnah’s blood. Jinnah would not be deterred though. He organized a mass campaign against the memorial and got a rousing welcome wherever he went.
The matter was to ultimately be decided by a citizen’s vote at the Town Hall. Jinnah’s call for action by voting was answered by
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20,000 Bombay citizens, Hindus, Muslims and even some Parsis. The whole of Home Rule League had been mobilized, reflecting the democratic aspirations of the people of Bombay against Willingdon. Meanwhile, the pro-British group was hard at work as well. Suleiman Cassim Mitha was bussing in his gangsters from other parts of India and filling up Muslim neighbourhoods with them. Influential Parsis by and large also were mobilizing to ensure that the vote went in Willingdon’s favour. The administration did not tell Jinnah or his supporters when the doors of the Town Hall would open, so Jinnah and his supporters arrived at 7:00 a.m. that morning. The voting was supposed to be at 5:30 p.m., but they were willing to wait. By 10 a.m., however, the doors were opened with Jinnah and his supporters taking up the best seats in the house. Soon afterwards though, a scuffle was started by a Parsi volunteer who attacked one of Jinnah’s supporters. Sheela Reddy writes: Jinnah, who had never once been tempted even in his youth to vent his anger through physical violence – it repelled him – would have preferred not to retaliate.'[25]
The scuffle broke out with one of the volunteers, probably one of Mitha’s goons, attempting to push Jinnah down the stairs. Jinnah refused to retaliate and immediately called upon his followers to sit down. Order was restored but things came to a head again when Suleiman Cassim Mitha’s Muslims entered the fray through a special door kept open for biryani to be served to pro-Memorial campaign. Ultimately, the pro-Memorial camp nominated Sir Jeejeebhoy to preside over the session despite protest from Jinnah and his supporters. Jeejeebhoy then announced the resolution carried after asking for those who supported the memorial. Clearly, this was not the case and there was commotion and chaos. After this, the police was let loose on Jinnah’s group and Jinnah himself
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was beaten up with a police baton. Ironically, Jinnah had himself appealed to the police to come in because he wanted to ensure that there were no further clashes between Mitha’s goons and his followers. To Jinnah, this was a rude shock. His followers had been peaceful and were exercising their right to protest while his opponents had come clearly with the intent of creating trouble. After they were forced to exit, Jinnah and Horniman emerged to a rousing welcome by 20,000 people who had gathered to support them outside. Outside, Ruttie had already made what was her maiden political speech telling the crowd that ‘we are not slaves’. Addressing the crowd, Jinnah said that the day (11 December 1918) was a red-letter day and a triumph of democracy not just in Bombay but in all of India.[26] In classic colonialist fashion, the Bombay Police was quick to try and cut down Jinnah to size and put it down to Jinnah’s inability to become part of the Western India Turf Club that had turned Jinnah so hostile to the governor.[27]
Till this time at least, Jinnah had always been willing to work with even those he vociferously disagreed with and, therefore, it was a rather strange accusation to be levelled against a man who had achieved so much at such a young age. Whatever the case, the people of Bombay thought otherwise and put up contributions to build Jinnah a monument in the form of Jinnah Memorial Hall, which still stands in the Congress compound in Bombay. Ironically though, for the future founder of a separate Muslim state, there was a communal angle to it with many Muslim citizens backing Mitha and his crowds against the largely Hindu crowd that supported Jinnah. A number of Muslims had been hard at work, probably with the government’s backing, to cause a split between the Congress and the Muslim League as well as to take back the Muslim League from Jinnah and his pro-Congress colleagues.
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There was certainly a deep feeling that ran against Jinnah among sections of Muslims elsewhere in India, especially in Muslimmajority areas, which saw the Lucknow Pact as a surrender of their majority rights for the sake of Muslim minorities in Hindu majority provinces.
As the war neared an end, the British officials had begun considering what would happen once the Defence of India Act 1915 was to lapse. In response to this, the Government of India appointed a Sedition Committee under Justice Sidney Rowlatt (of King’s Bench in London) along with Sir Basil Scott (Chief Justice of Bombay), Sir Verney Lovett (Member, Board of Revenue in the United Provinces), Diwan Bahadur Kumaraswami Sastri (High Court Judge at Madras) and Provash Chandra Mittar (a legal practitioner from the High Court of Calcutta). The two Indian members especially were there to show the British government’s willingness to take Indians along. The measures suggested by the committee were draconian because it sought to curb the ‘criminal conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movement in India.'[28] Recommendations included a trial by a commission of three High Court judges without juries, committal proceedings or a right of appeal and retaining discretionary powers of the executive.
Jinnah rose up to speak on the bill that was laid before Council and said: ‘In India, before 1906, there was no such thing as criminal conspiracies of a revolutionary character … the cause of this, is that there is discontent; there is dissatisfaction, there is unrest. Might I say, my Lord, that it is partly, if not wholly due to your policy … There is no precedent or parallel in legal history any civilized country to the enactment of such laws … these measures will have
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the most disastrous effect upon the relations between Government the people.[29] Jinnah was a vociferous opponent of this draconian law. He especially objected to its permanent character. While he was ready to accept some of these measures so long as the war dragged on, he was unwilling to countenance the legal system being entirely based on a premise that the British must subjugate the people’s legitimate desire for self-rule. Once the measure was passed, Jinnah advised the Viceroy to study the history of his own country, making a poignant reference to the Magna Carta by telling him that his countrymen had fought and shed their blood since the time of King John for the principle that no man’s liberty be taken away without trial.[30]
Not content, Jinnah fired off a classic letter to the viceroy as he was given to do:
Your Excellency’s government has actively negatived every argument they advanced but a year ago when they appealed to India for help at the war conference and have ruthlessly trampled upon the principles for which Great Britain avowedly fought the war. The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people had been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State, by an over-fretful and incompetent bureaucracy neither responsible to People nor in touch with the real public opinion… I, therefore, as a protest against the passing of the bill and the manner in which it was passed, tender my resignation… In my opinion, a government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim the be called a civilized government.[31]
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The Rowlatt controversy served to bring Jinnah and Gandhi together once again after their relations had deteriorated earlier over the issue of recruitment. Gandhi had been actively recruiting for the Empire’s war effort, getting the Kaiser-e-Hind medal for it. As we have seen earlier, Jinnah believed that if there was to be recruitment of Indians, commissioned ranks should also be open to them. In response to Jinnah’s overtures to this end, Gandhi had written to Jinnah in July 1918: ‘See ye first the Recruiting Office and everything will be added unto you.[32] However, Gandhi had now come out completely against the government and Jinnah joined him in the Satyagraha protests Gandhi organized on 28 March 1919 and 6 April 1919. Two months later, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah telling him that he no longer had the same opinion of the Empire as he had earlier and that stopping the Rowlatt Act was his priority now.[33] The future father of independent India wrote to the future father of independent Pakistan: “Our reforms will be practically worthless, if we cannot repeal Rowlatt legislation. And as I can imagine no form of resistance to the government than civil disobedience, I propose God willing to resume it next week. I have taken all precautions that are humanly possible to take, against recrudescence of violence.’ This underscored the difference in approach. Gandhi was full throttle into civil disobedience and Jinnah was attempting legislative challenge. The bloody events of April had not yet fully sunk in with either men it would seem. Jinnah was still hopeful about Montagu’s Reforms Bill and Gandhi was hopeful that he could resort to civil disobedience this time without violence. the
Around the same time, Jinnah was banned from entering Hyderabad state on account of his speeches there and the new governor of Bombay, George Lloyd, now wrote to Chelmsford suggesting that Jinnah and Gandhi should be sent to Burma.[34] In April
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1919, reports of violence from Ahmedabad led to Gandhi’s call to suspend his Satyagraha, which unknown to both Gandhi and Jinnah saved the two men from being deported to Burma. Gandhi had tried to travel to Punjab to address meetings there but the government confined him to Bombay. In response to this confinement, violence broke out all over and Gandhi, being principally committed to non-violence, was understandably distressed, making appeals from Bombay for an immediate end to violence. Similarly, the arrest of Dr Saifuddin Kitchlew in Punjab coupled with news of Gandhi’s confinement led to riots in Amritsar and parts of Lahore. Responding to attacks on British banks and several British women in Lahore and Amritsar, the Punjab Government now declared Martial Law on 13 April. Public meetings were banned but a large group in Amritsar met at Jallianwala Bagh where Brigadier General R. E. Dyer ordered the massacre that is known as the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. Close to 400 people were killed and in excess of 1000 wounded. When Jinnah tried to travel to Lahore to represent dissidents being tried under Martial Law, he was banned from entry by the Punjab government.[35]
For Jinnah, the massacre was yet another incident that would create massive hurdles in the reforms agenda he and other liberals were pressing. Recriminations of this kind would obviously make his task even more difficult in collaborating with British parliamentarians who were willing to move ahead with actual reforms to the structure of the Government of India. Condemning Brigadier General Dyer’s actions, Jinnah, nevertheless, hoped that the events of Jallianwala Bagh would be an isolated incident and that the British would not repeat such outrages. Perhaps this sanguine hope was not misplaced after all as the British by and large did not resort to such violence before or after April 1919, but it shows that despite what he would describe later as ‘physical butchery’, Jinnah was still willing to
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give British a chance, looking desperately towards the one man he actually respected, Edwin Montagu, the first Jewish Secretary of State for India. Montagu and Jinnah had met and developed a mutually liking instantly. Montagu was poisoned against Jinnah by the Bombay Government, which advised on the unreliability of the Bombay lawyer. Later in his memoirs, Montagu would recall that Jinnah was perfectly mannered, young and armed to teeth with dialectics. If Jinnah’s relations with Willingdon had been bad, Lloyd absolutely hated Jinnah, describing him as ‘attractive to meet, fair of speech but absolutely dishonest in every way.'[36]
In the opinion of this author, scant attention has been paid to Jinnah and Gandhi’s relations in light of the Amritsar massacre. April 1919 in any event was to be the last time Jinnah would ever join Gandhi in any movement for civil disobedience. Both men hated violence but drew different lessons from the Amritsar tragedy. Gandhi was still convinced of Thoreau’s methods. For Jinnah, Amritsar was a confirmation of what he had feared all along – that any resort to protest marches could turn violent, giving the government an excuse to resort to brute force and also to stop any constitutional progress by citing disorder. For Jinnah, this would mean a lifetime commitment to the idea of constitutional methods and means, till he would once again venture down that road much later in life with a similar call for disobedience twenty-eight years later that would lead to horrific violence in Calcutta. Jinnah continued to press for constitutional reform while Gandhi was chalking out plans for a civil disobedience movement that would shake the British government to its core.
Meanwhile, the Muslim League had asked Jinnah to lead a deputation of Indian Muslims to meet the British Prime Minister Lloyd George (not to be confused with governor of Bombay, George
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Lloyd) to convince him to include at the Paris Peace Conference a Muslim member (possibly Jinnah himself) among those representing India to ensure that the interests of the Muslim community were not overlooked in the aftermath of the war that had placed the Ottoman Caliphate in the defeated enemy category. Consequently, Jinnah and Ruttie arrived in London in May where Jinnah is said to have rented a flat near Regent’s Park. It was here that in the early hours of 15 August 1919, Jinnah’s daughter Dina was born, soon after the new parents-to-be returned to attend theatre in haste. While thrilled with this development, Jinnah nevertheless faced disappointment in his mission. His appeals to the Prime Minister fell on deaf ears and no Muslim member was included in the Paris Peace Conference where the Maharaja of Bikaner along with Montagu represented British India. Jinnah met Montagu in London to discuss several matters. At the top of the list was the issue of B. G. Horniman, his old friend, who had routinely faced harassment at the hands of the government. Now, Horniman had been deported from India and the Bombay Chronicle had been temporarily closed somewhere between April and May, right after the horrific events. The second issue had been the Rowlatt legislation, which had preoccupied both Jinnah and Gandhi. Montagu was getting influenced by the constant attacks on Jinnah by the governor of Bombay who had fired off several letters to tell Montagu not to trust Jinnah, one of them now describing Jinnah as having a black heart.
Jinnah returned to India and immediately gave an interview to the newly restored Bombay Chronicle, still telling the paper that ‘Mr Montagu will not fail us’[37] and that the reforms Montagu had promised would bear fruit. As it so happened, the much-touted Montagu Chelmsford Reforms actually were cleverly drafted to further divide and rule, this time through the introduction of the
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principle of Dyarchy and devolution of powers to the provinces. This was in reality designed to ensure that Jinnah and Gandhi lose their power at the top. Dyarchy allowed for limited subjects to be passed into the hands of Indians in the provinces. Jinnah appreciated the idea of passing these subjects to Indians but also pointed out that such responsibility should not be limited to provinces and should be allowed at a national level as well. As a national leader, Jinnah had much to lose from the injection of provincialism into politics. As things would turn out, this threw open the doors to parochial sentiments that both Congress and the League had to contend with in the coming decades. Franchise was also expanded through the Montagu Chelmsford Reforms. Now, everyone paying land revenue of Rs 25 or rent of Rs 50 was eligible to vote, expanding the electorate to 5 million people. Jinnah wanted a greater expansion and it was at this juncture that he proposed linking franchise to literacy, instead of land revenue. It was a tactical move since this would mean a larger number of voters and would mean an expanding electorate as literacy grew. It was also his way of bloodying the nose of loyalist zamindars of Punjab especially and earned him new enemies among Punjab’s agriculturalist Muslims who distrusted Jinnah as much as the British by this time. The British simultaneously argued that the electorate itself was not adequate to represent the Indian masses and, therefore, it could safely conclude that India would not be ready for self-government. Jinnah pointed out that this was a misnomer because the electorate even in the UK had been limited to less than 10 per cent until a few decades earlier. He pointed out that some 12 per cent of Indians were literate and, therefore, India was ready for self-rule.[38] The rest of the cross-examination on Jinnah’s evidence before British Parliamentary Committee on the issue of reforms ought to be considered too:
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Q. 3812. – That is to say, at the earliest possible moment you wish to do away in political life with any distinction between Mohammedans and Hindus ? Jinnah: Yes. Nothing will please me more than when that day comes.
EXAMINED BY LORD ISLINGTON Q. 3892. – ….You said just now about the communal representation, I think in answer to Major Ormsby-Gore, that you hope in a very few years you would be able to extinguish communal representation, which was at present proposed to be established and is established in order that Mahommedans may have their representation with Hindus. You said you desired to see that. How soon do you think that happy state of affairs is likely to be realized? Jinnah: I can only give you certain facts: I cannot say anything more than that: I can give you this which will give you some idea: that in 1913, at the All-India Moslem League sessions at Agra, we put this matter to the test whether separate electorates should be insisted upon or not by the Mussalmans, and we got a division, and that division is based upon Provinces; only a certain number of votes represent each Province, and the division came to 40 in favour of doing away with the separate electorate, and 80 odd – 1 do not remember the exact number – were for keeping the separate electorate. That was in 1913. Since then, I have had many opportunities of discussing this matter with various Mussulman leaders; and they are changing their angle of vision with regard to this matter. I cannot give you the period, but I think it cannot last very long. Perhaps, the next inquiry may hear something about it. Q. 3893. – You think at the next inquiry the Mahommedans will ask to be absorbed into the whole?
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Jinnah: Yes, I think the next inquiry will probably hear something about it.[39] (Emphasis added throughout)
The purpose behind quoting this evidence is to show where Jinnah stood vis-à-vis the position of his coreligionists in India. Jinnah clearly felt at this time that the issue of Hindu-Muslim conflict was immaterial to the question of reforms in India. Indeed, it seems that Jinnah was confident that Muslims would give up the entire idea of separate electorates and ask for a single joint electorate for all of India. He also dismissed the idea that Hindus would mistreat the Muslims because they were a majority. The evidence he gave would stand in sharp contrast to what Jinnah would ask later as the leader of the Muslim League. A series of micro-aggressions on his own person and leadership by the Hindu majority was what alienated Jinnah from the Congress and the Indian nationalists. There might have been his personal disappointment in the mix but by the same token there were actions by his counterparts among the Hindus, especially Gandhi, that contributed to the demise of the idealism that Jinnah displayed so fervently earlier on.
Certainly in 1919, Jinnah and Gandhi, despite their disagreements on the mode of the struggle, were staunch allies. Both were committed to getting the British to agree to a system of government where the people of India were the masters of their own home. Jinnah believed that every false move by the British government would give increased impetus to the struggle that he had aspired to lead. However, at the same time, he worried about the British injustices giving enough grief to the nationalists that increasingly all moderates and constitutionalists were joining the ranks of radical revolutionaries and practitioners of civil disobedience. He tried to caution the men in charge of India to cry halt and stop
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excesses like the Amritsar massacre and Rowlatt legislation before things got out of their hand. At the same time, he cautioned his countrymen to be patient at this critical juncture in their history and let the political leadership chalk out the best course of action forward. This was presumably to be done at the Amritsar Congress that happened at the end of 1919.
Jinnah’s attempts were to forge a united opposition in the new legislature that had been envisaged. [40] His greatest supporter in this cause was none other than Gandhi himself. At the Congress session, two distinct views had emerged. The first view was articulated by C. R. Das, the great Bengali statesman, and Tilak, who held the Reforms Act to be completely useless, inadequate, unsatisfactory and wholly disappointing. Meanwhile, Annie Besant came out in support of the reforms, suggesting that they had opened nothing less than ‘a gateway to freedom to the Indian nation.[41] Both Jinnah and Gandhi represented the third view, which was that the reforms were completely disappointing but inadequate and that these reforms had not gone far enough to meet the requirements. Gandhi’s amendment to Tilak-Das resolution, which Jinnah supported, stated ‘that both the authorities and the people will cooperate so as to work the reforms and so as to secure the early establishment of Full Responsible Government.'[42] Ultimately, this was the compromise that was reached with Jinnah adding another paragraph of thanks to Montagu who Jinnah held had laboured like no other Englishman had laboured for reforms in British India. This was the zenith in the short-lived partnership between Gandhi and Jinnah, which led the two men to a thumping triumph at the Amritsar Congress. This was to be in many ways the last fusion before the gradual fission that tore them asunder and in the process the unity of the newly emerging Indian nation. Disappointments
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were only beginning to loom large, which would eventually set the two great Gujarati leaders on separate paths despite their shared passion and objective of Hindu-Muslim unity and the self-rule for Indians.
At both the Congress and the Muslim League sessions, Jinnah supported the most strongly worded resolutions against the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, calling for the removal of Governor O’Dwyer and Brigadier General Dyer from all positions of responsibility and for them to be sent back. Jinnah also got these organizations to wait for the result of the Hunter Committee Report on the matter. Jinnah called upon Montagu to‘rise like the greatest Englishman that has ever lived and see that the wrongs of Punjab are avenged to the fullest.?[43] The Hunter Committee comprised British and Indian members who in the final report, which was released in May 1920, broke up into a majority and minority report. The British members penned the majority report and the Indian members penned the minority report. The minority report criticized the martial law administration for being racist against Indians while the majority report justified the imposition of martial law. Jinnah was the fiercest critic of the Hunter Committee Report, declaring that the report itself was nothing less than an effort to ‘whitewash the officials of this country’, adding that ‘the Hunter Report had shaken the confidence of every man, woman and child [44] but still he was willing to wait for a parliamentary debate in the British Parliament hoping that they would draw the right conclusions. The parliamentary debates also turned out to be a great disappointment because the Tories dominated them and asked, ‘Is it English to break a man who tried to do his duty’, criticizing the forced retirement of Brigadier General Dyer. The British public rallied to Dyer’s support once again, disappointing
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Jinnah who had hoped that the British conscience would be appalled at the treatment meted out to fellow British subjects in India. In September 1920, from the Muslim League platform, Jinnah spoke out against the manner in which the parliamentary debate had been carried out. He stated, ‘I must mention the parliamentary debate which forgot the Punjab and discussed General Dyer.’[45] By now, Jinnah’s patience with Montagu had also worn thin. He declared, Of course, Mr Montagu hadn’t the time to put India’s case before the House, being far too busy offering personal explanations. And then the blue and brainless blood of England, to their crowning glory, carried the infamous resolution of Lord Finlay.'[46] Jinnah’s criticism of Montagu was somewhat excessive given that Montagu had tried to warn his compatriots that Britain could not hold India by terrorism. Yet, this was the mood that Jinnah found himself in after repeated disappointments. His faith in Britain to actually do right by the Indians was now fading. He appealed to the British Government ‘not to drive people of India to desperation, or else there is no course left open to the people to inaugurate the policy of non-cooperation.’[47] Parallel to the League session, Jinnah attended a special session of the Congress in which he expressed doubts about Gandhi’s non-cooperation programme, but nevertheless supported the resolution, which condemned the Hunter Committee report as being ‘tainted with bias and race prejudice.’[48]
At the Muslim League session, Jinnah told his co-religionists consider whether or not they approve of its principle; and approving of its principle and details. The Muslim League also voted to support Gandhi’s non-cooperation programme. Gandhi had by now captured the imagination of Indians, regardless of religion, and Jinnah saw his constitutional agenda of reform being pushed back. The third place Jinnah saw a major reversal was at the Home
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Rule League session. Gandhi proposed an amendment asking for a change of the name from Home Rule League to Swaraj Sabha and to commit to the complete Swaraj according to the wishes of the Indian people. Jinnah was committed to self-rule within a British constitutional framework and was alarmed by these changes because they also indicated to him the predominance of one kind of Indian over another. Gandhi’s Satyagraha campaign and resort to Hindu idiom and concepts was unacceptable to Jinnah as a constitutionalist trained in the British liberal tradition. For the first time, he also began to see the logic in the Muslim complaints that he had hitherto dismissed with prejudice. Once the changes were adopted, Jinnah resigned from the Home Rule League. Gandhi was quick to respond, asking Jinnah to take up his share in the new life, which had opened up before the country. This elicited a sharply worded retort from Jinnah in form of an open letter, which was his first open break with Gandhi:
If by ‘new life’ you mean your methods and programmes, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster … your methods have already cause split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country, not only among Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and even between fathers and sons.[49]
Fathers and sons was the most poignant reference. In a privileged household in Allahabad, young Jawaharlal Nehru was busy trying to convince his father Motilal Nehru to join Gandhi and abandon his constitutional and legal form of opposition to the British
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Government. The elder Nehru had been willing to go along to a certain extent but the rift that Jinnah spoke of was self-evident in many such families.
It is not that Jinnah was opposed to the programme of noncooperation per se. Contrary to the picture painted of him, Jinnah was convinced of non-cooperation as a means to achieve self-rule. In September, he declared that ‘One degrading measure upon another, disappointment upon disappointment, and injury upon injury, can lead a people to only one end. It led Russia to Bolshevism. It led Ireland to Sinn Feinism. May it lead India to freedom.'[50] Indeed, Jinnah at this time seemed fascinated by the events in Russia and for this reason had also begun organizing trade unions. What he disliked was Gandhi’s peculiar variety that sought to bring in religious symbols and ideas into politics, which Jinnah wanted nothing to do with, because it would inevitably make communal identities non-negotiable for the communities involved. More importantly, Jinnah’s conception of non-cooperation was to first enter legislatures and councils and then refuse to cooperate from within. Gandhi wanted a complete end to all cooperation, no entry into legislatures, refusal to allow children to be educated in British schools, and for Indians to quit all the jobs in the administration and the military. To Jinnah, this meant educational, economic and social suicide of Indians. Jinnah had even more ardently than Gandhi desired self-rule but he was also mindful of the good that British had brought and was committed to the ideals of parliamentary democracy and the English common law to an extent that he could not countenance a return to medievalism that he saw inherent in Gandhi’s proposals. Even more alarmed was Jinnah at Gandhi’s championing of the orthodox religious demands of narrow-Muslims in wake of the Khilafat Movement. While Jinnah had argued in London that, given
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the Caliphate being at stake, Muslims had a legitimate communal interests, he wanted to keep the Mullah or the religious cleric as far away from politics as possible. As a modern Indian from the Muslim community, Jinnah had no love at all for the religious doctors who wanted to keep the Muslim community mired in backwardness and the women closed up behind walls.
Things between Jinnah and Gandhi finally came to a permanent break at the Nagpur Session of Congress. Jinnah objected to Gandhi’s programme, saying that Gandhi was committing Indian National Congress to a programme it would not be able to carry out. Here, he addressed Gandhi as Mr Gandhi, instead of Mahatma Gandhi, as the adoring masses had come to refer to him. According to one historian, at least he did refer to Gandhi as Mahatma Gandhi but then refused to call Maulana Mohammad Ali as Maulana, referring to him also as Mister. Either way, Jinnah stood his ground and refused to be cowered into submission by the crowd, which was constantly heckling him, calling him a political imposter. He told Durga Das that he wanted nothing to do with this pseudo-religious approach to politics or give into mob hysteria.[51] Tyranny of the majority is seldom about outrageous excesses but is often those micro-aggressions that lead to a permanent rupture. Jinnah’s unceremonious fall in the Congress was on account of his adherence to principles; first, his refusal to cozy up to the British who saw him as disloyal and a troublemaker who operated so smartly within the established bounds of the law that they found it difficult to deal with him and second, his refusal to compromise on his commitment to constitutionalism which alienated him from Gandhi, who despite his great qualities of head and heart could not imagine playing second fiddle to a westernized Muslim leader like Jinnah. Jinnah too was unable to reconcile himself to what he viewed as an appeal to
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irrational superstitions, wishing that Gandhi had a touch of Lenin. The defeat at Nagpur was enough for Jinnah who now quit the Congress. Here onwards would begin a series of disappointments and disillusionments with his colleagues, which would transform Jinnah’s ideas on Indian unity and nationhood.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote about Jinnah’s break in his autobiography. He said: A few old leaders … dropped out of Congress after Calcutta, and among them a popular and well-known figure was … Jinnah… he had been largely responsible in the past for bringing Moslem League nearer to the Congress. But the new developments in the Congress – non-cooperation and the new constitution, which made it more of a popular mass organization – were thoroughly disapproved by him. He disagreed on political grounds but it was not politics in the main that kept him away… temperamentally, he did not fit in at all with the new Congress.’[52]
Jawaharlal Nehru, unlike his father Motilal Nehru, always remained skeptical of Jinnah, while respecting him. He saw in Jinnah an elitist, even though it was Jinnah who had emerged on his merits from a humble background and Nehru was born and raised in an extremely privileged household both financially and as a member of the elite Brahmin caste within Hindus. As such, Nehru misread Jinnah’s reasons for break with the Congress. Jinnah was not wary of the khadi-clad crowds even if he preferred to dress up in the finest clothes. The charge of Jinnah’s almost famous disagreement with the non-cooperation movement is also not entirely borne out by the facts. As mentioned earlier, Jinnah was among the first leaders to join Gandhi in days of protest in 1919 and was personally in favour of non-cooperation, provided it did not mean surrender to
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forces underneath, which Jinnah was quite rightly suspicious of. It was not just the appeal to Hindu sentiments alone that bothered Jinnah, but even more so was the use of the specific and extraterritorial issue of Khilafat that had upset the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity. While Jinnah recognized that many of his co-religionists had a legitimate concern vis-à-vis the question of Caliphate in Constantinople, he certainly did not share that concern as a political leader. He was ready to raise this issue on behalf of his co-religionists through representation to the government but disapproved of its use as a mobilizing tool. For the first time, Jinnah had come face to face with the tiger of religion in Indian politics and, at this crucial time, had refused to ride it principally.
While Jinnah preferred to speak in English, which he believed was the lingua franca, given the diversity of languages in India, he certainly did not have an issue with others making speeches in Hindustani (i.e., Urdu or Hindi). Indeed, Jinnah had wanted the vernacular languages to be incorporated in competitive civil service exams. Nehru’s charges, therefore, were an utter misreading of the nuanced position Jinnah had taken on these issues at the Congress sessions. Another confusion that Nehru seemed to have operated under was that Jinnah only wanted matriculates to become part of Congress. It is true that Jinnah had as a counter-proposal to the British government’s land revenue and rent-based electorate proposed literacy-based electorate, which would have expanded the same, but that was a tactical position of a leader trying to expand the electorate as far as possible. It was also in line with Jinnah’s commitment to universal education for Indians, which he considered sine qua non for progress. Jawaharlal Nehru misread all of these points because he was not willing to give Jinnah a benefit. Nehru would become the rising star of Congress in the coming
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decades and at no point during 1920–47, was Nehru able to fully appreciate Jinnah’s various positions, which ultimately made it impossible for the two great leaders to ever see eye to eye despite the many things they had in common. The consequences for both men would be disastrous, especially when the results often turned out to be so completely different from what they had wanted for the country and the people that they both loved dearly.
One could argue that the door to India’s unity was slammed shut that day in Nagpur. It is just that Congress, Gandhi and even Jinnah himself did not know it yet. In the immediate aftermath of Nagpur, though, Jinnah still was hopeful that his break would be a temporary one. It would still take two decades for Jinnah to chart his separatist course and tear asunder the unity that he had worked so hard for most of his life. What had begun as an epic tale of heroism would gradually transform into a colossal Shakespearian tragedy at par with the tragedy of Macbeth. The fusion would now give way to fission and in its wake lay to ash a whole subcontinent. Jinnah would endure this at great personal and public cost and would at the very end of his life be forced to wonder out loud if he had done the right thing
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THE YEARS OF CONFLICT
The year 1920 ended with a number of major disappointments for Jinnah. Congress had moved away from the creed of constitutional methods that he had dedicated his life to. The end of this creed meant an end to Jinnah’s chances of leading the Congress as well. Gandhi had thoroughly routed Jinnah in the civil quest to lead India’s struggle for self-rule. Gandhi’s own personal evolution from a loyalist recruiter of the Empire to a full-fledged revolutionary had taken India by storm. However, to Jinnah, the religious character of the new Congress was more troubling, epitomized not just by Gandhi but more so by Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar (1878–1931) who, along with his brother Maulana Shaukat Ali, now aspired to dethrone Jinnah from his position as the leader of Muslims. Even at the Nagpur Congress, Jinnah’s defeat had been secured by a mob that was predominantly Muslim, comprising Khilafatists. At this point, Gandhi, through his deployment of Khilafat issue, had become the unquestionable leader of the Muslims. It was a political lesson that Jinnah would not forget but one that he was not quite ready to act on immediately. As we have seen, he was still too wary of the idea of a pseudo-religious approach to politics. This mixing of emotive
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religious appeals was too alien to his temperament and one which he realized would not end well for a society so deeply divided and antagonized on the basis of faith.
Unable to make headway against Gandhi and his newfound Muslim allies, Jinnah dedicated himself to his legal practice, which had waned during 1917–20. Here, he was back in his element as India’s finest lawyer. His practice grew as successful as ever. Most of the January 1921, Jinnah was busy with the Bombay High Court work.
Jinnah’s first real political appearance since Nagpur came on the sixth anniversary of Gokhale’s death when he spoke at the Servants of India Society, a meeting presided by R. P. Paranjpye, member of the Bombay Legislative Council and the first Indian to win the coveted senior wrangler position at the University of Cambridge. Paranjpye was like Jinnah, a committed moderate and constitutionalist and similarly subject to attacks. The members gave Jinnah a rousing welcome as he stood up to speak. Paying tribute to the late Gokhale’s leadership, career and work at Fergusson College, Jinnah then spoke about the political situation. He said that, admittedly, the present situation of the country was fraught with great difficulties. On the one hand, Indians had a government that had persistently and deliberately followed a policy that wounded the self-respect of the country. There was the great European war in which Indians shed their blood and gave them money. In return, Indians received the Rowlatt Act as a reward. There was not a single Indian member of the committee who did not oppose this act, but still it was passed. Jinnah felt it was not possible for any Indian with any self-respect to cooperate with a government that had forced obnoxious tyranny upon the country; at that very moment, it required a different sort of treatment. He continued, if
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the moderate and sober opinion in the country did not come out and put down what the government considered extremist position they would resort to repression … Without real change of policy, how would the government satisfy the intelligentsia of India? If the government wanted real peace and goodwill, and honestly and sincerely desired cooperation of the people, they would need to radically change the policy and that could only be done or not by small men will happen to be at the helm of government by a great big man and by generous change of policy.’ So long as that was not forthcoming, he was convinced more than ever that the intelligence of India would not be satisfied and he had asked himself.
Further, the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity stated that if Gandhi’s policy was not in the wrong direction, he would have been the first person to join but that was not the case. It was not that he did not have the greatest respect and reverence for Gandhi and the men who were working with him; he knew of the noble stuff they were made of as he had worked with them and was firmly convinced of their sacrificing spirits. Jinnah said that he was proud of them, Gandhi and others, as an Indian and there were many more like them in India but the programme of Mahatma Gandhi was taking them in the wrong direction. At this point, the crowd cried again ‘No, no’. Undeterred and unfazed by a crowd that had by this time turned hostile, Jinnah in his characteristic style repeated that what was needed at the time was a real political movement based on the real principles that could ignite the fire in the heart of every man for his motherland. Then he spoke of the boycott of Councils: ‘If we had 20 at 30 of our best men in the assembly, Mr Jamnadas’ resolution would not have been compromised. They would’ve fought it to the bitter end.’ Somebody in the crowd at this point said the resolution would never have been allowed. Jinnah replied: “[In] that case, the
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government would’ve been obliged to suspend assembly in less than a year of its existence. Continuing, he said he could not understand why they should not go to the councils and face the bureaucracies; he said he could not understand why they were not proceeding according to constitutional and political methods.?
He then criticized the idea of the boycotting of schools. Jinnah said that the boys were asked to withdraw from government-owned schools and colleges but what would they do after withdrawing from schools and colleges. He said that he had discussed this question with several of his friends and had not received any convincing reply. Jinnah said that Gandhi had asked them to spin the wheel for five hours a day and then if any time was available to devote it to learning Hindi. He emphasized that this was not really a political movement but a spiritual one. The first essential thing for any country to resist the government was to mobilize its forces. He warned that by following the doctrine of non-violence and non-cooperation, they were forgetting the human nature, they were forgetting that they were human beings and not saints. If they really wanted to serve the nation, they should raise the basic level of the average man of the country. Gandhi’s programme was based on the doctrine of soul force and this was Jinnah’s biggest objection to it.
To Jinnah, this spiritual movement essentially had destructive methods that did not take into account any human feelings. Nonviolent, non-cooperation would be a miracle if accomplished, he continued. Such principles and doctrine, as propagated by Gandhi, were opposed to the nature of an ordinary mortal; therefore, according to Jinnah ‘not one in one million would carry out Mr Gandhi’s doctrine’, which had its sole arbitrator, a person’s conscience. This was an ideological clash between two
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traditions within the political movements of the West. Other than his constitutionalist creed, Jinnah also could not contemplate how long the movement could last if boys were withdrawn from schools and colleges without substituting them by national schools and colleges. He still hoped that the government would think more of the intellectual opinion of the country and he trusted that it would not be very long before a real change of policy was brought about to satisfy the feelings of the people. Jinnah said that their present situation demanded of them to preach political doctrine and no other doctrine. Quoting the instance of Egypt, he stated how Zaghlul Pasha had called together men of influence, wealth and power who formed a committee and directed propaganda work throughout the whole of Egypt. These men, Jinnah said, went on educating the masses and they preached in the streets about what the government was and what the condition of the country was and how it was that they were ruled. So, if they would raise the level of average man, then the government would listen to them. Coming to the boycott of foreign goods, Jinnah asked how many of the delegates of the National Congress had really boycotted foreign goods. Someone from the crowd replied, “No one, none at all.’ Jinnah now said that this was not the principle that they could succeed by and what was needed was to educate everyone and start factories everywhere. The alternative, he said, was that Gandhi should have asked 320 millions of Indians to raise funds for national education and nobody would have been against it. In conclusion, Jinnah said that Gandhi undoubtedly was a great man and that he had more regard for him than anybody else but Gokhale would have never endorsed this programme had he been spared to live till then.’[2] To Jinnah, Gokhale was the gold standard and Gandhi was to be judged against that standard.
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Maulana Mohammad Ali took the offensive step against Jinnah in a speech delivered to a group two days later. It was probably the most acerbic attack on Jinnah’s constitutional politics by any Muslim leader. The Aligarh- and Oxford-educated Maulana recalled that Jinnah had at one of the meetings – probably the Congress meeting at Nagpur – asked what the political workers would do when they go to villages, only to be told that they would educate the villagers. Jinnah had then told the young audience, ‘Young men, the villagers know these things better than yourselves.’ Maulana Mohammad Ali said that the villagers knew these things better than Jinnah himself and that they were following the creed and programme of Mahatma Gandhi, which would ensure that men like Jinnah and Jayakar would not be able to divide them in classes any longer.[3] This charge of course was most unfortunate. Jinnah’s legislative and political career had been aimed at bridging the gap and speaking for all Indians across the class divide. 12 Even the speech by Jinnah that Maulana Mohammad Ali had chosen to criticize suggested the exact opposite. Jinnah long believed that Indians in the villages were not given enough credit for being politically aware as far as it concerned their rights. Jinnah was no doubt a well-dressed dandy who placed a premium on the idea of living well, but he was no classist. He was one of the earliest supporters of trade unions and workers’ rights as well as the rights of agricultural workers. Maulana Mohammad Ali, however, gave an entirely new complexion to Jinnah and his ideas. Gandhi had pervaded the atmosphere and was bringing about an incredible change. Mocking Jinnah for always referring to Gokhale, the Maulana now declared that if Gokhale was anything like what was described of him, then Gokhale too had a lot of weaknesses, primarily that he was not a man of the masses and certainly not
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one of them. Criticizing Jinnah’s constitutional approach, he said that humanity could not be measured by the foot rule they had borrowed from Europe. Indeed, according to the Maulana, if the history of England and Europe was constitutional, then Indians too were constitutionalist, asking in a classic tone of derision whether Jinnah thought it was the Congress in its 35th year that had gotten the Magna Carta approved. Jinnah, after all, had referred to the Magna Carta more often than anyone else among the Indian politicians of the time. Maulana chided him for placing too much faith in English history and British institutions.
It was a political hit on Jinnah that the Maulana carried out to perfection and the crowd roared with laughter. Jinnah certainly did not respond to the Maulana’s personal insults, but it gave fuel to Jinnah’s opponents. Jinnah had become a subject of ridicule for his western clothes, constitutional ideas and his resistance to the idea of mixing religion with politics. For Maulana Mohammad Ali, religion was intrinsic to every human endeavour. This inevitably meant division. Maulana Mohammad Ali promoted Gandhi as the panacea of all ills that confronted India. Much later though, he would declare that even the most degenerate Muslim was better than the most pious of Hindus like Gandhi. Maulana Mohammad Ali and Gandhi may have wanted Hindu-Muslim unity but by bringing religion into politics, they helped make communal identities non-negotiable, while Jinnah was kept out in the cold making appeals to their reason and good sense. Having resigned in 1919 from the Imperial Legislative Council, Jinnah notably did not participate in the elections in 1921. This was because he saw himself as a misfit in both Congress and the Muslim League. Jinnah was in no man’s land when it came to politics, though he continued to be a first-rank public figure.
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On 5 March 1921, Jinnah presided over a public meeting held under the auspices of the Press Association of India in relation to the Press day. In his presidential address, Jinnah said that there were two objects to the meeting and the first and most important one being the Press Act of 1910. Jinnah told his listeners that Gokhale and several others who were part of the legislative council in 1910 that events were taking place in India which were impossible for the government to control and that the press or a certain section of the press in the country was conducting itself in such a way that it was impossible to apply ordinary laws of the land. When the government placed certain matters before the representatives of the people, they had given their assent to the legislation under specific circumstances, but that was in 1910. Many of those members were now unwilling and hesitant to allow a statute of the character placed on the statute book of any government. Jinnah now pointed out that the Act had been enforced and administered and he wanted them to follow him when he said in what spirit of reasonableness of the leaders of the country place this power in the hands of the executive. However, since 1910, having watched the working of the Act and its administration, he had been voicing the opinion of the educated classes – that only one thing had come out clearly from this Act, which was that the Act had done no good to anybody. It had repressed and stunted unnatural growth of the press in the country. Jinnah said it had not allowed the press of the country to be independent, fearless and responsible and that it was patently clear that instead of helping the very object of the government had that at happening of perfect failure.
The only thing that the Act had been able to achieve was that it had placed certain powers in the hands of executive officers who had their own idiosyncrasies. According to Jinnah, the representatives of
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the people rightly felt that the Act was used in a most high-handed and oratory fashion, broadly gratifying the idiosyncrasies of certain officers. Government might forfeit the security, Jinnah said in the year 1921, but they were not going to prevent the people from exercising their fullest liberty of speech and writing. That was a great reflection upon any government that prevented its people from honestly, independently and fearlessly expressing their opinions and views. The liberty of the press, he said, was the most valuable thing and if that liberty was dashed in any way, it undermined the government more than it undermined the authority of the people.
Asking for the repeal of the Press Act, he quickly moved on to a question that had particularly upset him, i.e., the deportation of Horniman, his old friend and colleague at the Bombay Chronicle. Jinnah said he could not refer to Horniman without feelings of deep sorrow. A man who had rendered a most valuable service to the press and the public life of this country had been taken away and deported under a barbarous measure, which was intended purely as a war-time military measure. Jinnah said he regretted that the man who brought about that measure into force happened to be the governor of Bombay. The crowd by this time had crying out, ‘Shame, shame’. Jinnah said that the shame was that of a man who led a parliamentary life and then resorted to a measure like this. It was not merely a question of Horniman alone but everybody, continued Jinnah. Horniman had worked with the nationalists and was their greatest ally in the press. He continued to say that Horniman was taken away from his daily life, his profession and living, was placed in London and deprived of his livelihood, while the governor was sitting tight and giving no explanation. It was enough to rouse the blood of any man and Jinnah was not any man but someone who considered Horniman among his closest
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friends. Still a believer in British idealism, Jinnah wondered if the government had any regard for its name and if the Indians were going to get responsible government could they tolerate such an anomaly and brutal law, which would only be tolerated as a military measure and at what time? It was revolting for Jinnah to think that such a thing was possible in modern India in the year 1921 for a man to be taken away in this fashion. Concluding, he repeated once again that the ‘Press Act must go’. There was a bill repealing that in the legislative assembly and in the council of the state and that the government was in affix. If there had been any discussion, they would’ve been defeated in council.[4]
This was Jinnah at his finest, a defender of civil liberties and press freedom as he would continue to do so all his life. Meanwhile, unable to reconcile himself with the editorial policy of the Bombay Chronicle, Jinnah resigned from the chairmanship of the board. Bombay Chronicle had been an ally of Jinnah since the beginning of his career, promoting his nationalist endeavours and subsequently, Jinnah had accepted the chairmanship of the board. Since Jinnah did not believe in the board exercising any control over the editorial policy, he felt that the best course of action for him was to bid farewell to this institution. He had tried to impress upon the editor that as a pressman, he had to approach the issue more neutrally than he had been. We get an inkling of Jinnah’s differences from Jamnadas Dwarkadas’ interview published in the same newspaper in April. Jamnadas, who was a board member, was opposed to the idea of non-cooperation and the newspaper correspondent asked him about it and about why Jinnah had quit as chairman. He replied that Jinnah’s reasons were unknown to him. However, he pointed out that Bombay Chronicle had become
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too pro-Khilafat and had been converted almost into an Islamic journal, implying that this might have been a contributing factor in Jinnah’s departure.[5]
Meanwhile, Jinnah’s marriage, had gone through a lot of turbulence. They certainly were an impressive couple, bordering on scandalous, even for the British. Lady Reading – whose husband Lord Reading or Rufus Isaacs, the First Marquess of Reading, had become the Viceroy of India replacing Lord Chelmsford in 1921 – wrote to a friend: ‘In those days, Jinnah was an object of interest because of his startlingly beautiful wife. He came to lunch with his wife. Very pretty, a complete minx … She is a Parsi and he a Mohammaden (their marriage convulsed both communities). She had less on in the daytime than anyone I have seen. A tight dress, brocade cut to waist back and front, no sleeves, and a flower-patterned chiffon sari over her head … Her attire was completed with a liberty scarf, a jewelled bandeau and an emerald necklace. She is extremely pretty, fascinating, terribly made up. All the men rave about her and the women sniffed.[6] It seems that Jinnah quite enjoyed Ruttie’s antics designed to shock and awe. Though it was bound to create controversy, especially among Muslim circles, Jinnah, in Ruttie’s case, was quite adventurous, always standing up for his wife where needed. Strangely enough, the young child who had been brought into this world from this union remained nameless and was deprived for the most part of her parents’ affections, if various accounts were to be believed. Certainly, Jinnah’s only daughter, who would choose the name Dina for herself later, did not see it that way. Jinnah was obviously very busy but what was surprising was that Ruttie – who
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had a whole army of dogs and cats, some of them rescues like Loaferul-Mulk who had become an instant favourite at the household – kept a distance from her only daughter. –
Ruttie also did not get along with Jinnah’s sister, Fatima Jinnah. To Ruttie’s credit, she did try and play the role of a loving sisterin-law to Fatima but Fatima’s personality was icy cold and distant, as Jinnah’s own would become in time. Returning from a trip to Hyderabad, Ruttie tried to pretend that she had gone to Deccan to look for a suitable husband for Fatima. To her astonishment, Jinnah refused to play along with the suggestion. Another incident was when Ruttie got into a bit of an argument with Fatima when she suggested that the Quran was meant to be talked about and not to be read. Fatima had responded with a curt, ‘How could one talk about a book one hadn’t read?’ Ruttie interpreted this as a take down by Fatima, the pious. What made matters worse was that Jinnah refused to take her side. The hostile retorts between the two women became a regular feature in the Jinnah household, sometimes on entirely bizarre things such as Fatima’s objection to Ruttie’s insistence that Jinnah shave off his moustache, something which he had done very early on. The whole thing soon spiraled out of control to an extent that Jinnah had to arrange for his favourite sister to attend dental school in Calcutta.
By June 1921, Jinnah and his wife had arrived in London. The nationalist was back in prime fighting form. It had not taken him long to fire off an opening salvo to the Times where he had taken the British policy to task. Next, he spoke at a meeting organized by the Muslim League, presided over by the famous Syed Ameer Ali, former judge of the Privy Council, where he called upon the British to honour their pledge to Turkey. On 23 June 1921, Jinnah spoke at a public meeting in London appealing to the British public
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to hold their government to its pledges made to Muslims during the war. He then met his old friend Montagu. Soon afterwards, Jinnah and Ruttie left for Marseilles in France. From there, he sent off a letter to Montagu, which gives us an indication of what was discussed between the two.
Montagu and the new Viceroy of India, Lord Reading, were bound by more than just loyalty to Britain. Both of them were among the few British Jews who had made it to the top ranks of British politics. Montagu promptly forwarded Jinnah’s letter to arrange a meeting between the new Viceroy and Jinnah.? That meeting finally happened in November 1920 and we have a detailed account of it from the Viceroy himself. Lord Reading found Jinnah to be a nationalist and seems to have discerned an anti-British feeling. However, he noted that Jinnah was not quite as extreme as Gandhi and was somewhere between the moderate and extremist camps of Indian nationalists.[8] Jinnah seems to have spoken at length about the global situation and its impact on the Muslims of India, who he recognized were the main force behind Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement. He was of the view that Khilafat issue could be resolved if Smyrna and Thrace were restored to Turkey. This is around the time that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was leading his armies against the Greek invasion backed by the allies.
Jinnah also felt that Hejaz and Mesopotamia, i.e., Iraq, should be kept under the rule of Hassan and Feisul. If these could be maintained, the Palestine question would not be as important as it had become for the Indian Muslims. This was sometime after the Balfour declaration and Indian Muslims were quite anxious about British plans in the Middle East. Jinnah told the Jewish Viceroy that the Palestine issue would cease to have force if Smyrna and Thrace were restored to Turkey.’ It was certainly an interesting proposition
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but one that did not take into account the strong feeling Muslims of India had for what they called ‘Qibla-e-Awaľ, i.e., Jerusalem. Certainly, Jinnah seems to have had no strong feeling on this issue at this time. Later in his career, most notably during the Pakistan Movement, he would speak of Palestine and the cause of Arabs with a passion quite unlike the balanced unemotional way in which he approached the issue in 1921, but that time was still in the future. Jinnah also felt that the Punjab disturbances were a wound that could be healed if the British showed genuine remorse and contrition on the matter, ensuring that humiliations unleashed upon the Punjabis were not repeated again. Crucially, it was at this meeting that Jinnah suggested a conference of notable leaders, including Gandhi, that would lead to a settlement of issues.
Cast out of the Congress haven as it were, Jinnah now saw his role as the mediator between the government and the nationalist movement. There was still the Muslim League but Jinnah, till this point at least, had not entirely reconciled with the idea of being limited to a communal organization. As he would tell his friend’s son, the future Raja of Mahmudabad, he was an Indian first, second and last, advising him to be an Indian first and then anything else. Meanwhile, Congress had made some changes at the Ahmedabad session. It had rejected the resolution for complete independence, sticking instead to the demand for self-governing dominion status. It had also relaxed the mandatory nature of the non-cooperation, allowing each person to make their own decision.
A letter published on 4 January 1922 by M. M. Malaviya, M. R. Jayakar and others called for a representative conference of leaders, with a postscript stating ‘all communications should be addressed to M. A. Jinnah Esq., Malabar Hill, Bombay.'[10] Called the Malaviya Conference, this took place on 14 January 1922 at Jinnah’s
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house and then at Cowasjee Jahangir Hall at Mayo Road. Jinnah moved a number of resolutions at this conference, condemning the government’s unwarranted encroachment on citizens’ rights and fundamental liberties. Most importantly, however, it called for a roundtable conference on the Irish model and called upon the British Government in London to authorize the Viceroy to arrive at a settlement with the nationalists. Gandhi struck a sour note when he declared that he and the non-cooperators had come only as a matter of courtesy and were not interested in passing any resolutions. According to Gandhi, a wall separated non-cooperators and other parties and neither could join the other except by forfeiting a vital principle in their armoury. Jinnah had worked hard for this conference and had gotten the Viceroy to agree in the event Gandhi would agree.
The Malaviya Conference itself was an important event that has been overlooked by historians and writers. It further crystallizes the nature of the dispute between non-cooperators under Gandhi and Jinnah, who led the moderates and liberals. The conference was of a representative nature with notable politicians and leaders from all provinces converging. Even the editor of the Bombay Chronicle, a paper that had put its weight behind Gandhi, struck a critical note.[11] Sir Sankaran Nair (1857–1934), who had once been the president of Congress in the 1890s and was a respected figure from Kerala, withdrew from the conference, stating that he could not associate himself with Gandhi or his followers. Jinnah drafted and issued a statement defending Gandhi on behalf of the conference.[12] He pointed out that Gandhi’s views had to be obtained and divergent as they might have been, it was important to reach a working compromise. Pointing out that Sir Nair had erred in claiming that Gandhi wanted evacuation of Egypt by the British to be discussed
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the press statement, ‘he only said that when Swaraj was obtained, India would not permit a single Indian soldier to leave the country in order to enable England to maintain her supremacy in Egypt against the wishes of the Egyptians.'[13] It was also pointed out that Gandhi had agreed to take no offensive step calculated to destroy peace and harmony. A separate letter to the editor by Jinnah, published next to the press statement, further clarified Gandhi’s position and stated that Gandhi had ensured that working of the committee of the Congress had adopted the terms of the truce. Jinnah evidently was attempting to ensure that the roundtable conference went through but he could see that the British were planning on using Gandhi’s non-cooperation as an excuse to further delay matters. He ended the letter by saying, ‘It is now up to the government to take a dispassionate view of the situation.’ The British were obviously dispassionate and that is why they planned to exploit the noncooperation threat. Jinnah and Jayakar repeated much of the original statement in another press statement, repeating that Gandhi was ready to attend the roundtable conference as an individual delegate and Congress had postponed civil disobedience. The Viceroy replied through his private secretary on 26 January 1922. It was curt and to the point: ‘His Excellency regrets that the proposals now put forward should have been regarded by those who subscribed to the resolutions as a response to the sentiments, which he expressed at Calcutta. His Excellency has considered these proposals but is unable to discover in them the basis for a profitable discussion on the subject of Round Table Conference. No useful purpose would, therefore, be served by entering into any detailed examination of their terms.’
Jinnah, Jayakar and Natrajan wrote back asking for elaboration through a telegram on 30 January 1922. Meanwhile, another letter was dispatched to Gandhi, to which Gandhi replied that he had
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already sent a letter which would meet the Viceroy’s requirements, prompting Jinnah and others to state that Gandhi should not have written directly while they were engaged in a correspondence with his personal secretary. This back and forth went on and the entire correspondence was published in the Bombay Chronicle on 7 February 1922.[14] The Malaviya Conference and the suggested roundtable conference awaits its historian. India might have made substantial progress had there been a roundtable conference almost eight years before the roundtable conferences took place in London. Such a question obviously lies in the realm of what if, but perhaps it is not too off the mark to suggest that a self-governing Dominion of India might have emerged in the 1930s and it would have been spared the agony of the bloodshed that accompanied independence and Partition in 1947.
One of the key issues was the question of a self-governing India’s relationship with the British Empire. The Gokhale group, including men like Jinnah and Jayakar, wanted India to be a selfgoverning dominion with equal rights for Indians as members of the British Empire. Jinnah, being a product of British Liberalism, despite many reverses and disappointments, did not want to sever the connection entirely but rather wanted self-rule. The new generation of nationalists, inspired by Gandhi and the Ali Brothers, wanted independence and severance from the Empire. Speaking at a Students Brotherhood event, which he presided over in July 1922, Jinnah spoke of direct action, something that would become synonymous with him in the Indian mind, owing to his famous direct action day call in 1946 – direct action meant bloodshed and independence would mean bloodshed. He said India was not ready for it and that he did not support it, going so far as to say that it was everyone’s responsibility to oppose direct action, which
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some people wanted to adopt. He said that non-cooperation was a revolutionary movement and that revolutionary movements were never peaceful. Instead, he advised his followers to participate in civil service and the affairs of the country win swaraj through parliamentary means. Jinnah said that the British were not in India for the benefit of Indians but their own and that the way to counter that was to fight it by expressing themselves through the electoral process. He believed that the methods were to equip themselves with the parliamentary system and they would automatically win swaraj.[15] While Jinnah continued to oppose the methods of non-cooperation, quite evidently, he was willing to represent noncooperators in a court of law, as was clear from the famous Dharwar Riot Case, which was an appeal in the Bombay High Court.[16]
Jinnah did not quite share the views of Punjab’s leading loyalist politicians, Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Sir Muhammad Shafi. Nor did Jinnah share the views of Sir Aga Khan. He was, at the core, a nationalist who believed that while the British had done some good, they had also exploited the Indian people and that needed to change. There was nothing pusillanimous about Jinnah’s conduct. This is why when Lord Reading attempted to lure Jinnah in by offering him knighthood; Jinnah refused flatly. He would not want to be called Sir M. A. Jinnah but would rather be called plain Mr Jinnah as he was famously given to saying. This made Jinnah unique among Indian politicians or as Nehru said, a rather solitary figure in Indian politics. He would neither join the revolutionaries and the non-cooperators nor would he join the ranks of unquestioningly pro-British loyalists. As a consequence, all sides in the conflict misunderstood him and this would remain the case well into the late 1930s.
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In Punjab, Sir Fazl-i-Hussain (1877–1936) unveiled a model of politics that Jinnah would ultimately adopt. Like Jinnah, Fazl was an established lawyer. He was educated at Cambridge and was called to bar at Gray’s Inn. He joined the Congress in 1905 and left it in 1920, again like Jinnah, because of the non-cooperation movement, which he thought would hurt Punjabis and Muslims. The key difference between the two men was that Fazl looked at the India angle from the eyes of a Punjabi Muslim landowner. Fazl was an ardent supporter of the separate electorates as a means of ensuring Muslim representation. As a prominent Punjabi politician, he was named education minister and worked in this position to improve a lot of Muslims especially. Simultaneously, he created the Unionist Party, which was a cross-communal alliance that advocated essentially what would become the consociationalist model that the League itself would become committed to. The Punjabi Muslim majority had not been willing to suborn itself to the interests of the Muslim minorities in Hindu majority provinces. This was the major point of departure between Fazl and Jinnah. Fazl’s concern was a united Punjab preserved through a strong alliance between communities but one firmly establishing Punjabi Muslim primacy. Fazl was not an exclusivist theocrat but a modernist Muslim, who had, much like Jinnah, little patience for the use of the Maulanas and other religious appeals. He was, however, unlike Jinnah, a loyalist to the Empire and the British in turn relied on him to act as a bulwark against the Indian independence movement. Thus, when Fazl-i-Hussain was offered knighthood in 1926, he most gladly accepted it, becoming Sir Fazli-Hussain. In the years that followed, Fazl would be the doughtiest enemy of All India parties in the Punjab province. The Punjab Muslim thesis was based on the idea of autonomy and working the system to extract maximum concessions for this particular Punjabi
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parochialism. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the poet philosopher of the nascent Muslim nation, belonged to this parochialism as well and would go on to deliver the famous Allahabad address, which would become the creed of Muslim nationalism in India. It is not surprising that the P in Pakistan came from Punjab, because it was the Punjab thesis that had for its part led to the idea of a version of Muslim self-rule within British India.
As a notable Bombay politician who thought in Indian terms, Jinnah in the 1920s had no time for the local parochialisms that Fazl and Iqbal represented. Nor was he ideologically attuned to the consociationalist concerns of Sir Aga Khan, who had by this time come up with the idea of ‘United States’ as a form of confederacy of India. His concern was self-rule for India and the Muslim question to him was one which required resolution to constitutional means at the centre with a settlement between Hindus and Muslims as Indians. Jinnah’s concerns about the Indian situation were expressed on various forums, including memorial meetings in honour of the late Naoroji, late Tilak and late Sir Pherozeshah Mehta. Repeatedly, he called upon the Congress to revise its programme but also was vociferous in his attacks on the British Government, both in London and in Delhi.!? In September of 1922, Jinnah was involved in the Bombay Chronicle case, which was a contempt of court where Marmaduke Pickthall (1875–1936) the editor of the Bombay Chronicle had published an article called ‘British Justice’ which contained reproductions from the Irish paper Freeman’s Journal about Hasrat Mohani’s case. Maulana Hasrat Mohani, a member of the Muslim League and a noted freedom fighter, had been accused of waging war against the British. The government accused the Bombay Chronicle of misrepresenting the proceedings, which were pending. It was cases like these that cemented Jinnah’s reputation
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as the foremost defender of freedom of speech and he took that reputation with him to politics. He returned to the same theme in his presidential address to the meeting of the Press Association of India on 17 October 1922. The meeting was convened to mourn the loss of Babu Motilal Ghose, renowned journalist from Bengal, and to condemn the Princes Protection Bill. In this speech, Jinnah asked if it was wise to muzzle the press to safeguard the princes and that while one could criticize the Viceroy, no one could criticize a small chief from Kathiavad.[18]
Jinnah was scathing as ever towards the government. In a letter addressed to the editor of the Times of India, Jinnah frankly told the readers that if Congress was passing into extreme hands, it was because of the policy of the government. He said that moderates and the Liberal Federation had lost support because the government was unwilling to move forward on its pledges of self-government and was jailing thousands of people, making what seemed like poor excuses.[18] This letter was also highlighted in an editorial in the Bombay Chronicle, which nevertheless chastised Jinnah for having made a “futile appeal. Agreeing with most of what Jinnah had to say, it ended with this appeal to Jinnah,’… and men like Mr Jinnah should be with them in the thick of the struggle and not in the wilderness of pathetic faith in others.[19] Yet, this was not enough for Jinnah to accept the methods he disapproved and he would remain immune to these appeals. To this, G. M. Bhurgri, a barrister from Sindh and a close associate of Jinnah, responded through a letter to the editor upbraiding the Bombay Chronicle for turning up its nose at Jinnah. His letter is particularly important because it gives us a window into what Jinnah especially was thinking about the future of politics. He wrote, “Cannot a central organization be evolved out of our numerous existing Liberal Federations, Home Rule Leagues
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and Congress Committees, somewhat on the lines of the Labour Party which comprised various Trades, Interests and groups of political thought?’[20] Jinnah certainly had allied himself closely with the trade unions and the labour movement and this letter must have been written after taking Jinnah into confidence. It was certainly a counter-proposal and a vision for a truly secular, democratic and social welfare-oriented Indian republic of the future.
While Jinnah continued to disagree with the Congress and its methods, his sharp tongue would not countenance insults against Congress or Indians by the British. Clearly, Jinnah jealously guarded his own right to criticize Gandhi. An example of this was at a lecture by British Reverend R. M. Gray on the topic of Public Spirit and Citizenship’, held on 10 February 1923. According to the reports, the Reverend had spoken about modern spirit and had criticized Gandhi’s reliance on the cottage industry without the advantage of modern machinery before lecturing Indians on how to behave in modern India. Jinnah personally may have agreed with the speaker but he took this opportunity to pointedly tell the lecturer that if his community, i.e., the British, also acted in the way he had asked Indians to behave, they would have much room in India.[21]
Jinnah continued to be popular among all communities. One of his more popular election meetings in Bombay was held under the auspices of the Young Men’s Hindu Association, presided over by his friend M. R. Jayakar. Here, Jinnah repeated his promise to work for Hindu-Muslim unity. The polling for the elections was held on 14 November 1923 and Jinnah returned to the legislature firmly as a committed nationalist. One of his earliest engagements in Delhi
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was to move a resolution calling on the Governor General to remit the remaining period of the sentence passed against Mahatma Gandhi without further delay.[22] The government relented and Gandhi was released. To celebrate Gandhi’s release Jinnah presided over a public meeting on 4 February 1924, informing his listeners that nothing had given him greater pleasure than the news of Gandhi’s unconditional release. Asaf Ali, who would later be one of the Congress Muslims who would oppose Jinnah, was then tasked with moving a resolution to this end, which was adopted by the meeting.[23] Other than the fact that Gandhi’s incarceration was unconscionable to him as a nationalist, Jinnah was personally invested in getting Gandhi released because he viewed Gandhi’s incarceration as a possible hindrance to getting on with the task of achieving responsible government through constitutional means. He felt that repressive measures by the British government fuelled the non-cooperation movement and the British in turn used the non-cooperation movement as a reason not to hold talks on selfgovernment for India. He was committed as ever to constitutional and parliamentary ways of achieving self-rule for India and this was why when a speaker at the said public meeting tried to veer towards talk of non-cooperation, Jinnah as the presiding officer informed him that the meeting was being held to express joy at Gandhi’s release and not to forward party agenda. He also was attempting to use the occasion to bring the liberals and the non-cooperators together and did not want the partisan line to divide this unity.
The next day, Jinnah was in the Central Legislature when Diwan Bahadur T. Rangachariar moved his resolution to secure the full self-governing dominion status for India within the British Empire under the Government of India Act 1919. Sir Malcolm Hailey, the home member, rose to oppose the resolution suggesting instead an
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official inquiry to investigate and examine the Act. Motilal Nehru on 8 February 1923 moved the resolution, whereby he called for a roundtable conference to amend the Government of India Act. Jinnah rose to support Motilal Nehru. It was a remarkable speech though that was something that house always expected from Jinnah. It began by Jinnah thoroughly demolishing Sir Malcolm Hailey’s arguments. The first objection that Hailey had was that the time period envisioning a commission to reconsider the Act was ten years. Jinnah said that nothing in the Act precluded the appointment of a commission or committee earlier. Reacting to the proposal for inquiry, Jinnah said: ‘He says that the character of that step will be this, that they will make a departmental inquiry. That is to say, the Government of India will consult local governments or such persons as they may be advised, and they will formulate a scheme they think proper. That scheme will then be submitted to the Secretary of State. After the dispatches have gone backwards and forwards, the scheme will be placed before this Legislature and then it will be submitted to Parliament.[24] Jinnah said this was the wrong procedure and the right procedure was to hold a roundtable conference and decide these matters there. Jinnah had this master ability of demolishing official objections and he enjoyed exercising that ability to the fullest. In the weeks that followed, Jinnah was involved in key legislations of the day, from the Indian Auxiliary Force to the Indian Coinage (Amendment) Bill.[25] Meanwhile, he worked closely with Motilal Nehru and the Times of India reported that Jinnah had gathered as many as seventy non-official members to form a parliamentary party to oppose the government.[26]
On 11 February 1924, Jinnah rose to oppose the idea of passports, saying, ‘I think that all regulations which impose passports are the biggest nuisance and the sooner they are done away the better.[27]
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This was Jinnah the globalist, who believed that people should be allowed to travel without hindrances. The imprint of Jinnah on the legislation of India during the period was absolute as were his heroic efforts at transforming the Indian Central Legislative Assembly into a parliament. On 14 February, he spoke again, this time in favour of a motion that called for all contracts between the government and companies spanning a number of years and creating a public charge to be put before the legislature.[28] The government as usual opposed the measure but Jinnah continued to fight. The same day, he introduced a most historic resolution calling for the shift of purchase of stores from India Office in London to India itself in order to give impetus to indigenous manufacturers of India.[29] During the speech where he explained the resolution, he also raised the issue of his old friend, B. G. Horniman’s deportation. He said with great passion, You refused to give him a trial and you make allegations against that man. You deport that man, a most horrible procedure to adopt, and I say no civilized government in any country should resort to that. You have deprived that man of his livelihood.’
One of the allies Jinnah had in the assembly was Dr Hari Singh Gour (1870–1949). Dr Gour was an extraordinary legal scholar, a great criminal lawyer and one of the earliest Indians with a doctorate in law. Dr Gour was someone Jinnah more often than not found himself in agreement with when it came to legal matters, especially criminal law reform. Among them was Dr Gour’s bill that sought to amend Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code to increase the age of consensual sexual intercourse for a woman from 12 to 14, which Jinnah supported wholeheartedly. Some people objected this on grounds that it conflicted with the Hindu religion. Jinnah pointedly asked, “But I should like to be convinced where it has been laid down in the Hindu law or Hindu religion that a man must
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consummate a marriage with a woman at a particular age. Now if we want to raise this age from 12 to 13 or 14, does it in any way conflict the shastras and the Hindu religion?'[30] He ended his speech as he often did with an appeal to humanity and logic. Ultimately, sexual intercourse with girls under 14 did become statutory rape. Jinnah played an important role in this and in doing so risked the ire of the more pious among his community.
Earlier, Jinnah had endorsed in the select committee the idea of increasing the age of consent for prostitution for girls to 18 from 16, under Sections 372 and 373 of the Indian Penal Code; but he was less forthcoming of a similar amendment to Section 361, which required consent of guardian for all minors under 16 when they left their homes.[31] Perhaps, this had something to do with the fact that Ruttie herself had been a little over 16 when she began her courtship with Jinnah. In any event, Jinnah did not think girls over 16 but under 18 were any less independent or strong-willed than boys the same age who were exempted from this provision.
On 26 March1921, Dr Gour had also famously introduced the resolution to establish a Supreme Court of Appeal. On 17 February 1925, the matter came up again. Jinnah began by this extraordinary criticism of the Privy Council: “Then you find in the Privy Council, for which I have great respect – although I have no hesitation in saying that the Privy Council have on several occasions absolutely murdered Hindu law and slaughtered Muhammedan law – with regard to common law, the English law, of which they are the masters, undoubtedly they command the greatest respect of every practitioner and of every judge in this country.
Jinnah was opposed by none other than Swarajist leader Pandit Motilal Nehru. The Government came up with an administrative argument that Delhi was too small to house a Supreme Court. To
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the British argument, Jinnah replied: ‘Delhi is big enough and long enough. Miles and miles of buildings are cropping up, which are enough to dazzle anybody, and why cannot we locate the court in a small building?’ To Motilal Nehru, Jinnah replied: ‘I have great respect for Pandit Motilal Nehru, but I most emphatically differ from him on this subject. He said that as long as we have not got Swaraj, the federal state of government that Sir Hari Singh Gour contemplated, we must wait … We must get power in our hands and then immediately we will consider the question of establishing a Supreme Court.’ Jinnah then called upon Motilal Nehru ‘to hesitate and think before he goes into the government lobby on this question. Sir, I want the Supreme Court to be established. I ask the Members of this Assembly not to be led away and I also appeal to my Swarajist friends not to go into the government lobby and vote. I am always afraid of government when they agree with me.’
Jinnah and the Swarajists had earlier joined together in a broad based alliance called ‘The Nationalist Party’. This alliance was described by Lord Reading in the following terms: “The Independents under the leadership of Jinnah made upon their arrival in Delhi at the beginning of the session a bargain with the Swarajists, which we have always regarded as unwise, even foolish. Jinnah evidently thought that by the terms of the alliance he would be sitting in the driving seat holding the steering wheel, with Motilal Nehru beside him powerless to control, except by means of advice. The exact opposite resulted. Motilal Nehru was in the driving seat and Jinnah was scarcely beside him; his party was inside the car, being driven along without realizing where they were going or what could happen.[32] Some of this was true but there was also a great personal equation between Motilal Nehru and Jinnah, a personal equation that sadly could never be arrived at between Jawaharlal
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Nehru and himself, to the detriment of the subcontinent. Jinnah’s Independent Party was itself formed on the basis that an individual member should have the liberty to vote according to his conscience and when they voted as a bloc, they voted only after consensus. About the role of the Nationalist Party coalition, Jinnah made the position absolutely clear in a press statement: “The Nationalist Party is a party which is founded to work in this Assembly and nothing more; and in this Assembly we stand to pursue a policy and a programme of a constitutional character.[33]
The alliance, however, had its limits, which were tested in 1925 and there was a visible rift between the Independents and Swarajists. Nevertheless, Motilal Nehru made an effort to play down the differences when writing about Jinnah to a friend that, ‘Do not for a moment think that we are creating an impossible gulf between us. We can afford to fight like Kilkenny Cats and still be friends.[34] However, the issues came to a head in the Finance Bill debate in 1925. Jinnah from the floor of the house declared: ‘He and his party stand here on the floor of this house for the purpose of wrecking this constitution and obstructing from A to Z, from start to finish.[35] Jinnah and the Independents refused to vote against the Government on the issue of the Finance Bill because they thought it was sound. The Swarajists accused Jinnah of being the leader of communal strife – a strange accusation to be levelled against the man at a time when his party included such men as Pandit Malaviya and which was as a whole non-communal. However, this accusation was levelled because Jinnah was a Muslim or so it seemed to Jinnah. The Bombay Chronicle took the offensive against Jinnah, declaring that “Mendicancy was resurrected in the assembly today, thanks to the desertion of the popular cause by the Independents. The
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Nationalist Party had ceased to exist, a result that was welcomed by the British government.
This coincided with the time Jinnah began reaching out to the Punjabi Muslims, whose demands he had previously ignored. With the changing situation, the nature of the Government of India Act 1919 and Jinnah’s own estimation of the political situation left him with no choice but to rely on Punjab. In doing so, one of the major decisions he took was to support a resolution forwarded by Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and his supporters, which stated in no uncertain terms that ‘no majority should be reduced to a minority or even to an equality’. This was contrary to the spirit of the Lucknow Pact, which had been Jinnah’s crowning glory as a nationalist. Punjabi Muslims had particularly disliked Jinnah for his role in the Lucknow Pact and now they forced him to support a resolution that effectively undid his own work earlier. He also endorsed the idea that North West Frontier Province be given full provincial status. Nevertheless, he had not lost his faith in Hindu-Muslim unity even in these trying circumstances when he declared that Swaraj was interchangeable with Hindu-Muslim unity and that the day Hindu-Muslim unity came about would be the day India would get responsible dominion government. Otherwise, the domination of the bureaucracy would continue.[36] Ironically, it was for sentiments such as these that Jinnah had been called leader of communal strife. Another attempt at arriving at unity was made in Gandhi’s All Parties Conference Committee, of which Jinnah became a member on the condition that all decisions would be unanimous. Sadly, the committee’s work went nowhere after a dispute arose between Jinnah and Lala Lajpat Rai over the question of Muslim majorities in Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah wanted those majorities conceded
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in accordance with the numbers – a position completely contrary to the Lucknow Pact, which was up for renegotiation. Jinnah was driven into a corner when it was insisted that the committee’s decisions would have to be approved by the Hindu Mahasabha. Jinnah was instead more interested in negotiating with Congress and part of his insistence that Congress be the counter-party to the Muslim League stemmed from his fear that Hindu Mahasabha being a majority Hindu party would be hard to negotiate with. The possibility of a joint session between Muslim League and Congress in 1924 had been wrecked by Maulana Mohammad Ali, who hated Jinnah with a burning passion. Now Jinnah attempted to create a new secular and inclusive party in May 1925 on lines of the course suggested by G. M. Bhurgri in his letter to the Bombay Chronicle referred to earlier. In a letter to M. R. Jayakar, he stated the aims and objectives as being a common policy, which would offer a basis for cooperation between all Indian Nationalists through a vigorous prosecution of a broad-based constructive programme and through effective political education campaign of the masses.[37] There were no takers, except his ardent admirers who by this time were given to saying that the Indian legislative assembly without Jinnah was like the play Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.
In the legislature, Jinnah continued to serve the people of India and became a member of both the Muddiman and Skeen Committees, eliciting praise from even Lala Lajpat Rai for doing his constitutional duty at a great personal cost. The Muddiman Committee was formed to inquire into the actual operation of the principle of dyarchy, and the Skeen Committee was part of the effort to create an Indian Military Academy to train the officers of British Indian Army. This had been a project close to Jinnah’s heart
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and saw him visit Sandhurst and Westpoint. Ultimately, it was his efforts in the Skeen Committee that would lead to the founding of the Dheradun Academy.
Jinnah’s legal practice was suffering and so was his marriage. Young Ruttie had been suffering from depression and had made trips abroad, especially to France where she had seemingly fallen to the needle and had become an addict. The open and licentious atmosphere of 1920s France had meant license for Ruttie to seek at least physical love elsewhere if rumours of the time are to be believed. Jinnah, certainly did not have an issue with Ruttie’s increasingly hedonistic lifestyle but remained blissfully unaware of her drug habit. The couple had steadily drifted apart even though they continued to be very much in love. As the wife of one of the leading lawyer-politicians of British India, Ruttie seems to have suffered from neglect and what must have become a sexless marriage for the most part. Certainly, the age difference that was inconsequential in 1918 seemed to have become more apparent with Jinnah nearing 50 and more concerned with politics and law than romance or sex. Years later, Jinnah would remark that he should not have married Ruttie for she was just a child. Yet, it was Ruttie that always brought the best out of him and some have even speculated whether Jinnah would have veered away from his nationalist roots had Ruttie not died tragically in 1929. It may have been a contributing factor to Jinnah’s bitterness but there were forces afoot even before Ruttie’s sad death that had already begun to drift Jinnah in a direction that he would never have contemplated earlier. Her death, supposedly brought about by a bad case of colitis,
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which was speculated to have been suicide. Her letter to Jinnah from France seems to show the depth of her unhappiness with what she must have perceived to be neglect on part of Jinnah.
The Muddiman Committee included Sir Alexander Muddiman, M. A. Jinnah, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Dr R. P. Paranjpye, Sir Mohammad Shafi, the Maharaja of Burdwan, Sir Shivaswami Aiyer, Sir Henry Moncrieff-Smith and Sir Arthur Froom. Jinnah was the only nonknighted, non-princely member of the committee but he led the minority report. The Minority Report, which Jinnah authored, offered several criticisms showing Jinnah’s understanding of parliamentary politics. One key point was the absence of joint responsibility of ministers.[38] Jinnah’s objective was to establish a national parliament and a cabinet on the British lines. He criticized the attitude of permanent officials towards reforms and the difficulties in the way of ministers arising out of the powers of the governors in the provinces. These are all key points when considered against his criticisms to Congress rule twelve years later. Critics felt that this would necessitate a majority party but to Jinnah there had to be a majority party if the government was to be run on the Westminster model. Jinnah wanted a strong central legislature but at the same time spoke of unitary and responsible provincial government with uniform measure of autonomy. Jinnah also called for broadening of the electorate to create a non-official Indian majority in the legislature.
On 8 September 1925, Jinnah, at the height of his differences, rose to defend Motilal Nehru’s position: ‘Will you bring Pandit Motilal Nehru to bow down before the throne at Viceregal lodge … What has Pandit Motilal Nehru been doing in this Assembly? Has he not
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been cooperating with you? I want to know what more you want and may I know what evidence, what proof documentary or oral, do you want me to produce or adduce that the responsible leaders are willing to cooperate with you? Have you no eyes, have you no ears, have you no brains?[39] The events between 1924 and 1926 had a longlasting impact on India, especially modern India, whether Indians of today like to admit it or not. Jinnah’s work in the legislature laid the foundations not just of a military academy but also the Supreme Court. It also created the basis for further constitutional advance and while Jinnah was unsuccessful for the time being, it did lead to self-government, self-rule and even independence.
It may be said here that the eventual course politics would take in India became inevitable between the years 1926 and 1929. Had Motilal Nehru – that sagacious elder statesman of India – allowed his better judgment to prevail, he might have gone down in history as the founding father of a United India with Gandhi, Jinnah and others by his side.
An interesting character in this puzzle is Mohammad Carim Chagla, who would later become a judge and a diplomat in the service of independent India. M. C. Chagla was born in 1900 and grew up admiring the secular nationalist leadership that Jinnah provided in the whole decade before Gandhi’s arrival on the scene. In his twenties, Chagla joined Jinnah’s chamber as a young advocate. Inspired by Jinnah, both professionally and politically, he also joined Jinnah’s faction of the Muslim League that consisted of pro-Congress Muslim leaders and which was at the time part of the ‘liberals’ grouping in the wider Indian struggle for self-rule. Even though Chagla is better known for his description of Jinnah in the
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book Roses in December and as a high court judge in India, his role in the Nehru Report negotiations is lesser known.
In 1927 came the appointment of an all-white commission led by Sir John Simon to determine the future of India. Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, was of the view that for the commission to be impartial, it would have to exclude Indians. Naturally, Jinnah, Motilal Nehru and Gandhi were deeply incensed by this insult. Others were not so. Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Sir Muhammad Shafi, leaders of Unionist Party and the Muslim League in Punjab referred to as the Shafi League, endorsed the idea. Jinnah managed to convince even the Punjabi Muslims by appealing to their honour. Speaking pointedly at them, he now said that Muslim community could not stand to gain by accepting the present Commission. They will only go down in history as disloyal to the country, `justly accused by other communities of having played false not only to them, but also to their motherland… they will not even get the proverbial 30 pieces of silver, which Judas got for betraying Christ.[40] He described the Punjab Muslim League’s manifesto as the devil quoting the scripture.
For the twenty-seven-year old Chagla, these were soul-stirring events. He threw himself completely into politics and soon became known as Jinnah’s right-hand man in the Jinnah faction of the Muslim League. The official histories in India and Pakistan, while discussing the events of this period, jump straight to Jinnah’s fourteen points, forgetting that those irreducible minimums came at the fag end of failed negotiations over the Nehru Report. Since the Lucknow Pact, Jinnah had come to view the separate electorates as a necessary but temporary evil for Muslims to attain any kind of equality in India. At this juncture, confident in the success of the joint Hindu-Muslim protest, Jinnah proposed that separate electorates be replaced by
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joint electorates, provided that a minimum number of Muslims be elected in Hindu-majority provinces and a minimum number of Hindus be elected in Muslim-majority provinces, through joint electorate on designated constituencies. This would allow Muslim representation through joint electorate, which would mean that the electables would have to cut down their narrow communal rhetoric and instead appeal to secular issues like economic development, education, and others. The package Jinnah gave for a settlement became famously known as the Delhi Muslim proposals.
There is enough evidence to suggest that Motilal Nehru and Gandhi were thrilled by this proposal. Jinnah, by doing so, was taking a very bold political risk. The pro-British leaders of Punjab, like Sir Fazl-i Hussain and Sir Muhammad Shafi, considered any concession on separate electorates a matter of life and death. Yet, they too were willing to consider this proposal. In any event, to balance the weight of Punjabi Muslim opinion, Jinnah had proposed the creation of Sindh province out of Bombay Presidency and full provincial status for NWFP and Balochistan. Jinnah’s objective through the Delhi proposals was to create counter weights and counters to the counter weights. Reservation for 33 per cent Muslim representation meant that no one community would have three-fourth majority, which in turn would allow Muslims to block any legislation that they would deem inimical to their legitimate interests. However, to block Punjab’s unique Muslim opinion dominated by the so-called Punjab thesis, Jinnah saw the emergence of three new provinces as a major bonus. Ultimately, he imagined that Indians would make alliances across community lines and that there would be enough balance to ensure that a self-governing dominion would serve all its citizens equally. The Muslims of Punjab and Bengal, who Jinnah had persuaded into
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accepting joint electorates, also rejected the Delhi proposals. Lord Irwin told Birkenhead gleefully that the rejection of Delhi proposals had served to widen and not diminish the Hindu-Muslim divide.[41]
After exhausting all options of talking some sense to the imperial rulers, Jinnah called for an all-parties boycott and protest in Delhi, which was a rousing success. It was accompanied by a protest call by Jinnah, which was heavily attended. Gandhi was all praise for the ‘organizers’ of the immensely successful protest. For a brief moment since the collapse of the Khilafat Movement, there was another real chance of Hindu-Muslim unity with Nehrus, Gandhi, Sapru, Azad and Jayakar all responding to Jinnah’s call. All of India’s nationalists stood united in British high handedness. Then came the Nehru Report, the objectives of which Jinnah agreed with almost entirely but one, which he saw would be unacceptable to Muslims in Punjab and elsewhere. He decided to play the role he knew best, i.e., of the bridge between Muslims and Hindus. The British were extremely alarmed by Jinnah’s activities. Jinnah had been unflinching in his criticism of the British Government.
He now declared a constitutional war: ‘Negotiations for settlement are not to come from our side. Let the Government sue for peace. We are denied equal partnership. We will resist the new doctrine to the best of our power.[42]
The British had their own countermoves. Birkenhead laid out the strategy against Jinnah in a letter to Lord Irwin, which read: “I should advise Simon to see at all stages important people who are not boycotting the Commission, particularly the Moslems and the depressed classes. I should widely advertise all his interviews with the representative Moslems. The whole policy is now obvious. It is to terrify the immense Hindu population by apprehension that the Commission is being got hold of by the Moslems and may
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present a report altogether destructive to Hindu position, thereby securing a solid Moslem support, and leaving Jinnah high and dry.[43] Smashing Jinnah was a priority for the British because he was the bridge between the Hindus and Muslims. If there was ever a clear case of British exacerbating the Hindu-Muslim divide, it was this. Irwin, for his part, had assured the Secretary of State that Jinnah had been swallowed by the Congress and had forfeited any hold he might have exercised on the Muslims.[44] This is what Jinnah was up against while simultaneously having to fight against the Hindu Mahasabha, which was openly hostile to him.
In the summer of 1928, when these negotiations went on and a draft of Nehru Report was being finalized, Jinnah had been forced to London and Paris – his wife Ruttie was on her deathbed in Paris at the time. Around the same time, the Nehru Report was finalized. Under pressure from the Hindu Mahasabha, the Nehru Report did not go far enough to meet the Delhi proposals. Instead of the 33 per cent proposed reserved representation, the Hindu Mahasabha insisted on a lower number, agreeing ultimately at 25 per cent, i.e., one-fourth, instead of 33 per cent that Jinnah’s Delhi proposals asked for. A meeting of the Nehru Report attended by M. C. Chagla on behalf of the League became the turning point. While Motilal Nehru was ready to even accept separate electorates as an interim measure to allay the minorities, Chagla forcefully advocated joint electorates on behalf of Jinnah’s faction and also went on to accept the Nehru Report on the League’s behalf. When Jinnah returned, Chagla went to receive him at the harbour only to find his mentor furious. For Jinnah, the Nehru Report was a counter proposal and with one-fourth instead of one-third reserved representation was a
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non-starter. From Jinnah’s point of view, Muslims were giving up their separate electorates and the Hindu majority was expected to give something in return – an increase in reserved representation. Hindu Mahasabha’s decision to torpedo it by reducing Muslim reserved representation to one-fourth, thus, had brought down the entire constitutional edifice Jinnah had conjured up as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.
In December 1928, the Muslim League rejected the Nehru Report and presented six points, which were to form the basis of enhanced Muslim demands. Armed with these demands, Jinnah made his way to the All Parties Conference to present the Muslim case before Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. Within Jinnah’s own faction of the Muslim League, Chagla rallied a large number to support the Nehru Report without this necessary concession. Facing certain defeat in his own party on the issue, Jinnah placed his case before the Congress and Mahasabha leadership. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru called him a ‘naughty child’ and asked the committee to give the naughty child what he wants. M. R. Jayakar was even more insulting. He pointedly said that Jinnah’s own faction had come around to their point of view and therefore it was unnecessary to negotiate with Jinnah anymore given his lack of representative status. Jinnah ignored these attacks and spoke as ‘an Indian’ asking the leadership of the Congress if it was enough that Jinnah and a few others supported their report. He was acutely aware of the Muslim sentiments in North West of India and in Bengal. The proBritish leadership of Shafi faction of the League and Aga Khan’s All India Muslim Conference had gone as far as to support the Simon Commission and they – said Jinnah – commanded the loyalty of all Muslims not the few nationalist Muslims in Jinnah’s faction of the Muslim League. Therefore, he pleaded with his former colleagues to
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concede to the proposals so that Hindus and Muslims would march together as Indians towards independence. He ended his speech with his famous quote, “If we cannot agree then let us at any rate agree to disagree, but let us part as friends. The committee turned him down. As Jinnah got on the train to leave, he reportedly told his friend that this was the parting of the ways, and for the first time, his friend saw tears in his eyes. The second time, he would be seen publicly crying was two months later, when he buried Ruttie and broke down completely.
Jinnah was a defeated man, his life’s work for India being left in tatters by British machinations, obstinacy on part of the Hindu Mahasabha and the ever-increasing demands from Punjabi Muslims who always had the British to fall back on. In some ways, Jayakar’s assessment of Jinnah’s vulnerability and lack of representative status was true, but it was also a challenge almost. Though for the time being, a cruel hand had been dealt to Jinnah by the British, his countrymen both Hindus and Muslims and above all by fate itself, a man like that was not given to throwing in the towel.
Jinnah attended the All Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi and what followed were his famous fourteen points, the irreducible minimum for Muslim cooperation with the nationalists, a conglomerate of Muslim demands. Yet, significantly, he prevailed over his co-religionist enough to leave the door open for an eventual adoption of joint electorates. The most important point in the fourteen points was the issue of residuary powers. Jinnah had come to believe that all residuary powers must rest with the provinces and that it was a case of the provinces surrendering their sovereignty to the centre and not the centre giving those powers to the provinces. This remained a major gap between him and how the Congress’ brain trust saw the issue, recommending
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that residuary powers should stay with the centre and from there provincials lists be determined. It was a constitutional point that remained a major of point of contention between the two different views of federation that existed in India. There were others points that the Congress was willing to accept, including the creation of Sindh and full provincial status for NWFP.
After Ruttie’s demise, Jinnah threw himself even more in his work and politics. He opened parleys with the Viceroy Lord Irwin, impressing upon him the need for a roundtable conference immediately. Meanwhile, he made his way up to Lahore in 1930 to act as counsel in appeal for Ilam Din, a young Muslim man accused of murdering Raj Pal, a publisher who had published an apparently blasphemous book against Prophet Muhammad of Islam. The blasphemy tangle of course had lit fire to Punjab all throughout the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Muslims and Hindus had been engaging in pamphlet wars and even spiritual challenges in Punjab. There was something in the water that made Punjab a powder keg for communal violence and antagonism. The rivalry of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of the Ahmaddiya sect with Pandit Lekh Ram had been legendary. Lekh Ram’s murder in the late 1890s had led to Arya Samaj to start its own countermoves. Thus, at the turn of the century, Muslim community in Punjab – divided in itself – was united against Hindus, who they viewed as enemies of the faith. Thus, when Raj Pal published the book on Prophet Muhammad,
incensed. Raj Pal had been acquitted by the High Court under Section 153A and that led to communal rioting in May 1927.
295A of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalized speech that amounted to wanton attacks on and vilification of founders of
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religion designed to outrage feelings. Jinnah, along with most of the house, supported the government measure to criminalize that speech which was designed to cause chaos and conflict of the kind seen in Punjab but wanted bona fide criticisms of religion to be exempt, saying, ‘I thoroughly endorse the principle that while this measure should aim at those undesirable persons who indulge in wanton vilification or attack upon the religion of any particular class or upon the founders and prophets of a religion, we must also secure this very important and fundamental principle that those who are engaged in historical works, those who are engaged in bona fide and honest criticism of a religion, shall be protected.[45] In Pakistan, of course, this would in the 1980s acquire a more deadly form when capital punishment was added to penal code for any blasphemous remarks against Prophet Muhammad in the form of Section 295C of the Pakistan Penal Code. The addition of Section 295A to the Indian Penal Code had opened the door for this legislation. The framers of Section 295A, including Jinnah, were oblivious to and even blissfully unaware of the devastating long-term impact on freedom of speech in the subcontinent. What began as a measure to keep communal peace has often become a tool of majoritarian tyranny in both India and Pakistan. The law, both in its original form and the Pakistani amendment, has only served to have a chilling effect on the very bona fide criticisms of religion that Jinnah had sworn to protect when speaking in 1927. The gap between the intent and the eventual outcome cannot exempt Jinnah from his own portion of the blame, for he would also appear as a lawyer in Lahore High Court’s appeal in Ilam Din case.
In September of 1929, Raj Pal was murdered, allegedly by Ilam Din, a young carpenter who had been roused into action after listening to an incendiary sermon. Contrary to the myths that have
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been woven around this incident in modern Pakistan, which wanted to present the murderer as a matchless unbending warrior for the Prophet’s honour, Ilam Din had pleaded not guilty to the crime at the trial court where Farrukh Hassan represented him. For appeal to the High Court, the Punjab Muslims led by Sir Mohammad Iqbal and M. D. Taseer arranged for Jinnah to appear as the lawyer in appeal before the Lahore High Court. It was a division bench judgment with Justice Broadway and Justice Johnstone presiding. Jinnah’s contention was that the evidence produced before the trial court was insufficient and the prosecution story was dubious.
The court rejected this contention. The judgment stated that Mr Jinnah finally contended that the sentence of death was not called for and urged as extenuating circumstances, that the appellant is only 19 or 20 years of age and that his act was prompted by feelings of veneration for the founder of his religion and anger at one who had scurrilously attacked him.’ The court rejected this contention as well, referring to Amir vs. Emperor, which was the same court’s decision a few years earlier.[46] Interestingly, the curious reference to 19 or 20 years deserves some attention. The legal precedent in field at this time had ruled out clemency on the basis of ‘19 or 20 years of age’. Jinnah clearly was not invested in getting Ilam Din off the hook, which he might have seen as a hopeless case. He had bothered to make the trip only because he needed to tap into the Punjabi Muslim population, which had hitherto been hostile to him and had seen him as an enemy of the Muslims. To this day though, right-wing lawyers and commentators in Pakistan quote Jinnah’s willingness to appear in appeal for Ilam Din as an example of Jinnah’s religious orientation, forgetting what he had said in the legislature. Jinnah certainly did not attend any protest meetings and left Lahore once the case was finished. However,
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the damage had been done and all arguments made by liberals and secularists speaking about Jinnah’s idea of a secular Pakistan are promptly countered with this example. After all, they argue, Jinnah himself had taken up Ilam Din’s case. Pakistan’s officially sanctioned historians, generally hard-pressed to find evidence of religious piety with the founding father, seize this incident to make a case for Jinnah’s love for Islam.
Obviously, these attempts find little support from Jinnah’s own public record. Despite his disappointments and his search for in roads into Punjab, Jinnah remained as committed as ever to the idea of a modern progressive India. Speaking on 11 September 1929, Jinnah said, ‘If we are going to allow ourselves to be influenced by public opinion that can be created in the name of religion when we know religion has nothing to do with the matter, we must have the courage to say “no, we are not going to be frightened by that”. He was speaking on the issue of Child Marriages Restraint Bill, which was being opposed by his co-religionists as well as Hindus because it sought to raise the marriageable age for girls in India from 12 to 14. Noting that every time a social reform was attempted, the orthodox religious opinion tried to block it, Jinnah told the legislature: ‘If my constituency is so backward as to disapprove of a measure like this then I say, the clearest duty on my part would be to say to my constituency, “you had better ask somebody else to represent you”.’ This was Jinnah admirably resisting the pressures of populist aspirations of his co-religionists. In the aforementioned case of Section 295A, however, his resistance was followed by an uncharacteristic pusillanimous surrender. It would be the first in a series of critical mistakes Jinnah would make in appeasing the more orthodox sections of his community, which he himself had criticized for standing in the way of progress.
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Jinnah, nevertheless, continued to steadfastly stand for the nationalist cause. In September of 1929, he rose to speak on the issue of Bhagat Singh in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, which had been hurried through by the British.
Jinnah asked: “Sir, can you imagine a more horrible form of torture than a hunger strike? If, rightly or wrongly, these men are inflicting this punishment on themselves, and thereby you are unconvinced, is that any reason why you should ask us to abandon one of the cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence? Well, you know perfectly well that these men are determined to die? It is not a joke. I ask the hon’ble law member to realize that it is not everybody who can go on starving himself. Try it for a little while and you will see. The man who goes on a hunger strike has a soul. He is moved by the soul and he believes in the justice of his cause; he is not an ordinary criminal who is guilty of a coldblooded sordid wretched crime … It seems to me, Sir, that the great and fundamental doctrine of British jurisprudence, which is incorporated and codified in the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code has very wisely not made such an absurd provision in the criminal law of this country and I am not satisfied that there is a lacuna in our system of criminal law.’ Bhagat Singh’s methods were not something Jinnah had ever endorsed. Indeed, some in Bhagat Singh’s group had toyed with the idea of assassinating Jinnah to make an example out of constitutionalists and this was known to Jinnah at the time he got up to speak. He had also been present in the assembly when Bhagat Singh and others had thrown the cracker bomb. However, so committed was Jinnah to the ideals of freedom and India that, along with Motilal Nehru, Jinnah had appeared as a witness for defence. Jinnah’s commitment to due process and correct criminal procedure made him stand up for even those who completely
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disagreed with him. It was in 2011 that the Supreme Court of India came to the same conclusion as Jinnah, i.e., Bhagat Singh’s trial was contrary to the principles of criminal jurisprudence and procedure. Similarly, when in March 1930, Gandhi began his famous salt march, the British, among others, arrested Sardar Patel, it was Jinnah who spoke up against this internment once again despite his differences with Congress.
The year 1930 saw the publication of the Simon Report as well as the new Labour Government’s willingness to now finally consider a roundtable conference that Jinnah and his supporters had been asking for since 1922. The question now was to convince Gandhi and the Congress to come to the table and finally resolve the constitutional tangle of the subcontinent. Gandhi and Congress refused to attend the first roundtable conference in 1930. Jinnah considered it quite unwise but nevertheless made his way to conference later that year. Jinnah’s presence even at the first two conferences evidently did not go down well with Sir Fazl-i-Hussain. Writing to Sir Malcolm Hailey, the grand old man of Punjab declared, ‘Frankly, I do not like the idea of Jinnah doing all the talking and of there being no one strong-minded enough to make a protest in case Jinnah starts expressing his views when those are not the acceptable Muslim views.[47] It was to counter Jinnah that Sir Fazl had introduced Sha’faat Ahmad Khan, a professor of History from Allahabad University whose major work of note was on the issue of minority safeguards.
Jinnah, thus, stood in no man’s land once again, disliked by Congress, hated by the politicians from Muslim majority provinces and viewed with suspicion by the British. This was the baggage that Jinnah carried as he embarked on another voyage to London.
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THE LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE
The Indian Roundtable Conference was inaugurated on 12 November 1930 by the King (George V) at the House of Lords, without the Indian National Conference participating in it. The Maharaja of Patiala proposed the name of Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDondald as the chairman of the conference, which was seconded by Sir Aga Khan. The motion was carried. Various committees were announced and the work on the new constitution of India began in earnest. Jinnah spoke at the plenary session. In his speech, Jinnah pointed out that as early as 1917, the British had themselves declared, albeit implicitly, that the final destination for constitutional progress in India was the attainment of Dominion Status, at par with Canada, Australia and others.
Jinnah said that there was no more momentous or graver issue in the history of our two nations’, and he meant Britain and India, ‘than one we are called upon to face today and the solution of which was hanging the fate of nearly one-fifth of humanity.’l Significantly though, he then spoke of four parties around the table: 1. the British; 2. the Indian princes; 3. the Hindus and 4. the Muslims. He also pointed out that there were other important parties to the equation:
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Sikhs, Christians and the depressed classes.? On 16 November 1930, among the Indian delegates, Jinnah had worked out a new compromise with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Setalvad, Jayakar and Aga Khan, which would limit reserved representation of minorities to their population, give Muslims 30 per cent reserved representation at the centre and a communal veto to communities as far any issue that specifically concerned them. However, it was immediately rejected by Fazl-i-Hussain’s representatives Sha’faat and Zafrullah Khan, who insisted instead on the original fourteen points.[3]
Jinnah endorsed the idea of the federation but opposed the idea of a watered down federation, which he hinted that the Indian princes wanted.[4] Jinnah’s involvement at the roundtable touched almost every point of administration and governance but it was in particular the idea that the princes could come into the federation on different terms than the provinces that Jinnah vehemently opposed. On 5 December, Jinnah’s exchange with Colonel Haksar is of particular interest here because it explains how Jinnah was proceeding on the question. Haksar asked Jinnah what the provinces had to surrender. Jinnah promptly replied that Haksar was operating under the present constitution but that was precisely what was being changed. Jinnah instead said that provinces were sovereign provinces surrendering what they may agree to surrender just like the princely states.[5] In essence, Jinnah wanted to see what it was that the princes were willing to surrender before he would ask the provinces to surrender the same thing. What was important to him was that there should be no discrimination between a princely state and a province when it came to joining the federation as a constituent unit. This was a fair demand but it made Jinnah quite unpopular with the princes. He pointed out that when Australia and Canada became dominions, the provinces there were colonies and
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not sovereign provinces. When the chairman pointed out that they had legislatures, Jinnah responded that the situation was similar to what they had in India in 1930.[6].
Jinnah attended the first two conferences in 1930 and 1931. Gandhi had famously joined the 1931 conference as the representative of the Congress after entering the Irwin-Gandhi Pact, which ended civil disobedience. By 1931, Jinnah had decided to take up residence in Great Britain and because he was so hard to place in terms of his independent views, the British did not bother to call him for the third session of the Roundtable Conference in 1932, which finalized the Communal Award. Jinnah would remark later that, I displeased the Muslims. I displeased my Hindu friends because of the famous fourteen points. I displeased the princes because I was deadly against their underhand activities and I displeased the British Parliament because I felt right from the start and said that it was a fraud.’ In the end, the Roundtable Conference turned out to be an exercise that sharply polarized opinion. Gandhi claimed that Congress spoke for everyone and, therefore, even the princes should follow his lead. This was contested by Dr B. R. Ambedkar, who refused to accept that Gandhi spoke for the depressed classes. The Muslim view was largely represented by Aga Khan and Fazl-i-Hussain’s representatives, in particular, a brilliant young barrister-turned-politician by the name Sir Zafrullah Khan.
Jinnah had moved to England with his sister, Fatima and his daughter, Dina. In September 1931, Jinnah bought the West Heath House – a three-storied villa with a lodge and eight acres of grounds on West Heath Road in Hampstead – from one Lady Graham Wood. Dina was enrolled in a boarding school to learn the proper British ways. Jinnah had become completely irrelevant to Indian politics by 1931, focusing instead on his legal practice before the
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Privy Council. He certainly did not see his place either among the Muslims or the Congress-led Hindus. He did try to follow the erstwhile Naoroji model and stand for the House of Commons but Labour, his first party of choice, found him too well dressed and proper, ‘a toff like that, while the Conservatives found him too liberal with connections in the Fabian Society to be a fit in the Conservative right-wing of British politics.
What had been going in Jinnah’s mind vis-à-vis India can be gathered from the testimony of Durga Das, a renowned journalist and editor of the Associated Press of India, who visited Jinnah in London and had a long and frank discussion with him. Jinnah told him that he was not enamoured with practice in London but wanted a judicial seat on the Privy Council, failing which he would attempt to enter the parliament. When asked if Jinnah was planning on leaving India for good, Jinnah, seemingly, told him that he was staying away from India only to be away from that ‘wretched Viceroy’. The ‘wretched Viceroy at the time was none other than Lord Willingdon, who Jinnah had vehemently opposed during his time as the Governor of Bombay. Baring his heart to Durga Das, Jinnah said he had been hurt that his reasonable proposals had been turned down by the Congress. The Congress did not take him seriously because his following was small and Muslims refused to listen to him because – in Jinnah’s words – they took their orders from the Deputy Commissioner. About the Roundtable Conference, he said that what could be expected of a “jamboree’ of this kind? “The British would only make an exhibition of our differences.” As for Gandhi, Jinnah said that they (British) would make a fool of him and he will in turn make a fool of them’, asking what had come of Congress’ claim to speak for Muslims as well, when Gandhi had even failed to get Dr Ansari nominated
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to the conference. When Durga pointed out that he could make a non-communal alliance with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Gandhi, Jinnah said, ‘suppose I succeed, they have this fellow Aga Khan and Fazli’s dogs.'[7]
On 26 September 1931, Jinnah met Gandhi on the sidelines of the second Roundtable Conference and emphasized the need for separate Muslim representation and the idea of guaranteed Muslim majorities in Punjab and Bengal, indicating perhaps how far he had travelled after having come under attack from the Fazl-i-Hussain camp for having repeatedly tried to negotiate for joint electorates and equal representation instead of weighted higher representation. The negotiations between the Muslim delegation and Gandhi ended abruptly when Gandhi told Aga Khan, Jinnah, Shafi, Shafi’s daughter Jahanara and Zafrullah Khan that the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikhs were not ready to accept the terms proposed by the Muslim delegation.[8] In this, we get a clearer picture of the limitations that existed on Gandhi himself. One can venture forth the opinion that had Gandhi been able to argue without these limitations, he might well have jumped at the opportunity. Both Jinnah and Gandhi, in the last two decades of their lives, remained hostages to the extreme positions in their respective camps. Jinnah had wanted a new constitution with reasonable guarantees and these reasonable guarantees were contained in the fourteen points that Jinnah’s own camp insisted on.
Meanwhile, Gandhi faced hurdles in accepting them not just from the Hindu right-wing but also Jawaharlal Nehru, who had chosen this precise time to write extremely acerbic letters to Gandhi warning him against accepting any of Jinnah’s demands, calling Jinnah’s views ‘an amazing farrago of nonsense and narrowminded communalism’ in one letter and then saying, “I wonder if
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any purgatory would be more dreadful for me than to carry on in this way. If I had to listen to my dear friend Mohammad Ali Jinnah talking the most unmitigated nonsense about his fourteen points for any length of time, I would consider the desirability of retiring to the South Sea Islands where there would be some hope of meeting people who were intelligent enough or ignorant enough not to talk of the fourteen points.”[9]
Nehru felt a strange dislike and hatred for Jinnah that he was unable to overcome for the rest of his life. The great irony is that Nehru was unwittingly allying himself with right-wing Hindu forces, who are in the present day hell bent on wiping him and his legacy out of India. Time and again, Nehru’s personal dislike for Jinnah would stand in his way to come to an agreement. The personal equation between Jinnah and Gandhi may have contributed to their politics, but it was Nehru’s deliberate and utter dislike for Jinnah that ultimately confounded any honest solution to the subcontinent’s constitutional problem. It is one of those strange things. The relationship between Nehru and Jinnah mirrored that of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, with Nehru and Jinnah each being part Jefferson and part Hamilton in their approach to the constitutional problem of India. Nehru viewed Jinnah as an upstart, a shyster and a mere lawyer – a political phony with an aristocratic temperament, just as Jefferson was given to seeing Hamilton. The irony that both Jefferson and Nehru came from privileged backgrounds was often lost on these two great wordsmiths, as they attacked Hamilton and Jinnah for their significantly humbler roots. On the other hand, Nehru was the centralizing figure and Jinnah spoke of bottom up reorganization of sovereignty from the constituent units to a central government, making an interesting juxtaposition to the constitutional positions
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of Hamilton and Jefferson in the early period of the American Republic. What was certain, as with Jefferson and Hamilton, was that there was no love lost between Nehru and Jinnah.
It was during one of his walks from courts to his house that Jinnah picked up a copy of Grey Wolf, in which H. C. Armstrong detailed the life of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s president and modernizer. Now, he had the opportunity of reading in detail about the man who was his junior by five years but had managed to forge a modern republic from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Something appealed to Jinnah about Ataturk; he recommended it to his then fourteen-year-old daughter. Indeed, he seems to have spoken about it so much that Dina began calling him “Grey Wolf’.
From this point onwards, the dream of being the Muslim Gokhale seemed to be replaced with a new ambition and a new ideal. Certainly, Jinnah’s pronouncements that he was an Indian first, second and last became less frequent after this. Later, upon Ataturk’s death, Jinnah would remark that Ataturk was not just the greatest Mussalman of the age but one of the greatest men to ever live. Ataturk’s achievements as Turkey’s modernizing leader are many but it still seems strange that a man like Jinnah, a refined democrat schooled in British parliamentary procedure and English law, would now come to idolize a military leader so late in his life, especially one who was widely reviled as a dictator in the East by the British public and painted as such by the book Jinnah had found so fascinating. The only other contemporary Muslim figure Jinnah had ever referred to with approval up to this point was Egypt’s Prime Minister Zaghlul Pasha, primarily because Zaghlul Pasha was a great democrat who had also ensured protection for minorities in Egypt.
Reading through Grey Wolf, there is little that could commend itself to a constitutionalist parliamentary democrat schooled in the
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British tradition, but what does stand out is the irreverence with which Ataturk approached religion as well as his fierce commitment to modernity at all costs. This, after all, was the zenith of the idea of nationalism and self-determination. Muslim nationalism of a modernist variety was spreading and a deeper analysis of Turkey’s history shows that Turkish nationalism was a variant of this kind of modern reformist Muslim nationalism emanating out of a deep fear during the closing days of the Ottoman Empire, which made a number of Turks (a word interchangeable with Muslim and not the blood and soil of Turkish identity) really apprehensive of the future dominated by the economically and socially advanced Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Donme millets of the Ottoman lands. Ataturk used this idea to mobilize the Muslims of Anatolia into the war of independence that secured Turkey’s present day borders.
Soon, Ataturk would dismantle the Caliphate and ultimately establish a republic, originally with Islam as the state religion. In 1928, he had the assembly remove the state religion clause from the constitution and made Turkey completely secular in governance. However, at the heart of it, Turkish nationalism was a Muslim project that aimed to modernize a Muslim nation. Ataturk’s unsuccessful attempts to supplant Arabic with Turkish as the language of Azan, prayer and Quran was aimed at this modernization, as was his decision to use the Roman alphabet instead of the Arabic alphabet. For Jinnah, though, the idea of group nationalism must certainly have been a step backwards from the all-inclusive completely secular Indian national ideal to which he had been committed from 1904. It certainly took Jinnah another decade to adopt the two nation theory, though the idea that Indian Muslims constituted a nation had already found fertile ground among Muslims, especially a rising new middle class emerging out
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of Aligarh University and other schools and colleges by the 1930s. Interestingly, this new class of Muslim modernists were also taken by Turkey and the revolution that Ataturk had brought about.
Many of these Muslim modernists, much like Jinnah, had shunned the Khilafat Movement as a thoroughly reactionary movement, even if the older generation of the same group, especially Sir Aga Khan and Syed Ameer Ali, had pleaded with Ataturk not to abolish the Caliphate. Chief among them was Dr Mohammad Iqbal who, despite holding the view that religion and state were not separate in Islam, felt that Turkey’s revolution under Ataturk had brought a new renaissance in the history of Islam. | Another influence on Jinnah that seems to have been underplayed by Pakistani historians during this period was that of the largely Punjab-based Ahmadi sect. Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud, the second leader of the Ahmadi community, had been in touch with Jinnah since the 1920s and had entered into several discussions with him trying to convince him of the Punjab thesis, which emphasized separate electorates as a matter of life and death for Punjabi Muslims. Indeed, the two leaders that Ahmadis seem to have approached time and again were Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Jinnah. In 1932, an Ahmadi imam by name of Abdur Rahim Dard visited Jinnah in London and invited him to speak at the Al-Fazl Mosque located on Gressenhall Road in London. The Ahmadi version of events suggests that the Ahmadis there had delivered a message from their leader to Jinnah asking him to return and lead the Muslims of India. Whether or not this was what would ultimately convinced Jinnah to return to India, from this point onwards Jinnah did cultivate close ties with the Ahmadi community, often protecting them against the bigotry of other Muslim sects who considered them heretics.
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However, Jinnah did not return to India on the appeal of Dr Iqbal, who at any rate did not think much of Jinnah and his politics. Indeed, Iqbal had every reason to dislike Jinnah at this point because Jinnah was seen as too close to the Congress’ point of view and the kind of politician who was unsuited to plead the Muslim case. The myth that Pakistani historians and textbooks would conjure up about Iqbal appealing to Jinnah emotionally and telling him that he must return to India to lead the Muslims of India is unfounded and without any basis whatsoever. Jinnah did return to India in 1934 but it was not to lead Muslims to a cherished millennial goal. Jinnah had been dismissive of Cambridge-based Chaudhry Rehmat Ali and his Pakistan idea, asking one of the students from Cambridge who had come up with the scheme if they proposed to undo the one good thing the British had done, i.e., bring unity to the heterogeneous elements of the subcontinent?
There were no takers for the Pakistan demand even among Jinnah’s opposing camp. One newspaper reported that Jinnah had described the people who had raised the Pakistan demand as fools living in fools’ paradise. Historians who have studied Rahmat Ali’s Pakistan demand and its intellectual basis are quick to point out that it was a reaction to the Lucknow Pact, which was Jinnah’s great achievement but was seen as an absolute betrayal by Muslims in Punjab at least.
Interestingly, it must have been a letter from Sir Fazl-i-Hussain that would have convinced Jinnah to return to India. On 15 May 1934, the grand old man of Punjab wrote: “Muslim India cannot afford to lose you. Men of clear vision, independent judgment and strength of character are very few.’[10] Yet, Fazl-i-Hussain’s views on Jinnah swung like a pendulum, as is evidenced by his interview with Durga Das shortly before his death. In this strange interview, Sir Fazl-
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i-Hussain complained that Jinnah always stood for joint electorates and yet castigated him for having a communal programme.[11] Incidentally, while speaking about a United States of India, Fazl-iHussain seems to have dropped the ball in the interview when he stated that Jinnah was being funded by Hindu mill owners because of his close alliance with the Congress. Sir Fazl-i-Hussain had been the biggest supporter of separate electorates and a consociational Punjab model based on the fourteen points with maximum autonomy. This was certainly a vision of India that could have worked but was entirely unacceptable to Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. Paradoxically, Sir Fazl-i-Hussain had no sympathy for the separatist Muslim ideal that was taking root in Punjab. Like Jinnah, he was quite concerned about the Muslim minority in an independent India but unlike Jinnah, Sir Fazl remained extremely critical of the Lucknow Pact, which he continued to see as nothing but surrender of Muslims, accusing Jinnah repeatedly of trying to ingratiate himself with the Congress. Never have there been two men so similar in their approach divided by geography.
Jinnah, as mentioned earlier, looked at the Indian tangle from an all-India perspective and his concern for Muslim minority was from that central point of view, whereas Sir Fazl remained a Punjabi chauvinist and his communal programme was aimed primarily at achieving Muslim hegemony within Punjab but with in the overall framework of India. From this point of view, Sir Fazl could not place Jinnah, disliking his repeated attempts to give up separate electorates for guaranteed representation at the centre but paradoxically using his fourteen points as the basis of an all-India settlement. Whatever may have been the desires of these two men, in any event, the fourteen points were wholly unacceptable to the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha.
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Sir Fazl’s support was something Jinnah placed great premium on, and it was with this idea that Jinnah even tried to get Sir Fazl to preside over the Muslim League session, a proposition that Sir Fazl rejected with prejudice. Jinnah on his part made a comment that he would smash Fazl and his henchmen in Punjab. While a power struggle between these two major politicians of Muslim India was brewing, Fazl passed away in 1936, leaving the field wide open for Jinnah, notably bringing Zafrullah Khan and others into Jinnah’s camp. It was Jinnah who filled Fazl’s shoes in Punjab, as opposed to Fazl’s successor, Sir Sikandar Hayat from Wah. As we will see, the Pakistan demand was more a bargaining counter with the real objective being fulfilling this critical Punjabi aspiration for autonomy within India that had dictated Jinnah’s politics. The apparent strangeness of the paradox, Jinnah the nationalist turning communalist and Fazl the communalist making nationalist overtures during his last days, is only explained sufficiently when we consider the Pakistan demand in this light.
Strangely, Fazľs charge that Jinnah was introducing a purely communal platform in Punjab was not entirely borne by fact. To this end, we must consider Jinnah’s visit to Lahore in 1936. During this visit, Jinnah spent close to three weeks in Lahore’s summer heat in order to resolve the longstanding Shahidganj dispute between Sikhs and Muslims. This dispute pertained to a Mughal-era mosque in Lahore in the premises of which a gurduwara had been built during the Sikh times. On 7 July 1935, the mosque was demolished by Sikhs, leading to widespread disorder and violence. The Muslims started a civil disobedience campaign led by Zafar Ali Khan and his blue shirts. A dozen Muslims died in gunfire by the police. The communal situation spiralled out of control and the city was under curfew. Majlis-e-Ahrar and Unionist Party formed the ‘Majlis-e-Tahafuz
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e-Masjid’ as well as ‘Majlis-e-Itehad-e-Millat’. There was another angle to it. Sir Fazl-i-Hussain himself is accused by Sajjad Zaheer in ‘Light on League-Unionist Conflict’ of having masterminded the whole Shahidganj dispute to embroil the pro-Congress Ahrar in it and thereby sideline them during the coming elections.
Jinnah arrived in Lahore on the morning of 21 February 1936 via the Frontier Mail train. [12] Upon arrival, Jinnah spoke to the Muslim crowd that had gathered to welcome him and said: ‘My task is purely that of a conciliator and a peacemaker. I have arrived in Lahore in the full hope that the leaders of the various communities will help me bring about a settlement because the general and greater interest of the Punjab and particularly the city of Lahore will be best served by the three important communities – Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims – working together and cooperating in a friendly spirit. There are issues bigger than Shahidganj that Punjab will have to tackle and it is only by unity that we can tackle the various problems facing us and will continue to face us from time to time.'[13] Speaking at the Badshahi Mosque, Jinnah told leaders of the Muslim civil disobedience movement: ‘I appeal to you to maintain a helpful attitude and do nothing which may hurt the feelings of the other communities.'[14]
During 22–24 February, Jinnah engaged in important dialogue with Sikh and Muslim leaderships, impressing upon them the need to cooperate at all costs. On 23 February, the Tribune carried the following news story: ‘Mr M. A. Jinnah met the Hindu and Sikh leaders today and discussed with them the Shahidganj situation. In the morning, he went to the Badshahi Mosque and talked with the Muslim dictator (Malik Inayatullah) who is directing the Shahidganj agitation, for about an hour. He met the Hindu leaders and journalists at lunch … In the afternoon, he met Master Tara Singh,
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Harnam Singh, Advocate and other Sikh leaders and had prolonged conversations with them for about three hours and a half.'[15]
Speaking to the gathering of the Muslim students league, Jinnah spoke of the Sikh community in glowing terms: ‘I cannot perhaps account for it, but I have always considered the Sikhs a very fine community.[16] Again, speaking to Muslims on 29 February, Jinnah said about the Sikhs: “They are a great and brave community and I think I am voicing the true feelings of Muslims when I say that nothing will please the Muslims more than an honourable settlement between the two brave communities in Punjab.’[17]
Later responding to Barkat Ali’s address, he advised the Muslims to adopt constitutional and legal means and said, ‘We are going to make every possible effort to come to an amicable understanding with the Sikhs.’ He then urged the Muslims to remain calm and peaceful under all circumstances so that he could do his job. Jinnah left for Delhi on 29 February and returned to Lahore on 1 March. A press report meanwhile claimed that Jinnah had promised the Muslims that Sikhs were ready to regret their role in the demolition of the mosque. Through a press statement, Jinnah set the record straight and said that the communication between him and Sikh leaders was for now undisclosed. On the evening of 1 March, Jinnah addressed a gathering of Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and Muslims at the Town Hall in Lahore. The proceeding started off with Nanak Chand Pandit – a legislator from the Punjab Assembly – paying a glowing tribute to Jinnah and his leadership and expressing confidence in him on behalf of the Hindus of Lahore. Sardar Ujjal Singh, the prominent Sikh leader, reposed confidence and assured Jinnah of complete support from the Sikhs. K. L. Rallia Ram of the Indian Christian Community spoke on behalf of the Christians and expressed total
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confidence in him. If anyone had told them that one day Jinnah would be the apostle of Muslim separatism who would carve out a new country in a decade’s time, they would have laughed him out of the pandal.
Jinnah spoke last. He said: ‘Believe me, I have not come here as a Muslim leader. I have not come to champion the cause of the Muslims. I have only one object before me and that is to find a fair and just solution of the problem and if it is fair and just it will be honourable and lasting … I am convinced that there is not a single thinking Muslim who does not desire friendship and brotherhood with Sikhs and Hindus. As I have said before, we have got much bigger problems to tackle in Punjab and the greater interests of the Province demand complete unity. The newspaper also reported that the audience observed two minutes of silence as respect for the passing of Kamala Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru’s wife. On 5 March, Jinnah was the Chief Guest at the annual meeting of the Speakers’ Union of Dyal Singh College Lahore. Professor Lajpat Rai, the president of the Union, welcoming the guest said: ‘Sir, you have come to this province on a mission of peace and goodwill. We, in this institution, which is completely non-communal and non-sectarian, are doing our humble bit for the evolution of Indian nation. ‘[18]
Professor Das Gupta lauded Jinnah’s services to the Indian people and described as a ‘red letter day’ for the college. Jinnah’s reply gives us a clue for what indeed was still closest to his heart: ‘I feel myself among kindred spirits. This college does not believe in any creed and I too feel that the salvation of India lies in the nonsectarian feelings. It was this creed which I had in the past, which I have at present and which I will have in future dearest to my heart.’ Rejecting the idea that India should have dictators like Hitler and Mussolini, he referred to Gokhale and said: “Give me more
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Gokhales.'[19] This was probably one of the last references he would make to his old mentor. Jinnah concluded, ‘India has everything, God has given her everything but man has not served her well. Let man serve India and you have bright days ahead of you.[’20]
The next day, speaking at the Rotary Club about the Shahidganj issue, Jinnah said that the need was to prevent unscrupulous leaders from exploiting the masses. Later on in the day, speaking to a meeting of the Servants of India Association at Lajpat Rai Hall, Jinnah drove home that both for independence of India and for the dispute of Shahidganj, they had to come together as politicians and statesmen and not as Hindus, Christians or Muslims. He also spoke about his fourteen points and said that he had been proposing joint electorates and that the fourteen points were welcomed by many Congress leaders.[21] His fortnight in Lahore brought about the conciliation committee that Jinnah appointed. This included Iqbal, Abdul Qadar Kasuri, Mian Abdul Aziz, Raja Narendra Nath, Nanak Chand Pandit, S. B. Buta Singh, Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Sampuran Singh. Consequently, the communal situation improved and the dispute died down. Jinnah has never quite gotten the credit for this extraordinary feat of diffusing a virulent communal situation because by this time, he had already embarked on a course that would brand him not just anti-national but arch-communalist. He was about to become what Jamnadas had so inaccurately described him a decade earlier, the harbinger of communal strife.
Jinnah had returned to India two years earlier, unsure of what course he would chart. Even upon his return, while attending an event at Bombay’s Willingdon Club (named after his arch nemesis), Jinnah had told Diwan Chaman Lall, ‘Politics! I am finished … but if you could get six people like yourself to support me, I would come back. [22] Clearly telling Chamanlal that he had not quite reconciled
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himself to being simply a Muslim leader. Earlier in England, he had told his neighbour at the chambers, T. W. Ramsay, that he was going back to India on a mission.23 The mission was not clear to even Jinnah. He certainly was not yet a willing convert to the Pakistan demand that had found some traction among young educated Muslims.
Indeed, it would remain a question and remains to date a question how far he actually did accept it as an ideological commitment and how much it was a maximum demand to negotiate with the Congress and the British. The would-be ‘Grey Wolf’ of Muslim India had not quite decided the right course of action nor was he sure he even had a future. Speaking at the meeting of Muslim League Council in April 1934 during his first exploratory visit back to India, Jinnah said, ‘Nothing will give me greater happiness than to bring about complete cooperation and friendship between Hindus and Muslims. 24 Later, at the same event, he spoke of how he cared more for the untouchables than even Muslims in the name of humanity.
This might have been influenced by a new friendship Jinnah had begun to cultivate with Dr B. R. Ambedkar, who had evidently impressed Jinnah with his analytical skills and command over constitutional law. Jinnah was elected member to the Central Legislature again in October 1934 after a gap of several years and then joined the first session of the new legislature in January 1935. Jinnah entered the assembly as a staunch nationalist. In early January, Jinnah sent a letter to Iqbal, advising him to create bridges between Hindus and Muslims. Iqbal in turn wrote a letter to Dr Ansari of Congress and a fresh new initiative for a joint front against the government was in the works. Jinnah’s commitment to India remained paramount in his efforts. On 30 January 1935, speaking on the issue of the Indo-British
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Trade Agreement, Jinnah was back in his fiery form: ‘No, you are putting a halter round my neck and handicapping me in an agreement with other countries. England does not buy everything from India. This agreement is therefore full of meaning. We are ready to impose differential duties on the merits of the case, but cannot subscribe to a new principle which prevents our giving protection on any other ground.'[25] His speech at the legislature made one very important pronouncement that Pakistan’s official ideologues have been hardpressed to shove under the carpet: ‘Religion should not be allowed to come into politics … Religion is merely a matter between man and God. ‘[26] How strange does this sound as a principle in Pakistan of today, which is committed to a specifically Islamic polity. In February 1935, Jinnah had also denounced the banning of Khudai Khidmatgars, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s movement, in NWFP.[27]
From April to October 1935, Jinnah was back in England and was there when the King finally gave his assent to the Government of India Act 1935, in many ways the main forerunner of all modern constitutions in the subcontinent. The Act essentially had two main constituent parts. The first one dealt with the provincial government while the second one dealt with the federation – a federation that never took off because the princes refused to join it. Even though Jinnah and the Congress had not been entirely happy with the terms of the federation, it would have been an entirely different situation if the federal provisions of this constitution could have been allowed to work. Notably, Sindh did get its own province and NWFP was given the status of a full province. There was also a communal award but Jinnah himself was not too thrilled by the prospects of it. Congress outrightly opposed it. In January 1935, the Muslim League had accepted the Communal Award as an interim measure before a better alternative could be framed.
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This seemed to give Jinnah another opportunity to resurrect himself as the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. He entered into talks with Rajendra Prasad of Congress to come up with an alternative and substitute to the Communal Award, believing that the alternative would be better than the one given by the British. The basis for the alternative was to have joint electorate as Jinnah approved that the agreement should flow from this basic assumption. So contrary it is to the official ideology of Pakistan that no official textbook seems to mention the negotiations that Jinnah and the future first President of the Republic of India engaged in for the better part of two months in 1935. In any event, the formula arrived at between these two statesmen is part of history. It provided for a differential franchise to get the proportion of various communities reflected in the electoral rolls and the Centre. It called for ending the overlapping of electorates of different constituencies. It provided for the Sikhs and the Hindus in Punjab to choose the number of constituencies for the seats allotted to them in the Communal Award, with the remaining seats allotted to the Muslims according to the number of seats allotted to them in the Award; for dividing the seats obtained from Europeans between Hindu and Muslim in Bengal; for reservation of the seats allotted to Muslim at the centre by the Communal Award and most importantly for joint electorates. This was the basis on which an All India Federation and an Indian Nation was to be born. These were not unreasonable terms at all. The Jinnah-Prasad talks are conspicuous by absence in most accounts of this period. The only notable book that makes any detailed reference to these vitally important parleys is Changing Homelands by Dr Neeti Nair. The talks finally ended in March 1935, primarily because Prasad wanted the agreement to be between Congress and the Muslim League, whereas Jinnah’s view was that
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the agreement must be secured with Hindu Mahasabha as well because they were the ones who had in the past foiled the best laid plans of Congress’ moderates and Jinnah himself.
In 1936, Jinnah began reviving the moribund Muslim League. Jinnah’s pleading with Sir Fazl-i-Hussain had failed but he rallied other leaders. The first order of business was to come up with a new manifesto, which was in line with the changing realities. The manifesto was drafted to be as close as possible to the Congress with which Jinnah now aimed to create a cross-communal alliance. The programme called for ‘a repeal of all repressive laws, to resist those laws that encroached upon the fundamental liberties of people and led to their economic expoitation, to divert funds from administration to the development of expenditure, to nationalize the Indian Army and reduce its expenditure to encourage development of industries including cottage industries, to regulate currency, exchange and prices, to take steps for the uplift of rural population, to sponsor measures to alleviate indebtedness, to make elementary education free and compulsory, to promote Urdu language and script, to reduce the burden of taxation and create healthy public opinion and general political consciousness and to take general steps for amelioration of the conditions of Muslims.’
Further, it would protect the religious rights of Muslims in a non-sectarian manner by giving due weight to Sunni and Shia religious clerics. The Muslim League reached out to all Muslim parties to create a Muslim unity board. In its Bombay session, Ahmadis were specifically invited and in Punjab even Majlis-e-Ahrar, the pro-Congress Nationalist Muslim body, and in UP Jamiat-eUlema-Hind were invited to join. As Durga Das points out, the Hindu mill owners and capitalists who financed the Congress were also financing the Muslim League now because the general feeling
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was that Jinnah would be able to guide the Muslims into a broadbased alliance with the Congress.
Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam raised the stakes and demanded that Muslim League turn Ahmadis out of the Muslim League and that Muslim League should adopt complete independence as its goal. Muslim League’s response was that these issues could only be discussed at the General Council. In any event, Jinnah was not ready to put up complete independence as the goal as yet because he had been too invested in the idea of a responsible dominion government within the British Empire and on the issue of Ahmadis, Jinnah did not see any reason to bring theology to determine the religious status of a sect that he personally had cultivated a relationship with.
For its part, the Ahmadi leadership had attempted to reach out to Jawaharlal Nehru especially after Nehru’s spirited defence of Ahmadis in the public exchange with Iqbal in 1935. However, the Congress’ long-term alliance with Majlis-e-Ahrar and Jamiate-Ulema-Hind would ultimately preclude any long-term political alliance with Nehru, Gandhi and the Congress leadership. The two major political leaders that Ahmadis supported at different times were Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Jinnah, because these two leaders had resisted attempts by influential supporters and colleagues to decide the theological controversy.
Nevertheless, for a brief period in 1937, Majlis-e-Ahrar did join the unity board in Punjab, largely because of Dr Mohammad Iqbal, who had forwarded the thesis that Ahmadis should be declared a separate community from Muslims. Majlis-e-Ahrar soon left the unity board and the election results in 1937 to the extent of Punjab resulted in total annihilation for the Muslim League and other All India parties. The Unionists, under their new leader Sir Sikandar Hayat, emerged victorious in Punjab with ninety-five seats
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and his Unionist Party was bulwark for the British against Indian nationalists and the Congress. Even the Majlis-e-Ahrar outdid the Muslim League, winning as many as four seats compared to Muslim League’s one. Congress won eighteen general seats and no Muslim seats.
In UP, the erstwhile Muslim Unity Board comprising proCongress Muslim politicians and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-Hind merged with the UP Muslim League Parliamentary Board in order to put up a strong anti-government Muslim alliance, which would collaborate with the Congress.[28]
The Nawab of Chhatari had replaced in the role that late Sir Fazl played in Punjab. The landlords in the UPMLPB had been members of both this board and the National Agriculturalist Party, which was a pro-British non-communal organization comprising Hindu and Muslim landlords modelled after the Unionist Party in Punjab. As with the convoluted Unionist position in Punjab, the NAP position was beset with complete chaos. In his letter of resignation from the UPMLPB tendered to Jinnah, Chhatari argued that since the Communal Award was in place, there was no particular Muslim concern to call for a specifically communal party. He argued that a communal platform would reduce Muslims to a state of permanent minority and be an irritant to other communities. Ironically, he also accused UPMLPB of being a front for the Hindu Congress. This just goes to show that the ideas around community and nation continued to produce so many variants of thoughts that it was utterly impossible to delineate precisely what the terms communal and nationalist actually meant and also, who was communal and who was national.
Nevertheless, in his communication, Chhatari, while accusing Jinnah of being a front man for the Hindu Congress among
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Muslims, also questioned his nationalist credentials by stating that if he was a nationalist he ought to organize a non-communal party. The irony of course was that Chhatari himself had been the president of the All India Muslim Conference, the body that had fiercely stood for separate electorates. It was a strange contradiction as had been the case with Sir Fazl earlier. These gentlemen, pro-British in their orientation and champions of separate communal electorates, at no point seemed to realize that the idea of a separate homeland for Muslims was inherent in their demand for separate electorates. On the one hand, they continued to ask for this preferential treatment for the Muslim community and on the other, they continued to parade themselves as noncommunal, while taking positions that were calculated to keep the British fulcrum in place under the giant seesaw upon which Muslim and Hindu aspirations were perched. Jinnah wanted to remove the fulcrum and destroy the seesaw with the result that Hindus and Muslims would both have their feet on the hallowed ground of a self-governing dominion, while the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha wanted the fulcrum to readjust in a way that Hindus would always, by the sheer weight of their majority, have their feet firmly on the ground of an independent India, with Muslims flailing in the air with nothing more than a change of masters, entirely dependent on the Hindu majority.
The reductionist nationalist ideologies of India and Pakistan have never taken into account the utter complexity of these positions in the wake of the 1937 elections. The countless debates that have raged since independence in both India and Pakistan over terms such as secular, liberal, Islamic, national, Muslim nationalist, Hindu nationalist and so on have continued uninformed and without any
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inkling about the events that led to so many varying permutations and subsets in the subcontinent’s complex political milieu.
The roles and careers of Muslim politicians like Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, Sir Aga Khan, Nawab of Chhatari, Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, G. M. Syed, Allah Bux Soomro, Abdus Samad Achakzai, the Ali brothers, Fazl-e-Haq and Sir Sikandar Hayat, would help us better understand the positions that Jinnah as the ultimate sole spokesman had to take in relation to his former Congress friends and foes including Gandhi and Nehru in this period. The definitive history of Partition, taking into account all the troughs and peaks, is yet to be written. Tragically, the history of Partition has only been written in a partisan manner, as is evident in even a work like that of Venkat Dhulipala, a historian working under Gilmartin, whose otherwise well-researched book turned out to be a polemic against Jinnah and the Muslim League.
It so happened that the only places the Muslim League won in 1937 were UP and Bombay. In UP, the Muslim League emerged as the single largest Muslim party with.29 seats and Congress, which had won as many 133 seats, was wiped out on the Muslim seats, winning one. Agriculturalists won 22 seats. In line with the pre-election arrangement, Muslim League demanded a coalition ministry in UP with the Congress but Congress’ condition was that UPMLPB members join the Congress and cease to exist as a separate party. That there was a common arrangement between Muslim League and Congress in UP is not a contested fact, contrary to the claim of some apologists for the Congress. On the contrary, even Jawaharlal Nehru, who as we have seen was highly contemptuous towards
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Jinnah, had during the election campaign in UP told his audiences to vote for the Muslim League on those seats where Congress had not fielded a Muslim candidate because the League stood against the colonial government.[29] Even Dhulipala, who is utterly unsympathetic to the Muslim League in his book, is forced to note that given Jinnah’s affinity with the central Congress leadership, it has long evoked the curiosity of the historians as to why a coalition ministry was not formed at this critical juncture.
A coalition ministry in 1937 in UP would have created a new anti-British alliance, which would have kept Jinnah and the Muslim League firmly within the Indian nationalist framework and may even have induced him to make a return to Congress at long last. Instead, Congress’ actions, including its mass contact movement aimed at Muslims, seemed to indicate to Jinnah and the Muslim League that Congress was going to try and absorb the Muslim League in a way as to completely bulldoze the objective of having adequate safeguards for Muslims. Obviously, the Congress was well within its rights to start a mass contact movement with respect to Muslims but to have chosen this precise moment to try and cut out the one Muslim group that was closest to the Congress in its aspirations would turn out to be a monumental mistake on its part in general and Jawaharlal Nehru in particular.
It was Nehru’s attitude towards Jinnah and the challenge that Nehru, perhaps unwittingly, threw at Jinnah that made the latter look for alternatives, especially among the Unionists in Punjab. If the mistakes that Gandhi made during the Khilafat Movement were Himalayan, Nehru’s mistake was oceanic. Rafi Kidwai, tasked with whipping back Muslim League members into Congress, encouraged defections and this – according to Durga Das – set an evil precedent for defection ridden politics in India.[30]
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Maulana Azad, in his biography India Wins Freedom, was more scathing about Nehru than he had originally deemed fit to reveal in 1957. To a student of history, Azad’s decision to keep some pages under embargo till long after the dramatis personae of Partition were all dead seems quite strange. Regardless, his views need to be considered at length. We will obviously consider his views when discussing the Cabinet Mission Plan but here with respect to UP in 1937, Azad writes: Jawaharlal is one of my dearest friends and his contribution to India’s national life is second to none. I have nevertheless to say with regret that this was not the first time that he did immense harm to the national cause. He had committed an almost equal blunder in 1937 when the first elections were held under Government of India Act 1935. In these elections, the Muslim League had suffered a great set back through out the country except in Bombay… if the League’s offer of cooperation had been accepted, the Muslim League party would for all practical purposes merge with the Congress.'[31] Perhaps, had these pages been published in Nehru’s lifetime, he would have had the opportunity of giving his side of the story but that was not to be and we will never have a full picture of what went on that made a reasonable and rational accommodation of the Muslim League impossible in UP. Either way, this would mean a most grievous blow to Jinnah and his strategy of cooperation with Congress.
From this point onwards, Jinnah seemed to have turned a permanent corner. Though he would continue to try and arrive at an accommodation with the Congress, his attitude towards the Congress had become the same as his attitude to the British government. As Azad would claim from his vantage point, this gave a new lease of life to Muslim League in UP and allowed Jinnah to turn Muslim League against Congress. From what we have seen so far though, it
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was yet another dagger in Jinnah’s Indian heart, yet another betrayal, yet another disappointment and yet another humiliation that piled upon him from Nagpur, Calcutta and now UP. No longer would he call for Hindu-Muslim unity but rather depend on the new sword of Muslim nation whose scabbard he now had his hand on.
The tragic demise of the old Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity and Jinnah’s rebirth as the Quaid-i-Azam of Muslim India did not happen overnight. Most of the election campaign and the year that followed, 1936 and 1937 respectively, was a period still spent pleading with the Congress and trying to establish the bona fides of the Muslim League as a patriotic, nationalist and liberal political party of Muslims, which was ready to cooperate with Hindus and Sikhs for India’s freedom from colonialism. Explaining the Muslim League-stance in April 1936, Jinnah said, ‘While Muslims are therefore justified in putting their own affairs in order and in organizing themselves, it does not mean that, they should not stand as firmly by the national interests. In fact, they should prove that their patriotism is unsullied and that their love for India and her progress is no less than any other community in the country.'[32] A few days earlier, he advised the British government to treat India on a footing of complete equality saying: ‘There cannot be the real respect and trust which His Excellency desires unless India is treated on a footing of complete equality and on a basis of true partnership as a member of the British Commonwealth.[33]
On 9 June, Jinnah spoke his heart out at Srinagar in Kashmir about Hindu-Muslim unity, responding to the address of welcome: “I say from the bottom of my heart that I have worked for it and that I will continue to work for it. I believe that without this unity
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there is no hope for British Indians to rule India. I do not understand your problems here. I, therefore, won’t hazard my opinion. But I will, however, urge one thing upon you and the leaders that is to
justice and fair play in the state. It is the duty of the majority to make them feel so. I have tried this principle in British India and have not succeeded in convincing some of the leaders that there is no hope for their freedom without this principle being adopted. I will say that without minorities feeling that there will be fair play on the part of the majority, you will always have a sore festering in your body politic.[34]
This was Jinnah’s politics in a nutshell. He believed in a united India that would nevertheless treat minorities in a manner that would make them feel like equal citizens without any handicap in a great democratic federation. A candid attempt by Jinnah was made to reach out to Nehru during this period. Both Jinnah and Nehru attended a function together on 13 August 1936 in Lucknow under the auspices of the All India Students Conference. Jinnah seconded everything that Nehru said and then advised the students not to think of the problems that they were facing or that the country was facing in terms of religion but rather to teach the elders who were spoiling the national life by their communalism.[36] He advised the students to reject communalism in all its manifestations. This was Jinnah, the man who would time and again be accused of having led the communal strife in the country. What impact this would have had on Nehru is unknown but it is clear that Nehru continued to hold on to his opinion of Jinnah.
Jinnah, while speaking at the reception organized the Lucknow Municipal Board, appealed to every Indian to work for not only the amity between two major communities of India but for the unity in
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the whole of ‘Indian Nation.[36]On 15 August 1936, precisely eleven years before the Partition of India, Jinnah spoke to the UPMLPB meeting and rejected the notion that Muslim League’s primary aim was to encourage the communal basis. He told his listeners that the UPMLPB’s manifesto was clear that League was not a communal body but simply organizing the Muslims for political purposes as a matter of necessity.[37]
In Calcutta, Jinnah responded to an editorial by Amrita Bazar Patrika. The editorial had stated rather insultingly that, “The surprise of the student community will certainly not tend to diminish when they discover that Mr Jinnah who had stoutly defended the system of separate electorate for his own community at the Round Table Conference was the same amiable gentleman who stood before them and suggested that the students of Bengal should come under one organization, irrespective of caste or creed.’ Jinnah responded in no uncertain terms: ‘Let me tell you publicly that it is untrue that I fought for separate electorates. Over and over again, not only I but the Muslim delegation unanimously were willing to come to a settlement on the basis of joint electorate. We do not mind that the newspaper criticizes us. I welcome criticisms. But I must repel misrepresentation of facts of this character.[38]
On 28 August 1936, explaining his selection of the provincial boards of the All India Muslim League, Jinnah declared: ‘We have not lost sight of the basic principle that ours must be a party of progressive, patriotic and independent men who will not only serve Mussalmans but India as a whole.[39] These were Jinnah’s views not in the heyday of his time in the Congress but as the leader of the resurgent Muslim League in the 1930s. Jinnah stood with his hands extended outwards towards Congress, Gandhi and Nehru, but for some reason the great future founding fathers of
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independent India were not forthcoming. Every overture and every attempt by Jinnah to reach out to Nehru was rebuffed by a measure of arrogance that was quite unbecoming of Nehru. It is strange that Nehru did not adopt this attitude with anyone else but Jinnah. At one point, Nehru went so far as to compare Jinnah to Hindu communalist Bhai Parmanand, eliciting from Jinnah the response that unlike Bhai Parmanand who stood for Hindu Raj, he stood for democratic responsible government for the people of India without distinction.[40] Jinnah, had started off 1937 with a fresh appeal for communal unity in Nagpur, claiming once again that League stood for progressive ideas.[41] Then in Dacca, on 8 January 1937, he spoke of the likelihood of a single party of Hindus and Muslims together as the ideal.[42] This was now less than a decade before Partition. On 13 March 1937, he once again pointed out that there was no difference between Congress and the Muslim League, except that the latter stood for the rights of the Muslim minority in addition to its responsibilities towards India.[43] In May, he appealed once again to Congress to take the ‘minorities with you’, telling them that if he were Zaghlul Pasha of India he would have called all the minorities of India and granted them what they wanted.[44] As late as August of that year, Jinnah would offer a revival of Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad formula.[45]
The Lucknow Session of the Muslim League in 1937 turned out to be a landmark in the history of the subcontinent. It was also the first session at which Jinnah was hailed as the Quaid-i-Azam or the Great Leader of the Muslims. As Congress had already declared independence as its goal, Muslim League under Jinnah now committed itself to ‘the establishment of full independence in
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form of a federation of free democratic states’ with safeguards for Muslims and other minorities.[46] Jinnah’s presidential address was an eloquent summation of Muslim disenchantment with the Congress, accusing Congress of wanting Hindustan for the Hindus. In this address, Jinnah informed his listeners that politics was about power and without power they would remain hapless. No more would he trust the Congress and would only enter into parleys with them as a representative of the Muslim community.
For the first time, Jinnah became acerbic towards the Congress and its leadership and this would not be the last time. He told the Muslim League session that they could never expect justice and fair play from the Congress which spoke with many tongues. He was still not the apostle of Muslim separatism, but he had certainly abjured his role as the bridge between Congress and the Muslims, almost blowing it up with political dynamite. From this point onwards, he chose a new role – that of the leader, counsel and the sole spokesman for Muslims – and pursued this role to its logical conclusion. Everything else would flow from this, including the Pakistan demand that he was still not ready to adopt.
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TOWARDS PAKISTAN
The idea of pan-Indian Muslim identity, just like the pan-Indian Hindu identity, was primarily a British construct. It emerged mainly from the census, i.e., the counting of heads that the British introduced to classify their new colonial subjects. It is too easy to blame them for sowing the seeds of discord between the two communities, but paradoxically one must appreciate that this idea of one India also came from the same British rulers. Before the British came, India was a geographical and cultural unity but never really a political unity. One can argue that the idea of India in antiquity went beyond the subcontinent that we know of today but was spread right from parts of eastern Afghanistan to what is now Indonesia. However, with the exception of Ashoka, no ruler ever brought the subcontinent under one dominion. The only other ruler who came close before the advent of the British was Aurangzeb Alamgir (1618–1707), the Mughal Emperor, but even he could not conquer all of it. By the time British rule had fully dawned in India, the number of princely states, small and big, many ruled by families of former Mughal Governors or Nawabs and Nizams and others by Rajas, Maharajas, Chhatrapatis and even an occasional Sultan, stood
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at 565. India, as it existed in the early twentieth century, comprised two parts – British India and princely India.
By all accounts, the idea of nation and community was defined by horizontal and vertical divisions with the word qaum meaning a variety of things, including tribe, caste, sect, city, village and sometimes religion. There was no idea of an ‘Indian’ per se, but a definite sense of belonging to the land that was referred to as Hind. Even the term Hindu appears to have been a geographical term and used in the religious sense only in so much as to define the native religion of the people of India as Hindu Dharma, when contrasted with Turaka Dharma.? We get evidence of this juxtaposition in the writings of Syed Abdullah Shah Qadri, aka Bulleh Shah of Kasur (1680–1757), when he says:
na main arabi na lahori na main hindu turk peshori
‘I am neither an Arab nor am I a Lahori, Nor am I a Hindu or a Turk from Peshawar.’
It was this juxtaposition of the local indigenous faith versus Muslims or Turks or Mughals that had posed a unique problem for the British rulers, who coming from a context where people were neatly arrayed into Christian and non-Christian and later as Catholics and Protestants, sought to classify their subjects according to neat categories. A reform movement among the Hindus did not immediately find a counterpart among Muslims.
By the time Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the great Muslim modernist and reformer, came to the scene, the Hindu reform movement had already been under way for sixty odd years, starting with the
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visionary Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1774–1833). Predictably, this reform movement came out of Bengal, where the East India Company had first established its rule, and was a direct response to the modernizing influences that the British brought along. The Muslim reaction to the European onslaught was one of rejection. By and large, we find accounts of resistance till Sir Syed Ahmad Khan began his great movement for education of the Muslim Ashraf or elites. He faced major opposition from the religious circles for his reformist pro-British views. Even the great Islamic modernist Jamaluddin Afghani thought Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was too pusillanimous in his deference to the British. It was on Sir Syed’s request that Maulana Altaf Hussain Hali wrote his famous Musaddas e-Madd o-Jazr e-Islam or the Elegy of the Ebb and Tide of Islam, which was in many ways the open salvo of embryonic Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent. In this poem, for the first time, Muslims were defined as a qaum or a universal nation. In preceding chapters, we have already seen the development of Aligarh school of thought in Muslim politics, decidedly modernist but also communal in its orientation to the extent that it saw Muslims as a distinct political community with specific communal concerns requiring safeguards. However, predating this was the idea of Muslims as a nation, one that had not found political expression yet.
Dr Mohammad Iqbal perhaps best captured the idea of Muslim political, cultural and spiritual community and its aspirations in his Shikwa and Jawab-e-Shikwa. Shikwa, literally meaning complaint, is the cry of a Muslim in distress to God.
Ay Khuda Shikwa-e-arbab-e-wafa bhee sun le Khoo gar-e-hamd se thora gila bhee sun le Hum se pehlay tha ajab teray jahan ka manzar
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Kaheen masjood thay pathar kaheen mabood thay shajjar … Tuj ko maloom thaa leta thaa koi naam tera Quwwat-e-Bazoo-e-Muslim ne kiya kaam tera … Buut sanamkhanon mein kehtay hain Musalman gaye Hai khushi un ko ke Kaabay ke nigahbaan gaye Khandazan hai kufr tujhe ahsas hai ke nahin Apni Tauheed ka kuch paas tujhe hai ke nahin
He writes:
‘Oh God, hear this complaint from your loyal followers, From the reciters of your odes, hear these grievances, Before we came, the world presented a sorry picture, Stones (idols) were being prostrated to, trees were being
worshipped … Do you know that people did not even know you or mention
you? It was strength of the Muslim muscle that achieved this
for you … The idols in temples say that Muslims are finished They are happy that the defenders of Kaaba are finished Pagan infidelity is laughing derisively, do you see Do you even care about your monotheism?’
A few years later, Iqbal wrote the reply to the complaint, i.e., Jawab-e-Shikwa. It starts off with an admonition by God that those who achieved the victory of Islam were the ancestors of present day Muslims and that Muslims of the present day had only themselves to blame for their predicament. In it though, there are certain lines
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that seem to indicate Iqbal’s anxiety about the loss of distinction for the Muslim community. Iqbal says:
Thay kaheen Musalman bhee mojood? Wazah mein tum ho nasara, tau tamadan mein hunood Yeh Musalman hain jinhain dekh ke sharmain yahood
‘Were there even any Muslims left? In your dress and appearance you are Christian, in culture you are Hindu Really, these are the kind of Muslims who would put Jews to shame.’
Leaving aside the obvious anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Hindu overtones, which might be surprising for those who remember the Cambridge-and Munich-educated Barrister Dr Iqbal as the man who wrote Saray Jahan se acha hai Hindustan hamara, the underlying sentiment was of preservation of Muslim identity, which remained a major preoccupation for Iqbal. This idea of Muslim identity has been key throughout history in defining a global community. Therefore, Muslim nationalism as it emerged in the subcontinent was in a global context. In the early 20th century, Muslim nationalism was a latent force at work emerging out of a deep sense of loss of sovereignty and sense of fear of the majority. The upper-class Muslims, especially in urban centres, associated themselves with the Mughal Empire and viewed the end of the Mughal Empire as a tragedy. Significantly, though, it was a remarkable work by the Bengali author Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, titled Anandmath, that had in particular given the
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educated Muslim classes something to think about. Anandmath, most notable for bequeathing to India the song ‘Vande Mataram’, was a novel that portrayed Muslims as oppressive, exploitative rulers and the British as liberators who had come to free the Hindus. For this service of drawing a permanent wedge between Hindus and Muslims, Chattopadhyay was suitably rewarded by the British rulers.
Therefore, the emergence of Muslim group identity and nationalism must foremost be seen as a reaction to a palpable fear of the Hindu majority that a number of Muslims felt. The Hindi-Urdu controversy had emerged during the second half of the 19th century, which further helped solidify communal identities. Yet the registers of this language, Urdu and Hindi, written in two completely distinct scripts, were taken by their adherents to form two different languages. Urdu, i.e., Hindustani written in Nastaliq script with a rather heavy dose of Persian words, was adopted by the East India Company as the official language for lower courts, official documents and land records starting in 1837. This was when Persian, the language of the court, was replaced with the vernacular. So, Urdu was the natural successor to Persian. However, as literacy grew, and with it the number of Hindus who could now read and write Hindustani in the Devnagri script, the demand for adoption of the Hindi register also grew, especially in UP. This was a moment of profound disillusionment for Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and others.
When Iqbal got up to speak at Allahabad in 1930, where he proposed the idea of a consolidated Muslim state in the subcontinent, this sense of disillusionment had become a snowball effect among the lettered and educated classes of Muslims now emerging out of Aligarh and other places. In that address, which
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would be referred to as the ‘dream of Pakistan’ in official Pakistani nationalist canon, Iqbal spoke of a Muslim homeland in the North West of India within or without the British Empire. One of its primary purposes, according to Iqbal, was to liberate Islam from the stamp of Arab imperialism. He also reassured Hindus and others that it would not mean religious rule. However, Iqbal felt that for Islamic jurisprudence and Muslim culture to develop in line with the modern world, it was absolutely essential to have such a state. Iqbal was, at various times, a Muslim modernist (he endorsed the founding of secular Turkish republic as a seminal event in Islamic history), a Muslim reformer (his lectures, compiled as the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, show the breadth of his reformist vision) and an uncompromising Islamist believing in theological unity and purity of the Muslim community.
The idea of the loss of Muslim political power had been the preoccupation of many modernists among Muslims, most notably Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. A recurring theme in this line of thinking was the idea of theft’ – worldly progress and glory was the inheritance of the Muslims stolen from them by the West. Iqbal strongly emphasizes this theme in the lament and its response. His solution was a subtle departure from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Whereas, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan only exhorted the Muslims to edify themselves with western education, Iqbal pointedly referred to the failure of Muslims to live by the Quran, which he argued the West had already done. This idea took a life of its own. It also fuelled the idea of preservation of Muslim identity amidst what Muslims saw a hostile majority.
Obviously, this was not the first time that the idea of such redistribution of India was posited. Pakistani historian K. K. Aziz counted as many as eighty-eight schemes before Iqbal’s
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scheme. Most notable among them was one forwarded by Congress leader Lala Lajpat Rai. Chaudhry Rahmat Ali was the person who provided the demand a name and a skeleton, even if his idea of Pakistan was extremely impractical. Even though politicians that Rahmat Ali approached during his campaign for Pakistan, including Jinnah, rejected the idea as a mere students’ scheme, the idea did reflect the mood of the somewhat emerging new middle class, especially in the Muslim-majority provinces. Rahmat Ali was a man possessed. When we look back at his works, we realize that the terms of dispute and eventual partition were to be couched in language borrowed entirely from him. The arguments that Jinnah was to make in 1940 to claim a national status for Muslims were all borrowed from Rahmat Ali and to some extent from Mian Kifayet Ali, who wrote under the pseudonym A Punjabi’. It was almost as if Jinnah was arguing his case like a barrister supplied the legal arguments and facts by his instructing solicitors.
Like any barrister, Jinnah did not necessarily share the views of his client in entirety. He certainly had been no enthusiast of Urdu or Muslim identity and he never quite felt comfortable with the idea even when he tried to convince others of the role he marked out for himself in the last eight years of his life. His collaboration with Malaviya, who was a major proponent of Hindi as the official language, shows that the Muslim concerns to him came as an afterthought. This is why the final result or, to use the language of the court, relief that Jinnah got his client was so thoroughly unacceptable to Rahmat Ali, who would then go on to brand the Quaid-i-Azam of Muslim India as Quisling-i-Azam, accusing him of betraying the Muslim nation.[2]
Chaudhry Rahmat Ali’s life and background stands as a representative example of the Indian Muslim’s mind at this time,
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especially in Punjab. Rahmat Ali was born in 1897 in Punjab. His early childhood was spent in an atmosphere charged with hyper-communalism. The Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus were all at each others’ throats, contesting not just religious issues but also a shared past where one’s protagonists had often been the other’s antagonists. Taking the lead in a perpetual communal conflict, it was natural for Rahmat Ali to see the conflict in terms of us versus them. It is noteworthy that Rahmat Ali was in Lahore when Ilam Din killed Raj Pal for his book. Certainly, the communalism that emerged from the blasphemous pamphlet wars were a major contributing factor to Rahmat Ali’s Muslim nationalism. He taught in the Aitchison Chief’s College in Lahore where he came to rub shoulders with the fathers of his students who were invariably nawabs, chiefs and major landlords of Punjab. He was also simultaneously enrolled at Punjab University Law College and was for sometime an advisor and personal secretary to a Baloch chieftain called Sardar Dost Muhammad Khan Mazari of Dera Ghazi Khan district. It was his legal advice to the Mazaris that earned him a reward of Rs 67,000, which was a massive amount at the time. He used this amount to travel to England in October 1930 where he enrolled at Cambridge and Inner Temple Inn and was close to Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana,’ who had been in the Imperial Legislature and one of those pro-British Muslims Jinnah had crossed swords with.
Even before he had travelled to England, Rahmat Ali had been thinking in exclusively Muslim terms as was evident in his address to Bazm-e-Shibli, an organization he had helped found in Lahore, where he declared that north of India was Muslims and that they would make it a Muslim state, an objective only possible if north of India ceases to be Indian. He had called for the shedding of
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‘Indianism’once and for all because it was a false ideology.4 Rahmat Ali was also a vociferous opponent of the Lucknow Pact of 1916– Jinnah’s most famous achievement – which Rahmat Ali referred to as nothing less than perilous. Part of this had to do with his antipathy towards Hindus and part of it had to do with his close ties with the Muslim leaders of the Unionist Party. In 1933, Rahmat Ali released his first pamphlet called ‘Now or never; Are we to live or perish for ever?’ In this pamphlet, he denounced the idea of what he called ‘Indianism’, which to him was the byword for caste Hindu cultural life and which sought to dominate all the nationalities of the continent of ‘Dinia’, a play on the word India as being the land of many religious nations. By the time he mentioned ‘Now or Never’, he had managed to get a few other students to endorse his scheme. Thus, the Pakistan National Movement was born.[5]
Rahmat Ali attributed the name Pakistan to a spiritual vision, originally spelling it ‘Pakstan’ or the land of the Paks, with P from Punjab, A from Afghania, K from Kashmir and Stan from Balochistan. However, the more fundamental contribution than even the name was the articulation of the two-nation theory, which would one day be adopted by Jinnah and the Muslim League, even if they dismissed it as chimerical at the time. Reading through the ‘Now or Never’ document, one is struck by the fact that Jinnah’s famous address in Lahore in 1940 was heavily inspired by this document. Rahmat Ali writes: ‘In the five Northern Provinces of India, out of a total population of about forty million, we, the Muslims, constitute about thirty million. Our religion and culture, our history and tradition, our social code and economic system, our laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are fundamentally different from those of most people living in the rest of India. To Jinnah at least, at this time, these views were an anathema because

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they would stand in the way of his cherished goal of Hindu-Muslim unity, to which the majority of his life had been dedicated. Yet, seven years later, he was to repeat these arguments verbatim.
For politicians like Jinnah who had wanted Hindu-Muslim unity and a constitutional settlement, Choudhary Rahmat Ali had nothing but contempt. He writes: ‘Our brave but voiceless nation is being sacrificed on the altar of Hindu Nationalism not only by the non-Muslims, but also, to their lasting shame, by our own so-called leaders with a reckless disregard of our protests and in utter contempt of the warnings of history. The Muslim delegates at the Round Table Conference have committed an inexcusable blunder and an incredible betrayal.’ The original Pakistan demand, as stipulated by this first important circular, was reasonable to the extent that it argued that the creation of Pakistan was necessary for the benefit of the rest of India as well. However, it was the altered version that Rahmat Ali came up with later in which he proposed several enclave nations, as many as ten, within Hindustan; an utterly impractical proposal.
For Rahmat Ali, Muslims were a nation eternally bound together by the bonds of faith, a common history and experience. Jinnah would later repeat many of these arguments, without giving credit to Rahmat Ali. This was not a tactical argument as it was to Jinnah. Pakistan and other Muslim homelands were to be the fulfillment of their desire for sovereignty and the right to live as free people, living side by side Hindu, Sikh and other homelands, coming together in one cultural universe, which he curiously named Pakasia. The ‘Pak-Plan’ that Ali had envisaged for the whole of South Asia was unrealistic from the start. It was preposterous to imagine that a Hindu majority in the subcontinent would willingly agree to the redistribution of India, which would confine them to a few homelands, no matter how

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fair it might have seemed to the minorities. All the same, Muslimmajority provinces were not ready to submit to a strong centre dominated by the Hindu majority and Hindu provinces though they would have agreed to a looser federation.
By 1939, there were several schemes for a Pakistan in circulation. One such scheme was what ultimately became known as the ‘Confederacy of India’ by ‘A Punjabi’. K. K. Aziz identifies the author of the scheme as Mian Kifayet Ali, who confirmed it in his letters. There are startling revelations, which should help historians look at the entire history in a different light. For example, the original name of the scheme was ‘Pakistan’ when it went to the publishers. At the same time, it was sent to Jinnah as the president of the Muslim League. As the League had requested for alternative plans to the federation, envisaged under the Government of India Act 1935, Jinnah sent an immediate telegram to Nawab of Mamdot, the financier of the publication, asking him to change the name of the scheme. It was therefore amended and ultimately renamed ‘Confederacy of India’.
This scheme is both prophetic and another window into the mind of educated Muslim middle class of the time. Mian Kifayet Ali appears to have had a crystal ball when he made his remarkable predictions about the future of Muslim South Asia. The scheme mentions differences of history, culture, laws and ultimately religious doctrine that formed an unbridgeable gap between the two communities. However, after dwelling on these superficial but substantial differences, the author goes into the economic differences that stood in the way of Hindu-Muslim unity. It is in the end a class argument. Muslims were agriculturalists and had a weaker bourgeoisie whereas Hindus had a strong middle class. The author rightly noted that at times the protectionist tariffs affected
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Muslims and Hindus differently. Kifayet Ali predicted, that the movement for separation would be led by and fuelled by a middle class. K. K. Aziz calls this a remarkable prediction, given that it was Jinnah, a self-made man from the middle class and not the old Muslim aristocracy, who ultimately led the movement.
Other schemes included Sir Syed Abdul Latif’s scheme and Sir Abdullah Haroon’s scheme. Sir Latif’s scheme included a minimal all-India centre. Sir Abdullah Haroon proposed two separate federations. There was also the idea of a three-tiered federation as envisaged by Sir Sikandar Hayat, which as he told Penderel Moon, the ICS officer, was better than what would be far worse and by that he meant complete partition, which would lead to a slaughter of Hindus.[7] By and large, Muslims in Muslim-majority areas and also some in Hindu-majority areas were looking for constitutional schemes that would satisfy the primordial centrifugal urge of the Muslim-majority areas to separate from the Delhi centre. This primordial urge found its historian in Aitzaz Ahsan who wrote the Indus Saga, defining the areas in the North West as being historically distinct from the rest of the subcontinent.
This was because, seen from the Muslim eyes, the entire economic and political future was in the hands of the Hindu majority and the fear of marginalization was very real. W. Cantwell Smith, a writer who is particularly noted for his antipathy to Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement, while condemning the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan, wrote: ‘Middle-class Muslims realized one after another that their chance for middle-class success, pitifully meager in the present order, and, as individuals, none too bright in Free Capitalist India, would be immensely increased if they stand together as a corporate Muslim middle class and fight for power. If Pakistan were achieved they would have an opportunity
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of investing their money.”[8] At no point did the much-maligned Two Nation Theory ever say that Hindus and Muslims could not live together in one state. What it said was that just as there should be a Hindu-majority state, there ought to be a Muslim-majority state, with minorities residing in both.
With this brewing in the Muslim-majority areas, Iqbal wrote a series of letters to Jinnah in 1937, the contents of which have been referred to earlier. He wrote: “The atheistic socialism of Jawahar Lal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question, therefore, is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty?[9]” A month later, Iqbal wrote again: “The only thing that the Communal Award grants to Muslims is the recognition of their political existence in India. But such a recognition granted to people whom this constitution does not and cannot help in solving their problem of poverty can be of no value to them … it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities. Many British statesmen also realize this.'[10] Iqbal seemed to be asking Jinnah to take a decidedly Islamic line, albeit progressive and modernist; a strange appeal nonetheless to a man who had so publicly sworn off religious appeals in the past.
What Jinnah’s reaction was we do not know because when these letters were finally published, the meticulous barrister claimed not to have retained copies of his replies, a rarity for Jinnah. What is certain is that Jinnah could not have wholly agreed with the solutions presented by Iqbal, because Jinnah’s politics hitherto revolved mainly around Muslim-minority provinces. The majority provinces were to Jinnah a constant source of annoyance. As it so happens, Jinnah decided to make a Faustian bargain with the Unionist Party in Punjab. In October, Jinnah and Sir Sikandar Hayat,
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the Unionist leader, met in Lucknow and agreed to cooperate. The idea was that All India Muslim League would represent the Unionists at the centre while the Muslim League would be able to claim their ministry in Punjab as their own.
Meanwhile, Jinnah’s own personal life was going through another upheaval. Just like her strong-willed mother, Dina too decided to follow her heart. Dina had at some point been introduced through the good offices of her maternal grandmother to a young man by the name of Neville Wadia from a prominent Parsi family. Jinnah, according to M. C. Chagla’s book Roses in December, asked his daughter why, when there are millions of Muslim boys in India, would she choose a non-Muslim. To this, Dina asked why he had married Ruttie who was also a non-Muslim. Jinnah replied that she had converted to Islam. We do not know if this story is true because in any event, M. C. Chagla was not close to Jinnah in 1939 but was firmly in the opposing camp, having become Nehru’s blue-eyed boy after leaving Jinnah’s side. If true, it was a strange position to take for Jinnah, having argued so forcefully and effectively for the amendment to Special Marriage Act to allow inter-communal marriage without conversion or renunciation. Ruttie’s conversion was nominal to help Jinnah retain his Bombay Muslim seat, which he would have lost otherwise. At no point in her life did Ruttie exhibit any particular fondness for Islam. Certainly, Jinnah had made no particular effort to educate his daughter in matters of religion. Was Fatima Jinnah’s somewhat conservative Shiism to blame for this late expression of what appeared to be on the face of bigotry? Or was Jinnah simply worried that the news of his daughter’s marriage to a non-Muslim would alienate his Muslim supporters? We will
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never know since neither the father nor the daughter never quite explained this during their lifetimes.
There are other theories for this as well. One is that Neville Wadia was known to be a bit of philanderer and knowing this reputation, Jinnah was opposed to the match. Another theory is that Jinnah’s much vaunted opposition to his daughter’s marriage was only for public consumption. Whatever the case, it is clear that the relations between the father and the daughter were strained. He certainly did not disown her as Pakistani ideologues and historians claim. His driver delivered a bouquet of flowers on Dina’s wedding day. His last will and testament made shortly after the wedding had his daughter as a beneficiary along with Fatima Jinnah. The father and daughter reconciled a few years later when Rafiq Sabir, allegedly a follower of renowned Indian fascist Inayatullah Mahriqi, tried to stab Jinnah with a knife in 1943. Jinnah managed to overpower the young fanatic with the help of his secretary and house help.
On the political front, Jinnah had difficulties building up the grand Muslim coalition. Congress tried to steal the march everywhere Jinnah tried. Sindh required special attention because it was here that the idea of Pakistan found the optimum conditions to germinate and grow, primarily because of Congress’ attempts to thwart the Muslim League ministry. Sindh’s legislative assembly had 60 seats out of which 35 seats were Muslim seats.[11] The Muslim politicians of the province were divided into a number of parties, including Sindh Azad Party, Sindh United Party, Sindh Muslim Party, as well as Congress and a number of independents. Before the 1937 elections, Jinnah as the leader of the All India Muslim League attempted to create unity in the ranks by organizing a provincial parliamentary board but the effort was largely unsuccessful. As a result, the Muslim seats were divided along the following lines: Sindh
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Azad Party 3, Sindh United Party 21, Sindh Muslim Party 3, Congress 1 and Independents 7. The 25 non-Muslim seats were shared by Sindh Congress and Hindu Independent Party. Sindh United Party, which emerged as the largest party, was led by Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto and Sir Abdullah Haroon, both of whom lost their own seats, however, thus creating an opening for a coalition ministry.
Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayetullah of the Sindh Muslim Party became the first premier of Sindh in 1937 by cobbling up the Democratic Coalition Party, with the support of the Hindu Independent Party, Sindh Congress and some members of the Sindh United Party.[12] The Sindh Muslim League, meanwhile, was cobbled together in February 1938 under the leadership of Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi of the Sindh Azad Party. Hidayetullah’s ministry fell because Congress, Hindu Independent Party and Sindh United Party members withdrew their support. This brought the young Allah Bux Mohammad Omar Soomro to power as the second premier of Sindh. Soon afterwards, this coalition was also in doldrums, following a vote of no confidence. Owing to this situation of unstable government in Sindh, a fresh opportunity to make a Muslim League-led government presented itself, forcing Jinnah to take a trip to Karachi and hold a conference with major leaders. Jinnah’s objective was to unite all Muslim legislators under one umbrella.
During the marathon meetings that took place, the Sindhi Muslim leaders agreed that there should be a united Muslim party. In his statement of 13 October 1938, Jinnah stated the following: ‘On my arrival, it was made clear to me that there was a universal desire for solidarity among the Muslims of Sind. Whoever came to see me expressed most fervently the desire to bring about unity… That was the prevalent sentiment not only among Muslims but also
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among the thinking men of other communities, Hindus, Parsis and Europeans. They all desired that there should be stable government in Sindh. An agreement was reached the next day.
With the prospect of the Muslim League ministry now looming large, the Sindh Congress party leadership wired Congress High Command, asking for permission to vote individually and not as a party. This was done to show that Congress was now ready to play ball with the Premier Allah Bux Soomro. Upon finding this change in attitude, Allah Bux Soomro went back to the League leader on 12 October and told the assembled members that the only way he would join the League ministry was if they agreed to elect him as the leader, thereby going back on the agreement he had signed. This was considered an unjust demand by the members but after a day of deliberation, twenty-seven members agreed to the condition. Nevertheless, Soomro refused to play ball thereafter because by then the Congress had already assured him of their support.
Jinnah wanted to bring together a solid group of Muslim legislators and then cooperate with other parties. The result would have been a stable government in Sindh, but so obsessed was the Congress High Command with undercutting Jinnah that they essentially took back their own vote of no confidence. The impact of this must have been great on the all India situation, where in UP and Bombay, Congress majorities had disdainfully kept the Muslim League out of power despite having allied with them in the elections of 1937. To Jinnah’s mind, this meant that Congress would effectively call the shots not just in provinces where Muslims were in a minority but where they were in a majority. Sindh Muslim League thus became the first of the Muslim Leagues to resolve in favour of the creation of a separate Muslim homeland. It was an idea that was not immediately adopted by the All India Muslim
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League. In reality, the demand for separatism was always more of a paper tiger, raised to scare the Congress and its leadership into behaving better and coming to a settlement with the Muslims at an all India level. None of the main supporters of the resolution within the Muslim League in Sindh and later the resolution in the Sindh Legislative Assembly were ardent partitionists or Muslim separatists. This was certainly true of Jinnah.
Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind had left the UPMLPB and thrown its lot with the Congress. Madani explained that it was Jinnah who was responsible for this change in attitude. He claimed that Jinnah had spoken of complete independence before the elections but had later told him and his colleagues that this was only a political stunt. Jinnah denied this in a press statement, calling it completely untrue.[13] The correspondence between Jawaharlal Nehru and Jinnah didn’t go anywhere either, even though the two men sent each other regular letters throughout 1938 and 1939. On 18 January 1938, India’s future prime minister wrote to Pakistan’s future governor general that he agreed with the latter that statements through the medium of the press was not the way to conduct negotiations and that he was yet to understand the points of dispute in the interest of resolving all disputes.[14] Jinnah wrote back reciprocating his sentiments, pointing out that he was still waiting to hear from Gandhi on a letter he had sent to him earlier. He then invited Nehru for talks, provided he was ready to talk to each other instead of talking at each other. Jinnah said that he was willing to discuss all matters face to face, but Nehru kept insisting on getting the points of difference in writing. Nehru wrote detailed letters, often putting up points that were non-starters for Jinnah and Jinnah responded coolly but often acerbically, addressing him as Dear Jawaharlal or Pandit Jawaharlal.
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In one of the letters, Nehru wrote: “Then again the background of all such discussions must necessarily be a certain political and economic one – our struggle for independence, our antiimperialism, our methods of direct action when necessary, our anti-war policy, our attempt to remove the exploitation of the masses, agrarian and labour problems and the like. I take it that with the reorientation of the Muslim League’s policy there will not be any great difference regarding this anti-imperialist background.'[15] In the same letter, Nehru asked for suggestions, to which Jinnah replied, ‘Perhaps, you have heard of the fourteen points?'[16] Jinnah went on to say: ‘I consider it the duty of every true nationalist … to make it his business and examine the situation and bring about a pact between the Mussalmans and the Hindus and create a real united front; and it should be as much your anxiety and duty as it is mine … But if you desire that I should collect all these suggestions and submit to you as a petitioner for you and your colleagues to consider, I am afraid I can’t do it.'[17] Jinnah, however, did annex two articles, which explained the Muslim point of view.
In response, Nehru took upon himself to frame the issues and explain the Congress point of view. Yet, when explaining the position of the Congress in his own inimitable way, Nehru also addressed the Muslim League demand to be recognized as the representative organization of the Muslims of India. He wrote: ‘But we have to deal with all organizations and individuals that come within our ken.’ After detailing the number of Muslims in the Congress and other organizations, Nehru dropped this bombshell on Jinnah: ‘There are special Muslim organizations such as Jamiate-Ulema, the Proja Party, the Ahrars and others, which claim attention. Inevitably, the more important the organization the more the attention paid to it, but this importance does not come from
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outside recognition but from inherent strength.’[18] In other words, the rising Congress star was telling Jinnah in no uncertain terms that there were other organizations and the question of looking at Muslim League as the sole representative of the Muslims was a non-starter.
One could argue that the Congress was doing the same thing to Muslims and the League that the British had argued vis-à-vis Indians, i.e., saying that it would not negotiate with the Congress alone. Whether this was a counterproductive strategy or not cannot be said but the fact was that by the time this correspondence was taking place, Muslim League was carrying a number of regional parties within its big tent, owing to the pact between Jinnah and Sikandar Hayat. For Jinnah, it might have looked like a repeat of what Gandhi had done during the Khilafat Movement and hence, he certainly seems to have taken this as a challenge. Referring to the paragraph about inherent strength, Jinnah accused Nehru of using language and tone that exhibited the arrogance and militant spirit of a sovereign power, which Jinnah pointed out Congress was not. Using Nehru’s words, Jinnah said ‘we shall have to wait and depend on our inherent strength.'[19]
Nehru’s reply did contain an apology but significantly no indication that he had accepted Jinnah’s point of view. Jinnah did not reply. It is a strange turn of events when we consider that Jinnah’s own party had been funded by Hindu mill owners and backers of the Congress. The insistence of the Congress to deal with religious parties such as Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind and Majlis-e-Ahrar who were organized around a decidedly theological and sectarian agenda ahead of Muslim League – which though is a communal party had a purely political agenda led by a former Congressman known for his staunch Indian nationalism –
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is one of those strange mysteries which can only be explained in terms of personal likes and dislikes. In many ways, it was indeed a repeat of the critical mistake that Gandhi had made, preferring religiously inclined leaders from among the Muslim community instead of dealing with Jinnah on a footing of complete equality. At the time and later in 1928–29, the objection was that Jinnah represented only a small section of secular-minded Muslims in Muslim minority provinces. By 1937–38, Jinnah had managed to rally behind him two major Muslim-majority provinces. He had been willing to reach a settlement with the Congress and even come up with a suitable arrangement as a replacement for the Communal Award. Perhaps for this precise reason, the Congress leadership had grown more wary of him, looking at him as a crafty negotiator who was driving a hard bargain.
To Jinnah, this seemed to corfirm that Congress would instead deal with the Maulanas and religious-minded agitators instead of a constitutional politician like himself. In throwing this challenge to Jinnah, Congress inadvertently must have made Jinnah realize the power of religion in political mobilization, something he had opposed so consistently till now. While Jinnah did speak of Islam in political discourse from this point onwards, he made it a point to distinguish his ideas about Islam from the orthodoxy. Addressing the Aligarh students on 5 February 1938, Jinnah spoke at length about the dangers posed to the Muslims of India not just by the British or by the Congress but religious reactionaries within their own ranks. He spoke of his own bitter disappointments with the Congress and his attempts to come to Hindu-Muslim unity. He admitted that he had no self-respect when he went begging to the Congress but that was now changing. What the League has done is to set you free from the reactionary elements of Muslims and to
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create the opinion that those who play their selfish game are traitors. It has certainly freed you from that undesirable element of Maulvis and Maulanas.?[20] He next advised the Muslims to Remancipate the women’ for that was the key to progress.[21]
The emancipation of women would be something that Jinnah would repeat often in the course of Pakistan movement. There was a feminist dimension to the Pakistan movement that has hardly ever been underscored. Nationalism cannot afford to ignore women, especially when it comes to counting numbers. It was the women who thus formed the vanguard of popular movements, struggles, electoral battles and even war. Annie Besant, the famous English theosophist, could be regarded as one of the pioneers of women’s participation in politics. Among the conservative Muslims, we saw Ali Brothers’ mother Bi Amman jump into the fray at ripe old age in the non-cooperation and Khi afat movement. Later, Gandhian freedom struggle also saw active women’s participation. Kasturba Gandhi, Kamala Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Arun Asaf Ali are some of the names of the more famous women in the Indian freedom struggle. This was not all. It was in Lahore in 1931 that the Asian Women’s Movement was born. That first conference of barely twenty activists grew into a vibrant movement with network all over Asia. However, by and large, Muslim women remained oblivious to such developments. It was the exponential rise of progressive Muslim nationalism of the Aligarh variety in 1930s, based on the twin planks of modernity and reform, that brought the common Muslim woman out of seclusion and into the mainstream.
It was around this time that Shaista Ikramullah became the first Muslim woman to earn a doctorate and Abida Sultan became the third woman pilot in the Muslim world. Both were ardent Muslim Leaguers and later served Pakistan in several official and unofficial
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capacities. But more than this, it was the Muslim League and its leadership that for the first time asked the common Muslim women to shun chador and char dewari to become part and parcel of the political struggle.
Jinnah had been an activist for the suffrage movement in his student days in London. He was genuinely distressed to see the state of women in the Muslim community, something he alluded to on several occasions. Jinnah famously said in 1944: ‘No nation can rise to the height of glory unless your women are side by side with you; we are victims of evil customs. It is a crime against humanity that our women are shut up within the four walls of the houses as prisoners. There is no sanction anywhere for the deplorable condition in which our women have to live.’ In order to reinforce this notion, he made sure his sister was always by his side during his campaigns and political engagem nts. He no doubt realized, more than anyone else in the Muslim cornmunity, how essential women’s participation was to his struggle. After all, women’s participation meant doubling the number of voters and twice the number of agitators. As popular imagery goes, women threw off their dopattas and made flags out of them for the movement.
Thus, Jinnah galvanized the Muslim women into a veritable arm of the Muslim League. The effect was electric. Muslim women came out in large numbers attending Muslim League meetings, talking against the Maulvis and agitating against the Unionist government. In the closing stages of the civil disobedience movement in Punjab, more than 500 Muslim League women courted arrest in one day. It was here that the most famous incident of the Pakistan Movement saw a young woman, Fatima Sughra, jump the fence of the Lahore secretariat, climb up onto the top, throw away the British Union Jack and hoist the Muslim League flag up instead. In
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NWFP, where purdah was still the norm, Muslim League women courted arrest while protesting against Dr Khan Sahab’s ministry without a purdah during 1946–47. Brilliant young women poets and writers like Mumtaz Shahnawaz were among the agitators. Mumtaz Shahnawaz, whose mother Jahanara Shahnawaz was a stalwart of the Pakistan Movement and the first woman in Asia to preside over a legislative session, has left behind a touching novel on the crucial events of Partition, titled Heart Divided. Written from the Muslim League perspective, it tells the story of the struggle for Pakistan and the women’s sacrifices for the nation.
During 1938–39, Jinnah had travelled quite a distance from where he had been ten years earlier. Now, he openly questioned if the parliamentary form of government without safeguards for minorities was even applicable to India. His evolving idea was very much in the nature of what would later be identified as consociational system of government. Jinnah was certainly not the first Muslim politician to suggest this. As we have seen already, Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Sir Aga Khan were notable early proponents of this idea. To Jinnah, the idea of consociationalism was not as much his sudden protective urge for his community as much as it was a demand that he felt would help rally Muslims of the majority provinces behind him so that he could then finally negotiate an all-India settlement with the Congress. Jinnah had no love for separate electorates but felt that the idea of reserved Muslim representation would be an effective safeguard against majority communalism of which he had himself decidedly been a victim.
Thus, in the future federation of India, he would marshal Muslims into a united bloc that would be allied with the
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Ambedkarites and others like E. Ramaswami Naicker to form a grand opposition alliance in a modern federal India. He had to come up with a maximalist demand that would shock and awe the Congress into negotiating with him as the sole spokesman of the Muslims of India. This is where the idea of Pakistan, which had never personally appealed to him, became an article of faith as a sort of Plan-B nationalism. A bluff is never successful unless it is seen to be made in earnest and Jinnah certainly had the best poker face in the game.
In September 1939, World War II broke out. India became a warring party when the British Indian government declared war on Nazi Germany in the same month, without taking the Indian people into confidence. While the Congress was opposed to Nazism, they could not support the British unless independence was granted. Congress overplayed its cards as the British now naturally looked towards Jinnah who, through his Unionist alliance in Punjab, held great sway over the fighting men in India. Jinnah still attempted to reach out to Congress, asking them to take the Muslim League along with them, even telling Nehru poignantly that he was not opposed to the Congress demand. However, the Congress was at this time too far into its gravest miscalculation. Gandhi, in his interview with Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, spoke of non-violent and pacifist resistance to Hitler. When Lord Linlithgow finally asked Jinnah for his advice, Jinnah was most practical and forthcoming. He also assured the Viceroy that the Muslim League would not disrupt the war effort, provided when the war ended the British would not make a decision about the future of India without taking the Muslim League into confidence. That Jinnah was not an all-out supporter of the regime is quite clear from the fact that he forbade all Muslim League leaders from becoming part of the
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viceroy’s war council and even expelled those who disobeyed his order. This included Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz among others.
On 22 October 1939, Congress courted further disaster by resigning from the ministries in all provinces where it had power. The Congress demanded a constituent assembly there and then. The British were ready to grant immediate dominion status to India at the outbreak of the war.[22] Jinnah’s response to this was a call for day of deliverance on 22 December 1939, a day when Dr Ambedkar and Naicker both joined Jinnah in celebrations at being rid of Congress Raj. Gandhi astutely expressed sanguine hopes that Jinnah was forming the great anti-Congress party in India, which was partly true but was rejected by Jinnah. For Jinnah, keeping his plans close to his chest was the most important thing at the time. Linlithgow had asked Jinnah to come up with an alternative to Congress’ demand, sending the Muslim League brain trust into frenzy. It was ultimately a note or a memorandum prepared by Sir Zafrullah Khan that was found most appealing.[23] This was the famous Enclosure No.1 and contained the elucidation of the separation scheme as well as the clearest and the most cogent articulation of the Two Nation Theory.
Jinnah, in essence, repeated what Zafrullah had written, as we shall soon see. There has been a lot of controversy about who was the author of the Lahore Resolution but the answer becomes quite clear when one sees Zafrullah’s exposition of the Hindu-Muslim problem. More than Iqbal or Rahmat Ali, whose arguments he build his memorandum on, it was Zafrullah who gave the Muslim demand the concrete shape that it came to ultimately take through the Lahore Resolution. A textual analysis and comparison of Zafrullah’s note and Jinnah’s speech on 23 March 1940 shows us that Jinnah was regurgitating Zafrullah’s arguments, which had no doubt
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made it to his table. Jinnah had the highest regard for Zafrullah. Therefore, it is important to look at Zafrullah’s memorandum in some detail. The section on separation scheme significantly plays up the idea of Muslim majority states but then says, “We recognize that the devotion to the principle of All India Unity may in the end prove too strong to permit wisdom and foresight to govern the situation.’ So as an alternative, Zafrullah also lays down the case for an All India Federation that would take Muslim concerns into account. Stating that Muslims did not wish to take a ‘nonpossumus’ position on the matter and would be willing to examine as an alternative, the All India Federation while noting that ‘we are taking a risk of being misunderstood by our own community’, who he felt were hell bent on having North-Western and North-Eastern federations. “The federation,’ he goes on to define, ‘is essentially based on 14 points, the idea that the residuary powers must rest with the provinces’, and most importantly, as had been argued by Jinnah at the roundtable conference, princes should come into the Indian federation without any weightage, strictly on the basis of population ceding the same number of subjects to the centre as any province. While Zafrullah denigrates this to the next best alternative to separation, in reality, this is the preferred scheme that both Zafrullah and Jinnah wanted to arrive at. The separation scheme was the ruse and the threat they would want to use to force Congress to accept their idea of an Indian federation.
Jinnah was making the case for changing the status of a minority to that of a nation. By defining the Two Nation Theory in distinctly cultural terms, i.e., names, diet, heroes, lifestyle, Jinnah was making the case for a Muslim political platform that was distinct from religious dogma and was in very real sense, a secular political ideal -a nation defined by common history, cultural values and territorial
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homelands. It was also an overriding idea, which sought to paper over doctrinal differences between various sectarian groups. More significantly, the Two Nation Theory held Indian Muslims to be a nation – this was implied, and not all Muslims around the world. This became a point of contention between Gandhi and Jinnah. Jinnah made it clear when he said that Muslims had demanded self-determination on the basis of India for Indians and that Muslims were Indians. In other words, their claim to the right of self-determination was based on the principle that Muslims were the sons and daughters of India and not outside its milieu.
One of the common myths about the Two Nation Theory that is prevalent in both India and Pakistan is the claim that it postulated that Hindus and Muslims could not live together in one country. The claim that Muslims were a nation did not preclude coexistence with Hindus at any time. Only two months before the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah had given a detailed exposition of his ideas in The Time and Tide of London, where he explained that the final constitutional structure should be one where Hindus and Muslims ‘both must share the governance of their common motherland.[24] It was not that Jinnah had turned against Western democracy, particularly of the Westminster kind, but he was arguing that such a democracy has to be qualified. He wrote: ‘The Muslim people have cause to question the wisdom of the British Government in forcing on India the Western system of democracy without qualifications and limitations to which the system must be subject to make it at all suitable for Indian conditions.[25]
He explained at length what those special Indian conditions were that needed qualifications and limitations: “The British people, being Christians, sometimes forget the religious wars of their own history and today consider religion as a private and
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personal matter between man and god.[26] Interestingly, five years earlier, Jinnah had said exactly the same thing about religion in the subcontinent but the interim period had probably made him re-assess that situation. Now, he spoke of Hinduism and Islam governing law and culture precluding the ‘merging of identity and unity of thought, on which Western democracy is based, and inevitably bring about vertical rather than horizontal divisions that democracy envisages.[27] This was a statement of fact at least from Jinnah’s angle. He was not necessarily enamoured of the situation himself because he goes on to write: ‘There are in India roughly 400 million souls who, through no fault of their own, are hopelessly illiterate and consequently, priest and caste ridden.'[28] Jinnah also suggested that the experience of Congress rule was that ‘a Kulturkampf was inaugurated.[29] Then he spoke of the remedy, which may be reproduced in entirety:
1. The British people must realize that unqualified Western
democracy is totally unsuited for India and attempts to
impose it must cease. 2. In India, it must be accepted that ‘party’ Government is
not suitable and all governments, Central or Provincial, must be governments that represent all sections of the people.[30]
This was not an ardent ‘partitionist’. These were the words of a consociationalist. Earlier in his talks with Lord Linlithgow, Jinnah had spoken as a chastened nationalist. He had admitted to the viceroy that he saw no solution and that he did not now believe that this country was competent to run a democracy and he and others who had advocated a reformed system of government
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had, he felt in the light of practical experience, ‘formed a wrong judgment of the capacity of India to run such a system, that they had been carried away by their patriotic and nationalistic feelings into a wrong estimate of difficulties involved in the establishment and conduct of such a system and that such a ‘view was not confined to the Muslims.’ Linlithgow wrote: ‘He was clear, that “none of us” who had pressed for reforms had really thought the thing out at the time. They had been carried away by their natural desire for home rule and by their equally natural objection – an objection any man must have – to government by aliens. But he was satisfied now, he thought, that the present system would not work and that a mistake has been made by going so far.’ The alternative was a federal consociationalist state, which Jinnah was arguing for now.
That the Lahore Resolution came barely two months after the publication of the Time and Tide article has been cited as a contradiction or a change of position by some biographers of Jinnah.[31] It was, however, not a contradiction if we review carefully the actual text of the document. The last two paragraphs deserve our consideration. The second last paragraph deals with the minorities’ question:
That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for the minorities in these units and in these regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious,
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cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.[32]
The word ‘constitution’ here is singular and not qualified with constitution of Muslim-majority areas or constitution of Hindumajority areas. There is one constitution and one provision. Whether it was supposed to be an interim constitution is something that was left deliberately vague, but we get a better sense of the scheme when we look at the paragraph that follows: ‘The Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary. “[33]
So we see the constitution is singular and does not still contain a complete divorce despite assumptions of all powers’ eventually. If it was not a confederation but outright separation that was being envisaged here, it certainly is clear that there is an interim period. However, the last line ‘such other matters as may be necessary envisages a link still at some level between these various regions on an all-India level. The Lahore Resolution thus is entirely consistent with the idea of a confederation.
A very important speech of Jinnah’s that has not received the attention it should have was made to the Indian legislature on 19 November 1940. It was important enough to be included in a book that Jinnah and Muhammad Toosi published together called Problem of India’s future Constitution. Jinnah said that Congress looked at Muslims as a minority but Muslims have had at the back the basis
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that they are a separate entity, a position they have held on to for twenty-five years.[34] At this point, Madhav Shrihari Aney of the Congress Nationalist Party (a breakaway faction of the Congress) intervened and said: “At least that was not the view of Mr Jinnah before 1920.[35] Jinnah replied that it had been his view since 1916 when the fundamental basis of agreement was two separate entities. This was a striking statement, given that prima facie it contradicted many of the positions Jinnah had taken right up to 1937, but it also was true in the sense that Lucknow Pact, that great moment of unity was also significant in it signaling an acceptance of the existence of Hindu-Muslim cleavage. | The very idea of Hindu-Muslim unity – that cherished goal Jinnah and Gandhi shared for so long – was pregnant with the idea that there were two separate entities that needed to be united. It was this explicit acknowledgement of the political significance of these communities that to Jinnah and most Muslims had become the basis for further settlement and for ways to merge Hindus and Muslims into one territorial Indian nation. Obviously, this was a statement of fact and as we have seen for Jinnah this had initially been more of a cause of annoyance and frustration. It was also realism because the ground reality was that India was a deeply divided, community-ridden, caste-ridden and priest-ridden society. Muslims, Hindus, etc. were statutorily defined categories and Jinnah was operating in this context as a politician.
Many astute thinkers from India have more appropriately described the Two Nation Theory as ‘secular communalism’. In Pakistan, Hamza Alavi described the Pakistan Movement as a secular Muslim movement of the Muslim salaried classes, which is also confirmed by W. C. Smith’s analysis above. Was Islam a feature of the Two Nation Theory? Yes, but as Faisal Devji makes the case,
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this was an Islam ontologically emptied, a secularized husk, which provided the broad contours of identity and not really the substance and basis for things like legislation and polity. In that sense, it was never about establishing an Islamic state, which sought to privilege one idea of Islam over another or to privilege Muslims over other citizens. The theory, as put forward by Muslim League, was a counterbalance to the claims of the one nation theory of the Indian National Congress that the leaders of the Muslim League thought would relegate Muslims to a permanent minority. It was a group within a larger group, a nation within a nation and an autonomous territory within a territory, firmly rooted in the Indian subcontinent.
Even if this is to be described as a revisionist view of history, it is certainly confirmed by the prescient account of H. V. Hodson, who was the Reforms Commissioner in India in 1941. Hodson wrote in clear terms very soon after the Lahore Resolution that every Muslim Leaguer from Jinnah down to the last one interpreted the Pakistan idea as consistent with the idea of a confederation of India. Hodson believed that ‘Pakistan’ was a ‘revolt against minority status’ and a call for power sharing and not just defining rules of conduct how a majority (in this case Hindu) would govern India. He spoke of an acute realization that the minority status with all the safeguards could only amount to a “Cinderella with trade union rights and radio in the kitchen but still below the stairs.’ Jinnah’s comment was that Hodson had finally understood what the League was after, but that he could not publicly come out with these fundamental truths, as these were likely to be misunderstood at the time.[36] It does not become clearer than this when one is seeking evidence for the claim that for Jinnah, the idea of Pakistan was at best a tactical countermove aimed at uniting the Muslims from majority areas with Muslims from minority areas.
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The Lahore Resolution did not envisage a Partition of India per se. It remained vague in so much as it used both “autonomous’ and ‘sovereign’ for constituent units with contiguous Muslim majorities. Thus, the issue really was of sovereignty for Muslim majority areas, which itself went against the grain of the interests of the Muslim League’s core constituency, i.e., the Muslim salaried classes of UP and Bombay – indeed nothing less than a reversal of the famed Lucknow Pact that Jinnah had engineered twenty-four years prior. It was what the resolution implied that was most significant, i.e., an extended period of time where foreign affairs, defence and customs would remain the domain of a centre. This was the bargaining counter that Jinnah wanted to equip himself with. One could argue that for Jinnah, the separate federation of Muslim majority provinces was always in the realm of possibility but whatever the final settlement between Muslim community qua nation and Hindu community qua nation, there were going to be minorities in both states and an overarching treaty or constitutional arrangement for the protection of their status as equal citizens within Pakistan and Hindustan, which together would constitute India the ancient geographical and cultural unity. It was an India of at least two mansions. Thus, with one stroke, Jinnah sought to resolve the special concerns of Muslim-majority provinces against a unitary centre, protect Muslim minorities in Hindu-majority provinces, deliver a piece of the sovereignty pie to his Muslim constituents and bring about permanent Hindu-Muslim unity in the subcontinent.
If Jinnah had become a separatist, it was not because he had ceased to be an Indian, which he was still proud to be, but because he had re-conceptualized the whole idea of India into either a treaty organization or a confederation. This was his maximum demand but he was still willing to settle for something less, a loose Indian
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federation, which would secure for Muslims a semblance of security as a safeguard against the tyranny of the permanent cultural majority. This was a counter-majoritarian vision, which was built on the idea of power sharing, consensus and communal vetoes for all communities, especially the two main ones. It is true that Jinnah had till the late 1920s believed in working the reforms to an extent that a responsible government on the British model would serve India, but his ideas had evolved as a consequence of what he saw was the rise of communal sentiment and the use of religion in politics, which he had opposed.
The terms, therefore, were simple: A united India based on a power-sharing agreement between Hindus, Muslims and other communities, or two separate federations, which would then make parliamentary democracy possible. The real underlying slogan, therefore, was not Pakistan or Islam in danger (a slogan that Jinnah did not use at any point) but rather ‘United India or Parliamentary Democracy’. There is a tendency among our writers to now look back and say that the Two Nation Theory was the antithesis of secularism but in the 1940s at least, it was forwarded by two menAmbedkar and Jinnah – who were perhaps the most secular-minded politicians in South Asia. Under the heading “A nation calling for a home’ in his book Pakistan or the Partition of India, Ambedkar articulately explains, ‘Thus, the things that divide are far more vital than the things which unite. In depending upon certain common features of Hindu and Mahomedan social life, in relying upon common language, common race and common country, the Hindu is mistaking what is accidental and superficial for what is essential and fundamental. The political and religious antagonisms divide the Hindus and the Musalmans far more deeply than the so-called common things are able to bind them together… The Muslims have developed a “will to live as a nation”. For them, nature has found
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a territory, which they can occupy and make it a state as well as a cultural home … they can call their own.’
Yet, it would be a terrible reduction of the complexity of Ambedkar’s argument to suggest that he was suggesting an irrevocable partition of India. In Chapter XV titled, “Who can Decide’, Ambedkar sets down, as the great constitutional lawyer that he was, the draft of his own Government of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act, which laid down the best solution to the communal question, leading to either an amicable divorce or a gradual integration of Hindus and Muslims. Sadly, no one has paid any real attention to this remarkable draft legislation because it contained within it the germs of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which ultimately the Muslim League accepted and which could have averted Partition. However, Ambedkar’s plan was better. Ambedkar played a great role in influencing Jinnah’s ideas on a communal settlement.
Ambedkar and Jinnah had been natural allies as men of the law and as leaders of groups outside the upper-caste milieu of Hindudom. Ambedkar, Jinnah and Naicker formed a formidable trio against what they perceived to be caste Hindu domination that Congress and its Hindu Mahasabha allies were hell bent on imposing on India. It may also be pointed out that Ambedkar was never an uncritical ally of Jinnah. He criticized Jinnah, publicly and privately, wherever and whenever he felt Jinnah was making a mistake and Jinnah for once took it uncharacteristically. It was a relationship of peers and very few leaders could claim that kind of relationship with the newly minted Quaid-i-Azam of the Muslims.
The progress of the war in Europe and the rise of the Nazi tide was a major point of concern, especially for those members of the
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Muslim League, like Sir Sikandar Hayat and his loyalist supporters, who believed in the idea of benevolent British rule. They wanted to cooperate fully with the war effort. For Jinnah, this posed a dilemma. While he was opposed to obstructing the war effort in anyway, as a nationalist, he did not feel so keen as to come out entirely in support of the British government, which had kept Indians out of the decision-making process. The League’s policy was that the provinces could aid the war effort in their own way but wherever there was a conflict between League’s policy and call for independence and the British requirements, the League’s policy would supersede. Given the penchant of the pro-British members of the party to join government’s efforts to rally the Indians to its cause, the central League council passed a resolution empowering the president as the executive authority to deal with matters pertaining to the war effort.
In August 1940, the Government of India came up with what has gone down in history as the August Offer, which offered Indians a representative constituent assembly after the war in return for cooperation. This August Offer was in essence more favourable to the League than the Congress because it explicitly recognized that India comprised many sections and that any system that would be evolved would have take into account the diversity of the land and the social and political conditions prevalent in India. To Congress, this amounted to giving Muslim League and Jinnah a veto, something that the British were quick to deny. L. S. Amery, the new Secretary of State for India, specifically told the Congress that Muslims had been given no such veto. Jinnah and the Muslim League also rejected the August Offer subsequently, because it did not contain a specific reference to a guarantee that their demands would be taken into consideration.
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Meanwhile, Jinnah upped the ante by demanding that any ‘national government’ formed during the war should have 50 per cent representation of the Muslim League so that there would be parity between the two parties. The Viceroy refused to concede this demand but began offering Muslim League leaders a chance to join the National Defence Council, which Jinnah firmly forbade Leaguers. Sir Sikandar Hayat and A. K. Fazlul Haq, the premiers of Punjab and Bengal respectively, tried to join but ultimately had to give up their positions on NDC. Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz had been nominated to the NDC as a representative of women. She writes: ‘I wrote to Mr Jinnah, drawing his attention to this all-important question. I requested him to allow me to remain a member, as I had not been nominated as a Muslim but as a representative of the women of India, but he did not agree. All Muslim chief ministers, including Sikandar Hayat, resigned…[37] She was convinced by Sikandar Hayat not to resign and consequently, her membership was terminated. Jinnah had great personal regard for Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz and the work she did for the Muslim League but did not see why an exception could be made when Muslim League had decided not to endorse the government’s August Offer. He was acutely aware of the capacity of Punjab’s Muslim politicians to line up on British command and therefore, made it a zero-tolerance policy. Non-obstruction of the war effort did not mean pusillanimous submission to the Raj.
By 1940, Jinnah in his opposition to the Congress seemed to have created a broad appeal for himself beyond the Muslim community. This is where his tragedy truly lies. He was the only politician who was capable of forming a second mass non-communal party by bringing together Muslims, Dalits, Christians, Sikhs and other groups, especially in south of India, on a completely secular
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platform that was in line with his views from the time he was in Congress. This belongs in the what-ifs of history, but it would have certainly been major group that would have given the Congress a run for its money. On his sixty-fourth birthday, eighty-three eminent and influential figures of Indian life from all communities gave him a reception, acknowledging his great contributions to India and its political advancement. Sir Cattamanchi Ramalinga Reddy, the great Indian educationist, called him ‘the pride of India and not the exclusive possession of the Muslims.’ R. K. Shanmukham Chetty, the future finance minister of India, called Jinnah a ‘realistic patriot’ who’yields to none in his enthusiasm to obtain the political emancipation of his country.”
However, it was Mylai Chinna Thambi Pillai Rajah, the Tamil politician and scheduled caste leader, who probably paid the most elaborate tribute to Jinnah and his leadership: ‘All religions hold the belief that God sends suitable men into the world to work out his plans from time to time, and at critical junctures. I regard Mr Jinnah as the man who has been called upon to correct the wrong ways into which the people of India have been led by the Congress … [H]e is championing the claims of all classes who stand the danger of being crushed under the steam roller of a caste Hindu majority.:[38] Years later, a letter from E. V. Ramaswami Naicker hinted at a broader role for Jinnah but his appeal was couched in language that sought the right of self-determination for the Dravidian people of southern India.[39] Jinnah’s response was that he could only speak for Muslim India but any just and fair demand on part of any section of people of India would always have his support.
Could Jinnah not have banded together these men and also roped in Dr B. R. Ambedkar and formed a non-communal minorities party, an All India Minorities League instead of an All
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India Muslim League, which would have worked together as the great counterbalance to the Congress? Perhaps he realized that the interests of the Muslims in Muslim-majority provinces would have trumped any such cross-communal alliance. It was none other Gandhi who almost challenged Jinnah to make such a party so that instead of making the issue inter-communal parties, it would become an issue of two secular political parties. Writing on 16 January 1940, Gandhi said: ‘I do not mind your opposition to the Congress. But your plan to amalgamate all the parties opposed to the Congress at once gives your movement a national character. If you succeed you will free the country from the communal incubus… ‘[40] In his article in the Harijan, which he sent Jinnah, Gandhi wrote: ‘He is thus lifting the Muslim League out of the communal rut and giving it a national character… ‘[41] Jinnah’s reply must surely have disappointed the elderly Mahatma for he began by declaring that Gandhi was proceeding on the basis of a wrong idea, i.e., India is one nation. While Jinnah acknowledged that Gandhi had perceived the real meaning of the day of deliverance, Jinnah indicated that it was a case of adversity makes strange bedfellows’.
History would have been different had Jinnah followed the line suggested by Gandhi despite whatever grievances he had against him. Had he been younger or if Ruttie had not passed away so tragically, Jinnah may just have made this party, which was needed, and which would not just have helped evade the great divide of 1947 but would have ushered in a proper two-party system that would ultimately have developed along the lines of Republicans and Democrats in the US. There was no politician better suited to do so. Let us revisit what Ambedkar had to say about it:
‘There are many lower orders in the Hindu society whose economic, political and social needs are the same as those of the
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majority of the Muslims, and they would be far more ready to make a common cause with the Muslims for achieving common ends than they would with the high caste of Hindus who have denied and deprived them of ordinary human rights for centuries.[42] This was the opportunity to overturn the logic and politics of categories once and for all but Jinnah failed to take it. Had Jinnah done so instead of pursuing the idea of Muslim nationalism, he may not have founded a nation state but would have gone down in history as a much less polarizing figure than he eventually became.
By this time, there seemed to have come about a fundamental change in his approach to the question of nationality. Or maybe he was just driven by his deep concern for Muslims and their economic and social plight. This change of principles and his dogged commitment to his community qua nation above all else post 1940, which was an antithesis of the very condition on which he had joined Muslim League in 1913, remains an unexplained mystery and is likely to remain so because Jinnah never actually explained it himself. It was certainly no late-in-life religious conversion. Jinnah remained the fashionable dandy he always was and nothing seems to suggest that he had suddenly become a religious or a pious Muslim. What we must stipulate is that Jinnah, despite enjoying the confidence of many people in different communities, saw himself as the spokesman for Muslim India and did not attempt to speak for others after 1940. India lost out on Jinnah and Jinnah missed out on the true greatness for which the providence seemed to have earmarked him, becoming instead the founding father of a country that has remained in a perpetual identity crisis since birth and tragically more a discredit than credit to the man he was.
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Jinnah was always willing to meet Gandhi to resolve the HinduMuslim question. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru wrote to Jinnah on 6 February 1941, asking him to agree to meet Gandhi because ‘For if the country is dear to him, I believe, it is no less dear to you … I still prefer to look upon you as I used to in days gone by when other people also looked up to you, for guidance and advocacy of the cause of India, irrespective of caste, colour or creed.[43] Jinnah replied on 10 February 1941, saying, ‘I have always been ready to see Mr Gandhi or any other Hindu leader on behalf of the Hindu community and do all I can to help the solution of the HinduMuslim problem.[44] Sadly, nothing came out of this effort either. It seems that Sapru annoyed Jinnah enough with his statement dated 29 April 1941 that Jinnah published the correspondence in full on 1 May 1941. It is easy to see the real point of dispute here. Jinnah’s insistence that Gandhi, and by extension Nehru and other Congress leaders, should come forth as representatives of Hindus and not all Indians was borne out of the edifice that had been built by the Raj since 1909. It was not that Jinnah did not think a Hindu could not represent the Muslims, but to him it was elementary that if Congress failed to win Muslim seats, it did not represent the Muslims. This for Congress was an issue that hit at the root of its claim to represent all Indians and not just Hindus. The dispute was one of representative credentials and not necessarily communal versus secular, as was framed by the Congress.
In 1942, the British tried once more to resolve the Indian tangle by sending Sir Stafford Cripps. Cripps’ proposals were presented in form of draft declaration which had this objective: “The object is the creation of a new Indian Union, which shall constitute a Dominion associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every
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respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.'[45] Significantly, it also provided the following: “The right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides. With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty’s Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.[46] Arguably, this was a victory for Jinnah because the principle of a separate federation for Muslim-majority provinces was acceded to. However, there was a significant difference between what Jinnah had asked for and what the British were ready to give. Dr Ambedkar, the consummate constitutional jurist that he was, was among the very few who grasped that vital difference. He wrote that his alternative plan, which has been referred to above, was community based and therefore more realistic than the Cripps’ plan.
C. Rajagopalachari came up with what is known as C R Formula. This formula. It was predicated on the same basis as Cripps’ plan but spoke of demarcation of Muslim districts with absolute Muslim majorities where there would be a plebiscite on the basis of adult franchise. Predictably, Jinnah scorned the idea because his objective was an all-India community plebiscite and not a territorial plebiscite based on Muslim-majority districts. This plan was more offensive to Jinnah than anything else because it not only left his supporters in Hindu-majority areas in the lurch but also meant a partition of Punjab and Bengal, propositions that were unacceptable to Jinnah’s followers in those two provinces. It also gives us an understanding that this was not the Pakistan he was after and yet it was so precisely the Pakistan that he did get in
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1947. Therefore, it is fair to say that by rejecting Cripps’ proposal, followed by the C R Formula, Jinnah actually did not agree to the Pakistan he would eventually get. Arguably then, he was not looking for a complete divorce but rather a negotiated settlement.
It is important also to revisit the issue of the Ahmadis that was briefly touched upon in the previous chapter. This is important because the Ahmadi issue is something that would become a major constitutional crisis in Pakistan after independence, which has often ignited the debate around Pakistan’s founding ideology, if there was such a thing. Though there were some in the Muslim League who were willing to play ball, Jinnah refused point blank to give into such blackmail by his questioners. On 23 May 1944, he said, “A vexed question was put to me, “Among Muslims, who can become a member of Muslim Conference?” and this question was particularly in reference to Qadianis. My answer was that so far as the constitution of the All India Muslim League was concerned, it is laid down there that any Muslim, irrespective of his creed or sect, if he wishes to join the All India Muslim League, he can do so, provided he accepts the creed, policy and program of the All India Muslim League and signs the form of membership and pays his subscription of two annas. I would appeal to Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir not to raise any sectarian issues, but to organize the Musalmans and bring them on one platform and under one flag.[47] He pointed out that such a course would bode well for not just Muslims but all communities of India.
Earlier on 4 May 1944, the newspaper founded by Jinnah, Dawn, had reported this: ‘Mr M A Jinnah was pleased to assure him that according to the latest constitution of the All India Muslim League, there was no bar to the members of the Ahmadiyya Community joining the Muslim League and that as members of the Muslim League they would be entitled to such privileges as are enjoyed by
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members of other various sects of Muslims.[48] Jinnah, therefore, was unequivocal in his opposition to any attempts to define what a ‘Muslim’ meant. To him, a Muslim was one who professed to be a Muslim. This right to self-identify was especially crucial since he represented a community that was as divided along sectarian lines as the Hindu community was divided along caste lines. The reason this point needs to be underscored is in view of the abysmal treatment of this community, both Qadianis and Lahoris, by Pakistan after 1974. It militates against what Jinnah’s own personal view and relationship was with them.
We must also consider the mistakes Congress made in furthering parties hostile to the Muslim League. Some of these so-called ‘nationalist Muslim’ parties were so horribly outstep with Congress’ liberal and secular protestations. For example, the Congress supported the Majlis-e-Ahrar, who in turn used the vilest religious propaganda against Jinnah, Muslim League, Shias and Ahmadis, so long as their objective of weakening the League was met. Ayesha Jalal writes: “There was something peculiar about a “secular” nationalist party counting on the vocal support of anti-imperial cultural relativists of Ahrar and Madani to claim a Muslim following. A spate of pamphlets published by Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind and Ahrar delighted in exposing the League’s lack of Islamic credentials, pointing to Jinnah’s emphatic assertions about Pakistan being a democracy in which Hindus and Sikhs would have an almost equal population.’
Maulana Madani, another Congress favourite, did not attack Jinnah personally but attacked him for having supported the right to civil marriage between Hindus and Muslims and for watering down Shariat bills. The tragedy was that instead of coming to some sort of a power-sharing arrangement with the Muslim League, the Congress continued to champion these so-called nationalist
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Muslims who were in essence utterly medieval and reactionary towards other Muslims.
While Gandhi seemed to be more inclined towards a settlement with religious Muslims always, what is surprising is Nehru’s attitude since he modelled himself as a man of enlightenment. Commenting on the Jinnah and Nehru clash, veteran Indian lawyer and journalist, A. G. Noorani once poignantly wrote that the real tragedy emerges not from a clash between good and evil but between good and good. Men like Gandhi, Jinnah and Nehru had manifestly good intentions, but their clash set the stage for the tragedy that continues to haunt the subcontinent till today.
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The Birth OF PAKISTAN
In wake of the Quit India Movement, Gandhi and the Congress leadership had been sent to jail. It was one bad move after another on part of the Congress leadership because it left the field open for the constitutionalist barrister who never broke the law. In May 1944, Gandhi was released from the jail. On 17 July, the elderly Mahatma wrote to the Quaid-i-Azam in Gujarati: ‘Brother Jinnah, there was a time when I could induce you to speak in our mother tongue. Today, I take the courage to write to you in the same language … Don’t regard me as the enemy of Islam or of Muslims of this country. I am the friend and servant of not only you but of the whole world. Do not disappoint me.’ Jinnah wrote back on 24 July 1944: ‘Dear Mr Gandhi … I shall be glad to receive you at my house in Bombay … I am very very pleased to read in the Press that you are making good progress and I hope that you will soon be all right.[1]
Reactionaries and loyalists who were opposed to these talks, especially in Punjab, were naturally alarmed. Nawabzada Khurshid Ali Khan in Punjab took the offensive side by declaring that Muslim League was hampering the war effort. The President of the Lahore Muslim League responded to these allegations through the Press: ‘I
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have seen reported in the press, a statement by Nawabzada Khurshid Ali Khan … he is not happy about the coming talks between MrMA Jinnah and Mr Gandhi, and suddenly there sprung up sympathy for other interests in this country. He questions the integrity of the two greatest Indian leaders. For anyone, particularly a Muslim, to doubt the integrity or honesty of the purpose of Mr Jinnah is indeed to stoop very low … In no democratic country are military representatives allowed to interfere or take part or be consulted in political problems or shape policy and India cannot be an exception.'[2] Notable here is the reference to India as this country. This is in 1944, four years after the Lahore Resolution. Clearly, most Muslim Leaguers did not see Pakistan as something divorced from the rest of India.
The Mahatma and the Quaid-i-Azam met in September of 1944 at Jinnah’s house. The discussions centered around the working of the Lahore Resolution and the meaning of the Two Nation Theory. Gandhi reported that Jinnah had drawn an alluring picture of Pakistan as a perfect democracy, which would safeguard minorities. The two barristers now crossed swords and while Gandhi had never quite been as successful at law as Jinnah, he proved to be an equal match. Gandhi reminded Jinnah that he had said that democracy was not suitable to Indian conditions and Jinnah replied that it was with respect to imposed democracy. Jinnah’s position on parliamentary democracy was with respect to qualifications he thought were needed in a united India. Now he was arguing a different case altogether, i.e., division of British India into Hindustan and Pakistan. Jinnah had started off by questioning the representative status but the discussion soon moved away from that. The point of disagreement was the Two Nation Theory.
The Theory was number 15(b) of Gandhi’s questions posed in his letter dated 15 September 1944.) In his first response Jinnah
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refused to address this issue. When pressed by Gandhi again on the issue, Jinnah explained: ‘Ours is a case of division and carving out two independent sovereign states by way of a settlement between two nations, Hindus and Muslims … it does not arise as a matter of clarification, for it will be a matter for the constitution-making body chosen by Pakistan to deal with and decide all matters as a sovereign body representing Pakistan vis-à-vis the constitutionmaking body of Hindustan or any other party concerned. There cannot be defence and similar matters of “common concern” when it is accepted that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate sovereign States.'[4] This naturally alarmed Gandhi, who wrote: “You summarily reject the idea of common interest between the two arms. I can be no willing party to a division, which does not provide the simultaneous safeguarding of common interest such as defence, foreign affairs and the like. There will be no feeling of security by the people of India without recognition of the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity.’s From this round of correspondence, one could conclude that Jinnah was asking for complete separation into two independent national states, completely sovereign and foreign to each other, except Jinnah’s reply to this puts a completely different light on the matter.
On 23 September, Jinnah responded: ‘I am sorry that you think I have summarily rejected the idea of common interest between the two arms, and now you put it somewhat differently from 15(b), when you say there will no feeling of security by the people of India without a recognition of the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity. My answer, already given, is that it will be for the constitution-making body of Pakistan and that of Hindustan or any other party concerned, to deal with such matters
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on the footing of there being two independent states.’ The idea was to first divide and then bring the two nations together through a bilateral treaty between the two states. This matter continued to be agitated between the two with regard to final shape of an India central authority, which Gandhi wanted to be bound together as a Union through one constitution and Jinnah apparently wanted through a treaty between two sovereign states, a position that it might be added seemed to vary on Jinnah’s part. The other point of dispute was the nature of the plebiscite. Gandhi was ready to grant a territorial plebiscite in Muslim-majority areas based on adult franchise while Jinnah insisted on an all-India communitybased plebiscite, just as Ambedkar had proposed, to determine the Pakistan question. It was during this correspondence that Jinnah referred Ambedkar’s book to Gandhi and Gandhi responded with ‘Dr Ambedkar’s thesis, while it is ably written, has carried no conviction to me.'[6]
One wonders if Gandhi had gone through Ambedkar’s book in detail and seen his proposal contained in Chapter XV. Ambedkar’s plan provided for a trial separation and, most importantly, a link between Pakistan and Hindustan through the Council of India. After delineating upon how he came to the conclusions he did, Ambedkar wrote: ‘In my judgment, more important than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be adopted in bringing about Pakistan, if the object is that after Partition Pakistan and Hindustan should continue as two friendly States with goodwill and no malice towards each other.'[7] Ambedkar was sending out a clue to the Congress leadership. Jinnah was recommending the book to Gandhi. However, tragically Gandhi said that the book did not carry any conviction for him. Nevertheless, Gandhi and the Congress had taken a risk by even considering the possibility
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of a Pakistan, because V. D. Savarkar was quick to tell Gandhi that Indian provinces were not his personal possession to give them up in this manner. Therein lay the major difference between Savarkar’s idea of a united India and that of Congress, as well as Savarkar’s idea of the Two Nation Theory and that of Jinnah. Savarkar believed in one India with two nations where the Hindu nation dominated the Muslim nation. Jinnah, instead, argued parity or separate federations. Most of Muslim League supporters were of a democratic mindset and not necessarily the religious fanatics.
It must be remembered that the enthusiasm for Jinnah’s demand did not come from Muslims alone. Lal Din Sharaf Sargodhvi, a Christian political activist, had organized a party called Christian League that worked in tandem with the Muslim League.[8] Jinnah attended a public meeting with Sargodhvi in Quetta. There was also great enthusiasm for the Pakistan Movement among the scheduled castes. Jinnah Papers received several letters from nonMuslim well wishers, mostly christian and scheduled caste Hindus, who continued to praise Jinnah for his efforts and saw in his ideas an escape from what they viewed as caste Hindu tyranny in perpetuity. For most of these interlocutors, this was not necessarily a vision of tearing India apart but to create a truly federated structure with autonomous regions that would checkmate the idea of tyranny of the majority. The communal versus secular narrative that was superimposed on Pakistan versus united India narrative fails miserably to account for this as well as the support that Communist Party of India gave to the Muslim League in its demand of Pakistan.
The Communist Party of India not only supported the Muslim League but also gave its own people like Sajjad Zaheer, Abdullah Malik and Daniyal Latifi to the League. Daniyal Latifi, who was

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trained in law by Jinnah himself, authored the Punjab Muslim League’s manifesto for the 1945–46 elections, which was one of the most progressive manifestos in the history of this region. The same Daniyal Latifi then went on to represent Shah Bano in the Indian Supreme Court long after independence, winning her a historic verdict that was overturned by the secular Congress. The League’s entire election campaign in the 1945–46 elections was stage-managed in Punjab by the Communist Party of India. They would not have done so if they had thought the League was operating on a narrow communal agenda. Indeed, Sajjad Zaheer described the Muslim League as a great progressive liberationist force declaring further that the task of every patriot is to welcome and help this democratic growth, which at long last is now taking place among the Muslims of Punjab.”[9]
Therefore, the complex and nuanced set of events that led to the Partition of India do not quite gel with the ideological and nationalist mythologies that the people of India and Pakistan have been subjected to. For Pakistan, it continues to be a matter of life and death, unless, we take everything in entirety and resolve our identity crisis, we shall continue to be in a limbo.
Along with the proposals and plans of the Muslim League and Congress there were several other plans that were conceptualized by the British also during this period. One of them was the plan by the Secretary of State Amery who wanted to give immediate dominion status to India, which would have for the most part put the responsibility directly on the Indians themselves. It was in line with Gandhi’s claim that the existence of the third party, i.e., the British Government, caused the communal tangle. However, this
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brave new plan did not see the light of day. There was also Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru’s committee, which presented its report in March 1945, calling for a national government with parity between caste Hindus and Muslims in both the constitution-making body and at the Centre, joint electorates and three-fourth majority for any decisions taken. This was rejected by most of the Hindu politicians because of the proposed parity and by the Muslim League on the erstwhile excuse that it ruled out Pakistan. There was also the Desai–Liaquat Plan, which emerged out of Liaquat Ali Khan and Bhulabhai Desai’s talks, which called for an interim government based on League-Congress parity and one-fifth of the seats for other elements. No progress was made on this issue either, as Jinnah denied all knowledge of it and Liaquat Ali Khan backed out of it.
Lord Archibald Wavell, who had become the Viceroy of India in 1944, convened the Simla Conference in June 1945. This conference was to determine the composition of an interim government. It recognized the principle of parity between caste Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi was obviously not in favour of this and told the Viceroy that he was quite capable of advising Congress to only appoint non-caste Hindus. Ultimately, the Congress said that it should also control the appointment of communities other than caste Hindus. Jinnah insisted that Muslim League should appoint Muslim members and argued that even then Muslims would be in a minority because all other elements would vote for Congress. He suggested a communal veto to be given to Muslims. It was a rather fanciful demand but Jinnah was a master at negotiation and was driving for a bargain most favourable for his client – the Muslim community qua nation.
During the conference, Jinnah interjected that Congress only represented Hindus – a remarkable reversal from what he had
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said twenty years earlier in his letter to the Times of India. Khan Abdul Jabbar Khan, the premier of NWFP, objected strongly to this statement. Ultimately, it was resolved when it was stated that Congress represented its members. Jinnah replied “I accept that.’ Jinnah then made his points, which roughly followed the following lines:
1. The proposals were only a stopgap solution.
2. The League could not agree to a constitution on any basis other than Pakistan.
3. Framing the Constitution on the basis of Pakistan would take time and that the League would not immediately ask for Pakistan.
In other words, the proposals were acceptable to Jinnah on the basis of communal parity. The point to be noted here is that Jinnah spoke of a single constitution on the basis of Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan was ultimately to be an autonomous region within the Indian Dominion. The conference ultimately fell apart on the issue of parity and representation, with Jinnah refusing to allow Congress or the Unionist Party to nominate any Muslims. This was where the conference failed.
It was in the wake of this that the British Government announced the 1945–46 elections. We know that Muslim League swept the polls on Muslim seats. The charge levelled against the Muslim League in Punjab was that they used the Barelvi sect to mobilize support for the Pakistan Movement. A corollary of this argument is that it was because of this mobilization that Pakistan became possible. It is an intriguing argument, which is more fiction than fact. Countless authors present evidence of Barelvi literature
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and Barelvi mobilization in Punjab, which they contend is the only reason the Muslim League won Punjab in those crucial elections. However, closer scrutiny of the facts reveals this was to be the most ludicrous of all the myths perpetuated by the ‘Ideology of Pakistan’ group that seeks to ascribe a divine purpose to the creation of this country.
It is true that a number of Barelvi Pirs and Mashaikhs did create popular enthusiasm for Pakistan in certain sections, but by no means were they the only ones to do so, nor was this a decisive factor. Communist Party’s cadres, dispatched to help the Muslim League against the Unionists, like Daniyal Latifi and Sajjad Zaheer, actually spearheaded the League’s campaign in Punjab. Barelvis had been a limited factor in politics since the Unionist Party first introduced them in its successful campaign in 1937. However, the impact of the Pirs was extremely limited, given that no more than 14 per cent of the adult Muslim population was eligible to vote and these comprised property owners and educated middle-class professionals. No doubt, the electorate had expanded since 1937 but that had not altered the essentially elitist nature of elections in British India. Consequently, a small community like Ahmadis, whose votes counted as Muslim votes and who had emphasized education and self-help, was able to play a larger than proportional role in the elections. It is equally preposterous to argue that the Muslim League’s manifesto, which made no reference to an Islamic state, was no factor in the elections.
The Punjab Muslim League’s largely secular and socialist manifesto, drafted by Daniyal Latifi, a staunch secularist Leaguer,[10] was widely read and distributed among the voters. The word “secular’ here spoke of temporal things and did not ascribe a
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divine purpose to politics. The word ‘secular’ was in general seen with suspicion by most Indians then and even in 1949 when the Indian Constitution makers were debating to include it in the Constitution. It was not until 1976 that the word secular was included in the Indian Constitution.
The legislature was made up of constitutionalists and not popular street politicians. It shows the duality of constitutional politics versus the popular politics in British India. Meanwhile, Gandhi electrified rural India and also persuaded his comrades, like the very secular young Pandit Nehru, to give up their western suits and instead wear Indian attire. It was nothing less than a revolution to get Macaulayite Indians to now abandon their British mannerisms and become native again. Jinnah, however, was too much his own man to be driven by Gandhi’s pleadings and give up his western suits and lifestyle. Contrary to the popular myth, Jinnah did not abandon his western suits after 1937. It is true that in order to compete with the Congress, he wore a Karakul cap and sherwani on select public occasions such as mass gatherings but there are more public pictures of Jinnah in a suit than in a sherwani even during 1937–47. Significantly, he is seen wearing a suit at the most important events during the Pakistan Movement, such as Gandhi-Jinnah talks, meetings with Cripps mission, meetings with the Cabinet Mission and meetings with the Viceroys.
He also did not give up his penchant for cigars, scotch and a dog on his lap. He continued to travel in first-class cabins on his own money and would drink openly in front of visitors. There was no hypocrisy about the man. It is true that after 1937, when converting Muslim League into a mass party, Jinnah made a few references to Islam every so often but these were always intended to show that
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Islam was a positive force and not a regressive one. He spoke of women’s rights and the rights of minorities and assume Islam was completely compatible with democracy.
More pragmatically, Jinnah refused to accept the idea that there should be public prayer at Muslim League meetings, asking very poignantly who would lead such a prayer, a Shia or a Sunni? The request had come from the breakaway faction of the pro-Congress Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind led by Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. Throughout this period, Jinnah was denounced as Kafir-eAzam by the Ulema, not just because of his anglicized lifestyle, but because he refused to turn out Ahmadis from the Muslim League and because he appointed a Syrian Christian, Pothan Joseph, as the editor of Dawn. Fatwas were issued against him on a daily basis for his legislative positions such as his support for civil marriage bill, which would have allowed inter-communal marriage without conversion or renunciation by either party. To say that such a man wanted an Islamic state is the most absurd myth of them all. There is no resolution or official document of the Muslim League containing any reference to a promise of an Islamic state. An attempt was made in 1943 to commit the Muslim League to an Islamic state but Jinnah intervened, calling such a resolution censure on every Muslim Leaguer. These voters were the men and women of the world who saw in Muslim League an opportunity to build a strong counter-force to what they feared would be caste Hindu domination at the Centre. Had Jinnah not been so secular or unattached to matters of the faith, he would have never been able to bring about worldly unity among the Muslim multitudes.
Meanwhile, the so-called nationalist Muslims, mostly the religious divines of Ahrar and Deoband, continued their propaganda against Jinnah. A newspaper, Hakikat, quoted by the Modern Review
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of Calcutta and the National Herald, carried a salacious headline that Jinnah was receiving ‘six lakhs in subsidy’ from the British government through the Hyderabad state for siding with the British and the source attributed was Master Tara Singh, the leader of the Sikhs, who was said to have a documentary evidence. Tara Singh, in a statement to the press, denied that he ever claimed anything of the sort. He wrote: “[It] is not possible for me to believe that a gentleman of Mr Jinnah’s position and character can be capable of such meanness.'[11] Tara Singh was a vociferous opponent of Jinnah and he had been quoted as such by three newspapers. It is not clear if he had made the claim but he was not in possession of any documentary evidence, as there were rumours of a defamation suit filed against him by Jinnah. Several of Jinnah’s opponents in the Muslim community tried to discredit him with this vile rumour before the elections.
In any event, the Muslim League won most Muslim seats all over India, in the central legislature as well as Punjab, Bengal and Sindh. In NWFP, they had fewer seats than the Congress and Khudai Khidmatgar alliance and in Assam, which had also been claimed by the League, Congress won easily. All in all, the Muslim League won more than 90 per cent of the Muslim seats (445 seats out a possible 490 Muslim seats) and more than 70 per cent of the eligible Muslim votes. Congress had absolute majorities at the centre and Hindu majority provinces. Out of the 102 elected members at the centre, the Muslim League won all 30 Muslim seats and Congress won 57 general seats.[12] The best course forward would have been a new pact building upon the Lucknow Pact but there were no takers. The 1945-46 elections did give credence to Jinnah’s claim to speak for all Muslims in India in political terms. Statistically, one may point out that neither the Congress nor the Muslim League was
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elected by more than 10 to 12 per cent of the electorate. Therefore, in real terms, neither Congress nor Muslim League could claim a representative status, given the numbers. To keep the Muslim League, which was the largest party in Punjab, out of power, the British cobbled together a coalition of Unionists, Akalis and the Congress. Congress, which had steadfastly opposed British rule as well as big landlords in Punjab, threw its lot with Unionists, whose leader Khizer Hayat Tiwana is one of the unexplained mysteries of the pre-Partition period. A coalition between Congress and the Muslim League here, as was desired by the Communist Party of India, may well have led to a communal settlement but no one was willing to give it a try except the Communists.
In February 1946, Secretary of State for India Lord Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A. V. Alexander (the first Lord of Admiralty) were nominated as part of a special Cabinet Mission that would seek an agreement between Indians about the future of India. Prime Minister Atlee famously said that while the British were mindful of the rights of minorities, including the right of every minority to live without fear, they could not allow a minority to exercise a veto on the majority’s right to advance. Obviously, this statement had a devastating impact on the Muslims of India, but Lord Lawrence was quick to allay the fears of the Muslim League by saying that it was wrong to suggest that Muslim League was merely a minority political party but rather the majority party of the Muslim community.[13] The Mission arrived in India in late March and got down to work. It met Jinnah, whom the members initially found very charming and reasonable, ready to work with
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Gandhi and resolve all issues. Soon, however, they found Jinnah to be impossible to pin down.
Maulana Azad met the Mission as the President of the Congress. It was at this meeting that the genesis of what would be known as the Cabinet Mission Plan began in earnest. Azad spoke of federation with minimal subjects only three, i.e., defence, foreign affairs and communications with an optional subjects list for the provinces. During the discussion with the Mission, Azad did not entirely close the door on a ‘sub-federation’ of Muslim provinces in the North West.
Other than the Muslim League and the Congress, the Mission also met Sikh leaders who vehemently opposed partition, except Giani Kartar Singh. More interesting was the meeting between Ambedkar and the Mission. Ambedkar was opposed to a constituent assembly because it would be dominated by caste Hindus. He wanted separate electorates for scheduled castes and wanted a British or American constitutional lawyer to address constitutional questions. In many ways, Ambedkar’s position was analogous to Jinnah’s demands. Ambedkar wanted the communal issue to be resolved through an agreement between the leaders of the various communities and did not want to leave the issue to the constituent assembly, as was desired by the Congress.
It was in the second round on 16 April that Cabinet Mission put its foot on the accelerator. Right off the bat, they offered Jinnah a Pakistan stripped off Hindu majority districts in Punjab and Bengal as Option 1. This Pakistan would have a defense treaty with the rest of India. Given that this was the Pakistan Jinnah eventually got, sans the defence treaty, it should be enough to surprise anyone who believes that Jinnah was hell bent on Pakistan that he rejected
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this fully sovereign Pakistan out of hand. The second option was an All India Union, with defence, foreign affairs and communications as central subjects and constituent units have equal representation at the Centre, the provision to create sub-federations within and possibly an option to secede from the Union after fifteen years. Interestingly, Jinnah showed much more enthusiasm for this second option.
The Cabinet Mission proposed to the leaders of both parties an immediate interim government, which would then set up an All India Commission drawn Central and Provincial legislatures that would determine constitutional provisions for the protection of minorities and secondly settle the question of division of British India into two states. If there was no agreement on the second question, Muslim representatives in Muslim-majority provinces would vote for exclusion from an Indian Union and the number required would be 75 per cent. Furthermore, there was provision for non-Muslim areas contiguous to the Indian Union, which would have the right to join the Indian Union. Jinnah’s answer was that he was not interested in further discussion on the subject and once again rejected the proposal. So within a span of two weeks, Jinnah had rejected a clear route to separate Pakistan twice. Nehru also rejected the proposal and the Cabinet Mission reverted to the second scheme that they had found Jinnah warming up to – the three-tiered plan.
Consequently, another conference was called in Simla in the first and second week of May. Congress and Muslim League had agreed to come to the table and give the idea of a United India another chance. H. V. Hodson writes: ‘In light of the subsequent events, it is highly significant that at this stage, Mr Jinnah definitely offered to come into the Union if he could have his group. ‘[14]
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Jinnah’s conception of a settlement was, as Hodson puts it, Pakistan-plus. First, the Muslim group had to be conceded and then the Muslim-majority group would come into the federation or confederation (Jinnah’s maximum demand was a confederation either by a constitution or treaty). Congress proceeded on the premise which amounted to ‘Union-plus’ – i.e., the union had to be conceded first and then they would settle how far the Muslim demand could be conceded.
Significantly, Jinnah had a conception of India above Pakistan and Hindustan. What kind of unity this India would have was a question of details. Proceedings at Simla are a matter of record but there are certain snippets from it that need to be closely looked at. During the discussions, Jinnah played the role of the hardball negotiator, arguing at one point that he wanted the groups to have the right to secede if the Union was not working. To this, Sardar Patel responded that this meant partition that was the reality of the grouping scheme. Jinnah uncharacteristically reassured Patel that he did not want to break the Union but that there should be a constitutional mechanism, such as divorce laws, to ensure a peaceful end to it, if it proved impossible in light of experience.[15] He argued that grouping was the only way to prevent complete partition.
Wavell wrote to Pethick Lawrence complaining that ‘the strong reaction by Gandhi to my suggestion that Congress should make their assurance about the grouping categorical shows how well justified Jinnah was to doubt their previous assurances on the subject. It is to my mind convincing evidence that Congress always meant to use their position in the interim Government to break up the Muslim League and in the constituent assembly to destroy the grouping scheme, which was the one effective safeguard for the Muslims.'[16] The conditions he put forth were that the groupings
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must come from the union and that there should be at least two constituent assemblies to draft the constitutional arrangement. Congress for its part wanted a completely sovereign constituent assembly at the Centre and no parity for the Muslim group. On 16 May 1946, the Cabinet Mission gave its statement as the basis of settlement. It rejected the demand for Pakistan out of hand. The solution provided by this statement was:
1. There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects: foreign affairs, defence, and communications; andfinances.
2. The Union should have an executive and a legislature constituted from British Indian and States representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting from each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members
present and voting.
3. All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the provinces.
4. The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.
5. Provinces should be free to form groups with executives and legislatures, and each group could determine the 277 provincial subjects to be taken in common.
6. The constitutions of the Union and of the groups should contain a provision whereby any province could call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten-year intervals thereafter.[17]
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As Dr Ayesha Jalal notes in her book Sole Spokesman, this statement was basically a negation of the demands that Jinnah had put forth.[18] Jinnah’s demand had been parity. No parity was granted under the statement and the plan that followed. Muslims from Group B and C had a total of 79 seats in a house of 292. Jinnah had wanted only an executive at the Union and no legislature but a legislature at the centre was provided for. Residuary powers had been granted to the provinces but Jinnah had asked for sovereign rights for provinces, which was rejected. There was not one single Muslim group but rather two Muslim groups – B and C. As for the right of secession, that had been changed to ‘a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten-year intervals thereafter.’ We get a clue of where Jinnah stood from his meeting with Woodrow Wyatt. Taking account of Jinnah’s dilemma, Wyatt suggested to Jinnah that he should begin by condemning the Mission’s rejection of the Pakistan demand but that the Muslims never expected the British to give them Pakistan. However, to prove its good will and willingness towards achieving a peaceful solution, Muslim League would accept the resolution as the first step towards Pakistan. Jinnah responded delightedly that he had got it.[19]
On 6 June 1946, the Muslim League finally approved the Mission’s statement after Jinnah had recommended it to them. Any constitutional lawyer can see that reconsideration of terms after ten-year intervals was not the same as secession but that is precisely what Jinnah told the League council it meant. It was the only way for a consummate politician to now rally his followers to a solution that was less than the Pakistan he had been asking for from six years. It is on the basis of Jinnah’s enthusiastic acceptance of the Mission’s plan that historians like Dr Ayesha Jalal and lawyers
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like H. M. Seervai and A. G. Noorani have claimed that Jinnah was ready and willing to agree to something less than complete partition. Those who disagree with this idea rely on Jinnah’s pronouncement that the plan was the first step towards Pakistan.
The views expressed by Jalal, Seervai and Noorani seem to hold water because had the plan been accepted, it would have closed the door on a complete partition. After all, it was Gandhi’s position that the communal tangle was caused by British involvement. It stood to reason then that the groups would have slowly and surely moved towards a closer union, much like the former colonies of the United States had done. Reconsideration of terms ipso facto did not mean secession but if it is taken to mean that, would it not have been a better way forward? Besides, the demand for reconsideration of constitutional terms could come from a province and not a group. Nothing would stop Congress from campaigning on a platform of unity and winning the provinces. If reconsideration meant secession, it was a danger to groups as much as it was to the Union. Jinnah had delivered an Indian Union from the clutches of the Punjab thesis and the blackmail of Punjabi Muslim politicians, thereby doing exactly what he had said he would do in 1913, i.e., put national interest above community interest. Unfortunately, Congress leaders were not ready to see the wisdom of what Jinnah had achieved on 6 June 1946. The only leader in the Congress who appreciated the true significance of Jinnah’s acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan was Maulana Azad but his own conduct vis-à-vis the Mission had come under some scrutiny in the Congress and he was removed from his office as the president of the party.
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A new deadlock emerged on the composition of the representative interim government. Wavell’s formula of 5:5:2 was key to Jinnah’s strategy at this time. Furthermore, Jinnah demanded key portfolios for the League, i.e., defence, foreign affairs, planning, development and commerce. He had especially wanted defence because he thought this portfolio was going to be the most important one. Critics of the parity forget that this was for the interim period alone. It was not a formula to be etched in stone but only while a constitution was being framed at the centre. Congress preferred a formula of fourteen, which included five Congress seats, one Congress-appointed Scheduled Caste, one Congress-appointed woman, four Muslim League seats, one non-League Muslim, one Indian Christian and one Sikh. In other words, Congress wanted to outgun the Muslim League 10 to 4 in the Cabinet. This demand was ultimately accepted by the British, except that Muslim League had all five Muslim seats. To Jinnah’s protests, the Secretary of State replied that Jinnah did not have to come into the Interim Government now that his basic condition was not fulfilled. Meanwhile, Congress on 22 June 1946 accepted the 16 May statement but refused to join the interim government. Azad, notifying the acceptance, told Wavell: ‘While adhering to our views, we accept your proposals and are prepared to work them with a view to achieve our objective.[20] Technically, that meant asking the Muslim League to form the government but that did not happen. By the time the Cabinet Mission left India on 28 June, Jinnah’s entire strategy of bringing his Muslim followers in line as one unified bloc at an India centre was in tatters, because there were now voices within who had begun to question what it had been that Jinnah was after.
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The Cabinet Mission Plan was the best possible solution from Jinnah’s point of view because it gave the Muslims in majority provinces a certain measure of autonomy and safeguard against a Hindu-dominated Centre in addition to giving an umbrella of protection to Muslims in the rest of India. It was the one solution that gave Muslims of India a share in sovereignty not just over their homelands at the extremities of the subcontinent but also at the Centre that was otherwise dominated by the caste Hindus. In doing so, it also promised new alignments that would permanently thwart majoritarian communalism uniformly across the subcontinent. If there was to be an eventual separation, which had always been on the cards given the demography and the geography of India, it could be controlled through a constitutional process that would ensure a peaceful separation.
There were forces at play, especially the labour wings and the enthusiastic left within it, that wanted a centralized state. The undisputed leader of the left within the Congress was Nehru and he had by July become the new president of the Congress. His statement on 10 July 1946 was a bombshell on Muslims and the League. He repudiated the plan, and declared that Congress would fight the grouping tooth and nail and announced that the three subjects that were at the Federal Centre were to be interpreted as broadly as possible. Obviously, it was not just ideology or pure sentiment that played in Nehru’s abrasive denunciation. It was the result of internal constraints because Congress could not seen as weak or it feared being torn by internal dissension. Left was pulling on one side and essentially calling for a socialist state, while the Hindu communal element was wary of the number of concessions being made to the Muslim League. These were genuine constraints that any leader of the Congress had to take into account.
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Even Gandhi, who was the biggest champion of a United India, had begun to see the wisdom of the idea that Muslim-majority provinces should be allowed to go their own way if the price of having them stay was the three-tiered Cabinet Mission Plan. It was only Maulana Azad who remained committed to the basic premise of the plan, which was unity of India at all costs. Yet, Congress did not want to be the villain and would have rather preferred the Muslim League to have gone back on the plan. The ingenious device that was forged to achieve this was the interpretation of the plan. It was the interpretation of the plan based on paragraph 15 of the 16 May statement: ‘Provinces should be free to form groups with executives and legislatures, and each group could determine the 277 provincial subjects to be taken in common.’ This was qualified by paragraph 19, which stated in subsection VIII: “As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation, it shall be open to any province to elect to come out of any group in which it has been placed.’ Congress insisted that provinces could be kept out of the groups, such as NWFP, which had a Congress government, or Sindh, which evidently did not want to be swamped by Punjab. Muslim League obviously insisted on the letter of the plan which called for compulsory grouping at the first instance and then the option of leaving the group after the first general election as provided under 19(VIII). This was contained in the statement itself, which at the beginning of paragraph 19 said:
For the process of electing their representatives the Provinces are grouped into three sections. Section A comprises Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Orissa. These will have
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a total representation of 187 members, composed of 167 General and 20 Muslim. 279 Section B comprises the Punjab, the North West Frontier Province and Sind, with a total representation of 35, composed of 9 General, 22 Muslim and 4 Sikh. Section C, consisting of Bengal and Assam, has a total representation of 70, composed of 34 General representatives and 36 Muslims. To these will be added, in Section A, one representative each of the Chief Commissioners Provinces of Delhi, Ajmer Merwara and Coorg, and in Section B, a representative of British Baluchistan. The combined total, therefore, for British India will be 296.
Speaking in late July to the Muslim League Council, Jinnah defiantly told them that he had washed his hands of any decision as to the future unless they forced it down his throat. He then spoke of the decision to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan: ‘We voluntarily delegated three subjects to the Union to work for ten years. It is not a mistake. It is highest statesmanship the Muslim League has achieved… we showed courage – it was not a mistake – to sacrifice three subjects to the Centre.'[21] The mood in the council was very much for a civil disobedience campaign and drastic measures. Denouncing Nehru’s ‘childish statements’, Jinnah repudiated the acceptance of Plan and called for direct action, having forged a pistol in response to Congress’ guns of civil disobedience. Furthermore, the resolution for direct action was so hedged that it was not even clear that League would actually initiate it.
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Nehru had, during the course of his discussions earlier in the year, told the British that the Muslim League was not progressive enough to carry out ‘direct action’. He had calculated along with other Congress leaders that as a party committed to constitutional politics, the Muslim League did not have the organization or the manpower to carry out a civil disobedience movement. The Congress was convinced that if they remained firm, Jinnah was likely to back down from the brink. Jinnah, on his part, seems to have been convinced that if he threatened civil disobedience, the Congress would reconsider. Thus, when Jinnah and Nehru met on the evening of 15 August 1946, both men expected the other to back down. Each made a terrible error by underestimating the other’s resolve.
Jinnah left the programme for the day, vague in the hope that Congress and the British would relent. This view is corroborated by Maulana Azad who also wondered-in hindsight-how a constitutional politician like Jinnah resorted to mass politics and concluded that Jinnah was driven along a course that he was reluctant to and, at any rate, understood little of. On 14 August, explaining that direct action did not mean direct action in any form but a peaceful hartal, Jinnah said, ‘I enjoin upon the Muslims to carry out the instructions and abide by them strictly and conduct themselves peacefully and in a disciplined manner.’ H. V. Hodson, the British Reforms Commissioner and a student of Indian politics, wrote in his book The Great Divide that the working committee followed up by calling on Muslims throughout India to observe 16th of August as Direct Action Day. On that day, a meeting would be held all over the country to explain the League’s resolution. These meetings and processions passed off – as was manifestly the central League leaders’ intention-
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without more than commonplace and limited disturbance with one vast and tragic exception. What happened was more than anyone could have foreseen.[22]
The accusation that the Muslim League planned and executed the massacre of innocents in Calcutta does not stand the test of facts. Lord Wavell wrote on 21 August that ‘the estimate of casualties is 3,000 dead and 17,000 injured. The Bengal Congress is convinced that all the trouble was deliberately engineered by the Muslim League ministry but no satisfactory evidence to that effect has reached yet. It is said that the decision to have a public holiday on 16 August was the cause of trouble. There was a public holiday in Sindh and there was no trouble there. At any rate, whatever the causes of the outbreak, when it started, the Hindus and Sikhs were every bit as fierce as the Muslims. The present estimate is that appreciably more Muslims were killed than the Hindus.[23]
This was confirmed by Sardar Patel’s letter, where he gloated about more, many times more, Muslim casualties than Hindus.[24] One of the big gaping holes in the theory, which blames Jinnah and calls his call for direct action a dog whistle, is that while all accounts seem to indicate that Muslims were armed with sticks, according to Sir Francis Tuker, ‘buses and taxis were charging about loaded with Sikhs and Hindus armed with swords, iron bars and firearms.[25] The truth is that the Muslim League could not afford mass-scale HinduMuslim violence in Calcutta or in India. Suhrawardy was in power through a cross-communal ministry, which depended as much on Hindu support as it did on Muslim support. At the national level, after the collapse of the Cabinet Mission Plan, Jinnah’s strategy was to hold out from the interim government by pitching extreme demands. After being tainted with the same brush, Jinnah could no longer hold onto his earlier demand of Congress-League parity in
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the interim government or that, having swept Muslim seats, League alone had the right to nominate Muslims to the interim cabinet. Wavell – who absolved the League privately of the blame for Calcutta killings – used the killings as an excuse to go ahead with the transfer of power to a Congress-only cabinet
Ironically, for all the blame against the Muslim League on account of Direct Action Day, Blitz, a Congress mouthpiece in Bombay, declared a week later: ‘There is no denying the fact that by his latest master-stroke of diplomacy, Jinnah has outbid, outwitted and outmanoeuvred the British and Congress alike and confounded the common national indictment that the Muslim League is a parasite of British Imperialism.’
In fact, the opposite was true. Congress and the British in Calcutta managed to outwit and sully the pristine reputation of Jinnah, who, throughout his life, had been known for his constitutional and moderate approach to politics. He was now branded a communalist, hate-monger and mass murderer. Unsourced lines like ‘we shall have India divided or destroyed are attributed to him even though there is no record of him saying anything of the kind. Reliance instead is placed on the highly partisan account given by Margaret Bourke-White who was devoted to Mahatma Gandhi and whose account fails verification. Thus, a caricature of Jinnah as a cold, calculating power-hungry politician has deliberately been etched into the Indian memory. I leave it to the reader to decide how correct this view is.
Nevertheless, Lord Wavell attempted to bring Congress back to the letter and spirit of the Cabinet Mission Plan. We have a fascinating record of the meeting between Wavell, Gandhi and Nehru dated 27 September 1946, a month or so after the Calcutta killings. He started by asking Gandhi and Nehru if they would
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guarantee an acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Gandhi’s response was tragically fraught with hedging and obfuscation. He said, ‘We have already said that we accept it but we are not prepared to guarantee that we accept it the way that Cabinet Mission set it out. We have our own interpretation of what they propose.’ Gandhi and Nehru insisted that they were free to interpret the document the way they wanted to and were not bound by Cabinet Mission’s intent. At one point, Wavell pleaded that he was a simple soldier and bemoaned the fact that Gandhi and Nehru should confuse him with legalistic arguments. Ironic was the response he got in return. Nehru, who had probably not practised law more than a few days in his life, said, “We cannot help it if we are lawyers.’ When Wavell threatened to withdraw the offer of an interim government, citing Calcutta disturbances, Nehru replied with great vigour: ‘In other words, you are willing to surrender to Muslim League’s blackmail.’ Wavell, at this point lost his cool and said, “Who are you to talk of blackmail.[26] It was a strange attitude to adopt for the two men who had worked for India’s unity above all else in the last few years of the Raj.
The only question I have, mindful of the fact that by virtue of an accident of birth I am a Pakistani, is whether the idea of unqualified majority rule so important as to torpedo a perfectly reasonable solution that would have provided a federated structure standing as a wall against majoritarianism. Is the idea of having two majoritarian states as we do today really better than a Pakistan within a three-tiered Indian Union? Obviously, the bus left that stop a long time ago and there is no going back to it, but for statesmen of the stature of Gandhi and Nehru to have had this blind spot is
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almost inexplicable to a student of history. It is all well to argue that Congress had its own limitations, but was the sacrifice worth it in the end? It is easier to see Jinnah’s position in this, given that he was the advocate of a minority community trying to get the best possible deal for his constituents, some of whom he did not quite agree with. It was certainly not the best solution to his mind, but experience had shown him that this was the only possible solution – a division and then a reconstruction – Pakistan plus an Indian Union. It was for this reason that Jinnah stoutly resisted for months after independence the idea that the name India could be appropriated by just one successor state. The convenient villain of partition had an idea of an India above Hindustan and Pakistan – a secular multicultural federal state standing tall in the world. This was Jinnah’s conception of an independent India based on settlement between the Hindu and Muslim community. An India of his conception, with Pakistan and Hindustan as its constituent units, might yet have forged a closer union over time, provided all parties behaved in a manner befitting their great communities. Yet, what was immediately necessary was to get a consensus and it was this consensus he was striving at. Cast as a separatist, Jinnah was still at heart the idealist from Congress who had joined Muslim League only on the condition that it would not come between him and the greater national cause to which his life had been dedicated. A centralized Indian state was definitely unacceptable to the Muslim majority areas. Jinnah had realized this in his dealings with Punjabi Muslim politicians like Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and others.
What was needed was a decentralized union of provinces and the princely states. Such an experiment obviously would have been unique in history. Many critics of the idea and apologists for Congress’ actions in the closing days of the Raj say that this solution
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was worse than partition. One wonders what fuels their certitude. What evidence do we have that India would not have marched towards a greater union in time, just as United States of America had replaced the Articles of Confederation with a Constitution in 1789, a time infinitely more violent and less politically sophisticated than the twentieth century? And if there were to be a separation later, would it not have been more peaceable and less violent than what unfolded in 1947? Not enough people recognize this but the one principal contribution of the much-maligned Two Nation Theory was that by positing the dispute in terms of Hindu and Muslim community, the fissiparous tendencies of the provinces and states were greatly curbed. It was entirely possible that India would have Balkanized into several smaller states had it not been for the Hindu-Muslim reframing. A three-tiered federation under the Cabinet Mission Plan opened up the possibility of two futures: i) A united India with a stronger union organically emerging out of the plan or ii) a separation that was peaceable constitutionally and mutually agreed upon on a timeframe, which would have helped curb the communal bloodletting that followed. Either future would have helped avoid the kind of zero-sum game that Pakistan and India have engaged in since 1947.
So much energy of these majoritarian behemoths has gone into one-upmanship while the people of the two countries have continued to suffer. It is a tragedy given that India was blessed with three men – Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah – who in their sincerity of purpose, honesty, patriotism and selflessness could equal any in history. Yet, at this crucial time, they failed to agree and chart out a course that could have avoided the tragedy that befell the people of the subcontinent. While they all achieved some measure of greatness independent of each other, Gandhi more than the other
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two, this trio of London-trained lawyers would have cemented their reputations as the harbingers of the greatest compromise in the history of the world.
While these gentlemen played the game of high politics, the situation on the ground was deteriorating fast. The riots in Noakhali and then Bihar meant the entire edifice was collapsing and things were spinning in a direction that was nobody’s intention. Amidst all this, Jinnah and Gandhi tried once more to compose their differences. They signed on to a formula that stated that Congress accepted and did not reject that Muslim League represented the majority of Muslim public opinion while Jinnah would accept that Congress was free to nominate anyone from within its ranks on its seats. Unfortunately, Nehru and Patel chose this precise moment to break with Gandhi on policy. They rejected the formula, even though it was happily worded, in line with election results and provided for a basis for cooperation. Nevertheless, in late October 1946, Jinnah agreed to join the interim government. It is important to note that Jinnah did not get all that he had claimed. There was no parity given to the League, nor was the League given monopoly over Muslim representation. None of the portfolios he had demanded were given to him.
What Jinnah did manage to do was appoint, on a Muslim League seat, Jogindranath Mandal, the scheduled caste lawyer from Bengal, to represent the Muslims of India, in essence turning the logic of the Two Nation Theory and separate electorates on its head. Here was the Quaid-i-Azam of the Muslim nation saying that a scheduled caste Hindu could represent Muslims as well as any Muslim could. Very little has been made of this decision, which was a monumental one. In his book Facts are Sacred, Wali Khan, the son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, said that this was a principled decision. Dr Ayesha
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Jalal says that it also was the first hint of Jinnah’s ultimate intentions
Castes, certainly in Bengal, and other non-Congress elements.[27]
No historian has spent much time analyzing this crucial chess move. Was Jinnah belatedly moving towards the direction that Dr Ambedkar had spoken about in his book a few years earlier? This certainly appears to be the intention because even at this late a stage, Jinnah did not seem to believe that Pakistan was ever going to be conceded. Jinnah’s idea was to make Muslim League a big tent organization for non-Congress elements. Congress now pressed for an immediate session of the Constituent Assembly. Jinnah held out on the premise that he wanted the groupings granted first. This was the price that Jinnah named for the League’s entry into the Constituent Assembly because as is, several of his supporters were blaming him for giving too much by entering the interim government, which was equated with abject surrender. Another crucial mistake that Congress made was giving the finance portfolio to the Muslim League. This apparently was the brilliant idea that Patel came up with. He proceeded on the assumption that the Muslim League would falter under its burden. Liaquat Ali Khan, who became the finance minister, soon became a thorn in the Congress’ side and would become even more so a pain when he would come up with a budget – famously called the poor man’s budget – that would hit directly at the commercial interests that backed the Congress. In the wake of Noakhali violence, Jinnah condemned it, calling upon leaders of both communities to put an end to it in the name of humanity.[28]
Congress, for its part, had taken a decidedly anti-Muslim turn as is evident from a significant line from the memoir of George Jones of New York Times. ‘Congress party opinion began to express itself in Anti-Moslem (rather than anti-League) terms partly no
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doubt because a number of militant Hindus found it politically expedient to join the Congress Party bandwagon… it became rather difficult to differentiate between the frankly communal response of Congress and the Mahasabha.[29] Nehru resolutely attempted to bring the outrages in Bihar, where slaughter of Muslim villages was perpetrated, to an end but he was unable to. Instead, he now blamed the violence on the ‘unpatriotic and highly objectionable attitude of the Muslim League’, describing the peasantry as simple, likeable and peaceful.[30]
Muslim League, in its fact-finding missions, claimed that the death toll stood in excess of 30,000. This was clearly more than anything that had happened in Noakhali and led to recriminations
acerbic effect on Jinnah. For the first time, to his friends, Jinnah’s anger seemed as not being feigned as a negotiating tool but rather genuine hurt and pain at what had happened. While Nehru’s claim that the violence against Muslims in Bihar had been brought on by Muslim League’s attitude was obviously astonishing, the violence must have upset Jinnah to the core of his soul; for underneath that cold forbidding exterior he was, as Sarojini Naidu had once written, a deeply sensitive human being. Having led the Muslims for so long, he no doubt had developed a paternalistic attitude towards them and this must have had a devastating impact on his psychology.
To salvage something of the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Viceroy flew Jinnah, Nehru, Liaquat and Baldev Singh in December to London for a conference with the British Government there. Records show that the Indian leaders were quite cordial with each other during the flight.
Things unfortunately were not as cordial when they got down to business in London. The leaders could not seem to agree
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on anything at all. The bugbear was the grouping clause. Even Atlee, who was notoriously anti-Jinnah, agreed with Jinnah and this greatly upset Nehru. Meanwhile, Jinnah was cavorting with the Conservative politicians. Only seventeen years earlier, it was Jinnah who sent out an angry letter to the then Viceroy of India, warning him against the inclusion of the Conservative opposition at the roundtable conference. Now, things had come a full circle. He had found an ally in Winston Churchill, who found himself in congruence with the idea of Pakistan.
Jinnah and Churchill seem to have spent a lot of time together on Churchill’s estate, conferring as to the future and this is usually cited as evidence by many pro-Congress historians for imperialist perfidy behind partition. The main theme of Jinnah’s lobbying was that the British should not scuttle now and should stay on. How different was his position from the time he had been the champion of the nationalist cause years ago! Now he was almost begging the British to stay on because he had come to distrust the Congress so much. Given what had gone on in Bihar – something that played on his mind – Jinnah had by this point begun to see the Congress as the main enemy. The Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity had died much earlier but London marked his burial. Now, Jinnah spoke in terms of separation and he might for the first time have actually meant it, having given up all hope that Congress would ever agree to grouping. Kanji Dwarkadas, Ruttie’s old friend and confidant, came to see him at Claridges in London and found him sick and depressed. When he asked Jinnah what was going in the country, Jinnah replied painfully ‘Country? What country? There is no country. There are only Hindus and Mussalmans.°31 This was not a man on the verge of triumph but rather a defeated man who
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was seeing the dream of his youth breaking apart, partly because of Congress and partly because of his own doing.
While in London, Jinnah also addressed the people of the US in a radio broadcast, where repeating his arguments for the reasons why Muslim India and Hindu India must be separated, he also spoke of a possible relationship similar to US and Canada between the future states in India. This was a theme Jinnah was to repeat on several occasions now that he had finally reconciled himself with the idea that Cabinet Mission Plan would never be accepted in its true spirit by his opposite numbers in the Congress. To young Kuldip Nayyar, he would speak of blood ties between future Pakistan and Hindustan states. Curiously, he referred to both together as India, something he would not back down from till much after Partition.
In December of 1946, the House of Commons debated the Indian situation at length. During this debate, Winston Churchill pleaded Jinnah’s case essentially: ‘I must record my own belief that any attempt to establish the reign of a Hindu numerical majority will never be achieved without a civil war, proceeding, not perhaps at first on the fronts of armies or organized forces, but in thousands of separate and isolated places. The war will, before it is decided, lead through unaccountable agonies to awful abridgment of the Indian population. He reminded the listeners that Muslims in India numbered 90 million people and that the word minority has no relevance or sense when applied to masses of human beings numbered in many scores of millions. ‘[32] Congress meanwhile had expressed its desire through the Objectives’ Resolution in the Constituent Assembly on 13 December 1946 to establish sovereign republic with all power and authority derived from the people. One can only guess what Jinnah would have thought of that, for after
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all, this was an ideal for fulfilment of which he had struggled long and hard and now, because of circumstances, he was looking in as an outsider. Surely, something in him must have stirred and he must have thought that it should have been him in there moving that resolution and that perhaps he was cheated out of the role that he once had marked out for himself as a Congressman and the sole Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity who proudly professed to being an Indian first, second and last. That dream had been left far behind in the past for he was now the sole spokesman of the Muslim nation on whose behalf he was ready to carve out a state, even if he was still willing to enter into negotiations with Hindustan to bring about some sort of overarching unity of India.
On his way back to India, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan stopped at Cairo as guests of the Arab League. Here, Jinnah had the opportunity of meeting Arab leaders of all kinds and views, including the Egyptian Prime Minister, the Grand Mufti of Palestine and the Islamic revivalist Hassan Al Banna. Playing up the Pakistan demand, Jinnah went on to declare to the sceptical audience that it is only when Pakistan is established that Indian and Egyptian Muslims would really be free, warning them of the dangers of a future Hindu Imperialism in the event they fail. How much did he actually believe this canard one cannot say, especially when it conflicted entirely with his oft-repeated claim that Pakistan and Hindustan would march together against all foreign aggressors. Nevertheless, he played up this line, which spoke of spiritual and religious ties that bound the Arabs to Indian Muslims ‘inexorably’, warning them that if we are drowned all will be drowned.’ His pronouncements during the Egyptian visit stand in stark contrast to what he had done and believed all his life, where he had considered extra-territorial causes of Muslims to be an annoyance at best. It
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is important to remember that this was the same man who had denounced the Khilafat Movement as false religious frenzy and had lately told people that pan-Islamism was a bogey that had exploded. For decades, Pakistani state-sponsored historians would refer to his statements in Egypt as proof of his pan-Islamism, as some still do.
Punjab Muslim League, the largest party in the Punjab Assembly, left out of power by the coalition of Unionists, Congress and Akalis, had begun a civil disobedience movement against Khizer Hayat Tiwana, the pro-British Premier of Punjab. After thirty years of commitment to constitutional means that the Muslim League had admirably remained steadfast to, the door that was opened with Direct Action resolution had changed the very nature of the movement, arguably beyond Jinnah’s control. Any backtracking by Jinnah at this moment from the Pakistan demand would have swept Jinnah aside altogether. The Muslim League National Guards and the RSS were sharpening their knives. Meanwhile, Punjab Muslim League’s gentlemen, most of who had never been to jail before, were now seen courting arrest. The politics that Jinnah had detested all his life, the politics of breaking the law and courting arrests, had become the new fashion in the Muslim League. The Muslim League Working Committee met in Karachi on the last day of January 1947 and buried the Cabinet Mission Plan forever by stating that it had definitively failed.[33] It is important to note that this was less than half a year before the Partition of India. In February 1947, the British Government announced its intention to leave by June 1948 and it became apparent to all that the scuttle had well and truly begun. By March, the Punjab premier resigned and Congress passed a resolution calling for the Partition of the province.
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Jinnah’s response was to make overtures to the Sikhs to retain them in Pakistan. This included guaranteed seats in the legislature, share in the High Court and the Supreme Court, armed forces and a veto over any constitutional provision or legal provision that adversely affected their rights. However, by this time, Tara Singh had come out firmly against any settlement with the Muslims, citing the martyrdom of Sikh Gurus at the hands of Emperor Aurangzeb. Tara Singh had famously brandished a sword and declared death to Pakistan on Lahore’s historic Mall Road, an action that led to widespread rioting. While Jinnah was attempting to draw Sikhs into the Pakistan federation, his supporters in Rawalpindi began their reprisals against Sikhs, burying any chance of Muslim-Sikh pact in Punjab. The demand for Pakistan came with the price tag of partition of Punjab and Bengal, which promised to upset Jinnah’s eventual strategy of a possible Indian treaty union between Hindustan and Pakistan. The Sikhs were no longer willing to believe Jinnah’s promises and even if they were to believe Jinnah’s earnestness, they questioned how long the now seventy-year-old leader had to live. By the end, Jinnah promised them their own autonomous state within the Pakistani federation along with their own army, proposals modelled after the Cabinet Mission Plan. However, the Sikhs were not willing to agree.
In March 1947, Mountbatten replaced Wavell as the Viceroy and immediately went to work. His immediate objective seems to have been a revival of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Nehru was the first to meet Mountbatten and painted a most telling picture of Jinnah, which seemed to appreciate the latter’s shaky hold over its supporters. He described Jinnah as one of the most extraordinary
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men in history who avoids taking any positive action that might split his followers. [34]
Mountbatten’s strategy was to scare Jinnah into cooperation because Mountbatten was implacably opposed to dissolving the All-India Centre, which he felt was the only insurance to keep the Indian army united. The crucial interview between Jinnah and Mountbatten, which has been written about on several occasions, contains some massive clues as to what Jinnah was after. He insisted on a Pakistan with an army that would then give him the parity for a central organization at an All-India level.
This demand, the division of the army, was most likely a device to delay British departure, as was obvious when, according to Mountbatten’s record, Jinnah is said to have smiled cryptically and asked Mountbatten how he proposed the British could leave by June 1948. Jinnah could not believe that the British would leave India to chaos and civil war. Mountbatten responded by telling Jinnah that he had two options, i.e., either accept the Cabinet Mission Plan as is without getting Congress to accept the grouping or to accept a Pakistan based on partition of Punjab and Bengal. In Jinnah’s response, we find a most revealing line. He said that Punjabis and Bengalis shared common national characteristics, history and language and that partitioning these provinces would destroy the unities built over a long period of time. This was as clear a negation of the Two Nation Theory as could be. Mountbatten simply replied that what was good for Muslims was good for others as well and, therefore, partition of provinces was necessary. At this point, Jinnah demanded the power be transferred to the provinces and that the provinces be allowed to join whatever federation they wanted.[35] Obviously, this was one thing that Congress feared the most because it could mean provinces not joining any constituent assembly
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and Nehru feared the Balkanization of India. It was not the ideal situation for the proponents of Pakistan, because as things stood, Muslim League’s hold over provinces like NWFP and Sindh was questionable to begin with and then this would add the question of princely states and the like. However, the advantage was that it would bring Congress to the table and negotiate an India Centre on some measure of parity at the Centre.
Mountbatten came up with a similar plan called Plan Balkan but one, which still provided for a partition of Punjab and Bengal into two provinces. This had its own set of challenges and the Pakistan Federation, it seemed, would ultimately comprise only Western Punjab and Sindh with a population of 15 million at best. In this, Mountbatten had also calculated to scare the Congress into conceding parity to the Muslim League at the Centre. However, the Constituent Assembly of India had been working on its own report through Union Powers Committee and by late April had produced a document that interpreted the three subjects agreed upon in the Cabinet Mission Plan so expansively through subheads that it completely turned the proposal on its head and provided the Centre with all its existing powers. Nehru told the viceroy bluntly that there would no question of a Pakistan joined up in parity on an all-India level. Even Mountbatten, whose proCongress bias was hardly concealed, now frankly admitted that Jinnah was right in his belief that Congress had no intention of working the Cabinet Mission Plan fairly. In the final analysis of those few months, it becomes clear, contrary to what we have been told, that Ayesha Jalal’s famous assessment, ‘It was Congress that insisted on partition. It was Jinnah who was against partition,[36] is unimpeachable. Congress wanted a clean partition with Jinnah and the Muslim League out of their hair.
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Thus, Jinnah’s all-India strategy was left in tatters and his bluff had been called by the Congress, which now gave him precisely what his public demand had been and in doing so, applied the Two Nation Theory with such vehemence that the two main Pakistan provinces were now to be amputated and reduced to rumps of what they historically were. As Jinnah was to tell some of his friends later, he did not want this partition, it was imposed on him, but now publicly he had to own what he had done. The Punjab Muslim League leaders were more interested in securing power and made very little effort try and avoid this situation. The situation was better in Bengal where the Muslim League leader Suhrawardy reached out to the Congress and wanted a coalition ministry to be formed. In another ironic twist, the Congress now openly endorsed Hindu Mahasabha’s demand for partition, undercutting Sarat Chandra Bose, the leader of the Bengal Congress. In response to this, Suhrawardy came up with the idea of a United Independent Bengal and in this he was supported by none other than Jinnah, who told Mountbatten that he would be delighted to have a Independent United Bengal outside Pakistan. Jinnah continued to argue that the basic principle of the Pakistan demand did not mean a fragmentation of the provinces.[37]
The Congress, however, had made its mind and that meant partitioning Punjab and Bengal. This is why when the British Government sent its own revised Plan Balkan, Mountbatten broke all protocols of decency, integrity and fairness his office demanded by showing it to Nehru and not Jinnah. Nehru immediately rejected it with his usual emotional tantrum. The revised plan had proposed the choice of each province, Hindu majority or Muslim majority, to choose to join a constituent assembly or go its own way. Having gauged Nehru’s reaction and not giving Jinnah an opportunity
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to look at the plan, Mountbatten now revised the plan, including partition of Punjab and Bengal in it. Jinnah spoke in detail about Pakistan on 21 May 1947 in his interview with Doon Campbell of Reuters, which needs to be reproduced here in parts because it was the first clear pronouncement of his vision for Pakistan and Hindustan, which to him together constituted India:
Doon Campbell: How would you divide the armed forces? Do you envisage a defence pact or any other kind of military alliance between Pakistan and Hindustan? Jinnah: All the armed forces must be divided completely, but I do envisage an alliance, pact or treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan again in the mutual interest of both and against any aggressive outsider. Doon Campbell: Do you favour a federation of Pakistan states even if there is to be partition of Punjab and Bengal? Jinnah: This idea of partition is not only thoughtless and reckless, but if unfortunately His Majesty’s Government favours it, in my opinion, it will be a grave error and will prove dangerous immediately and far more so in the future. Immediately, it will lead to bitterness and unfriendly attitude between Eastern Bengal and Western Bengal and same will be the case with torn Punjab, between Western Punjab and Eastern Punjab. Doon Campbell: On what basis will the central administration of Pakistan be set up? What will be the attitude of this Government to the Indian States? Jinnah: [T]he Government of Pakistan can only be a popular representative and democratic form of Government. Its Parliament
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and Cabinet responsible to the Parliament will both be finally responsible to the electorate and the people in general without any distinction of caste, creed or sect, which will be the final deciding factor with regard to the policy and programme of the Government that may be adopted from time to time. Doon Campbell: What are your views in regard to the protection of minorities in Pakistan territories?
Jinnah: The minorities must be protected and safeguarded. The minorities in Pakistan will be the citizens of Pakistan and enjoy all the rights, privileges and obligations of citizenship without any distinction of caste, creed or sect … Over and above that, there will be provisions for the protection and safeguarding of the minorities, which in my opinion must be embodied in the constitution itself. And this will leave no doubt as to the fundamental rights of the citizens, protection of religion and faith of every section, freedom of thought and protection of their cultural and social life.[38]
More than the 11 August speech, it was this interview that encapsulated his vision for not just Pakistan but for the greater whole of India, which to Jinnah was at some level indivisible. Notable in this interview was Jinnah’s emphasis that Pakistan and Hindustan would stand together against any aggressive outsider not against each other. Pakistani historians and ideologues do not like to admit this but Jinnah was also burying the theory of panIslamism’, calling it an exploded theory. It was an internationalist vision with his pronouncement that no nation could live in isolation.
His Pakistan was to be a democratic state that treated all citizens equally and not the theocratic mess that the country finds itself in
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today. This was less than two weeks before they would sit down and finalize the details of the Partition plan. Where was the ideology of Pakistan or the invocation of New Medina in this? Both Islamists in Pakistan and writers like Venkat Dhulipala claim that Pakistan was to be a theocratic Islamic state, but here was the father of the nation clearly rejecting the idea. His was a secular vision for a modern democratic Pakistan firmly within the Indian milieu, entirely sovereign but in treaty relations with the rest of India.
It is necessary to consider the not-so-subtle effort by Venkat Dhulipala to attribute the idea of Pakistan to a millennial urge on part of the Muslims for a new Medina. Jinnah certainly never invoked Medina at any point.
On 31 May, Suhrawardy informed that the Congress had vetoed the idea of an independent Bengal. It was a tragic situation because it could have helped resolve the issue of Bangladesh twenty-four years before the eventual independence of the country. Now, it was left to the business of deciding the final contours of the independence plan or the Partition plan. The plan was put to the Congress, League and the Sikhs on 2 June 1947. Jinnah would not commit unless he had the approval of the conference, which he eventually agreed to get in a day.
At 11 p.m., Jinnah met Mountbatten again, trying to convince him not to announce the Partition plan publicly, saying that the Muslim League’s council may not accept it. Mountbatten warned him that he might lose Pakistan for good, to which Jinnah replied coolly: ‘What must be, must be.’
The so-called triumph of his life, the crowning glory of his political career, if biographers and historians are to be believed,
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was thus imposed on him through an act of bullying on part of Mountbatten. On 9 June 1947, the Muslim League accepted the plan as a compromise while the Congress accepted the plan as a final settlement on 15 June 1947. Now the question of the partition of provinces came forth. The United Bengal Assembly voted 126 to 90 to remain united and to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Then the bifurcated vote was taken in which the Eastern part of Bengal voted 106 to 35 to keep the province united and 107 voted to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. The Western part of Bengal voted 57 to 21 to partition the province and keep the new West Bengal province in the Indian Constituent Assembly. Precisely similar results were noted in the Punjab Assembly, where 91 members voted to keep the undivided Punjab province and to keep it in the Pakistani Constituent Assembly, 77 voted to keep it in the Indian Constituent Assembly. Christian members significantly voted with the Muslim League.
In the separate vote, Eastern Punjab voted 50 to 22 to partition the province and join the Indian Constituent Assembly. The Western Punjab Assembly voted to keep the province united and join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Thus, it was Congress that deployed the Two Nation Theory to partition both Punjab and Bengal and the Muslim League that voted to keep Punjab and Bengal united, a fact that is not underscored by historians. By mid-July, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and Sylhett had all voted to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.[39] Pakistan had become a reality but the price of its sovereignty was the mutilation of Punjab and Sindh – a price extracted by the Congress alone.
Pakistan was thus born amidst great chaos and open communal warfare. Punjab, especially, became the site of the largest communal carnage in the history of South Asia. Who was to blame for the
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tragedy of bloodletting in the streets is a question often answered in a partisan manner. To apportion blame for the events is not the main motivation of this book, nor is one inclined to guess the numbers of those dead, the estimates of which range from 100,000 to 1 million. The partition of Punjab and Bengal caused untold misery to millions and saw the largest forced migration in history on both sides of the border.

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THE END AND THE
BEGINNING
The concession of a completely separate Pakistan divorced from the rest of India must have come as a rude shock to Jinnah. His entire strategy had rested upon the assumption that Gandhi in particular would never allow the Congress to agree to a complete irrevocable division of India and would in turn negotiate with the Muslim League on the basis of an Indian Union. Pakistan, thus, would at best be a unit within the greater Indian whole, as a countervailing force to any overbearing centre dominated by what Jinnah called the caste Hindu majority. Hindu and Sikh citizens in such a Pakistan would be protected against the tyranny of the Muslim majority by a centre at Delhi and similarly, Muslims in Hindustan and indeed other minorities would make common cause with the Muslim majority in Pakistan against any one community holding all the cards at the all-India centre.
It was a constitutional lawyer’s vision based on equipoise between Hindus and Muslims at the centre, which would then allow one united India not dominated by any one community or
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culture. Obviously, having raised the demand, Jinnah must have realized that he had brought the idea of a separate Muslim state in the realm of possibility. Even so, the one thing he could not possibly have imagined was the creation of two mutually hostile nation states and the arms race that has plagued the subcontinent since. Jinnah’s references to US-Canada relationship, South Asian Monroe Doctrine and to partition of property between brothers who would live happily ever after as best of friends must be seen in this light.
Gandhi had warned against the internationalization of the Hindu-Muslim dispute but that is precisely why Gandhi’s actions in the wake of the Cabinet Mission Plan defy explanation. It is easier to understand Nehru’s point of view, given that he had implacably opposed the very idea of safeguards since his entrance into politics; though, strangely enough, he too would be accused of ‘minority appeasement’ by his critics later. Congress’ insistence on partition of Punjab and Bengal essentially set the ball rolling for utter and total chaos and breakdown, making peaceful birth of the two brotherly nations an impossibility. Nehru’s insistence on framing Pakistan as a seceding state from the Indian whole obviously meant that India and Pakistan were born as enemies. Jinnah, on his part, trenchantly refused the notion that Pakistan was a seceding state, framing it instead as a case of a successor state. He stubbornly continued to refer to the federation of Hindu-majority provinces as Hindustan and continued to see India as Pakistan and Hindustan together.
Lord Mountbatten wanted to become the governor general of the two dominions. Congress had already offered him this position but the Muslim League proposed Jinnah’s name as the governor general of the new state on 4 July 1947, something Mountbatten seems to have taken personally as a rebuke.
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It was the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act 1935 that strengthened the governor general and gave him powers to ensure passage of bills in a form that had been recommended by the governor general. From 19 July 1947 onwards, the Ninth Schedule was no longer available. A constitutional point of divergence between the Dominion of Pakistan and the Dominion of India was Section 93, which empowered the governor general to dismiss provincial legislatures. It was Pakistan that omitted Section 93 and India that adopted it. Therefore, the Pakistani governor general could not, in contrast to the Indian governor general, dismiss a legislature. In the Empire’s history, a powerful politician like Jinnah taking over as the first governor general of a self-governing dominion is the norm and not the exception.
What is often missing in this telling of history is that Jinnah made a counter proposal – a Super Governor General with arbitral powers sitting in Delhi overseeing the division of assets between the two proposed dominions. Jinnah also made a significant proposal that is often overlooked. He suggested that the new constituent assemblies of Pakistan and Hindustan should simultaneously meet in India’s capital New Delhi. This proposal could have laid the foundations of amity between the two dominions but was immediately shot down by the Congress, which did not want the Pakistan Constituent Assembly anywhere near New Delhi. The Muslim League also formally protested that Union of India was a name that could not be adopted by one state alone. The idea that India was something above Hindustan and Pakistan was very much alive in the mind of Pakistan’s founding fathers.[1]
With the scuttle having begun, various interests were now asserting themselves. On 5 April 1947, Giles Squire of the British Legation in Kabul reported to Hugh Weightman, then secretary of
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the External Affairs Department of the Government of India, that ‘the view taken by the Afghan Government is that the tribesmen in tribal territory are more closely connected with the Afghan Government than with the Interim Government of India and the Afghans have, as you know, already asked that the tribes should be given the option of securing their complete independence or joining themselves to Afghanistan if they wish to do so rather than continue as part of India. “[2]
He goes on to state that both the Congress and the Muslim League had started a campaign in the tribal areas to woo the tribes to their causes and that the Afghan government wanted the same courtesy extended to it. On 24 April 1947, Gerald Charles Lawrence Crichton clarified the British policy on the matter in his response to Squire, in which he rejected the Afghan claim altogether, saying that the tribal areas were part of Indian territory and no such claim would be entertained. On 11 June 1947, a few days after the approval of the 3 June plan, Giles Squire, in his letter addressed to the Earl of Listowel, once again mentioned the Afghan government’s dissatisfaction on the question of ‘independence’ for ‘Afghans living between the Durand Line and River Indus.’ He went on to say, ‘I endeavoured to explain that the Pathanistan kite had recently flown in Peshawar but had fallen badly… I explained that tribes in independent territory had already been assured that they were entirely free to negotiate a new agreement with India and that presumably this freedom included freedom repeat not to negotiate … as regards settled districts [the] proposed referendum would only decide which Constituent Assembly Province wished to join.”[3]
Five days later, J. B. Kripalani of the Congress Party addressed a letter to Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy of India, in which he demanded that alongside the options for Pakistan and Hindustan,
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an option for independence should also be incorporated as part of the referendum. Whether this had the blessing of Congress leaders Nehru and Patel is not known, but officially they were opposed to any such option for the fear of ‘Balkanization of India’.
The Congress Party had shot down the proposal for independent Bengal on this ground and they weren’t about to risk further division along ethnic lines for a small Muslim-majority province where their allies, the Khan brothers and the Ulema of Jamiat-e-Ulema-Hind (JUH), had at best a shaky hold. In his letter of 17 June 1947, the Viceroy replied: ‘I realize great difficulties of the Frontier situation, but it is not feasible to alter the terms of the Referendum as laid down in the statement of the 3rd June.[4]
Sir Olaf Caroe, the governor and also the famous author of the book Pathans, sent an urgent telegram to the Viceroy on the evening of 25 June 1947, in which he said: ‘Your Excellency should know that there is reason to conclude that this move was to some extent inspired by Frontier Congress leaders with certain Afghan elements and considered when Abdul Ghaffar Khan visited Kabul for Qashan last summer. Moreover, [the] fact that Gandhi is wedded to idea of Pathanistan will make it difficult for E. A. Dept at present juncture to approach this issue objectively.” Qashan was a Soviet town North of Afghanistan. The E. A. Dept referred to is the External Affairs Department which was under Nehru.
The External Affairs department itself denied Afghan claim in its letter to Earl of Listowel dated 30 June 1947, when it declared that all Afghan arguments were equally applicable on an Indian claim on Afghan territory and that such arguments would only lead to ‘reductio ad absurdum’. It went on to say: ‘The fact that what is now India is soon to be succeeded by two sovereign federal states cannot affect the strategic importance of the territory in
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question … A small independent state like the North West Frontier Province cannot (possibly) safeguard its own security and therefore must be a source of weakness to India. It can legitimately claim to exercise the fullest autonomy within the framework of one of the two federal dominions, which will replace the present Government of India. This measure of self-determination the plan of 3rd June does not exclude.[6]
Thus, the whole frontier issue took the form of an international dispute. The Congress leaders were themselves divided on the issue. Nehru and his External Affairs Department, officially at least, held onto the notion of the unity of the subcontinent. Gandhi’s support for ‘Pathanistan’at the eleventh hour created a new situation vis-àvis British India’s position with respect to Afghanistan.
The 3rd June Plan – agreed upon by Congress and Muslim League – envisaged a referendum in the NWFP to determine which constituent assembly the province will join. Prior to this, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress had waged a successful campaign against Sir Olaf Caroe, the governor of NWFP, who was removed because he was deemed by Nehru and Dr Khan Sahib to be partial towards the Muslim League. Perceptive historians on both sides of the border have since concluded otherwise. In any event, Sir Olaf was replaced by Rob Lockhart. It was under the new governor, who enjoyed the confidence of the Congress Party and its ministry in the Frontier that the referendum was to be held.
Howard Donovan, the Counselor for US Embassy in Delhi, said in his periodic report of 26 June 1948 addressed to US Secretary of State George Marshall, ‘Observers in New Delhi believe that the Muslim League will win the forthcoming referendum and that it is a foregone conclusion that the NWFP will join Pakistan. This is unpalatable to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his recent talks with
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Jinnah and Gandhi in Delhi were an effort to forestall … Gandhi has supported Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan … Nehru, Patel, and other Congress members of the Government are understood to be opposed to the idea of Pathanistan. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s action will further complicate the situation in the North West Frontier Province and it will in all probability lead to further strife and bloodshed.’
On 27 June 1947, Ghaffar Khan announced that ‘we have decided to establish Pathanistan, which will be an independent state of all Pathans. He also announced that the British were planning on making NWFP the base of operations against Russia and that the ‘arrival of General Montogomery and his meetings with Mr M A Jinnah are significant.’ Taking a leaf out of Jinnah’s own political vocabulary, he told the Pathans, ‘Let us all organize ourselves and work under the discipline.’ He also announced the boycott of the upcoming referendum. The editorial of the Indian nationalist newspaper Statesman of 28 June 1947 stated that this amounted to an admission that the Frontier Congressmen who had been claiming that they had killed the Pakistan idea in the elections were now ‘afraid to meet its ghost’. It went on to say “Nor can it be regarded simply as a provincial affair; it carries grave implications to all India. It is the first breach in the Mountbatten plan.’
On 2 July 1947, Pakistan Times carried a story by API with the Peshawar dateline of 30 June: “The idea of an independent Afghan state between Punjab and Afghanistan is supported by the Kabul newspaper, Islah, the semi-official organ of the Afghan Government, which says there is no reason why these Afghans should be forced to live under the domination of Indians of Pakistan or Hindustan as slaves.’
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On 3 July 1947, in a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Atlee himself, the India and Burma committee met to discuss inter alia the situation in NWFP. Here, the League’s position as expressed to Mountbatten, that the League was not ready to give any assurances regarding the continuation of treaty obligations of the British Raj, which was cited as irresponsible and it must be pointed out to the League that this considerably weakened its case on the NWFP. On 4 July, the Indian Cabinet met with Nehru, Patel, Rajagopalachari and Liaquat Ali Khan among others where the Government of India refuted Afghan Government’s claims on NWFP declaring that it had no locus standi. Thus, both the Muslim League and Congress High Command were on the face of it aligned with each other on this fundamental question. In private, the Frontier Congressmen were already conceding that a fair referendum would yield a favourable result for Pakistan. Yet, their insistence on boycott of the referendum continued for public consumption. Rob Lockhart wrote to Mountbatten on 3 July 1947, Although the Ministers admitted that there was no question of the North West Frontier Province wishing to join the Hindustan constituent assembly and appeared to agree that there was no way of putting any other alternative before the people except Pakistan or Hindustan without changing the plan of 3 June 1947, they would not agree to modify their statement.’
As had been predicted from every corner, the referendum to decide between Pakistan Constituent Assembly and Hindustan Constituent Assembly, held under an impartial governor who enjoyed the confidence of the Congress with a Congress government in the province, still resulted in a landslide victory for the Muslim League on the Pakistan question. Even though Congress had expected this outcome, its Frontier leaders denounced it as being
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rigged, without any real basis. Before the referendum actually took place, Dr Khan Sahib had famously said that he would resign from his post if Pakistan got 30 per cent of the electorate. Pakistan ended up polling more than 50 per cent of the total electorate, showing that the Pushtuns were overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan. It was in the aftermath of the resounding defeat for the Congress that Dr Khan Sahib declared that he didn’t have to resign because he commanded a legislative majority.
Kanji Dwarkadas, a staunch Indian nationalist in his own right, writing to D. G. Pole on 26 July 1947 said: “… an American journalist, a very reasonable and sound man, who has returned to Delhi from the Frontier has told me that … the Frontier referendum was run on fair lines and not as Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan have explained it. He found Dr Khan Sahib to be muddle headed and both Khan brothers are now rather sore with the Congress for having let them down. The Muslim Leaguers don’t want Afghanistan to interfere.”[7]
On 1 August 1947, Mountbatten and Rob Lockhart had a meeting with the newly appointed Pakistani cabinet minus Jinnah. These included Liaqat Ali Khan, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Jogindranath Mandal, Ch. Mohammad Ali, Abdul Rab Nishtar and Osman Ali, in which Mountbatten stated that the only course of action left was to ask Dr Khan Sahib and his ministry to resign, failing which he would dismiss the NWFP ministry and invite the leader of the opposition to form a new ministry. The second option was to use Section 93 and bring NWFP under federal rule on or before 14 August 1947.8 Having made this solemn pledge, Mountbatten went back on his word and refused to dismiss the NWFP ministry as he ought to have done and which was part of his responsibility. After Dr Khan Sahib
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he refused to resign, the governor of NWFP was left with no option but to dismiss the Dr Khan Sahib ministry under the Government of India Act 1935, after the creation of Pakistan.
If there was any doubt about what Dr Khan Sahib was up to, it must have been cleared up by his indiscriminate issuing of arms licenses to his party men- as many as 6000. Bacha Khan’s son, Khan Abdul Ghani Khan was busy arming Pushtuns to the teeth. Almost a month before partition, Rob Lockhart had warned of unscrupulous activity by the Khan Sahib government in this regard. “There is no doubt that most improper things have been happening. Certain people have been issuing instructions for licenses to be issued on a party basis. Even Dr Khan Sahib himself is said to be guilty on these scores. A prime offender in arms trade is Abdul Ghani, the son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. I have given orders that if proof can be produced he is to be proceeded against… there are reports that the Nawab of Tank, MLA, Muslim League is guilty of similar practices. If he too could be proceeded against, it would be good.”[9] Ghani Khan was the leader of ‘Zalmai Pakhtoon’, an organization that was involved in systematic violence against Muslim League and which was planning on creating widespread disturbances in the event of the dismissal of the Khan Ministry.
The main crux of the Faqir’s propaganda was that Muslim League was a bastion of British imperialism and Qadiyanism. It is ironic that those who claimed to be secular and liberal were now supporting Faqir of Ipi’s ‘jehad’ against the British, Hindus and the Muslim League. Faqir of Ipi’s role in the closing days of the Raj deserves an article by itself and would help understand the current state of Islamic insurgency in the tribal areas.
In July, the Faqir of Ipi made his announcement. This announcement was reported by S. M. Rashid, a young Muslim
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Leaguer, in his letter dated 17 July as, “Nobody is to participate in either Congress or Muslim League. Nobody is to violate the peace of the Hindus because have consented to pay the poll tax to me. Muslim Leaguers in this area (according to Shariat of Waziristan) are to be devoured by … wolves.’
This charge of Qadiani conspiracy came from the fact that Qadiani Ahmadis were actively working for Jinnah and the Muslim League in the tribal areas, trying to get the tribes in favour of the Muslim League and Pakistan. It is a searing irony that Ahmadis’ contributions are not recognized by the Pakistani state today but on 29 July 1947, M. Ramzan an Ahmadi, a member of the Muslim League wrote to Jinnah of his hardships in the Waziristan area. He warned of insidious propaganda and the arrest of an Ahmadi worker on the Afghan border by Dr Khan Sahib’s government.[10]
The Ahmadi issue was stoked again and again against the Muslim League, which makes their marginalization in modern-day Pakistan even more ironic. The birth of Islamic jehad in Pakistan’s North West had more to do with bringing the Pakistani state down than Pakistan using it against other forces. In the scuttle everything becomes hazy and that has been the case with history of the various movements in this region. As a politician schooled in parliamentarian traditions in the Indian legislature, Jinnah was repulsed by the idea of dismissing any Legislative Assembly. Therefore, in early August, he suggested instead if given a chance, the Muslim League could form a coalition government with non-Muslim representatives, which would give the Muslim League legislative majority and thereby bypass the Section 93 dismissal. As mentioned earlier, this Section 93 was in any event not available after 14 August 1947. Rob Lockhart was of the view that if a change was to be made in the fitness of things, it had to be made quickly because he recalled that Dr Khan Sahib had warned
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of a mass movement, which he would try and keep non-violent.’ Lord Mountbatten failed to heed either advice and consequently it fell to the governor general of Pakistan to take a decision that he had hoped to avoid
The Khan brothers boycotted the referendum, citing that it did not have the option of NWFP remaining independent or worse, joining Afghanistan. Bacha Khan had on 27 June 1947 called for an independent and free Pathan state, based on Islamic principles and social justice. Dr Khan Sahib meanwhile continued to distribute arms licences to his party men. In the circumstances, which government was going to allow an openly hostile government to continue in power, especially when that government had lost its majority in the Legislative Assembly? Jinnah, had not dismissed the legislature but had ensured an in-house change.
With the lapse of paramountcy now looming large, many princely states had begun negotiations with the Muslim League and Congress. Some of these were extremely small states or Talukas like Dasada in Baroda state. On 26 July, the Talukdar of Dasada, Shri Alladat Khan, wrote to Jinnah claiming that he had the support of twenty-two Bhagdars and therefore wanted terms.[11] The ruler of Pathari meanwhile made an appeal to all Muslim princely states to join together and form a federation because of the inimical way in which the Chamber of Princes was treating Muslim rulers.[12] These appeals did not particularly impress Jinnah and went unanswered. The three states that Jinnah seems to have been preoccupied with were Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh. There was also a fourth state which had been taken for granted to join Pakistan and that was Kalat. Khan of Kalat was constantly in touch with Jinnah and assured him of his settlement with Pakistan[1 Khan of Kalat went back on his word later and regretted it much later in life. We
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find evidence of this from the Khan’s own testimony as recorded by Munir Hussain, a former chief secretary of Balochistan, who met Khan at his residence much later.
One of the major concerns Jinnah had in the days leading up to Pakistan was the protection of minorities in Pakistan. To allay the fears of those who feared a theocracy in Pakistan, Jinnah spoke in clear and concise terms, which were unambiguous and unequivocal. On 14 July 1947, addressing a press conference, he said: “Minorities, to whichever community they may belong, will be safeguarded. Their religion, faith and belief will be secure. There will be no interference of any kind with their freedom of worship. They will have their protection with regard to their religion, faith, life and culture. They will be, in all respects, the citizens of Pakistan without any distinction of caste or creed. Jinnah would repeat this message many times in several of his speeches and pronouncements.
A few days later, Jinnah joined the leaders of the future Indian government in a joint communiqué, which read: ‘Both the Congress and the Muslim League have given assurances of fair and equitable treatment to the minorities after the transfer of power. The two future governments re-affirm these assurances. It is their intention to safeguard the legitimate interests of all citizens, irrespective of religion, caste, or sex. In the exercise of their normal civic rights, all citizens will be regarded as equal, and both the governments will assure to all people within their territories the exercise of liberties such as freedom of speech, the right to form associations, the right to worship in their own way, and the protection of their language and culture. Both the governments further undertake that there shall be no discrimination against those who before 15 August may
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have been political opponents. This was the closest Pakistan and India got to the sort of pact with reciprocal obligations but it was not a binding treaty. Meanwhile, to Muslim minorities in India, Jinnah counselled loyalty to India as was recorded by a Muslim member of the Central Legislative Assembly: ‘But he made it clear, in no uncertain terms, that they should be loyal to India, and that they should not seek to ride two horses.’14 A report of this meeting was carried by the Eastern Express, which stated that Jinnah said he was a citizen of the Union and that he was going to Pakistan as a servant of the new state and not its citizen just as Lord Mountbatten. It also reported that Jinnah told his listeners not to expect any help from Pakistan, which left the Muslim Leaguers in India dejected.[15]
Jinnah expected that now with Pakistan and Hindustan having been created as independent dominions, the majorities in both countries would accord fair play to their minorities – a conclusion that has not always been borne out by history.
Reports of violence against Muslims continued to pain Jinnah, often prompting him to send telegrams to various rulers of princely states to protect their minorities, as was the case with Muslim Meos in Bharatpur and Alwar. Ever the proper law-abiding citizen, Jinnah found time to pay his income tax officer in Bombay, addressing him as ‘Dear Sir, I am in receipt of your notice dated 1 July 1947 asking me to send my return of income for the Income tax year 1947–48. … I accept the assessment and accordingly, I am sending you the first instalment, which is due on 15 September 1947. The second and third instalments are due on 15 December 1947 and 15 March 1948 respectively.'[16] This is significant because it shows that Jinnah never quite intended to abandon Bombay and was paying his income tax even after partition. It also serves to reinforce his idea of an India above Pakistan and Hindustan where he could continue to be a
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citizen of Bombay and the governor general of Pakistan. It certainly does not indicate an idea of two mutually hostile states; for why would the founding father of one then give money voluntarily in advance to the supposed enemy state. It is certainly a far cry from what was eventually to become of these two countries.
One of Jinnah’s regular correspondents during this time was K. L. Ralia Ram, a Christian activist who had supported the Pakistan Movement and kept Jinnah apprised of the events in Punjab. In a letter dated 4 August, she proposed that Pakistan should have guaranteed reserved seats for Christians and women, an idea that may well have gladdened Jinnah as it had been so close to his heart for decades.[17] While the proposal was not quite implemented in Jinnah’s lifetime, it was keeping with the general tenor of Christian support for Pakistan in Punjab. The Christian minority in Punjab believed that Pakistan would be a haven for minorities and saw the Pakistan demand a minority rebellion against the caste Hindu majority. Same was true of sectarian minorities within Muslim community, such as Shias and Ahmadis.
Despite earlier misgivings expressed by certain Shia leaders, they seemed confident that if Jinnah, being a Shia himself, could lead the Muslims of India, they had nothing to fear in an overwhelmingly Sunni majority Pakistan. The Ahmadis were heartened by the special position and confidence the eminent Zafrullah Khan, soon to become the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan enjoyed with Jinnah who had chosen him to argue Pakistan’s case before the boundary commission. Scheduled caste Hindus in the proposed Pakistan areas also saw Pakistan as a vehicle for change of status for them. This is why Jogindranath Mandal, the lawyer from Bengal
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who had represented the League in the interim government, came out in support of the Muslim League. All in all, the minorities continued to believe that a Pakistan set up by Jinnah would never turn into a theocracy trampling on their rights. This miscalculation was because they had no idea that Jinnah by this time had already reportedly received a death sentence from his doctor and had very little time left. Jinnah, in any event, had no plans of living in Pakistan and saw his own role as a sort of an interim governor general, who would return to private life in Bombay and a much-deserved retirement after a long political career once the country was stable enough. The time and events around partition would not give him that opportunity. That he could have fancied the idea of living in Bombay after Partition is itself telling of what he imagined the relations between the two dominions.
The theocrats and the Pirs who had played their role in agitating for Pakistan in Punjab, albeit marginal, now wanted a piece of the pie. On 5 August 1947, the Pir of Golra wrote to Jinnah asking him to appoint Ulema to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.[18] Having won Pakistan, Jinnah certainly was in no mood to give them this piece. Similarly, letters from G. A. Parwez, the founder of the Tolue-Islam organization, with suggestions for cabinet positions were ignored. Another letter by one Mirza Muzaffar Beg suggested that Pakistan’s flag should incorporate Allah in the middle with a sun. Jinnah’s replies to these letters are not available.
On 7 August 1947, Jinnah finally bid farewell to New Delhi with his sister Fatima, having already sold his house in Delhi to his friend Dalmia, while retaining his Bombay house. In his message, he said: ‘I bid farewell to the citizens of Delhi, among whom I have many friends of all communities and I earnestly appeal to everyone to live in this great and historic city with peace. The past must be buried and
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let us start afresh as two independent sovereign states of Hindustan and Pakistan. I wish Hindustan prosperity and peace.’[19] As Jinnah’s Vickers Viking 1B-J750 aircraft took off from Delhi, Jinnah silently sat in his seat, according to his ADC Ata Rabbani of the newly formed Royal Pakistan Air Force, not displaying much emotion. When the plane reached Karachi, Fatima Jinnah excitedly remarked on how many people had gathered to receive them. Jinnah seems to have impassively replied, ‘Yes, a lot of people.’
If there was any exhilaration or excitement, Jinnah did not show it. After all, this marked the end of another dream, even if it was a beginning for Pakistan. The dream that Jinnah had dedicated most of his life to, the dream of a united India had now come to an end and he was the one being blamed or credited for its end. There was much work at hand and the next few days would be spent in frantic correspondence with various princely states, including Kalat, whose ruler now showed signs of vacillating. There was also the business of the cabinet under his prime minister designate Liaquat Ali Khan. For the first time, Jinnah, still the President of the All India Muslim League, was being forced to contend with competing interests. As with the great British scuttle, the product of Mountbatten’s hasty decision to bring forward the date of independence to 15 August 1947 from June 1948, there was a great scramble in Pakistan for positions, favours and power. This was primarily why Jinnah had chosen to be the governor general instead of the prime minister, to play a neutral arbiter between these interests. Then there must also have been emotional toll for even a person who exuded icy reserve to the world. He may have left India but he had left much of his life there as well. His daughter still lived in his cherished Bombay, now divorced but unwilling to abandon Bombay for Karachi. On Independence Day, she would raise two flags of both dominions
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in her house, true to her father’s original vision. Dina remained an Indian at heart and wedded to the Indian unity, which her father had once fought so valiantly for and then had caused to break down. In a peaceful Ithna Ashari cemetery in Bombay lay his wife whose grave he would visit every Thursday as a ritual, humming the tune of ‘End of a beautiful day’ by Paul Robeson. Jinnah was leaving all of this behind.
On 10 August 1947, Lord Mountbatten reported to the Earl of Listowel that Jinnah had written to him proposing a few changes to the oaths of office for governor general, governors and ministers of state. Jinnah had asked for the omissions of the words ‘so help me God’ and also insisted on changing the word ‘swear’ to ‘affirm’. In the legal sense the latter part was even more significant than the first because to affirm is a secular form in depositions and affidavits as opposed to “swear”, a distinction Jinnah was most certainly aware of. It becomes even more significant when we consider the oaths in present day Islamic Republic of Pakistan which are riddled with religious tests and references to deity.
The Pakistan Constituent Assembly met for the first time on 10 August 1947 and elected Jogindranath Mandal as chair for the first session, in a symbolic gesture meant to show that Pakistan was for all people of all religions and backgrounds. As was appropriate, Jinnah was the first to sign his name on the register of members. It was an extraordinary moment when the first governor general designate of Asiatic birth took oath as a member of the Constituent Assembly of an independent dominion. Evidently, there was no rule against the governor general designate remaining in the legislature or the constituent assembly and in any event, if there
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was such a convention, it was conveniently overlooked for Jinnah. While historians and constitutional scholars have concentrated on Jinnah’s decision to become the governor general instead of the prime minister, no one seems to have commented on this basic constitutional question of how the representative of the crown was also a member of the legislature. In other words, such a member would vote on a bill and then assent to it constitutionally as the governor general. Certainly, this was the case with C. R. Gopalachari in India who as a member of the Constituent Assembly held the offices of governor and governor general. Hence, holding two offices has never been such an issue in British parliamentary history.
The Constituent Assembly met again at 10 a.m. on 11 August 1947. Jinnah was elected unopposed as the first president of the Constituent Assembly. Speaking after the leader of the house Liaquat Ali Khan, the leader of the opposition, Kiran Shankar Roy of Congress Party spoke of his party policy, poignantly stating: “Sir, if the Pakistan you have in mind means a secular democratic state, a state which will make no difference between citizen and citizen, which will deal fairly with all irrespective of caste, creed or community, I assure you that you shall have our utmost cooperation.[20] Several other speakers then spoke, including Jahanara Shahnawaz and Jogindranath Mandal but conspicuously absent was any reference to Islam. After listening to them, Jinnah rose to address the house. He started by speaking about the duties of the Assembly and the Government, the foremost duty of which he said was to maintain law and order and protect the life property and religious beliefs.[21] He then moved on to the question of bribery and corruption but what is often overlooked is how he framed it. ‘One of the biggest curses India is suffering from – I do not say other countries are free from it but our condition is much worse – is
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bribery and corruption.[22] At the doorstep of Pakistan, Jinnah was referring to India as the country and Pakistan as the dominion. It was not an idle slip of tongue.
He went on to say: ‘A division had to take place; on both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my judgment there was no other solution and I am sure future history will record its verdict in favour of it. And what is more, it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that was the only solution of India’s constitutional problem. Any idea of a united India could never have worked and in my judgment it would have led us to terrific disaster. Maybe that view is correct; maybe it is not; that remains to be seen.[23]
Jinnah was saying that India had been divided into Hindustan and Pakistan but referred to India as something above Hindustan and Pakistan. Significantly, he offered the opinion that an idea of a united India would not have worked and would have led us – Hindustan and Pakistan – to a terrific disaster. It was the only solution to India’s constitutional problem – India again. Clearly, Jinnah had not made up his mind as to whether his view was correct – maybe it was and maybe it was not. This, Jinnah left to the verdict of history. He continued: “All the same, in this division, it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one dominion or the other. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be on end to the progress you will make.’ Now, he was beginning to answer the question posed to him by Kiran Shankar
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Roy – Pakistan would be a state with equal rights and equal opportunities without discrimination.
Continuing further, Jinnah said: ‘I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community – because even as Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on – will vanish. Indeed, if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and independence; if not for this we would have been free people long ago.[24] Here again, India was a nation of 400 million souls now divided into two dominions because of internal dissensions. Jinnah said that if this policy of division upon division continued, it would be endless. After all, most of his career – save the last ten years – had been spent trying to compose the HinduMuslim division and unifying them through a pact. Underlying these words was deep anguish and the nagging question – had he done the right thing by accepting the partition plan? Now it was done and it was important to make a new beginning, to start afresh on footing of equality and without distinction.
Jinnah continued:
Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State … The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other.
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Even now there are some states in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the Nation.[25]
Then came the startling renunciation of the Two Nation Theory: ‘Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. [26] Jinnah’s concern throughout his political career had been the inability of Hindus and Muslims to march together. In face of Congress’ refusal to settle the minorities’ question through a consociational framework, Jinnah had posited the Two Nation Theory. Having now achieved Pakistan, he wanted to bury it. Prima facie, this seemed like a terrible contradiction on part of Pakistan’s Quaid-i-Azam but taken on a longer timeline of his career from Congress to Muslim
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League to finally the father of a new nation, this showed remarkable consistency and single-mindedness. Jinnah was the same idealistic ‘Best Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity’, that he had been when he first joined Congress in 1904. Events, constitutional deadlocks and an acute feeling of being isolated from his former Congress colleagues had led him to this path to Pakistan but now having achieved a settlement, he was ready to revert to his old role.
Jinnah spoke of cooperation specifically: ‘I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fairplay without any, as is put in the political language, prejudice or ill-will, in other words, partiality or favouritism.:[27] This speech created much controversy in Pakistan and a continuous debate over whether Jinnah wanted a secular or an Islamic Pakistan. Perhaps to Jinnah, as a modern Muslim, there was no contradiction between his modernist idea of religion – so watered down and free of ritual and prohibition ontologically emptied – and the idea of a secular state.
Significantly, Jinnah did not use the word secular for reasons very similar to why Nehru and Ambedkar would keep the word out of the Indian constitution – the word was too loaded to find broad consensus. However, Jinnah’s references in the speech did not come from religion – certainly not the Islamic faith, which he did not refer to once in this speech. His speech was a summation of John Locke’s ideas on toleration and citizenship. The fact that the speech envisaged a secular state is undeniable. If Jinnah had wanted to make a distinction between his idea of an inclusive democratic state and that which had been proposed by Roy minutes earlier, he could have said so but he did not. Avid parliamentarian that Jinnah had been, his record shows that he would never leave a contentious point unanswered. As a lawyer trained in the rules and law of evidence, Jinnah knew that an assertion not rebutted would become
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an admitted fact. By delivering this speech, Jinnah made an explicit and clear promise not just to Roy but all Pakistanis and indeed the rest of India that Pakistan would be a secular democratic state.
Similarly, Pakistan was undeniably a Muslim majority state, conceived as such by design, where by the virtue of a Muslim majority, the unique Muslim culture would gain civic importance. Yet, there would be an effective separation of religion from the state and no discrimination against any minority belonging to another faith. To do this, Jinnah the politician had to convince his constituents that such an idea – the idea of a modern secular democracy – was not alien to their faith and culture but rather an integral part of their historical heritage. It was a tough balancing act to counter the excessive claims of his Muslim constituents on Islam’s role in polity but Jinnah was the one man entirely capable of doing so, by couching the idea in Muslim modernism. Sadly, no one after him quite held that balance and in 1949, less than a year after his death, his most capable lieutenants, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan would help pass the Objectives Resolution, which basically tipped the balance in favour of a religious polity.
This was still in the future but we see a glimpse of what was to come immediately in the debate that took place after Jinnah’s famous 11 August speech. Congress members had moved the motion that a fresh committee be formed to design the new flag of the Pakistani federation instead of the one designed by Liaquat Ali Khan and the one that was ultimately adopted as the Pakistani National Flag.28 Obviously, the Muslim League flag had been altered to include a white part for the minorities but the Congress did not deem it enough. In a robust debate that followed, Liaquat Ali Khan tried to assure the Congress members that the crescent
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and the star were not religious symbols and he was correct academically and historically but the crescent and the star had long been associated with Muslims. Under the circumstances, given that it came immediately after Jinnah’s historic pronouncement of secularism, the allowance of a committee on the subject might not have been out of place. The motion was defeated. Jinnah, as the President of the Constituent Assembly, did not participate in the debate and it is unclear whether the rules of business – for which Jinnah was a stickler, having earlier ruled that the language of the House could be English and vernacular only when the speaker was unable to speak English – allowed him to overrule the will of the majority, but given the stature he enjoyed, it was still quite unlike Jinnah, the erstwhile defender of minorities in India, not to at least indicate his displeasure. It certainly would have kicked off the task of constitution making with the right kind of precedent if this demand had been accepted.
The 11 August speech undeniably charted out a secular state. It resonated in the Indian Constituent Assembly as well where M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar said on 27 August 1947: ‘It would not be wrong for me to quote Mr Jinnah in this connection, whatever, he might have said before Partition. He said: “My idea is to have a secular State here.” Somebody asked: “Religious or secular?” He said: “Hindus and Muslim are alike to me. They must have equal opportunities.” I am trying to make a common nation for both of us. Why should our Muslim friends who owe allegiance to Mr Jinnah and whom they revere as I do, think differently in this matter? I am not prepared to call a single individual a minority. I do not like the word “minority” at all. Therefore, I am saying that I am opposed to this amendment. “[29] This was echoed by B. Pocker Sahib Bahadur, who said: ‘I wonder if my friends who have suggested
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separate electorate for minorities would appreciate the remarks of a great leader of India. It is Mr Jinnah who in his address to the Pakistan Assembly said: “We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and, equal citizens of one State.” Thus, Jinnah’s speech was by and large interpreted as indicative of a secular state even in India.
The next day, the Assembly Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities’ Rights was appointed, comprising five representatives from religious minorities, all from Congress and nine other members with the President of the Constituent Assembly as the ex-officio member. [30] The one-third representation for minorities (who comprised 22 per cent of East and West Pakistan wings together) in this most important constitutional committee was consistent with Jinnah’s own demand for 33 per cent representation for the Muslim minority in his famous fourteen points. It certainly would have gladdened the hearts of religious minorities, but the buoyant mood was wrecked this time by the Congress during the debate on the next agenda item. It was the motion by Liaquat Ali Khan which stated: “That this Assembly resolves that Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and governor general Designate of Pakistan be addressed as “Quaid-i-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah, governor general of Pakistan” in all official Acts, documents, letters and correspondence from 15 August 1947.[31] Many Congressmen rose up to oppose the motion, appealing to Jinnah who himself had declared on a number of occasions that he preferred to be referred to as ‘plain Mr Jinnah’, declaring that there was no place for titles in 1947, a strange objection for a party that had referred to Gandhi as Mahatma and affixed Pandit with Nehru’s name for so long.
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The treasury benches pointed out this contradiction while also pointing out that Quaid-i-Azam was not a religious or hereditary title, but the sharpest rebuke to the Congress came from Jogindranath Mandal, soon to be Pakistan’s first law minister, who said: ‘I am prepared to accept their submission but before my Congress friends come with this sort of proposal, they must record in the Constituent Assembly of India that Mr Gandhi should no longer be called Mahatma Gandhi. He is not a Mahatma; he is only a political leader. Here we are describing our leader as a leader and not a Mahatma. Can anybody dispute that Mr Mahomed Ali Jinnah is not a great leader? They can say so, I am prepared to accept their opposition. They how it fully well that it is not a title. We know that there was no soul in India more patriotic than Mr Mahomed Ali Jinnah and we know that he does not care for any title. We know he may even express his opinion for the stoppage of conferment of titles, but, Sir, this is no title. It is a token of affection. Unless we call him Quaid-iAzam we are not satisfied, we are not contented. ‘[32] The resolution was ultimately adopted.
These nuggets are indicative of the kind of inclusive parliamentary and democratic traditions he wanted to inculcate in the legislature, traditions that would find little support after his death. Under him, the Constituent Assembly continued to act as an admirably secular entity, with no religious fanfare. No references were made to an Islamic polity or an Islamic system of government in those initial days. The word Islam was conspicuous by absence, especially in Jinnah’s historic first address. There were no prayer breaks or calls to prayer in the middle of the proceedings. All this is part of the record and stands in strange contrast to the blatant deployment of religion that one sees in Pakistan’s highest legislature today. Clearly, if there
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was a religious raison d’être for Pakistan, it found no expression in those early days of Pakistan. Jinnah always had very little patience for outward displays of religiosity; he famously rebuked Zafar Ali Khan at one of the Muslim League meetings for asking for a prayer break. Here he was leading not just a communal party but a state that included many different communities.
It is not to say that Jinnah did not refer to religion at all when addressing the people but it was always to explain that Islam was compatible with modern democracy and life. Many have attempted to quote these speeches out of context to underscore the contradiction with his 11 August speech, most notably Dr Farzana Shaikh, who seized upon Jinnah’s speech at the Karachi Bar Association delivered on the birthday of the Holy Prophet as one such contradiction. However, a textual analysis of the speech shows no contradiction between what Jinnah said on 11 August 1947 and later at the Karachi Bar Association. He said: ‘Why this nervousness that the future constitution of Pakistan is going to be in conflict with the Shariat Laws? … Not only Muslims but also the non-Muslims have nothing to fear. Islam and its idealism have taught democracy. Islam has taught equality, justice and fair play to everybody. What reason is there for anyone to fear democracy, equality, freedom on the highest standard of integrity and on the basis of fair play and justice for everybody.'[33] Days before this address, a lawyer from the Karachi Bar had written to Jinnah asking him to do away with Western democracy,[34] and Jinnah was now speaking to that audience. It becomes clear that contrary to saying that Pakistan would be imposing an Islamic polity of a specific kind, Jinnah seemed to argue that democracy, equality, freedom, justice
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and fair play were central Islamic principles extended to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This was not a vision for a theocratic state but rather a secular state. He seemed to say that there was contradiction between Islam and secular democratic state. Jinnah’s references, few and far between, to Islamic principles were always in this light and never outside this framework of equality and freedom.
Despite many appeals from the Pir after Partition, Jinnah made no attempt to change the constitution or to Islamize the laws. Anyone familiar with Jinnah’s political style knows that he was not one to bow down to political pressure exerted by the Ulema, Mashaikhs, Pirs, and other godly men, based on undocumented, unsourced and ambiguous promises he may or may not have made. His opposition to the British colonial state had not been epistemologically anti-British in the sense that Gandhi’s was; it was procedural. Jinnah wanted to wrest control of power from the British bureaucracy and place it in the hands of representative Indians. This is why political scientists like K. B. Sayeed and others have accused Jinnah of following the vice regal system but it was a matter of necessity for Jinnah as the governor general. As the founder of the nation, he understood, as the late columnist Ardeshir Cowasjee used to say, when to put the foot down.
It would not be out of place to quote Barbara D. Metcalf, Professor Emeritus at UC Davis and a well-known historian of South Asia who writes in her essay: Jinnah himself, a true liberal, invoked Islam to foretell a society in which citizens would exist in direct relation with the state, their rights unmediated by sect, ethnicity or hierarchy as evident in his famous declaration to the Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims… in the political sense, as citizens of the state.”[35] Jinnah’s idea of
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Islam was always a progressive and ontologically emptied shell or as Dr Faisal Devji of Oxford University says in his essay on Jinnah, ‘it had, in fact, to secularize Islam by making belief and practice entirely nominal.’ This was a use of Islam ontologically emptied at the risk of sounding repetitive; it was a new enlightened idea of Muslim politics, which was secular, progressive and liberal. It was a moment that was not capitalized upon.
We get a glimpse of this in Jinnah’s speech on 14 August 1947 during the transfer of power ceremony. Lord Mountbatten, in his speech, paid tributes to Jinnah’s leadership and then referred to Akbar the Mughal Emperor as the epitome of tolerance and goodwill towards all creeds. Jinnah in his response made a reference to this again: ‘The tolerance and goodwill that the great Emperor Akbar showed to all the non-Muslims is not of recent origin. It dates back thirteen centuries, when our Prophet not only by words but by deeds treated the Jews and Christians handsomely after he had conquered them. He showed to them the utmost tolerance and regard and respect for their faith and beliefs. The whole history of Muslims, wherever they ruled, is replete with those humane and great principles which should be followed and practised by us.[36] Some Pakistani writers have attempted to portray this as a rebuke and others have attempted to use this to bolster Jinnah’s Muslim credentials. Emperor Akbar’s memory often evokes mixed reactions among Muslims. While some admire him as a great Mughal Emperor, others view Akbar as a non-Muslim who tried to introduce his own religion. Akbar’s legacy has been contentious for other reasons as well. However, Jinnah, who significantly never referred to any Mughal Emperors or any historical Muslim rulers during his political career, was – by appropriating the “Great Emperor’ Akbar’s goodwill and tolerance towards non-Muslims as a cardinal
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principle of Muslim rule dating back to the Prophet – sidestepping that controversy altogether.
He was hard-pressed to explain to his followers that an inclusive state was compatible with Islam. At this session, the All India Muslim League was split into two bodies – the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Union Muslim League – through its Resolution No. 3. Jinnah had long toyed with the idea of wrapping up the Muslim League now that it had fulfilled its purpose, but here he advised the Indian Muslims to retain the Muslim League in India. There was also another proposal to convert Muslim League in Pakistan into a National League open to all communities. While Jinnah favoured this idea initially, he did not make any effort to bring it about. The iterations of his interview with BBC’s Roger Stimson in the immediate aftermath of the final session of the All India Muslim League were revealing to say the least. There are three separate versions, which need to be considered in detail. On 16 December 1947, Stimson wrote: “Here is my proposed text of our interview…’ The proposed text contained these lines: the Muslim League of Pakistan would eventually transform itself into a national organization open to members of all religious communities, the Quaid-i-Azam said: “The time has not yet come for a national organization of that kind. Public opinion among the Muslims of Pakistan is not yet ready for it.[37] Jinnah omitted the reference to ‘Muslim way of life.’ It now read “they have still to build the structure that will suit the conditions and developments that will take place. But the decision to form a purely Muslim organization in Pakistan is not irrevocable. It may be altered as and when necessary to suit changing conditions. Nothing is static in politics. It all depends upon what progress we make and further developments that may take place.[38] It was a significant change, the only plausible
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explanation of which is that Jinnah did not want to limit Pakistan to some undefined idea of ‘Muslim way of life.’
About the future of the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, Stimson asked Jinnah why the new Muslim League was not being thrown open to the Hindus. He said it could not be done at this stage. He said that Muslims of Pakistan would immediately reply, “You are winding up the League; you are not building the Muslim state you promised us; you are trying to copy Western models in a half-baked way.[39] Apparently, Jinnah had come under this particular criticism for his 11 August speech. Still, it was a remarkable reversal for a man who, as we have seen earlier, had spoken about how if the constituency was not advanced enough to approve of a progressive measure, the clearest duty on the part of the legislator is to ask them to elect someone else. Jinnah in 1947 was not as willing to take on his own followers as Jinnah in 1929 was. Yet, what it shows convincingly is that Jinnah was not foreclosing the option of ultimately having an inclusive political party instead of the Muslim League. This showed a tactical acceptance of a ground reality rather conviction that this course was the right one. Nevertheless, Jinnah would put his foot down. During the session, one worker had interrupted Jinnah, saying, ‘… but Quaid-i-Azam, we have been promising the people Pakistan ka matlab kiya La illallah”. Jinnah’s reply was forthright: ‘Neither the Muslim League Working Committee nor I have ever passed a resolution [called] “Pakistan ka matlab kya” – you may have used it to catch a few votes.’ It was true. In 1943, there was a resolution presented in the Muslim League to commit Pakistan to principles laid down by the Quran and the Sunnah and Caliphs of Islam, but Jinnah had vetoed it saying that such a resolution would amount to censure on every Leaguer and that the government of Pakistan
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shall be what the people of Pakistan would decide. At no point under his presidency did the Muslim League ever pass a resolution calling for an Islamic state. This is a significant fact, which punctures the idea that Pakistan was founded in the name of Islam. Despite this, the slogan has stuck in Pakistan’s national psyche, repeated even at cricket matches. About the need for a Muslim League in India, he told Stimson that he felt that they would be wise to retain the organization because as a consolidated opposition they could still make their weight felt, and could still be good citizens of India despite that.[40]
Jinnah did not become the president of the newly formed Pakistan Muslim League. He stated that he could not continue as the president of avowedly communal organization while being the governor general of the country. This shows that he himself had harboured the hope that the League in Pakistan would become a national body but was unable to lead his followers along. At the very least, he imagined that there should be neutral arbiter at the top. Paul Alling, the American diplomat, in his report to George Marshall, the US Secretary of State, writes: ‘Mr Jinnah expressed his conviction that the Muslim League hereafter be regarded purely as a political party and, not as, in effect, the Government of Pakistan, and in that connection he proposed that no official of the Government of Pakistan or of any provincial government should hold office in the Pakistan Muslim League. Such a suggestion of course was revolutionary in as much as heretofore all of the important leaders in the League have been prominent either in the central or in the provincial governments.[41]
Jinnah continued to promise that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state, sticking to his distinction between a Muslim state and a theocracy. In an address to the people of the United States
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of America, Jinnah said: ‘In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State – to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims – Hindus, Christians, and Parsis – but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.[42]
Speaking at a Parsi gathering in Karachi in February 1948, he said: “I assure you, Pakistan means to stand by its oft repeated promises of according equal rights to all its nationals, irrespective of their caste or creed.[43] On 22 March 1948, meeting with Hindu legislators in an effort to stem their exodus to India, he said: We guarantee equal rights to all citizens of Pakistan. Hindus should in spirit and action wholeheartedly co-operate with the government and its various branches as Pakistanis.[44] On 23 March 1948, meeting the
Scheduled Caste Federation’, he said: “We stand by our declarations that members of every community will be treated as citizens of Pakistan with equal rights and privileges and obligations and that Minorities will be safeguarded and protected.'[45] Speaking to Quetta Parsis in June 1948, he said: ‘Although you have not struck the note of your needs and requirements as a community, it is the policy of my government and myself that every member of every community – irrespective of caste, color, creed and race – shall be fully protected with regard to his life, property and honour. I reiterate to you that you, like all minorities, will be treated as equal citizens with your rights and obligations, provided you are loyal to Pakistan.[46]
Jinnah had struck up a personal rapport with Sri Prikasa, the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan. At one point, Prikasa complained to Jinnah about reports that Pakistan would be an Islamic state. Jinnah asked him furiously, “Who is saying this?’ Prikasa said the prime minister had gone about spreading this view.
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Jinnah’s answer was ‘So go talk to him then.’Not letting up, Prikasa suggested that Jinnah himself had used the words Islamic state. Jinnah told him to prove it. As it turned out, Jinnah had not used the word ‘Islamic state’ but ‘Muslim state.'[47] Jinnah also told Prikasa that he wanted a completely secular state.[48] Similarly, he told M. S. M. Sharma, a journalist close to him, that he intended to become the ‘Protector General of the Hindus.[49] Symbolism was also very important. As mentioned earlier, Jogindranath Mandal, a Scheduled Caste federation politician and lawyer from Bengal, was first appointed on the League’s behalf to represent Muslims of India in the interim government. After Partition, he was nominated by Jinnah to chair the inaugural session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. He was then nominated to the first cabinet as Pakistan’s first law minister. This is a very significant fact. If Pakistan was to be an Islamic state, why was a Hindu being appointed the minister of law? Jogindranath Mandal was not only a scheduled caste Hindu but was also entirely unversed in Islamic law. Another significant thing was Jinnah’s decision to get a Hindu, Jagganath Azad, to write Pakistan’s first national anthem. This was done presumably to show that Pakistan was not exclusivist state for Muslims alone.
Though he has not been given sufficient credit, Jinnah did act as the Protector General of the Hindus and his attempts to douse the communal flames were no less than those of Gandhi and Nehru, even though the accompanying fanfare was considerably less. When riots broke out in Karachi in January 1948, Jinnah and his sister visited the riot-affected areas. On many occasions, he stopped his car to speak to Muslim refugees. He told them that he was grieved to hear of reports that Muslim refugees were taking part in disturbances and looting Hindu properties, calling anyone who was defying the law an enemy of Pakistan.
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In one such drive through Karachi, Jinnah also came across Gandhi’s statue, which he feared would be desecrated by the protesters. It was saved and protected by Ardeshir Cowasjee’s family and ultimately given to the Indian High Commission. It still stands today in the Indian High Commission’s grounds. Curfew was imposed and shoot-to-kill orders were given against any Muslim attacking a Hindu’s property in Karachi. These are facts that have often been shoved under the carpet in India where Jinnah is deliberately painted as a heartless communalist, which is an unfortunate characterization of the man.
The bloodletting at Partition soured relations greatly between the communities. Writing to Clement Atlee in October, Jinnah said that unless the Congress and the Indian dominion deal with the Sikh militant organizations with immediately an iron hand, the result would be a heavy toll of human life and destruction of property and the economic life in both dominions.[50] Mirza Abol Hassan Ipahani, Pakistan’s first ambassador to the US, told Robert A. Lovett frankly that Muslims were willing to unite under a common government with the Hindus but it was the latter group that had turned down their efforts, leading to Muslim separation.[51]
Meanwhile, Gandhi had reportedly given a statement warning of war between India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had sent a telegram complaining about the same to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who replied on 1 October explaining that Gandhi was merely warning all concerned that if matters were allowed to drift, it would lead to dangerous consequences.[52] Whatever the case, it was an alarming statement coming from a leader widely hailed as a symbol of peace and seems to have rattled
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the Pakistan government very much. War or not, Jinnah did not seem to give up on the Indian dominion where he continued to invest in shares instead of divesting.
Jinnah and the Pakistan government had ordered that no evacuees from Pakistan should be subjected to searches. However, Ayub Khuhro, Sindh’s Premier, told the Sind Observer that he did not agree with the Pakistan government that no searches should be made of the outgoing evacuees. He quoted the example of Bombay where firearms of an all India license would be detained in India, adding that he had only ordered male evacuees to be searched. Jinnah wrote to Khuhro on 3 October, asking him sternly: ‘I would draw your particular attention to what you said with regards to the searches to be made. This will create a very serious misunderstanding. Hence, I am writing to you to let me know whether you are correctly reported.’53 It speaks volumes about how Jinnah saw Pakistan-India (or as he called it Hindustan) relations, which he wanted to be based on mutual respect and courtesy between the citizens of both dominions. Despite all the bitterness he may have felt in wake of the terrible massacres, Jinnah still clung on to hope of a relationship similar to US-Canada between the two countries. His old colleague H. S. Suhrawardy continued to work to bring about communal peace, perhaps as a means to atone for his own alleged role during Direct Action Day. His letters to Gandhi and Mountbatten on 21 September 1947 from Lahore confirm Jinnah’s own views. He complained about the pull out of Sikhs from Lyallpur (later Faisalabad), reporting that Deputy Commissioner Hameed had come down severely on the Muslims to protect Sikhs, becoming to be known as Sikh Parwar. “It is a pity that the Government of India cannot take strong action against Sikhs.[54]
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Much of Jinnah’s bitterness was reserved for Sardar Patel. When asked by Lord Ismay what he thought of the theory that the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS and Sikh terrorist organizations were out to overthrow the Congress Government in India, Jinnah replied that it was ingenious fiction to excuse the impotence of the government of India, calling Nehru a vain, loquacious, unbalanced, unpractical figurehead, and that the real power lay with Patel who was actively aided and abetted by Gandhi. He declared that the Government of India would not fall unless Patel wished it. Patel, according to Jinnah, had all the power to stop the communal trouble in a week if he was so minded but that Patel wanted to drive out all Muslims from East Punjab.
About Gandhi, he had nothing better to say, describing his intent of destroying Pakistan while preaching love and tolerance, saying that ‘you, of course, can’t detect his poison, but Hindus for whose edification it is instilled, have no difficulty grasping his meaning, nor do I, who know him inside out.'[55] Given this view of Gandhi based on decades of rivalry and distrust, Jinnah would be most shocked at Gandhi’s assassination at the hands of a Hindu fanatic some months later, sending his son Devdas a moving personal message calling Gandhi’s loss ‘the loss of humanity.'[56] In his message to Lord Mountbatten, he would state, ‘I share the sorrow of the people of India in the loss of their great leader.[57] In his press statement, Jinnah described him as the greatest leader of the Hindu community, but in his official messages to Indian leaders, he described him as a great leader of all people of India.
For whatever wrongs Jinnah thought Gandhi was guilty of, his government announced a holiday on 31 January 1948, ‘on account of Mr Gandhi’s sad death.[58] Jinnah’s newspaper Dawn carried a full front page dedicated to Gandhi, extolling his virtues
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and rendering him “deep respect’,[59] and Radio Pakistan played mournful music, commemorating the life and legacy of Gandhi for three days. Jinnah’s attitude towards Gandhi during that last year remained indicative of his decades long love-hate relationship with the Mahatma.
In October 1947, things were not any better on the Western border of the country, where Afghanistan was the only country not to vote for Pakistan’s membership at the United Nations. Jinnah’s personal representative Saidullah Khan met Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan, a member of the royal family and the former prime minister of Afghanistan and complained. Strangely, the cordial prince reportedly told him that his position as Jinnah’s personal representative was like that of a governor general. It is not clear if this was meant as a compliment or a prescient foretelling of Pakistan’s Afghan policy in the closing decades of the twentieth century where many observers have complained that Pakistan treated Afghanistan as a colony. Saidullah Khan reported that Hashim Khan had later rung up the minister of foreign affairs, telling him to make suitable amends to the Afghan position on Pakistan.[60] The situation would continue to remain tense on the Durand Line dispute between the two countries, but there was enough confidence in the Pakistan Government to withdraw troops from Waziristan, in line with the frontier policy and relations with tribes who seem to have been promised an autonomous status. 61 The issue with Afghanistan, however, was the question of treaties between Afghanistan and British India. Afghan’s position was that these treaties were terminated while the Pakistani position, as expressed by Saidullah Khan, was that
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Pakistan had stepped into the shoes of the British Government in so far as those parts of British India were concerned that now formed part of Pakistan.[62] A meeting between Saidullah Khan and King Zahir Shah (1914–2007) was held at the royal palace on 22 October 1947, which put the misunderstandings to rest for a while.[63] King Zahir Shah later became the perennial persona non grata for Pakistan, and Pakistan resisted his return to the throne after the Afghan War in the 1990s.
Jinnah’s steps and missteps in the Kashmir War must also be considered. The issue of whether Jinnah knew about it is a contentious one, primarily because there is no evidence, let alone ‘overwhelming’ one, of Jinnah’s knowledge of the tribal invasion of Kashmir. On the contrary, the evidence as well as consensus among the majority of the students of the Kashmir dispute is that, sitting in Karachi in the first two months of Pakistan’s creation, Jinnah was entirely ignorant of the tribal invasion till at least October 10, 1947, when it was officially underway in the north.
Alastair Lamb, the author of Incomplete Partition, says: ‘What part had the government of Pakistan to play in this venture into the military venture into the state of Jammu and Kashmir? … The governor-general, M A Jinnah was kept ignorant of all the details, though naturally he was aware that there was trouble of some sort brewing in Kashmir, and the Pakistan cabinet did not take a minuted stance. ‘[64] Fatima Jinnah confirms this as well. Sorraya Khurshid, the wife of K. H. Khurshid and sister to Khalid Hasan, said that Fatima Jinnah told her that Jinnah had no clue about the tribal invasion. She is quoted as saying, ‘In fact, he did not know anything about it (Kashmir attack by tribals) at all and was very sorry that a thoughtless step had been taken in such a crude and unorganized manner.'[65]
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George Cunningham also seconds the view that Jinnah was unaware of the tribal invasion till very late. He is quoted as saying: ‘On 25 October, Colonel Iskandar Mirza arrived from Lahore. He told me all the underground history of the present campaign against Kashmir, and brought apologies from Liaquat Ali for not letting me know anything about it sooner. Liaquat had meant to come here last week and tell me about it personally but was prevented by his illness … Apparently, Jinnah himself first heard of what was going on about fifteen days ago, but said, “Don’t tell me anything about it. My conscience must be clear”… It was decided about a month ago that the Poonchis should revolt and should be helped. Abdul Qayyum was in it from the beginning. ‘[66]
Jinnah had little to no interest in military matters beyond a political angle. He had campaigned for the Indianization of the army as an Indian nationalist leader and after Pakistan was created, he had reversed the age-old martial race theory by forming Bengali regiments. Perhaps, somewhat exaggerated but not entirely off the mark, American scholar Stephen Cohen writes: “Jinnah cared little for military matters – he told the first commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army, Sir Douglas Gracey, to run things together with Liaquat Ali Khan.'[67] He did believe that the policy had to be made by the civilians and that military had no role in politics, a point he would make to military officers. At one such gathering in 1958, Ayub Khan carried out the first military coup in Pakistan.
Jinnah tried to assert himself when he ordered the Pakistan army to mobilize against the Indian army’s movement towards Srinagar, but he was dissuaded from doing so by what can legally only be called “mutiny’ and nothing else. It would be fair to say that had the Pakistan army moved at that time, the Kashmir dispute would have been resolved in one fair blow. The contention that India would
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have opened a front at Sialkot as they did in 1965 is also erroneous. As the former Kashmiri prime minister Mehr Chand Mahajan’s evidence shows, the document of accession was not signed till the Indian troops were firmly on ground in Srinagar. Swift action then would have saved both Pakistan and India considerable heartbreak that has come their way due to protracted conflict.
Jinnah had taken this position to safeguard the position of Hyderabad Deccan, which was a state the size of Belgium, and had aspirations of independence similar to those of Kashmir. Jinnah lost Kashmir when he did not mobilize the Pakistan army against the Maharaja of Kashmir, naively hoping that the Maharaja, who was averse to Nehru even more than he was to Jinnah, would sign a document of accession in Pakistan’s favour, following the standstill agreement between the two states and this would leave Hyderabad and India to settle their own issues. He had thus imagined Kashmir a ripe apple, which would naturally fall in his lap, leaving him to cry foul over Hyderabad legitimately when it logically was taken over by India. Here, Jinnah miscalculated and that miscalculation has cost Pakistan dearly.
There was much to be done in Pakistan from the influx of refugees to putting the state on a firm economic footing. One of the major concerns Jinnah had in the years leading up to independence was to focus on the economic and political uplifting of the Muslim community in British India. Given his own experience with newspapers like the Bombay Chronicle, Jinnah’s main preoccupation was setting up newspapers, the most famous of which would be the Dawn, which continues to be Pakistan’s finest English language newspaper.
In January 1947, Mian Iftikharuddin had on Jinnah’s directions started a left-leaning newspaper called the Pakistan Times with
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Faiz Ahmad Faiz as its first editor. There were countless other newspapers in the vernacular as well like Manshoor, which were set up by Muslim League activists on Jinnah’s directions. In doing so, Jinnah was furthering the mission of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. This extended to economic enterprise. Out of this effort emerged such ventures as Orient Airways – which would go on to become Pakistan International Airlines – Muhammadi Steamship Company and Habib Bank. As Pakistan’s founder, Jinnah was mindful of hitting the ground running. Not ideological, Jinnah does not fit into one particular category, though various regimes in Pakistan have tried to appropriate him with even a historian like K. K. Aziz writing an essay during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s socialist government attempting to prove that Jinnah was a socialist.[68] Beyond calling for rapid industrialization of Pakistan, Jinnah did not particularly posit a view with respect to the structure of the economy, leaving that to economic planners. Jinnah appointed Sir Archibald Rowlands, the former finance member of Government of India, as an adviser and he produced a lengthy report on the economics and finances of Pakistan, suggesting imposition of salt tax, general sales tax and agriculture income tax as well as a general hike in all transportation fares.[69] Pakistan was cash strapped, as Jinnah himself was to comment that there were only 20 crore rupees in the treasury and bills of over 40 crore rupees. Deprived of its 55 crore rupees, which were withheld by the Indian government, Pakistan was forced to look to the West for aid. Norbert Bogdan, the vice president of the J. Henry Schroeder Bank, was invited to come to see Jinnah to negotiate a possible loan agreement. He was a significant figure in the global lending industry and later a leading executive of General Dynamics.
Pakistan was firmly within the pro-Western capitalist sphere, which was helped by Jinnah’s choice of Ahmadi lawyer and
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diplomat Zafrullah Khan as the first foreign minister, a man who was well respected for his work in the League of Nations and later at the UN. Zafrullah Khan had earlier been deputed to plead Pakistan’s case before the Punjab Boundary Commission and had been unanimously praised for his skill in negotiation. Jinnah considered him to be one of the most capable Muslims in the Indian subcontinent and anxiously summoned him to Pakistan from New York to become Pakistan’s first foreign minister.[70] It was a particularly wise choice given that he became the architect of Pakistan’s independent but generally pro-West foreign policy of the early years. Despite its pro-West inclinations, under Zafrullah Khan’s tutelage, Pakistan emerged as a champion of Afro-Asian causes, including Palestine. The partition of Palestine plan, which had cited Pakistan’s creation as a precedent for the creation of Israel as the Jewish state, was stoutly resisted by Zafrullah Khan, who argued that Pakistan’s inhabitants had always lived in the region and had not been transported when distinguishing Pakistan’s case from Israel. The parallels between the creation of Israel and Pakistan were striking indeed. Faisal Devji points out that Jinnah owned more books on the problems of European Jewry than on any Muslim people. [71]
The Jewry and its problems may well have been a precedent for Jinnah as well. His admiration for British Jewish statesmen like Edward Montagu or his personal cordial ties with Lord Reading Rufus Isaacs, another Jewish statesman, may have left an indelible mark on him and an intimate knowledge of the problems facing Jews. In an incredible twist of fate, as Jinnah lay dying on 8 September 1948, one of the last communications from F. Amin of his camp office with M. A. H. Ispahani, Pakistan’s Ambassador
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to the United States, instructed the latter to send a lung disease specialist but that he should not be a Jew.[72]
Perhaps knowing that Jinnah was about to die, the members of the government of Pakistan were overly cautious to not be scandalized by claims that a Jewish doctor was treating Jinnah when he died. Nevertheless, it was strangely appropriate, given the country Pakistan was to become despite being founded by a man who had never believed in such taboos. Jinnah had certainly not given up his ability to rise above religious differences and his essential humanism that had so distinguished his earlier politics. The first religious service Jinnah had attended after partition was at the church in Karachi. We find evidence of Jinnah intervening to help Christians in Pakistan. For example, Jinnah had personally intervened to direct the district magistrate of Rawalpindi to ensure the safe passage of an invalid sister from Sacred Heart Cathedral in Murree to Sialkot.[73]
Against this background, it is easy enough to see why Jinnah might want to dissociate himself from the state he created. Part of it had become apparent to him in his lifetime as he is reported to have called the creation of Pakistan the biggest blunder of his life.[74] If Jinnah had hoped for a social contract between Hindus and Muslims, leading to perpetual peace, it was shattered with the bloodletting that the two communities engaged in at the time of partition. Contrary to his vision of a South Asia where Pakistan and India would have a relationship like the US and Canada, the two countries have engaged in a nuclear arms race. The communal issue that Jinnah sought to resolve has now metamorphosed into an international conflict. Nor has his vision of an inclusive state, impartial to personal of an individual citizen, been realized. His
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colleagues in the Muslim League, themselves Muslim modernists, made the first crucial mistake by passing the Objectives Resolution. By referring directly to the Quran and the Sunnah, they ensured the interpreters of the future constitution would not be them, the lawyers and politicians, but the Ulema. Inevitably, a Pakistan based on Objectives Resolution would be a theocracy, notwithstanding the intentions of its authors. In 1971, Pakistan lost its more secularminded East Pakistani majority and with it, its raison d’être as a Muslim homeland. The terminology of Muslim homeland was replaced by the terminology of an ideological Islamic state. By 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the secular socialist democrat, had gotten Maulana Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami and a vociferous critic of Jinnah, to vet the new constitution. The Ulema and forces of religious orthodoxy, most of which had been trenchant opponents of Jinnah in the 1940s, were finally ascendant in Pakistan. The embarrassing pronouncements of the Council of Islamic Ideology are a constant reminder of that.
In 1974, the secular socialist Pakistan People’s Party led by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dominated Pakistan’s National Assembly and the largest opposition was the secular left-leaning National Awami Party led by Wali Khan, the son of Bacha Khan. It unanimously undermined Jinnah’s idea of the right to self-identify and inclusive citizenship by declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims, severely limiting that community’s right to religious freedom. Ahmadis had moved their religious center to Pakistan under the instructions of Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud, the leader of the Ahmadi community, in 1947. During the Kashmir War, they had created a volunteer force under the aegis of the Pakistan army called Furqan Battalion, which had received commendations from the Pakistan Army Chief. Ahmadis from all over the world had
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supported Pakistan and its cause as a religious mission, with one R. Joeseof Ahmadi, the secretary of foreign affairs for Anjuman e Ahmaddiya from Indonesia, being one of the regular correspondents updating Jinnah from Jakarta. On 25 December 1947, he sent Jinnah two books on his birthday; the first being Perdjoeangan Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the second being Hindoe contra Muslim atau pertikaian di India.[75] Under the perpetual tyranny of an unthinking majority, the tragedy of Ahmadis in Pakistan is the biggest blot on the country’s name. In 1984, the Islamist dictatorship of General Zia promulgated an ordinance that has since criminalized Ahmadis from posing as Muslims and also their religious practice.
The situation is quite bad for non-Muslim minorities like Hindus and Christians as well, whose numbers have steadily dwindled in Pakistan. Pakistan has become a badly majoritarian state that is routinely on the list of worst offenders of religious and individual freedoms. Far from being the equal citizens that Jinnah imagined them to be, non-Muslim Pakistanis are at best second-class citizens barred from holding the highest offices in the land and systematically marginalized from the economic and political life of the country. Socially, they face forced conversions and blasphemy charges, often depriving them of their life, property and religious beliefs – the preservation of which Jinnah termed as the foremost responsibility of a civilized government. Christians who had supported Jinnah, played an important role in aid of the Muslim League in Punjab and served Pakistan valiantly in judiciary, education and the armed forces have grown particularly bitter by the continuous marginalization.
It is true that some Muslims, among those officially recognized as Muslims, have done well in Pakistan but even there the situation is far from exemplary. Jinnah had imagined that Pakistan would
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present Muslims the opportunity to excel in science, economics and other fields. Yet, in these fields, overall, the performance of Pakistan and especially its Muslims has been woeful. In seventy years, the world’s second-largest Muslim majority state has produced just one Nobel Prize in science and that recipient too has been forcibly declared non-Muslim. Jinnah wanted Pakistan to be a democratic state where civilians, and not the military, would rule through consensus of the people. Close to half of Pakistan’s existence as a nation has been under military rule. Even in the remaining half, military has ruled from behind the scenes with the help of an unelected bureaucracy. It stands in sharp contrast to Jinnah’s advice to a group who complained to him about retaining British officers: ‘Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.’
A major charge against Jinnah’s legacy has been his insistence on proclaiming Urdu as the state language on his visit to East Pakistan – now Bangladesh – therefore denying the rightful status to Bengali, which was spoken by a great majority in East Pakistan. The difference between a state language and a national language is often ignored by those who criticize Jinnah on this count – the former is appurtenant to statehood and the latter is a cultural construct. Nowhere in any of his speeches on that fateful trip to East Pakistan did Jinnah refer to Urdu as the national language. He used the words state language and lingua franca interchangeably. More importantly, he emphasized in the same speech that East Pakistanis had every right to safeguard and protect the Bengali
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language and culture as the official language and culture of East Pakistan. Therefore, the impression that Jinnah was out to destroy the Bengali language and culture is erroneous.
Concerning the decision to elevate Urdu as the lingua franca – the language of communication and the state language of Pakistan – it was obvious that the language had to be understood in all five provinces of the new state. Although Bengali was an important Pakistani language that could have been made the language of the East Pakistan province, no case could be made out for Bengali to be named the state language of Pakistan. Just as Punjabi could not become the state language of Pakistan, despite being the language spoken and understood by an overwhelming majority in Pakistan. The compromise that came was in form of joint status for Bengali and Urdu as the state languages. Jinnah’s mausoleum itself contains inscriptions in both Urdu and Bengali.
As the father of the nation and the first governor general of Pakistan, Jinnah had come to acquire a position that was unparalleled for any single Indian Muslim in history, especially for someone who had risen from a rather humble background. In a reversal of fortune, Sir Aga Khan, the founding president of the All India Muslim League and the leader of the Ismaili community, who had excommunicated Jinnah’s family decades ago, was now offered Pakistan’s Ambassadorship to the US. [76] Aga Khan had written back on 11 May 1948, saying that on principle he would be delighted to serve but would require a minister attached to the embassy owing to his age.[77] Jinnah had little time left but Aga Khan’s son, Prince Aly Khan, would represent Pakistan for years at the UN. Still, at some level, it must have been gratifying for Jinnah to be in a position to offer such a position to the exalted Aga Khan, whose relations with him at one point had been strained. Aga Khan on his part did all he
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could to help Pakistan and sent letters of advice, money and help to Jinnah throughout that first year.
The last official event Jinnah was to speak at was the opening of the State Bank of Pakistan, which was the culmination of his struggle for economic and political emancipation of the Muslims of India. Speaking on the occasion, Jinnah said, “As you have observed, Mr Governor, in undivided India, banking was kept a close preserve of non-Muslims and their migration from Western Pakistan has caused a good deal of dislocation in the economic life of your young state. In order to run the wheels of commerce and industry smoothly, it is imperative that the vacuum caused by the migration of non-Muslims be filled without delay.”[78] This was true but it also presented an opportunity for young Muslims to be finally forced to come into fields that hitherto had been considered below their station, such as banking, economics and commerce.
As Sumit Sarkar was to write, it was Pakistan that created a Muslim middle class. In the years that followed, a number of Muslims transitioned from traditional professions of soldiery and agriculture to became economists, bankers and accountants. By this time, Jinnah was dying. For the opening ceremony of the State Bank, Jinnah had flown into Karachi from Quetta, where he had been advised by his doctors to go to breathe the fresh mountain air of Balochistan. Fatima Jinnah had tried to talk him out of it but he had been insistent. Jinnah and his sister returned to Quetta on July 6 with Jinnah slightly feverish. The doctors now advised him to go to Ziarat, a hill station where the beautiful British Residency Bungalow would become his last house. Here, he would spend the last two months of his life struggling with the advancing lung disease. Even his doctors were surprised that Jinnah had survived in a state of emaciation. To Colonel Dr Ilahi Bakhsh, it was reminiscent
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of prisoners of war from Singapore. As one commentator would say, Gandhi died of a Hindu fanatic’s bullet and Jinnah died of his devotion to Pakistan. Strangely, he never stopped working even in those last days. By the third week of August, the 5-feet-11-inch leader weighed less than 80 pounds. He was at death’s doorstep. He was often quiet and seemed depressed, as if he had lost the will to live. On the first anniversary of Pakistan’s founding, Jinnah was incapable of walking and had to be moved on a stretcher. Quaid-i-Azam’s message published in the newspapers on the first anniversary of the independence had not been sent by him. It had been written in Karachi far away from Ziarat where Jinnah was bedridden.
He spent his last days in bed – quietly and listless – telling his sister, ‘I am no longer interested in living. The sooner I go the better.’ Bakhsh writes that on 29 August, Jinnah told him ‘It does not matter if I live or die.[79] Bakhsh’s account was later vetted and edited by the government. According to those who saw the first draft, Jinnah had frankly told his doctor that Pakistan had been the biggest blunder of his life and that he wanted to go to Delhi and tell Jawaharlal Nehru to be friends again. In September, his lungs were battling three ailments – tuberculosis, pneumonia and lung cancer.
On the morning of 11 September 1948, Jinnah was transported to Quetta aerodrome. The British pilot, with great emotion, recalls Jinnah giving him a beaming smile in the documentary titled Mr Jinnah and the Making of Pakistan. A man looked upon as cold, arrogant and haughty, Jinnah still had his effect on people. None of the interviewees in the documentary who witnessed the last few hours of Jinnah could speak of the event without breaking down. The last journey of Jinnah’s life ended at 4:15 p.m. at Mauripur Airbase in Karachi, where he was put into an ambulance that broke down on the way to Government House. It was replaced an hour
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later, while Pakistan’s Quaid-i-Azam and the father of the nation lay dying in Karachi’s heat. They could only reach Government House at 6:10 p.m. He died four hours later in Karachi, weighing 70 pounds, ending the story where it started..
Tributes and condolences came in from all over the world. Faiz Ahmad Faiz, the great poet and editor of the Pakistan Times, wrote the most moving tribute in which he spoke of how India and Pakistan had lost Gandhi and Jinnah so soon after independence. He pointed out that ‘ours is the more grievous loss.[80] for after all, India had Nehru, Patel, Gopalachari, Rajendra Prasad and countless other leaders of renown to stabilize the ship, but there was hardly anyone of Jinnah’s stature and authority in Pakistan.
Jinnah’s former colleagues, friends and rivals in the Indian Constituent Assembly, who met in November 1948, paid tribute to their fallen comrade and enemy. This was the first order of business as the President of the Indian Constituent Assembly Rajendra Prasad stated: “I ask you, Members, to stand in your places to pay our tribute of respect to Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who by his grim determination and stead fast devotion was able to carve out and found Pakistan and whose passing away at this moment is an irreparable loss to all. We send our heartfelt sympathies to our brethren across the frontier.’ The members stood up in silence.[81]
Pakistan and India traversed a path of mutual hostility that Jinnah would have never wanted. On 26 November 2008, one of the gunmen who attacked Mumbai, was captured alive. Ajmal Qasab was from Punjab Pakistan. In the 2012 judgment confirming Qasab’s death sentence, the Supreme Court of India made a poignant reference to Jinnah: ‘It is reported that it was at the Taj Mahal Hotel ballroom that, on 20 February 1918, at her eighteenth birthday party, Ruttie had accepted Mr Jinnah’s hand in marriage
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while the band was playing the Chopin’s So Deep is the Night. It is also reported that both Mr Jinnah and Mrs Sarojini Naidu often held court at Taj Mahal Hotel. Mr Jinnah also had an intimate connection with Mazgaon, where the bomb planted by two terrorists in a taxi killed three and wounded nineteen people. Mr Jinnah devoted Thursday afternoons to visiting the grave of his wife Ruttie at the Khoja Shiite Isna’ashri Cemetry, situated at Mazgaon, Mumbai. One wonders what Quaid-i-Azam would have thought of the terrorist attack on his favourite city in the subcontinent and especially on the Taj Mahal Hotel, with which he had a personal relationship of a very intimate kind. ‘[82]
I have attempted to answer the question and hope the readers have no doubt what Jinnah would have thought of the travesty not just on 26 November, but where the subcontinent stands today, often at brink of a nuclear war. The miseries of Muslim minority in India are often paraded by self-styled patriots of Pakistan as evidence for why Pakistan was necessary. If Pakistan was meant to bring communal peace in the subcontinent, as was Jinnah’s intent, the continuing misery of Muslims in India and of non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan only serve to prove him wrong. There is probably some truth to Jinnah’s self-analysis on his deathbed. Yet, one desperately clings to hope that a future generation of Pakistanis will transform into the kind of state that would have made the founding father proud.
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EPILOGUE
Jinnah’s death on 11 September 1948 left a void; the impact of which is still being felt in Pakistan and the subcontinent at large. It is not difficult to envisage that with Jinnah at the helm for a longer period, Pakistan may well have been able to negotiate the fragile equation between unelected and elected institutions.
His departure – what Faiz termed as more grievous to Pakistan than even Gandhi’s assassination in India? – left Pakistan without a guiding hand. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister, fell to an assassin’s bullet a few years later in Rawalpindi and before that, he was forced to compromise with the forces within Pakistan who were campaigning for a more definitive role of Islam in the state building.
According to the document, one of the objectives of the state was to enable Muslims to live according to the Quran and Sunnah. The Resolution professed a modern democratic state as its aim but had left the door open for religious arguments in the statecraft. If the framers of the document had intended to allow for a choice on the part of citizens, it was certainly not followed in the constitutionmaking of Pakistan.
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Instead, when it came to religion, Pakistan followed a trajectory which was nowhere close to the secular vision with which Jinnah had laid its foundation. The 1956 Constitution proclaimed Pakistan as an Islamic Republic with the office of the president being reserved for only Muslims. There was no state religion, however, and this position was maintained in the 1962 Constitution, which briefly jettisoned the adjectival qualification ‘Islamic’. The 1973 Constitution – truly the first popular constitution in the country’s history – gave more power to the Islamic Republic. Islam became the state religion and both the office of the president and the prime minister were reserved for Muslims. In 1974, the second Amendment declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. It was an unprecedented event in the constitutional history of the Muslim world. Then under Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s eleven-years’ regime, the Constitution was mangled beyond repair. He transformed Pakistan into a full-blown theocracy.
Another issue that has always been debated in Pakistan is whether it should be parliamentary or presidential in form. After the Partition of British India in 1947, the newlyformed Dominion of Pakistan – like the Dominion of India – was a constitutional monarchy in form and substance. The head of the state was the British monarch. Pakistan was an independent dominion, in the sense that its elected constituent assembly could sovereignly adopt any form of government it wanted.
It is a known fact now that Jinnah initially wanted to retire in Bombay, leaving the government of Pakistan in the hands of men like Liaquat Ali Khan and Zafrullah Khan, and the governor general being the representative who was supposedly going to be Nawab Hamidullah Khan of Bhopal. Since the ruler of Bhopal had duty towards his princely state, he did not take up this position. Meanwhile, the last Viceroy of British India, Lord Mountbatten,
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was offered the position of governor general of India and he insisted on becoming the governor general of Pakistan as well. A position that was found untenable by the Muslim League leadership given the open hostility that India’s new leadership displayed towards Pakistan. Thus, Jinnah’s name became the first obvious choice and he shelved his plans to retire to his precious Bombay. He became the first governor general of Pakistan, partly also to block the perfidious ambitions of the last viceroy of India.
The Government of India Act (GOIA) 1935 was the first constitution of Pakistan. It vested some extraordinary powers to the governor general, some of which like the Section 93 Jinnah voluntarily ceded. Section 93 granted power to dismiss provincial legislatures. Jinnah having long favoured federalism did not want the central government to have this power to dismiss elected legislatures.
India, on the other hand, retained this power both in the GOIA 1935 and then under the republican constitution of 1950, which allowed Jawaharlal Nehru to rule like a virtual centrist dictator for seventeen years. He controlled India till his death, dismissing legislatures in Kerala, Kashmir and elsewhere on whim.
Throughout the Pakistani Movement, the issue of parliamentary democracy was discussed among the higher echelons of the Muslim League. The proponents of presidential rule often point to Jinnah and the Muslim League and their misgivings about the parliamentary form of government in Pakistan.
If the conclusion from this is that the founding fathers preferred a presidential form of government, it is not illusory. The specific idea of parliamentary democracy that Jinnah and others supported was the unfettered majority rule in a unitary system, based on the Westminster-model. Neither Pakistan nor India could ever wholly accept this model as both were federations and not unitary states.
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Even Great Britain, in the last seven decades, has moved away from this model with the increased autonomy of Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Jinnah supported that there was no escape from parliamentary form of government, as that was a system that the politicians in the subcontinent understood. This is why Pakistan’s form of government has remained parliamentary in nature. If there are any disputes about what Jinnah had wanted, then surely the best solution would have been to finally declassify the constitution Jinnah had drafted, which has been kept under wraps for seven decades for reasons only known to the Pakistani establishment. Putting into effect that document would have ended the existing form of government in Pakistan. Hence, it has remained a secret from the public for seven decades
A constitution was also drafted by the first constituent assembly in 1954, which was federal and parliamentary in nature, but it was not allowed to be revealed. Instead, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali with some help from constitutional lawyers drafted and presented the Constitution of 1956 which made Pakistan a republic. The 1956, Constitution envisaged Pakistan as a unitary parliamentary democracy, but that lasted only two years.
Pakistan’s first and essentially only real experiment with presidential form of government came with the 1962 Constitution. The problem with that was the limited franchise given through basic democracies system. One of the biggest opponents of the system was Jinnah’s sister, Fatima Jinnah, who eventually became the combined opposition’s candidate in the 1965 presidential elections. One of her key promises was to restore universal adult franchise and democracy in Pakistan. The 1973 Constitution envisaged Pakistan as a federation and a parliamentary democratic state with Islamic
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provisions blended in it. Ultimately, the form does not matter as much as the fact that the deeply entrenched unelected institutions, i.e., civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military, have been unwilling to share power with elected institutions. This is why democracy has never really taken off in the country.
Perhaps the biggest reversal for Jinnah’s vision has been Pakistan’s troubled relationship with India. The evidence I have produced in the present work lends credence to the view that Jinnah had envisioned open borders and continuing cooperation and goodwill between the two states. To Jinnah, India was something much more than Pakistan and Hindustan. He left the door open on treaty relations and mutual understanding, on the basis, of complete sovereign equality. That vision had suffered a backlash in his lifetime with the Kashmir conflict.
The 1965 and 1971 wars made Pakistan and India mortal enemies. This is when the enemy property legislation in both countries was formed. Whether we wish to accept it or not, but in the jurisprudence of both countries, the other is the enemy. While Jinnah had wanted partition to resolve the issues between Hindus and Muslims and have them live as equal citizens in both successor states, the reality has turned out to be quite different. Pakistan and India are nuclear powers and increasingly more majoritarian than before. If partition was to resolve the issue of permanent minorities, the idea faces certain defeat with every outrage committed against Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan. This is why Jinnah lamented on his deathbed that he had perhaps made a mistake in making the country.
There is second guessing history. Pakistan exists as a country and it is up to the people of Pakistan to mould it in the way Jinnah
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would have wanted. Unfortunately, beyond Jinnah’s picture on every wall and on every currency note, his ideas remain forgotten and irrelevant to modern day Pakistan. Lip service to the father of the nation is plenty but Jinnah’s real memory has been discarded. For Pakistan to turn around and become a progressive state, it would have to hark back to him sooner or later.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Kanishka Gupta, from Delhi, called and proposed that I should write a book on Jinnah in October 2017. This was days before I was due for an awake craniotomy on a tumour that I was diagnosed with. I told him, I will write the book if I survive this operation. On my journey with Kanishka, I must acknowledge the medical team at Aga Khan University Hospital in Karachi led by Dr Athar Enam for saving my life on 18 October 2017. Without them this book would not have been possible.
I must acknowledge the contribution of my family – the four incredible women – my mother, Durr-e-Shahwar Hamdani, my wife Aisha Sawari, and two daughters, Zoya and Zainub, for their love and unwavering support during this time. Without my wife’s pep talks and morale-boosting lectures, much of this work would have remained unfinished. During my convalescence period and subsequently my stint at Harvard Law School as a visiting fellow, it was Aisha who held the fort financially and otherwise, allowing me to concentrate on my intellectual pursuits. I also must mention my late father, Abdul Latif Khalid, for imbuing the love of history in me.
Harvard Law School’s library was a treasure trove of information that I relied on when writing this book. While acknowledging Harvard Law School’s library, I must also mention the Alexander Library at my
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alma mater, Rutgers University, where my abiding obsession with Jinnah began two decades ago. US libraries are incredible when it comes to the rare collections they hold. I hope students from South Asia studying in the US make the most of these incredible resources.
Most of the research for this book is based on Jinnah Papers and Jinnah Ispahani Correspondence so diligently edited by the late Zawar Hussain Zaidi and similar collections of Jinnah’s correspondence and speeches by Dr Riaz Ahmad and the late Sharifuddin Pirzada. Another collection titled Plain Mr Jinnah compiled by the late Syed Shamsul Hassan, father of Pakistan’s diplomat extraordinaire Wajid Shamsul Hassan was also most useful. I also relied on the archives of Bombay Chronicle, Times of India, Hindu and Dawn to extract primary source record of the time. These have been the bedrock of this present work.
No acknowledgement is complete without the mention of Dr Ayesha Jalal whose 1985 classic, The Sole Spokesman, in my opinion remains unimpeachable, though many have tried to rebut it but failed. Around the same time H. M. Seervai, the great Indian jurist, published the introduction of his Constitution of India as a separate book called Partition of India: Legend and Reality which will inform coming generations of Indian lawyers of what led to the division of British India in 1947 and how it informed the constitutional history of the Indian Republic that followed. In the same tradition is the Indian Supreme Court lawyer, A. G. Noorani who has written on Jinnah probably more than anyone else. Another interesting avenue was the history of the idea of Pakistan given by Dr Faisal Devji, which addresses a new dimension i.e. the idea of Islam ontologically emptied and secularized as the basis of the Pakistan Movement. Then there is Dr Neeti Nair’s brilliant volume Changing Homelands, which in turn is supplemented by works of Joya Chatterjee. Late Stanley Wolpert had begun the process of serious inquiry into Jinnah’s life in the 1980s. Dr Akbar S. Ahmad, the famed anthropologist, had initiated the Jinnah Quartet in 1990s, a book, documentary, biopic and a comic book which is a remarkable effort towards reclaiming Jinnah and making him accessible to Pakistanis
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of my generation. Ian Bryant Wells’ contribution Jinnah: Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity is another work that left a lasting impression on me. Finally, among these great historians comes the work of Sheela Reddy in the form of Mr and Mrs Jinnah, undeniably the most readable and interesting work on Jinnah’s personal life as well as early politics.
While one acknowledges these authors that one is influenced by, one must also acknowledge the people who have debated on Jinnah’s life and politics. These are people from the entire spectrum of political opinion, including Pakistanis and Indians, who have come up with critiques of Jinnah, some fair and some unfair. To some of them Jinnah was the evil incarnate who divided India in mad pursuit of power and broke the unity of a civilization. To others he was a champion of Islam who stood for a new Islamic renaissance. Both views are very problematic but the importance of these people cannot be underestimated in terms of forcing one to research their claims, either to admit or to rebut. Their contribution in the making of this book is substantial and therefore merits a mention in these acknowledgements.
Last but not the least I must thank, Avneet Kaur, of Pan Macmillan India for her diligent editing that has made this book readable. Her suggestions about what to keep and what to jettison are invaluable. I am grateful to Pan Macmillan India for undertaking the publication of this book which, I feel, will finally help lay some furies of Partition to rest.
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NOTES
CHAPTER 1: THE BOY WHO STOOD UP FROM THE SAND
1. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali. Mohomed Ali Jinnah, an Ambassador of Unity: His Speeches and Writings, 1912–1917 with a Biographical Appreciation. Lahore, 1989.3.
2. For more details see: Boivin, Michel, “The Ismaili-Ithna Ashari Divide Among the Khojas.’ in The Shia in Modern South Asia, 36–56. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
3. Shakespeare, William. As You Like It. Delhi: DC Books, n.d.
4. Reddy, Sheela. Mr and Mrs Jinnah. New Delhi: Penguin Random House, 2017, 79.
5. Reddy, Sheela. Mr and Mrs Jinnah. New Delhi: Penguin Random House, 2017, 87.
6. Bombay High Court Records, 1896. 7. Bombay Gazette, 9 July 1897. 8. Bombay Gazette, 13 August 1897. 9. Bombay Gazette, 31 December 1897. 10. Bombay Gazette, 13 June 1900. 11. Bombay Gazette, 30 July 1904. 12. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol.I 1893–1912.
13. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol. I 1893–1912, Edited by Riaz Ahmad, Pages 80–81.
14. For the complete transcript, see Ibid pages 86–225.
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15. Ibid Pages 227–229.
16. Ibid Page 249.
17. Ibid Pages 261–266.
18. Ibid
19. Ibid Pages 267–271.
20. Report of the 25th Indian National Congress held at Allahabad, published by Panch Kori Mitra 1911, Pages 93–95.
21. Bombay Gazette, 7 January 1911. 22. 26 February 1912, Abstracts of Council Proceedings, Vol. 5, 160-2
23. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol.I 1893–1912, Edited by Riaz Ahmad, Pages 369–375.
24. Ibid Pages 379–388.
25. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol. II 1913–1916, Edited by Riaz Ahmad, Pages 64–85.
26. Ibid Page 91.
27. Ibid Pages 130–131.
CHAPTER 2: AN AMBASSADOR OF HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY
1. Ahmad, Riaz, ed. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Vol. 2. East and West Publishing Company, 1986. 251.
2. The Times (London), 12 May 1914.
3. Ahmad, Riaz, ed. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Vol. 2. East and West Publishing Company, 1986. 252.
4. Ahmad, Riaz, ed. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Vol. 2. East and West Publishing Company, 1986. 279–82.
5. Bombay Chronicle, 15 January 1915.
6. Ahmad, Riaz, ed. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Vol. 2. East and West Publishing Company, 1986. 308–10.
7. Bombay Chronicle, 6 March 1915. 8. Bombay Chronicle, 3 January 1916.
9. See Mr and Mrs Jinnah by Sheela Reddy for a detailed description of Jinnah’s fashionable lifestyle.
10. See the detailed transcript and reports: The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol. III 1916–1917, Edited by Riaz Ahmad, 16–225.
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11. See detailed transcript of Tilak Case, The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol.III 1916–1917, Edited by Riaz Ahmad, 238–281.
12. Bombay Chronicle, 21 June 1916.
13. See the detailed transcript and reports of Jinnah election inquiry: The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol. III 1916–1917, Edited by Riaz Ahmad, 303–59.
14. For detailed proceedings of this Conference see: The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol. III 1916–1917, Edited by Riaz Ahmad, Pages 360-404.
15. Bombay Chronicle, 23 October 1916.
16. Bombay Chronicle, 1 December 1916.
17. Bombay Chronicle, 27 December 1916.
18. See the detailed transcript and report of the AIML session: The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Vol. III 1916–1917, Edited by Riaz Ahmad, Pages 451–98.
CHAPTER 3: THE MAHATMA, JINNAH AND RUTTIE
1. Chelmsford Papers, IOLR MSS.Eur. E.264/18.
2. Bombay Chronicle, 23 January 1917.
3. Bombay Chronicle, 25 January 1917.
4. Bombay Chronicle, 26 January 1917.
5. Bombay Chronicle, 26 January 1917.
6. Chelmsford Papers, IOLR MSS.Eur.E.264/18
7. Bombay Chronicle, 29 January 1917.
8. Bombay Chronicle, 31 January 1917.
9. Bombay Chronicle, 6 February 1917.
10. India Legislative Council, Volume LV, Superintendent Government Printing Calcutta, 1917, 165–166.
11. Bombay Chronicle, 15 February 1917.
12. Bombay Chronicle, 22 February 1917.
13. Bombay Chronicle, 23 April 1917.
14. India Legislative Council, Volume LV, Superintendent Government Printing Calcutta, 1917, 317.
15. India Legislative Council, Volume LV, Superintendent Government Printing Calcutta, 1917, 456–58.
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16. Abstracts of Council Proceedings, Vol. 56, p. 740.
17. Bombay Chronicle, 3 March 1917.
18. India Legislative Council, Volume LV, Superintendent Government Printing Calcutta, 1917, 807–810.
19. Bombay Chronicle, 16 April 1917.
20. Bombay Chronicle, 31 July 1917.
21. Dwarkadas, Kanji. Indias Fight for Freedom: 1913–1937: An Eyewitness Story. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966. 45.
22. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada. The Collected Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Karachi: East and West Pub. Co., 1984. 252.
23. Reddy, Sheela. Mr and Mrs Jinnah: the Marriage That Shook India. India: Penguin Random House India, 2017. 102.
24. Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016. 69.
25. Reddy, Sheela. Mr and Mrs Jinnah: the Marriage That Shook India. India: Penguin Random House India, 2017. 161
26. Bombay Chronicle, 12 December 1918.
27. Bombay Police Secret Abstract, 1918, 717.
28. Resolution, Delhi, 10 December 1917, Rowlatt Committee Report, i.
29. 23 September 1918, Abstracts of the Council Proceedings, Vol. 57, 340.
30. Independent, 14 March 1919.
31. “Jinnah to Chelmsford’, 28 March 1919, Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 22.
32. “Gandhi to Jinnah’, 4 July 1918, in Collected Works of Gandhi, Vol. XIV, 470.
33. ‘Gandhi to Jinnah”, 28 June 1919, in Collected Works of Gandhi, Vol. XV, 398–99.
34. ‘Chelmsford to Montagu’, 16 April 1919, Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 5.
35. ‘O’Dwyer to Chelmsford’, 21 May 1919, Chelmsford Papers, Vol. 22.
36. ‘Lloyd to Montagu’, 4 July 1919, Montagu Papers, Vol. 24.
37. Bombay Chronicle, 17 November 1919.
38. “Jinnah’s evidence’, 13 August 1919, India Office Records, L/Par 1/2/405 Q3795.
39. ‘Jinnah’s evidence’, 13 August 1919, India Office Records, L/Par 1/2/405 Q3795.

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40. Bombay Chronicle, 26 January 1920.
41. Bombay Chronicle, 3 January 1920.
42. Report of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Indian National Congress, 124-128.
43. Report of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Indian National Congress,
124.
44. Bombay Chronicle, 28 June 1920.
45. Indian Annual Register, 1920, part III.
46. Indian Annual Register, 1920, part III.
47. Bombay Chronicle, 9 September 1920.
48. Times of India, 10 September 1920.
49. Jinnah to Gandhi’, 30 October 1920, in Bombay Chronicle, 1 November 1920.
50. Bombay Chronicle, 8 September 1920.
51. Das, Durga. India from Curzon to Nehru & After. New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2004.
52. Nehru, Jawaharlal. Jawaharlal Nehru: an Autobiography. New Delhi (India): Penguin Books, 2004. 67–8.
CHAPTER 4. THE YEARS OF CONFLICT
1. Bombay Chronicle, 21 February 1921.
2. Bombay Chronicle, 21 February 1921.
3. Bombay Chronicle, 23 February 1921.
4. Bombay Chronicle, 7 March 1921.
5. Bombay Chronicle, 1 April 1921.
6. Reddy, Sheela. Mr and Mrs Jinnah: the Marriage That Shook India. Haryana, India: Penguin Random House India, 2017. 149.
7. Montagu Collections, MSS Eur D.523, Vol. 12, 15.
8. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Riaz Ahmad. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom Movement, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1997. 68–71.
9. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Riaz Ahmad. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom
331
Movement, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1997. 68–71.
10. Bombay Chronicle, 4 January 1922.
11. Bombay Chronicle, 16 January 1922.
12. Bombay Chronicle, 20 January 1922.
13. Bombay Chronicle, 20 January 1922.
14. Bombay Chronicle, 7 February 1922.
15. Bombay Chronicle, 3 July 1922.
16. Bombay Chronicle, 1 February 1922.
17. Bombay Chronicle, 14 August 1922.
18. Bombay Chronicle, 14 August 1922.
19. Bombay Chronicle, 4 January 1923.
20. Bombay Chronicle, 5 January 1923.
21. Bombay Chronicle, 20 January 1923.
22. Bombay Chronicle, 12 February 1923.
23. Times of India, 21 January 1924.
24. Times of India, 6 February 1924.
25. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Riaz Ahmad. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom Movement, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1997. 327–36.
26. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Riaz Ahmad. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom Movement, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1997. Page 337–39.
27. Times of India, 7 February 1924.
28. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Riaz Ahmad. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom Movement, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1997. 341.
29. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Riaz Ahmad. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom Movement, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1997. 343–44.
332
30. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Riaz Ahmad. The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom Movement, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1997. 345–62.
31. Legislative Assembly Debates: Official Report, 1951. 1053–54.
32. Legislative Assembly Debates: Official Report, 1951. 1028–31.
33. Reading Papers, 7: Reading to Olivier, 13 March 1924.
34. Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnahs Correspondence. Edited by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada. (Second Revised Edition.). Karachi: Guild Pub. House, 1966. 94.
34. Thakurdas Papers, Motilal to Thakurdas, 27 April 1925..
36. Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. V, 18 March 1925, 2624.
37. Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. Foundations of Pakistan, 1969. 577.
38. Jayakar, M. R. “Jinnah to Jayakar’, 22 May 1925, Vol. IIM, 1959, 559.
39. Bombay Chronicle, 10 May 1925.
40. Legislative Assembly Debates: Official Report, Vol. 6., 940–41.
41. Bombay Chronicle, 12 December 1927.
42. ‘Irwin to Birkenhead’, Halifax Papers 26 May 1927, Vol. 3
43. Bombay Chronicle, 2 January 1928.
44. ‘Birkenhead to Irwin’, 9 February 1928.
45. ‘Irwin to Birkenhead’, 8 March 1928.
46. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada. The Collected Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Karachi: East and West Pub. Co., 1984. 208.
47. All India Reports 1930, Lahore, 157.
48. “Fazl-i-Hussain to Malcolm Hailey’, 10 May 1930.
CHAPTER 5: The Last EFFORTS FOR PEACE
1. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Muhammad Ali. Siddiqui. Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches: Round Table Conference, 1930–1932. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1996. 3.
2. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Muhammad Ali. Siddiqui. Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches: Round Table Conference, 1930–1932. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1996. 5.
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3. ‘Ismail Khan to Reading.’ Reading Papers. Vol. 56. November 19, 1930.
4. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Muhammad Ali. Siddiqui. Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches: Round Table Conference, 1930–1932. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1996. 12.
5. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Muhammad Ali. Siddiqui. Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches: Round Table Conference, 1930–1932. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1996. 21.
6. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Muhammad Ali. Siddiqui. Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches: Round Table Conference, 1930–1932. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1996. 22–3.
7. Das, Durga. India: from Curzon to Nehru and After. New Delhi: Rupa, 2004. 154–55.
8. Shahnawaz, Jahan Ara. Father & Daughter: A Political Autobiography. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002. 127–31.
9. ‘Nehru to Gandhi’, Selected Works, Vol. 5. 27 September 1931. 46.
10. ‘Fazl to Jinnah’, Fazl-i-Hussain Papers, 15 May 1934.
11. Das, Durga. India: from Curzon to Nehru and After. New Delhi: Rupa, 2004.
12. Civil & Military Gazette, 22 February 1936.
13. Civil & Military Gazette, 22 February 1936.
14. Civil & Military Gazette, 22 February 1936.
15. Tribune, 23 February 1936.
16. Civil & Military Gazette, 27 February 1936.
17. Civil & Military Gazette, 29 February 1936.
18. Tribune, 6 March 1936.
19. Tribune, 6 March 1936.
20. Tribune, 6 March 1936.
21. Civil & Military Gazette, 7 March 1936.
22. Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016. 99.
23. Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016. 100.
24. Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016. 101.
25. Indian Central Legislature, Jinnah, 30 January 1935.

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26. Indian Central Legislature, Jinnah, 7 February 1935.
27. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Waheed Ahmad. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches: Indian Legislative Assembly 1935–1947. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1991. 55-7.
28. Dhulipala, Venkat. Creating a New Medina State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India. Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 33–41.
29. Dhulipala, Venkat. Creating a New Medina State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India. Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2016.45.
30. Das, Durga. India: from Curzon to Nehru and After. New Delhi: Rupa, 2004. 182.
31. Azad, Maulana Adul Kalam. India Wins Freedom. London: Sangam Books Ltd, 1988. 170–71.
32. Civil and Military Gazette, 28 April 1936.
33. Interview with The Statesman, 21 April 1936.
34. The Tribune, 10 June 1936.
35. The Tribune, 14 August 1936.
36. Statesman, 15 August 1936.
37. Statesman, 17 August 1936.
38. Star of India, 21 August 1936.
39. Interview, Civil & Military Gazette, 30 August 1936.
40. Civil & Military Gazette, 22 January 1937.
41. Tribune, 3 January 1937.
42. Star of India, 9 January 1937.
43. Star of India, 15 March 1937.
44. Civil & Military Gazette, 6 May 1937.
45. Civil & Military Gazette, 4 August 1937.
46. Muslim League Annual Session Lucknow 1937.
CHAPTER 6: TOWARDS PAKISTAN
1. Lorenzen, David N. Who Invented Hinduism Essays on Religion in History. New Delhi: Yoda Press, 2009. 1–36.
2. Chaudhry, Rahmat Ali. The Greatest Betrayal, the Millat’s Martyrdom & the Muslim’s Duty. Cambridge: The Pakistan National Liberation Movement, 1947.
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3. Aziz, Khursheed Kamal. Rahmat Ali, a Biography. Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2008. 46.
4. ‘Ali Choudhary Rahmat. Pakistan: the Fatherland of the Pak Nation. Lahore, Pakistan: Book Traders, 1978. 214.
5. Mr Jinnah; The Making of Pakistan, directed by Christopher Mitchell, interview with Aslam Khattak.
6. Choudhary, Rahmat Ali. Now or Never. Cambridge: University of Openess Press, 2005.
7. Moon, Penderel. Divide and Quit. London: Chatto and Windus, 1961. 20.
8. Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Modern Islam in India. Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1963. 273–74.
9. ‘Iqbal to Jinnah’, 28 May 1937.
10. “Iqbal to Jinnah’, 21 June 1937.
11. Afzal, M. Rafique. A History of the All-India Muslim League, 1906–1947. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013. 393.
12. Afzal, M. Rafique. A History of the All-India Muslim League, 1906–1947. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013. 394.
13. Civil & Military Gazette, 19 August, 1938.
14. Wasti, Syed Razi. At Quaids Service: a Journey towards Discovery. Lahore: Jinnah Rafi Foundation, 1996. 260.
15. Wasti, Syed Razi. At Quaids Service: a Journey towards Discovery. Lahore: Jinnah Rafi Foundation, 1996. 270.
16. Wasti, Syed Razi. At Quaids Service: a Journey towards Discovery. Lahore: Jinnah Rafi Foundation, 1996. 271.
17. Wasti, Syed Razi. At Quaids Service: a Journey towards Discovery. Lahore: Jinnah Rafi Foundation, 1996. 272.
18. Wasti, Syed Razi. At Quaids Service: a Journey towards Discovery. Lahore: Jinnah Rafi Foundation, 1996. p. 283.
19. Wasti, Syed Razi. At Quaids Service: a Journey towards Discovery. Lahore: Jinnah Rafi Foundation, 1996. p. 286.
20. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Waheed Ahmad. The Nations Voice. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1992. 236.
21. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Waheed Ahmad. The Nations Voice. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1992. 236.
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22. Gilbert Laithwaite to MJ Coulson, Secretary to Secretary of State for India, March 6, 1940, Enclosure No. 1.
23. Gilbert Laithwaite to MJ Coulson, Secretary to Secretary of State for India, March 6, 1940, Enclosure No. 1.
24. ‘Time and Tide’, 19 January 1940.
25. Time and Tide’, 19 January 1940.
26. ‘Time and Tide’, 19 January 1940.
27. ‘Time and Tide’, 19 January 1940.
28. ‘Time and Tide’, 19 January 1940.
29. ‘Time and Tide’, 19 January 1940.
30. Time and Tide’, 19 January 1940.
31. See for example Hector Bolitho who in “Jinnah Creator of Pakistan’ implies that Jinnah changed his opinion.
32. ‘Lahore Resolution’, 1940.
33. ‘Lahore Resolution’, 1940.
34. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali. Problem of Indias Future Constitution. 1940.
35. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali. Problem of Indias Future Constitution. 1940.
36. Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Sang-e Meel Publications, 2010.
37. Shahnawaz, Jahan Ara. Father & Daughter: a Political Autobiography. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002. 163.
38. Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016. 121–22.
39. E V Ramaswami to Jinnah, 9 August 1944.
40. Gandhi to Jinnah, Quaid’s Correspondence edited by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, 103.
41. Gandhi to Jinnah, Quaid’s Correspondence edited by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada 103–104.
42. Ambedkar, Bhimrao Ramji. Pakistan or Partition of India. Lahore: Book Traders, 1976.
43. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali. Problem of Indias Future Constitution, 1940.97–98.
44. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali. Problem of Indias Future Constitution, 1940.98–99.
45. Cripps Draft Declaration.
46. Cripps Draft Declaration.
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47. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad. Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah. Lahore, Pakistan: M. Ashraf, 1968.
48. Dawn. From the Past Pages of Dawn: 1944: Seventy Years Ago: Membership for Ahmadiyyas.’ May 4, 2014. https://www.dawn.com/ news/1104077.
CHAPTER 7: THE BIRTH OF PAKISTAN
1. Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. Quaid’s Correspondence, 1987. 107–108.
2. Rashid Ali Khan’s Press Statement, “The Punjab Story’, Annotated Correspondence, edited by Waheed Ahmad, 21–22.
3. Rashid Ali Khan’s Press Statement, ‘The Punjab Story’, Annotated Correspondence, edited by Waheed Ahmad, 118.
4. Rashid Ali Khan’s Press Statement, ‘The Punjab Story’, Annotated Correspondence, edited by Waheed Ahmad, 126.
5. Rashid Ali Khan’s Press Statement, “The Punjab Story’, Annotated Correspondence, edited by Waheed Ahmad, 126.
6. Rashid Ali Khan’s Press Statement, ‘The Punjab Story’, Annotated Correspondence, edited by Waheed Ahmad 123.
7. Ambedkar, Bhimrao Ramji. Pakistan or Partition of India. Lahore: Book Traders, 1976.
8. Author’s interview with Brigadier Simon Samson Sharaf, the son of Mr Lal Din Sharaf Sargodhvi.
9. Zahir Sajjād. Light on League-Unionist Conflict. Bombay: Peoples Pub. House, 1944. 26–33.
10. Daniyal Latifi stayed back in India after partition and later represented Shah Bano in the landmark Shah Bano Case.
11. Ahmad, Waheed. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: the Punjab Story, 1940–1947: the Muslim League and the Unionists towards Partition and Pakistan. Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, Govt. of Pakistan, 2009. 89–90.
12. Hodson, H. V. The Great Divide: Britain – India – Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002. 131–32.
13. Hodson, H. V. The Great Divide: Britain – India – Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002. 134.
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14. Hodson, H. V. The Great Divide: Britain – India – Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002. 143.
15. Record of the Fourth Simla Conference.
16. Mansergh, Nicholas, Penderel Moon, David M. Blake, and S. R. Ashton. The Transfer of Power 1942–7. London: H.M.S.O., 1983. 323.
17. ‘India: Statement by the Cabinet Mission.’ (Hansard, 16 May 1946). Accessed January 22, 2020. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/ lords/1946/may/16/india-statement-by-the-cabinet-mission.
18. Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Sang-e Meel Publications, 2010. 195–96.
19. Transfer of Power Papers, Vol. VII, 684–87.
20. Transfer of Power Papers, Vol. VII, 1036.
21. Jinnah’s Address to AIML Council, Bombay 28 July 1946.
22. Hodson, H. V. The Great Divide: Britain – India – Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002. 166.
23. Transfer of Power Papers, Vol. VIII, 274.
24. Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India 1885–1947. India: Pearson Education India, 2014. 432.
25. Tuker, Francis Ivan Simms. While Memory Serves. London: Cassell and company, 1950.
26. Singh, Jaswant. Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence. New Delhi: Rupa, 2012. 551–53.
27. Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Sang-e Meel Publications, 2010. 225.
28. Times of India, 25 October 1946.
29. Hajari, Nisid. Midnights Furies: the Deadly Legacy of Indias Partition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015. 59.
30. Hajari, Nisid. Midnights Furies: the Deadly Legacy of Indias Partition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015. 62.
31. Dwarkadas, Kanji. Ten Years to Freedom. Bombay, 1968. 190–91.
32. Wolpert, Stanley A. Jinnah of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017. 304.
33. All India Muslim League Working Committee Resolution, 31 January 1947.
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34. Nehru’s interview with Mountbatten, 24 March 1947. 35. Mountbatten’s Interview with Jinnah, 10 April 1947.
36. Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Sang-e Meel Publications, 2010. 262.
37. Jinnah’s Press Statement, 1 May 1947.
38. Zaidi, Z. H. (ed) (1993) Jinnah Papers: Prelude to Pakistan, Vol. I Part I. Lahore: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, 845.
39. Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Sang-e Meel Publications, 2010. 290.
CHAPTER 8: THE END AND THE BEGINNING
1. For commentary on the moves and countermoves, please see pages 291-293 of The Sole Spokesman by Ayesha Jalal.
2. Giles Squire to Hugh Weightman-L/P&S/12/1811, cited in Jinnah Papers Volume III Annex IV.1, p. 856, alternative citation is NO.82, Transfer of Power Papers, Volume X, pp. 135–136.
3. Giles Squire to the Earl of Listowel-Telegram, L/P&S/12/1811, cited in Jinnah Papers Volume III, Annex IV.3, p. 859, alternative citation is No. 140, Transfer of Power Papers, XI, pp. 262–263.
4. Lord Mountbatten to J B Kripalani, R/3/1/151, cited in Jinnah Papers Volume III, Annex IV.4, alternative citation is No.236, Transfer of Power Papers, Volume XI, p. 459.
5. No. CA/126, cited in Jinnah Papers, Volume III, Annex IV.7, p. 864, alternative citation is No. 342, Transfer of Power Papers, Volume XI, p. 633.
6. L/P&S/12/1811, cited in Jinnah Papers Volume III, Annex IV.8, p. 866, alternative citation No.431, Transfer of Power Papers, Volume XI, p. 799.
7. US National Archives 845.00/8-747, also quoted as appendix to Jinnah Papers Volume IV, Annex IV.1.
8. No. 301 Transfer of Power Papers, Vol. XII, 441–45″ also quoted as “Jinnah Papers, Volume IV, Appendix IV.3.
9. Rob Lockhart to Mountbatten, 6 July, 1947, IOR, L/P&J/S/224 from India Office – also quoted as Annex II to Jinnah Papers, Vol. III, Appendix IV, 28.
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10. No. 40, Jinnah Papers, Vol. IV, 76-78.
11. Z. H. Zaidi, Jinnah Papers, Vol. IV, 2–3.
12. Z. H. Zaidi, Jinnah Papers, Vol. IV, 40–41.
13. Z. H. Zaidi, Jinnah Papers, Vol. IV 79.
14. Khan, Mohamed Raza. What Price Freedom a Historical Survey of the Political Trends and Conditions Leading to Independence and the Birth of Pakistan and After. Madras: Khan, 1969. 321–22.
15. Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. IV, Item 82, 142–43.
16. Jinnah Papers; First Series, Vol. IV, Item 106, 179.
17. Jinnah Papers, 203–05.
18. Jinnah Papers, 261.
19. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali. Selected Speeches and Statements: of the Quaid-iAzam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1911–34 and 1947–48) Collected & Edited by M. Rafique Afzal. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1973.22.
20. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, 11 August 1947.
21. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, Jinnah’s Address 11 August 1947.
22. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, Jinnah’s Address 11 August 1947.
23. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, Jinnah’s Address 11 August 1947.
24. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, Jinnah’s Address 11 August 1947.
25. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, Jinnah’s Address 11 August 1947.
26. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, Jinnah’s Address 11 August 1947.
27. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, Jinnah’s Address 11 August 1947.
28. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, 11 August 1947.
29. Constituent Assembly of India Debates, 27 August 1947.
30. Constituent Assembly of India Debates, 27 August 1947.
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31. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, 12 August 1947.
32. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, 12 August 1947.
33. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session, 12 August 1947.
34. Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, and M. Rafique Afzal. Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 1911–34 and 1947–48. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1980. 97.
35. Mirza Jalaluddin to Jinnah, 20 January 1948, Jinnah Papers, First Series Volume VII, 45–46.
36. Barbara Metcalf Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani and the Jamiat Ulama Hind’ in the book Muslims Against the Muslim League, edited by A. U. Qasmi.
37. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, First Session 14 August 1947.
38. Jinnah Papers First Series, Vol. VI, 467.
39. Jinnah Papers First Series, Vol. VI, 472.
40. Jinnah Papers First Series, Vol. VI, 476.
41. Jinnah Papers First Series, Vol. VI, 476.
42. Jinnah Papers, First Series Volume VII, pp. 144-145.
43. S. M. Burke, Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947–1948, Oxford 1997, 125.
44. S. M. Burke, Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947–1948, Oxford 1997102-103.
45.S. M. Burke, Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947–1948, Oxford 1997153.
46. S. M. Burke, Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947–1948, Oxford 1997154.
47. S. M. Burke, Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947–1948, Oxford 1997. 223.
48. Prikasa, 1965, 56–58.
49. Javed, Ajeet. Secular and Nationalist Jinnah. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011. 235.
50. Javed, Ajeet. Secular and Nationalist Jinnah. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011. 235.
51. Jinnah Papers, First Series, Volume VII, 16–17.
52. M A Jinnah to Clement Attlee, Item No.1, F93-GG/4–7, Jinnah Papers First Series Volume VI, 1.
53. Jinnah Papers, Annex to 2, 3.
54. Jinnah Papers, 5.
55. Jinnah Papers, 21
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56. Jinnah Papers, 686–87.
57. Jinnah Papers, 30–31.
58. Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VII, Item 61, 78.
59. Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VII, Item 61, 74.
60. Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VII, Item 61, 74.
61. Charles W Lewis Jr to George Marshall, Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VII, Item 61, 75.
62. Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VI, 8–9.
63. Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VI, 16–19.
64. Saidullah Khan to Ali Muhammad Khan, 19 October 1947, Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VI, 137–143.
65. Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VI, 166–68.
66. Lamb, Alastair. Incomplete Partition: the Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947–1948. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003. 137.
67. Khvurshid Surayyā. Memories of Fatima Jinnah. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2008. 87.
68. Mitchell, Norval. Sir George Cunningham a Memoir. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1968. 140.
69. Cohen, Stephen Philip. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington (D.C.): Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
70. Khurshid Kamal Aziz, Jinnah the Socialist, 1976.
71. Naureen Talha, Jinnah’s role in Strengthening Pakistan’s Economy.
72. M A Jinnah to Ispahani, 22 October 1947, Jinnah Papers, First Series, Vol. VI, 165: ‘As regards Zafrullah we do not mean that he should leave his work so long as it is necessary for him to stay there, and I think he has already been informed to that effect, but naturally we are very short of capable men, and especially of his caliber, and every now and then our eyes naturally turn to him for various problems that we have to solve.’
73. Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion and Faisal Devji’s email correspondence with the author.
74. Annex II to No. 57 F. Amin to M. A. Ispahani Telegram, First Series, Vol. VII.
75. Letter from Mother Mary of Sacred Heart to F. Amin, Jinnah Papers, First Series, Volume VI, p. 256.

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76. Tunzelmann, Alex Von. Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire. Place of publication not identified: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2017.
77. Tunzelmann, Alex Von. Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire. Place of publication not identified: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2017. 531–532.
78. M A Jinnah telegram to Aga Khan, 8 May 1948, Jinnah Papers, Vol. VII, 539.
79. M A Jinnah telegram to Aga Khan, 8 May 1948, Jinnah Papers, Vol. VII, 539-544.
80. M A Jinnah telegram to Aga Khan, 8 May 1948, Jinnah Papers, Vol. VII, 539–678.
81. Bakhsh, Ilahi. With the Quaid-i Azam during His Last Days. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2011.
82. Pakistan Times, 13 September 1948.
83. Constituent Assembly of India Debates, 4 November 1948.
84. Taken from the paragraph 45 of Criminal Appeal Nos.1899–1900 Of 2011 Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab and Abu Mujahid Versus State Of Maharashtra.
EPILOGUE
1. Iconoclast, Omaid, and Admin. ‘Faiz on Jinnah and Gandhi v. Faiz’s Indian Admirers.’ Pak Tea House, October 16, 2011. http://pakteahouse. net/2011/10/16/faiz-on-jinnah-and-gandhi-v-faizs-indian-admirers/.
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