INDIAN GUNNERS AT WAR THE WESTERN FRONT – 1971 – Maj. Gen. Jagjit Singh
PREFACE
“I also take the opportunity to remind them that for us Guns are our Colours. They are to be treated with care and respect during peace and defended with our blood in war.”
“ Artillery is the God of War” said Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, who steered the erstwhile USSR to victory against Germany in the Second World War. Napoleon Bonaparte also linked the Lord Almighty to the vital role played by Artillery in battle. He once said, “ God fights on the side with the best artillery. ” On another occasion the renowned master of warfare pronounced,“ Great battles are won with artillery. “To the Mughals in India, guns were the “ locks and keys of the Empire”. Rudyard Kipling, the famous British writer had this to say about the gunners, “ Tis gunner this and the gunner that. And chuck ’em out the brute. But it’s the saviour of the country. When the guns begin to shoot.” General George Marshal, the famous American soldier statesman of World War II, once said, “ The artillery at our disposal constitutes a powerful weapon; to refrain from using it up to the maximum possible without affecting the element of surprise deprives us of a great advantage.” For Field Marshal Montgomery, the victor of Al-Alamein, the battle which turned the tide against the German Afrika Corps, during World War II, his artillery was a“ battle winning factor”. So immense was Montgomery’s faith in the value of artillery that the war time British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in his book The Hinge of Fate calls the Field Marshal (baptized in the Infantry) as the
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“ Great Artillerist ”. The illustrious American General, Patton, when asked who won the war, replied, “ The artillery did”.
Throughout the long pages of military history and, in particular, after the discovery of gunpowder, great captains of war have won battles because they made the maximum use of fire-power.
Regrettably, in the post Independence Indian order of battle, the artillery was relegated to a third place in the combat order. While Indian gunners retained their traditional efficiency and contributed to Indian successes in our wars with Pakistan, shortage of artillery support and strict restrictions placed on ammunition expenditure were the prime reasons why we lost ground or failed to attain our planned objectives, (or suffered avoidable casualties), as this study of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war brings out.
The reader may remark that the same Indian Army won a stunning victory in the liberation of Bangladesh. What then is the need for giving it more guns, costly as they are to the national exchequer ? I can do no better than to give below the views expressed to me by Lieutenant General J. S. Aurora in this regard. Rather than blow his own trumpet for the victory of the Eastern Army, of which he was the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the General had the humility to say, “We were poor in artillery on the Eastern Front. It was our decision to cross the Meghna River and get behind the enemy, when the Pakistani army expecting head-on attacks sat guarding the main approaches that turned the scales. Mind you, such bold tactics were made possible because of local assistance. The fact remains that a number of Pakistani defences were still intact when Niazi (the General commanding the Pakistani forces) surrendered. If we were to reduce these strongholds, we needed far more artillery and of a much heavier calibre than the tiny 75mms
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that we were mostly equipped with.”
Seldom would an army get the type of help as in Bangladesh. Our deep penetration moves of the nature undertaken in the East were unthinkable on the Western Front. The same holds true of tomorrow, if another Indo-Pak war breaks out, since at one stage or the other the Indian Army would need to face the highly fortified Pakistan defences. Of this let there be no doubt. The point is that, within the Indian Army there is need to provide a greater artillery punch for the successful conduct of operations, as also to minimise our casualties in a future war involving our country.
In case this book is able to bring home the above imbalance in our combat structure to the policy makers of today and for them to take requisite steps to set it right, the time and effort that I have put in writing this book would not have been in vain.
A review covering an entire battle front can, however, leave a number of questions unanswered or events uncovered. There may also be some error of judgement on my part, while giving my comments. All that I would like to say is that I have tried to apply my mind in good faith, in the interest of national defence, without any prejudice.
I dedicate this book to the Officers and Jawans of the Regiment of Artillery of the Indian Army. May they continue to train hard in times of peace and to acquit themselves with honour and dignity in battle — in the highest traditions of the Gunners. I also take the opportunity to remind them that for us the Guns are our Colours. They are to be treated with care and respect during peace and defended with our blood in war.
Major General Jagjit Singh
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In the course of writing this book, which for me has been a labour of love, I sought out a large number of veterans of the 1971 war to obtain a firsthand account of the battles in which they took part. I thank them from the bottom of my heart for the kind co-operation and help they gave me. I am particularly grateful to Generals K.P. Candeth, Sartaj Singh, N.C. Rawlley, K.S. Bajwa, Avtar Singh, A.P. Bharadwaj and F.L. Freemantle for going through parts of the manuscript and giving me their valuable comments.
To the Secretary of the Regiment of Artillery Association, Nasik Road, I express my gratitude for providing me every facility to go through the history of gunner units that took part in the war and for taking photographs of paintings and other exhibits displayed in the Artillery Museum.
My special thanks are to Generai Z. C. Bakshi for his kind encouragement in writing this book and for giving me the benefit of his comments. Equally grateful am I to the Indian Army’s most versatile military writer, General D.K. Palit for going through the manuscript and his kind suggestions.
To Srinivasan, Varghese, Rajni Bakshi and V. K. Nair each one of whom typed and retyped parts of the manuscript, I remain highly obliged for their kind effort.
Last but not the least, I thank Prem, my wife for bearing with patience and good cheer my erratic hours of work while writing this book.
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THE POWER OF THE GUN
– A HISTORICAL REVIEW
“ While Napoleon Bonaparte smashed his way through Europe with the power of his guns, Napoleon III lost his kingship after a crushing defeat in the battle of Sedan in 1870 when French artillery was hopelessly out-gunned by that of his Prussian adversaries.”
A study of past battles conveys in no uncertain terms the vital role that was played by the artillery. Although, space will not allow writing a more detailed and comprehensive account, reference to a few important battles should be adequate to remind us of its battle-winning role in each one of them.
The English startled their French opponents in the Battle of Crecy, in 1346, when rudimentary guns were first employed in combat. According to historian Giovanni Villani of Florence, the English mixed with their archers “bombs which by means of fire darted iron balls for the purpose of frightening and destroying the horses and this kind of missile caused so much noise and tremour that it seemed like the thunder from heaven, whilst it produced great slaughter amongst the soldiery and the overthrow of their horses.”
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Villani’s account of the devastating effect of gunsire appears to be exaggerated. The success derived from the employment of guns was, perhaps, more psychological than real. Be that as it may, the gun had made its impact on the battlefield, and it is to Europe that credit must go for pioneering its development.
Two famous battles of medieval Europe at Breintenseld in Saxony, in 1631, and at Rossbachk, in 1757, were won by the Swedish King Adolphus and by Frederick the Great of Prussia respectively by employment of the latest guns in large numbers. The artillery also played a predominant role in the victory at Gettysburg, in 1863, during the American Civil War. While Napoleon Bonaparte smashed his way through Europe with the power of his guns, Napoleon III lost his kingship after a crushing defeat in the battle of Sedan, in 1870, when French artillery was hopelessly out-gunned by that of his Prussian adversaries.
At home, in India, Babur routed the numerically superior army of Ibrahim Lodi, the ruling monarch of Northern India, with effective employment of his artillery, in the First Battle of Panipat in 1526. Broadly, Babur’s tactical plan at Panipat was to roll the Afghan wings on to the centre, thus creating a killing ground for his gunners, deploying his guns en-masse to achieve maximum concentration of artillery fire. As Lodi’s troops advanced to attack, the Mughal cavalry executed a well timed enveloping movement. Outflanking the Afghans from the sides, a portion of the cavalry attacked the enemy’s rear. Simultaneously, the Mughal left and right wings charged the enemy’s flanks. Pressed from three sides, the Afghans converged to the centre. Lodi had fallen into the trap. Babur’s audacious plan had worked.
The day of the artillery had arrived. Ustad Ali and Mustafa, along with their Rumi and Persian gunners were
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quick to engage the enemy thus concentrated. Within a matter of a few hours the Afghans fell by the thousands. Frightened by the gunfire, Lodi’s elephants turned back in confusion, trampling their own troops. A mighty army was thus laid to dust, with 20,000 dead. The rest sled the battlefield.
A significant event which had gripped Babur’s mind to set about developing his artillery arm was the Battle of Calderan, fought between the Sultan of Turkey and Shah Ismail of Persia on 23 August, 1514. The Shah had relied mainly on the strength of his cavalry, and the Turks on their artillery, the best in contemporary Asia. In the battle that followed, Shah’s cavalry could not resist the fire that was poured upon them by the Turkish artillery and so lost the day.
The Mughal guns brought them victory again, in 1527, in the Battle of Khanua, 30 miles south west of Agra, against the Rajputs. In a sense, the battle at Khanua was of greater significance than that at Panipat. At Panipat, Babur had defeated the titular Emperor of Delhi, Ibrahim Lodi. At Khanua, on the other hand, he faced a powerful Rajput confederacy which was making a bid for Hindu supremacy, after the decay of the Turko-Afghan Sultanate. The Confederacy was headed by the one-eyed Rana Sangram Singh of Mewar, a hero of many military actions, crippled by a broken leg, deprived of one arm and with nearly eighty battle wounds on his body. The strength of the Rajput Army was about 80,000 men. The Mughals, initially, were about 25,000 strong, but with the defection of over 25,000 horsemen of an Afghan chief, their numbers doubled. Nonetheless Rana Sangram had a distinct numerical superiority.
The Confederacy, however, was without artillery. The impact of guns in the Mughal victory at Panipat must have
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been fully known to the veteran Rana. And yet he had decided to give battle without any gun support. Was it a desperate gamble to stem the tide of Mughal conquests in India ? Or was he forced to fight because of a political expediency ? Whatever the reason, Sangram Singh is said to have vowed that he would not return to Chittor, his capital, unless victorious. So certain he was of victory. This brave Rajput leader had, however, overestimated his army’s capability. He had also failed to visualise the full effect of Babur’s artillery in the ensuing battle. Time and again military leaders have lost the day by not fully grasping the significance of new means of warfare and changed tactical doctrine. Centuries ago, Babur’s ancestor, Chengez Khan had overrun Russia and half of Europe, exploiting the mobility and shock tactics of the cavalry. In 1527, Babur was to win his second decisive victory by making full use of at Khanua artillery.
So did Babur’s grandson, Akbar The Great, display the power of the gun in the capture of the Fort of Ranthambar, in 1568, deemed impregnable by contemporary methods of warfare. Dismantling some pieces of his light artillery, he moved them on top of a neighbouring hill, reassembled the guns, and ordered an intense bombardment of the fort. The defenders were taken aback by this volume of fire from a position that was least expected, lost heart and Ranthambar surrendered.
In the Third Battle of Panipat, in 1761, the sharp-shooting light artillery of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Afghan invader, swept through the Maratha ranks causing havoc and bringing about a crushing defeat to the strongest power in contemporary India. Maratha artillery on the other hand, was both out-dated and poorly handled, firing 800 metres behind the Afghan lines. Had the latter possessed comparable artillery, the Maratha infantry, which had achieved near success in attack, would have turned the
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Afghan right flank. Victory in this decisive battle would have made the Marathas the masters of Hindustan. Strange indeed are the ways of history, for whereas the victorious Abdali had to rush back home due to internal troubles, and the Marathas were left with a weakened army, it was the English who were to be the eventual gainers to rule India for the next one hundred and fifty years.
The well-equipped artillery of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, on the other hand, helped him to retain the strategic fort of Attock, after a glorious victory in the Battle of Chuch, in 1813. At one stage when the battle was going in favour of the Afghans, it was the Sikh gunners who rose to the occasion to save the day. Holding their fire till the “opportune moment ”, they faced the charge of the Afghan cavalry in a great display of military skill and the will to fight, as wave after wave of enemy horsemen charged at Sikh guns at full gallop. In a devastating inferno of cannon and grapeshot, the Sikh artillery took a heavy toll of both rider and horse. Demoralised, the Afghan cavalry turned back in confusion and took to flight. This first major victory of Ranjit Singh helped open the gates for further Sikh conquests in the North-West.
While writing about the Sikh artillery, mention must be made of an equally decisive role played by it in the capture of the Multan Fort, in 1818. For some days the outcome of the seige of the fort by the Khalsa army hung in the balance, with stiff opposition from the defending Afghans. Finally a breach was made by Sikh cannons. The making of the breach is a soul stirring episode, worthy of mention. It has been recorded by Ghulam Jilam, who was spying in the Sikh camp, in his book, Jang-e-Multan, (the Battle of Multan).
During the bombardment of the fort, a Sikh gun lost one of its wheels. The gun commander felt that if he could fire a few more cannons, the fort wall could be breached.
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There was no time for repairs and delay was very dangerous. He, therefore, proposed to his gunners to lay their shoulders under the axle on the broken side. The proposal was accepted by the rest. One by one the brave gunners, led by the gun commander, went forward to lay down their lives and it was after the 10th or the 11th shot, by when the entire gun detachment had been sacrificed under the gun axle, that a breach was made in the fort. Akali Sadhu Singh rushed to the spot with a sword in his hand, shouting Sat Sri Akal, to proclaim victory of Sikh arms, with his soldiers following him inside the fort. And thus the Fort of Multan eventually fell to the Sikhs, mainly on account of this unique spirit of self-sacrifice by a gun detachment for the cause of their nation.
In the First World War, French gunners redeemed their honour, (which as mentioned earlier, they had lost in the Battle of Sedan) with the introduction of the 75 mm gun, called the “ Nasty 75 “. It was the French artillery which was then primarily responsible for the allied victory in the First Battle of the Marne, in September 1914, firing over 100,000 rounds in less than two days. In the reduction of St. Michael’s salient near Paris, again in September 1914, the allies mustered 3010 guns of all calibres and pumped in an unbelievable one million rounds in a four day battle, bringing the opposing Germans to their knees, through the sheer weight of explosives.
Mortars, on the other hand, had not made much impact on the battlefield till their employment by the Germans against the Belgian Fortress of Liege, in August 1914. Repeated German attacks had been repulsed by accurate fire of the fortress guns, as the forts themselves had proved invulnerable to the fire of German field guns. It was the huge “ siege mortars ” with solid steel heads that eventually reduced the Belgian resistance. Hitting almost vertically, the mortar bombs penetrated the thick concerte masonry and
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so, unable to withstand the effect the Belgian embattlements crumbled.
At the time of the German invasion of the USSR, in 1941, the Red Army did not possess adequate armour to face the German Panzers. It was primarily the Russian artillery, employed in a direct firing role, which took the brunt of enemy’s tank assaults. Commenting on the part played by Soviet gunners, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Rokossovsky writes in his book, The Soldier’s Duty, “ Long before the war, our party and its Central Committee foresaw the role and importance of artillery on the battlefield and took steps to provide the nation’s Armed Forces with the most up-to-date ordnance. Highly qualified commanders were trained at artillery officers’ schools, advanced training and retraining courses and the Artillery Academy. It is to the credit of the higher command of the Soviet Artillery that its quality and standards of training of its officers and men far surpassed those of the artillery of the armies of all capitalist countries. Our artillery proved this all through the Great Patriotic War. From the outset, artillery was the principal means of opposition to the enemy’s tanks, which overwhelmed us in numbers and mobility. The artillery won unfading glory in the Battle of Moscow, and this holds in full measure for the artillery units organic to the 16th Army and those that co-operated with it. Our gunners trusted implicitly in the power of their weapons, and this kept the crews going inspite of the frequent danger of being crushed by tanks rolling en masse towards their positions. When circumstances demanded it, crews continued to deliver fire to the last shell and the last gun, successfully repulsing the enemy’s furious attacks.”
As the war progressed and guns and ammunition started rolling out from Soviet factories in greater numbers, the Russians began to place more and more reliance on their artillery. As earlier mentioned, to Stalin the artillery was
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the “God of War”. There is no better example of the faith that Stalin reposed in his gunners than the crucial Battle of Stalingrad during mid-1942. In this battle, while the opposing forces were almost equally matched, the Soviet Command managed to build up an artillery superiority of 10:1 (as compared to 3:1 in infantry and 2:1 in armour) in the direction of the main effort, during the Soviet counter-offensive, inflicting a crushing defeat on the enemy. Stalin’s above dictum had also made a deep impact on the Soviet commanders, and the rank and file of the Soviet Army, as they saw for themselves the results achieved through the power of the gun in each successive battle.
Russian artillery thus continued to be employed en masse. It’s bombardments lasted upto 1-3 hours before commencing assaults. Rokossovsky writes, “ The main thing, of course, is to overwhelm the enemy with artillery fire in the initial stages of the assault, demolish his system of defense and demoralize the defending troops. The infantry and tanks attacking in the wake of the rolling barrage had the task of penetrating the tactical depth, with the final breakthrough to be carried out by Army level second echelons and mobile formations …. And now we were adequately supplied with artillery ammunition, thanks to the heroic efforts of the Soviet people to provide their armed forces with everything needed to hasten victory. Our logistic personnel carried out a tremendous amount of work to provide the artillery gun positions with more than double the normal supply of gun and mortar shells.”
In the Battle of Kursk, 5 July to 23 August 1943, the Soviet artillery fired more than seven million rounds during the counter-offensive phase. The gun density during the battle varied from 120 to 220 guns to a mile. And this increased to an unbelievable 300 guns and mortars during the Battle of Kiev and the enlargement of bridgeheads across the Dnieper in October 1943.
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Whereas, artillery had a special place in the Soviet tactical doctrine, wherein“ an attack without fire preparation is not an attack but a crime “, it’s employment by the other armies of World War II and the importance they attached to the power of the gun was no less significant. A few examples of the number of guns employed during some major battles would be of interest.
In the most fateful battle for the Allies at El Alamein, in October 1942, the British 8th Army under Montgomery had mustered about 1000 guns. The battle zone was heavily fortified and held in strength. The front was limited with no flank to turn. It required the employment of artillery in its heaviest concentrations before the forward inrush of tanks and infantry. Montgomery believed, as Bernard Shaw said of Napoleon that “cannons kill men ”. The effective employment of artillery at Alamein paid handsome dividends.
During the Allied invasion of Italy, 600 guns — field, medium and heavy — were allotted to 13 British Corps during Operation Baytown, in September 1943, to ensure victory. In the Third Battle of Cassino, in March 1944, a divisional attack on Castle Hill was supported by 610 guns, with about 6,00,000 shells fired in the course of 11 days. The Fourth Battle of Cassino, in May 1944 (in which the British 8th Army and the US 5th Army took part), saw 1600 guns give a thorough plastering to every known German command post, gun position and infantry locality before the assault went in.
After the allied landings in Normandy, in France, 656 guns were employed to support a corps attack with three infantry divisions for th: capture of Caen in July 1944. Caen eventually fell in allied hands, after a battle lasting 2 days. The allotment of artillery much surpassed that at Caen in the Battle of the Rhineland, when 4 Canadian Brigade
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Groups’ assault was supported by 450 guns. The fire-power provided to another brigade attack for the capture of Carpiquet, in July 1944, was about 497 guns. In both battles the objectives were successfully captured. Can one imagine otherwise with so much artillery supporting a brigade attack? It reminds one of a gunner cliche that “ The artillery captures. The infantry holds”.
s Before concluding, one more example of the quantum of artillery support during the allied advance through France, in terms of artillery units, would be of interest to the professional soldier. In the capture of Boulogne, 3 Canadian Infantry Division was provided the following:
a) Five field, seven medium and three heavy regiments.
b) 9th Army Group Artillery.
c) Divisional Artillery of 51 Infantry Division.
d) Two 14 inch guns and two 15 inch guns of 540 Coast Regiment, Royal Artillery.
It is painful to comment that the planners of national defence, after India’s independence, failed to grasp the significance of the gun, while structuring the combat composition of the Indian Army, as this study of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, on the Western Front, so clearly reveals.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
“ In 1947 the fighting had been confined to Jammu and Kashmir alone. In 1965, it had also engulfed the rest of the western border of India and in 1971, the two countries were to be at war on both the eastern and the western fronts.”
At the peak of India’s glory, Hindu kings ruled from Afghanistan to the southernmost tip of the sub-continent. However, because of the vastness of the land and the slow means of communication, there seldom existed one central authority, except for short periods during the rule of the Maurayan and Gupta dynasties. India comprised of many independent principalities, big and small. Yet, it was politico-culturally one nation, mighty and rich, with a common social ethos and culture.
In the 11th-century A.D. commenced the Muslim invasion of India. At this point of its history the country was again without a strong central authority. Furthermore, centuries of affluence had brought in ease and comfort and with it a lowering of the moral and physical fibre of it’s people; this being a phenomenon of nature and the Indians were no exception to it.
The Muslim invaders coming from homelands much less prosperous were, on the other hand, sturdy, imbibed with a religious zeal to conquer the infidels and filled with a
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lust for loot and plunder in a land of plenty. Led by resolute military leaders, with the latest weaponry and combat techniques, they defeated the local kings who, despite their greater numbers, failed to unite to fight the common enemy. This is not to suggest that the aggressors were always victorious. Mahmud of Ghazni, for example was defeated many times, but each time the chivalrous Rajput, Prithvi Raj let him off, only for Mahmud to return wiser and with a larger army.
Then followed over 800 years of Muslim rule. Millions of Indians embraced Islam either through coercion or to improve their social and economic status. The bulk of the people however, continued to follow their religion, with Hindus and Muslims living, by and large, as good neighbours. As a gesture of oneness, political expedience to maintain the support of the Rajputs, or both, Akbar the great Mughal married a Hindu princess, who gave birth to his only son Salim – later the Emperor Jahangir. Muslims had brought Islam to India, but like many other invaders in the past, they too had adopted India as their homeland. Hindu generals, officers and men fought for Muslim kings against Hindu rajas and vice-versa, and the bureaucracy was partly Hindu.
The common homeland was regrettably broken apart, with the partition of India in 1947. The British policy of divide and rule by introduction of separate electorates, the division of Bengal into Muslim East and Hindu West Bengal, the Muslim fear of domination by the Hindu majority on India attaining independence, political ambitions of Muslim leaders and their call for a separate identity aroused the religious sentiments of the Muslim masses, giving birth to Pakistan.* Pakistan became an Islamic state, while India chose to be secular, with a Muslim population greater than that of Pakistan.
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* West and East Pakistan, with the two wings separated by the Indian mainland.
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With the departure of the British from India, the Princely states that they left behind opted either for India or Pakistan. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, with a Muslim majority, but ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, however, vaccilated. To gain time for a decision, with the hope perhaps of becoming independent, the State ruler entered into a Stand Still Agreement with India and Pakistan. The latter, however, broke the agreement and sent Pathan tribesmen of its North West Province, armed with risles, machine-guns and mortars, and surreptitously led by Pakistani officers and JCOs to overrun Kashmir through force of arms, with the aim that it would give Pakistan a pretext to move it’s regular troops into Jammu and Kashmir to restore the situation in her favour. Ultimately, the Maharaja turned to India for help while signing the Instrument of Accession to join the Indian Union, with full support of his Muslim subjects, headed by their political leader, Sheikh Abdullah.
The above developments led to the first round of the Indo-Pak war in 1947-48, till a cease-fire was brought about under the auspices of the U.N.O. Military observers from the world body, thereafter, supervised the sanctity of the Cease-Fire line, which had split the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with one third of its area falling into Pakistani hands.”
India and Pakistan again fought a second round, with Pakistan attacking India in the Rann of Kutch, in mid-1965, claiming a part of the Rann as Pakistan territory. An uneasy truce followed the above Pakistani aggression. This was shortlived, however, for in September 1965, the military dictator of Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, launched a full-fledged attack, spearheaded by Pakistani infiltrators
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* The territory in Pakistan’s possession was termed as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), by India, and the troops raised from the local inhabitants as POK battalions.
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disguised as civilians, in Jammu and Kashmir. Then followed 22 days of heavy fighting till the war was brought to an end with a Cease Fire Agreement concluded at Tashkent, through the good offices of the erstwhile Soviet Union.
After the termination of hostilities with India, there followed a period of turmoil within Pakistan, with it’s eastern wing agitating for a greater share of the national resources which had, till then, been denied to it. There was also a political imbalance, with actual authority resting in the hands of West Pakistan.
The situation took a serious turn after the Pakistani elections to the National Assembly in December 1970, in which the Awami League of East Pakistan emerged as the majority party, defeating it’s rival. The People’s Party of West Pakistan. Similarly, in the elections to the Provincial Assembly, the Awami League swept the polls in East Pakistan. These results were naturally not palatable to Yahya Khan, to his military junta and to West Pakistanis in general, since their acceptance meant giving greater autonomy to East Pakistan, as well as the end of Military rule. Eventually, the session of the National Assembly in Pakistan which was scheduled to be held soon after the elections, was indefinitely postponed. On 30 January 1971, an event took place which was to have far reaching effects on the course of Indo-Pakistan relations and the eventual conflict. This was the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Lahore, on it’s normal flight from Delhi to Srinagar. The same day, Pakistan granted political asylum to the hijackers, who later blew up the plane. In fact, they were acclaimed and received as heroes. Pakistan even refused permission to an Indian Airlines plane to land at Lahore and the passengers were sent back by the land route. This forced India to ban Pakistani civil and military flights over Indian territory. From then on, all movement between East and
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West Pakistan by air or sea could be carried out only via peninsular India. In East Pakistan, meanwhile, the postponement of elections fermented political uncertainty and unrest. This led to a non- violent civil disobedience movement under Sheikh Mujib, the leader of the Awami League, who felt cheated and frustrated. Yahya Khan hit back by using military force and the Sheikh was arrested. Before his arrest, Mujib declared the Independence of East Pakistan, renamed the nation Bangladesh, and called upon the people to throw out the occupation forces, which by April, had been further reinforced. The Pakistan army was now activated into full swing, bringing untold destruction and misery to the people. In panic, the Bangladeshis started to cross over to India to escape the military crackdown. By August 1971, their number had reached the forbidding 10 million mark. Unable to bear the cost of looking after this vast number of refugees, India appealed to the world community to persuade Pakistan to restore normalcy in it’s eastern wing, so that the refugees could return to their homes. With Pakistan’s military suppression continuing unabated and the refugee problem unresolved, India was brought into a direct confrontation with Pakistan once again. The refugees set up a provisional government in exile at Mujib Nagar, near Calcutta. Many amongst them, mostly students and young men, wished to start an armed struggle to liberate their country. This gave birth to the military wing of the freedom movement — the Mukti Bahini, with Colonel M.A.G. Osmani as Commander-in-Chief. Soon after officers and men from the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and Home Guards also flocked under the liberation banner. In the hope that Mukti Bahini would by themselves be able to liberate their homeland, India decided to provide them with arms and equipment and give training in guerilla warfare. Meanwhile Pakistan, moved two infantry divisions (9 and 16) into East Pakistan, and with their arrival Pakistani forces became more aggressive and thus
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commenced raids into Indian territory to hit at the bases of the Mukti Bahini, resulting in clashes with our men manning the border posts. As such incidents increased in frequency, the Indian Army moved in to strengthen the border. On 22 November, Pakistan launched a major raid across Indian territory, with infantry supported by armour. On the same day, she also brought in the Air Force to attack our positions. The stage had been set for the third round – the Indo-Pak War of 1971. In 1947 the fighting had been confined to Jammu and Kashmir alone. In 1965, it had also engulfed the rest of the western border of India, and in 1971, the two countries were to be at war on both, the eastern and the western fronts. Pakistan was totally defeated in the East. With its liberation by the Indian Army, Bangladesh now emerged as an independent nation. In a desperate bid to retain power, Yahya Khan launched a pre-emptive air assault on Indian airfields, followed by a ground offensive in the West. It was a case of clinging to the Presidentship by the fingertips. Yahya Khan tripped no sooner than the war ended, but its final aftermath had retarded the economic progress of the sub-continent by over a decade, besides loss of human life and property.
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THE WESTERN FRONT
“ Equally, the concept of what should constitute a ‘matching artillery’ was not correctly appreciated. Ipso facto, it meant greater casualties in the event of war, with loss of territory in defence and a feeble punch to achieve stipulated aims in attack.”
The Western Front extended from Partapur in Ladakh to the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat. The conduct of war on this front rested with Western and Southern Commands.
Whereas, on the Eastern Front, facing East Pakistan, India mustered a clear all round superiority, the Western Front was given a lower priority. Further, there was need to keep adequate forces facing the northern borders to guard against a Chinese intervention in support of Pakistan. Pakistan had close friendly relations with China and although China had occupied all the areas that it claimed during the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, no chances could be taken by lifting troops deployed on the Indo- Tibet border.
After meeting the above commitments, however, India still retained a definite edge in infantry, though Pakistan possessed an advantage in armour and artillery.
In terms of infantry and armoured formations, the position was as under:
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The Western Command, headed by Lieutenant General K.P. Candeth, comprised of three army corps – north to south: 15, 1 and 11 Corps. It was perhaps the largest field army that had ever been mustered on Indian soil. Its boundary with West Pakistan encompassed the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, the Punjab, and the Ganga Nagar district of Rajasthan. With nearly 4,000 kilometres of border to defend, including that with China in Ladakh, and a terrain that varied from the snowy pinnacles in the north, to the western plains, and to the sandy tracks of Ganga Nagar, Candeth was saddled with an immense responsibility.* This was further compounded by two vital factors. First, the peace-time locations of one complete corps of Western Command (1 Corps) were way back from the Western Frontin Central and Southern India. About 3-4 weeks were required for this Corps to fully concentrate on the western border. Second, with our national policy of fighting only in self-defence, the initiative to attack rested with Yahya Khan. Had the war started in October 1971, with things having already hotted up in the east by September, India would have
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* After the war, Western Command was split into two separate Commands, the Northern and the Western. The Western Front is, therefore, now manned by three Commands; the Northern, the Western and the Southern
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been most vulnerable in the stretch of land extending from Gurdaspur to Samba; the operational location of 1 Corps.* The move of 1 Corps had been held back till the beginning of October, to avoid further aggravation of the already very strained relations with Pakistan. The move of 1 Armoured and 14 Infantry Divisions to Punjab was similarly delayeda gamble undertaken to avoid tension. It was only towards the first week of November that the above formations were firmly concentrated in the west. On the other hand, with cantonments in West Pakistan all located close to the border, it was estimated that the enemy could mount an attack within about one week. Mercifully, Yahya Khan tarried too long and failed to pre-empt, till he missed his chance.
Southern Command was led by Lieutenant General G.C. Bewoor (later Chief of Army Staff). Bewoor’s operational responsibility was very much limited, with the bulk of his command comprising of the premier military training establishments of India. He had two infantry divisions for the conduct of operations.
That political unrest within Pakistan was to lead to an open revolt by its Eastern wing, followed by the influx of ten million refugees in to India and finally culminating in an all out war between India and Pakistan, in 1971, none could then predict. But, what came through as clear as daylight, after the inconclusive war of 1965 was, that the army had to further expand and be kept in constant readiness, because Pakistan’s tirades against India over the Kashmir issue continued unabated.
In the expansion programme of the Indian Army, greater emphasis was laid on the infantry as compared to the artillery and armour. The reasons for this were, first, with a declared national policy to fight only in self-defence,
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* Till the arrival of 1 Corps, the area was held by only one infantry division and one infantry brigade.
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(thus leaving the initiative to start a war to the adversary) on the one hand, and two hostile neighbours, China and Pakistan (particularly the latter), on the other, there was need for more infantry to adequately cover the vast borders of India. Second, as compared to artillery, it was far more cost effective to raise new units of infantry. Since this suited the limited Indian budget, increase in infantry was preferred. Third, there was a general lack of awareness of the vital role that artillery plays in battle. Scant attention was, therefore, paid to raising a matching artillery force. Adequate infantry to man the national borders was, undoubtedly, a basic requirement. But infantry units, while lacking proper backing of fire-power, were of much less avail in combat. Equally, the concept of what should constitute a “matching artillery “was not correctly appreciated. Ipso facto, it meant greater casualties in the event of war, with loss of territory in defence and a feeble punch to achieve stipulated aims in attack.
With the above factors in view, the Indian tactical doctrine was geared primarily to the employment of infantry and how best the artillery and armour could help the infantry in achieving success. This is
The primary task given to Western and Southern Commands was to hold the enemy in the west, as the Eastern Army went in strength to defeat the Pakistanis in the east. Nonetheless, both commands had also planned certain offensive actions, once Pakistan had revealed its hand. The aim of capturing territory in the west was a bargaining ploy, to safeguard against any losses that we may suffer in one sector or the other. India did not have any territorial ambitions, as such.
At 5.40 P.M. on 3 December, 1971, Pakistan carried out a pre-emptive air strike on Indian airfields and radar installations at Amritsar, Faridkot, Halwara, Sirsa,
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Pathankot and Srinagar in Western Command; Agra in Central Command and Jamnagar and Jodhpur in Southern Command. Our Air Defence artillery came into full play and coupled with various precautions taken by the Indian Air Force, negligible damage had, however, been caused.
The war between India and Pakistan had broken out and for the front line soldier, the seemingly endless wait had ended.
When the curtain was finally drawn, on the declaration of the cease- fire, at 8 PM on 17 December 1971, territorial gains and losses suffered by the two sides were as under:
Jammu and Kashmir : India had made sizeable gains opposite Partapur and Kargil in Ladakh and captured a few posts in Kashmir in Tithwal while beating back a Pakistani attack on Poonch. Further south, in the plains of Chhamb-Jaurian – Jammu, Pakistan captured Chhamb; and India the Chicken’s Neck. India also gained some territory in the Shakargarh bulge, between Samba and Pathankot.
Punjab : In the Punjab, fighting was mainly confined to straightening of opposing enclaves. India captured Dera Baba Nanak near Gurdaspur, and Sehjra in the Khem Karan region, while it lost Hussainiwala opposite Ferozepore; China Bidhi Chand near Khalra, and some ground in the area of Fazilka.
Rajasthan: Pakistan made an abortive bid to capture Jaisalmer; while in the Barmer sector our offensive cut through the desert and substantial territory fell into Indian hands.
bu On the balance, India captured more territory than it lost. Despite making the above gains, however, our offensive formations were unable to get to their final objectives as
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planned. On the other hand there were losses of vital territory to Pakistan.
The pages that follow give an account of the role played by the Indian gunners during the 1971 war; where lack of artillery support, either through improper employment; under utilization or shortage, both in guns and ammunition led to failure and, where this vital arm made it’s due contribution in achieving victory. While doing so, I have also tried to bring out the flaws in our planning and execution, in general, in order that they are not repeated and the imbalance in weaponry and other military hardware set right, to further improve our defence preparedness, passing as we are through times uncertain.
Starting with the battles fought by 15 Corps in the north, in Jammu and Kashmir, the narrative proceeds to give an account of the 1 Corps offensive in the Shakargarh bulge, followed by the operations conducted by 11 Corps in the Punjab. And finally the desert campaign in the south, by 11 and 12 Infantry Divisions.
An introduction to the war on the Western Front would be incomplete without making mention of the magnificient role played by the civil population. Our people literally pampered their brothers in uniform. There were canteens opened by voluntary organisations at railway stations for the army. Military vehicles were requested to stop by the roadside for refreshments. People in the villages brought hot meals to the troops deployed in the vicinity. Civil truck drivers risked life to deliver urgent supplies to forward areas. Above all, Indian women visited hospitals in large numbers to give the wounded soldiers both gifts and a word of cheer. A grateful nation went all out to honour it’s soldiers.
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JAMMU AND KASHMIR (OPERATIONS BY 15 CORPS)
“ Abutting on Uzbekistan, China and Afghanistan, Jammu and Kashmir has always been a strategic outpost of the sub-continent. ”
The State of Jammu and Kashmir can be broadly divided into five main sectors :
(a) The Ladakh Sector : Stretching from Chushul to
Zojila.
(b) The Kashmir Valley : Encompassing the Banihal
Pass- Tithwal-Uri-Gulmarg and Kanzalwan.
(c) The Pir Panjal : The area south of the Pir Sector Panjal range from Poonch to
Naushera.
(d) Chhamb-Jaurian : From Kalidhar range, south of
Naushera, to the Chenab River.
(e) The Plains Sector : Extending from Jammu Samba to Madhopur.
The main highways linking Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India are : First, from Manali in Himachal Pradesh,
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over the Rohtang Pass to Leh in Ladakh. Second, from Pathankot in the Punjab to Jammu-Udhampur, across the Banihal Pass to Srinagar, and thence, from Zojila to Leh. Third, a road in depth connecting Pathankot with Udhampur. Pathankot is also linked with Jammu by rail. The railway track runs approximately parallel to the Pathankot-Jammu highway, making both rail and road communications vulnerable to disruption by Pakistan. The road from Pathankot to Udhampur caters for such a contingency.
Within Jammu and Kashmir the major roads are from Jammu to Poonch via Rajauri and from Srinagar to Uri, Gulmarg, Tithwal and Kanzalwan. A few laterals also connect Samba, an important town between Pathankot and Jammu, with the depth road, Pathankot- Udhampur.
Abutting on Uzbekistan, China and Afghanistan, Jammu and Kashmir has always been a strategic outpost of the sub-continent. Inter alia, its people have witnessed long periods of warfare, tyranny and exploitation. Only for brief spells, now and then, had there been peace and prosperity. In the 5th-century B.C. the land came under the rule of Persia. Then came the restless nomads of Central Asia, the Kushans, followed by the White Huns, the Sultans of Swat, and the Mughals. On the decline of the Mughal empire, Jammu and Kashmir came under the rule of the Afghans, then the Sikhs of Ranjit Singh and finally the Dogras, till it acceded to the Indian Union in 1947.
The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India has led to the writing of yet another chapter of the turbulent history of this state. Regrettably, an amicable solution seems nowhere in sight as yet. On the contrary, an explosive situation prevails with the current militancy in the Vale of Kashmir, aided and abetted by Pakistan, adding fuel to the fire, frequent firing by opposing forces sitting eyeball to
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eyeball and Pakistani attempts to capture the heights of the forbidding Siachen Glacier, held by India. As such the Indian army continues to remain in a state of alert.ro gasos
In 1962, China broke the age old ties of good neighbourly relations with India and launched a massive attack in Ladakh. The casus belli was the uninhabited Aksai Chin with both India and China laying claim on it. Of late however, India and China are making efforts to mend fences and settle their territorial differences.
On yoq Before the commencement of the Indo-Pak war of 1971, 15 Corps was operationally responsible for the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. On the hostilities becoming imminent, 1 Corps commanded by Lieutenant General K.K.Singh was moved into the state. This corps then took over the conduct of operations up to Samba, leaving the remainder of Jammu and Kashmir under 15 Corps, with 26,10, 25, 19 and 3 Infantry Divisions.
15 Corps defended Ladakh with 3 Infantry Division. 121 Independent Infantry Brigade at Kargil, was also placed under this division for operations. The sensitive sub-sectors that faced Pakistan in Ladakh were Partapur and Kargil. 19 Infantry Division was responsible for the defence of the Kashmir Valley, holding the areas of Tithwal and Uri. 25 Infantry Division was deployed south of the Pir Panjal range, in the areas of Poonch, Rajauri and Naushera. 10 Infantry Division held Chhamb-Jaurian and the hills of the Kalidhar range, while the defence of Jammu sector was entrusted to 26 Infantry Division.
Pakistan held the areas opposite Ladakh with the Karakoram and Gilgit Scouts, backed by some elements of the regular army. 12 (Pak) Infantry Division was mostly deployed facing Tithwal, Uri and Poonch, with six brigades. 23 (Pak) Infantry Division with four infantry brigades, defended the sector between Poonch, exclusive, up to the
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Chenab. 15 (Pak) Infantry Division with three infantry brigades was responsible for the security of Sialkot, while 8 (Pak) Infantry Division, with four infantry brigades, guarded the approaches across the Ravi and through the Shakargarh bulge. In addition, a strike force comprising of 6 (Pak) Armoured Division, 8 (Pak) Independent Armoured Brigade and 17 (Pak) Infantry Division, was located in Kharian-Gujranwala. 7 (Pak) Infantry Division was located in the North West Province to guard the Afghan-Pakistan border. A possibility of this division moving down for operations in Jammu and Kashmir was of concern to 15
Troops were mostly deployed along the Cease-Fire Line.* Over the years both sides had fortified their defensive positions. Perched on hill tops, dominating various routes of ingress, they were provided with overhead protection and fenced with wire. Likely approaches were covered by minefields.
Major actions in the 15 Corps zone took place in Kargil, Poonch, Chhamb and the Pakistani salient called Chicken’s Neck, in Jammu. India was on the offensive in Kargil and Chicken’s Neck, while Pakistan attacked in Chhamb and Poonch. In addition, minor battles were fought opposite Partapur in Ladakh and around Uri and Tithwal in the Kashmir Valley.
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* Renamed the ‘Line of Actual Control’ after the Shimla Agreement in 1972.
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LADAKH
3 INFANTRY DIVISION
“ The region is no cakewalk for the conduct of military operations. And much less it was during 1971 and the wars fought earlier.”
A land of treeless, rock strewn mountains, rising to 22,000 feet; lack of road communications within Ladakh, cut off both from the Vales of Kashmir and Kulu due to heavy snowfall during winter months and with temperatures down to minus 30-40 degrees Celsius, Ladakh is amongst the toughest outposts of India. It is particularly so for the gunners with limited deployment areas and the difficulty of the carriage of ammunition.
The region had been mostly peaceful through the centuries, with Buddhist Lamas engaged in prayer and meditation in it’s many monasteries. This is not to suggest that the people of Ladakh were devoid of military prowess. On the contrary, they are sturdy, tenacious and brave when it comes to fighting a battle to defend their homeland. In the past they had faced attacks from Skardu and Balistan in the north, and from the Sokpos, a Mongol tribe of Tibet, but had still retained their independence. It was only in the 18th-century that Ladakh was overrun by Zorawar Singh, an illustrious General of the Dogra Raj, when weak kings of
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Ladakh had, over the years, failed to maintain a well trained and equipped army.
Ladakh again came under serious threat during the 1947-48 Indo- Pak War and from China in 1962. It was in the latter year that 3 Infantry Division was inducted to reinforce the borders of Ladakh.
As mentioned earlier, the Indian army faced Pakistan in the sub- sectors of Partapur and Kargil. The bulk of 3 Infantry Division, commanded by Major General (later Lieutenant General) S.P. Malhotra was however, deployed East to safeguard the border with Tibet.*
Significant development, particularly in road communications, has been carried out in Ladakh since the Sino-Indian conflict. Albeit, the region is no cakewalk for the conduct of military operations. And much less it was during 1971 and the wars fought earlier.
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* With the setting in of winter and the Chinese involvement in the 1971 war considered unlikely, 3 Infantry Division later shed one infantry brigade to reinforce the southern flank of 11 Corps.
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PARTAPUR SUB-SECTOR
(LADAKH SCOUTS)
The Partapur sub-sector was connected with Leh by a pony track, across the 18,000 feet high Khardungla Pass. With Colonel Udai Singh in command, it was garrisoned by about a battalion worth of Ladakh Scouts and 500 Nubra Guards. The former were a well trained body, motivated, acclimatised, extremely hardy and brave. They had proved their mettle in a commendable manner, in the Indo-Pak wars of 1947 and 1965 and against China in 1962.
Partapur garrison was maintained by air through the airfield at Thoise. India’s forwardmost post facing Pakistan was at Biagdangdo. Linked by a jeep road it was a few kilometres away from Thoise. Across the cease-fire line, Pakistan had deployed about two companies of Korakoram and Gilgit Scouts, served by the military base at Skardu, 135 kilometres in the rear. A jeep road ran from Skardu to Turtok, 15 kilometres behind the Cease-Fire Line. No road communication existed beyond Turtok. The general area of Biagdangdo-Turtok was spanned by steep mountains, 18,000- 22,000 feet high. Constraints of surface communications and towering mountains limited the scope of military operations in this sub-sector. Albeit, defences on both sides were well prepared, with mines covering likely approaches for attack.
Under cover of darkness, Ladakh Scouts, under Major
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Rinchin, a daring Commander skilled in mountain warfare, advanced into Pakistan on 7 December, and by next morning had captured “V” picket and Point 18402. It was a bold and well planned operation which took the enemy by complete surprise. This was followed by the capture of Oldi post. Between 10-17 December, a number of Pakistani posts, including Turtok and Thang, had fallen to the Indian assault, with Ladakh Scouts advancing 22 kilcmetres into enemy territory in one courageous sweep. Both Rinchin and Udai Singh were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for outstanding leadership and drive.
When I met Rinchin in Leh in 1982, and heard his story of the above operations across Biagdangdo, I was spellbound, for it was an incredible feat of human courage and endurance. Aptly does Lieutenant General K. P. Candeth comment in his book, The Western Front. Indo-Pak War, 1971, “I doubt whether any other army had ever battled in such appalling conditions and it speaks much for the determination, motivation and the physical toughness of our troops and commanders that they were able to carry out this task so well.”
Neither side employed artillery, the real killer in today’s ground warfare. As such, the casualties were low on both sides. It was in the major battles of 1971 that the gunners joined combat in full measure.“ The harder the battle, the more the infantry leans on the artillery, ” said Field Marshal
Montgomery.
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KARGIL SUB-SECTOR
(121 INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BRIGADE)
“ With one mortar regiment and one field battery to support six infantry battalions, seldom has a “double ” infantry brigade, in any world army joined battle with such meagre artillery support. ”
Lying mid-way on the strategic road from Srinagar to Leh, Kargil serves as a halting place for convoys carrying supplies to Ladakh. At one stage, during the Indo-Pak war of 1947-48, the town was captured by Pakistan. The 4,880 metre high Zojila Pass that links Kargil with the Kashmir Valley had also been occupied. But for the Indian army acting fast, we would have lost the whole of Ladakh to Pakistan. In a bold employment of light armour, coupled with a determined attack by 77 Para Brigade, duly supported by the gunners, the enemy was thrown out of Zojila. Both 77 Para Brigade and the Leh garrison then sent columns that met at Kargil and forced the enemy to pull out.
Pakistan however, continued to hold a few dominating features, north of Kargil. Of these, Point 13620 which is visible from miles as one approaches Kargil and Black Rocks, were the most dangerous. With them acting as an observation posts, both the town and the road could be engaged by Pakistan artillery. To a lesser extent, Pakistani
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posts astride the Brachil Pass and Hathi Matha also overlooked Kargil and the road. It was thus imperative that the above posts were captured to ensure the safety of convoys.
Indian troops had captured Point 13620 and Black Rocks in May 1965, in retaliation to the Pakistani attack in Kutch. They were however, returned a month later on UN intervention. Recaptured in August, during the 1965 Indo-Pak War, they were again handed back in January 1966, after the Tashkent Declaration. Knowing their importance to India, the above posts, as also all other posts in the area had, by 1971, been well fortified and likely approaches to them adequately mined by Pakistan.
During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, 121 Independent Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier M. L. Whig, was given the task to clear the enemy from Black Rocks, Point 13620, Brachil Pass and Hathi Matha and, thereafter, to capture Olthingthang and the Zanskar ridge areas, in depth. The Brigade’s infantry order of battle comprised of 16 and 18 Punjab, 2/11 and 5/3 Gorkha Rifles, 7 Guards and 9 Jammu and Kashmir Militia battalions, 87 Light Regiment and a battery of 15 Field Regiment. Two Vampire fighter aircrafts were alloted for close air support.
Whig opened the offensive with a two pronged thrust on cither side of the Shingo River, employing 2/11 Gorkha Rifles and 18 Punjab. The Gorkhas were given the task of capturing the Pakistani posts at Black Rocks and Point 13620, while 16 Punjab and 7 Guards were to clear the enemy from the Brachil Pass area, advancing west of the river.
Supported by 873 Light Battery and a troop of the field battery, 2/11 Gorkha Rifles commenced their operations
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with an attack on Post 12 (in the Black Rocks complex), at 2 A.M. on 7 December, and by early morning secured the lower slopes of the post. Further advance was held up by heavy enemy automatic fire. The gunners retaliated with a heavy crunch from field guns and mortars. Accurate and speedy, it enabled the battalion to close with the enemy and after a hand to hand fight Post 12 fell by 7 A.M. Preceded by heavy concentrations of artillery fire, the Gorkhas, thereafter captured Black Rocks and two other posts.
For the eventual capture of Point 13620, Whig put stops of platoon strength with 9 Jammu and Kashmir Militia, to isolate the post and to deny the defenders both reinforcements and water. To further demoralise the enemy, the post was heavily engaged by the gunners and the Vampires, and by the afternoon of 9 December, Point 13620 was assaulted and captured by the Gorkhas.
With the fall of the Black Rocks and Point 13620, General Malhotra, with his tactical headquarters since moved to Kargil, and Brigadier Whig heaved a sigh of relief. The threat to Kargil had been greatly reduced.
Simultaneous with the operations by 2/11 Gorkha Rifles, 18 Punjab advanced to the 14,000 feet high Brachil Pass with the task of securing the Left Shoulder of the Pass. The Punjabis executed a difficult night movement, and by the early morning of 7 December, secured the battalions,’ “ Forming up Place”* undetected. At this stage the enemy was alerted and opened up with heavy machine-gun fire. Indian gunners were, however, quick to hit back with an accurate concentration of fire. Aided by the morning mist and artillery shelling, 18 Punjab attacked the Left Shoulder and captured it by 7 A.M. The enemy holding Brachil’s Right Shoulder was now attacked by 7 Guards, preceded by heavy
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* A place close to the objective where troops make a final check up before going into the assault.
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bombardment. On the afternoon of 8 December, the Right Shoulder also sell to Indian troops.
With the capture of the Brachil Pass the stage was set to assault the Hathi Matha complex. The infantry had to do some hard fighting, particularly at posts Trishul, Point 3985, Wali and Malik, before Hathi Matha eventually fell on the afternoon of 17 December. Heavy artillery bombardments had to be brought down to neutralise the enemy.
With the fall of Hathi Matha, 121 Independent Infantry Brigade had broken through the strong network of enemy defences guarding the route to Olthingthang. Further operations had however, to end, with India declaring a unilateral cease-fire.
During 10 days of fighting, 121 Independent Infantry Brigade had captured 36 Pakistani posts and an area of 100 square kilometres. For his sound planning and resolute leadership, Brigadier M. L. Whig, a battlefield Commander to the hilt, was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. Indian casualties during this operation were 55 killed, 195 wounded, 28 missing and a very high toll of 517 cases of frostbite. Frostbite casualties were mostly from 7 Guards, who had wornjungle boots of canvas before commencing the advance. This was asking for trouble in sub-zero temperature. On the enemy side, 114 Pakistanis were believed killed and 22 taken prisoners while 80 rifles, a large number of light automatic weapons and three guns were captured.
Within the resources available, the artillery had played it’s role as best as possible in the conduct of the Kargil operations, firing a total of nearly 8,500 rounds. Whig summed up the performance of his gunners thus, “ Our artillery fire support was accurate and effective against targets in the open. Artillery fire sapped away the morale of
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the enemy troops and caused effective harassment to them.” A similar compliment was paid to Indian gunners by a party of one Pakistani Subedar and 12 other ranks who surrendered east of the Shingo. “ Heavy and accurate fire by the Indian Artillery had so demoralised us that we were forced into putting our hands up,” they said.
At the gun end, there were occasions when a battery had to engage 3-4 different targets simultaneously, including some with direct shooting. This was achieved by delegating the control of fire between the section commanders and the battery havildar major, a most adhoc arrangement. Inter alia, it also spoke of the utter inadequacy of artillery allotment to 121 Independent Infantry Brigade, with one mortar regiment and one field battery to support six infantry battalions. Seldom has a “ double ” infantry brigade, in any world army, joined battle with such meagre artillery support, while attacking an enemy entrenched on such dominating heights, as at Kargil, when on the contrary there is a greater requirement of gun support, due to the slow and difficult movement of troops than elsewhere. Had 121 Infantry Brigade been alloted three field regiments, a mortar regiment, and a medium regiment, the minimum essential for an attack by an infantry brigade, it would have not only suffered lesser casualties, but could have also captured Olthingthang,* the final objective, before the cease-fire.
In fact, shortage of artillery support to Indian infantry and armour on all fronts stands out in a most glaring manner, as this narrative of the Indo-Pak War of 1971 will reveal.
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* An inportant communication centre, it’s capture would have delivered a hard blow to the military posture of Pakistan in her northern regions. It was also to pave the way for a further advance into Pakistan, had the war continued.
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Albeit, the manner in which 87 Light Regiment was able to ensure maximum fire support possible during the Kargil operations was duly recognised with the Honour Title “Shingo River”, while it’s Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Kapoor was Mentioned-in-Despatches for his distinguished handling of the artillery placed under him.
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THE KASHMIR VALLEY
19 INFANTRY DIVISION
“ As Brigadier Bakshi prepared for a second attack, the Army Commander placed a restriction on the expenditure of artillery ammunition. With implicit faith in the power of the gun, he decided to turn a “ Nelson’s eye ” to the order and a heavy crunch of accurate gun fire preceded the attack. The result : our troops just walked into Sankh. Bakshi’s violation of the above order, keeping in view the ground realities, was happily overlooked.”
19 Infantry Division under Major General E.D. D’Souza was responsible for the defence of the Kashmir Valley. Stretching over an area of approximately 340 square kilometres, the valley had always been an important factor in Indian military planning, ever since the partition of the sub-continent.
In 1947, 5,000 armed tribesmen from Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, commanded by regular army officers, had crossed the State border on 21 October. Domel and Muzzafarabad, two small border townships had been overrun, their inhabitants looted and killed, and their
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women raped. Brigadier Rajinder Singh*, Chief of Staff of the Army of J and K had rushed forward to meet the Pathan onslaught, laying down his life, near Uri in the defence of Kashmir. When everything seemed lost, the State ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh had made a desperate appeal to Nehru for help, acceding his State to the Indian Union. It was touch and go, when the first contingent of Indian troops, of the crack 1st Battalion of the Sikh Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai* air landed at Srinagar. Rai too, made the supreme sacrifice in a courageous bid to hold the invader at bay, till the balance of 161 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier ( later Lieutenant General) L. P. Sen was fully inducted into Kashmir. Major Som Nath Sharma** was another very brave son of India who succumbed to his wounds in a valiant defence of the Srinagar airfield, against overwhelming odds. The Indian Army had then to fight many a bloody battle to wrest the initiative and drive back the aggressor, including regular troops of the Pakistan Army, which had openly joined the invading tribesmen by then.
During the Indo-Pak war of 1965, Pakistan resorted to large scale infiltration tactics. Armed Pakistanis in civil clothes crossed the border through various routes of ingress and entered the Kashmir Valley. The task assigned to them was to raid military headquarters, ambush convoys, destroy bridges, cut off roads leading to Srinagar from Kargil and Jammu to isolate Srinagar, and generally paralyse the functioning of the state civil administration. The radio station and the airfield at Srinagar were to be captured and through a Revolutionary Council, a “ lawful Government”. was to be proclaimed. The Council was, thereafter, to
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* For their outstanding display of courage and devotion to duty in the face of the enemy, Rajinder and Rai were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (posthmuous) – the first to be so decorated in Independent India.
** Som’s supreme sacrifice, beyond the call of duty, was recognised with Param Vir Chakra (posthumous); India’s highest gallantry award, of which Som was the first recipient.
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broadcast an appeal for help and recognition to the international community, including Pakistan. This was to be the signal for the latter to openly attack Kashmir. Till then, she was to project an image of innocence !
By 8 August, 1965, the raiders reached as far as the suburbs of Srinagar. On 13 August, a daring attack was carried out on the 8 Kumaon base at Naugam. A couple of bridges were destroyed and some military convoys ambushed. An estimated 3,000-4,000 Pakistanis had infiltrated during the course of a few days.
There was anxiety and concern in India at the above developments. The Western Army under Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh was, however, quick to react. Additional troops, including 163 Infantry Brigade from Ladakh, were rushed to the valley and Headquarters Sri Force, under Major General Umrao Singh was formed to deal with the infiltrators around Srinagar. Sri Force was also to maintain 3 Infantry Division across the Zojila, relieving 19 Infantry Division to conduct operations along the western border. In brief, attacks were thereafter launched against Pakistani posts in the west, including a brilliant operation carried out by 68 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Z.C. Bakshi, to capture the Haji Pir bulge. Besides bold infantry assaults, the gunners too had played a significant role at Haji Pir. A strong enemy post that stood in the way to Haji Pir was Sankh. The first attempt to capture the post did not succeed despite the support provided by all available artillery, due to a sudden and heavy rainfall, which made the ground slippery and difficult to climb the high Sankh gradient. As Brigadier Bakshi prepared for a second attack, the Army Commander placed a restriction on the expenditure of artillery ammunition. With implicit faith in the power of the gun, he decided to turn a “Nelson’s eye” to the order and a heavy crunch of accurate gunfire preceded the attack. The result : our troops just walked into Sankh.
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Bakshi’s violation of the above order, keeping in view the ground realities, was happily overlooked.
Meanwhile, in the Kashmir Valley, Sri Force eliminated the raiders in its area of responsibility.
From Day One (5 August) when the first group of Pakistani infiltrators had crossed into the valley, and their presence in the Gulmarg sector reported to the police by a youngster, Mohammad Din, the Kashmiris had given little assistance to their co-religionists from across the border.
Pakistan had hatched a clever plan, but it had failed to work.
During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the Kashmir front remained relatively quiet, except for some attacks at battalion level, primarily due to the severe winter and heavy snowfall. As in 1965, the maintainence of troops in Ladakh and the internal security duties in Srinagar was entrusted to a separate headquarters, (called the “V” sector) under Major General Patankar, leaving 19 Infantry Division free for the conduct of operations in the west.
The infantry and artillery order of battle of 19 Infantry Division comprised of 104, 161 and 268 Infantry Brigades, three battalions of the Border Security Force and 19 Artillery Brigade. The units constituting the artillery brigade under Brigadier Chatterjee, were 3 Field, 4 Field, 182 Light and 51 Mountain Regiments and 15 Medium Battery of 34 Medium Regiment. In addition, two ad hoc mountain batteries with 3.7 inch Howitzers and one ad hoc 4.2 inch mortar battery were raised from within the brigade resources.
To guard the main approaches to the Kashmir Valley, 19 Infantry Division was deployed in the general areas of Uri, Tithwal and the northern gullies. 161 and 104 Infantry Brigades defended the Uri and the Tithwal sub-sectors, while
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the northern gullies were held by one regular and about three battalions of the Border Security Force. 268 Infantry Brigade initially kept in reserve was later split, shedding a battalion each to reinforce 161 and 104 Infantry Brigades and the “V” sector, while the Brigade Headquarters was moved to Gulmarg to look after “ Golf ” sector with one battalion worth of regular and para-military personnel.
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TITHWAL SUB-SECTOR
(104 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
“ With lack of road communications, field guns and mortars were moved on mules, often manhandled, and the mediums dismantled, carried in 3 ton vehicles over the Nasta Chun Pass, reassembled and brought into action. The fact that the much needed fire support was still provided effectively was an incredible achievement of the gunners.”
104 Infantry Brigade with 8 Rajputana Rifles, 3 Bihar, 9 Sikh, a battalion from 268 Infantry Brigade and one battalion of the Border Security Force was responsible for the defence of the Tithwal sub-sector. 4 Field Regiment, 1821 Light Battery, 141 Mountain Battery, an ad hoc mortar battery, a section of medium guns and a section of 3.7 inch Howitzers formed the artillery component.
Opposing 104 Infantry Brigade was 11 (Pak) Infantry Brigade, with three infantry battalions, a battalion worth of scouts and the requisite artillery.
The task of 104 Infantry Brigade was to guard the enemy approaches along the Kishen Ganga and to prevent infiltration through the Tutmari Gali from the Lipa Valley.
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The latter forms a salient between Tithwal and Uri and is a good route of ingress to Srinagar. To achieve the above task, 104 Infantry Brigade was ordered to undertake offensive operations involving seven enemy posts.
On the night of 3/4 December, 8 Rajputana Rifles attacked Gasla Top and Ring Contour. Both objectives were successfully captured by 8 A.M. next morning, with 20 Pakistanis killed and 15 taken prisoners. The artillery also made a due contribution, with the Forward Observation Officer, Captain B. C. Pathak, taking some well directed shoots.
Encouraged by success in the capture of Gasla Top and Ring Contour, 104 Infantry Brigade now attacked the enemy post at Shisabladi, with 8 Rajputana Rifles on the night of 7/8 December. Three field batteries and a light battery provided the fire support, with the battalion’s recoilless guns employed to destroy the enemy bunkers. Held by one company of 2 Frontier Force, well entrenched in concrete fortifications, the above artillery was totally inadequate. The recoilless guns also proved ineffective. As a result, the attack failed with 2 JCOs and 35 other ranks laying down their lives, 2 officers and 65 other ranks wounded and one officer and three other ranks missing – believed killed. Shisabladi was an unfortunate case of haste and misplaced bravado by 8 Rajputana Rifles, resulting in heavy casualties and failure, when with some delay in attacking the post, additional artillery could have been moved up to support the operation. Shortage of artillery support, in fact, led to a number of such disasters, as we shall see in our study of the 1971 war.
In my opinion, what we failed to fully appreciate was the fact that the infantry battalions of Pakistan have much more fire-power at their disposal than ours. Instead of 36 light machine guns that we have with a battalion, the Pakistanis are equipped with 72. It follows that to suppress such heavy fire-power, there was a need for a greater
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quantum of artillery fire than what was, invariably, provided. Most of our failures can be attributed to this factor.
The battlefield teaches you fast, however. After the Shisabladi setback, more artillery was moved forward before undertaking to attack the next objective in 104 Infantry Brigade sub-sector — the enemy post at Wanjal. Further, a detailed coordination was carried out between the infantry and the artillery, making the best possible use of fire-power. On the night of 14/15 December, 3 Bihar attacked Wanjal and by next morning the post fell in our hands, after a short hand to hand fight. The enemy put in two counter-attacks to recapture Wanjal, but cut no ice in the face of our artillery fire.
The artillery had played a vital role in the capture of Wanjal. Three field batteries, one mountain and one mortar battery and a section each of medium guns and 3.7 inch Howitzers supported the operation.
To start with, the section of 3.7 inch Howitzers engaged enemy bunkers by direct shooting. The medium guns now took over and engaged bunkers that had eluded the Howitzers. Between the howitzers and the medium guns most of the bunkers were either destroyed or damaged. Heavy artillery crunches were then delivered on the objective, as our infantry moved into the assault. And finally, an effective counter-bombardment to silence the enemy guns was carried out by the medium artillery. This was achieved with observed shooting by Captain B.C.Pathak of 4 Field Regiment. For his valuable contribution in the capture of Gasla Top, Ring Contour and Wanjal, Pathak was awarded the Vir Chakra.*
The deployment of artillery and the carriage of
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* Enemy gun areas had been spotted by Pathak, acting as the Forward Observation Officer; with the Commando Platoon of 8 Rajputhana Rifles, infiltrated behind Wanjal prior to the attack, to cut off the enemy’s withdrawal route.
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ammunition to Lipa had posed a great challenge. With lack of road communications, field guns and mortars were moved on mules, often manhandled, and the mediums dismantled, carried in 3 ton vehicles over the Nasta Chun Pass, reassembled and brought into action. The fact that the much needed fire support was still provided effectively was an incredible achievement of the gunners.
For his outstanding handling of artillery, Lieutenant Colonel D. D. Batra (later Brigadier) cominanding 4 Field Regiment, was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal.
Concurrent with the above operations, 9 Sikh attacked the Pakistani posts of Thanda Pani and Kalyan, en route to Lipa and captured them on the night of 5/6 December. One field and one mortar battery and some medium guns supported the attack. The enemy counter-attacked twice, but was beaten back, mainly due to an effective engagement by the mediums. The well fortified Pakistani post at Nankot was attacked next and on the night of 15/16 December, the battalion captured Nankot after a severe battle.
Further operations in 104 Infantry Brigade sector ended with the ceasefire.
Tithwal brigade had successfully accomplished the tasks alloted to it despite a rugged terrain, hostile weather, and a deterīnined enemy. Regrettably, it’s good performance in Lipa was, to an extent, marred by a small enemy pocket that remained undetected at the time of the ceasefire. When it’s presence came to light, Major General D’Souza not only overlooked this enemy pocket, but decided not to report the Pakistani presence to the higher authorities. Eventually, a battalion attack had to be launched in May 1972. Meanwhile, the enemy had reinforced the post surreptitiously. The attack failed and the pocket continued to remain with Pakistan.
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URI SUB-SECTOR
(161 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
Providing the shortest route to Srinagar, Uri holds the key to the Kashmir Valley. During the 1947-48 and 1965 Indo-Pak wars, practically every Pass around the Uri bowl had been a scene of heavy fighting — every hill steeped in blood and a monument of the courage and devotion to duty of the Indian soldier. In 1971, however, the Uri sub-sector remained dormant, except for two small-scale attacks by 161 Infantry Brigade on enemy posts of Jhandi Mali and Jaya Shree. The attacks were supported by one field, one mortar and one medium battery. In addition, a 3.7 inch Howitzer was employed for destruction of enemy bunkers. Regrettably, both attacks proved abortive.
Jhandi Mali was attacked by a company of 8 Sikh, on the morning of 5 December. Prior to the attack, 3.7 inch Howitzers engaged the Pakistani bunkers, damaging nine by direct shooting. Then followed the main artillery concentration on the objective. Despite an effective fire-programme, the company barely advanced beyond the “Start Line “, ducking for cover as soon as it came under enemy fire. It later came to light that, because of poor leadership, the commanding officer had lost the respect of the men, thereby adversely affecting their will to fight. Although, he was soon removed from command, Jhandi Mali continued to remain with Pakistan.
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On the night of 5/6 December, 7 Sikh Light Infantry launched a company attack on Jaya Shree. An artillery fire-plan was duly made. This catered for attacking the entire objective in a single phase, assuming that the enemy held the post in a compact manner. But as the troops advanced and drew the enemy’s small arms fire, the company commander discovered that the defenders were, in fact, holding Jaya Shree in three separated localities and so decided to attack each locality in turn. In the excitement, however, he did not inform the Forward Observation Officer, Captain J. S. Virk, of this change. No modification was, therefore, made to the original fire-plan. An unfortunate situation thus prevailed with the gunners executing a fire-plan totally unrelated to the revised tactical plan. By the time Virk realised the mess, the company commander was killed while personally leading a section charge. Regrettably, this brave officer had failed to properly utilise the fire support of three artillery batteries placed at his disposal. The enemy put in a spirited counter-attack and our troops, confused and disorganised by now, were forced to scramble back to safety, with 11 other ranks (besides the company commander) killed and 11 wounded.
All that Virk, assisted by his wireless operator, Jiwa Ram, could do at this stage was to bring down maximum artillery fire to help extricate the infantry. And so, unmindful of personal safety, they continued to hold their Observation Post, till the entire company had pulled back. For their courage and devotion to duty, Virk and Jiwa were awarded the Sena Medal.
After suffering the above reverses, 161 Infantry Brigade took no further part in the operations, till the cease-fire put an end to further hostilities.
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AIR DEFENCE GUNNERS AT
SRINAGAR
An account of gunner participation in the Vale of Kashmir would not be complete without placing on record the role played by 1511 Battery of 157 Air Defence Regiment (self propelled), in the defence of Srinagar airfield.
The airfield was attacked by Pakistani jets daily between 3 and 6 December, with sporadic raids between 7 and 10 December. It goes to the credit of the air defence gunners at Srinagar that they were able to foil every single enemy attempt to cause damage. On the contrary, Pakistan lost one Sabre, while two were hit — though they managed to get across the border.
Gunner Arumugam displayed great courage during the enemy attack on 5 December and was responsible for the destruction of one Pakistani Sabre. Regrettably, this brave gunner was later killed during straffing by a follow-up Sabre. His gallant performance was recognised by the award of Vir Chakra (posthumous).
Another gunner of 1511 Battery, Joseph Dunna, was Mentioned-in-Despatches for his courage and devotion to duty during a Pakistani air attack on 9 December.
It requires cool nerves to face straffing by jet fighters. Those who have experienced such attacks would agree that striking aircraft, often flying at treetop level, are like roaring
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monsters that shake the earth below, while breathing down a hail of bullets. The reaction time for defending gunners is very little; though the same holds true of enemy pilots. It is a constant race between the two; the former to strike while evading detection by ground radar and the latter to engulf the attacking aircraft in a thick barrage of high explosive. That the gunners of 1511 Air Defence Battery stood up to this challenge in defence of the vital airfield at Srinagar needs to be warmly applauded.
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POONCH – RAJAURI –
NAUSHERA 25 INFANTRY DIVISION
“ Artillery duels can be deadly, with opposing gunners trying to get to one another’s throat from afar. A number of us had some close shaves while visiting our gun areas. Both sides also suffered casualities, with the Observation Post Officers often sneaking into enemy territory to direct the fire of their guns.
25 Infantry Division was responsible for the defence of Poonch, Thana Mandi, Rajauri, Naushera and Jhanggar. The sector is thinly populated, underdeveloped, and dominated by the rugged mountains of the Pir Panjal range, that vary in height from 3,000 to 8,000 feet. It is linked with the Jammu plains by a two way tarmac road running from Jammu to Poonch and to the Vale of Kashmir through various routes of ingress over the Pir Panjal.
During the Pakistani invasion of 1947, Poonch had been besieged, while Thana Mandi, Rajauri and Jhanggar had fallen to the aggressor*. Naushera too was heavily
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* Till the arrival of the Indian Army, the above areas had been weakly held by the State Forces of Jammu and Kashmir.
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attacked; and saved only by a dogged defence put up by 50 Para Brigade. A series of well coordinated operations, supported by the gunners and by armour wherever the terrain so permitted, had then to be undertaken to throw back the invader. Recapture of Jhanggar, Rajauri and Thana Mandi, the Indian victories at Chawa ridge, at the massive Pir Badeshar and at Pir Kalewa, fighting an opponent who refused to yield ground easily, often through the slush and mud of the monsoon rains, and finally forcing Pakistan to lift the siege of Poonch,* are now a part of post-Partition military history; a saga of Indian tenacity and courage in battle.
In the Indo-Pak war of 1965, 25 Infantry Division sector was infested by Pakistani infiltrators in almost the same strength as the Valley. I was then in command of 31 Light Regiment** deployed in the Naushera sub-sector, and vividly recall those difficult days. Not a day passed without a crisis of some sort — a convoy ambushed; an exchange of fire between an Indian patrol and the raiders; an attack launched by us to evict a Pakistani force holding a hill top; an encounter on the outskirts of a village with peasants, women and children watching terrified from a distance. On 6 August, a concentration of infiltrators was reported in the area of Dunga Gali, 10 miles north-east of Rajauri, causing serious alarm. On the night of 7/8 August, four strong attacks were launched on a picket in Poonch. There was a clash at Balnoi and another in Bhimber Gali. A divisional petrol dump near Narian was fired at but luckily no damage was caused. A daring raid was made on Headquarters 120 Infantry Brigade. My regimental headquaters was responsible for the defence of a bridge close to Naushera, on
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* The siege had lasted for about one year, with Pakistan unable to capture the town. It was like the encirclement of Leningrad by the Germans during the Second World War, when Russian soldiers would say in bitter sarcasm “ Blizok Lokat, Da Ne Ykushesh I” (The elbow is so close and yet one cannot bite it I.)
** Since redesignated as 31 Medium Regiment.
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the main highway, since we were located next door. I spent some anxious nights, lest some infiltrators sneaked in to blow it up. However, a simple solution to light up the area at night made life much easier. All said and done, the infiltrators had put us all on notice, good and proper. There was never a dull moment in the divisional sector.
To meet the deteriorating situation, 52 Infantry Brigade was rushed from 26 Infantry Division. Mandi, in particular, had become the infiltrators’ stronghold and 52 Brigade had to launch a full-scale operation to capture it. Albeit, 25 Infantry Division was still short of troops to cope with the menace. And so, the gunners and the engineers had also to be mustered, to give a helping hand to the extent possible. I recall an urgent call from my Brigade Commander asking me to combat a force of infiltrators holding a high feature north of Naushera. With my regiment, and the additional artillery placed under me fully deployed and the Observation Post Officers perched on pickets with the infantry, I assigned the task to my adjutant, Captain R.S. Garewal and all available personnel at the regimental headquarters. In the event, the gunners, operating as infantry, launched a spirited attack and threw back the enemy, with a large quantity of ammunition, equipment and some weapons falling in our hands. Garewal was awarded the Sena Medal, while four other ranks were Mentioned-in-Despatches for their display of gallantry in this action.
On 3 September 1965, India and Pakistan were engaged in open war. 25 Infantry Division was not involved in any large-scale operations, however. The battles in this sector were only confined to artillery duels,* raids into each
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* Artillery duels can be deadly, with the opposing gunners trying to get at one another’s throat from afar. A number of us had some close shaves while visiting our gun areas. Both sides also suffered casualties, with Observation Post Officers often sneaking into enemy territory to direct the fire of their guns.
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other’s territory and attacks at company-battalion level, while Pakistani infiltrators kept disrupting our road communications and generally harassing our rear areas. In the 1971 war, 25 Infantry Division under Major General Kundan Singh faced a major Pakistani attack against Poonch and a subsidiary thrust through Balnoi, along the Mendhar river. Having withstood the above attacks, India retaliated with an attack on Daruchian. Naushera and Jhanggar remained relatively quiet. The divisional order of battle comprised of 93, 120 and 80 Infantry Brigades. 93 Infantry Brigade defended Poonch, 120 Infantry Brigade was responsible for the Rajauri sub-sector and 80 Infantry Brigade held Jhanggar and Naushera. With reports coming in of Pakistani build-up opposite Poonch, 33 Infantry Brigade of 39 Infantry Division was also moved to Poonch to boost the defence potential of 25 Infantry Division.
The units forming part of 25 Artillery Brigade, commanded by Brigadier S.L. Chawla were : 61 Field, 195 Mountain and 34 Medium Regiments. The Divisional Artillery was further strengthened with 11 Field Regiment and 1861 Light Battery, affiliated to 33 Infantry Brigade, when the latter moved into Poonch.
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THE VICTORY AT POONCH
(93 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
“ Infantry – Artillery co-operation has to be a solid, well planned and well mixed concrete. So it was at Poonch. Our artillery truly was a battle-winning factor.”
Major General K. L. Rattan (Commanding 6 Sikh at Poonch in 1971)
Poonch is of considerable strategic value to Pakistan, giving access to the gullies over the Pir Panjal for infiltration into the Kashmir valley. Together with the Haji Pir bulge (since back with Pakistan after the Tashkent Agreement), its capture helps enlarge a vital salient right through the centre of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. As earlier mentioned, Poonch had been beseiged during the 1947-48 Indo-Pak war. It was again an important target in 1965. Well armed enemy infiltrators, operating in large numbers on it’s outskirts and in the area of Mandi, had made concerted efforts to isolate Poonch. With Pakistani designs having come to nought in both these wars, capture of Poonch was, perhaps, a prestige issue with Pakistan in 1971. Together with an offensive in Chhamb, Pakistan also aimed at isolating 25 Infantry Division and its destruction in detail.
With the above in view, Pakistan launched a full-fledged divisional attack on Poonch. Fortunately, it could not
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adequately conceal its’ offensive intention. The steady increase in vehicular traffic along the road to Haji Pir that followed during Pakistan’s build up phase in October-November gave us ample warning. To counter the likely offensive, 33 Infantry Brigade from 39 Infantry Division was moved into the Poonch sector just in time before the outbreak of war. Though at the cost of weakening the offensive punch of 1 Corps in the Shakargarh bulge, it proved to be a wise decision which saved Poonch.
Employing 12 (Pak) Infantry Division,* the Pakistani attack commenced on the night of 3/4 December, as India’s 93 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier A.V. Natu (later Major General), held Poonch with infantry battalions deployed in sub-sectors, as under:
(a) Gulpur west of the Betar Nulla : 1/4 Gorkha Rifles.
(b) Banwat north-east of Poonch and east of the Betar: 6 Sikh, along with 8 Jat of 33 Infantry Brigade.
(c) Thanpir east of the Durugali Nala : 11 Jammu and Kashmir Militia.
(d) Jhalas 9 Rajputana Rifles.
Mostly overlooked by Pakistani posts, across the Cease-Fire Line, troops of 93 Infantry Brigade were widely dispersed. 6 Sikh held the Brigade Vital Ground, at picquets 405, 406 and 406A. Capture of Poonch hinged on the enemy’s success against these positions.
The Pakistan plan envisaged almost simultaneous
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*(a) 2 (POK), 3 (POK) and 26 (Pak) Infantry Brigades, with a total of eight
infantry battalions.
(b) POK : Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.
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thrusts against 1/4 Gorkha Rifles, 6 Sikh and 11 Jammu and Kashmir Militia, while one infantry battalion, 9 (POK), was to infiltrate and occupy the Kalai bridge, south of Poonch, to cut off the line of communications from Rajauri. Another infantry battalion, 16 (POK), along with a commando company was then to link up with 9 (POK); eventually building up to a brigade less one battalion in the area. Finally, the Indian positions, north of Poonch, were to be mopped up.
Development of Battle
One infantry battalion assaulted Langoor Post in the Gulpur area, and in a swift move the enemy got to within 25 metres of the objective. But the Gorkhas held their ground and the attack was repulsed. Then followed a second attack at 3.00 A.M. on 4 December. This was also repulsed. It was only after the failure of a third attack, on the night of 4/5 December, that the Pakistanis finally gave up their designs to capture this post.
In the area of Thanpir, attacks were directed against posts at Gutrian and Shahpur, employing 26(Pak) Infantry Brigade. Gutrian was attacked thrice. In the third attempt, the enemy managed to capture a portion of the post, but was thrown back by a bold counter-attack. The attack on Shahpur also proved abortive. In a bitter encounter with Indian troops 26 (POK) Battalion suffered heavy casualties, including the Commanding Officer and two company commanders, killed and two other officers taken prisoners.
In the Banwat complex, 2 (POK) Infantry Brigade attacked picquets 405 and 406, with a simultaneous assault by two battalions. In a valiant defensive battle, 6 Sikh repulsed the attack. Next morning, 2 (POK) Infantry Brigade put in a second attack, reinforced by an additional battalion and by about 10.30 A.M. captured the helipad area.
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Thereafter, the helipad changed hands twice, with its ultimate control resting with the Sikhs.
Along with the attack by 2 (POK) Infantry Brigade, 9 (POK) Infantry Battalion infiltrated towards the Kalai bridge. By the morning of 4 December, the small Indian post at Thanpir, overlooking the bridge, was taken by surprise and it fell. Meanwhile, 13 Mahar Battalion of 33 Infantry Brigade, which had arrived in the Poonch sector on the night of 3/4 December, was ordered to evict the Pakistanis from Thanpir. This they successfully achieved towards the evening of 5 December. By then, the follow up battalion group, 16 (POK), and a commando company, had also managed to sneak through the 11 Jammu and Kashmir Militia sub-sector, as planned. But with failures both at Thanpir and Banwat, it was ordered to exfiltrate, without firing a shot.
By 7 December, the Pakistani offensive had fizzled out.* Having suffered heavy losses, all attacking troops had fallen back across the Cease-Fire Line, defeated and demoralized. To further strengthen it’s defensive posture, 93 Infantry Brigade now launched two minor attacks on Pakistani posts of Nangi Tekri and Jungle Tekri, overlooking the Madhopur bridge, on 10 December. Both objectives were captured by Indian troops. For his outstanding planning and conduct of operations, against exceptionally difficult odds, Brigadier Natu was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.
The following artillery had been allotted to 93 Infantry Brigade:
(a) 195 Mountain Regiment.
(b) 11 Field Regiment less one battery.
(c) 55 Light Regiment less one battery.
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* A subsidiary enemy attack along the Mendhar River also ended in failure.
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(d) 14 Medium Battery of 34 Medium Regiment.
(e) 1861 Light Battery.
(In addition, some 3.7 inch Howitzers were deployed on the picquets for direct shooting)
Elaborate arrangements for command, control, and coordination of artillery fire had been made. This included the establishment of an ad hoc Fire Direction Center and laying of approximately 300 kilometres of telephone cable, backed by an extensive wireless layout. Large-scale dumping of ammunition was carried out. Guns and command posts had been dug down and camouflaged (the latter also provided with overhead protection) and adequate ammunition stocked in ammunition bays next to each gun, for immediate use. Defensive Fire Task Tables had been well coordinated with the infantry down to sub-units and circulated to all concerned. Great care had been taken to organize the local defence of gun areas. Alternative gun positions were prepared, to which guns could move to escape counter-bombardment and air attacks. With the above preparations completed, guns were laid on the most dangerous targets to ensure immediate response. Last but not the least, Artillery Observation Posts shared duties, maintaining a 24 hour vigil at infantry picquets, as the enemy continued a build-up for attack.
The above is normal gunner activity in defence; the only difference being that for the battle of Poonch, there was no scope for half measures. If Poonch was cut off, as the Pakistanis had planned to achieve, it would take a long time for reinforcements to come; perhaps too late to influence the course of events. On the other hand, with proper planning, preparation and effective fire control, the artillery could help bring victory.
The Artillery is a versatile arm, with a battle-winning
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role, whether in an advance, withdrawal, attack or defence. But of all these, it is in defence, perhaps, that on it’s effectiveness or otherwise greatly depends the outcome of a battle. However brave the infantry, a determined attack in strength (as on Poonch) enables the enemy to overwhelm the defender with sheer numbers. It is the role of the artillery in defence to bring down a curtain of fire, and to keep it in pace with the advancing enemy, till the attack breaks up.
In the event, it goes to the credit of the gunners at Poonch that they rose to the occasion, in the finest tradition of the Indian Artillery, and played a vital role in winning the battle. Each Pakistani assault was broken up ły prompt and well directed fire, inflicting heavy casualties. Not many were able to get through the artillery’s curtain of fire. Those that did, were stopped short of closing in on their objectives by machine-gun and other automatic fire of the Indian Infantry. And when the enemy did succeed in making a dent in our defences, as at the helipad and Gutrian, the gunners effectively supported the counter-attacks to help evict the enemy.*
Major General K. L. Rattan, then a Lieutenant Colonel in command of 6 Sikh, which held the Brigade Vital Ground, has this to say on the gunner support provided to this battalion, “ Infantry- Artillery co-operation has to be a solid, well planned and well mixed concrete. So it was at Poonch. Our artillery truly was a battle-winning factor. ” Rattan was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for gallantry and leadership of a very high order.
195 Mountain Regiment, in direct support of 93 Infantry Brigade, particularly distinguished itself and earned the Honour title “ Banwat “, with the Vishisht Seva
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* The artillery at Poonch had fulfilled that unwritten pledge of giving it’s very best to support the infantry; the pledge that closely binds the two in battle.
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Medal awarded to the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Satjit Singh, for his outstanding handling of the regiment and the additional artillery placed under his command. Major C.M. Bhalla and Captain S.S. Sandhu of 195 Mountain Regiment, and Naik M. Verghese of 11 Field Regiment were Mentioned-in-Despatches, for their display of courage and devotion to duty.
An account of the battle for Poonch would be incomplete without placing on record the magnificant part played by the Indian Air Force. Our pilots flew in a large number of sorties in support of the defending infantry, not only to engage Pakistani troop movements and concentrations, but also to effectively engage their gun positions.
A word about the opposing artillery. The Pakistani attack is said to have been supported by 3 (Composite) Mountain Regiment, with five batteries and 27 Mountain Regiment, with six batteries. For a simultaneous assault by two infantry brigades, the above artillery support was grossly inadequate, particularly when the Indian defences were well fortified.
The Pakistani planners had prepared a sound tactical plan but the fact that an equally effective fire-plan was essential to achieve success had been overlooked. Regrettably, planning of the Indian offensives also suffered from the same drawback as a further study of the battles of 1971 in this book would reveal.
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BATTLE FOR DARUCHIAN
(120 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
“ Ironically, within the same division, while proper use of of artillery had saved Poonch, its faulty employment contributed to our failure at Daruchian.”
After the capture of Nangi Tekri and Jungle Tekri by 93 Infantry Brigade, the General Officer Commanding 25 Infantry Division decided to take Daruchian, in the 120 Infantry Brigade sector. Indian troops could then dominate the road from Kotli to Balnoi.
Daruchian was a well fortified post, with strong bunkers, mines and wire obstacles. Located on the east bank of the Poonch River, this cone shaped feature was held by one Pakistan company, deployed in mutually supporting platoon localities called the Apex, the West Spur and the East Spur. It had adequate artillery support.
The capture of Daruchian had been a part of the pre-war operational plan of 120 Infantry Brigade, and as such, on 3 December a 3.7 inch Howitzer had been moved to a picquet opposite this post for direct shooting at enemy bunkers in the event of hostilities. When Pakistan attacked in Poonch, the howitzer was brought into action, damaging a few bunkers at Daruchian on 5 December. On the night of
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10/11 December, a battalion of 120 Infantry Brigade launched a preliminary operation and captured three small Pakistani posts on the outskirts of Daruchian. On 12 December, Daruchian itself was heavily shelled. And finally, 14 Grenadiers attacked the post on the night of 13/14 December, supported by two batteries of 195 Mountain Regiment, two batteries of 11 Field Regiment, one light battery and two batteries of 34 Mountain Regiment.
The attack had been planned as under:
-(a) Phase 1 -B Company was to capture the Apex, commencing the assault at midnight.
(b) Phase 2 -C Company was to attack the East Spur from the opposite direction at 1 A.M. And lastly,
(c) Phase 3 -D Company And last was to attack the South West Spur at about 3 A.M.
Phase 1 commenced as scheduled. B company succeeded in capturing a portion of the Apex, but as the assaulting troops progressed, the enemy brought down heavy artillery and medium machine-gun fire, inflicting considerable casualities on our troops. The Company Commander made a determined effort to press forward but was killed by a mine blast. The artillery Forward Observation Officer, Captain S.S. Vashisht, assumed command and rallying the troops around him made a desperate effort to close with the enemy. Vashisht was also killed, when barely 30 metres from the objective. With his death the men lost the will to push forward.
Phase 2 met a similar fate. By the time C Company had –closed with it’s objective, the Company Commander and the Second-in-Command had been wounded, with considerable
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casualities amongst the rank and file. Captain J.C. Gosain, the artillery Forward Observation Officer took charge and, having collected the remnent troops, made a final bid to capture the East Spur. But a murderous artillery and small arms fire made it impossible for him to press the attack much further. Captain Gosain and his men, however, did not give up and continued to hold ground in close proximity. Next morning, the enemy engaged our troops with artillery. Gosain was killed in this firing and with no hope now left to capture the East Spur, the troops pulled back.
Phase 3:D Company also failed to capture its objective, having made good initial progress. The Company Commander was killed, alongwith many other ranks. A large number were wounded.
The attack on Daruchian was a sad experience, with 8 officers and JCOs and about 160 other ranks killed or wounded in this action. Engagement of enemy bunkers as early as 5 December and softening up of the Daruchian defences on 12 December by artillery fire had put the enemy on full alert. This was an error on the part of 120 Infantry Brigade for which it had to pay a heavy price. If only the fire of our guns had been withheld and a sudden volume of intense bombardment directed at the post immediately preceding the attack, the outcome of this battle would have been different. Ironically, within the same division proper use of artillery had saved Poonch and its faulty employment contributed to our failure at Daruchian. From the gunners, the two brave young officers, Vashisht and Gosain, made the supreme sacrifice, for which they earned the awards, posthumously, of Mentioned-in-Despatches and the Vir Chakra respectively.
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CHHAMB-JAURIAN
10 INFANTRY DIVISION
“ The stronger the artillery arm the greater the punch of a field army. Pakistan made full use of this principle at Chhamb-Jaurian by fielding an overwhelming superiority in artillery; whereas India failed to do so because of a lack of proper appreciation that the artillery is a battle-winning factor, both in defensive and offensive operations.
Flanked by the river Chenab in the south, and the hills of the Kalidhar range in the north, the Chhamb-Jaurian sector presents a funnel shaped configuration. Widest along the Indo-Pak border, the funnel begins to narrow along the line Dhonchak-Troti-Kalit, till it ends up at Akhnur. Located on the Jammu-Poonch highway, on both banks of the Chenab, Akhnur is of great strategic value.
Mid-way through the sector flows the Munnawar Tawi. It drains into the Chenab above the Marala Headworks in Pakistan. With crossing sites at Mandiala*, Chhamb, Darh and Raipur, the Munnawar is a vital tactical objective providing both India and Pakistan with a strong line of
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* The river is also spanned by a bridge at Mandiala.
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defence on the one hand, and a springboard for offensive operations on the other. The country west of the Tawi is generally open and undulating, well suited for the employment of tanks. East of the river, it is relatively low lying and covered with tall Sarkanda grass. Two roads run through the sector : one from Akhnur to Chhamb via Jaurian, and the other from Akhnur to Mandiala through Kalit.
Chhamb-Jaurian had been an historical invasion route to India. Through it had traversed the armies of Alexander, Mohammed Ghazni, Babur, Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah Abdali. Major battles in this sector were, however, fought only after the partition of the sub-continent.
Chhamb-Jaurian was a scene of some very fierce fighting in 1965. Blood flowed on it’s fertile soil again in 1971. In both wars Pakistan took the initiative to attack.
A Pakistani thrust through Chhamb, leading to Jaurian and thence to the choke point at Akhnur meant cutting off the entire 25 Infantry Division defending Naushera, Rajauri and Poonch. As narrated earlier, Pakistan launched a simultaneous offensive oppositc Poonch, both during 1965 and 1971. With the capture of Akhnur and Poonch, the enemy could mount a vicious pincer, with a view to grab the entire land mass which lies between them. Capture of Akhnur also opened an axis to attack the coveted city of Jammu.
The area of operation provided secure flanks to Pakistani assault formations by the northern hills and the Chenab while leaving adequate room for maneuvers for the infantry and armour and deployment areas for the artillery. Pakistan could also achieve a favourable relative strengths situation, at least during the initial stages of the battle, since it could speedily concentrate troops for attack with military bases close by at Sialkot, Kharian and Gujarat. Indian troops
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on the other hand had to move to this sector over a long and tenuous line of communication from Pathankot and beyond.* This was another factor that prompted a Pakistani offensive through Chhamb..
Even if the Chhamb offensive was to be partially successful, which in the event it was, capture of whatever territory that fell to Pakistan gave added depth to it’s vital road-rail communications linking Islamabad with Sialkot and Lahore, to safeguard against an Indian attack through Chhamb.
Pakistani attempts to grab the above sector, date back to the 1947-48 Indo-Pak War, when it’s armed Mujahids** overran some border posts, including the township of Chhamb. The area was, however, recovered by 1 Patiala Battalion (now 15 Punjab), supported by one mountain battery, a troop of field guns and a troop of armour. The battalion crossed the Munnawar Tawi from the east and secured the important tactical ground at Mandiala by a silent approach march at night. Chhamb was captured next. The enemy made repeated attempts to regain lost ground, but with the Indians holding firm, each Pakistani attack was beaten back.
100 Prior to the commencement of open hostilities in 1965, Pakistan infiltrated, as elsewhere in J and K, over 2,000 armed civilians, backed by regular troops in the area of Chhamb-Jaurian. 191 Infantry Brigade, responsible for it’s defence with two battalions plus on the Kalidhar range, called the Hill Sector, and a similar strength in the plains of Chhamb,along with an armoured squadron split into small detachments to block the enemy ingress.
14 Field Regiment, in direct support of the brigade, was
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* In keeping with the Karachi Agreement, both sides were debarred from inducting additional troops into Jammu and Kashmir, other than what were present in the state at the time of the Cease-fire in 1948.
** Soldiers of Islam
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also moved forward. By August, one field battery had been deployed in the area of Dewa-Mandiala. On 15 August the battery position was engaged by Pakistan artillery. Brigadier Master, the Brigade Commander, who had assembled his subordinate commanders next to the gun position for orders on the conduct of future operations, was killed. The gun position officer also succumbed to shell splinters. So intense was the firing that the gunners were unable to hold their hastily prepared position. The gun groups of the other two batteries of 14 Field were similarly engaged as they moved up, making it impossible for them to deploy. Pakistan artillery then switched fire on to the infantry localities along the Cease-Fire Line. By 25 August, eight Indian posts had been lost. With every day that passed Pakistani shelling increased in intensity, as the enemy geared up across the border for a full-fledged attack. 191 Infantry Brigade, however, reacted fast, with a new brigade commander who had assumed command. A battery of 39 Medium Regiment had also joined the brigade. By 27 August, all forward posts were re-occupied.
From all accounts, by then, war with Pakistan seemed imminent. In anticipation, Headquarters 10 Infantry Division, still under raising in South India, was moved to Jammu and Kashmir to take command of 80 Infantry Brigade (at Naushara) and 191 Infantry Brigade. 41 Mountain Brigade was also allotted to this division, with 28 Infantry Brigade standing by as Corps reserve.
Meanwhile, the enemy was playing it’s cards well; though keeping them close to the chest. We still did not know where it would finally strike. Well before dawn on 1 September, Pakistan attacked Chhamb. A massive artillery bombardment preceded the attack, as enemy armour and infantry moved forward to assault the Indian defences. Then followed a three pronged attack led by armour.
By the night of 1/2 September, 12 (Pak) Infantry Division spearheading the offensive, had broken through our
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defence localities. Except for two infantry battalions that still held the Kalidhar hills, the remainder of 191 Infantry Brigade had been thrown across the Munnawar Tawi, in just one day of fighting.*
Everything went haywire on that day. Even the Indian Air Force, whichjoined battle later during the day, destroyed three tanks of our own armoured squadron, mistaking them for enemy Pattons. It also destroyed the squadron’s only ammunition lorry and the recovery vehicle, besides hitting several ammunition lorries of the gunners. Nonetheless, having also effectively engaged the Pakistani armour, the Air Force helped slow down the momentum of the attack.
It was only after the above reverse that alarm bells started ringing all over, right up to Army Headquarters.
41 Mountain Brigade (with only two battalions), along with 161 Field Regiment, a battery of 39 Medium Regiment and a squadron plus of armour, was rushed to hold the line Troti-Jaurian, 12 kilometres east of the Tawi. But after giving only a day’s fight, on 3 September, 41 Mountain Brigade had also to withdraw from its hastily prepared positions. 3 September was particularly unfortunate for 161 Field Regiment, a newly raised unit. With guns deployed in the open, as the gunners still dug their gun pits, having arrived only by midnight, a plucky enemy Air Observation Post pilot brought down the fire of the bulk of Pakistani artillery on the regimental gun area. A couple of guns received direct hits and the ammunition lying in the open was set ablaze. There was utter panic, and the gunners of 161 Field Regiment lost heart, and abandoned their guns**.
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* But for the most gallant fight put up by the AMX squadron (20 Lancers), with only 3 tanks out of 11 left after the day’s battle, it may well have been a disaster.
** It was only in the Indo-Pak war of 1971 that the unit was able to wipe the slur of 1965, with a distinguished performance in the battle of Basantar, during India’s 1 Corps offensive into Shakargarh.
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The medium battery, however, showed great coolness, while also under shelling and provided the much needed fire support. Just one medium battery with the brigade was of little help, however.
In view of the fast deteriorating situation 28 Infantry Brigade had by now been released from Corps reserve and deployed at Fatiwal on 6 September. It was here that, for the first time, that the enemy attack was repulsed. On this day, India’s 11 Corps had also launched a counter-offensive across the International border opposite Amritsar, followed by 1 Corps in the Shakargarh bulge. This forced Pakistan to pull out a sizeable force from Chhamb-Jaurian. Our defeat in this sector was thus prevented from slipping into a disaster.
The 1965 Indo-Pak War finally ended with India continuing to hold on to the Kalidhar range, where repeated enemy attacks were repulsed, while losing all territory up to Jaurian to Pakistan.
THE BATTLE OF CHHAMB
1971
After the Indo-Pak War of 1965, Chhamb-Jaurian continued to remain the responsibility of 10 Infantry Division.
Commanded by Major General (later Lieutenant General) Jaswant Singh, the divisional order of battle comprised of 191, 52 and 28 Infantry Brigades,* a para commando group from 9 Para Battalion, a company of
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* 52 Infantry Brigade was stationed outside Jammu and Kashmir. 28 Infantry Brigade was deployed permanently on the Kalidhar range. 191 Infantry Brigade was located at Akhnur with it’s main battle positions in area Troti-Kalit. The Border Security Force manned the outposts in Chhamb.
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guided missiles from 12 Guards, 9 Deccan Horse and 2 Independent Armoured Squadron.* The gunner units provided to the division were 12, 81 and 18 Field Regiments, 39 and 216 Medium Regiments, 86 Light Regiment, 127 Divisional Locating Battery and a troop from 51 Air Defence Regiment, a total of 18 fire units (108 guns of all calibres).
Besides ensuring the defence of the Chhamb-Jaurian sector, 10 Infantry Division was also assigned the task to launch an attack across the border. 68 Infantry Brigade positioned in the Kashmir Valley as a reserve brigade of 15 Corps was earnarked to form its fourth brigade, both to reinforce the sector in case Pakistan attacked in Chhamb, as also, to form part of the divisional offensive.
Till end-October 1971, the defence plan at Chhamb-Jaurian was :
a. To occupy Chhamb with light forces (covering troops) in the general areas of Munawar, Jhanda, Barsala, Phagla, Gurha and the heights at Mandiala, west of Munnawar Tawi. Their task was to delay the enemy advance as long as possible, cause a measure of attrition and then withdraw.
b. To fight the main battle, east of the Tawi, along the line Tam ka Till-Kalit-Troti-Dhon Chak-Bakor.
c. Once the enemy had been adequately mauled, to mount a counter-offensive to throw back the enemy.
The above plan, which had been accepted by all right up to the Army Headquarters, had suddenly to be changed when the Chief of the Army Staff, General Manekshaw (later Field Marshal) visited 10 Infantry Division towards October end. While approving the divisional offensive, Manekshaw directed the General Officer Commanding to hold Chhamb
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* Headquarters 3 Independent Armoured Brigade with 72 Armoured Regiment was also later moved into the sector.
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in strength, as loss of territory there, in case Pakistan struck first, would not be acceptable either to him or to the country.
Jaswant Singh was a professional soldier of high military repute. Albeit, the urge to launch the offensive (and thus to keep the division suitably poised for it, vis-a-vis, to ensure that there was to be no loss of territory, in the event of an attack by Pakistan) had got the better of him. As a result, he only moved 191 Infantry Brigade to Chhamb, with a dual role of defending the area, as also to act as a firm base through which his assault formations were to go into attack. The other two infantry brigades he kept back with 52 Infantry Brigade (less a battalion along the Jammu-Akhnur road, to guard against an attack from Chicken’s Neck), at Kalit-Troti, and 68 Infantry Brigade in reserve at Akhnur, in readiness to spearhead the planned offensive. 72 Armoured Regiment, the Independent Armoured Squadron and 216 Medium Regiment were also held back. Further, the Chhamb Brigade was deployed in an extended manner, with additional troops mostly building up on the covering troops, already on ground in order to conceal the plans from defensive to offensive. Chhamb was thus left inadequately defended with some localities without due mutual support and a vital 5,000 metre gap left between Barsala and Jhanda through which the division was to launch the attack. The spirit of the offensive was all pervading to the extent that the entire month of November passed without special efforts to improve our defences, when there was the need to prepare a strong firm base capable of withstanding a pre- emptive enemy assault, behind which preparations for the offensive could be made.
On 30 November, a positive intelligence report was received at Delhi that Pakistan would attack India in the west within 72 hours. Based on this report, Lieutenant General Sartaj Singh held a conference the next day, and ordered his divisional commanders to be ready to launch the planned
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offensives. It was only after this warning that 10 Infantry Division also got down to improving it’s defensive posture in Chhamb. 52 Infantry Brigade less one battalion (which remained opposite Chicken’s Neck) along with a squadron of Deccan Horse was moved from Kalit-Troti to area Nawan Hamirpur-Chhati Tahli and a battalion of 68 Infantry Brigade to Troti heights, to take over defences vacated by 52 Infantry Brigade. Concurrently a squadron of Deccan Horse was inducted into Chhamb and 216 Medium Regiment moved forward to Kachreal, while ordering 10 Artillery Brigade Fire Direction Centre to pull back east of the Tawi. As to the Barsala gap in the Chhamb sector, a dummy minefield was laid to conceal it, while elsewhere some thickening of minefields and adjustment of defensive localities was undertaken. 68 Infantry Brigade less one battalion was, however, still retained at Akhnur. The above moves were completed by 3 December with 10 Infantry Division now deployed for battle as under :
191 Infantry Brigade : held Chhamb, with 5 Sikh at Point 303, Phagla, Gurha and Mandiala; 4/1 Gorkha Rifles at Munawar, Jhanda, Malke Camp and Negeal; 5 Assam at Point 951, Barsala, Ghogi and Singri; and 10 Garhwal at Chatti Tahli, Gijreal and Raipur crossing with “A” Group 9 Para Commandos in location.
52 Infantry Brigade : Minus the battalion opposite Chicken’s Neck — in area Nawan Hamirpur.
28 Infantry Brigade : On the Kalidhar range.
68 Infantry Brigade : Less the battalion moved to Troti heights, in reserve. Divisional Artillery: Commanded by Brigadier K. Srinivasan, the divisional artillery, with 108 guns and mortars, was deployed as follows:
a) 81 Field Regiment, 12 Field Regiment less two batteries and one battery of 18 Field Regiment, the Fire Direction
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Centre* and the Divisional Locating Battery at Sakrana,
west of the Munnawar Tawi.
b) 18 Field Regiment less one battery — at Nikkiar, east of the Tawi.
C) 216 and 39 Medium Regiment — at Kachreal, east of the Tawi.
D) 86 Light Regiment less one battery and a battery of 12 Field Regiment in the Hill Sector
e) One battery each of 12 field** and 86 Light Regiments
at Akhnur.
Armour :
a) 9 Deccan Horse : Regimental Headquarters and two armoured squadrons with 191 Infantry Brigade and the third squadron, less a troop, *** with 52 Infantry Brigade.
b) 72 Armour Regiment : In reserve, in the rear.
c) 2 Independent Armoured Squadron : At Akhnur.
Engineers : After completion of their engineer tasks which included laying of mines in the Barsala Gap, while leaving a few lanes for the offensive,**** 101 and 102 Field Companies were to hold defences in the area of Chhamb village.
Guided Missiles : A company of guided missiles — between Munawar and Barsala.
Across the border, 23 (Pak) Infantry Division, the formation that was to launch the attack, had by now completed it’s concentration opposite Chhamb and was all
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* Though ordered to move back east of the Tawi, it was unable to do so since Pakistan had launched the attack before it’s move. ** This battery moved forward to join the regiment on 6 December. *** The troop was detached to cover the Mandiala crossing under 191 Infantry Brigade. **** In the event, the gap could be partially covered, when Pakistan launched the attack.
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poised for the offensive. Whereas, according to our intelligence estimates, only 20(Pak), 7 (POK), and 4 (POK) Infantry Brigades, alongwith 26 Cavalry and the divisional artillery faced 10 Infantry Division and, inter alia, incapable of taking a major offensive in the sector, the enemy had boosted this division by two infantry brigades, and an independent armoured brigade with two regiments and considerable additional artillery.
The battle order of 23 (Pak) Infantry Division, thus comprised of 20 (Pak), 111 (Pak), 66 (Pak), 4 (POK) and 7 (POK) Infantry Brigades and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade with 11, 28 and 26 Cavalry Regiments. The artillery support was to be provided by 11 to 12 regiments; in all 33 to 36 fire units (198 to 216 guns of all calibres) drawn from the artillery brigades of 23 and 17 Infantry Division with the balance from the corps resources.
ENEMY PLAN
Major General Iftikhar Janjua, in command of 23 (Pak) Infantry Division, was given the task of capturing Akhnur, to isolate all Indian troops west of the Chenab, after establishing a bridgehead across the Munnawar Tawi.
With a fair estimate of Indian deployment in Chhamb, the Pakistani General decided to contain our defences in the south and launch an outflanking thrust in the north towards Mandiala, where we were weak, particularly in armour. His plan of attack was broadly as under:
a. 7 (POK) Infantry Brigade to engage our troops on the Kalidhar range and thus protect the left flank of his division, while it advanced to the Munnawar Tawi and beyond.
b. 4 (POK) Infantry Brigade to secure the Mandiala crossing at Tawi and establish a bridgehead east of the
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river, extending up to Kachreal heights.
c) 66 (Pak) Infantry Brigade to capture area up to Gurha and Phagla and link up with 4 (POK) Infantry Brigade at the bridgehead.
d) 111 (Pak) Infantry Brigade to contain Indian troops at Barsala-Jhanda, while capturing Point 303 and Chhamb.
THE PAKISTANI OFFENSIVE Night 3/4 December-Night 4/5 December :
At 8.50 P.M. on 3 December Pakistan commenced it’s Chhamb offensive with an intense artillery bombardment of all our forward localities. Indian posts at Pir Jamal, Jhanda, Munawar and Moel received a major share of the enemy shelling. While Pir Jamal fell in the first rush, the others held on. Later during the night the enemy made contact with 5 Sikh positions at Point 994 and Phagla, 5 Assam post at Ghogi and posts at Jhanda and Munawar, manned by 4/1 Gorkha Rifles. All Pakistani attacks were repulsed.
The tenacious defence put up by the screen position of 5 Sikh at Moel merits special mention. Courageously this platoon post held ground, despite repeated enemy assaults. It was only at about 1 P.M. on 4 December, when fully surrounded and attacked in overwhelming strength, that it’s brave defenders finally gave in, and the remnants fought their way back.
From the gunners, Captain R. Kaura of 39 Medium Regiment, the Observation Post Officer at Moel, distinguished himself by his courage, leadership and accurate shooting, which helped break up successive Pakistani assaults. On the morning of 3 December, this officer was to be relieved, as a matter of routine. Kaura requested permission to stay on, since he was well
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acquainted with the ground and as such could deal with the enemy better, in the event of an attack. In the final Pakistani assault, Kaura kept inspiring and encouraging the men at Moel to hold on to their position. He repeatedly exposed himself to danger, undeterred by heavy shelling, while bringing down accurate artillery fire, till he was killed by an enemy shell. This brave officer was later awarded the Vir Chakra (posthumous) for his gallantry, determination and leadership of a very high order; fighting an unequal artillery battle against the overwhelming gun superiority of Pakistan.
Besides fully activating his artillery units to engage the enemy, Brigadier Srinivasan moved a gun of 39 Medium Regiment to Munawar at night.* At dawn on 4 December, this gun commenced direct shooting at Pakistani positions on Mattewala ridge. A number of enemy bunkers were destroyed and the Pakistani Observation Post tower damaged, thereby denying the enemy observation over Jhanda and Munawar. Lieutenant Colonel B. C. Gauri Shanker, the Commanding Officer, personally directed the fire. The Havildar in-charge, Piara Singh, was Mentioned-inDespatches for his effective shooting.
The enemy had, meanwhile, concentrated a combat group of an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion opposite Gurha-Phagla. To counter the enemy armour, 191 Infantry Brigade rushed a tank troop each of 9 Deccan Horse to Phagla Ridge and Mandiala North with two tanks of the regimental headquarters to Gurha, to reinforce the above localities and Mandiala North. Capture of the latter was vital in the Pakistan design of battle, as it provided a gateway to the crossing site at the Tawi and subsequent establishment of the bridgehead across it. In the event, Mandiala North was attacked via the Sukhtau Nulla, a weakly guarded gap between 28 Infantry and 191 Infantry Brigades and with
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* To cater for various eventualities it was desirable to deploy at least a section of guns for an important mission as above.
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heavy concentrations brought down by enemy artillery, the post fell to Pakistan by midday. Our guns constantly pounded Mandiala North, but lacking the requisite punch, could not prevent the enemy to consolidate.
With the capture of Mandiala North, the enemy not only dominated the crossing site, it had also obtained direct observation over our guns in Kachreal. To make it worse, there were no Indian troops between the guns and the enemy. 216 and 39 Medium Regiments thus lay vulnerable, both to bombardment by Pakistan artillery and to ground attack, besides the enemy air.
In fact, the Pakistan Air Force joined battle, by day break on 4 December, with our medium guns at Kachreal as one of it’s prime targets. A Mirage attacked the gun area, followed by five Sabres in the morning. The Sabres also attacked thrice thereafter, in the afternoon.*
At last light on 4 December, the enemy put in a spirited attack on Point 994. Supported by a prompt and accurate response from our guns, the Sikhs beat back the attack. Phagla and Point 303 were attacked later at night with a determined bid to link up with 4 (POK) Infantry Brigade. But without success.
Down south, Burejal was attacked in strength at night. 5 Assam held ground and the attack was repulsed. Captain D. S. Jamwal, the Observation Post Officer at Burejal had to order the fire of guns on his own post in a desperate effort to throw back the enemy. The Pakistanis attacked again and because of sheer numbers and heavy artillery fire, the post was ultimately overpowered. It is a pity that adequate artillery was not available to support the brave defenders of Burejal. Like Captain Kaura at Moel, the Observation Post
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* One Sabre was hit and two damaged by the Air Defence guns deployed at Kachreal.
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Officer at Burejal, Captain Jamwal and his party laid down their lives directing the fire of guns till the end.
It had, however, become clear by now that the enemy had launched the main attack in the north. 68 Infantry Brigade was, therefore, brought in with orders to rush 7 Kumaon to cover the Mandiala crossing and to counter-attack Mandiala North. A squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment and group 9 Para Commandos were also ordered to move to the above area.
Regrettably, the Commanding Officer and four other officers of 7 Kumaon were killed by enemy shelling en route. With resultant dismay and confusion, the battalion’s move forward was disrupted. The armoured squadron was also somehow delayed, leaving the defence of the Mandiala crossing in the hands of only the Para Commandos.
As time was running out, 191 Infantry Brigade counter-attacked Mandiala North with a company of 4/1 Gorkha Rifles, supported by an armoured squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment and available artillery. A gallant night attack was made by the Gorkhas but it did not succeed. The enemy followed the failure of our attack with the capture of the Mandiala bridge.
Despite considerable enemy shelling of gun positions, both at Kachreal and Sakrana, and attacks by Pakistan Air Force, Indian artillery had been in top form till the night of 4/5 December, giving a splendid display of professionalism. With prompt and accurate response to calls of fire, the gunners had played a valuable role in repulsing successive Pakistani attacks. Regrettably, misfortune was to befall on them with the dawn of 5 December, from which they could not fully recover.
Day 5 December-Night 5/6 December
Events moved fast on 5 December, with fortunes
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changing, both for the attacker and the defender in the Mandiala area. With the bridge at Mandiala in their hands, the Pakistanis tried to get some tanks across it. But 9 Horse deployed opposite thwarted their attempts, knocking out nine of them. By about 4 A.M., however, two enemy battalions, 13 (POK) and elements of 47 Punjab of 4 (POK) Infantry Brigade, managed to infiltrate across the Tawi. 13 (POK) hit against 216 Medium Regiment which was deployed about 1,000 metres east of the Tawi and overran the two forward batteries.
One officer, two JCOs and 62 men were killed and three officers, two JCOs and 39 men wounded, with eleven other ranks missing in the above attack. The guns of these two batteries now lay abandoned.
Major G.S. Chopra (later Lieutenant Colonel) then commanding a battery of 216 Medium Regiment, who was in his battery area on this day, recalls, “ It was 4 A.M. when we noticed that the Sarkanda grass, about 200 metres ahead of our position, had caught fire. Silhouetted by the area thus lit up, we saw a large body of men moving towards us. At that time the battery was engaged in a firing programme across the Tawi. Before long, the enemy had approached quite close. We stopped our firing immediately and rushed to man our ground defences. It was faster to do so, rather than to train the big guns for open-sight shooting. Pakistani artillery had also started to engage the gun area about this time. I was hit on the head by a splinter and was moved to a trench in the rear. There I lay through the day, till evacuated. An enemy Air Observation Post aircraft came over the gun area and brought accurate and heavy artillery fire onto the guns, which by now had been abandoned, to destroy them. It was terrible indeed with every yard of the area covered by enemy shells. How I survived through this shelling was a miracle.
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As day broke, the depth battery engaged the enemy over open sights. Shooting by this battery had a most telling effect which completely disorganised the enemy, who split into a number of small groups, with some men moving to Kachreal heights, next door.* In the confusion, some Pakistanis also hit the wagon lines of 39 Medium Regiment, and damaged a few vehicles. The Regiment also lost eight men in this skirmish. 39 Medium was, however, quick to organise patrols to clear the enemy stragglers around their position. One of the patrols captured Major Abbasi, the Second-in-Command of 13 (POK), while driver Paramjit Singh bayoneted two Pakistanis to death, winning a Mentioned-in-Despatches for his cool courage. Meanwhile, the regiment continued to answer frequent calls for fire, west of the Tawi, with two batteries, as the third battery took on the enemy around.
The Mandiala bridge area was also a scene of some confused fighting. A number of parties from gunner units deployed west of the Tawi were ambushed and suffered casualties. An interesting incident relates to Lance Naik Shinde of 18 Field Regiment.
ise While crossing the bridge, Shinde was stopped by an enemy party. Unaware that it was the enemy,he halted his vehicle. But as he came out and realised that he was, in fact, faced with the Pakistanis, he was quick to fire a few bursts from his sten gun, forcing them to flee. Shinde jumped back into his vehicle and drove off, amidst a hail of bullets from the enemy nearby. In another encounter, near the bridge, a party of 151 Air Defence Regiment under Captain Deepak Kaul challenged a man hiding in a bush. The man jumped forward with his hands up and declared himself to be Lieutenant Colonel Bashrat Ahmed, Commanding Officer of 13 (POK) Infantry Battalion.
After the failure at Mandiala, the Pakistanis shifted
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* The depth battery later joined 39 Medium Regiment.
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their major effort to the plains sectors, and Ghogi, Barsala and Munawar were attacked, between 3 and 7 P.M. Our artillery broke up each assault.
Preceded by heavy artillery bombardment, the enemy also attacked Point 994, forcing our troops to fall back. A determined counter-attack was launched by 5 Sikh and Point 994 was regained. Captain Sukhwant Singh of 18 Field Regiment distinguished himself during this battle, skilfully directing the fire of ihe entire divisional artillery, unmindful of personal safety, while under enemy fire. Sukhwant was awarded the Vir Chakra for his contribution in the fight for Phagla.
In view of increasing enemy pressure, however, it was now clear that Pakistan had launched a major offensive in Chhamb. The following orders were issued to meet the situation :
(a) Guns west of the Tawi to withdraw east of the river.
(b) 5/8 Gorkha Rifles from 68 Infantry Brigade and a squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment to reinforce Chhamb.
(c) 10 Garhwal, deployed east of the Tawi, to move under command of 68 Infantry Brigade. The brigade was also ordered to guard the crossing at Chhamb, Darh and Raipur.
On the night of 5/6 December, the enemy again attacked Barsala, Ghogi, Jhanda and Ghura and succeeded in capturing the latter three localities. The gun areas of 12 and 81 Field Regiments were also heavily shelled. Nor was their rearward move, when given orders to withdraw east of the Tawi, without enemy ground interference. 12 Field Regiment’s gun group had to combat enemy infiltrators on the way back, with the Command Post vehicle of the regimental headquarters plastered with bullets. Six other
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ranks were wounded during the move. 81 Field Regiment had a similar encounter.
6 December
6 December was to be the last day of the battle at Chhamb with our forward localities changing hands in quick succession. The final verdict eventually went in favour of Pakistan. Gurha was recaptured on the morning of 6 December, with a well executed counter-attack by 5/8 Gorkha Rifles. The enemy, however, succeeded in overrunning Mandiala South, thus posing a serious threat to the troops ahead. 5 Assam counter-attacked with armour and regained Ghogi, but in the process the enemy realised that the minefield in the Barsala gap was only a dummy. The Pakistanis now acted boldly, and employing their armour in strength through the gap, closed in on Chak Pandit.
Events moved fast, thereafter. Gurha, Point 303 and Ghogi fell into Pakistani hands, followed by Point 951 and Barsala. 5 Assam had thus been overrun. There being no prepared positions for the battalion to fall back to, and with it’s strength much depleted the troops crossed over to the east of the Tawi.
In view of the collapse of the southern sector, orders were given to 191 Infantry Brigade at 7.30 P.M. to withdraw to Troti, in depth. The bridge at Mandiala was also blown up.
The saga of Chhamb had come to an end. Despite defeat, 191 Infantry Brigade under the leadership of Brigadier Jasbir Singh (later Lieutenant General) had fought splendidly, against heavy odds.
· The east bank was now held by 68 Infantry Brigade, with 7 Kumaon at Mandiala crossing and 5/8 Gorkha Rifles astride the main road. Its two other battalions 9 Jat and 10 Garhwal, defended the crossing sites at Darh and Raipur
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respectively. 72 Armoured Regiment was placed under command of the brigade. 52 Infantry Brigade continued to remain further south, with Deccan Horse under command. The artillery units west of the Tawi had also been re-deployed in the area of Pallawanwala, to support the new defensive layout. Further, a battery of 176 Field Regiment from 26 Artillery Brigade was moved from Jammu sector and deployed inside Chicken’s Neck to support 52 Infantry Brigade.
I vividly recall a liaison visit to the battle zone, east of the Tawi on the morning of 8 December. As Commander 26 Artillery Brigade, my aim was twofold. First, to check whether the boys from 176 Field Regiment were properly married up to carry out the assigned task. Second, to watch the din and smoke in 10 Infantry Division sector, as a spectator without responsibility!
With Pakistanijets flying in one sortie after another over the area, some almost at treetop level plummeting like swooping vultures on their targets below, the drive to the Fire Direction Centre of Brigadier Srinivasan was exciting. Enemy gunners were active, particularly in the Hill sector; apparently with no dearth of ammunition. Indian artillery was also taking on targets across the Tawi and in Dewa area; though with ammunition restrictions, our scale of firing was comparatively less. The air defence guns fired bursts of high explosive mixed with tracer shells at enemy aircraft that fell within their range. One aircraft had perhaps been hit, as I saw it speeding back, leaving a trail of thick smoke in it’s wake. In the distance, heavy machine-gun firing was going on in 28 Infantry Brigade sector.
The Fire Direction Centre was a scene of hectic activity; though with tired faces of officers and men, from the Brigadier downwards. What was of primary concern to one and all was the retrieval of the guns at Kachreal. Their loss
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had been a serious blow indeed. Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Guha, commanding 12 Field Regiment, along with Subedar Major Dattaram Shinde of 216 Medium Regiment had earlier led a party for the above task. But no sooner had they arrived at the gun area, they were engaged by three enemy aircraft. Guha and Shinde were killed and the attempt given up. Another effort was being planned by Srinivasan as I landed there. The task was difficult, since the gun area was under direct enemy observation and drew immediate retaliation from Pakistan artillery. Eventually, eight guns were brought back.
There was not much activity otherwise, with troops dug down, in the new defensive posture and vehicles dispersed to avoid presenting concentrated targets to enemy air. Only essential duty vehicles rushed past, with transport wrecked by artillery shelling and aerial strafing reminding drivers to press on fast.
A few hours later, however, the scenario was certainly heartening, as I drove back to Jammu. It was the Indian Air Force that was now on the offensive, with one jet after another that roared past overhead to hit the enemy lines across the Tawi and beyond.
On the other hand, it was depressing to see the multitude of Chhamb refugees around Akhnur. One wondered whether mankind would ever take a vow to stop going to war. Whether this uprooting of peace loving people, of soldiers having to shed blood when still in the prime of life, of widowed women and of children deprived of fathers, will ever come to an end. Passing thoughts they were ofcourse. We were still at war and I had a duty to perform in the Jammu sector.
Operations East of the Tawi
As in 1965, the Pakistanis chose to pause after their
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success at Chhamb for nearly three days; presumably to recover from the attrition inflicted on them and to regroup. This gave Indian troops the much needed time to reorganise and strengthen their defences.
On the night of 8 December, the Pakistanis launched a half- hearted attack on 10 Garhwal Rifles at Chatti Tahli. This was easily beaten back primarily by our artillery fire, with the Pakistanis leaving 39 dead and 6 prisoners of war. Probing attacks were also carried out in other areas but met with no success. bis
At 1 A. M. on 9/10 December, the enemy made a major attempt to establish a bridgehead across the Tawi with a two battalions attack on the forward companies of 10 Garhwal and 9 Jat covering the Raipur and Garh crossings. But the attack was broken up with accurate and concentrated firing by the Indian artillery.
On 10 December, at about 6.30 A.M., the enemy again attacked the crossing sites, employing one infantry battalion and two squadrons of armour. Preceded by aerial bombardment with artillery star shells lighting up the area between 5 and 6 A. M. followed by heavy shelling, the attack achieved a good measure of success, enabling the enemy to establish a bridgehead of about 3,500 metres by 1,000 metres. The Pakistanis had, however, suffered heavy casualties. To dislodge the enemy, a counter-attack was launched with 3/4 Gorkha Rifles, supported by armour. Unfortunately the tanks got bogged down in the soft ground and the infantry could only get up to a place about 900 metres short of the objective. There it dug down to prevent further ingress by the enemy.
On the Indian side, 9 Jat, which had lost maximum ground during the bridgehead battle, with restricted observation and fields of fire due to the tall Sarkanda grass in the area, had also suffered considerable loss of life.
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At the divisional headquarters, there was general confusion as to the strength and future intentions of the enemy. Further, once again our guns, 18 Field Regiment in particular, were posed with a serious threat of ground attack. The gunners were, therefore, instructed to send reconnaissance parties to their original positions at Troti in the rear, and a bid was made for additional armour to be sent to the sector immediately. General Jaswant Singh had been overtaken by the turn of events; from his plans to launch the offensive, to having to fight a defensive battle and the eventual withdrawal from Chhamb. As a result he had, perhaps, been rudely shaken and was seriously considering to take recourse to further withdrawal.
At this stage, the General Officer Commanding 15 Corps, Sartaj Singh, a resolute Commander, with a sharp, incisive mind and a forceful personality, landed in the divisional sector. His arrival was to inject the much needed tonic to the troops’ morale, check the impending panic, restore confidence and hold the division in line. That, in fact, is the role of the higher commander in critical situations and Sartaj played it in an admirable manner. An old gunner himself, the first order he issued was that the artillery would fight from its present positions. With the bitter experience at Kachreal, the gunners were fully prepared to take on a ground attack. Further, while making certain adjustments to contain the enemy and when issuing orders for a move of an armoured regiment (Central India Horse) and a company of 7 Grenadiers in APCs to 10 Infantry Division, he directed the divisional commander that there would be no withdrawal from present positions. He then ordered a counter-attack by elements of 52 and 68 Infantry Brigades, to recapture the Darh and Raipur crossings. At 5 P.M., a company each of 7 Kumaon and 5/8 Gorkha Rifles supported by a squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment, attacked Darh from the north. Some fierce fighting took place. By 7.30 P.M. the enemy was finally evicted. About the same time, 10 Garhwal Rifles assaulted
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Raipur from the south, while a company of 3/4 Gorkha Rifles attacked it from the north. The Pakistanis lost their nerve and fled. By 1 A.M. on 11 December, both crossings had been fully secured.
General Iftikhar had earlier been killed in a helicopter crash and the conduct of operations fallen to a less determined successor. Further, with our 1 Corps offensive having gained momentum, Pakistan had to move some troops from Chhamb to reinforce Shakargarh-Sialkot. It appears that a major part comprised of the additional artillery that had been inducted for the Chhamb battle. This also explains how the Indian artillery was now in a position to assert itself to play a vital role in halting further enemy advance in this sector and their eviction from the bridgehead, east of the Tawi.
The casualties suffered by 10 Infantry Division during the above operations, through ground assaults, artillery shelling and about 190 sorties by enemy aircraft, were a total of 1343 all ranks, with 430 killed, 723 wounded and 190 missing. Out of these, 23 officers were killed, 36 wounded and 5 found missing. The above casualty figure was the highest suffered in any sector during the 1971 war. Besides this loss of life, 17 Indian tanks, 10 guns and a number of vehicles and other equipment were destroyed and one tank and 12 guns damaged. Pakistan’s casualties were not announced, but Major General Fazal Muqueem Khan writes in his book, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership that they too had suffered heavily.
Operations in the Hill Sub-Sector
The operations of 10 Infantry Division would be incomplete without giving a brief account of the events in the Hill sub-sector. As earlier mentioned, it was held by 28 Infantry Brigade, with 8 Jammu and Kashmir Militia, 2
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Jammu and Kashmir Rifles and 5 Rajput. 86 Light Regiment less one battery and a battery of 12 Field Regiment were in direct support of the brigade. With no last minute changes made in troop dispositions in this area the defences here were well prepared and coordinated. The main fighting took place in 8 Jammu and Kashmir Militia battalion area, at Dewa, Point 707, Laleali and Red Hill. The battalion fought a magnificent battle and except for Dewa, which ultimately fell to the enemy, it did not yield any ground, despite repeated Pakistani attempts.
On 4 December, at 1 P.M. the Pakistanis attacked Point 707 after a heavy artillery bombardment. Major Gurdev Singh, the battery commander in support of 8 Militia brought down effective artillery fire and the enemy attack was beaten back. The enemy again attacked Point 707, as also Laleali, at 3 P.M., with a battalion each; and Dewa with two companies and a squadron of armour. All the three attacks were repulsed, with our artillery taking a heavy toll of the enemy. Earlier during the day, the Pakistanis had also lost an Air Observation Post aircraft by small arms fire from Laleali.
After it’s failure at Point 707 and Laleali, the enemy assaulted Red Hill. This attack was also repulsed. 28 Infantry Brigade had, meanwhile, reinforced 8 Militia with two companies of 5 Rajput. This action was very timely, since on the night of 4/5 December, the enemy put in three attacks on Dewa and two on Red Hill. All these attacks were beaten back.
At 11 A.M. on 5 December, an enemy party which had infiltrated through our forward defences, raided the wagon lines (administrative base) of 86 Light Regiment at Battal. 5 Rajput at Nathnan Tibba, next door, immediately launched a counter-attack and the enemy was thrown back. Later at night, the Pakistanis were again seen infiltrating to attack
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the wagon lines. They were promptly engaged by artillery and mortar fire and forced to retreat, leaving 40 dead.
At 4 A.M. on 7 December, the enemy launched a determined attack on Laleali and managed to overrun some forward localities. A quick counter-attack followed an hour later, and with effective artillery support the positions were restored.
As mentioned earlier, the only gain that the Pakistanis achieved in this sub-sector was at Dewa. At 8 A.M. on 8 December, Dewa was again attacked in overwhelming strength, after an intense artillery bombardment. The militia men resisted stoutly but numbers and enemy artillery fire eventually prevailed and the position was overrun. The enemy suffered about 300 casualties in the capture of Dewa.
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REASONS FOR DEFEAT AND
EVALUATION
John Kennedy, an illustrious American President of this century once remarked, “ Victory has a thousand fathers and defeat is an orphan.” Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the major reasons for the agonising defeat at Chhamb for the future.
First, till end-October 1971, 10 Infantry Division was required to offer the main resistance at Troti heights, 20 kilometres behind the Cease-Fire Line, while occupying Chhamb with light forces only. This plan had been war-gamed and approved at all levels. Inter alia, it implied acceptance of initial loss of territory in the event of war. On 1 November, the Army Chief directed the divisional commander during his visit to the divisional sector to hold Chhamb in strength, since no loss of territory was acceptable. A period of one month should have been adequate to prepare a reasonable defensive network with crawl trenches and minefields, though minus overhead bunkers of strong concrete. The point really is, why had this major directive to be given just a month before the actual attack when we had all those years, between 1965 to 1971, to make up our minds. And what if Pakistan had chosen to attack, say on 10 November by when Indo-Pak relations had already reached a breaking point ? Coupled with near obsession focussed on the divisional offensive, the above directive put things out of gear for 10 Infantry Division,
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leading from one mistake to another. Needless to add that eleventh hour alterations of operational plans, whether on political or on military considerations must be avoided.
Writing on the Battle of Chhamb, in the United Services Journal of July-September, 1990, Lieutenent General Jasbir Singh (Commander 191 Infantry Brigade during the battle) comments, “What was unpardonable was that in two months preceding the outbreak of hostilities, the task of the division in general and of the brigade in particular, was changed four times. From defence in Troti, to an offensive, thence to a forward posture, which also entailed safeguarding the sanctity of the CFL and finally on i December, the adoption of a defence posture.”
Second, the General Officer Commanding 10 Infantry Division faltered by adopting a compromise between the offensive and the defensive, in violation of the age old maxim of“ first things first ”, when clear orders had been given to him that loss of territory was not acceptable. This business of compromise often fails to work. Military professionals may recall the German defence of Normandy beaches during World War II and the controversy that arose between Field Marshals Rommel and Rundstadt; whether to fight the allies on the beaches or to hold defences well back and throw them out with a strong counter- stroke before they were firmly established. Commenting on the plan that finally emerged, Sir B. H. Liddal Hart in his book, Defence of the West comments, “ The actual plan became a compromise between the two ideas and fell between two stools !” In any case, a strong, firm base was required even for the planned offensive by 10 Infantry Division.
For the artillery, in particular, the compromise plan led to the guns being moved too far forward to support both 191 Infantry Brigade in defence and the initial phase of the divisional offensive. This proved to be a grave mistake and,
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in the event, adversely affected the provision of fire support to 191 Infantry Brigade. First, when Chhamb became untenable and with field regiments finding themselves in the show window, running a grave risk of ground attacks, the gunners failed to carry out a properly planned withdrawal (when ordered to do so) while ensuring a reasonable measure of artillery support to Chhamb. According to Jasbir,“ 5 Assam could be supported by one battery of 18 Field Regiment at extreme range, at a critical stage of the battle.” Second, the medium regiments found themselves under direct observation from the northern hills and, as the battle developed, came under accurate artillery fire, followed by ground attack. This, too, cost us heavy with loss of guns and reduction in quantum of fire support. That General Sartaj Singh on arrival in Chhamb stopped further withdrawal of artillery, even though the guns again lay vulnerable to a ground attack was, perhaps, a morale boosting measure, since any rearward move, in a crisis situation, can be contagious.
BesThird, no efforts were made by the higher commanders to correct the divisional deployment. Aided and abetted by intelligence agencies, it had, perhaps been concluded at all levels that Pakistan was not likely to attack in Chhamb. The compromise posture was thus allowed to remain, as it was, in the hope that the divisional offensive would eventually be launched.
G Commenting on the 1965 Pakistani offensive in Chhamb, Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, then commanding the Western Army, writes in his book, War Despatches, “We must admit, however reluctantly, that Pakistan scored over us in keeping us guessing regarding the timing and area of her intended offensive even up to the eleventh hour. Our Intelligence service had once again failed to penetrate the fog of war. ” Regrettably, 1971 proved to be a repeat of 1965.
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Fourth, Pakistan had mustered an overwhelming superiority in artillery with a total of 198 to 216 guns, as opposed to 108 guns with India. Our situation became even worse with a loss of two medium batteries (12 guns) on the morning of 5 December; not to speak of the restrictions placed on ammunition expenditure, thus clipping our wings further. A single gun can be a great pain in the neck, given plenty of ammunition; leave aside the above disparity in fire power.* In consequence, the Indian artillery was deprived of adequate counter-bombardment capability leaving, the enemy guns free to engage our infantry, armour and gun positions. Pakistan artillery hit our defences hard. Not one metre of our defended localities was spared. Firing was intense, sustained and concentrated. It was difficult to withstand the crescendo.
In his review of the Chhamb battle in the USI Journal, General Jasbir adds, “ There are other factors which influence men’s will to fight. The chief amongst this is battle fatigue. The effects of sleep deprivation can have a far reaching result on soldiers ………. The heavy and persistent attacks on companies, preceded by concentrated artillery fire, aerial bombardment and tank firing had rendered a large number of weapons ineffective and destroyed most defence works. Just before the cessation of hostilities, on the enemy side approximately 35 rounds of ammunition per gun remained, according to a Pakistani gunner OP,** who defected to our side.”
It was the Pakistan artillery which had in fact, been the cutting edge, primarily responsible for the above state of
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* Commenting on the battle for a 200 metre high feature called Badori during the 1965 indo-Pak war, Lieutenant General Bak hi recalls, “Two earlier attacks on this feature having failed, with artillery unable to hit the enemy defences by indirect firing, one 3.7 inch Howitzer was dismantled and carried to a forward position from where it engaged Badori by direct firing, half an hour before the attack. It had a devastating effect on enemy bunkers and so demoralised the defenders that the feature fell with negligible opposition. “
** Observation Post Officer
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affairs, which precipitated the eventual withdrawal of 191 Infantry Brigade.
While giving an account of the battle of Khalakhin Gol against the Japanese, in 1939, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov in his book, Reminiscences and Reflections, has a similar comment to make, “ Our air and artillery strike was so powerful and successful that the enemy was morally and physically depressed. During the first half an hour he could not even return the gun fire. “.
Our weakness in artillery at Chhamb-Jaurian, notwithstanding, it must be said in fairness to the gunners of 10 Artillery Brigade that they braced up to the occasion as best as possible and helped beat back many attacks, despite the loss of 6 officers killed, 6 wounded; 5 JCOs killed and 4 wounded; 135 other ranks killed and 135 wounded. These casualties formed a high percentage of the overall casualties of the division, given earlier. Two Vir Chakras, one Vishisht Sena Medal, one Sena Medal and three Mentioned-in-Despatches were awarded to the gunners in this sector.
Amongst the gunner units, it was 39 Medium Regiment that had provided the maximum fire support: from direct shooting on 4 December, to fighting the enemy with open sights on 5 December, to answering calls for fire along the entire front, wherever the long arms of medium guns could hit, and finally in the recapture of lost ground at Laleali. The performance of 86 Light Regiment in the Hill sector, particularly in support of Point 707 and Laleali, was also highly commendable. In recognition, both these regiments were given the Honour Title “ Laleali and Point 707″. Further, Lieutenant Colonel Gauri Shanker, commanding 39 Medium, was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal for his distinguished services.
Much like their comrades of 39 Medium and 86 Light
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Regiments, the gunners of 1512 Battery of 151 Air Defence Regiment (self propelled) distinguished themselves, defending field artillery gun areas and wagon lines, the Akhnur ferry, the Mandiala bridge and the divisional headquarters — glued to their guns with little respite. That Pakistani jets could cause little damage to 10 Infantry Division was primarily due to the ground flak that they met from those steadfast and quick shooting lads of 1512 Battery, while bearing the brunt of repeated air attacks.
As to the damage inflicted by the Indian air defence, one Sabre was destroyed, while another Sabre and an Air Observation Post aircraft were badly hit; though both managed to get back to Pakistan. Havildar Uttam Singh (later Honorary Captain) was awarded the Vir Chakra for his display of cool nerve and pluck in downing the Sabre, during an air attack on the divisional headquarters on 8 December. In a way, it was a small kill ratio; but deployed as they were, in sections and sub-sections due to paucity of resources, this was a good bonus to their overall achievement. In appreciation of it’s performance as an effective deterrence in the Chhamb battle, 151 Air Defence Regiment (self propelled) was awarded the Honour Title “ Chhamb “.
Before closing the account of the Battle of Chhamb, and our painful withdrawal, it would be in order to remind our planners of national defence, once again, of the vital role of the artillery in war.
A strong artillery force often makes up for flaws in planning, tactical deployment of troops and errors committed by field commanders in the conduct of battle. It remains potent whatever be the state of weather and be it day or night. It knows no obstacles, natural or artificial, a river or minefield. It guards weak inter-unit and inter-formation boundaries and gaps in defences. Artillery starts firing no sooner the enemy comes within range. The
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attacker is given no respite even if it succeeds in capturing the objective and when the defending troops are forced to pull out, artillery covers their withdrawal. The guns are active the whole time.
The stronger the artillery arm the greater the punch of a field army. Pakistan made full use of this principle at Chhamb-Jaurian, by fielding an overwhelming superiority in artillery, whereas India failed to do so, because of a lack of proper appreciation that the artillery is a battle-winning factor, both in defensive and offensive operations.
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26 Infantry Division was entrusted with a vast area of operational responsibility, stretching from the Chenab to Samba a distance of 80 kilometres. The primary task of the Division was to defend Jammu. A sprawling city, with a developing industrial belt on it’s outskirts, a hub of road communications leading to Poonch, Srinagar, Pathankot and Sialkot and a terminus for the railways linking Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian mainlana, Jammu was a lucrative target for Pakistan.
A Pakistani salient between the Chenab and one of its eastern channels, the Chandra Bhaga, was considered particularly dangerous. Through it the enemy could not only attack Jammu, but by capturing the Akhnur bridge, about 4 kilometres from it’s northern tip, could also isolate the Indian troops in Chhamb, Naushera, Rajauri and Poonch. Indian military commanders had given it the discomforting name of “ Dagger ”, till Major General Z. C. Bakshi took over the command of 26 Infantry Division, in 1970, and renamed it “ Chicken’s Neck”. Here was an aggressive and a highly decorated General, the victor of Haji Pir in 1965, who was keen to wring the salient by it’s neck, rather than show concern at the enemy’s dagger, pointed so close to Jammu.
During the Indo-Pak war of 1965, Pakistan had chosen to adopt a defensive posture opposite Jammu. 26 Infantry
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Division, on the other hand, undertook a limited offensive and captured the Pakistan territory of Ankula and Bajra Garhi.
Before the commencement of the 1971 war, 26 Infantry Division comprised of 19, 36, 162 and 168* Infantry Brigades and 3 Independent Armoured Brigade.**
The regiments that formed part of 26 Artillery Brigade, which I had the privilege to command were :
(a) 193 Mountain Regiment – 75/24 Howitzer.
(b) 16 Field Regiment – 25-pounder.
(c) 173 Field Regiment – 100 mm.
(d) 176 Field Regiment – 100 mm.
(e) 220 Medium Regiment – 130 mm.
(f) 37 (Coorg) Light Regiment – 120 mm.
(g) 205 Divisional Locating Battery.
(h) Two troops 151 Air Defence Regiment – L/60 guns.
(i) One troop 27 Air Defence Regiment – L/70 guns.
(j) One section No. 2 Air Observation Post Flight.
(k) One battery 3.7 inch Howitzers (ad hoc).
Facing 26 Infantry Division was 15 (Pak) Infantry Division, with three infantry brigades and an armoured
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* When the hostilities became imminent and i Corps was inducted into Jammu and Kashmir, 168 Infantry Brigade, alongwith 16 Field Regiment, was placed under the former for conduct of operations in the Shakargarh sector.
** Headquarters 3 Independent Armoured Brigade, with 72 Armoured Regiment, was later allotted to 10 Infantry Division to reinforce Chhamb-Jaurian.
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brigade. The divisional artillery comprised of three field regiments (25 pounder), one medium regiment (5.5 mm), a mortar battery and the Divisional Locating Battery. The main task of the division was to defend Sialkot, a major city of Pakistan. Protection of Chicken’s Neck salient (the Pakistanis called it “ Phuklean “) and the Headworks at Marala, which controlled the waters of the Chenab, as it entered Pakistan, were also the responsibility of this division.
But for the slight Indian edge in artillery, due to the longer range of our 100 mm field and 130 mm mediums, viz, the 25 Pounder and 5.5 mm guns of Pakistan, the opposing forces were evenly matched.
Besides ensuring the security of Jammu, 26 Infantry Division was given two offensive tasks. These were :
(a) Capture Chicken’s Neck – to eliminate a flank threat to
Chhamb-Jaurian and to pre-empt a likely enemy design to capture the vital bridge across the Chenab at Akhnur.
(b) Capture Sialkot in conjuction with an attack by 1 Corps from the south.
Although a successful attack was launched on Chicken’s Neck, the Sialkot offensive had to be cancelled, consequent to a redeployment of troops to meet the Pakistani attacks in Poonch and Chhamb. Only small-scale raids could be launched on enemy posts, three of which (Chota Chak, Chumbian and Peeli) are still held by us. In these border skirmishes, 26 Infantry Division never let the initiative slip into Pakistani hands, except on 5 December, when they occupied our post at Nawan Pind, earlier vacated by the Border Security Force. Before the enemy could firm in at Nawan Pind, however, a quick attack was put in by 10 Garhwal Rifles, supported by armour. A heavy doze of artillery fire by 173 Field Regiment and a light battery
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preceded the attack, in which 1 Pakistani JCO and 18 other ranks were killed. Then followed the enemy’s encirclement by infantry and armour. The intruders lost heart and 3 JCOS with 15 other ranks surrendered to our troops.
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CAPTURE OF CHICKEN’S NECK
(19 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
“ …… and vividly recall the night when the attack went in. On the right flank – in Chhamb-Jaurian sector – flashes emanating from the muzzles of Indian and Pakistani artillery, the sound of gunfire as shells left the barrels on their destructive journey and seconds later, as they burst on ground. Next door, the gunners of my brigade firing into Chicken’s Neck, as I held my breath and prayed for good shooting ……. It was a deadly display of fireworks and rolling thunder of gunfire and shell burst, on that dark night of 5 December. “
Encompassing about 170 square kilometres of flat terrain, traversed by a number of dry nallahs and interspersed with tall Sarkanda, Chicken’s Neck was held by two companies of 36 Punjab, about six companies of Chenab Rangers, elements of the Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, a troop of tanks and some mortars. The Chandra Bhaga, which separated the opposing forces, acted only as a partial obstacle. Although, it could be forded at selected places on foot, crossing of wheeled vehicles was not possible, since the river was not bridged.
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The key areas of the enemy’s defensive layout were the Nala Bend, Nawan Pind, Tibba, Pul Bajuan, Chinor, Chak Naun, Khoje Chak and Phulkean. Besides reduction of these localities, timely capture of ferry sites at Saidpur, Gondal and Gangwal, which linked the salient with Sialkot, was to help prevent the escape of Pakistani troops from the area.
The task of capturing Chicken’s Neck was entrusted to 19 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Mohinder Singh. The brigade order of battle comprised of 3/5 Gorkha Rifles, 7/11 Gorkha Rifles, 11 Guards, A Group from 9 Para Commando Battalion, a squadron of 8 Cavalry Regiment and about a battalion worth of engineers.
As regards fire support, only 193 Mountain Regiment and one light battery had been earlier earmarked for the Chicken’s Neck operation. In my opinion, this allotment was woefully short of the actual requirement and, on taking over the artillery brigade, I had strongly recommended that, subject to enemy activity in the other sub-sectors being dormant, the quantum of artillery for Chicken’s Neck should be increased. This would have entailed a temporary move of the bulk of artillery facing Sialkot, to gun areas immediately to the south of Chandra Bhaga. My viewpoint was not accepted however, and the allotment remained unchanged, till Major General Zorawar Chand Bakshi, affectionately called Zoru, took over the divisional command. During his first visit to 26 Artillery Brigade, when I briefed him on the artillery plan, I pointed out the utter inadequacy of fire support for the attack on Chicken’s Neck.
With vast combat experience behind him, Zoru readily agreed with me. Fully realising the need to maximise the available fire power, he said, “ Give me all the guns you can, since artillery is a battle-winning factor.”
In the event, the following artillery supported the
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attack. This was more than double of what had been alloted earlier :
(a) 193 Mountain Reginent.
(b) 176 Field Regiment.
(c) 173 Field Regiment less one battery.
(d) 43 Light Battery of 37 (Coorg) Light Regiment.
(e) 2202 Medium Battery of 220 Medium Regiment.
(f) Section 27 Air Defence Regiment.
(g) Section No. 2 Air Observation Post Flight.
TACTICAL PLANS
As part of normal preparation for a military operation, considerable planning, sand modelling and war-gaming had been done to rehearse the capture of Chicken’s Neck. The tactical plan of attack that finally emerged was broadly as follows :
(a) The operation was to commence on last light 5 December with an assault from the south-east by 7/11 Gorkha Rifles on Nala Bend, Tibba and Pul Bajuan.
(b) On clearance of Nala Bend, 3/5 Gorkha Rifles, squadron of 8 Cavalry and the Para Commandos were to infiltrate into Chicken’s Neck. The Gorkhas along with the armour were then to capture Khoje Chak and establish a road block on Khoje Chak-Saidpur road, and the Para Commandos were to secure the Saidpur and Gondal ferries.
(c) Once Tibba was overrun by 7/11 Gorkhas, 11 Guards were to move into the salient and capture Chinor, Chak Naun, Nawan Pind and Phulkean.
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(d) The entire operation was to be completed within 72 hours.
It was an audacious plan, indeed, and interestingly, conformed literally to the manner in which one would wring a chicken’s neck. It entailed the infantry battalions to operate on widely separated axes, mostly in company groups and to attack the enemy from the rear, flanks and the front.
As to the artillery support, our main concern was to ensure efficient signal communications, with as many alternatives as possible. To cater to the call of fire from four battery commanders and twelve Forward Observation Officers (the maximum number employed in any single attack in 1971) who we felt should accompany the assaulting troops, the answer was not easy to find. The problem was further bedevilled by the wide dispersal of gun areas and the Chandra Bhaga that separated one third of the participating artillery deployed behind Chicken’s Neck from the remaining regiments, south of the river. Many signal diagrams were produced to meet the requirement, but none hit the nail on the head. At times, I felt that I had put my neck into it, by recommending increased artillery support for Chicken’s Neck, to my General Officer Commanding. Three channels of radio communications between the battery commanders, the Forward Observation Officers, regimental Command Posts and the Fire Direction Centre were eventually established. Luckily, this ad hoc communication network succeeded, with a commendable exercise of fire control by Satish Bahri, Commanding Officer 193 Mountain Regiment, in direct support of 19 Infantry Brigade, and the Brigade Major, Anand, at the Fire Direction Centre.
THE BATTLE (5-7 DECEMBER)
To deceive the enemy regarding the actual direction of attack, the gunners carried out heavy shelling in the north
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western parts of Chicken’s Neck on D minus 1 day. Shelling was again repeated in the above area an hour before the actual attack was launched (from the south-east) on 5 December.
I had accompanied the divisional commander to 19 Infantry Brigade sector and vividly recall the night when the attack went in. On the right flank- in Chhamb-Jaurian sector- flashes emanating from the muzzles of Indian and Pakistani artillery – the sound of gunfire as shells left the barrels on their destructive journey and seconds later, as they burst on ground. Next door, the gunners of my brigade firing into Chicken’s Neck, as I held my breath and prayed for good shooting. Pakistani mortars and medium machine-guns fired back, as Indian troops moved into assault, though their response was rather feeble. Perhaps, the enemy had been taken aback by the volume and intensity of our artillery fire. It was a deadly display of fireworks and rolling thunder of gunfire and shell burst, on that dark night of 5 December.
Past midnight on 6 December, 7/11 Gorkha Rifles cleared both Nala Bend and Tibba. It then moved on to attack Pul Bajuan. There was some confusion in locating the objective. But when the accompanying battery commander brought down artillery fire on the enemy locality, the battalion successfully assaulted the objective with the help of the fall of shot.9 Para Commandos also accomplished their difficult approach march to Saidpur ferry, without meeting any opposition en route, and captured it by the dawn of 6 December.
3/5 Gorkha Rifles, having infiltrated over 6,000 metres inside the salient lost their bearings in the featureless terrain and did not quite know exactly where they had reached. Here again the affiliated battery commander fired a salvo from our guns at a safe grid reference and from the fall of shot arrived
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at the present position of the battalion. By 8 A.M. on 6 December, the Gorkhas succeeded in establishing the road block on road Khoje Chak – Saidpur, having cleared an enemy ambush en route. Two hours later, they attacked Khoje Chak, which fell after a brief engagement. Together with the Para Commandos, the battalion then secured the Gondal ferry.
11 Guards faced stiff opposition at Chanor, their initial objective.* The enemy was, however, thrown back after a determined assault. Clearing Chak Naun and Nawan Pind, thereafter, the battalion captured Phuklean, the enemy’s administrative headquarters in Chicken’s Neck. It then advanced to the south-west and captured a feature called 10r, overlooking the Marala headworks.
The Pakistan Air Force flew 16 sorties over Chicken’s Neck but, with our troops moving mostly at night, they were unable to do much damage. Nor did the enemy aircraft escape unscathed, for one Pakistani MIG 19 crashed to the ground by machine-gun fire of a rifleman of 7/11 Gorkhas. The pilot bailed out, however, and was captured.
By the evening of 7 December, Chicken’s Neck had been completely overrun. In this operation, 34 Pakistani soldiers were killed and 4 wounded while 28 were taken prisoner. This included 2 officers, one of whom later died of wounds.
The battle of Chicken’s Neck had been an easy victory for India. The reasons were, First, although, in sheer numbers, the defenders were a sizeable force to face a brigade attack, Pakistani commanders had overestimated the fighting potential of their para-military forces, which
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* The Guards were in high spirits ater their success, as Zoru and I visited Chanor soon after it’s capture. It was a well prepared position with mines covering the likely approaches. Luckily, the enemy had laid no mines along the route we followed.
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formed the bulk. Second, 19 Infantry Brigade had, apparently, achieved complete surprise. And, if the enemy did get an inkling of the attack, it was to let them believe that it would come from the north-west, because of the “decoy ” artillery concentration in that area on D minus 1 and immediately prior to the attack. Third, with good training and leadership, our troops successfully employed tactics of infiltration and attacks from unexpected directions. Fourth, even if the defenders had recovered from the effect of initial surprise and remained unnerved by attacks from the rear and flanks, they were unable to withstand the impact of the large volume of artillery fire, particularly of our 130 mm medium and 100 mm field guns, which fired over 2,000 rounds during this short battle.
Regrettably, the Gondal ferry could not be captured early, because of the slow movement of wheeled vehicles carrying essential stores and ammunition in this rugged terrain. This enabled the bulk of enemy troops to make good their escape. Nonetheless, Pakistan lost a large chunk of territory to India. Furthermore, with the threat that 19 Infantry Brigade now posed to the Marala headworks, it was forced to rush in one infantry brigade from GHQ reserves to strengthen the defences at Marala.
For this outstanding handling of 26 Infantry Division, Major General Bakshi was awarded the Param Vishisht Seva Medal. The services of Brigadier Mohinder Singh were also recognised and for his excellent conduct of the Chicken’s Neck battle, he was awarded the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal.
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THE GUNNERS AT JAMMU
“ Inter-formation move of artillery was, in fact, seldom carried out during the war. There is a need to give a rethink on this aspect of tactical handling of artillery to optimise fire support; not only to reinforce a threatened sector but also to concentrate maximum artillery possible, atleast during the break-in phase of an attack operation.”
In addition to providing valuable artillery support in the capture of Chicken’s Neck, the Nawan Pind action and raids undertaken by the infantry across the border, the gunners gave no respite to the opposing troops by frequently shelling enemy localities and gun positions. This included engagement of Pakistani bunkers by direct shooting with 3.7 inch Howitzer and 100 mm guns. A medium gun was once moved close to the border and a hundred rounds fired at the reported location of Headquarters 15 (Pak) Infantry Division, with a 400 metre sweep and search. As we learnt after the war, this shelling caused considerable confusion and not a little damage. The medium guns also engaged the Marala Headworks, with firing directed by a gunner officer of the Air Observation Post and direct hits were scored on the Marala bridge. The reported location of the powerhouse was also shelled. On the inter-divisional boundary between 26 and 39 Infantry Divisions, three batteries of the brigade helped
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repel a Pakistani attack on Nekowal, on the night of 8/9 December. As mentioned earlier, on instructions from Headquarters 15 Corps, a battery of 176 Field Regiment was also moved to Chicken’s Neck to support 52 Infantry Brigade of 10 Infantry Division. About 1,300 rounds fired by this battery helped to stem the enemy’s advance.
Besides limited artillery shelling of our forward localities, Pakistan mainly responded with air strikes. Flying 71 sorties into the divisional sector, it tried to hit our guns and armour. Three abortive raids were also carried out on the bridge across the Tawi in Jammu. Luckily each regiment had dug 15-20 battery positions, (though with considerable sweat), during the warning period, when the Division moved into deployment areas in October. The aim was to keep shifting from one position to another during the war and thus avoid casualties from aerial attacks and artillery shelling. With enemy aircraft having sneaked in thrice into Jammu sector during November, our gun locations had, undoubtedly been photographed. We further assumed that Pakistan would start the war with a pre-emptive air attack on Indian airfields, and that, our guns were likely to be the next target. The pre-emptive air strike was, therefore, fixed as a signal to immediately shift the units from their present positions. As expected, after the air attack on the evening of 3 December, the Pakistanis rocketted our gun areas and heavily shelled those within the range of their artillery the next moming. The entire artillery brigade had, meanwhile, moved to new gun areas at night, leaving dummy guns behind. One can, however, imagine enemy pilots and gunners having reported “heavy damage caused to the Indian Artillery ” on this first day of war!
Thereafter, we kept shifting our guns throughout the war, always a jump ahead of enemy artillery and aircraft. We almost followed the concept of “ Shoot and Scoot. ” Though not in the manner of the sophisticated Bofors of today, it
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served our purpose in 1971. It goes to the credit of my units commanded by Lieutenant Colonels Sat Kakkar and Satish Bahri (both Lieutenant Generals subsequently), Inder Manchanda, Sarao and Bapna to have carried out these frequent redeployments successfully, when each move meant so much effort in re-establishing line communications, setting up command posts, and carriage of ammunition. Inter alia, we saved our guns, vehicles and the ammunition and the valuable lives of our gunners.
Our air defence gunners too played a significant role during the Pakistani air raids. It was a delightful sight to see them hit back at enemy aircraft with tracer and high explosive shells, in a display of operational alertness and quick shooting. A situation was reached, towards the closing stage of the war, when Pakistani pilots entered Indian territory, as if merely to comply with a strike mission, since they would go back as fast as they came, after a half hearted attack. One Pakistani aircraft was destroyed, for which Naik Dattaraya Pawar was Mentioned-in-Despatches, and two more were hit, though both managed to get across the border.
While closing this narrative, I would like to express one regret however. Since the Jammu sector had become relatively dormant after the Chicken’s Neck operation, more artillery could have been moved out from there by the Corps Headquarters, to support the hard pressed defenders of Chhamb, than just one field battery. It needs to be stressed, in this regard, that mobility of artillery should be fully utilised to reinforce a neighbouring sector, even if it be temporarily. In this case, it meant only a short hop from Jammu to Chhamb.
Inter-formation move of artillery was, in fact, seldom carried out during the war. There is a need to give a rethink on this aspect of tactical handling of artillery to optimise fire
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support; not only to reinforce a threatened sector but also to concentrate maximum artillery possible, atleast during the break-in phase of an attack operation. The fact remains — the harder you hit the enemy, the weaker his will becomes to fight.
On the subject of quick shift of artillery from one sector to another, Marshal Foch had this to say way back in 1903, “ Artillery must obviously be the first to act, owing to its range, its mobility and the fact that it can easily come into action and go out of it in order to proceed, when necessary, to some other place; moreover, it can act so as to get hold of the enemy.” This truism is applicable in even greater measure today, with increase in range, mobility and rate of fire of present day guns.
Notwithstanding, what I have said above, I must add that it is the induction of reinforcing artillery, in the form of corps/army artillery, which is primarily required to achieve more fruitful results. Such artillery, regrettably, the Indian Army did not adequately possess. In fact, it was woefully short of it, of which we shall observe more, as this story of the 1971 war proceeds.
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THE SHAKARGARH BULGE
(1 Corps Operations)
The Shakargarh bulge juts out from the mainland of Pakistan between the Ravi and Samba and lies in close proximity to the vital Pathankot-Jammu Highway and the sensitive areas of Gurdaspur and Batala in Punjab. It is a dangerous launching pad from which Pakistan can undertake offensive operations into India.
The security of the bulge is of equal concern to Pakistan as it provides a vital defensive cushion to the network of road and rail communications that link Sialkot and Lahore, two major cities of Pakistan. An Indian offensive through it can thus, drive a wedge between the Pakistani forces located north and south of Shakargarh.
With the above backdrop, it is clear to see why the bulge area was the scene of many a bloody battle during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971.
In both these wars, India chose to launch i Corps in a major offensive through Shakargarh. First, to relieve pressure on our troops in the Chhamb sector, where the Pakistani forces, backed by massive artillery, were speedily cutting through the Indian defences. Second, to ensure the security of the Pathankot-Jammu Highway and the fertile plains of Gurdaspur- Batala. Third, to make a bold bid to
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cut the Pakistani army in two, thus releasing troops holding the river line in north Punjab.
The bulge terrain is well suited for large-scale operations, including employment of armour. The Ravi is the only major obstacle, with minor rivers to its west, flowing from north-west to south-west. Almost dry during the winter, their value as obstacles is only partial; these are the Vijh, Bein, Karir, Basantar, Degh and Aik. The important communication centres in the area are Shakargarh, Pasur, Chawinda, Zafarwal and Narowal.
In 1965, 1 Corps, with 1 Armoured, 6 Mountain and 14 Infantry Divisions, captured nearly 490 kilometres of enemy territory. In terms of actual advance, however, it could barely penetrate about 18 kilometres into Pakistan, beyond the bridgehead, with an attack on Zafarwal, which fizzled out short of the town, and abortive attempts to capture Chawinda; two important objectives of the Corps offensive. This is not to suggest that the Indian Infantry lacked the will to fight. On the contrary, it fought hard with plenty of courage. The armoured regiments, equipped with Centurion tanks, too, proved their mettle, particularly at Phillora, pitched against the vastly superior Pattons of Pakistan, and took a heavy toll of the latter. The gunners also performed well, with the available artillery. And above all, we were able to achieve a good measure of surprise. Yet, we failed to inflict a decisive defeat on Pakistan at Shakargarh.
The slow rate of advance by the Corps was attributed to the muddle-headedness of the higher Commanders who let go of good opportunities to exploit success; lack of inter-formation coordination, inadequate cohesion within the newly raised 14 Infantry Division and employment of 6 Mountain Division in the plains of Punjab, when it had been equipped and trained for mountain warfare.
But the main fact that we had launched a full-fledged
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Corps offensive with the most inadequate artillery support* was not duly realised by the military brass. And if it was, the need to better equip the artillery arm was not fully appreciated by the political leadership. As a consequence, the 1 Corps offensive in 1971, also suffered from the same drawback, with an identical end result.
In the Indo-Pak War of 1971, 1 Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General K.K. Singh, comprised of 36, 39 and 54 Infantry Divisions, 2 and 16 Independent Armoured Brigades, 41 and 31 Independent Artillery Brigades, less one medium regiment, a locating battery, an Air OP Squadron less a flight and an equivalent of two engineer brigades.
The Corps front extended from Thakurpur to Samba. It’s flanks were covered by 15 Infantry Division (11 Corps) and 26 Infantry Division (15 Corps).
Since it was India’s policy to hold in the west, hence leaving the initiative to start the war with Pakistan, the initial task given to 1 Corps, therefore, was to take up a defensive position in its area of operations. Troops moved out from their peace time locations from mid-October by road and rail and by the first week of November 1 Corps was ready to face the enemy with 54 Infantry Division deployed from Samba to the Bein, 39 Infantry Division between the Bein and the Ravi and 36 Infantry Division down south, in the area of Sherpur-Thakurpur.
In the event that Pakistan chose to be on the defensive in the Shakargarh bulge, 1 Corps had also been entrusted with an offensive role. The original plan was to advance through the Shakargarh bulge and capture Zafarwal, Dhamtal, Narowal and Qila Sobha Singh. The Corps was,
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* a) To give an example: The attack on Chawinda by 58 Brigade (6 Infantry Division) was broken up at the ‘Forming Up Place’ itself, by Pakistani artillery. If we only had enough artillery to silence the enemy guns, Chawinda would have fallen into Indian hands, thus paving the way for further successes. b) The artillery component comprised of divisional artillery brigades and the corps artillery brigade.
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thereafter, to secure the line Marala-Ravi Link Canal, followed by the reduction of Pasrur and development of operations towards Sialkot. The offensive was to be launched in conjunction with 15 and 11 Corps. As earlier mentioned, 15 Corps had planned an offensive across Chhamb with 10 Infantry Division, while 26 Infantry Division was to attack Sialkot. Concurrently, troops of 11 Corps were to cross the Ravi at the Gill ferry and enter Pakistan from the south.
Operational plans have often to be modified, however, depending on enemy reaction and so was the case in 1971. With a Pakistani buildup opposite Poonch, 33 Infantry Brigade of 39 Infantry Division was rushed to reinforce that sector. Further, as reports came in of the enemy adopting a forward posture in the bulge, 168 Infantry Brigade of 26 Infantry Division was placed under the command of 1 Corps, thus weakening the offensive potential of the former. Then came the Pakistani attack in Chhamb. This pinned down 10 Infantry Division to fight a defensive battle. The offensive plans of 15 Corps had thus to be given up. The 11 Corps offensive could not also materialise since after meeting the vast defensive requirements of the corps and with Pakistan having strengthened defences opposite this sector, adequate forces were not available for the above task.
In the light of the above developments, 1 Corps was left to carry out the offensive all on its own. This necessitated a modification of the original grouping and tasks with the corps objectives now confined to Zafarwal, Dhamtal and Shakargarh.
Across the border, 8 (Pak) Infantry Division (four brigades) with 8 (Pak) Independent Armoured Brigade and the Divisional Artillery Brigade, was responsible for the defence of the Shakargarh bulge. A formation of 1 (Pak) Corps, it had 15 Infantry Division (i (Pak) Corps) and 10 Infantry Division (4 (Pak) Corps) on either flank, with 6 (Pak) Armoured Division, 17 (Pak) Infantry Division and the Corps Artillery Brigade, in reserve, in area Daska-Pasrur. 1 (Pak)
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Corps was responsible for the overall conduct of the Bulge operations.
8 (Pak) Infantry Division had organised it’s main defences around Zafarwal, Dhamtal, Shakargarh and Narowal, with three brigades. The fourth brigade was in reserve. Defences were well fortified, with concrete pillboxes and all approaches to them were protected by minefields and anti-tank ditches.
The forward line of defence of 8 (Pak) Infantry Division was manned by para-military forces, with important posts reinforced by the regular army. The areas between the forward and the main defences were covered by armour-infantry batile groups, acting as covering troops. Organised as an ad hoc force, called the “ Chengez Force “, it comprised of two armoured regiments and a reconnaisance and support battalion. Protected by minefields, and fully backed by the artillery, the “ Chengez Force ” was given the task of causing maximum delay and attrition to the 1 Corps advance. A line of “ No Penetration”, running along the Basantar, the road from Zafarwal to Shakargarh and the Bein River, had been laid down. To deny contact with the main Pakistani defences, an Indian advance beyond this line was to be fiercely counter-attacked by 8 (Pak) Independent Armoured Brigade and a mechanised battalion, located at Chawinda.
THE INDIAN OFFENSIVE
As mentioned earlier, Pakistan launched a pre-emptive air strike on Indian airfields on the evening of 3 December. This was closely followed by offensives in Poonch and Chhamb sectors, while adopting a defensive posture elsewhere in the Western Command. General Candeth, therefore, ordered i Corps to put into effect it’s modified plan for the Bulge offensive, immediately.
1 Corps offensive commenced on the night of ⅚
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December, with the under-mentioned grouping and tasks :
(a) 54 Infantry Division (47, 74 and 91 Infantry Brigades)
under Major General W.A.G. Pinto, with 16 Armoured Brigade less one regiment and 41 Independent Artillery Brigade, advancing along axis Galar-Darman, between the Degh and the Karir, with Zafarwal and Dhamtal as
final objectives.
(b) 39 Infantry Division less it’s three integral brigades, but
with 72 Infantry Brigade (36 Infantry Division), under Major General B.R. Prabhu, with 2 Independent Armoured Brigade less one regiment, and one mechanised battalion (1 Dogra), along the axis Mawa-Dehlra, between the Karir and the Bein, with the task to capture Shakargarh.
(c) 36 Infantry Division (18 and 115 Infantry Brigades) less 72 Infantry Brigade, under Major General Balwant Singh Ahluwalia, with one armoured regiment of 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, was retained in a defensive role, initially, in the area of Thakur ferry, except that 18 Infantry Brigade moved forward to occupy the Indian enclave of Lasian.
(d) 323 Infantry Brigade (39 Infantry Division) and 168 Infantry Brigade (26 Infantry Division), held the general area of Ramgarh-Samba, organised as X-ray sector, while 87 Infantry Brigade of 39 Infantry Division occupied a firm base in area Bamial-Narot-Parol.
In other words, 1 Corps went on the offensive with 39 and 54 Infantry Divisions – a total force of four infantry brigades, two armoured brigades less a regiment each, supported by their divisional artillery brigades and 41 Independent Artillery Brigade. The remainder of the corps was held back to defend the flanks, to counter a possible offensive by Pakistan employing 6 (Pak) Armoured and 17 (Pak) Infantry Divisions.
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39 INFANTRY DIVISION
It will be seen from the revised grouping of 1 Corps given earlier (consequent to modification of offensive tasks) that 39 Infantry Division had shed all it’s integral infantry brigades while 72 Infantry Brigade, ex 36 Infantry Division had been placed under it. It was also alloted one mechanised infantry battalion (1 Dogra) and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade less one regiment. The Divisional Artillery, under Brigadier Gurbachan Singh, comprised of 92 Field and 101 Field (self propelled) Regiments, 36 and 186 Light Regiments less a battery each, one battery of 77 Medium Regiment, one troop of 45 Air Defence Regiment and an ad hoc battery of 3.7 inch Howitzers.
With the above order of battle, 39 Infantry Division was given the task of capturing Shakargarh in a five phase operation. First, to eliminate the border posts at Lamriyal Bhopalpur, Sukhmal and Upala. Second, to establish a bridgehead in the area of Harar Khurd and capture Harar Kalan. Third, capture Chakra and Dehlra.* Fourth, destroy enemy covering troops south of the line Chakra Dehlra-Chak Amru and fifth, to capture Shakargarh.
The divisional offensive commenced well. To start with, 92 Field Regiment knocked out the Pakistani Artillery Obervation Post at Sukhmal, on the morning of 5 December. It was a good punch in the opponent’s eye in the opening round which helped reduce the effectiveness of the Pakistani
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* To specd up the advance, capture of Chakra-Dehlra was later entrusted to 54 Infantry Divison.
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artillery, albeit temporarily.
The same night, 72 Infantry Brigade (1 Mahar, 15 Grenadiers, 22 Punjab, and 3 Sikh Light Infantry) backed by artillery concentrations captured the enemy border posts. The next day, however, Pakistani artillery came into full play, subjecting our advancing troops to heavy shelling. War had just begun and the gunners could afford to be liberal in ammunition expenditure. Enemy artillery fire had the desired impact and it reduced the speed of the advance of 72 Infantry Brigade. As a result, it was only on the afternoon of 7 December that the leading battalion (1 Dogra) was able to make contact with the Pakistani position at Harar Kalan.
Prior to launching the attack on Harar Kalan the battalion sent out a reconnaisance patrol, composed of infantry and armour, to obtain information of enemy strength and layout. Unfortunately, because of good camouflage and strict control of movement by the enemy, the patrol concluded that the positon was lightly held. In actual fact, it was a well prepared position. Protected by a minefield, one infantry company and some elements of the reconnaisance and support battalion defended the post. Based on the patrol report, 1 Dogra launched a quick frontal attack the same night (7/8 December), supported by armour, without ensuring sufficient artillery support.
As the battalion arrived at it’s “ forming up place “, before going into assault, the enemy opened up with heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. 25 Dogras were killed and 65 wounded in this firing. As a result, the attack was called off. On the plus side, 22 Punjab captured Chak Amru, while 15 Grenadiers succeeded in overrunning the enemy at Khaira.
The failure at Harar Kalan was an avoidable setback suffered by 39 Infantry Division, which affected it’s subsequent speed of advance. The situation could have been saved if the maximum artillery available had participated in this operation.
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An account of this abortive attack would be incomplete without recording the bravery displayed by Forward Observation Officer, Captain S. G. Singh of 101 Field Regiment (Self Propelled). Unmindful of the heavy shelling and the small arms fire that sprayed the ground he continued directing his guns against Harar Kalan, in an effort to neutralise the enemy and help 1 Dogra to extricate, till he was mortally struck by a mortar splinter. His gallant performance was recognised with a posthumous award of the Vir Chakra.
On the night of 10/11 December, 72 Infantry Brigade put in a second attack on Harar Kalan, with due preparation and planning. An elaborate fire-plan — employing two field regiments, three medium regiments and 36 Light Regiment, equipped with 160 mm mortars — was fired before 1 Mahar, the assaulting battalion, went into attack, Enemy defences caved in, in the face of this artillery bombardment and the position was captured without much opposition. The intensity and accuracy of artillery fire drew appreciation even from Brigadier N.A. Khan, Commander of Paksitan’s “ Chengez Force”.
About this time, 15 Grenadiers occupied Harar Khurd, 22 Punjab occupied Shahbazpur and 3 Sikh Light Infantry occupied Munam. Further advance was held up on encountering another mine barrier. Efforts were made to breach the minefield but no headway was made.
For the next few days, there followed a period of a stalemate in operations. Only the gunners remained active, engaging their opposite numbers in artillery duels with heavy shelling by both sides. For effective provision of fire support against enemy opposition so far encountered and the artillery duels that followed, Brigader Gurbachan Singh, Commander 39 Artillery Brigade and his Brigade Major, Major S.K. Behl displayed excellent coordination and control of artillery fire, for which they were Mentioned-inDespatches.
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In the conduct of the above operations, the brunt was borne by 101 Field Regiment (Self Propelled). Heavy and continuous calls were made on this regiment for fire support, which it provided accurately and in time, in the highest traditions of the Indian Artillery. The casualities suffered by the regiment were 1 officer and 10 other ranks killed, 2 officers and 30 other ranks wounded and 3 other ranks missing. In recognition, the regiment was awarded the Honour Title “ Harar Kalan “.
The slow rate of advance by 39 Infantry Division was, however, affecting the speedy conduct of operation by 54 Infantry Division, operating on the right flank. In the event, the Army Commander ordered a regrouping of forces on 12 December, in which the former was given a defensive role. Inter alia, the order of battle of 36 and 54 Infantry Divisions was boosted up and the operational tasks reassigned as follows:
a) Headquarters 39 Infantry Division to assume the responsibility of the Ramgarh-Samba gap, already held by 323 and 168 Infantry Brigades, to coordinate the conduct of operations in the event of a Pakistani counter-offensive through the gap.
b) 87 Infantry Brigade of 39 Infantry Division and Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade with 1 Horse, to reinforce 36 Infantry Division.
C) 36 Infantry Division to secure the east bank of the Bein and attack and capture Shakargarh on 13/14 December.
D) 72 Infantry Brigade, with 7 Cavalry, to form part of 54 Infantry Division as the fourth brigade. It was to continue operation between the Bein and the Karir and threaten Shakargarh from the north, to facilitate it’s capture by 36 Infantry Division.
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54 INFANTRY DIVISION
54 Infantry Division, with 16 Independent Armoured Brigade (Centurions) less 16 Cavalry, was ordered to advance between the Basantar and the Karir, with the task of capturing Zafarwal-Dhamtal. In addition to it’s Divisional Artillery (69,161,162 Field, 44 Light and 70 Medium Regiments) commanded by Brigadier (later Major General) Avtar Singh, it had been alloted 41 Independent Artillery Brigade to provide the artillery support.
The Divisional plan envisaged a five phased operation. First, to clear seven enemy posts manning the border and to secure the area up to Thakurdwara. Second, to capture Bari, Darman and Laiser Kalan. Third, to establish a bridgehead across the Basantar. Fourth, to overcome the enemy holding the Supwal ditch and fifth, to regroup and attack the main Pakistani defences at Zafarwal-Dhamtal.
Advancing abreast of 39 Infantry Division, 54 Infantry Division crossed the border on the night of 5/6 December, with 74 and 91 Infantry Brigades. The elimination of the Pakistani border posts was successfully achieved, supported by the artillery, and 47 Infantry Brigade (16 Madras, 16 Logra and 3 Grenadiers) with 4 Horse in the lead, pushed forward.
The armour had hardly started, however, when on the morning of 6 December it hit the first enemy minefield in the
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area of Thakurdwara-Nagwal.* Trawling through the minefield commenced immediately and, covered by artillery fire, the armour got across it successfully by the evening. By 7 December, 47 Infantry Brigade had extended the bridgehead, including Dadua Kalan, Bari- Dharman and Ghamrola. During the next three days 54 Infantry Division consolidated in the above area, besides clearing the enemy from some neighbouring villages.
The next important objectives of the Division were the well fortified Pakistani defences at Chakra-Dehlra. With 74 Infantry Brigade now leading, Indian troops crossed the Karir on the night of 10/11 December and, after clearing a minefield, 18 Grenadiers launched a well planned attack on Chakra, supported by armour. A powerful artillery programme had been arranged. The defenders fought hard, but by the morning of 12 December, they were completely overwhelmed. Such was the impact of artillery fire that, while abandoning the position, the Pakistanis left behind six tanks, still running! On the other hand, it enabled the Grenadiers to capture Chakra, a pivot of the enemy’s defence line east of the Karir, with only light casualties. Dehlra was attacked next and it fell to 6 Kumaon without much of a fight.
Nine field and six medium batteries supported the above attacks. Firing over 2,400 rounds, they duly contributed to our success. Captain M.S. Gadagakar, a Forward Observation Officer and his wireless operator, Tuka Ram Pawar, particularly distinguished themselves in the assault on Chakra. Gadagakar was awarded the Sena Medal for effective direction of fire in the face of enemy shelling and small arms fire. The devotion to duty displayed by Pawar, who kept moving with the officer in the assault, despite being wounded, was recognised by a Mentioned-in- Despatches.
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* In all 54 Infantry Division encountered three minefields, 600 to 1,200 metres wide during the course of operations.
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Simultaneously with 74 Infantry Brigade’s operations at Chakra and Dehlra, 91 Infantry Brigade made contact with the second mine barrier, running north of Lagwal-Barkaniya-Jatwal-Chakra. On 13 December, the infantry assaulted through the minefield after dark and captured Laisar Kalan. The trawls cleared a tank lane and armour was inducted into the area past midnight. Nine field and six medium batteries supported the attack.
From the gunners, Captain A. Chaudhri, a Forward Observation Officer, distinguished himself during the attack on Laiser Kalan. Despite heavy enemy fire, Chaudhri had kept his cool and brought down effective artillery fire on Pakistani localities. For his courage and devotion to duty, he was awarded the Sena Medal. 69 Field Regiment also earned praise for it’s timely and intimate fire support, and it’s Second-in-Command, Major G. Kartic, Captain M.R. Sharma, the Adjutant and Subedar R. Shinde were Mentioned-in-Despatches for their excellent performance at the gun-end.
By 15 December, 91 Infantry Brigade was dominating the Shakargarh-Zafarwal road, having secured Kukiyal, Kawan, Dadwal and Ramri, about a kilometre from the highway.
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THE BATTLE OF BASANTAR
(47 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
“ Lieutenant Colonel Maqsood and Major Rizvi of the Pakistan Artillery were more forthright and generous in their praise for Indian gunners. During a meeting with the commanding officer of 161 Field Regiment (in direct support of 47 Infantry Brigade) after the cease-fire, they said, ‘Hats off to your artillery, Sir. This was a battle of the artillery and you have won it.’
54 Infantry Division was now poised to cross the Basantar, and establish a bridgehead which was to extend about 3,000 metres wide and 2,000 metres deep, in the area of Sikanpur-Barapind-Lohal. Major General Pinto entrusted the bridgehead task to 47 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier (later Major General) A.P. Bharadwaj. 74 Infantry Brigade was then to pass through and capture the enemy’s defences on the Supwal ditch.
In the next 48 hours the dry and open fields across the Basantar were to witness a grim battle and many deeds of valour.
47 Infantry Brigade planned to capture Suraj Chak and a forest stretch near Lalial with 16 Madras in Phase I. This
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was to be followed by the trawls and the engineers clearing a sase lane through a minesield for the crossing of armour, before the enemy’s inevitable counter-attack. In Phase 2, 3 Grenadiers were to capture Jarpal and Lohal. Thereafter, 6 Madras was to close the gap between 16 Madras and 3 Grenadiers and expand the bridgehead by first light.
Besides his three battalions, Bharadwaj was alloted 17 Horse and 18 Rajputana Rifles less two companies, and three companies of Engineers. 54 Artillery Brigade, two medium regiments of 41 Independent Artillery Brigade, one regiment, ex 39 Infantry Division and mortars of 91 Infantry Brigade within range, were to provide the fire support.
The attack commenced at 7.30 P.M. on 15 December and by 9.45 P.M., 16 Madras had captured both its objectives – Suraj Chak, followed by the Lalial forest. The battalion had, however, hardly completed consolidation when the Pakistanis counter- attacked. Luckily, it had tied up the defensive fire tasks with the gunners by then. The assaulting troops were met with an effective artillery crunch and the attack failed.
Captain R. N. Anand of 70 Medium Regiment, distinguished himself during the above attack. While going into assault as the Forward Observation Officer with a company, Anand was hit in the abdomen by the enemy’s machine-gun fire. His radio operator was also wounded. Despite his wounds, he took over the radio set and continued to bring down artillery fire, and when the enemy launched the counter-attack soon after, he effectively engaged the assaulting Pakistanis, thereby breaking up the counter-attack. For his gallantry and devotion to duty of such a high order, Anand was awarded the Vir Chakra.
3 Grenadiers now passed through. The battalion objectives were Jarpal and Lohal. Supported by a heavy artillery bombardment, Jarpal was captured the same night
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(15 December) and Lohal, by 3 A.M.
Next morning, the Pakistani armour fiercely counterattacked a company of 3 Grenadiers, commanded by Major Hoshiar Singh, at Jarpal. The company, in fact, found itself sandwiched between the enemy armour and a few tanks of 17 Horse, which had moved into the village. Soon the opposing tanks were hitting out at one another, while the enemy machine-guns, mounted on roof tops of Bara Pind, rained bullets at the Company position. It was a grim situation, with shell and bullet flying all over and the Pattons charging in at full gallop. Hoshiar kept his nerve however, and moving from one platoon locality to another, he kept encouraging his men to hold ground, while refusing to evacuate when seriously wounded. Thus inspired, the company put up a gallant defence and beat back repeated Pakistani assaults. Major Hoshiar Singh was awarded the Param Vir Chakra for supreme courage and determined leadership against heavy odds, as the Indian Infantry wrote yet another chapter of grit and valour.
17 Horse, meanwhile, moved into Jarpal in greater strength and as the opposing armour started to pull back, our tankmen decided to pursue the withdrawing enemy. In the leading tank stood the regiment’s youngest officer, Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal. In the battle that followed, Arun’s tank was hit by an enemy tank and caught fire. His Squadron Commander thus ordered him to pull back. But Arun decided to fight on and replied, “No Sir, at least my gun is still functioning, and I will get these bums.” Although he was mortally wounded soon after, he destroyed five Pattons. Khetarpal was awarded the Param Vir Chakra, posthumously, for display of courage and devotion to duty of the highest order. So ended the second day’s battle around Jarpal. Seldom, in the annals of Indian military history, had soldiers received the two highest awards for gallantry in a single battle within the course of a few hours.
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By now, 6 Madras, the third battalion of the Brigade, had also moved in and instead of expanding the bridgehead, as originally planned, it reinforced our existing positions, in view of the prevailing situation.
Led by armour, the enemy meanwhile continued to counter-attack the Indian bridgehead throughout 16 December. Troops were also subjected to intense artillery fire in which 16 Madras, in particular, suffered heavy casualties with Lieutenant Colonel V. K. Ghai, the Commanding Officer killed; and the Second-in-Command, the Adjutant, the Intelligence Officer, the Unit Medical Officer and a large number of other ranks wounded.
In the above dismal situation, Major H.K. Chopra, the battery commander affiliated to 16 Madras assumed command. Artillery officers are known to have taken over command of assaulting companies, on the company commander becoming a casualty; but rarely at the level of an infantry battalion. Albeit, with great presence of mind and courage, Chopra held the battalion together. For his inspiring leadership he was awarded the Vir Chakra.
On this day, yet another gunner, Captain S. C. Sehgal, a Forward Observation Post Officer with 17 Horse, rose to great heights of courage and aggressive spirit. In the fierce armour battle that took place on 16 December, he engaged enemy armour barely 250 metres away with medium guns. He then charged forward and destroyed an enemy tank with his tank gun. Sehgal later laid down his life in the action that followed. For his display of gallantry, he was awarded the Vir Chakra posthumously.
Between Anand, Chopra and Sehgal, the Gunners had risen to the occasion in the highest traditions of the Indian Artillery.
The night of 16/17 December passed without further
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counter- attacks, albeit the Indian troops had no respite from enemy guns and machine-gun fire.
At first light on 17 December, Pakistan’s 35 Baluch launched a counter-attack to throw back our troops holding Jarpal. Anticipating this attack, Commander 54 Artillery Brigade, Brigadier Avtar Singh, had earlier alerted his regiments to be ready to meet it. At 5 A.M., when the enemy commenced bombardment with artillery, Avtar knew that it was a prelude to the actual attack. He recalls, “With the likely assembly areas, forming up places and approaches to Jarpal registered by our Air Observation Post, I took General Pinto’s permission to bring down artillery fire. Thereafter, I let the enemy have it in a big way. Our gun fire had a telling effect and the attack was broken up with the Commanding Officer, Second-in-Command and the Adjutant of 35 Baluch amongst those that were killed in this firing. The Subedar Major of 35 Baluch who came to 3 Grenadiers after the cease-fire, to collect the 80 dead bodies lying around Jarpal, burst into tears. He said that his battalion had been finished by the Indian Artillery, as 350 men had earlier been killed in the assembly area. “
At 8.10 P.M., the enemy made a final effort against the Indian bridgehead, but this attack too failed, largely due to the protective screen of our artillery fire, which also caused heavy casualties.
Besides the vital role played by the gunners, the battle at Jarpal will always be remembered for the heroism displayed by Major Hoshiar Singh and Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal. Lieutanent Colonel (later Lieutenant General) V.K. Airy, commanding 3 Grenadiers, also distinguished himself during this battle for his effective leadership and was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.
In the bridgehead battle, the Indian armour also lived up to its fighting reputation. As in 1965, it out-classed the
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opposing armour both in technical skill and tactical superiority. Lacking neither in offensive spirit nor courage, it had taken a heavy toll of enemy armour, particularly, when a major tank battle took place on 16 December.
Lieutenant Colonel Hanut Singh (later Lieutenant General), Commanding Officer 17 Poona Horse and Brigadier Arun Vaidya (later Chief of Army Staff), Commander 16 Independent Armoured Brigade were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for their distinguished command.
Bridgehead battles are, invariably, hard to fight. So it was at Basantar. But for India’s unilateral cease-fire, it seems that India had won this round.
The reported casualties in this battle were : 48 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 20 captured. India lost 4 tanks, while 10 were damaged. 222 Pakistani troops were killed,* about 900 were wounded and 60 found missing. 54 Division had 6 officers, 1 JCO and 69 other ranks killed and 13 officers, 10 JCOs and 249 other ranks wounded. Our officer casualties were proportionately very high. It, however, highlights the fact that Indian officers never shirked to lead their men in battle. Most of the casualties suffered by both sides, in killed and wounded, were from artillery fire.
The role played by Indian gunners at Basantar was commended by the General Officer Commanding 1 Corps thus, “54 and 41 Artillery Brigades again shot eminently well during this battle and were primarily responsible in breaking up the enemy infantry assaults. Accurate and prompt response from the Divisional and Corps Artillery
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* The total number of Pakistani troops killed was possibly much more if one is to go by the casualty figure of one battalion alone, as given by the Subedar Major of 35 Baluch mentioned earlier.
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Brigades, in the end gradually wore down the repeated Pakistani counter-attacks. ” Looking back at the Shakargarh operations and the artillery support given to his formation, Major General Bharadwaj recalls, “ The gunners lived upto their reputation of providing close, intimate and adequate fire support to my brigade throughout the operations.”
There was also recognition from the other side of the fence. Brigadier Khan, the commander of ‘Chengez Force’, said, “ The enemy made the best possible use of his artillery to demoralise and neutralise our defences.” Lieutenant Colonel Maqsood and Major Rizvi of the Pakistan Artillery were more forthright and generous in their praise of Indian gunners. During a meeting with the Commanding Officer of 161 Field Regiment (in direct support of 47 Infantry Brigade), after the cease-fire, they { uid, “ Hats off to your artillery, Sir. This was a battle of the artillery and you have won it.”
An important factor which contributed to the excellent performance by the gunners was the provision of reliable signal communications. This enabled prompt concentration of artillery fire, even though the units were widely dispersed. In recognition, Major. S.C. Tanaskar, Lieutenant S.K. Ghosh and Lance Naiks Phagu Ram, M. Ingle, M.S. Chako and Lal Bahadur, from 1 Corps Artillery Brigade Signal Company were Mentioned-in-Despatches and Captain G.P. Singh and Lieutenant Suresh Rajan of 41 and 54 Artillery Brigade Signal Companies, respectively, were awarded the Sena Medal.
Brigadier Avtar Singh who, at one stage of the battle coordinated the fire of 162 artillery pieces (the maximum number employed by India in any single battle in 1971) was awarded the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal for his most distinguished services. In all the gunners won three Vir Chakras, one Vishisht Seva Medal, two Sena Medals and six
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Mentioned-in-Despatches in this memorable battle. “Many more acts of gallantry were in fact, performed by my officers and men at Basantar. Regrettably, I was told too late and their performance went unrecognised. The trouble with the gunners is that they are the least articulate of all, ” recalls Avtar.
The award of Honour Title “ Basantar River” to 161 Field Regiment, and to 75 Medium Regiment in direct support of 16 Independent Armoured Brigade, is a further testimony to the battle- winning role played by the gunners in this famous battle. Despite many casualties in officers, JCOs and other ranks, these regiments provided continuous fire support at the time and place required, upholding the motto of the Indian Artillery – Sarvatra-Izzat-o-Iqbal : “ Everywhere, with Honour and Glory”.
The Honour Title “ Basantar ” was also awarded to 45 Air Defence Regiment. Between 15-17 December, Pakistan Air Force mounted 10 air raids with 16 Mig 19s and 8 Sabres to dislodge our troops in the bridgehead. All air attacks were made ineffective due to accurate firing by two troops of this regiment which took part in the Basantar battle, while destroying one Pakistani MIG fighter and damaging another. In all, the Regiment claimed to have destroyed, damaged 30 enemy aircraft during 1 Corps operations and was a proud recipient of one Vir Chakra, five Sena Medals and two Mentioned-in-Despatches.
While on gunner performance in the corps sector, an equally laudable role was played by 29 Air Defence Regiment, particularly in defence of the vital bridge on the Ravi and in providing protection to gun areas. Beating back successive Pakistani air attacks the regiment claimed to have downed 13 enemy Sabres, thus winning two Vir Chakras (one posthumous), three Sena Medals and six Mentioned-in-Despatches. In recognition, the regiment was bestowed the Honour title : “ Samba”.
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36 INFANTRY DIVISION
“ The Air Observation Post pilots can easily be called the elite of a modern army and are the only combatants who go into battle ‘unarmed’, facing both ground slak and enemy fighters.”
Prior to commencement of the offensive, 36 Infantry Division was deployed in a defensive role in the area of Thakurpur-Gurdaspur-Dina Nagar, along the east bank of the Ravi, with 18 and 115 Infantry Brigades. 14 Horse formed it’s armoured component, while 87 Infantry Brigade of 39 Infantry Division, covered the divisional right flank, in the area of Parol-Bamial.
The Divisional Artillery, commanded by Brigadier K.S. Bajwa, (later Major General) comprised of 63, 66 and 92 Field and 222 Medium Regiments, a battery of 36 Light Regiment and 204 Divisional Locating Battery. In addition, 231 Single Barrel Rocket Launcher Battery, 107 Air Defence Battery of 29 Air Defence Regiment and 221 Medium Regiment had been made available for the impending operations.
On the night of 5/6 December, 18 Infantry Brigade established a firm base in the Indian enclave of the Lasian bulge, east of the Ravi. Soon thereafter, the Divisional Engineers built a Class 9 bridge over the river, followed by a Class 40 bridge. On completion of the latter, 14 Horse was inducted into Lasian.
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On the right of 8/9 December, 115 Infantry Brigade was also moved into Lasian, and given the task to capture Nainakot and, thereafter, to develop a threat towards Shakargarh from the east. The brigade made a good start and with effective fire support provided by 66 Field Regiment, it speedily overran all enemy posts holding the border. Second Lieutenant A.J. Singh, a Forward Observation Officer with 4 Grenadiers, did some excellent shooting, unmindful of personal safety while under enemy fire and was Mentioned-in-Despatches.
In the meantime, 14 Horse broke out from the bridgehead on the morning of 10 December and cut the roads Nainakot-Nurkot and Nainakot-Shakargarh. The enemy vacated Nainakot and 115 Infantry Brigade secured it without opposition by midday on 10 December. On this day, two enemy tanks were destroyed, with the Air Observation Post directing the fire of our medium guns.
Led by the 14 Horse, 115 Infantry Brigade resumed advance the next day. A tank battle took place in the area of Nurkot in which 14 Horse destroyed 7 Pattons for the loss of only one of their own.
By midday of 12 December, 115 Infantry Brigade had reached the line of the Bein. The going so far had been encouraging.
At this stage, 87 Infantry Brigade (alongwith a squadron of 16 Cavalry) and Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade with 1 Horse, also moved under the command of 36 Infantry Division, consequent to the regrouping of forces mentioned earlier.*
Thus reinforced, the division was given the task to capture Shakargarh by 13/14 December, while 72 Infantry
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* 87 Infantry Brigade, at Bamial-Parol, had already commenced an advance, (on night 9/10 December), along axis Ikhlaspur-Shakargarh.
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Brigade operating under 54 Infantry Division posed a threat to the town from the north.
The Divisional Commander, meanwhile, had second thoughts and obtained the Corps Commander’s approval to postpone the attack on Shakargarh to 14/15 December, to ensure better planning and coordination. Regrettably, due to some confusion or poor staff work, 4 Grenadiers of 115 Infantry Brigade moved into the attack on the night of 13/14 December, as earlier planned.
From here onwards, things started going wrong.
As a preliminary operation, 4 Grenadiers sent a company plus, under Major Chaudhary, after last light on 13 Decernber, to carry out a reconnaisance in force and, if possible, to secure a foothold west of the Bein.
On reaching the far bank of the Bein, the company hit a minefield, but managed to get across, having found a gap, and occupied a small village, Dinpur Khurd, and some houses on the outskirts of Shakargarh unopposed. Reporting the above success and placing guides in the minefield gap, Chaudhary now waited for the rest of the battalion to build up for an attack on Shakargarh, as planned.
At about midnight, the battalion left it’s firm base east of the Bein and commenced to move across the dry river bed, alongwith a squadron of 14 Horse. When hardly 800 metres short of Chaudhary’s company, the enemy got wind, and opened up with artillery and machine-gun fire. About this time, the leading tank or two got bogged down in the soft sand. This made the squadron commander over-cautious and he decided to move his squadron back to the firm base. Unwilling to proceed without the armour and with confusion caused by the enemy’s unexpected artillery shelling, the battalion commander also decided to return to base, while
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ordering the leading company to make it’s way back. Before Chaudhary could pull out, his company was encircled and 72 Grenadiers and the Forward Observation Officer were taken prisoner. It was a sad episode and an avoidable failure, had the operation been undertaken with adequate planning and requisite coordination with the artillery and engineers.
From the gunners, Capt. S.V. Pradhan of 222 Medium Regiment, assisted by his wireless operator, Suresh Chander, made a brave effort to retrieve the situation, bringing down maximum artillery, while under heavy enemy fire. But as in the case of the attack on Harar Kalan by 39 Infantry Division, last minute call for fire without the supported arm closely tying up the artillery programme before the battle, did not help matters. Both Pradhan and Suresh Chander were awarded the Sena Medal for courage and devotion to duty.
87 Infantry Brigade, meanwhile, made good progress and by the morning of 14 December, Bhatti and Shalpur Chinjore, on the east bank of the Bein had fallen to it.
On the afternoon of 14 December, an artillery Air Observation Post reported vehicle convoys moving west from Shakargarh. This led the divisional commander to conclude that the enemy was abandoning the town and decided to launch a quick attack on Shakargarh, on the night of 14/15 December, with 115 and 87 Infantry Brigades. As learnt later, the enemy had, in fact, reinforced the town and the westward movement of vehicles was that of empty transport returning to the rear.
The plan to capture Shakargarh envisaged a two pronged attack by 115 and 87 Infantry Brigades from the east and north respectively.
With Shakargarh reinforced, as mentioned above, the
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chances of a quick attack succeeding, without detailed preparations, had become remote. In the event, both the attacks ended in a fiasco. 115 Infantry Brigade led by 4 Grenadiers was haited by intense artillery fire, without making much headway. In the north, 87 Infantry Brigade met some initial success, with the assaulting unit, 3/9 Gorkha Rifles, capturing a village on the outskirts of Shakargarh. Thereafter, the Gorkhas also made no further progress in view of an enemy minefield, which could not be successfully breached. In the process, the unit suffered heavily, with some men taken prisoners.
36 Infantry Division now got down to preparing for a deliberate attack on Shakargarh on the night of 17/18 December. By then it was too late, in view of the Cease-Fire.
Thus ended the operations conducted by 36 Infantry Division. On the whole, it was not able to achieve much, despite a battle tested divisional commander. Perhaps, an undue reliance had been placed on quick infantry attacks, without fully taking into account the fire-power potential of a highly trained artillery brigade plus, available with the division. Nonetheless, to the extent that it was utilised, the divisional gunners gave speedy and accurate fire support throughout the operations. This is not to blow the gunner trumpet unduly. Artillerymen undergo the most realistic peace time training with live shells fired at the ranges. Their battle drills and procedures, checks and counter- checks have thus to remain in trim, for training inspectors evaluate a unit’s efficiency based on the results they see on ground.
Before concluding this narrative and gunner participation in the divisional operations, the courage and devotion to duty displayed by Captain P.K. Gaur, an Air Observation Post Officer with 36 Artillery Brigade, needs special mention. Throughout the operations, Gaur flew missions deep inside enemy territory, undeterred by small
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arms and artillery air-burst fire and Pakistani Sabres.
On 14 December, Gaur was given the task to locate and register targets in depth, as a prelude to a deliberate attack on Shakargarh which, as mentioned earlier, was now to be launched on the night of 17/18 December. While on this mission, he saw three enemy fighters operating in the area. Instead of hurrying back to base to escape them, Gaur decided to continue with his dangerous mission. Regrettably, it was to be short-lived, for soon after, his aircraft was shot down by a Sabre and this brave gunner pilot was killed. For his courage and devotion to duty, Captain Gaur was awarded the Vir Chakra (posthumous). While reminiscencing about the Shakargarh operations, Major General Bajwa speaks of Gaur with pride and sad nostalgia, even after a passage of 22 years.
The Air Observation Post pilots can easily be called the elite of a modern army and are the only combatants who go into battle“ unarmed ”, facing both ground flak and enemy fighters. Their normal role is to fly along the line of forward troops and act as elevated Observation Posts for engagement of targets that are not visible to their counterparts at ground level. But in actual fact, they often fly deep into the enemy territory, as did young Gaur at Shakargarh.
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AN EVALUATION
“ Pakistan had heavier calibre weapons and used these to considerable effect…. As in the 1965 conflict, the infantry found it difficult to stand against the devastating fire of Pakistan artillery in some cases. The need for heavy calibre long-range weapons, was much felt by the Indian Forces.”
General K.V. Krishna Rao
(Former Chief of Army Staff, Indian Army)
The Corps offensive had to be ended on 17/18 night on the declaration of the Cease-Fire without the capture of Shakargarh and Zafarwal. All it had achieved was to overwhelm the forward posts and throw back the covering troops, advancing just 13 kilometres in 12 days.
Military writers have commented that the courage and fighting spirit displayed by all ranks in the battle zone, notwithstanding, the slow rate of the 1 Corps advance was due to inadequate employment of armour in the offensiive role, for which it was best suited; that too much caution was exercised by tying down two to three infantry brigades in a defensive role; that the best way to maintain the tactical balance would have been to unbalance the enemy by bold offensive action. Its
The critics are partly justifed in making the above comments. But not fully.
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The slow rate of advance was equally attributable to three other factors. First, our inability to speedily breach the enemy minefield. Second, launching quick infantry attacks, which proved abortive without arranging adequate artillery and engineer support, even though available. The clock was thus put back for preparation of more deliberate and properly coordinated operations. Third, lack of long-range artillery and means of locating hostile batteries to suppress the fire of Pakistani guns, directed against our advancing troops.
With regard to the shortage of artillery support, the following cornments would be equally relevant.
a)The divisions of i Corps did not possess adequate artillery to provide effective support for a simultaneous attack by two infantry brigades. That they employed only one brigade at a time in the attacks so far undertaken, notwithstanding, this was a serious handicap in the planning and execution of further operations had the war continued.
b) 1 Corps had yet to face Pakistan’s main defences. Heavily protected by minefields and troops occupying bunkers and pillboxes with overhead cover of thick concrete, the fortress defences of Zafarwal and Dhamtal, in particular, were going to be extremely hard nuts to crack.
c) At some stage of the battle, the Corps was also likely to be engaged in combat with the bulk of 6 Armoured and 17 Infantry Division, yet uncommitted.
In the above scenario, artillery backing was going to be acutely short of the actual requirement.
Reflecting on the employment of artillery, Major General Avtar Singh has a similar comment to make. “ From the artillery angle, I would have never recommended a simultaneous two brigade attack to my GOC at any stage. I
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also consider that success of our further offensive into Pakistan would have been severely jeopardised, with the quantum of artillery provided to 54 Infantry Division. ‘
The need of the hour was of two additional brigades of medium artillery and a shell heavier than the 130 mm, with which the medium artillery units of 1 Corps were then equipped.
Even for the battles fought so far, a stronger artillery force would have meant more effective engagement of hostile batteries and machine-guns. Inter alia, our troops would have suffered much less casualties. The breaching of the minefields covered by Pakistani guns would have been speedier. Above all, the crunching impact of medium artillery shells would have helped shake the defenders’ will to fight and thus speed up the pace of advance. And if only a part of medium artillery was self propelled, the punch and mobility of Indian armour would have been greatly enchanced.
In his book Prepare or Perish, General K.V. Krishna Rao, former Chief of Army Staff, comments, “ Pakistan had heavier calibre weapons and used these to considerable effect. …… As in the 1965 conflict, the infantry found it difficult to stand against the devastating fire of Pakistan artillery in some cases. The need for a heavy calibre long-range weapon was much felt the Indian Forces….. It was also obvious that if armoured formations were to undertake longer advances, suitable self-propelled artillery must be provided to them.”
That it was not possible to allot adequate medium artillery to 1 Corps, because of paucity of guns, does not provide the answer. Our field commanders, officers and men deserved a better deal to carry out the operational tasks assigned to them.
It is said that Generals often pray to the Lord before a
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battle, to grant them success. So did Babur, Ahmed Shah Abdali and Ranjit Singh. The latter, however, commanded strong artilleries, which brought them victory in every action they fought. But with the God of War (Artillery) relegated to a back seat in the Indian Army in 1965-71, how could the Indian generals at Shakargarh expect HIM to bless them with a worthwhile success.
As regards Air Defence Artillery, 45 and 29 Air Defence Regiments with 1 Corps performed very well, but more up-to-date radars and guns to take on modern aircraft, together with a better coordinated air defence system, would have caused much more damage to enemy fighters. We need to remind ourselves that the aim of Air Defence is not only deterrence, but also effective attrition of the opposing Air Force.
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THE PUNJAB – GANGA NAGAR
(Operations by 11 Corps)
“ The gunners did a tremendous job. They broke up attack after attack of the enemy. I am an infantry officer, but I would say that a large infantry force in the contest of plains warfare does not win you battles.”
Lieutenant General N.C. Rawlley
(GOC 11 Corps in 1971)
In the long pages of India’s history the Punjab has always been a gateway to the Indian mainland for foreign invasions from the north-west. Through it have traversed the armies of the Greeks, Sakas, Huns, the Afghans and the Mughuls, turning it’s rich plains into a recurring battle ground. The deadliest battles of the sub-continent have been fought here, smearing the soil of the Punjab with the blood of the defending Indians and of invaders alike. Sliced into two halves, after the partition of India, the Punjab was again a battleground during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971.
Originating in the Himalayas, five major rivers flow through the Punjab. The Ravi and the Sutlej run along the Indo-Pak border, with bridges over the Sutlej at Hussainiwala and Sulaim inke; while the Beas, Jhelum and the Chenab meander in the respective hinterlands of India and Pakistan.
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Besides the above rivers, a number of canals and their distributaries cut across the land. Of these, the Ichhogil Canal, about 8 kilometres from the border, has been converted by Pakistan into a strong military obstacle. A ditch cum bund forms India’s forward defence line in some sensitive areas, safe-guarding against a surprise attack.
The main routes of ingress into India are from Shakargarh to Gurdaspur; Narowal to Dera Baba Nanak; over the Gill ferry near Ajnala; from Lahore to Amritsar along the famous Grand Trunk Road; from Kasurto Ferozepur over the bridge at Hussainiwala, and across Sulaimanke opposite Fazilka.
Ganga Nagar, a district of Rajasthan, was till recently, a virtual desert, difficult of access to an invading army. The construction of the Rajasthan Canal, after India’s independence has, however, catapulted the area into one of equal strategic and economic significance. Although Ganga Nagar was not a scene of battle during the above Indo-Pak wars,* a major Pakistani thrust in this sector during 1971 was considered a distinct possibility. The same holds good should there be another war with Pakistan.
During the 1965 Indo-Pak War, 11 Corps ( 4 Mountain Division, 7 and 15 Infantry Divisions)**crossed the International border on 6 September, as a counter to the Pakistani offensive in Chhamb. The initial tasks given to the Corps were to secure the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal, and establish bridgeheads across it at certain points. Thereafter, it was to pose a threat to Lahore, while a brigade group was to capture Dera Baba Nanak.
The Corps advanced speedily on the first day, taking
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* Except for a Pakistani intrusion after the cease-fire.
** Each division comprised of two brigades, with their third brigade employed elsewhere in the corps sector.
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the Pakistani army completely by surprise. Writing in his book, War Despatches, Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh comments, “ The sudden swiftness of our thrust dazed the enemy into temporary inaction.” Some daring actions were, thereafter, fought by the Indian infantry, notably at Dograi by 3 Jat. The enemy enclave at Dera Baba Nanak also fell into Indian hands. But on the whole, the Indian offensive did not achieve the desired result.
It was the intense shelling by Pakistani artillery and effective air strikes by the enemy air force which, to a large extent, stood in the way of the corps advance.
Having checked the offensive by 11 Corps, Pakistan retaliated with a counter-stroke employing 1 (Pak) Armoured and 11 (Pak) Infantry Divisions. The Pakistani plan envisaged securing a lodgement in the Khem Karan area (held by 4 Mountain Division) with the Infantry Division. The armoured division was then to fan out and capture the bridges over the Sutlej at Harike, and over the Beas by D plus 3. With the above task successfully achieved, Pakistan expected to seal off 11 Corps and, thereafter, undertake operations to overrun the whole territory west of the Beas. An audacious plan it was indeed. It spoke of the over-confidence of Pakistani military commanders. Perhaps, their minds were clouded by the performance of 4 Mountain Division during the Indo-Chinese conflict in 1962, under circumstances that were beyond it’s control. The enemy paid for that misjudgement in the battle that followed.
The enemy offensive made a good start, forcing 4 Mountain Division to vacate Khem Karan. The division now took up a defensive position at Asal Uttar Chima, some distance in the rear.
In throwing back our troops at Khem Karan, Pakistan artillery had again played a decisive role. The official history of Indian Artillery records, “ Pakistan artillery fire had been
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a most telling factor. The Artillery Brigade had no means of locating the hostile guns nor an Air Observation Post aircraft to send up when the Pakistani guns opened up. Apart from losing all Forward Observation Post Officers, the gunners of the division had a taste of Pakistan artillery fire directed at the gun positions. ”
It was at Asal Uttar that 4 Division finally dug it’s heels in, well and proper, and in three days of bitter fighting, during which Asal Uttar literally turned into a graveyard of enemy tanks, the Pakistani attack was beaten back in a glorious feat of arms. The division had more than retrieved the honour it had lost at Khem Karan. 3 Cavalry, Deccan Horse and 40 Medium Regiment, in particular, distinguished themselves in this battle, with the medium gunners earning the Honour Title, “ Asal Uttar”.
An excerpt of conversation between the Pakistan armoured division commander and an armoured brigade commander quoted by Major Praval in his book Indian Army after Independence indicates the desperation of Pakistani commanders during the course of the Pakistani offensive.
Divisional Commander: “ It is most important that the advance is continued. Therefore, in the name of Islam, Pakistan and Hilal-e-Jurat, I command you to get up and go forward.
Brigade Commander : “I will try my best. As things are, I do not know how the hell I am going to do that. The bloody enemy artillery is knocking the hell out of us and I am afraid, at the moment I cannot do any better than this.”
After a devastating knock from the Indian armour and artillery that sent it’s strike formations limping back home, 4 Mountain Division planned to evict Pakistan from Khem Karan. Regrettably, this did not fully materialize in view of the cease-fire.
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As mentioned earlier, Punjab was again a battleground when the Indo-Pak war of 1971 broke out. As opposed to 1965, however, it only witnessed isolated battles at Dera Baba Nanak, Burj and Fatehpur, in the areas of Khalra and Khem Karan, at Hussainiwala, and after the cease-fire, in the Ganga Nagar sector.
In 1971, 11 Corps commanded by Lieutenant General N. C. Rawlley was responsible for the defence of the territory extending from Dera Baba Nanak in the Punjab, to Anupgarh in Ganga Nagar, a vast distance of over 700 kilometres. The fact that the Corps sector remained comparatively dormant, none the less, it was the most important territory in Western Command, both strategically and politically. Of prime concern was the heavily populated city of Amritsar, rich in trade and Punjabi culture, and a revered seat of the Sikh religion.
11 Corps order of battle comprised of 15 and 7 Infantry Divisions, an ad hoc divisional size formation called “F” sector, 14 Independent Armoured Brigade, 4 Independent Armoured Squadron and 21 Independent Artillery Brigade. 15 Infantry Division (86,54,66 and 96 Infantry Brigades), under Major General B.M. Bhattacharjee, with 66 Armoured Regiment was responsible for the defence of the area from Gurdaspur to Rajathal. 7 Infantry Division (65,48 and 29 Infantry Brigades), under Major General Freemantle, with 33 Cavalry, extended from Khalra to Jalalabad, south of Ferozepur. The protection of the border beyond Ferozepur, extending up to the Corps boundary, south of Anupgarh, was entrusted to “F” Sector Headquarters, under Major General Ram Singh, with three infantry brigades, 18 Cavalry less a squadron and one independent armoured squadron.
Across the border, Lieutenant General Bahadur Sher, in command of 4 (Pak) Corps, defended the area extending from Lahore to Bhawalpur, with 10 and 11 (Pak) Infantry
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Divisions. Pakistan’s 2 Corps, under Lieutenant General (later General) Tikka Khan, formed the Army Headquarters Reserve, with 1 (Pak) Armoured Division and one or two infantry divisions. Located in the area Multan-Okara-Montgomery, it was poised for an offensive; more likely in the Ganga Nagar sector.
To meet the above threat, 1 Armoured and 14 Infantry Divisions had been positioned in the 11 Corps sector, as Army Headquarters reserve. Of the above formations, l Armoured Division remained intact, but 14 Infantry Division had to detach two infantry brigades to reinforce 15 and 7 Infantry Division sectors respectively. Later, however, the brigade with 7 Infantry Division reverted to 14 Infantry Division and with two brigades, the division was entrusted with the defence of the area from the Harike headworks to Fazilka, including the city of Ferozepur.
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15 INFANTRY DIVISION
15 Infantry Division was given the task to defend Amritsar and Dera Baba Nanak sectors. To strengthen it’s defence potential, 58 Infantry Brigade of 14 Infantry Division and 14 Armoured Brigade were also allotted to it. The division deployed it’s five brigades as follows :
a. 86 Infantry Brigade : From Dera Baba Nanak to Gili ferry on the Ravi.
b. 58 Infantry Brigade : In area south of Ajnala.
c. 96 Infantry Brigade : At Chaugawan – Bhindi Aulak.
d) 54 Infantry Brigade : From Ranian to Attari.
e)38 Infantry Brigade : South of Attari to Rajathal.
The Divisional Artillery Brigade, commanded by Brigadier M.L. Chadha, consisted of 42 Field, 175 Field and 177 Field Regiments, 74 Medium and 84 Light Regiments, and 202 Divisional Locating Battery. In addition, it was allotted 163 Field, 71 Medium and 76 Medium Regiments, two troops of 49 Air Defence Regiment and 3 Air Observation Post Flight, while 20 Locating Regiment assisted in the survey and location of enemy guns.
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CAPTURE OF DERA BABA
NANAK
(86 Infantry Brigade)
“ Regrettably, the imperative need to silence the opponents’ artillery and taking requisite measures to do so was mostly given lip service during the Indo-Pak wars, both in 1965 and 1971. The battles help to remind our military commanders that this aspect must form an essential ingredient of an operational plan, to minimize casualties from artillery, the prime killer, as achieved at Dera Baba Nanak.”
The Dera Baba Nanak complex consists of a small town called Dera Baba Nanak, south of the Ravi, about 50 kiiometres from Amritsar, and two enclaves to the north and south of the river. The northern enclave, Kasowal, belongs to India and the southern, Dera Baba Nanak to Pakistan. The latter enclave with a rail- road bridge over the Ravi, provides an easy access to the major towns of northern Punjab. A Pakistani advance through it can out- slank the Indian defences of Amritsar and the military base at Pathankot. The Kasowal enclave is a springboard across the Ravi, from where India can develop operations into Pakistan.
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86 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Gauri Shanker, was responsible for the defence of the general area opposite Kasowal-Dera Baba Nanak, stretching from Gurdaspur to Ram Dass. Depending on the tactical situation, the brigade was also given the task of capturing Dera Baba Nanak.
At about 9.30 P.M. on 3 December, Pakistan attacked Kasowal with infantry, tanks and artillery. As planned, the enclave was vacated by Indian troops by the dawn of 4 December. A decision was also taken to attack Dera Baba Nanak. Pakistan held Dera Baba Nanak with a company of para-military forces and a company plus of regular infantry. Mostly based on bunds, known as the Depth, the Rail, the Road, the River and the Dussi Bunds, the enemy defences were fortified with concrete pillboxes and bunkers, from where machine-guns and recoilless guns had been skilfully sited.* Concrete emplacements had also been provided to artillery mortars. Each locality was inter-connected by brick lined communication trenches and well covered by minefields. Adequate artillery support had been catered for. Dera Baba Nanak was a tough nut to crack.
For the Dera Baba Nanak operation, the order of battle of 86 Infantry Brigade, comprised of four infantry battalions (10 Dogra, 1/9 and 4/8 Gorkha Rifles and 17 Rajput) and 71 Armoured Regiment. Artillery support was to be provided by 42 Field and 71 Medium Regiments and a battery each of 177 Field, 84 Light, 74 Medium and 76 Medium Regiments. A flash spotting troop of 20 Locating Regiment was to locate enemy guns and Headquarters 21 Independent Artillery Brigade was to establish a Fire Direction Center for control of artillery fire.
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* Covered with earth and foliage, they looked like natural mounds and could only be detected either at very close quarters or when the enemy fired his weapons through the narrow slits.
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86 Infantry Brigade plan of attack envisaged a three phased operation :
(a) Phase I – 10 Dogra less one company, with 71 Armoured Regiment less one squadron, to advance on the night of 5/6 December and capture the eastern end, including the Depth Bund, the Road Bund and the River Bund from the rear. The operation, involving a difficult approach march and double crossing of the river, was to be completed by 8.30 P.M. on 5 December.
(b) Phase II — 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, less one company, to capture the Dussi Bund by 4.30 A.M. on 6 December.
(c) Phase III – 17 Rajput less two companies with two troops of 71 Armoured Regiment and two companies of the Border Security Force to clear the remainder enclave by first light on 6 December.
As a prelude to the main attack, a company of 4/8 Gorkha Rifles was to secure an assembly area for 10 Dogra in a small enclave named Metla. Thereafter, two platoons of 17 Rajput were to secure a crossing site through which 10 Dogra was to cross the Ravi. Concurrently with the above, a commando company, formed out of the commando platoons of the infantry battalions was to capture 7 r, a dominating feature in the enclave.
10 Dogra moved into the attack on the night of 5/6 December as planned. Unfortunately, tall Sarkanda grass impeded the pace of the infantry. Some tanks also got bogged down enroute. On reaching the river line, it transpired that with a high water level at the crossing site, the armour could not cross the river. The battalion was then ordered to follow the river bank and cross where possible. The brigade commander also made an immediate change in the tactical plan. Realising that with a slow advance by 10 Dogra, an adherence to the existing plan may jeopardize the entire operation, he ordered the Phase II battalion, 1/9 Gorkha
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Rifles, to move into the attack, leaving the Dogras to plough their way forward.
In the event, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles captured it’s objective, the Dussy Bund, fighting through one enemy pillbox after another, with pole charges, Molotov cocktails, hand grenades and the famous Gorkha“ khukri”. In a determind and well executed night movement, 10 Dogra also managed to get behind the enemy’s rear as planned, and captured all it’s objectives after some hard fighting. By 7 A.M. on 6 December, the battle of Dera Baba Nanak had been won, with 17 Rajput having overcome the remaining enemy posts. The threat to the Punjab through Dera Baba Nanak had been removed. Gauri Shanker and his command had fought an excellent battle, for which he was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.
Commenting on artillery support, Major General Sukhwant Singh, who visited the enclave after the operations, as Deputy Director Military Operations, Army Headquarters, writes in his book, Defence of the Western Border, “ The Independent Artillery Brigade supported the operation with intimate, timely and abundant artillery fire. So effective was the brigade’s counter-battery programme that there was no interference by the enemy artillery. “The performance of the Flash Spotting Troop of 20 Locating Regiment in particular, had been commendable. It had started “ fixing” the Pakistani gun areas from Day One, when Pakistan attacked Kasowal. Thereafter, whenever and from wherever the enemy artillery opened up, the eyes and instruments of the flash spotters kept up-dating it’s latest locations, enabling effective counter bombardment.* The assaulting troops could thus close with the defenders
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* The flash spotters had established an Observation Post in the high dome of a mosque in Rattan Chhattar village, which provided them an excellent view deep into enemy territory. The Pakistanis got wind of the presence of this Observation Post and made two futile attempts to dislodge the flash spotters with artillery fire.
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without suffering many casualties from enemy gun fire. 10 Dogra received the maximum artillery support in their difficult task. Star shells were fired to guide the battalion on to the objective when troops appeared to be losing direction in the darkness. Pakistani gun areas were then engaged to silence the opposing artillery. And finally, an accurate crunch of fire was brought down on the defenders, immediately preceding the assault, by the Forward Observation Officer, Captain Jitender Kumar of 42 Field Regiment, while he himself was under heavy small arms fire. For his cool and sustained courage, Jitender was awarded the Vir Chakra. Another act of exceptional gallantry was performed by Major (later Brigadier) P. K. Sharma, the affiliated battery commander with 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, also of 42 Field Regiment. As the battalion moved forward to attack the Dussi Bund, this officer, along with another member of his party, Naik Mool Chand, charged into an enemy bunker left undetected by the advancing infantry, and killed it’s occupants at great risk,thus averting casualties to follow up troops. Sharma was awarded the Vir Chakra and Mool Chand the Sena Medal for their display of courage.
Gunner contribution in the success of the Dera Baba Nanak operations was further recognized with Brigadier M. L. Chadha being Mentioned-in-Despatches for his distinguished handling of 15 Artillery Brigade. Control of the artillery fire to support a multi- faceted operational plan, modified no sooner than Phase I commenced, had posed a great challenge to the gunners. That they were able to respond with speed and accuracy was a feather in the cap of the participating regiments. In particular, great credit was due to Lieutenent Colonel (later Lieutenent General) A. Manglik, commanding 42 Field Regiment), the regiment in direct support, and Major S. K. Sekhri, the Brigade Major of 21 Independent Artillery Brigade, manning the Fire Direction Center. For their distinguished coordination and control of fire, both officers were awarded the Sena Medal.
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Last but not the least, the Honour Title “ Dera Baba Nanak” was conferred on 42 Field Regiment. Above all, it was an efficient network of signal communications that helped the gunners to cope with the complex situation. The Artillery’s dependence on good communications needs no emphasis. Any disruption, delay or lack of fire control can lead to things going haywire, with rounds landing over their own troops, or at wrong places at the wrong time. It goes to the credit of the artillery commanders of the Dera Baba Nanak battle that they were able to achieve “ par excellence ” signal communications.
A study of this battle brings out some useful lessons.
1. First, it exemplifies a first rate tactical plan conceived by the Corps Commander aimed at quick capture of the enclave with minimum casualties.* The attack by 10 Dogra, in particular, had taken the Pakistanis by complete surprise. As the battalion’s leading elements were approaching the objective from the rear, a Pakistani soldier, unable to identify friend from foe in the darkness, was heard urging them to move on faster since “ the Indians had launched an attack on Dera Baba Nanak !” Equally commendable was its execution by Gauri Shankar, the Brigade Commander, combining both flexibility and firmness, against a determined enemy which was so well entrenched. Second, it highlights the importance of sound signal communications and the close cooperation that must exist between the artillery and the supported arm, failing which victory in modern warfare is seldom possible. Third, the vital role that counter bombardment can play towards success in battle. Inter alia, the need to silence the opposing artillery by air strikes, engagement by artillery air observation and ground
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* Ten Indians were killed, thirty-two wounded and three were missing. Pakistani casualties were twenty-four killed, one wounded and twenty-six prisoner.
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observation posts, the latter infiltrated behind enemy lines, ground raids on gun areas and above all, fixing hostile batteries through locating devices. Regrettably, the imperative need to silence the opponent’s artillery and taking requisite measures to do so was mostly given lip service during the Indo-Pak wars, both in 1965 and 1971. The battle helps to remind our military commanders that this aspect must form an essential ingredient of an operational plan, to minimize casualties from the artillery, the prime killer, as achieved at Dera Baba Nanak.
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CAPTURE OF BURJ AND FATEHPUR
(96 Infantry Brigade)
Pakistan had two enclaves across the Ravi, north-west of Amritsar at Fatehpur* and in the area of Bhaggo-Kamo, where it had prepared defences in the complex of the Dussi and other bunds. The battles for Burj and Fatehpur were fought by 96 Infantry Brigade to improve it’s defensive posture, in case Pakistan chose to launch a major offensive through these enclaves, thus posing a threat to Amritsar.
With one battalion gone out of it’s command to the Gurdaspur sub- sector, 96 Infantry Brigade had with it two infantry battalions (15 Marathas and 8 Sikh Light Infantry), and a squadron of tanks. 177 Field Regiment was in direct support. The brigade could also call for fire from 175 Field Regiment and 74 and 76 Medium Regiments, less a battery each. 15 Marathas was deployed along the Saki Nala, with some forward elements along the Dussi Bund skirting the Pakistani enclaves; while 8 Sikh Light Infantry held ground in the area of Chugawan in depth. Troops of the Border Security Force placed under the operational command of 96 Infantry Brigade manned the border, suitably reinforced by regular troops.
On the night of 3/4 December, Pakistan attacked our posts at Fatehpur, Burj, Ghoge, Behlol and Gulgarh. With
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* An Indian post, held by the Border Security Force, was also called by the same name.
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intense artillery bombardment preceding the attack, these posts were pushed back, and except for the villages of Bhindi-Aulak and Fatehpur, a sizeable area fell into enemy hands.
On 6 December, the Pakistanis attacked Bhindi-Aulak. This attack was, however, repulsed.* The same day, 15 Marathas went on the counter-offensive and fighting it’s way through a series of enemy bunkers located along the Dussi Bund, captured Tur and Burj. The enemy (43 Baluch) was badly mauled in this attack, leaving behind 53 dead and a large quantity of arms, ammunition and equipment. On 9 December, the Pakistanis counter-attacked Burj, but our artillery broke up the attack. 32 Pakistanis lay dead in this action and much ammunition and many small arms were captured.
Captain. V.D. Cherian of 177 Field Regiment, as the Forward Observation Officer, displayed exceptional courage throughout the above operations. By prompt engagement of targets, unmindful of personal safety, he played an important role in the Indian success. In appreciation, Cherian was awarded the Vir Chakra.
From the tempo of enemy activity it was by now apparent that it had no plans to mount a major offensive through this sector. 96 Infantry Brigade, therefore, decided to lift the depth battalion (8 Sikh Light Infantry) and employ it for the capture of Pakistan’s Fatehpur post and adjacent localities. The enemy strength in the area was estimated at two companies.
On the night of 11/12 December, 8 Sikh Light Infantry attacked Fatehpur. With the Pakistanis well entrenched, the battalion faced stiff opposition. Nevertheless, the assaulting
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* A day earlier, 150 men of the East Bengal Rifles had surrendered to Indian troops.
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troops pressed forward, assisted by tanks and effective engagement of targets by the gunners. By midnight, Fatehpur fell to the Indian attack. The Pakistanis launched a counter-attack. This too was beaten back.
Captain L.N.S. Rajan of 177 Field Regiment distinguished himself as the Forward Observation Officer. Assisted by his wireless operator Lance Naik Vijay Kumar, he provided timely and accurate artillery fire, both in the capture of Fatehpur post and in the breaking up of the counter-attack. Rajan and Vijay Kumar were awarded the Sena Medal.
The enemy stronghold called the Bund Junction was the next to fall. The Pakistanis reacted with a determined counter-attack, which nearly succeeded. On seeing the enemy about to rush his position, the company commander, Major Tirath Singh, called for gun fire on his own position, in the hope that while his troops sitting in bunkers would suffer less casualties, the assaulting enemy would suffer more. For a while, gunners at the gun end hesitated to respond and rechecked the order. The guns finally opened up. Regrettably, the gallant company commander was amongst the first fatal casualties. But as expected, the Pakistanis suffered more and unable to withstand the artillery bombardment, took to their heels. Tirath had saved the day, by taking the extreme step, rarely resorted to in battle.
96 Infantry Brigade now planned to capture the second enclave at Bhaggo-Kamo, to put an end to a threat through this sector. But with the declaration of the Cease-Fire, the attack did not materialize.
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BATTLE FOR RANIAN AND
PULKANJARI
(54 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
In the 54 Infantry Brigade area of responsibility, fighting between the opposing forces took place at Ranian and Pulkanjari, two border posts held by Indian troops.
Manned by troops of the Border Security Force, Pulkanjari was attacked twice. In the second attack on 4 December our troops were forced to pull back. It was only on 17 December, that the enemy was thrown out of Pulkanjari in a determined assault by 2 Sikh. Recalling the recapture of this post. General Rawlley reminiscences, “ On 16th evening, I was rung up by the Divisional Commander Bhattacharya saying that 2 Sikh were keen to recapture Pulkanjari. Since this post fell in their sub-sector and with India and Pakistan having agreed on a cease-fire, which was to come into effect 24 hours later, the battalion wanted to undertake this operation before the war ended, as a matter of honour. I agreed, but on the condition that it must be completed before the cease-fire. To ensure success, I further directed that every single artillery piece – medium, field and heavy mortar — within range, must be made available to support the attack.” The Corps Commander had fully appreciated the power of the gun to ensure success at Pulkanjari. In the event, 2 Sikh succeeded in capturing Pulkanjari in time, routing a company of 43 Punjab. The
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enemy counter-attacked, but the Sikhs stood firm. One Pakistani officer and 12 other ranks were captured and a large number wounded in this well conducted battle. As for the gunners, their response with the ammunition restrictions much relaxed in view of the impending cease-fire, had been marvellous indeed and greatly contributed to our success.
Ranian remained in Indian hands throughout. Captain H. S. Kahlon of 175 Field Regiment, the Observation Post Officer with a company of 9 Punjab, holding the post, distinguished himself in the defence of Ranian. Unmindful of personal safety and steadfast under heavy Pakistani shelling, this brave officer brought down effective artillery fire, which was largely responsible for beating back several enemy attacks. For his courageous role, he was awarded the Vir Chakra.
ATTARI – RAJATHAL
(38 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
38 Infantry Brigade was deployed south of the Grand Trunk Road, from Attari, exclusive to Rajathal. It was supported by two light batteries and one field battery. Both armies remained on the defensive in this area throughout the war. 30 Infantry Brigade did, however, capture two Pakistani border posts, besides carrying out aggressive patrolling and raids into enemy territory.
Lack of any worthwhile offensive action by India in Attari- Rajathal could be attributed to the meagre artillery support alloted to this sub-sector.
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7 INFANTRY DIVISION
7 Infantry Division was responsible for the defence of the axes Khalra-Burki and Khem Karan-Kasur, the Hussainiwala headworks and the city of Ferozepur. 65 Infantry Brigade covered the Khalra, and 48 Infantry Brigade the Khem Karan axes respectively. 15 Punjab with three companies of the Border Security Force defended Hussainiwala, while 35 Infantry Brigade from 14 Infantry Division placed under 7 Infantry Division was responsible for the security of Ferozepur. 29 Infantry Brigade less 15 Punjab, was held in reserve in the area of Patti-Harike. The forward brigades generally held defences behind artificial obstacles close to the border, with covering troops deployed ahead.
7 Artillery Brigade, commanded by Brigadier. R.S. Mahal, consisted of 171, 172 and 174 Field Regiments, 35 Light and 60 Heavy Regiments, 125 Divisional Locating Battery, one troop of 49 Air Defence Regiments and two sections of 14 Air Observation Post Flight. On arrival of 35 Infantry Brigade in the divisional sector, 5 Field and 223 Medium Regiments, affiliated to the brigade, also became part of the divisional artillery.
The Divisional Sector was sub-divided into three sub-sectors, with the following artillery alloted to each :
a)Khalra Sub-Sector (65 Infantry Brigade) 172 Field Regiment.
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One battery 35 Light Regiment.
Two batteries 60 Heavy Regiment.*
b) Khem Karan Sub-Sector (48 Infantry Brigade)
171 Field Regiment less one battery. 174 Field Regiment. 60 Heavy Regiment less two batteries. One battery 35 Light Regiment.
c) Ferozepur Sub-Sector (35 Infantry Brigade)
5 Field Regiment. 223 Medium Regiment.
One battery 171 Field Regiment. One battery 35 Light Regiment. One battery 3.7 inch Howitzers (ad hoc).
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* 76 Medium Regiment of 7 Division Artillery Brigade was alloted to 21 Independent Artillery Brigade and 60 Heavy Regiment of the latter formation was given to 7 Division Artillery Brigade.
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KHALRA SUB-SECTOR
(65 Infantry Brigade)
Failure at Chinna Bidhi Chand 65 Infantry Brigade (14 Rajput, 14 J & K Rifles, 3 Madras), responsible for the defence of the Khalra axis, was developed about 8 kilometres from the border along the Meri-Megha drain. The brigade front extended about 26 Kilometres. 3 Madras and 14 Rajput held the main defences on the drain, while 14 J & K was kept partly in reserve and the rest employed as covering troops. The border was held by troops of the Border Security Force.
| At about 6.30 P.M. on December, the enemy started shelling our border posts. Thinking that an attack was imminent, the Border Security Force personnel fell back to fill the gaps in the main defences. On their withdrawal, the Pakistanis occupied the area vacated, including the Indian post at village Chinna Bidhi Chand, and made contact with our covering troops. They now tried to feel the flanks and there were minor clashes with 14 J & K, but they did not make much effort to edge forward.
With the front thus stabilised, it was decided to evict the enemy from Chinna Bidhi Chand, behind which it had established a forward base. The task was alloted to 14 Rajput, supported by a squadron of armour. The post was reported to be held by one comapny.
At midnight of 7/8 December, two companies of 14 Rajput launched the attack and captured Chinna Bidhi Chand by 2 A.M. The Pakistanis put in a quick counter-attack but without success. All seemed well, till it
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was realised that there was yet another enemy company in the area whose presence had not been detected by the battalion patrols.
At dawn the next day, 14 Rajput anxiously awaited the arrival of the armourd squadron and re-organisation stores to help consolidate the position. Unfortunately, the tanks were unable to cross the Upper Bari Doab Canal and the re-organisation stores could not reach the objective due to enemy artillery fire. At 7.15 A.M., the enemy launched a second counter-attack. This too was repulsed. The enemy again counter-attacked at 10.30 A.M., at which time the Rajputs withdrew, with 1 officer and 5 other ranks killed, one JCO and 23 other ranks wounded and 3 JCOs and 22 other ranks missing.
As for the gunners, Captain A.K. Karkare and Captain V.K. Mishra of 35 Light Regiment held on to their posts, and as Forward Observation Officers they played a gallant role in covering the withdrawal of the infantry. Karkare went to the extent of calling for fire on his own position to keep the enemy at bay. While crossing the canal on pulling out from the village, this brave officer was killed by enemy machine-gun fire. For his courage and devotion to duty, he was awarded the Vir Chakra (posthumous), while Captain Mishra was Mentioned-in-Despatches. Major Harbajan Singh and Captain Tilak Raj of 172 Field Regiment also distinguished themselves in providing fire support at Chinna Bidhi Chand and were Mentioned-in-Despatches. These were individual acts of gallantry on the part of the gunners. But on the whole, no worthwhile use was made of the available fire-power, i.e. 172 Field Regiment, a battery of 35 Light Regiment and two batteries of 60 Heavy Regiment that could have been effectively utilised to support the operation. Had this been done, Chinna Bidhi Chand may well have remained in our hands.
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THE FEROZEPUR SUB-SECTOR
(35 Infantry Brigade)
Loss of Hussainiwala
“ Surprise is the most potent of all weapons yet discovered by man. The side that wields it effectively invariably wins the day. 15 Punjab too fell a victim to it. Once taken by surprise, things started going haywire, and a well prepared defensive position given up, when a fine unit like 15 Punjab was capable of digging it’s heels in.”
The Hussainiwala enclave lies west of the river Sutlej, along the main Lahore-Ferozepur Highway. About 29 square kilometres in area, it is linked with the Indian mainland by a rail-road bridge over the Sutlej. A series of bunds constructed within the enclave give protection to the Hussainiwala headworks during floods. The headworks feed the Gang Canal system which irrigates the arid villages of Ganga Nagar.
Militarily, the enclave is a valuable area for India. It provides depth to the headworks and the rail-road bridge and inter alia, to Ferozepur. A Pakistani breakthrough in this
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sector also poses a serious threat to Amritsar.
15 Punjab, along with three companies of the Border Security Force defended Hussainiwala. The defences were well prepared, with pillboxes and concrete bunkers skilfully sited along the flood protection bunds, and mines laid in the more sensitive areas. A squadron of 3 Cavalry was also alloted to the battalion. Positioned on the home bank, it was to be inducted into the enclave in the event of an attack. A two storied building built in the memory of the great freedom fighter, Bhagat Singh within the enclave, and a watch tower on the home bank, provided good all round observation. Although, all four companies of 15 Punjab were deployed inside the enclave the battalion headquarters was located across the river !
The battalion could expect artillery support from 11 fire units of various calibres, while a troop of 49 Air Defence Regiment protected the bridge from enemy air attacks. To direct artillery fire, three artillery Observation Posts, including one on the Bhagat Singh Memorial had been deployed within the enclave. Yet another was located on the watch tower. Provision of air support had been catered for. Hussainiwala was considered a strong position with a reputable, battle-tested battalion stocked with ammunition and rations for 15 days defending the enclave.
On 3 December, the routine continued as usual in 15 Punjab and the normal traffic of foreign tourists and load carriers flowed along the main road. Battalion officers and JCOs were attending a tea party at the battalion headquarters (outside the enclave), to bid farewell to the retiring Subedar Major, as Pakistan’s 106 Infantry Brigade, silently completed its concentration for attack.
At 6.30 P.M., on 3 December, the Pakistanis struck at Hussainiwala. Intense artillery bombardment preceded a well coordinated three pronged attack, along the main road,
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from the south towards the bridge and from the north-west respectively, taking 15 Punjab by complete surprise.
The night of 3/4 December witnessed numerous scenes of fierce fighting. While 15 Punjab put up a stout defence, the Pakistanis were equally determined to capture the enclave. The company deployed to cover the main road withstood the initial brunt of the Pakistani attack, resisting repeated assaults. Led by courageous leaders however, the enemy kept pressing forward and engaged the defenders in hand to hand combat, as Bhagat Singh’s memorial, some distance in the rear, looked helplessly on. The brave martyr had not laid down his life for India’s freedom to witness this spectacle of a divided India, with brothers of yesteryears out to kill one another. The Pakistani thrust, down south, also steadily progressed, edging it’s way towards the bridge.
|As the battalion was engaged in the grim night battle, an unfortunate incident occured. This was the blowing up of the Hussainiwala bridge, either in panic or by sympathetic detonation of the demolition charges prepared by the engineers; a mystery which remains unresolved. Whatever be the truth, the armoured squadron remained confined to the home bank and the hard pressed infantry denied the much needed tank support. In fact, one Centurion tank, earlier inducted into the enclave, and for some reason ordered to return to home bank, sank to the bottom of the Sutlej with its crew and some wounded Punjabis as the bridge collapsed.
By the early morning of 4 December, two forward companies had been overrun. Only a handful of troops occupying the upper storey of the Memorial held out. Describing the Memorial battle, Major General Fazal Mukeem writes “ Pakistani troops occupied the ground floor with picked volunteers, but could not reach the top as the brave Indian 15 Punjabis continued defying these attempts
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from the top floor. ” Eventually, Pakistani tanks had to blow up the building to evict the gallant defenders. 15 Punjab had gone through a ghastly night. And yet, it’s gallant men still held Hussainiwala with the remaining two companies. Later, during the day the Indian Air Force too joined battle. In 23 sorties flown to Hussainiwala, it inflicted considerable damage on enemy infantry and armour.
Meanwhile, at the battalion headquarters, the Commanding Officer, Shastri, had formed a gloomy picture of his ability to hold Hussainiwala any further. He thus urged Anand, the Brigade Commander, sitting next to him, to permit withdrawal. The Brigade Commander concurred. The Divisional Commander with his headquarters 128 kilometres away, could not possibly obtain a proper feel of the battle or to exercise his personality. In the face of the assessment of the situation conveyed to him, he also agreed. The Corps Commander had his reservations and decided to fly to Ferozepur to make an on the spot assessment. But a mechanical failure of his helicopter prevented his flight. In the event, orders were issued by the General Officer Commanding 7 Infantry Division for 15 Punjab to abandon Hussainiwala at 6 P.M. on 4 December.
en hos Indian casualties during the battle were 17 killed, 3 officers and 31 other ranks wounded, while 2 officers, two JCOs and 72 other ranks were missing. Apparently, the enemy had also been badly mauled as it made no attempt to interfere with the withdrawal of our troops.
The Indian failure at Hussainiwala can be attributed to : First, the complete surprise achieved by Pakistan. The traffic check post which was kept open, presumably on political considerations, till the actual outbreak of hostilities,* largely contributed to the surprise since normal
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* Closing of the Check Post would have been looked at as an hostile act.
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flow of traffic gave a scene of normalcy to the defenders. To them war with Pakistan did not appear to be imminent. On the other hand, the open border was a God sent situation for the enemy. Making full use of it, the leading elements of the assaulting battalions entered the enclave in civil buses, completely unsuspected, as part of the routine traffic. 15 Punjab had already lost the first round. Surprise is the most potent of all weapons yet discovered by man. The side that wields it effectively invariably wins the day. 15 Punjab too, fell a victim to it. Once taken by surprise, things started going haywire, and a well prepared defensive position given up, when a fine unit like 15 Punjab, was capable of digging it’s heels in. Second, the commanding officer failed to move to a forward command post from his battalion headquarters on the east bank. He thus denied the men his personal leadership, besides carrying out the requisite readjustments of defences as the battle progressed. Third, the blowing up of the bridge adversely swayed the course of the battle. With the armour unable to enter the enclave, the infantry was denied its much needed support. Fourth, Pakistan had amassed for the battle more than double the number of guns, as compared to India. This assessment is based on reports from Indian gunners that Pakistani artillery had fired from about 30 different locations. According to Freemantle, enemy shelling made movement to and within the enclave almost impossible. Besides being surprised, our troops thus faced the impact of heavy concentrations of enemy artillery.
One also cannot help comment that neither the Divisional nor the Corps Commander could reach the scene of battle due to non- availability of a helicopter. That it was not possible to provide adequate number of these machines to senior field commanders with their troops spread over vast areas, can hardly be condoned. The enemy inaction after capturing Hussainiwala notwithstanding, any breach in defences is always a matter of serious concem, for it can
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snowball into a flood and turn the strategic chessboard completely topsy-turvy.
For the gunners it had been hectic non-stop activity. Artillery wireless and telephones worked around the clock, buzzing with passage of fire orders, as gun areas thundered with fire. Ammunition expenditure had been heavy, with over 6,000 rounds fired during the battle. To replenish stocks, ammunition vehicles rushed from the wagon lines to the gun end. Artillery Observation Posts, both within the enclave and on the home bank, kept engaging the enemy throughout the night of attack and the next day with little respite. Those within the enclave, with Captains M. M. Ghosh, Surinder Singh and M. S. Matharoo were amongst the last to abandon Hussainiwala, engaging the assaulting Pakistanis till as long as possible. Captain M. S. Matharoo of 171 Field Regiment, occupying an Observation Post on the Memorial engaged enemy tanks barely 75 metres away. He was the only survivor of his party. Captain D. K. Sharma of 223 Medium Regiment on the watch tower, continued to man his post bringing down artillery concentrations, unmindful of personal safety, as the enemy made frantic efforts to destroy the tower with artillery fire. And when the tower was finally hit, Sharma still held on, alongwith his wireless operator, Harbhajan Singh, firing at the enemy with all available artillery. For their courage and devotion to duty, Sharma was awarded the Vir Chakra and Harbhajan Singh was Mentioned-in-Despatches. Lieutenant Colonel L. T. Fernandes, Commanding 5 Field Regiment, in direct support of 35 Infantry Brigade, was also Mentioned-in-Despatches for efficient handling and coordination of his artillery resources. He was wounded due to enemy shelling.
Paying a tribute to the Indian Artillery and Air Force, Lieutenant General Candeth writes, “ It was the intimate gun support and the Air Force action that had held the enemy at bay till the evening of the 4th and this enabled the
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forward troops to withdraw successfully.” The contribution of Indian artillery in this battle has also been acknowledged by Major General Fazal Mukeem Khan in his book, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership.
Loss of Hussainiwala equally highlights that even effective artillery and air support are of no avail, if the Commander’s will to fight is lost. This truism shall always remain the crucial fact. Further, it is no business of front-line units to lower their guard, merely because all appears quiet and peaceful opposite their sector. A get-together of officers for a farewell party when, as mentioned earlier, the entire Western Front had been placed on full alert (with a positive intelligence report received on 30 November, of Pakistan attacking India within 72 hours) cannot be condoned.
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THE KHEM KARAN SUB-SECTOR
(48 Infantry Brigade)
Capture of the Sehjra Salient
“Our guns were ordered to engage Sehjra defences on two consecutive nights immediately preceding the attack at exactly the same time as we had planned during the actual attack. As a result, while the Gorkhas edged forward to close on to Sehjra, the enemy was led to believe that our artillery firing on the night of 5/6 December was yet another act of harassing fire by the Indians.”
Major General F.L. Freemantle
(GOC 7 Infantry Division, in 1971)
The Sehjra salient is a 55 Sq. Kms. Pakistani enclave, south-east of Khem Karan. Situated on a 20 foot high escarpment, the village of Sehjra, with some 800 houses, dominates the entire area and is the key to the defence of the enclave. A 10 foot high bund protects the village from the north. The Pakistanis had laid extensive minefields covering the approaches to Sehjra, except in the south, where a 5 foot deep stream, nicknamed the “ Snake ”, acted as an obstacle. The bulge was defended by 25 Baluch of 52
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(Pak) Brigade, along with the Sutlej Rangers, Mujahids and elements of a reconnaisance and support battalion.
Sehjra provided Pakistan a suitable springboard from which it could attack our main defences at Valtoha, with a follow-up assault to capture the Indian headworks at Harike and the bridge over the Sutlej.
To counter the above threat and to improve our defensive posture in the Khem Karan sub-sector, 48 Infantry Brigade (1/5 Gorkha Rifles, 6 Mahar and 9 Sikh Light Infantry) under Brigadier Menon, was given the task of capturing the Sehjra salient, supported by a squadron of 3 Cavalry. Besides 174 Field Regiment in direct support, the Brigade was alloted six additional batteries, including two heavy batteries, to provide the fire support.
With concrete emplacements, amply stocked with ammunition, and with weapons skilfully sited, Sehjra was a strong Pakistani position. The key to success lay in the degree of surprise that we could achieve. General Freemantle succeeded in achieving this one hundred percent, and coupled with a brilliant plan of attack, Sehjra fell in just one night of fighting.
The attack on Sehjra was launched on the night of 5/6 December. As a preliminary operation, a company of 6 Mahar infiltrated through the bulge defences and cut off the enemy’s escape routes by establishing a road block near Mahiwala village. Meanwhile, 1/5 Gorkha Rifles set out on a wide outflanking move and at midnight, attacked Sehjra village from the rear, after fording the “Snake”* . This unexpected direction of attack took the defenders completely by surprise. Nonetheless, the enemy soon rallied itself and
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* An attack from the rear had hinged on troops’ ability to wade through the “Snake”. It was a group of buffalos that were to remove all doubts, as a sneak patrol of 1/5 Gorkhas watched them cross the nullah with ease.
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had to be evicted practically from every bunker. As the Gorkhas were engaged in reducing the Sehjra defences, 9 Sikh Light Infantry captured the Pakistani border posts at Mabbuke, Bhukkiwala and Nagar Aminpur, while 6 Madras swept through enemy posts at Chat Chupsari, Mobiwala and Foitiwala. Well supported by artillery, both battalions carried out a tidy operation with minimum casualties.
By the morning of 6 December, the entire salient had been captured.
The artillery’s share in the victory at Sehjra had been no less significant. Not only did it help break the defenders’ will to fight with tight concentrations fired by nine fire units on each locality by turn, it also contributed in achieving surprise. With regard to the latter, Freemantle recalls, “ Our guns were ordered to engage the Sehjra defences on two consecutive nights immediately preceding the attack, at exactly the same time as we had planned during the actual attack. As a result, while the Gorkhas edged forward to close on to Sehjra, the enemy was led to believe that our artillery firing on the night of 5/6 December was yet another act of harassing by the Indians.”
The capture of Sehjra had been a commendable operation. The point to note is that 1/5 Gorkha Rifles attacked the main enemy defences without numerical superiority, when the norm is to attack with a strength thrice that of the defender. Such was the effect of surprise, resolute leadership, superb conduct of battle and a most effective employment of artillery.
From the gunners, Major H. L. Dua and Captain Gajraj Singh of 174 Field Regiment distinguished themselves by their good shooting, unmindful of personal safety. Both Dua and Gajraj were Mentioned-in-Despatches for their contribution in winning the battle. For it’s provision of excellent fire support, 174 Field Regiment was awarded the
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Honour Title “Sehria ”
Our casualties during this operation were two officers, one JCO and 10 other ranks killed and 26 other ranks wounded, while Pakistan had 30 killed and 65 taken prisoner. A very large quantity of arms and ammunition fell into Indian hands.
During the night of 12/13 December, the Pakistanis, about a company strength, again entered the salient. On being detected the next morning, they were surrounded by a company of 1/5 Gorkha Rifles, a platoon of 6 Mahar and troops of the Border Security Force and later overrun by our tanks. The enemy left behind 30 dead and 14 wounded.
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7 INFANTRY DIVISION GUNNERS
Cobopna vinoinarrbro A Compliment
The loss of Hussainiwala and Chinna Bidhi Chand, notwithstanding, a warm compliment paid to the gunners by their General Officer Commanding merits mention, before closing the account of the operation undertaken by 7 Infantry Division. Major General Freemantle said, “I have no doubt that the artillery was the battle-winning factor. The demands on our guns were numerous and despite the enemy making frantic and extensive efforts to silence our guns, there never was an occasion when fire called for was not produced, quickly and effectively. I do know how close the enemy counter-bombardment came to our gun positions but I was proud and pleased that never once did the guns fail to respond to a call of fire. In addition, the work by the forward observation officers and Artillery observation posts wa’s of a very high order, practically without exception. In a nutshell, 7 Artillery Brigade, including 60 Heavy Regiment, was largely responsible for any success gained by 7 Infantry Division and primarly responsible for staying off any possible defeats that we might have sustained.”
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14 INFANTRY DIVISION
(Operations by 35 and 116 Infantry Brigades)
14 Infantry Division (58 Brigade, 35 Brigade and 116 Brigade), under Major General Harish Bakshi, had moved into the 11 Corps sector towards the third week of October. As mentioned earlier, this Division together with 1 Armoured Division formed the Army Headquarters reserve, as a counterpoise to 2 (Pak) Corps. Whereas 1 Armoured Division remained intact, 14 Infantry Division on arrival was ordered to detach 58 and 35 Infantry Brigades to meet immediate operational requirements in 15 and 7 Infantry Division sectors, respectively. Headquarters 14 Infantry Division was located at Faridkot and it’s third brigade (116), deployed in the Muktsar area.
After the fall of Hussainiwala, 35 Infantry Brigade reverted to 14 Infantry Division and operational assignments were readjusted. 14 Division was now made responsible for the area from Harike headworks up to Fazilka; the city of Ferozepur being one of its important defensive commitments. Since Pakistan did not commit 2 (Pak) Corps to battle, 14 Infantry Division did not play any significant role, except for undertaking a few local actions, south of Ferozepur.
In the 35 Infantry Brigade sector, Pakistan heavily shelled the border observation posts at Raja Mahatam and Joginder, on the night of 4/5. December. Troops of the Border Security Force manning these posts fell back, unable
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to withstand the shelling. They were ordered to retake the posts, which they did, three days later. Wadhwa, a police officer, distinguished himself in the capture of Raja Mahatam. He was killed in this action and awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (posthumous), for his courage and devotion to duty. Harish Bakshi, who visited the post after it’s capture, was also wounded by a mine blast and was evacuated, handing over his command to Major General Onkar Singh Kalkat. Elsewhere in the brigade sector, 15 Dogra captured enemy border posts at Basti, Anoke and New Kasoke, thus securing the area north of Ferozepur up to the Sutlej. The battalion was then ordered to eliminate a Pakistani enclave, south of the Sutlej to deny the enemy a lodgement area for developing a thrust towards Ferozepur. As part of this operation, 15 Dogra captured Rangewala, though with considerable casualties from enemy artillery and machine-gun fire. Later joined by 13 Punjab, the enclave was ultimately cleared by 16 December.
Further south, 116 Infantry Brigade was deployed to hold the bridgehead across the Bikaner Gang Canal, to cover the Ferozepur-Gur Harshai Canal and Muktsar-Jalalabad roads. With the enemy lying dormant in this sector, Kalkat moved some elements of the brigade forward and captured the Pakistani posts at Peepoke, Kalisahn, Gatti Bhapole, Ghurka and Amin Shaini, employing 1 Para and 17 Madras. In the capture of the above posts, Pakistani casualties were 29 killed while 17 were taken prisoner. Indian troops also captured a large number of weapons and ammunition. One Indian NCO was killed, two JCOs and 13 other ranks were wounded during the above attacks. After the ceasefire, Pakistan attacked Kali Sahu post on 3 January. The attack was repulsed. 24 Pakistanis were killed and 12 taken prisoner.
In all, 14 Infantry Division captured 13 Pakistani posts, displaying good aggressive spirit, planning and execution.
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OPERATIONS IN “F” SECTOR (ebppna vitons
“To honour the officers, JCOs and jawans who gave their lives at Fazilka, a magnificent memorial stands today at village Asafwala; and every year a big Shaheedi Mela is held here. The memorial must also serve as a grim reminder of the shortage of fire support that was provided to them.”
“F” sector, under Major General Ram Singh, was responsible for the defence of the territory from beyond Ferozepur to Anupgarh. The sector order of battle comprised of three infantry brigades (67,51 Para, and 163), 18 Cavalry, 4 Independent Armoured Squadron, 70 Armoured Regiment less a squadron, 92 Independent Reconnaisance Squadron, 166 Field Regiment, 9 Para Field Regiment, 15 Field Regiment, 723, 729 and 721 Medium Batteries and an engineer brigade equivalent.
Ram Singh deployed his command with a brigade group each in the areas of Fazilka, Ganga Nagar and Suratgarh. The main enemy action in “F” sector took place in the area of Fazilka. Further south, India had to fight a costly battle to deal with a Pakistani force which had intruded into Jalwala, in the Suratgarh sector, after the cease-fire.
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THE FAZILKA BATTLE
(67 Infantry Brigade)
Fazilka town faces Pakistan’s Sulaimanke headworks on the Sutlej. Located about 1.5 kilometres inside Pakistan and about 16 kilometres from Fazilka, the headworks feed a number of canals that irrigate the sandy tracks of Pakistan, to the south. The defence of Sulairnanke was of vital concern to Pakistan. Equally, Fazilka held great strategic importance for India. First, in case Pakistan launched a major offensive, employing 2 (Pak) Corps, either along the southern flank against Ganga Nagar-Anupgarh, or across the Sutlej between Hussainiwala-Sulaimanke, Fazilka could act as a pivot for developing an Indian counter-offensive against either flank. Second, Fazilka could itself become a major battlefield if Pakistan launched 2 (Pak) Corps through Sulaimanke. With the Sutlej now flowing in Pakistan territory, it could be crossed at will, without involving the attacker in an opposed river crossing operation. A good Class 70 bridge was available for further build up.
67 Infantry Brigade (4 Jat, 3 Assam and 15 Rajput) with two battalions of the Border Security Force was given the task to contain the Pakistani bridgehead at Sulaimanke and to defend Fazilka. The Brigade was alloted a squadron of 18 Cavalry, 4 Independent Armoured Squadron, a squadron of 70 Armoured Regiment, 166 Field Regiment and one medium battery.
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Facing 67 Infantry Brigade, Pakistan had deployed 105 Infantry Brigade (18 Baluch, 7 Punjab and 6 Frontier Force), along with rangers and mujahids, supported by one armoured squadron, one medium regiment and one field regiment.
There were four approaches to Fazilka. The first and second approaches were via Muazzam in the north and along the main Sulaimanke-Fazilka road respectively. The third and fourth approaches were from the direction of Amrok and Shitriwala in the south.
After the 1965 Indo-Pak War, a wet 45 feet wide anti-tank obstacle, with a 15 to 20 foot high embankment on the home side, called the Sabuna Distributory, had been prepared, to bolster the defensive potential of Fazilka. Aligned parallel to the border, about 5,000 metres behind, strong defensive positions had been prepared along this distributory.
To defend Fazilka, 67 Infantry Brigade deployed four companies of the Border Security Force along the border, while three companies of 3 Assam acted as covering troops ahead of the Sabuna, holding strong points at Pakka, Churiwala and Didir Baksh. The fourth company was deployed on the distributory, with it’s right flank at Beriwala bridge, held by miscellaneous personnel, including the battalion’s motor transport platoon. 15 Rajput less two companies, and four companies of the Border Security Force manned defences along the distributory further upstream. The remainder of the brigade held a fortress defence at Fazilka, about ten kilometres in the rear.
At 6.30 P.M., on 3 December, Pakistan’s 6 Frontier Force moved into the attack preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment on the entire front. Advancing silently along a carefully selected route, a company of this battalion succeeded in capturing the Beriwala bridge, taking the
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defenders completely by surprise. Another battalion (7 Punjab) advanced towards Pakka and by midnight managed to get behind the strong point. The Company Commander at Pakka was killed, and the remainder 118 all ranks, including the artillery Observation Post party, were taken prisoner, without much fight. With the fall of the company strong point at Pakka and the capture of the bridge, the other two strong points and posts manned by the Border Security Force also fell back on the distributory. Seeing the rout, the brigade commander panicked and ordered the demolition of the remaining bridges on the distributory.
Five attempts were made by the brigade to retake the Beriwala bridge, between 4 to 14 December. Each attack was pressed forward with vigour. The courage displayed by 4 Jat Battalion, in particular, won appreciation even from Pakistani commanders. Our attacks were, however, launched piece-meal. Further, with wet rice fields around, the tanks got bogged down, presenting lucrative targets to Pakistani medium artillery. On the other hand, the enemy had extensively covered all approaches to the bridge with small arms, anti-tank and artillery fire. Coupled with the dogged resistance put up by the defenders, who now held the bridge with two companies, Beriwala remained in Pakistani hands. The Beriwala bridge operation had been costly indeed. Major General Ram Singh was himself wounded while personally supervising one attack.
From the gunners, Captain R. S. Sodhi and Wireless Operator Surjit Singh, both of 166 Field Regiment, distinguished themselves during the attacks on Beriwala. Though wounded, in two seperate attacks, they kept performing their role with courage. Surjit Singh was awarded the Vir Chakra and Sodhi was Mentioned-in-Despatches.
Emboldened by the success at Beriwala, the enemy now moved a battalion and a troop of tanks in the area of their
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posts at Muazzam and Gazi, north of Fazilka. The enemy’s apparent aim was to bypass the Sabuna drain for development of further operations inside Indian territory. –
15 Rajput and 3/11 Gorkha Rifles were ordered to counter this threat by capturing the above posts. Muazzam was successfully attacked on the night of 11/12 December by 15 Rajput. The battalion next attacked Gazi, the following night, with 3/11 Gorkha moving to Muazzam. Gazi too, was captured in a well executed encircling movement. Unfortunately, the Rajputs were not quick to consolidate their gain and were thrown back by a Pakistani counter-attack, leaving behind a few wounded and a recoilless gun.
Lieutenant Colonel N. N. Rawat, the Commanding Officer of 166 Field Regiment who had accompanied the Brigade Commander to the area of Gazi post, collected about 10 men from the withdrawing battalion and along with a platoon of 3/11 Gorkha Rifles recovered the recoilless gun and evacuated some wounded jawans. He then mustered more stragglers from 15 Rajput and took up a defensive position along the Muazzam Bund and held it till reinforced by a company of 3/11 Gorkha Rifles. For his courage and initiative Rawat was awarded the Vir Chakra.
Commenting on the covering troops debacle, Lieutenant General Candeth writes, “The border security outposts sent alarming and exaggerated reports of the strength of the enemy massing for the attack and this assessment was unfortunately believed by the Commanding Officer of 3 Assam, whose troops were deployed on the covering position and by the Brigade Commander. They were convinced that they were about to be attacked by two infantry brigades plus an armoured regiment.” Apparently, the word also percolated down to the covering troops, shaking their confidence to hang on to their strong points.
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Troops in contact tend to send exaggerated reports and when the initiative to start hostilities rests with the aggressor, men occupying isolated strong points do, at times, lose their nerve. In fact, at one stage, a withdrawal even from the distributory had been recommended, and it was only on the personal intervention of Candeth that this was averted.
I do not wish to enter into the merits or de-merits of the tactical deployment of troops: Whether 3 Assam should have held the distributory in strength rather than the bulk of it occupying covering positions, and whether the concept of fortress defence of Fazilka located 10 kilometres away, gave the brigade the ability to fight an integrated defensive battle are moot points.
But one observation stands as clear as daylight. The allotment of only one field regiment and a medium battery to 67 Infantry Brigade, extended over a vast area, was grossly inadequate.* 72 and 79 Medium Regiments, less a battery each, had later been rushed to supplement the meagre artillery resources. Perhaps, they were moved too late to the brigade sector. In any case, this reinforcing artillery was also not adequate to influence the battle. A sector of such strategic importance as Fazilka required thrice the quantum of fire support, both for effective defence, and to prevent loss of valuable lives. In consequence, the Brigade’s casualties during the 14 days of fighting were 190 killed, 425 wounded and 196 missing. India had also to part with a rich track of agricultural land for Pakistani occupation.
To honour the officers, JCOs and jawans who gave their lives at Fazilka, a magnificent memorial stands today at village Asafwala and every year a big “ Shaheedi Mela” is held here. The memorial must also serve as a grim reminder of the utter shortage of fire support that was provided to them.
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* To cover the entire frontage, the regiment had to be deployed batterywise, in three separate gun areas, thereby reducing it’s effectiveness by one third.
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With regard to the employment of artillery alloted to 11 Corps, Lieutenant General Rawlley comments, “The medium guns had to be rushed all over. We reached a stage when the gun tyres completed their mileage, after which they had to be moved by train. Regrettably, there were no spare tyres with us, nor were any held in army depots.” Rawlley tried to optimise his artillery resources and in the process he had, perforce, to whip his medium guns, in order to utilise their longer range, till they could not move on their own. But the fact that the defence planners at Delhi had not catered for adequate gun tyres, when about to go to war, is indeed both revealing and sad. Further, it speaks of the utter shortage of artillery alloted to 11 Corps which, as mentioned earlier, was the most important sector of the Western Front. To say that this was not possible since the artillery available to Western Command was itself limited neither helped the front-line soldier nor the protection of our national frontiers.
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ACTION AT JALWALA
One other action in “F” sector which merits mention, is a Pakistani intrusion in the Suratgarh sector (held by 50 Para Brigade), after the cease-fire.
On 25 December, it was discovered that Pakistan had established a platoon post of regular troops, along with some Rangers, in the area of Jalwala. A company attack was launched by 4 Para Battalion to evict the enemy, in the early hours of 28 December.
After a two hour battle, the battalion succeeded in throwing back the enemy. Pakistan artillery, however, played havoc with the Indian assault. A copy of the enemy fire-plan, which fell in to Indian hands, was an eye-opener as to the amount of artillery support that was provided to this post held by just 30-40 men. In his book Indian Army aster Independence, Major K. C. Praval writes, “It is estimated that Pakistanis employed 72 artillery pieces (four artillery regiments) in this action. Indian casualties totalled 81 – 21 killed (including 3 officers) and 60 wounded (including 2 officers). ”
All credit to the paratroopers who pressed on to the objective despite very heavy casualties. But look at the attrition rate of opposing troops with artillery employed en masse, in the event of a long war.
Before concluding an account of the operations in the Punjab and Ganga Nagar in 1971. I quote below General
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Rawlley’s warm appreciation of the role played by gunner units of 11 Corps and his view of the value of the artillery arm in general, “ The gunners did a tremendous job. They broke up attack after attack of the enemy. I am an infantry officer, but I would say a large infantry force in the context of plains warfare does not win you battles.”
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AERIAL STRIKES ON PATHANKOT – AMRITSAR
(Airfields – Ammunition Dump – Signal Unit)
During the 1971 war, the Punjab had been a dormant sector, as compared to the intensity of battles elsewhere on the Western Front. As such, our ground forces in this region experienced little aerial activity. Pakistan’s main effort was directed on our airfield – ammunition dump at Pathankot, and the airfield – signal unit at Amritsar. Enemy success against these vital targets would have had a far-reaching impact on our conduct of war, with denial of valuable air support and ammunition replenishment to the Army and strategic bombing of enemy in depth.
Not much is known of the outstanding part played by 27 Air Defence Regiment, whose sub-units defended the above areas, in aborting the designs of Pakistan. Given below is a brief account of the steadfast and courageous role of this regiment in beating back successive eremy attacks.
On the evening of 3 December, the first wave of Pakistani aircraft (Sabres and Mirage III jets) crossed the International border for a pre-emptive strike at Pathankot airfield. With war by now immi .ent, and air defence gunners on full alert, the enemy was met with a prompt barrage of gun-fire. Pakistani pilots lost heart, turned back and sped away without releasing their bombs. They were
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certainly in for a severe reprimand at home. Then came the second wave. It succeeded in penetrating the curtain of gunfire, but lacked the nerve for an accurate strike. One Sabre was seen engulfed in smoke as it headed for Pakistan. On 4 December, enemy aircraft attacked the large ammunition dump at Pathankot. A lucrative target, its blowing up would have spelled disaster. But our stout-hearted gunners threw back the invaders with their effective firing. One aircraft was destroyed while the pilot bailed out. Havildar G. K. Nair displayed exemplary leadership during this engagement, in complete disregard of personal safety, and was awarded the Vir Chakra. During the period 7 – 11 December, the Pakistanis intensified their air strikes, both on the airfield and the ammunition dump — but with little success. Our air defence claimed having hit five jets — though none could be downed. Air attacks on Pathankot ceased thereafter; presumably in face of effective flak, with loss — damage to aircraft on the one hand and failure to achieve any worthwhile result on the other.
Concurrent with the pre-emptive air strike on Pathankot, Pakistan bombed the airfield and the air force signal unit at Amritsar on the evening of 3 December. One Mirage III was hit by our gunners during this attack; though it managed to get across the border leaving behind a trail of smoke. Besides damaging a portion of the runway (which was soon repaired) the air strike had been a failure. Eleven air raids were carried out by the enemy in the first three days alone to render the airfield non-operational. During this crucial period, two enemy aircraft were shot down and three damaged by 12 Air Defence Battery. One starfighterwas shot down by Havildar Chettiar during the Pakistani raid on the airfield and the pilot captured, while a B 57 was destroyed in the air strike on the signal unit by Havildar Krishnan with it’s pilot killed and navigator captured – both on 5 December
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To ensure a kill is not easy. The air defence gunner has to hold his fire till the opportune moment as the roaring monster approaches the target area. In the shooting down of the above aircraft, it had been a one to one fight between the attacking aircraft and the gun; with split second decision making both by the pilot, when to release his bomb, and the gunner, the time to press his trigger. For their display of cool nerve and courage of a high order, Chettiar and Krishnan were decorated with the Vir Chakra. Excellent command and control exercised by Major S. R. Prothi (later Brigadier), the Battery Commander, and Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) H. S. Sandhu, in command of the troop at the signal unit, throughout the above operations, was also recognised with the award of Vishisht Seva Medal and Sena Medal respectively.
Civil morale shot up as word went around of the success achieved by the air defence gunners. Newspapers and the radio paid tribute to their courage and fighting skill. Overnight they had become heroes of Amritsar.
In recognition of it’s outstanding performance, 27 Air Defence Regiment was bestowed the Honour Title “ Amritsar Airfield “, and the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Saldana was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal for effective handling of his unit.
While recording of the glorious air defence at Pathankot and Amritsar in 1971, we must also remind ourselves of the growing capabilities of air power. The destructive potential of modern aircraft has to be matched with organisation of improved air defence in the event of a future war. Needless to add that inputs made to strengthen India’s air defence would be negligible, viz, the damage that enemy air power can inflict on us. We cannot, therefore, afford to be penny wise and pound foolish.
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RAJASTHAN Operations by Southern Command
“ It was desert warfare in its truest form and colours, with no roads, acute scarcity of water and vast expanses of shifting sand dunes, interspersed with rocky outcrops. The area of operations was practically treeless and devoid of vegetation, with clusters of low thorny scrubs dotting the forbidding landscape, their colours merging with the desert sand.”
The Indo-Pak war of 1965 witnessed little activity in the Rajasthan sector. Fighting was limited to a 40 kilometre stretch in the area of Barmer-Hyderabad, with troops of 11 Infantry Division driving out Pakistani Rangers from the area of Gadra, followed by the capture of enemy posts at Dali and Khinsor. Pakistan retaliated with an attack on Munabao, forcing our garrison to withdraw. After the ceasefire, Pakistan also managed to grab some additional territory surreptiously, as a bargaining counter to Indian gains elsewhere.
It was in the 1971 war that Rajasthan became a major battleground.
The area of responsibility of Headquarters Southern Command, under Lieutenant General G.C. Bewoor,
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extended from Bikaner to the sea. Broadly divided into Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Barmer and Kutch sectors, military operations during 1971 were confined to Jaisalmer and Barmer.
11 and 12 Infantry Divisions were the two formations placed under Headquarters Southern Command to fight the desert war. During the warning period, they had been concentrated in the Barmer and Jaisalmer sectors respectively. To face the above formations, Pakistan had deployed 18 (Pak) Infantry Division, with two armoured regiments, five wings of Desert Rangers and seven to eight Mujahid battalions.
An Indian thrust across the desert could hit Pakistan hard in the underbelly. Inter alia, it could threaten the security of her only seaport, Karachi, and the rail-road link between Sindh and West Punjab. Based on a degree of success, it could also force Pakistan to detach some forces from 2 (Pak) Corps to counter the Indian advance, thereby weakening the offensive potential of this corps for operations against India in the Anupgarh sector.
Fully alive to the above possibilities, Pakistan had left the desert on her side of the border about 40-60 kilometres deep, undeveloped and had organised it’s defence line in the green belt and beyond. Indian troops had thus to face a major problem of desert crossing and to carry out the requisite build up before launching an attack.
According to Indian assessment, the enemy was likely to remain on the defensive opposite Rajasthan, employing one infantry brigade, with an armoured regiment each, to cover the Jaisalmer and Barmer sectors, while keeping the third brigade group in reserve.
Broadly, the Indian plan envisaged 12 Infantry Division under Major General R.K. Khambatta to advance in the
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Jaisalmer sector, cross the desert and capture Rahim Yar Khan and it’s airfield. Located on the rail-road link, between Lahore and Karachi, it’s capture would cut off Punjab from Sindh. Thereafter, the division was to develop operations towards Sukkur or Bahawalpur. In a simultaneous offensive, 11 Infantry Division, under Major General R.D.R. Anand was to launch an attack in the Barmer sector, about 240 kilometres to the south, capture Naya Chor and pose a threat to Hyderabad (Sindh).
The plan had been war-gamed several times and approved. Battles do not, however, always go as planned. Ground realities, at times, turn out to be quite different to what has been conceived. Added to it are the human failings of commanders acting brave and optimistic while planning on paper or on sand models. This applied as much to the Rajasthan campaign, with people getting wiser only after the event.
In defence of our operational planners it must, however, be said that this was the first time that the Indian Army was to undertake a large scale operation in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. Nor was the experience gained by Indian troops in World War II, in the North African desert, to be of much help. The latter generally allowed free movement of both wheeled and tracked vehicles on fairly hard going. Lack of mobility, on the other hand, was a major handicap, faced by our troops in the soft sands of Rajasthan.
It was desert warfare in it’s truest form and colours, with no roads,acute scarcity of water and vast expanses of shifting sand dunes, interspersed with rocky outcrops. The area of operations was practically treeless and devoid of vegetation, with clusters of low thorny scrubs dotting the forbidding landscape; their colours merging with the desert sand. This land of sheep, camel and drought, had changed little in landscape through time. The ravages of history had
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hit Rajasthan hard. It’s great forts, manned by legendary warriors of yesteryears, tall, sturdy and chivalrous had lost their old grandeur, now lying empty, their glory extinguished through inter-clan fighting and the sword of the invader. It is only now that the merciful waters of the Rajasthan Canal have begun to give the land a new life; atleast to some areas which are within it’s reach.
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THE JAISALMER SUB-SECTOR
(12 INFANTRY DIVISION)
12 Infantry Division was responsible for the conduct of operations in the Jaisalmer sub-sector. The divisional order of battle comprised three infantry brigades, a regiment of AMX tanks, an independent armoured squadron (T55) and an engineer regiment.
Brigadier N. T. Nathan commanded the Divisional Artillery with 167, 168 and 170 Field Regiments, 185 Light Regiment and 12 Air Observation Post Flight. In addition, 1522 Air Defence Battery was placed under command of the brigade for the operations.
Besides ensuring the defence of the sub-sector, 12 Infantry Division was given the task to undertake an offensive into enemy territory and capture Rahim Yar Khan. The divisional plan of attack was broadly as follows:
(a) One infantry brigade was to hold a firm base on our side of the border in the area of Kishangarh-Tanot with a battalion at Sandhewala- Laungwala. The brigade was also to capture two Pakistani border posts en route to Rahim Yar Khan.
(b) The second infantry brigade was then to take over the advance, with one infantry battalion, the AMX Regiment and the T55 Squadron, supported by 185 Light Regiment, along the axis Kishengarh-Rahim Yar Khan.
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(c) Finally a divisional attack on Rahim Yar Khan was to be launched, not before D plus 5 days.
As earlier mentioned, Pakistan had left the desert belt between Rahim Yar Khan and the International border, a distance of about 60 kilometres, without a road link. Construction of a road up to Rahim Yar Khan had thus become a vital aspect of the Indian offensive.
A bold plan, it required resolute leadership and good luck. Across the border, the enemy had made an equally ambitious plan. Contrary to our assessment that 18 (Pak) was likely to be on the defensive, it had planned to make a deep thrust into Indian territory, along axis Gabbar-Laungwala, and capture Jaisalmer and Ramgarh, employing one infantry brigade and an armoured regiment.
Oblivious to the above planning by Pakistan, 12 Infantry Division moved into it’s battle positions, in area Kishengarh-Tanot, all set for an advance to Rahim Yar Khan. The offensive which was scheduled to start on the night of 4/5 December was, however, postponed by a day, due to the lack of requisite preparation, except that the two enemy border posts along the axis of advance were overrun by the leading brigade on the night of 4/5 December, and early next morning, respectively. An air reconnaissance over the planned axis of advance, was also carried out on the evening of 4 December as a final check on enemy activity. The aerial survey did not cover the Gabber-Laungwala axis in the south, since a threat from this direction was considered most unlikely. But as a precaution, one company of 23 Punjab was deployed at Laungwala, a place 16 kilometres behind the border. No artillery support had, however, been catered for this post, nor a minefield laid to protect it. With only two recoilless guns held at Laungwala, the company’s tank fighting capability was also negligible.
At about 2 A.M. on 5 December, Laungwala reported
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the approach of a Pakistani armoured column, along with jeep mounted infantry, heading towards it. The enemy had moved across a distance of over 100 kilometres from concentration areas in Reti and Gabbar on dirt tracks and soft sands. This unexpected spoiling attack sprung a complete surprise on 12 Infantry Division and altered the entire course of events in the Jaisalmer sector.
It was not only the isolated post at Laungwala that had suddenly now become the focus of attention at all levels; of more serious concern was the security of the towns of Ramgarh and Jaisalmer. There was little time to lose.
The first reinforcements to reach the post were two recoilless guns that were rushed in by 23 Punjab, as the Divisional Headquarters ordered an infantry company, a troop of AMX tanks, 1701 Field and 1852 Light Batteries to move fast to Laungwala. The airbase at Jaisalmer was also requested to carry out air strikes commencing first light the next morning.
The air strike came promptly in time with two Hunters, the only aircraft available at Jaisalmer. Having bungled in due coordination with the Pakistan Air Force, 18 (Pak) Infantry Division, on the other hand, had no air support.
Nor had the enemy’s air defence guns fetched up with the leading elements. Indian Hunters thus had a free run at enemy tanks and vehicles, flying one sortie after another. Guided by the artillery’s Air Observation pilots, flying the tiny Krishaks, our aircraft destroyed 17 Pakistani tanks and 23 soft vehicles, bringing the enemy’s further advance to a halt.
From the gunners, a troop of 1701 Field Battery was the first to be deployed by early next morning, to provide the much needed fire support. Immediately on arrival, the Gun
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Position Officer, Second Lieutenant P. K. Gupta, tuned his wireless set on to the radio net of the Laungwala company, reported his readiness to fire and without waiting for an artillery Observation Post Officer, commenced firing, with the Company Commander directing the gun fire. For his initiative and pluck, young Gupta was Mentioned-in-Despatches. Two hours later, the remainder of the field battery and the light battery were also deployed and with Observation Post Officers occupying suitable vantage points, the enemy was given a good artillery pounding. Coupled with the arrival of tanks and a company of infantry, Laungwala held on.
By midday of 5 December, 30 Infantry Brigade, poised for advance at Kishangarh and Tanot, was rushed to Laungwala along with 168 Field Regiment. At the same time 332 Infantry Brigade with 167 Field Regiment, was moved further south to Ramgarh, leaving the Kishangarh sub-sector with one battalion and a field battery.
On 6 December, a second Pakistani column was sighted by the Air Force on the Gabbar-Laungwala axis. This force, too, was effectively engaged.
General Officer Commanding 18 (Pak) Infantry Division’s gamble to out-flank the main Indian build up in the area Tanot-Kishengarh (for an advance to Rahim Yar Khan) had failed; his big boast of Pakistani troops having “ breakfast at Ramgarh and dinner at Jaisalmer” ended as a utter fiasco. Major General Mustaffa was sacked the next day.
Regrettably, 12 Infantry Division was too slow to react. With the enemy spread along Gabber-Laungwala in total disarray, it was time to strike fast. “Mercifully, the Indians did not pursue,” writes Major General Fazal Mukeem. It was only on the morning of 8 December, that the Division finally commenced a counter- offensive, employing 332 and 30
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Infantry Brigades and bulk of it’s armour and artillery, to trap and destroy the enemy. By then it was too late, since by last light on 7 December, the Pakistanis had managed to pull back.
In the event, only two actions near the border, around Kharotar and BP 638 were fought on 8 and 9 December by 322 and 30 Infantry Brigades respectively. The offensive was called off on reaching the border.
At Kharotar, the enemy put up nominal resistance; unable to withstand a heavy crunch of fire from 167 and 168 Field Regiments and 1852 Light Battery. A Pakistani attempt to recapture Kharotar also ended in failure. In fact, the attack was broken up before it could be launched with effective direction of artillery fire by Captain V. L. Wadodkar of 167 Field, at great personal risk. Wadodkar was awarded the Sena Medal and his wireless operator Havildar Gurmit Singh, was Mentioned-in- Despatches. Similarly, Karewala Dara was engaged by our guns and the enemy withdrew without giving a fight.
The Artillery’s contribution to the capture of BP 638 was equally considerable. The enemy suffered 53 dead, primarily because of effective artillery fire brought down by Second Lieutenant G. S. Bajwa of 168 Field Regiment, assisted by his wireless operator, Tek Ram, while under heavy enemy shelling. Both were awarded the Vir Chakra for their display of gallantry in this action. In an earlier action, at Kotra Ka Dara and Ridge No.1, the Pakistanis fled only on engagement by the artillery.
It had been tough going for the gunners, with their endurance and innovative ability put to a hard test. At times, the entire strength of a battery had to be employed to push a single gun. D4 Dozers with gunner units proved to be of immense use, clearing sand dunes, making tracks, even pushing bogged down ammunition carrying vehicles with
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their broad blades. Despite the above constraints, artillery support was invariably provided, at the time and place required.
A decisive role in the Laungwala sub-sector was played by 168 Field Regiment. Demoralised by the Jaisalmer misadventure, it was the continuous and effective gun fire provided by this regiment that expedited the enemy’s rout. In recognition, 168 Field Regiment was confered the Honour Title, “ Laungwala “.
As for the capture of Rahim Yar Khan, Headquarters Southern Command now realised that it was not possible to undertake the operation without the fire support of a medium regiment. Since this could not be provided, with our overall shortage of medium guns, and coupled with a poor cross-country mobility displayed by the aging AMX tanks, the plan to capture Rahim Yar Khan was given up. 12 Infantry Division was ordered to go on the defensive and to shed one infantry brigade group to reinforce 11 Infantry Division.
In all, 12 Infantry Division destroyed or captured an estimated 24 tanks, 5 field guns, 4 air defence guns and 138 vehicles of Pakistan.
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THE BARMER SUB-SECTOR
(11 Infantry Division)
11 Infantry Division was responsible for the conduct of operations in the Barmer sub-sector. Stretching from Pochhina in the north to the Inter-State boundary of Rajasthan and Gujarat in the south, Barmer is an extension of the Thar Desert.
In pre-partition days, a meter-gauge railway line ran from Barmer to Gadra Road and thence to Manabao. On the partition of the sub-continent these two places had come to India, while Gadra City had gone to Pakistan. In course of time, the rail track beyond Munabao had been lifted by Pakistanis for about 200 metres, while a stretch of about 6 kilometres up to Khokhropar had come under sand, because of disuse.* As such, trains only ran up to Khokhropar. Before partition this railway line had been a luxurious means of travel through the desert from Jodhpur to Karachi. But times had changed since then.
According to intelligence reports, a tarmac road also ran upto Khokhropar from the Pakistan side. In reality, it was only a dirt track. Learnt only on capture of Khokhropar, it was to cause a major set-back in the progress of the Indian offensive.
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* Arrangements had been made by Southern Command to speedily revive the rail-link between Munabao and Khokhropar, in the event of war, for which track construction material had been positioned at Barmer.
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The divisional order of battle comprised of three infantry brigades, a camel mounted battalion (17 Grenadiers), one independent armoured squadron and the divisional engineers. In addition, 10 Para Commando Battalion was to operate in the ground role, directly under Headquarters Southern Command.
Brigadier N.M.K. Nayar commanded the Divisional Artillery, with 13 Field, 164 Field, 68 Field and 218 Medium Regiments, 1891 Light and 1521 Air Defence Batteries, a locating battery and 5 Independent Air Observation Post Flight.
The task given to 11 Infantry Division was, first, to ensure the security of the Barmer sub-sector, in the event of a Pakistani offensive. Second, to launch an offensive and capture Khokhropar, Gadra City and Kinsar and, thereafter, to destroy maximum enemy forces in the area of Naya Chor – Umarkot.
For an offensive into Pakistan, the divisional plan envisaged a three pronged thrust as follows:
a. 85 Infantry Brigade to advance along axis Munabao – Khokhropar-Naya Chor, the main axis of the divisional advance, and capture Khokhropar by midday, on D Day. Thereafter, the brigade was to establish a firm base for a divisional attack to capture Naya Chor by D plus 8 days.
b. 31 Infantry Brigade to launch a subsidiary thrust, south of 85 Infantry Brigade, and capture Gadra City by D plus one day and, thereafter, to exploit up to Dali-Khinsar-Chachro.
c. 17 Grenadiers to operate north of axis Munabao-Naya Chor and to guard against enemy interference from that direction.
d. Concurrently, 10 Para Commando to carry out raids
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in the areas Chachro-Umarkot to cause confusion in the enemy’s rear. It was also to destroy the road-rail bridge over the Thar Canal, and thereby assist in the operations against Naya Chor.
The Artillery Brigade was sub-divided into two groups. 13 Field Regiment, 1891 Light Battery and 2181 Medium Battery were alloted to 31 Infantry Brigade. The remainder of the artillery was to support Naya Chor, with a medium battery, at priority call, to 17 Grenadiers.
With Pakistan taking a defensive posture opposite Barmer, 11 Infantry Division went on the offensive on 4 December, as planned.
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OPERATIONS ALONG AXIS MUNABAO – NAYA CHOR
(85 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
“ Then the unexpected happened ….., the so called tarmac highway beyond Khokhropar was found to be only a desert track. This meant the laying of duck boards, which for the task alloted to 11 Infantry Division was estimated at ten kilometres now shot up to sixty.”.
Gazi Camp and Kajlor were the first line of Pakistani defence that was cracked by 85 Infantry Brigade, as it went into the attack on the night of 4/5 December. To display it’s defence preparedness, as also, to bolster the morale of the troops who were to bear the first brunt of Indian attack, the defenders of Gazi Camp and Kajlor had been provided with concrete bunkers. They were well armed with machine-guns and mortars, stocked with adequate ammunition and rations, and backed by artillery.”
To ensure quick capture of the above posts, and with minimum loss of men, a couple of medium guns of 2183 Medium Regiment were moved close to the enemy, on the previous night, for destruction of Pakistani bunkers by direct shooting. With little cover available in the open desert, it was a bold step taken by the gunners and it paid a handsome
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dividend. Most of the bunkers, which with normal indirect artillery firing would have remained unhurt, were destroyed by the direct impact of medium shells. Havildar Jagat Narain, in particular, distinguished himself in carrying out this task. For his pluck and good shooting he was Mentioned-in-Despatches.
With the destruction of enemy bunkers and a heavy crunch of artillery fire preceding the attack, Gazi Camp and Kajlor fell to the assault of Indian infantry, without giving much fight. By midday of 5 December,85 Infantry Brigade had also captured Khokhropar and Bhitala.
The offensive had begun well. The troops’ morale was sky high, with all eyes set on Naya Chor.
Then the unexpected happened. As mentioned earlier, the so called tarmac highway beyond Khokhropar was found to be only a desert track, incapable of taking sustained heavy traffic. This meant the laying of duck boards, which for the task alloted to 11 Infantry Division was estimated at ten kilometres, now shot up to sixty. The problem was further aggravated by persistent strikes by the Pakistan Air Force. Nonetheless, with additional engineer resources rushed to the division, the advance continued and Vadarbh was captured at midday on 6 December. The difficulty of vehicular movement beyond Vadarbh on the dirt tract had, however, begun to tell on the speed of advance. This day also witnessed a major mishap. The Brigade Commander and Commanding Officer 164 Field Regiment, travelling together in a jeep, were seriously injured in a mine blast, depriving the brigade of two key commanders.
On 7 December, a battery of 68 Field Regiment came under heavy straffing by enemy aircraft. Undeterred, the field gunners stood up to the attack, despite losing five vehicles, two gun tractors and a 25 Pounder gun. Naiks Raghavan and Sudhakaran displayed conspicious courage
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and devotion to duty, during this attack and were awarded the Sena Medal, both posthumously. Major G. S. Atariwala, the Battery Commander, also rose to the occasion, rushing to his gun group from his headquarters. He narrowly escaped a bomb explosion while retrieving a gun. Atariwala, however, ensured that his battery was on the move again to support the advancing infantry, winning the third Sena Medal for this display of leadership. On this day, the first train also steamed into Khokhropar, though not without a hot reception from the Pakistan Air Force, on arrival.
By the afternoon of 7 December, 85 Infantry Brigade had secured Parcha Ji Veri and in the evening of 8 December, established contact with the enemy at Apex and Parbat Ali, the two dominating features guarding the approach to Naya Chor.
Apex was attacked on the night of 10/11 December, supported by 68 and 164 Field Regiments and 218 Medium Regiment less a battery. With a 1,000 rounds pumped into Apex, and a determined infantry assault, the objective was captured on the morning of 11 December. The slow build up for the attack, because of the difficulty of vehicular movement, had however, caused a two day delay, giving the enemy valuable time to reinforce the Naya Chor and Parbat Ali defences. Preparations now commenced for an attack on Parbat Ali, a U-shaped sand dune, about 200 feet above ground level. Acting as a screen position for Naya Chor, which lay 4,000 metres to the west, it provided an excellent base for development of further operations, including the attack on Naya Chor.
Parbat Ali was held by two companies each of 21 Frontier Force and 39 Frontier Force Infantry Battalions. Likely approaches to it were heavily mined and well supported by medium machine-guns and the artillery. Parbat Ali was a strong defensive position.
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With Apex as the firm base, the plan for the capture of Parbat Ali involved a simultaneous attack by 10 Sikh and 2 Mahar. Concurrently, 2 Rajputana Rifles and 10 Sikh Light Infantry were to simulate attacks on the flanks and the armour to carry out an outflanking move from the south, to distract the enemy’s attention from the main assault.
At 3 A.M. on 12/13 December, 2 Mahar and 10 Sikh went into the attack. Supported by an accurate artillery bombardment, the assaulting troops captured the initial objectives. A company of 10 Sikh, moving to attack an objective in depth, however, ran into an enemy force forming up for a counter-attack. Captain P. K. Chopra, the Forward Observation Officer, rushed to occupy a vantage point and promptly brought down a heavy crunch of fire, forcing the enemy to disperse. For his presence of mind and good shooting, Chopra was awarded the Sena Medal. The battalion was counter-attacked again at 6.45 A.M. on 13 December, but the attack was beaten back with prompt artillery support.
By 10 A.M. on 13 December, Parbat Ali finally fell, with 10 Sikh repulsing a third counter-attack, supported by a troop of tanks. Captain I. J. Reddy, a Forward Observation Officer, engaged Pakistani tanks with medium guns. Shaken by the impact of 130 mm shells, the tank crew abandoned their tanks and fled. Two tanks were later destroyed by the Air Force.
In the battle of Parbat Ali, 57 Pakistanis lay dead and 35 were taken prisoner. A large quantity of arms, ammuniton and equipment also fell into Indian hands. The main factors which gave us success in this operation were surprise and effective engagement by the artillery. Surprise was achieved by choosing a difficult approach involving a very steep climb, and an attack from the direction least expected by the enemy.
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As to the artillery support, this was provided in full measure, despite the engagement of our gun positions by Pakistan artillery. 68 Field Regiment, in particular, came under heavy shelling. But under the leadership of Second-in-Command, Major M. L. Kumar, assisted by Subedar K. S. Nair, who kept moving from gun to gun to boost up morale, unmindful of personal safety, the men kept firing. Forward Observers accompanying the attacking infantry, Captain R. N. Sen Gupta and technical assistant Shiv Ram, 164 Field Regiment, and Captain S. Dutt, 218 Medium Regiment, also distinguished themselves during the above battle in bringing down effective fire, unmindful of personal safety. Sen Gupta was wounded and Shiv Ram laid down his life. For their courage and devotion to duty of a high order, Sen Gupta was awarded the Vir Chakra, while Dutt and Shiv Ram were decorated with the Sena Medal.
After consolidating at Parbat Ali, preparations commenced for an attack on Naya Chor. On 15 December, a battalion was sent on a probing mission. It was a costly operation; one officer and five other ranks were killed and five officers and twenty six other ranks wounded.
The ceasefire on 17 December brought further operations on the Naya Chor axis to an end.
68 and 164 Field Regiments had made a significant contribution in the successful conduct of the advance and capture of Apex and Parbat Ali. Despite aerial attacks, counter-bombardment by enemy artillery and movement across the most difficult terrain, these regiments never failed to provide timely and accurate fire support, with Forward Observers boldly directing the fire of guns, unmindful of personel safety. In appreciation the Honour Title“ Parbat Ali “was bestowed upon both, 68 and 164 Field Regiments.”
Before concluding this narrative of gunner
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participation in the divisional advance to Naya Chor, the gallant role of two pilots of 5 Air Observation Post, Captains P. Madhavan and Altaf Yusufji merits special mention. Flying their tiny, single seater Krishaks, unarmed and slow of speed, they undertook many daring forays deep into enemy territory to bring back vital information of enemy dispositions and to direct the fire of Indian guns on Pakistani gun positions. Every minute of their stay in enemy air, in the face of Pakistani Sabres and ground fire, was dangerous; each such mission a display of fearless devotion to duty. On 5 December, Madhavan’s Krishak was badly hit by enemy machine-gun fire and on 8 December, that of Altaf. In both cases, they still went ahead to achieve their alloted tasks, flying their damaged aircraft before managing to land back safely in base. In recognition of their sustained performance of such a high order throughout the operations, Captains Madhavan and Yusufji were decorated with the Vir Chakra.
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THE SOUTHERN AXIS (31 INFANTRY BRIGADE)
“ As our troops were falling back, Captain Kotwal (from the Light Battery) mustered some men and charged at the advancing enemy. Men of great courage and emotion often act on their immediate impulse in battle. But fighting against heavy odds, Kotwal made the supreme sacrifice.”
On the night of 4/5 December, 15 Kumaon supported by 13 Field Regiment, 2181 Medium, 1891 Light and 1521 Air Defence Batteries, attacked Gadra City, a small Pakistani village on the international border. As in the case of Ghazi Camp and Kajlor, the Pakistani defences of Gadra City were well fortified with concrete pillboxes and had a well coordinated obstacle belt around. Held by two platoons, the post was supported by six 6 pounder guns, eight medium machine-guns and six 3 inch mortars.
Before launching the infantry assault, the air defence guns were moved forward to knock down a Pakistani Observation Post by direct shooting. Then followed a well prepared artillery programme during which the enemy positions were thoroughly plastered. As the attack progressed, however, the enemy opened up with murderous machine gun fire from undetected locations on the flanks,
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coupled with heavy mortar fire. As a result the attack was halted, and the leading companies went to ground, suffering heavy casualties.
The situation was saved by the pluck and presence of mind shown by Captain Leslie Nibblet, a Forward Observation Officer. Unmindful of enemy bullets and shells, he rushed to a vantage point along with his observation party and effectively engaged the enemy machine-guns, which were soon silenced by artillery fire. Meanwhile, the location of the enemy mortars was also established and guns directed to engage them. With the enemy thus neutralised, 15 Kumaon were quick to resume the attack and, after a bitter hand to hand fight succeeded in capturing Gadra City. Nibblet and his radio operator, Amolak Singh were Mentioned-in- Despatches for courage and devotion to duty displayed by them during the above attack.
31 Infantry Brigade, thereafter, captured Dali, Pirani Ka Par and Mehendro Ka Par by 7 December. Further south, Khinsar was captured on 5 December and Chachro three days later.
Movement of vehicles and guns became increasingly difficult as the advance progressed. It was a continuous struggle to negotiate the sand dunes. Naib Subedar Ranjit Singh of 13 Field Regiment distinguished himself in preparing tracks using field expedients for the deployment of guns in support of attacks on Dali and Pirani Ka Par. His services were recognised with the award of Vishisht Seva Medal.
After the capture of Chachro, 31 Infantry Brigade sent 18 Madras, with 36 Field and 1891 Light Battery in support, along axis Chachro – Ramsar, to develop a threat towards Umarkot. Despite very difficult going, the battalion made speedy progress and by 16 December, it’s leading elements had reached Hingor Ja Tar.
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On 17 December, the Pakistanis counter-attacked, supported by artillery. Regrettably, the sand dunes delayed the deployment of field guns. Only the light battery was available to support the infantry, that too with limited ammunition. Making the best of the artillery available, Captain B. S. Kotwal, the Forward Observation Officer, effectively engaged the enemy and the attack was repulsed. The Pakistanis did not give up, however, and put in a second counter -attack during which they succeeded in over-running the forward localities. Meanwhile, the light battery’s ammunition had been expended.
As our troops were falling back, Captain Kotwal mustered some men and charged at the advancing enemy. Men of great courage and emotion often act on their inmediate impulse in battle. But fighting against heavy odds, Kotwal gave the supreme sacrifice. Hats off to gallant soldiers like him. He was posthumously awarded the Sena Medal.
The cease-fire brought an end to further operations on the southern axis.
From the gunners, a highly commendable role was played by 13 Field Regiment. In recognition, it was awarded the Honour Title “ Gadra City “, while Lieutenant Colonel Ashok Gillani, the Commanding Officer, won the Vishisht Seva Medal, for coordinating excellent fire support along widely separated axes.
Having earned the Honour Title “ Chushul” in the Ladakh sector during the Sino-Indian conflict, 1962, 13 Field Regiment had won the distinction of being the only unit of the Indian Artillery with two Honour Titles.
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AN EVALUATION
Southern Command could not attain its objective of reaching the Green Belt in Sind before the cease-fire put an end to all operations.
On the Barmer front, non-existence of the so-called 60 kilometre tarmac road from Khokhropar to Naya Chor gave a major setback to the offensive of 11 Infantry Division. It was a case of blind acceptance of terrain intelligence provided by double agents. Neither our intelligence agencies nor the operational planners made efforts to counter-check the authenticity of this vital piece of information through sneak patrols and air photographs. As a result, the leading elements of 11 Infantry Division reached the outskirts of Naya Chor by 11 December, yet the attack could not go in for want of a requisite build up, till the declaration of the ceasefire. This delay of seven days enabled Pakistan to reinforce the Naya Chor defences. Anand’s efforts at speed and action, backed by the traditional élan of the armoured corps, to which he belonged, could not help matters.
12 Infantry Division, on the other hand, failed to trap the Pakistanis at Laungwala. Exhausted after a long approach march, their administrative resources far out-stretched, and with fighting echelons broken up after the air strike, they lay most vulnerable to a speedy counter-offensive by India. That they managed to slip away before 12 Infantry Division got going was mainly due to our lack of tactical flexibility and speed of action. It is most unlikely that Khambatta, a tough and aggressive
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paratrooper from the gunners, developed cold feet to deal with the situation. Perhaps, he went too much by the text book : first defend, then advance and then attack, when there was need for a quick assault, envelopment and pursuit. One might say that it is easier said than done, in the difficult desert terrain with troops flung over long distances. But that is where a big victory lay for 12 Infantry Division.
The above lapses on the part of the Southern Command forces notwithstanding, the fact of the matter is that the Indian Army was poorly equipped for warfare in the Rajasthan desert. The need of the hour was transport helicopters, mechanised infantry, self-propelled medium guns and adequate engineer resources; the latter to speed up construction of roads and tracks in the battle zone. Needless to add, that, had the planned offensive to Rahim Yar Khan been launched, it was most likely to face the same delays as at Naya Chor.
On the plus side, Pakistan was forced to detach a brigade group from 33 (Pak) Infantry Division for the defence of Sind. The offensive capability of i (Pak) Corps for operations in Southern Punjab was thus diluted. Further, the capture of a vast area of Pakistan, about 12,000 square kilometres, helped us in political bargaining after the war.
And finally, before concluding this short narrative, it must be said that despite its many constraints, the Southern Army struggled through the soft sand and negotiated the never ending sand dunes, some as high as 50 metres, as best as possible. As elsewhere during the Indo-Pak war of 1971, it fought hard, made the best possible use of the limited fighting tools provided to it, and faced the numerous administrative shortfalls with good cheer. As to the gunners, they fulfilled that unwritten pledge, both to the infantry and armour, and lived up to their motto of “ Sarvatra,
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Izzat-o-Iqbal” . “ Everywhere, with Honour and Glory”. The after action report of 11 Infantry Division sums up the gunner contribution thus : “ Despite the problem of movement of guns and carriage of ammunition in the area, our artillery support never failed us. The Observation Post Officers were very bold and brought down very effective and accurate fire.”
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THE CEASE-FIRE
“ Some last minute ‘give and take often precedes a cease-fire between old rivals. The Indo-Pak War of 1971 was no exception to it; more so when both sides were still full of muscle. In comparison, it was the Pakistanis who decided to display a much greater show of fireworks.”
With Indian troops a stone’s throw away from Dacca, General Niazi, commanding the Pakistani forces in the east, was left in no doubt that further resistance was fruitless. On the afternoon of 16 December, 1971, he signed the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender at Dacca, leaving 90,000 prisoners of war to Indian care and captivity.
Later, in the evening of 16 December, Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister announced that she had ordered a cease-fire on the Western Front, to begin at 8 P.M. on 17 December. Our country had thus kept the word given earlier at the United Nations through our foreign minister Swaran Singh, on 12 December, that we had no aggressive designs on West Pakistan. Now that the Eastern problem had been solved, enabling the return of the refugees from Bangladesh to their homelands, Indian guns in the west could also fall silent, unilaterally. The apprehensions of USA that“ at the next turn of the screw India planned to intensify operations on the Western Front, with additional troops moved from the east, ” were also laid to rest.
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The initial reaction of Pakistan’s President, Yahya Khan, to India’s declaration of a Cease-Fire was one of anger and defiance. In his broadcast to the nation at 8.30 P.M. on 16 December, he announced that war with India in the west would continue; that by accepting a cease-fire in East Pakistan, “ they had lost only a battle and not the war. ” It was only at 3.30 P.M. the next day, that better counsel prevailed on the Pakistani dictator and a statement was read out over Pakistan Radio in which Yahya Khan declared that his country would reciprocate the cease-fire.
Intense diplomatic activity had preceded the above events, momentous as they were in the history of the sub-continent. While USA and China had favoured a solution to salvage the wreck and avert a break-up of Pakistan, USSR along with Poland, sided with India in her recognition of an independent Bangladesh. India had also faced military intimidation from the former powers. The American Seventh Fleet threatened intervention with a task force comprising of the aircraft carrier, Enterprise, an amphibious assault ship, four guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate and a landing craft that entered the Bay of Bengal on 15 December – ostensibly to evacuate American nationals and Pakistani forces in the east.
The Chinese also took a hand in putting India on guard. Meteorological data on the state of weather at various military locations in Tibet was collected and passed to all concerned. Whether it was a facade or a definite measure towards combat preparations, implying a possible threat to Ladakh, is not known however.
Be that as it may, it was the lightening speed of the Indian advance, in a striking feat of arms that had thwarted everything, when Pakistan had seriously banked on American and Chinese help.
The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation
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entered between India and USSR in August 1971 had also come to India’s aid. With Article IX of the treaty stipulating: “ In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or threat thereof, the High Contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat. .”, USA and China had been put on hold; to think twice before providing active military assistance to Pakistan.
Some last minute “give and take ” often precedes a cease-fire between old rivals. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 was no exception to it – more so when both sides were still full of muscle. In comparison, it was the Pakistanis who decided to display a much greater show of fireworks than did the Indians. Their gunners were particularly aggressive. As the clock ticked, bringing the agreed time of the cease-fire closer, they set ablaze many sectors in the western front in a final show of fire-power, engaging our infantry localities and gun areas with heavy concentrations. That had been their style in 1965 and troops had been warned to be careful should they repeat it again. Except for some hot-heads, Indian gunners exercised restraint and did not retaliate. It was pointless wasting ammunition. Recalls Brigadier Surendra Mohan who was then a battery commander in 15 Infantry Division sector, “ Pak artillery of all calibres opened up along the entire divisional front in a vain effort of hitting some target. Firing went on for almost 15 minutes past the time to ceasefire on that cold full moon night. Then it suddenly stopped and the calm that prevailed after 14 days of fighting did appear unusual. ”
Ultimately, the army guns fell silent. All activity by the opposing air forces also ended. So did India’s naval blockade of Pakistani shipping in the Indian Ocean. Only military hospitals remained busy treating the war casualties; a grim reminder to mankind to stop killing one another and to share the bounteous wealth of Mother Earth together, in amity and
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harmony. To remind them that military conquerors of the past left behind nothing but destruction and misery and that the wealth they amassed and the territories they conquered were transitory episodes. That the empires they built were to change hands, sooner of later, in this cycle of history and the rise and fall of nations.
The above thoughts on human brotherhood notwithstanding, the front- line soldiers with guns emptied and ammunition back in boxes, reminiscenced the last 14 days of hell and fire. At their section and platoon posts, in tank harbours, at gun positions and observation posts, at headquarters and command posts, over langar meals and rum, when issued, they wondered whether the cease-fire would hold and the war come to an end. Or would fighting flare up again for one reason or another.
Contrary to common belief, it is the soldiers who least wish to start a military conflict. Nor are their military commanders always a country’s hawks. More often, it is the political compulsions of a country that force it go to to war. The soldiers go through the rigours of war and shed blood in battle to answer the call of duty — for self-respect, for the honour and dignity of their country, unit and formation. The world over they are a class apart.
Reverting back to the trenches on the Western Front, the troops talked about how they had gone into assaults across minefields braving bullets and shrapnel. How they had faced enemy shelling that shook the earth below with the deafening impact of shell bursts, often leaving them dazed, in defence. They recalled how some amongst them displayed acts of exceptional courage, unmindful of personal safety. They admired the leadership qualities they witnessed in their officers in battle and were critical of the omissions and commissions committed by them. They paid silent homage to those who had laid down their lives and hoped
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for the safety and welfare of those taken prisoner. Each one thought of his dear ones at home and of family reunions.
The gunners got busy taking a final stock of ammunition dumped at their gun positions — in bays next to each gun and in central pits behind – gradully moving the bulk of it to the wagon lines and beyond, as the cease-fire continued to stay. They checked the wear and tear caused to gun barrels and completed ammunition firing records, while damaged equipment was sent back for workshop repairs. They gave their guns a new shine and adorned the pictures of their military heroes or the God they worshipped, kept in each gun pit, with flowers where available. Like western gunners of old, who would invoke the protection of Saint Barbara before firing, Indian gunners too had sought their blessings for safety of their guns and accurate shooting every time they commenced firing. Artillery command post staffs, likewise, began giving their dug-outs a face lift, neatly re-marked their battle maps, removing non-essential operational details with which they had been cluttered, while records of important enemy targets and fire-plans were placed in safe files for future reference. Peace now prevailed in each command post, with passage of fire orders and tactical information come to a sudden stop, as operators gave duty on radio sets now kept on wireless silence, ready to break it with a flick of the knob, if ordered. Except for night sentries, the gun-end slept in peace at night, after 14 hectic days of war, without thoughts of ground and air attacks or enemy shelling.
So did front-line infantrymen and Artillery Observation Posts, having been at the receiving end the most. The latter, in particular, had suffered heavily with almost 25 percent personnel either killed or wounded. For tankmen, signallers and engineers also, began a major exercise to get their weapons and equipment back in shape, while unit adjutants and brigade majors completed their war diaries and wrote
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accounts of the battles fought.
Above all, the Indian Jawan remained a priceless commodity. He greeted the officers with the same smile, despite all that he had gone through, as one went around on visits. Exceptions apart, the officers had also responded with personal example, sharing the hardships of the men under their command and risking life when the call of duty so demanded.
Except for some re-grouping and readjustment of defences, there was to be no withdrawal from forward areas yet. The orders were to stay put where we were – in full alert, till the war was declared ended and an agreement signed between India and Pakistan. Albeit, a measure of normalcy in daily front-line routine commenced. Gradually, peasants with lands along the border started to return to their home and hearth. Only those from Chhamb and Fazilka still lived in refugee camps, wondering what the future had in store for them.
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, Yahya Khan resigned his Presidentship, unable to withstand his country’s humiliation in the East and Zulfkar Ali Bhutto took over as President, while independent Bangladesh under Shiekh Mujib, got down to resettlement of it’s countrymen returning from the Indian camps. Nonetheless, the sub-continent still remained a flash-point, till Pakistani prisoners of war returned home and a formal agreement was signed between the two countries.
On 2 July 1972, India and Pakistan finally signed an agreement at Shimla, since known as the Shimla Agreement. And with it ended the Indo-Pak war of 1971. Both sides released their war prisoners. While captured territories in Jammu and Kashmir (being a disputed region) were retained by the victors, the rest were handed back by both countries and the opposing armies moved back to barracks.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
“ The decisive elements in today’s ground warfare are the long-range, stand-off killers – strike aircraft, missiles and guns. Of these the latter are readily available to engage the enemy within minutes, in keeping with the fast moving battles of today.”
The Indo-Pak War of 1971 is long over. Leaving behind some harsh memories, it is now a part of history. With their freedom won through Indian arms, the country that stood to gain was Bangladesh. But India and Pakistan, whose soldiers shed their blood in the battles of 1971, continue to remain at loggerheads, with frequent exchange of fire across the Line of Actual Control or skirmishes at the forbidding heights of the Siachen Glacier. Above all, it is the high level of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, aided and abetted by Pakistan, that keeps adding fuel to the fire. The sub-continent still lives in mutual distrust. An atmosphere of uncertainty prevails; some incident or a thoughtless act may trigger yet another war between the two neighbours. India would need some expert driving and strong will, both political and military, to negotiate the dangerous curves of mountainous Kashmir. Equally vital is the need for skilful diplomacy to ensure that world opinion which presently is, by and large, in India’s favour, does not shift to the opposite camp. The Indian army, meanwhile, has no option but to remain in a state of full alert.
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Fortunately, our borders in the East have been peaceful for a long time, with India and China holding occasional meetings to promote mutual trade and to eventually resolve their territorial dispute. The only incident after the 1962 showdown that threatened another Sino-Indian conflagration occurred at Sumduruong (Wandung) in Arunachal Pradesh, in 1987. A massive Indian buildup that followed was, however, a clear message to the Chinese that the Indian Army was now well prepared, and that a repeat by the Chinese of their victory of 1962 was out of the question. But what needs to be applauded is the path-finding September 1993 Accord between India and China. In an astute display of politico-military pragmatism, both sides have decided to put their territorial dispute in “cold storage” and carry out mutually agreed reduction of forces along the border. Whether the Accord would come to stay, with an accepted Line of Control and an equitable withdrawal of troops is yet to be seen. Hopefully it would, since it appears to meet the economic and strategic interests of both countries.
THE NATIONAL TRIAXIS
The stability, economic progress and security of a country rests on a triaxis, comprising of the politician, the economist and the military man. Of these, the political member is the controlling factor. It is for him to keep the nation welded together and to manage the system for the national good. He is also answerable to the people for the faith reposed in him and to ensure their overall well being. The economist is responsible for formulating the right economic policies to suit the nation and to keep a watchful eye on the country’s exchequer, while the military man has to focus on the strength, composition, weaponry and equipment required by the armed forces, in keeping with the country’s policy on national security, to monitor their morale
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and combat readiness and to deploy their full potential in the event of war. In essence, it is one team, of which the political member is the Captain; although in times of economic distress, it is the economist who must become the front-runner, to devise ways and means to set matters right, as in the event of war, it is the military man who bears the brunt.
There is, however, trouble whenever the triaxis does not function in unison. For example, it failed to do so in the years preceding the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The military was relegated to a back seat; its opinion neither taken nor heeded. Consequently, because of the lack of defence preparedness, India suffered a humiliating defeat. On the other hand, when in recent years the country was down the drain financially, the Indian Prime Minister gave his fullest support to the new economic policies of his finance minister and we managed to avert a disaster. History is replete with examples of how nations have gained or suffered, depending on the working of the triaxis.
In the functioning of the Indian triaxis, as it pertains to national security, the following drawbacks exist :
First, there is no regular interface between the politician and the military within the Government on matters concerning national security. This distancing of the politician from the military man is not a healthy practice, as it would not be if the economist was kept at an arm’s length. The two must meet directly, face to face, across the table as it were. The placing of civil bureaucrats between these two members of the triaxis is a defective method of decision making, when the former have no accountability in the event of a military failure and the heads that roll, as they did in the past, are those of politicians and generals.
That the country’s bureaucracy plays a vital role, from a village to the highest echelons of governance at the Centre,
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is not in dispute. Albeit, the fact remains that bureaucrats are civil administrators and cannot be expected to have a professional grasp of military matters. Their participation in the defence apparatus pertaining to administration of civilians in service establishments, military land and cantonments, liasion with State Governments, coordination with different ministries at the centre and parliamentary questions would, however, be necessary.
In India, the Service Headquarters do not even form a part of the Government. As a result, the military chiefs are, at times, unaware of the critical determinants in the formulation of defence policy. Commenting on this lack of interface between the politician and the military, Major General D.K. Palit a reputed military analyst and a former Director of Military Operations, Indian Army, in his book, War in the High Himalayas writes, “Organic segregation of the Service Chiefs from the Government not only serves to diminish their status and performance, it also results in denying politicians the counsel of military professionals.” The above situation needs to be set right, rather than let things move as they are. We have to remind ourselves that constant debate and review is an essential ingredient of democracy.
Second, we have Unity of Command at all echelons within the Services, starting from the lowest level. At the level of the service chiefs, however, there is no professional head, to coordinate planning and direction of defence effort between the three services. In peace times, defence coordination is done by the civil bureaucrats, while the Service Chiefs command their respective services during war; banking on co-operation and good will of the other two.
The requirement of a Chief of Defence Staff has been raised since India became independent. From Lord Mountbatten to Lord Ismay to a number of Indian army
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chiefs and other generals; one and all have urged the need for the above appointment. For how long will the Government keep dragging its feet ? On the subject of Unity of Command, Lieutenant General K. P. Candeth writes, “The chances of differences arising, especially in the face of stresses and strains created by adverse tactical situations are great, and it is then that the presence of a strong single authority to direct the war is most needed. ” Colonel Pritam Bhullar, a distinguished defence writer has this to say in his article published in The Tribune on 14th May 1993, “ Modern wars need a high standard of defence management, which can only be achieved by integrating the defence forces. The conduct of operations by the allied forces in the Gulf war was a good example of all the three services working in unison, under one Commander. In the USA, the higher defence set-up has undergone four major changes since World War II. This is because of the reason that the system is debated from time to time and any weaknesses noticed in it are removed without any inhabitions.” In consequence, the politico-military team work that has emerged in America is indeed exemplary. The result : the highly successful planning and execution of the Gulf war against Iraq.
In the erstwhile USSR, the Defence Ministry was often headed by a serving military officer. In addition, there was a Chief of the General Staff in charge of higher operational planning and coordination. The USA and Pakistan have entrusted centralised planning and coordination to a Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. In UK there is a Chief of Defence Staff; in France a Chief of Staff of Armies; in Iran, Chief of Supreme Commander’s Staff; in Indonesia, the Chief of the Armed Forces. Military thinking in the present day world accepts the principle that all three Services must come under a single commander.
In India, on the other hand, the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force take their turn on the basis of seniority
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to act as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The authority vested in the Chairman, however, is merely procedural; limited to the observance of protocol. Military preparedness does not, therefore, derive intrinsic and worthwhile benefit.
What has then stood in the way of creating the appoinment of the Chief of the Defence Staff, as also the induction of service experts in the Defence Ministry? Is it the fear of a coup, by giving the Military greater authority and weightage ? While advocating the appoinment of the Chief of Defence Staff in his book Of Matters Military, Lieutenant General S. K. Sinha, former Vice Chief of the Army Staff writes, “ If the appointment of a Chief of Army Staff at the head of an Army of 8.25 lakhs is not a threat to our political institutions, how can the appoinment of a Chief of Defence Staff for the three Services, totalling a little over nine lakhs, constitute such a threat? The argument regarding the Chief of Defence Staff posing a threat to our political institutions has been conjectured by arm-chair thinkers, who for reasons best known to themselves are keen on not allowing this appointment to be created.”
Are the Service Chiefs themselves not keen on pressing for the above appointment, since with a Chief of Defence Staff, their authority, as Chiefs of their respective services would diminish? Diminish it will to some extent. But National Security must have precedence over personal interests. To balance the prestige of the three services, however, we may appoint the Chief of the Defence Staff on a rotational basis. Alternatively, the political member is given the option to choose his military member – the Chief of Defence Staff – from amongst the three Service Chiefs to ensure a healthy functioning of his team.
Will the “ Unified Command ” set up in May 1993 to combat militancy in the Kashmir Valley and which is said to
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be paying dividends, show us the way ?
The above two drawbacks are a matter of concern. The political member who heads the triaxis must give a serious rethink, to remove them; the sooner this is done, the better it would be for our national security.
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Indian armies of old were strong and well equipped. They compared well with the best in the world. The Indian sword, for example, had earned a great reputation, both for it’s elegance and cutting capacity,* and swordsmanship raised to the level of a fine art. Indian spears, javelins, shields, maces and battleaxes were also of a high quality. So was the body armour and helmets. The decline of India, over the centuries, however, equally affected the development of new means of warfare. Even the breed of Indian horses, when the cavalry became an important arm of the military, did not much improve, for rarely did Indian rulers import stronger and faster animals from abroad or undertake their cross breeding with local horses.
According to historian Trevanier, gun powder was first discovered in Assam. But we failed to make use of it for military purposes. It had to travel back to us via Burma, China and Europe much later.
Nor was India amongst the first to produce the rifle or the gun.
Indian armies kept relying on the bow and arrow, the
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* To quote from P.C. Chakravarti’s book – The Art of War in Ancient India, Arabic poet, Hellal, describing the flight of the Hemyarites, says, “But they fled under its (i.e. the clouds) small hail (of arrows) quickly, whilst hard Indian swords were penetrating them”. “And again, He died and we inherited him; one old wild (cuirass) and a bright Indian (sword) with a long shoulderbelt”.
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sword, the lance, the shield and sheer numbers. The main bastion of defence and the primary instrument of attack remained the elephant for several centuries. It was only after the First Battle of Panipat in 1526, that the invading Mughal, Babur rudely shook the Indian military mind by the devastating impact of gun-fire, with the poor elephants running back for safety, trampling their own troops.
There was no dearth of courage and the will to fight. But India remained behind the times in equipping her armies with the latest means of warfare. Living in a world apart, we neither kept ourselves fully abreast with the introduction of new weapons elsewhere, nor made efforts for their indigenous development.
Thanks to the wisdom of the leaders of postIndependence India, we now have a sizeable organisation dealing with military research and development known as the Defence Research and Development Organisation. India’s main battle tank, Arjun, as good as any in the world, is almost ready to join service. Our missiles Agni, Prithvi, Nag and Akash have been successfully tested, with Indian leadership having boldly withstood Western pressure to curtail our missilery programme, and shall soon be making a very heartening addition to the Indian armoury. Similarly, the development of the sophisticated phased array radar (Par), after almost two decades of research, has given more teeth to the Akash. Military research and development is equally engaged in a number of other projects, including a Light Combat Aircraft and the Advance Jet Trainer for the Indian Air Force. These should also bear fruit in due course.
Albeit, the national investment in research and development remains most inadequate to compete with the galloping technological progress being made by the advanced countries. Our investment in this field needs to be doubled, to say the least, for us to achieve a respectable
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degree of self-reliance. We need the national will to do so, for it would mean tightening our belts elsewhere. There is no escape from making greater inputs in military research and development, if we are not to repeat pitching elephants against guns, as at Panipat. A speedier decision making in our equipment policy is equally called for. With regard to the latter, let us remind ourselves how, for example, we sent our soldiers to the battlefront equipped with outmoded .303 rifles to fight the Chinese, when most armies had switched over to automatic rifles a decade earlier. It was the 1962 debacle that forced our decision makers to commence the production of the 7.62 mm rifles. We were behind the times, once again, since the world powers now held the AK 47s and 74s or their equivalents. It is only after the clamouring for several years by the top military brass for a change of the 7.62 mms that an indigenous version of the 5.5 mm assault rifle (called the INSAS – Indian National Small Arms System) has been developed.
We have yet to cover a lot of ground, however. Besides increased financial investment, a direct interface between the political and military members of the triaxis must take place to help take faster decisions, both with regard to new projects and speedy execution of the ones in hand.
Statesmanship and diplomacy play a vital role in the avoidance of military conflicts. They help in winning allies and in the formation of right coalition of forces in the event of war. Nonetheless, when the chips are finally down we have to be strong within, lest after a victory we become helpless appendices to an all powerful coalition partner, or suffer defeat as in the case of Iraq in the Gulf war.
Investment in research and development has to be an ongoing affair. A country’s security environment can suddenly change for the worst, but a military machine cannot be built overnight. In any case, it is not a cozy
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situation that we are placed in today. And so writes the former Chief of Army Staff, General V.N. Sharma, in his article, “India’s Security Environment”, in the United Services Institute Journal, Oct-Dec 1992, “ We cannot lower our guard. We must remember that a simple change in US policy can reshuffle the kaleidoscope. We must develop the political will as also diplomatic, economic and military capability to neutralise the threat from Pakistan.”
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Our planning of National Defence, is often ad hoc, leaving no option but to react to situations as they occur. This “ playing it by the ear” approach is detrimental to the functioning of the defence apparatus. We need to duly deliberate on the various issues that affect our national security and self interest and evolve an overall defence strategy, with clearly defined short and long-term goals. Do we want to develop a military capability to recapture our territories lost to China in 1962 ? What should be our military aim in the event of war with Pakistan ? Are we to recapture Pakistan Occupied Kashmir or should our aim be to inflict a military defeat on that country, in order that a weakened Pakistan learns to live in peace with India ? To what extent must the Army be employed for internal security and aid to civil authority ? It is from well deliberated and clearly defined objectives that our force structure should emerge; to be both adequate and balanced to meet our set goals. In this regard, the concept of the National Security Council introduced in recent years, duly represented by members of the political-economic-military triax, backed by a “think tank ” of civil and military professionals should be speedily activated. Despite considerable debate and discussion it continues to occupy a dormant place till now. It is about time that the Council is institutionalised and activated as an ongoing entity.
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STRONGER ARTILLERY PUNCH
In the Indo-Pak War of 1971, we fell short of capturing most of our final objectives on the Western Front and, except for the heroic defence of Poonch, we lost valuable territory in Chhamb and Fazilka. Admittedly, some formation commanders were not bold to exploit favourable tactical situations during our offensives, and lost their nerve while fighting in defence. But what has been overlooked is that, our main weakness lay not so much in planning and execution, as it did in a woeful shortage of a vital battlewinning factor – the Artillery. How weak we were can be gleaned from the number of artillery pieces that supported brigades, divisions and corps during battles of World War II, (refer to chapter “ Power of the Gun “) as compared to the meagre gun support provided to Indian formations in 1971.
The tendency towards underrating fire-power has marked every peace interval in modern history. But in the case of the Indian Army, regrettably, it still continues to exist, despite fighting four wars in a short span of forty seven years, since Independence. As a result, the teaching at our premier training establishments including the Defence Services Staff College and elsewhere, has been to measure relative strengths in terms of infantry and tanks. This has become an outdated method of military evaluation and needs revision. The decisive elements in today’s ground warfare are the long-range, stand-off killers-strike aircraft, missiles and guns. Of these the latter are readily available to engage the enemy within minutes, in keeping with the fast moving battles of to-day.
The next war involving India, if and when it is forced on her, is likely to be more devastating. That it would be of a short duration, as often thought, none can say with certainty. It could well prolong much longer than those fought earlier, claiming far more valuable lives.
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Tomorrow’s war will again be fought primarily on land. In a land war, the harder the fighting, the greater does the front-line soldier lean on the artillery. This is an accepted fact of modern wars, with all the lethal weapons that they bring to bear on the battlefield. Since it is difficult to predict when India may be involved in war again, the sooner that the above imbalance in acute shortage of artillery is corrected the better it would be in the interest of our defence preparedness and national security.
The bulk of the Indian Artillery, to-day, is equipped with short-range guns that fire shells which are light in weight. These guns have outlived their effectiveness in the fire-power environment of present day battles. This is particularly so in the face of well prepared defences, with over-head protection of strong concrete that oppose us on the Western Front. The above guns need to be replaced by ones with longer ranges and capable of firing heavier shells. Long-range guns act as force multipliers, with their ability to reach out to more targets in the battle zone from a given gun position. Deployed comparatively in the rear, they also help to avoid cluttering up of the forward areas, required for infantry deployed in depth, harbour areas for armour etc. Equally, their heavier shells are far more effective in the demolition of the enemy’s field works and in the destruction of armour. Their “ big bang” is nerve racking and helps to lower the opponent’s will to fight. Such guns must also possess a quick rate of fire and the ability to “scoot” after an engagement, to escape retaliation by enemy artillery and aircraft. “ Shoot and scoot ” has, in fact, become the norm for today’s artillery. So did the coalition gunners employ it in the Gulf war to very good effect, suffering negligible damage themselves.
A suitable proportion of the above guns would need to be self-propelled to operate with armoured formations. This is a high priority requirement. With increased battlefield
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mobility, self-propelled artillery has, in fact, become a favoured option for many countries.
The present 155 mm Bofors of Sweden, despite the many heads that it rolled on induction into the army, is a good gun. The army needs guns of similar calibre and characteristics in much larger numbers. Our research and development must undertake to develop guns of the above category and, if possible, up-gun our present holdings of 130 mms. We must also commence in right earnest the production of rocket artillery, with which the army is presently equipped. These rockets of Russian origin are a devastating weapon, with a tremendous fire-power packed in each rocket launcher.*
Meanwhile, we need to import the above equipment or enter into foreign collaborations to produce them in India, till our indigenous manufacture can effectively get underway.
Another aspect that requires special attention is the provision of adequate ammunition. Strong restrictions placed on ammunition expenditure was a lament of every single formation commander of the 1971 war. The Western world has made great strides in the development of a generation of “ Smart ” munitions. With their capability of self-guidance in the final phase of flight, they shall have a revolutionary impact on the engagement of enemy tanks and vehicles by the artillery, and may well explode the theory that a tank’s natural enemy is another tank. Development of the above ammunition by Indian research will help further enhance the artillery’s contribution for success in battle.
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* It would be of interest to note that a rocket battery of six launchers, each fitted with 40 tubes, fires 240 warheads in 20 seconds. To deliver an equivalent amount of high explosive, it would require 13 medium regiments (234 guns) firing one round per gun, in the same time.
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Last but not the least, our tactical concepts must cater for allotment of maximum possible artillery at the point of attack.
Likewise, all available artillery should be rushed to reinforce a sector where the enemy is likely to make a breakthrough. This should include artillery units of neighbouring formations side- stepping to further bolster our fire-power, to the extent possible, be it for temporary periods. While moving such artillery, it would, however, be advisible that observation parties stay back with the units and formations to which affiliated. Only the gun groups “scoot ” for short periods. The orders for move, carriage of ammunition, selection of gun positions in the new deployment areas, their digging and technical preparation and eventual control of fire etc. are matters of detail. Nonetheless, they would need proper examination for quick and effective employment of artillery so side-stepped.
Side-stepping of neighbouring artillery, notwithstanding, the bulk of additional fire support required would need to be provided by the reinforcing artillery comprised of 155 mm guns and multi-barrelled rockets. The need of the hour is to provide one artillery division of four brigades to each corps, besides the present divisional artillery, integral to an infantry-armoured division. Although, it would not be possible to raise artillery divisions overnight, the earlier we make a start, commencing with their allotment to our strike formations and sensitive sectors that we need to defend, the better. Three brigades of the proposed artillery divisions should be equipped with five medium regiments each and the fourth, to comprise rockets, air defence and SATA (Surveillance and Target Acquisition) regiments. Had we the above quantum of artillery available with 15, 1 and 11 Corps in 1971, we would have lost neither Chhamb nor the rich fields of Fazilka and penetrated much deeper into Pakistan at Shakargarh.
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With the above fire-power given to a corps, it’s sub-allotment to divisions would depend on the prevailing tactical situation, morale of own troops etc. Coupled with the maximum move of artillery within a corps, and inter-corps, as mentioned earlier, it would be possible to treble the presently available fire-power to brigades and divisions while going into attack, or holding important sectors in defence.
The point to impress is that, it is fire-power, as opposed to merely the bayonet strength, that would bring us victory in battle. The accuracy of today’s artillery has increased manyfold. Besides “Smart ” munitions, mentioned earlier, ballistic computers combined with accurate survey and meteorological data and electronic muzzle velocity measuring equipment has made “ first Salvo ” effectiveness a near reality. A study of recent wars reveals that approximately 80 percent of all casualties in battle can be attributed to artillery fire.
Commenting on the effective employment of gun fire in the Falkland war, Ian V. Hogg, in his book, Artillery 2000 writes, “ It surprised many people that, in the final stages of the brief Falkands campaign in 1982, with every possible modern and scientific weapon deployed and with air power of the most up-to-date type available on call, it was actually the bombardment of Port Stanley by two regiments of field artillery that brought about the collapse of Argentinian resistance and the surrender of their forces. This is a well attested fact, and not myth. Artillery fire is frequently called an “area weapon ” when the fact is that modern guns can be used with surgical precision, as they were at Port Stanley, to bring fire to bear upon carefully selected and discrete targets in a manner that can persuade an enemy that he is virtually under a microscope and that his every move invites shellfire.”
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“ Artillery raid” is another concept that has now emerged in the employment of guns. Such raids were carried out by the coalition gunners during the Gulf war with devastating results. Medium and heavy artillery and rocket launcher units surreptitously moved well forward by night to unsuspected positions, undertook destruction of enemy equipment, communication centres and gun areas and generally caused immense harrassment to defending Iraqis. The shock effect of these raids, which took the latter by complete surprise, lowered their morale and will to fight. If a miniature raid by 220 Medium Regiment of 26 Artillery Brigade, with a single gun that fired a hundred rounds at the Pakistani divisional headquarter near Sialkot in 1971, could inflict considerable damage and confusion (as earlier mentioned) – the impact of artillery raids by large numbers of artillery units in the Gulf war can be well imagined.
The impact of coalition artillery on the Iraqi army in general and it’s contribution to help reduce the ground war time-table to a mere 100 hours is much less known, viz. the destruction caused by it’s air forces. As mentioned earlier, gunners are the least articulate community. Amongst the busiest soldiers in the battlefield, where is the time for them to blow their trumpets! This is not to suggest that they start doing so. Let them continue to spend time and energy to blow up enemy personnel and defences.
Alongwith the induction of more guns in the Indian Army is our need for suitable Artillery Radars, both for survelliance and location of guns. Commenting on their performance in the Gulf War, Lieutenant Colonel James Vandernaald, U S Army, writes in an article titled Desert Storm Artillery Report : Triumph for Weapon Locating Radar, “Weapon locations from AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars brought accurate fire on hostile firing positions with dramatic and decisive results ….. Just as often quoted were the reactions of Iraqi soldiers. Because, when they fired,
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return fire was immediate, captured Iraqis have said that to pull the lanyard was to invite death. “Radar had thus helped neutralise the mighty artillery of Iraq. Our investment in radar equipment cannot, therefore, be overemphasised.
On fire-power in tomorrow’s battlefields, Major General Prakash Jairath, in his book, Tactical Concepts and Fire Power in the 21st Century, writes, “ The 21st-century is going to be an era of Fire-Power where indirect fire will be the major bed partner and will assume the traditional role as Queen of the Battle.” Advanced countries are now engaged in the development of Autonomous Artillery. As opposed to gun deployment in troops, batteries and regiments, the Autonomous concept envisages engagement by single guns, with a one to one link with the Forward Observers, using the gun’s own computer. Like mini SCUDS, (Shorter of range but far more accurate) they may then be spread over widely in a given sector, to avoid both air and artillery retaliation and yet retain the ability to concentrate on a given target. Undoubtedly, autonomy would bring a heavy demand for communications and interference by electronic counter-measures. But the techniques to overcome ECM will also arrive, with the progress being made in electronics.
From all accounts, artillery is tomorrow’s Arm of Decision. Our operational planning would, therefore, need to be predominantly artillery oriented.
India’s air defence environment, likewise, requires to be considerably strengthened, in the face of the ever increasing power displayed by modern aircraft. This vital aspect of National Security cannot be ignored. To counter the growing air threat, new measures will be needed to detect aircraft. Phased array radars coupled to computers will be required for effective surveillance, fire control and missile guidance. Light, automated, multi-barrelled guns, with a higher rate of fire and improved sighting systems, firing ammunition
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with proximity fuses would be needed to combat the aircraft of tomorrow. Guns and missiles would have to operate in unison to engage aircraft with the most suitable weapon. Above all, air defence artillery will have to face the challenge of electronic warfare.
Coalition forces, superior electronic machine in the Gulf war, for example, was primarily responsible for down – grading the effectiveness of the Iraqi air defences, composed of 17,000 SAMS and nearly 10,000 air defence pieces. As a result, coalitions’ loss of aircraft was much lower. As one pilot is said to have commented, “ If it had not been for ECM —- 50 percent of our aircraft would not have returned.” India’s air defence preparedness would, therefore, entail requisite investment to counter the enemy’s electronic warfare capability.
How do we raise the funds for carrying out the above said expansion of artillery? The question is pertinent in the face of our present financial constraints. It would appear that there are three courses available to achieve this aim. First, make a more concerted effort to boost our exports of military hardware to earn additional foreign exchange. Second, consider a merger of the various categories of our para-military forces into two sub-groups; one for internal security and the other to guard the border. This would cut down expenditure on running separate administrative, training and command establishments for each force. Further, in case the latter could form the border wing of the army, there would be additional reduction in expenditure, beside ensuring better coordination between the border guards and the army, during operations. Third, consider trimming down the army’s manpower by drawing ajudicious balance between numbers viz. fire-power.
Be that as it may, the requirment to raise more artillery is inescapable. It has been the “ ultimate ratio regum” — the
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last argument of the kings for centuries; whereas it was relegated to play a secondary role in the Indian Army after Independence, it is time that we correct this imbalance. That our missile Prithvi shall soon join the gunner train, the need for additional artillery with capabilities and characteristics as mentioned above, does not diminish. Nor would it if, with nuclear neighbours around, India decides to acquire the above capability as military deterrence against intimidation and blackmail. It is about time we took the decision to do so, anyway. And in case we already have some bombs in the basement, let us make it known for the benefit of the likely adversaries. That India has been advocating a total nuclear disarmament for decades on the one hand cannot be dubbed as political duplicity on her part. It is a separate issue and one hopes that some day the nuclear monster will be given a permanent burial to make our planet safe to live, removing all prospects of a thermonuclear conflagration. For if we do not and a third world war breaks out, Einstein’s words may come true,“ the fourth world war would be fought with stones !”
As I end writing this book, I do hope that our policy makers will give the views on India’s defence preparedness expressed above a serious thought. To brook delay in correcting the functioning of our defence apparatus can prove costly — living as we are in uncertain times. A sudden international event could upset the apple cart. Let us go by “first things first ”. And what can take priority over one’s honour and self respect, home and hearth. To rush to lock the stable after the horse has bolted would be of no avail. At the cost of repetition, I earnestly urge that we duly appreciate the power of the gun and strenghten the artillery arm, in particular. Nor must they be miserly in the allotment of ammunition. Ultimately, the shell is the killer. The gun is only a means. To go to war with strict ammunition restrictions is like fighting with one hand tied behind the back. As earlier mentioned, shortage of ammunition was a
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lament of every single formation commander of 1971.
To quote Rudyard Kipling once again :
“Tis gunner this and gunner that,
And chuck’em out the brute,
But it’s the Saviour of the Country,
Wow When the guns begin to shoot.”
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