BANGLADESH AT WAR | MAJ GEN K. M. SAFIULLAH

BANGLADESH AT WAR | MAJ GEN K. M. SAFIULLAH

বিশেষ দ্রষ্টব্যঃ কপিরাইট সমস্যা যাতে না হয় সেকারণে সকল লেখা শুধুমাত্র ‘only Readable’, ‘non-downloadable’ ও ‘non-clickable’ রাখা হয়েছে। সংগ্রামের নোটবুকের সকল নথি-পত্রিকা-দলিল-সংকলন-বই থেকে নেয়া তথ্য-ছবি-ভিডিও শুধুমাত্র গবেষণার কাজে ব্যবহার্য। বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা সংগ্রাম ও মুক্তিযুদ্ধ গবেষণার জন্য সংগ্রামের নোটবুক একটি অলাভজনক অবাণিজ্যিক বিজ্ঞাপনমুক্ত ডোনেশনমুক্ত স্বেচ্ছাশ্রমে গড়া প্রচেষ্টা।

FOREWORD
I have gone through the book with great interest. It brings to our memory the events leading to the struggle for independence from Pakistan. It gives vivid description of the battles fought out in different sectors. The events have been narrated in simple, lucid and clear language. The people are more or less acquainted with the political aspect of the movement. They are eager to have graphic description of the battles. The First Chief of Army Staff of the Independent Bangladesh, Major General K. M. Safiullah, fulfills that expectation.
The book reveals moments of anxiety, suspense, retreat, preparation, determination and victory in the battle fields. But the author has not omitted to portray the discrimination, neglect and wellplanned subjugation suffered by the people of Bangladesh prior to the declaration of Independence. On the emergence of Pakistan in August 1947 this territory was officially called East Bengal. It was, in fact, so called during British days. Even this was too much for the rules of Pakistan to tolepate. They tried to make us forget our inherent culture and traditions. As indeed there was an attack on the language a Bengalee child learns at the lap of its mother or in its cradle. After some time East Bengal was named East Pakistan by the rulers, who could take any decision without caring for the sentiment of the people.
The people of Bangladesh exhibited their patience, tolerance and spirit of reconciliation in overlooking many designs to obliterate our cultural, spiritual and social traditions. We even tolerated too long the treatments which resembled those colonial rules. The seat of the Government was in West Pakistan. The headquarters of the Army, Navy and the Air-Force were also there. The author has referred to the unseemly discrimination. What is after all a colony ? Briefly speaking, a colony is a territory : which is ruled by
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another, located at a distance. This land of ours is separated from what was known as West Pakistan by 1200 miles of Indian territory. Although majority of the population lived in the then East Pakistan, the authority of the Government emanated from West Pakistan. The persons, who were repository of all state powers hailed from West Pakistan except for some very brief periods. It was more so after the military take-over in 1958. The Bengalees in the Government since then were controlled by non-Bengalees.
The people of the then East Pakistan resented the discrimination and the neglect. The Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur, gave voice to the gagged silence and demanded equal treatment for his people. He asked for appropriate shares in all spheres of the Government including Armed Forces.
The author has referred to the treatment meted out to the civilian population and put on record the discrimination suffered by the Armed Forces. He says, “Bangalee elements had no viable existence in Pakistan Army.” It is known to all that the inherent quality of a man needs inspiration, encouragement and appreciation for further development. The colonial rulers, where in Africa and in Latin America or in the Indian Sub-continent, never thought that such development of the strength of the people was desirable. The rulers wanted them to carry out orders and never to learn how to give or enforce them.
Bangladesh, confident in its inherent strength, could forgive ninety thousand soldiers of Pakistan and allow them to return home. But the author did not omit to say for the sake of history that Pakistan would not stop until the ‘shackles of colonial rule were fastened tight around our neck’. He has stated how Pakistani Army carried out ‘treacherous and brutal attack’ on the members of the Police Force, East Pakistan Rifles, unarmed students including girl students of Rokeya Hall. He has described brutalities in Iqbal Hall, the Dhaka University campus, Dhaka Medical College and digging of mass graves at Jagannath Hall and throwing dead bodies of students into the same. He rightly considers it to be a genocide ‘like of which world did not witness before’.
The author has given other instances of brutalities. If we turn to one, say Comilla, we will realise that human beings at times cease to be so. They interrogated the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police, who succumbed to the torture inflicted on them. He has also
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mentioned that ‘on March 29 at 4 P.M. a group of Bengalee young men were brought, killed and thrown into mass grave’. A senior officer of West Pakistan called his three Bengalee colleagues and confined them in a solitary room. They were then gunned down. Providence helped Lieutenant Imamu-zzaman, a wounded Bengalee officer to escape. We are then taken by the author through the breath-taking details of his coming out of the hell and jumping into the river Gumti. The author has referred to the need for a political leadership in a war. This must be so in peace time as well. He says, ‘Obedience to a legal and constitutional authority is the basis for the healthy functioning of any military force’. He describes how thousands, admist thunderous cheers, witnessed the birth of a new State, Bangladesh, in a border village, later christened as Mujib Nagar in the Subdivision of Chuadanga. The Awami League formed the government and with the co-operation of other political parties launched a worldwide movement for the undeniable human right of self determination. Statesmanship of Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam and organizing ability of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed spear-headed the movement.
Anyone reading this book would come across many touching moments. To give an instance, Daula Mia courageously fought in a very difficult situation till a bullet struck him. As he was about to breathe his last he shouted “Joy Bangla” and requested the author to show his bloodsoaked shirt to the beloved leader Sheikh Mujib after Independence and to convey to him that he carried out the order till the last conscious moment. The people of Bangladesh pushed to the extreme, organised mass neetings, protested against unequal treatment and suffered death and destruction, but achieved victory at the end. The triumph of truth was inevitable. The fight was for the achievement of fundamental human rights and a parliamentary form of governments as already pledged before 1970-elections. The solemn commitment was that country would be governed in accordance with the wishes of the people expressed through elected representatives under a democratic constitution.
Along with the civilian population and the newly recruited freedom fighters, the gallant Bengalee soldiers took up arms against the colonial might of Pakistan. Although our National Movement was founded on the policy of constitutionalism and non-violence, it was necessary to take up arms in defence of truth, justice and national respect. They did
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so as the Pakistani soldiers started killing men, women and children and committing rape, loot and arson. The Bengalee personnel of the Armed Forces reacted instantaneously and reflected national pride, patriotism and self-respect. The personality of General Osmany was a source of inspiration to them.
I felt an indefinable feeling of joy in going through the narrative unfolding the events of withdrawal from Joydevpur and regrouping at Mymensingh in those hours of uncertainty and anxiety on the night of March 28/29. The author reveals how the patriotic soldiers received tumultuous welcome, support and encouragement from the civilian population. It is equally fascinating to read what happened at Sholashahar under the command of Major Zia (later President Ziaur Rahman).
By March 30 the author got encouraging and welcome messages from Chittagong, Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Pabna, Bogra, Kushtia, Habiganj, Brahmanbaria and Feni. The Bengalee Armed Forces everywhere responded to the call of Sheikh Mujib and took up arms to free the motherland from the presecution of the invading forces. So did the newly recruited freedom fighters all over the country. The achievements of Kader Siddiky are well-known.
The author, who took a leading part in the War of truth and justice, has given vivid descriptions of how the actual battles were fought out and won in the face of endless difficulties. There was unthinkable lack of modern arms and ammunitions, sophisticated weapons and yet their fearlessness, determination and love for the country inspired them to march forward to triumphant glory.
A reader would experience in this book the thrills, suspense, anxiety, ecstasy, joy and almost a feeling of actual participation.

18 July 1986 Abu Sayeed Chowdhury
Former President
People’s Republic of Bangladesh Rosendale
103, Mymensingh Road Dhaka

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Acknowledgment
I have long been contemplating to bring out in black and white an account of the great liberation war, that was fought in Bangladesh in 1971. But my pre-occupations afforded me very little time to complete the work earlier than now.
In this book I have tried to highlight some episodes and illustrated some important features of the war from military point of view and avoided making deliberate comments. I leave it to the readers to draw their own conclusions on the quality of guerilla warfare and battles fought by the liberation forces. My attempt by no means, all embracing. My humble apology to those who may not find special mention of their names in my narration. It was neither intentional nor possible. But I assure them that they may find descriptions of identical nature involving their comrades in arms.
My humble tribute goes to the valiant freedom fighters of the liberation war, to the teeming millions of Bengalees who directly or indirectly contributed to the liberation of our motherland, and last but not the least, to all ranks of the Bangladesh forces, who to my estimate, are second to none in their professional achievements. My deep gratitude to General M A G Osmany, the then Commander-in Chief of the Bangladesh forces. As the Commander-inChief, General Osmany, during the most difficult period of the war of liberation led us through the thick and thin of the war with utmost ability. We owe him a great deal for our ultimate victory.
My gratitude to Brigadier VC Pande, Inspector-General of Indian Border Security Force, who helped us with whatever he had at his disposal during the most crucial period of our war of liberation.
I am thankful to Mr. Ashraf Ali Dewan (deceased) who was the labour leader of Teliapara Tea Garden. During the war he along with his entire Tea Garden labour force remained vigilant round the clock and built thatched houses in our camps where ever we moved, built
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roads in the camp area and made sure those remain negotiable all the time.
My gratitude to Mr. Nuruddin Kamal (last appointment as Chairman PDB) who, during the war, as civilian staff officer under my Sector, was entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining continuous liaison with the Indian counterparts for obtaining arms, ammunitions and explosives for the Freedom Fighters operating within the Bangladesh territory. In this gigantic task Kamal was assisted by two very energetic freedom fighters. They were Mr. Alkas and Mr. Ashique.
My gratitude also to two very dedicated freedom fighters and they were Mr. M A Mahi (Retired as GM Sonali Bank) and Advocate Aminul Huq (Atorny General till death). Mr. Mahi worked as Accounts Officer of the Sector. He with a small clerical staff maintained the record of payment to all guerillas operating all over the sector area and Mr. Aminul Huq worked as Camp Commandant of Nimbuchara Training Camp, where he apart from being a Camp Commandant, worked very hard as instructor to train the boys in his camp. I am thankful to the officials of the Bangla Academy for their conscientious recording of my interviews which helped me off and on in frequent references to dates and incidents of the war.
Brigadier (Retd) D S Yusuf Hyder, psc., has contributed more than his due share in collecting materials, taking interviews of many freedom fighters and finally consolidating them for me in writing up this book, I owe him heartfelt gratitude.
I am particularly indebted to my wife, Sayeda Akhter who during the war of liberation was left at her own with our three small children. She managed to evade Pakistani forces and crossed over to India in the month of June 1971. During the period of her stay in India she used to send me notes of inspiration to fight for the liberation of the country. It was her inspiration again which encouraged me in writing this book.
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Preface
Birth of Bangladesh as a separate physical and political entity on the map of the subcontinent is associated with memories of pain, bitter struggle and great sacrifices. The myth of one Pakistan founded in 1947 on the basis of religion crumbled when our Muslim brothers of the western wing lashed down upon their aspiring and unsuspecting fellow brothers of the eastern wing with brute military force on the night of March 25, 1971. It was an act of unparalleled savagery, leaving in its wake of death, destruction and dislocation. The sleeping population of Dhaka and elsewhere were caught unaware many never woke up next morning to find out what struck them in the dead of the night. Senseless killing and destruction of property followed.
And it was all because the 75 million ill-fed, ill-clothed people of the then East Pakistan wanted an end of the exploitation by their big brothers in Islamabad, because they exercised their democratic rights, and because they gave their mandate to the champion of their cause Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the 70’s general election.
Thus when the edifice of friendship broke, there was no illusion left. Innocent people, children, women and old alike were the victims of their atrocities. Our mothers and daughters were dishonoured. Thrown to the wolves, the peace loving Bengalees found no other option but to defend their lives, virtues and dreams.
The initial actions of the Bengal Regiments and individual officers and men, did not start as a result of systematic and co-ordinated military plan. But the action started precisely, simultaneously, throughout the length and breadth of the country, in order to save their motherland from the ravage of Pakistani brutal force.
The Bengalees, all and sundry rallied behind the Liberation Forces to fight a war spearheaded by the Bengal Regiments. The nucleus of the Liberation Force was formed by the Bengal Regiments, the infantry
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battalions of Pakistan Army, peopled by Bengalee troops. These battalions provided the leadership in their own regions where they were joined by East Pakistan Rifles, Police, para-Military Force, students and great number of civilian populace in active fighting.
Bangladesh’s war of liberation was indeed an unique episode of history. It was a war with many facets, distinctive in its nature, scope, spirit and totality. On one side was a vast well trained and armed army but lacking in moral inspiration waging war against helpless and virtually unarmed people and on the other were an odd assortment of ill armed soldiers and freedom fighters backed by the whole population in their just struggle. For these people there were no alternatives but to win and they were ready to pay any price, so they fought desperately and laid down their lives willingly and uncaringly.
As pure conventionalism did not have place in this war, the Liberation Army did not restrict their battle only on conventional pattern. It unfurled itself in many dimensions as it progressed along beyond the conventional pattern. The Liberation army faced defeats after defeats but they kept their morale high and kept on hitting at the enemy always and everywhere until their nerves cracked and they were rendered completely bewildered. The courage, determination and tenacity with which the Bengalees fought crowned them with a glorious victory out of mounting defeats.
The victory came at the end, but it was a victory dearly won. In the nine months of fighting hundreds of thousands of people died, many millions more lost their home and suffered. The flower of the country’s manhood, the youths, students, soldiers gave their lives for freedom and future for the posterity.
And for us those that live the memory of their sacrifice is ever so dear.

Dhaka 1st July, 1988
Major General K. M. Safiullah, BU, psc, (Retd.)
First Chief of Army Staff Bangladesh Army

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Background
Utter confusion, disillusionment and hopelessness preceded the fatal night of March 25, 1971. The election was over, Lieutenant General Shahibzada Yacoob, general officer commanding the Eastern Command, in his address to the officers of the Dhaka garrison, narrated, what he called ‘an eagle’s eye view of the events that took place in a chronological order since the downfall of the Ayub regime. ‘So far, so good’ he concluded ‘now is the final stage of smooth power handover to a democratically elected government.’ He described that stage ‘an uphill task’ and in the process could not conceal his love for the Bengalees. He sermonised, ‘treat them well’.
One is inclined to be optimistic about the end result, particularly when the preceding parts progressed with utmost genuineness. Ordinarily people took Yahya’s pledges for granted and believed when he said, ‘I am a soldier and would like to go back to the barracks’. He seemed to have accepted that the Bengalees were neglected. To their gratification, he expressed, ’75 million people of East Pakistan should be given their due share in the Government so that they develop a sense of participation in the country’s administration.’ West Pakistan always got a lion’s share in everything. They utilised 70% of the nation’s foreign aid.Out of East Pakistan’s foreign exchange earning, 70% imports found their place in West Pakistan. They monopolised 90% of the central bureaucracy and 95% of the army’. Apparently Yahya was not unfavourably disposed towards “Six Points’ or towards its accredited author, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Yahya’s credibility reached beyond reproach when under the umbrella of the army, he successfully completed the first countrywide election on the
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basis of adult franchise wherein Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats thereby gaining an overall majority in the national assembly, while Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party captured 83 out of 144 seats in West Pakistan. This was a achievement indeed. It took Yahya to the pinnacle of popularity in the mind of some Bengalees who took him for a man of words. It won for him the credit that he lost miserably due to his glaring neglect towards the cyclone hit coastal areas of Bangladesh during November 1970. But the Bengalees did not know what was under his sleeves. When the hideous hyena revealed itself mastering all its brutalities, the hand of time had already crossed the twentyfourth hour.
It was in the gardens of Larkana’s prince, self-styled ‘Prince of Denmark’ where Yahya and Bhutto made their debut while shooting birds. They hatched conspiracy to perpetuate ruling the Bengalees. If the reports of Yahya’s intelligence were correct, they anticipated nothing more than 60% seats in East Pakistan in favour of Mujib. With that score a coalition in the centre would be inevitable. So the chance of election was worth taking, they concluded, but the election result unnerved them all. Mujib had a clearcut absolute majority.
The Pakistan military junta rallied behind Bhutto, who vituperated, ‘if West Pakistan dominated East Pakistan for twenty-four years, it is no excuse for East Pakistan dominate West Pakistan’. Bhutto took advantage of his landslide victory in West Pakistan and the support of the junta. He made a tool of Yahya. The General had no doubt that the home front was solidly behind Bhutto who also enjoyed overwhelming support of the armed forces. The gossip had it that Yahya was under total eclipse and when asked by a foreign journalist, he replied with an embarrassment that he was still holding the reins of the government.
The gossip culminated in a specially arranged conference of the governors and the martial law administrators, held in Islamabad towards the end of February. It was here that Yahya’s decision to put off sine die, the date of summoning the ‘National
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Assembly in Dhaka on March 3, was made known to all the participants. Admiral S M Ahsan, supported by Lieutenant General Rakhman Gul, the Governor of Sind, repeatedly requested the President to reconsider his decision. He minced no words in bringing home to the President, the dire consequences of this fatal decision. But Yahya remained firm in his resolved.
Already, the Admiral was known for sympathising and maintaining a close liaison with the Bengalee leaders. His growing popularity with the Bengalees was a matter of concern for Yahya and the junta. They lost all confidence in Ahsan.
Ahsan advised the President to fix a fresh date for summoning the National Assembly, instead of postponing it indefinitely. But to no avail. Yahya finally ordered Ahsan to fly back to Dhaka and to inform Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of this decision on February 28 which was done accordingly at the government house, to the utter dismay and disappointment of the Bengalee leader.
The junta drew up a military plan for ‘East Pakistan’, behind the scene while Yahya’s hissing monotone began to reverberate in the air on March 1. The speech was a blatant provocation. It suspended sine die the seating of the National Assembly due on March 3. Public reaction was violent in Bangladesh. They immediately came out in the streets all over the country. Protest processions thronged the main thoroughfares of Dhaka and all other cities. Lieutenant General Yacoob clamped curfew in the cities and ordered his army in battle order to guard the thoroughfares.
In the same evening, the Governor made his last bid to the President. He reaffirmed to Yahya his earlier proposal to fix a fresh date for the National Assembly session. He informed the President that a point of no return had already reached which could only be controlled by political means. Yahya could not tolerate this. The same night Ahsan was relieved of his duties.
The country being in the throes of a grave political crisis, army could do little by their language of guns. Slogans for holding the National Assembly on the scheduled date and place rent the air all over Bangladesh. A volcanic frenzy so overtook the men on the street that even the live bullets could not scare
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the marchers away from their endless cavalcade. If one fell, there came hundreds to take the coveted place of martyrdom which shot up to over few hundreds in a matter of three days.
Thus ended the third day of March. Yacoob called his army back to the barracks and sent a flash to Yahya-“Kettle is on the boil (.) I am somehow keeping the lid on (.) No power on earth can check this force (.) Request accord political direction (.) Yacoob.”
There was a marked reaction in Yahya’s mind and the flash message incensed the junta instantaneously. The message brought an abrupt end to the illustrious career of one of the seasoned generals of Pakistan army. The junta dubbed him a coward, ‘political direction’ to them was nothing but a preposterous idea.
Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, one of the major hawks, was immediately summoned to Islamabad to replace Admiral Ahsan, the moderate governor of ‘East Pakistan’ who had already refused to trek the path of the hawks and resigned, on March 3. Tikka would also replace Yacoob now and take over the Eastern Command. Thus a thing, which was merely a matter of conjecture, since the governors’ and martial law administrators’ conference held in February last in Islamabad, became a reality. In that conference Tikka’s flamboyant overtones on the postelection condition obtaining in Bangladesh and its answer had a Maoist texture, ‘power comes through the barrel of a gun’ a familiar quib so frequently uttered by Bhutto. Tikka was tipped for the job there and then, on his frank assurance to silence the Bengalees, to boomerang the verdict of the people within ‘only 48 hours’. He said ‘give me enough force and I will crush them’. A mission was spelt out to Tikka, ‘crush Sheikh Mujib and his Awami League’. He was given a blank cheque even if this meant a wholesale massacre of a teeming generation of Bengalees. But this was not the last word.
Thus equipped with the dual robe of honour, Tikka demanded the best of troops and munitions of war which were already forthcoming in a daily average 500 in regulars, paramilitia and police and 500 tons in supplies, weapons and equipment through the Pakistan International Airlines and
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commercial lines. All the cantonments in the eastern province of Pakistan were beaming with brisk and hectic radiness for war. But war against whom ? Even a charlatan would rule out any possibility of war against India. By the second half of February, anti-aircraft defence around Dhaka international airport and other vulnerable points was almost complete. 40 milimetre Bofors were sited on tactical ground around the airport. Pakistani’s made no secret of the show of power to hundreds of passersby. The military junta thought that they would give an impression to the people that Pakistan was making these preparation for a show down with India—their traditional enemy, yet the people sensed what it was really meant for. They had but one forgone conclusion—a bloody war was in the offing against the Bengalee nation. Only they failed to gauge the magnitude of the blood shed.
Thanks to the hijacked ‘GANGA* with its ceremonious funeral at Lahore airport, the over-flights being discontinued, the PIA traffic took a circuitous route over Sri Lanka, which considerably delayed the process of taoops build up.
Tikka also put his bid on Lieutenant General A A K Niazi, a rustic and a foul-mouthed general of the Pakistan army with an ungainly nom-de-plume ‘Tiger’ before his name. The land of Royal Bengal Tigres hardly took any notice of Niazi.
A masterpiece of oration and statesmanship of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the March 7, told the longest epic in the fewest words to an impatient human ocean. Ramna race course with the imposing roof tops and the lofty rows of teak, was packed to capacity with human ocean from all sections of the society. Spellbound, they heard the voice, as if from a messiah of God and got baptised. It said, ‘get ready and be prepared to fight. If I am not there to give orders … fight with whatever you have … struggle this time is for freedom, struggle this time is for independence …’*
Another Pakistani hawk, Tikka’s arrival a day before aggravated the already troubled situation. He made up his mind.
__________________________________________
*The Indian F-27 Foker Friendship aircraft
**8th March 1971, Daily ITTEFAQ, Dhaka
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Should the Sheikh declare independence, which, in all probability, was the expectation of all, the die would be cast.
All the approaches, to and from the race course were plugged in by infantry soldiers and armour heavy in fire power, both in automatics and mortars. Pilots of F-86 sabre jets armed to the hilt tucked in one of the corners of Dhaka airport, were in cock-pit readiness. And lastly a detachment of the armed signal personnel made a dash into the Dhaka radio station and quickly snapped the transmission of the historic speech without any word of warning to the millions of anxious radio listeners.
All these provocative measures failed to arouse corresponding provocation on the Sheikh. He made the speech in measured words, not more than 500 in number. Soon some radical followers of Sheikh started distributing thousands of Bangladeshi flags and voice slogans to declare the inevitable. But Sheikh Mujib’s thundering charade subdued the roaring crowd who swayed like the waves driven by the good angel Aerial.
After 15 minutes, too soon, with the spontaneous magic slogan Joy Bangla the crowd began to disperse with the Sheikh. The speech was indeed, a declaration ad-valorem. But the hawk was made to allow its transmission the same night. The masses got the message and a total non-co-peration movement ensured from the following day. Sheikh Mujib’s Dhanmondi residence virtually became another government house from where policy directives began to emanate and the entire nation, with no exception, responded by showing unqualified support to the authority they accepted with their heart and soul. Only those under compulsion worked but that also with utmost reluctance.
Visible effects of the non-cooperation movement began to manifest immediately from the following day. All sorts of supplies and provisioning stopped. The troops began to consume costly tinned substitutes. It was resolved by a group of jurists of Dhaka High Court Bar that they would refuse to conduct the swearing-in ceremony of Tikka as the Governor. Tikka had to face a show down as Justice B A Siddiqui, when summoned to the government house, declined to go there and swear him in.
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The directives of the Sheikh began to be observed in letter and spirit. The only exception was the non-Bengalees.
Even after twenty-four years of their stay in East Pakistan the non-Bengalees, who were known as ‘Biharis’, did not associate themselves with the main stream of life and maintained their own identity. They spoke the language of the West Pakistanis i.e. Urdu. Soon polarisation began to set in Pakistani pundits began to motivate the non-Bengalees to join hand with them against the Bengalees, in the traditions of jehad. The nonBengalees responded favourably. In the sermons they eulogised the non-Bengalees and called them the greatest patriots, who got the independence in 1947 and also who would preserve it now’. Thus the so-called preservers of independence rallied behind the Pakistanis against Bengalees.
Bengalees serving in the armed forces were kept in the darkness about the military plan. But it was, nevertheless, becoming clear from the hush hush staff activity in the headquarters of the Eastern Command, 14 Division and Logistic Area that it was, as if, a blanket silence before a storm, disquietening and distressing.
Pakistan high command having effected a complete blackout of their true intentions, took advantage of the prevailing political uncertainty. Plane loads of West Pakistan jawans in civilian dresses were being flown in. It was revealed later that first such arrivals bore the cryptic name, ‘guests’. The daily situation reports reflecting the influx of manpower were given highly classified treatment and did not find their way to the Bengalee officers. But the feeding strength of the armed forces was no more a secret which was indicating a daily intake to the tune of 500 additional mouths since February 22, 1971. It was during these days that the senior West Pakistani army officers began to pour into Dhaka. Major Generals Mitha, Qamar Ali Mirza and Janjua, Brigadier Harrison and Colonel M R Hassan all from the logistic side came to Dhaka to check on the provisioning. Mitha, though he was the quarter master general, had a befitting task to himself, to plan on a commando operation and also to take the field if need be. This task kept him longer in this tension ridden region, while Qamar Ali Mirza,
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convinced of the alarming supply situation confronting the army developed solely out of the non-cooperation movement, flew back to Pakistan to arrange air lifts for the essential commodities including perishable items of supply. A costly venture no doubt and no military planner could ever think of undertaking an offensive in the face of such a lacuna in the field of logistics. Janjua also left followed by MR Hassan. Harrison stayed behind to look after the supply and transport situation in the logistic area.
Bangalee officers no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the West Pakistan military rulers. They were being constantly shadowed and watched. Intelligence agents sneaked around every office and dwellings of Bengalees in pursuit of preparing their dossiers and painting them white, gray and black, the three colours they chose to determine their loyalty and fidelity to Pakistan. It was during these days that Major General Akbar Khan, the chief of the intereservices intelligence, visited Bangladesh on a motivation tour.
The effects of the non-cooperation movement surfaced in a big way when the government of Sri Lanka, due to internal trouble in that country, conveyed to the government of Pakistan that the refuelling facility so far extended by them to the returning boeing 707 flights, would, possibly, be suspended. Not one drop of fuel JP-1 could be obtained from the Burma Eastern depot at Godnail which was under constant surveillance of the Sangram Parishad comprising a group of militant youth, who were determined to blow off the depot in case of any violation of the non-cooperation movement by the trade’s administration. PIA’s own stock available at the airport tankage and at the Allenburry drum depot located opposite the Dhaka airport totalled only 80,000 gallons and March 10, which was sufficient only for two refuelling. Tikka ordered his logistic commander, Brigadier M H Ansari to capture the Burma Eastern depot with two companies of the 18 Punjab regiment on the night of March 11. After some harangue, good sense prevailed on him. Before the H hour, he had to cancel his order, probably, fearing violent reaction from the tension loaded population, in which case, the
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situation might go out of his control at a time when he was not all the way through with his military build up.
As the day’s uneasy peace crept along in snail’s pace, Yahya again came up in the air and announced a fresh date for the national assembly. The date so fixed was March 25, the ominous day preceding the blackest night in history. To give it a touch of matter of factness. Yahya planned a feint. He declared that he would make an attempt to negotiate a settlement between the Sheikh and Bhutto. Bhutto retorted. He immediately reaffirmed his boycott and decided to maintain an uncompromising posture regarding his ‘two majority parties’, ‘two constitutions’ and ‘two assemblies’. He unequivocally refused to be on the opposition bench. This was again a calculated move in the game of simulation.
With the polarization in the political arena complete between the two wings, there was little that could be achieved by negotiation. But Sheikh Mujib decided to give it a try.
When the two peoples, conscious of their two national identities, began to run away from each other, a point was already reached from where there was no return. Ignoring this parting note, Tikka opened his address to the garrison officers with a story from his reminiscent past. His landlady’s little daughter in the states thoughtfully asked him ‘General, you have a peculiar country with two parts separated by more than 2000 kilometers. How you call it one country and how d’you keep it together ? The General oversimplified and said nonchalantly ‘By Islam’. This disconcerting story was more out of place to us, than it was to the girl whose tender heart might have run out of breath looking for humour in the general’s laconic reply. As for Islam, it was no more than a trade name for exploitation of the Bengalees during the past. With its treasures exhausted to the point of bankruptcy, its use in the present context had a dangerous connotation. Was Islam now going to be used as a weapon for domination of the Bengalees ?
In the backdrops of these talks and eager expectation of the proposed negotiation, military build up continued at a neck break speed. Herculis C-130 transport aircraft started landing at
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Dhaka, Chittagong and Jessore airports at the rate of two sorties per day, each sortie having two to three aircraft’s. This was in addition to the increased boeing flights, all carrying variable arsenals and battle motivated troops garbed in innocuous civilian clothes who lost no time to the airport tarmac to change into Khakis.
Dhaka airport was virtually turned into an operational air base heavily defended and security measures turned up on war footing. A dug-in anti-aircraft artillery command post was established on the western side of the airport building with its tentacle spread over the entire area. All West Pakistani officers and men were ordered to send their families home so that they could live in this wing under field condition. The families of West Pakistani armed forces personnel and civilians found enough space in the returning boeings and C-130 air crafts. There was a mad rush for flight back home. All these returnees made one thing sure. How best they could stretch their imagination and made one thing sure. How best they could stretch their imagination and make a front line story of the so-called ‘Bengali atrocities’ meted out to them in order that slurs of cowardice did not turnish their traditional flare for Jehad.* As the false propaganda began to gain ground, Bengalees living in West Pakistan became targets of vilification and constant harassment. Some of them managed to trickle out of West Pakistan through the boeing flights to Dhaka which had scarcely any seat to spare for thousand of Bengalees waiting for their turn to reach home. The situation was explosive, the atmosphere was charged. In this tension ridden part of the world, nothing seemed to have the faintest ray of hope for any settlement. Rapid build up continued to flow in through the air bridge and sea route. Operational plans were being drawn up for battle in built up areas. A Bengalee intelligence officer later revealed that a trace of the building of Sheikh Mujib’s Dhanmondi residence also found its place in the operation plan. On the other hand, the non-cooperation movement gained such an unprecedented success that it was
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Holy war
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only within the limits of the cantonments that Pakistan existed. With the exception of random shots here and there killing unarmed civilians, no arrest was made of the Awami League leaders. Yahya, presumably, was watching the course of events that followed the non-cooperation movement. Even the British colonial masters could not risk a breakdown of administration resulting out of the Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement, half as affective as the one launched by Sheikh Mujib. But without much hullabaloo, he offered an innocent proposal of settlement through negotiation. The proposal did not go with the mood of time. On the face of Sheikh Mujib’s announcement that he was taking over the administration of Bangladesh from the clutches of martial law, Yahya on March 15, flew in Dhaka with a large retinue consisting of General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lieutenant General Pirzada and Major General Omar, economic adviser M M Ahmed and A Brohi, the constitutional expert. A number of political henchmen. Quayum Khan, Mufti Mahmood, Mumtaz Daulatana and other also accompanied him. In those days of uneasy peace, a disquietening radio message was on the air asking the foreign national to leave Bangladesh. While emphasising on the urgency for their immediate departure, the message concluded with a warning that those who stayed back would do so at their own risk. Following this message, foreign mission began to thin out. Foreign nationals and their families, in a great hurry embarked on mass exodus. Only a few dare devil foreign correspondents and reporters decided to risk their life for becoming and eye-witness to the drama that was about to unfold itself. But they were sadly disappointed. Hardly had the fire works started, when on Tikka’s orders a Lieutenant Colonel interned most of them in the Hotel Intercontinental for despatching them to Karachi the next day aboard Pakistan International Airlines.
In this pageantry of negotiators, Bhuttos absence was conspicuously felt. In the midst of the talks Bhutto flew in Dhaka on March 20. Discussion had already been held on constitutional issues and a formula for power handover worked out. In the opinion of the economic adviser and the legal expert, there seemed to be no problem. While the Awami League team
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waited for the final draft of the Presidential proclamation to this effect, the draft makers made a surreptitious departure to Karachi on March 24. The President with the rest of his retinue departed secretly on the evening of March 25, with a subdued message that he was going to make an important announcement on March 26.
The scheduled announcement, indeed, was made within 24 hours when the blood thirsty hayenas of Yahya Khan had already started the diabolic drama of killing human ever recorded in history.
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Striking Strength
After leaving the battle fields of Arakan, 14 Division found a ceremonious place in the Pakistan army unlike her sister formations in the other wing. This division relinquished her operational appearance, grace and gaiety for a milder role. It was nothing more than a static formation designed to perform only ceremonial duties with limited capability to tackle minor internal disturbances. This formation was totally devoid of teeth arms like armour, field, medium and heavy artillery. It was an understrength division until 1963, with only two brigades, 53 brigade located at Mainamati and 107 brigade located at Jessore. An understrength squadron of Air Force was located behind the civil airport, Dhaka.
23 Brigade was raised in Dhaka with two integrated battalions in 1964. Bengalee elements had no visible existence in the Pakistan army. Being in absolute minority, they were subjected to adjunct treatment by their West Pakistani destiny makers. Thanks to the Bengalee nationalism which provided the moral fibre to the young Bengalee troops to stand out in the ranks and excel the West Pakistani soldiers in their professional performances.
The East Bengal regiments, best knwon as ‘Tigers’ since their inception in 1948, received a step-motherly treatment from the Pakistan army. While Punjab and Baluch regiments crossed their 40th battalions and Frontier Force and Azad Kashmir their 30th after the war of 1965, the ‘Tigers’ had reached their 6th only. The 7th and the 8th battalion of the ‘Tigers’ of Pakistan vintage had just seen the light of day in 1969 and 70, yet to be manned, organised and trained fully.
Hardships of military training coupled with harsh and loathsome treatment meted out to the Bengalee recruits by the
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West Pakistani instructors could hardly scare away the soft looking, short and brown skinned Bengalee soldiers. They stuck to the profession, trained themselves up, learnt the art of warfare and came into the front rows of soldiers of repute. These boys of the Bengal regiment went ahead in achieving the ideals left by General Sir Frank Messervy, ‘I hope you will show to he world that Bengali Mussalmans are as good a soldier as any’. These were the boys who formed the hard core of the Bangladesh liberation force in 1971. It was from this hard core that the leadership and training were provided to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions of freedom fighters during the war of liberation.
An important military development took place in the region in 1969. Following the overthrow of the Ayub regime and usurption of power by General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, it was decided that headquarters of the Eastern Command, equivalent to the command of a corps, would be raised in Dhaka and for its logistic backup a Logistic Area headquarters would also come up. The work of raising was geared up at top speed. Lieutenant General Shahibzada Yacoob Khan, a veteran cavalier, was tipped as the commander, Eastern Command. With the coming up of the new command, a brigade was also formed with its headquarters in Dhaka. It was serialled as 57 Brigade. Its battalions were raised out of the divisional troops already available in the region 23 Brigade was settle at Rangpur.
By the third quarter of 1970, the 8th battalion of the East Bengal regiment was raised. The youngest of the Tiger family remained at Solashahar, Chittagong, where it was raised and was waiting to move to West Pakistan to join the other three battalions of the East Bengal regiment already there. The 5th battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel MA Rouf was in Sialkot. On the eve of the war of 1971, it was brought to Lahore front to fight in the Wagha sector. During the war one of the company of the battalion defected an crossed over to India and joined us during the last stage of war. The battalion was thus unceremoniously withdrawn from the front, disarmed and gaoled. The 6th battalion was initially commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Firoz Salahuddin. On his posting to Dhaka
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during the later half of 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Mashhoorul Haq took over its command. During the war this battalion was forced to contain mixed elements from the Punjab and Baluch regiments. Pakistanis could no more trust the Bengalee troops and at the same time could not throw them away. The 7th battalion under Lieutenant Colonel H M Ershad also had some mixed elements. It was in Malir cantonment before the war and being on reserve, remained uncommitted during the war. Fearing a gathering of force, the battalions of the East Bengal regiment were never allowed to remain together as a matter of strategy. It was with this motive that the newly raised 8th battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Janjua, a West Pakistani, was earmarked to soil to West Pakistan on the next available ship and thereby maintain the balance of Bengalee troops in both the wings of Pakistan.
The 1st battalion of the Tiger commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rezaul Jalil was located at Jessore cantonment about 30 miles from the Indian border. The 2nd was at Joydebpur 25 miles from Dhaka, the largest of the garrisons in the eastern region. The battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Masaudul Hossain Khan. Both these battalions had Bengalee commanding officers.
The 3rd battalion was at Rangpur, commanded by a West Pakistani officer, Lieutenant Colonel Fazal Karim. The 4th battalion was at Mainamati. This again was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Khizir Hyat, a West Pakistani officer.
In addition to these regular troops, Dhaka garrison had another training battalion, 10 East Bengal, Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mueed Uddin, a Bengalee officer. This was raised to train the young college students in response to the National Service Scheme launched by Yahya Khan in 1969. East Bengal Regimental Centre at Natunpara cantonment in Chittagong had a strength of about 2500 recruits.
Beside these front line units, 4 to 5 perscent Bengalee representation was there in all non-infantry units and headquarters. All total Bengalee forces available in the army then under the Eastern Command did not exceed six thousand officers and troops.
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Immediately following the army, East Pakistan Rifles, the EPR as they were called, provided another major source of armed strength to the liberation war for two reasons. One, it had a sizeable Bengalee soldiers to the tune of 15,000 scattered mostly along the borders. Two placed on the borders, they enjoyed a rare freedom to defect, if they wanted, instantaneously with the crackdown of March 25, 1971.
The police about 20,000, a few thousands of exservicemen, the Ansars and trained Mujahids but without arms remained a strength to be reckoned with.
This was indeed a mighty force which the Bengalee liberation fighters could have counted on their side, but actually it remained only a speculation. On the ground where they were born, having full-hearted support of the people behind, this strength could easily cope up with any army twice its size, had it been available in one lot, orgaised, equipped and co-ordinated. Initially the army crackdown was aimed at the elimination of the Bengalee first line troops, EPR, and the police force. Pakistanis managed to reduce their strength considerably. Those who escaped the carnage of crackdown joined the liberation war. There was another unfortunate lot belonging to the army who were surrounded and rendered helpless. They had to act for their survival but some of them over-acted in the process. This Bengalee force, if numerically counted, made a favourable balance of strength against the Urdu- speaking West Pakistan, army. But practically the strength was too little to cut any ice to start with.
First, let us examine the case of the East Bengal regiments. All total only five battalions were located in East Pakistan separately, 1st at Jessore, 2nd at Joydebpur, 3rd at Rangpur, 4th at Comilla and half of 8th at Chittagong. They were out of contact from each other and were not in a position to work out a joint military plan following the political developments prevailing at that time. A definite political direction was also lacking. Thus they were simply incapable of staging a concerted action. To decide on the course of any military action against an established government, is not an easy matter specially for an uniformed soldier. Further, with a view to reducing the hitting
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power of a battalion and to decimate their strength, they were split into companies and these companies were often beyond battalion communication network. This had another advantage for the West Pakistani army. They aimed at keeping the Tigers out of picture of the build up that was going on behind, in the cantonment and at the same time, dealing with them piecemeal, in isolated actions.
The 1st battalion at Jessore in a body went out on a long field exercise to Chaugacha area near the Indian border. The 2nd battalion had one company at Tangail, one company at Mymensingh, and out of the remainders at Joydebpur one platoon was detached to Rajendrapur and another platoon to Gazipur. The 3rd battalion moved out of the cantonment with two companies at Ghoraghat and one at Parbatipur. The 4th battalion at Comilla had also one of its company at Shamshernagar and the other two at Brahmanbaria. The 8th battalion having sent part of its troops to West Pakistan was grossly understrength and was already in Sholashahar away from the main cantonment, Natunpara.
It was like testing the mind of a caged bird by allowing it all the freedom to fly out of range. Sitting on the edge of freedom they were watching the progress of political parley going between Sheikh Mujib and Yahya with the keenness of a racing team on the start line. They were waiting eagerly for the word ‘go’.
When the spirits were high and the nation, tuned to one frequency, was eagerly awaiting the results of the parley, Joydebpur became the first victim of blatant Pakistani provocation. On March 19, a strong armed contingent headed by Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab Khan made their way to Joydebpur to feel the pulse of the ‘Junior Tigers’ –with a probable motive to disarm them. The rumour finally came true. The 2nd Bengal’s readine to face such an eventuality did not allow the Brigadier to proceed any further than mere show of force. On his way back, the civilians of Joydebpur courageously put up an impregnable barricade at the railway crossing resulting in a hot exchange of fire with two civilian casualties. This was a high water mark.
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Then came the MV ‘SWAT laden with munitions of war. It was an ominous signal. The dockyard was on strike and the clearance of the vessel was not possible for a week or so. Reports of PNS JAHANGIR and few other vessels waiting at the outer anchorage further confirmed the Pakistani design. Brigadier Majumder – a Bangalee officer_ was immediately removed from the command of the garrison at Chittagong and was replaced temporarily by a West Pakistani Brigadier M. H. Ansari who went ahead to get the vessel unloaded by force, resulting in massive killing of civilians of Bengalee soldiers.
Tension mounted in the East Bengal regimental Centre and in the 8th East Bengal regiment. Recruits of the EBRC who refused to unload the ‘swat were shot at. This was the beginning, beginning of nine months of war. Soon an all devouring hungry conflagration engulfed the country
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Tiger Out of Cage
The imposing century old palace at Joydebpur stood as a sentinel on the gateway to Dhaka, only 25 miles away. The palace, turned into a citadel, garrisoned the 2nd battalion of the East Bengal regiment, popularly known as Junior Tiger, to defend the northern frontiers against Indian threat. This mission was assigned to 2 East Bengal regiment where I was the secondin-command since October 1970.
The rising political crisis during the month of February 1971 agitated our minds. But it led us nowhere beyond the limits of a soldier’s thinking on politics. It appeared so simple and reasonable that the election verdict would ultimately sweep all political crisis. We pinned all our hopes and aspirations on Sheikh Mujib and firmly believed that as the leader of the majority party, he would hold the reins of the government. To remove all our doubts Yahya emphatically declared Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the ‘future Prime Minister of Pakistan’.
During the third week of February there was conference in Dhaka of all brigade commanders. A timely arranged conference where very cleverly decisions were taken. Bengal Regiments, four in number in the then East Pakistan, were ordered to deploy at various places on this or that plea in aid to civil power or exercising the troops. The 1st battalion located at Jessore cantonment was sent to the western border near Chaugacha on field exercise. The 2nd battalion at Joydebpur was decimated in strength by sending out one company at Tangail and the other at Mymensingh on a covert mission of internal security. The 3rd battalion was split up in company groups and sent to Parbatipur and Ghoraghat. The 4th battalion located at Comilla was weakened by detaching one company to Shamshernagar and two to Brahmanbaria. The 8th battalion minus advance party
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remained at Solashahar, Chittagong on orders to move to West Pakistan, thus they were not deployed. On February 27, 2 East Bengal was assigned the task to enforce law and order at Mymensingh and Tangail. Its operational mission was also invoked, to defend the frontiers at Jamalpur and Haluaghat, should the Indian army attack, taking advantage of the political crisis prevailing in the country. Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab Khan, Commander, 57 Brigade gave out his orders to 2 East Bengal. Two companies under my command moved to Tangail and Mymensingh. The battalion headquarter with the rest of the troops remained at Joydebpur under the command of Masud, the commanding officer of the battalion. By March 1, 1971 the move was complete and I established my headquarter at Tangail. To my mind this move was a complete hoax. Law and order situation in both the district were not that serious which warrants the presence of army. Deployment of troops were unnecessary. The move had hardly and operational value, having troops about 80 miles away from the border. The motive that lay behind this seemingly discordant order was perhaps to screen off the Bengalee troops from the main stream of activities that was to follow shortly. It singularly indicated the coming of serious law and order situation in the near future. An ominous signal indeed. With the gradual process of decimated deployment, the battalion would be reduced in its capability and effectiveness to a great extent. But beyond the perceptible, in this deployment, there lay the hidden seeds of freedom to defect lock, stock and barrel, when the time was ripe. President Yahya through a radio broadcast on March 1, prosponed the National Assembly seating. This had a spontaneous reaction on the Bengalees. They came out in the streets, went processioning and shouting slogans of protest. Similiar reaction in the rank and file of the Bengalee troops was also noticed. We had four West Pakistani officers and a few soldiers in the battalion. A mistrust prevailed between us and the West Pakistani troops which aggravated with the passage of time.
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Our troops looked upon us for direction and we looked upon the fountain head in mute supplication. We eagerly awaited for a definite direction from Sheikh Mujib through his historic speech of March 7. The days preceding this historic day were tense, exciting and extremely explosive. In Tangail civil administration was almost non-existent. Some veteran politicians in a public meeting, amidst thousands, hoisted a Bangladesh flag and declared that on March 7, Sheikh Mujib would hoist this flag and declare independence. The public, out of hatred for the Pakistan government, hoisted black flag on all the government buildings in Tangail. Some students came to the Circuit House, where my headquarters was located, and hoisted black flags. Although in my heart of hearts I was not opposed to the raising of black flag yet I neither showed enthusiam nor resist their attempt to decry Pakistan. There were two reasons for my action at that stage. One, I could not express my enthusiasm as I had two West Pakistani officers in my headquarters. Two, I did not resist in order to avoid confrontation at that time. I, therefore, advised that we should not get provoked for such small things like black flag. They seemed to have not liked the idea of having a black flag flying on top of my headquarters. However, they remained quiet as I decided not to resist.
With the entire Bengalee nation we also sat eagerly by the radio to hear the speech of Sheikh Mujib on March 7. But to the dismay of the millions, the transmission was snapped. The message of Sheikh Mujib, however, was relayed the same night and the following day. The entire nation responded to his call for launching the non-cooperation movements. Amidst an atmosphere of uncertainly, fear and suffocation, my boys maintained a high morale and decided to join the movement.
Indeed it was difficult to trust one another but somehow or other my action and that of Masood’s had an identity of purpose. Though we never opened heart to each other yet I thought we understood each other. I knew Masood did not trust West Pakistani officers and therefore, always made sure that I am present in the battalion headquarters particularly in his absence.
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My wife and the children were in Dhaka cantonment. Hearing the news of my father-in-law’s death, my family went to Comilla on March 10. I also left Tangail to attend the funeral the following day and returned to Joydebpur on March 12. While leaving for Joydebpur I told my wife to stay in Comilla and not. to return to Dhaka cantonment.
By then Lieutenant General Tikka Khan had arrived in Dhaka as the military governor of this province and took over charge of the Eastern Command from Lieutenant General Shahibzada Yacoob Khan. On the eve of his departure, Yacoob flew over to Joydebpur to address the Junior Tigers, as 2 East Bengal was popularly called. I remember a part of the address that he made in pure Bengali. Here is an excerpt of what I do remember. ‘I marvel at you with utmost satisfaction on your achievements in the fields of tactics and military activity during training. You are trained to fight the enemy. The skill that you have attained is worthy of mention. The country and people will demand your services to salvage this country out of the prevailing state of affairs. I believe, with the Tigers’ ideal and aim before you, you will come forward in the service of your country. I am confident that you will maintain your traditions.’ He spoke these words with tears in his eyes.
Tikka’s visit was to closely follow. It was either on 14 or 15 March. This visit was aimed at familiarsing with the troops and the places. Tikka was accompanied by his aide-de-comp, Captain Khalid Masud who happened to be a true copy of his general father. Captain Aziz pulled his course-mate to a side and asked him ‘Khalid, where is your father staying ? Flag staff house or the government house ?’
“Flag staff house. But soon your chief justice and chief secretary will be taught the lesson of their life. Wait for only a couple of day. Don’t you forget that he is the same general who taught a lesson to Baluchi’s at Quetta.’
Khalid stopped for taking breath. Aziz quietly left the place. Later when Azia narrated this conversation to me, I could not simply throw it away as a friendly joke.
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We started taking precautions. On the plea of law and order situation, the troops were put on the alert. One company remained in the Palace all the time ready with their arms and ammunition. One platoon remained outside the Palace area to keep a watch on the Dhaka-Mymensingh highway for any unusual military movement. One sentry with a telephone was posted in the cinema hall at Chourasta (cross-road) with instructions to communicate to the battalion headquarter of any military vehicular movement towards Joydebpur. Another sentry was posted on top of the water tank of the Palace. The underlying meaning of all these activities remained unknown to the West Pakistanis of the battalion.
Rumour had it that our battalion would be disarmed. It had an element of truth also. We had some surplus arms. Orders came to have these deposited. We were also preparing to carry out the order.
But the public took this rumour as a serious threat to their security more than our own. On March 17, they raised about 50 barricades on the highway between Tongi and Joydebpur in an effort to deny the use of this road by the Pakistani troops. But these barricades acted against us as well. Tongi-Joydebpur road was our only supply route. We, therefore, had no other alternative but to remove these barricades. We also did not want to have a confrontation with the people. In order to avoid it I had to do a lot of explaining to the people before they were convinced. But they still wanted to see the battalion commander which they did and the battalion commander Masood, a Bengalee, took them in confidence and advised them to remove the barricades. The public apparently left convinced. But the barricades remained where they were. So ultimately our jawans had to take on this unpleasant task of clearing the road. The barricades dismantled by the jawans in one end were being put up again by the civilians on the other end and the race continued. Our action was looked upon with suspicion by the Pakistani commanders. On March 19, around 10 O’clock in the morning we received a wireless message from 57 Brigade headquarters ‘the
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commander with his escort is coming to lunch with you. He would also visit Gazipur ordnance factory’.
Situation at Gazipur was also tense. Barricades were erected en route and the resident director of the ordnance factory, Brigadier Kalimullah, a West Pakistani, was surrounded by the workers. We had to send our troops to retrieve the resident director.
At 12 O’clock that day we received another wireless message from the brigade commander, ‘I have cleared some barricades. Now I am at Chourasta. I am using the civilians to open the barricades, you also clear the barricades from your side and meet me en route. If there is any opposition use maximum force.’ Quite contrary to orders with regard to the duties in aid to civil power, the Pakistani brigadier directing us to ‘use maximum force’ showed the attitude that they had in mind towards the civil population.
As per order we started off from Joydebpur. We employed our jawans to remove the barricades while Brig Arbab got hold of the civilians and forced them like slaves to clear the road. Those who did not listen to his command were badly beaten. Around 1.30 p.m. in the afternoon the brigadier with his retinue consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Zahed, Major Zaffar the brigade major, three Captains, and 70 other ranks landed at Joydebpur, full of pride. The group represented the teeth arms. The Lieutenant Colonel and one of the Captains were gunner officers. The major was an armour man. Of the remaining two captains one was an infantry officer while the other was a commando. Seventy jawans from 32 Punjab were invincibly armed with all the 7.62 millimeter Chinese light machine-guns, the automatic fire power of an entire infantry battalion.
So from a position of strength Arbab said victoriously ‘nobody can stop us. We can move in any direction, wherever and whenever we want to.’
It sounded like Julius Caeser clamouring about his victories saying, “Vini, Vidi’ Vici’. I came, I saw, I conquered. The brigadier had little comprehension of what lay ahead beyond these unarmed civilians whom they had so easily tackled with armed threat.
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We were ready in the Palace to face all eventualities. The rumour about disarming could not be dispelled from our minds. Our jawans remained alert in their battle dress in armed readiness.
As the brigadier entered the premises of the Palace his 70 armed jawans immediately got down and collected at one place. We did not like this and felt uneasy because of their fire power. As an infantry battalion, in battle field we maintain our own defences. This was merely an act of utter provocation and confirmed to us that we were no more and object of trust in the eyes of Pakistanis.
The brigadier went round the Palace and I am sure our state of readiness created a suspicion in him. He asked me, ‘why this readiness?’ I replied, ‘the situation here is bad. Any moment the angry public can mob us. Moreover the situation on the border might compel us to move out at short notice.’
It seemed we read each others mind. The brigadier looked grim. We were having midday meals when the news reached him that a violent and charged group of public gathered at the railway level crossing in the bazar and erected a mighty barricade with the help of a loaded railway wagon. Infuriated, the brigadier ordered Masood ‘I want this barricade removed within 20 minutes. In case of any opposition use maximum force.’
Major Moinul Hussain was ordered to move with his company. In no time the company moved and Moin reached the barricade. The civilians were apprehensive of the brigadier’s arrival with force and they suspected them of having attempted at disarming us.
It was Friday, a bazar day. There were about 50,000 people in the bazar. A sizeable crowd gathered on either side of the barricade who refused to be convinced by Moin that the Bengalee troops were still holding their arms. They refused to remove the barricade. Moin went to the leader. They were standing in the bazar. Awami League leader Mr. Habibullah and labour leader Mr. Abdul Muttalib rose to the occation and tried to convience the public of the wisdom to do as per Moin’s appeal. A hue and cry filled the air.
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In the meantime brigadier Arbab reached the spot with his troops while the rest of 2 East Bengal remained in the Palace under my command. The crowd on the other side of the barricade in the bazar was quieter than that of the station side. Moin’s company was in position on the station road facing the crowd.
On the arrival of the brigadier, the crowd grew restless and a commotion ensued. Moin informed the brigade commander that the political leaders would like to talk to him. The brigadier retorted ‘I do not want to see them. Tell them to get away and remove barricade.’ Brigadier Arbab’s angry retort and deployment of troops by Moin frightened the leaders. As they began to retreat, the crowed became more violent than before. The brigadier ordered Moin to open fire. In the same breath he ordered Moin to take orders from his commanding officer who was nearby.
Tension mounted when two Bengalee soldiers, a driver and his helper appeared in the scene. They somehow managed to escape from the crowd inspite of severe beating. Badly shaken these two soldiers said in presence of the brigadier that as they were coming in with their vehicle towards the Palace the crowd stopped them and forcibly took away five of their men and snatched away their arms and ammunitions.
These two soldiers along with five more were coming from Tangail on a truck to carry their rations from Joydebpur. They were absolutely unaware of what was happening at Joydebpur. When they arrived at the bazar, the crowd asked them to fight against the West Pakistani soldiers who were taking up position to fire at them. The soldiers were puzzled and did not know what to do. The crowd then forced them to a room, locked them up and snatched away four Chinese rifles and one Chinese submachinegun. Two of them who escaped were without arms. Brigadier Arbab then ordered ‘fire and clear the barricade.’ Moin sounded the bugle, raised his flag and warned over the public address system that fire would be opened. The crowd remained undaunted. In order to disperse the crowd, Moin opened fire but in his order he added in Bengalee ‘fire below’ or ‘fire over the head.’
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Brigadier Arbab shouted ‘fire for effect.’
By this time fire was also opened by the crowd. The brigadier became wild and shouted ‘I want one dead body for one bullet. If you cannot handle the situation I will employ my troops.’ As the events took a dangerous turn. Moin ordered his men to fire for effect. A man fell on the ground with a bullet hit. The crowd began to disperse helter skelter and random fire from the crowd injured some of our men. The captured chinese submachinegun opened up from behind the barricade from top of the mosque on the brigadier who luckily escaped death.
As I heard the sound of fire I ordered some men from the palace and took up position behind the West Pakistani troops. My aim was to assist Moin’s company in case they were overpowered by the crowd. I was also watching the West Pakistani troops and the brigadier, of their evil motives. The skirmish continued for about 20 minutes. After the crowd had disappeared, we removed the barricade and the brigade commander left for Dhaka. He left instruction to clamp curfew on Joydebpur, Gazipur and the Chourasta area in order to recover the lost weapons. He also wanted to know the ammunition expenditure and casually reports of the dead and wounded. To the great disappointment of the brigade commander, our reports showed two dead and a few wounded. The brigade commander was not happy. He asked ‘why 63 rounds were fired for only two dead?’ On his way to Dhaka he opened fire to disperse crowd from the Chourasta. Two died there. The number of the injured people could not be ascertained
Curfew was imposed the same evening. Around 5 O’clock we were able to rescue five missing jawans from a room near the mosque. With the help of the civilians we were also able to recover four rifles by the next day. Curfew was lifted after 3 or 4 days when the lost sub-machinegun was traced out from Gaffargaon. This untoward episode could have easily been avoided, if we were left alone to deal with the situation. Only tact and patience were required and not provocation. Show of force and the use of
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‘maximum force’ induced a state of frenzy amongst the crowd. They were overtaken by a mob hysteria. When fire was opened at them, they fired back in self-defence little realising that they were hitting against a wall. Probably it was a test for us to see, whether we could kill the Bengalees. If it was so, in their estimate, we failed miserably.
Our jawans resented this act of violence and on the same night five of our men deserted with their personal weapons, four Chinese rifles and one sub-machinegun with full quota of ammunition. All of them happened to be the batmen of the battalion officers.
This was the last straw on the camel’s back. The battalion commander had to explain why 63 rounds were fired for only two civilians killed, how five men deserted with weapons and ammunition. His explanation failed to satisfy the authorities. Ultimately Masud made up his mind to visit the brigade headquarter. I forebode ‘don’t go sir, unless you are called.’ But anxiety so overtook him that he left for Dhaka on March 23, little knowing that Dhaka was a veritable trap laid out for the Bengalee officers. Brigadier Arbab finally on the morning of March 25, told him ‘you don’t have to go back to the battalion. You would be attached with the station headquarters for inquiry.’ So, there it was. Masud became the first casualty of the battalion to be replaced by another son of the soil but belonging to a different stock.
I was told to command the battalion in officiating capacity until the new incumbent, Lieutenant Colonel A.F.M. Abdur Raquib, another Bengalee officer, took over the command. He was in command of 32 Punjab regiment in Dhaka. I knew that his battalion on March 1, 1971 had staged a crackdown on Awami League supporters and brutally killed quite a number of innocent Bengalees in Dhaka. I, however, had no intimate knowledge about Raquib as he was not an officer of the Bengal Regiment. His reputation as a commanding officer was not above reproach. I therefore had a mixed feeling whether he was the man of the crisis.
At 11 a.m. on March 25, I was informed that Brigadier Majumdar the centre commandant, would be arriving to address
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my troops. I was not aware as to why and how he was brought here from Chittagong, the bastion of power of the Bengal Regiment. I was also informed that Raquib would accompany him. Masud told me on telephone ‘Raquib would be coming today. He is a good man. I don’t repent for what has happened to me. God’s doings are for the good.’
Around 1 p.m. Brigadier Majumdar reached the battalion. We had an hour’s discussion. He was not able to answer to my queries. I had a feeling that he had something in mind. But under the circumstances he was not pulling up sufficient courage to disclose his mind. Raquib also arrived after a while. The brigadier addressed the jawans at 3 p.m. The sum and substance of his speech was ‘we are soldiers. We go by the orders of the government. We are bound to obey the command of the government.’ He then introduced Raquib saying ‘from today he will be your new battalion commander’. He left the battalion about 3.30 p.m. But before his departure I requested him ‘Sir, you have come to our battalion for the first time. Stay the night here.’ But the brigadier preferred to stay with his in-laws in Dhaka. What an irony of fate ! Had he stayed the night with us, probably he would have been one amongst the valiants.
Before the cloud of dust thrown by the brigadier’s car could settle down, Raquib and myself sat down to talk. My mind was full of pressing problems. The foremost was the mood of my men, viewed in the prevailing context. They were on a crossroad, wavering, and looking for direction. The officers had almost made up their mind. They had the capacity to think on the pros and cons. I was fully satisfied when I came to a decision. My immediate loyalty was towards my men that I commanded. Loyalty to the country was the ultimate duty of any soldier. We were ready for that. I knew my troops well. They were standing on the precipice for the final word. That was their state of mind. I gave Raquib a bit of that to get his reaction. I had to be discreet as he was not reacting favourably.
I explained the deployment of the battalions as it stood on March 25 to the new battalion commander. Alpha company was at Tangail and Charlie at Mymensingh. Both these companies were under my command. One platoon of Delta company was at
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Rajendrapur ammunition depot. There was also a company of Pakistani troops there. One platoon of Bravo company was at Gazipur ordnance factory. The remaining battalion along with the battalion headquarters remained at Joydebpur.
The Crack Down Soon after mid-night General Tikka Khan passed down an order to Raquib on the telephone ‘there is some trouble at Gazipur ordnance factory. Send a company there under a responsible officer.’ Gazipur is hardly five kilometre from Joydebpur. We should have known if there was any trouble. We had our troops there and we were also in communication with them. It struck me immediately that it was Tikka’s deliberate attempt to peter us away so that we were rendered incapable to take any coordinated action, should we decide to take up arms against the Pakistan authority. Raquib sent the rest of the Bravo company to Gazipur at about 3 a.m. in the morning. Prior to this we received a telephone call from Masud. He said “how is everything with you? In Dhaka, we are hearing a lot of gun cracking.’
It was a snappy but meaningful message. In fact, it was the first authentic news of the brutal crackdown and with this message the civil telephone line was disrupted. Our tensionloaded men were mentally charged enough to bolt out of the palace.
With normal telephone communications in the entire Joydebpur, Gazipur, Tongi area being snapped, I along with Raquib went to the battalion control room to get some information about the happenings in Dhaka through wireless. A GRC-9 set brigade rear link, manned by West Pakistani operators, was established in the battalion headquarters from 27 February onwards. We being part of 57 Brigade it was but natural that we remain in the same frequency as that of the other battalions of the brigade. When the set is on, we keep on listening to each other’s conversation and pass messages when necessary. In fact this was the practice upto 25 March. If there was any deviation from this practice we should have been informed. The operators; however, appeared to have been
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briefed by their masters from Dhaka secretly as to what they were supposed to do. In the morning of 26 March, when Raquib and myself went to the control room to listen to the conversation of various sub-stations, we to our utter surprise, found that we were not in the same frequency as that of the units in Dhaka. We were connected only with the brigade headquarters on the different frequency. I then asked the operators to put the set on to the frequency on which Dhaka battalions were operating but the operators avoided with one excuse or the other.
Unable to collect any intelligence, we returned to the office. On our way I told Raquib ‘there must have been something serious happening in Dhaka. That’s why brigade headquarters doesn’t want us to hear them.’ However I directed one of our Bengalee operator to keep a watch on the West Pakistani operators on the brigade rear link. Battalion rear link had a message for me. From Mymensingh Major Nurul Islam was on the air ‘we are surrounded by a few thousand people. They are asking East Bengal regiment of join them.’ I told him ‘go slow and wait for my orders.’
Nurul Islam requested me for sending him some reinforcement. I promised him ‘I would try’.
Peelkhana and Rajarbagh Ravaged
The night of March 25 sounded a death-knell on Dhaka. The rattilng of the guns and tanks pierced through the curtain of sleep and all the city-dwellers woke up to witness the massacre of Dhaka.
The East Pakistan Rifles had been a provincial militia force at Peelkhana, the name kept after Mughal traditions. This militia force was officered mostly by the West Pakistanis ever since its inception. Bengalee officers in very limited number had the privilege to serve in East Pakistan Rifles. It was organised into six geographical sectors namely Dhaka, Chittagong, Sylhet, Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Jessore and Mymensingh had an independent wing. Each wing consisted of 450 men. The troops were mostly Bengalees with a sizeable proportion of Biharis, Punjabis and Pathans with them. They were trained in infantry small arms and infantry tactics.
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Peelkhana accommodated roughly about 2500 troops during March 71. This included 250 recruits, 450 men of the headquarters wing and 200 men of the headquarters. In addition there were three wings of the Dhaka sector namely 13, 15 and 16 each having a strength of 450 men. There were four Bengalee officers in Dhaka, namely Captains Dilawar, Danial Islam, Latif and Azad.
Towashs the end of february “71, 22 Baluch Regineat was the frist infantry battalion that arrived from Pakistan in the crises ridden Baugladesh. The battalion, on arrival, was straight away posted at Peelkhana. Once in position they gradually took over the responsibility of the security aspect of Peelkhana also. Brigadier Nissar Ahmed Khan, an armoured corps officer, though outwardly quiet and sober, had already engaged his spying activities in Peelkana, to track down the movement of Bengalee officers and men. The hush hush resentment over the gradual involvement of 22 Baluch in Peelkhana affairs reached his ears. The second-in command of the battalion. Major Ataullah having served in the East Pakistan Rifles was posted to Quetta as the second-in-command of 22 Baluch regiment. He was well-versed with the area and was glad to be back again in Peelkhana.
The Bangladeshi officers and men of the East Pakistan Rifles at Peelkhana, being in the mainstreams, had close contact with the civilians and had the knowledge of their sentiments. When 31 guns boomed on March 23, to celebrate Pakistan’s last republic day in Bangladesh, a full size national flag of Bangladesh began to flutter from a tree-top of Peelkhana. The flag was quietly brought down with utmost humiliation and a quiet investigation followed to find out the culprits.
The general staff officer grade-2 of the East Pakistan Rifles headquarters, Major Jamil, knew the culprits well. All the Bengalee officers were called at this office at 11-30 a.m. on March 25 and were arrested.
The preparation for the drama of terror, butchery and blood letting began by the dusk on March 25, Dhaka Betar Kendra already captured, the Pakistani troops left their barracks at 10-10
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p.m. and under the cover of darkness spread over the city and took up battle position.
A military column turned left from the airport road towards Rajarbagh police headquarters where 1000 members of the reserve police were ready to offer resistance to the Pakistani force.
Another column wheeled straight on the University campus and surrounded the area. The fireworks had already started at Peelkhana by about 11 p.m. The East Pakistan Rifles boys under the leadership of Subedar Ghani and Subedar Hashmat Ullah (Shaheed) gave valiant resistance.
Rajarbagh Police Station, Dhaka railway station, the Rokeya hall, the offices of ‘Ittefaq’ and ‘Holiday’ seethed under fire and bullets.
The battle at Peelkhana remained uninterrupted throughout the night. On March 26, Subedar Hashmat Ullah died in Peelkhana while fighting. A Pakistani officer of 22 Baluch was killed in battle. There were lot of casualties on the Pakistani side also. Casualties amongst East Pakistan Rifles troops ran in hundreds. They started falling back across the Buriganga towards Jinjira.
Towards the afternoon tanks were brought in and after a few rounds of fire the battle field of Peelkhana become quiet. Subedar Ghani continued to give a gallant fight from Jinjira across the river Buriganga.
Peelkhana, Rajarbagh, the University campus and all the police stations in the city including city fire brigades were silenced. Sporadic pot shots from the Pakistani troops lying in wait for an opportunity target were heard here and there. The roadside dwellings and bazars were occasionally being lighted by tracer fire. Smouldering fire and smoke from flame throwers began to envelope the city monstrously. Dhaka lay groaning under the feet of Yahya’s army.
Junior Tiger at the Cross-roads The company under Nurul Islam was lodged in the wing headquarters of East Pakistan Rifles. One East Pakistan Rifles-
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reserve company was also located there, majority of whom were Bengalee. The assistant wing commander, a West Pakistani, Captain Qamar Abbas of Baluch regiment withdrew the Urdu speaking troops from the border. As the public surrounded the East Pakistan Rifles lines, Nurul Islam came up on the public address system and appealed to the public ‘please clear off from the area. We assure you, when time comes we won’t disappoint you.’
After a long demonstration, the public left the area, fully convinced of the assurance give by Nurul Islam. The public had awaken. We would not disappoint them. Time was fast approaching, time for a bold decision was running out. We had to act without any delay. The Bengalee operator whom I assigned to keep a watch on the brigade rear link, to try and hear the conversation when they switch on to the Dhaka frequency, came running to me. He told me that when we left the control room the operators, keeping the volume low, switched on the Dhaka frequency. He said, he heard the conversation between the stations. Someone was reporting about their movements, some about casualty figures, some asking for ammunition replenishment and so on. I lost no time in informing the battalion commander of these and told him ‘Sir, it is about time we do something. Any further delay would render the situation irretrievable.’
Raquib asked me ‘what should we do.’ I replied ‘situation at Mymensingh is bad and we should move to Mymensingh in aid of our troops’.
The idea was to concentrate at Mymensingh so what we could decide on a line of action according to the dictates of the situation. ‘How can we take this step without orders from Dhaka? Questioned the commanding officer.
I told him ‘Sir, please take orders and tell them that the condition at Mymensingh is serious and the reinforcement there is absolutely necessary’. He reluctantly agreed and spoke to Dhaka on the wireless but received a negative reply from them. I insisted ‘the safety of our men is in our hands. If we don’t act now, we will be failing in our duty.’
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He appeared puzzled and indecisive. I don’t blame him. The time was crucial. In Dhaka the strongest man Tikka Khan having taken charge of the office of Military Governor, the Eastern Command and the Martial Law Administrator, sat down with his heinous operational plans for sporting on the lives of millions. While his martial law directives were continuously being announced on the radio, an army helicopter MI-8 flew over Rajendrapur for ammunition. It was a clear indication that overnight expenditure on ammunition was too heavy a drain on the stocks available in Dhaka. I shuddered to think of the enormity of destruction that might have had befallen in Dhaka. An eye witness arrived on March 27. He as sepoy Fazlu, one of our drivers. “Bengali soldiers in Dhaka were being handcuffed in line and killed”, he reported. Here my battalion was in volatile condition. The commanding officer was wavering to take any direct action. In fact he was more concerned about himself and his family than the men he commanded. More dangerous was that none of us could confide in the Commanding Officer as much as we wanted to.
At about 2 p.m. the Brigade commander called Raquib on the wireless and ordered, “our troops are facing some difficulties at Tongi. Send a company to do some shooting.” What an order! This was probably a measure to commit Bengali troops at Tongi so that the question of sending reinforcement to Mymensingh could be avoided.
We had only one company at Joydebpur under Moin. The last trump card, we could ill afford to lose. The battalion commander ordered Moin to go. I prevailed on him and suggested that a West Pakistani officer be sent for a reconnaissance at Tongi before Moin’s company is committed.
The West Pakistani officer of the Bravo company at Gazipur, Major Asjad Latif, was sent to Tongi. He came back in the afternoon to report innocently that there was a big barricade near Tongi bridge. The troops from Dhaka faced some opposition in removing the barricade and therefore had to do some sporadic firing there. At Tongi Latif initially was taken for a Bengalee officer and was made a approach the sentry with his
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hands up. The officer retorted in Punjabi and the sentries hurled abuses in reply still thinking that he was a Bengalee officer who was trying to impress them with his knowledge of Punjabi. Later, when he was recognised Latif had a thorought briefing for one hour. This incident was disclosed to us through one of our drivers who accompanied Latif to Tongi. We were horrified and visualised the treatment that would be meted out to us when in the hands of Pakistanis.
A messanger arrived from Dhirashram railway station to inform me that Lieutenant Colonel S M Reza wants to contact the commanding officer, Masud. But Reza did not know that Masud was already removed from command. I told the messenger to inform Lt. Col. Reza that Masud is no more in command. The present commanding officer is Lt. Col. Raquib. However, he should come to the battalion. The messenger went away. But Reza did not turn up.
The Fateful Decision It was the evening of 27 March. I told the battalion commander “Sir, it is about time that you took some action. Otherwise it would be too late.” “What can I do?” asked me commanding officer. I retorted, “Can’t you see Sir, while six West Pakistani battalions (including two artillery regiments) and a tank squadron have been concentrated in Dhaka, your battalion has been split into small groups and deployed at far-flung areas.” “So what can I do?” said the battalion commander again. I said, “Sir, first get the battalion concentrated at one place. Then only you can decide your future course of action. In any case I have already sent messengers to Gazipur and Rajendrapur to brief the commanders there. I will get the confirmation by tonight that my message had been received and understood by all of them. All action will start from tomorrow morning with a coded message from here. You are most welcome to join us, but not obliged to do so. In case you decide otherwise we will provide safe passage to you. You can go to the cantonment and tell them that they have all gone and no one listens to you. You will not be blamed for it, as you have joined only three days before. Neither you

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know the troops nor the troops know you. If you want, we can even tie you and leave you in one of the rooms so that Dhaka authorities do not doubt your loyalty towards Pakistan.” Raquib was still undecided when I took leave of him for the night.
I had to spend lot of time in briefing the officers and junior commissioned officers. In doing so I had to be very discreet because of the presence of some West Pakistani officers and men in the battallion. While I was tying up various loose ends, of the impending action I noticed some hush hush exchanges going on between the three West Pakistani officers and some junior commissioned officers of the battalion. They were probably making their own plan on the briefing received by Latif at Tongi. I had to put a stop to it and ordered Latif to return to his company at Gazipur at once.
Since the battalion was split into small groups and were spread over very large area in three districts it could not be effective anywhere. Our plan, therefore, was to get the battalion concentrated in Mymensingh and then only we would decide the future course of action. To do this I had to have a cover plan to convince the West Pakistani officers and men that there is no foul play. I had painted a picture that Charlie company at Mymensingh is being attacked by the civilians and they are asking for reinforcements. I being the commander of that area must go to Mymensingh with reinforcement. So the order has been given as to who are to go with me. In the guise of this reinforcement I planned to take all the personnels and all surplus arms and ammunitions with me, leaving behind Delta company of Moin at Joydebpur, Bravo company of Asjad Latif at Gazipur and a platoon of Alfa company at Rajendrapur.
The troops who were left behind had a secret order to join me at Mymensingh abandoning their posts stealthily on the night of March 28/29. Their move, therefore, was to take place in the hours of darkness. In order to keep the area dark we arranged with the local Water and Power Development Authority to shut off the electricity supply at Joydebpur, Gazipur and Rajendrapur from 7 p.m. onwards, on that day. We had to plan this night move because of the presence of the West Pakistani officers and
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men in the battalion. We also made a plan to disarm them peacefully but if it failed then forcefully. Moin was to coordinate the move of the left over troops. In the morning when I was leaving Joydebpur, Raquib finally told me that he will join us and bring the left over troops.
After having been briefed all the officers and junior commissioned officers started quiet preparations for the move.
In the morning of 28 March before I left Joydebpur, Nurul Islam from Mymensingh called me on the wireless to give me a shocking news. The Pakistani soldiers of the East Pakistan Rifles attacked the Bengalee troops the previous night. The fight was still continuing.
To move to Mymensingh we needed lot of vehicles. We did not have enough vehicles in the battalion. However, the civil population was enthusiastic and cooperative. Mr. Abdul Muttalib, a local labour leader, with the cooperation of the public arranged a number of trucks and buses for us. At 10 a.m. I moved out on schedule. As my convoy approached Tangail, an armed civilian jeep came to receive us. Civil volunteers armed with police weapons were deployed at Tangail. They were all in their trenches. As we entered their defence line, they stood up. A band party parade the main road as we entered the town. The town-folks danced with joy. It was a heart warming ovation. Their spirit was high and so was the case with our men.
Alpha company at Tangail by then was in ready position awaiting orders from me.
While at Tangail, I was informed that Major Ziaur Rahman declared independence of Bangladesh from Chittagong. This news emboldened me. It encouraged me to think that I was not the only one to defy Pakistani authority.
Major Kazem Kamal, the company commander of Alpha company at Tangail, was already disarmed the previous night. I appointed Lieutenant Morshed as the new company commander. I addressed the company and ordered them to follow me to Mymensingh, where further briefing would be given to them. I also advised them, “I am leaving your previous company
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commander Major Kazem Kamal with you. Keep him with you and bring him to me in safety.” I instructed them not to leave Tangail till the rest of the troops from Joydebpur arrived.
The road to Mymensingh did not afford an easy going. There were barricades, wooden bridges were burnt. It took us long to cover the way. We reached Muktagachha, a small suburban town only 10 miles from Mymensingh, very late at night. At the entrance of the town, there were people on guard who were prepared to fire at us. But before that happened we were able to prove our identity as friends. It was March 29. Late hours of the night we huddled in the Muktagachha college building. It was another sleepless night. But it was different from the agonising and indecisive days of Joydebpur. My heart was panting in suspense for the two companies, the remnants of the battalion headquarters and the platoon left behind at Joydebpur, Rajendrapur and Gazipur complex. If everything went well and they made their moves as scheduled at 7.30 p.m. the last evening, they should be here any moment in the morning.
For a night move and the barricades en route, it was rather a quick one. All the troops at Joydebpur, Gazipur and Tangail reached Muktagachha at daybreak. It was perhaps one of the happiest moments of my life. Almost entire battalion with lock, stock and barrel was present in front of me. They were safe and were free to look out gracefully and ready to pounce upon the enemy with strength and speed like tigers. The tigers were out of the cage now.
But I had few surprises in store for me. First, the battalion commander did not come. Second, after I left at 3.00 p.m. the battalion commander decided to delay the time schedule by one hour. Since there was time so it was possible to inform all the outposts about the change of time. But at 7 p.m. he again ordered to put it off by another half an hour, which was not possible. The tension of the troops was at its height by 8 p.m. There was also complete blackout in the area and on top of it due to several changes of timings by the battalion commander a commotion took place in the Palace. Taking advantage of this commotion West Pakistani wireless operators manning brigade
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commander Major Kazem Kamal with you. Keep him with you and bring him to me in safety.” I instructed them not to leave Tangail till the rest of the troops from Joydebpur arrived.
The road to Mymensingh did not afford an easy going. There were barricades, wooden bridges were burnt. It took us long to cover the way. We reached Muktagachha, a small suburban town only 10 miles from Mymensingh, very late at night. At the entrance of the town, there were people on guard who were prepared to fire at us. But before that happened we were able to prove our identity as friends. It was March 29. Late hours of the night we huddled in the Muktagachha college building. It was another sleepless night. But it was different from the agonising and indecisive days of Joydebpur. My heart was panting in suspense for the two companies, the remnants of the battalion headquarters and the platoon left behind at Joydebpur, Rajendrapur and Gazipur complex. If everything went well and they made their moves as scheduled at 7.30 p.m. the last evening, they should be here any moment in the morning.
For a night move and the barricades en route, it was rather a quick one. All the troops at Joydebpur, Gazipur and Tangail reached Muktagachha at daybreak. It was perhaps one of the happiest moments of my life. Almost entire battalion with lock, stock and barrel was present in front of me. They were safe and were free to look out gracefully and ready to pounce upon the enemy with strength and speed like tigers. The tigers were out of the cage now.
But I had few surprises in store for me. First, the battalion commander did not come. Second, after I left at 3.00 p.m. the battalion commander decided to delay the time schedule by one hour. Since there was time so it was possible to inform all the outposts about the change of time. But at 7 p.m. he again ordered to put it off by another half an hour, which was not possible. The tension of the troops was at its height by 8 p.m. There was also complete blackout in the area and on top of it due to several changes of timings by the battalion commander a commotion took place in the Palace. Taking advantage of this commotion West Pakistani wireless operators manning brigade
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Quamar Abbas they were overworked—apparently an innocent order which was logical and convincing. But behind this innocence there lay a treacherous move. The Bengalee troops though went to sleep in the barrack but did not deposit their weapons. When they were wside in the barracks, the West Pakistani troops quietly stocked their arms and ammunitions on the headquarters rooftop and placed all their vehicles with headlights facing towards the barracks where Bengalee troops were sleeping. Our Charlie company was in bivouacs behind the barracks and close to the perimeter wall. At mid-night suddenly the vehicle headlights were switched on flooding the barracks with light, which the Bengalee EPR troops were occupying and opened up with all the fire power at their disposal. The Bengalee EPR troops who were in the barrack quickly fired back and started to give resistance. Our Charlie company troops were also alert. They had the orders to keep their weapons and ammunitions with them all the time. The moment our troops were fired at they quickly went over the perimeter wall and took position and fired back. The Bengalee EPR troops who were inside the barrack could get out of the barrack because of the covering fire provided to them by Charlie company. Once they also went over the wall they together became a formidable force against the West Pakistani troops firing at them.
Major Nurul Islam the Company Commander and Lieutenant Mannan the Company Officer of Charlie company were staying in the C & B rest house, about half a mile away from the place where their troops were staying. According to Nurul Islam fire was also opened at the rest house. The moment they were fired at they hurriedly left the rest house through the back door towards the river and along the bank of the river Brahmaputra reached the city. However, a hot exchange of fire began to rage at the East Pakistan Rifles line. It continued uninterrupted until 2.30 p.m. on 28 March. Our troops retaliated with great courage and finally succeeded in annihilating all Pakistani troops at Mymensingh except six who were taken into custody. In the absence of any officer on the spot this operation was conducted by the Senior JCO’s of the respective forces i.e. Charlie company Senior JCO and EPR company JCO.
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By 4 p.m. on March 29 the battalion completed its concentration in Mymensingh. From here would begin a new chapter. We were firm in our resolve to fight the enemy. We rose to the occasion and took up arms against the Pakistan army. We had defied the Pakistani authority and according to them we committed a treasonable offence. So from here there was no going back. Only road open to us was to fight back and liberate our motherland, Bangladesh, or die. At 4 p.m. the same day when the battalion got concentrated at Mymensingh I administered an oath to the entire battalion officers and men in the City Hall to owe allegiance to Bangladesh and fight against the Pakistanis for the cause of Bangladesh.
Chittagong Explodes Bangladesh was a living volcano in the days preceding March 25, 1971. It suddenly erupted with a mighty bang with innumerable craters spreading all over the country. Big and small craters began to throw out hot flames of liberation war.
Chittagong, on the mouth of Karnafuli, kept quietly watching the water front. On the shore, the port town began to see an ominous confrontation between the Bengalee and nonBengalee population. Non-Bengalee areas were quite a few in Chittagong city. These areas consisted mainly of wireless colony, Ispahani colony, Ambagan colony, Kulshi colony, Sardar Nagar and Shershah colony. These areas began to receive supplies of arms and ammunition secretly through the West Pakistani troops. They had another source of supply. With the help of the Pakistani troops, they looted shops and houses belonging to the Bengalees for arms and ammunition.
In the wake of a total non-cooperation call when the prosperous city stood motionless, the non-Bengalees were hell bent on rendering it a failure. With armed strength behind them and enlisting the support of the West Pakistani troops, the nonBengalees launched a virulent campaign of vilification and blood letting over the Bangalee population. Unfortunately enough, the city of Chittagong had no exclusive Bengalee locality to derive strength from. So the Bengalees had a difficult going within the city areas.
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Six miles to the north of the city, Natunpara cantonment garrisoned the East Bengal Regimental Centre. On the foothills of the Sitakundu ranges bounded by the Hathazari road on one side and the Bay of Bengal on the other, Natunpara stood out in its semi-hilly abode as a bastion of power for the Bengalee. It has about 2500 troops, mostly recruits, all Bengalee, commanded by a Bengalee brigadier and a number of Bengalee officers and junior commissioned officers. Brigadier Majumber, the centre commandant, was patiently watching the developments. Colonel Shigri, a West Pakistani was the deputy commandant. His chief instructor, Lieutenant Colonel M R Chowdhury was another Bengalee officer. Lieutenant Colonel Z S Osmani, a Urdu speaking officer was the Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General of the centre. Troops of 20 Baluch regiment, who were on order of transfer from Comilla to West Pakistan, had already started pouring in Chittagong. More West Pakistani troops were also lined up for the defence of Chittagong.
On the Baizid Bostami Road, across the railway crossing at Solashahar in the vacant sheds of the Chittagong Development Authority (CDA), the 8 East Bengal Regiment was ready to move to Karachi by the next available ship. It was an understrength battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Janjua. This battalion had little over 400 troops. Solashahar effectively dominated the two main exits into the city. The battalion’s second-in-command was Major Ziaur Rahman, a bright and young son of the soil. In addition to this, there were about 600 troops of East Pakistan Rifles, out of which roughly 300 troops were nonBengalees. The sector commander was Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Aziz Shiekh. He had Captain Rafiq as his adjutant, another son of the soil. West Pakistani elements in Khakis were, however, negligible in strength. Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi, commanding officer of 20 Baluch had just been briefed on March 24 to disarm the centre with his battalion headquarter and the rifle companies with approximately a strength of 600 soldiers. This
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battalion was hurriedly airlifted and was stationed at Natunpara. The battalion was about to move back to West Pakistan after a tenure of two years in East Pakistan in January 71. On March 25 airlifting to Chittagong continued. 27 Punjab started arriving. The commandos of 3rd Commando battalion, in civies, were immediately launched to strengthen the non-Bengalee population of the city. Some were deployed to strengthen the defence of Patenga airport which was already being guarded by the Pakistan navy. The naval base had a clear preponderance of West Pakistanis with a count approximately over 200 all ranks which include the shore establishment, PNS BAKHTIAR and the flotilla berthed on the jetty.
The leadership of the troops in Chittagong lied in the hands of Bengalees and naturally, initiative, if taken in appropriate time, was sure to crown us with an unprecedented victory. The course of liberation war, in that case probably would have taken a different turn.
The man vested with the power of taking decision was Brigadier Majumber. He remained silent and watchful. Behind his appearance betraying a state of impasse and aloofness, he quietly ordered his recruits to be issued with arms and pouch ammunition. He instructed them to remain vigilant and alert. He looked on, as MV SWAT arrived at the port anchorage loaded with a mighty arsenal. As a Sub-Marital Law Administrator of the area he remained silent when the porters and the stevedoring staff, on a total lock out, refused to discharge the ship, but he waited a bit too long. General Abdul Hamid Khan, the chief of staff, Pakistan army along with Brigadier M. H. Ansari, the logistic area commander rushed to Chittagong on March 24, in a MI-8 helicopter. MV SWAT at the anchorage remained undischarged. There was no time for the Pakistanis for dilly dallying. Majumdar was a Bengalee. So he had to be removed. A suitable excuse was not difficult to find for the change of command. The 2 East Bengal at Joydebpur was without a commanding officer. Masood being under detention in Dhaka. A “loyal Officer, Raquib was found. It would be quite within the traditions of
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service for a centre commandant to install a new commanding officer in one of his battalions. So the decision was made without raising much dust.
The helicopter took off in the afternoon with three passengers, Hamid Khan, Majumder and Captain Amin Ahmed Chowdhury. Majumder must have realised that he was being removed. Ansari on the saddle, decided to have a clean sweep in Chittagong. Shigri took over as the centre commandant with Osmani as his deputy. MR Chowdhury remained oblivious about his future and the future of his men, little knowing that he had another 24 hours to live.
Early at 8 a.m. on March 25, a helicopter took off from Dhaka cantonment carrying half a dozen senior army officers. It was on a courier mission. Remarkably enough Major General Janjua, Mitha, Nazar Hussain Shah, Omar and Colonel Sadulla, the colonel staff of the 14 Division were boarding the helicopter. Sadullah, a sharp and cool headed fanatic, carried a number of sealed envelop all marked with top security classification. The helicopter landed at each garrison by turn and took off after delivering the message for the next destination in a most business like fashion. Thus the “go ahead” was given for wiping out a teeming generation of Bengalees as the Zero hour struck.
The Bengalee troops of the Centre were ordered on duty without arms. One company under the escort of 20 Baluch was sent to the port to unload MV SWAT. Major Mir Shawkat Ali, the Adjutant of 8 East Bengal, was ordered by his commanding officer, Janjua to send one company on port duty. Another company of 8 East Bengal was deployed on the Ispahani hill. The rest of the battalion was at Sholashahar with most of its families residing in the cantonment.
20 Baluch at 11.30 p.m. on D-day first attacked and captured the Kote (armoury) of the East Bengal Regimental Centre. They started killing the Bengalees sleeping in their beds. The family quarters were also attacked. In all, the death toll on the black night of March 25, was more than a thousand. The blood thirsty hyena spread out in the city also to improve their score by mass killing.
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At Sholashahar, Janjua passed an order to Zia to move to the port with a company. He even brought a naval truck for Zia and saw him off. It was 11.30 p.m., Zia vacillated as he started off. After clearing a number of road blocks en route, he reached Agrabad commercial area where he was stopped by Captain Chowdhury Khaliquazzaman an officer of his battalion. This was the turning point. Khalique informed him of the killing and warned him that the port was nothing but a trap for him. On hearing this Zia immediately returned to Sholashahar and conveyed his decision to take up arms against the Pakistan army to his officers and men who readily welcomed it. Janjua was awakened from his bed and was taken into custody. Later he was eliminated by his own batman for the treachery he did by sending Zia to the port.
On the fateful night of March 25, Captain (later Major) Rafiq of the East Pakistan Rifles defected and tacfully neutralised the wireless colony, the Railway hill and Halishahar the sector commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sheikh was arrested at Sialbukka and was handed over to Zia, who ultimately handed him over to the Indian authorities. During the quiet of the night, the city of Chittagong was brought under the control of Rafiq. He had already sent a message to his troops at Ramgarh and Kaptai to come and join him as reinforcements to the troops fighting in Chittagong city.
The morning dawned with dreadful stories. Mujib-Yahya talks had ended in a fiasco, blood bath in Dhaka and at Natunpara innocent Bengalee recruits, while in sleep, were brutally killed. Those who survived, ran either to the city or to the hills.
Zia’s Declaration
Having settled his score with his commanding officer on the night of March 25/26, Zia decided to take his battalion on the outskirts of the city to re-organise, strengthen and then launch a decisive blow on Chittagong. All troops were collected at a place near Patiya.
17 Wing of the East Pakistan Rifles from Kaptai on their way to join Rafiq in the city was intercepted by Zia at 0800
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hours on March 26. They were then incorporated within his force. All the troops then took an oath of allegiance to Bangladesh. The oath was administered by Zia at 1600 hours on March 26. Thereafter, he distributed 350 troops of East Pakistan Rifles to various task forces under command of an officer each. These task forces were meant for the city. The whole city of Chittagong was divided into various sector and each sector was given to a task force.
Having made all these arrangements, Zia made his first announcement on the radio on March 27.* In this announcement apart from saying that they were fighting against Pakistan army he also declared himself as the head of the state. This, of course, could have been a result of tension and confusion of the moment.
As the battalion began to gather strength, in the afternoon of March 28.* Zia made another announcement from the Shawadhin Bangla Betar Kendra established at Kalurghat.
The announcement reads as follows:
a. “I Major Zia, provisional commander-in chief of the Bangladesh liberation army, hereby proclaim, on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the independence of
Bangladesh.”
b. “I also declare, we have already formed a sovereign, legal government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which pledges to function as per law and the constitution.”
c.”The new democratic government is committed to a policy of non-alignment in international relations. It will seek friendship with all nations and strive for
international peace.”
d. “I appeal to all governments to mobilize public opinion in their respective countries against the brutal genocide in Bangladesh.”
e. The government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is
sovereign legal government of Bangladesh and is
______________
*In the first edition of this book due to type mistake these were shown as 26 and 27 March respectively, which has been corrected in this edition.
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entitled to recognition from all democratic nations of the world.”
He further said, “We shall not die like cats and dogs but shall die as worthy citizens of Bangla Ma. Personnel of the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles and the entire police force had surrounded West Pakistani troops in Chittagong, Comilla, Sylhet, Jessore, Barisal ‘ and Khulna. Heavy fighting was continuing.”
This significant announcement had a salutary effect all over the country as well as abroad. All those fighting their individual and isolated battles got a moral boost that they were not alone in the struggle, others also took up arms and are fighting.
Ambush at Kumira News had it that a column consisting of 24 Frontier Force regiment and 88 Mortar battery of 120 millimetre mortars was moving fast towards Chittagong under the command of Brigadier Iqbal Shafi, Commander 53 Brigade of Comilla.
The Pakistan army column advanced steadily, unopposed barring some unprotected road block, the column had a smooth sailing all the way through. By 5 p.m. the column got across Shuvapur bridge in safety. Kumira defile lay ahead with no apparent sign of life where the enemy column stopped as usual to clear just another road block the like of which they had faced all the way through.
It was 7-15 p.m. suddenly Kumira burst out with life. Heavy machine gun and mortar fire was brought to bear on the enemy. The enemy was taken by complete surprise. For a few minutes they were alarmed and baffled. Leaving a good number of casualties in dead and wounded they took up position and began to return fire. This continued for good two hours after which the battle field was covered with a blanket of still quietness.
The ambush at Kumira was laid by about 100 men from the East Pakistan Rifles and some police. This operation was led by Captain M. Subed Ali Bhuyan, on the first night, in which the commanding officer of 24 Frontier Force, Lieutenant Colonel Shapoor Khan rumoured to have got killed and with
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him 152 other ranks also lost their lives. Bhuyan, for reasons best known to him discreetly left Kumira leaving his men to their fate on that very night. There was also a hot rumour that Shapoor was shot and killed on the very first day of the crack down by the brigade Major Sultan, as he did not approve of the Pakistan army action, and was opposed to the killing of the rear party personnel of 4 East Bengal. The rumours apart, two truckloads of ammunition was captured by our troops. On our side, we lost 14 gallant soldiers. The ambush at Kumira turned into a full-fledged battle in the next two days. The enemy was completely demoralised. The command of 24 Frontier Force was given over to a Bengalee officer, Major Amjad. Mitha Khan arrived on a helicopter to motivate his fallen comrades with the spirit of Jehad. Finally artillery and gun boats were brought in by them to support the attack of 24 Frontier Force. The attack was launched on 28 March from two directions. Our troops, although, leaderless, fought courageously and extricated from the position inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
By then Chittagong saw a massive reinforcement of enemy forces. Brigades of 9 Division arrived from Kharian were already in Dhaka. They were being airlifted to Sylhet and Comilla. Chittagong got the left over troops of 53 Brigade along with its headquarters. In addition, a man-of-war of the Pakistan navy, PNS JAHANGIR arrived at Chittagong with two infantry battalions and two squadrons of tanks. Pakistan army, thus got on a strong wicket in the battle field at Chittagong and the Freedom Fighters had to leave their city strong-holds at Halishahar and the Court Hill by April 2.
The Battle of Kalurghat In the afternoon of March 26, a manned light machine gun propped up form the MV SWAT facing the recruits and men from 8 East Bengal Regiment who were brought there for unloading the ship, were lined up on the jetty number 17. The machine gun opened up and they were killed brutally. Six or seven of them escaped this brutal killing by jumping into the river Karnaphuli.
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On March 28 one platoon of regulars, commanded by Lieutenant Shamsher Mobin and another platoon of East Pakistan Rifles commanded by Captain Harun were told to take up defensive position near Chawk Bazar area. Defensive positions were ready by March 29. By that time Pakistan army put in the first attack on the evening of March 29. this attack was repulsed by our troops. The fighting in the city became so intensive that on April 1, our position in the city had to be abandoned and the troops fell back to Kalurghat the same night. The battalion headquarters was established nearby.
8 East Bengal Regiment supported by one company of East Pakistan Rifles took up a strong defensive position on Kalurghat on the Karnaphuli-Cox’s Bazar highway. The battalion headquarter was established at Gomdandi, a village in the neighbourhood of Kalurghat.
The defence at Kalurghat was organised with three companies of 8 East Bengal on the eastern bank of Karnaphuli and one company of the East Pakistan Rifles on the Western bank. This company had the role of an advanced position, to pass back information of the enemy, make contact, inflict casualty with a view to delaying the enemy, and finally to fall back on the eastern bank through the Kalurghat bridge.
The main defences were held by Alpha company on the right, Bravo on the centre and Charlie on the left, commanded respectively by Captain Chowdhury Khaliquzzaman, Lieutenant Shamsher Mobin and Captain Harun Ahmed Chowdhury. The company of the East Pakistan Rifles which was acting as a screen was commanded by a junior commissioned officer.
When the battalion was busy in preparing the defence at Kalurghat to meet the ememy onslaught, Zia anticipating a bigger enemy threat in the offing, crossed over to Subroom in India to seek help from India and some reinforcement from us, The junior officers were holding the fort. At this stage Major Mir Shawkat Ali, the adjutant of the battalion, who was the next senior, was also away on a special mission to Cox’s Bazar. In the absence of any senior officer, the junior officers were preparing to fight a defensive battle at Kalurghat. Shawkat however,
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returned on 9 April. Since Zia did not return till then, Shawkat took control of the operation at Kalurghat.
The defences having dug in, the troops were in position by March 30. The company at the advanced position located itself in the Ispahani buildings about a mile to the west bank of the river. Some troops were also located on the west bank as a measure of providing, besides moral support, active physical support to the advanced position. Harun, Shamsher Mobin and Lieutenant Mahfuz stayed on the west bank with some troops.
A platoon of 3 Commando battalion advanced on Kalurghat and occupied the Agriculture building on Karnaphuli about a mile to the south. It was early morning on March 31. Mahfuz was ordered to dislodge the enemy. He conducted with his platoon a daring raid and successfully captured the building.
The battle at Kalurghat continued sporadically and several times enemy attempts at capturing the brige were foiled courageously. Shawkat at times took out strong ambush parties himself and always kept the enemy foxed and contained. He carried about himself a style of his own. A strong believer in fire power, he did not hesitate to take out even suicide parties only after he was amply sure that the party had all the fire power at his command.
The fighting in Kalurghat area continued for several days. Ultimately on April 11, the enemy put in a determined attack on our advanced position. The attack had hardly gone in when the enemy was found in possession of the Ispahani building. Our troops on the west bank stayed on to cover he anticipated withdrawal of the advanced position troops. But they were not to be found. Harun got up from his trench to see the situation. Hardly few hundred yards away from his position, the enemy was found steadily advancing on our position. Soon the bullets started flying all over. Harun got a mortal bullet in his stomach. He fell off. Mahfuz along with one student volunteer, carried Harun across the bridge. The enemy by then was already on our position. Shamsher Mobin was the next officer to be mortally wounded by a point blank shot. There was no time left. He was taken prisoner by the enemy.
The enemy, a battalion strength was in occupation of the west bank while the defences of the 8 East Bengal began to fall
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apart on the east bank. The uncoordinated withdrawal of the advanced position company of the East Pakistan Rifles, allowed the enemy to close in and occupy west bank, resulting in casualties of two officers. Due to enemy superior fire power our position on the east bank became untenable. The battle of Kalurghat thus came to an end. The 8 East Bengal went further into the heart of Chittagong hill tracts in three columns. The major column fought its way to Rangamati under the command of Shawkat. Another column moved to Kaptai under Mahfuz. The third column went towards Cox’s Bazar under Khaliquzzaman. They continued to fight disjointedly and ultimately fell back to India to re-group, re-equip and reorganise.

Kushtia Retaliates
On the west, Kushtia was, by then experiencing a hot blaze of gun fire. The battle of Kushtia started on the night of March 25. Without warning 13 military vehicles halted outside the police station. This convoy carried 147 men of the Delta company of 27 Baluch from Jessore. At 10-30 p.m. on the very night a massacre started in Dhaka. Before any one could guess the intention of the Baluchi troops in Kushtia 500 police were quickly disarmed by them without meeting any resistance. Four more key points, the district police headquarters, the government officers building, the VHF radio transmission station and the Zilla school, went under the control of Pakistani forces.
Early in the morning jeep loads of soldiers drove through the empty streets of Kushtia announcing a total curfew to begin from 6 a.m. on March 26. Kushtia remained calm for the next 48 hours. Major Abu Osman Chowdhury, the commander of the Chuadanga wing of the East Pakistan Rifles along with his family, was in Kushtia on that fateful night, he managed to escape with his family to Chuadanga, his headquarters, by 1 p.m. on March 26. Osman’s wing headquarters had already decided to defect. His wing havildar Major Mujibul Hoque, at his own initiative, had disarmed all the non-Bengalee elements and taken them into
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custody. Doctor Ashabul Haque, MCA and the civil officials were called by Osman for an emergency discussion of the situation. After the discussion was over, Osman with the available troops organised the defence of Chuadanga. He alerted his border outposts at Maslia and Phillip Nagar. Captain Azam Chowdhury drove down a katcha road to Poradah on orders from Osman. Subeder Muzaffar advancing from Phillip Nagar, also converged on Kushtia.
Time correspondent Don Coggins gave a detailed story on the battle of Kushtia. According to his narration, on March 28, some 53 policemen of the already neutralised police station “easily overpowered a handful of soldiers”. They fled out to nearby villages and joined with the group of students who were already working for Bangladesh movement and were training the locals on the rudiments of guerrila warefare. Within the next two days several thousand volunteers and militia men of the East Pakistan Rifles were organised to launch and attack to liberate Kushtia. The volunteers were armed with “hatchets, farm tools and bamboo staves.”
At 4-30 a.m. on March 31, a force of 500 peasants-police pessonnel and East Pakistan Rifles troops launched the attack simultaneously on five enemy positions. Thousands of townsfolk joined them with full throated shouts of “joi Bangla”. The Delta company got panicked seeing the advancing human wave with heart rending cries and relentless rifle cracking. They had no heart to fight.
By noon the government building and the district headquarters crumbled. Major Shoaib, the Pakistani company commander requested for immediate reinforcement but failed to get any. The Delta company already reduced in fighting strength, was facing danger of total annihilation.
Before dawn on April 1, about 75 survivours, made a frantic dash for escape. Two jeeps were “halted by surging mob.” Pakistani soldiers were “Pulled out by the dozens” and were killed on the spot. Major Shoaib was one of the victim there.
The other vehicles also got trapped in a ditch dug across the road. They were “overpowered and hacked to death by peasants.” In this blockade two prisoners were taken. One was
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Subedar Ayub and the other was Lieutenant Ataullah Shah. The rest were killed on the spot. Later, on April 2, another 13 prisoners of war were taken into custody in the district jail.
On April 5, Pakistan army dispatched another infantry company from Jessore to recapture Kushtia. But the unfortunate company “fell into a booby trap” set up by the Bengalee force at Bishakhali. The entire convoy consisting of 2 Jeeps and 9 trucks plunged into a well camouflaged ditch. All troops got killed in fighting with the peasants.
Kushtia was liberated. From all rooftops, shops and vehicles Bangladesh flags fluttered and Bangladesh administration was set up under Doctor Ashabul Haque, “a forceful physician who packs a webly and scott revolver and a Spanish guernica automatic.” Kushtia remained alert and ready to repel any Pakistani attack in the future.
It was a great victory. A big convoy lined up in front of Osman’s tactical headquarters carrying captured 75 millimetre recoilless rifles, machine guns and light machine guns. Kushtia evoked a sense of pride for Bangladesh forces as much as it demoralised the Pakistanis who cast an evil eye on it and were looking for a chance to take a reprisal action. For Osman it was a positive score to his credit in the liberation war.
Junior Tiger Strikes
It was as if thrown by a mighty storm that the wrecked ship had been drifting of the coast far into the high seas. We were left meandering. The storm that was let loose by Yahya would not stop until the shackles of colonial rule was fastened tight around our neck. “I have ordered them (the armed forces of Pakistan) to do their duty.” Yahya said. Their treacherous and brutal attack on Peelkhana and Rajarbagh bear testimony to that nefarious design. The East Pakistan Rifles personnel and the police fought back gallantly. The unarmed students and even girls were not spared from their brutality. Iqbal Hall, Jagannath Hall, the University campus, Dhaka medical college and the Rokeya Hall witnessed some of the bloodiest operations spear-headed by M24 medium tanks, recoilless rifles and bazookas. Hundreds and
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thousands fell victim to a genocide the like of which the world did not witness before.
We had chosen our only course. We pledged to the cause of liberation of our motherland. We took up arms against the occupation army of Pakistan. The war had started. It had to be fought successfully to the end. The entire country was behind us and would remain so. This was the main anchor sheet which outweighed all our weaknesses. The major problem I was confronted with was the coordination between different troops fighting in different areas. This was accentuated by complete black out of information. We had no means to know the state of affairs on the other fronts except Zia’s call from Chittagong. Zia’s message was timely and it gave inspiration to others, specially the uniformed persons who were fighting in isolation.
We had a dynamic potential in our youth. They were motivated to the highest degree. They only wanted a call, a direction and a lead. Their eyes were on the Bengalee troops. Sufficient confidence was yet to be created in them to make them move. They wanted an inspiration.
Then we had about 15,000 trained troops of East Pakistan Rifles. East Pakistan Rifles centre in Dhaka rose against the Pakistan authority on the night of 25 March. In this action Pakistan army ultimately overpowered the East Pakistan Rifles troops, most of whom were either taken into custody or killed. Troops on the border or in other parts of the country were fighting in a disjointed manner. They were ready force willing to welcome the army’s leadership.
Yet another source of strength lay scattered all over the length and breadth of the country. They were the Ansars and Mujahids. They were trained in handing of weapons. A short term refresher training could bring them at par with any soldier. If inducted these heterogenous elements would number about 25,000.
Although police was a large force within the country, very negligible number joined the liberation force. However, they were not found lacking in patriotism when working with us.
I counted on the understrength five East Bengal Regiments whose total was not more than 3,000 soldiers. Then there were
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2500 recruits in the East Bengal Regimental Centre. Another strength of 2,000 Bengalee elements belonging to other arms and services were serving in Bangladesh. These elements were serving insuch units where the troops were predominantly West Pakistani. Therefore of them hardly any significant number could join us in the liberation war.
This was not a rosy picture. I knew it well that one could argue a case on some hypothesis, but it was different to fight a war. I should thank my star if the actuals were half as many as I indicated.
My immediate aim was to make sure that I keep the Dhaka troops engaged so that they were not in a position to send reinforcement out of Dhaka.
I called the East Pakistan Rifles company back to Mymensingh on the evening of March 30. The same day last of my platoons arrived from Rajendrapur. The border was no more a threat to me than where I was. The police had a powerful wireless set. I made use of it. With the help of this set I passed a message to all within the police net spread over the various parts of the country. The message was, “I, Major Safiullah, of East Bengal Regiment have taken up arm against the Pakistanis. At present the district of Tangail and Mymensingh are under my control. If you are a Bengalee, wherever you are, take up arms with whatever you may have, against the Pakistanis and begin an armed resistance to liberate your country from the colonial fetters of Pakistan.”
I was really thrilled with the response I got. Within an hour’s time I started getting messages from Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Pabna, Bogra, Kushtia, Habiganj, Brahmanbaria and Feni that they are also fighting against the Pakistanis and our action have emboldened them further.
In order to tie up various loose ends I held a meeting in my headquarters with the district administration and the local Awami League leaders. In this meeting we took the following important and far-reaching decisions :
a. The responsibility of conducting the battle was assigned to the commander of 2nd East Bengal Regiment.
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b. Law and order of the district was to be enforced by thedistrict administration in consultation with the local Awami league.
c. Provision and supply for the force was to be arranged by the civil administration and the local Awami League leaders.
d. The need for a regular supply of arms and ammunition was accepted by all. It was also unanimously agreed that a proposal for assistance will be sent to Indian authority, if needed. It was decided to appoint Mr. Syed Abdus Sultan, MNA as a special envoy of Bangladesh to New Delhi through whom our proposal for assistance would be conveyed to the government of India.
e. It was also decided to send a feeler for such assistance to the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) at Haluaghat, prior to sending Mr. Syed Abdus Sultan to New Delhi.
Without wasting any time I sent Captain Azizur Rahman to Haluaghat to establish contact with the Indian BSF officers. He met Captain Baljeet and Lieutenant Colonel Sinha, an intelligence officer. Aziz also met the commandant of the Border Security Force. The response we got was favourable. They had promised to help us with whatever we need.
With this assurance, I went ahead organizing a force consisting of East Pakistan Rifles, Police and 2 East Bengal personnel. The force also had some elements of trained civilians. The strength I could master was approximately 3000. This force was officered by 8 officers and a good number of junior commissioned officers. I also requisitioned the services of two doctors from the Mymensingh medical college.
In the face of a sickening void we did not sit idle. The Brigade rear link which was established at Joydebpur with the help of a GRC-9 wireless set was brought along with me to Mymensingh. At Mymensingh I made use of this set in monitoring the enemy messages. It was on the afternoon of March 30 we monitored an interesting conversation between the colonel staff, Headquarters 14 Division Colonel Sadullah and the brigade major of Jessore brigade. The colonel staff was rebuking the brigade major “you have been routed by rag tags
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and have no shame. How could you be routed by unarmed people ? You deserve kicks. Tell your commander if he needs help we will be able to provide. We are sending two air sorties to Kushtia to strafe and bombard the city and the circuit house. We have been able to tackle Dhaka, which did not bother us much. We are really concerned about Kushtia now.”
Another piece of conversation between the general officer commanding of 14 Division, Major General Khadem Hussain Raja and his colonel staff, Colonel Sadullah was monitored the same evening. The GOC was speaking from Chittagong “we have captured 8 East Bengal headquarters. We are now proceeding towards radio station. In the process we have suffered a lot of casualties. Send a C-130 transport aircraft tomorrow to Chittagong to carry the dead and wounded. If it is not possible to send a C-130, then send an Alleutte (helicopter) to naval base at 10-30 a.m.”
These messages were revealing. It was clear that the Pakistan army was facing troubles at Kushtia and Chittagong. Reinforcements from Dhaka was wanting at both these places. The capture of 8 East Bengal Regiment headquarters was a menacing news for me. I shuddered to think Zia was caught with his officers and men. If that was so, I was not sure who else was there to give leadership to the liberation movement at Chittagong. This demoralising news had such a bad effect on me that it obliterated my thinking process for a short while. I was thus gripped with such an anxiety that it did not strike me at all that the capture of headquarters do not necessarily mean the capture of personnel.
By the time the battalion got concentrated at Mymensingh some of the companies were without their company commanders. I therefore, had to reorganise the command structure of the battalion. Major Nurul Islam being the next senior I appointed him as my Second-in-Command and the command of the rifle companies were also re-arranged. In this re-arrangement Nasim was given Alfa company, Bravo company to Ejaj, Charlie company to Aziz and Moin remained with Delta company. Morshed and Mannan were kept as Company Officer to Alfa and Charlie companies respectively. Ibrahim the junior most officer was appointed as Adjutant.
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The Desperate Plan

I took a desperate decision to attack Dhaka, the bastion of power of the Pakistan army, so that no reinforcement could flow out to the affected areas. My plan was :
a. 2 East Bengal and a company plus East Pakistan Rifles to attack Dhaka cantonment from the eastern direction.
b. Two companies of East Pakistan Rifles to move to western part of Dhaka covering Mirpur, Mohammadpur and Dhaka airport areas with a view to keeping the enemy engaged and simulating our presence in the direction.
c.One company of Mujahid and Ansar beefed up by some regular troops to be deployed at Gaffargaon to deny enemy use of rail axis from Dhaka direction.
d. One mixed company consisting of East Pakistan Rifles and Ansars to be deployed at Tangail to deny enemy use of Dhaka-Mymensingh highway.
e.One mixed company each consisting of East Pakistan Rifles, Police and Ansars to be deployed at Bahadurabad gaht and Sirajganj ghat to deny enemy coming from the north.
To arrive at this plan I was guided by the following considerations:
a. I must keep Pakistani troops in Dhaka engaged in Dhaka so that they are not in a position to spare troops and send re-inforcements to Chittagong, Kushtia or any other place. Therefore, I must reach Dhaka as fast as possible.
b.Numerically as well as armament wise Pakistan’s strength in Dhaka was much superior to ours, yet I thought we might be able to achieve our goal if I attack the cantonment from an unexpected direction. I appreciated 57 brigade would expect us to attack them either from the west or Tangail-Tongi-Dhaka highway. I “therefore, decided to attack the cantonment from the eastern direction.
c. When I am engaged in fighting in and around Dhaka I should protect my rear so that my plan is not upset by enemy surprises. I should, therefore, deny the use of Bahadurabad ghat and Sirajganj ghat to the enemy.
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These considerations forced me to move my troops as fast as possible and led me to adopt the eastern approach for the main attack.
There was a built-in cover plan in my plan of attack. Two companies of East Pakistan Rifles covering MirpurMohammadpur and Dhaka airport areas were meant to keep the enemy engaged and simulated our presence on the north and west of Dhaka so that their troops gets committed on that direction and their attention was diverted from my main thrust. While deploying my troops I had to keep in mind the morale of the civil population, so I could not keep Mymensingh and Tangail approaches absolutely open to the enemy. Therefore, Gaffargaon and Tangail were held with a company each mixed with trained Mujahids, Ansars, East Pakistan rifles and a nucleus of regulars from East Bengal Regiment.
By March 31 all the troops moved to their battle locations. The two East Pakistan Rifle companies, who reached Savar area on 31 March, were instructed to strike and draw the enemy towards them. This was to facilitate our main operation in the cantonment. The eastern approach that I selected for the attack on Dhaka cantonment is frequently interrupted by Balu and Shitallakhya rivers. I decided to advance upto Narshingdi by train and thereafter by bus, truck and then foot it upto the two crossing places. The crossing places on these two rivers were at Murapara and Tri-mohani. Crossing was planned by country boats. The date fixed for this attack was April 1.
March 30 and 31 were hectic days. I was all the time busy in passing orders and supervising the move. We had limited number of rolling stock. So movement of troops to Narshingdi was done by train in penny packets. I moved my headquarters at Kishoreganj on March 30. In Mymensingh and Kishoreganj three officers, who were either enjoying retired life or on leave joined me. They were Major Kazi Nuruzzaman (Retd.), Captain Motiur Rahman and Captain Abdul Matin. With these three additional officers at my disposal I enjoyed certain amount of flexibility which every field commander would cherish to have.
While my troops were moving from Bhairab Bazar towards Dhaka Captain Sehgal, an officer of this battalion, who was the
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pilot of Corps Commander’s helicopter, defected from there and joined the battalion. I gave him the Command of Alfa company of my battalion. This Company reached Narshingdi on 31 March. The following day the forward elements of my troops who had left the concentration area at Narshingdi earlier, reached Bashabo area and were closing on the Dhaka cantonment.
Attack Called off At Kishoreganj I received a message from Major Khaled Mosharraf. Brahmanbaria subdivision was already under his control. When apprised of my impending plan of attack on Dhaka cantonment he requested me to call off the advance to Dhaka. His message further added that he wished to establish contact with me. But due to security reasons I could not communicate clearly my plan of action through wireless. Khaled’s message was however a welcome news for me. Here was another soldier to take up arms against the occupation army of Pakistan. A young and promising officer, Khaled was a man of action and courage. I reposed a lot of hope in him and aspired to meet him the quickest I could.
It was March 31. The plan of advance on Dhaka was on its final stage of completion. I did not want to abandon it before confirming what Khaled had in mind. Therefore, at about 1 p.m. I along with Major Nuruzzaman (Retd.) took a train to Brahmanbaria to meet him. Khaled was away from his headquarters at Brahmanbaria when I reached there. Major Shafaat Jamil, Khaled’s second-in-command, handed over a request note, addressed to me, which read as follows:
“Do not go towards Dhaka. You will be banging your head against a wall. We have liberated whole of Brahmanbaria subdivision and a part of Sylhet. Before taking any further action on Dhaka, we should jointly liberate this whole area and then go for Dhaka. I had already contacted Indian BSF officers and they have agreed to help us. I could not wait for you as I am to meet Brigadier Pande of Border Security Force who promised to help us. —Khaled.”
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Khaled’s message did not provide anything new for me. When I made my plan of attack on Dhaka cantonment I knew fully well what was awaiting in Dhaka for me. Despite all these I had to plan for an action in Dhaka on the considerations explained earlier. Khaled’s message, however, gave me a new dimension to think of. I consulted with Major Zaman regarding this proposal and came to the conclusion that it was sound. Khaled’s own strength and assurance of help from the BSF gave us a sense of confidence. We should rather go for a joint venture to liberate the areas of Brahmanbaria and Sylhet, consolidate it, and them make for Dhaka. I, therefore, decided to call off the attack.
My troops who were already on their way to Dhaka were ordered to fall back by company at successive staging points established at Ashuganj and Brahmanbaria while one company must protect Dhaka-Norshingdi road during this withdrawal.
I had separate orders for my troops operating on the western side of Dhaka. They were instructed to cause damage on the enemy as much as possible using hit and run tactics and ultimately fall back along Dhaka-Mymensingh highway. They were also instructed to make use of Madhupur Jungle as their sanctuary.
On 1 April a very big Pakistani contingent mounted on civil vehicle moved towards Mymensingh. My troops operating on the western side of Dhaka intercepted this column and ambushed them near Tangail. The ambush was so successful that the enemy could hardly react. Our troops having inflicted heavy casualties on them withdraw to safety. The enemy, however managed to carry trucks load of dead and wounded. Indeed Madhupur jungle provided my troops a very safe sanctuary, wherefrom they operated till the end of April.
On 1 April there was another big Pakistani contingent mounted on civil vehicle advanced towards Narshingdi along Dhaka-Narshingdi road. This column was also very effectively ambushed by my troops located at a place between Narshingdi and Panchdona. The enemy suffered heavy casualties and retreated towards Demra leaving behind their dead and wounded.
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The same evening the enemy brought the heavy concentration of artillery fire on my company localities. We were very badly pounded. Due to lack of artillery we failed to silence the enemy guns. But my troops gave a stubborn resistance. After 48 hours of artillery shelling enemy put in an attack on our positions supported by air. Badly assailed, my troops were forced to fall back to Narshingdy in a disorganised manner. At this stage we took a denial plan and as the first denial measure, the Rampur railway bridge was blown off on April 3.

Mainamati Blazes
On the eastern sector, Mainamati hills, under the blaze of Krishnachura blossom, remained a hotbed of conspiracy. Unlike other Pakistani garrisons in Bangladesh, Comilla had an evil influence of a master killer. Major Sultan, the brigade major of 53 Brigade had no parallel in the act of human killing in cold blood. He chalked out a blue print where every Bengalee officer, junior commissioned officer and jawans of the garrison were given a place. The main hurdle in the execution of this task was the presence of 4 East Bangal Regiment in the cantonment.
Major Khaled Mosharraf had earlier experienced the growing mistrust between the Pakistanis and the Bengalees since January 1971. As brigade major of 57 Brigade he felt that he was being hoodwinked by the brigade commander, Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab Khan in all matters. His performance during the first week of March, while the brigade was deployed in the city of Dhaka on internal security duty, brought him discredit in the eyes of West Pakistani commanders as a trustworthy brigade major. During those days he got posted to 4 East Bengal as the second-in-command with Lieutenant Colonel Khizir Hyat as his commanding officer. He reached Comilla on the evening of March 22, and joined his officer the following day.
The blue print of massacre in Comilla was already drawn up. The guns of 53 Field regiment artillery were laid on the 4 East Bengal. 3 Commandos had their automatics on fixed lines. All arrangements were completed to effectively deal with 4 East Bengal Regiment should they refuse to surrender their arms.
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But in the meanwhile the Pakistani tactical plan underwent a change. A substantial part of 53 Brigade, consisting of 88 Mortar battery and 24 Frontier Force, was to move to Chittagong under the command of the Brigade commander himself on March 26. This would leave the garrison defensively untenable if the 4 East Bengal Regiment was allowed to stay in Mainamati and defect, which in all probability the battalion would do, under the circumstance.
The battalion had already sent Charlie and Delta companies to Brahmanbaria on internal security duty since early March. A West Pakistani company commander, Major Sadeq Neawaz commanded the Delta company, who was also in the overall command of troops there. Major Shafaat Jamil, a Bengalee officer, commanded Charlie company. Shahbazpur was within his operational responsibility.
Khaled was ordered to move to Shamshernagar with Alpha Company on March 24, to deal with what his battalion commander called “Indian Infiltration”. Normally the second-incommand do not assume the role of a company commander which is a subordinate role. On operational duties, however, when two or more companies are detached from the battalion, the second-in-command is called up to command that force. So to justify the move of Khaled, he was promised by the brigade commander that soon more troops would join him at Shamshernagar. To this effect he was told that 31 Punjab from Sylhet would despatch one company and two companies from East Pakistan Rifles would come under his command at Shamshernagar. As was revealed later, it was a sinister design to get these three companies butchered by 31 Punjab in small isolated action.
The Alpha company marched on schedule and reached its destination by the afternoon of March 24. Over 100 miles to the north-east of Comilla, in the midst of vast expanse of sprawling tea gardens Shamshernagar was really a lone place, far from the mainstream of activities.
Khaled started thinking. He had to collect enough intelligence before he could decide any action that he might take. He contacted Shafaat on the wireless and told him to
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remain vigilant. Shafaat was constantly being shadowed by Sadeq Newaz. So no frequent communication could take place between them. Being nearer to Dhaka, Shafaat heard about the Rape of Dhaka on March 25 and was shocked to see some of the horror stricken escapees. Their tale of misery weigh heavily on his mind. He was getting restive and agitated.
The headquarters of the 4 East Bengal Regiment with Bravo company was in Comilla. Lieutenant Ghaffar, a young and tactful son of the soil, was its adjutant. He managed, by his prudence, to be on the right side of the West Pakistani commanding officer. He recalls, “Khizir Hyat was not a difficult man. With tact he could be managed.” He was managed and was prevailed upon to move to Brahmanbaria with the rest of the troops.
Since March 22, a situation of “no war no peace” continued to prevail in Commilla cantonment. The 3 Commando battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Zahid Khan, laid their machine guns on fixed line to deal with 4 East Bengal. Ghaffar was vigilant. He secretly issued his men with similiar weapons from retreat to reveille. The battalion remained in this state of armed readiness until March 25.
At Brahmanbaria, Shafaat also had sensed some foul play in the offing. He realised that his battalion had very recently been changed over to Chinese weapons from British pattern and that the British made weapons and ammunition were still in the battalion headquarters. He therefore, arranged with his quartermaster to secretly transport all such weapons and ammunition on the ration carrying vehicles. By March 25, almost the entire lot of British type weapons and ammunition reached Brahmanbaria under heaps of rice and atta bags.
Khizir Hyat consulted the brigade commander about the move of the battalion headquarters with rest of the troops to Brahmanbaria. Having taken the brigade commanders’ blessings, he moved the remainder of the battalion and reached Brahmanbaria on the night of March 25. The families, however, remained in the cantonment. Captain Matin also arrived at Brahmanbaria with his Bravo company leaving behind a platoon at Jangalia
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Contact with Khaled was of prime importance now. Ghaffar snapped a chance on the wireless and conveyed the message to Khaled the same evening. It was manifestly clear to him then that a murderous plan of extermination was afoot. He decided to act and lost no time to march towards Brahmanbaria with his company.
Khizir Hyat insisted to address the battalion. So in the morning of March 27, the battalion was assembled on parade ground to be addressed by the battalion commander. But a conference was scheduled in one of the office tents where the battalion commander would preside prior to his address. Shafaat got his men, who were ready to stage a coup-de-theatre. The stage being set, he immediately took a bold action and dramatically arrested Khizir Hyat and other two Pakistani officers on the conference table. The rest of the 66 Pakistani troops serving with the battalion were immediately taken care of. The Baby Tiger, as 4 East Bengal regiment was popularly called, ture to its tradition, declared aut vincere aut mori. Shafaat immediately got his troops deployed on the ground and kept waiting for Khaled.
Khaled arrived at about 11 a.m. and took over the command of the battalion at Brahmanbaria. A large number of East Pakistan Rifles troops, police and volunteers thronged the battalion area and offered their services in the cause of liberation. Khaled got down organising this heterogeneous elements with his command.
Ainuddin escaping from Comilla joined the battalion during the time of re-organisation. He was given the command of a platoon ex-Delta company with additional manpower from the East Pakistan Rifles, police and volunteers.
Khaled set about a defence on wide front. One platoon from Charlie company was deployed at Gokana ghat with Ghaffar in command. The platoon of Delta company was deployed at Brahmanbaria under Ainuddin on Anderson canal. Shafaat was sent to defend Akhaura-Gangashagar-Kashba complex with the rest of his Charlie company. Alpha company was deployed in Shahbazpur. Bravo company was kept in reserve with the headquarters at Madhabpur.
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The headquarters of 4 East Bengal Regiment soon moved to . Teliapara tea gardens, where the defensive position of the battalion underwent more changes. Its area of responsibility extended upto Sylhet.
With this backdrop on the East of Meghna, I entered the scene with 2 East Bengal Regiment. Thereafter we reallocated our operational area of responsibility.
A Second Lease of Life
There are moments in life when man, rid of all his self-control devices, totally surrenders to the will of providence, who then, in His grandiose scheme, steers the condemned man along the labyrinth to the safe lap of destiny. Second Lieutenant Imamuzzaman of 53 Field regiment artillery, even today looking back to those dreadful moments of his life, shrinks with a awesome astonishment and muses to himself, “It was something supernatural that possessed me and steered me through the whole rut, alive.”
Nurul Islam and ALA Zaman were the two Bengalee captains in the regiments. Captain Siddique was a domiciled Urdu speaking non-Bengalee and Second Lieutenant Imamuzzaman was the youngest Bengalee officer. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Yacoob Malik, masterminded all the cold blooded killings at Comilla and in this effort, Sultan, the West Pakistani brigade major, played a major role.
In the midst of mutual suspicion growing thicker, hectic preparation for the final move was gradually being brought to completion. March 25 arrived and Imam’s unit got busy in tying the loose ends.
Just before dusk an unscheduled night duty was ordered by the commanding officer. A notice was served. Imam hurriedly dresses himself up in khakis and walked to the office premises. All the officers were there, Imam, Nuru, Zaman and Siddique. The unusual night parade cast a gloom on their faces. The club had its usual Thursday Tambola evening. This, however, could not quite camouflage and abnormality of the situation.
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The adjutant of the unit informed everyone that the parade was put off for an hour or so. He came to Imam and said, “let’s go for a game of Tambola.’
Imam refused. But could not flout the repeated requests of the adjutant.
The club wore a discordant look. All the Bengalee officers were there, Lieutenant Colonels Jahangir, Anwar and the rest. The brigade commander was also there with a number of West Pakistani officers. Tambola was on.
During the conduct of the game, the telephone rang. The barman leaving the earphone, ran to the brigade commander and said, “Sir, corps commander is on the line.”
Brigadier Iqbal Shafi lost no time to attend the call. He said, “Sir, everything is ready. You need not worry. Things will go just according to plan.” The conversation ended quickly.
A cold shiver travelled through Imam’s spine. Soon after the brigadier had finished his telephonic conversation, the adjutant told Imam and others, “let’s go to the office.”
The four Bengalee officers were then told to sit with the second-in-command. The West Pakistani officers, JCOs and men suddenly appeared with their personal weapons. All were looking grim. They started moving about in hurried steps, as if suddenly something was set in motion.
The commanding officer arrived and called for the Bengalee officers. Afraid, worried and completely shaken they appeared before Yacoob.
Looking away from their eyes, he began with a drowing voice, “right now, both Bhutot and Mujib are under arrest, and both East and West Pakistan are under curfew. Troops are marching to the town to kill any Bengalee who falls on the way. It would be quite unplesant for you to do the killing of your own men. So, to save the embarrassment, you four would stay here in this office building. Your beds and food would be brought here. You are not allowed to go anywhere else.” Yacoob stopped.
Siddique asked him, “Sir, I am a Behari. Where should I stay?”
Yacoob thought for a while and replied, “you also stay here.”
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The adjutant took them to the quartermaster’s office room where already four cots were laid on and sentries posted on the doors and windows. They were confined within the office building. They were only allowed to use the veranda for going to the bathroom and toilet which were on the extreme end.
Except for the sound of guns, rifles and reflection of brutality on the grim faces of the soldiers, these four detainess were cut off from the rest of the world. The next morning was revealing. A heavily guarded black Marcedes car helted in front of the office.
The two men who came out of the car were the deputy commissioner and the police super of Comilla. They were huddled into the last room of the office building near the bathroom. Many trucks carrying civilians continued to come and dump the civilian officials in the nearby buildings. This was an unending process. In the sequence, a merciless sequel of interrogation continued openly, with hair raising brutality. Gripped with deathly pain, the victims shrieked, groaned and lastly moaned and died quietly. As they fell motionless and speechless, the bodies were dragged outside and piled up. The disposal of corpse was a hurried affair. Mass graves were dug on the dead grounds or on the folds of hillocks for the disposal of corpse.
The four detained witnesse the saga of human killing with mute astonishment and were helplessly awaiting their turn. Siddique, the urdu speaking officer could not be confided upon. He would always say “don’t try to escape. They will kill us. We are safe here.”
That day ALA Zaman made repeated requests to the adjutant, “I want to see the CO.” He would not disclose why he wanted to see the commanding officer. At last, the adjutant informed the commanding officer who stopped at the door and asked “what do you want, Zaman?”
Zaman came forward and said, “Sir, I can be of great help to you, I know the people in the town, the Awami League leaders and the miscreants. I can collect them from their hide-outs. Please allow me to prove my loyalty.”
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Yacoob got interested. He seemed to have believed what Zaman had said. A welcome smile appeared on his face and he said, “okay.”
Then turning to the adjutant Yacoob ordered, “take him to the kote and issue him his weapon.”
Zaman walked out a free man without any hesitation or remorse. A glee flushed across his proud face. The remaining three detainees looked on silently. This happened on March 26.
Zaman scored a point over the other detainess in winning over the confidence of the Pakistanis. He was found particularly vocal and loud about his exploits in the town. As he often approached the office building, he was heard saying in urdu, “Yara, Dekho Kitna Miscreant Liaya. Inko Jaldi Dafa Karo. Main Dobara Shaher Jata Hun.” (See how many miscreants have I brought. Dispose them off quickly, so that I can again go to the town).
The adjutant hurriedly got the vehicles emptied for Zaman to reaffirm his loyalty to Pakistan.
Interrogation of the deputy commissioner and the police super was conducted closed doors. They wore a haggard look with unshaven face due to continuous grilling.
From March 26 onwards the detainess had no sleep. They ate whatever little was brought for them. Imamuzzaman and Nurul Islam used to have guarded talks. Due to the presence of Siddique, they could not make any joint plan of escape. The sentries were on the door and windows and a little away there was a parapet where a light machine gun, on fixed line, was on the alert all the time. Imam recalls “I had no way to escape. From March 28, our cell remained lighted for the whole night and all the observant eyes of the sentries and guards remained focussed on us. Escape was simply an impossibility.” |
On March 29, a new development was noticed. Just before dusk, all the 18 field guns of the regiment were brought into action. The barrage of fire began to shift to all directions. Simultaneously automatic fire from machine guns were heard from distant perimeter of the cantonment. Stary fires were heard all over. A dreadful chill travelled down the spine of the detainees. They did not know what was happening around, but
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guessed, probably the 4 East Bengal had launched an attack on Comilla cantonment. But then, what next. They wondered. The cell of the detainess was locked from outside.
The brigade infantry workshop company and the station supply depot had a good percentage of Bengalees. They were already taken care of like the rest of the Bengalees. The same day, a group of Bengalee boys were brought to the nearby basketball ground. A stage managed game was being witnessed by a section of armed and helmatted Pakistani commandos. Suddenly they opened fire on the players as if shooting game birds. Some died on the spot, while a few ran for their life, God knows whether they have succeeded in escaping.
The artillery barrage and the perimeter fire occurred again in the same ferocity the following day, 30 March. The cruel game of interrogation and death found no respite all these days. The officers and the men of 53 Field regiment along with other fellow Pakistanis, got deeper in the diabolic game of human killing.
It was 4 p.m. A group of Bengalee boys of the infantry workshop company and the supply deport were seen parading on the road with their hands up in the air under armed escort. They were huddled in a room just emptied by those who were condemned and disposed off in mass graves few minutes before.
Ten minutes later a cracking sound of boots quickly went past the veranda towards the direction of the last room where the deputy commissioner and the police super were gasping in agony. Suddenly a burst of fire shook the building and then quickly the fire stopped.
Nurul Islam murmurrred “they are finished, now is our turn.”
The angel of death followed them like a shadow. Suddenly a sten nosed into the room through the glasspanes of the door. Imam’s own regimental subedar held the sten. Nurul Islam and Siddique in an attempt to beg mercy in folded arms cried, “Saab, Khoda Ke Lie Bachao.” (Saheb, For God shake save us). Hardly had they finished when a burst of bullets pierced through the chest of Nurul Islam. He fell and instantly died. Siddique also fell motionless. Blood gushed out from Nurul Islam’s mouth and flooded the cemented floor of the cell.
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Imam got to a side and stood still with his back to the wall. The bullets flying in front created such a shiver in him that he could not keep himself on his feet. A dozen holes were made on the wall. The barrel could not be fully turned on Imam.
Imam thought, he had just another minute or so to live, the door would soon be opened and one click on the trigger would finish him off. He, like a drawing man, got hold of a straw, for his survival and as the subedar left the door, he hurriedly fell under the cot and pulled the bed spread down to screen him, knowing it fully well that it was not bullet proof.
There was sound on the door. Some one was trying to open the lock and there he was the same subedar with his loaded sten.
As the subedar stepped into the cell, Imam, getting out of himself, gave out a heart rending shriek. The subedar did not have to search for him. He fired a burst over the thin tape meshing of the cot. Imam was lying on his chest with his hands holding his face. He lay quiet after the burst. Hot blood began to flow from his body. He did not know, where he was hit. After the first burst, the subedar lifted the hanging bed spred and sprayed fire to empty his sten on Imam. Imam lay agape with his bleeding wounds, motionless and lifeless.
Having finished with his last victim, the subedar triumphantly marched out of the room.
Lying in the pool of blood, the three weired bodies with no sign of life were subjected to physical check by a jawan in presence of Sultan. As the jawan, in his utter excitement, confirmed their death, Sultan burst out with a monstrouous laughter, true, all Bengalees have gone to hell. Ha! Ha! Ha! And went on.
Soon after, some inquisitive jawans of the unit crowded around the room and began to peep through the windows and door to have the last glimpse of Imam and of the rest. The subedar had to be strict. He drove away the onlookers, closed the windows and locked the door of the haunted room. The weary sun began to set on the western horizon leaving a scarlet hue all over.
With the room already dark, the night ushered in a faint ray of hope in Imam’s mind. His benumbed-body was still lying
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under the cot with his limbs thrown out. The angel of death spared him new lease of life. Was it to enable him to make good his escape now? The door would be opened to dispose off the corpse. Could he dash out ? No. The good angel whispered in his ears. Should he allow his body to be dragged to some nearby mass grave and escape from there ? Escape from the grave may not be possible at all. He might curse himself for such a hopeless death. Should he escape this very night ? The good angel blessed Imam and left behind the idea of escape that very night.
Amidst all the darkness in the room, as Imam slightly moved his extended hand, his fingers touched another finger. There was a reflex reaction.
-Are you alive ? It was Siddique’s voice. – Yes. Are you ? inquired Imam doubly surprised.
So these were the only two survivors. Nurul Islam died like a slaughtered animal, just a few seconds after the firing. Sidduque was weak and thirsty. He tried to get up. After sometimes he did. Imam asked him in a choked voice, —Are you going anywhere?
– No, I want to drink water.
Siddique poured a glass of water from the table and drank. Imam told him again-lets escape now.
– Escape! What are you talking ? It is impossible. They would kill us. Lying in the pool of blood, Siddique still thought that he was not shot to kill by the Pakistanis.
Siddique could not harbour the idea of escape. He still felt that he was a victim of cross fire. Imam felt weak. Heavy loss of blood continued. But he had to do something. A bullet had grazed through the corner of his right eye. His right forearm and a bullet hole. His face was punctured at hundred places with concrete splinters. A bullet had grazed over his shoulder. Profuse bleeding left him so weak that he had no power to get up from below the cot.
It was midnight. Imam with great effort crawled out. Siddique asked him,-Imam, please don’t escape.
-No, I want a glass of water.
Imam slowly got up. Slowly and stealthily he got on the table and carefully handled the window bolt and the window slit opened agape.
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Not a second was wasted. He had sprang out a mighty leap. The sentry on the veranda was only five feet away. He was taken aback and in confusion, screamed in panic. Imam started a lightning sprint.
A fleet of steps ran down the slope. Imam fell on the last step. In a moments time he got up again and ran towards the road. The sentry fired the first shot in darkness when Imam was about 150 yards away. Firing started in his direction and with that, sympathetic fire broke out all along the perimeter. Just short of the road, Imam stood in the middle of the bushy hillock. Two white figures of human shape stood out in front of him. He looked at them with curious fantasy and took them for phantoms of holy spirit descending to the earth to stand witness to the killing of innocent Bengalees.
Imam started again. He already discarded his shirt and the white vest and got his forearm wrapped up around the bullet hole. He was running along the road. All the mobile patrols had by then taken position in their dug outs. The perimeter was another 400 yards away, crossing of which was mighty risky. Should he bump in any of the perimeter posts, his fate would be sealed. Imam, got down on the ground and started crawling north towards the earth work on the bank of river Gumti. He kept on crawling and the tracer bullets kept on whizzing past across his line of sight. Crawling meant everything to him. So he had no other thought, not evern fear. He lost his sense of time.
To his surprise, after a while he noticed tracer bullets were no more whizzing past across his line of sight and no sound of fire was heard from behind him. Imam sighed in relief. He was out of the perimeter, out of the ring of fire at last. Chances of life smiled at him. Ahead was the high earth work. He stood up and made a dash over it. On the other side of the earth work Gumti snaked along from east to west singing a charming melody. The river of sorrow welcomed Imam, as a deliverer. He jumped into water and began to swim across.
When he touched the other bank, ‘dawn’s left hand was in the sky’. Imam pulled himself up. A few villagers stopped and sympathised with him. They took him to a nearby village
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dispensary and arranged his first-aid and shelter. With the help of some Awami League workers Imam was taken across the border to a Border Security Force based at Motingar on April 4. His wounds were healing and spirits were coming back.

Move to Teliapara
In view of our plan for a joint action in the districts of Sylhet and Comilla and having extended my operational area, from Sylhet on the north-east of Brahmanbaria-Dhaka on the southwest, I had to move my headquarters from Kishoregonj to the eastern side of the river Meghna. Teliapara, therefore, was the obvious choice. A semi-hilly area with lush green tea gardens, Teliapara provided us a border sanctuary from where we could operate with ease and train our men in safety. It provided us plenty of accommodation for both storage and training.
But the move was not an easy one. Rolling stock was far short of our requirement. A few covered wagons had to be modified for transporting our vehicles. We had to cut open the covered wagons for loading of vehicles. With all these difficulties we completed our move by April 3.
My arsenal, by then had an addition of another 1,500 rifles, 20 light machine guns, 12 sten guns and 3 hundred thousand thousand ‘303 rifle ammunitions which I took in my possession from Mymensingh police armoury. This of course was in addition to the personal weapons and surplus arms and ammunitions of the battalion that we carried with us from Joydebpur.
In our area of operation the enemy, apart from having a very big strength in Dhaka, had a big and regular cantonment in Comilla with a brigade strength and small garrison with a battalion in Sylhet. To sustain their troops in Sylhet the enemy would very much like to reinforce that garrison. The garrison in Comilla would also be enlarged to accommodate a division. To reinforce Sylhet garrison either from Dhaka or from Comilla, Brahmanbaria-Bhairab-Ashuganj Complex was vital to them. We decided to deny this area to the enemy.
With the decision to deny this area to the enemy we were faced with a problem of tackling the enemy approaching us from three different directions. We had to keep this in mind while
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deploying our troops. Khaled’s battalion was stationed opposite Comilla and were quite conversant with the Comilla terrain. He, therefore, took the responsibility to deny enemy use of road and rail axes from Comilla leading towards Brahmanbaria. I had to deploy my troops to encounter the enemy approaching from two directions. In the initial stage the enemy in Sylhet was not as big a threat for me as the enemy approaching from Dhaka. I, therefore, decided to hold Brahmanbaria-Bhairab-Ashuganj complex in strength.
As we were in the process of moving our troops in our respective area of operations. Major Zia came from Chittagong on April 3 and met me and Khaled at Teliapara. He requested us for some regular troops to reinforce his area. Although we were not in a position to spare any regular troops at that stage, yet myself and Khaled decided to part with a company each for Zia. These two companies moved to Chittagong on April 5.
The police, East Pakistan Rifles and the student volunteers who gathered in my headquarters needed to be regrouped, reorganised and trained. Major Nurul Islam, my second-incommand at this stage was showing some sign of strain. He was naturally worried about his wife and children who were in Dhaka. therefore to keep him busy I gave him the responsibility to establish a training camp at Teliapara immediately, so that these boys and the student volunteers who were joining us could be trained. Lieutenant Ibrahim the adjutant was also made available to assist him in this task. I had limited number of instructors who could be spared for this purpose. Nevertheless I spared some instructors and the training started with an intake of 2000 youth for a duration of two weeks in the first batch. The training continued unabated since then. While in one hand we got down to train our people in right earnest on the other hand we started deploying the trained troops at a fast pace.
In order to face the situation confronting us we moved our troops to our respective area of responsibility. I had my troops deployed over a long stretch of area from Narshingdi on the south-west to Sherpur-Shadipur on the north-east, a distance covering over 130 miles. My actual dispositions as it stood on April 4 is as given below:
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a. One company plus EPR troops under Captain Motiur Rahman was located at Norshingdi.
b. Alpha company 2 East Bengal beefed up with Mujahid under Captain Nasim was located at Ashuganj.
c. One platoon of regular troops beefed up with EPR troops under Lieutenant Morshed was located at Lalpur.
d. One mixed EPR and Mujahid company under a JCO was located at Ajabpur.
e. One platoon Delta company 4 East Bengal beefed up with EPR troops under Captain Ainuddin was located at Brahmanbaria.
f. One company EPR troops under Captain Matin was located at Sharail.
g. Charlie company 2 East Bengal under Captain Aziz was located at Sherpur-Shadipur in Sylhet.
h. Delta company 2 East Bengal under Major Moin was located at Teliapara. This company was to be moved in aid of the troops fighting in Sylhet or AshuganjBrahmanbaria area. I. Bravo Company 2 East Bengal under Captain Ejaj Ahmed Chowdhury moved to Teliapara on its way to join Major Zia in Chittagong.
j. Battalion headquarters, 2 East Bengal was located at Teliapara tea garden.
My main concentration of force was on Ashuganj-Lalpur complex. It was a defensive position vested with the task of denying the enemy the use of both the railway and the river way in an attempt to reinforce either Sylhet or Comilla. The company at Sharail was assigned the task to reinforce TalshaharGokanaghat line of defence, should an enemy pressure develop at Lalpur and Ashuganj. The company of Moin at Teliapara was assigned two tasks. First to reinforce Maulvibazar in aid of my troops deployed at Sherpur-Shadipur, should the enemy attack them from the direction of Sylhet and the second to assist the troops at Brahmanbaria Ashuganj area.
During this period, I was constantly on the move. I had to visit all the places within my area of operation. Narshingdi, Bhairab, Sylhet and the interior. It was a long series of tough and
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monotonous hiking. Like a tramp I roamed the area, sometimes on rail, sometimes on rickshaw or boats, mostly on vehicles. Wherever we went people welcomed us with warmth and affection. They fed us from the day we bolted out of Joydebpur palace. Food was something for which we never had to worry about. We never went hungry. We had someone everywhere to look after us. Mr. Mizanur Rahman, manager of a mill at Narshingdi, Mr. Safiuddin of Ashuganj, ex-MPA Mr. Lutful Hye Sachchu of Brahmanbaria, Mr. Mahboob of Madhabpur, Mr. Sabu Chowdhury and Mr. Mohammad Alkas Mia of Sylhet were those who came in the forefront to help us with all that we needed, at the peril of their life.
As I got busy in deploying my troops in my area of operation Khaled got busy in the same manner. The moment I brought my troops in the area, Khaled pulled out his troops. He, however, left behind Captain Ainuddin along with his troops who were located at Brahmanbaria and Gokanaghat. By April 4, he deployed a company under Shafaat at Ujanisha and Ganga Shagar, the rest of the battalion including battalion headquarters except Bravo company was moved to opposite Comilla. Bravo company commanded by Captain Matin was being sent to Chittagong under Zia.
Khaled concentrated his force south of Akhaura and east of Comilla. The main idea behind this was, first, to stop enemy attempt to open up rail and road communications between Comilla and Brahmanbaria and second, to take an attempt to occupy Comilla cantonment. However, these were the strength and dispositions of our troops in this general area on April 4.
Surma, Meghna, Titas, Jamuna and Brahmaputra snaked through the alluvial tracts of Sylhet, Comilla, Mymensingh and part of Dhaka. The topography is riverine and rivers nourish them. Extremely closed country, with only one all-weather road and a railway track, leaves one with the only choice of using the mighty rivers for a major move. The grain of the land permits only small scale action upto a battalion level. Paddy fields, groves of evergreen trees and small undulating tea gardens provide ample cover. The topography of Bangladesh was more to our advantage.
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The enemy was equipped with wireless communication and modern weapons, long range guns and air force, the most important striking power. They had the capability to move fast. We were determined to deny the enemy the use of terraint to their advantage. To this end, we had the denial plan ready. We registered a couple of important bridges for destruction. We planned to erect barricades and cover them with fire power effectively. Country boats were either taken over by us for use or to be sunk. We presented very small target to the enemy by camouflage and despersion.

An August Assemblage
In the initial days of liberation war we in uniform were looking for a senior and able commander to give us the desired leadership. We were fighting isolated and disjoined battles all over the country, lacking in co-ordination and higher direction which were factors of utmost importance in any war. A senior officer was required who could, with foresight and military genius, lead us to a successful war. Then there was a need for political support, without which the war of liberation could as well be termed as an insurgency or at best a revolution. We had to master political backup for another very important reason. We needed armed assistance from abroad which could only be possible through political negotiation.
April 4 was a memorable day. Many senior officers of liberation war assembled at Telipara in my Headquarters and they were, Colonel MAG Osmany, Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rab, Lieutenant Colonel Salahuddin Mohammad Reza, Lieutenant Colonel Kazi Nuruzzaman, Major Khaled Mosharraf, Major Nurul Islam, Major Shafaat Jamil, Major Moinul Hossain Chowdhury and others who created a sensation in my bumble headquarters. I was overwhelmed with delight and welcomed them warmly.
Osmany was without his bushy moustache that day. He looked like a stranger without it. I gave a second look to recognise this clean shaven Osmany, popularly called “Chacha Osmany” (Uncle Osmany).

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While welcoming Reza, I casually asked him “Sir, why did you not join us from Dhirashram on March 27?” He retorted rather sarcastically, “how could I? You were courting with a serpent, which would have roped me in, the moment I joined.” A serpent ? I asked, “what else ? Raquib (This Raquib was the one who was posted as 2 E Bengal commanding officer on 25 March, ’71) was their man. He would have got me arrested. Thank God, you are safe.” “Thank God.” I repeated to myself.
A meeting was then held in my headquarters the same day. Here it was decided that the war of liberation would be continued under a central command and the command should rest on a senior army officer. On the political side it was also decided that we should tell the politicians to form a government immediately. After the meeting we immediately set out to contact and bring the MNA’s and MPA’s to Agartala.
In this meeting we also allocated our area of operational responsibility. Brahmanbaria-Sylhet area came under my command. Comilla-Noakhali area was given to Khaled Mosharraf. Chittagong-Chittagong Hill-tracts was given to Ziaur Rahman.
The meeting augured well. Many significant decisions were taken here. It was very gratifying to note that we all had a complete identity of purpose. It gave our forces an organisational concept which was to be soon implemented in the form of Mukti Bahini. Formation of the government of Bangladesh in exile was to materialise hardly six days after i.e. on 10th April at Agartala and with the appointment of Osmany as the Commander-in-Chief was only a foregone conclusion. On this day four region commanders were also appointed and they were Safiullah, Zia, Khaled and Major Abu Osman Chowdhury.
Enemy in Sylhet Squeezed
I brought my troops to Brahmanbaria-Sylhet area to liberate this area jointly with Khaled’s troops. But the situation all over were changing so fast that we all were swayed away by the changing situations. Khaled had to move out towards Comilla area and I was to deal with the enemy in Sylhet area single handedly.
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The presence of 31 Punjab in Sylhet was not a very comfortable situation for me. It was like a thorn in my throat. I could not feel easy or act freely with their presence there. I decided to deal with them first. It was with this aim I moved my Charlie company at Sherpur-Shdipu Aziz.
At Moulvibazar Major C R Dutta organised a force with the East Pakistan Rifles and some local volunteers, totalling about two companies. As I moved my troops to Sylhet Dutta also joined me. He then briefed me about the situation and we were convinced that the enemy was fairly weak in Sylhet, having only one battalion, 31 Punjab, the enemy would not venture to get out of Khadim-nagar where he was garrisoned. But to our surprise he was found stretched far beyond his limit. His troops stuck far out across the Surma, thereby weakening their own fighting capability. I decided to strike them at that time.
I quickly drew up a plan to attack 31 Punjab. My rough plan was first to attack and capture upto southern bank of river Surma with whatever troops available with me in Sylhet area. After having captured and consolidated this area I will then go to free the northern bank of river Surma. According to first part of my plan I moved Dutta along with his two companies along the main road to Sylhet from Sherpur-Shadipur. I also moved my regular company under Captain Aziz of 2 East Bengal to advance to Sylhet via
Srimangol-Moulvibazar-Kulaura-LatuBianibazar-Sheola-Karimganj and Churkhai. All the move started on April 5. Aziz reached Sylhet on the evening of the following day and secured the southern bank of Surma by evening of April 7. Dutta’s column reached Lala Bazar on April 6 and joined Aziz the next morning.
It is interesting to note that during the conduct of this operation there was hardly any enemy opposition. Aziz secured the southern bank of river Surma after a brief and snappy encounter with the enemy. Being driven out, the enemy was forced to fall back on the Shalotikar airport where the organised a pill box defence. Thus the entire area south of river Surma along with the city of Sylhet on the northern bank was in our hands. On April 7, the town of Sylhet stood liberated with the exception of only the airport area.
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By this time, some East Pakistan Rifles troops from Sunamganj area began to trickle down to Sylhet. We had by then a company of regulars, and two companies of East Pakistan Rifles and volunteers at Sylhet town. They were all ill armed, ill trained and were not enough in numbers to fight a regular battalion.
Just when I was thinking of switching some troops from Brahmanbaria sector to clear the enemy in Sylhet sector, I was informed that Brahmanbaria sector was warming up with intense enemy activities. I, therefore, had to move to that front with orders that the liberated areas of Sylhet would be defended and the enemy should not be allowed to break through. I advised, “deny the use of Shalotikar air base to the enemy at all cost.”
But the enemy was pumping in heavy reinforcements by air at Shalotikar and soon after came the reprisal.

Senior Tiger Mauled

For nearly two months the 1 East Bengal regiments, popularly known as Senior Tiger, remained busy in collective training at Jagdishpur, a village 13 miles north-west of Jessore cantonment. 1ts commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rezaul Jalil, an intelligent and highly career conscious Bengalee officer, during the collective training period of his battalion, frequently visited his family in the cantonment. This was the period when serious political and military activities were taking place in the country. It was, therefore, hard to believe that he was unaware of the happenings in and around the cantonments. Apart from the commanding officer there were three more Bengalee officers present in the battalion. They were Lieutenant Hafizuddin, Second Lieutenant Safi Wasiuddin, Second Lieutenant Anwar Hossain. Hafiz recalls “even on March 29, the officers and men were not quite clear as to what was happening in different part of Bangaldesh.” So on the afternoon of March 29, when Brigadier SAR Durrani, Commander 107 Brigade, ordered the battalion to return to the unit lines, it returned without any hesitation. After the battalion had returned to the cantonment, they realised that they made a blunder. They were sensing serious troubles all over. By 11 p.m. the move completed, the
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troops lined up infront of the kote to deposit their arms and ammunition.
On March 30, the battalion having passed an uneasy night, started their daily chore. At 8 a.m. Brigadier Durrani came to the battalion, took the keys of the kote and magazine in an attempt to disarm the battalion. As the brigadier left the unit, the Bengalee troops dramatically broke open the kote and got themselves armed.
The defection was anticipated by the Pakistani troops. Two companies each from 25 Baluch, 27 Baluch and 22 Frontier Force advanced on the 1 East Bengal from three directions, the fourth direction being closed by mortar and artillery shelling. The Bengalee troops got into their trenches already dug in tactically around the battalion for internal security. They were the first to open up on the Pakistani troops and kept them pinned down. The enemy was, thus, unable to enter the battalion lines.
Hafiz made repeated appeals to Jalil to take control of the situation and lead the Senior Tigers. But Jalil appeared extremely panicky and flabbergasted. His family was already taken care of by the Pakistan military authority and their security was foremost in his mind. He ordered the troops to stop firing and in execution of his order a junior commissioned officer came up with a megaphone. He assured them pardon if they had stopped firing. This had some affect and about fifty boys responded. But alas ! The assurance was dishonoured by the Pakistani authority who later killed all of them cold-blooded by firing squads. Some of the Bengalee junior commissioned officers of the Senior Tiger, in a furious mood, went to kill all the Pakistani officers of the battalion. But, for Jalil none could be killed. In a way this was a good step. Had the Pakistani officers been killed, no Bengalee, men, officers and their families, would probably have survived the wrath of the Pakistanis in Jessore cantonment.
In the afternoon, the Senior Tigers started thinning out from the cantonment through Khitibdia, under the leadership of Hafiz. They started concentrating at Naslia near Chaugacha bazar, eleven miles to the north-west of the cantonment. The enemy fire continued unabated. The concentration was completed before dusk.
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As Anwar with his group of men at the tail end of the battalion started his escape, he received a machine gun burst in his waist and soon breathed his last. The first Shaheed of the Senior Tiger was decorated posthumously with the second highest gallantry award “BIRUTTAM”.
Of the entire battalion about 1000 soldiers were on leave and hardly 300 soldiers could get out of the encirclements. This includes 10 junior commissioned officers. The rest of the troops of the battalion were either killed during action or shot by Pakistani firing squads.
The Bengalee troops of the 1 Field ambulance also rose and defected along with the Senior Tigers. Its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hai was killed while in detention. With his death, the troops of the field ambulance lost cohesion. They, being troops of the army medical corps, had little experience with fire arms. The enemy easily overpowered them, most of whom were executed. Only a handful escaped to safety.
The Senior Tigers thereafter came under the command of Osman and on the orders from him, Hafiz organised his defences. He ordered his Bravo company to take up defensive position in village Shalna astride Jessore-Chaugacha road. He started vigorous patrolling in the vicinity of the cantonment. He also organised some successful ambushes on the JessoreChaugacha road and in one, he was able to blow off a road brigade at Haibatpur on April 10.
In those initial days of the war of liberation the Senior Tigers were rendered unable to take any organised action. Hafiz had innumerable problems. The foremost was the shortage of arms and ammunitions. He had no other officer to assist him. A lone officer with little service and experience, could not be expected to do any better than what Hafiz had done in deciding to defect and successfully fighting his way out of the cantonment and giving his troops a lead in those initial days of crisis.
Minor Tiger Groans
The 3 East Bengal Regiment, popularly called as Minor Tiger, was located at Sayedpur, a small garrison situated at the railroad
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junction west of Rangpur. Its commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Fazal Karim. This officer, though a West Pakistani, was of a different bent of mind. He held little support for what was being planned against the Bengalee troops, particularly those under his command. This might have been not so much due to the soft corner that he had for his troops, as much as due to his appreciation on the military aspect of the situation. But Fazal Karim was not heard. Instead, he was called at the brigade headquarters and was made to prolong his stay there detached from his unit. So according to plan, as for the other Bengal Regiments, 3 East Bengal also underwent a split up.
Two of its companies. Alpha and Bravo, were detached to Ghoraghat under Major Nizamuddin. This force had to shed out one platoon to Gaibandha to guard the VHF station there under Lieutenant Mukhles. The Delta company under the command to Captain Shafat Hussain, a non-Bengalee officer, was moved to Parbatipur. The battalion headquarters, the headquarters company and the Charlie company remained at Sayedpur.
Brigadier Abdullah Khan Malek, Commander of the 23 Brigade group sent strong columns to Dinajpur and Bogra to take control over those areas. A company of 26 Frontier Force was sent to the town of Dinajpur and two batteries of 23 Field Regiment, artillery were despatched to Bogra by road prior to the crackdown. He kept 29 cavelary at Rangpur and the left over troops of 26 Frontier Force at Sayedpur to face the remaining troops of 3 East Bengal. 25 Punjab was left at its own at Rajshahi.
With the onset of the Pakistani crackdown Bogra, Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Pabna and a big chunk of territory to the north of Tista stood liberated solely with the efforts of the local East Pakistan Rifles, Police force and volunteers. Brigadier Abdullah Khan Malek completely bewildered, held on to Rangpur, as if by miracle. Rangpur was no better than a thorn in his neck.
Nizamuddin, the force commander at Ghoraghat was unable to grasp the gravity of the situation as it confronted him immediately on or around the crackdown. However, he was persuaded to take decision in favour of liberation war. In the
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meanwhile Captain Ashraf, the Charlie company commander at Sayedpur and Lieutenant Anwar, the unit quartermaster were on the look out for stealing a chance to join the impending war of liberations. As it has been earlier mentioned that the East Pakistan Rifles troops at Rangpur and Dinajpur had already taken up arms against Pakistan, the Pakistani troops posted in these areas were facing the dangers of liquidation. The company of 26 Frontier Force at Dinajpur soon got encircled and was completely wiped out. The situation at Thakurgaon was not different. During the initial fight the Bengalee troops eliminated the Pakistani elements who resisted them.
On March 26 Ashraf was deputed to contact the East Pakistan Rifles at Thakurgaon by his Pakistani second-incommand so that he could appease the East Pakistan Rifles troops through his influence. Ashraf took this chance to join the East Pakistan Rifles troops and contacted them at Thakurgaon on March 26. The East Pakistan Rifles by then had already established their authority in the area. They could not readily accept Ashraf as a loyal supporter of the liberation war. He was told to establish his loyalty by bringing his troops with him. Only then could he get the support of the East Pakistan Rifles troops. Ashraf went back to Sayedpur and convinced the secondin-command of his sincere desire to fight the ‘defectors’ and was able to upstick the Charlie company on way to Thakurgaon. He arranged with Anwar to keep ready to extricate the remaining battalion and the Bengalee families out of Sayedpur cantonment mid-night. Ashraf promised to help Anwar in his safe extrication.
Bogra stood out. Two batteries of the 23 Field Regiment failing to make any headway, were returning to Sayedpur as this news reached Ghoraghat, some elements of Major Nizam’s company decided to ambush them at Palashbari road junction. The ambush was supposed to be conducted by two platoons. The platoon at Ghoraghat under command Lieutenant Rafiq Sarkar and the platoon at Gaibandha under command Mukhles were detailed to ambush the column when it reached Palashbari, but the platoon from Gaibandha under Mukhles had not yet reached. Sayedpur-bound-batteries of the 23 Field Regiment soon arrived

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at the road junction Rafiq being alone did not go ahead with the plan. But even then the Commanding Officer of 23 Field Regiment picked up Rafiq and took him to Sayedpur where he was later killed.
In the meantime a message arrived at the battalion headquarters for the adjutant Lieutenant Sirajul Islam. He was ordered to move to Ghoraghat and while moving he was told to stop over at the brigade headquarters at Rangpur. Sirajul Islam immediately moved. He was detained at the brigade headquarter never to be seen again.
Nizam in a message to Ashraf, ordered him to move to Phulbari with his company. The same message was also transmitted to Delta company. The company commander Captain Shafaat refused to comply with these instructions and offered resistance. He was therefore, eliminated by his troops.
Fazal Karim was away at Rangpur since March 25. On the night of 26/27 March he came to Sayedpur and instead of going to his own battalion went to 26 Frontier Force Regiment lines where from he called Anwar on the telephone. Anwar sensed an unusual note in this message and told his commanding officer to come over to his own unit instead. But Fazal Karim could not gather enough courage of going to his battalion at that stage.
It was before mid-night when a company of 26 Frontier Force opened fire on 3 East Bengal. Anwar had his plan ready. Without delay he returned fire. He resisted for a while and instead of getting his men killed during the fight, he decided to extricate without any loss of time. However, the extrication could not be conducted in any orderly manner. In ended in a melee. The families however, could not be extricated and were left behind to suffer detention in the hands of Pakistani military authority. Anwar later managed to join Delta company with his headquarters company and the battalion headquarters at Parbatipur.
As these developments were taking place, all the troops or 3 East Bengal less Charlie company concentrated at Phulbari. During this concentration Ashraf took up successive defensive positions on Rangpur-Bogra road. He was able to delay the pursuing enemy by staging successive abmushes north of Phulbari.
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Nizam at this stage was showing sings of indecision to his men and officers. He was not yet able to reconcile with the war of liberation. While at Phulbari he made an attempt to escape to Pakistani camp. He was caught and kept under observation by the officers and men. When the battalion reached Hill towards the end of April, Nizam made a second attempt to scape. This time he was caught by the troops who were already sufficiently confirmed in their mind that Nizam’s action were against the sprit of liberation. They killed him on the spot. While the troops of 3 East Bengal were organising at Hilli and carrying out limited operations in the surrounding areas, Anwar went across the international border and made contracts with Indian authorities. The only two officers Ashraf and Mukhles were left with the troops at Hilli. Towards the beginning of May 71 these two officers also on their own left the battalion quietly to carry out operations in the country side at Rajshahi and Pabna. However, in the absence of any officers this seasoned battalion became fairly disorganised.
While this battalion was at Phulbari and Hilli, 29 Cavalry was despatched to recapture Bogra during the second week of April 71. In this reprisal action Bogra suffered colossal amount of destruction and ultimately succumbed to Pakistani troops. 4 Frontier Force was flown in with the mission to recapture Tista bridge against Captain Nawazish. 4 Frontier Force suffered heavily and amongst others the second-in-command of the battalion Major Ijyaz Mostafa Sayed got killed.

Rajshahi Moans

Rajshahi the land of bottomless quick-sand was a defensive area for 25 Punjab. The battalion having completed its tour of duty in East Pakistan was eagerly awaiting for its journey back home.
With the sudden turn of the politico-military situation the move of the battalion was held up. During the non-cooperation movement the unit started training the local non-Bengalees with a view to creating a second line force. The districts of Pabna and Rajshahi were within the operational responsibility of this battalion, which was indeed an impossible task. The operational plan envisaged one of its companies to take control of Pabna.
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The remaining battalion was supposed to control the city of Rajshahi and also the country side in the interior.
Lieutenant Colonel Shafquat Baluch, the commanding officer, was dropped in a helicopter in his tiny cantonment at Sapura on the evening of March 25. According to the operational plan a company plus was already moved under command of Major Aslam, the second-in-command , to capture Pabna. The city of Rajshahi apparently remained quiet the following day. The police force of Rajshahi sensed a big upsurge and got trenches prepared in the police lines. The civil officials in response to the non-cooperation movement quitted their duties and remained in their houses even on March 26. An army contingent quietly lifted Mr. Mamun the deputy inspector general and Mr. Majeed, the superintendent of police from their residence. At Sapura these two officers were put to great coaxing and harassment for absence from duty. They were promised freedom if they could order the police to surrender their arms peacefully. These officers knew the mind of their men and told the military authority “we cannot prevail on them. They won’t give up arms. You may try and see.”
The army being weak at Rajshahi hesitated to take a direct action against the police. So they continued harassing these two Bengalee officers. The police in their trenches were prepared to fight the army in case they were attacked. They took the detention of these two Bengalee officers as an affront. The public also showed their resentment and openly came to the police with their warm support and material help.
After two days the army decided to use force. They attacked the police lines with mortar and machine guns. Being in the open the army could not stand for long against the police. After an hour or so they announced a cease-fire and told the police that there would be no more demand for surrender of arms. To justify their sincerity the two police officers were also set free. Thus convinced of the sincerity of the Pakistani force the police stopped firing. The army contingent also disappeared from the scene.
This was a treachery. The police believed the assurance given by the Pakistani force and left their trenches and even
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arms and began to relax in their lines. It was about 3 p.m. on March 28. Hardly after two hours of disappearance of the Pakistani force from the scene the police line was again shaken with the sound of mortars and machine gun. The shower of bullets caught the police unaware. The army rushed into the police line in a lightning speed. There was no time for them to take up arms and fight. The police line was captured by Pakistani forces on the dead bodies of may police men. Only a few escaped. This was the beginning of liberation war in Rajshahi city.
As the news of Pakistani atrocities in Dhaka and Chittagong reached Rajshahi, Captain Rashid, Adjutant of Rajshahi Cadet College decided to take up arms against the Pakistani regiment on 26 March. This was the time when the troops of 25 Punjab created a region of terror at Pabna. This company brutally massacred the entire labour force and workers of the North Bengal sugar mill. Rashid being Adjutant of the Cadet College did not have any troops under his command. He therefore, organised the volunteers, Police and EPR and formed them into companies to fight the Pakistanis. Out of these troops he despatched one of the company to Pabna to deal with Major Aslam’s company of 25 Punjab. The civil volunteers and the police force of Pabna also confronted this company. Major Aslam having sensed the threat retreated from Pabna towards Rajshahi. From Pabna he instead of going direct towards Rajshahi, diverted his way towards Gopalpur where they were successfully ambushed by Rashid’s troops on 29 March. Major Aslam and Captain Ishfaq were killed in this ambush along with 40 other Pakistani troops. The servivors got disorganised and started moving towards Rajshahi in a rout and almost all of them were killed before they could reach Rajshahi.
Having taken up arms against Pakistani regime Captain Rashid contacted Major Ghias at the East Pakistan Rifles wing headquarters at Nowabganj and Major Najmul Haque at the East Pakistan Rifles wing headquarters at Noagaon. He was also contacted by Major Osman from Chuadanga and was told that a Pakistani brigade was preparing to make a bridge head at Nagarbari ghat. Rashid was informed that an East Pakistan
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Rifles company with a sizeable strength of volunteers under the command of Major Najmul Haque was holding Nagarbari ghat with a view to stopping the enemy in their attempt at a safe landing. The quantum of troops Major Najmul Haque was commanding was not sufficient enough to stop a brigade landing. He, therefore, requested Captain Rashid to send some trained troops to assist him in thrawarting the enemy’s river crossing operation.
By this time both Rashid and Gias with approximately 1200 troops comprising of East Pakistan Rifles, volunteers and Police closed on the tiny cantonment at Rajshahi. Since March 30, they were in full control of Rajshahi city. The enemy squeezed in Sapura, remained under constant threat of survival. It was from here that Rashid despatched one company to Nagarbari ghat in aid of Najmul Haque.
The enemy brigade finally appeared on 8 April and started bringing down heavy fire on Nagarbari ghat from the middle of the river. Najmul Haque’s troops at Nagarbari ghat had only small arms which failed to bring effective fire on the enemy. On the other hand Pakistani troops being armed with superior fire power, brought in heavy and accurate fire on our troops. Our troops, however, could not stay on for long and the enemy landed successfully.
This was 57 Brigade. It caused endless destruction and killing en route and was nicknamed “Fire Brigade”. It took six days to reach Rajshahi, a distance of 150 miles. 25 Punjab thus saved, came out of Sapura and started settling their scores with the Mukti Bahini, Both Rashid and Gias fell back to India on April 14.
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With Back To The Wall
During the initial days of liberation war, vital information of the enemy was not available to us. What little we had, was of no military consequence. News that massive movement of enemy troops and ammunitions of war was in progress since the commencement of non-cooperation movement could help us little. It was merely a vague information and not military intelligence, without which no tactical appreciation was possible, not to speak of a tactical battle. This was one-reason why initially liberation war did not take a co-ordinated shape.
By the second week of April 71 we started getting fairly accurate enemy intelligence, their disposition and movements, through our agents and through those who defected from the Pakistan army.
Eastern Command, in addition to Corps troops, had 14 Division with its full complements of armuor and artillery. 57 Brigade, located in Dhaka, was initially allotted the task of clearing Dhaka. It was assisted by a squadron of tanks. In achieving its mission this brigade unleashed itself in the rape of Dhaka.
107 Brigade in Jessore was ordered to take over civil administration and all vital installations with Khulna administrative division. In the process this brigade was to disarm Bengalee troops and to arrest all political leaders.
This brigade sent some columns to Khulna and was able to achieve initial success there. Columns sent to the direction of Jhenaidha, Ishurdi and Benapole faced stiff opposition and could not proceed beyond six miles off Jessore. The brigade also sent a column consisting of a company of 27 Baluch to Kushtia which after initial success got completely annihilated by the liberation force of Kushtia. The columns of 25 Baluch got bogged
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down opposite Benapole. Jessore airport, situated in the middle of the cantonment, was no more a safe place for Pakistani aircraft to land. The brigade seemed to be losing operational control and desperately needed reinforcement to retrieve the situation. On April 18, it received 12 Punjab from Dhaka, a welcome reinforcement.
23 Brigade group stationed at Rangpur-Sayedpur area was given similar missions. 25 Punjab located in the satellite town adjacent to Rajshahi remained under constant pressure. One of its company was sent to Pabna. A company of 26 Frontier Force got surrounded around Dinajpur. 23 Field Regiment moved to capture Bogra. In addition, this brigade had 29 cavalry, two companies of engineers belonging to 10 and 6 Engineer battalions, brigade signal company and one field ambulance at Rangpur. With the vast tract of land north of Tista bridge, Dinajpur, Bogra, Pabna and Rajshahi gone to the hands of the liberation forces, the Pakistani brigade group at Rangpur was most unhappily disposed.
The situation was no better in Comilla sector. A task force from Comilla consisting of 24 Frontier Force, detachment of engineers and 88 Mortar battery with 120 millimetre mortars moved to Chittagong at 0100 hours on March 26. This left 53 Brigade weak with only 53 Field Regiment artillery and 1 Commando battalion for operations in Comilla. 31 Punjab regiment remained strung at Sylhet, which, for all practical purposes, remained cut off from the parent brigade since the crackdown.
Chittagong in the initial days had the naval base, 20 Baluch and a company of 31 Punjab. 3 Commando battalion was in the process of arrival. Chittagong presented the weakest link of the overall Pakistani military planning. But this was only for a short while.
9 Division located at Kharian was ordered to move to Dhaka. The Division started arriving Dhaka from April 2. The move was, surprisingly enough, completed by the first week of April. The general officer commanding of the division, Major General Shawkat Reza, on arrival in Dhaka was given his mission. The Division had the task of clearing area from Sylhet
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down to Chittagong by the end of May. Its 27 Brigade was placed under command 14 Division and was moved to Mymensingh. 313 Brigade was flown to Sylhet where 31 Punja was already under great pressure. 117 Brigade was sent to Comilla, to replace 53 Brigade, which was ordered to move to Chittagong.
Having taken over the control of Comilla cantonment 117 Brigade began to fan out in battalion columns. 33 Baluch was ordered to recapture Chandpur but it got bogged down on the very outskirts of the cantonment. A similar column was sent to capture Akhaura which also faced with similar fate.
By this time, 16 Division from Quetta had also completed its move. This division was given, within its operational control, the whole of north Bengal.
14 Division had Mymensingh, Dhaka and Jessore within its operational control. Its 57 Brigade after having completed its mission in Dhaka was given an independent mission across the river Jamuna in aid of 9 Division. 27 Brigade was to open road and rail links between Comilla-Sylhet prior to its move to Mymensingh. In fulfillment of this mission the brigade launched a vigorous river crossing operation over Meghna and Bhairab Bazar. It was assisted in this operation by tanks, commandos, helicopters and aircraft. In addition, the enemy had landing craft tanks (LCT) and gun boats in its support. This attack lasted over 72 hours.
After initial success in Dhaka 57 Brigade the “Fire Brigade” was given the mission to rescue 25 Punjab at Rajshahi. It moved by road and river from Dhaka to Rajshahi covering a distance of about 150 miles. During its move it left a trail of fire and smoke all along its route. The destruction and killings caused by this brigade was fraught with utter consternation by the people of Bangladesh. The column started on April 8 and reached Rajshahi on April 14. 27 Brigade moved to Mymensingh in two columns by road and rail. On April 11 Lieutenant General A A K Niazi became the commander of the Eastern Command. General Tikka Khan was thus relieved of his additional responsibilities of command. He
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was left solely to works as the Governor and the Martial Law Administrator. But for the sheer weight of his force, the impact of Niazi’s command was hardly felt. Niazi issued his new operational directives to be accomplished in five phases. Those were :
Phase 1: Clearing of all major towns and sealing off the borders.
Phase 2 : Clearing and holding of Chittagong port and keeping it safe from Mukti Babini. Phase 3: Opening of essential river, road and rail communication.
Phase 4 : Clearing of all towns in the interior and the coastal areas.
Phase 5 : Combing operation of the whole province and elemination of resistance.
Niazi decided to replace East Pakistan Rifles by an equivalent organization of the civil armed forces officered and manned mainly by those brought from West Pakistan. He named it East Pakistan civil armed forces and placed Major General M Jamshed to command this force. A start was already made for the recruitment and training of Mujahids and Razakar forces. Their main tasks were to defend the police stations, the vulnerable targets like bridges, railway and electric installations in the interior. They were also supposed to harass, intimidate and eliminate the supporters and sympathisers of the liberation army. Thus the occupation army of Pakistan got down on the ground with 14 Division controlling areas between DhakaMymensingh and Jessore, 9 Division to the east of river Meghna covering areas from Sylhet to Chittagong and 16 Division looking after the whole of north Bengal. East Pakistan civil armed forces was raised to look after the interior. With this forward posture the Pakistan army began its clearing and combing operation with all the resources at their disposal.
Dhaka was the operational, as well as the logistic base of the occupation army. The air bridge established by the boeing 707’s of the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) regularly turned out an average of over 500 soldiers in Dhaka for further dissemination to various cantonments. This bridge was
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strengthened by the induction of the C-130 transport aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force. For quick despatch of reinforcement to the affected areas and also sometimes for the lack of landing space in the Dhaka airport appron, very often the C-130 herculis transport aircraft used to be diverted to the nearest air heads from the air. In the name of resumtion of PIA domestic service, the fokker friendships were also engaged in a mad rush of troop lifting. With this air bus service, very soon the enemy strength in Sylhet showed a sharp rise. It was noticed that a battery of 120 mm mortar had arrived at Shalotikar air base. In addition, two more battalion had also arrived there. We were then more than sure that 313 Brigade had arrived in Sylhet.
Habiganj had a rare combination of a lucky trio. MNA Mr. Manik Chowdhury, MNA Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rabb (retired) and Major C.R. Dutta. They raised a resistance force with 200 Ansars. They were armed with rifles and 6000 rounds of 303 ammunition. Soon more EPR troops joined them. At this stage I entered the scene with my troops. I then drew up a plan to capture Sylhet. The troops started moving towards their objectives on 5 April.
After fighting a successful action at Sherpur Major Dutta’s troops reached Lala Bazar on April 6. My Charlie company under Captain Aziz, who was launched from the eastern flank, successfully secured the southern bank of Surma by evening April 7. Dutta’s troops thereafter, joined Aziz, went across the bridge and got busy in organising themselves into a strong force in general area Sylhet town and Khadim Nagar.
The enemy build up at Shalotikar demanded an immediate action on our part. But I did not have enough troops to launch an attack on Shalotikar airport. On April 8 as I was going to visit my troops at Sylhet, I stopped at Moulvi Bazar and had a discussion with Dutta about the enemy development that were taking place at Shalotikar since April 6. We were already two days behind the schedule. We agreed that we must attack the enemy without any delay.
The same day Colonel Osmany, Lieutenant Colonel Rabb and Major Qazi Nuruzzaman also arrived at Moulvi Bazar. At Moulvi Bazar Colonel Osmany told me that they were thinking

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of making Sylhet as another sector with Major Nuruzzaman at its command. Major Dutta would also work in this sector under Major Nuruzzaman.
The enemy had dug down in Shalotikar in strength. It was about 5 miles to the north of the town. On its south there was a forest and Khademnagar, a satellite township. On its west, it was bounded by Cherapunji road. The Kalagul tea gardens and a marshy land bordered the air base on the north and north-west. A range of small hills skirted Shalotikar on the south and southeast.
The enemy, in danger of being encircled, organised a pillbox defence. After having been beaten on the bank of Surma, their moral was flagging. Before the reinforcement arrived they were about to surrender to us. Apprehensive of sure death in case they were caught alive, they could not take any chances. So they prepared an impregnable defence which could serve them as a springboard as well, for future operations in the area.
The plan
I decided to attack the air head before it was too strong. A big show of strength would be staged as if to mob the enemy localities from the western side of the airfield with the help of civilians mastered by MNA Manik Chowdhury. When enemy’s attention would be fixed on the demonstration, the actual attack would be launched through the jungles of Khademnagar. One company of regulars and three of the EPR companies already in Sylhet were earmarked for this attack.
The disposition of my troops at this stage was, one company of irregulars on the Jaintiapara on the south of the Shalotikar airport. The second company was deployed on the Chhatak road. The troops of the EPR, from Sunamganj were further west on the Chhatak road. The regular company was placed in depth to guard the Surma bridge from the south bank.
I could not spare any more troops for this action from what little I had in Ashuganj area. I was already understrength and the task ahead of me was too big.
Mr. Manik Chowdhury could not master sufficient number of volunteers to stage the demonstration as planned. This
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brought about a great setback in execution of our plan of attack on Shalotikar.
Aziz carried out wide reconnaissance in Sylhet town. In this he was assisted by the local population and in particular by MNA Mr. Dewan Farid Ghazi. The enemy had fallen back to Shalotikar. They had some troops scattered at various points in the town such as Ambarkhana, wireless station and MC college area. Everywhere they were well dug in but they had to vacate these small pockets.
On April 7, with the help of Mr. Dewan Farid Ghazi the district jail was opened and all the prisoners were let off, most of whom were political prisoners and students.
In Sylhet the enemy had a network of fifth columns through whom they gathered accurate information about our location. It was surprising to note that the information so fed to the enemy was correct upto the minutest detail. This was a great advantage for the enemy, who, inspite of being cut off confined to Shalotikar, could effectively use their long range weapons against us. By now, with the continuous airlifts reaching Shalotikar, the enemy had gathered enough strength.
Aziz got worried about the enemy’s increasing strength and he decided to disrupt the airlifts either by destroying the aircrafts or damaging the airstrip.
On April 8, two detachments of MG and 3 inch mortar were sent from the direction of Khadimnagar to the close proximity of the airstrip. This was the time when a PIA fokker friendship had just landed with fresh troops. The incharge of the detachment, Naik Surat Ali, fired one mortar shell from a hillock. As he was about to fire the second shell an enemy MG burst killed him on the spot. Our own MG returned fire but to no avail. Being under heavy pressure both the detachments fell back. Naik Surat Ali’s dead body could not be extricated. The selection of 3 inch mortar for this type of action at such a close proximity of the enemy was obviously wrong, due to which the mission got miscarried.
On the same evening Aziz moved in and deployed his troops in the town. He deployed a company of EPR at Ksadimnagar and manned Ambar Khana and wireless station with 60 volunteers
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under one Mujahid Captain. Khadimnagar experienced a hand to hand fight that very night. Similarly enemy contacted our troops at Ambar Khana and wireless stations also. A heavy fighting continued the whole night. The regular company was deployed on the southern bank of Surma with a screen position on the northern bank. Aziz was badly short of manpower. The EPR troops trickling down from Sunamganj were not yet fully in. So they could not be counted in his battle strength.
The battle gained momentum at about 3 a.m. in the morning. Our troops in the town started falling back almost in a route and the enemy was behind them. Enemy artillery started pounding us on the southern bank also.
Aziz deployed his LMG on the southern end of the Kim’s bridge. The enemy, after about 4 hours of fight, was able to occupy the town and stopped short of the bridge. Constant shelling by artilliery and mortar and fire from the automatics continued to engage our troops on the southern bank. In the morning, enemy killed our LMG man on the bridge. Aziz himself got behind the unmanned LMG and continued firing on the enemy. All this time the enemy gave no indication of making any effort to get across the river. Aziz had deployed his 75 mm RR detachment on his right flank. This detachment became the main target of the enemy. About 2 p.m. two enemy Sabre jets flew over our position and started straffing . Our regular troops had fair idea of field defence. So enemy straffing could not do much harm to them. In the thick of the battle, Dutta came along with Lieutenant Colonel Limayya, an Indian army officer. It was rather unexpected and risky for an Indian officer to be there then. However, in reply to a question from Lamayya, Aziz told him that he could not make any arrangement to protect his flanks against any possible enemy crossing. Limayya asked him—how long would you be able to hold on to this position, Aziz Like spirited soldier informed him that he would be able to hold on to his position as long as it is required. Soon Dutta and Limayya left the battle field.
It was then that the most inevitable had happened. Aziz was informed that the RR detachment on the right flank had
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abandoned the gun position. Without any delay he rushed there and found his silent recoilless rifle standing unmanned. It was mounted on jeep where the driver was also missing. Aziz got himself behind the steering wheel and as he started moving back to his command post, enemy tried a direct hit on the jeep. The jeep rolled down along the slope of the river and stopped half way. Luckily no damage was done. Aziz began to drive back. It was here that he found some of his men from the right flank running in panic. They said that enemy a platoon strong had crossed the river and landed at Kadamtali. Aziz was unable to get his men back to their position. As he reached his command post, news of a similar crossing on his western flank had also reached him. It was now clear to him that he was on the verge of being encircled by the enemy. The apprehension of Limayya was coming true. If only Aziz could appreciate in time the situation could have been different. However he could not help it. He did not have enough troops. By evening he had to fall back to Lala Bazar where he collected all his men before finally falling back on SherpurShadipur line.
Aziz organised strong defences on Sherpur-Shadipur line having a screen position on the far bank. He appreciated that the enemy, being strong, would chase him now. On April 23 an enemy aircraft flew over his area several times and after being sure about the target, began straffing and rocketing. This was followed by long range artillery fire on his position. The screen position was contacted by the enemy infantry on April 26. With heavy casualties the screen fell back but the enemy could not dislodge Aziz from the main defences.
In this action Havildar Muslemuddin and Lance Naik Abdur Rahman died and five were injured. The enemy also sustained heavy casualties, both in dead and injured.
This debacle was first of its kind. We lost a vast tract of the liberated area in Sylhet. This was a major setback. In retrospect, while analysing this action, I could not blame my men. They were inferior both in strength and in weapons to the enemy. We were too scattered to give a fight in an organised manner. Three-
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fourth of our troops were not trained to fight conventional setpiece battle.
We could master very little support from the locals to execute the plan. Lastly, the field commanders on our side lacked experience in the use of ground and weapons.
Turning Point The liberation war up till now was lacking in the life force for want of a political back up. Obedience to a legal and constitutional authority is the basis for the healthy functioning of any military force. The vacuum created by the absence of a formally constituted government of Bangladesh was keenly felt by the rank and file of the liberation army. Thus thousands, amidst thunderous cheers, witnessed the birth of a new stateBangladesh, in a border village, later christened as Mujib Nagar, in the subdivision of Chuadanga. This was officially proclaimed at an impressive oath taking ceremony which took place at Mujib Nagar on April 17. This ceremony was attended by over 50 foreign journalists and thousands of spectators.
After having formed the provisional government in exile at Agartala on April 10, the Prime Minister designate, Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed, made his first radio broadcast through Shwadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (voice of free Bangladesh radio) announcing the formation of military command structure of ‘Mukti Bahini’, in which Colonel (later General) Osmany was made the Commander-in-Chief and named Safiullah, Zia, Khaled and Abu Osman as region commanders. On 11 April 71, Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed made his second radio broadcast again through Shwadhin Bangla Betar Kendra and called upon the people of Bangladesh to mobilise their energy for the liberation struggle. In this spirited and patriotic address, he eulogized the liberation army, which was being formed around the nucleus of the professional soldiers from the East Bengal Regiment. While surveying the activities of the liberation army with additional information he further expanded the command structure, dividing the country into seven major regions and appointed the commanders for each region and those were :
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a. Chittagong-Chittagong Hill Tracts region under Major Ziaur Rahman.
b. Comilla -Noakhali region under Major Khaled Musharraf.
c. Sylhet-Brahmanbaria-Mymensingh region under Major K. M. Safiullah.
d. Rangpur – region under Captain Nawazish.
e. Dinajpur – Rajshahi – Pabna region under Major. Najmul Haque.
f. South West region (Kushtia-Jessore) under Major Abu Osman Chowdhury.
g. Barishal – Patuakhali region under Capt. Jalil. As predicted, Colonel MAG Osmany was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the liberation force of Bangladesh. The announcement was most opportune. It had its desired effect.
Zia, Khaled and myself made our plan to mop up pockets of resistance in our area preparatory to a combined onslaught on Dhaka. But our plans could not be meterialised immediately. Enemy struck us at all fronts. Pakistani forces were hell bent on ousting us from the liberated areas.
Meeting on the Meghna Pakistanis had a serious headache about Brahmanbaria, a place of vital importance between Sylhet and Comilla. As a river route to Sylhet, Bhairab-Ashuganj complex enjoyed tactical as well as strategic importance. Khaled on the south and my troops on the north, from either side, we had Brahmanbaria and AshuganjBhairab respectively within our fold. Pakistanis decided to effect a break through. With a part of 53 Brigade-located at Comilla, Brigadier Iqbal Shafi had already made a dash over to Chittagong to take on Zia. This brigade finally moved to Chittagong duly replaced by 117 Brigade ex-9 Infantry Division. Pakistanis wanted to have uninterrupted control over SylhetComilla highway so that 313 and 117 Brigades could have free hand on the use of the highway. It was, therefore, quite obvious that a break through operation would be launched from Dhaka and that I would be required to receive the enemy at BhairabAshuganj.
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In April most of the river banks in Bangladesh stand out above the receding water level. At places the banks are steep and non-negotiable by transport without the help of a barge. At Ashuganj side of Meghna, although large scale landing facility did not exist, infantry movement was not at all difficult.
Ashuganj is a railway station on the home side of the bridge. It is on a slightly raised ground. I decided t hold it physically with a company of regulars under Captain Nasim. About 3 miles to the north of Ashuganj, Ajabpur is a river ghat which serves Sharail and Brahmanbaria. An irregular company was deployed there under a junior commissioned officer. About 2 miles to the south of Ashuganj Lieutenant Morshed had a mixed regular and irregular company deployed thinly at Lalpur. Lalpur and Brahmanbaira were linked with an unmetalled road. Morshed’s task was to deny enemy landing within his area of responsibility and deny the use of unmetalled road by the enemy leading towards Brahmanbaria. Captain Matiur Rahman after fighting his way down from Narshingdi was deployed at Bhairab Bazar. He had an EPR company. Another mixed regular company under Captain Ainuddin was deployed at Brahmanbaria facing Gokanaghat on the river Tista. One company of EPR troops under Captain Matin was located at Sharail. The main purpose of keeping this company at Sharail was to use them as reserve and also provide depth to the forward localities by occupying Talshahar and Gokanaghat line of defence. This line of defence was the only intermediary position between Ashuganj and Brahmanbaria. The company was kept mobile so that it can move fast and occupy Talshahar-Gokanaghat line of defence without much loss of time with a view to forestalling any threat developing on Ashuganj front.
Of late, the enemy reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters were active on our area. The purpose of these reconnaissance missions was known to us. We were, therefore, very particular about our camouflage and passive air defence.
Matiur at Bhairab was not at all in a happy situation. He had a difficult withdrawal from Panchdona and Narshingdi. The enemy had followed him closely behind. Though the Rampur railway bridge was demolished it would need only a few hours
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effort to establish a bridge head at Rampur and about 8 hours for assault crossing. I had to send a reinforcement there without any delay. A draft of young, hurriedly trained civilian volunteers arrived at Brahmanbaria in the morning on April 13. I ordered them to be despatched immediately to Bhairab Bazar.. This draft of young boys was from among the first batch of trainees received from Teliapara. As they were about to leave for Bhairab they came under heavy enemy straffing near the railway station. In this sudden air strike sepoy Mohammad Mohsin of East Bengal Regiment and a trained volunteer got killed. It was definitely a demoralising effect on my troops. I was there to see them off to Bhairab. On this day I got a message from Colonel Osmany to attend a co-ordination conference to be held at Moulvi Bazar at 10 a.m. on 14 April. I therefore, left my headquarter for Moulvi Bazar on the morning of 14 April.
Early in the morning of April 14, the enemy with a fleet of river craft probed the bank of river Meghna near Lalpur for a landing. To our appreciation, the enemy was carrying out a reconnaissance of the landing place.
It was evident that the enemy was not able to make up their mind about the landing. They were yet not clear about or defensive layout and was, therefore, going slow about the landing. Suddenly the enemy came under intense fire from Lalpur. Exchange of fire continued for about an hour and the enemy pulled back downstream to the south.
Lt. Col. Reza was at Brahmanbaria for shifting the currency from the banks and for depositing the same of Bangladesh Government at Agartala. Apprehending the threat confronting Lalpur, Lt. Col. Reza ordered the reserve company of Matin at Sharail to move to Lalpur. But for them my orders were different. On such situation they were to get deployed on the intermediary position between Talshahar and Gokanaghat line. This company in advance had reconnoitered and prepared this positions. In my absence, however, Matin was given a different task and in order to accomplish that task he moved to the new location during the night along the eastern bank of river Meghna. As a result, he was not in a position to deploy his
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troops at Lalpur during the night, the reason being the position was neither reconnoitered nor prepared by him. However, on reaching Lalpur Matin hurriedly positioned himself on the left of Morshed’s position. As he moved along river bank he had to leave behind his recoilless rifles at Ashuganj with Nasim because of transportation difficulties. Morshed remained deployed at Lalpur on the right side of Matin’s company. It remained a mistry to me why this company from Sharail was moved to Lalpur on foot via Ashuganj rather than sending them on vehicle via Brahmanbaria.
On hearing about this impending enemy landing, at 2 a.m. on April 15, I left Moulvi Bazar and reached Brahmanbaria at dawn. I was surprised to learn that my reserve company was already moved from Sharail to Lalpur by Lt. Col. Reza. Lalpur tactically was an important place no doubt. It dominated the mouth of Titas and the track running due south-east of Brahmanbaira. For this purpose I deployed Morshed there. But to me depth at that time was more important under the circumstances, than linear deployment of all the available troops on the river bank. Beaching operation, though an extremely difficult one, but is never a failure. A determined enemy could always make a landing on the enemy shore, and successfully make a bridge head. We could stop him only after the landing and fight him from successive intermediate positions. But my intermediate position remained unoccupied.
I had no wireless communication with the companies. The use of a foot runner was time consuming. The battle was gaining momentum. Recalling of the reserve company at this hour was neighter possible nor logical particularly when we were under constant enemy air attack. I took the bitter pill and only hoped for the best.
At 5-30 a. m. on April 15, enemy guns opened up on our positions at Ashuganj, Lalpur and Bhairab. It was evident that pre-H hour bombardment had started. I guessed, it was from the vicinity of Khana Bari railway station that the guns were firing. The enemy flotilla again appeared in front of Lalpur.
Heavy bombardment continued which kept our heads done. My troops at Lalpur under the command of Matin caught sight
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of the enemy advancing cautiously over the Meghna. The enemy was heading towards Lalpur for a landing under the cover of their artillery fire. It was virtually a flotilla that carried the enemy on board, approximately a battalion plus strength. The fleet consisted of two gunboats, two landing craft tanks (LCT) and four launches. A troop of chafee’s PT 76 with their upright hulls were ominously lurking at Lalpur. I must congratulate my boys for exercising extreme restrain and control on fire. With their eyes on the enemy and fingers on the trigger, they were measuring up the range.
In the meantime another enemy battalion stole on Bhairab Bazar along the railway track. I had no means to influence the battle across the river. Matiur was instructed to contain and to impose maximum delay on the enemy and ultimately fallback on the home bank over the bridge and by boat.
As the battle raged on the enemy bank, the flotilla closed in within range and formed a perfect target. The commander at Lalpur, Matin, in his hurried and difficult move the previous night had left his 106 mm RR with the company at Ashuganj under Nasim. The RR could not be moved because of carriage difficulties. However, one 75 mm RR was moved from Gokanaghat to the mouth of Titas which scored 5 shots at the LCT without causing any material damage.
When the flotilla was still looking for our position with searching eyes, a trigger happy soldier from the middle opened fire. The enemy returned immediately with a volley from the tanks. Instantly all the fire opened up. Our rocket launchers and mortars started pounding the enemy. The enemy was taken aback. The flotilla gradually started drifting away from the bank while the guns kept on spitting fire.
In no time, six Sabre F-86 fighters were on our positions at Bhairab, Ashuganj, Lalpur and at Brahmanbaira. They were playing havoc and kept us pinned down. Air action left my troops in a spell of chaos and confusion. This continued uninterrupted for 6 hours from 5-30 a.m. to 11-30 a.m.
It was during this time that I noticed a beeline of MI-8 helicopters yonder across the river to Shohagpur between Ashuganj and Ajabpur. The helicopters squatted for a while to
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unload the Pakistani “Maroon Barets” and flew back to fly in more sorties. It was a company plus that landed behind our position. I had no anti-heli force to counter this dangerous threat behind my back. Thus, to our great disadvantage, another dimension was added to this battle, where we could not help much.
The Ajabpur position was thinly held by irregular troops under a junior commissioned officer. The heli landings took place around that place unhidered. The enemy air strikes continued to dominate the battle field. My troops simply ducked down in their trenches. Their power of movement and initiative was snatched away. The heliborne troops soon organised themselves quietly and attacked our position at Ashuganj from the north-east of the railway track.
To counter this unforeseen development, that is, the landing of the heliborne troops at the rear, Nasim quickly reorganised his company inspite of air action and assaulted the enemy. Lance Naik Abdul Hai, the detachment commander of an MG post, kept on firing on the enemy from an open trench on the railway track till he was hit by a direct shot from 83 mm blendicide causing his instantaneous death.
The enemy closed in our defended localities in a body. Soon they were drawn in unawares within our fold. Close quarter battle, that continued for about an hour, had witnessed some of the fiercest hand to hand fights. The enemy suffered a good number of casualties in this encounter.
Nasim and Morshed sustained injuries during this action which had an adverse effect on the battle. Now with the successful heli landing of the enemy I thought it better to get my troops extricated to safety. They were already disorganised and were in utter confusion. Towards the evening Nasim fell back towards Sarail.
The enemy flotilla turned on the mouth of Titas, landed their troops and began to sweep along my left flank. Matin at Lalpur began to feel uneasy. The position was no more tenable by him. It was evening when he fell back along the railway track and therefrom to Brahmanbaria. Brahmanbaria wore a deserted look. It was about midnight when, Matin along with his troops made
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for Sarail without any delay and found none of our troops there also.
After a long hurried night march the troops got exhausted and tired. They were thirsty. Sarail gave them a rather cold welcome. The warmth and enthusiasm of the locals on the previous day diminished to its lowest ebb. We could appreciate the feelings of the people. They had reposed high hopes on us. We failed them and could not come upto their expectation at Ashuganj. Another eight miles to Shahbazpur, on the banks of Titas. I was there with my troops less the company under Matin. By the second half of the night Matin reached Shahbazpur. Bhairab could not be held for long. Matiur was overpowered. The use of the bridge and the river Meghna to get across to our side of the bank was denied to him. Matiur withdrew to the north along the railway track to Kuliarchar. He joined me later through Chatalpar.
The meeting on the Meghna was the first set-piece battle of the liberation war. It amply demonstrated enemy’s superiority in fire power and its overwhelming capability to move at ease by air and water. The enemy was better trained in modern warfare and in the handling of weapons. With the lack of mobility and fire power the two main deciding factors for any conventional warfare, no commander can ever conceive of an armed engagement. But the situation was different with the liberation army. We had to fight with whatever we had. We knew it for certain that today’s defeat would bring forth victory in the future.
The first set-piece battle had its obvious toll in killed and injured. Subedar Sirajul Islam, Lance Naik Abdul Hai, sepoys Kafil Uddin and Abdur Rahman Sarkar and many others died in this action while a good number got injured.
Defence at Madhabpur Madhabpur provided a suitable defensive position. On its west, Titas made a wide loop near Harinber. Its low lying areas covering a wide expanse, dry in all seasons except monsoon, broken and undulating, firmly secured the right flank of
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Madhabpur. With the international borerd on its east flank, Madhabpur was a narrow gap and was easy to defend. While my troops were preparing a defence at Madhabpur, a temporary defence was prepared at Shahbazpur on the eastern bank of Titas. The bridge there was blown off and Matin’s company consisting of EPR troops were deployed on the home bank to guard this obstacle. Followed by our evacuation of Ashuganj on April 15 the enemy took it for granted that we had fallen back to Brahmanbaria. They continued pounding Brahmanbaria for two consecutive days after which they advanced towards Shahbazpur, Brahmanbaria remained untouched by the enemy for another couple of days.
We had the information of the enemy’s move. At Shahbazpur, our field defencess were properly dug in. The river bed was denuded of all boats and rivercraft with the exception of one which was being used as a ferry by our detachment across the river.
On April 21 the enemy, about two battalions strength, stealthily advanced, by artillery bombardment and air action. The air action had left our troops completely shaken. We had nothing to stop them. The enemy occupied Shabazpur on April 21 and my troops after having imposed necessary delay on them, fell back to Madhabpur, The pre-selected defensive position located on Chandura-Itakhola road where Sonai river cuts it from east to west. The forward defended locality ran approximately along the Sonai river line. On the right flank Matin deployed his company around village Keitara. Nasim remained on the bridge area, the road being within his area of responsibility. Nasim’s company was given three 82 mm mortars to cover the dead ground. A company under commander Subedar Mujibur Rahman of EPR was deployed in the rear astride road to give depth to Nasim and Matin. Further behind, a platoon was employed as anti-heliborne troops, under Lieutenant Mannan.
A composite platoon with some trainees from the first batch of Teliapara camp under Morshed was sent by me to probe and raid the bridge head established by the enemy at Shahbajpur. The platoon carried out the mission successful on the night of
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April 26/27 and returned to the location of the depth company area behind Madhabpur in the afternoon on April 27. As a result of this action enemy suffered some casualties in dead and wounded On April 28 at about 8 a.m. the enemy brought in artillery fire on our position at Madhabpur. They made indiscriminate use of high explosive and incendiary bombs. Furious fire works surrounded our defended locality.
After initial probing, the leading elements of the enemy made their appearance in front of our locality around 12 noon. They attacked in three columns. One column made for Matin’s company on the right flank. Second column headed for the gap between the two forward companies. Third column made a frontal attack on Nasim. This was a battalion frontage. Immediately behind them was another enemy battalion.
My troops repelled the attack from their bunkers and trenches with rifles. LMG’s, mortars and RRs. Our mortars played a very important role in this battle. Enemy’s centre column made a dent into the gap of the defensive position held jointly by Nasim and Matin. Both the companies were blunting waves after waves of attacking enemy. The enemy ultimately after accepting heavy casualties and experiencing a bitter close quarter battle succeeded partially penetrating through the gap between the right forward platoon of Nasim and the left forward platoon of Matin i.e. in between general area south-eest of village Keitara and south-west of Madhabpur bazar. It was about 3 p.m. when this column went further north and swerved right on the main road hitting Nasim’s depth position. At this juncture the coordination between these two forward companies got disrupted. As a dent was already made in the gap, the enemy with a little more effort was able to break-through Matin’s left position, his position was no more tenable. Facing a total envelopment by the enemy with much superior strength. I ordered for pulling back. Anticipating this before, at about 11 a.m. I had moved the reserve platoon of Morshed to the right flank of the enemy. At a time when the enemy was about to penetrate into the defences in the locality between Nasim and Matin, Morshed with his platoon launched a flanking attack at
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the enemy’s right rear flank from general area village Alinagar. This forestalled the frontal attack of the enemy and afforded an opportunity for my troops to fall back. This was indeed, an SOS mission, superbly executed by Morshed.
In Matin’s locality suddenly the fiercest of the battle diminished on either side. We later discovered that Matin had exhausted his reserve ammunition. Due to lack of wireless communication with the battalion headquarters, no replenishment could be arranged. To cap this predicament, the enemy had positioned itself behind Matin, blocking his route of withdrawal. At this stage luck played in our favour. We noticed that the enemy was also feeling uneasy and the intensity of their fire had also reduced considerably. We discovered later that the enemy was retracking. Surprisingly they were also facing shortage of ammunition. A group of retreating enemy entered Matin’s defences and a hand to hand fight ensued where Sepoy Mofiz of Matin’s company inflicted 14 casualties on the enemy.
In this action my troops displayed exemplary courage and steadfastness. Nasim, Matin, Morshed, Shahjahan (Saheed), Mofiz and Waheed deserve special mention for their valour and devotion to duty. In addition, we had a number of other casualties. In this action Pakistanis also suffered no less. Their casualty figure in dead and wounded would be no less then 270 of their fighting men.
With the fall of Madhabpur our liberated area got further reduced in size. We then controlled an area between Srimangal and Shaistaganj on the North and Teliapara, Mantala, Mukundapur and Shingarbil on the South. I started strengthening my defencs at Teliapara-Mantala complex.
Sylhet Highway Since March 25, Pakistani commanders in Dhaka made several decisive attempts to open the Sylhet highway. Ashuganj, Shahbazpur and Madhabpur successively fell to the enemy. Yet they remained concerned about the security of the highway and persisted in their efforts to open the highway within the shortest possible time. But we stood on their way.
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The highway was still far from being a safe place for enemy movements. As long as Teliapara-Itakhola-Shajee Bazar line of defence remained in our hands, it was difficult, if not impossible for the Pakistani troops, to use this highway. Nevertheless, the enemy kept on pressing from Dhaka along the direction of Brahmanbaria. The enemy pressure from Sylhet also increased manifold since the fall of Sherpur-Shadipur complex. But their columns from the opposite directions could not meet easily, though partially the Sylhet highway was open. The enemy could bypass Teliapara and meet the columns from Sylhet at Srimangal via Shajee Bazar rendered it most hazardous. The enemy often used Shaistaganj-Chunarughat-Teliapara road which was virtually a death trap from them. This 25 miles long highway through the tea gardens was a paradise for laying ambush. Everyday a good number of enemy troops were caught in these ambushes and suffered heavy casualties either dead or injured.
Khaled was successful in blocking the enemy advance from Comilla. He disrupted both their rail and road movement, by demolishing bridge at Ujanishah and the railway bridge at Akhaura and Gangashagar. To further prevent the enemy from repairing these bridges, he posted his troops tactically covering all these obstacles.
The railway communication to Sylhet remained absolutely closed, since March 25. It involved more risk to try to open the railway track than the highway. Upto Karimganj the alignment of the railway track was in conformity with the road and Pakistanis rightly decided not to try the rail communication which had no special advantage to offer.
Affairs in Sector 2 By April 10, 4th East Bengal Regiment and the mixed troops of East Pakistan Rifles, Police, Ansars, Mujahids and student volunteers under Sector 2 had taken an organised shape. The Bravo company under Captain Matin had already left for Sitakund-Mirsharai axis to reinforce Zia’s efforts in Chittagong Hill Tracts. With the remaining regular troops, nuclei were formed for the newly raised four oversized companies under
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Lieutenant Imamuzzaman, Didarul Alam, Mehboob and Gaffar to organise four sub-sectors.
Gaffar had his defences based on Mondabhagh-Shaldanadi area with his headquarters at Konaban. Didar’s company was at Motinagar-Bakshanagar area. To the south of Comilla, Imamuzzaman positioned himself on Comilla-Chandpur rail and road axes on April 13. Mehboob was sent to Chandpur to keep the area under control.
Imamuzzaman was given the task to deny to the enemy the use of Comilla-Chandpur road. His secondary task was to secure the defence of Laksham. He took up a strong defensive position along line Barpara-Durgapur about 2 miles north of Lalmai. A broken dry nullah crossed the position almost vertically.
The presence of liberation forces at Chandpur made the enemy retreat. Two companies were despatched from Comilla by road to capture Chandpur. A convoy of 13 trucks started during the early hours of April 14, Pakistanis were not yet quite conversant with waylaying tactics of the freedom fighters.
The convoy was allowed to come well within the range of small arms. Imamuzzaman’s company opened fire with rifles, machine guns, 81 mm mortars, launchers and bazookas. In no time three of the enemy vehicles toppled over and the remaining extricated themselves and retreated back to Comilla.
The first ambush succeeded in raising the moral of the freedom fighters. After this ambush he should have taken his troops to a different place to lay another ambush. Instead he stayed put where he was and started to improve his defences.
The enemy appeared again. This time they were more cautious and stronger as well. They debussed at a distance and advanced tactically, supported by artillery fire. The enemy artillery began to use air bursts on our localities. It was no more possible to hold on. Before the assault was launched, Imamuzzaman fell back two miles to the rear at Lalmai.
The nearby lake area was chosen for the defence. The village-folks came rushing in our assistance. They dug trenches and fed the troops and even came forward to man the defences. Imamuzzaman had suffered heavy casualties at BarparaDurgapur area. He asked his headquarters for reinforcement. But
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it was not forthcoming. He was told that reinforcement would come to him from Barisal. After three days, on April 19, Imamuzzaman’s position was attacked, this time, by an enemy battalion. The Bengalee fighters held up the enemy.
On April 20, the most expected reinforcement arrived at Chandpur by a few launches. They reached Lalmai on bus. It was a timely reinforcement. They were immediately deployed on the ground. Imamuzzaman, now was stronger than before. That day heavy artillery and mortar shelling preceded the enemy attack. The enemy came in waves in-spite of heavy casualties. Imamuzzaman held the position intact for the next three days.
Situation at Chandpur was turning bad. Continuous straffing kept Mehboob’s troops immobile. They had to keep their heads down. A strong river borne force supported by a troop of tanks was about to be launched on Chandpur. Heavy reinforcement rushed in to strengthen the enemy, facing Lalmai position. They had to open the road for link up force to join the river borne enemy who were to as disembark at Chandpur. So heavy pressure was brought to bear on Imamuzzaman. On April 23, in the face of assaulting waves of the enemy, Imamuzzaman fell back on the road to Laksham, his secondary task.
Immamuzzaman took up his defence on a nullah line on the north of Laksam, Hardly he had settled down, when enemy following him on his heels, launched a vigorous attack in an extended line. The first wave of attackers were mauled to the ground. The undaunted enemy attacked again in wave and again repulsed. But a heavy price was paid in dead and wounded on our side. Imamuzzaman’s defence had already started breaking up. With the final assault, which came immediately after the second wave, broke open the defences and enemy rushed on the town of Laksham. Completely routed, Imamuzzaman fell back cross country on Dakatia diagonally between LakshamChauddagram and Laksham-Comilla roads. His new defences were around Kashimnagar. From 9th April he conducted occasional raids and ambushes on Chandpur road. He contacted his sector headquarters from here and got orders to stay on at Kashimnagar.
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The Pakistani battalion commander visited Laksham on April 23. He called the town elders and told them in an air of vengeance, “Your Muktis have done us much harm for the last two days, We shall do the same”. Thereafter an unprecedented carnage befell Laksham.
Imamuzzaman was ordered to fall back on the line of Kakrinalah on the Comilla-Chittagong highway. Towards May 7, he took up a defensive position with his depleted company at Miar Bazar astride the highway. A column consisting of two companies of 39 Baluch was successfully ambushed at this position. Imamuzzaman could no more hold on with his depleted company. Moreover, his troops were tired enough, having fought continuously since April 14. He was ordered to hand over the defence of Miar Bazar to a Mujahid company commander. He was relieved in line on May 9 and on the same day he moved to Chuaddagram.
Chauddagram was under pressure both from Laksham and from Comilla. The enemy battalion at Laksham by then got reorganised, reinforced and re-equipped. They marched on Chauddagram on May 14 with aritillery support. The attack was launched at noon with artillery air bursts, which saw Imamuzzaman with all his ammunition exhausted. At 8 p.m. he crossed the border and fell on Rangamura in India, opposite Chauddagram.
With his battle weary understrength company and four 81 mm mortars, he took upon himself the task of raising Rangamura sub-sector. A serious development was underway right at this time at Belonia.
Shaldanadi Line of Defence
Towards the middle of April Gangashagar on the north and Bibir Bazar on the south, about 35 miles long border belt, though remained under active control of 4 East Bengal for quite some time, important tactical positions in the area often changed hands. Khaled made a successful raid on Gangashagar at 2 a.m. on the night of 14 April. The enemy, one company strength, was deployed in area Gangashagar railway station. Two companies
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of 4 East Bengal made a two pronged simultaneous attack on the enemy position supported by mortars from Cornel Bazar area.
The enemy was surprised. They ran helter and skelter and fell back towards south. The enemy occupied Kashba bazar and threatened to take Shaldanadi enclave which was of vital importance to the enemy and to us as well.
Lieutenant Gaffar was ordered to clear Kashba-Shaldanadi area of the enemy. On 18 April Gaffar reached Kashba. The enemy was deployed at the railway station which from tactical point of view, was most unsound as immediately on its front and on either side the area was semihilly and dominated Kashba. A two-pronged attack descended on the enemy from the high ground on either side of Kashba, supported by 3X3 inch mortars and the enemy could not hold the area any longer. They withdrew to Arai Bari and Kuti leaving behind many dead. The enemy launched a counter-attack to recapture the area. But the counter-attack was repulsed and the enemy fell back to Kuti where they established their battalion headquarters.
The elements of 4 East Bengal extended its area of exploitation up to Shaldanadi and further south up to Nayanpur. The line of defence that ran along our border sanctuary was based on the railway track with its forward limit on the river Shaldanadi itself. The enemy by then had committed a battalion, 33 Baluch with its headquarters at Kuti. Kuti is hardly 4 miles to the west of Kashba. A district board road connected those two places. Kuti position was further strengthened by artillery guns by the enemy.
All the enemy pockets within this area were gradually neutralised and held by Khaled’s troops. Mandabhagh railway station was cleared and the position held by a platoon. On the north of Kashba, a dominating high ground called Latumura was held by a company. Further south along the road and the railway track three more companies were deployed. Two companies were deployed on the Shaldanadi itself. This was a vast area which provided us area for training of our men. Being under the very nose of the enemy, our soldiers learnt the use of arms and rudimentaries of field craft better. The local population fed us both with food and enemy information.
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The railway line, the bridges electric pylons and telegraph poles in this area were destroyed by us. Enemy communication was totally disrupted. Our men removed the enemy’s internal telephone cables and sets and made up their own deficiencies.
From these bases we began to harass and paralise the enemy with unconventional warfare like raids, ambushes, demolition missions and sabotage activities behind the enemy lines. This war of attrition continued intermittently and the enemy began to suffer heavy casualties. As the enemy became weak, their morale started flagging. On the other hand the morale of our troops was at its highest.
Down south the situation at Belonia was fast deteriorating. Captain Jafar Imam and Lieutenant Imamuzzaman, with their war weary troops, were facing a great threat developing from Feni direction. To forestall the threat, Khaled decided to switch Gaffar’s company to Belonia sub-sector.
Goalondo Action
on April 10, Osman got report from his men posted at Aricha that a Pakistani brigade was about to launch a river crossing operation. The brigade was bound for Goalondo. A fleet of launches and boats, 35 in number supported by two gunboats were arranged for this river crossing operation.
Osman had to do a lot of thinking to deal with this threat. He had not troops to spare, 1 East Bengal at Navaron could not be touched. One EPR company each at Chaugachha, Magura, Jhinaidaha and Chuadanga could neither be spared for any additional task nor did they have suitable weapons for operation at Goalondo ghat.
He attempted a gamble and decided to spare only one platoon from Magura. He armed it with 2 LMGs, 1 MG 1×3.5″ rocket launcher and 2×3″ mortars. Naib Subedar Samsul Haq was the platoon commander. He was instructed to collect local volunteers. Police and the public for active support as was done in Kushtia. Their mission was to stop the enemy landing at Goalondo at all costs.
Early morinning April 12, the enemy fleet came within sight. At 300 yards away the enemy was suddenly engaged by our automatics, mortars and rocket launchers.
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As the luck could have it, the first launch got a hit from our rocket launcher and its body gave way in mid-waters. There was panic in the drowning launch. This shattered the enemy morale. The cntire fleet stood still on the water and started firing at the bank. This continued until late in the afternoon. As the firing stopped the enemy fleet started drifting to the north.
Osman had already sent a message to the EPR wing commander at Naogaon about a probable enemy landing at Nagorbari.
These are the enemy troops who turned towards Nagarbari ghat, brushed off the freedom fighters and successfully landed there at dawn. The brigade dashed towards Rajshahi leaving column to cross Hardinge bridge via Ishwardi.
A platoon of EPR under Subedar Muzaffar posted at Kushtia side was overpowered by the enemy. The enemy column advanced on Bheramara. The defensive ring around Kushtia began to crumble and the enemy entered Kushtia on April 15.
Osman moved his headquarters from Chuadanga to Meherpur the same day. After three days he moved still behind and crossed the border.
Rajshahi Debacle Major Najmul Haque, the wing commander of the 7 EPR wing located at Naogaon was contacted by Osman to inform him about the landing of an enemy brigade at Nagarbari. Major Ghias and Captain Rashid were then jointly holding Rajshahi city against 25 Punjab. The safety of the Nagarbari ghat under the circumstances gained paramount importance. Major Najmul Haque had hurriedly raised a force out of his own EPR troops and some volunteers for the defence of the ghat. Rashid also sent a company to Nagarbari ghat from Rajshahi town. This company could not reach Nagarbari ghat in time and was caught up by the enemy brigade at Pabna. The enemy advanced in lighting speed and reached Sarda on April 13. Sarda cadet college, the police academy and Charghat had fallen to Pakistan army the same day.Ghias and Rashid were now between two fires. The enemy brigade attacked Talaimari border outpost and entered Rajshahi city on April 14. The same day Ghias fell back to Godagari and
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Rashid to Charghat and ultimately both of them crossed over to India.
Having crossed over to India with their troops Ghias and Rashid, with the help of the Indian BSF, started to reorganise and regroup their troops at Sheikapara and Lalgola respectively in the district of Murshidabad. Thereafter, they started an uninterrupted campaign of conventional and unconventional warfare in occupied areas of Rajshahi and Pabna.
Western Border
Let us go back to the western sector where Osman, having liberated Kushtia, was busily engaged in consolidating his gains. His primary handicap was in trained manpower. 1 East Bengal was grossly understrength and due to lack of integral weapons, it was simply not able to fight as an infantry battalion. So, Osman could not expect much from Hafiz. He organised his sector in 7 sub-sectors, each having one company. His deployment from north to south was, Moheshkundi borer outpost area on the north under Lieutenant Jahangir, Essakhali border outpost area under captain Azam Chowdhury, Jibannagar border outpost area under Captain Mustafizur Rehman, Kashipur-Mukundapur border outpost area under Captain Najimul Huda, Benapole customs check post area under Captain Abdul Halim and later under Captain Taufiq, Baksha-Kakdanga area under Captain Shafiqullah and lastly Shatkhira area under Captain Salauddin.
With the activization of these sub-sectors, the entire length of the border falling within Osman’s sector began to bristle with guerilla activities. Ambushes, disruption of enemy line communications and killing of collaborators were the day-to-day routine activities of the freedom fighters in this sector.
At Shatkhira, there was a departure from this routine. Salauddin’s company was deployed behind a high embankment at Bhomra. He also deployed some men on top of the embankment. The enemy, a battalion of the Punjab Regiment made repeated attempts to dislodge him. But they could not do so due to our position on he embankment. On May 27, at 4 p.m. the enemy attacked us with two companies. The attack was repulsed inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. After two
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hours, the enemy launched successively two attacks on us with two fresh companies and one battalion. The battle continued for the whole day. The enemy was again beaten back with innumerable casualties in dead and wounded. The commanding officer was wounded in this action. Two officers were killed. The enemy failed to retrieve most of their dead bodies. The area remained liberated since then though occasional attempts at its recapture by the enemy continued.
Change in the Method of Warfare With the reduction of area of operation, the scope for conventional warfare also got tailored to size. To offset this tactical weakness, it was rather natural to fall back on unconventional warfare, more popularly known as guerilla warfare. But conventional warfare was not altogether discarded. Defence of Teliapara and Mantala was organised on conventional lines, whereas guerilla operation was organised deep into the interior from a number of firm bases at Chunarughat, Habiganj and Baniachong in Sylhet, at Nasirnagar, Sharail, Mukundapur and Nabinagar in Brahmanbaria, at Kuliarchar, Bajitpur, Katiadi, Pakundia and Hussainpur in Kishoreganj, at Raipura, Shibganj, Narshingdi, Kapashia, Monohardi, Kaliakair and Kaliganj in Dhaka, at Gaffargaon and Bhaluka in Mymensingh.
A number of training camps were established to conduct training on guerilla warfare. We had our own instructional staff. We also got some instructors from India to assist us in guerilla training.
Training camps to train on conventional warfare were also set up where instructional staff was wholly provided from our own resources.
The regular and the irregular forces who were fighting for the liberation were known as Mukti Bahini. The Government of Bangladesh officially called the former as “NIOMITA BAHINI” (regular force) and the later as “GONO BAHINI” (non-regular). The Government of India however, called our regulars as “Mukti Fouj” and Gonobahini as the “Freedom Fighters”. These names bore special connotation with India. They looked upon eagerly
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towards the freedom fighters and not on the regulars to contribute to the war of liberation. Irregular force were important in their own place. With the help of an irregular force a resistance movement was possible but not a revolutionary war. To free Bangladesh, a revolutionary war had to be waged and therefore, a regular army was our requirement. So we started organising a regular force side by side with the non-regulars.
Numerous refugee camps on the border provided us a ready ground for recruitment. There was no dearth of young manpower. Students, peasants, workers and political men offered themselves for recruitment in large numbers. It was impossible to recruit everyone. We could see disappointment in the face of those who could not be taken in for training. It was a most fascinating phenomenon to see Bengalee nation with characteristic tenderness of mind and body suddenly turned into a martial race. Such was the result of motivation that the nation had experienced through the traumatic days before the crackdown of March 25.
After obtaining six weeks training, the recruits were sent to the guerilla bases. Special care was taken so that the recruits were posted to their own areas for operation. The success of guerilla operations depended mainly on the popular support of the locals. A local guerilla was expected to exploit this advantage to the maximum.
I faced a special difficulty in getting young volunteers in Sylhet. The main reason was that, there was no escape route towards my sector in Sylhet. Plenty of young boys escaped towards Dawki on the north. Since there was no regular troops there these young boys were not utilised for quite sometime. Therefore, the guerilla bases in Sylhet were hardly effective. Those few who volunteered were, however, very sincere and devoted. We were obliged to make the bases effective towards the end of July by spot recruitment.
Arms and equipments were scarce with us. So we could not properly arm our men. All the guerillas operating from the bases were given hand grenades, gun cotton slabs and allied explosives to two or three in a batch. Only three men out of a group of 10 guerillas got weapons, mostly 9 mm sten and 303 rifle. They
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were instructed to depend on the captured arms and ammunitions from the Razakars, Al-Badar, Al-Shams and the Pakistani troops. This was a source which paid rich dividends to our guerillas although it was a difficult source.
From August, we started getting arms and ammunition from India. With this assistance we could arm eight out of ten men and consequently the guerilla warfare started gaining momentum throughout the country.
21 Days in Teliapara
Fall of Madhabpur was followed by a hot pursuit by the enemy who were bent upon opening the Itakhola-Chunarughat road. My headquarters at Teliapara stood on its way. I had a company of irregulars deployed south of the Surma tea gardens in defence of the headquarters. This was further strengthened by Matin’s company after it had fallen back from Madhabpur.
Further south at Mantala about four & half miles from Teliapara Nasim deployed his company along the railway track. Moin’s company was deployed further south in general area Harashpur. Matiur Rahman with his troops was operating in general area opposite Chunarughat.
The area bounded by the Sylhet highway and ShaistaganjChunarughat road formed an oval shape. This area proudly nurtured a cluster of prosperous tea gardens. Surma, Kaptai and Lalchand tea gardens extending from north to south covered the entire area with exquisite greenery. This area had a number of internal roads. The ground was broken and undulating and had all the qualifications to be termed as a soldier’s paradise.
The oval shaped area must be dominated. Matin therefore, wanted to do some offensive patrolling in this area. For this purpose he needed some extra officers to assist him. During this period Captain Subed Ali Bhuyan came to join in my Sector. After the battle of Kumira at Chittagong on the night of 26/27 March Bhuyan was not seen any where. When he appeared again during the last week of April. Zia did not want to accept him any longer. Bhuyan having found no place there came to my Sector. I was happy to get an extra hand and immediately asked him to join Matin. With an extra officer Matin felt stronger and
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therefore, on 2 May he with his company went through the invisible internal tracks and stopped short of Shajee Bazar. Matin’s taks was to disrupt the enemy movement by raids and ambushes at Shajee Bazar.
Within a matter of 6 days three raids were conducted successively at Shajee Bazar, Noapara and Shapur. Matin had a sad experience in this area. The public here played a most indifferent role. Matin remained mostly in the hideouts provided by the northern wings of Lalchand tea gardens. Local boys on bicycles scouted Pakistani columns. These leading elements acted as the eyes and ear of the enemy. With this early warning the enemy could always deploy and frustrate our plan.
The first raid was planned around the power station at Shajee Bazar. But before Matin could made any headway the enemy deployed a company on the power station. Matin’s first attempt to raid, thus, ended in a fiasco.
Little south of Shajee Bazar, Noapara is a village on the outskirts of Lalchand tea gardens. Matin laid an ambush there the next day. He surprised the enemy convoy and successfully destroyed three trucks. The enemy also suffered some casualties.
At Shahpur Matin planned another ambush. It was afternoon, around four. Four cyclists arrived within sight. Matin’s men from their hideouts were itching to shoot. But Matin, stopped them. He did not want to spoil the ambush by getting four enemy agents only. Our men covered both the flanks with automatic. After a while a jeep arrived on our left flank. It was a dead ground. Another jeep led by the cyclists appeared on the right. Soon Matin discovered that a company of infantry with a number of civilian collaborators on either flank. The concentration of enemy force on our flanks left no doubt that the enemy had advance information of the ambush and that they were ready to take on our men. Enemy opened fire on us from an LMG post near the shrine. They also used their 3 inch mortars but to no avail. Mortars had little effect in the jungles. Matin ordered his men to collect at a point within the Lalchand tea gardens. Accordingly Bhuyan on the right and Matin on the left started falling back. Before sunset they reached the rendezvous and our troops began to rest there. Immediately after the sunset
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Matin and his men left the place without being seen by the enemy agent and stayed the night about a mile further south. Matin was forced to take this action to deceive the enemy of our actual position. The appreciation was correct. From the new location, our men heard the sound of enemy shelling on old location.
While Matin was conducting raids at Shajee Bazar, Noapara and lalchand tea garden area, simultaneous raids were carried out by Morshed elsewhere in order to disrupt the enemy’s line of communication. On May 13, Morshed along with about 12 men based in Mantala went to general area village and laid an ambush on milestone 21 on Sylhet-Brahmanbaria highway. The ambush site was not an ideal one yet Morshed laid a daring ambush near a bridge which was previously demolished by us. To move with ease the enemy made a diversion near the bridge by earth filling. The road was higher than the surroundings. Morshed laid two anti-tank mines on this diversion, covered them with earth and lay in wait for the enemy who were coming from Sylhet direction. At about 3 p.m. the convoy appeared. It was a very big column which Morshed could not appreciate before. As the first vehicles started to negotiate the diversion it went over the mine which exploded. A jeep and a truck full of enemy troops were also blown along with it. With the sound of explosion Morshed opened up with all the fire power under his command, inflicted heavy casualties on the standing convoy and extricated his boys from the ambush site with fastest speed. He was, however, chased for about two miles. Use of anti-tank mine in this sort of operation, which was first introduced in this sector, later on paid rich dividends to the liberation forces all over.
Matin fell back to Teliapara on May 6. His tired company immediately took to rest. Matin came to me to report his arrival. After seven days, operation he was tired and exhausted. Hardly the reporting had begun, there came the noise of a rifle and automatic fire from the defensive position. Some bullets even hit the thatched walls of my headquarters. We came out. It was a dismal sight. The enemy in the guise of Indian BSF, entered our defences and were in firing position. They formed an inner
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circle. My field defences in Teliapara were very well dug in. Communication trenches with overhead cover made it possible for the defenders to move about with ease. But the trouble was with Matin’s men. They were not in their defences. Exhausted, as they were, they could not wait any longer for better bed than what was provided by the good earth. They woke up only to see the enemy staring at them. It was probably the same enemy who missed them previously in the Lalchand tea gardens.
Matin ordered his men over the walkie talkie to stand and fight in support of the company already in defence. He approached towards the high ground in the middle of Teliapara position. A machine gun was pumping out bursts of fire without stop on all directions. Enemy also had directed all his fire power on this lone machine gun. It was noticed with great relief that quite a few enemy posts were gradually being silenced and the enemy disgracefully dropping out.
Matin moved toward the machine gun post. Lance Naik Abdur Rahman of East Bengal Regiment was manning it. He shouted at Matin—”Saab, duck down”. Matin dacked down beside him. Rahman had a chinese automatic rifle in addition to his invincible machine gun. He pointed out to a dead body of one of his comrades and said, “this is his rifle. I have it as a stand by. If the enemy closes in, the bayonet is fixed for a close quarter battle.” Rahman was not aware that the enemy was beating a retreat. He was still thinking that the enemy had overrun our defences. He was a case of nervous action. Matin calmed him down and apprised him of the situation.
Thus the enemy, over two companies strong, made a hasty retreat. I ordered my troops to pursue them. On the Chunarughat road we got two trucks, one of them was lying off the road, left by the enemy in a hurry. The battle field of Teliapara was left littered with dead bodies of the enemy. We also lost a number of men.
Here I would like to give an idea of the defences of Teliapara. Due south of the Surma tea gardens of which Teliapara is also a part, my defences stuck on to the IndoBangladesh border. A nullah running approximately east-west divided the Teliapara defences. Akhaura-Sylhet railway track
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running north-south within my defences formed the western limit of my inner line of defence. Itakhola-Chunarughat highway formed its northern extremity. An internal track run through the defences and formed a crescent with the Chunarughat highway. On these tracks there were some buildings of the tea garden. My headquarter was located there on the north of the nullah. An area of approximately one square mile was within the bounds of my all round defence.
Matin held the defence of Teliapara on his return from Lalchand tea gardens. The next day the enemy brought in a battery of field guns at village Jagadishpur on my left. They kept pounding us intermittently the whole day. This aimless firing continued sporadically for another two days, but failed to do any damage to us.
On May 10, the enemy started shelling, followed by a company assault which miscarried.
Under artillery cover the enemy began to push his convoys through the Chunarughat highway. On May 11, Morshed mined the road with anti-tank mines. The patch of road where mines were laid, Morshed spread some coaltar to camouflage signs of mine lying. He also ran a vehicle tyre over the coal tar where tread marks prominently showed up to deceive the enemy convoy. Morshed took up position to cover the ambush and waited for the enemy convoy. It came. A jeep passed by. Another truck went over unharmed. The third one was loaded 7 ton truck. With its weight the mine exploded with a bang. Sympathetic detonation took place and other mines also exploded. Morshed’s men pinned the enemy down. As a reaction the enemy deployed and attacked our position in Teliapara only to be repelled with more casualties. In this action an intact enemy bus was captured by us.
Another few days passed without any change. Enemy pressure continued to develop unabated. We held on to our defences and did not allow the enemy to make any dents in our locality. Raids and ambushes continued to be staged. Matin’s company, over the last few days, sustained heavy casualties. Approximately 50 of his men laid down their lives in the defence of Teliapara. They needed rest.
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Matin’s company was relieved in line by Morshed’s troops on 18 May. Unluckily for Morshed, enemy brought in a battalion plus and launched a deliberate attack on Teliapara on the same day. The attack was preceded by artillery fire starting from the afternoon. Morshed’s company consisting of irregulars was hardly settled in their defences, when the attack came. My mortars were brought to bear on the enemy and a phased fire support was given to Morshed. Enemy troops began its breakthrough. This was the time when I had to fall back across the international border. Before dusk Morshed also fell back. . It was a crushing blow. It affected materially as well as morally. Loss of Teliapara was the last thing that the men of the company could bear. The company over the last 20 days lost several brave soldiers in its defence. They were determined to regain Teliapara. But with the approach of dusk, the possibilities of successful counter-attack diminished. Matin and Morshed however launched an attack next morning, May 19, only to be repulsed. They fell back to Simna, about half a mile inside Indian territory.
Out of many who sacrificed their lives in the defence of Teliapara, Naik Nizamuddin, Lance Naik Aslam Mia, Sepoys Mobarak Ali, Rangoo Mia, Abdul Ghaffar Mia, Ali Azam Bhuyan, Jamaluddin, Abu Mia, Mujahids Ghiasudin and Alkas Mia were a few amongst many.
With the fall of Teliapara, I was left with the only tract of land lying between Mantala and Shingarbil.
It was about this time Colonel Osmany, in pursuance to Prime Minister’s orders divided Bangladesh into 11 sectors, which was officially formalised in a Sector Commanders conference held from 10 to 17 July at Mujib Nagar. According to his instructions, I was given over the command of number three sector bounded by Churamankathi near Srimangal on the north and Shingarbil on the south. In addition, I was given the responsibility over a vast area in the interior.
My operation area included Moulvi Bazar subdivision, Habiganj subdivision, Brahmanbaria subdivision excluding some part of Nabinagar P.S., Narayanganj subdivision excluding Arai Hazar and Baider Bazar P.S., Dhaka north excluding Dhaka
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city, Kishoreganj subdivision and Ghaffargaon and Bhaluka P.S. in Jamalpur subdivision.
I had organised a number of guerilla bases in my area of operation. Guerilla strength in these bases rose between 20,000 to 25,000 by November, which by far outnumbered the enemy located in the area.
Some of my bases remained constantly under enemy threat and pressure but they remained completely under our control, throughout the period of liberation war.. The areas where we had our complete control were, Shibpur, Monohardi, Kapashia, Bajitpur, Kuliarchar, Bhaluka and Ghaffargaon. In these areas we had established our effective administrative network.
Mantala Complex Lost Mantala was the last post, loss of which would leave us with no place to put our feet in Bangladesh. After the loss of Teliapara, all our hopes were pinned on Mantala complex. We had to defend it. For the enemy, it was the last stumbling block on the Chunarughat highway. I had two of my companies badly mauled at Teliapara. Only three companies were left for the defence of Mantala.
Mantala, a small railway station on the Akhaura-Sylhet railway track extends from the north to south. ItakholaMadhabpur-Shahbazpur road zigzagged on its north.
Three of my companies were deployed along the railway track. Nasim’s company was holding general area Mantala railway station. On his south was Subed Ali Bhuyan’s company in general area Kashimpur railway station. Morshed took over the third company as Moin was posted out to raise and command 1 East Bengal Regiment. Morshed’s company was on the extreme left flank, general area Harashpur railway station. All these three companies were actively threatening the enemy’s line of communication, on Sylhet-Brahmanbaria highway.
Having cleared Teliapara, the enemy concentrated all his efforts to dislodge my defences from the soil of Bangladesh and push me across to Indian territory. Sporadic attacks continued for more than three weeks. The enemy was unable to dislodge us. These attacks were pretty costly for the enemy in terms of dead and wounded.
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Enemy, having failed in their attempt to dislodge us from this area by conventional methods, changed their battle technique. Attack by conventional method proved very costly for them. This battle thus became a prestigious question for the enemy. Even with heavy casualties they did not give up and were adamant to dislodge us. Probably that is why they changed their battle technique. On the other hand it was a symbol of honour to us. We were also fighting for our existence. If we lose this area we would have no place to put our feet on Bangladesh soil.
The new technique was put into action by the enemy from 15 June onwards when two enemy battalion started advancing towards Mantala railway station by digging trenches. One battalion from the direction of Itakhola from the north and the other battalion from the direction of Madhabpur in the west were converging towards Mantala railway station.
During the day the enemy used to keep us engaged by small arms fire from the trenches and artillery fire from Itakhola and Madhabpur. During the night only artillery used to keep on showering intermittent fire on us in order to keep our heads down. At the same time taking the advantage of the darkness of night the enemy infantry battalions were digging trenches and were creeping forward towards us but we could not do much. The enemy was safe from our small arms fire being in trenches and the artillery guns were beyond our mortar range. We occasionally did engage the advancing infantry on our front with mortar fire but could not bring in the quantum of fire it deserved. This was due to the fact that we had very limited quantity of ammunition with us. This continued for five days and by 20 June the advancing battalions reached fairly close to our battle localities. By this time the enemy activities on all fronts increased manifold. They also carried out heavy air reconnaissance of our battle localities. Air photos were also taken by low flying fighter aircrafts. Thus the situation on my all fronts were very critical and teuse.
Nasim’s company was seriously threatened and he requested for some reinforcement to plug the gap. I had hardly any trained troops in my hands. His request was also very genuine. I,
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therefore, decided to send a platoon from Matin who reached him just in time and were in position on the night of June 19/20.
On the morning of June 21 the enemy made a desperate attack on Mantala complex with four battalions having almost over 4 to 1 superiority over us only in terms of quantum of troops. It was a dawn attack simultaneously from three directions. The attack was also supported by artillery bringing accurate fire on us with the help of a helicopter borne observation post.
Nasim’s position was attacked by those two battalions who advanced towards him by digging trenches. Bhuyan’s position was attacked by a battalion from the direction of Chandura from the west. Morshed’s position was attacked from the south-west direction by a battalion from Mukundapur. The battalion which attacked Bhuyan’s position from the direction of Chandura, overran has position in a lightning speed, swang towards Harashpur and encircled Morshed’s locality from the north-east direction.
As the battle reached to a pitch, enemy made a heli landing of commandoes behind Morshed’s company, thereby adding another dimension to our already critical situation. Here was a situation where Nasim was fighting a desperate battle, Bhuyan’s position was overrun and Morshed has been encircled by the enemy. Except two platoon of Matin. I had no troops left in my hand.
Nasim was requesting for reinforcement and Morshed was desperately fighting to get out of enemy encirclement. I could not master any more troops to influence the battle and at the same time could not watch my troops get butchered by the enemy fire. I, therefore, ordered Nasim to fall back to Indian territory. At the time when I was planning to put a counter-attack with only two platoons of Matin, to retrieve Morshed from a critical situation, I located Bhuyan’s company falling back to Indian territory from Kashimpur area.
I immediately gathered them and in order to extricate Morshed’s troops from a dangerous situation, desperately put in a counter-attack, with Matin and Bhuyan’s troops from the direction of Kalkalia. This desperate attempt of mine bore fruit
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and we were able to make a wedge into the enemy encirclement and forced them to fall back. In the process we not only retrieved Morshed’s troops from dangerous situation but also regained some lost territory. Tactically the territory was no more tenable, it was roughly about 40 square miles in general area Harashpur Mukundapur, but it was a question of pride for us. This small piece of land remained under our occupation and control till the liberation of the country.
This desperate counter-attack was successful because absolute dedication of my troops. The liberation of the motherland was supreme to them. One of the light machine gun (LMG) post of Morshed, held by a valiant freedom fighter Daula Mia played a vital role in the success of this operation. He, inspite of being surrounded and mortally wounded, did not give up fighting. He kept on providing fire support from our right flank which was most vulnerable. It was because of this effective fire support the counter-attack was successful.
Freedom fighter Daulat Mia deserves a special mention in this book. Daula Mia comes from Shaldanadi in the district of Comilla. He joined me during the early stage of liberation war at Teliapara. A tall, strong, and well built person completely dedicated to the cause. He left behind his wife and only daughter at home at the mercy of Pakistani occupation force to take part in the war of liberation.
Initially he was with Matin. I came to know him personally after an incident that took place when Matin was in a raid mission at Shajee Bazar, Noapara and Lalchand tea garden area. Daula Mia had a bad habit of drinking. During this mission he managed to lay hand on some local made drinks from the teagarden labourers and got drunk. Having got drunk he took out his submachine gun (SMG) and went for his fellowmates. Matin acted calmly and superbly and managed to persuade him to put down his gun. He was then disarmed, arrested, tied by the rope and sent to me for disciplinary action.
When I came to know of this incident I was naturally very annoyed. He was a potential danger to anyone around him. I, therefore, told him that I will kill him. He did not utter a word. From his facial expression I could feel that he is repenting for
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what he had done. But then it was also necessary to take some disciplinary measures against him. So I ordered him to leave my sector area at once. Having heard my decision he burst into tears and begged for giving him another chance. He said, “sir, give me one more chance under your command to prove my worth to you.” He also said, “sir, I am giving you my word of honour that I will not drink any more. If you ever find me drinking or if you find me behaving the way I have behaved, do shoot me without asking me a question”. I believed him but Matin was not happy to accept him in his company any more. He had a reason not to accept him. I, therefore, ordered him to join Morshed’s company. Surely he kept his word.
It was the same Daula Mia who was manning the LMG post and was providing effective fire support to the counter-attack force. After consolidation when we reached to his position we found Doula Mia in a pool of blood lying in agony with his right hand on the LMG and his left hand on the stomach. A machine gun burst had ripped open his stomach and legs badly battered. With this mortal wounds he continued his fire support and did not leave the post.
On seeing me he shouted ‘Joy Bangla’ and said “sir, I am dying and would not be able to see Bangladesh liberated. Please keep my blood soaked hirt under your custody to show this to Sheikh Mujib, when the country is liberated, to see for himself that I have obeyed his order. And to you Sir I am grateful that you gave me a chance to work under your command and prove my worth.” Having seen his condition I could not check my tears. After first-aid I immediately drove him to hospital. As I was driving him to the hospital he was begging to me that if he dies he should be buried in Bangladesh soil. He also requested me to look after his daughter.
Thanks to Almighty God. Daula Mia survived. He came out of the hospital after four months. He still required further. convalescence. But Daula Mia as I knew him could not stay in the hospital any longer. He wanted to be again in the front line but I convinced him to stay in my headquarters. During the war of liberation such example of motivation, courage and dedication were many. Liberation forces were full of Daula
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Mia’s and that was the reason for us to be able to liberate Bangladesh in such a short time.
Causes of Our Withdrawal
Two main factors has cast their evil influence over the entire course of battle against our interest. The enemy had the overwhelming superiority of trained soldiers over the liberation army. Secondly, the enemy was equipped with modern conventional weapons, long range artillery, sound communication system and above all, the air power, on ground support was made available to them. The enemy held the scepter of power in this country. All the propaganda machinery was in their hands and its unbridled use won for them a blanket support amongst a good part of the influential section of the population, particularly in my sector. This made our job very difficult. We were fighting a closed battle with back to the wall. This phenomenon generated a sense of insecurity in the mind of our rank and file. But we survived it. It was the same psychological attitude which overtook the occupation army of Pakistan in the months of November and December. But they were unable to survive it and this ultimately led to their unconditional surrender. We had an organizational difficulty in the initial days. Conversion from much familiar conventional warfare to unconventional guerilla methods, was not a simple thing. To most of the regular troops it was an anathema and they accepted the new method with a pinch of salt. The enemy had all the resources to move fast and they made the best use of these and gave us hardly any time to organize. Against all these odds, we managed to stand out and gave a befitting reply to the enemy inflicting heavy casualties on them and delay their process for further advance. From Ashuganj to Mantala, a distance of only 35 miles, the enemy took two and a half months to cover. This was because we fought for every inch of our motherland.
Belonia Falls
Belonia salient acted as a double-edged weapon for Pakistan army. They could neither physically hold it nor could they pass it on to us. Since the beginning of the liberation war this enclave
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remained with us. Chhagalnaiya, situated on the narrow strip of land connecting Chittagong with the rest of Bangladesh, was effectively guarding the gateway to Belonia. Since April Captain Jafar Imam was holding Chhagalnaiya against repeated enemy attacks. He was an officer from 24 FF Regiment, stationed in Comilla. After the crack down he defected and joined the liberation force. He had a small force to face comparatively a much bigger enemy. However, the enemy after three major encounters, was forced to fall back to Feni.
In the meantime Belonia sub-sector came into being and Jafar Imam was ordered by Khaled to take over this Sub-sector which he did on May 9. In June, however, the overall command of this sub-sector was given over the Captain Aminul Haque and defence of Belonia was organised around Pir Baksh Hat.
It was about the same time when Imamuzzaman with his weary men and 4X81 mm mortars crossed the border at Rangamura. He was to join Jafar Imam and play a significant role in Belonia operation.
The enemy began to construct strong fortifications at Feni. Their build-up indicated that they were poised for an attack on Belonia. They were just gaining time. Jafar Imam deployed his troops and entrenched his covering troops on the bank of river Selonia. Strong bunkers and shell proof shelters, came up to strengthen the natural obstacles.
As in the past, Belonia was always looked upon with utter consternation by the Pakistani troops. They could never gain any foothold across the river Selonia. Every attempt to cross it was vigorously bounced back with mounting casualty on the part of the enemy which affected the morale of the Pakistani troops who in the event of their posting to this sector, were always haunted by the angel of death.
For the Pakistani troops, it became more of a prestige issue. They wanted their morale back. So they wanted to take Belonia. Militarily, for Pakistanis, it was better not to physically occupy the enclave surrounded on three sides by India. The land mass, once closed at its southern opening, would act as a corked bottle. The narrow enclave of Belonia at its widest part is 8 miles wide and 17 miles in length. The use of aircraft on ground support
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role by Pakistan, was risky, as the area did not provide enough space for a turning circuit without violating Indian air space. The artillery support also involved similar risks. But Pakistan army decided to attack. They were preparing to take a reprisal action and were determined to make their way into Belonia enclave. The fortifications at Feni and activities in the enemy camps made the enemy intention imminently clear. Khaled, with a view to meeting this threat squarely, decided to send Gaffar with his company to Belonia. The charge of Shaldanadi sub-sector was given to a young officer cadet Humayan Kabir. Jafar Imam had three companies including the one of Imamuzzaman at Belonia. With the arrival of Gaffar on the evening of June 6 both Amin and Jafar Imam had a sigh of relief.
Belonia is longitudinally divided into two halves by river Muhuri running from north to south through the heart of the enclave. The eastern half formed a part of Number 1 sector under Zia. The position was held by Captain Oli of 8 East Bengal.
The defensive layout of the western half of Belonia was made on conventional lines. Covering troops were deployed around Bhandura railway station on the home bank of river Selonia. The main defence in area between Anandapur and Pir Baksh Hat, were thinly held before the arrival of Gaffar, Jafar Imam held the area including the railway track extending towards east. Imamuzzaman’s company was on the extreme east up to the Mahuri river. There remained two wide gaps—one on the Selonia flank and one between the companies of Jafar Imam and Imamuzzaman. Gaffar’s company was used to plug these gaps. A platoon was deployed on the Selonia gap and another between Jafar Imam and Imamuzzaman. The third platoon with the company headquarters remained in depth as reserve at Pir Baksh Hat. Ghatia nullah diagonally crossed the defence in front of Imamuzzaman’s company. The nullah flowed down on Selonia touching Anandapur and Bhandura. This was a partial obstacle to tanks. Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines were laid 200 yards ahead of own position.
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The enemy contacted the covering position in the morning of June 7. A heavy shower of mortars kept descending on the covering position. This continued the whole day and night with increasing vigour. The covering troops could not be dislodged.
Next morning the attack came with more intensity and the enemy closed in at 8-30 a.m. The leading column started crossing Selonia. Our 81 mm mortars from the main position engaged the enemy while crossing the river. Inspite of heavy casualties, the enemy remained undaunted and kept on crossing.
The convering troops having delayed the enemy advance and inflicting heavy casualties on them, fell back on the main defensive position.
The enemy sped up after crossing the river and in no time appeared on the west of Anandapur. This was the time when enemy artillery opened up on position.
After one hour’s continuous shelling the artillery fire was lifted. By then, they were about 500 yards in front of our forward defended localities. Our men silently held their fire until the enemy closed to within 200 yards from their line of sight in extended line covering two battalion frontage. It was obvious and later confirmed that another battalion remained closely behind.
The enemy was steadily advancing towards our position still uncertain of our exact location. As they reached the minefield, our men opened fire. The enemy’s advance slowed down considerably due to our fire and mine blasts. They kept on advancing for a while. But they could not stand the mines and fire for long. The attack thus was blunted. The enemy started falling back to Anandapur under the cover of their artillery fire.
Further attacks from the enemy was expected. Our anticipation was reassured by report that enemy was getting heavy reinforcement both in men and material. It was also reported that a troop of tank had been brought in for the operation.
The report was however, verified and Aminul was warned to keep ready for an enemy attack at night. But the attack did not come. The enemy stayed put and dug down at Anandapur. This was not at all expected by us. Ghatia nullah divided the two
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opposing forces which stood about 800 yards apart from each other.
Fighting against the enemy never bothers a soldier, but for two confronting forces long period in wait tends to tell upon their nerves. From June 9 and 17, hot exchange of fire continued between us and the enemy. Movement by day became almost impossible. Any slight movement was hazardous and often attracted enemy fire. Under this static war condition, both sides however kept up their state of preparedness.
On June 17 at about 8 p.m. the enemy attacked our position. Artillery shelling continued. But the enemy could not make headway. About this time three helicopters were seen flying towards north. We never thought these to be enemy helicopters. In fact we thought those helicopters to be Indians.
In rained that evening and darkness fell all over. The helicopters landed behind the depth platoon of Gaffar. Immediately after the some unusual movements were noticed behind Gaffar’s position. It was only then that we realised that those helicopters have dropped enemy troops behind us. These were para troopers. They formed up behind us. In the meantime enemy crossed both Muhuri and Selonia rivers on either side and their main forces with tanks started advancing from the front towards us.
It was a desperate situation. The enemy was about to encircle us. Our troops were determined to fight them.
Gaffar’s depth platoon came under attack from the para troopers at 9-30 p.m. The tanks were advancing towards Jafar Imam’s position. On the Muhuri river side, Imamuzzaman also came under pressure.
Khaled was kept informed of the latest situation. He ordered his troops to stick on to their position. Our mortar position came under enemy attack. The enemy ring was getting closer and closer every minute. Jafar Imam again informed Khaled, who ultimately ordered them to pull back on Chitalia.
Through cover our troops managed to fall back on Chitalia by morning. Enroute our withdrawing troops gave clean battle to the pursuing enemy. Our troops destroyed the bridge at Fulgazi to disrupt the enemy pursuit.
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At Chitalia, a hasty defence was organised by Gaffar and Imamuzzaman’s companies. Imamuzzaman was covering the left flank up to Muhuri river while Gaffar deployed his troops astride the district board road. Under the cover of these companies Jafar Imam with his troop withdrew to Parshuram area.
On June 18, the enemy crossed Muhuri river by helicopters and surrounded Imamuzzaman. He also had to withdraw.
Next Gaffar was attacked from both side of his flanks and the enemy blocked his way to Parshuram. It was difficult for him to extricate. He, however, managed a safe withdrawal using the railway embankment as a cover.
Enemy followed us there too. Their artillery barrage was brought to bear on us at Parshuram. Our troops were at the fag end of their strength. Their ammunition was exhausted and there was no food. So Parshuram had to be evacuated giving a mobile battle to the enemy. Thus Belonia was occupied by Pakistan army.
Northern Sector
The dividing point between 5 and 11 sectors was Tekerghat. Sector 5 excluded Karimganj-Zakiganj on the east and included Tekerghat on the west. Sector 11 excluded Tekerghat on the east and included Rahumari on the west. By the middle of September, ‘Z’ Force having completed its mission on the north of Mymensingh, left for Sylhet area. Major Taher, a brave officer who having defected from Pakistan Army in the month of August ’71 joined the liberation war and was posted as sector commander of 11 sector. In the absence of ‘Z’ Force he was made responsible to keep this area activated.
‘Z’ Force got trifurcated in Sylhet. It was placed within the operational control of ECHO – one sector of the Indian command. The concept of operation of ‘Z Force thereafter underwent a drastic change. Under the new concept 3 East Bengal was placed on the north. This battalion was to clear Gowainghat-Chhatak road upto Sylhet with Major Shafaat Jamil in command. 1 East Bengal was placed opposite Zakiganj for clearing Zakiganj-Sylhet road with Major Ziauddin in command.
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8 East Bengal was to enter Sylhet through ShamshernagarFenchuganj road. This battalion was commanded by Major Aminul Haque, another brave and capable young officer. Zakiganj and Shamshernagar-Fenchuganj area was in Sector 4. Dutta needed some extra hands to operate in this sector effectively. 1 and 8 East Bengal was thus able to fill in the gaps.
Sector 11 had just come up with its HQ at Mahendraganj. The sector was organized into five sub-sectors. These were Mainkerchar, Mahendraganj, Dhalu, Baghmara and Rangra. This was a vast and difficult terrain from attackers point of view, undulating and semi-hilly ground with green vegetation, provided lot of cover to the defender. On the other hand the attacker had a tough going. There were numerous char land on the old Brahmaputra bed, which were only individually defensible. The entire char land complex was liberated by ‘Z’ Force with the exception of Char Kodal Kathi on the mouth of Tista. The enemy had a camp at Char Kodal Kathi where the civil population was put to inhuman physical torture.
Taher organised his troops and distributed them to the various sub-sectors. The bulk of his troops were newly trained students, peasants and very small number of trained soldiers. He had Lieutenant Mannan as his adjutant and his sub-sector commander were : Squadron Leader Hamidullah at Mainkerchar and 2nd Lieutenant Asaduzzaman was his assistant. Captain Aziz was placed at Mahendraganj. He had 2nd Lieutenant Mizan and Shamsul Haque as his assistants. Dhalu sub-sector was commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Taher. 2nd Lieutenant Kamal was his assistant. Rangra sub-sector was commanded by Captain Matiur Rahman commonly known as Captain Hamid. Baghmara sub-sector had no Bagladeshi officer. It was commanded by a Captain from the Indian Border Security Force.
On assumption of command the liberation of Char Kodal Kathi became the first task for Taher. Subedar Altaf was given two companies of irregulars for this task. Subedar Altaf along with his troops crossed Brahmaputra in the hours of darkness and infiltrated into Char Kodal Kathi. A few hundred yards away from the enemy camp Altaf quietly dug in near a thick
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vegetation. There was an open space between the enemy position and ours.
The following day, the enemy detected the presence of our troops in the vicinity. They immediately launched an attack on Altaf. This was exactly what Altaf had expected the enemy to do. He opened up. The enemy was in the open. They came under our direct fire. Altaf’s automatics sited at deflated position began to take heavy toll of the enemy. They suffered heavy casualties and the few who survived escaped on their gunboats. Thus Char Kodal Kathi was liberated.
The enemy position at Chilmari as quite strong. After they were driven out of Char Kodal Kathi, they intensified their reprisal action on the liberated area of Rahumari. More often than not they used to carry out raids at Rahumari area on gunboats.
Taher looked on Chilmari as a prize. The enemy had dumped huge quantities of arms and ammunition there. If liberated, Chilmari could substantially make up the acute deficiencies of 11 sector in arms and ammunitions. So Taher decided to attack Chilmari.
Chilmari is an inland port. In addition, it is an important communication centre, having both road and rail communication. It was under Pakistani occupation force.
Warrant Officer Shafiqullah, the intelligence officer of the sector carried out a detailed reconnaissance of the Pakistani troops and disposition at Chilmari. His report revealed that Pakistanis had two companies of regulars, two militia companies, besides there was a strong Razakar force organised by notorious collaborators. The Pakistanis strongly held the railway axis. WAPDA colony at Thanahat and Balbari had concrete bunkers. Their frontage at Chilmari extended from Rajbhita to Jorgachha, both these positions were strongly held. They had few gunboats on the Chilmari ghat behind Char Samad.
Taher worked out a daring plan. The width of the river at Chilmari was approximately 3 miles, interpresed with a number of Char land. The crossing of the river itself, was a gigantic operation. The arrangement of boats, fire support and
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maintaining secrecy of the entire operation were the three main requirements for the successful execution of the plan. The enemy was to be isolated from the rear, as well as from the other localities of the defensive area. To achieve this, enemy’s line of communication from the rear had to be snapped and a simultaneous attack had to be launched on maximum number of defensive localities in the area. This pre-supposed adoption of infiltration as a method of operation and the bringing of the four available guns nearer to the objective.
The attack was planned in two phases. Phase one — the cut of party was to be secretly in position somewhere in the interior so that when the main attack was launched they could easily disrupt the enemy communication. This move was to be completed by October 9. Phase two — the main body to embark on 60 country boats to carry them to the enemy shore. The four guns were to be moved to Char Chaliapara where sector command post would also be established. The rendezvous was established at Ghazir Char, which was about two miles to the south of Chilmari. D-Day was fixed on October 11, and H-hour at 4 a.m.
Then he allotted his troops according to tasks assigned to them. Naib Subedar Mannan, a brave soldier, was to destroy the enemy at WAPDA colony. The WAPDA house was used by the officers. This was the main target. For this task, in addition to personal weapons, Mannan was given two 3.5 inch rocket launchers. Commander Chand was given the task of attacking Jorgachha, Rajbhita, Thanahat police station and the bridge area behind. The troops were armed with ‘303 rifles, stenguns and hand grenades.
The main body was further broken up in 6 small groups. These groups were commanded by Khalid, Dulu, Sulaiman, Nur Ahmed, Alo and Nazrul. Each group was allotted a minor task except Balbari which was not held by the enemy during night.
Infiltration was completed by 1 a.m. The attacking troops were getting ready in their forming up places. Taher, in his command post, was anxiously counting the crucial moments. His head was heavy with many thoughts. Here was a lilliput army embarking on an impossible task.
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As it struck 4, rocket launchers roared on the WAPDA house and with it the entire Chilmari complex burst out with fire works. Our artillery brought fire to bear on the enemy gunboats.
By 6 a.m. Jorgachha, Rajbhita police station and the bridge area came under our control. WAPDA house was still standing out. The enemy was firing on us from the concrete bunkers around the WAPDA house. Only two rocket launchers were not enough to neutralise the area.
Chand was holding the police station. He had dumped huge quantities of ammunition and a total of 76 small arms. He was holding on against strong enemy pressure. Chand frantically asked for reinforcement. The enemy was quickly taking up position at Balbari and all along the railway track.
Taher left his command post on his small gunboat. At Ghazirchar Squadron Leader Hamidullah was busy interrogating the prisoners of war. Taher along with his LMG escort rushed towards the police station. But before he could reach there, Chand had to abandon the position. The enemy started firing from the police station. The LMG escort got deployed’ and commenced a hot exchange of fire. Under cover of LMG fire Taher’s men attacked the enemy on the railway track and drove the enemy away.
Taher followed the enemy along the railway track. The enemy at Balbari began to take ground. They were ready to resist Taher’s advance.
Taher returned to the police station. The captured arms and ammunitions were despatched to Ghazirchar. The enemy at the WAPDA house stubbornly held the position. But Mannan kept them contained. Balbari position could not do much to help out the enemy situation at Chilmari.
In the evening Taher fell back on Ghazirchar. It was not possible to hold on to Chilmari with the mighty Brahmaputra at the back, nor was it the intention. The enemy was sufficiently punished, killed and shaken by the surprise attack launched by Taher. This attack was able to break the morale of the enemy. Besides this, Taher got a good prize out of this attack in the form of arms and ammunitions, a war booty which was much needed by the ill equipped lilliputian army of 11 sector.
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As it struck 4, rocket launchers roared on the WAPDA house and with it the entire Chilmari complex burst out with fire works. Our artillery brought fire to bear on the enemy gunboats.
By 6 a.m. Jorgachha, Rajbhita police station and the bridge area came under our control. WAPDA house was still standing out. The enemy was firing on us from the concrete bunkers around the WAPDA house. Only two rocket launchers were not enough to neutralise the area.
Chand was holding the police station. He had dumped huge quantities of ammunition and a total of 76 small arms. He was holding on against strong enemy pressure. Chand frantically asked for reinforcement. The enemy was quickly taking up position at Balbari and all along the railway track.
Taher left his command post on his small gunboat. At Ghazirchar Squadron Leader Hamidullah was busy interrogating the prisoners of war. Taher along with his LMG escort rushed towards the police station. But before he could reach there, Chand had to abandon the position. The enemy started firing from the police station. The LMG escort got deployed’ and commenced a hot exchange of fire. Under cover of LMG fire Taher’s men attacked the enemy on the railway track and drove the enemy away.
Taher followed the enemy along the railway track. The enemy at Balbari began to take ground. They were ready to resist Taher’s advance.
Taher returned to the police station. The captured arms and ammunitions were despatched to Ghazirchar. The enemy at the WAPDA house stubbornly held the position. But Mannan kept them contained. Balbari position could not do much to help out the enemy situation at Chilmari.
In the evening Taher fell back on Ghazirchar. It was not possible to hold on to Chilmari with the mighty Brahmaputra at the back, nor was it the intention. The enemy was sufficiently punished, killed and shaken by the surprise attack launched by Taher. This attack was able to break the morale of the enemy. Besides this, Taher got a good prize out of this attack in the form of arms and ammunitions, a war booty which was much needed by the ill equipped lilliputian army of 11 sector.
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Latitilla border outpost of Pakistan, had since been an eyesore for us. This border outpost on the Pakistan side of the border was a well defended area. It had to its credit a number of border clashes against Indian border outpost at Kukital in the past. The enemy held it with a platoon.
Captain Rabb was given the plan by Lieutenant Colonel Devenson, commanding officer of 7 Raj Rif. The attack would be preceded by neutralization of the Pakistani border outpost by Indian artillery fire. At 4 a.m. on June 19, Rabb commenced his move from the assembly area. At 5-45 a.m. the troops closed in. Latitilla border outpost was in the lap of deathly sleep.
As scheduled, suddenly artillery fire opened up and continued neutralizing the enemy for good 20 minutes. As the artillery fire stopped Rabb charged Latitilla. The enemy was taken by surprise. They began to run in panic and in the process many of them got killed. Latitilla border outpost crumbled to pieces. Our troops captured huge quantities of arms and ammunition. This action was a great morale raising factor for us. Latitilla, a symbol of invincibility of Pakistan was shattered and the Pakistan army could never venture to recapture this post during liberation war.
On the north, Latu began to grow as a threat to our sanctuary at Kharampur. Latu, best known as Shahbazpur was held by a company of 31 Punjab and a platoon of Rangers and armed Razakars. The enemy conducted a reign of terror in the surroundings particularly at Kumarshak and Kharampur.
Dutta approved a daring plan of attack on Latu. On August 10, Rabb crossed the international border with five companies of irregulars. Having blocked the Barlekha and Beanibazar escape routes to the enemy Rabb called for artillery fire and waited at the forming up place at Kharampur with three companies for launching the attack.
The attack went in little after 5 a.m. against strong resistance by the enemy. A part of Latu was cleared. The enemy immediately brought in a very heavy artillery fire on us and followed it up by a desperate counter-attack resulting in Rabb’s

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retreat. But this attack cost the enemy many lives and on our side we lost five brave soldiers. In the mean time some organizational changes had taken place in Sector No. 4. The enemy stronghold at Atgram was growing stronger. An unmetalled road link was established between Atgram and Zakiganj on the international border and Pakistan army was busy fortifying Zakiganj also. Dutta planned a desperate seize operation. To accomplish this task he decided to concentrate maximum force at Jalalpur Sub-Sector. At Kukital Captain Dalim lay seriously injured by a shell splinter. Flight Lieutenant Qader took over the command of the subsector. All troops from Kukital, Amalshid, Dharmanagar and Mahishashan were concentrated at Jalalpur sub-sector and the command of his force was given to Captain Rabb.
Two companies were to go to the enemy’s rear to the west of Atgram and block the Sylhet road. One company to clear the metalled road Atgram-Zakiganj at Kamalpur and the forth company was to take up defensive position at village Gotagram on Atgram-Zakiganj unmetalled road. Rabb remained with this company.
The operations started on November 9. The first encounter was made by the enemy at Kamalpur at 11 p.m. The company took half an hour to clear the opposition. The gap thus, being made enable the rest of the companies to cross in safety.
The village Gotagram had a Razakar camp which was surrounded by one of the platoon from Rabb’s company around 5 a.m. and all the Razakars were caught alive except one who escaped to Atgram.
Atgram had a company plus of infantry and one company each of Razakars and Khyber scouts. Having been informed, the enemy, immediately advanced on Gotagram with a platoon. The enemy also sent columns to Kamalpur and to the Sylhet road where our troops had taken up position.
Rabb got his LMG man on the enemy advancing near Gotagram and killed all of them. At the other two places also the enemy was successfully repulsed.
By evening Atgram received re-inforcement form Sylhet. They also got a battery of 105 mm howitzer. In the evening of
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November 10, at about 5 p.m. the enemy advanced on Gotagram led by a huge crowd of civilians. As they closed within range, fire was opened. The civilians disappeared in no time. But the enemy formed up for at three-pronged attack with artillery support. The attack was launched and the pressure began to grow stronger. The liberation forces stuck to their position and fought on.
At 8 p.m. Rabb started running short of ammunition. Replenishment was most difficult. It was at this stage that Rabb had to order a retreat. An ambitious plan as it was, for its success, logistic support should have been ensured.
The seize of Atgram having failed, it was planned to liberate through conventional attack. November 20, the night following the Eid day was fixed for the attack. One battalion of the Guards with tank and artillery support was given the tasks of clearing Zakiganj. One battalion of Gurkha regiment and East Bengal troops of the ‘Z’ force, were given the task of clearing Atgram, a very strong enemy position. Salam Tilla and Raja Tilla on ,the other bank of Surma were assigned to the irregular forces under Rabb.
The attack on Zakiganj was launched on the night of November 20-21. By 1 p.m. Zakiganj was liberated. Atgram was cleared by the evening of November 22. 1 East Bengal in this battle lost on of its brave company commander Captain Mahboob. By November 21, Salam Tilla and Raja Tilla were captured by Rabb. This successful attack took the liberation army across the Surma and their onward march towards Sylhet continued
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Twiilight Border
Fifteen hundred miles of border radiated with the rays of hope. All frantic eyes of millions of refugees sparkled as they looked on towards the sprawling horizon where lay chances of life for the unfortunate Bengalees. In an unending stream, they began their journey towards the twilight border. It was an exodus unparallel in the history of mankind and the road to the border was too long for the immigrants to sustain the miseries and hazards it had in store. Yet the stream of human beings continued to flow out through the innumerable hidden paths, foot tracks, marshes and rivers.
The state government of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura directed all the resources under their command to tackle this gigantic human problem. A crash programme was launched without losing any time to set up reception centre and refugee camps. It was no small a problem. Pressure began to mount as the influx of refugee reached massive proportions. By mid-April a daily average of 40,000 men, women and children had to be sheltered and fed. Thanks to the Indian administration. Memory of those days evokes a deep sense of gratitude for our great friendly neighbour for their warmth of heart, their affection and sympathy towards us in those perilous days. The Indian proviences bordering Bangladesh, in no time, were turned into a veritable refugee sanctuary. Mashroom camps of thatches and canvass camp up. A government organisation was set up for the construction of camps, for setting up of the reception centres and for their maintenance of provisions. Supply of essential food-stuff and baby food for the infants never failed to reach the unfortunate camp dwellers. Apart from this, a daily allowance was also advanced to them to meet their other expenses.
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As the camps began to swell up with teeming population, the general sanitation condition of the camps reached a deplorable state. Soon every camp became a health hazard. Epidemic started visiting them frequently with a heavy toll in dead. Probably they preferred this type of death, less humiliating and inhuman, than in the hands of Pakistani soldiers.
Around these camps grew another type of camp, smaller in size, called youth camp. Initially most of the youths come from the refugee camps. These young boys were mostly from the student community and farmer stock. Fleeing away from Bangladesh, leaving behind their kith and kin, these boys had but one aim before them, join the liberation force.
These young and able-bodied men of the camps were our prized possession. In the wake of organising their camps for imparting a purposeful training, a long thinking process remained constantly engaged at higher echelons.
The headquarters of the Bangladesh army came into existence on April 12. It was a field headquarters, light and mobile, headed by the commander-in chief. By May 71, an organization for this headquarters was worked out which is given on the next page.
Youth camps figured quite prominent in the organisation of headquarters of Bangladesh army. Within the concept of a total war of the people of Bangladesh, these youths were assigned a complimentary role of creating a base force, dedicated to the cause of liberation. The government of Bangladesh took upon herself the noble task of training these dedicated young people and arming them to destroy the enemy by adopting guerrilla tactics. This training would include a vast spectrum of subjects from physical training to ploughing of land from standing on a queue in the morning to the use of arms and explosives.
On arrival at the reception centre, after due registration and documentation, eligible young men were taken in the youth camps. Each batch of youth further subdivided into balanced groups and working teams.
First two days were devoted to this preliminary work. This was followed by two weeks of intense training with emphasis on motivation. On completion of this training cycles, the trainees
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were then eligible for recruitment in the Bangladesh forces. Many of them could not be taken by us as we did not have sufficient resources for imparting training. On the other hand many of them did not fulfill our standards of recruitment. Those who could not join the Bangladesh forces voluntarily underwent another additional two weeks training with special bias on rural development work, rural arts and crafts and self-government practices. On expiry of the second phase of two weeks training the trainees were briefed by the locality leaders, tasks assigned and group leaders appointed and they finally passed out as freedom fighters.
The concept of youth camps, therefore, went far beyond he bounds of the camps. It found for itself ‘Safe Base’ in the villages and derived its strength from self-governing village panchayets. it aimed at enlisting the participation of other young men who were outside the limits of the youth camps. In the overall scheme of a total war, the role of people at large, in expanding the scope of war effort, did find a prominent place in the training schedule of the youth camps.
An average youth camp had 3,000 to 4,000 trainees. These were commanded by political leaders and young students. The instructional staff were provided by the Bangladesh forces.
Youth camp scheme came into force on May 16. Before this, there was no regular systems of recruitment. We organised our own training camps. Teliapara was one such camp in my sector. Later on, in June when the intake increased, this camp was moved to Teliamura. This training camp turned out to be one of the largest. Lieutenant Colonel Mazumder of the Indian army commanded this camp till the last.
As the youth camps went into full production, more army training camps came up. For convenience of movement these youth camps were established near communication centres. In the vicinity of these camps a good number of army training camps were set up. Bakshanagar, Baghdogra, Bishalnaghar, Bujanagar, Dauki, Debipur, Dhanpur, Durga-Choudhuripara, Hapania, Harina, Kampthana, Kathalia, Konabari, Konabon, Mainkarchar, Motinagar, Narshingar, Nirbhoypur, Patgram, Rajnagar, Rangamura, Raumari, Shaldanadi, Shingarbil, Zirania.
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Training camps were also located along with some of these camps. Baghafa, Baghmara, Balurghat, Cooch Bihar, Gauhati, Kalachhara, Masimpur, Melaghar, Nimbuchhara, Palatana (near Udaypur), Shillong and Tetulia were organised as army training camps.
The training camps were many. It was not possible for us to provide necessary training and administrative staff to these camps. In these camps, we therefore, had Indian staff also, both for training and administration.
Each sector had a colossal strength of freedom fighters, commonly called guerrillas. Their strength was roughly 90,000 or more. Sectorwise breakdown was : sector one — 5,000, sector two – 20,000, sector three — 25,000, sector four — 5,000, sector five — 5,000, sector six – 5,000, sector seven — 5,000, sector eight – 9,000, sector nine — 4,000 and sector eleven – 7,000. This strength was in excess of the authorised strength. The ration entitlement and the pocket money sanctioned by the Bangladesh government was always less than feeding strength. The shortfall was met by curtailing the individual entitlements.
The sectors exercised both administrative and operational control over these freedom fighters. Their deployment and operation was within the framework of the sector plan. But we were neither rigid about their discipline nor did we initially try to bring them within the fold of existing army rules and regulations. It was expected of them to gradually develop the sense of discipline and acquire requisite knowledge of the ways of the army as they proceeded in their career as guerillas. There was another consideration for not being rigid with them. They were selfless freedom fighters. They were not given any regular allowance. A meagre amount in the form of induction money was given to them as subsistence and when they were required on mission in their respective bases in Bangladesh. Their entitlement to pocket money was also not regular.
When the army and the guerillas were fighting the liberation war with increasing vigour on all fronts, a group of youth, picked up from all and sundry, began to disappear to some discreet rendezvous. This was noticed during early June. Since then this became a regular feature and soon it began to tell upon
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us. We often felt that our guerilla bands were left leaderless and youth camps were being denuded of the bright boys. It became a burning issue for the sector commanders when these very boys were launched on special missions within the sectors without even the faintest knowledge of the sector commanders. This was strongly resented to by the sector commanders who argued that, this amounted to, not only interference but also, compromised their operational plan. This was more than likely that with the creation of this force, a sense of rivalry might creep up in our rank and file. Milking out all the bright boys from the guerilla bands and from the youth camps created a leadership vacuum which was detrimental to our cause.
This was the brain wave of General Oban, the veteran guerilla expert of the Indian army who drew up this scheme with the approval of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the cabinet division of Indian government. It was named Mujib Bahini, trained at Deradun.
Obviously enough this was an elite force consisting of carefully selected young patriotic Bengalees, well trained, well armed and led by selected leaders belonging to rightist political groups. Young leaders who were picked up to organise this force were Messrs Sheikh Fazlul Hoque Moni, Tofail Ahmed, Abdur Razzak and sirajul Alam Khan. Sheikh Moni in the eastern sector, Razzak in the northern i.e. Mymensingh area, Sirajul Alam Khan in north and west i.e. Rangpur and Dinajpur area and Tofael Ahmed in the western sector were super- imposed over the regular sectors.
I have no reason to under-estimate their capability and efficiency if not better, they were definitely at par with the guerillas trained by us, in their quality as soldiers. They were drunk with the political indoctrination. They had sophisticated weapons and equipments, far better that those with the guerillas by us. Its roles and functions in the initial stage were not known to us.
Side by side with the Bangladesh operational sectors there came up six Indian sectors. Those were Alfa at Moorti camp — West Bengal, Bravo at Raiganj – West Bengal, Charlie at Chakulia – Bihar, Delta at Deota Mura – Tripura, Echo-one at
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Masimpur-Assam, Foxtrot at Tura-Meghalaya; commanded respectively by brigadiers BC Joshi, Prem Singh, N A Salik, Shabeg Singh, M B Wadke and Sant Singh. These were the sectors who provided all the military hardware required by the Bangladesh forces. It was not an easy task to extract military assistance from them where even in the thick of the battle, our troops failed to get the required supply of arms and ammunitions. Communication was never satisfactory. What little communication we had, it was all out of those which we brought along with us when we defected from Pakistan and later captured some from the enemy. Lack of timely artillery support often cost us heavily in terms of casualty and loss of territory. But there were some within Bangladesh who were always on the right side of the Indian sectors in matters of military assistance.
In the initial days of the liberation war when the regular troops of the Bengal Regiments, East Pakistan Rifles and Police were resisting the occupation forces of Pakistan, some Bahinis came into existence in the interior of the country. They of their own ware conducting an operation of hide and seek against the enemy. Their movement was mainly confined within the locality where they belonged to. Their resistance against the Pakistan army started gaining momentum with the passage of time as they started getting military assistance from India.
Young, Abdul Qadir Siddiqi of Tangail organised a sizable force know as Kader Bahini. Kader Siddiqi, a dominating personality, defiant and arrogant in attitude, was able to install sufficient courage and confidence amongest the local public in his favour.
Since the departure of 2 East Bengal during the initial days of liberation war, Mymensingh remained out of the jurisdiction of the regular troops of Bangladesh. During the August assemblage of April 4 at Teliapara, Lieutenant Colonel S M Reza was detailed for operation in Mymensingh region which never materialised. Until later, ‘Z’ Force was organised in June 71 under Zia with its headquarters at Tura, Mymensingh somehow remained out of our active control. 11 sector, as it was called, could not bring Kader Siddiqi within its fold. In Bhaluka, Baten and Afsaruddin also organised similar bands of young
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men under their command. These Bahinis failed to work in unison and cooperation with each other and consequently fell victim to the onslaught of the Pakistan army. The mutual jealousy between these Bahinis led them to internal feuds wherein they attempted to overshadow each other. In the process they got exhausted, disorganised and weakened and could no more dominate their localities. Pakistan army had extended their, sway over these areas. Kader Siddiqi, Baten and Afsaruddin fell across the border at the time when 11 sector got organised. Baten and Afsaruddin joined my sector, sector 3. Bhaluka thus fell within my sector.
Kader Siddiqi crossed into India in the month of June 71 and contacted the Indian authority. He was able to arrange a regular flow of arms and ammunition from India. He even managed to get some trained manpower. Thus equipped with arms and ammunitions, Kader Siddiqi returned to Tangail. He was then a stronger man, but remained static and localised. Throughout the liberation war he remained aloof within his locality. His war efforts, therefore, was localised and could not influence the liberation war that was mounting high and gathering momentum all over Bangladesh under an unified command.
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Guerilla Is Another Name
If anything that scared a Pakistani soldier to his stomach, it was the word ‘Mukti’. It became almost an obsession with them. Mukti phobia was a living nightmare. Guerilla is the other name for this legendary word.
The prevailing conditions precluded the need for continuing the conventional method of fighting. The foremost reason was that we did not have a large enough fighting machine to contain our adversary. Our equipment was rickety, outdated and meagre. A protracted war on conventional lines was out of the question. On the other hand the country was ours. Its terrain was familiar to us; its nature, its roads tracks and streams, its gardens and bushes and even the backyards of our village-folks were not only known to us, these were also our playground of childhood days. The people’s support was behind us. They had already shown their unqualified support and cooperation to the cause. With this background, a guerilla warfare had a bright prospect of success. This fact was always foremost in our mind and accordingly I had already organised a number of guerilla bases in my area of operation and trained young men in carrying out guerilla tasks.
July 10 sector commanders ten-day long marathon conference in Mujib Nagar began with an unpleasant note. Colonel Osmany the commander-in-chief of the Bangladesh forces had reportedly resigned and the Prime Minister Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed was in the chair. The actual reason behind taking such a drastic step was not known. But it was presumed that it must be due to some remarks about the prevailing command set up in the Bangladesh forces. The commander-inchief exercised his command from the Bangladesh forces headquarters at Mujib Nagar on the western border. At Agartala on the eastern border an echelon headquarters was set up with a
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chief of staff at the helm of affairs. Lt. Col. Abdur Rabb was appointed as chief of staff at the echelon headquarters who had no operational responsibility.
Major Q N Zaman was then commanding some troops at Ashrambari. According to him, which was also the views of almost all, it was practically impossible for Colonel Osmany to effectively control and direct this war effort alone from his headquarters at Mujib Nagar. It was felt that he should delegate some of his authorities to others. He, therefore, suggested that in order to effectively direct the war effort there should be a war council, comprising of the senior army officers. The entire Bangladesh be divided into three areas; i.e. the eastern, the western and the northern areas. The commanders of these areas be given independent responsibility to conduct their individual operations. It was also observed that Colonel Osmany, with the existing set up was not exercising effective command from Mujib Nagar. Those who took part in this discussion were myself, Zia, Khaled, Nurul Islam, Rafiq and many others.
Colonel Osmany must have been hurt when this talk travelled to him in a twisted manner and consequently submitted his resignation. On the conference day after a preliminary discussion with the Prime Minister we all came to the conclusion that Colonel Osmany must withdraw his resignation and he should remain as commander-in-chief and therefore, on the second day of the conference Colonel Osmany was called in whereupon he was requested to withdraw his resignation which he did. From the second day onwards Colonel Osmany conducted the conference of all the sector commanders.
The sector commanders and the staff officers who attended this conference from July 10 onwards were; Lieutenant Colonel Rabb, Major Safiullah, Major Zia, Major Nuruzzaman, Major Dutta, Major Khaled, Wing Commander Bashar, Major Osman, Captain Rafiq, Captain Jalil and Major A. R. Chowdhury (AOCS-Log).
In this conference, existing sector areas were reviewed and boundaries defined. The attached map indicates the sector boundaries. The other details of these operational sectors are given at annexure-A.
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Bangladesh was divided into eleven operational sectors but by July 71 only eight sectors could be made operational. The sectors which were not operative upto July 71, were 5, 10 and 11 sectors. Therefore, in this conference of the sector commanders there were no representatives from these sectors. The conference ended with a number of specific recommendations. The main purpose of this conference was to launch a vigorous countrywide guerilla warfare. Therefore, apart from clearly demarcating the sector boundaries the following recommendations were also taken:
– Each Sector will organise guerilla bases within his
franchise area.
-Each guerilla base will have a small number of regulars who would form the nucleus and would provide the leadership in guerilla operation.
-Each Sector / guerilla bases would have their intelligence network for proper and quick collection, dissipation and dissemination of information.
-Each guerilla bases will have a political adviser to conduct motivation lecture sessions.
-Each Sector would raise medical team to take care of the sick and wounded guerillas.
-Each Sector under central guidelines would launch psychological warfare side by side with armed operation to break the morale of the enemy.
-Each Sector’s operation will include disruption of communication system. Sectoral operation would also include destruction of raw materials and finished products in enemy godowns and elsewhere.
– Each sectoral operation will make allout effort to deny logistic and transportation facilities to enemy.
-Each sector will make effort to create a public opinion against those, who collaborates with the occupation forces, and if necessary eliminate them.
-Also create an unusual atmosphere in Dhaka and other main cities to nullify propaganda media that things are normal.
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During the conference we had to work out our requirements and quantum of troops to activate our respective sectors. In order to keep my sector areas active I estimated that a minimum of ten infantry companies would be required and therefore I had divided my sector into 10 sub-sectors whom I allotted a company each. These sub-sectors, according to the dictates of the situation, fought both conventional and unconventional war. The sub-sector commanders were responsible for reinforcing the guerilla bases. They were also responsible to ensure the safety of routes. In doing so, at time, they were engaged in pitched battles.
My sub-sector commanders were Captain Aziz at Asrambari, Captain Ejaj at Bagha Bari, Captain Matiur Rahman at Hathkata. Captain Matin at Simna, Captain Nasim at Panchabati, Captain Subed Ali Bhuyan at Mantala. Lieutenant Shamsul Huda Bachchu at Bijoynagar, Lieutenant Majumder at Kalachhara, Lieutenant Morshed at Kalkalia and Lieutenant Sayeed at Bassotia.
Major Nurul Islam my second-in-command was hardly any help to me. After our arrival at Teliapara he placed himself around No-2 Sector area to extricate his wife and children from Dhaka. Once they joined him he found a suitable place for him at Calcutta as Military Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed. However, at this stage Cap. Nuruzzaman came to join me. I appointed him as my second-in ommand. Therefore, at this stage in my sector headquarter I had Capt. Nuruzzaman working as my second-in-command, Lieutenant Ibrahim as adjutant, Mr. Nuruddin Kamal as Administrative and Logistic officer and Mr. M A Mahi the Accounts officer. Mr. Kamal had Mr. Alkas and Mr. Ashique to assist him in his gigantic task of collection and distribution of ration, arms and ammunitions, in addition to induction of guerillas, and providing operational support service to Sector Commander. While Mr. Mahi worked with a small clerical staff for payment and maintenance of account of the sector and over 25,000 guerillas operating inside Bangladesh. These bright young civilian staffs on all occasions conducted themselves like regular military personnel and at times participated in military operations of the sector.
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In the light of the directive of the commandr-in-chief, I introduced a lot a improvement in all my guerilla bases. There were possibilities of clash between the bases of the neighbouring sub-sectors. To obviate this possibility the bordering bases were clearly demarcated. Personal relationship was grown between the guerillas of the neighbouring bases. Tasks were carefully chosen for each base and mutual coordination was maintained between the commanders.
We had no wireless or line communication on regular basis between the headquarters and the bases. I employed a reliable but rather slow system of communication through ‘runners’. However at Raipura and Monohardi we had two wireless sets through which regular communication was maintained with the headquarters.
Two political advisers were deputed in each base. My guerillas used to get political direction through them. These two political men maintained contact with me at my headquarters. They visited my headquarters once a month. The guerillas and the regulars serving in these bases used to get their pocket money, through their commanders. The political advisers submitted their strength list to the headquarters a month in advance. On expiry of the month they used to collect the cash and deliver the same to the respective commanders.’
By August and September, the guerilla activities increased manifold in its intensity and effectiveness. The enemy dared not go out in small groups. They organised two perimeter defence around their posts. The outer perimeter was guarded by the Razakars and the inner by themselves. Their morale was on its lowest ebb. Any unusual noise or sound around their post would make them pale and at times they would cry out ‘Mukti Agaya’ (the freedom fighers have come).
During this period all river, rail and road communication almost came to a stand still. Schools, colleges and bazars never functioned properly. Even the life in the cities under Pakistani control was anything but normal. With the guerilla activity gaining momentum, the occupation army felt utterly insecure anywhere in Bangladesh.
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Guerilla operations were numerous. Here I would mention only a few of them which were relatively significant and had far reaching effect. * In the following paragraphs the readers will get a cross-section idea of the diversity of these operations.

Ambush at Madhabpur
Madhabpur fell on 28 April. Sherpur-Shadipur line was cleared by the enemy earlier. Thus Sylhet highway was open to the enemy but they could not straight-away use this highway for their vehicular traffic as we demolished the bridges on this road. However, they prepared the diversions by earth filling where we damaged the bridges and brought it under use.
I instructed my troops to make this highway hazardous for the enemy move and ordered them to ambush the enemy column continuously so that their line of communication is disrupted Lieutenant Morshed was sent on one such mission. He planned a daring ambush on a diversion near a bridge and selected 12 men from under his command for this mission. On 23 May, at about 2 a.m. he reached the ambush site along with his men. There he laid two anti-tank mines on a diversion, covered them and lay in wait for the enemy to come.
It rained that night. Morshed and his men completely drenched, lay there until 10 a.m. the following morning. The bait remained undisturbed as no Pakistani convoy passed. Morshed and his 12 men with the sleepless night, got tired and moved to a nearby deserted village to rest. They took shelter in one of the deserted house, not very far from the ambush site.
It was about 3 p.m. when a Pakistani battalion convoy appeared on the road heading towards Brahmanbaria. Morshed with his men quickly moved to the ambush site unnoticed. The convoy was led by a jeep. It was a very big convoy for which Morshed was not prepared. As the jeep started to negotiate the diversion, the buried mine exploded. The jeep blew in the air and fell off the road. The second vehicle indecisively made a dash forward and met with the same fate. The convoy stopped and the troops debussed.
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* The operations that I narrated here took place in my area of operation. Similar operation took place in other sector area too.

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At this stage Morshed opened up all fire power under his command, inflicted heavy casualties on the nervous enemy and extricated himself from the ambush site with the fastest speed. The neighbouring village was suspected by the enemy as our sanctuary. Enemy numbered about 300 surrounded the village for taking their usual course of vendetta. Morshed and his men extricated from the ambush site to a safe distance using nullah and the fold of the ground.
Thereafter they covered their withdrawal with fire and movement for about two miles with the enemy closely following behind. It is significant to mention here that the use of anti-tank mine in such operation was made for the first time in the liberation war. As a result of this action the enemy suffered heavy casualties in men and material.
Apart from Morshed and another NCO, this ambush party consisted entirely of the students trained by us before launching them for this action. Out of this group of students, Salim, Salam and Anis acted very bravely. They later on got commission in the Bangladesh Army.
Ambush at Nalua Tea Garden
Few miles to the east of Shaistaganj, Nalua tea garden restricts the road within the lap of a defile. Following the ambush of Madhabpur, Matiur Rahman with 13 men under him laid an ambush on the Sylhet highway at Nalua. He also used anti-tank mines on the road. It was May 15. An enemy company moving in a convoy was bound for Brahmanbaria. It was about 2 p.m. when the enemy column entered the ambush site.
The column was moving at its usual speed, quite cautious but did not suspect that they have entered an ambush site. As they were passing over the mine, over of the mine exploded and blew the vehicle which come over. The enemy truck quickly got reduced to charred junk. Matiur and his men lying in wait in the victinity under cover of the tea plants opened fire. A fierce battle took place where the enemy company suffered heavy casualties. Enemy was more in number. Matiur, therefore, pulled his men to safety before they could engage him. Before withdrawing, some of the enemy shirt pockets were searched where a letter was
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found in the pocket of a dead soldier which revealed the despicable condition of morale of the enemy. Later we learnt from the employees of the tea garden that 27 enemy soldiers were killed and many more injured in this action. Captain Matiur and Havilder Abul Kalam, due to their personal courage, made this ambush a success.

First Ambush at Teliapara
The enemy could not easily digest the debacle at Nalua tea garden. On May 16 they despatched some troops towards Brahmanbaria through Chunarughat-Teliapara highway. Matin was manning the defences at Teliapara. From this defence he milked out a few of his men and laid an ambush on the Chunarughat highway. He also used anti-tank mines. In this ambush one enemy vehicle was destroyed and the troops suffered casualitiesin dead and wounded. Matin and his men fell back to the main defence soon after successfully inflicting damage to the enemy.
Second Ambush at Teliapara
The successive ambushes over the last few days began to tell upon the enemy at Chunarughat area. It was not unknown to the enemy that it was from Teliapara that activities were being directed and initiated. The enemy previously made several attempts to capture Teliapara but to no avail. In their desperate bid to make a decisive strike at Teliapara the enemy got two companies from Brahmanbaria to reinforce their forces at Chunarughat.
Morshed relieved Matin on May 19, He decided to deny the enemy reinforcement from Brahmanbaria and the use of Teliapara-Chunarughat highway. He used four anti-tank mines at night and lay in wait for the enemy. Having laid the mines on the metalled road he covered them with coal-tar. And in order to camouflage it he ran a vehicle tyre over that. The convoy came as expected. The mines did not explode as the first vehicle went passed. The next two vehicles went over the mines close to each other and there was an explosion. The whole convoy came to a stand-still. The troops after debussing collected in a clearance, a small distance away.
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Morshed had a machine gun ready there. As the enemy formed a perfect target the machine gun inflicted its full share of casualties. In this ambush we got a good amount of arms and ammunition from the enemy. We got one of their good vehicles which was in running condition in addition to three destroyed. Over one hundred enemy soldiers were killed or wounded in this action. But Teliapara could not be held for long though it had given us due divident.

Belabo Operation
Till July 14, Pakistan army could not lay their hands on Raipura, Narshingdi, Kapasia, Monohardi, Kuliarchar, Bajitpur and Katiadi. We had established strong guerilla bases in all these places. The occupation army decided to bring these place under their control. In this effort they selected Belabo as their first target.
Subedar Bashar was in command at Belabo. Through his intelligence he learnt about the enemy plan. The enemy would come on launches along the Banar river. Accordingly Bashar planned and ambush at Tok, a place on the upstream.
The enemy through agents got the information of ambush and slightly modified his mode of conveyance. They inducted some country boats and boarded them. The boats came first and crossed Tok. Bashar lay quiet in his hideout. He did not realise that the enemy has already crossed him in boats. He was waiting for the launch to come. It came, but it was empty. As the launch came within range Bashar and his men opened fire. In the mean time the leading boats banked and the enemy troops landed without any opposition. They came behind Bashar and encircled him. But our men did not surrender to the enemy. Being inside the ring they boldly fought and killed number of enemies. The fight continued for a couple of hours. At last a few of our men broke the ring and fell back. Subedar Abdul Bashar, Sepoys Abdul Bari, Nurul Wahab, Sohrab Hussain, Momtazuddin, Abdul Hoque and Abdus Salam laid their lives in this battle. We later recovered the dead body of Subedar Bashar in a turmeric field. He had a bullet injury in his stomach. In an effort to stop – bleeding Bashar tore his own shirt and bandaged the wound. His
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LMG was lying by his side. Probably when he was sure of his death, he tore off the important documents with his own hands lest they fell in the hands of the enemy. The invaluable contribution of Subedar Bashar and his brave comrades in the liberation struggle can never be forgotten.

Ambush at Katiadi
Belaboo operation gave the occupation army a moral boost. They became overconfident about themselves. They made their defences at Monohordi and decided to take Katiadi. This would enable them to take on Bajitpur and Kuliarchar, two strongholds of the liberation forces, with ease.
Havilder Akmal Ali was in command at Katiadi. He lay in wait for the enemy on a pre-selected area on the bank of old Brahmaputra.
On August 16 the chance unfolded itself and their long waiting ended with a victory. The enemy in a few launches began to approach Katiadi, full of confidence, Suddenly Akmal’s men got their bait at a point of their own choice and opened fire. The fire was so effective that the enemy could hardly return fire. Some of the launches got drowned and with them their occupants also. In addition, a lot of soldiers in other launches either got killed or injured. A few of them escaped death and got deployed to counter it.
The enemy under fire was in communication with their rear and probably called for SOS. Thus the enemy reinforcement was sent which came very quickly. Akmal, however, having inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy pulled out from the position before they could do any damage to his party. The enemy had to use helicopters for the evacuation of the dead and injured. We learnt later that in this operation the enemy casualties were 143 dead and some wounded. By all standards, it was a suitable reply to the debacle at Belabo.
Ambush at Mukundapur
Nothing was more insecure at that time than travelling by train. Inspite of frequent disasters and inherent drawbacks of rail moves, the enemy could not altogether avoid its use. Because
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probably, they had very little choice. For them day move was insecure with very little difference in degree.
Occasional derailment and train accidents, due to removal of rails, explosions and damage to railway bridges, was taken as a faith accomply by the enemy. They however devised a way so as to avoid the intensity of damage to life and property. For that they used wagons filled with stone and sand tagged ahead of the locomotive engines. The main train remained behind. With this changed tactics, Pakistanis materially profitted.
In order to counter this action of the enemy we also changed our method in the use of explosives, detonation of which was remote controlled through electric circuit. This method of detonation was brought into use for the first time at Mukundapur on the Akhaura-Sylhet railway line.
Enemy was actively busy in opening the railway line between Akhaura and Sylhet. We kept their activities under our observation for a few days and then devised a remote controlled explosion near Mukundapur little south of Harashpur. Two antitank mines were placed under the rails. A remote control was installed about 300 yards away. The ambush party commanded by Morshed lay in wait there.
On September 13, one company of Pakistani troops was due from Akhaura to Harashpur. This train also include two Pakistani officers. The train with its two stone and sand laden prodder wagons crossed Mukundapur about 4 p.m. and was slowly moving towards Harashpur.
The ambush party became alert. The prodder wagons rolled forward. As the engine and the main train got close to the antitank mines a button was pushed in the control. The sound of explosion silenced the hissing sound of the locomotive. 27 enemy soldiers and 2 of their officer got killed in this action and many got injured.
Ambush at Kalenga Forest
The sprawling Kalenga forest around Sreemangal and Satgaon area was a sanctuary for our guerillas. They trailed through this forest quite often to operate in the interior in my area of operation. When the enemy came to learn that it was a guerilla
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sanctuary, they started their operations in Kalenga. To keep this area under active surveillance they decided to establish their headquarters in the rest house. Our men from their hideouts kept the enemy under observation. Some anti-personnel mines were secretly burried on the approach rood to the rest house. To watch the reaction of the enemy, some guerillas were posted in the neighbourhood. On September 20, some Pakistani soldiers entered Kalenga. They went round the forest and after roaming a while they went towards the rest house. On their way as they trampled, one anti-personnel mine exploded. The soldier who stepped on the mine lost his leg and a few were seriously injured. The enemy did not go to the rest house. They made for Shindur Khan.
The next day enemy came with a bigger strength to clear the mine field. They wanted to develop the area into a camp. Our men watched them quietly. They were planning for a bigger kill.
On September 24 our guerillas laid an ambush on the small hillocks on either side of Kalenga-Shindur Khan road. On this way a large body of enemy troops were advancing towards Kalenga. They were led by about 20 to 25 Bengalee Razakars. They were rather confident that day. Our guerillas were watching them. The Razakars came within our trap. The guerillas awaited the arrival of the Pakistani troops. The guiet of the forest suddenly broke asunder, as a sizeable group of Pakistanis entered into the trap. Spontaneous fire from all over the place took a heavy toll. The enemy from outside the ring began to fire on our men but with little effect. Our men, from their well dug in trenches returned fire.
As this exchange of fire continued Naik Abdul Mannan, suddenly ran amock. He jumpe out of his trench, ran towards the enemy who lay wounded and began to shout ‘Joy Bangla” at the top of his voice. He was saying “I will bring a Pakistani alive before my Captain Saheb (Captain Aziz). He will garland me”. Hardly had he finished these words when a burst of machine gun pierced through his chest and another hit him on the head. Naik Mannan recited Kalema, “Laelaha Illallahu Muhammadur Rasulullah”, before he breathed his last. We lost Mannan, a brave soldier.
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In this action one Pakistani officer and 61 soldier got killed. In addition there were many injured. The rest of the enemy managed to escape.
Seize of Monohardi
As the guerilla activity increased, the Pakistani high command decided to increase their strength in the police stations. By October they decided to raise the strength to a company. But with the operational commitment, it was not possible for them to provide the required strength.
To overcome this problem the Pakistanis accepted a risk. Since March 25, they arrested a large number of Bengalee troops both EPR and regular and kept them in jails under inhuman torture. These men under their custody were being regularly put to cruel execution. The authority offered these unfortunate Bengalees a choice. If the offer is accepted, they would have a new lease of life. Otherwise, sure death would await them. Obviously they chose to live.
After obtaining assurance from them to the effect that these Bengalee troops would remain loyal to the Pakistan authority they were posted to various police stations under the command of Pakistanis.
In my area of operation Raipura, Narshingdi, Shibpur, Monohardi, Kapashia and Kaliganj and a few other places had such element of Bengalees. When contacted by our guerillas they assured us of their full support when time came.
At Monohardi Pakistanis had 40 ex-EPR Bengalees and about 36 Pakistanis. Our guerilla base there contacted these EPR boys before October 21. They promised their support. Havilder Akmal Ali, the base commander of Monohardi on October 21 laid a seize of the police station with his company. The EPR boys according to their earlier promise, joined the guerillas. The battle continued for couple of hours. 25 Pakistanis were killed in this action and remaining 11 surrendered. Out of these prisoners, only 4 reached me alive, and the rest got killed by the angry public on the way.
One Pakistani JCO of this camp killed a young boy the previous day. The father of the boy was looking for an
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opportunity. Soon after the surrended the axed this JCO to death thereby avenged the murder of his son.
Havilder Akmal maintained his previous record of courage and valour. It was proved in this action that all Bangalees, wherever they were, had complete faith in the cause of liberation of Bangladesh. Given an opportunity they never failed. It was only fear of life which made them go along with the Pakistanis on occasion.
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The Three Fighting Trio
A new organisational concept started gaining ground as the war progressed. Guerilla warfare continued to harass, weaken and bleed the enemy through small actions, by adopting hit and run tactics, but it was not capable to gain, hold or consolidate ground through this type of warfare.
It was adopted merely as a temporary measure. However, effective this type of warfare may be, it cannot replace the conventional warfare. Thus the requirement was of a national army. For a national army is the symbol of national sovereignty.
When we all were contemplating to start organising a bridge size formation, orders came in early July to organise and train ‘Z’ Force under Zia’s command. 1, 3 and 8 East Bengal Regiment was to be integrated in ‘Z Force and Major Moin from sector 3, Major Shafaat Jamil from sector 2 and Major Aminul Haque from sector 1, were posted to 1, 3 and 8 East Bengal Regiments respectively as their commanding officers. The battalion concentrated at Teldaha in early July for training. After completion of one month’s rigorous training, this brigade was launched for independent operation in the north. ‘Z’ Force HQ was accordingly raised at Teldaha about two miles East of Mainkerchar.
Niazi Revises plan
Towards October Yahya re-emphasized that not an inch of territory would be lost. Niazi was so obsessed with this idea that he passed this message on to every soldier under his command. In order to carry out the Presidential decree, he made it abundantly clear to his commanders that even a tactical withdrawal would be treated as a disgrace, undesirable and unsoldierly. The formation commanders dispersed their troops in
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their respective operational areas and began to hold ‘every inch of ground’ by deploying troops in penny packets all along the border. Thus the bulk of Pakistani troops were on the borders holding border outposts. This strategy contradicted Niazi’s previous concept of defence on ‘strong points’.
In pursuance of this concept all Pakistani units and formations, EPCAF, Rangers, Police and even Razakars got dispersed over vast areas. In October Niazi made some strategic moves. 16 Division remained in North Bengal with its main HQ at Natore and tactical HQ at Rangpur. This was commanded by Major General Nazar Hussain Shah. 9 Division moved to Jessore with Major General M H Ansari as its general officer commanding, 36 Division was in Dhaka and Mymensingh area with Major General Jamshed as its general officer commanding. 39 Division was responsible for Comilla and its south. This division was commanded by Major General M Rahim Khan. 14 Division was responsible for Bhairab and Sylhet. The General officer commanding of this division was Major General A Majid.
On the other hand the Bangladesh armed forces headquarters issued orders to raise two more brigade type formation. ‘S’ Force was to be raised by me and ‘K’ Force by Khaled. In anticipation of this order we did some ground work before hand when the orders came it did not pose any problem for us. In no time these formations were raised. These were then straightway put through one month’s rigorous training before they could be launched as fighting formation. By September 71, these were ready to be launched for limited operations.
‘Z’ Force in Action
So long, the liberation war was mostly being fought at company and platoon levels. More often than not, the enemy was dominated by raids and fighting patrols. Very rarely did a major engagement, involving a battalion, not a speak of a brigade, took place in the course of the liberation war up to August 1971. It was the nature of terrain that dictated the size of operation. Bangladesh is a land of minor tactics. Here the theatre of operation is cut into isolated compartment having certain amount
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of aloofness with each other. This factor requires these compartments to be self-sufficient. The possibility of concentration of force at a particular place and time was, therefore, remote in various isolated areas of Bangladesh. This was one consideration which could have prompted the enemy to have strong bases with limited outposts. But the Pakistani military commanders did just the opposite. Niazi directed his commanders to hold every inch of ground from innumerable outposts. So far, our irregular warfare coupled with company and platoon action, suited us fine. But to counter Niazi’s latest tactical concept, it was necessary to raise the size of operation on our side. A battalion or a brigade launching an attack from our side would achieve two main goals — one, initiative would remain with us and two, morals of our troops would remain high.
‘Z Force, thus having completed the organization and training, was poised in readiness for action.
Kamalpur
Kamalpur was a strong Pakistani border outpost situated on the mouth of the old Brahmaputra and on the road link with Mymensingh via Jamalpur. It contained concrete bunkers with shell proof roofs. Communication trenches were dug in to provide communication between bunkers. The defence had in its perimeter booby traps and mine field. The Pakistani troops used to fall back on the inner line of defence in hours of darkness.
Captain Salahuddin Momtaz was in Quetta. He was a soldier with a lion’s heart full of patriotic zeal. It was rather impossible for him to remain a silent spectator when Bangladesh was bleeding. In a desperate attempt he was successful in escaping to his motherland during early July and reported to ‘Z’ Froce. Salahuddin Momtaz joined 1 East Bengal.
The battalion at that time was contemplating to launch a big offensive. In order, therefore, to undertake such an operation, information about the enemy was vital. Salahuddin Momtaz was one of those who was sent on reconnaissance missions to collect information about the enemy. He at times conducted some very daring reconnaissance missions at Kamalpur border outpost.
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During one such mission he ran across an enemy patrol which indicated to the enemy our aggressive posture. Enemy strength at Kamalpur was immediately raised to two companies of 31 Baluch excluding Razakars.
The information was thus obtained and a plan was made. Attack was to be launched from the north-east of the enemy post with two companies. Delta on the left and Bravo on the right, commanded respectively by Salahuddin Momtaz and Hafiz. From the assembly area they moved. Delta company leading followed by Bravo company. Next in order was the battalion orders group (O group) where in addition to Moin, the battalion commander, Zia was also present. H-hour was fixed at 3-30 a.m. on 1 August. After 20 minutes of the H-hour own artillery was programmed to provide covering fire.
The attacking troops were absolutely raw. There was a bit of confusion at the forming up place resulting in delay in the move. It was all due to the officers personal example and motivation that the troops started moving on to the objective.
As they moved towards the objective the enemy artillery also opened up. Our troops came under a very heavy fire and started sustaining casualties. Their movement became slow. Since the bulk of the troops did not have previous war experience they began to go to ground more frequently than the enemy shelling. Salahuddin played a heroic role at this stage in reviving the morale of his troops. They then moved on.
The outer perimeter was being vacated by the enemy. Our troops entered the outer perimeter and began to cross the minefield. The enemy was bringing in effective fire on us from the shell proof bunker of the inner defence.
The battle started gaining momentum. Casualties were piling up. But there was no going back, Salahuddin Momtaz, who had dynamic leadership quality was leading troops into the inner defence. Shouting at the top of his voice, he was directing his men and chanting words of encouragement to them. An embodiment of courage himself, fearless Salahuddin Momtaz snubbed one of his faithful soldiers saying, “Yahya Khan has not yet been able to manufacture the bullet that would kill me.”
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Those were not the last words. Two shells dropped in front of Salahuddin Momtaz. Twice he shook and then all was over.
Salahuddin Momtaz murmured, “if you have to die, die after killing the enemy. Die on the soil of Bangladesh.” Salahuddin’s body could not be retrieved. Three soldiers died in their attempt to retrieve the dead body of their beloved leader. However, his watch, stengun and some papers were retrieved.
Hafiz miraculously escaped death. His stengun blew off by an enemy artillery shell splinter. He got injured. Naik Rabiul ran in the face of enemy fire to evacuate Hafiz to safety. But he was mortally injured there.
Salahuddin Momtaz died Hafiz was injured. These incidents left the two attacking companies in a state of chaos and confusion. The community centre situated behind the forming up place was getting filled with battle casualties. It was 7 a.m. broad daylight. Casualties were still increasing. Ultimately at 730 a.m. Moin ordered the battalion to withdraw.
Both enemy and own troops died in a great number in this action. The Pakistanis for the first time realised that Bengalees knew how to fight fearlessly. The senior Tigers evoked fear in the mind of the enemy at Kamalpur. The concrete bunkers saved them from bullets and artillery shells but not from fear. This battle was most significant in the sense that it taught the first lesson of attack to the new recruits of the Bengal Regiments. Lessons learned at Kamalpur was never lost sight of by us. Subsequently when a series of attacks continued, the spirit of Kamalpur came back every time.
Bahadurabad Ghat
‘Z’ Force made a simultaneous plan of operation at Bahadurabad ghat. The operation was assigned to 3 East Bengal. Major Shafaat Jamil took over the command of this battalion in West Dinajpur in June. On the formation of ‘Z’ Force the battalion was brought to Teldaha for training.
Bahadurabad ghat was a major transhipment point where railway river service arranges transhipment of goods trains. During the war this ghat was used by the Pakistan army for
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transhipment of all military cargo and also troops meant for North Bengal.
On July 31, 3 East Bengal left Teldaha for the operation. The battalion had about 350 men who were pre-1971 trained soldiers and rest were new recruits. Nasser, a local student belonging to the area of operation, was the guide.
The route was 20 miles long and hazardous. Three rivers were to be crossed. The entire area was dominated by the enemy. The enemy gunboats were on the rivers. A convoy of 11 countryboats, surprisingly reached the destination without being noticed before 3 a.m. in the morning of August 1. Alpha and Delta companies under Lieutenant Anwar and Lieutenant Nurunnabi respectively lined up for attacking Bahadurabad ghat complex. Anwar’s Alpha company remained in a hideout north of the railway line on the boat terminal. One of his platoon was positioned between Bahadurabad ghat and Dewanganj on the railway track. Nurunnabi’s Delta company would launch the attack. He had two objectives — one, to isolate passenger train and attack guarded waiting goods train carrying warlike goods, while the other platoon was to attack the jetty.
It was reveille time and the enemy troops were on stand to position. The passenger train was shunting. As the shunting train tracked behind and the goods train came in full view Subedar Karam Ali fired his 3.5 inch rocket launcher at the generator set kept in the goods train. The Subeder also engaged the passerger train and destroyed its engine. Simultaneously Subedar Bhula Mian’s platoon from the right started lobbying hand grenades in the compartments of the passenger train where Pakistani troops were sitting. The attack began to spread all over the ghat complex. The railway stations, boggies, railway steamers and the jetty roof, everywhere the enemy’s weapon sites were destroyed. Bahadurabad ghat was thus liberated.
The next day, August 2, the attack on Bahadurabad ghat extended to Dewanganj. Subedar Karam Ali went to demolish the railway bridge situated on the midway between Bahadurabad ghat and Dewanganj. The blast of the explosives did not go unresponded. Enemy troops at Dewanganj rushed towards the bridge without any loss of time.
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But the reaction on the part of both the Alpha and the Delta companies was quicker. Dewanganj bazar area, sugar mill and the Razakar camp were attacked simultaneously by Alpha and Delta companies respectively. The enemy was neutralised both at Bahadurabad ghat and Dewnaganj. This was a great achievement of ‘Z’ Force.

Nakshi
The attack on Nakshi border outpost fell on the lot of Major Aminul Haque, commanding officer of 8 East Bengal. It was one in the series of offensives that were undertaken by ‘Z’ Force and was daringly conducted.
Rangtia-Nakshi-Haljati complex remained under active surveillance of our reconnaissance patrol for three days prior to the attack scheduled originally on August 2 and later changed to August 3, the H-hour being 3-45 a.m. Having conducted the reconnaissance throughly, the company commander Captain Amin Ahmed Chowdhury left the assembly area, Haljati hat across the international border. Through a foot tract along the nullah, the approach was covered by the continuation of Haljati forest densely afforested by Shal trees. ‘Z Force commander remained at Haljati hat to watch the conduct of the battle. Along the main road Rajendraganj-Rangtia-Haluaghat two platoons moved and took up the role of cut off party and positioned themselves at Naya Rangtia. To the north of Nakshi border outpost, on a high ground a platoon of EPR was deployed to assist the attack.
The attacking troops stealthily reached the forming up place, along the tract to the west of the objective. The battalion commander was there to conduct the battle.
Exactly at 3-45 a.m. through the wireless, the coded message was communicated to the supporting artillery for pre-H hour bombardment.
Our artillery had not yet achieved the desired efficiency and accuracy as a result of which a few earlier shell dropped right on the forming up place, causing grievous injury to four of our men. This was enough to do the damage. Confusion ensued. The battalion and the company commanders played a decisive role to
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salvage the attacking troops out of this predicament at the crucial moment. But in the meantime enemy artillery was also brought to bear on our troops.
The situation was partially saved by the EPR platoon placed on a high ground to the north of the objective. The attacking troops got on the move. About 300 yards short of the objective there was a nullah embankment. The company commanders ordered their men to open fire and charge. The troops however executed a part of the order. They opened fire while taking cover of the embankment. The company commanders ordered their men to move on. They literally pulled them up from the ground and dragged them along towards the objectives.
When the attack was finally through an enemy shell landed right in front of Captain Amin Ahmed Chowdhury. He fell on the ground seriously injured. He shouted at his men to capture the objective. The injured company commander was lying exposed to fire works. He was helplessly trying to take cover and rolled along the slope. But unfortunately he was heading towards the enemy. He pulled up all his energy and started crawling towards the Shal forest.
In the meantime, the enemy had come out of his trenches and hand to hand fight was going on all over the area. All sorts of fire was going on. At the Shal forest, Aminul Haque, the battalion commander, under cover of his platoon took a daring and bold rescue action. Here was a commander who was ready to risk his life, yet could not leave his dying comrade in the battle field.
Aminul Haque took his injured comrade on his back and returned to safety. This was a rare phenomenon of personal example.
Battles are either won or lost. That does not always determine the quality of battle. The quality of battle is always determined by the inspiration of the commanders at all levels which makes their soldiers to face bullets and the major source of such inspiration is personal example of courage and devotion to duty. Judged by this standard the battle of Nakshi border outpost ranks higher than a battle won.
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“Z Force operated in this area until No. 11 sector was activated in the middle of September. During this period ‘Z’ Force, under the command of Zia remained active on the eastern bank of Brahmaputra. Rahumari area comprising of charland was liberated by ‘Z’ Force. Out of the charland complex, Char Kodal Kathi was yet to be liberated when ‘Z’ Force was called upon to operate elsewhere leaving this area under the operational control of sector No. 11.

‘K’ Force Launched
In the month of September Khaled got the orders of raise ‘K’ Force. He was ready and therefore, in no time he raised ‘K’ Force headquarters at Melaghar. 4, 9 and 10 East Bengal Regiments were raised in situation at Mandobhagh, Latumura and Belonia under command respectively by Ghaffar, Ainuddin and Jafar Imam.
Latumura was a whole time defensive outpost manned by a platoon. On the north of Kashba, this outpost was, tactically very important. Defence of Latumura was vital to the defence of Kashba. The enemy had always kept his evil eyes on this post and ultimately captured it with heavy loss of men and material.
Latumura fell to the enemy and officer cadet Humayun Kabir with his company was open to the frequent enemy onslaughts. Kashba, including the railway station, was with the enemy. Having only one company at his disposal it was not possible for him to recapture the position.
After the fall of Belonia, Ghaffar was ordered to return back to Kashba sub-sector, which he did on June 27.
The situation in that area was far from satisfactory. Shaldanadi railway station, Boyek, Mandobhagh railway station, including northern part of the enclave were in enemy hands. The entire Mondobhagh-Konaban area stood denuded of own troops. Captain Salek an officer from Beluch Regiment, joined Khaled during mid April. He was given to command of Shaldanadi subsector.
Ghaffar was given Konaban area to command. He established his headquarters there. He had a force of two companies including the one left with officer cadet Humayun
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Kabir. His area of operation extended from Kashba-Jadeshwar on the north to Boyek on the south. The entire enclave was extended on the west from the C & B (construction and building) road upto Companyganj Bazar.
Mondobhagh railway station was a stronghold of the enemy. Ghaffar ousted the enemy from there on June 30. He repulsed two counter-attacks of the enemy. The success was exploited and in the process surrounding 4 or 5 villages were also cleared of the enemy. This liberated area remained so under our command till the last and became a refugee sanctuary.
The Pakistan army brought forward their troops to neutralise the Mukti Bahini pressure developing from Mandobhagh. They sited their heavy mortars on Mandobhagh Bazar and field guns at Araibari and Nayanpur. They started shelling Mandobhagh day in and day out.
Boyek village on the south of Mandobhagh was next to fall and thereafter Ghaffar was performing a holding role from Kashba to Boyek. Salek held the area from Katamura to Gaurangatola. He dominated upto Nayanpur railway station.
During this period quite a good number of raids were conducted on the enemy supply routes, roads, railway and river way. They were mostly crowned with success and big catches in the form of arms, ammunition and supplies. These raids took big toll of the enemy.
In the meantime ‘K’ Force had already come into being out of 4 East Bengal and two newly raised battalions, 9 and 10 East Bengal. In September, these battalions began to operate as a cohesive force. During this period Shaldanadi-Mandobhagh area reached a high water mark in successful conduct of small operations. The enemy was constantly being harassed and
gagged.
So long the enemy had 33 Baluch at Kuti-Kashba area. They gradually brought in a brigade of which 30 Punjab was located in area Nayanpur on the southern bank of Shaldanadi. Shaldanadi railway station, besides being a vital link in railway communication between Chittagong-Comilla-Dhaka and Sylhet, served as an immediate link between the enemy forces on either bank of Shaldanadi.
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Khaled, realising this importance, decided to capture Shaldanadi railway station. According to his plan, Ghaffar’s company took position at Boyek on the north of Shaldanadi railway station. Captain Ashraf’s Company advanced from Mandobhagh and took up position a little way off Nayanpur. This officer originally belonged to 3 East Bengal, who left the battalion at Hilli in early March ’71 and joined Khaled during late August ’71. Salek crossed Shaldanadi and took up position near a godown to the west of Shaldanadi railway station. Captain Pasha remained at Mandobhagh with his artillery i.e. Mujib Battery. A mortar section was placed behind Boyek under command of Subedar Jabbar. The overall command of the operation was vested in Khaled.
It was during the last days of September after 3 days of preparation all the troops formed up in the forming up place at dawn and were waiting for the pre H-hour bombardment.
At 6-30 a.m. Pasha opened up his guns and all the enemy location at Shaldanadi railway station and Nayanpur. Under the cover of own artillery, the infantry moved on to their respective objectives. Without much loss of time the enemy artillery started counter/bombardment fom Burichang, Kashba, Kuti and Chandla.
Ashraf’s attack on Nayanpur was successful. The enemy ran towards Shaldanadi railway station leaving Nayanpur liberated. Ghaffar with his company exploited upto the bridge to the south of Nayanpur
Salek’s attack could not make much headway. Shaldanadi railway station was much too strongly defended by the enemy. The battle continued until 9 a.m. Enemy shelling continued to play havoc on Salek. After 3 hours of battle he was also falling short of ammunition. So ultimately he had to fall back to Mandobhagh.
This battle was a part success. Probably Shaldanadi station deserved more attention. Salek was alone there. There seems to have been no attempt to isolate Nayanpur. So the defeated enemy from Nayanpur easily fell back on Shaldanadi station and reinforced that position. As a force this was the first effort of the ‘K’ Force and its part victory had a far-reaching effect on the subsequent operation in this area.
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Shaldanadi
Number 2 sector called both Salek and Ashraf for service in the HQ, leaving all the troops in Shaldanadi area under the command of Ghaffar.
Mandobhagh remained as the HQ of this sub-sector. Close reconnaissance on Shaldanadi station was possible from there. From reconnaissance reports it was revealed that Shaldanadi station was strongly held by the enemy. Direct assault on the enemy there, would be very costly and success and doubtful. So, Ghaffar drew up an intelligent plan of attack. The plan was in two phases. In phase one-one company will carry out four raids in the surrounding enemy held areas. These would be platoon raids and conducted simultaneously. This was expected to draw attention of the enemy at Shaldanadi railway station, who it was expected, would not sit idle. The idea was to commit and peter out of fire effort of the enemy and Shaldanadi railway station in response to the raids. This would be followed by a three-pronged attack on Shaldanadi station by two companies.
It was night of October 7-8 According to the plan four raiding parties started off for Banadhusia, Chandla, Kayampur and Gobindapur. Raids went it simultaneously. Shaldanadi station woke up. The enemy there started bringing their fire on the raiders. This continued for the whole night.
In the meanwhile Naib Subedar Shiraj, Subedar Mangal Mian and Subedar Belayet with a platoon each took up position on the east, north and west of the objective respectively. Subedar Wahab with a company remained behind Subedar Mongal Mian.
The missions having completed the raiders returned to their pre-selected locations. It was early in the morning of October 8. After slight pause at 8 a.m. the main attack was launched on Shaldanadi railway station simultaneously from three directions. Heavy fire began to descend on the battle field from either side. Out of four strong entrenchments of the enemy two were destroyed by our own recoilless rifles. The enemy left the broken entrenchments and took shelter in the remaining two. Subedar Belayet immediately snatched the initiative and jumped into the river with his troops. They swam across to the enemy
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bank and occupied the broken entrenchment. This action got the enemy in the bazar area separated from those in the station area.
Ghaffar pressed in his attack more vigorously. The enemy was put in a precarious position. His fire power was dwindling. Around 11 a.m. the enemy started falling back on Nayanpur railway station. Shaldanadi railway station area at last was liberated
The emeny tried to recapture the station and immediately launched a counter-attack towards the godown area in the bazar. It was Subedar Belayet’s position. While carrying out reconnaissance Subedar Belayet was killed by an enemy sniper. But Shaldanadi station could not be captured by the enemy.
This was a singular achievement of Ghaffar in recognition of which he was awarded ‘High Order’ gallantry award later came to be called ‘Bir Uttam’.
Kashba
Captain Ainuddin was in command of 9 East Bengal. Since the creation of ‘K’ Force this battalion formed an integral part of this force. The area between Gangashagar and Kashba was within its operational responsibility. But its movements were greatly hampered by the presence of enemy at Kashba and Latumura. Klaled decided to drive the enemy out of this area.
Since long the loss of Kashba and Latumura was a great tactical setback for 2 sector. Khaled drew up a plan for the recapture of Kashba by 9 East Bengal. Kashba was a hard nut. The enemy had a company entrenched in the area.
Two companies of 9 East Bengal were earmarked to launch a two-pronged attack from the north and south under own artillery cover. It was October 22, about two weeks after the recapture of Shaldanadi railway station and Nayanpur that, 9 East Bengal was called upon to put in its offensive against Kashba. Khaled himself conducted the battle. 9 East Bengal formed up on the high ground on the north and south of Kashba and advanced on the enemy. The 1 Bengal artillery roared from behind. In no time the enemy guns also opened up on our advancing troops. The presence of Khaled in the battle field
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inspired his troops to advance in the face of intense enemy shelling.
Suddenly, a shell landed close by and a splinter pierced through the forehead of Khaled. It was a grievous injury and Khaled fell on the ground motionless. He was immediately evacuated to Agartala for medical treatment. His survival was a freak of nature. But his inspiration did not go in vain. The attacking troops recaptured Kashba. Subsequently in November, 9 East Bengal was able to oust the enemy from Latumura at the cost of 3 officers and nearly 40 soldiers killed and more than 60 got injured.
Belonia Regained
During the third week of June, Belonia was lost to the enemy. Since then it remained under the occupation army. Jafar Imam remained busy in raising and reorganising the 10 East Bengal under the concept of ‘K’ Force.
The enemy’s defence of Belonia fell directly within the operational responsibility of the brigade located at Feni. The best part of this brigade was located at Belonia where they established strong points all along the rail and road axis running down from Belonia to Feni. Parshuram, Chitalia, Fulghazi, Munshirhat and Bhandura.
Sadly enouth within a month of the formation ‘K’ Force, the force commander, Khaled Mosharaf got fatally injured. His place was taken over by Salek. But 10 East Bengal at Beloina sub-sector was since then placed virtually under Indian Kilo Force commander by Brigadier Anand Sarup.
By the end of October a company of 2 East Bengal under Morshed was despatched to reinforce Belonia sub-sector. By then Jafar Imam had about 80% of his troops out of the older stock, trained and experienced. Only 20% of his men were from the newly trained lot. The state of arms and equipment was also satisfactory. By all standards, in early November, Jafar Imam was in a position of readiness to strike the enemy at Belonia salient.
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On November 6, Rafiq and Jafar Imam were assigned to liberate Belonia. The task assigned to them was to clear area between Belonia railway station down south upto Feni. Both Rafiq and Jafar Imam planned an operation through infiltration. They selected the narrow strip to the north of the salient immediately to the south of Parshuram, for this operation. The infiltration was to start from either flank of the salient, over rivers Belonia and Muhuri on one flank and just crossing the border on the other. The Parshuram Belonia pocket, thus, would be cut off from the rest of the salient and cleared in isolation. This operation would receive active assistance from Indian Kilo Force. D-Day was fixed on 8 November.
From the western side of the salient Jafar Imam with 10 East Bengal and Morshed with a company of 2 East Bengal moved towards Parshuram, crossing Belonia and Muhuri rivers and from the eastern side Mahfuz with a sector battalion of 1 sector positioned himself on the south-east of Parshuram. It was raining that night and a winter gate blew over the salient. The troops, in small groups, began to infiltrate through various predeterminated routes. As usual in such operation, the problem of command and control, cropped up, particularly when the troops were to assemble in the pre-designated rendezvous. In the darkness, and in the absence of any well-defined tracks, it was very difficult to keep the troops within the gaps and infiltration lanes. In-spite of these predicaments infiltration was complete before dawn and both the force reached their respective destinations as per schedule. The troops then started digging down before their presence were known to the enemy.
Naib Subedar Yar Mohammad had his platoon deployed opposite Parshuram in the vicinity of the rail road axis. It was morning. An enemy trolley was rolling down unconcerned of the presence of our troops. As it came within close range. Yar Mohammad ordered his men to open fire. This was the beginning. The trolley got derailed and all its occupants, including an officer, were killed.
The enemy at Parshuram and Chitalia, hearing the sound of fire, rushed in rescue.
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In the meantime Yar Mohammad got up from his trench and went forward towards the trolley. He snatched away the revolver from the dead Pakistani officer and started dragging him towards his trench. In the process Yar Mohammad was shot by an enemy sniper on the forehead and he died on the spot.
The enemy attack continued vigorously. They brought in their artillery. Parshuram was in a desperate situation. Enemy launched an attack from there at night. This attack was strengthened by enemy at Belonia. Their main effort was to link up with Chitalia. The attack was repulsed.
Enemy shelling continued on November 10, intensifying it by air strike at 4 p.m. Our troops were dug in. So the air strike could do no damage to us. The situation remained unchanged on the following day. The enemy again brought in air support. Four enemy aircraft flew over our locality and were rocketing us at ease. We had no anti-aircraft guns. Nonetheless, one enemy aircraft was brought down by one of our MMGs. This was a remarkable achievement on our part. The same night Kilo Force came to our help and Belonia and Parshuram were attacked sinultaneously. These two enemy positions were captured inflicting 80% casualties on the enemy, 49 Pakistani soldiers were captured.
The surviving enemy along with those at Chitalia fell back in a route on Munshirhat further south. Allied troops chased the enemy and encamped at Niloki. This brought pressure on the enemy at Fulghazi. Chitalia was no more tenable by the enemy. So they fell back on Fulghazi which was already under pressure. But this enemy concentration was only temporary, for they soon realised that the mouth of Belonia salient, if closed, will seal their fate. So the enemy enmasse fell back on Bhandura position. But in the meantime the pursuing troops quickly consolidated at Kalirhata and Pathan Nagar facing Bhandura. On further south Shonaghazi was already brought under control by our guerillas. This move left the enemy with no more alternative but to fall back towards Laksham via Feni. Feni was however, liberated on December 6.
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B Company : Lieutenant Bodiuzzaman and his company officer was 2nd Lieutenant
Salim Mohammad Kamrul Hassan.
C Company : Lieutenant Syed Nohamnad Ibrahim.
D Company : Lieutenant Ghulam Helal Morshed.
11 East Bengal regiment had just been raised by Nasim who was appointed as its battalion commander. Lieutenant Nasir was his adjutant and Lieutenant Moinul Hossain was his medical officer. The company commanders were :
A Company Lieutenant Shamsul Huda Bachu.
B Company : Captain Subed Ali Bhuyan and his company officer was 2nd Lieutenant
Kabir.
C Company : 2nd Lieutenant Nazrul Islam.
D Company : 2nd Lietenant Abul.
The sector troops consisted of ten companies. I organized them in a manner that these troops if necessary could form into two battalions. The new sector commander was Capt. Nuruzzaman. He had two civilian staff officers. Messrs. Nuruddin M Kamal and M A Mahi. Messrs. Alkas Mian and Asheque Hossain were the assistant civillian officers. The sector had five company commanders each commanding two companies. Captain Matin, Captain Ejaj Ahmed Chowdhury, 2nd Lieutenant Sadeq, Majumdar and Jahangir made a fine team of company commanders.
‘S’ Force was thus separated from the sector ‘troops. The former needed training and re-organisation from the sector before any operational commitment. Both the battalions were understrength. We completed the recruitment of 1200 men by September and the following two months were devoted to their training in conventional warfare.
Attack at Dharmaghar
‘S’ Force has just got organised. The battalions were still recruiting and training their troops. During the process of training I thought of giving them a task to open the road Dharmaghar-Itakhola. The objective was Dharmaghar, a Pakistani border outpost. It was a strongly defended outpost. Our
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own reconnaissance revealed that the outpost was held by a strong regular platoon beefed up by a Company of Razakars.
The raising of 11 East Bengal was not yet complete. The available troops were being trained and equipped for the final encounter. Only battalion which had some capability and could be launched was 2 East Bengal. I was interested to see the standard of training and performance of the battalion in a set piece attack, especially after its role in guerilla warfare. Captain Subed Ali Bhuyan was one of the officer who had conducted some raids and some small scale attacks in and around Dharmaghar area. As per seniority of the officers under me this officer was senior enough to command a battalion. He was my obvious choice to command the attacking company.
The attack was planned with two blocking positions, one to the north and the other to the west. Mirpur bazar on the north was to be blocked by Captain Matin and Captain Nasim. Lieutenant Morshed on the west was to block at Ahmedpur. Subed Ali was to cross the border from the south at Malanchapur and put an attack on the enemy outpost from the west. D-day was September 3 and the H-hour was 3 a.m. Artillery support from an Indian mountain battery was guaranteed.
Prior to the attack extensive reconnaissance was carried out from August 28 to 30 by Subed Ali and his platoon commanders. The troops were given due rest preceding the attack.
On D minus 1 Day the troops embussed at Mantala, at 10 p.m. on September 2, and debused at Mohanpur, the assembly area near the border, at about 10-30 p.m. From the assembly area the attacking troops marched towards the forming up place (FUP) which was about two and a half miles away from the assembly area. I was there to see that everything go well as per plan. Captain Subed Ali recalled the order of battle of his attacking company, “Lieutenant Badiuzzaman’s No. 4 platoon was leading. The senior JCO, Subedar Chan Mian was with him. Next to follow was Subedar Safiullah’s No. 6 platoon. I was next and with me was my company HQ. Behind me was No. 5 platoon of Subedar Tayub.”
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The night was pitch dark, the visibility was not more than ten feet. It also started raining very heavily at the time when the troops began to march towards the objective. In his order of March Subed Ali also instructed his men to keep some gap between the platoons.
Everything went well upto assembly area but the trouble started thereafter. The leading platoon took off as per schedule with the navigator in front but due to faulty night navigation the platoon took a wrong turn and got detached from the main column. The follow up platoon of Subedar Safiullah having realised that the leading platoon is not in front of him, informed Subed Ali about it. Subed Ali stopped the column and sent parties to all directions to find out the leading platoon. There was no trace of the platoon. The time was running out. Subed Ali decided to go ahead to accomplish his mission with the company minus the platoon.
In the meantime Badiuzzaman also realised that he is off the track and heading towards wrong direction. He therefore, without wasting any more time returned back to the assembly area. I, immediately, directed him to join his company. When Subed Ali contacted me on the wireless, I told him that Badiuzzaman is being directed to join him.
Captain Subed Ali informed me at 3-15 a.m. that all his troops reached the forming up place. At 3-20 a.m. he conveyed the code word to my HQ and the gun position, meaning thereby that he is starting for the objective now and the artillery should give him fire support as per programme. As our artillery started firing the enemy artillery also retailated with air burst in general area where we were. It was real havoc. The torrential downpour of rain also continued to devour us.
The FUP was about 1,000 yards from the objective. The troops left the FUP for the objective at 3-20 a.m. Given all the allowances of darkness, rain and fatigue the troops should have been on the objective by 4-30 a.m. Since they did not reach the objective even at 5 a.m. I had my doubts whether they really reached the FUP at 3-15 a.m. Although Subed Ali informed me
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at 3-15 a.m. that they are at FUP but I am sure they must have been far away from the objective, and it was almost daylight.
Due to prior artillery shelling the enemy became alert. From the time the artillery fire was lifted to the time the attacking troops came close to the objectives, there was sufficient time for the enemy to be properly in position to halt any attack on them. The artillery gave fire support as per time programme but their fire support could not be guaranteed for an indefinite period. So when the troops were near the objective and when they needed the close fire support badly it was not provided to them.
Subed Ali was calling for more artillery fire support but it was not forthcoming. In the absence of close artillery fire support and in the face of heavy enemy fire it was not possible for my troops to close in and attack the objective. I, therefore, had no other alternative but to call off the attack. The reasons for calling off this attack were : first, the attack did not go in as planned. Second, the troops were in the open and were suffering casualties. Third, time was also running out to extricate them safely. Last but not the least, the artillery could not continue to provide sufficient fire support to the attacking troops at a time when they needed it most.
Most of the troops of this company was new recruits and I could not reconcile about the way Subed Ali led his troops in this attack. Although the attack was conducted under several constraints, the overall performance of Subed Ali in leading the operation was unsatisfactory and demoralising for the troops.
Immediately after this operation Pakistan army sent some reinforcement and strengthened this post. I thought of attacking this outpost again. From the available information and as per my appreciation a battalion attack was necessary to dislodge the enemy from this outpost. But some Indian higher commander thought differently. They perceived the area could be cleared by using maximum of two companies. Therefore 18 Rajput took this task to clear Dharmaghar with a similar plan of attack using two companies.
The second attack was scheduled on September 28, 2 East Bengal was employed on the same two blocking positions. Subed Ali was assigned a diversionary attack from Bijoynagar

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direction to the south-east of the objective. H-hour was fixed at 5 a.m. and the main direction of attack was from the north above Mirpur Bazar. The attackers were ensured artillery fire support in a large scale.
The troops moved to their respective positions as on schedule. Pre-H-hour bombardment started over our head on the enemy position. Simultaneously, the enemy artillery also opened up.
Two companies of 18 Rajput charged the enemy against the sweeping fire of three heavy machine guns sited ahead of the forward troops. This made the attack of the Rajput battalion difficult. The attack continued against heavy casualties on either side until 10 a.m. Ultimately when the attack could not proceed any further it had to be call off.
Mukundapur Cleared After Dharmaghar operation I instructed my battalion commanders to concentrate on training. I also instructed them to give special emphasis on attack on strong points and attack by infiltration. When the second attack on Dharmaghar by trained soldiers of 18 Rajput failed, I felt more acutely the necessity of training my troops, specially in attack on strong points. The whole of October was thus spent on training.
During early November the training of 2 East Bengal was disrupted a little. I had to send a company to Belonia to reinforce 1 Sector and 10 East Bengal efforts to recapture Belonia. This I considered as practical training for my troops and therefore, willingly send this company to take part in this operation. When the Belonia operation was in progress, I also undertook some small operation in hand so that my troops gain experience and confidence.
Mukundapur village and railway station area was under enemy control. They had established a strong defensive position at Mukundapur border order outpost with an infantry platoon. This post was situated between Mukundapur village and railway station, not very far from the border.
Towards the begining of November we intensified our activities in the entire area. It was due to this increased offensive
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activities of ours the enemy at Mukundapur area started to feel rather uncomfortable. My troops were also feeling restive to clear the area ahead so that the enemy at Dharmaghar on the north could be unhinged. I also felt that this is the opportune moment for me to strike.
11 East Bengal was still undergoing training and was not yet ready to be launched for such operation. I had also sent a company from 2 East Bengal under command Morshed to Belonia to take part in recapturing Belonia bulge. For the operation at Mukundapur the troops available to me was 2 East Bengal minus a company. I was also assured the help from 18 Rajput.
I, therefore, made a simple and silent plan of atack to capture Mukundapur. 18 Rajput would block the railway line on the north at Jalilpur and 2 East Bengal minus two companies would hold the line of Kalachhara river to the south. Lieutenant Saeed with one company would attack Mukundapur. The D-Day was fixed on the night of November 18. The direction of attack was planned from the west and the time of attack was at dawn.
Having secured the two blocking positions on the north and on the south of the objective by 18 Rajput and 2 East Bengal respectively, Saeed along with his company was to infiltrate into the enemy territory in small groups and reach assembly area in a small orchard south of Mukundapur village. The eastern edge of the village which was about 800 yards from the border outpost was selected as the forming up place (FUP). Measures have been taken to secure the FUP. All activities up to the time of attack was to be done silently and to be kept quiet as long as possible. The artillery was kept on call; meaning thereby the attacking commander to call for the artillery fire support when the attack becomes noisy or as and when he wants it.
Everything went well according to plan and a dawn attack was launched on November 19, Pakistanis from their post gave us a stubborn fight. From the nearby posts some Pakistani troops did try to come for their help but they were prevented from interfering in the battle by our troops from the blocking positions. The battle continued until afternoon and Mukundapur was captured by Saeed.
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Miraculously we sustained no fatal or serious casualties except a few injury. The enemy on the other hand, left 31 prisoners of war and with them we captured 27 rifles, 2 sten guns, 2 LMGs and 1 X 3 inch morter.
Mukundapur gave us a thumping victory and afforded me an open lodgement area for subsequent operation.
Battle of Akhaura
The time was ripe for allout offensive. With the victories smiling at us on all fronts the state of morale of our troops was sky high. It was most opportune time for the offensive that I was contemplating for some time. I, therefore, lost no time and planned an operation to free Akhaura.
The attack was planned in two phases. In phase one — escape to and reinforcement from Sylhet was to be closed to the enemy along Mantala – Harashpur. 11 East Bengal was assigned to accomplish this task. In phase two — 2 East Bengal would clear the area, north to south, from Shingarbil to Akhaura. For this operation I deployed two companies out of the sector troops, under command Matin on the east of Akhaura in general area north-west of Agartala airfield to protect the flank of the attacking troops. Further to the south in the Indian territory Indian troops were already deployed.
By November 30 all preliminaries were completed. Nasim effectively blocked northern approach and brought Mukundapur, Harashpur and Mantala under his control. Thus both the border routes and railway track were closed to the enemy. Two companies under command Matin dug down towards north-west of the Agartala air field and were in position, 2 East Bengal was ready on the start line (SL). When the battalion got concentrated at the Assembly Area (AA), unexpectedly some enemy shell landed there. Due to this shelling Naib Subedar Ashraf Ali Khan of Alpha Company, inspite of being in the dug out, received a splinter wound and became the first casualty in this operation and embraced martyrdom.
The H-hour was at 0100 hours on 1 December. The attack went in on time and progressed steadily due south fighting and eliminating enemy oppositions. By dawn Moin’s troops cleared
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area north of Azampur railway station. Enemy opposition was stiff there. Bitter fighting took place with enemy in shell proof bunkers and my troops in the open. The enemy did try to tackle my troops from the east but Matin did not allow them to come out. As a result he took lot of punishment with the showers of artillery barrage. By 3 O’clock in the afternoon we were able to break through the enemy resistance at Azampur and cleared area south of the railway station.
The enemy withdrew to the south. They made a last ditch effort on the night of 1-2 December and in a bid to regain the lost territory launched a vigorous counter-attack. It was a determined attack and was so sudden that our forces were compelled to pull back. Azampur railway station was partially recaptured by the enemy on the morning of 2 December. Pakistanis had their entrenchments and cemented bunkers still intact on the southern side of the railway station where some enemy was in occupation. They had a good stock of ammunition and were firing at us with automatic weapons almost nonstop. Moin could not immediately recapture the railway station area with this limited troops and very few heavy weapons. Here the area was also heavily mined. Mostly there were nuisance mines. With frequent exchange of fire continuing throughout the night 2-3 December Moin managed to stay on. The railway station remained in his hand.
On the morning of 3 December we again launched our offensive towards Akhaura. A bitter fighting continued and recaptured the area lost on the morning of 2 December. For this operation I was ensured continued artillery fire support but compared to Pakistani artillery fire on us it was negligible. On top of it enemy also brought in air force to pound us to support their operation in Akhaura-Azampur complex.
The enemy’s continued air strike and almost nonstop artilery and automatic fire on our position could not dampen our spirit. On the face of this relentless fire, my troops continued to press on and broke the enemy defences from the north. During this battle Lieutenant Badiuzzaman the Company Commander of Bravo Company while encouraging and leading his troops to move forward received a mortal shell wounded and embraced
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martyrdom. In his absence Lieutenant Salim took over command and led the troops in this attack. It was about this time, when my troops were fighting a bitterest battle in and around Akhaura. General Yahya Khan declared war against India.
With the declaration of war by Pakistan with India, the Indian troops marched in on 4 December. Akhaura was thus surrounded by Bangladesh ‘S’ Force and Indian 57 Mountain division. Pakistani troops did not fight any more and gave up. Akhaura fell on 5 December and the entire Pakistani troops stationed at Akhaura surrendered to the Joint Command.
On December 3 my troops fought one of the bitterest battle. On this day I lost some very brave soldiers. They fought fearlessly and laid down their lives with only one aim before them, liberate Bangladesh from the clutches of the usurpers. I feel sad that they are no more with us and feel proud that I had the honour of commanding such brave patriots in the battle field.
During the battle from 1 to 4 December the enemy sustained heavy casualties. Casualty was also heavy on our side. Of all the heroes those who laid down their lives in the battle of Akhaura, the following deserves special mention : Lieutenant Badiuzzaman, Naib Subedar Ashraf Ali Khan, Sepoy Amir Hussain, Sepoy Ruhul Amin, Sepoy Shahabuddin and Sepoy Mustafizur Rahman. Except Naib Subedar Ashraf Ali Khan who was buried in Harashpur area the rest of the shaheeds were buried in a grave yard near Azampur Railway Station. I wsas present there to make sure that all the martyrs were given proper military burial.
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The Final Round
The achievements so far made were enormours. With the expansion of the scope of guerilla warfare, by August the entire country side remained under our active control. Gram parishads were set up in the village to replace the peace committees. Most of the Razakar camps stood liquidated to make room for the guerilla bases.
In the style of the guerillas, the liberation was within the country was joined in by a few more groups of fighters. Their efforts did not lack in the sincerity and enthusiasm in so far as it meant liberation for the country. But other connotation differed. Ambition, political or personal, at times came in the forefront of their struggle. A group of fighters, dominated the mangrove forest belt of the coastal area and they had a wide network of workers and peasants under Capt. Jalil to wage a war on guerilla pattern. Tangail area particularly was the domain of Kader Siddique. He had a fairly large armed band, to the tune of about 5,000 young men to command. Havilder Hemayet uddin had formed another such group of fighters in general area Faridpur. Their efforts did soften up the enemy in the rural area considerably and thereby helped in eventual consolidation of the guerilla force in those areas.
The border areas were bristling with activities. Every six weeks about 1,000-1,500 guerillas were being regularly turned out from each of the training camps set up in the border. Mushroom factories grew up within the country and also on the border to manufacture grenades, mines and booby traps. The estuary on the Bay of Bengal also fell within the scope of the guerilla operations. Aggressive patrolling on the water front and frogman operations intensified during August. By All standards the guerilla organisation in Bangladesh was a reckonable force,
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a force spontaneous in response, par excellence in intellect and unparalleled in success. It was time to leave them alone to manifestly contribute to the liberation war by intensifying guerilla activities. So while arming of the guerillas continued, the process of organising a regular force also continued unabated.
First step towards this direction had already been taken “Z Force come into being in the month of July, ‘S’ and ‘K’ Force came into being in the month of September.
November was the month of great excitement and thrill for us. Feverish preparation for a joint venture between the Indian army and Bangladesh forces for the final capitulation of the occupation forces of Pakistan in Bangladesh was almost at its fag end. The Bangladesh forces had already been successful in capturing strategic salients around the border. Pakistani troops were engaged in pitched battles and were decisively defeated everywhere. These victories were the stepping stones for the success of the ensuing operations under a joint command..
In the western sector Meherpur and Kaliganj were cleared following the encounter at Boira. A foothold was gained near Chuadanga by 8 Sector. Another gigantic thrust was made towards Hilli by 7 sector. Areas on the north Bhurungamari on the west bank of Brahmaputra was freed by 6 sector and the Pakistani air field at Lalmanirhat was rendered unsafe for use. Kamalpur on the north was another successful battle where liberation forces under Taher was able to make a big dent. At Belonia on the east, a Pakistani brigade was contained and the salient held leaving many Pakistanis dead and wounded. From October ‘Z Force was active in Sylhet. 1 East Bengal entered Sylhet through successive tea gardens of Khejurichhara, Champaroy, Dhalai and Pathorkhola. Under the able leadership of Major Ziauddin this battalion captured Atgram on November 20 against 31 Punjab. This battalion withstood a fierce counterattack and consolidated area east of Kanairghat on Surma river.
3 East Bengal laid seize on the cement factory at Chhatak. At Chhatak a Pakistani brigade commanded by Brigadier Rana resisted the seize for six days and by the end of October, had to fall back leaving many dead and injured. During the conduct of
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seize, the battalion commander Major Shafaat Jamil got wounded and had to be hospitalised. The command of this battalion was, therefore, given to his number two Major Mohsin. The battalion under the leadership of the new battalion commander captured Goainghat on November 2. They commenced their onward march towards Sylhet on December 5.
8 East Bengal advanced through Shagarnal and Phultala tea gardens under the command of Major Aminul Haque. It advanced on Dakshingul tea garden and Latu by the middle of November. By December 1, this battalion liberated upto Kamalganj and the Pakistanis fell back on Moulvi Bazar.
‘Z’ Force was, thus, relentlessly advancing on Sylhet from three directions. The ground was softened enough for the forces under the joint command to launch the final offensive.
Lightning Campaign
At last the inevitable had happened. The pressure developed over the last nine months in the sub-contient had reached its release point. Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora’s “Lightning Campaign” was launched.
The concept of speed formed the essence of the Joint Command plan, contain the enemy where he was strong, while by a series of bold and powerful thrusts bypass the enemy strongholds, race for the capital city of Dhaka in particular and other important cities like Chittagong, Khulna and Bogra in general. This was a departure from the traditional methods of battle craft which happened to be Nazi’s forte.
Aurora’s plan envisaged three main thrusts from three directions and comparatively minor thrust from the Meghalaya. A sizeable compliment of air effort in strategic interdiction and close support rold on as required basis was guaranteed to the Eastern Command. Similarly Indian Eastern Naval Command successfully lent support to operations in Bangladesh by blockading the ports of Chittagong and Chalna.
West of Padma
Lieutenant General T.N. Raina’s Calcutta based 11 Corps set out to liberate the territory west of Padma in two divisional thrusts
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in the following brigade columns :
(a) One brigade for Kushtia.
(b) One brigade for Magura-Faridpur.
(c) One brigade for Khulna-Barisal.
(d) The remaining brigadess to cut off Khulna-Jessore Bheramara railway axis to stop the enemy’s lateral movement.
Mukti Bahini in this sector, had already liberated a portion of Chuadanga which helped launching of two brigades without any enemy opposition. These two columns spearheading towards Jhinaidah and Jessore cut the lateral communication of the enemy. Eventually both Jhinaidah and Jessore fell. With the fall of Jhinaidah the Pakistani brigade headquarters fell back to Magura further to the east. Pakistani troops rushed in the melee to Khulna once Jessore fell. But by then Khulna was effectively sealed off from the south within the result that the enemy was bottled up there. Soon Magura was threatened. The enemy pulled out and moved on towards Kamarkhali on the bank of Madhumati and tried to retreat to Faridpur which effort was successfully throttled by an Indian brigade from the rear. Kushtia, inspite of the enemy’s determined counter-attack could not hold out for long. Thus by 11 December the enemy west of Padma was on his last leg awaiting surrender.
West of Jamuna
Lieutenant General M L Thapan’s XXXIII Corps based on Siliguri had two tasks. The primary task was to spearhead a divisional attack on Hill which was aleady softened up by the Mukti Bahini while the secondary task was to contain enemy strongholds at Rangpur and Dinajpur with two brigades. The containing column and the striking division had to face the strongest enemy defence and pill boxes. They captured Pirganj, Lalmanirhat, Durgapur and liberated as far as Sherpur.
Lieutenant Colonel Q N Zaman with his 7 sector spearheaded, made a dash on Chapai Nawabganj on December 13. Captain Jahangir and Major Ghias attack the town from two sides on an enemy battalion. The valiant freedom fighter Captain Jahangir charged the enemy. While lobbying a hand grenade into
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the enemy’s bunker in an effort to neutralise the enemy LMG he was killed. The personal example set by him, inspired his men to ultimate victory. The hero of Chapai Nawabganj was awarded the highest gallantry award “Bir Shresta”. Chapai Nawabganj fell on December.
Captain Idris entered Dinjapur on December 14 with his famous Dinjapur battalion. Tariq a student volunteer, known as a Lieutenant, liberated Nawabganj, Ghoraghat Palashbari, Gaibandha and finally entered Bogra on December 16. During this period when the war was in its pick, the Commander 16 Division, Maj. Gen. Nazar Hossain Shah found himself alone at Palashbari on 8 December. He some how managed to escape the wrethe of the public by taking a hike in a local bus to Rangpur.
Down South from Tura
On the north Taher’s 11 Sector unleashed itself on Kamalpur and liberated it on December 4. Bakshiganj and Morapur were liberated within next two days. After the capture of Dewanganj and Bahadurabad ghat on December 7, a column was despatched to Jamalpur by train. Jamalpur fell on December 11 and the coulmn headed towards Dhaka.
Major General GS Gill’s 101 Communication Zone with one brigade under command based at Gauhati was on the outskirts of Jamalpur on 9 December. Major General GS Gill was replaced later by Major General G S Nagra as the former got fatally injured in battle. Major General Nagra brought another brigade and made for Mymensingh.
A column of 11 sector also headed for Mymensingh on December 9 and reached outskirts of the city the following day. Mymensingh was liberated on December 14.
At Tangail, a stronghold of Kader Siddique, the enemy was still holding out. An Indian para-battalion was dropped at Tangail few miles north of the town across the river. Fall of Tangail was followed by link up with Kader Bahini and with the Indian brigades driving down south from Jamalpur and from Mymensingh. This para-battalion pushed ahead fast towards Dhaka.
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East of Padma and Meghna
Lieutenant General Sagat Singh’s IV Corps with three mountain divisions duly modified, reorganised and regrouped was the strongest fighting machine in the Eastern Command. Mission assigned to Sagat Singh was to “liberate Bangladesh territory south of Surma and east of Meghna rivers”. The subsidiary tasks were : (a) To cut off communications to Chittagong with a view
to snapping off it supply resources. (b) To effect a crossing over the Meghna and rush for Dhaka.
Operation Jackpot With this overall plan given to him, Sagat Singh worked out his own plan and christened it “Operation Jackpot”. He planned three-pronged divisional thrusts across 250 kilometre stretch of border between Meghalays and Feni Salient. His plan was :
(a) One division along Silchar-Karimganj axis towards Sylhet.
(b) One divising along Akhaura-Ashuganj axis towards Dhaka.
(c) One division in the south Tripura area would advance in three brigade columns as follows:
(1) One brigade to contain and occupy Comilla.
(2) One brigade to move out westwards towards Laskham and Chandpur.
(3) One brigade to move southwards from Feni to cut off Chittagong supply base from rest of Bangladesh Advance of 3 East Bengal on Sylhet continued. After the fall of Chhatak on December 6, the battalion advanced with Shawkat’s troops of sector 5 on Chilitabari and captured it on December 9. Shalotikar air base captured on the following day along with a major portion of the Pakistani troops taken as prisoners of war. Govindaganj and Lamagari, these two strong Pakistani posts fell on December 15. The battalion entered Sylhet on the victory day from three different directions.
On the south / East Bengal kept up a relentless advance against great odds. After the capture of Kamalganj, the battalion
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headed towards Fenchuganj, captured it and poised for attack on Sylhet from the south. They entered Sylhet on December 15.
1 East Bengal, on the north-east, liberated upto Surma river by the last week of November. On December 8 and 9 the battalion moved towards Sylhet town and reached the outskirts on December 14.
On the south, after the liberation of Feni on December 6, Zafar Imam was ordered to liberate Chittagong. After having liberated Laksham-Maizdi, Kilo Force advanced towards Kumira along with the sector troops. On December 13, they were 4 miles short of Kumira when the enemy launched a determined attack. The attack was repulsed.
Here 10 East Bengal less a company under Lieutenant Didar, moved under Zafar Imam towards Hathazari. A company of 4 East Bengal under Ghaffar was already on this axis. On December 14, the column of 10 East Bengal reached Hathazari police-station, in the vicinity of the university. They were digging down when Ghaffar was ahead of them operating on Chittagong-Rangamati axis.
Hathazari was held by B Company of 24 Frontier Force where Zafar Imam originally belonged to. Zafar Imam made offers to his old colleague, Major Hadi, to surrender, but in vain. After the action that followed, the B company had to withdraw leaving some dead and prisoners of war.
Ghaffar in the meanwhile, had joined Zafar Imam and both advanced on Natunpara on December 15.
Lieutenant Didar, on the Kumira axis launched a vigorous attack on Kumira. The defeated enemy fled away to Faujdarhat. The allied forces followed the enemy.
The troops under command ‘S’ Force had already liberated a big chunk of land on the Akhaura Sector by 3 December. Pakistani defences at Akhaura were slowly falling to us when “Operation Jackpot” was launched. 57 Mountain division, therefore, had an easy run upto Akhaura, where ‘S’ Force was busily engaged in destroying the enemy. As the battle raged, Indian 57 Mountain division joined us in the battle of Akhaura and laid a seize on Akhaura from the south-west. Thus trapped,
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the enemy, a brigade strong surrendered to the Joint command on December 5.

The Great Pursuit
Pursuit as an operation of war is the greatest manifestation of high morale and superior military genius for the pursuer and greatest ignominy for the pursued. This was self-evident on the opposition forces in the liberation war of Bangladesh during first week of December. The enemy got caught up between the people and the liberation force under Joint Command. It was an inevitable death trap. An inescapable surrender was in the offing.
After the fall of Akhaura some of the enemy made for Brahmanbaria. In the process many got either killed or caught and some trickled down to Brahmanbaria where the enemy had already set up strong defences.
Attack on Brahmanbaria was planned. Indian 57 Mountain Division from the south along the rail and road and ‘S’ Force from the north along Sylhet-Brahmanbaria highway axis would close on Brahmanbaria like the jaws of mighty pincer. Accordingly orders were given to the troops under ‘S’ Force to advance. 11 East Bengal Regiment was ordered to lead the advance starting on the night of 5-6 December. 2 East Bengal regiment having had just fought the Akhaura battle, was ordered to move behind the leading battalion.
I also ordered 3 Sector commander to capture Teliapara and Mantala by last light of 6 December. The capture of Teliapara complex was necessary in order to facilitate the movement of my vehicles which was to bring forward the ammunitions and stores on the Sylhet highway.
The enemy was under pressure in Sylhet and it was more than expected that they would make frantic efforts to reach Dhaka. The Sylhet highway, therefore, had to be plugged. On its march to Brahmanbaria, 11 East Bengal Regiment was ordered to secure the highway upto Sharail. In this effort this battalion was assigned two tasks:
(a) To establish a road block on Sylhet highway north of Chandura.
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(b) To clear road between Chandura and Sharail. In fulfilment of these tasks, Nasim detailed a company under Major Subed Ali Bhuyan to lay a road block at a brigade-cumnullah about a mile north-east of Chandura. The rest of the battalion advanced towards Chandura through Harashpur on its way to Sharail. When the remaining battalion had reached Paikpara near Chandura, Subed Ali confirmed that the road block had been completed. It was obviously a welcome news. Nasim ordered his battalion to advance along the highway without having any fear of emeny appearing from behind his back. Chandura, Shahbazpur, Sharail and then Brahmanbaria would be liberated again. A touch of nostalgia moved my sentiments. I could not stay on any more. The pursuit operation had to be fast moving, specially so in this case when we had to keep pace with the Indian division advancing from the south.
It was 1 O’clock in the afternoon, I arrived Paikpara accompanied by my runner. The company under Lieutenant Nazrul advanced steadily. About one thousand yards behind this advance company was the battalion headquarters where I got in touch with Nasim. We were eight in number.
The enemy vacated Chandura and fell back to Shahbazpur. The forward company sped up its advance. I ordered them to capture Shahbazpur brigade before it was destroyed by the enemy to cause delay on our advance.
The battalion headquarters was just about to reach Islampur when a truck appeared behind us. Its colour resembled that of a truck belonging to 11 East Bengal Regiment. Nasim seeing the truck remarked – “Sir, Teliapara must have been captured by 3 sector troops”. It is important to note that our troops were in the Indian territory — east of Teliapara. So with out having captured Teliapara our vehicles could never have made their way. Enemy vehicles were not expected as Subed Ali Bhuyan and already confirmed having completed the road block north-east of Chandura.
Believing that the vehicle was ours, as it came near, we very casually — not even properly looking at the vehicle, signalled to the driver to stop. The driver applied brake and inostensibly halted the vehicles. As the vehicle stopped, to our utter surprise,
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we saw that it was full of Pakistani soldiers. These troops were fleeing from Sylhet area. It was more than a surprise for us to see enemies staring at us from the truck. They were 14 to 15 in number. They were no less amazed and disappointed, for a retreating enemy it is worse to have his adversary staring in the face rather than trailing him from the rear.
An Episode
Within minutes of the surprised appearance of the enemy vehicle a dramatic incident precipitated. As was expected of the victor, we ordered the enemy to surrender raising their hands — saying “hands up’. While a few of them in response to the order raised their hands indicating their submission, a few others jumped out of the vehicle and dashed towards the village and in the process opened eratic fire. A stout Pakistani Subedar seated on the front seat of the vehicle jumped out and caught hold of me and a hand to hand scuffle ensued for which I was least prepared.
The leading company was about one kilometre ahead of us in the direction of Shahbazpur and the rest were about me one kilometre behind in the direction of Paikpara from the place of incidence, Islampur. From the very appearance of this group of enemy I had no doubt that they came from North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan and are Pathans and the Subedar was a hefty man at that. It was quite a job for me to tackle him. We both had our pistols in the pouches but failed to make it handy. My runner Sepoy Mannan with my stengun, in-spite of several attempts, could not fix his aim at the Subedar due to the fact that both of us were qrappling, scuffling and moving to and fro; as a result at times I was infront of the barrel and at times the Subedar was infront of the barrel. Sepoy Mannan, therefore, could not press the trigger thinking that I would get hurt.
In the meantime Nasim had sustained a serious bullet wound on his buttock and my runner Mannan got a bullet on the knee. At long last I was able to invoke the judo and boxing style upon my adversary and succeeded in overpowering him with a knee tackle on the groin and a mighty punch on his jaw. The Subedar fell asunder. He swang quickly, went behind Mannan and grabbed hold on his stengun, who was laying on the ground with a bullet wound on his knee, and fired at me holding Mannan as
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his shield. Only a yard away, there was no chance of missing the hit. But I did not feel any thing excepting that I heard a sound – bang-bang. One of our men came running towards us and tried to shoot at the Subedar but he could not use his gun as the Subedar was holding Mannan as his shield. Mannan’s rifle was bying on the grounded which I picked up and used the butt on Subedar’s head. As he fell on the ground, I hit him several times with the rifle butt until he fell unconscious. I thought he was dead.
All these happened in matter of seconds. It was short and snappy drama only witnessed by a few. I found myself all alone. Two of my soldiers dead. Nasim lay severely wounded bleeding profusely and no one was around me.
The leading company hearing the gun shots at their back turned about towards Islampur and the rear elements were cautiously closing up towards us. But before any of the group could come up to us a bus with about 25 Pakistani soldiers in it came up behind us. As they were debussing I raised the rifle which was in my hand to fire at them, too soon to realise that it had met with the same fate as that of the Subedar’s head. It was broken. My stengun was with Sepoy Mannan. He was not there when I called for him. He by then had crawled to safety along with my stengun. I threw the broken rifle away and reached for my pistol which was in my pouch. But this also failed for none of its fault for it took two bullets fired by the Subedar at me and stood condemned. I put my saviour back in the pouch and seeing no other alternative dived in a nearby muddy swamp to hide myself.
Pakistani troops got down from the bus and quickly went to the ground an took up position in and around the village and the swamp where I was trying to hide myself. They were wearing grey militia, shirt and Khaki trousers and I had olive green dress which turned grey with the mud, an automatic camouflage. I suddenly found myself amongst the enemy troops with none of my troops around me. I was in real helpless state, the angel of death was around to protect me, when I decided to act boldly. I got up from the swamp and walked confidently in front of the enemy troops and quietly walked into a hut and hide myself in its safety. While I was passing in-front of them, I was holding a small holy Quran’ very close to my heart, which I used to hang
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around my neck and had been praying to God to give me a weapon so that at this stage of the war I do not get killed unarmed. My prayer was responded because when I walked right in-front of them in broad day light no one noticed me. I must say, it was God’s infinite mercy which saved me.
By then my leading and the rear elements closed in the eneny from two sides and attacked them. A hot exchange of fire took place. The enemy suffered heavy casualties and began to fall back. While withdrawing all of them were caught by our troops. In his action 25 enemy soldiers got killed and 11 of them were taken as prisoners. Three more were taken as prisoners the following day. Incidentally out of these three prisoners one was the JCO with whom I fought a close quarter battle the previous day and left him there as dead. He had bandage in his head. The casualties on our side were also no less. We suffered 2 killed and 11 injured. Havilder Rafiq died a hero’s death and Sepoy Mujibur Rahman also sacrificed his life like a brave soldier.
Apart from Havilder Rafique and Sepoy Mujibur Rahman those who showed unqualified courage in this action deserve special mention here. They are Lieutenant Nazrul Islam, Havilder Abul Kalam and Naik Mustafa Ali.
Doctor Lieutenant Moinul was also injured in this action. For the treatment of our injured, immediately no one was available on the spot. Chandura was the nearest place where medical cover was available. So I got them boarded in the truck, brought by the Pakistanis and unable to wait any longer for a driver, took the steering myself. Our rear elements were advancing up the road. As I was approaching them they took me for the enemy probably because of the truck that I was driving and began to spray maehine gun fire on the truck. Such panic, confusion and risks are not uncommon in war. In those few moments of crisis I did not know what to do. Suddenly someone recognised me and stopped firing and thus I was saved. I was in a hurry to take the wounded troops of mine to Chandura for immediate medical care, so I was rushing.
Again as I was driving and was approaching the last company fire was brought to bear on the unfortunate Pakistani truck. My troops thought that the enemy in truck is fleeing away. I somehow or other managed to stop their fire by waving my cap. Its windscreen broke to pieces, but I remained without any
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scratch on my body. I was again safe and sped up to reach Chandura at last. I cannot give any explanation to such miracle except to say that it was again God’s infinite mercy which continued to protect me and the wounded I was carrrying.
There was no hospital arrangement at Chandura but with the help of the local doctors we gave them first-aid and send them to Agartala on stretchers.
Due to the injury, Nasim was unable to command the battalion any longer. He was bleeding profusely., When I was sending him on a stretcher to Agartala he was pleading with tears in his eyes telling me. “Sir, who will look after my battalion and the troops in my absence. Please allow me to stay with them”. I consoled him, gave him assurance and told him that he needs immediate surgical care. Even then when he was leaving there was tears in his eyes. Such was the feeling, attachment and sense of responsibility existed amongst all during the war of liberation between the commander and the command.
Subed Ali was the next senior to command the battalion. After what he did on the road block north-east of Chandura, I could not repose confidence on Subed Ali any longer. It was an unpardonable act for a soldier in war. I therefore, needed an officer immediately to command this battalion. As I said before, I had very limited number of wireless set in my Force. So my communication with the rear was through runner. Considering the importance of the matter I could not rely on the messenger either.
I therefore, instructed Lieutenant Nasir, the adjutant to consolidate the battalion around Islampur and Chandura and left the place to go to the rear and bring along someone to command the battalion. The next morning I returned to Chandura and brought along Matin with me and placed him in command of the battalion.
The previous day, when we were busy in the action at Islampur, the enemy managed to destroy the Shahbazpur bridge resulting in 24 hours delay on our advance.
Matin, on arrival, could not immediately launch his battalion across Titals river without knowing the strength and disposition of the enemy. Subed Ali Bhuyan with his company, was ordered to go across primarily on fighting reconnaissance mission on the
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same very night. According to reports received on the morning of 8 December, enemy had vacated the far bank of Titas river and Subed Ali was in control there. The battalion got across the river in no time and made for Sharail with utmost speed. Subed Ali’s company leading.
57 Indian mountain division reached Brahmanbaria on 8 December which was already vacated by the enemy. Simultaneously ‘S’ Force also reached Sharail unopposed. By this time the enemy had no will to fight. They would run for security of life and collect at places in strength. In this sector all the surviving enemies collected at Ashuganj and Bhairab Bazar.
Both the Indian troops and the ‘S’ Force resumed advance towards Ashuganj without any loss of time. By the evening of 8 December 11 East Bengal Regiment reached Ajabpur and Durgapur to the East of Ashuganj. 2 East Bengal and the sector troops remained behind, between Sharail and Shahbazpur. ‘S’ Force headquarters was established at Sharail. Indian 311 Mountain brigade closed in within the vicinity of Ashuganj with 10 Bihar on the south of Durgapur. 18 Rajput between Talshahar and Durgapur and 4 Gurard at Talshahar itself. 73 Brigade remained at Brahmanbaria.
We could not advance any further towards Ashuganj. Enemy’s long range guns were in action without any interruption. Indian guns were still behind somewhere around Agartala and Shingarbil. So they had to be brought forward to give us effective fire support. This was an immediate setback in our advance.
On 9 December both ‘S’ Force and 311 Mountain brigade slowly and steadily kept on creeping forward towards Ashuganj.
Ashuganj and Bhairab Bazar were strongly held by the Pakistani troops. 14 Division headquarters was located there, a symbol of strength for the retreating enemy. But they were left with no guts to fight. Only the long range guns roared on.
18 Rajput took a bold step in attacking Ashuganj and got badly trapped there. With enemy troops on its either flanks, it was difficult for the Rajput to extricate themselves. Therefore, in order to extricate them 10 Bihar and 11 East Bengal attacked Ashuganj from the direction of Durgapur. The attack was supported by a squardron of PT 76 Indian tanks. It was a determined attack. The enemy opened up their anti-tank guns.
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With the pressure developing on the left, at last 18 Rajput was able to extricate, but with a high price. Four tanks were knocked out in addition to many casualties in dead and wounded. Immediately after this action at about 10-30 a.m. the enemy dynamited a part of the bridge on Ashuganj side and one span of the bridge fell in the river.
In the absence of own artillery support the battle slowed down and with the close of the day, taking the advantage of the darkness on December 10 the enemy fell back to Bhairab. Without giving any respite, two companies of Indian 16 Punjab were dropped on the far bank of Meghna by helicopters. On December 11, around 1130 hours the enemy dynamited a part of the bridge on Bhairab side and destroyed two spans of the bridge. Bhairab thus remained in seized.
Bhairab was to be contained and bypassed. One of ‘S’ Forces battalion i.e. 11 East Bengal regiment and 16 Punjab regiment of 73 Indian mountain brigade stayed behind to contain enemy at Bhairab while 311 Indian mountain brigade and the rest of ‘S’ Force advanced towards Narshingdi.
Narshingdi to Dhaka
4 Guards regiment was heli-lifted to Narshingdi to be later linked up by 10 Bihar, 18 Rajput, 2 East Bengal regiments and the remaining troops of ‘S’ Force and of Sector 3. It was a marching column.
2 East Bengal regiment reached Raipura on 12 December. ‘S’ Force headquarters remained with this battalion. On the following day in the evening when we reached Narshingdi, we were welcomed by the Guards regiment which had already occupied the industrial complex of Narshingdi on 11 December with little or no resistance from the enemy. The Guards regiment had the privilege of collecting all the transports that came their way at Narshingdi.
The joint command ordered my only regular battalion, the 2 East Bengal regiment to stay at Narshingdi while the Indian 311 Brigade would continue its march on to Dhaka. This was an unacceptable and unreasonable decision. My troops could not be left behind, we should be the one to be in fore front to liberate Dhaka. I, therefore, informed the Joint Command that my troops will not stay behind at Narshingdi. My desire symbolised the
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wishes cherished by all my officers and men. So, I took that decision. I was very firm in my decision to process to Dhaka, and therefore, the Joint Command could not but accede to my desire.
On the way to Dhaka again, the brigade column led by 4 Guards took the Narshingdi-Demra-Tarabo road whle ‘S’ Force along with the other sector troops took Narshingdi-BhultaMurapara road. My troops crossed Shital-lakhya river at Rupganj there from invest Dhaka city and the cantonment from the east. My troops arrived at Murapara in the afternoon of 13 December and on the same day the leading element effecting crossing of river Shital-lakhya and Baloo having only 5 to 6 miles between them and Dhaka.
The enemy had organised a strong outer perimeter defence towards the east across the Baloo river. The area around Bashabo and Khilgaon had field defences. The ‘S’ Force and the sector troops gradually began to deploy for the final assault.
To be exact, the disposition of the troops under the joint Command on 14 december was as under :
(a) 4 Guards and 18 Rajput regiments reached on the east bank of the river Shital-lakhya at Tarabo.
(b) 10 Bihar regiment was at Rupshi.
(c) 2 East Bengal regiment at Pubgaon and across Baloo river west of Demra.
(d) The 3 sector troops and eliments of 2 sector troops were around Bashabo and Khilgaon.,
(e) A field regiment artillery was deployed east of Tarabo in general area Borpa.
The Dhaka-Demra road was yet to be brought under our control. The advance of Indian 311 Brigade came to a stand still for almost two days. The brigade operated along the east bank of Shital-lakhya river to effect a crossing until the morning of 16 December.
My sector troops established contact with the enemy defence at Bashabo area and a battle raged on the night of 14 December. The enemy made a last ditch effort and he did it with desperation and determination. But he could not endure for long inspite of receiving fresh reinforcement of troops from Dhaka.
The long range guns of the artillery under Joint Command began to roar incessantly over Dhaka whereas Nizai had all his
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guns far out on the borders. He had troops but did not have the long range weapons to impair our advance not to talk of stopping the advance. I could well imagine how miserable General might have been feeling without the gun, as we had also gone through the same process during our early stage of the battle. However, there was a bit of difference and that was that we did not have any long range weapons where as Gen. Niazi had the weapons which he mis-used. For this blunder he had nobody to blame but curse himself.
In any pursuit operation and more so in the circumstances that we were in, time and space ranked highest of all the considerations. Race for Dhaka had to be completed with neckbreak speed, even faster than the “Enterprise” that was cruising towards Bay of Bengal in an unknown mission. This was another major reason for adopting this strategy of speed. In the international front, following India’s recognition of Bangladesh on December 6, the US support to Pakistan came to the surface. Mr. Jack Anderson’s disclosures at the times, made it immediately clear to the world that the government of US will do every thing to help Pakistan. In pursuance of this policy orders were already given to mobilize the mighty 7th fleet for an unknown mission in Bay of Bengal. So top consideration had to be given to speed, a factor which only could neutralize this move.
The Indian 11 corps was able to get Major General H. M. Ansari’s 16 Division cornered, isolated and encircled in small pockets on the west of Padma. The XXXIII corps made a sweeping advance through the Hilli salient down to the mouth of the confluence of the mighty Jamuna and Padma. 101 communication Zone debussing from Tura on the north stampeded with a lightning speed and was heading towards Dhaka when, more than anything, the electronic warfare from behind the scene, had started eroding the enemy’s morale. Finally, from the east, IV Corps advanced in three divisional columns. On the north-east a divisional column advanced along Silchar-Sylhet road to take care of the enemy in Sylhet. On the south-east another division in two columns drove to contain and capture Comilla and Chittagong. From the east 57 Mountain division in its relentless advance left the enemy besieged at Bhairab and was at its last leg on the road to Dhaka. The enemy,
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all over the country was engulfed as if in a deluge, which had taken the spark from them.
As the noose around Dhaka gradually began to close in at an unprecedented speed in clocklike precision, a radio message from the Indian Chief of Army Staff General Manekshaw to the Eastern Command, Pakistani Army, began to reaffirm the inevitable surrender in the minds of the occupation forces of Pakistan. The effects were manifest in many enemy commanders and troops in the far-flung areas of Bangladesh. Only exception was found in Dhaka where Niazi’s empty boast, “fall of Dhaka will be over my dead body” provided a propaganda value for the consumption of the Pakistani people at home. Pakistani’s second man in Bangladesh. Major General Rao Farman Ali’s appeal to the United Nations to arrange for a safe evacuation of the Pakistani troops was quickly counter-manded by Yahya. Niazi only symbolised the authority of Islamabad, having little regard on what was happening around him.
16 December dawned with the talk of the surrender of the occupation forces. Bombing halt ordered by General Manekshaw in response to Niazi’s surrender proposal signed on 15 December was valid upto 9 a.m. on the 16 December and accordingly a radio watch was established to receive confirmation or otherwise from Niazi. The beleguered Eastern Command asked for extension of the dead line by another six hours, which was accepted and confirmation sent to this effect at 10 a.m.
Things now on moved fast. Major General Jacob, the chief of staff on the Indian Eastern Command flew into Dhaka by a helicopter exactly at 1 p.m. with the terms of surrender. Niazi initialled the terms at 2-45 p.m. and set the stage for the signing ceremony to be held at the Ramna Race Course at 4-30 p.m.
Pakistani troops at Demra surrendered to the Joint Command at 1 p.m. Around 1.30 p.m. I was told by Commander Delta Sector, Brigadier Shabeg Singh that he has a message for me from GOC 57 Mountain Division which says that I should be present at the airport by 3.30 p.m. to receive Lt. Gen. Aurora and should also be present at the Ramna Race Course as member of Bangladesh delegation in the surrender ceremony. The time was short and the road to the airport was hazardous. So I had to leave for the airport without any loss of time. Before I left I instructed
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Moin to bring the battalion to Ramna Race Course at 4.30 pm and also instructed my BM, Major Gulati to inform rest of the Sector troops to get concentrated in the Race course area.
The Demra-Dhaka road was not yet safe. The fallen enemy out of jitter and vengence kept their fingers on the trigger. I therefore asked Lieutenant Colonel Khiljee, the Pakistani battalion commander of the area, to escort me through his troops to the airport. So by the time Lt. Col. Khiljee could make the area safe to drive it was already 2.30 p.m. I could not waste any more time and rushed through and reached airport and about 330 p.m. Dhaka airport bore the look of a war torn battle field, yet it radiated a welcome smile on the victory day.
Amongst many who came to receive Lieutenant General Aurora at the Airport, Lieutenant General Niazi was the centre of attraction. He had a gloomy, depressed appearance. It was an experience of life to witness a general defeated in the theatre of operation with a record of discgraceful genocide to his credit. As I scorned at him, his entire being appeared to be dishevelled and full of utter disgrace. He was more than defeated, for defeat has also a grace which Niazi did not have.
We did not have to wait for long. Soon a fleet of helicopters appeared in the sky and landed on the tramac with General Aurora and his party. Group Captain Khandaker, Deputy Chief of Staff (Operation & Training) Bangladesh Forces was also a member of this party. Airport formalities soon over, we started for the Ramna Race Course, now renamed as Suhrawardy Uddyyan. A mammoth crowd, hilarious with joy of victory thronged the vast expanse. Jubilant cry of “Joi Bangla” rented the air. It was a day of rejoicing, a day of thanks-giving, a day of victory which cost Bangladesh an ocean full of blood.
We looked on as the signing ceremony progressed. It was a snappy and simply ceremony. It was a proud moment of my life to represent the government of Bangladesh on this occasion.
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Annexure – A
Bangladesh Operational Sectors
On 10 April ’71, the Prime Minister designate Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed in his first announcement named four region commanders. They were Major Safiullah, Major Zia, Major Khaled and Major Osman. The area of responsibility that was allocated to them were, Sylhet-BrahmanbariaMymensingh region to Safiullah, Comilla-Noakhali region to Khalaed, Chittagong-Chittagong Hill Tracts region to Zia and South Western region to Osman. The next day on 11 April ’71, the Prime Minister designate announced the name of three more region commanders. They were Captain Newazish-Rangpur region, Major Najmul HaqueDinajpur – Rajshahi – Pabna regopm amd Captain Jalil – BarisalPatuakhali region. These regions later became sectors and during the Sector Commanders conference on 10 to 17 July ’71 the whole of Bangladesh was divided into 11 Sectors. Those were as under :
1. Sector No. 1— Includes the districts of Chittagong and western part of Chittagong Hill tracts. The border area extends up to Shuvapur bridge including Feni river:
(a) HQ – Sabroom.
(b) Sector Command :
(1) Major Ziaur Rahman, psc — upto June 1971
(2) Capt. Rafiq – from July 1971 onwards.
(c) Civil Affairs Adviser – Mr. A. Mannan, MNA.
2. Sector No. 2 – Includes the districts of Noakhali, part of Faridpur, Comilla excluding Brahmanbaria subdivision and part of Dhaka. The border area extends from excluding Feni river upto Akhaura.
(a) HQ – Melaghar.
(b) Sector Command : Major Khaled Moshrraf, psc — upto third week October, 1971.
(c) In the absence of Khaled the following officers shared the responsibility in the Sector from last week of October 71 but officially they were not made Sector Commander.
(1) Capt Salek Chowdhury – He being the senior most officer in the Sector HQ officiated as Sector Commander
(2) Capt. ATM Haider – In Khaled’s absence he was conducting the FF’s operation in Dhaka city crea.

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(d) Civil Affirs Advisers :
(1) Mr. Nurul Haq, MNA
(2) Prof. Khorshed Alam, MNA.
3. Sector No. 3 – Includes parts of the districts of Sylhet, Comilla, Mymensingh, Tangail and Dhaka. The border area extends from Akhaura upto Churaman Kati.
(a) HQ — Simna
(b) Sector Command :
(1) Major K. M. Safiullah, psc — upto September 1971
(2) Capt. A. N. M. Nuruzzanan* – from October 1971 onwards.
(c) Civil Affairs Advisers :
(1) Prof. Khorshed Alam, MPA.
(2) Mr. Lutful Hye Sachchu, MPA. 4. Sector No. 4 – Includes eastern part of Sylhet district. The border area extends from excluding Churaman Kati upto including Karimganj-Zakiganj.
(a) HQ – Karimganj.
(b) Sector Command — Major C. R. Dutta.
(c) Civil Affaris Adviser – Mr. Dewan Farid Ghazi, MNA.
5. Sector No. 5 — Includes northern part of Sylhet district. The border area extends from excluding Karimganj-Zakiganj upto including Takerghat. This sector became operational from end — August 1971 onwards.
(a) HQ – Karimganj.
(b) Sector Command – Major Mir Shawkat Ali, psc
(c) Civil Affaris Adviser – Mr. Dewan Farid Ghazi, MNA.
(1) Mr. Abdul Haque MNA
(2) Mr. Dewan Obidur Reza Chowdhury, MNA. 6. Sector No. 6 – Includes the districts of Rangpur and Dinajpur. The Border area extends from Bhurungamari in Rangpur upto Hilli in Dinajpur.
(a) HQ — Tetulia.
(b) Sector Command – Wing Commander A. Bashar.
(c) Civil Affaris Advisers :
(1) Mr. Matiur Rahman, MNA
(2) Mr. Fazlul Karim, MPA.
7. Sector No. 7 — Includes the districts of Rajshahi and Pabna. The border area extends from excluding Hilli upto Hardinge bridge.
(a) HQ – Kaliganj.
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* Was retired from Pakistan Army before 1970

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. (b) Sector Command :
(1) Major Najmul Haque — upto July 1971
(2) Major Qazi Nuruzzaman, psc — from August 1971 onwards.
(c) Civil Affaris Advisers :
(1) Mr. Azizur Rahman MNA
(2) Mr. A. Salam
8. Sector No. 8 — Includes the districts of Kushtia, Jessore, partly Faridpur and Khulna. The border area extends including Hardinge bridge upto Kaliganj.
(a) HQ— Kalyani.
(b) Sector Command –
(1) Major Abu Osman Chowdhury — upto August 1971
(2) Major M. A. Manzur, psc — from September 1971 onwards.
(c) Civil Affaris Adviser : Mr. Rawshan Ali. MNA
9. Sector 9 – Includes the district of Khulna, Barisal and Patuakhali. The border area extends from excluding Kaliganj upto Shundarban.
(a) HQ — Taki.
(b) Sector Command – Capt. Jalil.
(c) Civil Affairs Adviser s:
(1) Mr. M. A. Ghafoor, MNA
(2) Mr. Nurul Islam Manju, MNA.
10. Sector No. 10 – Includes the eastern part of Chittagong Hill Tracts upto Teknaf. This sector was never made oiperative. Later special Naval Commando operation areas were redesignated as Sector 10 area.
11. Sector No. 11 — Includes the northern parts of the districts of Mymensingh and Tangail. The border area extends from excluding Tekerghat upto Rahumari. This sector became operational from endAugust 1971 onwards.
(a) HQ — Tura.
(b) Sector Command — Major M. A. Taher — from end-August to end-November 1971.
(c) When Taher became injured during the last week of November ’71. Capt. Aziz was the next senior officer in this Sector who took over the responsibility of Sector Commander, in the Acting capacity. He later led the troops to Dhaka but he was not made Sector Commander officially.
(d) Civil Affaris Adviser : Mr. Rafiquddin Bhuyan, MNA
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*Retired as Major from Pakistan army before 1971
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