Bangladesh The Birth of a Nation Marta R Nicholas, Philip Oldenburg

Bangladesh The Birth of a Nation Marta R Nicholas, Philip Oldenburg

 
Bangladesh The Birth of a Nation Marta R Nicholas, Philip Oldenburg (Unicoded)
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FOREWORD
MAJOR developments in international affairs, whether they reflect massive human tragedy or give promise of advancing the cause of world peace, present important opportunities for stimulating interest in and deepening understanding of students everywhere about the rest of the world and its relationship with their own society and their own lives. For students in the South Asian subcontinent, and especially those who are now citizens of the newest nation in the world, the tragic events which led to the birth of Bangladesh hardly need further emphasis through study in the classroom in order to stimulate awareness, although such study may help to deepen understanding of the background to this great tragedy. In the case of the students of Bangladesh, many were directly involved in the events which brought about the creation of their nation. For students farther removed from the scene, however, there is need both for stimulating interest in and for deepening understanding of the momentous events which fundamentally changed the face of the South Asian subcontinent in the year 1971.
Taking American students and the role of their government in international affairs as an example, two recent developments, although sharply contrasting in character, illustrate the capacity of major world events to stimulate the interest of students, as well as teachers and others in all walks of life. One is President Nixon’s trip to China in early 1972, which has been widely acclaimed as advancing the cause of world peace. The second is U.S. policy during the recent crisis in the South Asian subcontinent which, alas, grew out of great human tragedy and did little to ease (and in the view of some, much to aggravate) that tragedy.
Because of the widespread public interest which foreign policy developments of this basic importance generate, they both offer a point of leverage with which to move beyond the transitory events of newspaper headlines to a more searching examination of the peoples involved and their societies and traditions, as well as their relationship to longer term and more fundamental concerns of other societies. The purpose of this Handbook on Bangladesh is to provide a means of moving from the more transitory aspects of the crisis on the subcontinent which has lead to the birth of the new nation of Bangladesh to a greater understanding of the ideas, institutions, and issues involved in and affected by that crisis.
Like similar crises in the past, the Bangladesh crisis has generated more heat than light, more advocacy than analysis. We hope that this Handbook, prepared by a group of scholars, many of whom have specialized in the study of Bengal and all of whom have specialized in the study of the South Asian subcontinent, will help to shed light on the complex character of the events of the crisis and the background to them, as well as prospects for the future of the young nation of Bangladesh. In short, our desire is to deepen the understanding of Bangladesh and neighbouring countries by drawing upon the interest aroused by the recent and tragic crisis in the subcontinent.
We do not offer this Handbook as a final and definitive work on the new nation of Bangladesh. As Marta Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg note in their preface, what was East Pakistan and is now Bangladesh has been relatively little studied. But because of the paucity of materials on Bangladesh for students, particularly those which try to give basic background on the land, people, society, and culture, we feel the publication of the Handbook will fill an important gap until more definitive works suitable for general student use appear.
Many books and articles dealing with the crisis leading up to the birth of Bangladesh, of which a sampling are listed in the bibliography at the conclusion of the Handbook, have been published in recent months. We believe that the Handbook complements these works by providing both background on the history and culture of Bangladesh and a selection of the more important documentary sources on the recent crisis which speak for themselves and allow the reader to make his own interpretation of that crisis.
We hope that the Handbook will prove useful to general readers, teachers, and students at the school, college, and university levels who are concerned with understanding the contemporary society and recent history of one of the world’s major regions containing one-seventh of all mankind. We also hope that, by drawing on the documentary materials, chronology, and commentary in the text, the book can be used with profit by students and teachers of international relations and foreign policy as a case study of “crisis management” by the various governments involved.
A preliminary edition of this Handbook without the documentary sources was first reproduced in February 1972, by the Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies of the New York State Education Department for use in a series of conferences for teachers on South Asia and other educational activities involving the South Asian subcontinent. The manuscript for this version of the Handbook was produced under great duress of time in order that
it might be available for the conferences on South Asia for teachers. I should like to express my great appreciation to Marta Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg and all the other contributors from Chicago and elsewhere to the Handbook for completing the original version of the manuscript in such a limited period of time amid many other demands on their attention and energies.
Encouraged by the reception of this preliminary version and the interest shown by M. Seshachalam and Company in its possible publication, we proceeded to revise and expand the Handbook into its present form. In this effort, I have taken primary responsibility for organizing and editing the documentary sources and making arrangements for publication, while Philip Oldenburg, Marta Nicholas, and I have shared responsibility for revising the preliminary text.
This has been a cooperative venture in which many have participated. In addition to the various contributors who are listed on the title page, Judith Aronson of the University of Chicago typed the preliminary version of the manuscript, and Mrs. Betty Coughtry, Mrs. Barbara Vanat, and Mrs. Gail Corbett of the Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies and Mrs. Cynthia T. Morehouse assisted in typing and proofreading the final version. A special cyclostyled version of the preliminary text was produced by Miss D. Savitri and the M. Seshachalam and Co. staff in Madras in twenty four hours in order that copies would be available to circulate for criticism and comment in India. We are also indebted to Romesh Shah, Senior Professor at the National Institute for Training in Industrial Engineering, Bombay, for reviewing the manuscript. In virtually every instance these persons made their contribution to the Handbook a labor of love, working above and beyond their regular duties.
Not only the staff but also the logistic facilities of the University of Chicago South Asia Language and Area Center and the New York State Education Department’s Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies were important factors in the preparation of this book. Some of the editorial expenses were contributed by the Conference on World Affairs, Inc., a non-profit educational organization in New York City concerned with strengthening international understanding. All of these institutions and individuals have a share in bringing about what we hope will be a concrete and constructive outcome from publication of the Handbook, for we have made arrangements for all royalties from sale of the book to be used to help rebuild the shattered college and university libraries of Bangladesh.
Truth is an elusive property, and no two observers of the same
event are likely to see it in quite the same way. The possibilities for varying interpretations of the causes and effects of a crisis as complex as that which lead to the birth of Bangladesh are obviously far greater. Other interpretations of what has happened to that troubled land in recent months are surely possible. Different interpretations will certainly be offered as more evidence becomes available. This Handbook reflects the views of a group of North American-based scholars in South Asian studies generally and Bengal studies specifically, on the basis of the evidence available to them at this particular point in time. We are grateful to M. N. Rao of M. Seshachalam and Co. for his interest and cooperation in making it more widely available as one further step to increase understanding of the newest nation in the world.
WARD MOREHOUSE, General Editor Center for International Programs
and Comparative Studies State Education Department University of the State of New York
Croton-on-Hudson, New York July, 1972.
PREFACE
THIS Handbook has been put together from drafts submitted by various scholars, mainly from the University of Chicago. These include Peter Bertocci, Edward C. Dimock, Jr., Susan G. Hadden, Marta Nicholas, Ralph Nicholas, Philip Oldenburg, Aditinath Sarkar, and Thomas Timberg. Marta Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg prepared the final draft, and the unevenness of style, repetitions and over-explanations, and errors and inconsistencies are their responsibility. For various reasons, Bangladesh has been a relatively unstudied region. Much of the statistical data is outdated, particularly since the last Census in Pakistan was in 1960. Similarly, economic data are largely drawn from Pakistan Government sources and are often unreliable. Estimating figures which are themselves political issues—the number of civilians killed by the Pakistan army, for example—is of course extremely hazardous. As a result, any discussion of events leading to the creation of Bangladesh or prospects for its future must be tentative.
As scholars we have a commitment to truth, and we feel that the truth about this crisis compels a view sympathetic to the people of Bangladesh. To the extent that the Government of Pakistan has a case, we have tried to present it, but it should be made clear that we do not find it very strong. Words such as “ slaughter” or “massacre” are not emotive words of propaganda in this context but rather often inadequate descriptions of widely attested actions. We feel that the people of Bangladesh have been shamefully treated in the past, and we wish the new nation well in the future.
MARTA NICHOLAS PHILIP OLDENBURG Bengal Crisis Committee, University of Chicago
Chicago July, 1972
1. INTRODUCTION
BANGLADESH was, from 1947 to 1971, the eastern ‘wing’ of Pakistan and is the eastern half of the cultural, linguistic, and, to an extent, economic region of Bengal. The western half is the state of West Bengal in India. The people of Bangladesh share various cultural characteristics with their Indian neighbors-e.g., their food preference of rice and fish, a proud literary heritage—but differ from them mainly in that Bangladesh is overwhelmingly Muslim. The religion of Islam has distinctive social patterns associated with it, not only in festivals and modes of worship, but also in marriage patterns, the seclusion of women, and even in dress. It was the common bond of Islam on which the new nation of Pakistan was founded in 1947. Despite the more than 1000 miles that separated East from West Pakistan (and despite certain ethnic and cultural antagonisms), the union seemed to be workable until the eve of the West Pakistani crackdown of March 1971-a crackdown brought on by East Pakistani demands for greater autonomy within the federal Union.
Since the terrible cyclone which devastated parts of East Pakistan in November 1970, and the national elections which followed a month later, developments in that region have been almost constantly before the public eye: the massacres carried out by the Pakistan army have been described again and again; the flight of ten million refugees into India as a result of Pakistan’s effort to hold its eastern wing against a democratic movement turned guerilla army; and the final, decisive intervention of India. What is perhaps less known are the details of the crisis, and how far back into the history of the South Asian subcontinent its roots go; the socio-economic characteristics of what is now, with 75 million people, the world’s eighth most populous nation (larger than any single country of Europe), although we all know vaguely that it is desperately poor; and the prospects for economic and political recovery
in the years ahead. Bangladesh is thus worthy of our considered attention. What follows is an attempt to outline the shape of Bangladesh, past and present, and within limited space, to give substance to shadowy understanding.
2. THE AGONY OF THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH
THE emaciated bodies of refugees from East Bengal, in newspaper photographs and on the TV screen, gave immediacy to the tortuous crisis out of which the new nation of Bangladesh emerged. By the time the Indian army intervened, some ten million Bengalis had been forced to flee to India; anywhere from one to three million had been killed before they could leave home or had died somewhere along the way; a revolutionary army—to use the American name of 200 years ago-of 100,000 men had volunteered, been trained and blooded; and quite incidental to and yet terribly important for the suffering and struggle of the Bengalis, the great powers’ had made ‘moves and counter-moves’ in the world ‘arena’.
On December 17, 1971, the day after the Pakistan army Commander in the east had surrendered to the head of the triumphant Indian and Bangladesh forces in Dacca, Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire already put into effect by India. A sovereign Bangladesh became a reality. As with other great cataclysmic tragedies in human history, we want to know whether it was inevitable.
After the initial Pakistan army crackdown on the night of March 25/26, 1971, Pakistan quickly regained control of what, the Bengalis claim, had been its eastern wing. Had been because, as Tajuddin Ahmed, Prime Minister of the Bangladesh government-in-exile, said:
Pakistan is now dead and buried under a mountain of corpses. The hundreds and thousands of people murdered by the Army in Bangladesh will act as an impenetrable barrier between West Pakistan and the people of Bangladesh. By resorting to preplanned genocide, General Yahya must have known that he was himself digging Pakistan’s grave.
After its initial attacks on the intellectual and political elite of East Bengal, including shelling of the universities and systematic search for active supporters of the Awami League—the Bengali nationalist party, the Pakistan army expanded its operations to include wanton destruction of life, society and property over the countryside as well as in the cities. To distract attention from their actions, the military government at one point began putting blame on the Hindus, and concentrating special fury on them. Refugees from the violence and terror crossed into India by the tens of thousands daily.
In the first week of June, a team from the World Bank found that the situation was not settled enough to justify the continuance of aid projects in East Bengal, and noted two formidable constraints’ to ‘forces that might be relied upon by themselves to generate a strong momentum toward normalization: (1) the general sense of fear and lack of confidence on the part of most of the population, and (2) the complete dislocation of the communications system.’ As the local guerilla units obtained arms and training, and began inflicting considerable damage on roads, railroads, power installations and shipping, Pakistan found the burden of supplying her army, largely by air, so heavy that she was forced to suspend repayment of much of her foreign debt. (India would not allow Pakistan to fly over her intervening territory; blocked by the Himalayas to the north, they had to go around the southern tip of India, a trip of some 3000 miles from Pakistan.)
Both India and Pakistan attempted to raise the issue of the quickening crisis in the United Nations, but on different terms. Pakistan pointed out that the guerillas were operating out of sanctuaries in India and that this constituted interference in the internal affairs’ of a sovereign state; India urged a consideration of the violation of human rights implicit in the Pakistan action of repudiating the election of December 1970, by force, and at the same time insisted that the war inside Bangladesh was a civil war. While India’s Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, toured Western capitals seeking the end of support of Pakistan, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan sent Z. A. Bhutto, the democratically elected leader of the west wing of the country (and now its President) to China to solidify Pakistan’s alliance with that country. Indian pressures on Pakistan forces in
After its initial attacks on the intellectual and political elite of East Bengal, including shelling of the universities and systematic search for active supporters of the Awami League—the Bengali nationalist party, the Pakistan army expanded its operations to include wanton destruction of life, society and property over the countryside as well as in the cities. To distract attention from their actions, the military government at one point began putting blame on the Hindus, and concentrating special fury on them. Refugees from the violence and terror crossed into India by the tens of thousands daily.
In the first week of June, a team from the World Bank found that the situation was not settled enough to justify the continuance of aid projects in East Bengal, and noted two formidable constraints’ to ‘forces that might be relied upon by themselves to generate a strong momentum toward normalization: (1) the general sense of fear and lack of confidence on the part of most of the population, and (2) the complete dislocation of the communications system.’ As the local guerilla units obtained arms and training, and began inflicting considerable damage on roads, railroads, power installations and shipping, Pakistan found the burden of supplying her army, largely by air, so heavy that she was forced to suspend repayment of much of her foreign debt. (India would not allow Pakistan to fly over her intervening territory; blocked by the Himalayas to the north, they had to go around the southern tip of India, a trip of some 3000 miles from Pakistan.)
Both India and Pakistan attempted to raise the issue of the quickening crisis in the United Nations, but on different terms. Pakistan pointed out that the guerillas were operating out of sanctuaries in India and that this constituted interference in the internal affairs’ of a sovereign state; India urged a consideration of the violation of human rights implicit in the Pakistan action of repudiating the election of December 1970, by force, and at the same time insisted that the war inside Bangladesh was a civil war. While India’s Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, toured Western capitals seeking the end of support of Pakistan, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan sent Z. A. Bhutto, the democratically elected leader of the west wing of the country (and now its President) to China to solidify Pakistan’s alliance with that country. Indian pressures on Pakistan forces in
After its initial attacks on the intellectual and political elite of East Bengal, including shelling of the universities and systematic search for active supporters of the Awami League—the Bengali nationalist party, the Pakistan army expanded its operations to include wanton destruction of life, society and property over the countryside as well as in the cities. To distract attention from their actions, the military government at one point began putting blame on the Hindus, and concentrating special fury on them. Refugees from the violence and terror crossed into India by the tens of thousands daily.
In the first week of June, a team from the World Bank found that the situation was not settled enough to justify the continuance of aid projects in East Bengal, and noted two formidable constraints’ to ‘forces that might be relied upon by themselves to generate a strong momentum toward normalization: (1) the general sense of fear and lack of confidence on the part of most of the population, and (2) the complete dislocation of the communications system.’ As the local guerilla units obtained arms and training, and began inflicting considerable damage on roads, railroads, power installations and shipping, Pakistan found the burden of supplying her army, largely by air, so heavy that she was forced to suspend repayment of much of her foreign debt. (India would not allow Pakistan to fly over her intervening territory; blocked by the Himalayas to the north, they had to go around the southern tip of India, a trip of some 3000 miles from Pakistan.)
Both India and Pakistan attempted to raise the issue of the quickening crisis in the United Nations, but on different terms. Pakistan pointed out that the guerillas were operating out of sanctuaries in India and that this constituted interference in the internal affairs’ of a sovereign state; India urged a consideration of the violation of human rights implicit in the Pakistan action of repudiating the election of December 1970, by force, and at the same time insisted that the war inside Bangladesh was a civil war. While India’s Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, toured Western capitals seeking the end of support of Pakistan, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan sent Z. A. Bhutto, the democratically elected leader of the west wing of the country (and now its President) to China to solidify Pakistan’s alliance with that country. Indian pressures on Pakistan forces in
East Bengal increased, and both nations slowly but surely prepared for the war, which began on December 3, 1971.
The official Pakistan version of the army action on the night of March 25/26 is that it was an exercise of minimal force, designed to forestall the imminent declaration of independence by the Awami League. Their argument runs that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (the Awami League leader, now Prime Minister of Bangladesh) had said the six point program of regional autonomy—the platform on which the Awami League had campaigned and won 167 out of the 169 East Pakistan seats in the Constituent Assembly—was not an absolute demand, but negotiable; and that his subsequent insistence on them betrayed an unwillingness to commit himself to Pakistan as one country. Further, Pakistan points out, the constitution that was to be the end-product of the National Assembly chosen by the election should not be written simply by a majority of the members of the assembly, but by the people as a whole, as represented by the entire assembly.
They claim that the immediate reason for the crackdown was, in addition to forestalling the declaration of independence and the allegedly plotted coup, the threat of anarchy, a threat made real by events in the beginning of March in which nonBengalis (the so-called ‘Biharis ‘) were killed and mutilated by Bengali mobs. But, they say, the basic and pervasive reason was an unwillingness to let the unity of Pakistan be shattered; once having joined a nation voluntarily, as the Bengalis certainly had done, one is not at liberty to dissolve the bond unilaterally. The American Civil War, the Pakistan government noted, was fought to uphold precisely that principle. And, they say, as for the ‘excesses of the army action, they were blown out of all proportion by foreign reporting, and when they did occur, were the unfortunate result of the individual soldier’s desire to retaliate for the far greater massacres perpetrated by Bengalis on the Biharis.
The Bengali version is, of course, very different. They point out that, upon the urging of Z. A. Bhutto-leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, which won 88 of the 144 West Pakistan seats in the Assembly, President Yahya had postponed the March 3rd meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The Bengalis believe that the assembly was cancelled because Yahya and
Bhutto had not foreseen the overwhelming victory of the Awami League and were unwilling to accept Bengalis having that much power. They say that West Pakistani delegates to the assembly had already been threatened, allegedly by Bhutto’s party, that they should not go to Dacca for the meeting. Most East Bengalis went out into the streets to protest the announcement of the postponement of the assembly meeting. The Awami League claims that the Bengalis were non-violent but that several people died from army firing. To protest this, a massive general non-violent work-stoppage was called; again the response of the people was nation-wide; again the army fired on crowds. The Awami League says that until March 25th, there was law and order, albeit maintained by Awami League workers. Impartial news reports, it must be added, do confirm this assertion.
Yahya Khan held talks with Mujib in Dacca from March 15 to 25, but he is accused of doing so in bad faith, for at the same time he was flying in army reinforcements at a great rate. Bhutto—who had adamantly refused to meet in the assembly as long as the Awami League maintained the platform on which it had been elected—also went to Dacca for talks with Mujib. Most Bengalis thought at the time, that these ‘negotiations were sincere; later they saw them as cover-ups to gain time for military advantage. (The appendices give relevant documentary sources, including Yahya’s March 26 radio broadcast, the Bangladesh Declaration of Independence, the results of the December 1970 election, and Mujib’s six points.)
As for the actual massacres of the night of March 25/26, there can be no doubt of excesses (even though foreign newsmen were rounded up that night and flown out the next day). The reports of refugees, diplomats and newsmen all agree, and the almost instantaneous unity of the Bengalis is eloquent testimony. Finally, the Bangladesh Declaration of Independence, when it came on the heels of that tragic and eventful night, was justified in that within the British parliamentary tradition—and Pakistan always had an attachment to that tradition the majority does, in a sense, represent the nation, and that it is hard to see how the majority does not have the right to dissolve a union when it wishes.
Bengali politics are notoriously faction-ridden, although the participation in a successful war of independence may have altered this. The Awami League was considered to be the leading party of East Bengal before the December elections, but it was by no means the only powerful one. While at this distance it is difficult to determine just why the Awami League did so well in the election (80% of the vote, 167 of the 169 East Bengal seats, in a truly open, democratic election), most observers emphasize the aftermath of the terrible cyclone that devastated part of East Bengal just a month before the polling date and West Pakistani apathy toward it.
For what happened then was a vivid portrayal of precisely what the Awami League had been charging the government with: a complete disinterest in the plight of the Bengali. In a disaster in which at least a half million persons lost their lives, President Yahya waited a week to come and inspect the damage. The government made little or no effort even to distribute the food, medicine and clothing that was generously contributed by the rest of the world. It kept the foreign exchange sent to buy aid materials in the central account in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan the army refused to release helicopters and planes for relief work, and foreign relief organizations were wrapped in red tape rather than assisted. In short, the central government seemed unwilling to put much effort into the massive job of relief and rehabilitation of the people of East Pakistan. As such, the central government acted as a piece of living Awami League propaganda; and from then on, the election result was a foregone conclusion.
We began with the emaciated bodies of Bengali refugees, symbolic of a crisis that began with a terrible natural tragedy. Looking at these crises, one wonders whether this area of the world is doomed to suffering. Is it perhaps a horrifying glimpse of the future of our overcrowded planet? It is with these sorts of questions with which we hope to come to grips in the following chapters.
3. GEO-POLITICAL BACK
GROUND
BANGLADESH is the newest nation of the South Asian subcontinent; others are India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan, and the small Himalayan Kingdoms of Sikkim and Bhutan. Several of these nations have within them diverse and distinct cultural groups, usually confined to particular geographical regions, and differing from one another in language, dress, food habits, kinship patterns, etc. The importance of these culture regions should not be minimized; many are as large as the nations of Europe.
The defining feature of a culture region tends to be a separate language, for languages developed in, and spread out from, ‘ natural ‘, geographically separate areas, although regions typically overlap. The language of the delta of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers is Bengali, while the language of the upper reaches of the former river is Hindi and of the latter Assamese. Bengali is related, much as Romance Languages are related to one another, to the languages of people to the north and west of Bengal, including the languages of West PakistanPunjabi, Sindhi and Urdu. Bengali is written in a distinctive script which is closely related to other scripts of North India, except for Urdu, Sindhi and West Pakistan Punjabi; these are written in a Perso-Arabic script (from right to left) but are easily, and indeed often are, written in the script of Hindi, Devanagari. The languages of West Pakistan, especially in their literary forms, take much of their vocabulary from Arabic and Persian, but they are otherwise unrelated to them. Bengali literature, beginning its development before the time of Chaucer, came to a flowering in the late 19th and early 20th century, as part of a general ‘renaissance’ of Indian culture centred in Bengal. The Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1913.
Although the entire region of Bengal shares much beyond language in terms of culture—a common political history of hundreds of years, for instance—it is divided by religion; the western half is predominantly Hindu, the eastern half largely Muslim. Even this difference, as seen from the outside, does not seem as sharp as the comparable division of the Punjab region in the northwest. Bengali Hinduism and Bengali Islam both have a prominent mystical and devotional strain; the Muslims of Bengal are descended from converts made by travelling sufis (mystics) who were often willing to accept elements of Hinduism. It is not uncommon for the Hindus and Muslims of a Bengali village to worship at the same saint’s tomb.
The religious difference in Bengal was compounded by a class problem; in much of East Bengal a Hindu landlord class ruled over the Muslim majority. The British attempted to cater to the Muslims of East Bengal by dividing the province in 1905; a vigorous nationalist movement centred in Calcutta and West Bengal forced them to annul the partition a few years later. By 1947, the Muslims of East Bengal had decided that the benefits of an existence separate from West Bengal, as a part of the new Islamic state of Pakistan, took precedence over the regional Bengali identity based on the similar economic situation, similar customs and the shared language of Bengal as a whole. There is no indication that this view has changed in the last twenty-five years. What has changed is the belief that these benefits could be gained within the framework of Pakistan. No one talks seriously of a reunited Bengal.
In the years since Pakistan and India gained independence, the two halves of Bengal have moved further apart, though not as far apart as the two halves of Punjab. The percentage of Muslims living in West Bengal and the percentage of Hindus living in the East has declined steadily: in March 1971, 12% of the population of East Bengal were Hindus; in 1961, Hindus had been 18.4%; before partition, in 1941, nearly 28% of the population were Hindus. Calcutta had been the premier city, the industrial and intellectual centre of the undivided province, and was also the hub of the transportation network. With the division of Bengal, Calcutta’s jute mills were left without much raw material and East Bengal’s jute farmers had no
where to sell their produce. Jute mills have been constructed throughout East Bengal since 1947, and the Dacca-Narayanganj urban complex has grown phenomenally. The transport network has been reoriented to serve the city of Dacca and the ports of Chittagong and, secondarily, of Khulna.
There was also an attempt made by the central Pakistan government to separate the Bengalis of east and west culturally. It took violent political agitation to finally establish Bengali in 1954 as one of the two official languages of Pakistan. Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, had favoured Urdu as the sole national language, despite its being spoken by a very small minority of the people of Pakistan. The works of Bengali Hindus, even Tagore, were banned from the governmentcontrolled radio of East Pakistan; and there was no importation of books from India.
It is often said that Pakistan was a ‘monstrosity’ of a country, a geographical absurdity’ of a nation, with its two wings divided by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory. But in 1947, the Bengali Muslims chose to join the new state of Pakistan, and they did not abandon their commitment to Pakistan until March 1971, when the Pakistan army was ordered to put down the treasonable ‘ demands for regional autonomy. Islam was seen as the unifying force of the state of Pakistan in two senses. First, Pakistan was to be a country for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent-primarily, a place where they would be safe from Hindu rule. Second, the basis of the new state would be Islam.
Some would argue that these two aspects are in fact one, since the believers in Islam form a community, and that well before 1947 there was a separate Islamic nation i.e., a people) in the subcontinent, transcending regional divisions. In 1947 East Bengalis opted to join a politically separate Muslim state, but as time went on, they began to feel that the bond of Islam was less important than the economic and administrative structure that had been built up between the wings. That, and the fear of India. India was seen as the land of Hindus (though there are more Muslims living in India than live in West Pakistan), bent on the extirpation of Muslims, as an enemy who would be sure to take advantage of a divided and thus weak Pakistan. In the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, a
fight concerning territory adjacent to West Pakistan, the people of East Bengal were wholehearted supporters of Pakistan and fiercely opposed to India.
Despite these ties between the two wings, there were many sources of stress. Historically, Punjabis and others of the northwest-Hindu and Sikh as well as Muslim-have looked down on the culturally (and to a degree, ethnically) distinct Bengali. The man of the northwest sees himself as virile, plain-speaking, martial, and possessed of sound common sense; the Bengali, by contrast, is seen as fearful, contentious, effeminate, sly, and generally over-educated. Economically, the East felt that it was exploited by the West, as the following table reveals.
Regional Disparities in Pakistan
Population (1971 est.)
East Pakistan West Pakistan 78 million (54%) 67 million (46%)
36%
64%
Central Government
Expenditures: 1965-70 Share in foreign
economic assistance Central government
employment (1960) Share in the army
less than 20%
13% less than 10%
87%
The inequitable expenditure on the East was found particularly galling because the bulk of Pakistan’s earned foreign exchange (hard currencies) came from exports of the jute and tea produced in the East. The end result was that East Bengal, the poorer half of Pakistan in 1947, became comparatively even poorer.
One significant source of tension between East and West Pakistan was, at least in part, symbolic. The original conception of Pakistan—which dates from 1930—had, significantly, omitted Bengal. It can be argued that the West Pakistani considered the heartland ’ of Pakistan to be in the west (recall the desire to have Urdu as the sole national language), that he did not accept the numerical majority of the eastern wing as sufficient grounds for accepting the claims of the Easterner to
more than simply parity’. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that the basis of an Islamic state would be majoritarian; there is, by contrast, a strong Islamic tradition of decision by the consensus of the whole. Rule by the overwhelmingly West Pakistani-staffed military and central administrative apparatus after the 1958 coup d’etat exacerbated the Bengali’s feeling that he was being considered a second-class citizen. The December 1970 election (see Appendix 2 for results) was the first election in Pakistan based on the one man-one vote principle, so that the massive victory of the Awami League, in which that Bengali party gained an absolute majority of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, opened up the prospect of the Bengalis having a significant share in moulding the destiny of Pakistan, and especially, East Bengal.
4. LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OF BENGAL
THE language picture on the South Asian subcontinent is extremely complex: hundreds of separate languages, many having numerous distinct dialects; dozens of different scripts; many languages with long, proud literary heritages. These languages belong to several completely different linguistic groups. For example, the four main languages of South India belong to the Dravidian family of languages and are as unrelated to most of the languages of North India as English is unrelated to Arabic.
Bengali is an Indo-European language, the eastern most member of that family group, and as such is distantly related to languages such as English. Much closer in affiliation, however, are the languages of the modern Indo-Aryan sub-family spoken in northern India and Pakistan: Hindi, Marathi, and the like. It is important to note that Urdu, the official language of Pakistan, is also a member of this family, although it is written in the Perso-Arabic script.
The immediate ancestor of the Indo-Aryan languages is Sanskrit, and all of these languages reflect their heritage, both linguistically and in their literatures. Bengali and the other languages of the eastern part of the subcontinent, Assamese and Oriya, began to grow away from the main trunk of Sanskrit, and from each other, about 1000 A.D. The earliest texts in what is recognizably Bengali (although Assamese and Oriya claim them as well) date from about that time. These texts are esoteric Buddhist poems, preserved in manuscripts found in Nepal. (The humid heat of Bengal is not kind to the palm leaves on which early texts were written. It has been said, only half jokingly, that 90% of Indian literature has been eaten by insects. This means that the literary history of Bengal is older than that of English (though not of Anglo-Saxon), a fact
of which Bengalis are understandably proud. And if one takes into account the literary tradition of Sanskrit, which is continued in Bengali as well as the other Indo-Aryan languages, the tradition is one of over 3000 years.
Little is known of the development of the language or its literature from 1000 A.D. until the late fourteenth century, for no written texts have been preserved. This does not mean, as some scholars have claimed, that this was a dark age’ of ignorance, but merely that because of the heat and insects, no manuscripts have lasted until the present. It is likely that many old literary forms were preserved in texts transmitted orally until written down in the fourteenth century and after. For it was about that time that the mangal poems, eulogistic poems running sometimes to tens of thousands of lines, began to be written down. About this time too the Shrikrishna-kirtan, a connected series of sensuous lyrics on the theme of the love of Radha and Krishna, was written.
In the middle period,’ from the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the primary type of literature was the religious poem-sometimes short lyrics, sometimes long eulogies or devotional descriptions of one or another of the gods of the Hindu pantheon. These range in style and attitude from the simple devotionalism of the village bard to the highly sophisticated, subtle, Sanskritic poetry of the court poets, to pure secular history with a veneer of religion.
But although Hinduism in one form or another was the prime motivating force in the literature of the middle period, in the twelfth century another religious and cultural force began to enter the stream of Bengali cultural and literary history—Islam. Islam entered Bengal first through a trickle of mendicant Muslim mystics, the Sufis, whose religious beliefs were at the root not very different in kind from certain indigenous Bengali tenets; and later Islam expanded through fullscale invasions. The course of the history of the subcontinent was drastically altered.
In addition to those Muslims who were direct descendants of the invaders, many Hindus, especially of low or no caste, were converted to Islam. Linguistically, the situation did not change. The converts continued to speak Bengali; and even the non-Bengali Muslims were oriented toward the
Bengali language, some of the rulers went so far as to commission Sanskrit and Persian classics to be translated into Bengali. This, of course, did have its effect on the history of the literature. In addition, many Bengali Muslim poets wrote in Bengali on Persian and otherwise Muslim themes; still others accommodated the Sufi style to indigenous Bengali imagery. The closeness of this relationship of Islam with Bengal, and of Hindu and Muslim in Bengal, has been partially responsible for the atrocities of the Pakistani army in Bangladesh. For the Muslims of the West say that Bengali Islam is somewhat tainted because of its association with Hinduism, and holy war for the purpose of purification of the faith is justified in the Islamic tradition.
This does not mean that in Bengal Hindus and Muslims have always lived together in perfect brotherhood. Much communal blood has flowed in Bengal, as elsewhere in the subcontinent. The British saw the deep rift between the communities and tried to take advantage of it by partitioning Bengal into Hindu and Muslim sections in 1905.
The British had arrived in Bengal in the eighteenth century as a trading company; they stayed to conquer and to rule. British rule is an important fact for Bengal, as for the rest of the subcontinent, for a variety of reasons, affecting every sphere of life. From the cultural point of view, the significance is that the British brought with them not only an army and commercial interests (thus causing the growth of great commercial centres such as Calcutta), but European style education, Christianity, and the English language. The Bengalis took to these importations with gusto. The founding of the great University of Calcutta satisfied the traditional Bengali love of education. In reaction to Christianity, movements to reform Hinduism—the Brahmo Samaj and others—began in Bengal in the early nineteenth century. And Bengali writers adopted the new literary forms which were functions of the English language: the novel and the short story. Whether Bengali writers write today in Bengali or in English, western literary forms and values are an intrinsic and inescapable part of the intellectual life of Bengal.
The partition of Bengal in 1947, when India and Pakistan were divided, did not result in total cultural bifurcation. The
language in West Bengal, India, as well as East Pakistan, remained Bengali, despite efforts by the central Pakistani government to impose Urdu. Rabindranath Tagore, the Hindu Bengali writer who had won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1913, remained the father of modern Bengali literature on both sides of the border. (There was a huge outcry from the people in East Pakistan when the government attempted to ban Rabindranath’s songs from the radio. And the national anthem of the new country of Bangladesh, “Amar Sonar Bangla,’ Our Golden Bengal, is a Rabindranath song.)
But communications between the two parts of the region were to a large extent disrupted; for example, books published in what was then East Pakistan were not, by and large, available in West Bengal, and vice versa. There were indications that dialect divergences were growing for lack of contact. And Muslim writers, largely in East Bengal, were using increasingly more Perso-Arabic vocabulary and, naturally enough, treating more and more Muslim subject matter than their fellow writers in West Bengal. With the creation of Bangladesh, the traditions will once again be brought into interplay with one another, for communication will be easier. The effect of this, and the effect of the war, on Bengali literature, can only be speculated upon. What is certain is that the unifying effect of commonality of language and pride in a literary tradition of a thousand years in that language will work toward the development of unity within Bangladesh and understanding, if not necessarily brotherhood, with Bengalis in India.
5. LAND (AND WATER)
OF BANGLADESH
BANGLADESH is almost entirely a land of broad rivers, small waterways and the low-lying land in between. At the height of the monsoon more than half the land is under water. Yet during the dry season, crops may suffer because of insufficient water. Rainfall is heavy on the land itself, as well as in the hills and in the Himalayas from which flow the streams which join the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers (they are called
Padma’ and ‘Meghna ’ respectively when they flow through Bangladesh). Autumn often brings cyclones (hurricanes) and tidal floods to the coast and offshore islands.
The largest rivers are the only waterways—in a country with a maximum east-west width of 290 miles and a maximum north-south distance of 325 miles, there are 4,500 miles of navigable water. The southern region contains thousands of small waterways, and a considerable area is swamp; some of it (the Sunderbans) is uninhabited and almost impenetrable. During high water, rivers are miles wide, and so bridging them becomes very difficult. Railroad lines therefore tend to stop at waters’ edge; goods and passengers are ferried over to the continuation of the line on the other bank. The railroad embankments are difficult to maintain (they often are the only dry land in an area). As major roadways would be even more difficult and costly to build, they are few and far between.
Apart from the large steamers that ply between the major ports, the backbone of transport is the small traditional country boat, making use of sails, oars, poles, and the current. In some areas, the boat is an absolute necessity, even to go from house to house in the flood season. Houses are built on natural or artificially-prepared high places in the expanse of flat land;
viewed from the air during the floods, the houses look like so many small boats floating in a limitless sea.
The climate of Bangladesh is tropical, generally hot and humid, and along with the high rainfall (50-60 inches per year is a low figure; there are places that get more than 200 inches or 16 feet per year) the heat insures that vegetation is lush. The mangrove swamps in the southern tidal areas and the extensive forests along the eastern border shelter tiger. Other fauna of Bangladesh include deer, wild fowl of many kinds and snakes, not to speak of the abundant fish of the waters in and around the country. The forests contain both deciduous and evergreen trees, but are so hard as to be useless as timber. Wood is thus extremely scarce, so bamboo is used in building houses, bridges, etc. Mineral resources also are extremely scarce, with only three small fields of natural gas and some deposits of very poor grade coal.
6. RURAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN BANGLADESH
IN a country of some 55,000 square miles (by comparison, slightly larger than New York State), over 90 percent of the population of Bangladesh in 1970 lived scattered about the countryside in more than 64,000 villages, in densities ranging from 750 to 2,000 persons per square mile of cultivated area. (If the mainland United States had a population density equal to that of Bangladesh, it would contain one and a half times the world’s population. The country is mainly a land of small farmers, most of whom own less than the country’s average of a little more than three acres per farm. Moreover, most of these tiny farms consist of many small, discontinuous plots. Many of the people engaged in agriculture are cultivators who own their farms, but more commonly, they rent or share crop someone else’s land. However, nearly 20 percent of those employed in agriculture in 1960 were landless labourers, and it is likely that their number was greatly expanded in 1970.
Rice dominates agricultural production in Bangladesh, contributing under normal conditions upto 75 percent of the produce from all crops and occupying 80 percent of the total cultivated area. Rice has three principal growing seasons in Bangladesh, demarcated by the length of growing time in conjunction with the appearance of the monsoon rains. The summer crop, aus, is planted when the monsoons appear in April or May and harvested in July or August, at which time the autumn crop, amon, is immediately sown with a view toward its harvest in December. The season of the boro crop is the dry winter period, in which the least rice can be grown, owing to a lack of rainfall and as yet meager irrigation facilities.
Because they cannot cultivate much of their land during the winter season, most Bangladeshi peasants must rely on the
summer and autumn crops for the bulk of their yearly production. In recent years, the summer season has accounted for about 30 percent of total annual rice production, the autumn crop for about 60 percent. Indeed, the predictions of famine, announced in the early months of the liberation struggle, were based on fear that the cultivation of these two crucial crops would be disrupted because of the conflict, which did reach the rural areas. Fortunately, these fears were not fulfilled.
The winter season accounts for little more than 10 percent of the yearly rice crop. Yet climatically it is thought to be ideal for planting and cultivation. One of the less well-known, but nonetheless sad, aspects of the breakdown of Pakistan’s politics is that prior to the tragedy of March 1971, plans for a massive mechanized irrigation program for all of the former East Pakistan were about to be implemented. This would have enabled farmers to cultivate during the dry season, and it was expected that annual rice production would increase rapidly as a result.
Throughout most of Bangladesh, annual yields of native rice varieties from both the summer and autumn crops typically average between 1,000 and 1,500 pounds per acre in consumable rice. Since many families farm less than the average of three acres, they are left with around 2,000 pounds of rice a year; it can be assumed that many do not attain this standard. Thus, it can be seen that many families in Bangladesh live on the margins of self-sufficiency, even in good times, particularly just before the harvest periods indicated above.
It is true, of course, that sugar cane, a few vegetables, pulses, spices and numerous fruits are raised on peasant farms. Moreover, a good many fish varieties are cultivated and caught in East Bengal’s omnipresent ponds, rivers and streams. But rice is the sine qua non of the Bengali diet; and moreover, it is central to Bengali ideas about what constitutes’ a good meal’. In Bangladesh (and India’s West Bengal as well) one does not merely ask, “Have you eaten yet?’ The idiomatically correct query, which reflects Bengali gastro-psychological’ sentiment, is, ‘Have you taken rice?
The basic building block of this rice-oriented rural society in Bangladesh is found in the peasant homestead, which typically houses a man and wife, their married sons and the
latter’s wives and children, as well as the unmarried sons and daughters of the eldest couple(s). Variation in this general pattern of household residence is common, but what anthropologists call the patrilineal extended family is the ideal rule and the actual, statistical norm.
However, even where several generations of a family’s members live in the homestead, most property, including cultivation land, is not jointly or commonly owned. Land ownership in particular is individual, passing from a father to his sons, usually at the time of the former’s death, whereupon the sons divide the property, each setting up his own separate household within the confines of the homestead. (Among Muslims, daughters can legally inherit property and sometimes do in Bangladesh, but it is common in practice for women, who usually live away from their natal homestead after marriage, not to claim their legal inheritance from their fathers.) Thus, the Bangladesh rural homestead is the dwelling place of peasant families with around 25 people in all (but sometimes as many as 50), extended over several generations, but not in joint ownership of property.
Typically, the homestead consists of a rectangular courtyard, bounded by the inward-facing dwellings and cooking houses of the individual households of the family members. The basic building material used in construction is mud: packed down, the thick, clay-like soils found everywhere in the Bengal delta harden solidly when dry. Near the homestead a few fruit-bearing trees-banana, mango, jackfruit, etc.—may be found, along with vegetable plots and seed beds for rice. Also in the vicinity of the homestead there lies a small man-made pond which serves several functions, notably as a place for fish cultivation and as a bathing facility. The soil removed in the excavation of the pond is usually used to raise the living area, as protection from monsoon flooding.
As is common in Muslim societies, the homestead’s layout, especially those belonging to the wealthier families who possess larger dwelling areas, is so arranged as to allow for the privacy and seclusion of women in a manner consistent with the norms of purdah, which is rather stringently practiced in rural Bangladesh. Seen from the outside, located as often as not on relatively high ground, surrounded by trees, the peasant B.—2
household seems compact, well-arranged and well-insulated from the world around it. But it is certainly not socially insulated from its immediate surroundings. Groups of eight to twelve homesteads in relative proximity form the peasant village, whose membership-usually 300 to 400 people—is typically a matter of social definition.
Because of the dense population in most of rural Bangladesh, the dwellings of rural people are ubiquitous in the countryside, primarily separated only by rice fields. Moreover, because the flatness of the delta combines with the potential heaviness of the monsoon rains to threaten rural dwellings with flood, relatively high ground is ideally sought for homestead location; this requirement of living in the Bengal delta produces a scattered pattern of rural settlement. The combination of dense population and scattered settlement means that the stretch of human habitation in this part of the world seems never-ending. As a result, it is usually difficult for the outside visitor to the Bangladesh countryside to determine where one village’s boundaries end and those of another begin. However, these boundaries are well-known to local people; membership in a given village is a matter of local definition and dependent upon whatever grouping of homesteads provides the focus of collective activities for each family.
In each cluster of homesteads comprising a village, leadership in collective social, political and sometimes religious activities is usually provided by the wealthier and larger families. Their members most often organize whatever is done in the way of common village endeavours, and their homesteads are most commonly the loci of informal social and recreational activities. Men from these more influential local families provide what has traditionally existed in the way of political leadership as well, particularly with respect to the settlement of local disputes. As village elders’ in this capacity, such men are known variously throughout rural Bangladesh as sardars or matabbars, titles which distinguish their inherited status and reflect their ideal roles as political influentials and keepers of the peace’.
An interesting feature of rural political organization in Bangladesh is the fact that, given the continuous stretch of population and the proximity of local villages to one another,
conflict resolution and political leadership often extend beyond the immediate confines of the socially defined village community. That is, the sardars and matabbars of local villages are, at least in some parts of the country, members of a multivillage Council of Elders’ whose decisions in the resolution of a dispute are binding upon the members of all the villages involved. In this manner, which some urban planners consider ideal for the solution of American metropolitan problems, villages in some areas of Bangladesh have long practiced
political amalgamation’ in the resolution of problems of conflict which might simultaneously affect separate though contiguous, densely-packed local communities.
Thus, homesteads unite to form small villages and even intravillage units, and these in turn are linked in certain political contexts to conglomerations of villages in those instances where formal organization beyond the village level’ is needed to resolve problems of conflict. Each unit of this ever-expanding ensemble of rural institutions encompasses increasing areas of territory at each level, along with their respective agglomeration of population, across the countryside.
Also central to the elaboration of human organization across the delta is the role of the rural market, hundreds of which are to be found in each of Bangladesh’s 19 administrative districts. The local market, which usually meets twice a week, is more than just a place for the exchange of goods and services, and the collection and distribution of trade items to and from larger centres. Usually identified by the dozen or more permanent’ shops and tea houses which constitute its telltale layout, the local market is a recreational centre for the many villages which surround it. It may also be the locus of the only public secular school for village children, the seat of local official’ government, and contain on its peripheries a mosque or Hindu temple or shrine. Most of the buyers and sellers present on any given market day will come from nearby villages. Even at the height of the agricultural seasons, men will leave their ploughs in the late afternoon to meet their fellows at the local bazaar.
It is interesting to note that the five to ten square mile area typically served by a rural market in Bangladesh seems to constitute a larger social community, which encompasses dozens
of local villages and their inhabitants. According to a study, one indicator of this fact is the finding that around 40 percent of a given village’s marriage ties over several generations were centered in the market area. Thus in addition to homestead, village and multi-village units of organization, the rural market, as a kind of economic and social ‘ central place’, serves as a key link in the chain of institutions that give form and shape to society in Bangladesh’s countryside.
But a society is more than the total of its formal organization and institutions. Central to its existence and continuity is the common ethos’-values, norms and shared understandings—that serves to unite its members. The rural people of Bangladesh are certainly united in their sharing of the unique Bengali culture which set them apart from their former compatriots in West Pakistan.
And this was true even though nearly 90 percent of the people of East Bengal shared with the West Pakistanis adherence to a common religion, Islam. Present in Bengal for nearly 600 years, Muslim beliefs, religious practices and standards for conduct constitute part and parcel of the life pattern for most of the people of Bangladesh. And the notable uniformity with which Islam is adhered to throughout the country’s rural areas contributes to its remarkable homogeneity.
Islam in Bengal reflects many of the characteristics of Islam everywhere. The basic requirements of the Faithful—the socalled ‘ Five Pillars of Islam-are well-known and need little discussion here. However, it is important to point out the significant degree to which several of these cardinal injunctions are followed in rural Bangladesh. For example, the expectation that Muslims will pray five times daily and attend congregational prayer finds widespread obedience. Be it in paddy field or on rocking river boat, it is usual for men to drop their tasks to pray at each appointed hour. Similarly the commandment to fast during the month of Ramadan is rigourously followed, even when the month falls during the hot summer, when food and water would provide a most welcome respite from the long day’s toil in the fields.
What impresses the observer of the Bangladesh countryside in these respects is not only the relative universality with which the traditional requirements of Islam are performed. Equally
imposing is the quality of the normative climate which surrounds their performance, subjecting those not conforming with generalized expectations of fulfilment of traditional religious obligations to the constant fear of public discovery of their deviance, and hence shame and ridicule. Thus, widespread public conformity to the traditional practices and conduct enjoined by Islam is a feature of the notable similarity of life everywhere in rural Bangladesh.
As elsewhere in the Islamic world, in rural East Bengal the local imam or mullah is the most commonly found religious leader. He serves primarily as prayer leader and as a religious functionary in other ceremonies for local people. Although his formal schooling in theological matters may not be impressive, his training will be sufficient to satisfy the members of the mosque congregation employing his services so that he can meet their needs. His acknowledged expertise in religious matters carries over into the secular sphere as well. Thus, in a manner consistent with the fact that law and theology are not separate in Islam, the local imam serves as the watchman over adherence to traditional norms of religious and social conduct. As such, he is regarded, sometimes more than necessary, as a bastion of resistance to change by those who would reform and modernize rural society.
Pirs, or Muslim saints, play an important part in Bengali Islam. A pir need not have any formal religious training; he collects a following based on personal charisma, which may retain its glow long after his death. Pirs are believed to possess barkat (holiness), which may manifest itself in either great spiritual or magical power, depending on the individual follower. Shrines at the tombs of pirs are the loci of holiness. Everywhere in East Bengal, annual religious conclaves at the tombs of local pirs constitute an important event for the especially devout.
‘Pirism’-an appreciation of the personal religious charisma of an individual—is also consistent with another historical emphasis in Bengali Islam: the preference of large numbers of Bengali Muslims for Sufism-personal, mystical forms of religious expression and worship. The sufis are credited with having been responsible for the massive conversion to Islam in Bengal. This in turn is related to the fact that antecedent
religious emphases in the region, whether Buddhist or Hindu, had always accentuated the mystical, rather than the strictly rational, approach to religious experience. To this day, at least three major Sufi tariqa (orders)—the Qadriya, Chistia, and Naqsbandiya-have a wide following in East Bengal, including adherents from the rural areas.
7. THE DAILY ROUND OF
LIFE IN RURAL BANGLADESH
THE Bengali peasant is most busy during the monsoon season, from late April through late September. Then, after a brief respite from his work in the fields following the end of the monsoon, he must return to his paddy field for the harvest in December. A typical day in mid-July might be taken as representative of his and his family’s daily round of activities.
The family begins to stir early in the morning, perhaps around 5.30 A.M. Soon the men and older boys are busy readying themselves for a day of toil in the fields under the hot summer sun, and the women are involved in their many morning chores. The smaller children are already playing as the sun begins to rise. The notion of a ‘good hot breakfast’ is rather foreign to the Bengali farm family; rather the day begins with a little tea—if the family can afford it—and may be some rice left over from the night before, soaked in water. Or they might eat dry, puffed rice, not unlike the packaged kind which Americans have bought for years. If the family homestead is not far from a local market, the men might go quickly to local tea shops, whose proprietors will have already prepared their steamy brew, to be served with cookies or sweet breads to those who drop into the shops before work for a little predawn conviviality.
July marks the transition from the summer to the autumn crop. The primary tasks of the peasant family during this month are two-fold. First, the summer crop must be harvested and threshed. Second, as soon as the latter is off the fields, the soil must be plowed afresh so that the paddy seeds for the autumn crop can be sown, or the seedlings transplanted from nursery plots.
The men and older boys, perhaps with the help of unemployed kinsmen or hired labor, cut the crop with small serrated sickles. They cut the paddy from a crouching position and put the bundles of rice on the field embankments. There other workers fasten them firmly to each end of bamboo poles. Balanced on the shoulder, the poles with their heavy load of rice bundles are brought swiftly home, where the women and girls await them for the next stage—the threshing.
Threshing is, more often than not, the work of the household’s women. If the family has bullocks, the latter are tied to a post erected in the middle of the courtyard. The paddy stalks are strewn on the ground in an area where the bullocks are driven in a never-ending circle, their feet loosening the rice grains from the stalks. After the bullocks have trod on the paddy stalks for a certain period of time, the women sweep up the grains and winnow them. The stalks are removed to a neat stack. Another, perhaps more efficient though more backbreaking, method of threshing is carried out entirely by the women; they take piles of rice stalks in hand and slam them over logs or perchance an oil drum the family may have acquired from somewhere.
Once the rice grains have dried for a day or two, either on the homestead’s courtyard floor or on a specially prepared clay platform nearby, the women will begin to husk some of it. An arduous and none too efficient method is employed for this task, utilizing a time-honoured instrument known as a dekhi. The dekhi consists of a heavy, cylindrical weight attached to a heavy plank, approximately four inches by four inches in cross-section, placed over a fulcrum, imbalanced toward the heavy-weight end. One woman mounts a platform at one end of the machine’ and using her foot on the plank pushes down to make the weight rise and releases it to let the weight fall. At the other end, the weight falls into a hole into which another woman constantly puts and removes rice paddy; the action of the weight loosens the outer husk of the grains. Two experienced women usually keep at this task for several hours, husking several pounds of paddy. One knows when the women are husking rice; the steady ‘thump, thump, thump of the dekhi resounds from behind mud walls.
Once the summer crop is off the fields, the task of plowing
for the planting of the autumn crop begins. If the soil is relatively moist, the plowing can begin in earnest. Otherwise, the next rainfall must be awaited or, if a pond is near the field, it can be irrigated to soften the soil. Shallow channels are dug from the pond to the field, and water is splashed into them by a single man or boy using a bamboo-constructed shovel’. Or two men swing a bucket-like scoop, also made of bamboo, from a rope, thus lifting the water from the pond directly into the irrigation channels. This process of irrigation is very timeconsuming; it might take a full day to bring moisture to a small field.
If it happens to be a market day and the field work is moving steadily along, the men and boys may stop work in mid-afternoon to go to the market. If they have some paddy or husked rice prepared, they may bring it along to see what price it will fetch. Or they may go to the market merely as a respite from the day’s labour, to drink tea and chat with friends. For one who has been at work since six in the morning, by four it has already been a long day. Early evening in the market is pleasant and, as the sun sets, the men and boys in the market might gather on a platform or in a nearby mosque for evening prayers.
Women rarely work in the fields, but much of the apparent jungles surrounding a homestead is in fact a supply of edible and medicinal plants managed by the women. In addition, they usually have vegetables, spices and herbs growing all yearround in their kitchen gardens. At the end of the monsoon season, it is the women who have the strenuous job of patching the mud walls that have been damaged by the driving rains. Later in the dry season, when they have free time, they make quilts which are used both as mattresses and as covers. And they make the string bags in which kitchen utensils and other belongings are hung from the rafters. (Men usually make the rope from which these are made, and they usually weave the fish nets. Of course, the women are in charge of the general upkeep and cleanliness of the house and compound. As for child care, in larger households often pressure on an individual mother is somewhat relieved by a female who is less able to do the heavier work, taking charge of most of the child care tasks. And in any case, older children tend to take care of the younger
ones, sometimes including those just barely smaller than themselves.
If one rises a little later than the average rural family, one might see local children returning from their madrassas (Islamic schools). The more conservative families especially consider it important that their children, both boys and girls, get the proper Muslim education, imparted in the madrassa by a mullah or imam. In the main, it consists of learning the proper prayers and worship ritual. This is often as not the sole ‘schooling’ the girls receive. Many families, with an eye to a daughter’s future marriageability, consider it essential that her upbringing be properly Islamic.
By mid-morning, the local secular school will have begun classes. Those village children whose families feel it important will be present, learning to read and write. By no means do all children go to school, at least not for more than the first few grades. In particular, the number of girls seen in the schoolrooms decreases with each grade. Moreover, attendance in most cases is irregular; a chat with local teachers might elicit the information that roughly 50 percent of those enrolled are likely to be absent on a given day, particularly during the harvest season.
A slight digression into educational development since 1947 is in order here. From 1947 onward, the Government of Pakistan invested heavily in education for West Pakistan, while virtually ignoring the east wing. Although Bengalis have always placed a high value on education, the percentage of increase of schools, students, and literates in East Pakistan lagged far behind those increases in West Pakistan. The number of primary schools in the east wing rose from 26,989 in 1949-50 to 28,225 in 1966-67, while in the same period in the west wing the number grew from 9,411 to 33,271. In the decade of 1951 to 1961, the number of matriculates (high school graduates) rose by only 6 percent in the East and by 144 percent in the West. College graduates in the East actually declined by 32 percent as the number in the West increased by 21 percent. Although in 1951 there were approximately equal numbers of college graduates in each wing, in 1961 there were nearly twice as many in the West as in the East. Overall, literacy in Pakistan rose from around 14 percent to 18 percent in the same decade.
Let us return to the village scene. Small children are allowed to play as they like. But even they are drawn into agricultural activities when needed. It is not uncommon to see a small boy guiding a pair of bullocks over a field in plowing. They can also help load shoulder poles with rice bundles, even if they cannot carry them. Similarly, little girls can help their mothers gather rice grains separated from the paddy stalks from the floor of the courtyard, and children of both sexes perform the important task of combing the freshly-cut fields in search of stray stalks of paddy that may have been dropped in loading and carrying the bundles. In a society that imports rice, every grain reaped from the fields is crucial.
Most of a Bengali woman’s day, any time of year, is taken up with the preparation of food, either for later use—such as the threshing and husking described above, or drying, pickling or otherwise preserving other foodstuffs-or for immediate consumption. And the job of preparing the daily meals involves not only the grinding of spices and cooking the food, but also making the fire and fetching water which is safe to drink.
Two large meals are eaten during the day. The first comes in the late morning, when men and boys return from the fields, bathe in the inevitable pond near the house, and go home to take rice. As noted above, rice is the sine qua non of any Bengali meal. It is served in heaping quantities as the mainstay of the day’s food. Depending on the family’s
affluence, there may also be a few curried vegetables and perhaps bits of fish (which have been caught in nearby ponds or streams just before—there is no refrigeration and no ice in the countryside). In the evening, after the sun has set, the meal will be repeated.
Evening also brings the respite of recreation which in the main, consists of simple conviviality among neighbors and kinsmen. Men drift casually to the houses of friends; sometimes there is one homestead, that of an influential family, which serves as an informal’ place to go ‘for the evening’s idle conversation. In the local market, the tea shops, staying open until well into the night, are also focal points for the gathering of men from many villages. Often men while away the evening playing cards and drinking tea. But by
midnight all is silent, save for the few die-hards in the tea shops. And if a visitor to the village is up and around at that hour, and if he is lucky, it will be a moonlit night, the gold of the moon casting its halo over the fields. Perhaps from somewhere he will hear the sound of a bamboo flute, as a lonely young man sits by his house pouring his emotions into the simple instrument. Idyllic though this may sound, this description is not at all removed from what the fortunate visitor to Bangladesh may experience from time to time. And if he does, he will know why the country’s national anthem is called Amar Sonar Bangla (My Golden Bengal’).
8. THE HINDUS IN RURAL
BANGLADESH
IN 1961, Hindus comprised nearly 20 percent of the population of East Pakistan. However, this proportion of Hindus in the province diminished significantly over the next decade, due to their steady trickle of out migration, fed by the insecurities of life in Pakistan and given special spurt by communal disturbances in the early sixties. It is estimated that by March 1971, they were only 12 percent of the population.
Although large numbers of Hindus lived scattered throughout rural East Bengal, in densely-populated pockets in some places, the incidence of multi-caste Hindu majority villages appears to be rare. Far more common is one of two alternative situations. The first of these is a Muslim majority community in which several Hindu families representing different serving castes were also to be found. In these cases, the Hindus articulated themselves into the rural economy through the practice of their traditional occupations which often, for historical reasons, had left them with a monopoly on certain services that Muslims did not take up, even after partition. Thus, for example, caste carpenters and potters would tend to be able to make a living by contributing their traditional services to the agricultural economies in which they found themselves. Other tasks, such as that of the barber and the washerman, also continued to be the domains of caste Hindus, particularly because the ‘polluting’ aspects of their work made their traditional occupations as repugnant to Bengali Muslims as to their fellow Hindus. The second residential situation for Hindus was the occasional village where members of a single caste lived together, with a few others from other castes and a few Muslims. In these cases, too, reliance on the traditional occupation was a major source of livelihood.
Under normal conditions, Hindus tended to participate more or less fully in the secular life of the Muslim majority communities in which they found themselves. They did not, of course, take part in religious ceremonies of Muslims, although it was the case that Hindu ‘pundits’, whose spiritual power was associated with healing powers, would be called to aid ailing members of Muslim families. In public, secular meetings, where food was served, Hindus and Muslims would eat separately, in keeping with caste-enjoined commensual rules. Major Hindu festivals such as Durga Puja and Kali Puja were celebrated in rural communities where there were substantial numbers of Hindus, although these occasions, along with Saraswati Puja, for example, tended to be celebrated with more fanfare in the urban areas. In addition, certain lesser festivals and pujas were also celebrated.
The Hindu community was the special target of Pakistani repression and about 75 to 80 percent of the refugees in India in December 1971 were reportedly Hindus. As of this writing, almost all have returned to Bangladesh.
9. CITIES IN BANGLADESH
DESPITE the fact that one of the world’s largest citiesCalcutta—is located in Bengal, the Bengalis are not an urban’ people. Before 1947 the region that is now Bangladesh was the rural hinterland of Calcutta and contained nothing that we would recognize as a city by modern standards. Dacca, which became the capital of East Pakistan, had been a Mughal administrative center before British rule and a center of handloom weaving before the industrial revolution forced Indian cloth off of the English market. It remained only as a secondary administrative, educational, marketing and transportation centre during most of the British period. Dacca grew rapidly after 1947, both because it became the provincial capital and also because it had to assume new functions in manufacturing, marketing, education, etc., that had previously been performed by Calcutta. New and modern buildings arose among the decaying bungalows of the earlier period. Slums developed with equal speed. – The processing of East Bengali jute had previously been done largely in the Calcutta area and then it was shipped overseas from the port of Calcutta. The new jute mills in East Bengal were built primarily in Dacca and its suburb of Narayanganj and in the town of Khulna. Port facilities were developed in Chittagong and at the shallow-draft river port of Chalna, near Khulna. Apart from these few centres of industrially based urban growth, the other towns’ of Bangladesh are the administrative headquarters of the rural districts.
Altogether less than 10 percent of the people in Bangladesh live in cities and towns, which is an unusually low proportion for so densely populated a region. There were officially 78 towns and cities in East Bengal according to the 1960 Census of Pakistan. Of these, only Dacca, Narayanganj, Chittagong, and Khulna had populations of over 100,000 persons.
10. ECONOMY
BEFORE the 1947 partition of Bengal, East Bengal filled most of the jute needs of the world, through the mills of Calcutta. (Jute is the fibre used in burlap, gunny bags and carpet backing.) In the first few years of independence, the new Pakistani government managed to cut off the flow of jute to India and create a flourishing jute mill industry in East Pakistan. Some assistance was also granted to newly-created industries to manufacture sugar and paper.
However, these industries were, for the most part, managed by West Pakistanis. And though often mentioned, a government Jute Research Institute never did materialize. The fact was that the bulk of governmental and foreign aid funds were spent in the west wing of Pakistan, even though less than half the population was there. And even more heavily concentrated in the West was private industrial investment.
It is true that East Bengal, being the broad delta of two of the world’s largest rivers, is not endowed with some of the natural resources necessary for heavy industry. But in addition, by keeping development expenditures low in the East, and imposing currency controls and trade tariffs, the West Pakistancentered government conveniently guaranteed the protection of the manufacturing industries of the western wing. East Pakistan had to send devalued exports of its jute and tea industries to West Pakistan in exchange for over-priced manufactured goods from there.
Other expenditures of the Pakistan government were also weighted in favor of the west wing: 80 percent of the military expenditure (less than 10 percent of the army was Bengali); civil administrative apparatus (only 15 percent Bengali); and so on (see table on regional disparities in Chapter 2).
The government did make efforts to increase agricultural productivity and extend the area under cultivation by promoting fertilizer consumption, organizing community develop
ment efforts and so forth. But the resources committed were not sufficient to make much of an impact; productivity increased almost imperceptibly (perhaps 1-2 percent a year). Still, East Bengal provided the bulk of Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings by exporting tea and jute. From 1947 to 1967, the west wing imported goods worth three times those imported into East Pakistan. To do this, the central government made use of foreign exchange earned in the East, as well as about 80 percent of the foreign aid provided by the Aid Pakistan Consortium (of which the United States was the leading member) and others. Central government development banks never gave more than one-third of their loans to projects in the East in any year. The overall total from 1961-67 was less than 30 percent.
The Pakistani government did not succeed in breaking one of East Bengal’s most critical barriers to development: the inadequate transportation network, much of which was still oriented towards Calcutta. Roughly three-fourths of Bangladesh’s villages are more than five miles from a paved road, a railway station, a bus stop, or a steamer stop. And of course, during the occupation of the Pakistani Army, much of the existing transportation network was destroyed by the Mukhti Bahini; one of the few hopes of stopping the army was to cut off their supplies. In addition, most of the remaining bridges were destroyed by the retreating Pakistan Army in December 1971.
Also, many of the economically critical technical cadre, especially the skilled laborers of the tea plantations, were killed or forced to flee. Very little of the industrial plant was hurt, though it had been lying idle for months and presumably deteriorating. Items such as seed grain stores, plows, irrigation earthworks and so forth will be hard to restore. (However, it is reported that most of the standing crops were not destroyed, so perhaps these capital losses affect only part of the country’s agriculture.)
The new government has a good chance for rapid recovery, especially if foreign assistance can make good the losses in transportation stock (river boats and railroad cars—the latter a natural item for Indian industry). Of course, it will be faced with a disruption of supply and production networks, and
difficulties in re-establishing foreign contacts. Furthermore, it will have to replace a large part of the technical personnel in the jute and other industries. But none of these tasks are beyond accomplishment, especially with Indian assistance. The cost to India might easily be made up by the Soviet Union, or the United States, if the latter can finally see its way to accommodation with a post-Bangladesh India. With slack in production in India’s engineering industries, the main costs of her refurbishing Bangladesh’s physical plant are likely to be raw materials, such as coke and iron.
A further dividend can be expected from production that is almost certain to spring up behind the protective tariff wall that Bangladesh will very likely want to build. Other dividends will doubtless come from trade with India: West Bengal could use cheaper fish; Bangladesh, cheaper cement. But twenty years and more of separate development have rendered the economies of these neighbors largely competitive rather than complementary; and the gains on this account are not likely to be dramatic for a few years. Another potential lies in increasing agricultural productivity, and in basing further industrial growth on that rise. It is likely that new rice varieties will be developed that will gain for the east of the Indian subcontinent the benefits already enjoyed by the wheat-growing western areas. (More than 71 percent of Bangladesh’s arable land is sown in rice; a little less than 8 percent in jute; the rest in tea, sugar cane, oil seeds, tobacco, gram, and other crops.) Other hopes can be placed in cooperative action of the villagers arranging flood protection, irrigation and other productivity-increasing measures. An efficient system of water-control has not yet been developed for the area; and without that, high-yield plantings based on fertilizers and other scientific agricultural methods will be difficult to carry out.
With so many unresolved factors, any projection of growth, at this point, is necessarily highly speculative. We must wait to see the policies of the Bangladesh government and what attitudes and relations the other nations of the world will adopt toward it.
11. “WE DIVIDE AND
THEY RULE’
MUSLIM leaders were partners in British rule in the Province of Bengal throughout the thirties and forties, and it was a Muslim, Fazlul Huq, who was the Premier of Bengal from 1937-43. The Muslim League won the 1946 provincial elections largely by campaigning on the issue of Pakistan and Islam. Although at that point Pakistan was to have included the united province of Bengal (in which Muslimswere a majority, but Hindus were a sizeable minority), there is every indication that the partition of Bengal was accepted by the East Bengalis, and the decision to join Pakistan was made with open eyes.
We divide and they rule’ was the bitter observation of a nationalist leader on how the British exploited Hindu-Muslim differences in India. In 1905, the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, partitioned Bengal, giving the Muslims of the East a place in the sun. Curzon wrote to the Secretary of State for India regarding the apprehensions of the Congress (the nationalist movement of India, founded in 1885 and though secular, largely Hindu in leadership) on partition: Their apprehensions are perfectly correct, and they thus form one of the great merits of the scheme…. It is our main object to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule…. The Bengalis who like to think themselves a nation, and dream of a future, when the English will have been turned out…of course bitterly resent any disruption. The Muslims of East Bengal, however, were not unhappy with the particion, for it gave them a chance at leadership hitherto held by the largely Hindu Bhadralok (literally ‘the gentle folk’, in practice, the well educated, well-off social, cultural and political leaders of Bengal). The Muslims had been alienated from the nascent nationalist struggle as it developed in Bengal by its use of Hindu symbolism as well: the novel Anandamath, which became
the literary rallying point of the new movement, attacked British tyranny by portraying a fight of Hindus against Muslim rule of pre-British Bengal. Consequently, the agitation which caused the British to reunite Bengal was not supported by many Muslims.
It would be impossible to give here an adequate outline of the development of the movement which brought about an independent Pakistan. Suffice it to say that East Bengal came round to its support of Pakistan relatively late. The main supporters of the idea of a separate state for the Islamic nation on the Indian subcontinent came from the provinces of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where Muslims were in a decided minority. Pakistan began its life in a bloodbath of communal rioting, particularly in the west, and its struggle for survival was dealt a terrible blow by the death in 1948 of the man who could be said to have embodied Pakistan-Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The subsequent political history of Pakistan is one of turbulence, particularly after the assassination in 1951 of the other ‘tall man’ of the Pakistan movement, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan. It proved impossible to write a constitution for the new state until 1956, and governments rose and fell with bewildering rapidity. Former President Ayub Khan reports in his autobiography that, as Commander-in-Chief, he was asked to take over the country as early as 1954. By 1958, political instability had become so great—the Deputy Speaker of the East Pakistan Assembly had been killed in the assembly chamber—that Ayub seized power in a coup that met with widespread popular approval. The period of martial law lasted from 1958 to 1962.
During the Martial Law regime, the bureaucracy was ‘cleansed’ of corruption and, at least in West Pakistan, economic progress began to take place, as foreign aid was put to efficient use. President Ayub also instituted a system of ‘basic democracies,’ a system in which national officials were elected indirectly by lower tiers of representatives, with the lowest tier being the village council or urban ward. The first indirect election for president of Pakistan held under this system occurred in 1965, and Ayub Khan defeated Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Pakistan’s founding father.
From the point of view of East Pakistan, this period of army
rule—for although elections had been held, the control of the military and the central bureaucracy, in concert with the handful of rich families of West Pakistan, was never relaxed—was simply rule of the East by West Pakistan. Both the army and the bureaucracy were staffed almost entirely by West Pakistanis. Ayub’s regime began to lose some of its lustre in the late sixties as it became clear that it was as subject to corruption as its predecessors. President Ayub was forced to permit politicians at least limited activity, and he himself joined the Muslim League although he had come to power as the bluff, commonsensical military man, who had nothing but scorn for politics and politicians.
Ayub’s power had been eroded by his settlement in Tashkent of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, on terms which many extremists in Pakistan, particularly in the West, felt was tantamount to surrender. Agitation among students and industrial strikes for an increased share of soaring profits took place in West Pakistani urban centres late in 1968. This gave added impetus to the anti-Ayub sentiment in the East, which had been gaining since 1962 (Miss Jinnah had received the bulk of her support in the 1965 Presidential election from the East). The unrest then rose to such a height that Ayub had to release Sheikh Mujib from detention so that he could participate in a Round Table conference with other political leaders of Pakistan. The demonstrations of support that he received from the people of the East left no doubt that from then onward he was the leader of the East.
The political agitation became so intense that Ayub was forced to give way to his Commander-in-Chief, Yahya Khan, in 1969. The 1958 scenario was seemingly repeated; due to the “corruption of the government’, and the danger of anarchy’, the nation had to be saved from the politicians. This time, however, Yahya Khan moved to fulfil his pledge to hold genuinely democratic elections. He permitted political parties to operate, gradually lifted press censorship, and officially withdrew the conspiracy case against Sheikh Mujib.
12. ELECTION AND
AFTERMATH
ON November 28, 1969, President Yahya Khan announced the date for a general election of members of a constituent assembly—the first free election with universal adult franchise since Pakistan gained her independence in 1947. President Yahya then promulgated the Legal Framework Order of March 1970, which specified that a constitution would have to be written within 120 days of the first meeting of the assembly; if this proved impossible, then a new set of representatives would have to be elected and a new constituent assembly would try again. The Legal Framework Order also specified that the constitution would have to contain provisions for fundamental rights (comparable to the U.S. Bill of Rights) and for a federal structure of government.
These provisions of the Legal Framework Order are important, for they removed well beforehand much of the flexibility that might otherwise have prevented the crisis in East Bengal. Before discussing this assertion in detail, it is necessary to review the intermediate events. Many parties contested the election, but the Awami League in the East and the Pakistan People’s Party in the West are of the most interest. The Pakistan People’s Party leader was Z. A. Bhutto, now President of Pakistan; its platform was ‘Islamic socialism ‘-economic equality and removal of the great power of big business, within the framework of a strongly Islamic state.
The Awami League-led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahmancampaigned on the basis of its Six Points,’ all concerned with the federal structure of Pakistan. Among the Six Points were demands for provincial control over currency and foreign trade, suggesting a structure best described as a confederation
-i.e., not a federal state. These demands were intended to insure that the practice of West Pakistan using, for its own benefit, the foreign exchange earned by the East’s jute and other
similar misappropriations, would end. Many campaign speeches by Sheikh Mujib, spoke of West Pakistani exploiters’. Although increased regional identity and autonomy for all provinces (the west wing to be dissolved, re-establishing the provinces of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province) was the essence of the Awami League platform, it identified most specific grievances with the disadvantages of East Bengal. Thus the party found its strength solely in the East. (See Appendix 1 for text of the Six Points.)
There were many other parties contesting the December 1970 election; some of them, like the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), had, or tried to have, all-Pakistan appeal. The callous disregard of the Pakistan central government toward the victims of the November 1970, cyclone underscored the demands of the Awami League, and so increased its popularity in Bengal that the major rival party there withdrew from the elections. As a result, the Awami League won 167 of the East’s 169 National Assembly seats; the PPP won 88 of the 144 seats of the western wing. Neither party won a seat in the ‘other’ wing. (The East was allotted more seats because it has a larger population.) This meant that Awami League representatives were not only the largest bloc in the assembly, but also constituted an absolute majority of it. This was so unexpected that a semi-official Pakistani source admitted that if President Yahya had suspected the possibility of its happening, he simply would not have called the election. (The results of the election are given in Appendix 2.)
In view of the rivalry between the two wings of Pakistan and the results of the election, the importance of the Legal Framework Order becomes clear. There would have been pressure on the assembly to complete a draft of the constitution within 120 days, since no one wanted to have a new election. Yet, in order to write the document in such a short time, there had to be basic agreement on what it was to accomplish. The Awami League’s Six Points may have originally been designed as maximum demands for bargaining, but the party’s position had gradually hardened during the campaign, and their overwhelming majority had vindicated their demands for nearly complete autonomy. The parties of the West, on the other hand, were not prepared to agree to such autonomy, nor were
they willing to allow the Awami League, through its control of the assembly, to force its platform through without some minority agreement. For example, Z. A. Bhutto said on Feburary 15, 1971, that he would not even attend the assembly, scheduled to start on March 3, unless there was some ‘reciprocity’ by the majority party. Thus as the assembly date approached, the positions of the different members grew further apart, rather than approaching the sort of consensus envisioned by President Yahya.
Rather than doom the assembly to failure, on March 1 President Yahya postponed its opening. This move was seen in the East as a denial of its rightful majority voice. A general strike was called in protest. In the course of this strike, the army, consisting almost entirely of West Pakistani troops, was called out to keep order; five persons were killed and at least 62 wounded. Each side said the other was responsible for the deaths, and the Awami League then formulated new demands that had to be fulfilled prior to its attending the assembly: the removal of martial law and an inquiry into the army firings. In response to this, the army was withdrawn to its barracks and the assembly was called for March 25. Talks continued among the leaders, with Bhutto insisting that the Awami League must plan to share power with the minority. On the 23rd of March, the President again postponed the assembly, and launched a final desperate round of talks.
On March 25th, President Yahya left Dacca, and on the night of March 25/26 he ordered the army into East Bengal, declaring it a ‘rebel’ province. (See Appendix 3 for text of Yahya’s March 26 radio broadcast.) In Dacca and elsewhere, student dormitories were shelled, slum shantytowns inhabited by Hindus were burned to the ground, and Awami League workers were rounded up and executed. After a brutal two-week campaign, in which the army (which had been considerably reinforced while the Yahya-Mujib talks were in progress) massacred possibly hundreds of thousands of people, Pakistan established a modicum of control over the eastern wing. Systematic killing of Awami League supporters, Hindus, and intellectuals continued up until the entrance of Indian troops into Dacca some nine months later. As many as ten million refugees fled to India. The Bangladesh govern
ment now estimates that three million Bengalis were killed either by Pakistani bullets or by having their homes and food destroyed in reprisal raids by the army bent on punishing villagers for allegedly sheltering Bangladesh guerillas.
Although at first the Pakistan army had a strong advantage in terms of men and matériel, this advantage gradually diminished as the problems of resupply from West Pakistan became almost insuperable. Barred from overflying Indian territory, Pakistan was forced to ship supplies and troops 3,000 miles around the tip of India.
In June, observers were saying that the guerillas had no chance to overcome the Pakistan army; indeed, skirmishes were so minor that Pakistan was claiming a return to normality.’ However, the guerillas did keep pecking away, gaining strength as more and more men joined the struggle, as the Pakistan army’s morale eroded and as India’s assistance to the guerillas increased their effectiveness. By December, the number of guerillas was estimated to equal the number of Pakistani troops. The economic drain on both the West—supporting its army,– and on the East—losing crops, homes, bridges and people was very great, and it began to seem that these considerations rather than military ones would determine the outcome of the war. However, India’s entry into the war proved decisive. By November, India had ceased denying that she was playing any role in helping the guerillas. In December, Pakistan attacked India in the West, apparently to bring the crisis to a head.
The war lasted two weeks, at the end of which Pakistan was totally routed in the East. Casualties were minimal: India reported 2,300 killed; Pakistan fighting a defensive war in the East, probably lost fewer men. Civilian casualties were light, as India isolated cities in the East rather than take them by assault. In short, and while statistical data always have an uncertain quality in such situations, the casualties from the two-week war were a tiny fraction of the one to three million Bengalis estimated to have been killed during the eight months of military repression by the Pakistan Army. (The appendices contain relevant documentary sources, including the instrument of surrender, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi’s address after the Pakistani attack on Indian airfields in early December,
and excerpts from the United Nations debate on the war.)
Bangladesh was proclaimed an independent nation, and efforts to secure the release of Sheikh Mujib, imprisoned since March in West Pakistan and under sentence of death, intensified. He was finally released early in January 1972, and flew home to lead his nation as prime minister in its difficult task of reconstruction.
13. THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED STATES
THE United States has been the single largest donor of aid to Pakistan, including some $1.5 billion of arms aid since Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO. Officially, the U.S. has treated India and Pakistan equally: important government dignitaries had to visit both countries or neither, aid requirements were paired, etc. Yet, Pakistan has received approximately four times as much per capita U.S. foreign aid as India. This has puzzled India, since she sees herself as a country of far greater power and potential than Pakistan and—as the largest democracy in the world—more worthy of U.S. attention and sympathy than military-ruled Pakistan. She has never been able to understand America’s objection to her independence, symbolized by a non-aligned foreign policy.
After the Pakistan army moved in the East, the United States announced that U.S. military aid to Pakistan had been cut off. It later developed that shipments, said to be only nonlethal military supplies’ (ammunition and spare parts for equipment and weapons previously supplied by the U.S.) continued on at least through August.
The June 22 New York Times disclosure of the continuance of these arms shipments, coming a day or so after the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh had left Washington with assurances that all military aid had been cut off, proved particularly damaging to U.S.-Indian relations. General Yahya publicly praised the U.S. for supporting him while other nations (including England) were condemning his use of force in East Bengal.
There were overwhelming votes in both the House and the Senate to cut off all aid, military and economic, from the army dictatorship of Pakistan. But the Nixon administration strongly resisted, in fact, directly contravened these moves,
asserting that the aid was necessary to maintain leverage’ with the Yahya Khan government. Results of this leverage’ never appeared; the West Pakistan army continued its brutal policy in East Bengal, while Sheikh Mujibur Rahman lay under constant threat of death in a West Pakistan prison.
While the Indian army moved in concert with the Mukhti Bahini (Bangladesh Freedom Fighters) in East Bengal, the White House labeled India as aggressor against a government that had already accepted ‘sage’ U.S. counsel and was ready to negotiate its internal’ problems. The concessions Pakistan was willing to make would perhaps have been acceptable to the Bangladesh leaders before the army crackdown in March. Coming as they did when Bangladesh was on the point of attaining her freedom, they seemed to be an unrealistic attempt to return to the status quo ante. United States support of an undemocratic and brutal Pakistan regime was seen to be totally unrealistic as well as morally reprehensible. The bitterness felt by the people of Bangladesh and of India toward the U.S. has been directed at the Nixon administration by the fortuitous publication of the ‘ Anderson Papers ‘.
Finally, on April 4, 1972, the United States extended diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh, almost four months after the fact of independence and only weeks after virtually all other major nations, including European allies of the U.S. such as Britain and France, had done so. (The text of the recognition statement, the ‘Anderson Papers ‘, and other relevant documentary sources are given in the appendices.)
14. INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THE position of Bangladesh vis-a-vis other nations should be seen not only in the context of the war in which she gained a sovereign existence, but also in the context of the play of forces on the South Asian subcontinent since India and Pakistan became independent in 1947.
The crucial actors in South Asia have been India and Pakistan, and the greatest bone of contention has been Kashmir. Pakistan has felt that India was never reconciled to the partition of British India into two new states, and that India’s refusal to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir was part of a campaign whose ultimate end would be the annulment of partition. India saw the Kashmir problem as one arising out of the precipitate Pakistani effort to annex the state by force in 1947. In August, 1953, an agreement between the prime ministers of the two countries pointed to a possible solution. However, this possibility evaporated when Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (followed by her joining of SEATO and CENTO) with the United States.
Since her independence, India had pursued a policy of non-alignment in the cold war; but her reaction to Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. indicated that her non-alignment in the world rested in part on a recognition of her position as the pre-eminent power on the South Asian subcontinent. India was four times the size of Pakistan and had many more natural resources which have been used in creating a defence capability; for example, India now manufactures tanks and jet planes of Indian design, as well as Soviet-designed MIG 21’s. Pakistan, feeling threatened by India in 1953, saw an alliance with the U.S. as a way of achieving at least military parity with India.
The United States, it should be remembered, at that time was embarked on a campaign to contain communist expansion
ism the world over. Near South Asia, the Chinese had already consolidated their hold on Tibet, and the U.S. saw a Soviet attempt to move into Iran. Pakistan stood as the guardian of the northwestern ‘ gateway’ to the subcontinent, the same gateway which the British had guarded against Czarist Russian expansion in the late nineteenth century. From the U.S. point of view, then, India’s ‘neutralism’ was at best foolish and at worst immoral—one cannot be neutral in a struggle between good and evil. Pakistan’s willingness to join in alliance with the U.S., for whatever motive, was welcomed. No informed observer of the subcontinent has doubted that Pakistan’s principal motive was security against India, although Pakistani leaders in the 1950’s were certainly also concerned about expansion of Soviet influence in the subcontinent. In addition, of course, the U.S. was able to set up air bases (at which U-2’s were based) and surveillance centres in Pakistan.
The inclusion of Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO brought the USSR openly to support India. From 1954 onwards, the USSR vetoed resolutions on Kashmir in the United Nations. Attacks on Nehru as a ‘bourgeois social democrat’ stopped, and the new Soviet-Indian friendship culminated in Bulganin’s and Khruschev’s triumphal tour of India in 1955. Throughout the fifties and sixties India received economic aid from the Soviet Union and the United States pre-eminently, and from other countries of the developed ‘world as well.
After the Chinese invasion of India in 1962, India received limited U.S. military aid. In the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Indian defense forces were still largely British in material and organization. Since the 1965 war, Soviet arms aid has become increasingly important to India. By the late sixties, Pakistan too was receiving Soviet arms aid, as the USSR reacted to Pakistan’s growing ties to China by moderating her proIndia stand.
Pakistan, again with relations vis-a-vis India as a prime consideration, saw China as a natural ‘ally after the SinoIndian border war of 1962. She soon signed an agreement conceding Chinese claims in Kashmir, and more recently has received limited Chinese military aid. Most of the small arms used by the Pakistan army in the attempt to crush the revolt in East Bengal were provided by China. The Chinese incur
sion against India was most serious in India’s northeast, where the Chinese border is within 100 miles of the border of Bangladesh. At the time of the 1965 war, China engaged in some
sabre-rattling’ in this area as a way of relieving Indian pressure on Pakistan.
East Bengal has always been considered to be very vulnerable to Indian attack, and was, as the December 1971 war has shown, so poorly supplied and garrisoned that it could not withstand the Indian invasion. During the 1965 war, it must be emphasized, East Pakistan was wholly committed emotionally and materially to the fight against India. Despite friction with the western wing, an Indian invasion of the East would undoubtedly have met with fierce resistance by the entire East Bengal populace. Yet, in 1971, the Indian invaders were welcomed as liberators.
The confrontation of the U.S. and the USSR, which was the overarching context of Indo-Pakistan relations in the 1950’s, has become, in 1972, a shifting triangular relationship between the U.S., the USSR, and China. But in the Indian subcontinent, India has emerged from the 1971 war with her military and political power secured. The potential of the world’s second largest nation—a country with ample resources, a stable and vigorous political system, and now a self-confident populace—is yet to be fully realized, but India, it is clear, is not going to accept the status of a dependent power. Her keynote is self-reliance and confidence.
The end product of the ‘ leverage’ which the United States supposedly employed on Pakistan in 1971 (no apparent modification of policies at all), would indicate that the supplier of arms aid cannot count on the dependence of the recipient. The surest way the USSR would lose the value of her current, very friendly relations with India would be to try to extract concessions from her.
Although the core of Pakistan’s military strength was drawn from and kept in the western wing, the repression of the East and the war have shattered her economy. West Pakistan, alone, will not be able to support a military establishment to challenge India, and there is little indication that China has the means, or the U.S. the willingness, to do anything more than reestablish Pakistan’s minimal defensive capability vis-a-vis
India. From India’s standpoint, the threat from Pakistan has ended, at least for the near future.
The Indian army had intervened in the War of Independence in Bangladesh for a variety of reasons. The most immediate was the bombing of eight Indian airfields by Pakistan. The pressures on India had been mounting due in part to the presence of 10 million refugees from East Bengal on Indian soil and the consequent threat to the Indian economy. It was believed that the cost would have consumed all the funds available for development in the 1971-72 fiscal year. (The amount was estimated by the Indian government to be $ 500 million; an equivalent portion of the U.S. budget would be $26 billion.) In addition, the presence of the refugees, and the continuation of the struggle inside Bangladesh, posed a threat to the political stability of the entire eastern region of India. This threat existed particularly in West Bengal (an Indian state where revolutionary violence has been commonplace and where radical leftist political parties have great electoral strength) but also in the border states of Manipur, Nagaland, and Assam.
Moreover, it is important not to underestimate the Indian commitment to democracy. While, as Pakistan argued, some Indians may have been motivated by a vindictive desire to divide the country that had insisted on a separate existence in 1947, many were concerned with the issues of exploitationand, after March, oppression-raised by the Bengalis. The successive military governments of Pakistan had provided a striking contrast to India’s five peaceful national elections and generally orderly governmental process. Mujib’s demands for regional equality were also familiar to many of India’s politicians. The Indians felt they could not stand by, restrained by the world opinion of those ‘great powers ‘—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China—whose own restraint in crossing international boundaries with their armies has been noticeable by its absence. But certainly the Indians also felt they had the opportunity to end once and for all the military threat that Pakistan had posed since 1947.
Perhaps the most important issue arising out of India’s intervention is the question of whether India’s aim is to make Bangladesh a client state. Bangladesh will require consider
able aid to restore her economy destroyed during the war and through the pillaging of the Pakistan army. However, if East Bengal was able to export a large part of her earnings to West Pakistan for twenty years, then the retention of those earnings will mean a comparative improvement in economic potential. Politically, the Bangladesh government will be able to draw on the strong nationalist feelings aroused during the crisis. Although many of Bangladesh’s potential leaders, including intellectuals and civil servants, were victims of the Pakistani army or army-inspired pogroms, there remains a sound basis for a stable government. Potential divisions between the former guerillas and the more conservative members of the former government-in-exile may be overcome by the strong personal loyalty which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman commands as prime minister and leader of the country.
Bangladesh is, to be sure, a populous nation, but other sources of military and political potential are few. Her geographical position suggests that her main potential ally against India—if we postulate a growing resentment against Indian pressures, for instance—is China. But China, at least for the foreseeable future, is likely to interest herself only in guerilla movements opposing Sheikh Mujib’s government. So the more important question is: How does India perceive her relationship with Bangladesh? That is, can India consider it in her own interest for Bangladesh to be kept as a client state ? Bangladesh will require economic and administrative aid, certainly; and India seems willing to do what she can. But clearly a politically stable Bangladesh is of paramount concern, and India has learned the lesson of Pakistan’s attempt to hold the East by terror. The only stable Bangladesh will be a completely independent Bangladesh. And an independent Bangladesh must be a nation which is not perceived by her own people to be under the rule, however benign, of India. The relationship of India with Bangladesh will be, from the Indian point of view, most like that of the United States with Canada.
While Bangladesh’s relations with the U.S. are bound to be difficult as long as the memories of U.S. support for Pakistan remain, the European powers, particularly Great Britain, are on friendly terms with the new nation. It is patent from the B.-3
confrontation between China and the USSR that took place during the Security Council meetings during the 1971 war that the United Nations can be discounted as a significant political factor on the subcontinent in the immediately foreseeablefuture. As far as Bangladesh is concerned, her independent existence is sure, and she can concentrate on repairing her heavily damaged economy and moving beyond that to building a secure nation, based upon the proclaimed goals of democracy, socialism, and secularism.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
The following chronology does not purport to be a complete one. It does, however, try to contrast the claims of the opposing sides at various times. It does not include more than a very few entries on the actions of the Pakistan army in East Bengal after March 25. Stories of most atrocities were revealed long after their actual occurrence, and as the stories mounted up, it became clear that such incidents could be listed for almost every day. No particular one stood out or served as a focal point of rebellion or a turning point of the war. Similarly, actions of the guerillas in opposing the army are not listed.
(Key dates are given in italics.) August 14, 1947 Pakistan gains her independence from
Britain. March, 1956
A constitution is adopted with a federal
form of government. October, 1958 General Ayub Khan, backed by army,
takes over power. March, 1969
General Yahya Khan takes power. November 28, 1969 President Yahya calls for elections to a
National Constituent Assembly in 1970. March 30, 1970 Legal Framework Order, establishing that
constitution must be written within 120
days, issued. September, 1970 Floods in East Pakistan. November 13, 1970 Worst cyclone of the century in East
Pakistan; victims numbered in the hund
reds of thousands. December 7, 1970 General elections held. Awami League wins
167 of East Pakistan’s 169 seats; Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party wins 88 of the
West’s 144 seats. * December 20, 1970 Bhutto declares PPP will not sit in opposi
tion as it is the major party of the West where the real power of the central
government lies. *See appendices for related documentary material.
56
January 14, 1971
January 27, 1971
February 13, 1971
February 15, 1971
February 16, 1971
February 21, 1971
February 28, 1971
March 1, 1971 March 2, 1971
Yahya, pleased with polls, flies to Dacca to coordinate talks between the leaders prior to the Assembly. Bhutto goes to Dacca for talks. Admits that long interim till Assembly sits is creating authority problems. Yahya summons National Assembly for March 3. Bhutto says he will boycott Assembly unless the Awami League agrees that he should participate equally with it. Bhutto announces his decision is irrevocable’ Yahya dissolves his civilian cabinet and announces that breaches of martial law will no longer be tolerated. Bhutto says that if the 120 day limit is waived or if the convening of the Assembly is postponed, he will continue talks with Mujib. Yahya postpones the Assembly. Mujib’s general strike is called to protest the postponement. Several are killed in clash with army. Further protests called against army killings. Yahya calls for more meetings of leaders; Mujib refuses to go, pending investigation of firings. Leaders of smaller West Pakistan parties support Mujib, blame Bhutto for impasse. Army is withdrawn to barracks. Assembly is called for March 25. General strike continues; more killings by army; parallel government begins operation in East. Pakistan claims it has captured Indians inside East Bengal, aiding the demonstrators. Yahya goes to Dacca for talks. Awami League run de facto parallel government. in operation. Bhutto goes to Dacca.
March 3, 1971
March 4, 1971
March 5, 1971 March 6, 1971
March 12, 1971
March 15, 1971
March 21, 1971
57
March 22, 1971 Talks break down. Yahya postpones the
Assembly again. March 23, 1971 Resistance Day’ in Bangladesh. The
Bangladesh flag is flown in place of the Pakistan national flag over many government offices, schools, and the homes of
Awami League leaders. March 25, 1971 To stop an alleged Awami League armed
uprising, Yahya orders troops into East Bengal. Using tanks and artillery, troops enter three cities, killing many in sight. University dormitories, Hindu areas, and Awami League supporters are special targets. All foreign newsmen are rounded up, and
shipped out next morning. Mujibis arrested. March 26, 1971 Yahya addresses nation on East Bengal,
asserting treason’, and ‘insurgency’. Awami League is banned as is all political activity; press censorship and other attributes of martial law imposed. Bangladesh
declares itself an independent nation.* March 31, 1971 India declares support for Bangladesh in
Parliament March, April, 1971 Killings of Bengalis, Biharis, and Pakistanis
reported. By middle of April, foreign evacuees are reporting massacres of inno
cent Bengalis by army. April 17, 1971 Bangladesh Government installed near
Indian border. May 2, 1971
Pakistan Government announces nearnormality’ in Bengal; denies reports of
millions of refugees entering India. May 6, 1971 Pakistan charges buildup of the Indian
air force; charges India shells Pakistan posi
tions near border. May 7, 1971
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee asks a ban on further arms shipments to Pakistan. The Administration terms this ‘ merely a symbolic move, as our arms
are not in use. May 13, 1971 Pakistan in United Nations charges India
aids secessionists. *See appendices for related documentary material.
58
BANGLADESH–THE BIRTH OF A NATION
May 24, 1971
June 15, 1971
June 22, 1971
June, July, 1971
July 10, 1971
Three and a half million refugees reported in India, with 60,000 more coming each week. India says her national interests are jeopardized. Bhutto says that people must accept the reality ‘that the Awami League is banned and therefore no longer a force in the nation. Clashes between guerillas and army continue in Bengal with reprisals against Awami League, Hindus and intellectuals documented. Six million refugees estimated in India. Reliable reports that army is using relief jeeps to carry out pillage. Pakistan freighter Padma sails for Pakistan from New York loaded with U.S. arms including eight aircraft and non-lethal’ ammunition. Continuing clashes with guerillas, whose strength is clearly increasing. World Bank report says that East Bengal is so ravaged that economic aid could not be assimilated. Bengalis claim that, in one of a series of incidents, 30,000 are slain in Jessore by army. Gallagher amendment to withhold aid until the refugees return to their homes is approved by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee. Pakistan threatens war with India if it continues to aid the guerillas. U.S. arms aid to Pakistan is found to be continuing. Yahya suggests Mujib won only because of the Hindu (anti-Pakistan) vote, despite the fact that Hindus constitute only 10% of East Bengali population and that Mujib received over 80% of the East Bengali vote. U.S. House of Representatives bans aid to Pakistan, countering a Nixon statement of June 28. Nixon says ban on aid is political pressure on Pakistan, which is ‘counter-productive’.
July 13, 1971
July 15, 1971
July 20, 1971 July 24, 1971 July 31, 1971
August 3, 1971
August 4, 1971
59
August 8, 1971 The Pakistan government announces that
88 Awami League Constituent Assembly members may retain their seats as individuals; the remaining 79 will get a chance to * clear themselves of specific charges against
them’. August 9, 1971 India and USSR sign friendship treaty. August 11, 1971 Mujib goes on secret military trial in West
Pakistan. October 6, 1971 Pakistan complains in United Nations
about further Indian incursions. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes to end economic and military aid to Pakistan until
the end of the crisis. October 11, 1971 Pakistan lifts ban on political activity in
East in preparation for by-elections to replace the ousted Awami League members; the new Assembly will convene on
December 27. Early November, 1971 Indira Gandhi of India tours world capitals,
seeking aid in finding a political solution to the crisis; admits India is aiding the gue
rillas. November 15, 1971 Indira Gandhi stalls the hawks in her
Parliament who seek war with Pakistan. November 21, 1971 Pakistan army attacks town of Boyra near
Indian border, shells falling in India. India replies. Later India admits an incursion into Bengal, but calls it self
defence’. December 3, 1971 Pakistan attacks eight Indian airfields.
India declares Pakistan has launched a full-scale war and she will do everything
to repel her enemy.* December 6, 1971 War opens on the western front with Pakis
tan attacking and moving forward in
Kashmir. December 7, 1971 Jessore liberated; Pakistan Army retreat
ing.
December 11, 1971 U.S. claims Russian ship moving to Bay of
Bengal. December 12, 1971 The U.S.S. Enterprise leaves Vietnam for
the Bay of Bengal. It is soon obvious that * See appendices for related documentary material.
this is not meant to aid in evacuation of U.S. personnel, as is first claimed, but to divert Indian attention from their war in the East. Nixon threatens to cancel Russian trip if Russia does not put pressure on India to cease fighting Indian troops enter Dacca; East Pakistani regime quits. Pakistan Commander in East offers cease
December 14, 1971
December 15, 1971
fire.
December 16, 1971
December 17, 1971 January 7, 1972 January 10, 1972
Pakistan Army surrenders in East. India orders unilateral cease-fire in West. * Pakistan orders cease-fire. Mujib released. Mujib flies to Dacca and receives hero’s welcome. Mujib becomes Prime Minister of Bangladesh.
January 12, 1972
Diplomatic Recognition of Bangladesh by Major Powers
December 6, 1971
January 24, 1972
India grants diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh. Bangladesh is recognized by the Soviet Union. United Kingdom recognizes Bangladesh. France recognizes Bangladesh. United States recognizes Bangladesh.*
February 4, 1972 February 12, 1972 April 4, 1972
*See appendices for related documentary material.
APPENDICES
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The selection of documentary materials which follows is designed to cover the more important developments in the sequence of events leading to the birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation, but it is in no sense exhaustive nor even comprehensive. Reference will be found in the bibliographic note which comes at the end of this Handbook to sources of documentary materials which contain far more extensive collections of such materials.
Among the major world powers which were not principals in the conflict leading to Bangladesh’s independence but were nonetheless involved, more emphasis has been given to the role of the United States for two reasons. One is the unusual degree to which formulation of U.S. policy during the height of the crisis became exposed to public view through the publication of the so-called
Anderson Papers’ and other key documents, thereby affording an opportunity to examine foreign policy crisis management’ in a leading world power. Second, while we hope that the Handbook will be useful to all who are concerned with deepening their understanding of the great human tragedy which led to the creation of Bangladesh, those most actively involved in preparation of the Handbook are especially concerned with enlarging the understanding of American students who will naturally be most directly interested in the role of their own government in the events which generated the materials in these appendices. Views of other major powers are also included, however, particularly in the material drawn from the United Nations Security Council debates, and primary emphasis has been given to those countries and their leaders most directly involved-namely, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.
Wherever possible, documents and speeches have been included in full, but in several cases, their length has made some editing essential. Where deletions have been made, they have been indicated by the standard designation for ellipsis (…). An exception is the first appendix, where the complete text of Mujib’s Six Points’ have been given, but introductory and concluding paragraphs in the pamphlet from which the text of the Six Points’ was taken have been omitted. The complete text of the Anderson
Papers’ and Henry Kissinger’s off-the-record briefing (Appendices 10 and 11) have been included because these key documents, which provide an inside view of how U.S. policy was shaped during the December war, have apparently been published in their entirety in only one or two other places, and so far as we know, not outside the United States; these appendices are likely, therefore, to be especially interesting to readers in the South Asian subcontinent and elsewhere who may have seen only brief excerpts and quotations from the documents.
APPENDIX 1
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: Awami League, Six Point
Formula-Our Right to Live,’ March 23, 1966.
POINT 1
In this point I have recommended as follows:
The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.
It will be seen that this point consists in the following seven ingredients, viz.: (a) Pakistan shall be a Federation, (b) it shall be based on Lahore Resolution, (c) its Government shall be of Parliamentary form, (d) it must be responsible to the Legislature, (e) the Legislature must be supreme, (f) it must be directly elected and, (g) election must be on the basis of universal adult franchise.
Let the opponents of 6-point programme speak out. Which of these seven ingredients are they opposed to? Let the people know who are federalists and who are unitarists. Those who are unitarists are definitely against Lahore Resolution. Conversely, those who are opposed to Lahore Resolution are definitely unitarists. So let it be decided once for all who own and who do not own the Lahore Resolution by which Pakistan was created and is rightly called the Pakistan Resolution. The people who disown Lahore Resolution disown Pakistan itself. It is evidently those people who did not raise their little finger in the struggle for Pakistan but subsequently jumped on it to grab power after it was created with the blood and tears of the people. These opportunists and job-hunters cannot naturally have any regard for or attachment to the sanctity of such an historic Resolution which brought about a revolution in the subcontinent and created Pakistan. Even amongst those who swear by the Pakistan Resolution, there are some pseudo-federalists. They pay lip-service to the Lahore Resolution but disregard it by speaking against the very fundamental principle of Federation and by introducing extra-political controversies. This confusion has been further confounded by the power that be by forcible addition of
political aberrations like basically controlled democracy. It was against such future personal likes and dislikes, whims and caprices, hunger and thirst for power of individuals, that the Lahore Resolution was pledged as a guarantee by the creators of Pakistan under the able guidance of Qaid-i-Azam. It will be sheer political dishonesty to deviate from Lahore Resolution after Pakistan was created by people’s votes obtained on the basis of that Resolution. If it is now found necessary to so deviate for the sake of stability and integrity of Pakistan itself, the people will certainly agree to such changes or even complete reversal. But in any event it is the people who will decide and not any body else. As far as the people of East Pakistan are concerned they in the 1954 general election overwhelmingly voted for a Constitution based on the Lahore Resolution. If, however, any body has any doubt about their present attitude due to lapse of long twelve years, we are prepared to face another referendum on the issue. Until that is done by a specific referendum on universal adult suffrage the Lahore Resolution and all its corollaries remain the Magna Carta of the people of Pakistan, and the rulers and the leaders are bound to give them a Constitution based on the Resolution.
POINT 2
This point recommends as follows:
Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects, viz.: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the Federating States.
Let us dispassionately discuss whether a two-subject Centre will be sufficiently strong to be a respectable Federation. It should be borne in mind that what makes a Federation strong is not heaps of subjects under it. A Federation becomes strong by the loyalty and affection in which it is held by the people in peace and the allegiance they owe and obedience they show it in war. The happy and strong people represented through efficient and strong units that make the Federation, are the real source of its strength irrespective of the number of subjects dealt with by it. Indeed, a State which serves the base rather than the apex is really the strongest. It is now a well established principle of political science that decentralization rather than centralization makes the work of a State efficient both in the administrative and in the developmental spheres. It is also a well recognised principle of Federation that only those subjects should be in the Federal list which can be jointly managed more efficiently and profitably. It is the same principle that is underlying the system of Local Self-Government like District
Councils and Municipalities. The very concept of Federation is based on the maxim of unity in diversity and union without overcentralization.
It was on this principle that in 1946 the Cabinet Mission proposed an Indian Federation with only three subjects, viz.: Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication. Both the Congress and the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Plan. The fact that ultimately it did not materialize due to a hitch elsewhere is a different matter and quite irrelevant to the issue now before us. Now, the British Government by proposing the Plan and the Congress and the Muslim League by accepting it have all demonstrated their agreement on the feasibility of a Federation with only three subjects. The only difference between the Cabinet Plan and my proposal is that I have given two subjects instead of three given in the Cabinet Plan. Even that difference is only apparent and not real as will be seen in my explanation to the Point 3 given later on. That explanation will show that I too have given three subjects to the Centre and not two. Only I have recommended Currency in place of Communication as had been earlier done in the famous 21-point programme. I have omitted Communication for obvious reasons. The basic principle on which subjects are handed over to a Federation, as has been said earlier, is the oneness and indivisibility of the interest of the federating units in the subjects concerned. In the case of an undivided Indian Federation, Communication was really such a subject. In it, all the federating units would have been commonly interested and could have been more efficiently and profitably run if jointly managed by the Federation. An unbroken Railway line and a non-stop through Railway train could have run from Khybar to Chittagong. This would have been so because of the geographical contiguity. Not so Pakistan. Pakistan being comprised of two geographical units separated by over a thousand miles of foreign territory, cannot possibly have any unbroken line of communication between the two wings. The two wings being themselves two compact geographical areas, must have their own system of communication separately organized and managed. It can, therefore, never be a Federal subject. By transferring the railways to the Provinces though after prolonged procrastination the present regime has reluctantly admitted the hard fact of geography. The same will have to be done also in the case of Post and Telegraphs and all other branches of communication.
In this connection another point need be clarified. Here I have recommended designation of the federating units as ‘states’ instead of provinces ‘as is now done. This very mention of the word state ‘ is liable to be mischievously misinterpreted by the unitarist
and pseudo-federalists. They will tell the unwary public: “Look, Mujib is wanting independent States’. This would be viciously wrong. Everywhere in different Federations of the world federating units are called states’ and not provinces ‘. U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Federal Germany, Federation of Malaysia, and last of all our neighbour India, all have designated their units as ‘states’ instead of provinces’. Our next door neighbours like West Bengal and Assam are states of Indian Union and not provinces’. That designation of Indian provinces has not rendered their Union loose or their Central Government weak. If Assam and West Bengal can have the dignity and honour of being called states’ without impairing the solidarity of Bharati Union, why can’t we have the same dignity and honour without impairing the solidarity of Pakistan Federation? Why are our rulers so allergic to our dignity?
POINT 3 In this point, I have recommended either of the following two measures with regard to our Currency, viz.:
A. Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may be introduced, or
B. One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case, effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan.
From the above it will be seen that I have not recommended the straightaway taking of Currency out of the Federal list. If my recommendation contained in B above is accepted, Currency remains a Central subject. In this case, the only difference is that I have recommended the creation of separate Reserve Banks for two wings in a Federal Reserve System as obtains in U.S.A. According to this arrangement, the State Bank of Pakistan will have two Reserve Banks for two wings. The currency for East Pakistan shall be issued through the East Pakistan Reserve Bank and shall be marked East Pakistan’ or simply Dacca’. Similarly, West Pakistan currency shall be issued through West Pakistan Reserve Bank and shall be marked West Pakistan’ or simply ‘Lahore’.
This is the only way by which we can save East Pakistan from sure economic ruination by effectively stopping flight of capital from this wing to the other. The geographical separateness has made the two wings ipso facto two economic units. An economic convulsion, either for the better or for the worse, in one wing has no corresponding convulsion in the other wing. So progress and deve
lopment in the one does not in the least benefit the other. Expenditure in one cannot create employment in the other. This economic independence and separateness of the two wings is correctly reflected in their respective price and wage structures including the price of gold. This is what is known as the absence of mobility of labour and capital. This immobility of capital, however, does not prevent flight of capital. This is how it happens under the present dispensations:
We are supposed to belong to one indivisible economy. We have one currency. There is no distinguishing mark to show the currency circulation wing-wise. We are under only one Finance Ministry situated in and operating from West Pakistan presided over always by a West Pakistani Minister formulating financial, fiscal and monetary policies through one single Central Bank, that is, the State Bank of Pakistan, also located in West Pakistan, issuing money minted, coined and printed in West Pakistan. This money after travelling and meandering in circulation throughout the country journeys back to and rests in accumulation in West Pakistan. Along with the head office of the Government Central Bank the head offices of all the joint-stock Banks, except one or two small ones of very recent origin, are also located in West Pakistan. The seat of the Government being located in West Pakistan, head offices of the three Armed Forces, all Foreign Missions and almost all foreign and national trades and industries organizations are situated in that wing. As a result, all money transactions done in East Pakistan are instantaneously transferred to West Pakistan. All share money of joint-stock companies, all deposits of Banks, their security money, all Government reserves, all earnings, profits and savings of trade and industry operating in East Pakistan move in a matter of seconds to West Pakistan. Anyone conversant with banking operation knows well that only barely ten per cent of the entire deposit need be kept ready for payment and the rest can be and generally is invested. Savings when invested become capital. This investment is naturally done in West Pakistan as West Pakistan’s capital. This is how capital formation in West Pakistan has been so rapid. This again is how there has been total absence of capital formation in East Pakistan. As investment means employment, this incident has meant the employment in West Pakistan only. As capital formation is followed by rapid industrialization, this has meant industrialization of West Pakistan alone. This process will continue unless and until the prevailing one-way traffic of finance is effectively checked by stopping this flight of capital. This can be done and capital investment can be generated in East Pakistan only by creating a Reserve Bank for East Pakistan as
suggested by me. It is the only way to save East Pakistan from economic extinction. This reform in our currency system while saving East Pakistan from economic collapse will keep currency a Central subject as a symbol of our unity and oneness.
If, however, our West Pakistani brothers think otherwise, then my other alternative may be adopted. Under that arrangement Currency will, no doubt, be a provincial subject, but that will not weaken our Centre. Neither will it affect the oneness of Pakistan. For even then we can have the same currency symbol by mutual discussion and agreement. And for the other, a federation can effectively work and be strong and stable without Currency as its subject. The Cabinet Mission recommended an Indian Federal Centre without Currency in the Federal list. Had it been thought unworkable, British Government would not have recommended it, nor would the Congress and the Muslim League have accepted it.
POINT 4
In this point, I have recommended that the power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and that the Federal Centre will have no such power. The Federation will have a share in the state taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes.
It is this proposal that seems to have most annoyed the unitarists and pseudo-federalists. They are making a lot of noises and kicking up dust of confusion such as disintegration and disruption. These are old bogeys and shibboleths used by the vested interests against all reforms in all ages. They need not worry any Pakistani. The fact is that a strong Federation can successfully work and is actually working without the power of taxation. It makes the Federation rather stronger. This is so because taxation is a duty and necessity rather than a right and power. Levying taxes and collecting them is a responsibility and a botheration. It is just like manually earning one’s own livelihood. In our daily life we find people wanting to better employ themselves in finer and nobler work, lease out their properties to others at fixed rent leaving to them the arduous task of collecting small amounts from individual tenants and earning petty sums from day-to-day transactions. The monarchs of the past used to, and landlords of the present do, lease out their realms in ijara for tax collection. The Central authorities in all ages have tried to be spared the botheration of tax collection for their own maintenance. It is only the banya mentality of the present day rulers that impels them to handle all money matters themselves.
A little reflection will show that the right and power concerned do not rest in the act of tax collection but in the money so collected. If a Central Government is constitutionally assured of the required amount, why should it bother about the actual collection? In the case of a Federation it is only the fiscal taxation in which it is interested. The rest of the purposes of taxation, viz. : protective, social, commercial and moral, are the responsibility of the federating units. This is what is done in U.S.A. and some other Federations. In the U.S.S.R. even the fiscal taxation is not done by the Union. There is no Finance Minister and Finance Ministry in the Union Government of the Soviet Union. The Finance Ministries and Ministers are all with the federating Republics. They meet the requirements and serve the purposes of the Union Government. Have these arrangements weakened the Central authorities of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.? It was with this knowledge and experience of the working of a Federation that Cabinet Mission offered an Indian Federation without the power of taxation and it was for the same reason that the Congress and the Muslim League accepted the offer. It will, therefore, be seen that a Federation can be firmly provided with its fiscal finances without being burdened with the duty of tax collection. My proposal is precisely to this effect. According to my recommendation, the Constitution will provide that a certain percentage of the Revenue collections on all heads shall automatically be credited to the Federal Fund by the Reserve Banks, on which amount the unit Governments shall have no control. Constitutional provisions may also be made empowering the Federation to raise funds to meet the increased Defence expenditure at the time of war including expansion of Federal jurisdiction in such emergencies. It is, therefore, sheer bunkum to call the autonomists the disruptors of Pakistan. On the contrary, relieving the Federation of the burden of tax collection will have the following salutary effect, viz.:
(a) the Federation will have more time to devote in matters of Defence and External Relations and to act as a unifying force,
(6) wastage due to overlapping, duplication and litigation, etc. will be saved and money thus saved and officials thus relieved will be available for better and nobler utilization,
(c) the tax and revenue collection will be cheaper and easier,
(d) economy of having a single authority for tax collection will have been achieved,
(e) it will pave the way for introducing and adopting the most modern taxation method, viz., single taxation.
POINT 5
In this point, I have recommended that:
(1) there shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings,
(2) earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan Government,
(3) foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed,
(4) indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings,
(5) the Constitution shall empower the unit Governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in, and enter into agreements with foreign countries.
Now, a panoramic glance at the economic history of Pakistan since its creation will show the following consistent incidents:
(a) East Pakistan has earned bulk of the annual foreign exchange of Pakistan.
(b) East Pakistan’s earnings have been spent in West Pakistan in industrializing that wing and earnings from those industries have been reinvested in West Pakistan as the earnings of that wing.
(c) East Pakistan’s earnings are not being spent in East Pakistan on the plea of its inability to absorb them due to absence of capital formation.
(d) Import to East Pakistan is less than her export, whereas import to West Pakistan is more than her export.
(e) Two-thirds of Pakistan’s foreign exchange is earned by jute; but that earning is utilized neither for the benefit of the jute-growers nor for East Pakistan.
(f) Almost all foreign aids and loans are secured against foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan; but they are spent in West Pakistan on the same plea of non-absorbing capacity of East Pakistan. The irony is that interest on these loans and their instalments are being borne by East Pakistan.
Now, the cumulative effects of these economic incidents, all of which are artificial, are the following consequences, viz.:
(i) East Pakistan has not been industrialized sufficiently,
(ii) the little industrialization that has been done has been done by West Pakistanis or by people other than East Pakistanis with all the characteristics of foreign investments both in the matter of employment and profit-earning,
(iii) there is chronic inflation causing soaring high prices of commodities with all its concomitants like blackmarketing and
profiteering bringing untold miseries to the life of the people,
(iv) jute-growers are not only not getting fair economic price of their produce but even the cost of production is denied to them resulting in their perpetual indebtedness and progressive impoverishment.
These are man-made inequities and are, therefore, remediable. The obvious remedies are, firstly, to industrialize East Pakistan to produce wealth among and provide employment for East Pakistanis; secondly, to check inflation by equalizing import and export and thereby supplying commodities to the people at reasonable prices; thirdly, to nationalize jute trade and thereby give fair price to the growers and ensure the state’s earnings in foreign exchange. It was with this last object in view that Awami League Government set up Jute Marketing Corporation in 1957. It was subsequently reduced to nothing by the vested interests with the help of the Central Government.
Each and every one of these steps presupposes acceptance of the above proposals recommended by me.
POINT 6 In this point, I have recommended setting up of a militia or a para-military force for East Pakistan. This is neither unreasonable nor new. We had pledged in the famous 21-point programme in 1954 that we would give arms and uniforms to our Ansars.
Neither is the proposal unprecedented and impracticable. There are instances where such para-military territorial forces are maintained in outlying regions. We ourselves had one such regiment from before Independence. It was the Eastern Rifles. After Pakistan, it became East Pakistan Rifles. The present regime has taken this away from the hand of East Pakistan Government.
East Pakistan is the home of the majority of Pakistanis. To defend it is the political obligation as well as moral duty of the Government of Pakistan. Why then should it be necessary for East Pakistanis to demand it? Why do they not do it on their own initiative? How and with what conscience do they say that defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan? Is it not tantamount to saying that the mouth, the belly and the stomach of East Pakistan lie in West Pakistan? How will the arms, ammunitions and wealth in West Pakistan help East Pakistan when transport between the wings can be snapped in a matter of seconds ? Has not the recent 17-days war proved our utter helplessness? How can one brag that some event in Warsaw saved East Pakistan? It is the defence policy of our Government that has reduced us to this position.
In spite of all this we want a united Defence of the country and to retain it as a Central subject. But at the same time we want that East Pakistan be made self-sufficient in the matter of Defence; that an Ordnance Factory, à Military Academy and the Navy Headquarter must be set up in East Pakistan. These things were actually demanded in 1954. Nothing, however, has been done in the course of long twelve years. We do not yet know when these will be done.
So in the meantime we want to make our own Defence arrangement in a small way with unsophisticated weapons suited to our own field craft within easy reach of our limited resources. What is the objection? Where does it lie? It is not easy to comprehend. Neither is it easy to understand why a Fund separately raised for East Pakistan war purposes is promptly taken over by the Center. Source: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, President of East Pakistan
Awami League, Six Point Formula-Our Right to Live, published by Tajuddin Ahmed, General Secretary, East Pakistan Awami League, Dacca, March 23, 1966.
APPENDIX 3
Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan: Radio Broadcast to the
Nation, March 26, 1971. My dear countrymen. Assalamo-Alaikam,
On the 6th of this month I announced the 25th of March as the new date for the inaugural session of the National Assembly hoping that conditions would permit the holding of the session on the appointed date. Events have, however, not justified that hope. The nation continued to face a grave crisis.
In East Pakistan a non-co-operation and disobedience movement was launched by the Awami League and matters took a very serious turn. Events were moving very fast and it became absolutely imperative that the situation was brought under control as soon as possible. With this aim in view, I had a series of discussions with political leaders in West Pakistan and subsequently on the 15th of March I went to Dacca.
As you are aware I had a number of meetings with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in order to resolve the political impasse. Having consulted West Pakistani leaders it was necessary for me to do the same over there so that areas of agreement could be identified and an amicable settlement arrived at.
As has been reported in the Press and other news media from time to time, my talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman showed some progress. Having reached a certain stage in my negotiations with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman I considered it necessary to have another round of talks with West Pakistani leaders in Dacca.
Mr. Z. A. Bhutto reached there on 21st March and I had a number of meetings with him.
As you are aware, the leader of the Awami League had asked for the withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer of power prior to the meeting of the National Assembly. In our discussions he proposed that this interim period could be covered by a proclamation by me whereby Martial Law would be withdrawn, Provincial Governments set up and the National Assembly would ab initio, sit in two committees–one composed of members from East Pakistan and the other composed of members from West Pakistan.
ONE CONDITION Despite some serious flaws in the scheme in its legal as well as other aspects, I was prepared to agree in principle to this plan in the
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interest of peaceful transfer of power but on one condition. The condition which I clearly explained to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was that I must first have unequivocal agreement of all political leaders to the scheme.
I thereupon discussed the proposal with other political leaders. I found them unanimously of the view that the proposed proclamation by me would have no legal sanction. It will neither have the cover of Martial Law nor could it claim to be based on the will of the people. Thus a vacuum would be created and chaotic conditions will ensue. They also considered that splitting of the National Assembly into two parts through a proclamation would encourage divisive tendencies that may exist. They, therefore, expressed the opinion that if it is intended to lift Martial Law and transfer power in the interim period, the National Assembly should meet, pass an appropriate interim Constitution Bill and present it for my assent. I entirely agreed with their view and requested them to tell Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to take a reasonable attitude on this issue.
I told the leaders to explain their views to him that a scheme whereby, on the one hand, you extinguish all source of power namely Martial Law and on the other fail to replace it by the will of the people through a proper session of the National Assembly, will merely result in chaos. They agreed to meet Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, explain the position and try to obtain his agreement to the interim arrangement for transfer of power to emanate from the National Assembly.
The political leaders were also very much perturbed over Sheikh Mujib’s idea of dividing the National Assembly into two parts right from the start. Such a move, they felt, would be totally against the interest of Pakistan’s integrity.
The Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party, during the meeting between myself, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and him, had also expressed similar views to Mujib.
On the evening of the 23rd of March the political leaders, who had gone to talk to Mujib on this issue, called on me and informed me that he was not agreeable to any changes in his scheme. All he really wanted was for me to make a proclamation, whereby I should withdraw Martial Law and transfer power.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s action of starting his non-co-operation movement is an act of treason. He and his party have defied the lawful authority for over three weeks. They have insulted Pakistan’s flag and defiled the photograph of the Father of the Nation. They have tried to run a parallel Government. They have created turmoil, terror and insecurity.
A number of murders have been committed in the name of movement. Millions of our Bengali brethren and those who have settled in East Pakistan are living in a state of panic, and a very large number had to leave that wing out of fear for their lives.
The Armed Forces, located in East Pakistan, have been subjected to taunts and insults of all kinds. I wish to compliment them on the tremendous restraint that they have shown in the face of grave provocation. Their sense of discipline is indeed praiseworthy. I am proud of them.
REASONABLE SOLUTION I should have taken action against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his collaborators weeks ago but I had to try my utmost to handle the situation in such a manner as not to jeopardise my plan of peaceful transfer of power. In my keenness to achieve this aim I kept on tolerating one illegal act after another. And at the same time I explored every possible avenue for arriving at some reasonable solution. I have already mentioned the efforts made by me and by various political leaders in getting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to see reason. We have left no stone unturned. But he has failed to respond in any constructive manner; on the other hand, he and his followers kept on flouting the authority of the Government even during my presence in Dacca. The proclamation that he proposed was nothing but a trap. He knew that it would not have been worth the paper it was written on and in the vacuum created by the lifting of Martial Law he could have done anything with impunity. His obstinacy, obduracy and absolute refusal to talk sense can lead to but one conclusion the man and his party are enemies of Pakistan and they want East Pakistan to break away completely from the country. He has attacked the solidarity and integrity of this country—this crime will not go unpunished.
We will not allow some power hungry and unpatriotic people to destroy this country and play with the destiny of 120 million people.
In my address to the nation of 6th March I had told you that it is the duty of the Pakistan Armed Forces to ensure the integrity, solidarity and security of Pakistan. I have ordered them to do their duty and fully restore the authority of the Government.
In view of the grave situation that exists in the country today I have decided to ban all political activities throughout the country. As for the Awami League it is completely banned as a political party. I have also decided to impose complete Press censorship. Martial Law regulations will very shortly be issued in pursuance of these decisions.
AIM REMAINS SAME
In the end let me assure you that my main aim remains the same, namely, transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. As soon as situation permits I will take fresh steps toward the achievement of this objective.
It is my hope that the law and order situation will soon return to normal in East Pakistan and we can again move forward towards our cherished goal.
I appeal to my countrymen to appreciate the gravity of the situation for which the blame rests entirely on the anti-Pakistan and secessionist elements and to act as reasonable citizens of the country because therein lies the security and salvation of Pakistan.
God be with you. God bless you. Pakistan Paindabad.—APP.
Source: Dawn, Karachi, March 27, 1971.
APPENDIX 4 Bangladesh Proclamation of Independence (April 10, 1971). Mujeeb Nagar (Bangla Desh)
The proclamation of independence order, which was issued on April 10 shall be deemed to have come into effect from March 26, 1971. The text is as follows:
The proclamation of independence order, dated 10th day of April 1971.
Whereas free elections were held in Bangla Desh from 7th December 1970 to 17th January 1971, to elect representatives for the purpose of framing a Constitution, and Whereas at these elections the people of Bangla Desh elected 167 out of 169 representatives belonging to the Awami League, and Whereas General Yahya Khan summoned the elected representatives of the people to meet on the 3rd March 1971, for the purpose of framing a Constitution, and Whereas the Assembly so summoned was arbitrarily and illegally postponed for indefinite period, and Whereas instead of fulfilling their promise and while still conferring with the representatives of people of Bangla Desh, Pakistan authorities declared an unjust and treacherous war, and
GENOCIDE
Whereas in the facts and circumstances of such treacherous conduct Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed leader of 75 millions of people of Bangla Desh, in due fulfilment of the legitimate right of self-determination of the people of Bangla Desh, duly made declaration of independence at Dacca on March 26, 1971, and integrity of Bangla Desh, and Whereas in the conduct of a ruthless and savage war the Pakistani authorities committed and are still committing numerous acts of genocide and unprecedented tortures, amongst others on the civilian and unarmed people of Bangla Desh, and Whereas the Pakistan Government by levying an unjust war and committing genocide and by other repressive measures made it impossible for the elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh to meet and frame a Constitution, and give to themselves a government, and Whereas the people of Bangla Desh by their heroism, bravery and revolutionary fervour have established effective control over the territories of Bangla Desh, We the elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh, as honour bound by the mandate given to us by the people of Bangla Desh whose will is supreme duly constituted ourselves into a Constituent Assembly, and having held mutual consultations, and in order to ensure for the people of Bangla Desh equality, human dignity and social justice, declare and constitute Bangla Desh to be sovereign people’s Republic and thereby confirm the declaration of independence already made by Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and
PRESIDENT
Do hereby confirm and resolve that till such time as a Constitution is framed, Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman shall be the President of the Republic and that Syed Nazrul Islam shall be the Vice-President of the Republic and that the President shall be the Supreme Commander of all the armed forces of the Republic, shall exercise all the executive and legislative powers of the Republic including the power to grant pardon, shall have the power to appoint a Prime Minister and such other Ministers as he considers necessary, shall have the power to levy taxes and expend monies, shall have the power to summon and adjourn the Constituent Assembly, and do all other things that may be necessary to give to the people of Bangla Desh an orderly and just government.
We the elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh do further resolve that in the event of there being no President or the
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President being unable to enter upon his office or being unable to exercise his powers and duties due to any reason whatsoever, the Vice-President shall have and exercise all the powers, duties and responsibilities herein conferred on the President. We further resolve that we undertake to observe and give effect to all duties and obligations devolved upon us as a member of the family of nations and by the Charter of the United Nations. We further resolve that this proclamation of independence shall be deemed to have come into effect since 26th day of March, 1971.
We further resolve that to give effect to this our resolution, we authorise and appoint Professor M. Yusuf Ali, our duly constituted potentiary to give to the President and Vice-President oaths of office. Source: The Sunday Standard, Bombay, April 18, 1971
APPENDIX 5
Tajuddin Ahmed, Prime Minister of Bangladesh:
Statement of April 17, 1971. Bangla Desh is at war. It has been given no choice but to secure its right of self-determination through a national liberation struggle against the colonial oppression of West Pakistan.
In the face of positive attempts by the Government of Pakistan to distort the facts in a desperate attempt to cover up their war of genocide in Bangla Desh, the world must be told the circumstances under which the peace-loving people of Bangla Desh were driven to substitute armed struggle for parliamentary politics to realise their just aspirations.
The six-point programme for autonomy for Bangla Desh within Pakistan had been put forward in all sincerity by the Awami League as the last possible solution to preserve the integrity of Pakistan. Fighting the elections to the National Assembly on the issue of six points, the Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats from Bangla Desh in a House of 313. Its electoral victory was so decisive that it won 80 per cent of the popular vote cast. The decisive nature of its victory placed it in a clear majority within the National Assembly….
It is now clear that General Yahya and his generals never had the slightest intention of solving Pakistan’s political crisis peacefully but were only interested in buying time to permit the reinforcement
of their military machine within Bangla Desh. General Yahya’s visit to Dacca was a mere cover for his plan of genocide. It now becomes clear that contingency plans for such a crisis had already begun well in advance of the crisis.
Shortly before March 1, tanks which had been sent north to Rangpur to defend the borders were brought back to Dacca. From 1st March the families of army personnel were being sent off to West Pakistan on a priority basis along with the families of West Pakistani businessmen.
The military build-up was accelerated after March 1 and continued through the talks up to March 25. Members of the armed forces dressed in civilian clothes were flown in PIA commercial flights via Ceylon. C-130’s carrying arms and provisions for the garrisons flew into Dacca. It is estimated that up to one division, with complementary support, was brought into Bangla Desh between March 1 and 25. To ensure security, the airport was put under strict air force control and heavily guarded with artillery and machine-gun nests whilst the movement of passengers was strictly supervised. An SSG Commando Group specially trained for undercover operations in sabotage and assassination was distributed in key centres in Bangla Desh and were probably responsible for the attacks on Bengalis in Dacca and Saidpur in the two days before March 25 to provoke clashes between locals and non-locals so as to provide a cover for military intervention.
As part of this strategy of deception, General Yahya adopted the most conciliatory posture in his talks with Sheikh Mujib. In the talks beginning on March 16, he expressed regrets for what had happened and his sincere desire for a political settlement. In a crucial meeting with Sheikh Mujib he was asked to positively state the Junta’s position on the Awami League’s four-point proposal. He indicated that there were no serious objections and that an interim constitution could be worked out by the respective advisers embodying the four points.
The basic points on which agreement was reached were: (1) Lifting of Martial Law and transfer of power to a Civilian
Government by a Presidential proclamation. (2) Transfer of power in the provinces to the majority parties. (3) General Yahya to remain as President and in control of the
Central Government. (4) Separate sittings of the National Assembly members from
East and West Pakistan preparatory to a joint session of the
house to finalize the constitution…. Once this agreement in principle had been reached between
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Sheikh Mujib and General Yahya there was only the question of defining the powers of Bangla Desh vis-a-vis the Centre during the interim phase. Here, it was again jointly agreed that the distribution of power should as far as possible approximate to the final constitution approved by the National Assembly which, it was expected, would be based on the six points.
For working out this part of the interim settlement, Mr. M. M. Ahmed, Economic Adviser to the President, was specially flown in. In his talks with the Awami League advisers he made it clear that provided the political agreement had been reached there were no insuperable problems to working out some version of the six points even in the interim period. The final list of three amendments to the Awami League draft which he presented as suggestions, indicated that the gap between the Government and Awami League position was no longer one of principle but remained merely over the precise phrasing of the proposals. The Awami League at its sitting of March 24 accepted the amendment with certain minor changes of language and there was nothing to prevent the holding of a final drafting session between the advisers of General Yahya and Sheikh Mujib when the interim constitution would be finalis
ed….
Whilst hope for a settlement was being raised, more ominous signs of the intentions of the army were provided by their sudden decision to unload the munition ship, MV Swat, berthed at Chittagong port. Preparatory to this decision Brig. Mazumdar, a Bengali officer commanding the garrison in Chittagong, had been suddenly removed from his command and replaced by a West Pakistani. On the night of March 24, he was flown to Dacca under armed escort, and has probably been executed. Under the new command, notice was given to local authorities of the decision to unload the ship, in spite of the fact that the army had abstained from doing so for the last 17 days in the face of non-cooperation from the port workers. The decision to unload was a calculated provocation which immediately brought 100,000 people on the streets of Chittagong and led to massive firing by the army to break their way out. The issue was raised by the Awami League with General Peerzada as to why this escalation was being permitted whilst talks were still going on. He gave no answer beyond a promise to pass it on to General Yahya Khan….
By 11 p.m. of March 25, all preparations were ready and the troops began to take up position in the city. In an act of treachery unparalleled in contemporary history, a programme of calculated genocide was unleashed on the peaceful and unsuspecting popula
tion of Dacca by the midnight of March 25. No ultimatum was given to the Awami League by General Yahya. No curfew order was issued when the machine-guns, artillery and cannons on the tanks unleashed their reign of death and destruction. By the time the first martial law proclamations issued by Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan were broadcast the next morning, some 50,000 people, most of them without offering any resistance, and many women and children, had been butchered. Dacca had been turned into an inferno with fires raging in most corners of the city. Sleeping inhabitants, who had been drawn from their homes by the fires started by the military were machine-gunned as they ran to escape the flames. …
General Yahya himself left Dacca on the night of March 25 after having unleashed the Pakistan army, with an open licence to commit genocide on all Bengalis. His own justification for this act of barbarism was not forthcoming till 8 p.m. the next day when the world was given its first explanation for the unleashing of this holocaust. The statement was self-contradictory and laced with positive lies. His branding of a party as traitors and outlaws, with whom he had only 48 hours ago been negotiating for a peaceful transfer of power, bore no relationship to the situation in Bangla Desh or to the course of the negotiations. His promise to hand over power to the elected representatives of the people after banning the Awami League which was the sole representative of Bangla Desh and held a majority of seats in the National Assembly was a mockery of the freely recorded voice of 75 million Bengalis. The crudity of the statement was clear evidence that General Yahya was no longer interested in taking shelter behind either logic or morality and had reverted to the law of the jungle in his bid to crush the people of Bangla Desh.
Pakistan is now dead and buried under a mountain of corpses. The hundreds and thousands of people murdered by the army in Bangla Desh will act as an impenetrable barrier between West Pakistan and the people of Bangla Desh. By resorting to pre-planned genocide General Yahya must have known that he was himself digging Pakistan’s grave. The subsequent massacres perpetrated on his orders by his licensed killers on the people were not designed to preserve the unity of a nation. They were acts of racial hatred and sadism devoid of even the elements of humanity. Professional soldiers, on order, violated their code of military honour and were seen as beasts of prey who indulged in an orgy of murder, rape, loot, arson and destruction unequal in the annals of civilisation. These acts indicate that the concept of two countries is already deeply rooted in the minds of General Yahya and his associates, who would not dare commit such atrocities on their own countrymen.
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General Yahya’s genocide is thus without political purpose. It serves only as the last act in the tragic history of Pakistan, which General Yahya has chosen to write with the blood of the people of Bangla Desh. The objective is genocide and scorched-earth, before his troops are either driven out or perish. In this time, he hopes to liquidate our political leadership, intelligentsia and administration, to destroy our industries and public amenities, and as a final act, he intends to raze our cities to the ground. Already his occupation army has made substantial progress towards this objective. Bangla Desh will be set back fifty years as West Pakistan’s parting gift to a people they have exploited for twenty-three years for their own benefit.
This is a point of major significance to those great powers who choose to ignore this largest single act of genocide since the days of Belsen and Auschwitz. If they think they are preserving the unity of Pakistan, they can forget it because General Yahya himself has no illusions about the future of Pakistan….
It is, therefore, in the interest of politics as much as humanity for the big powers to put their full pressure on General Yahya to cage his killers and bring them back to West Pakistan. We will be eternally grateful to the people of the USSR and India and the freedom loving people of all the countries for their full support they have already given us in this struggle. We would welcome similar support from the People’s Republic of China, the USA, France, Great Britain and all Afro-Asian countries who have freed themselves from colonial rule and from all freedom loving countries. Each in their own way should exercise considerable leverage on West Pakistan and were they to exercise this influence, General Yahya could not sustain his war of aggression against Bangla Desh for a single day longer.
Bangla Desh will be the eighth most populous country in the world. Its only goal will be to rebuild a new nation from the ashes and carnage left behind by General Yahya’s occupation army. It will be a stupendous task because of the destruction of the economy by General Yahya’s army in our already underdeveloped and overpopulated region. But we now have a cause and a people who have been hardened in the resistance, who have shed their blood for their nation and won their freedom in an epic struggle which pitted unarmed people against a modern army. Such a nation cannot fail in its task of securing the foundations of its nationhood…. Source : Seminar, June 1971 (No. 142), from press statement of
Bangladesh Government dated April 17, 1971.
APPENDIX 6
Government of Pakistan: White Paper on the Crisis in
East Pakistan, August 5, 1971.
CONCLUSION The recent tragic events in East Pakistan can be seen in their proper perspective in the light of the foregoing chapters. The fact that the atrocities and acts of lawlessness committed by the Awami League militants prior to 25 March, 1971 had not been publicised, to avoid possible reprisals, has led to the impression that the action of the Federal Government was directed at suppressing a popular movement. It can now be seen that armed forces moved to restore law and order and the authority of the Government which had been gravely undermined in the 25 days of the Awami League’s nonviolent non-co-operation ‘ movement.
A dispassionate study of the facts and documents provided in the White Paper should further make it clear that the President went as far as he possibly could to help create conditions for transferring power to elected representatives by evolving a consensus among the various parties without which a true Federal set up could not be established. He persevered in negotiations with the Awami League and delayed the assertion of the Government’s authority to a point that is being considered in retrospect by some as having been too close to disaster. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the other leaders of the Awami League, however, progressively escalated their demands, with complete disregard for the fact that their mandate was for autonomy within a Federation, even in terms of the League’s own Six Points. Towards the concluding phase of talks, their draft proclamation spoke of a confederation’ which is a loose association of independent and sovereign states, and included other unmistakable indications of their resolve to break up the country. This was not only unacceptable to the leaders and parties of the other federating units but also clearly violated the terms of the Legal Framework Order, under which elections had been held, and which contained a basic commitment by the President to safeguard the unity and integrity of Pakistan.
The Awami League leadership had counted on their success in paralysing the civil administration, combined with their subversion of the loyalty of many units of the armed forces and their collusion with India to present the world with a fait accompli in case negotiations did not secure their secessionist demands. Having tried all
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avenues of compromise and having failed to evoke a statesmanlike or moderate response consistent with the concept of a united Pakistan, the President was left no choice but to make the painful decision to preserve the integrity of the country as he had repeatedly warned he would, should the need arise. Source : Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and National Affairs, White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, Islamabad, August, 1971.
APPENDIX 7
Senator Edward M. Kennedy: Address on the Bengali Refugees, to the National Press Club, Washington,
August 26, 1971. … In just a few months, since early April, the civil war in East Bengal has driven nearly 8,000,000 men, women and children into India to escape conditions in their homeland. Unnumbered thousands of others have been slaughtered in the civil strife, or displaced with in their country. Millions more in East Bengal face continued terror, disease and starvation, unless they receive immediate relief.
This stark tragedy is not yet understood by the world. And although it has been a source of urgent concern to me and the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees from the outset, I can tell you that not until you see it first-hand can you begin to understand its immensity. For only by being there can you sense the feelings and understand the plight of the people, and the forces of violence which continue to create refugees and increase the toll of civilian casualties….
It is difficult to erase from your mind the look on the face of a child paralyzed from the waist down, never to walk again; or a child quivering in fear on a mat in a small tent still in shock from seeing his parents, his brothers and his sisters executed before his eyes; or the anxiety of a 10-year-old girl out foraging for something to cover the body of her baby brother who had died of cholera a few moments before our arrival. When I asked one refugee camp director what he would describe as his greatest need, his answer was ‘a crematorium.’ He was in charge of one of the largest refugee camps in the world. It was originally designed to provide low income and middle income housing, and has now become the home for some 170,000 refugees. It is time—it is past time—for Americans to understand what has
B.-4
produced this massive human tragedy, and to recognize the bankrupt response by our own nation.
The issue from the beginning in East Bengal has been self-determination and democratic principle. After years of political and economic domination by West Pakistan-after years of martial law and unfulfilled election promises—a free election finally was conducted throughout Pakistan last December 7th. The election was administered under martial law and, at the time, loudly proclaimed fair by the government of President Yahya Khan. It produced in East Bengal an overwhelming mandate-almost 80% of the votefor the Awami League party and its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman….
While the East Bengalis negotiated for democracy and autonomy, the West Pakistan army prepared for systematic repression and organized terror. Countless thousands were butchered during the days that followed March 25th, and many millions more were dislocated within East Bengal. What I saw last week in India was the human debris from that night of terror and from the subsequent weeks of violence. Martial law remains, as does the military’s violence. Collective responsibility ‘-a policy of destroying whole villages on the suspicion that they harbor Awami Leaguers or Bengali guerillas-is now sanctioned by martial law, and it is reflected in the continuing flow of refugees.
Unfortunately, the face of America today in South Asia is not much different from its image over the past years in Southeast Asia. It is the image of an America that supports military repression and fuels military violence. It is the image of an America comfortably consorting with an authoritarian regime. It is the image of an America citing its revolutionary past and crowing about its commitment to self-determination, while it services military juntas that suppress change and ignore a people’s aspirations.
The situation in East Bengal should particularly distress Americans, since it is our military hardware—our guns and tanks and aircraft delivered over a decade—which are contributing substantially to the suffering. And even more shocking is the fact that these military supplies continue to flow—apparently under instructions from the highest officials of our land. Pakistani ships loaded with U.S. military supplies continue to leave American harbors bound for West Pakistan troops. And it is all so shameful and so sad. For they could be halted with a simple stroke of a pen.
It is argued that the continuation of military aid to West Pakistan somehow gives us ‘ leverage’ to constructively influence the Pakistan military’s policy in East Bengal. Well, where is that leverage?
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Where is the leverage to stop the use of U.S. arms which produce the refugees and civilian victims that we then must help support in India? Where is the leverage to halt the secret trial of Sheikh Mujib whose only crime is that he won a free election? Where is the leverage to prevent our humanitarian aid from being turned into military equipment, when American relief boats are transformed into Pakistani gun boats? Why, if we have the leverage to influence the Government of Pakistan, must our great nation assist in this shabby and shameful enterprise ?….
The implications for American foreign policy are clear.
First, we must arouse America to the real human tragedy now taking place in Pakistan and India. The tragedy of East Bengal is not only a tragedy for Pakistan. It is not only a tragedy for India. It is a tragedy for the entire world community, and it is the responsibility of that community to act together to ease the crisis. If America is to fulfil its role as the leading humanitarian nation of the world community, then America must take the lead in bringing international aid and relief to the millions of refugees and other victims of this international conflict. …
To be sure, as the Administration pointed out with pride, we have pledged a larger share of the total than the rest of the world combined. But the pride is quickly dispelled by the vastly greater burden now being carried single-handedly by the government and the people of India. When we realize that India herself faces the prospect of a budget for refugee relief of $500 million to $1 billion in the next year alone, we realize how little the outside world is really doing, and how paltry the American contribution really is….
Second, we must do an about-face in our relations with the nations in the area. Most important, our government must stop preaching restraint’ to India and start showing ‘restraint’ ourselves toward Pakistan. We must end immediately all further U.S. arms shipments to West Pakistan. We must end all other economic support of a regime that continues to violate the most basic principles of humanity. We must demonstrate to the generals of West Pakistan and to the peoples of the world that the United States has a deep and abiding revulsion of the monumental slaughter that has ravaged East Bengal
My experience in the field last week has strengthened these views immensely. No American who has seen the faces of children too weak to cry, too tired to live, too shocked to care, could settle for less. No American would recommend less against a government that tries a political leader in secret-and, as many fear, may put him to death—for the crime of winning a free election….
Third, I believe that the United States should work strongly within the framework of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to bring as much pressure as possible to bear on the Government of West Pakistan to modify its cruel policy of repression toward East Bengal. If no alleviation of these policies is immediately forthcoming, the United States should lead the other SEATO nations in seeking to terminate the participation of Pakistan in the organization.
Similarly, we should re-examine every other bilateral and multilateral relationship we have with Pakistan. No forum of this nation, no forum of the world community, should hesitate to focus the bright light of informed opinion on the nightmare of terror and inhumanity now being perpetrated in South Asia…. Source: Press Release from the Office of Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, Washington: August 26, 1971.
APPENDIX 8
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: Address to the Nation on Outbreak of War with Pakistan, Delhi, December 4, 1971..
I speak to you at a moment of grave peril to our country and to our people. Some hours ago, soon after 5.30 p.m. on December 3, Pakistan launched a full-scale war against us. The Pakistani Air Force suddenly struck at our airfields in Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipur, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra. Their ground forces are shelling our defense positions in Sulaimanki, Khemkaran, Poonch and other sectors.
Since last March, we have borne the heaviest burden and withstood the greatest pressure, in a tremendous effort to urge the world to help in bringing about a peaceful solution and preventing the annihilation of an entire people, whose only crime was to vote for democracy. But the world ignored the basic causes and concerned itself only with certain repercussions. The situation was bound to deteriorate and the courageous band of freedom fighters have been staking their all in defense of the values, for which we also have struggled and which are basic to our way of life.
Today the war in Bangla Desh has become a war on India: this has imposed upon me, my government and the people of India a great responsibility. We have no other option but to put our country on a war footing. Our brave officers and Jawans are at their posts mobilized for the defense of the country. An emergency has been
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declared for the whole of India. Every necessary step is being taken, and we are prepared for all eventualities.
I have no doubt that it is the united will of our people that this wanton and unprovoked aggression should be decisively repelled. In this resolve, the Government is assured of the full and unflinching support of all political parties and every Indian citizen. We must be prepared for a long period of hardship and sacrifice.
We are a peace loving people. But we know that peace cannot last, if we do not guard our democracy and our way of life. So today, we fight not merely for territorial integrity but for the basic ideals, which have given strength to this country, and on which alone we can progress to a better future. I
Aggression must be met, and the people of India will meet it with fortitude and determination and with discipline and utmost unity. Jai Hind. Source: India News, Washington: Embassy of India, December 10,
1971.
APPENDIX 9 United Nations Security Council Meeting on Military Con
flict between India and Pakistan, December 4, 1971. Note: During the first two weeks of December 1971, the United Nations Security Council held a series of meetings at the U.N. in New York to consider the military conflict between India and Pakistan. Below are excerpts from the first of this series of December meetings after armed conflict had erupted. The views of eight member governments are given in the order in which their representatives spoke at the Security Council meeting.
(A) PAKISTAN Mr. Shahi (Pakistan): I thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Security Council, for inviting the Pakistan delegation to this Council meeting to be heard.
This meeting of the Security Council is being held in one of the most extraordinary situations in the history of the United Nations. A State Member of the United Nations, India, has not only launched aggression on the territory of another Member State, Pakistan, but has openly demanded that Pakistan dismember itself and give up that part of its territory which contains the majority of its population.
This is not just an allegation that I am making before the Council. The world knows about the statement of the Prime Minister of India, made on 1 December, that Pakistan should withdraw its troops from its eastern part. The world also knows that Indian troops entered the territory of Pakistan and have been there since at least 21 November. The two facts are undeniable and are acknowledged by India.
These are the two cardinal facts of the situation on which its consideration by the Security Council has to be based. Nothing like this has happened before in the contemporary age.
There is no other example of a State Member of the United Nations which has recognized and had normal diplomatic relations with another Member State demanding that the latter withdraw its troops from its own territory and thus yield possession and control over it. India has not only made the demand but, in pursuance of it, has escalated its aggressive activities to bring about the disintegration of Pakistan. A challenge was thus hurled at Pakistan, and Pakistan has decided to meet it resolutely.
From this point of view, the situation that has been brought before the Security Council is not one which involves Pakistan alone. It involves every State that believes in the principle of territorial integrity of States, which is fundamental to the Charter of the United Nations. It concerns all who are in danger of being overrun by larger, more powerful and predatory neighbours….
The Indian attack was unprovoked; it was on a large scale; it was co-ordinated, it was preceded by heavy artillery fire; and it was made under air cover. It was definitely not, as the Indians initially tried to maintain, only a stepping up of activity by the secessionist guerrillas. In the engagements that have taken place between the Pakistan and Indian armed forces, several of the Indian army units have been identified through Indian soldiers killed or captured….
The facts of the situation prior to 3 December which are beyond controversy are:
First, Pakistan has been the victim of acts of sabotage, subversion and terrorism committed by armed bands organized by India.
Second, these acts have involved incursions into Pakistan by those bands operating from Indian territory and having their bases in India.
Third, even the most elementary considerations of internal security for Pakistan demanded the capture or expulsion of those bands from Pakistan.
I can state with a full sense of responsibility that at no time and
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place did the armed forces of Pakistan stationed in the East take any steps beyond those which were adequate to safeguard the borders of the State and to maintain internal security in Pakistan.
Even if it may be assumed, contrary to the facts, that some excess in the form of a local encroachment across the border might have occurred somewhere, there was no warrant for India’s claim that the invasion of Pakistan was justified by recourse to the right of self-defence.
No less frivolous and unwarranted was the Indian claim that Indian attacks on Pakistan were justified because they were in support of insurgent forces in Pakistan. Even if these insurgent forces were not stationed in Indian territory and were not operating from it, the acknowledgement by India that it was giving them arms and other support would amount to an admission not only of interference in the affairs of Pakistan but also of indirect aggression. Since the incontrovertible fact is that these forces are trained, organized, financed, giyen arms and equipment and furnished bases by India, and that their operations are directed by India, they are nothing but irregular Indian forces. Their continuing sabotage and incursions, accompanied and supported by the military activity of the regular Indian armed forces, constitute aggression by India as much as does an assault by an unmixed regular Indian force….
To avoid undue length I shall only briefly list these major acts of interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan by India:
First, even before elections were held in Pakistan in December 1970, a pipeline for the supply of arms and ammunition by India to certain elements which were plotting the disintegration of Pakistan had been set up.
Second, in February 1971, India engineered the hijacking to Pakistan of one of its aircraft flying from Jammu and Kashmir. The hijackers were Indian intelligence agents. From this incident India obtained a pretext to ban the overflights of Pakistani aircraft from West Pakistan to East Pakistan over Indian territory. This ban was totally illegal, but it cut the direct air link between the two parts of Pakistan. Indian official sources even said that the restoration of the air link would be viewed with deep misgivings by the people of East Pakistan.
Third, immediately after the negotiations toward a political consensus in Pakistan with regard to the future constitution of the country broke down, the Indian Parliament adopted a resolution pledging support to one of the parties. I put it to the members of the Security Council here: would any of your Governments ever
think of such action in relation to an internal crisis in a neighbouring country?
Fourth, the upheaval in East Pakistan was accompanied by, and gained in malignancy from, the propaganda barrage unleashed by India. It was the vastly exaggerated and sensationalized reports published by the Indian press and picked up by foreign news media which produced the panic in East Pakistan that resulted in a large-scale exodus.
Fifth, India exploited the refugee problem for military, political and diplomatic purposes. Militarily, it created from among the displaced persons an irregular army. Politically, India cultivated the belief among the displaced persons that they would go back not to Pakistan as constituted, but to a new sovereignty in East Pakistan. There are on record numerous statements to this effect made by Ministers of the Indian Central Government. Diplomatically, India made use of the refugee situation for its campaign to secure the stoppage of all economic assistance to Pakistan.
Sixth, whatever the nature of the crisis in Pakistan, it posed no military threat to India. But India immediately massed a force of over five divisions on or near the borders of East Pakistan soon after the internal crisis broke out. What other motive than that of intimidating Pakistan and encouraging saboteurs and subversionists could have moved India to make this demonstration of its military might at the time that the garrisons in East Pakistan were hard-pressed in overcoming armed insurgency?
This is a mere summary of India’s interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs, which has now culminated in aggression on Pakistan’s territory. There is only one result of the internal crisis in Pakistan which is truly international in its nature, and we readily acknowledge it to be so. That is the problem of a large number of people who left East Pakistan and are at present on Indian soil. But this problem, while international in nature, is not political. It would have been a political problem if Pakistan were to deny the right of these uprooted people to return to their homes, to be restored to their properties and to live in their own country in perfect security of life and honour. Since, far from denying their right, Pakistan is most anxious to receive them back, since Pakistan has welcomed the assistance of the United Nations in facilitating their voluntary repatriation, since Pakistan is anxious to arrange this rehabilitation as speedily as possible, the problem is purely a humanitarian one. It is a problem which can be solved with compassion and understanding. It is a problem whose solution demands co-operation between India and Pakistan and of both countries with the
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United Nations. Of all problems, it is the one with which playing politics is totally indefensible.
But that is what India did. In fact, by blocking the return of the displaced persons to Pakistan as constituted, India tried to link the fate of this mass of human beings with the dismemberment of Pakistan….
The root cause of the hostilities between India and Pakistan is, therefore, not the occurrences of this year but the policy so far pursued by Indian rulers—the policy of denying Pakistan’s international rights and refusing to resolve outstanding issues between the two countries according to the recognized means of pacific settlement. Normalcy in relations between the two neighbours in South Asia will come not by waving a magic wand, nor with declarations, nor with no-war pacts but with the readiness of both parties to resolve situations of friction and to settle disputes in the only way that that can be done-namely, employing the means listed in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
How anxious Pakistan has been to avert the eruption of hostilities is amply borne out by the fact that the Government of Pakistan responded affirmatively to every proposal that would bring about the peaceful resolution of the present India-Pakistan situation. The President of Pakistan some months ago declared his readiness to meet with the Prime Minister of India anywhere anytime. The response from India was totally negative. On 20 November the President of Pakistan extended his hand of friendship to India. India’s answer was the major armed attack on Pakistan launched the next day….
The proposal to invite the so-called delegation [from Bangladesh] in question is only seemingly innocent. We have been told that the Council would benefit from the information that may be given in regard to the deteriorating situation leading to the armed clashes between India and Pakistan.
But with regard to such information all members of the Security Council and those of the General Assembly and of the Non-Governmental organizations have been deluged with material submitted by the so-called representatives of a particular entity, and so much has appeared in the press that no further purpose could beserved by giving it official recognition and circulating its documents to the members of the Security Council.
I said that this proposal is only seemingly innocent because fundamentally it would mean that at one stroke, by seating such socalled representatives, the Security Council would have struck at
the territorial integrity of a Member State, and sought to dismember Pakistan by according this kind of recognition.
What is this entity on behalf of which the representative of India has circulated a document and which it now demands be seated at this Council table and be given a hearing? It is a group of men contrived, organized and established by India, a country which has carried out subversion, has aided secession and rebellion against Pakistan, has engaged in aggression against Pakistan and is now at war with Pakistan. And this group of men have their seat in Calcutta. We know that right here in New York there are a number of organizations and entities which claim to speak in the names of certain legitimate Governments, or so-called legitimate Governments, and they deluge us with material and request us to have it circulated as official documents of various organs of the United Nations. Should we begin to adopt this practice of complying with their request in contravention of the principles of the Charter?
It has been contended that the letter of the nine delegations asking for a meeting of the Security Council refers to ‘ ….the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan’ (S/10411). What is the situation which occasioned the request for this meeting by the nine delegations? The situation in Pakistan was brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council by the Secretary-General in his memorandum of 20 July, and again in November the members of the Security Council refused to meet on the basis of the information that was supplied by the Secretary-General when he was in fact, though not explicitly, exercising his functions under Article 99 of the Charter. For there is no other provision of the Charter under which the Secretary-General can bring a situation affecting peace and security to the knowledge and attention of the members of the Security Council. The situation which occasioned the letter from the nine delegations is that which erupted yesterday because of full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan. I would submit that the Security Council should interpret this document strictly and not with retrospective effect because it had not thought it fit to meet to consider the situation when certain aspects were brought before the members of the Security Council by the SecretaryGeneral.
Finally, we believe that the refugee problem is a humanitarian one. We are ready to do anything that the international community requests us to do on the basis of a humanitarian approach to ensure the repatriation of these refugees in conditions of honour,
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security of life and restoration of property. And to say now that in a situation in the subcontinent when the flames of war threaten to envelop 700 million people the refugees who are in India should be accorded a kind of representation in and before the Security Council is something which is so unprecedented that the Security Council would have to ponder deeply the consequences of its actions. I would make an appeal that the Security Council act with every sense of responsibility and respect for the fundamental principles of the Charter. And should a dangerous precedent be set, then Pakistan would have to reappraise seriously its co-operation with the Security Council and the United Nations.
(B) INDIA Mr. Sen (India): I am grateful to the Council for the invitation to India to participate in this important debate….
We have heard a long statement from the Ambassador of Pakistan, which tells the story from 21 November, and quickly—and I thought rather casually—brushes aside much that has happened before. We do not represent a military regime and I do not wish to go into many military details now. But I would, however, suggest that it is neither right nor proper that we should start our discussion on any particular date….
Therefore, the first problem we are facing, the particular situation we are confronting today, has a long history behind it. This history is essentially a history between the West Pakistan regime and the people of Bangla Desh. Therefore, without the participation of the people of Bangla Desh, it would be impossible for us to obtain a proper perspective of the problem.
The Ambassador of Pakistan brushed aside these people as groups of either refugees or rebels. They are nothing of the sort. They are the elected representatives of 75 million people. There is neither normalcy nor peace in East Pakistan, and as a result, we have suffered aggression after aggression. Now, in order to come to a solution which would be acceptable to the Council and acceptable to those who are responsible for running the country, it is essential, in our opinion, that the representatives of Bangla Desh should be present here. I am most grateful to the representative of Italy for having mentioned that I was perhaps out of order in bringing up this question, but as the representative of Pakistan has already pointed out, this is a substantive matter.
Now, the Ambassador of Pakistan starts the story from 21 November. I have here a report which has just come in: Security Council document S/10412 of 4 December. Paragraph 4 of that report states the following:
“4. On 3 December 1971, the Chief Military Observer, on the basis of reports from United Nations Military Observers, reported as follows (all time indications WPT):” –which I believe is West Pakistan Time
“(a) Srinagar airfield bombed at 1745 hours on 3 December.
(6) United Nations Military Observers at Field Station Punch reported at 2020 hours that Pakistan troops had crossed the cease-fire line at the Punch crossing point….at 1910 hours. At 2140 hours, the station reported that shelling had commenced from the India side of the line toward the Pakistan side, and at 2256 hours it reported that the area of Punch was under fire from Pakistan artillery.
(c) Field Station Kotli reported at 2145 hours that small-arms fire from Pakistan pickets toward Indian pickets had commenced at 1930 hours and was continuing.
(d) Field Station Jammu reported at 2245 hours that heavy artillery fire from both sides had commenced at 2215 hours and was continuing.
(e) Field Station Sialkot reported at 2250 hours that rounds of artillery were landing in their vicinity.
(f) Field Station Rajouri reported at 2250 hours that theyhad been informed by the local military authority that fighting was taking place along the cease-fire line from Punch to Naushera.
(g) The Chief Military Observer considers that hostilities along the cease-fire line have commenced, and he will instruct the Military Observers to remain at their stations.” (S/10412, Page 4)
Therefore, to begin with, the whole picture given by the Ambassador of Pakistan is a build-up for military action. Now, he asked the question, why is it necessary for Pakistan to take military action against India, which is so much more powerful, has a more numerous population, and so on? The answer to that question is very simple. Pakistan, for the last 23 years, has not been broken up by India. Pakistan has been ruling its own people by military might and at one stage, when they had the opportunity to express what kind of government they want, the Pakistan military machine was put into operation to suppress the wishes of the people. So it is not India that is breaking up Pakistan; it is Pakistan that is breaking up Pakistan itself and, in the process, creating aggression against us.
Pakistan made a great rhetorical statement that it had not taken any military actions, that President Yahya Khan offered to withdraw, and so on and so forth. What are the facts ? Pakistan moved its troops to the frontier long before we did. We responded
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by moving our troops. Pakistan declared a national emergency on 23 November 1971. We declared it on 3 December 1971. Pakistan has launched a campaign of ‘crush India’, ‘conquer India’, and has engaged in a completely orchestrated campaign of war mentality. As a response, we had said that we are not going to start a war; we shall not fight a war; but if anyone starts a war, we shall defend ourselves.
The question arises: Why is Pakistan doing all this? The answer again, as I said, is simple; but I had to give this little background. After having failed totally to suppress the Bengali rebellion, as they call it-the Bengali liberation front, as we call it—they have to find some device to justify their peculiar dilemma. They have sought to justify this dilemma by making rather fantastic proposals for inviting India to join and co-operate with them in repressing and punishing the Bengalis. In other words, we should enter into a partnership with Pakistan for carrying out the unspeakable deeds that they are perpetrating against the Bengali people. Well, we refused. We still refuse.
Then there was a great hue and cry to internationalize the problem: diplomatic moves, various moves in the United Nations through these proposals for observers, and this, that and the other —all designed to make it into an Indo-Pakistan dispute. Once it is turned into an Indo-Pakistan dispute, people will forget what the Pakistan army is doing in East Pakistan. They can go on burning their villages, raping their women and so on. People will then forget and say that it is an Indo-Pakistan dispute. It is extraordinary, therefore, to find that today, when pressure for action is so great in some quarters, this background is forgotten.
Here we have three or four main factors, none of which has been properly considered by the Security Council. What happened to the campaign of genocide? Did the United Nations respond? What happened to the total elimination of all democratic rights? Did the United Nations respond? What happened to the millions of people who had been driven from their homes and who are creating such a burden on India ? Was any solution found? After this position has been reached, a large number of appeals are made. All kinds of unreal statements of normalcy’ having returned to Pakistan are put out. To what extent normalcy has been restored can be judged by the fate of the United Nations relief programme in East Pakistan itself. Time and again assurances were given that this relief equipment-trucks, vehicles, boats—would not be used by the Pakistan Army. But this is precisely what has happened. Time and again assurances were given that relief opera
tions would reach the victims for whom they were intended. Only the other day, Mr. Paul-Marc Henry explained in great detail before the Third Committee that this was almost impossible. So there is no normalcy; there is only butchery. As a result of butchery more people have come over to our areas.
Much has been said about the return of the refugees. It would be interesting to know why the refugees are still coming if such normal, heavenly conditions exist in Pakistan. They are coming because they are being terrorized, they are being butchered. That is why they are coming. And we cannot take any more. We have told the international community time and again that we have come to the end of our tether. The situation is intolerable. We cannot go on paying $3 million a day to look after the refugees. And still they come—not because we are looking after them well; in fact, we are looking after them extremely badly with our limited resources. There are bad sanitary conditions and many other evils. The refugees are living in most horrible conditions. None the less they come. Nobody wants to leave his home to live in such conditions unless there are compelling reasons to do so. These compelling reasons are the brutalities of the Pakistan Army, the denial of the rights of 75 million people, the total negation of everything that human life stands for, the deliberate attempt to hold under colonial rule 75 million persons whom they have exploited for 23 years….
Much has been said about a cease-fire. I have looked at some of these documents floating around, about a cease-fire. A ceasefire between whom and whom? Shall we release the Pakistani soldiers by a so-called cease-fire so that they can go on a rampage and kill the civilians in Dacca, in Chittagong, and in other places? Is this the kind of cease-fire we desire ? Are the soldiers meant to fight and die for whatever cause they believe in, whether it is the cause of civilization or the cause of darkness, or are they to be relieved from this particular duty for which they have taken an oath so that they can go and butcher women and rape young girls of 19, 17, 15, 13, 11 and even less….?
Pakistan is saying, “We offered to have observers. We offered withdrawal,” and so forth. Why are the situations first created and then all these offers made? But about one thing they could do, not a word is said. They could come to a political settlement with the elected leaders. That could be quite peaceful. But no, that is not to be done. All our friends tell us that great pressure has been brought to bear on President Yahya Khan to come to a political settlement. And what is the result? Nil, absolutely nil.
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The great General does not listen to the other great generals, perhaps.
So there is no way open for Pakistan now except to beat up the military situation which it has done, as I explained, first on the eastern front by bombing our villages, and on the western front by a wanton attack on our cities, by suddenly, on the second night, sending several planes. The Ambassador of Pakistan says, “We bombed only a few cities and villages near the frontier.” But they came as far and as deep down as Agra-300 miles.
Is that a picture of premeditated armed intervention on the part of India ? Would the Prime Minister of India go to Calcutta to see the refugee camps if she was thinking of launching an attack on Pakistan on that day? If the Security Council believes that, let it believe it, but I would warn again that nothing will stop us from protecting our own territory, integrity and sovereignty and our national security and our human values….
Under the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly there are certain criteria laid down concerning how and when an area can be regarded as non-self-governing. If we applied those criteria to East Bengal, and if we had a little more morality, we could declare East Pakistan a non-self-governing territory. Let it not be said that because I talk of morality I am self-righteousalthough I think that, as between Pakistan and India, we are so right and they are so wrong that I have every right to be selfrighteous. This is treated as if it were some kind of monstrous charge to be right. We are glad that we have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering. If that is a crime, the Security Council can judge for itself. However, if a crime is to be perpetrated by actions such as some of the proposals for resolutions today envisage and India is to be made a partner of that crime, we shall resolutely and stoutly say no. No one can remove us from our path by mere resolutions and mere exhortations. The question of a cease-fire, as I have already mentioned, is one not between India and Pakistan but between the Pakistan Army and the Bangla Desh people. Therefore let us hear them before we go further into this debate.
(C) UNITED STATES
Mr. Bush (United States of America): From reports that we have all received today it appears that a state of open hostilities exists between India and Pakistan. There is a grave threat to the peace
and stability of Asia. This recourse to war by the nations of South Asia is tragic and unnecessary….
These events of recent months have been profoundly disturbing to the United States. As the President made clear in his report to the Congress earlier this year, our aim in South Asia has been to build a structure of peace and stability within which the great economic and social problems of the region can be addressed. The effectiveness of our efforts in this task is necessarily determined by the ability of the nations of the area to solve their mutual political problems and to build domestic political and economic systems within which orderly change is feasible. The deteriorating military situation with which we are now confronted makes it increasingly impossible for us to contribute to the economic development and political stability of the area, to which we are committed.
My Government is, therefore, deeply concerned by the hostilities which are now taking place along the borders of India and East Pakistan. Hostilities have intensified in East Pakistan. There have been admitted incursions of Indian troops across the border of East Pakistan. It is now clear that the forces of both countries are involved in military actions along the frontier between West Pakistan and India. It is of the utmost urgency that there be an end to these hostilities which could escalate into all-out conflict.
We are not oblivious to the complex factors which are at the root of this tragic and dangerous situation. But the United States cannot over-emphasize its conviction that nothing can come out of a resort to force except greater tragedy for the peoples of South Asia.
The United States Government has made a major effort in South Asia to ease the human suffering caused by the present crisis, to prevent war and to facilitate a political solution to the problem. The United States early recognized the need to assist refugees in India and to help avert famine in East Pakistan and promptly responded by providing major assistance to the United Nations efforts in both countries. We have already committed $245 million to these international humanitarian efforts. The danger of famine has been averted, but large relief requirements remain in both countries. The President, therefore, has requested the Congress to appropriate an additional $250 million to which would be added further food shipments if necessary.
The United States Government, which values its close relations with both India and Pakistan, has made a vigorous effort to avert war, which would increase human suffering and delay the return of refugees to their homes. We have called on both India and
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Pakistan to avoid actions which would increase military tensions. Specifically, the United States Government has proposed that both sides withdraw their military forces from their borders. Pakistan accepted this proposal. Regrettably, India did not. The United States has repeatedly made clear its view that increasing military tensions prevent progress towards resolution of the political problems that caused the refugees to leave their homes and provided the stimulus for guerrilla war. The United States Government has sought to facilitate negotiations leading to a political settlement of the East Pakistan problem. The United States pointed out to the Indian Government that an increase of military tensions could only stand in the way of necessary progress towards a peaceful political settlement and the return of refugees.
We recognize that a fundamental political accommodation still has not been achieved in East Pakistan. While we continue to feel that the only proper solution is a political one, we do not find justification for the repeated violation of frontiers that has taken place in East Pakistan. The immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces are essential conditions for progress towards a political solution in East Pakistan.
This body cannot accept recourse to force to solve this problem. Indian officials have now announced that regular Indian forces have been instructed to move into East Pakistan in what the Indian Defence Secretary is quoted in the press as calling a “no holds barred” operation. The very purpose which draws us together here—building a peaceful world—will be thwarted if a situation is accepted in which a government intervenes across its borders in the affairs of another with military force in violation of the United Nations Charter….
(D) FRANCE Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet (France) (INTERPRETATION FROM FRENCH): In speaking now we are discharging a two-fold duty: that of contributing as a permanent member of the Council to the restoration of peace by every means and that which is dictated to us by the ties of friendship which bind us both with India and Pakistan, by the great esteem which we feel for these two countries and peoples and our desire to see them devote in peace all their resources to development.
No Power can itself alone resolve an infinitely serious crisis which the ethnic and political geography of the region renders even more complex. But when war exists—and, tragically, it does exist—it is up to the entire international community, and particularly Security Council and its members upon whom the Charter confers special
duties, to unite so as to shoulder their responsibilities to bring an end to acts of war and to find a basis of understanding between the parties concerned.
The present situation has two aspects: one which is at the origin of the crisis and which is political in nature. It affects relations between the Government of Islamabad and the population of East Pakistan. It is subject to a political solution susceptible of receiving acceptance by both sides. The second aspect is derived from the first, by reason of the influx of refugees to India. It affects relations between that country and Pakistan. It has created a state of tension which after much violence has eventually reached the stage of open acts of hostility. A civil war has thus been transformed into a war between nations.
This dual aspect of the crisis gives rise to a dilemma. If we were to consider only the first aspect of the crisis, our action risks being considered an interference in internal affairs, and we appreciate the fact that Pakistan is attached both to its sovereignty and its integrity. But if we were to consider only the second aspect, our action risks being considered as partial and without going to the root of the matter, and we appreciate the fact that India cannot feel satisfied with superficial solutions when it has millions of refugees under its care….
My Government has, since the beginning of the crisis and during the last few days intensified its efforts to convince those with whom it is dealing on both sides and to avoid a bloody conflict which could only add additional burdens to a population that has already been decimated and severely devastated. With the necessary discretion we have made suggestions in order to lay the basis for a peaceful settlement, which of necessity must be political and which must be based on the consent of the populations concerned. Other States which share our concern to avoid a catastrophe have acted in the same direction, and we have not ceased to let it be known that we are prepared to join in our efforts to prevent, in the words of our Minister for Foreign Affairs, “the supreme injustice, namely, war, from overtaking millions of people who seem to be the victims of so many cataclysms”….
For all these reasons, we hope that a substantive draft resolution will be submitted which will be capable of receiving the unanimous support of the Council. It is in this spirit that we shall continue consultations with the various delegations so as to endeavour to reach a solution. It is with these considerations in mind that we shall pronounce ourselves in due course on the draft resolutions that will be submitted.
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(E) JAPAN
Mr. Nakagawa (Japan): My delegation strongly believes that the Security Council should take effective steps to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the IndoPakistan subcontinent, which now seems to be on the precipice of a full-scale war. We have for months followed with deep apprehension the fact that an immense number of refugees has been flooding from East Pakistan to the adjacent state of India, which is causing a tremendous burden to the economy of the latter country. Recent reports of armed clashes on an increasing scale along the border of India and Pakistan have stirred widespread anxiety among the friends of India and Pakistan. Japan, as an Asian country, has been seriously concerned with the aggravation of the situation of the sub-continent; it will have a vital impact on the peace of Asia and of the world at large.
Mr. Sato, the Prime Minister of Japan, sent messages last month to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan expressing deep concern about the situation and the wish that the tension should be eased.
However, in view of the recent escalation of hostilities, such bilateral appeals must now be reinforced by the concerted efforts of the Members of the United Nations. My delegation believes that the Security Council should take steps to effect an immediate cease-fire and the cessation of all military activities by the armed forces of India and Pakistan.
We have here a report submitted by the Secretary-General on the humanitarian efforts launched under his initiative to alleviate the difficulties of the East Pakistan refugees in India and the distressed peoples of East Pakistan. Japan, for its part, has made a modest contribution to this humanitarian programme. My country will continue to co-operate with other States and the United Nations in rendering necessary assistance to the suffering people, and wishes to urge other countries to intensify their efforts to cooperate with the Secretary-General in his noble and laudable endeavours. Such humanitarian measures may alleviate the suffering of the distressed people, but they will not cure the cause of such suffering. nl
The Third Committee of the General Assembly recently adopted a resolution, with the concurrence of both India and Pakistan, which called for the creation of conditions conducive to the speedy and voluntary repatriation of the millions of refugees to their homes in East Pakistan. My delegation believes that the principles em
bodied in that resolution should be reaffirmed, especially in view of the further aggravation of the situation in the sub-continent.
I have underlined the basic position of my Government vis-a-vis the item now under discussion. In this connection, the draft resolution submitted a short time ago by the representative of the United States is certainly worthy of careful study. My delegation is prepared to give it sympathetic consideration.
In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that my country will do whatever possible within its capacity to collaborate with the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, to restore peace and stability in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.
(F) CHINA Mr. Huang (China) (INTERPRETATION FROM CHINESE): Recently the Government of India openly dispatched troops to invade East Pakistan, thus giving rise to a large-scale armed conflict and thereby aggravating tension in the India-Pakistan sub-continent and in Asia as a whole.
The Chinese Government and people wish to express deep concern over this, and are paying close attention to the development of the situation.
The question of East Pakistan is purely the internal affair of Pakistan. No one has the right to interfere in it. The Government of India, using the question of East Pakistan as a pretext, has committed armed aggression against Pakistan. That is not permissible. The Government of India says its dispatch of troops into East Pakistan is purely for purposes of self-defence. That is the law of the jungle. The facts prove that India has committed aggression against Pakistan, not that Pakistan is threatening India’s security.
According to the logic of the Indian Government, any country can use self-defence as a pretext for invading other countries. What kind of guarantee is there of a State’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, then? The Government of India says it is sending troops to invade East Pakistan to help with the repatriation of East Pakistan refugees. That is completely untenable. At present in India there are a large number of so-called Chinese Tibetan refugees. The Government of India is grooming the chieftain of the counterrevolutionary rebels, the Dalai Lama. Using the Indian Government’s logic, is it going to use that as a pretext to invade China ?
The Government of Pakistan proposed that the armed forces of both sides withdraw from the front, disengage and solve the question of the refugees of East Pakistan through negotiations between both Governments. That is completely reasonable. But the
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Indian Government has most unreasonably rejected that proposal. That shows that the Government of India has not the least intention to settle the question of the East Pakistan refugees but intends to capitalize on the question as a pretext for committing further subversion and aggression against Pakistan.
The Chinese delegation is of the view that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council should surely condemn the act of aggression by the Government of India and demand that the Indian Government immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its armed forces from Pakistan.
Lastly, on behalf of the Chinese Government I should like to state that the Chinese Government and people resolutely support the Government and peoples of Pakistan and support their just struggle against the Indian Government and its aggression.
I should also like to point out to the Security Council, the United Nations and the people of the entire world that this act of aggression of the Indian Government was launched with the support of social imperialism. Countless facts have proved that….
(G) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Mr. Malik (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (INTERPRETATION FROM RUSSIAN): We cannot fail to express profound concern and alarm in connection with the problem which is before the Council at today’s meeting and which is the subject of its preoccupations. We have profound respect for both India and Pakistan. We have developed, we are developing, and we shall continue to develop friendly relations with both these countries, countries which are worthy of all respect. We are proud that it was precisely the Soviet Union which some time ago, when in the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent a threat of conflict emerged after a serious clash had arisen between these two countries friendly to us, became the mediator. It was precisely the Soviet Union and the head of the Soviet Government that applied all efforts to see to it that, in Tashkent, an agreement could be achieved between the two parties, thereby averting in the Indian sub-continent the serious threat of war at that time.
We are proud of the fact that the Tashkent spirit has gone into history as one of the noble efforts of the Soviet Union, of the Soviet people, of the Soviet Government to help find ways to settle the sharp difference that had arisen between the two States of the Indian sub-continent and that could have resulted in an outbreak of war.
In view of those facts, any chatter about social imperialism is playing into the hand only of the imperialists. It is precisely chatter, prattle and demagogy about social imperialism that will defend imperialism and its policy of aggression, that will defend the policy of establishing military aggressive blocs and drawing numerous countries, including Pakistan, into them. It defends military dictatorship, terror and oppression….
It is clear to all of us that the subject of discussion in the Security Council is, as has been pointed out on several occasions, the situation that has been produced in East Pakistan as a result of the actions of the Pakistan military authorities. We must be objective and we must call a spade a spade. We have a right to that. That right is confirmed by history, when we spoke as the impartial mediator between the two parties, a mediator who strove, strives, and will continue to strive to achieve further improvement in relations with these two highly respected States and their peoples.
It was precisely as a result of the application of force and terror against the people of East Pakistan—and this has been so convincingly related to the Council by the representative of India, Ambassador Sen—that millions of people were compelled to leave their homeland, to forsake their property and land, to flee to a neighbouring country, India, and become political refugees.
In connection with the events in East Pakistan, the President of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Podgorny, addressed to the President of Pakistan, President Yahya Khan, in April of this year, an “earnest appeal to take the most urgent measures to put an end to the bloodshed and repression directed against the population of East Pakistan, and to turn instead to methods of peaceful political settlement.” That same letter said:
“We are convinced that this would be in accord with the interests of the entire Pakistani people; that it would promote the cause of the maintenance of peace in that region and would bring a peaceful solution to the most important problems. It would be welcomed with satisfaction by the whole of the Soviet people.”
Unfortunately, however, events in East Pakistan took an entirely different turn.
The Government of India, for its part, similarly addressed numerous appeals on various occasions to the United Nations and to different States of the world concerning measures that should be adopted to solve the problem of East Bengal. But in spite of all such appeals, no measures were adopted for resolving this problem. On the contrary, certain allies of Pakistan in their military
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bloc insisted on placing Pakistan and India on the same footing and viewing them in the same light, insisted on placing equal responsibility on the country where the internal crisis had occurred and on the one which subsequently became the victim of that crisis.
Therein lies the root-cause of the fact that no appropriate measures were undertaken. It was precisely those who approach this problem from that sort of position who prevented the adoption of timely and equitable measures and held back events.
The Government of Pakistan, on its part, likewise took no action whatsoever to resolve the problems that had emerged in East Pakistan. As a result, the population of East Pakistan have continued to be persecuted and to live in fear and uncertainty for the future. This can be seen from the continuing flow of East Pakistani refugees into India….
The dangerous course of events in the Indian sub-continent calls for the speedy attainment of a political settlement in East Pakistan that would take into account the will and the inalienable rights and lawful interests of its population. It is necessary to achieve such a political settlement as would produce a safe set of circumstances for the return of the refugees to their homes and to the places where they lived, and that would ensure a full guarantee on the part of the Pakistani authorities that the refugees would not be persecuted, that they would be given an opportunity to live and work in East Pakistan, peacefully and in an atmosphere of security.
The Soviet delegation has very carefully listened to the statement of the representative of the United States. The first thought that emerges after having heard that statement is that it would be well if all, or at least part, of the good wishes and proposals made by the representative of the United States could be applied in IndoChina—and first and foremost, in regard to the immediate withdrawal of troops.
The Soviet delegation is studying the draft resolution introduced by the United States delegation from the standpoint that I mentioned at the beginning of my statement. We will have occasion to make our views known, but our first impression is that it is a one-sided and unacceptable draft, given that approach, which is peculiar to those who are trying to shift responsibility from the guilty to the innocent….
(H) UNITED KINGDOM Sir Colin Crowe (United Kingdom): My delegation is one of the signatories of the letter requesting you, Mr. President, to convene immediately an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider
the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan. We are grateful to you for having acted so promptly on that request.
We have listened with care to the debate so far, and it is clear that we are nearly all of us inspired by an urgent desire to stop hostilities, to stop the flow of blood. My delegation’s purpose in joining in the request to you to convene this meeting was to ensure that the Security Council became seized of the situation.
Over the last few months, as other representatives have pointed out, efforts have been made through informal consultations to see if the Security Council could take useful action to avert a crisis, to develop the possibility of a peaceful solution. Similarly, many Governments including my own have tried through direct contact with both sides to achieve the same purpose. Unfortunately, these efforts have all so far failed.
My delegation realizes that the mere fact that the Security Council has now met and been seized of the matter does not of itself make a solution any easier. It is a complex matter, and for that very reason requires a comprehensive solution. This will require careful thought, and we are in no position to apportion blame, to pass quick judgments on the present or on the past. We must exert every effort to find a satisfactory, peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter. But the recent outbreak of largescale hostilities has brought us up short.
We cannot evade our responsibilities. What must we do now? Our task, as members of the highest world body charged with responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security, is to exert our influence to restore peace, to bring the fighting to a stop and to secure the relief of suffering. My delegation will be guided by that criterion.
I suggest that any proposals made should be considered in the context of whether or not they are likely to help us towards a satisfactory solution, and in this connection I share the view of the representative of France that unanimity is of the essence. It is in this spirit that my delegation will examine all draft resolutions submitted here.
(I) RESOLUTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL Note: Below are the operative portions of several of the draft resolutions on the dispute between India and Pakistan which were introduced into the Security Council at meetings on December 4, 5, and 6, 1971. These resolutions reflect the principal
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substantive alternatives being considered by the Security Council in its debate on the Indo-Pakistani war, including the positions of the major powers. Other draft resolutions not given here are S/10417, S/10419, S/10426, S/10426 (Rev. 1), and S/10428. On December 6, the second six-nation draft resolution (S/10429), referring the matter to the General Assembly, was adopted by the Security Council. The General Assembly then adopted, on December 7, its own resolution which, in its operative provisions, is the same as the eight-nation draft resolution (S/10423) previously defeated in the Security Council.
By the United States-S/10416
The Security Council: 1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities; 2. Calls for an immediate withdrawal of armed personnel present on the territory of the other to their own sides of the India-Pakistan borders; 3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, at the request of the Government of India or Pakistan, to place observers along the IndiaPakistan border to report on the implementation of the cease-fire and troop withdrawals, drawing as necessary on U.N.M.O.G.I.P. personnel; 4. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best efforts toward the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan; 5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that would endanger the peace in the area; 6. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary-General offering good offices to secure and maintain peace in the subcontinent; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.
By the Soviet Union-S/10418
The Security Council: 1. Calls for a political settlement in East Pakistan which would inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities; 2. Calls upon the Government of Pakistan to take measures to cease all acts of violence by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan which have led to deterioration of the situation.
By China-S/10421
The Security Council: 1. Calls upon the Government of India to withdraw its armed forces and armed personnel sent by it from Pakistan territory immediately and unconditionally and calls upon the Government of Pakistan to withdraw the armed forces which it has sent into Indian territory for counter-attacks; 2. Calls upon India and Pakistan to cease hostilities and to withdraw respectively from the international border between India and Pakistan and to disengage from each other so as to create conditions for a peaceful settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan; 3. Calls upon all states to support the Pakistan people in their just struggle to resist Indian aggression; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit as early as possible a report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution. By Eight Nations—S/10423
The Security Council: 1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders; 2. Urges that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes; 3. Calls for the full co-operation of all states with the SecretaryGeneral for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of this resolution; 5. Decides to follow closely the situation and to meet again as soon as necessary. By Six Nations-S/10425
The Security Council: 1. Calls upon the Governments concerned forthwith, as a first step for an immediate cease-fire; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed of the implementation of this resolution; 3. Decides to continue to discuss the further measures to be taken in order to restore peace in the area.
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Security Council Resolution 303 (Six-Nation Proposal
-S/10429) The Security Council:
Having considered the item on its agenda as contained in document S/Agenda/1606,
Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 1606th and 1607th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Decides to refer the question contained in document S/Agenda/1606 to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 377A (V) of 3 November 1950. General Assembly Resolution 2793
The General Assembly:
Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 and the letter from the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,
Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,
Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,
Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of the conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,
Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,
Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,
Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders,
Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the General Assembly’s responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly resolution 377A (V) of 3 November 1950,
1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders; 2. Urges that efforts be intensified in order to bring about,
speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes; 3. Calls for the full co-operation of all States with the SecretaryGeneral for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees; 4. Urges that every effort be made to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area of conflict; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly and the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution; 6. Decides to follow the question closely and to meet again should the situation so demand; 7. Calls upon the Security Council to take appropriate action in
the light of the present resolution. Source: United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record
of the Sixteen Hundred and Sixth Meeting (New York, December 4, 1971); UN Security Council and General Assembly, Official Records.
APPENDIX 10
The Anderson Papers. Note: Jack Anderson, whose column on developments in Washington is widely published in a number of American newspapers, wrote several columns during the height of the military crisis over Bangladesh in the South Asian subcontinent in December 1971, criticizing the United States Government, and particularly the President and his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, for their handling of the U.S. role in the crisis. His columns were based upon highly secret Government documents which he acquired through means which he has not yet revealed. When the White House attempted to dispute Mr. Anderson’s interpretation of certain events surrounding U.S. policy during the crisis, Mr. Anderson released the complete text of several key documents, which are reproduced in their entirety below.
Four of the documents are reports of meetings of the National Security Council’s Washington Special Action Group, a body convened to deal with major international crises. The National Security Council is a high level committee, which is composed of the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense,
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and Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the group’s function is to advise the President on policies and issues related to the national security of the United States. The fifth document is the text of a cable from the U.S. Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, to the Secretary of State in Washington, about the crisis in South Asia. A number of terms and abbreviations are used in these documents, including the following:
A.I.D.-Agency for International Development A.S.D. (I.S.A.)—Assistant Secretary of Defense, International
Security Affairs CENTO–Central Treaty Organization C.I.A.–Central Intelligence Agency C.J.C.S.—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff D.A.S.D.: N.E.A.S.A. & P.P.N.S.C.A.—Deputy Assistant Sec
retary of Defense, Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Plans
and National Security Council Affairs Depsecdef-Deputy Secretary of Defense Dep Dir: N.S.C.C. & P.P.N.S.C.A.—Deputy Director, Policy
Plans and National Security Council Affairs F-104—Starfighter jet aircraft 1.0.-International Organization Affairs I.S.A.-International Security Affairs of Defense Department J.C.S.-Joint Chiefs of Staff L.O.C.-Line(s) of Communication M.A.P.-Military Assistance Program N.E.A.—Near Eastern Affairs, Section of State Department N.E.S.A.-Near East and South Asia N.S.C.-National Security Council 0.J.C.S.-Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff O.S.D. Files-Office of Secretary of Defense Files P.D.A.S.D. (I.S.A.)—Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, International Security Affairs PL-480—Public Law 480, governing surplus food sent abroad
as aid P.O.L.-Petroleum, oil and lubricants R. & C. Files—Records and Control Files SEATO-South East Asia Treaty Organization Secdef-Secretary of Defense U.S.G.–United States Government U.S.N.-United States Navy W.S.A.G.–Washington Special Action Group, arm of National
Security Council.
(A) REPORT ON WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 3, 1971
SECRET SENSITIVE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Refer to: 1-29643/71 International Security Affairs Memorandum for the Record
SUBJECT WSAG Meeting on India|Pakistan
PARTICIPANTS Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—HENRY A.
KISSINGER Under Secretary of State JOHN N. IRWIN Deputy Secretary of Defense-DAVID PACKARD Director, Central Intelligence Agency—RICHARD M. HELMS Deputy Administrator (A.I.D.)—MAURICE J. WILLIAMS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER Assistant Secretary of State (N.E.S.A.) -JOSEPH J. Sisco Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.-G. WARREN NUTTER . Assistant Secretary of State (1.0.)-SAMUEL DE PALMA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)–ARMISTEAD
I. SELDEN, JR. Assistant Administrator (A.1.D.IN.E.S.A.)—DONALD G. MacDONALD
TIME AND PLACE 3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situation Room, White House.
SUMMARY Reviewed conflicting reports about major action in the west wing. C.I.A. agreed to produce map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving $99 million, and a hold on further action implementing the $72 million P.L. 480 credit. Convening of Security Council meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March 1959, bilateral U.S. agreement with Pakistan.
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Kissinger: I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise. Helms: Concerning the reported action in the west wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankat and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials say this is a lie. In the east wing the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved. Kissinger: Are the Indians seizing territory? Helms: Yes; small bits of territory, definitely. Sisco: It would help if you could provide a map with a shading of the areas occupied by India. What is happening in the Westis a full-scale attack likely? Moorer: The present pattern is puzzling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant numbers of Indian combat aircraft. Helms: Mrs. Gandhi’s speech at 1.30 may well announce recognition of Bangladesh. Moorer: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during late afternoon, which doesn’t make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts on this yet. Kissinger: Is it possible that the Indians attacked first and the Paks simply did what they could before dark in response ? Moorer: This is certainly possible. Kissinger: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the $99 million credit. He wants the $72 million P.L. 480 credit also held. Williams: Word will soon get around when we do this. Does the President understand that? Kissinger: That is his order, but I will check with the President again. If asked, we can say we are reviewing our whole economic program and that the granting of fresh aid is being suspended in view of conditions on the subcontinent. The next issue is the U.N. Irwin: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Secretary leans toward making a U.S. move in the U.N. soon. Kissinger: The President is in favor of this as soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the U.N.
can’t operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East. Sisco: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we could tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow. Kissinger: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear. Sisco: That’s ideal! Kissinger: The earlier draft for Bush is too even-handed. Sisco: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush. Kissinger: We can say we favor political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action. Sisco: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi. Williams: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also ? Kissinger: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn’t addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet. Sisco: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation under review ‘. Kissinger: It’s hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision. Packard: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are so near the weekend. Kissinger: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March 1959, bilateral agreement. Prepared by: S/ initials
James M. Noyes Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African
and South Asian Affairs Approved: (illegible signature)
For G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
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Distribution: Secdef, Depsecdef, CJCS, ASD (ISA), PDASD
(ISA), DASD: NEASA & PPNSCA, Dep Dir: NSC & PPNSCA, OSD files, R & C files, NESA.
(B) REPORT ON WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 1971
SECRET SENSITIVE THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
5 December 1971 Memorandum for the Record
SUBJECT Washington Special Action Group Meeting on Indo-Pakistan
Hostilities; 4 December 1971 1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100 hours, Saturday, 4 December, to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger. 2. Attendees A. Principals: DR. HENRY KISSINGER; DR. JOHN HANNAH,
A.I.D.; MR. RICHARD HELMS, C.I.A.; Dr. G. WARREN NUTTER, Defense; ADMIRAL ELMO ZUMWALT, J.C.S.; MR.
CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN, State. B. Others : MR. JAMES Noyes, Defense; Mr. ARMISTEAD SELDEN, Defense; REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT WELANDER, O.J.C.S.; CAPTAIN HOWARD KAY, O.J.C.S.; MR. HAROLD SAUNDERS, N.S.C.; Col. RICHARD KENNEDY, N.S.C.; MR. SAMUEL HOSKANSON, N.S.C.; MR. DONALD MACDONALD, A.I.D.; MR. MAURICE WILLIAMS, A.I.D.; MR. JOHN WALLER, C.I.A.; MR. SAMUEL DE PALMA, State; MR. BRUCE LANIGEN, State;
MR. DAVID SCHNEIDER, State. 3. Summary. It was decided that the U.S. would request an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The U.S. resolution would be introduced in a speech by Ambassador Bush as soon as possible. The U.S.G.-U.N. approach would be tilted toward the Paks. Economic aid for Pakistan currently in effect will not be terminated. No requirements were levied on the J.C.S. 4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by indicating that the Indians were currently engaged in a no holds barred attack of East Pakistan and that they had crossed the borders on all sides this morning. B.—5
While India had attacked eight Pak airfields there were still no indications of any ground attacks in the West. Although not decreeing a formal declaration of war, President Yahya has stated that “the final war with India is upon us,” to which Mrs. Gandhi had responded that the Pak announcement of war constituted the ultimate folly. The Indians, however, had made it a point not to declare war. The Indian attacks have hit a major P.O.L. area in Karachi resulting in a major fire which will likely be blazing for a considerable length of time, thus providing a fine target for the Indian air force. Mr. Helms indicated that the Soviet assessment is that there is not much chance of a great power confrontation in the current crisis. 5. Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full-scale invasion, this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement. 6. Mr. Helms indicated that we do not know who started the current action, nor do we know why the Paks hit the four small airfields yesterday. 7. Dr. Kissinger requested that by Monday, the C.I.A. prepare an account of who did what to whom and when. 8. Mr. De Palma suggested that if we refer to the India declaration in our discussion in the U.N., that we almost certainly will have to refer to remarks by Yahya. 9. Dr. Kissinger replied that he was under specific instruction from the President, and either someone in the bureaucracy would have to prepare this statement along the lines indicated or that it would be done in the White House. 10. Mr. Helms referred to the “no holds barred” remark in the official India statement and similar remarks that were being made from the Pak side. 11. Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Indians have stated anything to the effect that they were in an all-out war. 12. Mr. Helms said that the terminology was “no holds barred”. 13. Dr. Kissinger asked what the Paks have said. Mr. Helms said the terminology was “final war with India”. Dr. Kissinger suggested this was not an objectionable term. It did not seem outrageous to say that they (the Paks) were trying to defend themselves. 14. Dr. Kissinger then asked what was happening in the U.N., to which Mr. De Palma responded that the U.K., Belgium, Japan, and possibly France were joining for a call for a Security Council meeting. The Japanese had detected some slight tilt in our letter requesting the meeting. The Japanese preferred a blander formulation. We have not, however, reacted to the Japanese.
15. Dr. Kissinger asked to see the letter and requested that it be promulgated in announcing our move in the U.N., to which Mr. De Palma responded affirmatively. 16. Dr. Kissinger stated that while he had no strong view on the letter, our position must be clearly stated in the announcement. 17. Dr. Kissinger stated he did not care how third parties might react, so long as Ambassador Bush understands what he should say. 18. Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking Presidential wrath. The President is under the “illusion” that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind. 19. Mr. De Palma indicated that he did not yet know whether the Security Council would be convened in the afternoon or evening (this date). However, the first statements at the meeting would likely be those by the Indians and Paks. He suggested that Ambassador Bush should be one of the first speakers immediately following the presentation by the two contesting nations. He felt that the impact of our statement would be clearer if it were made early. Dr. Kissinger voiced no objections. 20. Mr. De Palma asked whether we wanted to get others lined up with our resolution before we introduced it. This, however, would take time. Dr. Kissinger suggested rather than follow this course, we had better submit the resolution as quickly as possible, alone if necessary. According to Dr. Kissinger the only move left for us at the present time is to make clear our position relative to our greater strategy. Everyone knows how all this will come out and everyone knows that India will ultimately occupy East Pakistan. We must, therefore, make clear our position, table our resolution. We want a resolution which will be introduced with a speech by Ambassador Bush. If others desire to come along with us, fine; but in any event we will table the resolution with a speech by Ambassador Bush. 21. Dr. Kissinger continued that it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the U.N. is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The U.N., itself, will in all probability do little to terminate the war. He summarized the foregoing by saying that he assumed that our resolution in the U.N. will be introduced by a speech and there will be no delay. We will go along in general terms with reference ito political accommodation in East Pakistan but we will certainly
not imply or suggest any specifics, such as the release of Mujib. 22. Dr. Kissinger asked how long the Indians could delay action in the Council. Mr. De Palma said they could make long speeches or question our purpose. Mr. Van Hollen said that they would draw out as long as possible which would allow them to concentrate on the situation in East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma said that they could shilly-shally for three or four days which, Mr. Helms stated, would be long enough for them to occupy East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma stated that we could always try to force a vote. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that there was no chance in getting anything useful in the U.N. 23. Mr. De Palma suggested that in all likelihood one side or the other will veto. 24. Concerning the matter of economic aid, Dr. Kissinger stated that the President had directed that cut off was to be directed at India only. He indicated, however, that he wanted to read the announcement to the President so that the latter would know exactly what he might be getting into. At this point Mr. Williams asked whether some mention should be made in the statement explaining why aid for Pakistan is not being cut off. Dr. Kissinger said that information would be kept for background only. 25. Mr. Williams said that the Department of Agriculture indicated that the price of vegetable oil was weakening in the United States; thus cutting off this P.L.-480 commodity to India could have repercussions on the domestic market. He asked, therefore, whether oil could be shipped in place of wheat. Dr. Kissinger said that he will have the answer to that by the opening of business Monday. 26. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a brief rundown on the military situation. Admiral Zumwalt responded that he thought the Paks could hold the line in East Pakistan for approximately one or two weeks before the logistics problems became overriding. He expected the Soviets to cement their position in India and to push for permanent usage of the naval base at Vizag. He anticipated that the Soviet’s immediate short range objective would be to gain military advantages through their current relationship with India. 27. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the next meeting will convene Monday morning (December 6).
/S/ H. N. Kay H. N. KAY Captain, U.S.N. South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, J5 Extension 72400
(C) REPORT OF WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 6, 1971
SECRET SENSITIVE
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
6 December 1971 Memorandum for the Record
SUBJECT Washington Special Action Group Meeting on Indo-Pakistan
Hostilities; 6 December 1971 1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100 hours, Monday, 6 December, to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger. 2. Attendees A. Principals : DR. HENRY KISSINGER, MR. DAVID PACKARD,
Defense; AMBASSADOR U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, State; GEN. WILLIAM WESTMORELAND, J.C.S.; MR. RICHARD HELMS,
C.I.A.; MR. DONALD MACDONALD, A.I.D. B. Others: Mr. CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN, State; MR. SAMUEL
DE PALMA, State; Mr. BRUCE LANIGEN, State; MR. JOSEPH Sisco, State; MR. ARMISTEAD SELDEN, Defense; Mr. JAMES Noyes, Defense; MR. JOHN WALLER, C.I.A.; MR. SAMUEL HOSKANSON, N.S.C.; Col. RICHARD KENNEDY, N.S.C.; MR. HAROLD SAUNDERS, N.S.C.; REAR ADM. ROBERT WELANDER, 0.J.C.S.; CAPT. HOWARD KAY, O.J.C.S.; MR. MAURICE
WILLIAMS, A.I.D. 3. Summary. Discussion was devoted to the massive problems facing Bangladesh as a nation. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the problem should be studied now. The subject of possible military aid to Pakistan is also to be examined, but on a very close hold basis. The matter of Indian redeployment from East to West was considered as was the legality of the current sea “blockade” by India. 4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. He stated that the Indians had recognized Bangladesh and the Paks had broken diplomatic ties with India. Major fighting continued in the East but India is engaged in a holding action in the West. Mr. Helms felt that the Indians will attempt to force a decision in the East within the next ten days. The Indians have almost total air superiority now in the East where they can employ
approximately a hundred of their aircraft against Pak ground forces and logistic areas. The Indians, however, have not yet broken through on the ground in East Pakistan. Major thrust of the Indian effort in East Pakistan is in the northwest corner of the province. The airfield at Dacca is all but closed. The Indians are registering only minor gains in the Jessore area, but they claim to have taken Kamalpur. In the West, Indian activity is essentially limited to air attacks. The Paks appear to be on the offensive on the ground and have launched air strikes in Punjab. Overall, the Paks claim 61 Indian aircraft destroyed; the Indians claim 47 Pak planes. In naval action one Pak destroyer has been sunk by the Indians and another claimed sunk (sic). The Indians also claim the sinking of one Pak submarine in eastern waters. Moscow is increasingly vocal in its support of India and is not supporting any U.N. moves to halt the fighting. The Chinese press made its strongest attack on India this morning. 5. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a military assessment, questioning how long the Paks might be able to hold out in the East. General Westmoreland responded that it might be as much as three weeks. 6. Dr. Kissinger asked what is to be done with Bangladesh. Mr. Helms stated that for all practical purposes it is now an independent country, recognized by India. 7. Ambassador Johnson suggested that the Pak armed forces now in East Pakistan could be held hostage. General Westmoreland re-enforced this by noting there was no means of evacuating West Pak forces from the east wing, particularly in view of Indian naval superiority. 8. Dr. Kissinger stated that the next stage of play will involve determining our attitude toward the state of Bangladesh. 9. Mr. Williams referred to the one and a half million Urdu speaking (Bihari) people in East Pakistan who could also be held hostage. 10. Dr. Kissinger asked if there had already been some massacre of these people. Mr. Williams said that he certainly thinks there will be. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could do anything, to which Mr. Williams stated that perhaps an international humanitarian effort could be launched on their behalf. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we should be calling attention to the plight of these people now. Mr. Williams said that most of these people were, in fact, centered around the rail centers; that they are urban dwellers and that some efforts on their behalf might well be started through the U.N. Dr. Kissinger suggested that this be done quickly in order to prevent a bloodbath. Mr. Sisco stated that while the
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U.N. cannot do anything on the ground at this time, public attention could be focussed on this situation through the General Assembly. 11. Mr. Williams referred to the 300,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan, and that they too were in some jeopardy. Mr. Sisco said that this humanitarian issue could be a very attractive one for the General Assembly and that we would begin to focus on Assembly action. Mr. MacDonald cited as a possible precedent the mass movement of population from North Vietnam in 1954. 12. Returning to the military picture Mr. Williams stated that he felt that the primary thrust of the Indian Army would be to interdict Chittagong and cut off any supply capability still existing for the Paks in the East. He said that he felt that the major thrust of the Indian Army in the East would be to destroy the Pak regular forces. He felt that a major job would be to restore order within the East inasmuch as it will be faced with a massacre as great as any we have faced in the 20th century. 13. General Westmoreland suggested that the Indians would probably need three or four divisions to continue to work with the Mukti Bahini; the remainder could be pulled out to assist the Indian forces in the West. 14. Mr. Sisco opined that the Indians would pull out most of their troops once the Pak forces are disarmed, inasmuch as the Indians will be working with a very friendly population; thus, they will turn the military efforts over to the Mukti Bahini as quickly as possible. He felt that the extent and timing of Indian withdrawal from East Pakistan would depend to a large degree on developments in the West. 15. In response to a question, General Westmoreland stated that Indian transportation capabilities were limited from West to East, and that it would probably take at least a week to move one infantry division. It might take as much as a month to move all or most of the Indian forces from the East to the West. 16. Mr. Sisco said that the long term presence of Indian forces in Bangladesh would have to be addressed. Mr. Van Hollen remarked that should the Indian Army remain more than two or three weeks after the situation in East Pakistan is wrapped up they would, in fact, become a Hindu army of occupation in the eyes of the Bengalis. 17. Mr. Van Hollen raised the problem of the return of the refugees from India. Inasmuch as Bangladesh is predominantly Moslem, the return of 10 million refugees, most of whom are Hindu, would present another critical problem.
18. General Westmoreland suggested that the Indian position in the West was not unadvantageous. He briefly discussed the order of battle in West Pakistan and suggested that the Indians were in relatively good shape. He said that he expected the major Pak effort to be toward Kashmir and the Punjab. The Indians, he felt, will be striking toward Hyderabad so as to cut the main L.O.C. to Karachi. He did not think that the Indians, necessarily plan to drive all the way to Karachi. He also suggested that the current Indian move in that direction could very well be diversionary in order to force the Paks to pull reserves back from the Kashmir area. 19. Mr. Packard asked about the P.O.L. supply situation for Pakistan. Mr. Helms said that at the present time it looked very bad. The overland L.O.C.’s from Iran, for example, were very tenuous. 20. Mr. Williams suggested that the reason for the Indian thrust to the south was essentially political. Inasmuch as the Indians do not want to fight on the border they will have to give ground in Kashmir. In order to ward off parliamentary criticism, Mrs. Gandhi may be going for some Pak real estate in the south. 21. Dr. Kissinger then asked about U.N. initiatives. Mr. Sisco said that we are now reviewing the situation with Ambassador Bush. Two Security Council resolutions have been vetoed by the Soviets. However, there is a ground-swell building in New York for an emergency session by the General Assembly to be convened under the provisions of the threat to peace” mechanism.
The crisis could be moved into the Assembly through a simple majority vote. 22. Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Sisco agreed that any resolution introduced into the General Assembly must retain two key elements: Cease-fire and withdrawal of military forces. Dr. Kissinger agreed that our U.N. delegation has handled the situation extremely well to date. Mr. Sisco said that although it is very likely that the crisis will be introduced in the General Assembly, we must remember that there are 136 countries represented therein and we can expect all sorts of pressure to be generated. Mr. De Palma suggested that when the resolution is introduced in the Assembly there will be a new twist, i.e., the Indians will be no longer terribly interested in political accommodation. By that time that issue will have ceased to be a problem. 23. Mr. De Palma said that a Council meeting was scheduled for 3.30 today and at that time we could try to get the Council to let go of the issue in order to transfer it to the Assembly, it being
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quite obvious that we are not going to get a cease-fire through the Security Council. 24. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could expect the General Assembly to get the issue by the end of the day, to which Mr. De Palma replied that hopefully this will be the case. 25. Dr. Kissinger said that we will go with essentially the same speech in the General Assembly as was made in the Security Council, but he would like something put in about refugees and the text of our resolution. 26. Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level. 27. Dr. Kissinger then asked about a legal position concerning the current Indian naval “blockade”. Mr. Sisco stated that we have protested both incidents in which American ships have been involved. However, no formal proclamation apparently has been made in terms of a declaration of a war, that it is essentially still an undeclared war, with the Indians claiming power to exercise their rights of belligerency. State would, however, prepare a paper on the legal aspects of the issue. Ambassador Johnson said that so far as he was concerned the Indians had no legal position to assert a blockade. 28. Dr. Kissinger asked that a draft protest be drawn up. If we considered it illegal, we will make a formal diplomatic protest. Mr. Sisco said that he would prepare such a protest. 29. Dr. Kissinger then asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan. As of last January we made a legislative decision not to sell to Pakistan. Mr. Sisco said that the Jordanians would be weakening their own position by such a transfer and would probably be grateful if we could get them off the hook. Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them. 30. Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor those requests. The matter has not been brought to Presidential attention but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated. Mr. Packard then said that we should look at what could be done. Mr. Sisco agreed but said it should be done very quietly. Dr. Kissinger indicated he would like a paper by tomorrow (7 December).
31. Mr. Sisco suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated that from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from “ extinguishing ” West Pakistan. 32. Dr. Kissinger turned to the matter of aid and requested that henceforth letters of credit not be made irrevocable. Mr. Williams stated that we have suspended general economic aid, not formally committed, to India which reduces the level to $10 million. He suggested that what we have done for Pakistan in the same category does not become contentious inasmuch as the Indians are now mobilizing all development aid for use in the war effort, whereas remaining aid for East Pakistan is essentially earmarked for fertilizer and humanitarian relief. A case can be made technically, politically and legally that there is a difference between the aid given to India and that given to Pakistan. 33. Dr. Kissinger said to make sure that when talking about cut off of aid for India to emphasize what is cut off and not on what is being continued. 34. Dr. Kissinger then asked about evacuation. Mr. Sisco said that the Dacca evacuation had been aborted. 35. Dr. Kissinger inquired about a possible famine in East Pakistan. Mr. Williams said that we will not have a massive problem at this time, but by next spring this will quite likely be the case. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we will appeal to bail out Bangladesh. Mr. Williams said that the problem would not be terribly great if we could continue to funnel 140 tons of food a month through Chittagong, but at this time nothing is moving. He further suggested that Bangladesh will need all kinds of help in the future, to which Ambassador Johnson added that Bangladesh will be an “international basket case “. Dr. Kissinger said, however, it will not necessarily be our basket case. Mr. Williams said there is going to be need of massive assistance and resettling of refugees, transfers of population and feeding the population. Dr. Kissinger suggested that we ought to start studying this problem right now. 36. Mr. Williams suggested that the Indians had consistently requested refugee aid in cash. The Indians in turn will provide the food and support for the refugees. This has provided India with a reservoir of foreign currency. Dr. Kissinger also asked that this problem be looked at by tomorrow to determine whether we could provide commodities in lieu of cash. We do not want to cut off humanitarian aid. We would like to provide material rather than cash.
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37. The meeting was then adjourned.
S/ H.N. Kay H. N. KAY Captain, U.S.N. South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, J5 Extension 72400
(D) REPORT OF WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 8, 1971
SECRET SENSITIVE
THE JOINT STAFF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
S8 December 1971 Memorandum for the Record
SUBJECT Washington Special Action Group Meeting on Indo-Pakistan
Hostilities; 8 December 1971 1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100 hours, Wednesday, 8 December to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger. 2. Attendees A. Principals : DR. HENRY KISSINGER, MR. RICHARD HELMS,
C.I.A.; GENERAL JOHN RYAN, J.C.S.; MR. DONALD MacDONALD, A.I.D.; MR. DAVID PACKARD, Defense;
AMBASSADOR U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, State. B. Others : MR. MAURICE WILLIAMS, A.I.D.; MR. JOHN WALLER,
C.I.A.; COL. RICHARD KENNEDY, N.S.C.; MR. SAMUEL HOSKANSON, N.S.C.; MR. HAROLD SAUNDERS, N.S.C.; MR. ARMISTEAD SELDEN, Defense; MR. JAMES NOYES, Defense; MR. CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN, State; Mr. SAMUEL DE PALMA, State; MR. BRUCE LANIGEN, State; MR. DAVID SCHNEIDER, State; MR. JOSEPH Sisco, State; REAR ADM. ROBERT WELANDER, O.J.C.S.; CAPTAIN HOWARD KAY,
0.J.C.S. Group 4 downgraded at 3-year intervals; declassified after 12 years.
3. Summary. Dr. Kissinger suggested that India might be attempting, through calculated destruction of Pak armored and air forces to render Pakistan impotent. He requested that the Jordanian interest in assisting Pakistan not be turned off, but rather kept in a holding pattern. He asked that Pak capabilities in Kashmir be assessed. 4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. In the East the Indians have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river crossings prevent them from investing Dacca. The Indians are advancing rapidly throughout East Pakistan. All major Pak L.O.C.’s in the East now are vulnerable. In the West, the Paks are now claiming Punch, inside the Indian border. However, the Paks are admitting fairly heavy casualties in the fighting. Tank battles are apparently taking place in the Sind/Rajasthan area. Mrs. Gandhi has indicated that before heeding a U.N. call for cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan’s armor and air force capabilities. Thus far only India and Bhutan have recognized Bangladesh. It is believed that the Soviets have held off recognition primarily so as not to rupture relations with the Paks. Soviet action on the matter of recognition, however, may be forthcoming in the near future. 5. Mr. Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be expected to hold out in East Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. The time to reach the ultimate climax is probably a function of the difficulties encountered in river crossings. 6. Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan indicated that he did not see the Indians pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem content with a holding action. 7. Dr. Kissinger asked how long it would take to shift Indian forces from East to West. General Ryan said it might take a reasonably long time to move all the forces, but that the airborne brigade could be moved quickly, probably within a matter of five or six days. 8. Dr. Kissinger inquired about refugee aid. After a discussion with Mr. Williams it was determined that only a very small number of U.S. dollars earmarked for refugee relief was actually entering the Indian economy. Contrary to the sense of the last meeting, the Indians have actually lost foreign exchange in the process of caring for refugees. In any event, the entire relief effort is currently suspended in both India and Pakistan.
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9. Dr. Kissinger then emphasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, PL-480 commodities, or development loans could be assigned to India without approval of the White House. Mr. Williams stated there was no problem of anything sliding through. 10. Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be. Mr. Williams said that the only other possible option was taking a position concerning aid material currently under contract. This, however, would be a very messy problem inasmuch as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit. Mr. Williams further stated that we would have to take possession of material that was being consigned to the Indians by U.S. contractors and thus would be compelled to pay U.S. suppliers, resulting in claims against the U.S.G. 11. Mr. Packard said that all of this could be done, but agreed that it would be a very laborious and difficult problem. He further elaborated that all the items involved would have to be located, the United States would have to take ownership, settle with suppliers, locate warehousing, etc. Nevertheless, if such was desired it could be done. Mr. Williams said that in a very limited way this type of action had been taken against some Mid-East countries, but that it had taken years to settle the claims. 12. Dr. Kissinger asked how India was handling next year’s development loan program, to which Mr. Williams responded that nothing was under negotiation at the present time. 13. Dr. Kissinger inquired about next year’s [A.I.D.] budget. Mr. Williams stated that what goes into the budget did not represent a commitment. Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything into the budget for A.I.D. to India. It was not to be leaked that A.I.D. had put money in the budget for India, only to have the “ wicked ” White House take it out. 14. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a U.S. ally to go down completely while we participate in a blockade? Can we allow the Indians to scare us off, believing that if U.S. supplies are needed they will not be provided ? 15. Mr. Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the
viability of West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory. 16. Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madame Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chinese intervention in the West. She said that the Soviet had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Ladakh but that the Soviets had promised to take appropriate counteraction if this should occur. Mr. Helms indicated that there was no Chinese buildup at this time but, nevertheless, even without a buildup they could “make motions and rattle the sword”. 17. Turning then to the question of military support of Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger referred to an expression of interest by King Hussein relative to the provision of F-104’s to Pakistan, and asked how we could get Jordan into a holding pattern to allow the President time to consider the issue. Dr. Kissinger also asked whether we should attempt to convey to the Indians and the press that a major attack on West Pakistan would be considered in a very serious light by this country. 18. Mr. Packard explained that we could not authorize the Jordanians to do anything that the U.S.G. could not do. If the U.S.G. could not give the F-104’s to Pakistan, we could not allow Jordan to do so. If a third country had material that the U.S.G. did not have, that was one thing, but we could not allow Jordan to transfer the F-104’s unless we make a finding that the Paks, themselves, were eligible to purchase them from us directly. 19. Dr. Kissinger suggested that if we had not cut the sale of arms to Pakistan, the current problem would not exist. Mr. Packard agreed. 20. Dr. Kissinger suggested that perhaps we never really analysed what the real danger was when we were turning off the arms to Pakistan. 21. Mr. Packard suggested that another consideration in the Jordan issue is that if Jordan delivers this equipment we would be expected to replace it. Ambassador Johnson stated we do not have any more M.A.P. left. 22. Dr. Kissinger states that what we may be witnessing is a situation wherein a country [India] equipped and supported by the Soviets may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state
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and the other half into a vassal. We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action. 23. Mr. Helms asked about our CENTO relationships with Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated we had no legal obligations toward Pakistan in the CENTO context. Dr. Kissinger agreed but added that neither did we have legal obligations toward India in 1962 when we formulated the air defense agreement. We must consider what would be the impact of the current situation in the larger complex of world affairs. 24. Dr. Kissinger said that we must look at the problem in terms of Security Council guarantees in the Mid-East and the impact on other areas. We must look at the military supply situation. One could make a case, he argued, that we have done everything two weeks too late in the current situation. 25. Mr. Packard stated that perhaps the only satisfactory outcome would be for us to stand fast, with the expectation that the West Paks could hold their own. 26. Ambassador Johnson said that we must examine the possible effects that additional supplies for Pakistan might have. It could be that eight F-104’s might not make any difference once the real war in the West starts. They could be considered only as a token. If, in fact, we were to move in West Pakistan we would be in a new ball game. 27. Ambassador Johnson said that one possibility would be our reply to Foreign Minister Singh, in which we could acknowledge the Indian pledge that they do not have territorial designs. He also stated we must also consider the fact that the Paks may themselves be trying to take Kashmir. 28. After discussing various possible commitments to both Pakistan and India, Mr. Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don’t win, don’t get involved. If we were to attempt something it would have to be with a certainty that it would affect the outcome. Let’s not get in if we know we are going to lose. Find some way to stay out. 29. Mr. Williams suggested that we might now focus efforts for a cease-fire in West Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated this might, however, stop the Paks from moving into Kashmir. 30. Dr. Kissinger asked for an assessment of the Pak capabilities and prospects in Kashmir. He asked C.I.A. to prepare an assessment of the international implications of Mrs. Gandhi’s current moves. He indicated that we should develop an initial stand on the military supply question. He reiterated that he desired to keep
Hussein in a “holding pattern” relative to the latter’s expression of support for Pakistan and that he should not be turned off. The U.S.G. should indicate to Hussein that we do not consider trivial his feelings in this matter. 31. Turning to the question of the blockade, Ambassador Johnson said that both India and Pakistan have taken blockade action, even though the Pak blockade is essentially a paper blockade. Dr. Kissinger said that we should also protest to the Paks. Ambassador Johnson indicated we do not have a legal case to protest the blockade. The belligerent nations have a right to blockade when a state of war exists. We may think it unwise and we may question how it is carried out. We have, in fact, normally expressed our concern. On the other hand we have no problem in protesting the incident of the S.S. Buckeye State [an American ship strafed in a Pakistani port]. 32. Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even-handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be even-handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States. Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India’s state of mind. “The Lady” is cold blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President. Ambassador Keating, he suggested, is offering enough reassurance of his own. 33. Addressing briefly the question of communal strife in East Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger asked whether anyone would be in a position to know that massacres were occurring at the time when they took place. Mr. Helms indicated that we might not know immediately, but we certainly would know after a massacre occurred. 34. The meeting was adjourned at 1210 hours.
IS/ H. N. Kay H. N. KAY Captain, U.S.N. South Asia/M.A.P. Branch, J5 Extension 72400
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(E) AMBASSADOR KENNETH B. KEATING: CABLE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
DECEMBER 8, 1971
Mr. Keating said he was very interested to read an article by the International Press Service [United States Information Service] correspondent in the morning’s wireless file reporting “White House officials”” explanation of development of present conflict and United States role in seeking to avert it. While he appreciated the tactical necessity of justifying the Administration’s position publicly, he felt constrained to state that elements of this particular story do not coincide with his knowledge of the events of the past eight months.
Specifically, the IPS account states that the United States Government’s $155 million relief program in East Pakistan was initiated “at the specific request of the Indian Government”. His recollection, and he referred the State Department to his conversation with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in New Delhi on May 25, is that the Government of India was reluctant to see the relief program started in East Pakistan prior to a political settlement on the grounds that such an effort might serve to “bail out Yahya”.
In noting offer of amnesty for all refugees, story fails to mention qualification in Yahya’s September 5 proclamation that amnesty applies to those “not already charged with specific criminal acts”, which Ambassador Keating took to be more than a minor bureaucratic caveat in East Pakistan circumstances.
Story indicates that both the Secretary [of State, William B. ROgers) and Dr. Kissinger informed Ambassador Jha (Indian Ambassador to the United States, L. K. Jha] that Washington favored autonomy for East Pakistan. Mr. Keating said he was aware of our repeated statements that we had no formula for a solution, and our relief that the outcome of negotiations would probably be autonomy if not independence, but he regretted that he was uninformed of any specific statement favoring autonomy.
Also according to story, Jha was informed by department on November 19 that “Washington and Islamabad [capital of Pakistan) were prepared to discuss a precise timetable for establishing political autonomy for East Pakistan”. Ambassador Keating said the only message he had on record of this conversation sa department message to him on November 21) makes no reference to this critical fact.
With vast and voluminous efforts of the intelligence community, reporting from both Delhi and Islamabad, and with his own dis
cussions in Washington, Ambassador Keating said he did not understand the statement that “Washington was not given the slightest inkling that any military operation was in any way imminent”. See [for] example DIAIB, 219-71 of November 12 [Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Bulletin No. 219-71, of November 12] stating specifically that war is “imminent”.
Statement that Pakistan had authorized U.S. to contact Mujibur through his attorney seems an overstatement, since according to Islamabad 11760 [message from American Embassy in Pakistan] Yahya on November 29 told Ambassador Farland [U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland] nothing more than that a Farland-Brohi meeting would be a good idea since Ambassador Farland would be able to obtain from Brohi at least his general impressions as to the state of the trial and its conduct. Mr. Keating said he was unaware of any specific authorization from Yahya “to contact Mujibur” through Brohi [the defence attorney for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman]. In any case, as we are all only too unhappily aware, Yahya told Ambassador Farland on December 2 [Islamabad 11555] that Brohi allegedly was not interested in seeing him.
The Statement on G.I.P. [Government of Pakistan] agreement on distribution by U.N. of relief supplies in East Pakistan obscures the fact that the U.N. never had nor intended to have sufficient personnel in East Pakistan to handle actual distribution, which was always in Pakistani Government hands.
Mr. Keating said he made the foregoing comments in the full knowledge that they may not have been privy to all the important facts of this tragedy. On the basis of what he did know, he did not believe those elements of the story [reporting the backgrounder] either add to our position or, perhaps more importantly, to American credibility. Source: New York Times, January 6 and January 15, 1972.
APPENDIX 11
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs: Background Briefing on India
Pakistan, December 7, 1971. MR. ZIEGLER (Press Secretary to the President): Dr. Kissinger is here with us this afternoon. What he says to you will be back
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ground. You can attribute it to White House officials, but no direct quotations…. DR. KISSINGER: I thought I would talk to you about how we have approached the problem in South Asia: what we have done and what has led to the number of pronouncements that have been made by official spokesmen at the U.N. in recent days.
I do not have any organized notes, so I am going to speak to you extemporaneously, and I may refer to an occasional paper just for accuracy in the question period.
First of all, let us get a number of things straight. There have been some comments that the Administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate. India is a great country. It is the most populous free country. It is governed by democratic procedures.
Americans through all Administrations in the postwar period have felt a commitment to the progress and development of India, and the American people have contributed to this to the extent of $10 billion. Last year, in this Administration, India received from all sources $1.2 billion for development assistance, economic assistance, of which $700 million came from the United States in various forms….
Now let me describe the situation as we saw it going back to March 25th. March 25th is, of course, the day when the central government of Pakistan decided to establish military rule in East Bengal and started the process which has led to the present situation.
The United States has never supported the particular action that led to this tragic series of events, and the United States has always recognized that this action had consequences which had a considerable impact on India. We have always recognized that the influx of refugees into India produced the danger of communal strife in a country always precariously poised on the edge of communal strife. We have known that it is a strain on the already scarce economic resources of a country in the process of development….
There were two aspects to the refugee problem: One, taking care of the refugees that were inside India, and secondly, to avert conditions inside East Pakistan that would generate more refugees, particularly to ease famine conditions. We committed $90 million for the support of the refugees in India and $155 million to avert famine in East Pakistan, which is more than the rest of the world has done combined….
Now, the United States did not condone what happened in March 1971; on the contrary, the United States has made no new development loans to Pakistan since March 1971.
Secondly, there has been a great deal of talk about military supplies to Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that immediately after the actions in East Pakistan at the end of March of this past year, the United States suspended any new licenses. It stopped the shipment of all military supplies out of American depots or that were under American governmental control. The only arms that were continued to be shipped to Pakistan were arms on old licenses in commercial channels, and those were spare parts. There were no lethal end-items involved.
To give you a sense of the magnitude, the United States cut off $35 million worth of arms at the end of March of this year, or early April of this year, immediately after the action in East Bengal, and continued to ship something less than $5 million worth; whereupon, all the remainder of the pipeline was cut off….
Now, then, we come to the problem of political evolution. What has the United States done in this respect?
It is true the United States did not make any public declarations on its views of the evolution, because the United States wanted to use its influence with both Delhi and Islamabad to bring about a political settlement that would enable the refugees to return. At the request of the President, this was explained by me to the Indian Foreign Minister and to the Indian Prime Minister when I was in New Delhi in early July, and both indicated that they understood our decision in this respect and made no criticism of our decision.
They did make a criticism of the arms shipments. Secondly, we consistently used our influence that we gained in this manner to urge the Government of Pakistan in the direction of a political evolution. We urged the Government of Pakistan and they agreed that relief supplies be distributed by international agencies, in order to take away the criticism in East Pakistan that they might be used to strengthen the central authority, and the Government agreed that a timetable be established for returning Pakistan to civilian rule. That was supposed to be done by the end of December.
We urged a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border, and when India rejected this, we urged a unilateral withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the border, and that was accepted by Pakistan and never replied to by India….
We went further. We established contact with the Bangla Desh people in Calcutta, and during August, September, and October of this year no fewer than eight such contacts took place.
We approached President Yahya Khan three times in order to begin negotiations with the Bangla Desh people in Calcutta. The
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Government of Pakistan accepted. We were told by our contacts in Calcutta that the Indian Government discouraged such negotiations. In other words, we attempted to promote a political settlement, and if I can sum up the difference that may have existed between us and the Government of India, it was this:
We told the Government of India on many occasions—the Secretary of State saw the Indian Ambassador 18 times; I saw him seven times since the end of August on behalf of the President. We all said that political autonomy for East Bengal was the inevitable outcome of a political evolution, and that we favored it. The difference may have been that the Government of India wanted things so rapidly that it was no longer talking about political evolution, but about political collapse.
Without attempting to speculate on the motives of the Indian Government, the fact of the matter, as they presented themselves to us, was as follows: We told the Indian Prime Minister when she was here of the Pakistan offer to withdraw their troops unilaterally from the border. There was no response.
We told the Indian Prime Minister when she was here that we would try to arrange negotiations between the Pakistanis and members of the Awami League, specifically approved by Mujibur, who is in prison. We told the Indian Ambassador shortly before his return to India that we were prepared even to discuss with them a political timetable, a precise timetable for the establishment of political autonomy in East Bengal. That conversation was held on November 19th. On November 22nd, military action started in East Bengal….
This country, which in many respects has had a love affair with India, can only, with enormous pain, accept the fact that military action was taken in our view without adequate cause, and if we express this opinion in the United Nations, we do not do so because we want to support one particular point of view on the subcontinent, or because we want to forego our friendship with what will always be one of the great countries in the world; but because we believe that if, as some of the phrases go, the right of military attack is determined by arithmetic, if political wisdom consists of saying the attacker has 500 million and the defender has 100 million, and, therefore, the United States must always be on the side of the numerically stronger, then we are creating a situation where, in the foreseeable future, we will have international anarchy, and where the period of peace, which is the greatest desire for the President to establish, will be jeopardized; not at first for Americans, necessarily, but for peoples all over the world. …
Question. Why was the first semi-public explanation of the American
position one of condemning India, and why this belated explanation that you are now giving? The perceptions of the world is that the United States regards India as an aggressor; that it is anti-India, and you make a fairly persuasive case here that that
is not the case. So why this late date? DR. KISSINGER….. We were reluctant to believe for a long time that the matter had come down to a naked recourse to force, and we were attempting for the first two weeks of the military operations to see what could be done to quiet it through personal diplomacy conducted by the Department of State.
We made two appeals to the Indian Prime Minister. We appealed also to the Pakistan President, and we appealed also to the Soviet Union.
Now, then, on Friday the situation burst into full-blown war and it was decided to put the facts before the public. Now, I cannot, of course, accept the characterization that you made of the way these facts were put forward; that they were put forward as antiIndian. Question. I said the perception of the world public was that the United
States was anti-Indian because of the nature of that first back
ground briefing at the State Department on Friday. DR. KISSINGER. We are opposed to the use of military force in this crisis, and we do not believe that it was necessary to engage in military action. We believe that what started as a tragedy in East Bengal is now becoming an attempt to dismember a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations ….
Let me go off the record here for a minute.
We took the view that once negotiations started, the release of Mujibur would be an inevitable consequence after some period of time, and, therefore, we felt that the most important thing was to get the negotiations started.
This part I consider off the record. It is simply for your understanding. I think it is safe to say the Indian side wanted a maximum of rapidity, and perhaps more speed than the Pakistan political process would stand. We were urging movement at the greatest speed that the Pakistan political process could stand. We felt that one way to resolve this would be for the Indians to give us a timetable of what they would consider a reasonable timetable, and this was raised first when I was there in the summer, and received no clear reply. It was raised again with the Indian Ambassador just before he left, and it was not answered.
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So we never got a concrete expression of what the difference in time was. They knew that we believed that political autonomy was the logical outcome of a negotiation…. (End off the record.)…. Question. Is it a fact that two other factors that you did not deal with
in your opening remarks here were also major causes in your and the President accepting India as an aggressor—that is, accusing India as an aggressor—the fact that (1) to do otherwise might lead to a collapse of the President’s trip to China and (2) he often stated in print personal preference of the President and you for General Khan over what were considered to be the unrealistic leaders in New Delhi ?
DR. KISSINGER. With respect to the first question, we do not have the impression that the Peoples Republic of China considers agreement with us a prerequisite for a successful visit on other issues in the United Nations, and, therefore, we do not consider that the Peoples Republic of China has a veto over our policies. …
Secondly, speaking first about myself, the first time I visited the Indian subcontinent I was the subject, in 1962, as can easily be checked in newspaper files, to the most violent newspaper criticisms in Pakistan for my allegedly Harvard-produced preference for Indians, and so much so that I even suggested that I might cancel my visit to Pakistan.
There is no personal preference on my part for Pakistan, and the views that I expressed at the beginning, of the American positionthat is, about the crucial importance of India as a country in the world and in the subcontinent-have always been strongly held by me, and I, therefore, enthusiastically support those as an expression of bipartisan American policy in the postwar period.
As for the President, I was not aware of his preference for Pakistan leaders over Indian leaders, and I, therefore, asked him this morning what this might be based on. He pointed out as you know, I was not acquainted with the President before his present position-but he pointed out to me that on his trip in 1967, he was received very warmly by the Prime Minister and by the President of India; that the reports that he was snubbed at any point are without any foundation, and that in any event, the warmth of the reception that we extended to the Indian Prime Minister two weeks before the attacks on Pakistan started should make clear what enormous value we attach to Indian friendship.
While I can understand that there can be sincere differences of opinion about the wise course to take, I do not think we do ourselves any justice if we ascribe policies to the personal pique of individuals.
Besides, the charge of aggression was not made in this building in the first place. Question. Was there a failure of understanding between the President
and the Prime Minister when she was here last month; a failure of understanding of what this country wanted and what she was planning to do?
DR. KISSINGER. We explained to the Indian leaders, the President did and so did the Secretary of State, exactly what our position was. We pointed out the offers that had been made. We were not given any reply to the offers, and we were not given the slightest inkling that such a military operation was in any way imminent; indeed, in the interval between her departure and the beginning of military operations, we did three things:
One, we attempted to promote these negotiations between the Government in Islamabad and Bangla Desh representatives approved by Mujibur. We did not get the agreement of the government in Islamabad, at the time the war had broken out, to that procedure. I am just saying what we were trying to do.
Secondly, we urged very strenuously on the Pakistan Foreign Secretary when he was here that the greatest possible number of concessions that could be made were urgently required and we were promised an answer, as it turned out, for the week that the military attacks took place.
Thirdly, and I did not mention this before, we had the approval of the Government of Pakistan to establish contact with Mujibur through his defense lawyer. All of these facts were communicated to the Indian Government, and nevertheless, military attacks took place. Question. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to ask you a clarifying question
about something you said just a moment ago. You said that the charge of aggression was not made in this building.
Two questions about that. One, – DR. KISSINGER. We do not disagree with it, but it was in reference to a point that the President and I have an anti-Indian bias. Question. Does this carry the implication that you are putting the res
ponsibility for that original charge of aggression on the State
Department ? That is my first question. DR. KISSINGER. No. There is a united governmental view on it.
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Question. Secondly, I am still trying to clarify the question in Mr.
Lisagor’s mind and others, Mr. Ziegler did say in Florida on Saturday that India had engaged in a massive military action and he used the word massive’ which sounds like this building
to us. DR. KISSINGER. Sounds like a what? Question. Like a charge of aggression from this building, to me, at
least. DR. KISSINGER. We don’t disagree with it. I was trying to explain that this was not a personal idiosyncrasy. The phrase ‘massive military action’ that Ron Ziegler used was a quote from an official Indian statement saying that massive military operations have begun in East Pakistan and Ron was simply referring to the quote from the Indian officials’ statement…. Question. What…was the basis of your belief that the result of these
negotiations would in fact be autonomy for East Pakistan? DR. KISSINGER. I didn’t say that this would in fact be the case. I said that we had said we would support this, that we would use our influence in Pakistan to help bring this about and that we were willing to listen to a specific timetable. Question. I thought you said that, DR. KISSINGER. I said it was our personal judgment; that could not be proved, and it was off the record, that it was likely that once negotiations started and were showing some progress that it would lead to the release of Mujibur, but we don’t insist on this. Question. I thought you said it was inevitable. DR. KISSINGER. I said off the record, that it was our judgment that the inevitable outcome would be political autonomy for East Pakistan and we had talked in this sense to the Government of Pakistan and they had in fact proclaimed that they were prepared to grant political autonomy for everything but foreign policy, defense, and currency, I believe. Question. We have been very much involved in the negotiations, from
what you say. DR. KISSINGER. Not on substance. Question. Not on substance? Autonomy for East Pakistan, et cetera? DR. KISSINGER. Well, the negotiations had never, in fact, started….
Question. Regardless of who was to blame for the breakdown in the
negotiations you referred to, do you and the President feel personally that India is the sole aggressor in the current out
break of hostilities? DR. KISSINGER. I can only repeat—I don’t want to use emotionally-charged words—we are saying that military action was not justified. We are saying that there should be a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces, after which the political evolution which we have described should be addressed with even greater vigor than before…. Question. Do you feel that Madam Gandhi betrayed us? DR. KISSINGER. I would not use such words. Question. Did she give any indication that she would seek a peaceful
solution and instead do something else? DR. KISSINGER. All I can say is we had no reason to believe that military action was that imminent and that we did not have some time to begin to work on a peaceful resolution…. Question. Henry, you said earlier that we have had contact with the
Soviet Union, consultations with them on the problems there. Were they aware of our actions and the progress and the hopeful circumstances as time went along, from March up until the
shooting started Friday? DR. KISSINGER. I think they were generally aware…. Question. Is it a proper role for a great nation which has maintained a
posture of impartiality in South Asia for about 25 years now
to take a side or to appear to take a side in this present crisis? DR. KISSINGER. Well, we have attempted to alleviate the suffering and we have attempted to be true to our principles of giving people an opportunity to determine their political future, but we have not done it in a pressing way. We have done it in an attempt to preserve the peace with the approval of both sides. With respect to the immediate issue which is before the United Nations, we have an obligation to make clear for the sake of peace that we do not favor recourse to military forces as a member of the United Nations, and as one of the principal countries in the world. … Source : Congressional Record—Senate, December 9, 1971.
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APPENDIX 12
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: Letter to President Richard
M. Nixon, December 15, 1971.
Dear Mr. President,
I am writing at a moment of deep anguish at the unhappy turn which the relations between our two countries have taken.
I am setting aside all pride, prejudice and passion and trying, as calmly as I can, to analyze once again the origins of the tragedy which is being enacted.
There are moments in history when brooding tragedy and its dark shadows can be lightened by recalling great moments of the past. One such great moment which has inspired millions of people to die for liberty was the declaration of Independence by the United States of America. That declaration stated that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of man’s inalienable rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, it was the right of the people to alter or abolish it.
All unprejudiced persons objectively surveying the grim events in Bangladesh since March 25 have recognized the revolt of 75 million people, a people who were forced to the conclusion that neither their life, nor their liberty, to say nothing of the possibility of the pursuit of happiness, was available to them. The world press, radio and television have faithfully recorded the story. The most perceptive of American scholars who are knowledgeable about the affairs of this subcontinent revealed the anatomy of East Bengal’s frustrations.
The tragic war, which is continuing, could have been averted if during the nine months prior to Pakistan’s attack on us on December 3, the great leaders of the world had paid some attention to the fact of revolt, tried to see the reality of the situation and searched for a genuine basis for reconciliation. I wrote letters along these lines. I undertook a tour in quest of peace at a time when it was extremely difficult to leave, in the hope of presenting to some of the leaders of the world the situation as I saw it. It was heartbreaking to find that while there was sympathy for the poor refugees, the disease itself was ignored.
War could also have been avoided if the power, influence and authority of all the states and, above all, the United States, had got Sheikh Mujibur Rahman released. Instead, we were told that a civilian administration was being installed. Everyone knows that
this civilian administration was a farce. Today the farce has turned into a tragedy.
Lip service was paid to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring this about. Instead, the rulers of West Pakistan went ahead holding farcical elections to seats which had been arbitrarily declared vacant.
There was not even a whisper that anyone from the outside world had tried to have contact with Mujibur Rahman. Our earnest plea that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman should be released, or that, even if he were to be kept under detention, contact with him might be established, was not considered practical on the ground that the U.S. could not urge policies which might lead to the overthrow of President Yahya Khan. While the United States recognized that Mujib was a core factor in the situation and that unquestionably in the long run Pakistan must acquiesce in the direction of greater autonomy for East Pakistan, arguments were advanced to demonstrate the fragility of the situation and of Yahya Khan’s difficulty.
Mr. President, may I ask you in all sincerity: Was the release or even secret negotiations with a single human being, namely, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, more disastrous than the waging of a war?
The fact of the matter is that the rulers of West Pakistan got away with the impression that they could do what they liked because no one, not even the United States, would choose to take a public position that while Pakistan’s integrity was certainly sacrosanct, human rights, liberty were no less so and that there was a necessary inter-connection between the inviolability of states and the contentment of their people.
Mr. President, despite the continued defiance by the rulers of Pakistan of the most elementary facts of life, we would still have tried our hardest to restrain the mounting pressure as we had for nine long months, and war could have been prevented had the rulers of Pakistan not launched a massive attack on us by bombing our airfields in Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipur, Utterlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra in the broad daylight of December 3, 1971, at a time when I was away in Calcutta, my colleague, the Defence Minister, was in Patna and was due to leave further for Bangalore in the South and another senior colleague of mine, the Finance Minister, was in Bombay. The fact that this initiative was taken at this particular time of our absence from the Capital showed perfidious intentions. In the face of this, could we simply sit back trusting that the rulers of Pakistan, or those who were advising them, had peaceful, constructive and reasonable intent?
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We are asked what we want. We seek nothing for ourselves. We do not want any territory of what was East Pakistan and now constitutes Bangladesh. We do not want any territory of West Pakistan. We do want lasting peace with Pakistan. But will Pakistan give up its ceaseless and yet pointless agitation of the past 24 years over Kashmir? Are they willing to give up their hate campaign posture of perpetual hostility towards India ? How many times in the last 24 years have my father and I offered a pact of non-aggression to Pakistan? It is a matter of recorded history that each time such offer was made, Pakistan rejected it out of hand.
We are deeply hurt by the innuendos and insinuations that it was we who have precipitated the crisis and have in any way thwarted the emergence of solutions. I do not really know who is responsible for this calumny. During my visit to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria and Belgium the point I emphasized, publicly as well as privately, was the immediate need for a political settlement. We waited nine months for it. When Dr. Kissinger came in August 1971, I had emphasized to him the importance of seeking an early political settlement. But we have not received, even to this day, the barest framework of a settlement which would take into account the facts as they are and not as we imagine them to be.
Be that as it may, it is my earnest and sincere hope that with all the knowledge and deep understanding of human affairs you, as President of the United States, and reflecting the will, the aspirations and idealism of the great American people, will at least let me know where precisely we have gone wrong before your representatives or spokesmen deal with us with such harshness of language. With regards and best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Indira Gandhi. Source: New York Times, December 17, 1971.
APPENDIX 13
Instrument of Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command,
Dacca, December 16, 1971.
INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER The PAKISTAN Eastern Command agree to surrender all PAKISTAN Armed Forces in BANGLA DESH to LieutenantGeneral JAGJIT SINGH AURORA, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian and BANGLA DESH forces in the Eastern Theatre. This surrender includes all PAKISTAN land, air and naval forces as also all para-military forces and civil armed forces. These forces will lay down their arms and surrender at the places where they are currently located to the nearest regular troops under the command of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA.
The PAKISTAN Eastern Command shall come under the orders of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA as soon as this instrument has been signed. Disobedience of orders will be regarded as a breach of the surrender terms and will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war. The decision of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA will be final, should any doubt arise as to the meaning or interpretation of the surrender terms.
Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA gives a solemn assurance that personnel who surrender shall be treated with dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with the provisions of the GENEVA Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of all PAKISTAN military and para-military forces who surrender. Protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of WEST PAKISTAN origin by the forces under the command of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA. Jagjit Singh Aurora
Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi Lieutenant-General
Lieutenant-General General Officer Commanding Martial Law Administrator
in-Chief Indian and BANGLA DESH Zone B and Commander Eastern Forces in the Eastern Theatre Command (PAKISTAN) 16 December 1971
16 December 1971 Source: The Illustrated Weekly of India, January 16, 1972.
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APPENDIX 14
U.S. Senate Action on Recognition of Bangladesh,
March, 1972. (A) COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 55) calling upon the President to recognize the existence of Bangladesh as an independent country and to recognize its Government (hereinafter referred to as the Bangladesh resolution), having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the concurrent resolution, as amended, do pass. …
On March 3 in executive session and on March 6 and 7, in public session, the committee held hearings on the resolution. Executive branch testimony was received in both executive and public session. The committee considered the resolutions in executive session on March 8 and 9. In order to avoid a peremptory tone, the committee agreed to amend Senate Concurrent Resolution 55 by striking the word “immediately” from the original text which read“…. the President should immediately recognize Bangladesh as an independent foreign country and recognize the government of that country,” the committee on March 9 ordered the resolution reported by a unanimous voice vote….
The three principal criteria for recognition of de facto governments applied by the United States in recent years, as summarized in the State Department’s, “Digest of International Law,” are as follows:
(1) Whether the Government is in de facto control of the territory and in possession of the machinery of the State; (2) Whether it is administering the government with the assent or consent of the people, without substantial resistance to its authority, i.e., whether there is public acquiescence in the authority of the government; and (3) Whether the new Government has indicated its willingness to comply with its international obligations under treaties and international law.
In addition the Digest cites certain other factors bearing on recognition which, it notes, are “increasingly borne in mind”. These are:
the existence or non-existence of evidence of foreign intervention in the establishment of the new regime; the political orientation of
the Government and its leaders; evidence of intention to observe democratic principles, particularly the holding of elections; the attitude of the new Government toward private investment and economic improvement. Importantly, also, the interest of peoples, as distinguished from governments, is of concern….
The committee notes that the new Government in Dacca does indeed control the territory of Bangladesh and, that despite the enormous task of rebuilding which it faces, is administering the country with the consent of the Bengali people in accordance with the provisions of a democratic constitution. Bangladesh’s acceptance of and ability to discharge the functions and obligations of independent status is attested to by the fact of its recognition by nearly 50 nations.
While the committee is aware that Indian troops were present in Bangladesh until March 12, these troops were stationed there with the full agreement of the Bangladesh Government. The committee in recommending passage of this resolution, did so in expectation that Indian troops would be withdrawn. Now that their withdrawal has been accomplished, the committee is of the strong opinion that no impediment remains in the way of U.S. recognition of the new nation.
The President may wish to consider a variety of factors in reaching a decision regarding the recognition of Bangladesh. The committee believes, however, that it is the constitutional responsibility of the Senate to assist him in that process by expressing what it believes to be the predominant view of the American public with regard to Bangladesh. The committee, therefore, urges the adoption of this resolution as an expression of good will and understanding toward the new democratic nation of Bangladesh and as an act reaffirming the friendship between the American and Bengali peoples. Source: United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Recognition of Bangladesh (Report No. 92-694 to accompany Senate Concurrent Resolution 55), 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, March 15, 1972.
(B) ACTION ON THE SENATE FLOOR
The Senate proceeded to consider the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 55) providing for the recognition of Bangladesh, which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations with an amendment in line 3, after the word “should”, strike out “immediately”; so as to make the concurrent resolution read:
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Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That it is the sense of Congress that the President should recognize Bangladesh as an independent foreign country and recognize the Government of that country.
THE ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to….
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the concurrent resolution, as amended.
The concurrent resolution, as amended, was agreed to. Source: Congressional Record-Senate, March 21, 1972.
APPENDIX 15
Secretary of State William P. Rogers: Statement on U.S.
Recognition of Bangladesh, Washington, April 4, 1972.
As you know, the question of recognition of Bangladesh has been under active review for some time. This review has now been completed, and I am pleased to announce this morning that the United States Government is extending recognition to Bangladesh. Our principal officer in Dacca, Mr. Herbert D. Spivack, is now carrying a message from the President to the Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, informing him of our recognition and of our desire to establish diplomatic relations at the embassy level.
We look forward to good relations with this new country. The United States has had an official mission in Dacca since 1949 and many Americans, both in official and private capacities, have been associated over the years with the development efforts of the people of Bangladesh. President Nixon emphasized in his foreign policy report to Congress that as we strengthen new relationships in Asia this concern for the welfare of the people of Bangladesh will continue.
As we now enter into an official relationship with the Government and people of Bangladesh, I want to express on behalf of all the American people our good wishes for the future. I also want to reaffirm our intention to develop friendly bilateral relations and be helpful as Bangladesh faces its immense task of relief and reconstruction. Source: Department of State Press Release No. 79, Washington:
April 4, 1972. B-6
A BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE
Background Reading and Reference
There are very few readily available books which provide background on the history, culture, and society of what was East Pakistan and is now Bangladesh. In some works which deal generally with Pakistan prior to the creation of Bangladesh, however, information on the eastern wing is often separate from that about West Pakistan.
One good survey is Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven: HRAF (Human Relations Area Files) Press, 1964. Khalid bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, is probably the best work on politics and political history available. A good set of maps and much other geographical and occupational information is to be found in Nafis Ahmad, Economic Geography of East Pakistan, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
The literature on the South Asian continent in general, which often includes specific references to Bengal as a whole or its eastern portion, i.e., the present nation of Bangladesh, is, of course, vast. A brief annotated listing of basic reference sources such as handbooks, yearbooks, and bibliographies on different subjects from both India and Pakistan will be found in the South Asia section of James R. Kennedy, Jr., Edith Ehrman, et al, editors, Guide to Reference Sources on Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Russia and East Europe: Selected and Annotated (Foreign Area Materials Center Occasional Publication No. 17, University of the State of New York and National Council of Associations for International Studies), Williamsport, Pennsylvania: Bro-Dart Publishing Company, 1972. Bibliographical sources dealing specifically with Bangladesh and the recent crisis leading to its creation are given below.
Recent Political Developments, the 1971 Crisis, and the
Achievement of Bangladesh Independence
A sequence of human events of such cataclysmic proportions as that leading to the creation of Bangladesh should move the pens of many a scholar, journalist, and political leader, and recent developments in the South Asian subcontinent have certainly done so. Only a handful of titles from this vast outpouring of the written word is listed here, primarily those which are available both in
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India and North America; the bibliographical sources below give many more books and articles.
Mohammed Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War, New Delhi: S. Chand, and Mystic, Connecticut: Lawrence Verry, 1972.
A study of the political and military events leading up to and culminating in the liberation of Bangladesh in December, 1971. The authors are a specialist on Pakistan at Jawaharlal Nehru University and an authority on defence and national security who is head of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
in Delhi. Pran Chopra, editor, The Challenge of Bangladesh: A Special Debate, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, and New York: Humanities Press, 1971.
This book contains articles and essays by Pran Chopra, wellknown Indian journalist and political commentator, and other Indian scholars and journalists, together with an appendix by three American economists with extensive experience in the South Asian subcontinent on the conflict in East Pakistan and its economic implications. Indira Gandhi, India and Bangla Desh, New Delhi: Orient Longmans, and New York: Humanities Press, 1972.
Selected speeches and statements by the Prime Minister of India from March to December, 1971, on the crisis in East Pakistan, Indo-Pakistani relations, and the emergence of
Bangladesh. Subhash C. Kashyap, editor, Bangla Desh: Background and Perspectives, Delhi: National, and Mystic, Connecticut: Lawrence Verry, 1971.
This volume is based on a symposium organised by the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies in Delhi and contains, in addition of a number of essays by Indian scholars and political leaders, documentary sources and a useful biblio
graphy. Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh, My Bangladesh, New Delhi: Orient Longmans, and New York: Humanities Press, 1972.
A collection of statements and speeches from October, 1970, to March, 1971, when he was imprisoned by the Government of Pakistan. dited with Enotes by Ramendu Majumdar. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, The Genesis of Bangladesh: A Study in International Legal Norms and Permissive Conscience, Bombay and New York: Asia, 1972.
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The author, a Calcutta lawyer, has undertaken an extensive analysis of international legal precedents and procedures and their relationship to the tragic events which culminated in the
independence of Bangladesh. Two basic collections of documents by parties to the conflict in East Pakistan have been published, and taken together, provide a wealth of official government statements, speeches, newspaper articles, and other materials reflecting differing points of view of the crisis. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Bangla Desh: Documents, New Delhi, 1971. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and National Affairs, White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, Islamabad, August, 1971,
Various international bodies, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies and non-governmental organisations, issued reports and comments, in addition to the U.N. Security Council debate which appears in the appendices. Simply by way of example is the study by the Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, Geneva, 1972.
For North American readers, the American news magazines and weekly periodicals such as Newsweek, Time, Saturday Review, and New York Times Magazine carried a number of articles reporting on the crisis in Bengal as it developed; citations of specific items are given in some of the bibliographies below. The daily newspapers likewise provided extensive coverage, especially during the height of the crisis, of which special mention should be made of the Christian Science Monitor. Also useful are congressional documents, several citations of which follow, and material published in the Congressional Record, which contains a number of eyewitness accounts and special analyses of the crisis in the South Asian subcontinent and U.S. Government policies.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Crisis in East Pakistan (Hearings, May 11 and 25, 1971), Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Relief Problems in East Pakistan and India (Hearings, Part I: June 28, 1971); ibid., Hearings, Part II: September 30, 1971; ibid., Hearings, Part III: October 4, 1971; ibid., World Relief and Humanitarian Problems, (Hearings, July 22, 1971); ibid., Crisis in South Asia (A Report by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, November 1, 1971); ibid., Relief Problems
in Bangladesh (Hearings, February 2, 1972); Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971 and 1972. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Recognition of Bangladesh (Hearings, March 6 and 7, 1972, and Report, March 15, 1972); Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1972. Material in the Congressional Record is quite extensive, particularly during the height of the crisis. Here are some dates for key debates and statements. • 1971: May 18 and June 22 (Senate, U.S. arms to Pakistan);
August 3 (House of Representatives, foreign aid to South Asia); October 26-29 (Senate, foreign aid to South Asia); December 1-17 (House and Senate, Indo-Pakistani war).
1972: February 1 (Senate, recognition of Bangladesh); February | 4 (Senate, foreign aid to South Asia); March 21 (Senate, recogni
tion of Bangladesh).
Bibliographical Sources
The February, 1972 issue (No. 150) of Seminar, a monthly published in New Delhi, is devoted to the Impact of Bangladesh’ and contains a useful, selected bibliography of Indian books and periodicals on the crisis in the subcontinent, prospects for Bangladesh, Indian relations with Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the major world powers, and the impact of the crisis on India. Similar bibliographies of material from more varied sources in India, Pakistan, and elsewhere are included in the volumes by Subhash C. Kashyap and Subrata Roy Chowdhury cited above. The library at Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi, has prepared an extensive 24 page bibliography which may be consulted at the Library.
Two bibliographies more readily available to North American readers are a brief listing prepared by Larry A. Niksch, Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Library of Congress, Refugee and Relief Problems in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: A Bibliography, Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, March 1972, and a considerably more extensive bibliography compiled by Ved P. Kayastha, South Asian Librarian at Cornell University, The Crisis on the Indian Subcontinent and the Birth of Bangladesh: A Selected Reading List, Ithaca, New York: Library and South Asian Program, Cornell University, January, 1972, and Supplement, February, 1972. A revised version of the Cornell bibliography will be issued in late 1972 by the South Asia Program as South Asia Occasional Papers and Theses No. 1. A very brief, annotated bibliography of Indian publications on the Bangladesh crisis is included
in Educational Resources Center, The Emergence of Bangladesh from the Perspective of ERC, New Delhi: ERC, 1972, copies of which are available on request from the Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies, State Education Department, University of the State of New York, 99 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12210.
The most comprehensive listings of books and government documents published in South Asia in English and South Asian languages are contained in the Library of Congress Accessions Lists for India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Nepal, which are issued by the Library of Congress book procurement centres in Delhi and Karachi. Beginning in 1972, a separate acquisitions program was initiated by the Library of Congress office in Dacca for publications from Bangladesh; while no separate Accessions List is issued for this program, many items about Bangladesh (or East Pakistan before independence) appear in the India and Pakistan Accessions Lists. Current issues and back files of the Accessions Lists are made available to libraries by these offices on request and are available for reference in major universities and research libraries in South Asia, the United States, and other countries. Items listed in the Accessions Lists from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Nepal and materials from Bangladesh are sent to some 20 academic and research libraries in the Unites States. *
For periodical articles and monographs published in Western languages in South Asia, the United States, and elsewhere throughout the world, the best single source is the South Asian section of the annual Bibliography of Asian Studies, which is published as a separate number of the Journal of Asian Studies (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Association for Asian Studies).
*These libraries include: University of California (Berkeley), Berkeley, California; Center for Research Libraries, Chicago, Illinois; University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois; Columbia University, New York, New York; Cornell University, Ithaca, New York; Duke University, Durham, North Carolina; University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii; University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois; Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan; University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota; New York Public Library, New York, New York; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, University of Texas, Austin, Texas; University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin; University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan; University of Washington, Seattle, Washington; and Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut receive materials from India, Ceylon, Nepal, and Pakistan but not Bangladesh.
Audio-Visual Materials
Audio-visual materials, on the social and cultural background of the recent crisis, especially important to students not directly familiar with the South Asian subcontinent, are virtually nonexistent on what was East Pakistan and is now Bangladesh. One U.S. Government-sponsored film, ‘A Simple Cup of Tea” (black and white, 28 minutes, 1966, produced by Amram Nowak. Associates, Inc., for the U.S. Agency for International Development, and distributed by the AID Information Staff, Radio-TV-Film Service, Washington, D.C. 20523), provides some glimpses of the land and people but within the rather specific context of the U.S. foreign aid program in Pakistan. Father Tom Royer (Mercy Hospital, 1400 West Park, Urbana, Illinois 61801) has produced a film on Bengali society and the impact of the recent crisis and may be contacted for current information on its availability. A basic filmstrip on the land and people of Bangladesh is being prepared by the Bengal Studies Group at the University of Chicago in cooperation with the New York State Education Department’s Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies, and several other films are in preparation by scattered individuals and agencies in North America. Information of the availability of these materials may be secured from the Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies at the address above.
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