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SHEIKH MUJEEB’S SIX POINT POLITICS

Research paper, ছয় দফা

SHEIKH MUJEEB’S SIX POINT POLITICS

SUBMITTED TO:

HUMANYUN

BY:

YUMNA HASSAN

SHEIKH MUJEEB’S SIX POINTS POLITICS

 

NAME: YUMNA HASSAN

SEAT NO: 67

DEPARTMENT: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI

 

DEDICATED TO

I want to dedicate this book to my parents.

Preface

This book is the outcome of my assignment given to me by my respected teacher. The objective of this book was to through a glance over Sheikh Mujeeb’s Six Point Politics. Six Point Program a charter of demands enunciated by the Awami League for removing disparity between the two wings of Pakistan and bring to an end the internal colonial rule of West Pakistan in East Bengal.

It was great experience for me to write this book although I faced some problems during its writing period. But thanks to the library of my university and Pakistan Studies Center from where I got all the material need to write this book.

I want to thank my Teacher Dr. Humanyun for supporting me and my parents because without them I wouldn’t be able to do this. I also want to thank the staff members and the librarian of Mahmood Hussain Library and Pakistan Studies Center for the concern and support.

 

CONTENTS

  • Introduction
  • The Rise of Bengali Sub-Nationalism
  • The Beginning of the End: The Rise of Mujeeb
  • Evaluation of Six Point Program
  • The Six Point Program and Its Effects

Introduction

This book will try to explore the role of Bengali political leadership to transform the dream of separation of East Pakistan into reality. It will also provide a detailed and systematic study of Six Point Program of Awami League which proved to be a ‘charter of independence’ and gave a comprehensive analysis of the basic demands of East Pakistanis and successfully combined public opinions in order to get mass support in the struggle for freedom from the West Pakistan. Moreover, this study will seek several waves of criticism regarding Six Point Program by the state of Pakistan, political parties of West and East Pakistan, and even by the people within the Awami League.

The East Bengalis political elite played an important role in the separation of East Pakistan. It was economic exploitation which gave them an ample opportunity to win over popular support. They were conscious of these distinct geographical and cultural features, and they lost no occasion to project the differences between the two wings. They highlighted the points of ‘separateness’ in their speeches in the Constituent Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. For instance, Abdul Mansur Ahmad, a prominent member from East Pakistan, observed in Constituent Assembly

Pakistan is a unique country having two wings which are separated by a distance of more than a thousand miles…religion and common struggle are the only common factors… with the exception of these two things, all other factors, viz the language, the culture…practically everything is different. There is, in fact, nothing common in two wings.

Chapter#1  

The Rise of Bengali Sub-Nationalism

From the very beginning, the relations between the two wings were difficult and complicated. The three main areas of conflicts between East and West Pakistan were the language issue, difference regarding constitution making, and economic centralism. The question of the status of Bengali language was resolved by the mid 1950s but no consensus could ever be reached on constitutional and economic issues.1The following were the factors that led to the rise of Bengali nationalism among the people of East Pakistan.

1.    The Geographical and Socio-Cultural Differences

Immediately after independence, Pakistan’s two wings were set apart by one thousand miles of enemy territory. Both air and maritime contact could be blocked by India at any time. This unique geographical position could pose a great threat to the integrity of the country. With the exception of religion and a common struggle for independence, there was practically nothing common between the two wings of the country. In short, Pakistan lacked all the usual bonds that unite a nation, viz. social setup, culture, language, etc.2

Geographical separation was the base for other differences i.e. racial identity, language, habits of life and culture. East Pakistan was only one-seventh of the total area of the country but its population exceeded the total population of all other provinces and states of West Pakistan.3 In West Pakistan people spoke different languages but there was a reluctant consensus on Urdu as their common language. In the East Pakistan, Bengali was the common language but also a symbol of Bengali nationalism and pride. Moreover, unlike West Pakistan, which was predominantly Muslim, East Pakistan had important non-Muslim minorities4, particularly the Hindus who largely controlled the economy and education of the eastern wing. The Hindu teachers played a vital role in poisoning the Bengali youth against West Pakistan, prescribing textbooks that contained the material against the Ideology of Pakistan. The photographs of Gandhi and Nehru were reportedly displayed on the walls of many educational institutions instead of Jinnah. A favorable lobby existed amongst the intelligentsia of East Pakistan, which welcomed the anti-Pakistan literature poured inform India.5

The leadership in West Pakistan mainly came from the landlords and in eastern wing from professionals like lawyers, teachers and retired government officials. The people in the eastern wing were, therefore, more conscious about political matters and well aware of their rights compared to the people in the western wing who had been living in the society dominated by the feudal lords and the tribal chiefs.6 Education was more widespread in the eastern wing and middle class was strong and assertive.

Hailing from different strata of society, the leaders and administrators from East and West Pakistan had conflicting ideas and aspirations and they could not understand properly each other’s problems. The Bengali administrators and leaders were more egalitarian and democratic in outlook, closer to the people in mood and attitude and less haughty than their Western Pakistani counterparts.7

Indifferent to Bengali point of view, the West Pakistan dominated ruling class of early Pakistan stressed on a strong center, Urdu as the symbol of national unity and Islamic ideology, and the strengthening of the armed forces in West Pakistan at the cost of overall economic and social development. They considered every demand of East Pakistanis as a conspiracy and a threat to the Islamic ideology and integrity of the country.8

Diversity is the essence of a federation but the attempt to impose uniformity where diversity was desirable had unfortunate consequences; the Bengalis, particularly the intelligentsia, began to look more and more to West Bengal for cultural affinities and bonds. Culturally and perhaps psychologically, the country was divided long before the crisis of 1971.9

2.    The Language Issues

The language issues originated even before the creation of Pakistan. In the Lucknow session of All India Muslim league in 1937, the Bengali delegates strongly opposed a resolution proposing Urdu as language of Muslim India and the official language of Muslim League.10 The Bengali Language Movement started almost immediately after independence, demanding that Bengali should be the medium of instruction, language of the courts, administration and mass communication in East Pakistan. They also demanded that it should be one of the state languages of Pakistan along with Urdu.11The Bengalis opposed Urdu as the only state language on the plea that if Urdu is made the state language, the educated Bengalis will become illiterate and disqualified for government services.12

The movement for Bengali language gathered the spontaneous support of the Bengali language gathered the spontaneous support of Bengali civil servants, academics and students, some members of Provincial Assembly and a few ministers as well. By February 1948, the controversy had come out to the streets. The East Pakistan Student League, founded in the first week of January 1948 by Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman, led the agitation.13

On 11 March 1948, a student demonstration in favor of Bengali language was baton charged and a large number of students were arrested.14 Jinnah’s announcement during his visit to Dacca in March 1948 that the language of province could be Bengali but the state language of Pakistan was going to be Urdu followed a disturbance in Dacca University Convocation.15 Moreover in January 1952, Khwaja Nazimuddin’s support to Urdu as the only state language during his visit to Dacca provoked a bitter reaction in the press and demonstrations were organized in favor of Bengali.16

On 26 January 1952, the Basic Principle Committee of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan recommended that Urdu should be the only state language. It sparked off a wide wave of resentment in East Bengal. Bengalis held protest meetings in Dacca and it was decided to hold a general strike on 21 February, during which processions were taken out despite the official ban imposed by Mr. Nurul Amin’s administration, leading to clashes with the police and the killing of three students and a number of other people.17

Although Bengali was recognized as the state language along with Urdu in the constitution of 195618 but, perhaps, it was too late to defuse the rising spirit of Bengali nationalism.

3.    Economic Disparity and Exploitation of the Eastern Wing

The most serious challenge to Pakistani nationalism was the economic disparity between East and West Pakistan. The Bengalis believed that the Eastern wing of the country was ruthlessly exploited by the western wing and that East Pakistan was deprived of its due share in the developmental funds and foreign aid.19The bulk of the country’s revenue was spent in West Pakistan because the federal capital was there. Moreover a high percentage of the budget was spent on defense, which was all concentrated in West Pakistan. East Pakistan earned most of the country’s foreign exchange by the export of jute; yet most of it was spent on the industrialization of West Pakistan.20

The Bengalis claimed that what was earned in East Pakistan was spent in West Pakistan21 because East Pakistan provided 60 percent of the total revenue, compared to 40 percent by West Pakistan, but it received only 25 percent for its expenditure. The rest 75 percent was spent in West Pakistan.22

4.    Disparity in Development Planning

In the six-tear development program (July 1951 to June 1957), and in the First and Second Five Year Plans (1955-60 and 60-65), East Pakistan again complained of injustice.23

The economic disparity between the two wings was recognized and admitted in different reports and economic studies conducted by the central government during Ayub Khan’s Presidency. Ayub Khan admitted confessed the injustice and he promised that development in East Pakistan will be accelerated to make up for the deficiency.24 The Constitution of 1962 also promised to adopt such economic policies, which would help in removing the disparities in per capita income between the provinces.25 The disparity, however, increased after ten years of Ayub Khan’s rule. The per capita income in West Pakistan was 32 percent higher than East Pakistan in 1959-60 and 1 percent higher in 1969-70.26

Yahya Khan also tried to remove the economic disparity between the two wings through “step by step concessions” but the impatient Bengalis were by then in the mood of revolution rather than waiting for an evolutionary process.27

5.    Disparity in Civil Services and Armed Forces

The Bengalis were poorly represented in the civil services and in the Army. Moreover, the civil and military officials from West Pakistan stationed in East Pakistan considered the Bengali Muslims inferior converts from low caste Hindu.28

In 1970, about 85 percent of the armed forces belonged to the Punjab whereas the majority of population belongs to East Pakistan. Some claimed that this disparity was not intentional on the part of the West Pakistan dominated ruling elite but a result of the legacy of British rule during which the Punjabis were preferred in the armed forces due to their marshal spirit and willingness to join military service.29 However, there was no justification for the disparity in the bureaucracy. As the Bengalis did not have adequate representation in the armed forces and the bureaucracy, they always opposed military rule and never trusted these two players in the body politics of Pakistan.30

The disparity in the civil services and Armed Forces was rapidly disappearing because in 1966, Ayub Khan had allocated 60 percent of the vacancies to East Pakistan. In 1965, the East Pakistan CSP officers constituted 34 percent of the total strength of the Civil Services but by 1969, their share had risen to 40.8 percent.31

Yahya, in order to give some share to the Bengalis in the top positions in the administration, made six Bengali CSP officers “Central Secretaries” and gave direction to all the ministers that whenever a senior post become vacant, Bengali candidate should be accorded priority ‘even if this meant disregarding of the principle of seniority’. The quota for Bengali recruitment in the armed forces was also doubled. It was a step in the right direction but came too late; it should have been taken in the early 1960s when Bengali nationalism was still in a nascent stage.32

6.   Differences over Constitution-Making

The controversy over constitution making started as early as March 12, 1949 when the Objective Resolution was adopted and a Basic Principles Committee was constituted to report on the main principles on which the constitution of Pakistan was to be framed. The Bengali leaders raised objections to some points of the Objective Resolution and the interim report of the basic Principles Committee, which they thought would lead to a unitary central government, which will make East Pakistan a colony of West Pakistan.33

In constitution making, the two main issues hard of solution were the ratio of representation in the Central legislature and the distribution of powers between the center and the provinces.34

After the failure of the First Constituent Assembly, the Second Constitution Assembly gave the country its first constitution on 29th February, 1956, which provided for a unicameral legislature with parity of representation between the East and the West wing.35 Bengali was accepted as one of the state languages.36 However, East Pakistan was not satisfied with the parity principle. The demand for more provincial autonomy still persisted and it finally culminated into the Six-Point program of Shiekh Mujeebur Rehman.37

References

  1. Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.20.
  2. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Divided: Study of the Factors and Forces Leading to the Breakup of Pakistan in 1971 (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1989), p.2.
  3. W.Chaudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule (England: Scorpion Publishing Ltd., 1988), p.12.
  4. p.12.
  5. Safdar Mahmood, (op.cit. p.6-7)
  6. Asghar Khan, We’ve Learnt Nothing from History, Pakistan: Politics and Military Power, (Karachi; Oxford university Press, 2005), p.9.
  7. Ibid. p.4.
  8. Hasan Zaheer, (op.cit. p.16.)
  9. W.Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1974), p.11.
  10. Hasan Zaheer, (op.cit. p.23)
  11. Tariq Rehman, Language and Politics in Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford   University Press, 1996), p.84.
  12. pp.84-85.
  13. Hasan Zaheer, (op.cit. p.21)
  14. Ibid. pp.21-22.
  15. Tariq Rehman, (op.cit. p.87)
  16. Ibid. p.90.
  17. Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender, (Karachi: Oxford university Press), pp.216-17.
  18. p.219.
  19. Matiur Rehman, ed, Second Thoughts on Bangladesh, with a foreword L.F. Rushbrook Williams (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, n.d.), p.9.
  20. W.Chaudhry, (op.cit. p.9)
  21. Hasan Zaheer, (op.cit. p.51)
  22. Siddiq Salik, (op.cit. p.7)
  23. Ibid. pp.54-55, 90.
  24. Ibid. p.91.
  25. Ibid. p.93.
  26. W.Chaudhry, (op.cit. p.15)
  27. Ibid. p.60.
  28. Ibid. p.6.
  29. Asghar Khan, (op.cit. pp.8-9)
  30. Ibid. p.9.
  31. Safdar Mahmood, (op.cit. pp.32-33)
  32. W.Chaudhry, (op.cit. p.54)
  33. Hasan Zaheer, (op.cit. pp.28-30)
  34. W.Chaudhry, (op.cit. p.13)
  35. Ibid. p.18.
  36. Rashiduzzaman, “Bangladesh at 26; Encountering Bifurcated History and a Divided National Identity”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.XXI, No.3 Spring 1998, p.49.
  37. Safdar Mahmood, (op.cit. p.64)

Chapter# 2

The Beginning of the End:  The Rise of Sheikh Mujeeb

 

Muslim League fell into selfish hands soon after independence and became a hotbed of intrigues. The internal dissentions in the Party caused the decline of the only national organization of the country and the rise of regionalist parties. In February 1948, prominent League leaders like Maulana Abdul Hameed Bhashani and Fazlul Haq left the Muslim League. In June 1949, they formed a new party called East Pakistan Awami Muslim League. Maulana Bhashani was elected President of this new party, while Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman, a student leader, was appointed the Joint Secretary of the party. In March 1950, the party was re-named as All-Pakistan Awami Muslim League and Suharwardi was appointed as the President and Chief Organizer of the Party. In July 1953, Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman was made General Secretary of the party. Provincial autonomy and Bengali as the state language topped the new manifesto of the Party.1

In April 1953, the Awami Muslim League dropped the word ‘Muslim’ from its name and it became the Awami League. The old Muslim Leaguers resigned from it and their seats were filled by moneyed Hindu politicians who later on influenced its policies decisively. Fazlul Haq “the lion of Bengal”, formed his own political party in Dacca called ‘Krishak Sramik Party’ (The Labour Peasant Party).2In the elections of 1954, Muslim League was completely routed. It secured only 9 seats out of the total number of 309 seats in East Pakistan Assembly.3

The first political shock for the East Pakistanis came in 1947 when the more popular and charismatic leader, Hussain Shaheed Suharwardi, was not allowed to assume the Parliamentary leadership of East Pakistan Assembly. Instead, Nazimuddin, who had no base among the masses, was elected Chief Minister because Liaqat Ali Khan considered Suharwardi as a rival, who could challenge his authority and position in the party.4

The Bengalis were further when Governor General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin’s ministry. They declared it as ‘a conspiracy against the Bengalis’. Ghulam Mohammad tried to pacify the Bengalis by installing another Bengali Mohammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister, but he had no power base in Bengal and played into the hands of his Punjabi patron, the Governor General.5

The rise of Bengali nationalism and anti-West Pakistan feelings resulted in the defeat of the ruling Muslim League in the elections for the Bengal Legislative Assembly in March 1954. The Awami League had formed a United Front with other East Pakistan political parties to oppose the ruling Muslim League. The first two items on the twenty-one point agenda of the United Front manifesto were Bengali as one of the state languages and provincial autonomy. A student nominee of the Front defeated the Muslim League Chief Minister Nurul Amin.6 It followed the unanimous vote in favor of more provincial autonomy in East Pakistan Assembly which raised concerns among the Punjabi leadership about a solid Bengali block in the Parliament, sweeping the smaller provinces and the Punjab. In face if this new challenge, Malik Feroz Khan Noon, the Punjab Chief Minister of the time, proposed the formation of a zonal sub-federation of the provinces in West Pakistan on 15 September 1954, with the ulterior motive of counter-balancing the Bengali power in the parliament.7 Resultantly, on October 14, 1955, One Unit was established in West Pakistan. The Bengalis considered it another move to deprive them of their legitimate rights.8

In August 1955, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali became the Prime Minister while Ghulam Mohammad was still the Governor General. Mohammad Ali’s Appointment caused bitter resentment in East Pakistan as it violated the established tradition that if the Prime Minister was from East Pakistan the Governor General would be taken from West Pakistan or vice versa. In September 1956, Hussain Shaheed Suharwardi was commissioned to form the ministry at the Center. However, he was forced to resign in October 1957 to escape dismissal. His resignation was termed by East Pakistanis as the result of a conspiracy of vested interests of West Pakistan.9

If judged on the basis of facts and figures, the Bengali grievances of political alienation seemed credible. From 1947 to 1958, East Pakistan got only 42 percent and West Pakistan 58 percent representation in the Central Cabinets except for Suharwardi’s cabinet in which East Pakistan had 57 percent share.10

The Agartala Conspiracy Case

After the death of the most popular Bengali leader, Hussain Shaheed Suharwardi, Mujeeb was now alone in the spotlight and able to demonstrate his charisma.11

By 1960s, the Bengali leaders felt that East Pakistan could be emancipated   only if the strong central government was replaced by autonomous and comparatively more powerful provinces.12 Finally, Shiekh Mujeebur Rehman announced his famous Six-Points on February 6, 1966, termed by West Pakistan as a move from secession.13

What made Mujeeb a real leader was the Agartala Conspiracy case in January 1968. Sheikh Mujeeb and 34 other Bengalis were accused of planning the secession of East Pakistan and the establishment of an independent Bengal with the Indian assistance.14When the trial started in July 1968, it evoked a bitter reaction in East Pakistan. Mujeeb came out of the trial as a hero after he was released from the prison under public pressure. The gave such popularity to Mujeeb that would, otherwise, have taken a lifetime to acquire. Another accused of the Agartala Conspiracy, Sergeant Zahoorul Haq, was shot dead while in military custody at Dacca cantonment on February 15, 1969. The Bengalis took it as a deliberate murder of their hero.15

Mujeeb’s alleged involvement in the case added to his popularity in East Pakistan. The gulf between the Central Government and the people in Eastern Wing had become so wide that what Ayub Khan regarded a treason was an act of patriotism and service to the people in the eyes of East Pakistanis.16

The Election of 1970

When Yahya Khan took over from Ayub Khan, he promised to hold elections to the Central Legislature in October 1970, and on March 30 1970, issued the Legal Framework Order. According to the LFO, out of the total number of 313 members of the national Assembly who were to draft the new constitution, 169 were to be elected from East Pakistan on the principle of one-man one-vote.

He also dissolved One Unit in West Pakistan17 and expressed his willingness to concede demands for maximum autonomy for East Pakistan, provided it were within the framework of United Pakistan.18 The inner cabinet of Yahya and the West Pakistani leaders, however, opposed unlimited provincial autonomy and insisted the constitutional matters in the proposed one chamber legislature should be decided by at least 60 percent vote. Otherwise, they feared, the ‘brute Bengali majority’ would impose their own constitution on the remaining units of West Pakistan.19

In 1966, a Convention was called at Lahore to voice an organized opposition to the regime of Ayub Khan. The Convener of this Convention was Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. Sheikh Mujeeb also attended and it was there that the Six Points Program was first made public. The Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report suggests that the six point were not authored by Sheikh Mujeeb but by a West Pakistani civil servant. It further suggest that the Six Points had been formulated before the Lahore Convention and a copy of it had been sent to Mr. Nurul Amin, leader of the Pakistan Democratic Party who showed it to another member of his party Mr. Mahmud Ali and both agreed that it contained the seeds of secession which they could not support.20

Mujeeb on his part, gave the impression that he was satisfied with the promises made by Yahya Khan and that his Six Points were not ‘the Koran or Bible’.21 However, he made it clear that if the extent of provincial autonomy were defined or the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ were modified by any special procedure of voting on the constitutional issue, it would mean the end of negotiation and the beginning of an armed confrontation. Some of the generals seemed to prefer a confrontation before election, i.e. before Mujeeb could consolidate his position in East Pakistan and emerge as the sole leader of the Bengalis but Governor Ahsan warned Yahya that a United Pakistan would not survive a confrontation with Mujeeb.22 Yahya did not want to annoy any of the two parties. Although he did not define the limits of provincial autonomy but the Legal Framework Order (LFO), which was announced on March 31, 1970, contained five points or principles as the minimum requirements for United Pakistan. One of these five principles was the territorial integrity of Pakistan.23

Mujeeb accepted the five principles laid down in the LFO and in his speeches and statements, he assured the territorial integrity of Pakistan by saying “Pakistan has come to stay and there is no force that can destroy it”.24 But at the same time, Mujeeb was reported to have said to his inner cabinet that his ultimate aim was to establish Bangladesh and that he would tear the LFO as soon as the elections were over. He also hinted to his colleagues about the help from ‘outside sources’.25

The October date for holding the election was put back because of severe Monsoon flooding in East Pakistan. On November 12, 1970, a terrible cyclone blasted five East Pakistani coastal districts. The death toll was placed well above a million and property damage was total in the affected regions. The rescue work was slow and ineffective because of different reasons and Yahya also did not visit the affected areas until some days after the calamity,26 giving more reasons to East Pakistanis to hate and distrust their West Pakistani countryment.27

The Awami League leadership took full advantage of this situation and they created an emotional hysteria in East Pakistan. The Central Government was accused of the ‘deliberate’ and ‘cold blooded’ murder of a million people in the cyclone affected areas of East Pakistan. The environment helped them in sweeping the polls in East Pakistan.28

The Awami League contested the election on the basis of Six-Points, which in the view of the military junta was ‘nothing less than a subtle form of secession’ but they hoped that Mujeeb would not be able to carry the majority or at least absolute majority in East Pakistan. The Central Government, therefore, did not prohibit Mujeeb from using the Six-Point program in his election campaign.29 In the election campaign, Mujeeb and his followers openly preached the idea of Bangladesh without any hindrance, making mockery of the Martial Law regulation that talking against territorial integrity of Pakistan would be severely dealt with. Even the map and flag of Bangladesh were prominently and openly displayed in meetings held at Dacca.30

What happened on the election day is extensively written about and needs not to be repeated here. The returns of the elections confirmed the Awami League as the majority party, securing 167 seats out of a 313 members of the National Assembly. The Pakistan Peoples’ Party of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto emerged as the second largest party with 81 seats, all of them in West Pakistan.31

The Awami League’s landslide victory was due to many factors, including the rise of Bengali emotionalism, politicization of the November cyclone, and the all out support of the Hindu voters to Awami League.32

Mujeeb had indicated that he would modify his Six-Point plan after the election but a Bengali regional chief of the civil intelligence services had given Yahya enough indication that Mujeeb’s strategy seems to be use the election to establish his credentials as the ‘sole leader of the Bengalis’ and after it he would ‘show his teeth’. There were also reports that Mujeeb had begun to have contacts with New Dehli.33

After elections, Mujeeb declared that the Six Points were “the property of the people of Bangladesh and that there could be no co promise on it”.34 The military junta was hesitant in calling upon him to form his government because he had no representation in West Pakistan.35

References

  1. Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender, (Karachi: Oxford University Press), p.18.
  2. Ibid, p.217.
  3. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Divided: Study of the Factors and Forces Leading to the Breakup of Pakistan in 1971, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1989), p.19.
  4. Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.18.
  5. Siddiq Salik, (op.cit. p.217)
  6. Ibid, pp.217-218.
  7. Hasan Zaheer, (op.cit. p.35)
  8. Siddiq Salik, (op.cit. p.219)
  9. Safdar Mahmood, (op.cit. pp.20-23)
  10. Ibid, pp.38-40.
  11. Hafiz Malik, “The Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan”, Pakistan in Transition, ed. W.H. Wriggins (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975), p.99.
  12. Ibid, p.98.
  13. Siddiq Salik, (op.cit. p.22)
  14. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1941-1986, (Lahore: Progressive Publications, 1987), p.180.
  15. Siddiq Salik, (op.cit. p.223)
  16. Asghar Khan, We’ve Learnt Nothing from History, Pakistan: Politics and Military Power, (Karachi; Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.25-26.
  17. Hafiz Malik, (op.cit. pp.100-101)
  18. W.Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1974), p.83.
  19. Ibid, pp.91-93.
  20. The Reporter of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971War as Declassified by the Government of Pakistan, (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., n. d.), p.56.
  21. W.Chaudhry, (op.cit. p.85)
  22. Ibid, p.91.
  23. Ibid, pp.93-94.
  24. Ibid, p.97.
  25. Ibid, p.98.
  26. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.330-31.
  27. Lawrence Ziring, “Militarism in Pakistan: The Yahya Khan Interregnum”, Pakistan in Transition, ed. W.H.Wriggins (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975), p.217.
  28. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (op.cit. p.181)
  29. Ibid, pp.216-17.
  30. W.Chaudhry, (op.cit. pp.98-99)
  31. Lawrence Ziring, (op.cit.pp.332-333)
  32. Hafiz Malik, (op.cit. p102)
  33. W.Chaudhry, (op.cit.p.138)
  34. Ibid, p.145.
  35. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, (England: W. M. Dawson & Sons. Ltd., 1980), p.102.

Chapter# 3

Evaluation of Six Point Program

 

After becoming President of Awami League in 1966, Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman provided further impetus to the movement of the separation of East Pakistan through his mind blowing speeches, slogans and his famous Six Point Program. Some glimpses from his speeches are as follows.

The Awami League Leader regretted that East Pakistan had to bear the country’s major burden of paying off annually Rs. 100 crore interests of foreign loans although barely one-fourth of Rs. 2000 crore was spent in this wing. Other aspects of our life did not present any better picture.1 He further added that the perpetuation of the exploitation of East Pakistan brought the economy of the province on the verge of ruination. Easy Pakistan, which used to form abroad annually while West Pakistan now produces eight hundred million tons surplus.2 Referring to his Six Point Program launched four years back, said, “we plunged into the struggle to save the people from exploitation, knowing full well its consequences, which we suffered later”.3 He told the East Bengali people that we cannot expect any genuine change for the better until we free ourselves from the clutches of the explicators and the ruling class which ruthlessly suppressed the voice of people whenever they rose against the vested interests, looting our resources unchecked.4

Sheikh Mujeeb said, “All our legitimate interests were made subservient to exploitation by the vested interests. He charged that our flourishing weaving industry was made to suffer decay, Salt industry destroyed and Beedi industry dragged to ruination turning millions of people into virtual distrust only to make East Pakistan serve as market to exploiters from West wing”.5 He further regretted, “the history of East Pakistan would have been different if some political Mir Zafar did not sabotage our causes. He accused them of playing the role of agents of exploiters, who happened to come from West Pakistan. They sold our interests for ministerial jobs”.6

On October 17, 1970 in Dolaikhal Sheikh Mujeeb said that Bonus Voucher system had destroyed the small traders of Bengal and he assured that he would safeguard the interest of the small business from the devouring grip of the big business and monopoly capital of West Pakistan.7In Dumni (Tejgoan) on October 20, 1970 Mujeeb told the cheering crowd who came from far flung areas in procession that Six Point program was to ensure justice for the people of west Bengal whose basic rights and privileges had so long been trampled underfoot. The program, if implemented, would put an end once for all the continued exploitation, oppression and suppression which had reigned supreme during the last many years.8

In the same speech while recalling the long 23 years of independence, he said that Whenever people of Bengal raised their voices to get their due rights, lathi-charge, bullets and jails were in store for their leaders and workers and the bogey of ‘Islam in danger’ was raised to confound the political atmosphere of the country.9

Six Point Program was evolved through different phases of history. The first Grand Convention of the Democratic Federation was held at Dhaka in November, 1950 in which some prominent Awami League leader participated. Their constitutional proposals against the first report of BPC provided for a ‘United States of Pakistan’ with only defense and foreign affairs in the hands of the federal government. On the subject of taxation, it was suggested by the Convention that center only could impose taxes under some specified heads with the consent of the province. In the famous 21 Point Program of East Pakistanis in1954 a full provincial autonomy on the basis of the Lahore Resolution was demanded by giving center only defense and foreign affairs. The demands in the Six Point Formula were, therefore, based on the earlier proposals evolved through different phases in the history of East Pakistan.10

Salahuddin Ahmedis is one of the view that the main source of inspiration of the Six Point Program lies on the original concept of Pakistan that it would consist of ‘independent Muslim States’.11 He quotes Sir Hussain Suharwardi saying that in 1942 Mr. Jinnah envisages the course followed in the evolution of the Union of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of Canada. The Muslim States will first function as separate and independent until in the British Commonwealth of Nations; and, if and when found feasible, confederate as equal partners by mutual consent with other parts of India and with other Dominions.12 he further quotes, on the eve of the Partition of India, even the British authorities believed that the units of Pakistan would be administratively and financially autonomous. On 5 February, 1946, Sir D Monteath13 wrote to Lord Pethick-Lawrence as would seem more probable, Western and Eastern Pakistan exist as separate Units administratively and financially, but united by  something like a treaty arrangement for policy purposes.14

The Awami League was basically a middle-class party mainly consisted on various economic interest groups, which provided its main support in the country. They were surplus farmers, traders and small industrialists and the lower echelon of the civil service. The number of traders and industrialists were small in former East Pakistan; they suffered from comparative disadvantage in competition with their more established counterparts in Pakistan.15 All other contemporary political parties of Awami League in East Pakistan were losing their support in common asses and Mujeeb was vividly examining the situation.

Having considered the weakening position of the national Awami Party (NAP), the Awami League’s only rival party with mass base, Sheikh Mujeeb decided to capture the public support in the existing vacuum by raising the popular demand for autonomy in more radical and concrete terms.16

Tariq Ali argues Awami League that the party which had formulated them became, in the eyes of the people, the only force able to fight for Bengali equality. ‘Parity not charity’ was the message of Mujeebur Rehman.17The Awami League Council meeting at Dhaka in February, 1966 proved to be a famous platform where Six Point Formula for autonomy of East Pakistan was adopted. In the same meeting Mujeeb was also elected president of the Awami League. It was presented publically in March, 1966 in Lahore before an all political parties meeting.

The main exponents of Six Point Formula were Tajuddin Ahmed, Mujeebur Rehman and Ruhul Quddus. Majority of party workers did not know regarding the Formula till the Council Meeting held in February, 1966. This ‘program’ had an important position in the life of all classes of East Pakistani society.

The program was primarily financed by the rising Bengali business community and the wealthy owner of the pioneer Press, Dacca helped printing the booklet free of cost.18

The East Pakistanis welcomed the Six Point Program whole heartedly and it gained immense kind of support for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it challenged the political and economic monopoly of West Pakistan. Secondly, the East Pakistan’s export earnings would no longer be exploited and manipulated for the growth of the industrialization of West Pakistan. Thirdly, foreign aid would no longer be monopolized for West Pakistan only. Fourthly, the East Pakistan would no longer remain an inferior and sub-ordinate market for West Pakistani products. Fifthly, the end of Economic priorities determined for the advantage of West Pakistan only.

Six Point Program proved to be a ray of hope for almost all the sections of West Bengali society and soon its survival became a matter of life and death for East Pakistanis. The emerging industrialists and businessmen found in the Six-Point formula relaxation of intense competition and short cut route to prosperity. The labor and peasants found in the formula some chances of incoming change for the better. The formula itself helped inspiring and consolidating the nationalist forces and soon became the vehicle of Bengali nationalist movement. The program seemed to be a well-thought out concrete manifestation of historical urge of the Bengalis and appeared to be a more solid straight forward scheme compared to any other political program ever offered to the country by a political party.19

It is very interesting to note that Mujeeb tried to trace analogy between the Lahore Resolution and Six Point Program by placing it in the same month and venue. In March, 1966 he was in Lahore, the same month and the same city where the famous Lahore Resolution (presented by Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Haq) was passed in 1940. In a meeting when various political parties were present, he placed the Formula claiming to have been based on the principles of the Lahore Resolution, to save Pakistan from disintegration. He distributed the few hundred copies of the booklets of Six Point Program which he carried with him from East Pakistan with an explanatory note in reply to the criticism already raised from different quarters.20

Immediate Cause of Six Point Program

General Gul Hassan writes in his Memoirs, that the Six Point were concocted soon after the 1965 war. In a nutshell the Six Points amounted to provinces minding their own business, with the central government being reduced to the status of a referee without a whistle. The 1968 (Agartala) conspiracy may well have been a result of the growing impatient on the part of the Sheikh and India over the non-implementation of the Six Point Formula.21

Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman, the president of East Pakistan Awami League, presented Six Point Program for provincial autonomy in an atmosphere which was least congenial for such ‘extreme’ demands.22 The program was announced immediately after the 1965 war with India. According to Talukdar Mainruzzaman, during the war with India in September 1965 East Pakistan was completely cut off from West Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan felt completely helpless.23 According to another source, during the 1965 war Pakistan had only half a division of soldiers stationed in the East Pakistan, a region surrounded by the ‘enemy country’ from three sides. The East Bengalis were terrified by the thought that India could run over them anytime and this fear made them feel more neglected than ever before.24

The people of East Pakistan found themselves in an uncovered military posture during the short-lived war although India, for its own reasons made no significant hostile encroachment on their territory. However, the Bengalis had a weighty complaint to make about the war’s impact on them. The scheduled economic development program was cut 5 percent, because of increased military costs. In the first year of the third five-year plan for 1965-70 which was to mark the beginning of provincial economic parity, funds to the Provincial Government were reduced. Moreover, double funds were allocated to the military expenditures for 1965 and 1966 at the expense of agricultural production in east Pakistan.25

Many Economists, during this period particularly in East Pakistan, began to talk about the ‘two economy theories’ for Pakistan. According to Talukdar Mainruzzaman, the helplessness of the Bengalis during the war of 1965 with India and the increasing economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan gave Mujeebur Rehman ‘a political entrepreneur par-excellence’.26 In a press conference, Mujeeb declared “the question of autonomy appears to be more important after the war. Time has come for making East Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects”.27

Reference

  1. The Bangladesh Papers: Why Did Pakistan Break? Who Was Responsible? (Lahore: Vanguard Books LTD, 1970), p.98.
  2. Ibid, p.98.
  3. Ibid, p.98.
  4. Ibid, p.98.
  5. Ibid, p.98.
  6. Ibid, p.98.
  7. Ballot Battle My Last Fight To Secure Rights of East Bengal, Mujeeb Speech at Dolaikhal on October 17, 1970, The Bangladesh Papers: Why Did Pakistan Break? Who Was Responsible? , p.99.
  8. Bengalis Shall not be Allowed to Turn Slaves, Mujeeb speech at Dumni on October 20, 1970, The Bangladesh Papers: Why Did Pakistan Break? Who Was Responsible? , p.100.
  9. Ibid, p.101.
  10. Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy 1950-1971, (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 1991), p.87.
  11. Salahuddin Ahmed, Bangladesh Past and Present (New Delhi: A.P.H Publishing Corporation, 2004), p.158.
  12. Quoted in, Latif Ahmed Sherwanni, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan 1940-47, p.35, Quoted by, Salahuddin Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present,158.
  13. Ibid, p.159.
  14. Quoted in, Niclas Mansergh, The Transfer of Power 1942-47,Vol , Document no, 397, p.882, Quoted by, Salahuddin Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present, p.158.
  15. Narul Islam, Development and Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Political Economy, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), p.21.
  16. Moudud Ahmed, (op.cit. p.79)
  17. Ali, Tariq, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of State, (Great Britain: The Chaucer Press Ltd, 1980, p.80.
  18. Moudud Ahmed, (op.cit. p.86)
  19. Ibid, p.86.
  20. Ibid, p.79.
  21. Gul Hassan Khan, Memories of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), Appendix A.
  22. Muhammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p.281.
  23. Quoted in Talukdar Maniruzzaman, National Integration and Political Development, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1997), p.223.
  24. Moudud Ahmed, (op.cit. pp.80-81)
  25. Charles Peter O’Donnell, Bangladesh: Biography of A Muslim Nation, (London: West view, 1984), p.67.
  26. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, (op.cit. p.800)
  27. Quoted in The Daily Ittefaq, Dacca, February 11, 1966., Quoted by, Khwaja Alqama, Bengali Elites Perception of Pakistan: The Road to Disillusionments Uneven Development of Ethnicity, p.224.

 

Chapter# 4

The Six Point Program and Its Effects

The position of the Awami League on provincial autonomy and the constitutional structure was embodied in the now famous Six Points. In summary the points were: the Government shall be parliamentary in form, at the center and in the provinces, governed by a directly elected legislature chosen on the basis of population by universal adult franchise, the central government shall be responsible only for defense and foreign affairs and, under certain conditions, currency, there shall be separate but freely convertible currencies for each wing, or, should a single currency be used there shall be means to prevent the transfer of resources from one wing to the other, fiscal policy will be vested in the provinces which, in turn, will provide “requisite resources” to the central government for it to carry out its responsibilities in the defense and foreign affairs areas, separate accounts will be maintained for the foreign exchange earnings of each province and the provinces will provide foreign exchange as necessary to the central government in a similar manner as internal revenues are to be provided under point ,Each province shall be permitted to maintain a militia.1

The third, fourth, and five of the Six Point Program purely dealt with the economic issues of East Pakistan. The third point section demanded “Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may be introduced and furthermore one currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan”.2

In the Formula he (Mujeeb) analyzed this aspect on the basis that Pakistan had two economic units, one in East and the other in West because of the distance between the two parts…there was no mobility of labor and capital between the two wings but the flight of capital could not be prevented due to the fact of having one currency.3

The West Pakistan was the center of all important government offices. For example, the head office of the State Bank of Pakistan which was the main body of issuing currency, the head offices of the Central Bank (State Bank of Pakistan), the head offices of all public and private institutions and national and foreign industrial organizations were located in West Pakistan. Consequently, the transfer of money transactions from East to West wing was a natural thing.

All deposits of banks, all government resources, all earnings, profits and savings of trade and industry operating in East Pakistan would move in a matter of second to West Pakistan. Ninety per cent of the bank deposits or savings were generally invested and this investment was naturally done in West Pakistan and this was how the capital formation in West Pakistan was so rapid. The immediate benefit of investment i.e. employment and industrialization both were derived by West Pakistan.4

Mujeeb suggested that the only way to save East Pakistan from an immense kind of economic exploitation from West Pakistan by creating a separate Reserve Bank for East Pakistan, capital investment could be generated in that region. This reform in the currency system, he maintained, would save East Pakistan from economic deterioration and at the same time, keep currency a central subject as a symbol of unity and oneness of the people of Pakistan.

Muhammad Waseem narrates that it was indeed an exposition of the two-economy thesis. Given the absence of geographical contiguity which had resulted in relative immobility of labor and capital across the regional boundaries, already two different and wage structures had emerged in the country. It was claimed that in all matters related to money transactions, the East Pakistan was neglected. The regional Reserve Banks were, thus, to act as a bulwark against this flight to capital from East Pakistan.

Syed Shahid Husain, in his book, ‘What Was Once East Pakistan’, is of the view that there was nothing wrong with this demand, because independent economists acknowledge that there had been a massive transfer of resources from East Pakistan to West Pakistan which was one of the causes of ill will between the two wings. He further says that asking for a separate currency did not mean to a call for secessionist movement. It was only intended to get guarantee that the non-transfer of resources from an under-developed region to one that was developed. All the people of the East Pakistan had a full legal right on their own resources. They were also entitled to get subsidies on the basis of being more economically violated and exploited than the West Pakistan.5

The fourth point, “The power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and that the federal center will have no such power. The federation will have a share in the state taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The consolidation Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes”.

Mujeeb naively claimed that such an arrangement would make the federation rather stronger and that tax-collecting was a liability not a source of power. Not surprisingly, this point attracted maximum criticism from what Mujeeb called the ‘uniteriarists’ and ‘pseudo-federalists’.6

Mujeeb was of the view,

The central government would be constitutionally guaranteed of the required amount they needed. The right and power concerned did not rest in the act of tax collection but in the money so collected. The constitution would provide that ‘a certain percentage of the revenue collection on all heads shall automatically be credited to the Federal Fund by the Reserve Banks on which amount the unit governments shall have no control.7

The demand was based on past experience of the federating unites not being allocated their due share of the national resources. This too was an unexceptionable demand not inconsistent with greater autonomy.

The fifth point of the Six Point Program had sub five points: “There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings, earning of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan Government, foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed, indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings, the constitution shall empower the unit Governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with, foreign countries”.8

Mujeeb proposals regarding fifth point were there to draw attention to the following facts such as the Eastern wing had earned a lot of the annual foreign exchange of Pakistan, East Pakistan’s earnings had been used for the industrialization of West Pakistan and the earnings from those industries were again reinvested in that wing, East Pakistan’s foreign earnings were not being used in that wing due to the non-availability of capital formation, imports to East Pakistan was less than as compared to her exports whereas imports to West Pakistan was more than her exports, two-thirds of Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings were made by jute which was the main cash crop of eastern wing, but those foreign earnings were used neither for the development of the jute growers or planters nor for the common people of East Pakistan and almost all the foreign aids and loans were taken against foreign exchange earned by Eastern wing; but they were used in Western wing. Moreover, the irony was that installments and interest on these loans were being paid by East Pakistan.

Moudud Ahmed further says that Mujeeb was of the view that oft-quoted economic inequalities were man-made inequities. He firmly believed that they were remediable. He suggested some remedies: Firstly, provision of employment at a very large scale for East Pakistanis through a systematic process of industrialization; secondly, check and balance of skyrocketed increasing inflation by the creation of equilibrium between the imports and exports and there by availability of commodities to the common masses at minimum prices; thirdly, nationalization jute trade and thereby provision of good price to the planters and maximum share in the state’s earnings in foreign exchange. Muhammad Waseem points out that this demand sought to stop the Centre from spending East Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings in West Pakistan, as was the case in past.9

West Pakistanis and Six Point Program

Mujeeb believed in sound confederation. He tried to convince the people of West Pakistan through his anti-thesis ‘unity in diversity’. He proposed that’ only those subjects should be in the federal list which can be jointly managed more efficiently and profitably’.10

Mujeeb put Six Point Program before West Pakistanis in more simple and in appealing form. He addressed the people of West Pakistan precisely in the following line. Firstly, ‘Six Points was not formulated in the interest of East Pakistan only. Secondly, ‘Eastern wing wealth is being transferred to and concentrated in Western wing only meant regional imbalance. It did not mean that the common masses of West Pakistan receive this wealth. The entire wealth of the country was controlled by a few families. There are millions in West Pakistan like poor Bengalis who are also being exploited in the hands of these families. Thirdly, the capital of Pakistan had been located in Eastern wing instead of Western wing. This regional economic violation and exploitation would have occurred in the reverse way. The 62 per cent of our revenue that was being spent on our defence forces 32 per cent of our revenue that was being spent on our central administration would have been spent in East Pakistan instead of West Pakistan. This 94 per cent of the total revenue which was annually spent in West Pakistan forming its income would have spent in and enriched East Pakistan.

All the spending of the headquarters of armed forces, central institutions and foreign missions would have been in East Pakistan had the seat of the government been there’. Fourthly, ‘if the situation was reverse and the seat of the government was in East Pakistan, even if East Pakistanis were the majority they would have done everything to make West Pakistanis feel that the country belonged to the people of East Pakistan as well as West Pakistan, both in thought and in action. The state power would have been shared equally. Mujeeb asserted that ‘this feeling of absolute equality, sense of inter-wing justice and impartiality is the very basis of Pakistani patriotism’. Fifthly, ‘whenever East Pakistan demanded something, it was considered to be a move to undo Pakistan. At the time of demanding Bengali as a state language or joint electorate or parity, East Pakistanis were blamed to have been inspired from across the border. All these demands were now accepted but without causing the undoing of Pakistan’. Sixthly, ‘East Pakistanis, although being majority, always sacrificed for Pakistan both for its creation and for its preservation’.11

Syed Shahid Husain concludes that the West Pakistanis were not as politically conscious as the Bengalis and were led to believe that Mujeeb’s Six Point Program was actually an agenda of secession. This argument, on the one hand, deflects the blame from the real culprits and on the other, finds a convenient and acceptable scapegoat. Hasan Zaheer also describes the same view in these words that media and academic circles in the West Pakistan regarded the Six Points Program as just a dangerous slogan. There appeared to be little understanding of the emergence of new biased factors which required a re-ordering of the well-established system and a fresh national compact among the main federation units.12

Ayub and Six Point Program

Ayub immediate reaction was very hostile towards Six Point Program. He was already dubious regarding the Bengalis character as he viewed them conspirers in the hands of traditional enemy of Pakistan (India). He adopted several coercive measures against Awami League leaders in order to keep them away from the politics of agitation on the basis of Six Point Program.

Ayub called the formula a ‘secessionist move’ which would disintegrate Pakistan. The government took Six Point as a program to divide Pakistan, the implementation of which would destroy the integrity and stability of Pakistan.13

Ayub went on saying about Six Point Program “it would spell disaster for the country and run the people of East Pakistan into slaves”.14 He also threatened about the consequences of civil war between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Moreover, his government used the tool of censorship and banned one of the leading newspapers of East Pakistan and time and again threatened Mujeeb when he was on the country tours in order to acquainted masses about the importance of Six Point Program. Moudud Ahmed describes that Ittefaq, which was the main vernacular daily newspaper and it was working as the Awami League’s mouthpiece for a very long time and championing the cause of the East Bengali Nationalist movement was banned by the government of Pakistan. Furthermore, its press was confiscated and its sole editor, Mr. Tofazzal Hussain, who was popularly known as Manik Mia was jailed.15

The Awami League was singled out as a party wanting to destroy Pakistan in the name of the Six Point Formula. When Mujeeb was touring East Pakistan explaining his formula to the people he was apprehended by the government authorities on several occasions. In April, Mujeeb was arrested three times on the warrants issued by the Magistrates in Dhaka, Sylhct and Mymensingh. In the early morning of May 9 Mujeeb was finally arrested under Section 32 of the Defense of Pakistan Rules (Emergency provision for preventive detention imposed during the 1965 war) in the interest of security of state and maintenance of public order. This was followed by the arrest of several thousand Awami Leaguers including almost all the front-line leaders. President Ayub Khan responded very furiously to the rising popularity of Six Point program. He charged that the document amounted to a demand for complete independence from the ‘Centre’. From the viewpoint of those who believed in the necessity of centralized government, he was correct, but he did not analyze that the position of the Six Point Program was negotiable.

Yahya and Six Point Program

General Yahya followed the policy of his predecessor regarding Six Point Program and did not give a primary importance to this burning issue. In a very desperate bid to retain power and to validate his unprovoked attack on the East Pakistanis, he made his speech on 26 March, but all he could blame Mujeeb of was ‘obstinacy, obduracy and refusal to talk sense’.16

Here are some insights from Hamood-ur Rahman Commission Report about the Yahya casual attitude towards Six Point Program. A retired Chief Justice of Pakistan who also served as a constitutional expert in Yahya’s military regime, Justice A.R Cornelius, told the Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission, that he (Yahya) was familiar with them (Six Points) and he used to talk about them from time to time but he never asked for an analysis of these but according to my mind, I think that about four of them were quite easily acceptable and I said in a meeting of the cabinet that it would be easily possible to amend the Constitution so as to give effect to most of the Six Points and that would perhaps ease the political situation.

Syed Shahid Husain narrates a very interesting event, On 6 January 1971, Lieutenant General Peerzda, the Principle Staff Officer to General Yahya, called on the Governor of East Pakistan, Admiral Ahsan, and asked him to obtain a copy of the Six Points Program because he said that on the next day the President would be discussing it with Mujeeb Rehman and his colleagues. That at this stage the presidential team did not have so much as a copy of the Six Points Program is in itself a shocking eye-opener. The failure on the part of Gen. Yahya Khan and his advisers to critically examine the Six Point of Sheikh Mujeebur Rahman and to permit the latter to campaign on the basis of his said Six Point Program, declaring that the elections were actually a referendum on the Six Points, seems to suggest that neither the General nor any one of his advisers was ever bothered about what the result of the election would be.17

The Commission concluded that the government’s approach to Mujeeb’s Six Points was off -hand. It also examined that Yahya was totally unprepared for talks with Mujeeb. On the other hand, Mujeeb was ready to negotiate as once he said that ‘Six Points are not the words of God’.19 Privately, before election, Mujeeb was assuring Yahya that Six Points were his bargaining position’. However, Yahya regime tried level best to fan propaganda and encouraged to create an impression in both West and East Pakistan that the Six Point Program was nothing, but an unjust plan to divide the country.

Hasan Zaheer concludes that the Six Points were never referred for official examination to bring out their full implication and to develop alternative proposals to accommodate Bengali demands within a viable federal structure. This had become necessary after the election, when they become the official policy of the majority party. Yahya did not clinch the issue when the Awami League leaders made a presentation of the Six Points to him in January. He had not briefed himself to ask the Bengali leaders informed and intelligent questions about the shape of the federation that would emerge from the implementation of thesis formula. Indeed, a day before these meetings, according to admiral Ahsan, Peerzda was searching for a copy of the Six Points. The Awami League, backed by professionals’ economists, had issued detailed explanation of its program from time to time and made light of the country through complete regional autonomy. He further quotes that Umar recalls some vague and causal thinking about the Six Points: one point of view was not to discuss the Six Points in detail. Many people thought that Bengal was a liability. M.M. Ahmed, V. Jaffery, and perhaps Ghulam Ishaq Khan concluded that the acceptance of the Six Points Program would be suicidal for national integration. But the subject matter was neither formally brought up for original consideration or discussion in the cabinet nor before the President.20

Bhutto and Six Point Program

During the election campaign of 1970, Bhutto did not accept the Six Point Program. He neither negotiated with Mujeeb, nor developed a critique. He did not also develop an alternative. But, on the other hand, the East Pakistanis had used first the rebellion of 1969 and then the elections of 1970 in order to popularize, and to make the substance of the Program. So, the both sides which later came together on the negotiating table after the elections, in fact, came with vastly different an attitude which was less congenial.21

The negotiations occurred in a vacuum. By 1971 the impulse in Bengal was not to consider the preservation of Pakistan’s unity as a priority, the highest priority for the East Bengali leadership was to safeguard the distinct interests of their own region at all costs. They did not wish to break up Pakistan; a majority party had no reasons to do that. Nonetheless the continued existence of a unified Pakistan was subject, in the Bengali view, to the successful realization of the Bengali agendas. Their interests had been betrayed in the past, the ones who had betrayed them were still in power, there was no question of trust; future arrangements had to be guaranteed structurally. Bhutto told in a conversation that he had with one of Yahya’s top advisors months before the negotiations; when this gentleman asked Bhutto what he thought Mujeeb’s intentions were, Bhutto’s unhesitating response came in one word ‘separation’. In the Six-point Program itself, Bhutto saw India’s conspiratorial hand. Throughout the negotiations, Bhutto believed that the Awami League was moving in fact toward independence’.22

Salahuddin Ahmed points out a very interesting fact that in order to diffuse the appeal of the Six Point Program, Bhutto wanted to influence Maulana Bhashani behind Mujeeb’s back. He impressed upon the Maulana that the Six Point Program had the backing of the American authorities in order to reduce the growing friendship between Pakistan and China. LXVII

Bhutto criticized the Six- points Program on the following grounds: Firstly, Provincial control of aid and trade, in addition to the Awami League’s idea of separate currencies for the two provinces, would have meant separate and exclusive economies for the two Wings and would have turned Pakistan into a hotbed of ‘imperialist intrigues’. Secondly, aid and trade are so bound up with Foreign Policy and Defense that the central government’s control over those areas would have been undoubtedly impaired. Thirdly, new constitution cannot be unilaterally imposed by any one of the federating units, as Mujeeb wished to do with his draft based on the Six-points, but has to be acceptable to all the units in the federation, irrespective of their relative size.

On the burning issue of Six Point Program, there were held some meetings between Bhutto and Mujeeb. On 27 January, 1971 Bhutto flew to Dacca with the following constitutional formula in order to find some common grounds regarding East Pakistan’s economic grievances. Firstly, no separate currency for East Pakistan. Oppressive measures for checking the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan may be ensured. Secondly, Foreign trade being inextricably linked with foreign policy would be a core central subject. However, export earnings of each province may be deposited into the accounts of respective government to be opened in state Bank after deducting an agreed percentage for the central government.23

In a closed door meeting on January 27, 1971, Mujeeb insisted on the full taxation power for the provinces and he also made clear that East Pakistan would contribute to defense budget in proportion to her representation in the armed forces. On the other hand, Bhutto opposed this idea and argued that it would not be acceptable to the army. Bhutto opines that the central government without these subjects would not be able to keep the two regions together. But, Mujeeb suggested the creation of a ‘Revenue Allocation Committee’ for determining the revenue share of the center after it was raised by the provinces. Bhutto suggested the postponement of further discussion on this subject and the creation of two separate State Banks with one currency. Consequently, their meeting turned into fiasco because of their basic differences on international trade (foreign exchange), taxation, and international aid.

Awami League and Six Point Program

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, West Pakistan and East Pakistan political parties but it also faced criticism within the Awami League. Particularly, the West Pakistani members of the Awami League had some serious concerns against the program.

In their criticism, the rightist elements called the Six Point Formula a communist and India-initiated program aiming at destroying the ‘Islamic State of Pakistan’ and the leftists called it an imperialist design.24

The apprehension of the Six Point Program was enough strong that it threatened the military-bureaucratic oligarchy in Islamabad, which was in fact the real ruling elite body in Pakistan since 1958. Moudud Ahmed describes the following reasons for this appalls: Firstly, ‘point two of the formula, recommending only two subjects to the Central Government such as defense and foreign affairs which limited the scope of governance of the Central Government’. Secondly, ‘point three it was to stop the height of capital from East Pakistan to West Pakistan; the ruling elite became gravely concerned at this, because, so long East Pakistani resources were used at will for the development of West Pakistan’. Thirdly, ‘what appeared to be more menacing to the ruling elite was point four which proposed to hand over the taxing power to the federating units. Without this power the central Government would be reduced to a kind of post office’. Fourthly, ‘along with that, point five, related to foreign exchange and inter-wing trade, and was viewed by the ruling elite with grave concern’.

Conclusion

The critics of the Six Point Program, more concerned with its political than its economic implications. Mujeeb’s proposal for substantial control of the economy by the provinces gave birth to an irrational fear in West Pakistanis that the six-point plan would lead to the dismemberment of Pakistan by encouraging dissident tribal and linguistic groups in the west. In reality, Six Point Program reflected some genuine East Bengali grievances and which were long standing demands of the East Pakistanis who were waiting for these fulfillments for decades. Mujeeb’s movement proved to be a radical departure from the simple autonomy demand of the past. The Six Point Program aimed towards a confederation, instead of a federation. The demand of full control on rising taxes and expenditure along with the freely convertible currencies and the power to enter into foreign trade relationships, keeping foreign exchange earning separate, was too much for the central government to accommodate. Neither any political party nor the central government of Pakistan gave any detailed explanation why they were opposed to the Six Points Program.

Reference

  1. Quoted in Morning News (Dacca), June 8, 1970. Quoted by, David Dunbar, Pakistan: The Failure of Political Negotiations, Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 5 (May, 1972), pp.444-461Published by: University of California Press.
  2. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Divided,(Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1989), p.237-38.
  3. Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy 1950-1971, pp.80-81.
  4. Ibid, p.81.
  5. Syed Shahid Husain, What Was Once East Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.24-25.
  6. Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman, ‘6 Point Formula—Our Right to Live, The Bangladesh Papers: Why Did Pakistan Break? Who Was Responsible?, p.28.
  7. Moudud Ahmed, (op.cit. p.82)
  8. Safdar Mahmood, (op.cit.p.239)
  9. Muhammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, p.281.
  10. Moudud Ahmed, (op.cit.p.84)
  11. Ibid, p.85.
  12. Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.146.
  13. Moudud Ahmed, (op.cit.p.87)
  14. Salahuddin Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present, p.160.
  15. Moudud Ahmed, (op.cit.p.89)
  16. Syed Shahid Husain, What Was Once East Pakistan, p.21
  17. The Report of the Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War, p.343.
  18. Syed Shahid Husain, (op.cit.p.20)
  19. Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism, p.127
  20. Ibid., pp.146-147.
  21. Review of The Great Tragedy by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; September, 1971; Pakistan People Party Publication; 107 pages, Reviewed by Aijaz Ahmad, The Great Farce, Source: Pakistan Forum, Vol. 2, No. 6 (Mar., 1972), p.14. Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project.
  22. Ibid., p.14.
  23. Safdar Mahmood, (op.cit.p.102)
  24. Moudud Ahmed, (op.cit.p.88)

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