Islamabad and New Delhi
By J. K. Ray, CAN India avoid a war with Pakistan? Throughout the period 1947-71, the West Pakistani ruling circle in the state of Pakistan has consistently tried to divert the attention of its people away from domestic failures towards India, mainly by carrying on a hate-India campaign. When this campaign proves insufficient, Pakistan has even been prepared to launch a full-scale war. In 1965, for instance, the movement for autonomy and democratic rights acquired such a tremendous strength in the East Wing that it became one of the most important factors shaping Pakistan’s decision to attack India in September that year. In March 1971, unable still to recover from the shock of the Awami League’s unprecedented victory in the first-ever nation-wide election (held in December 1970) and to get reconciled to the inevitable loss of colonial domination over the East Wing, the West Pakistani overlords made an attempt at confrontation with India. This was apparent from the fact that General Yahya Khan cited India’s unfriendly attitude as one of the reasons justifying the indefinite postponement of the session of the National Assembly in which the Awami League held an absolute majority of seats). The hijacking of the Indian aircraft and deliberately blowing it up were other indicators in this direction. Probably the success of the non-violent non-cooperation movement (which had no parallel in the history of the world), launched by the Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, disconcerted Islamabad and prevented the escalation into an actual conflict with India. Islamabad then concentrated its efforts on military action within Bangladesh and on counteracting the spontaneous resistance by the ill-equipped Bangladesh forces.
In future, however, Islamabad may still lunch a war against India in either of the following situations. In the first place, the Bangladesh army may be able to inflict at increasing amount of casulties on the occupation forces in the rainy season, and the latter, in hot pursuit, may cross into Indian territory and start a war. In the second place, Islamabad may succeed it breaking the back of the resistance movement and emerge as a victor with nearly un challengeable control, in a military sense over Bangladesh. It may then be impelled to try to redress the population imbalance between the two Wings of Pakistan by pushing in more and more refugees into India till a point is reached when India cannot bear the burden. Developments in both these directions have already taken place, and it is India’s extraordinary restraint which has prevented the outbreak of a war. In the third place, the war of decolonization in Bangladesh may last for some time. Meanwhile, West Pakistan will be economically more and more impoverished, and politically more and more unstable. The ruling circle may then be compelled to distract popular wrath and impatience by initiating a war against India.
It is, of course, possible to envisage a variety of other situations. For instance, while the war in Bangladesh goes on for a fairly long time, the ruling circle of Pakistan may remain satisfied over the extent of its military control in Bangladesh and political control in West Pakistan. Continuous military and economic aid from other countries may make it quite likely. Even relief materials to be poured into the hands of Yahya by the United Nations, if converted into much-needed supplies for the West Pakistani troops in Bangladesh may be come a contributory factor. In the meantime, the number of, and collaboration between, insurgents in India and like-minded groups in Bangladesh may grow. Since these groups tend to enjoy certain advantages in a democratic state, in contrast to a ruthless military regime, they may decide to concentrate on activities in India with a view to launching an insurrection. They may dream of consolidating their position in Bangladesh after gaining a foothold in West Bengal. There have been some recent reports of Tariq Ali being present in Calcutta and advocating the above line. Arms and ammunition may be smuggled from Bangladesh into West Bengal for this purpose. (With the present type of situation the border is quite porous). To prevent and manage all this will require a degree of regimentation and militarization that a democratic state may find extremely distasteful to achieve. But delays will merely worsen the situation and call for harder and more unpalatable decisions. Thus, if not a war with Pakistan, a warlike situation in the eastern region of India, appears to be in the making.
The Tariq Ali line may look more and more feasible if one is permitted to speculate that the Awami League may not now be in a position to direct the activities of various armed groups jumped together, more for convenience of description than for underlining the actuality of a unified command, under the designation of the Bangladesh Army. On their own admission the Awami League leaders were not quite prepared for the crackdown of the West Pakistani Army. It is likely, therefore, that many sections of the Bangladesh Army or the Liberation Army (Mukti Fouj) are not under the control of the Awami League. Since the Awami League was not a military oriented party and since no party can achieve this orientation quickly, it is very likely that the leadership of the Liberation Army will gradually pass into the hands of the leftist extremist groups. The longer the war, the greater is the probability that this will happen. Insurrectionists in West Bengal may then make a common cause with their Bangladesh counterparts and start an uprising. Refugees in West Bengal will provide ready-made recruits, forgetting to be grateful to the Government of India for what it did when they fled to India, and blaming the Government of India for its failure to do what is practically impossible (i.e. to rehabilitate them to their entire satisfaction).
One wonders whether all these alarming possibilities are being adequately taken care of by the present policy of the government of India. Undoubtedly New Delhi has displayed great restraint in its dealings with Islamabad. In the short run, this has probably made world public opinion favourable to India. But favourable world public opinion has not even enabled India to secure significant material aid for refugee relief in the short run. And it can hardly be of any assistance to India in facing problems in the long run. Moreover, a policy of restraint may often be read as a policy of wait-and-see. But waiting far too long may be counterproductive, for the Government of India may find itself compelled to take drastic measures at unfavourable moments and places, and repent that it did not take those measures at an earlier and more opportune period.
To put it more bluntly, it is high time that India should take a decisive step that alone can safeguard its India whose interests are most vital in Bangladesh, and it is India which has to act unilaterally in order to ensure the speedy emergence of a viable Awami League Government in Bangladesh. During March-April 1971 the Government of India’s decision of non-recognition and non-intervention could have been somehow defended on the expectation that freedom-fighters could go it alone. By June 1971 it has been quite clear that freedom-fighters are not able to cope with the gigantic military might of the West Pakistani invaders. The policy of non-recognition of Bangladesh has, therefore, to be thought out afresh. At this moment it viable and friendly Bangladesh Government for India is to recognise the one led by the Awami League and help it militarily through to a victory. This is also the only way of safeguarding Inida’s security that is menaced by the inflow of refugees whose number may reach ten millions in a few months. A country is always justified in taking military measures in order to stave off threats to security. One can imagine no graver threat to refugees an inflow that has been carefully manipulated by the potential aggressor, which hopes to reap the fruits of aggression without committing it overtly. Indirect aggression may or may not be followed by direct aggression, but the victim of indirect aggression must not certainly allow its sovereignty to be nibbled away.
One of the lessons of the Bangladesh war is that (not to speak of Super Powers who have taken many decisions of military intervention without any regard for legitimate self-interest) even the small Powers like Iran do not hesitate to aid West Pakistan in violation of these canons and limits. But India hesitates, although it is called upon to support a just cause and defend the most legitimate national interests.
In this connection it is useful to recall Machiavelli’s advice on what the Prince should do in case an armed conflict occurs in the neighbouring territory:
“It is always the case that the one who is not your friend will request your neutrality, and that the one who is your friend will request your armed support. Princes who are irresolute usually follow the path of neutrality in order to escape immediate danger, and usually they come to grief.”
“Then, no Government should ever imagine that it can adopt a safe course of action; rather, it should regard all possible courses of action as risky. This is the way things are : whenever one tries to escape one danger one runs into another. Prudence consists in being able to assess the nature of a particular threat and in accepting the lesser evil.”
Reference: Hindustan Standard 29.6.1971