US – USSR Intervention in
1971 War of Bangladesh Liberation

Ana Sinha

Abstract – The 1960s and 70s were a turbulent period in the independent Indian history. It was the first time that India had to stand against virtually all the major players of the world – USA, UK, China, etc. The international platforms received the entire sequence of events much after the situation had escalated beyond measure. The formation of Bangladesh was a big blow to Pakistan. It gave India another batch of outnumbering refugees. It also brought India and Russia closer, and to some measure gave USA another blow in its foreign policy in quick succession after its failure in Vietnam. This paper seeks to analyse the implications US – USSR conflict in the 1971 War of Bangladesh Liberation. India and Pakistan had already had two face-offs before 1971 and Russia had mediated the ceasefire in 1965. In case the USA had not entered in the situation, perhaps this would also have been another example of Indo – Pak war series. But USA did. Which is why the questions arise – Why did the USA enter the tension zone of India – Pak at all? Why was USSR supportive of India? What was the Blood Telegram? How did the article of Anthony Mascarenhas in the UK’ s Sunday Times expose the brutality of Pakistan’s suppression of the Bangladeshi uprising? How did it affect the global opinion about India’s fierce participation in what was earlier deemed as a mere internal dispute of a new born nation? What are the various claims or theories about the US – USSR faceoff in the Bay of Bengal with their nuclear submarines? What strategies dictated the entry of USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal? And ultimately, how did India outmanoeuvre USA in its own game?

Key Words: Task Force 74, Blood Telegram, Indo – Soviet Treaty of Friendship, etc.

“While India rarely spoke about its imperative as the moral one, and few people steeped in real politics can shed their cynicism when a politician speaks in moral terms, and the intervention certainly suited India’s strategic interests, the fact remains that in the annals of humanitarian interventions, few were as swift, successful, purpose-driven and with humanitarian goals as the Indian intervention to liberate Bangladesh. India went in when it was attacked, and left before its troops became unpopular”.[1]

[i]Introduction

When a colony gets independence from its colonial master, it is a subject of two way euphoria for both of them. While the colony has the satisfaction of becoming free after long years of movements (violent or nonviolent or both), the erstwhile colonizer has the psychological certainty of an impending failure of the newly formed State in the coming decades. Invariably, this certainty has proved to be true for a large number of newly formed States, particularly so in Africa. In the case of India, however, there was an exception. Although the reaction of the British was predictable in its overbearing certainty of India vanquishing in the jaded atmosphere that was ‘filled with chaos, confusion, hatred, conflict’[2] on the grounds of religious divisions in which they had left the country; but in terms of India, it was a well-timed wake up call.

The Pandora box of religious intolerance and division of land and everything standing on it on the grounds of the same, (that the British had opened, and which Pakistan was over-excited to tear open completely in its wake of attacking Kashmir), India was simply not allowed the leisure to enjoy its independence. On one hand, it was drowned in the problems of a new democracy, organizing the first general elections all over the country, settling refugees, settling the linguistic debates, claiming the acknowledgement of the big powers as an independent sovereign State, establishing ties with them, and so on. On the other hand, the country found both a threat and an opportunity in the unique geographical quotient with a newly formed, comparatively more tumultuous Pakistan split in two parts along its crucial land borders- West Pakistan and East Pakistan.

Added to the gallimaufry was the entire notion of joining any one of the two blocs of US or USSR. And as the years passed from 1950s to 1970s, it became more of a race of having more allies than the other, so much so, that both of them started using their resources to protect their allies. India, under Nehru’s leadership, was primarily set for a socialist course bringing it closer to the USSR with a shrewd touch of non – alignment in the mix.

Background

Issues with West and East Pakistan (State level factors) – “Fear, fire and the sword are the only things holding East and West Pakistan together … “[3]

West- East equations –
Geography– The two regions were at the two ends of India claiming unity in the name of a common Pakistan had five provinces, four in West – Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the North-West Frontier, and one in East – East Pakistan.
Religion– West Pakistan had 97% Muslims and East Pakistani had 85% Muslims. [4]
Language– Muhammad Ali Jinnah in a public meeting at the Race Course Maidan, Dhaka, on 21 March 1948 proclaimed Urdu as the state language of [5]Most of the West Pakistanis spoke Punjabi and Sindhi, while East Pakistanis spoke Bangla. West Pakistan had no qualms with Urdu as the suave lingua franca of Pakistan. But East Pakistan had a Muslim population that was in no mood to surrender its rich Bengali heritage to the West. Seven students were killed in a fierce protest on February 21, 1952.
Commerce– East Pakistan made 70% of all of Pakistan’s exports, while it only received 25% of imported In 1948, East Pakistan had 11 fabric mills while the West had nine. In 1971, the number of fabric mills in the West grew to 150 while the number in the East went down to 26. About 2.6 billion dollars of resources were also shifted over time from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. [ii]
Political– Inspite of a landslide victory of the Awami League in 1970 elections, the Pakistan government did not hand over the power of the province to the winning party[iii]. Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six Points to the President of Pakistan[iv] and claimed the right to form the government.
Military attack and Operation Searchlight– The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in Mujib was arrested on the night of 25–26 March 1971 at about 1:30 am (as per Radio Pakistan’s news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan. The Pakistani government sent its army to the East Pakistan to suppress the movements, particularly the voice of the educated elite by Operation Searchlight, when a large number of students, professors, and many other intellectuals, especially Hindu, were brutally shot dead.
1970 cyclone– East Pakistan was vulnerable to natural calamities and was struck by a massive cyclone in While Pakistan obtained, millions of rupees for disaster relief, a miniscule fraction of it was actually spent on East Pakistan.

b.) India, RAW and guerila warfare–

The defense analysts of India were skeptical of any improvement in the relations with Pakistan in the wake of the 1965 war. It was also disillusioned of any support from USA except for perhaps a moral verbal support. USA had made no secret of the fact that it was peeved with India’s proximity to USSR. India on the other hand was firm on its Non- Alignment stand. But, it was also intuitive to realize the precariousness of the seething turmoil in East Pakistan. Most of the reports suggest that it decided to go with the flow and instructed its RAW agency to train the revolters in guerila warfare. In fact Indira Gandhi was bold enough to suggest USA that she had no qualms in launching the ‘refugees’ as guerrillas courtesy, L K Jha (then the Indian ambassador to US) warned Kissinger. India was also sure that China would never wish a direct confrontation along side Pakistan. The latter valued its close ties with USSR much more. And India was also assured of the support of USSR in any form from the UN to the battlefield. Although India never openly acknowledged any tilt towards USSR, it was a much well- known fact, that the series of leaders till that time, right from Nehru in the pre- Independence years, were much impressed with the Socialist models and ideals, their five year plans, bought a major chunk of its defense equipment from them and cherished their close relations in the backdrop of the mess Pakistan was continuously dumping towards India with its wars, and tensions.

c.) Refugee Influx to India

India did not declare an offcial war on Pakistan until November 1971. It was set on tackling this situation using diplomatic measures. But with the Pakistani military’s suppressive measures that bordered to the extreme limits of cruelty with uncountable rapes of women, killings of Hindu minorities, the number of refugees swelled from a quarter of a million on April 21 to 1.48 million by May 6, mostly into the states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi justifiably described them as “victims of war who sought refuge from military terror across our frontier”. The threat perception arising from the refugee influx acquired grave proportions when the number progressively increased to reach 6 million in July to eventually peak at 9 million by November. Pakistan had successfully pushed out 8-10 percent of East Bengal’s population into India. Articulating Pakistan’ s export of its internal security threat to India as constituting a grave national security challenge, Indira Gandhi in a speech on May 24 rightly commented, “What was claimed as an internal problem of Pakistan has also become an internal problem of India”. There were unbearable pressures on the fledgling Indian infrastructure to assist the refugees.[6]

d.) Sino – US – USSR – Indo – Pak associations-

According to Henry Kissinger, “When the Nixon administration took office, our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid adding another complication to our agenda.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 848) And it would not have interfered much in practice had the situation remained same. But USA was much more interested in fostering a much closer relation with the ‘communist’ China. During its Vietnamese wars, the two countries had been at loggerheads on many occasions, each vilifying the other as an opportunist and an ideological rival in every sense. Off late, China felt being disgruntled by the USSR’s interest in Indian problems. In fact, the first indication of this was on February 12, 1965, when in a Communist Party journal, Beijing attacked the Soviet leadership as “revisionist,” in the first public indication of a Sino – Soviet split. And soon made it clear that they were open for a deal. On February 1, 1969, in a secret memo to his new national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, Nixon stated, “I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is ‘exploring possibilities of raprochement [sic] with the Chinese.'” In response, Kissinger called for an internal re-examination of Sino – US policy. USA found a perfect foil in Pakistan to facilitate this. President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger exploited Pakistan’ s cozy association with People’ s Republic of China to start mystery contacts that brought about Henry Kissinger’ s mystery visit to China in July 1971 subsequent to going by Pakistan. Amid the second week of July, 1971, Kissinger landed in Beijing, where he heard the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai saying : “In our opinion, if India continues on its present course in disregard of world opinion, it will continue to go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they [the Indians] are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by.’ On this, Kissinger assured China that the US was also in favor of Pakistan on this issue. These contacts brought about the 1972 Nixon visit to China, and the resulting normalizing of relations between the United States and the People’ s Republic of China. But why was USA in favor of Pakistan? It seems prudent to mention here that the first defense deal of Pakistan was also with USA in 1954. The reasons are many. Firstly, Pakistan was a member of the American led military Pact, CENTO[v] and SEATO[vi]. Secondly, India was coming more and more closer to the USSR. Although there had been no open acknowledgement, USA primarily considered India pro- Soviet. Any victory for India would certainly be deemed as the victory of the Soviet Union. It was also worried about India’s rising influence in South East Asia. Combined with its non – alignment status, India was potentially a hazard as well.

As can be evident from the above observations, USSR was very much feared as a prospective godfather to Asia. Its chemistery with India was remarkable. What truly made these two countries come together was their mutual confidence in their partnership. And that’s precisely what made USA tick. USSR was always supportive of India’ s take on Kashmir, their stand in 1965 War with Pakistan, among many others. Even during the 1971 War, when USA was planning to dump the entire issue of East Pakistan in UN, their motto was simplt to leave the knot as its is just like the Kashmir issue. It was only USSR’s veto that saved the day for India. In fact, perhaps it would not be incorrect to assume that India’s admiration and tilt towards USSR stemmed from its cooperation and recognition but bloomed fully at the veto rounds of the Security Council. USSR gave the umbrella cover to India when it needed it the most. And that’s precisely why the 1971 war was an overwhelming success for India.

The American entourage was dismantled in four major blows –

The Blood telegram (April 6, 1971)

“When Archer K. Blood died last month, in retirement in Colorado, there was family, a few old friends and an entire nation to mourn his passing, but the nation that grieved for him was not his own. It was Bangladesh[7].”

In the most figurative trems, Blood voiced what would be the strongest word of dissent in the US Foreign Service history. In his ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan, Nixon had completely ignored any intimation of genocides or devastations meted out by the Pakistani military in the name of suppression. The Pakistan army, faced with an incipient rebellion among the Bengalis, slaughtered thousands in a pre-emptive attack on the University of Dacca and the barracks of Bengali police. Columns of troops followed the roads throughout the country, burning and killing. Blood sent his first cable on March 27, 1971, which said under the subject heading “Selective genocide”:

Here in Decca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak[istani] Military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have list of AWAMI League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down
Among those marked for extinction in addition to the A.L. hierarchy are student leaders and university faculty. In this second category we have reports that Fazlur Rahman head of the philosophy department and a Hindu, M. Abedin, head of the department of history, have been killed. Razzak of the political science department is rumored dead. Also on the list are the bulk of MNA’s elect and number of MPA’s.
Moreover, with the support of the Pak[istani] Military. non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking poor people’s quarters and murdering Bengalis and Hindus. (U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective genocide, March 27, 1971)

It was the telegram of Archer Blood signed by 29 Americans, on April 6, 1971 that gave the official word on the bloodshed and asked for action from the US on moral grounds.

‘Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak[istan] dominated government and to lessen any deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy,(…) But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely an internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional civil servants, express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected.’[8]

As was expected, USA denied any such activities, but what remains to be duly noted is Nixon’ s response in his own handwriting, “To all hands: DON’T squeeze Yahya at this time.” Yahya Khan, dictator of West Pakistan at that time. Known for gifting horses to the then First Lady Jackie Kennedy horses in 1962, also known for his role in mediating talks between Kissinger in Beijing. In reaction, despite the fact that Blood was planned for an additional 18 month visit in Dhaka, President Nixon and Kissinger reviewed him from that position since his conclusions conflicted with their agenda of utilizing the backing of West Pakistan for discretionary openings to China and to counter the force of the Soviet Union. Government authorities in 1972 conceded that they didn’t trust the size of the killings, marking the telegram scaremonger. His career was enormously damaged by the telegram. Blood was awarded the

Christian A. Herter Award in 1971 for “extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage and creative dissent”.[vii] Blood’s death was a matter of front page headlines in Bangladesh, but was deemed important only as much in the USA as to be allowed the conventional obituary section at the back pages of the American newspapers. Bangladesh sent a delegation to the funeral in Fort Collins and his wife received numerous condolence messages from Bangladeshi civilians on the occasion of his death.

A journalist’ s word

“I have witnessed the brutality of ‘kill and burn missions’ as the army units, after clearing out the rebels, pursued the pogrom in the towns and villages.

I have seen whole villages devastated by ‘punitive action’.

And in the officer’s mess at night I have listened incredulously as otherwise brave and honourable men proudly chewed over the day’s kill.

‘How many did you get?’ The answers are seared in my memory.”

In response to the Blood Telegram and similar reports that they had received, USA and Pakistan decided to send a troop of journalists to East Pakistan who would report in favour of Pakistani military and rather accuse the Awami League supporters of massacres and brutal killing of innocents. It must be noted here that although there is a large figure of the number of civilians killed by the Pakistani military in Bangladesh, it is also a much debated issue that the East Pakistani revolters had also killed a large number of West Pakistan supporting population. Eight journalists were given a 10-day tour of the province. While they were there, Anthony Mascarenhas, a Pakistani journalist, born in Goa, educated in Karachi duly made his observations, bundled his family in in Pakistan out of the country to London, and finally went to the Editor’s offices of the Sunday Times to submit his news story. But there was another journalist, Joseph L. Galloway, who was a part of this group. He met Archer Blood in person. Blood had alarge number of East Pakistanis working under him and he was worried about their safety. He granted Galloway free rein to interview as many people he wished in a separate cabin and report the facts. Blood was pretty confident of India’s victory in this War and ultimately he was correct. In fact, a month after Blood died in 2004, Galloway syndicated an obituary in his honor. When this troop returned home, almost all of them duly wrote what they were told to. But Mascarenhas’s story hit the nail right on the head of the opposing powerful countries of the West.

“Abdul Bari had run out of luck. Like thousands of other people in East Bengal, he had made the mistake – the fatal mistake – of running within sight of a Pakistani patrol. He was 24 years old, a slight man surrounded by soldiers. He was trembling because he was about to be shot…”

This article came out on June 13, 1971 and opened with the above mentioned lines. India cashed in on this spontaneous wave of sympathy and the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told the then editor of the Sunday Times, Harold Evans, that the article had shocked her so deeply it had set her “on a campaign of personal diplomacy in the European capitals and Moscow to prepare the ground for India’ s armed intervention”. [9] As is known very well, Indira Gandhi went on a six nation tour to garner international support since in their last letter discourse, Nixon had point blank refused to consider any other options.

The entire world was shocked of the extent of Pakistan’s brutal suppression of the unrest. In fact, it made the picture much clearer, exactly why East Pakistan would want to be free of a sadist administration that was geographically, politically, far far away from it.

Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (August 9, 1971)

Indira Gandhi finally took a hard move and on August 9, signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with Soviet Union. The State Department historian says, ‘in the perspective of Washington, the crisis ratcheted up a dangerous notch, India and the Soviet Union have signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation.’ This was exactly what the USA had feared, an extension of USSR influence into India and in turn the entire subcontinent. The Article X of this treaty clearly summarizes Indo – Soviet actions and relations in the future years – Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more States, which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting Party further declares that no obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party.

USS Enterprise (or US 7^th Fleet or Task Force 74)

Post Operation Chengiz Khan of Pakistan on December 3, 1971, India finally got the advantage of open retaliation across international borders both on the Eastern and Western fronts. In the East, the IAF achieved complete air superiority over Bangladesh by the third day of the war commencement. On the Western front, IAF fighter bombers carried out effective strike against Karachi port and oil installations located there. But what truly surprised USA was the efficiency of the Indian navy in the Bay of Bengal. The Indian forces speedily resolved the situation. And when Pakistan was finally in a deadlock, Task Force 74 entered the Bay of Bengal, which negs the question Why? Because as far as Indo – Pak were concerned, the war was at its last stages.

“We are involved, no matter how often our press spokesmen say we are not. The question is the degree of our involvement”. This was Kissinger’ s take during Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting in Washington, on December 9, 1971. In the same meeting the first discussions on the possibility of a US carrier in the Bay of Bengal took place.[viii] The same day, Kissinger had another meeting with the President. Kissinger was of the opinion of having a settlement with India via Soviet. At this stage, he simply considered the possibility of hovering US helicopters on the Bay of Bengal as a measure of deterrence to India from attacking and capturing POK (Pak Occupied Kashmir) as well. In fact a CIA report strongly suggested that if things went on as they were going, Pakistan would not have just this one division, but in the future, three more states could be formed out from it.

“The partition of Pakistan is a fact” he [Kissinger] said. “You see those people welcoming the Indian troops when they come in.” “Why then,” he [Nixon] asked, “are we going through all of this agony?” Kissinger replied: “We are going through this agony to prevent the West Pakistan army from being destroyed. And secondly, to retain our Chinese arm. And thirdly, to prevent a complete collapse of the world’s psychological balance of power, which will be produced if a combination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed client state can tackle a not insignificant country without anybody doing anything.”

Kissinger’s basic fear was this: “If the Russians come out of it totally cocky, we may have a Middle East war in the spring.” And to avoid this, he was willing to send arms in the subcontinent. In fact, as the records suggest, in his own words, Kissinger considered India as their ‘own personal Rhineland’.

Nixon wanted to evacuate the American civilians in the East Bengal for which they wanted to enter their USS Enterprise. Its location at that time was in the

Western Pacific in the vicinity of Taiwan, Subic in the Philippines and the Yankee Station. Originally, the 7^th Fleet was bound for Hong Kong to celebrate Christmas. But they got sudden instructions to move into the Bay of Bengal. But there is a confusion in the official records. While Kissinger was primarily aiming for deterrence, Nixon was supposedly simply bent on evacuation. Their calculation was simple. If US launched its carrier in the Bay of Bengal, it would expect China to do the same in support of Pakistan. In fact, a major reason for Pakistan’s miscalculations in terms of strategy was its assumption of Chinese intervention in the Bay of Bengal any time. In tactical terms, the prescribed movement of the carrier would take two days, during which they were confident of the secrecy of their movement. But somehow the information was leaked. And India was again in attention. The Soviet nuclear submarines were already in the Bay of Bengal for guarding purposes. So when the HMS Eagle of the UK and the USS Enterprise entered Bany of Bengal, all they had to do was show their heads after encircling. The commander of the Carrier Battle Group was then the counter-admiral Dimon Gordon. He sent the report to the 7th American Fleet Commander: ‘Sir, we are too late. There are Russian nuclear submarines here, and a big collection of battleships’. The USSR had also threatened China that, if they ever opened a front against India on its border, they will receive a tough response from North. And that was precisely when America realized that for the second time it had been outmanouvred by a much deficient country.

There are many proposed reasons for the entry of USS Enterprise-

The USS Enterprise task force, Task Force 74, had no orders to attack or engage India. Its purpose was to warn the Soviet Union, to make Moscow squirm about possible confrontation with its Indian Ocean ships and then pressurize India into not attacking and humiliating West Pakistan with another attack on Kashmir as The idea was to “warn the Soviets not to let their ally India destroy Pakistan.” East Pakistan, modern day Bangladesh, was written off as a lost cause. The idea that the task force was about sending a message to Moscow and not to them may sound strange to Indians, but fit in neatly with a foreign policy that reduced everything to great power rivalries and alliances.
The attempt was simply to evacuate American civilians from the strained
The USA wanted to lure the Chinese into entering the conflict so that they could finally claim China’s entry into their
The USA wanted to deter India or make it aware of its vulnerable position as a country at war with a

The Indian side’s blunt approach to the entire situation was what affected US strategies completely. India had made its aims and objectives very clear. Something that Nixon administration avoided. A fine example of USA’s perplexity on India’s approach was when the US president said ‘the goddamn Indians’ were preparing for another war, Kissinger retorted ‘they are the most aggressive goddamn people around.’

It is also evident that Pakistan was disappointed in the US support in view of its failure to achieve the same in their own measures. The USSR had sent a massive supply of tanks of various types including amphibious tanks, heavy guns, anti-aircraft guns and other equipment to India in November and December by air and by sea. They had also employed a lot of skill in buying time at the Security Council to avoid any ceasefire. This was so because USSR had grasped the importance of US involvement with Pakistan. And a victory of India would indirectly imply the victory of USSR over US as well. Pakistan started reminding US of its campaign in the Middle East that it warned would be sabotaged by the Indo – Soviet partnership.

The extract from the letter mentioned below was sent by Yahya Khan to the President on December 14, 1971.

‘The perfidy in the sub – continent may not be the only move by the

Soviet Union to counter. There are already reports that the Soviet Union

is telling the Arabs about the futility of a United Nations with the sound

implication that, in order to achieve their objectives, they too may have

to resort to arms. This eventuality causes us considerable concern, because

it is bound to erode the solid Arab support that we have enjoyed

so far, apart from pre-empting the growth of favourable public opinion

in Arab countries as a result of your timely support to Pakistan.’

In fact, Pakistan repeatedly asked the USA to move the USS Enterprise to the Arabian Sea and launch an official attack on India. But USA had finally learned its lesson.

Recent trends in relations of India with the external players of 1971 War

‘The significance of the Bangladesh War on India’s national security, apart from being militarily strategic, lay in the political and diplomatic spheres. India’s role as a regional power was asserted.’[10] Post- Bangladesh Liberation, there was a paradigm shift in the foreign policy of almost every major or minor player of South East Asia- India, Pakistan, China, USA, USSR, UK and a positive start in Bangladesh too. India’s dominance of the subcontinent was established. And however unused this message has been, there was a clear message to almost every existing, or future state of the globe- India is a key player in International Relations. Pakistan was plunged into the shame of the debacle that its government and military had created. USA had another major shock after the Vietnam fiasco of 1960s and as has been evident from the last four decades, it has been working hard to establish a positive bilateral policy between the two countries. In fact, one can hardly imagine the quaint hostility of USA in 1970s, while considering the kind of mutual support the two countries have given to each other in almost every government since then especially in terms of human resources and nuclear treaties. The USSR had a major blow in 1989 with its disintegration, that ended the Cold War, but forced India to look West for new allies. Yet the relations have never gone downhill with the present day Russia as well. In the last decade, a large number of agreements have been signed and implemented and it still remains the biggest source of arms and armaments in India. Pakistan still remains the ‘shady next door neighbor’ of India. The latter has had numerous clashes with it after the 1970s as well, particularly the 1999 Kargil War, along with a host of terrorist activities and problems like counterfeit currency as well. Pakistan is an Islamic, undemocratic, unstable medium- sized garrison- state that in recent decades has been using Islamism, jihadism and support for terrorism to achieve its goal of becoming the dominant Islamic power in the region[11]. China and India have a competitive foreign policies. Both the countries constitute a major part of the global population with human resources. China has emerged as a fierce competitor of USA, bringing the latter and India closer. USA considers China as a threat to its status of global superpower while India considers the extremely rapid economic and military development of China as a dire potential threat. Turnabout is a fair game indeed.

Conclusion

India had an extremely crucial strategic victory in 1971. It freed itself from the constant threat of double side attack from Pakistan. It also had an even greater success in establishing itself as a key player of South Asian politics. But the biggest achievement of India during this war was its coming out from the very centre table of Cold War politics remarkably unscathed. With a little tweaking on its Non- Alignment stake, it was assured of the Soviet relationship and forced the USA to consider its potential as a neutral ally. USA indeed had faced a direct hit in the Vietnam War, but it was the global diplomatic good will that India created in an all around negative international political forum that truly left its mark as a dependable, independent, and a potentially strong international ally that would prove an important base of all its major foreign policies.

[1] (Tripathi, 2014)

[2] (Thapliyal, 1998)

[3] (Galloway, 2004)

[4] (Rahman)

[5] (Quaid-e-Azam declares Urdu as state language in East Bengal in 1948, 2014)

[6] (Kak, 2012)

[7] (Galloway, 2004)

[8] (U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan, April 6, 1971, Confidential, 5 pp. Includes Signatures from the Department of State. Source: RG 59, SN 70-73 Pol and Def. From: Pol Pak-U.S. To: Pol 17-1 Pak-U.S. Box 2535;)

[9] (Dummett, 2011)

[10] (Thapliyal, 1998)

[11] (Kemenade, 2008)

[i] List of abbreviations

USA- United States of America

USSR- Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

CENTO- Central Treaty Organization

SEATO- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

RAW- Research & Analysis Wing

UN- United Nations

IAF- Indian Air Force

[ii] During the period of 1947-1970 East Pakistan contributed 54.7% of the total income from exports. Though they exported more, they had only 31.1% share of the total import. The surplus from exports was spent for the imports of West Pakistan. Though the low-cost raw materials were available in East Pakistan, most of the mills and factories were set up in West Pakistan. The few industries grew in East Pakistan were owned by West Pakistanis. So for industrial matters East had to rely on the West. There was no barrier for anyone who went to West Pakistan taking gold and money with him/her; but there were government restrictions on bringing gold and money fromWest Pakistan.

[iii] In the parliamentary elections held in 1970, Awami league, advocating autonomy of East Pakistan, won absolute majority. Out of total of 300 National assembly seats, 162 was in East Pakistan, of which Awami league won 160 seats, Pakistan people’s party got 81 seats, all in the west. But the majority, Awami league was not allowed to form government, as the Punjabi dominated West Pakistani army took over.

[iv] Rahman’s six points were:

—The constitution should provide a federal and parliamentary form of government based on direct elections and universal suffrage.

—The central government would have authority only for defense and foreign affairs with all residual and other powers residing in the federating states.

—Two separate currencies which would be freely convertible should be created, although one currency would be acceptable provided that there would be adequate protection against the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan.

—Responsibility for fiscal policy should rest with the federating units and taxes would be collected by the states rather than by the central government.

—The states should maintain separate accounts for foreign exchange and would be free to conduct their own trade and aid negotiations.

—The federating units would be empowered to raise and maintain their own militia and paramilitary forces.

[v] The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), originally known as the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) was formed in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. It was dissolved in 1979.

[vi] The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, signed in September 1954 in Manila, Philippines. Despite its name, SEATO mostly included countries located outside of the region but with an interest either in the region or the organization itself. They were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (including East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

[vii] In 1968, the American Foreign Service Association established its Christian A. Herter Award to honor senior diplomats who speak out or otherwise challenge the status quo.

[viii] Kissinger: We should keep open the option of trying to deter the Indians, by a show of force, if necessary. We could then use that as a bridge to the sort of negotiation you (Williams) are talking about. This would also give the Soviets an excuse to try to help. Along this line, the President has asked for the pros and cons of getting an American aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal for the purpose of evacuating Americans. (to Moorer) Can you do it?

Adm. Moorer: Sure. It will take five or six days. We have several options. (South Asia Crisis, 1971, 2005)

(2005). South Asia Crisis, 1971. In L. J. Smith, & E. C. Keefer (Eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (Vol. XI). Washington: United States Government Printing Office.

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US – USSR Intervention in 1971 War of Bangladesh Liberation

[i]Introduction

Background

Recent trends in relations of India with the external players of 1971 War

Conclusion