Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh

“Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh”

Executive Summary

This report is a preliminary quest on how religious fundamentalism based on Islam grew in Bangladesh and what are the risks involved. Through a commentary on the different historical events occurring prior to and after the birth of Bangladesh as a nation-state, it will be shown how identity politics among other factors paved way for Islamic fundamentalism, and how Bangladesh has gone from a nation arising out of Bengali nationalism to an Islamic state. There have been perpetual violence on minorities, women and also towards secular sections of the society in the name of religion. Several bomb attacks have taken many innocent lives and this is only a minor attempt at revealing some of the causes of the emergence of religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh and its impact on the overall security of the country and its neighbouring states.

1. Introduction

1.1   Purposes

The aim of this report is to understand how Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh emerged and what impact it has on the security and stability of the country and its surrounding states. The report will dwell on how identity politics throughout history have helped breed fanaticism in Bangladesh, marked by repeated military coups and military rule, assassinations, political killings, killing of intellectuals, identity crisis, changes in the Constitution, gender inequalities, attack on minority groups, and an overall insecurity. It will thereby relate to International links to religious fundamentalist movements happening around the world. Henceforth it will follow that religious fundamentalism poses a serious threat to the country’s secularism, gender equality, lives and wellbeing of minorities and intellectuals, and to the security of Bangladesh and its neighbouring states. Lastly, some recommendations will be given as to how extremism and violence could be reduced and dealt with based on recent trends and events that are political or otherwise. Some definitions of key terms shall be explained in the following paragraph.

1.2   Definition of Key Terms & Abbreviations

Fundamentalism

According to Karen Armstrong, “Fundamentalism is more than a political protest against the West or the prevailing establishment. It also reflects deep-seated fear of modern institutions and has paranoid visions of demonic enemies everywhere. It is alarming that so many people in so many different parts are so pessimistic about the world that they can only find hope in fantasies of apocalyptic catastrophe.” (Murden, 2011) Although the term is originally used for Christians, to denote some Protestant churches. Since there are no modern or liberal approaches to Quran, the inclination of all Muslims towards the text of Quran is by principle fundamentalist. Nevertheless, the so-called Muslim or Islamic fundamentalists, that are the subject of this report, are different from other Muslims in that they not only base themselves with the teachings of Quran but also with Hadith or the Traditions of the Prophet (Lewis, 1988). They are “fundamentalist” in their intolerance and violence towards non-Muslims or to anyone harbouring views different from them.

Burqa is the veil or covering worn by Muslim women.

Fatwa is a sanction or a kind of ruling according to Islam, decided by muftis, Imams or other Islamic scholars, which they think are in accordance to the Quran, the holy book of Islam, the hadith, which is a collection of sayings and conduct of Prophet Muhammad, and form part of Sharia Law⁰ (Lewis, 1988).

Madrassa is the Arabic word for school, which could be either religious or secular, but is usually set up by Imams or Islamic priests and scholars and often is part of a mosque, and is religious. In Bangladesh, they are more popular in the villages than in the main cities, but their presence in the cities is also significant.

Murtadd means a person charged of apostasy in Islam and is considered an enemy or threat to Islam, and is subject to death as punishment and a war or jihad against him/her valid and necessary (Lewis, 1988: 84). Here, used in reference to the language used to call for the death of someone, who is of perceived threat to the Islamic fundamentalists. (Please refer to the Glossary of Terms and Acronyms at the very end)

1.3   Procedures

Information from various books on the topic, newspaper reports and articles, journals and some personal experiences have been included in this report. The study will involve drawing logical inferences and conclusions from the sources. Usually, the bibliography will include the journals and books consulted. There will also be a Notes section (corresponding to superscripted numbers in this report) containing a list of news reports, speeches, interviews, videos of historic moments and articles retrieved online.

1.4   Background

In 1947, British Rule ended and the Muslims claimed Pakistan to be their state while Hindus were to be settled in India although India retained secularism as the basis of its statehood. The Indian sub-continent was partitioned along the Radcliffe lines, which still remain the fault lines of dispute and communal tension, since the regions of Punjab (in the north-western side) and Bengal (in the eastern side) were not and could not be divided with the precision that all Muslim majority regions would fall in the portions of East or West Pakistan and all Hindu majority regions would fall in the Indian territory (Ganguly, 2001). Thus since the partition of 1947, communal tensions were common in many parts, including the now divided Bengal. Refugee flows¹ were common as many people fled to save their lives from the wrath of mobs (Zolberg et al, 1989).

During the 1950s and 1960s the grievances of East Pakistan grew as they were being more and more neglected by the West Pakistan centre, both economically and politically (Jahan, 2000). In 1952, the language movement broke out to demand for Bengali as one of the official languages of the State, and many lost lives (Anisuzzaman, 2000). In 1958, General Ayub Khan came to power and tried to corner Bengali identity in several ways, e.g. by trying to prevent Tagore centenary celebrations. Bengali identity began to gain more grounds due to such oppositions by the state, and the only common link between East and West Pakistan, Islam, got lesser importance. In 1969, power was transferred to General Yahya Khan². By now, the potentials of a new autonomous state for East Pakistan became a reality as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of AL, and 33 others, were released from prison, as they were charged with sedition in the Agartala Conspiracy Case in Ayub Khan’s regime; one other imprisoned was already killed while in custody of Pakistan Army. The hope of a new state called “Bangladesh” was already in the air. Later in 1970, the AL, the Bengali nationalist party of East Pakistan, secured an overwhelming victory in the elections, which was not accepted by the ruling elites of Pakistan. The overall discontent towards the rulers of West Pakistan heightened as East Pakistan was badly hit by cyclones during November and December of 1970. By March 1971, non-cooperation movement began, which involved students, political leaders and the many unfortunate people of East Bengal (or East Pakistan), and the call for independence³ was not very far. This was when genocide was carried out by the Pakistan Army on the people of East Pakistan and is still mourned as the dark nights of 25 March, 1971 (Mascarenhas, 1971). On 26 March 1971, independence of Bangladesh (Jahan, 2000) was declared⁴. Bangladesh was liberated after nine months of armed war, aided by direct intervention of India⁵. One might think this was the end of identity issues, as the Bengalis of East Pakistan found their Bengali identity established in the newly founded state of Bangladesh, which meant giving more importance to Bengali-ness in language and culture instead of being a satellite state with Pakistan only on the basis of religious similarity. Although the refugees who sheltered in India⁶ during the liberation war returned to Bangladesh after the surrender of Pakistan Army⁷ in the presence of the Indian Army on 16 December 1971, marking the Victory Day for Bangladesh, assassinations, political instability and military rule soon diseased the nation afterwards. Soon, the Bengali identity started getting side-lined. Identity crisis grew and refugee flows continued.

2. Findings

The following findings are mainly causes and impacts of religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh, that will help understand the rise of religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh. They are roughly ordered chronologically, but also separated by the issues and the nature of events involved. The events and/or phenomena are historical milestones that have or have helped aggravate the rise of religious fundamentalism.

1. Identity Crisis: Bangali or Bangladeshi?

Soon after the urge for realising a Bengali identity materialized with the liberation of Bangladesh, the need for a Bangladeshi identity instead of a Bengali nationalism began to come up (Anisuzzaman, 2000). When citizens of Bangladesh were to be called Bengalis, voices from the indigenous population of CHT, the Chakmas or the paharis, who were never Bengalis, raised opposition. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the then Prime Minister of Bangladesh, another kind of Bangladeshi nationalism came to the light, which did not arise out of any need for recognition of the paharis, but out of an intention to be different from the Bengalis of West Bengal, India. This was again alarmingly pointing back to the two-nation theory based on religion. Changes in the constitution indicate a lot about shifting identity dynamics.

1. Changes in the Constitution

In November 1976, the Constitution was amended (Fifth amendment) by General Ziaur Rahman (Anisuzzaman, 2000). Article 12 which emphasized on realising secularism through elimination of: communalism in all its forms, religious favouritism and/or discrimination and abuse of religion for political purposes, was removed. “Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim” (In the name of Almighty Allah) was added before the preamble. In May 1977, Article 38 was revoked allowing rights of political parties to be established on the basis of religion; a new clause was added in Article 25, stating “fraternal relationship with other Muslim states” based on “Islamic solidarity”. Later in the Eighth Amendment, on 7 June 1988, Islam was made the State religion, during the autocratic regime of Ershad. Recent amendments had made a ban on religious political parties at least on paper in 2010, but by July 2011 that has been restored⁸. Also, Islam was retained as the state religion, although secularism⁹ has been included again.

1. Islamic Militant Groups and Actors

Jama’at-i-Islami is the main Islamic political party in Bangladesh and has its parallels in India, Pakistan and in Kashmir. It originates from the Indian Jama’at-i-Islami, spearheaded by Maulana Abul Ada Maududi (1903–1979). Its main aim was to establish Islamic state. In Bangladesh, they are against NGOs and any culture of modern development (Rozario, 2006). Another Islamist group is JMB spearheaded by Maulana Saidur Rahman. JMB is reported to have caused seven bomb blasts in Dinajpur¹⁰. They also operate through their madrassas which are a source of recruits from poor sections of the society.

It is known that militants and actors from Islam majority countries including Bangladesh have been associates of Bin Laden in Kandahar. In a global operation led by the US, more than 80 Islamic militants were captured from different countries that form a crescent starting from Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan and Yemen to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and the Phillipines. In India, Bangladeshi militants plotting to bomb the US Consulate in Calcutta were detained by Indian authorities in December 1998. Bangladesh authorities also reported that Bin Laden sent US$1 million to HuJI in Dhaka. Many HuJI members trained and fought in Afghanistan (Rashid 2001, p136-7).

1. Minority Report

From 1947 to 1971, both Bengali Hindus and Bengali Muslims became migrants of India, mostly settling in West Bengal and some north-eastern Indian states such as Assam. Their treatment was rather different by the Indian authorities: the Bengali Hindus were treated as “refugees” but the Bengali Muslims were termed as “illegal migrants”. In 1971, both were termed as refugees, but both the Hindus and the Muslims trying to enter into India post-1971 were called as “illegal migrants”. But Hindu minority in the then East Pakistan continued to enter India in large numbers whenever religious agitations escalated and demand for Bengali rights conflicted with Pakistani authorities, as they were victimised both my the mob and the state apparatus of Pakistan. Seeking shelter on the basis of threat to life due to communal violence gave them refugee status and they had a potential “homeland” in India (Zolberg et al, 1989; p132-5).

“Government of Bangladesh has published many Census documents. In 1941, 28.3% of the population was minorities. Out of this, of Hindu was 11.88 million, while 588 thousand was other religious and ethnic minorities, like Buddhist, Christian and animist. As per the 1991 Census, the Muslim majority increased by 219.5%, while the Hindu community increased by 4.5%. If usual increase rate prevailed, the number of the Hindu community would have been 32.5 million in 1991, but the actual figure is 12.5 million. It means twenty million Hindu souls were missing.”¹¹

After the 2001 National election in Bangladesh, Hindus, Christians and Buddhists were beat up by elements of BNP and their ally Jamaat. They were also threatened to be forced to leave, or have their women raped, if they approached polling centres. Such oppression also occurred during 1990 just before fall of the Ershad regime. Hindu temples have been demolished on many occasions.

1. Terrorist Acts: Bomb Blasts and More

In March 1999, bomb blasts at UDICHI took 10 lives and several others were left wounded (Seabrook, 2002). In April 2001, there was a bomb blast at the Ramna Batamul in Dhaka during the Bengali New Year Festival, Pahela Baishakh; I myself had been present very near the blast when it happened, but was fortunately unhurt by it. In 21 August 2004 grenade attack – 9 to 13 explosions occurred in succession (Karlekar 2005). There were countrywide bombings on 17 August 2005. Behind all these terrorist acts were HuJI, JMB or LeT.

1. Passage of Arms and Ammunitions

On 2 April 2004, 1,290 AK series rifles, 1.1 million rounds, 25,020 grenades, 840 rockets, and night vision goggles and silencers for guns were seized from CHT, considered enough to arm a battalion in a modern army. The containers had ‘made in China’ labels. Experts believe that these were meant for some third party end users such as LTTE in Sri Lanks, and Maoist insurgents or J&K militants in India (Kumar 2004).

1. Women’s freedom under threat

 

Women, whether from majority or minority groups, have been oppressed in various ways by the patriarchal nature of the society, but religious fundamentalism has done its bit to enhance the situation for the worse. Today more Muslim women are donning the burqa than they did before, not necessarily by choice (Rozario, 2006) and on many occasions out of coercion from the family or society. In the villages, various fatwas sanction the stoning of women to death for the “crime” of asking for justice, for having been raped.

1. Voices against Religious Fundamentalism

Several intellectuals and secularists have been termed by Islamic fundamentalists as “murtadd”. One of the leading authors, Humayun Azad¹², was brutally stabbed in public by JMB elements intending to kill him. He barely escaped death and was in critical conditions. He died soon after in Germany, the events around which are also not very transparent.

3. Discussion

According to Kumar (2004), “Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan” (We would all be Taliban, and Bangladesh would be Afghanistan) – this slogan of the HuJI is a serious security issue for India. In that line, it is more problematic for Bangladesh herself. It follows from 2f. that if Bangladesh could be used as a transit of arms supply to J&K militants from say, Nepal, it won’t be too late that Islamic militants in Bangladesh would start arming themselves through similar contacts and routes. Such apprehensions are not outright far-fetched, due to events mentioned in 2e.
Following from 2d, at least after 1947, one side kept attacking the other (minorities, mostly Hindus), with the other either fleeing to India or accepting their fate. There was no option or decision neither the will nor the organization to fight, or to defend. It was only a die or fly situation.

From 2g, while even moderate Muslims might argue that burqa is not necessarily affecting the society or harming women as such and in fact helping them from the prying eyes of ogling men, it in fact poses serious problems for those women who are not in a position to wear it, or wish not to wear it and in the most obvious case, who are non-Muslims. The burqa cannot be a solution for today’s women of Bangladesh, as they are increasingly seeking professions outside the four walls of their homes. Also, the burqa cannot reduce rapes or molestations on women.

One trend should not go unnoticed: although the two main political parties AL and BNP have been in power alternatively and religious political parties have taken a backseat, their influence on the society cannot be undermined. This is evident in greater “Islamization” of the society and solidly expressed through establishment of Islam as state religion, albeit it was implemented for other political purpose to legitimise military rule in Bangladesh.

4. Conclusion

It can very well be concluded that the present scenario is not too hopeful and things are on the edge ready to be tipped off for the worse. The identity politics, the past prior to the birth of Bangladesh and the political dynamics have significantly aided the growth of religious fundamentalism and its immediate victims are the minorities, the women, and the secular sections of the society, and most importantly, the country’s security is at stake, also thereby endangering neighbouring states. The many terrorist acts and violence reassure the risks.

One may argue that religious fundamentalism is only an overt tool to fulfil political motives and that they are rather staged to realise political purposes. These identity politics do not simply have political implications, but they deeply affect culture and society. As Karl Marx rightly mentioned, “religion is the opium of the masses”, large sections of people can be mobilized in the name of religion and the nuisance it has caused, whether there be any political motivation or not, has been rather disastrous. Religion has been the cause or tool for much violence in South Asia (Radhakrishnan, 1995), and it continues to be the dominant issue in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

So, does it mean that religious fundamentalism is only a weapon or a distraction used for political purposes to ward off attention from the main issues which threaten the Bengali society, such as poverty, corruption, population and political instabilities? Or is it something deeper than that?

Does the compromised location of Bangladesh being a deltaic region perpetually hit by floods and cyclone, make the region unfortunate enough for people to seek solace in religion?  Are the people really god-fearing and simply supporting fanaticisms in fear of going against the grain of Islam, or are they afraid of hurting the dominant sentiments? What are these dominant trends (some of it has been discussed in the earlier section) and how have they come about to the present state? Could it be that the seeds of the past (of 1947) are simply being reaped off? Or, is there an extended past in which one group (lower caste Hindus and non-Hindus) have been thoroughly oppressed by some other group (the upper-class Hindus of the Brahminical order and The Kings), and now, the former have evolved over the years to fear and mistrust the intentions and plights of the latter? Does it really make the atrocities done on the minority groups justifiable for the recent decades? Or will the basic sentiments of Bengali identity and the significance of the language Bengali keep re-emerging in times of crisis and need, as they have done in the past, and keep religious fundamentalism at bay?

These are only some of the questions that come up from the information and discussions so far, in the narrowed space of this report. This bombardment of questions may seem inconclusive but in fact reveals key issues threatening Bangladesh and its society, to which there are no straightforward answers or solutions. There are also contemporary issues outside the context and history of Bangladesh and its surrounding states, which affect the dynamics of religious/political identity in Bangladesh.  There is also an overarching influence of the Islamic Bloc in the international community which may lead us to assume the presence of a kind of Islamic hegemony which is almost surpassing the Western/European hegemony of the yester years. It is now no longer the west versus the rest but the Islamic Bloc versus the rest (Huntington, 1996). This may sound like an anti-Islamic rhetoric sponsored by the Western imperialists, but when it comes to sub-continental situation, there are more traumas to deal with in the backyard by the antagonistic local communities themselves rather than blaming the Western imperialist powers who have perennially tried to rule the East earlier by colonization and later through impositions of modernization and globalization. The so-called Arab awakening is echoing another kind of fear among secular scholars/authors, albeit Western, who feel these overthrows (despite being inevitable and necessary) of monarchs would only pave way for more religious fundamentalism as the better organized Islamists would and are taking over the Arab streets and filling in the “power vacuums” that come for free with the revolutions (Bradley, 2012). Whatever the significance of that maybe to the Western powers, for weak powers such as Bangladesh, and especially for the dwindling minorities, the women and the “godless” secularists of Bangladesh, this may well ring yet another alarm bell, as Islamic elements may very well join the Arab journey into yet another hundred years of travelling “backwards”, following the footsteps of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Social globalization which is a very much on-going phenomenon, especially more so in the current years, would only help coagulate the links and the tendencies (Nye, 2005). What would be interesting to watch is, where all these would steer Bangladesh and its people into, if all the elements, opposed to religious fundamentalism and its moderate versions, disappear, or are excised systematically, as they have been on many occasions in the past. Perhaps due to no resistance or action by minority groups against torture and violence against them by fundamentalist or opportunist groups, it would be rather difficult for any actors (internal or external) to keep fuelling the religious divide, unless situations go berserk due to several other factors, which is more probable. This is particularly probable since war is not the means, but the end itself (Creveld, 1991). I would say that war is not the end but only the beginning. On this note, I remain timidly hopeful to offer some recommendations in the following section.

5. Recommendations

• If madrassas cannot be immediately removed, close supervision is needed as to what curriculums they follow. They should slowly be converted into school units of a standardised curriculum, since these become easy barracks or training camps for fundamentalist acitivities.
• Population control programs should be undertaken since Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated regions of the world and much of the problems arise out of problems in handling such a large population. Although Bangladesh is considered to be homogenous, the disparity in people of contrasting socio-economic classes makes it rather problematic for the overall development of the society. Physicians often complain of not being able to successfully advice patient into birth control and family planning due to their general ignorance and belief in superstitions.
• Laws for rights of women and against violence on women should be enforced. Civil society groups should also bring more awareness so that laws are utilised to prevent or bring justice to violence on women. Elements of religious fanatic groups, especially in villages, sanction stoning to death of women or other atrocities done on women. These need to be directly stopped by law.
• Bengali identity together with room for pluralism should be encouraged by the state. Cultural associations and activities can be a good source of such assimilation and accommodation.
• Article 2A of the Constitution which states Islam as the state religion must be withdrawn. This will not be easy to implement but is imperative for communal harmony and for better integration of minorities into the nationhood.
• Strict actions must be taken by law to prevent abuse of religion for political purposes and Article 38 should be implemented again as was originally there in the constitution before 1977.

Notes (News and Video Sources)

1. BBC “Sharia”http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/sharia_1.shtml
2. BBC Documentary “The Day India Burned” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WQcMPbHfxaA, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoeiS094g9Y&feature=relmfu
3. President Yahya Khan interview on East Pakistan refugees, 31^st July 1971 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9cHUJBt2Sw&feature=endscreen&NR=1
4. Historical Speech by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 7 March 1971 (in Bengali) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ep74MqbXEWU&feature=related
5. ABC News of Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0tQk4r0FtmY
6. Interview of Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, 1971. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKiQboyDMUo
7. Indira Gandhi on the refugees in India, 1 November 1971 http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=3OdRm7AS9O4&feature=fvwp
8. Brigadier Baqir Siddiqui, Chief of Staff, Eastern Command of Pakistan Army surrenders with his 12,000 men before Indian Army Major General Gandharv Nagra on December 21 1971 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQb6mhgBVmE
9. The Daily Star, 1 July 2011 http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=192303
10. com, 4 October 2010 http://www.bdnews24.com/details.php?cid=2&id=175271&hb=4
11. South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm
12. Islam Watch. “Humanity Assassinated: Ethnic Cleansing of Minorities in Islamic Bangladesh” by Sujit Das, 12 July 2009 http://www.islam-watch.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=88
13. The Daily Star Home. “The assault on Humayun Azad and a few thoughts” by Kazi Priyanka http://www.thedailystar.net/rising/2004/03/02/special.htm

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdullah, A. A., 2000. Bangladesh: Promise and Performance. Edited by Rounaq Jahan. London: Zed Books

Anisuzzaman, M., 2000. Bangladesh: Promise and Performance. Edited by Rounaq Jahan. London: Zed Books

Bradley, J. R., 2012. After The Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle-East Revolts. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Creveld, M. V., 1991. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press

Feldman, S., 2000. Bangladesh: Promise and Performance. Edited by Rounaq Jahan. London: Zed Books

Ganguly, S., 2001. Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947. Washington D C: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.

Jahan, R., 2000. Bangladesh: Promise and Performance. Edited by Rounaq Jahan. London: Zed Books

Karlekar, H., 2005. Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? New Delhi: Sage Publications

Khan, A. R., 2000. Bangladesh: Promise and Performance. Edited by Rounaq Jahan. London: Zed Books

Kumar, P., 2004. “Bangladesh: Turning into another Afghanistan?” Terrorism – Articles, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi. Website:http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism/bangladesh-turning-into-another-afghanistan-1371.html Last Accessed: 30 April 2012

Lewis, B., 1988. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Mascarenhas, A., 1971. The Rape of Bangladesh. New Delhi: Vikas

Murden, S., 2011. The Globalization of World Politics. 5th Ed. Edited by John Baylis & Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Nye, J. S., 2005. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History 5^th Ed. New York: Pearson Education

Radhakrishnan, S., 1995. Religion and Society. New Delhi: Indus

Rashid, A., 2001. Taliban The Story of Afghan Warlords. London: Pan Macmillan

Rozario, S., 2006. “The new burqa in Bangladesh: Empowerment or violation of Women’s Rights?” Women’s Studies International Forum 29 (2006) pp. 368–380                                                                                           Website: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277539506000379 Last Accessed: 30 April 2012

Seabrook, J., 2002. Freedom Unfinished: Fundamentalism and Popular Resistance in Bangladesh Today. London: Zed Books.

Zolberg, A. R., Suhrke, A. & Aquayo, S., 1989. Escape From Violence: Conflict and Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Glossary of Terms & Acronyms

AL Awami League

BNP Bangladesh National Party

CHT Chittagong Hill Tracks

HuJI Harkat-ul-Jehad-ul-Islami

IOJ Islamic Oikyo Jot (Coalition of Islamic Unity)

Jamaat/JIB Jama’at-i-Islami, Bangladesh

J&K Jammu and Kashmir

JMB Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh

JP Jatiya Party

LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Paharis tribal people who live in the hills of Bangladesh

UDICHI cultural wing of the Leftist Communist Party of Bangladesh