What Really Led to Partition Pakistan | Rajnikant Puranik
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Questions of Nation, Country & Religion
Why was Sindh not Partitioned? Nehru declined Khairpur offer Making Jews of Hindu Sindhis
Congress without an Answer, thanks to ‘Non-Violence’ {8} Partition of Assets
55 crores to Pakistan & the Kashmir Issue {9} Hurried, Irresponsible Partition
Partition Mayhem Unplanned & Mismanaged Partition Joint Culpability British Culpability & Mountbatten’s Gross Mismanagement Indian Leaders’ Culpability. Nehru-Liaquat Pact 1950 Ambedkar’s Sensible Solution: Population Exchange Clueless Gandhians
In the context of the Partition and Pakistan, it is worthwhile to deliberate on the basics related to a country, state, nation, nationhood, and nationality.
(Dr BR Ambedkar’s quotes below are from his exhaustive, analytical, and well-argued book “Pakistan or the Partition of India”{Amb3}, second edition, published in January 1945. His earlier book on the same theme was “Thoughts on Pakistan” published in 1941. Remarks in square-brackets are not part of the quotes.)
Bibliography
What constitutes a Nation?
Common Race, Language, Geography? Ambedkar: “…As a matter of historical experience, neither race, nor language, nor country has sufficed to mould a people into a nation. The argument is so well put by Renan: … Language invites re-union; it does not force it. The United States and England, Spanish America and Spain speak the same languages and do not form single nations. On the contrary, Switzerland which owes her stability to the fact that she was founded by the assent of her several parts counts three or four languages. In man there is something superior to language-will. The will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the variety of her languages, is a much more important fact than a similarity of language, often obtained by persecution.’…”
What REALLY constitutes a Nation? Ambedkar: “Nationality is a social feeling. It is a feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and kin. This national feeling is a double edged feeling. It is at once a feeling of fellowship for one’s own kith and kin and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not one’s own kith and kin. It is a feeling of ‘consciousness of kind’ which on the one hand binds together those who have it, so strongly that it over-rides all differences arising out of economic conflicts or social gradations and, on the other, severs them from those who are not of their kind. It is a longing not to belong to any other group. This is the essence of what is called a nationality and national feeling.”
Renan’s Definition
Renan (Joseph Ernest Renan (1823-1892) was a French philosopher and historian, and well-known for his 1882 lecture ‘What is a Nation?’) quoted by Ambedkar:
“…A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common possession of a rich heritage of memories; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve worthily the undivided inheritance which has been handed down. Man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, and sacrifices, and devotion.
“Ancestor-worship is therefore, all the more legitimate; for our ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory-I mean glory of the genuine kind-these form the social capital, upon which a national idea may be founded. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have done great things together, to will to do the like again-such are the essential conditions for the making of a people. We love in proportion to the sacrifices we have consented to make, to the sufferings we have endured. We love the house that we have built, and will hand down to our descendant…
“In the past an inheritance of glory and regrets to be shared, in the future a like ideal to be realised; to have suffered, and rejoiced, and hoped together; all these things are worth more than custom houses in common, and frontiers in accordance with strategic ideas; all these can be understood in spite of diversities of race and language… to have suffered together, for indeed, suffering in common is a greater bond of union than joy. As regards national memories, mournings are worth more than triumphs; for they impose duties, they demand common effort…”
‘Nationality’ is the status of belonging to a particular nation either by birth, or by naturalization. It is being a member of a nation. It determines the political status of an individual.
Nationalism’ refers to loyalty and devotion to a nation. It is a sense of national consciousness exalting one’s nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups. Nationalism is based on the premise that an individual’s loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpasses other individual or group interests. It represents the spirit or aspirations common to the whole of a nation. The term ‘nationalism’ is generally used to describe the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity; and the actions that they take when seeking to achieve or sustain self-determination.
Religion does NOT define nation or nationhood. If it did all of Western Europe, which is Christian, would be one country. From Egypt to Pakistan there would not be multiple countries, but one Muslim country. Most modern countries are multi-religion countries.
‘State’ refers to a self-governing legal and political entity. The Montevideo Convention defines the state as a person of international law that possesses the following four qualifications: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
One country may comprise several nations or nationalities. For example, Switzerland comprises three nations or nationalities: the Germans, the French and the Italians. The United Kingdom comprises four nations or nationalities: Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and England. Canada and Belgium comprise two nations each.
One nation or nationality may be spread across many countries. You have Indians and Jews all over the world.
There may be nations or nationalities without any country. For example, Kurds and Yezidis, and lately, the Tibetans, do not yet have a country of their own. Jews did not have a country of their own till Israel (which used to be their country long back) came into being in 1948.
Country, Nation, Nationality, State, … :
Definitions & Differences A country’ is a physical region that is identified as a distinct entity in political geography. A country may be an independent sovereign state, or one that is occupied by another state-a non-sovereign state. The term country emphasizes the physical region, the boundaries of a geographical area.
Whether or not a country is a country may depend upon one’s political stand. For example, Taiwan claims to be a country, but China states that Taiwan is just another part of China. Many countries, not wanting to upset China, don’t recognize Taiwan as a country. Many countries annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War were treated as independent but ‘occupied countries by the USA and others.
‘Nation’ has been defined above, and refers to specific community of people with shared history, culture, and aspirations. Although the term ‘nation’ is often used interchangeably with the term ‘country’, there is a subtle difference. ‘Country’ refers to a physical region, while ‘nation’ refers to people.
‘Nationhood is the state of being a nation.
Why India a Nation British Propaganda: India-NOT a Nation! Ambedkar: “The Anglo-Indians were never tired of proclaiming that India was not a nation, that ‘Indians’ was only another name for the people of India. In the words of one Anglo-Indian ‘to know India was to forget that there is such a thing as India’…”
John Strachey wrote in 1888: “This is the first and most essential thing to remember about India: that there is not and never was an India, possessing… any sort of unity, physical, political, social or religious; no Indian nation.”
Lord Minto (1845-1914), who succeeded Lord Curzon, and was the Viceroy of India from 1905 to 1910, deliberately and mischievously referred to India as many nations. Further, rather than acknowledging the fact that 99.9% of the Indian Muslims were forced Hindu converts, and thus belonged to the same nation and race as the Hindus, referred to them as “the descendants of a conquering and ruling race”, so as to drive a wedge between the two communities.
The soldiers of fortune of the East India Company were gradually replaced by the British Civil Services in the latter half of the 19th century. Being lucrative, the services attracted the British upper and middle class talent. As this class settled in India with their families comfortably in exclusive Civil Lines, with an army of cheap, native household staff at their beck and call, and socialised in their exclusive clubs, they entrenched themselves as the new ruling elite. They developed a vested interest in their own continuance. They had friends, acquaintances, and relatives in the army, academe, media and political establishment, who also directly or indirectly benefitted from the Raj. Gradually, they all started talking the same language, and began propagating the same myth: that India is an artificial entity-a creation of the British! That there were but a few periods in history when India was united; and that it were the British who wove the pieces into a single political entity, and thus created a single, unified nation. Tragedy is many educated Indians even today believe this fairy tale.
One has to credit the British and Western historians, sociologists, archaeologists, economists, novelists, authors, academicians, bureaucrats, civil servants, politicians, journalists, army men and the like with one thing: they spoke and wrote consistent and co-ordinated lies to advance the cause of colonialism, and Western and Christian domination. Perhaps their standing, fame, funding, acceptability, popularity, and material status depended upon that, as also the opportunities the East India Company, and later the Crown and the Raj opened up for them.
This self-serving British and Western narrative helped perpetuate colonial domination by its multiple mischievous ends: brain-wash Indians themselves by teaching such muck (like India was never a nation, it was only a creation of the British) in schools and colleges, and propagating it generally as a product of serious research; inculcate inferiority complex among the subjects; promote policy of divide and rule, and so on. Brown Sahibs were its by-products, as also the westernised, fake-modern Indian political dynasties.
people that constitute a nation are best served by a common political entity-the nation-state. What constituted a nation has already been defined above. The feeling of being a nation, and the nationalism (love of one’s nation/country, and willingness to sacrifice for it) that it gives rise to led to the creation of nation-states and modern countries, with their well-defined boundaries, and the passport and visa system.
The UK as we know now is the result of reformation in 1822. It underwent changes in 1702, and then again in 1801.
The US is barely 240 years old, and has undergone massive changes since its inception in 1776. Initially, it comprised only the states on the East Coast, and its area was a small fraction of its current spread. Thomas Jefferson, the third President, nearly doubled the geographical area of the USA through purchase of Louisiana from the French. Consequent to a war with Mexico, Texas and California joined it only in 1845. It gradually expanded.
The countries in Africa and South America are also relatively young, and their boundaries are a result of the European colonial rule.
Would any one deny Greece as a nation-state? Greece has one of the longest histories of any country, and is considered the cradle of Western civilization. Yet, annexed by Rome in the 2nd century BCE, Greece became an integral part of the Roman Empire and its successor, the Byzantine Empire. Later, falling under Ottoman Empire in the mid-15th century CE, Greece re-emerged only in 1830 following a war of independence.
If centuries of same geographical boundary, inhabited by the same people, under a continuous political rule be the criteria of a nation-state, then NO European, American, Asian or African country qualifies for it. So, where is the justification in singling India out?
Egypt, Iran, and Iraq retain nothing of their ancient civilisations, the same having been obliterated by Islam, yet they are nation-states. China is the only ancient civilization that can claim continuity like India.
No country or nation in the world comes anywhere near India in the continuity of its ancient civilisation and religion, and yet the British had the temerity to question India’s nationhood!
Grounds: Why India a Nation
If India Not A Nation, So Also All Other Countries When the British and the West told all those above things about India, they conveniently forgot to mention that almost all the Western countries have a long history of ever-changing borders, partitions, truncations, mergers, and re-groupings. If despite all that they remained nations and countries, why not India? If anything, India with its well-defined, natural geographical borders-sea on two sides, Himalayas to the north, and mountain-ranges in the west-has been a nation for thousands of centuries.
Idea of nation-states emerged in Europe in the 18th century. It was realised that the aspirations of the
Geography The boundaries of India are defined by nature: sea on almost three sides, Himalayas to the north, and mountain-ranges to the north-west, and north-east.
Civilization Indian civilization is the oldest in the world. As per the latest research, the Indus Valley Civilization is
Thanks to fertile and economically favourable river-soil-climate systems around Indus, Ganga, Narmada, Cauvery and other rivers, India has been home to rich civilization since the olden times.
Arabs, Persians and Greeks were familiar with the area that was Hind (India) long before the Mughals came on the scene. Megasthenes (350-290 BCE), a Greek ethnographer and explorer, wrote his 4-volume work ‘Indica’ on India. Name of the work on India of another Greek, Arrian, a historian of Alexander the Great, is also Indica.
In a long series of powerful Indian Emperors who consolidated India since the fourth century BCE, the British were only the last power to administratively consolidate India’s territories-but, certainly not the first. The lies of the British and Western historians, academics and politicians, and their Indian lackeys, cannot hide the stark truth.
Through scriptures like Ramayan, Mahabharat, Vedas, Upanishads, Puranas, and various other texts, one finds that Bharat, or Bharatavarsha, or Aryavarta, or the Indian nation, and Bharatiyata, or Indianness have existed for thousands of years, long before the term nation-state or nationality was coined in the West, and long before the US, the UK, and other countries came into existence.
Hinduism has long since joined east and west, and north and south. The most sacred Hindu places have been there in the four corners of India. From Kashmir to Kanyakumari, and from Dwarka to Assam there has been all too obvious common heritage.
Despite the changes in kings, and the changing boundaries of kingdoms in the various territories within India through the ages, an overarching cultural and religious oneness remained. India had gurus, sadhus and saints from all parts of India-north, south, east, west, centre-and all were equally venerated: there was no domination from any one area. For example, even though Adi Shankaracharya belonged to Kerala in the extreme south, he travelled all over India, established maths, and was, and is, revered by all Indians. He established maths in the four corners of India: Badrinath in the north in Uttarakhand, Shringeri in the south in Karnataka, Puri in the east in Orissa, and Dwarka in the west in Gujarat. Besides, there is Shankaracharya Hill in Srinagar in Kashmir, which he had visited. The legend of Shakti permeates all of India with its 51 Shakti Peetham temples spread all over India.
Even though Hinduism-the most broad-minded, tolerant, respectful-to-others and democratic among all religions-had multiple strands, they all wove into a common thread.
British Lies If India was not a nation, and didn’t exist but for the British, why did they call their company that began India’s colonisation the ‘East India Company’? Why the different European colonialists called their companies ‘British East India Company’, ‘Dutch East India Company’, ‘French East India Company’, and so on. They could have called it ‘British South Asia Company’, or something like that.
Why Columbus, when he reached the Americas by mistake, rather than India he had sailed out for, called the natives there Indians? They came to be known as the red-Indians.
If there was no India, and if India was a creation of the British Empire, why did the Portuguese celebrate the discovery of a sea-route to India when Vasco de Gama had landed in Calicut in South India? Why were the British, the Dutch, the French, and the Portuguese queuing up for India. Obviously because they knew it to be a rich nation waiting to be looted. And, to insult that very nation after filling-up your pockets by calling it not a nation’is not to be just ungrateful, but to be downright mean, vile and smallminded, befitting the mentality of a thief and a dacoit.
Muslims-a Separate Nation?
Indian civilization is a unique example of unity in diversity. Despite multiple languages, differing foodhabits, differing attires, differing strands of Hinduism, differing manners of worship, differing cultural scenes, differing political kingdoms within its territory-which elsewhere in the world would have meant scores of nations and nationalities, and what British indeed tried to leverage and hammer-in for their divide-and-rule project-Indianness and over-arching broad Hinduism wove Indians together as one nation.
Political Oneness Western nations may boast political unity going back a hundred to several hundred years. India was politically united as long back as in the third century BCE under the Mauryas. Thereafter, from time to time it got divided among various kings, and got periodically re-united under powerful emperors like Kanishkas, Satavahanas, Guptas, and so on. Powerful southern dynasties like the Chalukya-Cholas united south India, and came up north. The southern kings, including Vijayanagara Kingdom, extended their empire to south-east Asia, and as far away as Indonesia and Cambodia.
Arabs, Persians and Greeks were familiar with the area that was Hind (India) long before the Mughals
Jinnah, Iqbal, Aga Khan, other Muslim leaders, and the Muslim League claimed Muslims formed a separate nation. Hence, they deserved a separate country-Pakistan.
Similarities between Indian Muslims & Hindus There were enough similarities between the Indian Muslims and Hindus to constitute them into ONE nation, and NOT TWO nations.
Ambedkar: “…it is said that there is no difference of race between the Hindus and the Muslims. That the Punjabi Musalman and the Punjabi Hindu, the U. P. Musalman and the U. P. Hindu,… are racially of one stock. Indeed there is more racial affinity between the Madras Musalman and the Madras Brahmin than there is between the Madras Brahmin and the Punjab Brahmin. In the second place, reliance is placed upon linguistic unity between Hindus and Muslims. It is said that the Musalmans have no common
contrary, there is a complete linguistic unity between the two. In the Punjab, both Hindus and Muslims speak Punjabi. In Sind, both speak Sindhi. In Bengal, both speak Bengali. In Gujarat, both speak Gujarati. In Maharashtra, both speak Marathi. So in every province. It is only in towns that the Musalmans speak Urdu and the Hindus the language of the province. But outside, in the mofussil, there is complete linguistic unity between Hindus and Musalmans. Thirdly, it is pointed out that India is the land which the Hindus and Musalmans have now inhabited together for centuries…”
On social and cultural similarities, Ambedkar said that it had been pointed out that: “…the Avans of the Punjab, though they are nearly all Muslims, retain Hindu names and keep their genealogies in the Brahmanic fashion. Hindu surnames are found among Muslims. For instance, the surname Chaudhari is a Hindu surname but is common among the Musalmans of U.P. and Northern India. In the matter of marriage, certain groups of Muslims are Muslims in name only… In the social sphere the caste system is alleged to be as much a part of Muslim society as it is of Hindu society. In the religious sphere, it is pointed out that many Muslim pirs had Hindu disciples; and similarly some Hindu yogis have had Muslim chelas…”
Why Certain Similarities Superficial Ambedkar: “… There are many flaws in the Hindu argument. In the first place, what are pointed out as common features are not the result of a conscious attempt to adopt and adapt to each other’s ways and manners to bring about social fusion. On the other hand, this uniformity is the result of certain purely mechanical causes. They are partly due to incomplete conversions. In a land like India, where the majority of the Muslim population has been recruited from caste and out-caste Hindus, the Muslimization of the convert was neither complete nor effectual, either from fear of revolt or because of the method of persuasion or insufficiency of preaching due to insufficiency of priests. There is, therefore, little wonder if great sections of the Muslim community here and there reveal their Hindu origin in their religious and social life. Partly it is to be explained as the effect of common environment to which both Hindus and Muslims have been subjected for centuries. A common environment is bound to produce common reactions, and reacting constantly in the same way to the same environment is bound to produce a common type…”
Dissimilarities between Indian Muslims & Hindus Looking to Renan’s definition given above of what really constitutes a nation, let us see what Ambedkar had to say.
Ambedkar: “…Are there any common historical antecedents which the Hindus and Muslims can be said to share together as matters of pride or as matters of sorrow? That is the crux of the question… So far as this aspect of their relationship is concerned, they have been just two armed battalions warring against each other. There was no common cycle of participation for a common achievement. Their past is a past of mutual destruction-a past of mutual animosities, both in the political as well as in the religious fields. As
mutual destruction-a past of mutual animosities, both in the political as well as in the religious fields. As Bhai Parmanand (Indian nationalist and Arya Samaj leader: 1876-1947) points out in his pamphlet called ‘The Hindu National Movement: ‘In history the Hindus revere the memory of Prithvi Raj, Pratap, Shivaji and, Beragi Bir, who fought for the honour and freedom of this land (against the Muslims), while the Mahomedans look upon the invaders of India, like Muhammad Bin Qasim and rulers like Aurangzeb as their national heroes.’… Thus, the things that divide are far more vital than the things which unite. In depending upon certain common features of Hindu and Mahomedan social life, in relying upon common language, common race and common country, the Hindu is mistaking what is accidental and superficial for what is essential and fundamental…
“Said Renan: ‘Forgetfulness, and I shall even say historical error, form an essential factor in the creation of a nation;…’ The pity of it is that the two communities can never forget or obliterate their past. Their past is imbedded in their religion, and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. To hope for this is to hope in vain… There is no such longing between the Hindus and Musalmans to belong together as there is among the Musalmans of India…”
Why Muslims a Separate Group? Evaluating this claim of Muslims in the light of the definition for a nation and nationality articulated by Ambedkar under the heading ‘What constitutes a Nation?’ above, Ambedkar observes: “…Is it or is it not a fact that the Muslims of India are an exclusive group? Is it or is it not a fact that they have a consciousness of kind? Is it or is it not a fact that every Muslim is possessed by a longing to belong to his own group and not to any non-Muslim group?…”
Muslim View of Nation Ambedkar: “…According to Muslim Canon Law the world is divided into two camps, Dar-ul-Islam (abode of Islam) and Dar-ul-Harb (abode of war). A country is Dar-ul-Islam when it is ruled by Muslims. A country is Dar-ul-Harb when Muslims only reside in it but are not rulers of it. That being the Canon Law of the Muslims, India cannot be the common motherland of the Hindus and the Musalmans. It can be the land of the Musalmans-but it cannot be the land of the ‘Hindus and the Musalmans living as equals’. Further, it can be the land of the Musalmans only when it is governed by the Muslims. The moment the land becomes subject to the authority of a non-Muslim power, it ceases to be the land of the Muslims. Instead of being Dar-ul-Islam it becomes Dar-ul-Harb.
“It might also be mentioned that Hijrat [move out to a Muslim country] is not the only way of escape to Muslims who find themselves in a Dar-ul-Harb. There is another injunction of Muslim Canon Law called Jihad (crusade) by which it becomes ‘incumbent on a Muslim ruler to extend the rule of Islam until the whole world shall have been brought under its sway… Technically, it is the duty of the Muslim ruler, who is capable of doing so, to transform Dar-ul-Harb into Dar-ul-Islam.
“Not only can they proclaim Jihad but they can call the aid of a foreign Muslim power to make Jihad a
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the eages and no modulation of age-old angularities.
endeavour a success. This was clearly explained by Mr. Mahomed Ali in his address to the Jury in the Sessions Court.
“This is the basis of Pan-Islamism. It is this which leads every Musalman in India to say that he is a Muslim first and Indian afterwards. It is this sentiment which explains why the Indian Muslim has taken so small a part in the advancement of India but has spent himself to exhaustion by taking up the cause of Muslim countries and why Muslim countries occupy the first place and India occupies a second place in his thoughts… [example: Khilafat Movement of 1920-22].
“…Among the tenets one that calls for notice is the tenet of Islam which says that in a country which is not under Muslim rule wherever there is a conflict between Muslim law and the law of the land, the former must prevail over the latter and a Muslim will be justified in obeying the Muslim law and defying the law of the land…”
“…For Islam divides as inexorably as it binds. Islam is a close corporation and the distinction that it makes between Muslims and non-Muslims is a very real, very positive and very alienating distinction. The brotherhood of Islam is not the universal brotherhood of man. It is brotherhood of Muslims for Muslims only. There is a fraternity but its benefit is confined to those within that corporation. For those who are outside the corporation, there is nothing but contempt and enmity. The second defeat of Islam is that it is a system of social self-government and is incompatible with local self-government, because the allegiance of a Muslim does not rest on his domicile in the country which is his but on the faith to which he belongs… Wherever there is the rule of Islam, there is his own country. In other words, Islam can never allow a true Muslim to adopt India as his motherland and regard a Hindu as his kith and kin. That is probably the reason why Maulana Mahomed Ali, a great Indian but a true Muslim, preferred to be buried in Jerusalem rather than in India.
“From a spiritual point of view, Hindus and Musalmans are not merely two classes or two sects such as Protestants and Catholics or Shaivas and Vaishnavas. They are two distinct species… For them Divinity is divided and with the division of Divinity their humanity is divided and with the division of humanity they must remain divided. There is nothing to bring them in one bosom…”
Irreconcilable Hindu-Muslim Antagonism Ambedkar: “… The real explanation of this failure of Hindu-Muslim unity lies in the failure to realize that what stands between the Hindus and Muslims is not a mere matter of difference, and that this antagonism is not to be attributed to material causes. It is formed by causes which take their origin in historical, religious, cultural and social antipathy, of which political antipathy is only a reflection…
“… Like the Christians and Muslims in the Turkish Empire, the Hindus and Muslims of India have met as enemies on many fields, and the result of the struggle has often brought them into the relation of conquerors and conquered. Whichever party has triumphed, a great gulf has remained fixed between the two and their enforced political union either under the Moghuls or the British instead of passing over, as in so many other cases, into organic unity, has only accentuated their mutual antipathy. Neither religion nor social code can bridge this gulf.
“The two faiths are mutually exclusive and whatever harmonies may be forged in the interest of good social behaviour, at their core and centre they are irreconcilable. There seems to be an inherent antagonism between the two which centuries have not been able to dissolve. Notwithstanding the efforts made to bring the creeds together by reformers like Akbar and Kabir, the ethical realities behind each have still remained, to use a mathematical phrase, which nothing can alter or make integers capable of having a common denominator.
“If Islam and Hinduism keep Muslims and Hindus apart in the matter of their faith, they also prevent their social assimilation. That Hinduism prohibits intermarriage between Hindus and Muslims is quite well known. This narrow-mindedness is not the vice of Hinduism only. Islam is equally narrow in its social code. It also prohibits intermarriage between Muslims and Hindus. With these social laws there can be no social assimilation and consequently no socialization of ways, modes and outlooks, no blunting of the edges and no modulation of age-old angularities.
Muslims: Really a Separate Nation? NO. As was seen earlier, religion can NOT be a ground for a separate nation. Indian Muslims were NOT a separate nation entitled to a separate country, Pakistan. Nor was there such a definite demand till 1940. However, sustained demagoguery of the leaders of the Muslim League and other Muslim organisations, actively encouraged by the British for their own vested interests did the trick.
However, it has to be admitted that there is something unique about Islam-something uncommon with other religions. While other religions have evolved or changed, or their followers no longer take the original edicts of their ancient religion seriously, the same is not the case with the overwhelming majority of Muslims. They still wish to be guided and controlled by what was said in the seventh century CE. The combination and co-ordinated vested interests of the Muslim clergy, and the kings and the ruling classes of the Muslim countries have been so viciously strong that they don’t allow any liberalisation, lest their hold be diluted. They want the Muslim masses to remain devoutly religious, and stick to the seventh century CE edicts and culture and practices. Why? That’s their defence against secularism, democracy and freedom. Because if their countries become secular, free, and democratic, where would their power, hold and clout be? The game is of political power, and cornering of riches. Religion is a cloak. There is nothing spiritual, or holy, or good, or pro-people about it. Unfortunately, the Muslim masses are in such a vicious grip that it would take several revolutions for them to emerge out of their sorry state.
The point that is sought to be made is that Islam is unique in that it is much more amenable to misuse by vested interests; and that’s what happened in respect of the demand for Pakistan.
in Canada demanded partition because they are a separate nation? Do the English claim partition of South Africa because they are a distinct nation from the Boers? Has anybody ever heard that the Germans, the French and the Italians have ever agitated for the fragmentation of Switzerland because they are all different nations? Have the Germans, the French and the Italians ever felt that they would lose their distinctive cultures if they lived as citizens of one country and under one constitution?
Pakistan-A Separate Country?
Geographical Reasons: Pros and Cons Ambedkar highlights the Indian view that since the areas that Muslims want, and that would form Pakistan, have historically always been a part of India, why should India part with them? However, Ambedkar stresses, geographies of countries and continents have changed from time to time.
Ambedkar: “… Italian newspapers have described the annexation of Tripoli as recovering the soil of the Fatherland because it was once a province of the Roman Empire; and the entire region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek Chauvinists on the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, the cradle of Alexander the Great in the fourth century B.C. …
“…If it is geographical unity, then that is no unity. …In building up a nationality on geographical unity, it must be remembered that it is a case where Nature proposes and Man disposes. If it is unity in external things, such as ways and habits of life, that is no unity. Such unity is the result of exposure to a common environment.
“If it is administrative unity, that again is no unity. The instance of Burma is in point… Upper Burma was annexed in 1886. The administrative unity between India and Burma was forged in 1826. For over 110 years that administrative unity continued to exist. In 1937, the knot that tied the two together was cut asunder and nobody shed a tear over it. The unity between India and Burma was not less fundamental.
“If unity is to be of an abiding character, it must be founded on a sense of kinship, in the feeling of being kindred. In short, it must be spiritual. Judged in the light of these considerations, the unity between Pakistan and Hindustan is a myth. Indeed, there is more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma than there is between Pakistan and Hindustan. And if the Hindus did not object to the severance of Burma from India, it is difficult to understand how the Hindus can object to the severance of an area like Pakistan, which, to repeat, is politically detachable from, socially hostile and spiritually alien to, the rest of India…”
“On the contrary, all these distinct nations have been content to live together in one country under one constitution without fear of losing their nationality and their distinctive cultures. Neither have the French in Canada ceased to be French by living with the English, nor have the English ceased to be English by living with the Boers in South Africa. The Germans, the French and the Italians have remained distinct nations notwithstanding their common allegiance to a common country and a common constitution. The case of Switzerland is worthy of note. It is surrounded by countries, the nationalities of which have a close religious and racial affinity with the nationalities of Switzerland. Notwithstanding these affinities the nationalities in Switzerland have been Swiss first and Germans, Italians and French afterwards.
“Given the experience of the French in Canada, the English in South Africa and the French and the Italians in Switzerland, the questions that arise are, why should it be otherwise in India? Assuming that the Hindus and the Muslims split into two nations, why cannot they live in one country and under one constitution? Why should the emergence of the two-nation theory make partition necessary?…”
Muslims’ Unjustified ‘Hindu Raj’ Claim Ambedkar: “Must there be Pakistan because otherwise Swaraj will be a Hindu Raj? The Musalmans are so easily carried away by this cry that it is necessary to expose the fallacies underlying it.
“In the first place, is the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj a conscientious objection or is it a political objection If it is a conscientious objection all one can say is that it is a very strange sort of conscience. There are really millions of Musalmans in India who are living under unbridled and uncontrolled Hindu Raj of Hindu Princes and no objection to it has been raised by the Muslims or the Muslim League. The Muslims had once a conscientious objection to the British Raj. Today not only have they no objection to it but they are the greatest supporters of it. That there should be no objection to British Raj or to undiluted Hindu Raj of a Hindu Prince but that there should be objection to Swaraj for British India on the ground that it is Hindu Raj as though it was not subjected to checks and balances is an attitude the logic of which it is difficult to follow.
Examples: One Country comprising several Nations Ambedkar: “…The Musalmans of India as I have said are not as yet a nation in the sense of the term and all that can be said is that they have in them the elements necessary to make them a nation. But granting that the Musalmans of India are a nation, is India the only country where there are going to be two nations? What about Canada?
“Everybody knows that there are in Canada two nations, the English and the French. Are there not two nations in South Africa, the English and the Dutch? What about Switzerland? Who does not know that there are three nations living in Switzerland, the Germans, the French and the Italians? Have the French in Canada demanded partition because they are a separate nation? Do the English claim partition of South
“Another ground on which the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj rests is that the Hindus are a majority community and the Musalmans are a minority community. True. But is India the only country where such a situation exists? Let us compare the conditions in India with the conditions in Canada, South Africa and Switzerland…
“This shows that the smaller nationalities have no fear of being placed under the Raj of a major
VVIS
possibility of the major nationality establishing its supremacy in those centres of power and authority, namely the Legislature and in the Executive? Quite the contrary. Unfortunately no figures are available to show the actual extent of representation which the different major and minor nationalities have in Switzerland, Canada and South Africa. That is because there is no communal reservation of seats such as is found in India.
“Each community is left to win in a general contest what number of seats it can. But it is quite easy to work out the probable number of seats which each nationality can obtain on the basis of the ratio of its population to the total seats in the Legislature Proceeding on this basis what do we find? In Switzerland the total representatives in the Lower House is 187. Out of them the German population has a possibility of winning 138, French 42 and Italians only 7 seats. In South Africa out of the total of 153, there is a possibility of the English gaining 62, and the Dutch 94 seats. In Canada the total is 245. Of these the French have only 65.
“On this basis it is quite clear that in all these countries there is a possibility of the major nationality establishing its supremacy over the minor nationalities. Indeed, one may go so far as to say that speaking de jure and as a mere matter of form in Canada the French are living under the British Raj, the English in South Africa under the Dutch Raj, and the Italians and French in Switzerland under the German Raj. But what is the position de facto? Have Frenchmen in Canada raised a cry that they will not live under British Raj? Have Englishmen in South Africa raised a cry that they will not live under Dutch Raj? Have the French and Italians in Switzerland any objection to living under the German Raj? Why should then the Muslims raise this cry of Hindu Raj?…”
Pakistan sans Civilisational Basis Creation of a separate country is driven by national and civilisational aspirations. Indian Muslims were nothing but forcibly (mostly) or voluntarily (rarely) converted Hindus, or Hindus converted through material enticements. A negligible percentage were imports from other Muslim countries. That being the case, the Pakistanis did not have a civilisational basis different from Hindus. However, the bitter truth could not be taught. Pakistan, therefore, created fictitious basis of their nationhood, linking themselves to Babur, Qasim, Ghaznavi, Ghori, and so on-the tormentors and violators of their ancestors became their revered figures!
Cons: India’s Unity Ambedkar: “…In considering this question one must never lose sight of the fundamental fact that nature has made India one single geographical unit… Her unity is as ancient as Nature. Within this geographic unit and covering the whole of it there has been a cultural unity from time immemorial. This cultural unity has defied political and racial divisions. And at any rate for the last hundred and fifty years all institutions-cultural, political, economic, legal and administrative-have been working on a single, uniform spring of action. In any discussion of Pakistan the fact cannot be lost sight of, namely, that the starting point, if not the governing factor, is the fundamental unity of India.
“For it is necessary to grasp the fact that there are really two cases of partition which must be clearly distinguished… But in India the starting point is unity. Why destroy its unity now, simply because some Muslims are dissatisfied? Why tear it when the unit is one single whole from historical times?…”
Cons: Communal Divide, therefore… Ambedkar: “Must there be Pakistan because there is communal antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims? … The question however is, is the antagonism such that there is no will to live together in one country and under one constitution? Surely that will to live together was not absent till 1937. During the formulation of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, both Hindus and Musalmans accepted the view that they must live together under one constitution and in one country and participated in the discussions that preceded the passing of the Act. And what was the state of communal feeling in India between-say 1920 and 1935? As has been recorded in the preceding pages, the history of India from 1920 up to 1935 has been one long tale of communal conflict in which the loss of life and loss of property had reached a most shameful limit. Never was the communal situation so acute as it was between this period of 15 years preceding the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, and yet this long tale of antagonism did not prevent the Hindus and the Musalmans from agreeing to live in a single country and under a single constitution. Why make so much of communal antagonism now?…
“Is India the only country where there is communal antagonism? [Ambedkar gives example of Canada and other countries]…”
Cons: Why can’t Hindus & Muslims live together? Ambedkar: “Must there be Pakistan because the Musalmans are a nation? It is a pity that Mr. Jinnah should have become a votary and champion of Muslim Nationalism at a time when the whole world is decrying against the evils of nationalism and is seeking refuge in some kind of international organization…
“If the Musalmans want to be a different nation it is not because they have been but because they want to be. There is much in the Musalmans which, if they wish, can roll them into a nation. But isn’t there enough that is common to both Hindus and Musalmans, which if developed, is capable of moulding them
Partition Question Ambedkar has discussed the various pros and cons of this question in his book ‘Pakistan or the Partition of India’.
Cons
divide Hindus and Musalmans. The question is, which of these should be emphasized. If the emphasis is laid on things that are common, there need be no two nations in India. If the emphasis is laid on points of difference, it will no doubt give rise to two nations.
“For, as Disraeli said, a nation is a work of art and a work of time. If the Hindus and Musalmans agree to emphasize the things that bind them and forget those that separate them there is no reason why in course of time they should not grow into a nation.
“Is it right for the Muslim League to emphasize only differences and ignore altogether the forces that bind? Let it not be forgotten that if two nations come into being it will not be because it is predestined. It will be the result of deliberate design…”
racing the issue by taking refuge in two things.
“He started by saying that to partition India is a moral wrong and a sin to which he will never be a party. This is a strange argument… There are very few countries in Europe which have not undergone partition during the last 150 years. This shows that the partition of a country is neither moral nor immoral. It is unmoral. It is a social, political or military question. Sin has no place in it.
“As a second refuge Mr. Gandhi started by protesting that the Muslim League did not represent the Muslims and that Pakistan was only a fancy of Mr. Jinnah. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Gandhi could be so blind as not to see how Mr. Jinnah’s influence over the Muslim masses has been growing day by day and how he has engaged himself in mobilizing all his forces for battle. Never before was Mr. Jinnah a man for the masses… Now they have raised him above themselves and call him their Qaid-e-Azam. He has not only become a believer in Islam, but is prepared to die for Islam. Today, he knows more of Islam than mere Kalama. Today, he goes to the mosque to hear Khutba and takes delight in joining the Id congregational prayers. Dongri and Null Bazaar once knew Mr. Jinnah by name. Today they know him by his presence. No Muslim meeting in Bombay begins or ends without Allah-ho-Akbar and Long Live Qaide-Azam…”
Pros
Pros: Punjab & Bengal Ambedkar: “… In this connection it is enough to consider the reaction of the high caste Hindus only. For, it is they who guide the Hindu masses and form Hindu opinion. Unfortunately, the high caste Hindus are bad as leaders. They have a trait of character which often leads the Hindus to disaster… [Gandhi and Nehru being two prominent examples]
“…The Muslims in the Punjab number 13,332,460 and the Hindus, with Sikhs and the rest, number 11,392,732. The difference is only 1,939,728. This means that the Muslim majority in the Punjab is only a majority of 8 p.c. Given these facts, which is better: To retain the unity of the Punjab and allow the Muslim majority of 54 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 46 p.c. or to redraw the boundaries, to allow the Muslims and the Hindus to be under separate national states, and thus rescue the whole body of Hindus from the terrors of the Muslim rule?
“The Muslims in Bengal number 27,497,624 and the Hindus number 21,570,407. The difference is only of 5,927,217. This means that the Muslim majority in Bengal is only a majority of 12 p.c. Given these facts, which is better: To oppose the creation of a National Muslim State out of Eastern Bengal and Sylhet by refusing to redraw the boundaries and allow the Muslim majority of only 12 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 44 p.c.; or to consent to redraw the boundaries, to have Muslims and Hindus placed under separate National States, and thus rescue the 44 p.c. of the Hindus from the horrors of the Muslim rule?…”
Gandhi’s Unrealistic Stand on Partition Ambedkar: “…The Hindus are in the grip of the Congress and the Congress is in the grip of Mr. Gandhi. It cannot be said that Mr. Gandhi has given the Congress the right lead. Mr. Gandhi first sought to avoid facing the issue by taking refuge in two things.
“He started by saying that to partition India is a moral wrong and a sin to which he will never be a party.
Religion & Nationality Over 99% of the Indian Muslims are either Hindu-converts or descendants of Hindu-converts. If a person changes her/his religion, does her/his nationality also changes? Can the change of religion lead to a new nation? Can it justify a separate nation? That’s absurd. Unprecedented anywhere in the world, but it happened in India, thanks to the vested interests of the British, the cunning manoeuvres of Jinnah and the Muslim League, and the clueless Congress-Gandhian-Hindu leadership.
If religion defined a nation, then if in Pakistan about 25% convert to Christianity in due course, should they demand a partition and a separate nation. Further, if religion defined a nation, all of Western Europe, which is Christian, would be one country; from Egypt to Pakistan there would not be multiple countries, but one Muslim country; Bangladesh would not have separated from Pakistan… The fact is most modern countries are multi-religion countries.
That Jinnah and the British had (mis)used Islam as a ground for political purposes to form a separate country becomes obvious when one takes note of the following:
(a)Jinnah tried his best to persuade the border (Princely) states of Bikaner, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur to accede to Pakistan even though they were Hindu-majority states.
(b)Addressing the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947, Jinnah said: “…You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State… you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens
νιιΙμυμιιμι μαυμοουυιυα Ρυμμμμμμι1 VAUιμαιμου μι υμων PuιιιΙνι1 τμυ μουυα τυ μυιμιιυu 111 4
separate subchapter in this book.
Vuin uu vuwu, mu uuruu. wuu ulluuuuu u uu uuim 11 uuu uuyu, ipui cury nuru Jinnah confess: “I have made it [Pakistan] but I am convinced that I have committed the greatest blunder of my life.”{Sar/94}{Akb/433}
(d)Even Premier Liaqat Ali Khan had remarked one day after coming out of the ailing Jinnah’s room: “The old man [Jinnah] has now discovered his mistake.”{Sar/94}
1946-Cabinet Mission Plan Logic Reproduced below is an extract from Rafiq Zakaria’s book “The Man Who Divided India’ of the meeting that the Cabinet Mission had with Jinnah that itself brings out the absurdity of Partition and Pakistan. This was narrated to Rafiq Zakaria by Lord Alexander, a member of the Cabinet Mission:{RZ/107-8}
Cabinet Mission: “Do you (Jinnah] realise that the Pakistan you are demanding will leave substantial Hindus under Muslim domination?” Jinnah: “That will be so; but I will leave many more Muslims under Hindu domination in Hindustan.” Cabinet Mission: “How does it then resolve Hindu-Muslim discord? It will only perpetuate the hostilities.” Jinnah: “It will free at least two-third Muslims from Hindu domination.”
Finally, Why Pakistan?
Ambedkar’s Logic After setting out various arguments both in favour of Pakistan, and against it, Ambedkar proceeds to articulate his conclusion in his book ‘Pakistan or the Partition of India’.
Ambedkar: “… What is my position regarding the issue of Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have set out?… I hold firmly that, subject to certain conditions… if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be conceded to them. I know my critics will at once accuse me of inconsistency and will demand reasons for so extraordinary a conclusion-extraordinary because of the view expressed by me in the earlier part of this chapter that the Muslim case for Pakistan has nothing in it which can be said to carry the compelling force which the decree of an inexorable fate may be said to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan. Yet I hold that if the Muslims must have Pakistan there is no escape from conceding it to them.
“As to the reasons which have led me to that conclusion I shall not hesitate to say that the strength or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not one of them. In my judgement there are two governing factors which must determine the issue. First is the defence of India and second is the sentiment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard them as decisive and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.
“Nobody will consent to the Muslim demand for Pakistan unless he is forced to do so. At the same time, it would be a folly not to face what is inevitable and face it with courage and common sense. Equally would it be a folly to lose the part one can retain in the vain attempt of preserving the whole.
“These are the reasons why I hold that if the Musalman will not yield on the issue of Pakistan then Pakistan must come. So far as I am concerned the only important question is: Are the Musalmans determined to have Pakistan? Or is Pakistan a mere cry? Is it only a passing mood? Or does it represent their permanent aspiration? On this there may be difference of opinion. Once it becomes certain that the Muslims want Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to concede the principle of it…”
Cabinet Mission: “And you will put more than that number of Hindus under Muslim domination. That is no solution.” Jinnah: “That is the only solution if you don’t want civil war.” Cabinet Mission: “But should you adopt such a callous attitude towards the minorities in the two states, they will be in worse condition than the Muslims in united India-also the Muslims in divided India will be worst sufferers.” Jinnah: “Their best protection will be the establishment of two strong states, neither of which will dare misbehave towards each other’s minorities.” Cabinet Mission: “You mean to say that these minorities will be hostages.” Jinnah: “Exactly. If one state mistreats it minorities, the other state will retaliate against its minorities. It will be tit for tat.” Cabinet Mission: “That is a horrible concept which did not work even in medieval times.” Jinnah: “Fear is the most potent weapon; I am sure the rulers in either state will be wise enough to conduct themselves properly. They will be afraid of retaliation against their coreligionists.” The Cabinet Mission reminded Jinnah that the world had much advanced and that it would never accept the theory of hostages as propounded by him. The Mission entreated him not to destroy the unity of India which the British had worked so hard to build.
Dr Ambedkar had suggested population-exchange in case partition was agreed to-detailed in a separate subchapter in this book.
Contrary to what Jinnah claimed, while India protected its minorities, Pakistan failed to do so. While the Hindu population in Pakistan and Bangladesh has drastically reduced post-partition, and Hindus have been ill-treated there; the Muslim population in India has grown.
the Hindu population in Pakistan and Bangladesh has drastically reduced post-partition, and Hindus have been ill-treated there; the Muslim population in India has grown.
Muslim Population & Pakistan
Punjab and Bengal had their own local Muslim leadership, different from the Muslim League. They were not enamoured of Jinnah’s Muslim League’s concept of Partition and Pakistan. Why? They were already ruling in collaboration with the local Hindu parties. They didn’t feel threatened. They were confident they would continue to rule, being in majority overall. They were not worried about a democratic constitution under which Hindus could dominate the Central Government, like the Muslim League propagated; nor were they interested in a separate Muslim state. Division of Punjab and Bengal was actually to their grave disadvantage. Premier Sikandar Hayat Khan of Punjab and Premier Fazal-ulHaq of Bengal were opposed to the concept of a separate Muslim nation of Pakistan, and Sikandar Hayat Khan used to dismiss it as ‘Jinnahstan’.
Muslim Population & Their Distribution in Provinces
As per the last census of 1941 before partition, the Muslim population of British India was about 7.9 crores (27%) out of a total of 29.2 crores; while that of all the Princely States was 1.2 crores (14%) Muslims out of a total of 8.8 crores. Combining the population of the British India and the Princely States, the Muslim population was 9.1 crores (24%) out of a total of 38 crores.
Out of 562 Princely States, 14 were Muslim-majority Princely States contiguous with West Pakistan, and went to form Pakistan. Overall the percentage of Muslims in the 548 Princely States that went to form India was below 10%.
The absolute Muslim-majority states were NWFP (92% Muslims), Baluchistan (88%), and Sind (70%). However, certain eastern portions of Sind had marginal Hindu majority. Undivided Bengal and Punjab with 54% and 57% Muslims respectively had marginal Muslim majority. However, East Punjab and West Bengal had Hindu majority.
The NWFP Chief Minister Dr Khan Sahib had bluntly told the Cabinet Mission in 1946 that the Muslim League did not represent all Muslims, that the Pathans had no affinity for their Punjabi neighbours, and that NWFP would never join Pakistan willingly. Further, while they preferred no Centre, and wanted to be fully independent, they didn’t fear Hindu domination of an overweening Central Government largely controlled by Hindus.
Even Viceroy Wavell had advised London: “Pakistan idea is stronger in the Muslim minority provinces than in the Pakistan [Muslim-majority] provinces.” He further went on to explain that in the Muslimmajority provinces Muslims were already on top, and that with a little forbearance they could placate the non-Muslim minorities. Further, they stood to gain little by having Pakistan.
For the reasons given above, the Muslim League was not popular in the Muslim-majority provinces, and never won an absolute majority in any elections in those provinces.
Muslim population percentage in the British India provinces that went to form India were: Assam 33%, UP 15.3%, Bihar 13%, Bombay 9.3%, Berar (Maharashtra) 9.2%, Madras 7.9%, Central Provinces 3.4%, and Odisha 1.7%.
Attitude of the Muslim-minority Provinces.
Attitude of the Muslim-majority Provinces The Muslims and Muslim-leaders of Muslim-majority provinces like Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan felt secure that they would continue to rule. Hence, they were not really bothered about Partition and Pakistan. They already had what they wanted. What, however, they were concerned about was that their rule, and their particularist traditions, should not get disturbed. They also had deep antipathy for any central rule-either by united India or divided India, that is, Pakistan. That is why the Muslim League could not find traction in these regions. Even now, about 7 decades after partition, they would be happy to be independent than continue to be ruled by the Punjabis of Pakistan.
Punjab and Bengal had their own local Muslim leadership, different from the Muslim League. They were not enamoured of Jinnah’s Muslim League’s concept of Partition and Pakistan. Why? They were
It is worth noting that till the early 1940s, the Muslim League dominated in the areas that did not become Pakistan. The call for partition and Pakistan was mostly driven by the Muslim leaders like Jinnah, Iqbal and others, who were from UP and other areas, that did not become Pakistan, and where Muslims were in a minority; and not from areas where the Muslims were in majority, like in the areas of West Pakistan. Why?
One: Muslims didn’t feel insecure in areas where they were in majority, and were practically ruling, like in Punjab, Sind, NWFP, etc. Muslims felt insecure elsewhere-at least, their leaders.
Two: Muslim leaders from UP and other areas, where Muslims were in a minority, didn’t wish to remain deprived of power.
The Muslim League mostly controlled the Muslim-minority provinces; and it was the only party among the Muslim political parties that had a vested interest in Partition and Pakistan.
Jinnah’s Contradictions
{3}
Factors : Partition & Pakistan
1940 onwards Jinnah and the Muslim League started demanding a separate nation based on religion, carved out of Muslim-majority areas. At the same time they wanted the whole of Punjab and Bengal to be part of the future Pakistan. That is, they wanted major parts of Pakistan on provincial basis, and not on religious basis. East Punjab and West Bengal being prominently Hindu could not have been part of Pakistan if Pakistan was to be formed from the Muslim-majority areas. To get the whole of Punjab and Bengal, Jinnah started pointing to their common language and culture ignoring the religious-factor that was his logic for Pakistan! To get power and Pakistan, logic didn’t matter. Nor did the obvious contradiction of the incompatibility of the provincial and the communal option.
Factors-l: British Vested Interests
It is worth noting that Nehru and the Congress were unnecessarily too obsessed with the Centre and the Central legislature, where Jinnah was able to play a wrecker. Had they played their cards well in the provinces in the Muslim-majority areas, they could have derailed Jinnah. The Unionist Party of Sikandar Hyat Khan and Khizr Hyat Khan Tiwana that ruled Punjab was a Muslim-Hindu-Sikh coalition. The Krishak Proja Party headed by Fazlul Huq, a nationalist Muslim, dominated Bengal. Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah had formed a Hindu-Muslim coalition in Sind, independent of the Muslim League. NWFP was controlled by the Khan brothers, who were close to the Congress. If the Congress had intelligently coordinated its efforts with these parties, it could have sidelined Jinnah and his Muslim League. But, sadly, the Congress and the Congress leaders, particularly Gandhi and Nehru, lacked that tact.
Britain had a vested interest in the creation of Pakistan, driven by the following considerations, some of which overlap.
(1) Oil & the Middle-East The experience of the two world wars, and growing rail, road, air and water transport, and industrialisation established the criticality of oil. The largest oil reserves happened to be in the MiddleEast, and therefore the Middle-East had to be secured for the UK, and the West. How to secure? You had to have the countries in the Middle-East, and those bordering them, under your power and influence. Western India, adjoining Afghanistan, fell in that category-and fitted the bill for proposed Pakistan. Muslim Pakistan was pliable, while India was not. The area nearer to the Middle-East had therefore to go to Pakistan.
(2) Usage of Muslim Pakistan Pakistan was a Muslim country, and so was the Middle-East. Being a Muslim country, Pakistan was in a better position to influence the Middle-Eastern countries, thought UK. Seen from this strategic requirement of the UK of securing the Middle-East oil, India was dispensable, but Pakistan was critical. The US and the West went along with the UK, for they were allies in the cold war, and all of them wanted to secure the Middle-East oil. DN Panigrahi states in his book ‘Jammu and Kashmir, The Cold War and the West:
“Clement Attlee [UK PM, 1945-51], in his official as well as private correspondence, categorically stated that Kashmir was an issue so germane to ‘the Muslim world that they must support Pakistan keeping in view British interest in the Middle East. …the western powers, including Britain, considered Pakistan ‘as a key factor in international politics by virtue of being Muslim’ and because of its proximity with the Middle East. …Sir Olaf Caroe…an ICS officer [also served as Governor of NWFP)…wrote an article on Pakistan’s potential role for Middle East defence…in 1949…his influential book, ‘Wells of Power: The Oilfields of South Western Asia, a Regional and Global Study’. He argued that Middle Eastern oil held the key to progress and to international relations in the world in the future…”{Pani/3}
Partition India, and fully support Pakistan! Back in 1945 itself, Churchill, therefore, favoured partition of India into “Pakistan, Hindustan and Princestan[comprising Princely States)”. {RG/343}
Partition of India was actually a British-Churchillian plan; and Jinnah was but an instrument for its implementation. If Jinnah had refused to do what the British wanted, the British would have chosen another Muslim leader, and made a Jinnah of him. Shimla Conference of June 1946 was wrecked by Jinnah at the behest of Churchill and Viceroy Wavell (who was Churchill’s hatchet man): Jinnah had commented: “Am I a fool to accept this [offer), when I am offered Pakistan on a platter?”{BK2/178} Wrote Durga Das:
“Churchill played a key role in the creation of Pakistan… [He] decided to give up India to the Indians after the war.’ Churchill and his colleagues decided, at the same time, to save what they could of the wreckage and it was this conviction that lay behind the offer to Jinnah of ‘Pakistan on a platter’. Pakistan was expected to give them a foothold in the subcontinent.”{DD/255)
симышь у пис шv vv uu и пич, изиси су ишv v vv ин инисисипи ишv vзvс v нь шvvс countries can go for the sake of oil. Panigrahi further writes:
“The main thrust of the Caroe’s argument was that the competition for oil would determine the future relationships of the powers and that ‘the danger of attack of Soviet Russia was less likely in Europe than in the Middle East. Second, he argued that Pakistan, apart from having a strategic position in the region, was a Muslim country, and hence had a better
chance of serving British interests in the Middle East than India…”{Pani/24-5} Wrote Dasgupta: “For over a century, British policy in Gulf had largely been shaped by the strategic interests of her Indian Empire… By 1947, the tables had turned-Britain’s strategic interests in the Gulf and the Middle East had become a major factor in her South Asia policy.”{DG/18}
(3) Pakistan as an ally in the Cold War Since the First World War India’s primary usefulness to Britain was less as a market for commercial exploitation and more in the field of war and defence, and in maintaining and securing its Empire. Through India as the base, and its Indian army, Britain controlled other countries in Asia. It could illafford to altogether give up its two-century old Empire, without having a firm foothold at least in part of India. That’s when it cooked up the idea of Pakistan.
The West wanted to check the expansionist ambitions of communist Russia and China towards the Middle-East and the Indian Ocean. How to do that? The regions adjoining Russia and China had to be under their influence: that is, northern India bordering Russia and J&K. Pakistan was willing to be an ally of the West in their cold war with the communists, hence critical to their strategy, along with J&K; while India, with its little likelihood of cooperating with the West in military matters, and forming an alliance with them, given India’s anti-West dogma, Nehruvian pro-Russia bend, and protestations of non-violence, was dispensable. The British military establishment too had become a strong proponent of Pakistan on account of its promise of cooperation in military matters.
Pakistan was actually midwifed by the UK and the US as a bulwark against Russia; and that’s why they always came to its rescue lest it should fail.
(4) Churchill’s Imperial Strategy of Partition Although by 1945 Britain had won the World War II, it had extracted from it an enormous cost, so much so that it had neither the money, nor the manpower, nor even the will—it was too exhausted-to maintain its empire. It wanted to quit India (not because of Gandhi’s “Quit India”, which had started and flopped years back in 1942), yet it wanted to retain its clout and its bases to be able to influence the Middle East and South-East Asia.
If Jinnah is regarded as the ‘Father of Pakistan’, then Churchill must be regarded as the ‘Grand Father of Pakistan’.
In the context of Kashmir, this is what Churchill told the then India’s Governor-General Mountbatten who was on a visit to London in November 1947 to attend his nephew’s royal wedding, as recounted by Tunzelmann in ‘Indian Summer’:
“He described Nehru and Patel as ‘enemies of Britain’, and the Muslims as Britain’s allies; and accused Mountbatten of planning and organizing ‘the victory of Hindustan’ (he refused to call it India) ‘against Pakistan’. Churchill told Mountbatten that he should leave India, ‘and not involve the King and my country in further backing traitors [Indians)’.”{Tunz/296}
(5) British Army & Bureaucracy-Pro-Pakistan Narendra Singh Sarila quotes in his book ‘The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition’ a report of the British chiefs of staff: “The area of Pakistan [West Pakistan or the northwest of India] is strategically the most important in the continent of India and the majority of our strategic requirements would be met…by an agreement with Pakistan alone…”{Sar/28}{DG/17}
Once the British realised India would deny them military cooperation after independence, they settled in favour of Pakistan, which was willing to cooperate with them, be their lackey, and help them in securing the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area.
“Field Marshal Lord Montgomery argued that it would be a tremendous asset if Pakistan, particularly the North-West, remained within the Commonwealth. The bases, airfields and ports in North West India’ would be invaluable… The British Chiefs of Staff came to the same conclusion…”{DG/16-17)
The top echelons in the British army had prepared a dhobi-list of what all the British politicians should
Churchill and Viceroy Wavell realised that a pro-Soviet, socialist Nehru would not cooperate in its foreign policies and in military matters; while Jinnah and the Muslim League would be pliable. Solution: Partition India, and fully support Pakistan! Back in 1945 itself, Churchill, therefore, favoured partition of
and port of Karachi; to demonstratively support the Muslims and Pakistan so as to endear Britain to the Muslim Middle East, and get a better hold there; agree on military cooperation; and so on. Wrote DN Panigrahi:
“Sir George Cunningham and Sir Francis Mudie, the governors of NWFP and Punjab (Pakistan) in 1947, were the principal sources of trouble in India’, according to Nehru and others, apart from their general policy to help Pakistan’. Cunningham was regarded by Khan Saheb, the Premier of NWFP in 1945-47, ‘as the only Muslim League leader of NWFP’. Jayaprakash Narayan…told Sunday Statesman that he did not distinguish between the
Muslim League and the British’.”{Pani/157} Yet another reason the British army and bureaucracy was favourable towards Pakistan was that they were being offered positions and employment in Pakistan.
(6) Why Partition if United India would serve your purpose? The UK would have had no difficulty if they were sure that India-undivided India-after Independence, would serve as their ally. Had they felt reassured on those issues critical to their national and foreign policy interests, there would have been no Partition or the J&K imbroglio.
What did India gain out of Nehru’s socialism and pro-Soviet tilt? Nothing. India’s economy went to dogs, and no one took India seriously in foreign affairs. It was Nehru’s fads of socialism and pro-Soviet bend that led to Britain and Western nations, including USA,
going against India, and resulting in the tragedy of partition, and the problem of Kashmir. Had it been a wise Indian leadership that was adequately enlightened on the international affairs, and the vested interests of Britain and the West, and their Oil and Cold-war strategy, they would have been careful and tactful enough to have reassured Britain, the US, and the West on their cooperation; but actually done what was in the best national interest of India, after independence. And, in any case, being pro market-economy, and pro-West, compared to being socialistic and pro-Russia, was far more beneficial for India. But, when, despite being political leaders, you spend precious years in jail and outside hand-spinning yarn, experimenting with nutrition and indigenous medicines, and with truth, fasting, and non-violence, rather that deliberating on the crucial post-independence issues of economy, poverty and prosperity, internal and external security, and foreign policy, what can be expected? Wrote VP Menon in ‘The Transfer of Power in India’:
“Moreover, the Congress opposition to the war effort and the League’s de facto support for it convinced the British that the Hindus generally were their enemies and the Muslims their friends, and this consideration must have added force to the silent but effective official support for the policy of partition.”{VPM2/438/L-8234} (7) Inimical Congress & Hindus-the Bad Boys!
(7) Inimical Congress & Hindus—the Bad Boys! The Revolutionary Movement, the Constitutional Movement for Self-Rule, and the Gandhian Freedom Movement were predominantly driven by Hindus; while the Muslim League and other Muslim organisations and leaders were predominantly pro-British, and collaborated with the British. A dominant majority of the Brits in India and Britain therefore regarded the Hindus and the Congress as their enemies, and Muslims and the Muslim League as their friends.
The British also found to their dismay that the Indian leaders had other ideas-they were unlikely to cooperate with Britain on foreign policy, military matters, cold war against the communists and in securing Middle-East oil. The INC and others fighting for independence sought to spoil the British party. They became the “bad boys”. Since the majority in these organisations were Hindu, Hindus came to be despised British did everything to show Indian culture and Hinduism in bad light. Politically, they tried to break the back of the organisations struggling for independence and sent hundreds of thousands to jail and Andaman. Britain therefore became anti-Congress, anti-Hindu and anti-India.
(8) Slavish League, Jinnah & Muslims-the Good Boys! Fortunately for the British, the Muslim League gladly ticked the dhobi-list of the British requirements. You wish to continue to have presence here even after independence-ok. You want us to be anticommunists-ok. You want to station your troops here-ok. You want to use our air-fields-ok. You want our army to fight against your enemies-ok. The Muslim League and other pro-Pakistan organisations never gave trouble to the British. No agitations, no marches, no fast. Hence, no jail or Andaman for them. Jinnah or any of his colleagues never went to jail. For the British, the Pakistanis and those Muslims, who always sucked up to them, were “the compliant, good boys”. Once the British establishment firmed up that their national and foreign policy interests were best served by having the regions that ultimately formed West-Pakistan and J&K under their influence, they became even more rabidly pro-Muslim League and pro-Pakistan.
Pakistan, the lackey, became their natural ally. In fact, an overwhelming majority of UK politicians, bureaucrats, army-men, journalists, academicians, writers and media-persons were pro-Pakistan, proMuslim League and pro-Muslim for these selfish British interests; and anti-Congress, anti-Hindu and anti-India. Philip Noel-Baker, the UK Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, did all he could, including telling blatant lies even in the forums like the UN, to support Pakistan’s case. Incidentally, upon partition, relatively much larger number of British bureaucrats and army men had shown preference for Pakistan and had gone over to Pakistan.
(9) Jinnah-The Crescent Card After the Congress refused to cooperate with the British in the Second World War, the Raj began building up Jinnah as their Crescent Card to counterbalance, and then to defeat the Congress challenge. Vis-à-vis the naïve Gandhians, the British were so focussed and tactful that they went to the extent of even
Jinnah to make them support Jinnah, and present a united Muslim front to take on the clueless Gandhians.
Wrote Durga Das:
“I wrote in the Hindustan Times a piece [in 1944] entitled ‘Conspiracy between British Diehards and Jinnah’. This was based on a talk with a top Briton who said to me: ‘Mr Jinnah will never come to an agreement (with the Congress] during the war. While he is intransigent, he is on top; the moment he settles with the Congress, the latter will be on top. Once he agrees to a transitional arrangement, the League will get merged in the nationalist movement and will never be able to dictate terms to the Congress. Mr Jinnah’s intransigence suits us, and if he maintains his attitude and keeps his hands off Punjab, which is our special
preserve, he will deserve some support at the end of the war.””{DD/211} What was noteworthy of the British was that all of them-Royalty and their advisors, politicians of all hues, diplomats, top, middle and low level bureaucrats, generals and army men, media, journalists, academics, historians, novelists, writers-acted in unison in their self-interest to promote the cause of Muslims and Pakistan, and to act against the interests of India and the Hindus. It was not as if it were the superior strategy and tactics of Jinnah and the Muslim League that won them Pakistan, but it was the whole British cabal that made sure Jinnah and the Muslim League did not budge from their demand for Partition and Pakistan.
Punjab Chief Minister Sikandar Hayat Khan was not enamoured of Jinnah’s policy of driving a wedge between Muslims and Hindu-Sikhs in Punjab to gain Pakistan, and he was powerful enough to oppose Jinnah. However, Viceroy Linlithgow used his good offices and pressure upon Sikandar Hayat Khan to make him fall in line with Jinnah. The British could go to this extent to achieve their objectives.
(10) Pakistan on a Platter Jinnah and the Muslim League had to do precious little to get Pakistan-they got it on a platter. Muslim League and associated Muslim organisations never really struggled and sacrificed anything to gain independence. They got their independence and their country simply as a by-product of all the pains taken by and sacrifices done by INA, revolutionaries, the Congress and other organisations. Even the crease of the suites of Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders never got crumpled in any agitation. All that they had to do was stay firm that Muslims and Hindus cannot live together, engineer communal violence to prove so, have a nuisance value, and, of course, remain lackeys of the British. British advised Jinnah and others to just stay firm in their demand for Pakistan. Churchill was particularly active in this approach, and communicated secretly with Jinnah. He offered ‘Pakistan on a platter’ to Jinnah as the British were keen to salvage whatever they could out of the wreckage of the Indian Empire, and, through Pakistan, have a foothold in the sub-continent.
The British not only extensively looted and tormented India for two centuries; but they left after favouring those (or, their misguided Hindu-converts) who had pillaged India for about a thousand years, and the clueless Gandhians and the Hindus were left licking their wounds.
(11) Wooing Muslims; Divide & Rule It could have been, and should have been, Indians, that is, Hindus + Muslims + Others, against the British. The Raj was intelligent and cunning enough to sense how that combination would shatter their dreams of dominance forever. From 1890s onwards itself the British set about getting Muslims on their side to disrupt any Hindu-Muslim unity. Hindus tried their best to keep the Muslims with them, and maintain Hindu-Muslim unity. It was a wooing competition between the Hindus and the British on who could get the Muslims onto their side. The British had the power, money and the means to win. The British gave the Muslim leaders power, position, and respect. They showered political favours on them. The Hindus had only the sentiments to woo the Muslims, and whatever concession they could offer them. Gandhi went to absurd lengths to woo the Muslims. The more powerful, the one who could give more-the British-succeeded.
Britain actually wanted to divide India into as many pieces as possible. Churchill and many other Britons had talked of dividing India “into Pakistan, Hindustan and Princestan”{RG/343}. And, it would not have been one Princestan, but hundreds of Princestans (corresponding to 562 Princely States), whom Britain could then woo in its favour. The purpose was also to demonstrate that without the benign binding force of Britain, India would go into pieces forever fighting with one another.
The Raj had also tried, and succeeded to a great extent, in creating other fissures in the Indian society in order to perpetuate their own rule: North-South divide through the floating of Aryan-Dravidian fiction; promoting Depressed Classes against Caste Hindus; firming up and promoting caste and sub-caste divisions; promoting linguistic and regional divisions; floating the fiction of Martial Races vs. NonMartial Races, and so on.
Moradabad Commandant Lieutenant-Colonel Coke had laid down the following guidelines back in the mid-nineteenth century:
“Our endeavour should be to uphold in full force the (for us fortunate separation which exists between different religions and races, not to endeavour to amalgamate them. Divide et
imperia [divide and rule] should be the principle of Indian government.”{Grov2/306}{RPD/456} After the 1857-Mutiny the East India Company (EIC) had set up a Commission to analyse the causes, and suggest ways to perpetuate its rule. Lord Elphinstone, the then Governor of Bombay, who had been in EIC’s service since 1796, suggested to the Commission: “Divide et impera was the old Roman motto, and it should be ours.”{Akb/33} Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State between 1858 and 1866, had stated:
“We have maintained our power by playing off one against the other, and we must continue
The British not only extensively looted and tormented India for two centuries; but they left after
was to unite against us, how long could we maintain ourselves?”{Akb/33} Sir John Strachey had stated in 1888: “The truth plainly is that the existence side by side of these hostile creeds is one of the strong points in our political position in India… “{Grov2/306}{RPD/456}
Strachey further stated in 1894: “The better classes of Mohammedans are a source of strength and not of weakness. They constitute a comparatively small but energetic minority of the population, whose political interests are identical with ours, and who, under no conceivable circumstances, would prefer Hindu dominion to our own.”{URL10}{RPD/457}
At a meeting in the house in Aligarh of Sir Syed (or Sayyid) Ahmed Khan in 1894, Theodore Beck argued for an alliance of the two minorities (!), English/Christians and Muslims, in India against the majority Hindu community, and exemplified such joint threats to them as the anti-cow-slaughter agitation by the Hindus.{Akb/63}
AO Hume, the joint-founder of the Congress, had confided to Gandhi that the British Government was indeed “sustained by the policy of Divide and Rule”. Lord Oliver had written in 1926:
“No one with a close acquaintance with Indian affairs will be prepared to deny that on the whole there is a predominant bias in British officialdom in India in favour of the Muslim community, partly on ground of sympathy, but more largely as a makeweight against Hindu
nationalism.”{RPD/457} The formation of the Muslim League in 1906 and the putting forth of its demands to the Raj like “separate and privileged representation in any electoral system that might be set up” were actually encouraged, facilitated, and stage-managed by Viceroy Lord Minto and the British officials. Upon success of their efforts in ensuring that the Muslim League was formed, J Dunlop Smith, private secretary of Minto, sent this effusive message to Viceroy Minto:
“I must send your excellency a line to say that a very, very big thing has happened today. A work of statesmanship (on the part of the British Raj] that will affect India and Indian history for many a long year. It is nothing less than pulling back of sixty-two millions of people (Muslims) from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition (Congress).”{Akb/68}
speed. But here was something in which the Government did not betray any great interest. Or was it actually interested in having a communal riot in Bombay? I remember there was a riot in Bombay when KM Munshi was the Home Minister and another when Morarji Desai was the Home Minister and both of them suppressed the riots in a day or two.”{MCC/111}
(12) Religion to camouflage selfish intentions How did the British ensure Pakistan was created, without allowing the blame to come on them? They actively promoted the canard that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together. British used Islam to divide India and create Pakistan; just as US later used fundamentalist Islam to drive out the Russians from Afghanistan. Each used Islam for their own selfish purpose, and created monsters that are bedevilling the world.
(13) Partition holocaust, thanks to the British It has been contended that had the British been absolutely firm that they would not allow partition of India, the demand for Pakistan would have been dropped. (Sar/61} All this issue of Hindu-Muslim was only a smoke-screen. It is the British who encouraged the break. It also shows to what level Britain could descend to achieve its selfish objective-even if it meant the Partition holocaust, with lacs dying for no fault of theirs. In its ultimate result, how then were the British different from the Nazis?
(14) Put the Partition-Blame on Indians Not only did the British partition India, they made sure—and this was one of the main responsibilities entrusted to Mountbatten-the blame for the partition was not laid at their door. The blame was to be assigned to the inability of the Hindus and Muslims to live together in peace. They succeeded.
It is worth noting that an overwhelming majority of communal riots took place in British India, even as the 562 Indian Princely States (forming 40% of the area of India) were generally islands of peace in so far as communal riots were concerned. Why? The British encouraged the fissure and the riots, and made least efforts to curb and control them. Wrote MC Chagla:
“I hope I am not being unfair but I had a distinct feeling that the British Government was not really serious in its intention to put down these riots as quickly as it could. It had the necessary power at its disposal. On the other hand, whenever the Government wanted to take action against any section of the people for political reasons, it acted with efficiency and speed. But here was something in which the Government did not betray any great interest. Or
Factors-II: Islam, Muslim Mind-set & Muslim
Leadership (1) The Nature of Islam & Muslims There is a general, global Islamic tendency for religious and cultural segregation, intolerance towards other faiths and cultures, inability to intermix and merge with others, pan-Islamism overriding loyalty to the geography and nation of residence, and a supremacist attitude (my religion is the best, it’s the only true religion-a blind, fanatic faith, impervious to facts, science, logic or reasoning, that has failed to evolve with time) inspired by their holy scriptures.
While Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists and others have long since moved far beyond their religion in the matter of statecraft, the Muslims, at least a considerable majority of Muslims, continue to be, or wish to continue to be guided by what was revealed, or said or decreed or practised as proper about a thousand and four hundred years ago! That renders democracy and current civilizational norms irrelevant for them. They wish to be guided by Sharia, Quran and their associated religious texts. Rather than
Indian Muslims were cunning enough to realise that the Hindus would fight the British for freedom anyway; and that their (Hindu’s) fight would also gain them (Muslims) freedom. Why then dirty their hands and spoil relationship with the British. The wiser and cleverer thing to do was to be on the right side of the British and ensure favourable treatment and privileges for themselves, and also make sure that when they (British) left they didn’t leave them (Muslims) to the mercy of the Hindus. Writes Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in his autobiography:
“I was present at the [foundational Muslim League] session [of 1906] and remember two reasons advanced for the establishment of the League… one of the objects of the League would be to strengthen and develop a feeling of loyalty to the British Government among the Muslims of India. The second object was to advance the claims of the Muslims against Hindus and other communities in respect of service under the crown and thus safeguard Muslim interests and rights. The leaders of the League were therefore naturally opposed to the demand for political independence raised by the Congress. They felt that if the Muslims joined in any such demand the British would not support their claims for special treatment in education and service… “{Azad/117}
(4) Muslim Loyalty to the British It was peculiar to the Indian Muslims that their tall leaders like Syed Ahmad Khan began to advocate loyalty to the British rule, rather than freedom from them.
other civilizational norms. A comment in this regard of Lord Lothian, a Briton, was prophetic: “The people as yet have had no experience of representative institutions, and if Congress pushes them too far, it may push the Mohammedans out of India altogether.”
(2) Muslims, Nation & Religion Although Muslims in undivided India were in a minority of about one-fourth of the population, in absolute numbers they were more in numbers than the population of several other countries put together. In a democratic setup, where in their view the majority, that is, the Hindus, would dominate, they felt they would be rendered second class citizens. Compared to that they felt they were better off with the British rule, especially considering the British Raj favoured them over the Hindus for their own vested interest, and the British ensured the Hindus and Muslims did not come together to unseat them.
The assumption of the Muslims, as above, was real, but faulty. There are examples of many multiethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious and secular countries, including Switzerland and Canada, where it is not as if the minorities are at a disadvantage. If one were to go by their assumption, each religious group would or should have its own nation; while those with identical religion should have only one nation-when the fact is that there are a large number of Muslim and Christian nations.
The above faulty thinking was perhaps a self-serving thinking of the Muslim elite. Many Muslim leaders who were otherwise or initially secular, liberal or nationalistic turned communal when they weighed in the personal benefits, and the benefits for their class, they would derive by having a separate country for themselves-coupled with the encouragement of the same by the British. Jinnah was one such person. So also persons like Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of the Aligarh Muslim University, and the originator of the two-nation theory that later influenced Iqbal and Jinnah.
Initially Syed Ahmad Khan was all for Hindu-Muslim unity, and even said: “We (Hindus and Muslims) should try to become one heart and soul and act in unison; if united we can support each other…” However, he wrongly thought that democratic, representative governments were suitable only for ethnical and religiously homogeneous societies. And, this wrong belief led to his advocating ways to prevent likely domination of Hindus.
Iqbal also argued self-servingly that Islam was not compatible with the European-style democratic majority rule; and that religion could not be relegated to private sphere!
Taken together, the gist of the above was that no non-Muslim body (like the Congress), however liberal or enlightened or Muslim-appeasement-oriented, could have political legitimacy over Muslims. Hence, all attempts by Gandhi and the Congress to take along Muslims were bound to fail.
(3) Why fight for freedom when Hindus are anyway doing it? Indian Muslims were cunning enough to realise that the Hindus would fight the British for freedom anvwav: and that their (Hindu’s) fight would also gain them (Muslims) freedom. Why then dirty their
The Muslim League’s first president Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk Mushtaq Hussain said at the opening meeting, “the political rights of a subject race thrive best in the soil of loyalty, and consequently the Mussalmans should prove themselves loyal to their Government before they can ask for any of their rights.”{PF/43}
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad writes in his autobiography that during his tour abroad he met Muslim revolutionaries in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey fighting for freedom. They (Muslim revolutionaries) expressed their surprise that the Indian Muslims were either indifferent to or were against the nationalist demands. They couldn’t digest the Indian Muslims were the camp followers of the British; and opined that they (the Indian Muslims) should rather lead the national struggle for freedom.{Azad/7}
(5) Attitude of the Muslim-Majority Provinces Please refer to the previous chapter, where it is detailed.
(6) Attitude of the Muslim-Minority Provinces Please refer to the previous chapter, where it is detailed.
(7) Vested Interests of the Muslim Ruling Class In Pakistan, the Muslim political and religious leadership, the rich businessmen, the landed feudal elites, and the Muslims in the bureaucracy and the army looked forward to greater power and a much
leadership, most of whom had huge landed and real-estate interests, the socialism of the Congress socialists like Nehru and many others, that had the potential for expropriation of private property, was an anathema.
It is worth noting that the Muslim leaders didn’t seek to mobilise Muslim masses by promising better material prospects and freedom from bondage, because that would have meant exposing their own exploitive status and sacrificing their own vested interests. They, therefore, focussed solely on the only safe way-Islam, and ‘Islam in danger’.
(8) Communal Electorates Although one can blame the British for promoting the Hindu-Muslim divide through various devices including the various Acts and the Communal Award of 1932, the fact remains that it was the Congress itself which first formally accepted the communal principle in the national politics as early as in 1916 through the Lucknow Pact with the Muslim League (please see details elsewhere in this book). That position was then incorporated by the British in the Government of India Act of 1919. The Gol Act was based on the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms Report of 1918. Montagu and Chelmsford had significantly pointed out that the provision of separate electorates was subversive to democracy and nationalism, but had expressed their helplessness in the matter as the Congress had already accepted the position. It was the concept of communal electorates that ultimately led to the partition and Pakistan.
themselves of a union of northern Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and Afghanistan.”{Mak/33} After his tour of Europe in 1905, Mohammed Iqbal, who had earlier written poems on nationalism and communal harmony, changed his tune, and began to champion the cause of the Islamic brotherhood and Ummah, and declared that the spirit of Islam was contrary to the concept of nationalism. Wrote the wise Dr BR Ambedkar:
“I feel that those Hindus who are guiding the destinies of their fellows have lost what Carlyle calls ‘the Seeing Eye and are walking in the glamour of certain vain illusions, the consequences of which must, I fear, be terrible for the Hindus… The Hindus will not realize, although it is now a matter of experience, that the Hindus and Muslims are neither one in temperament, nor in spiritual experience, nor in the desire for political union; and even at the few moments when they approached a kind of cordiality their relations were uneasy. Yet the Hindus will continue to cherish the illusion that notwithstanding this past experience there is still left a sufficient stock of broad and real community of aim, sentiments and policy to enable Hindus and Muslims to come together… In spite of all this the Hindus will not give up the illusion that Pakistan is only the fancy of Mr.Jinnah and that it has no support from the Muslim masses or other Muslim Leaders… When one hears these things from the Hindu camp one wonders what has made the Hindu intellect so weak and so dull… A thick and impervious wall of false sentiments and false illusions has prevented the Hindu from receiving fresh light. It is because of this that I felt the grave necessity of applying my batteries. I do not know how far I have succeeded in making breeches in the wall to let in light in the dark places. I am satisfied that I have done my duty. If the Hindus don’t do theirs they will be plagued by the very consequences for which they are laughing at Europe and they will perish in the same way in which Europe is perishing.”{Amb4/349-52}
(2) Mishandling the Muslim Leadership There were many enlightened elements among the Muslim leadership. Of course, they were ambitious and sought power; but had the Hindu leadership been visionary, it could have accommodated them. Lokmanya Tilak did. However, Gandhi was keen to be regarded as the sole, supreme, all-India leader cutting across castes, communities, and religion. He desired to be the top-most leader (a dictator, as he liked to be called) of the Congress, the Hindus, the Muslims, the depressed classes, and so on. In that zeal he sought to displace all competitors. He wanted to be one up on the Congress Constitutionalists who were hitherto the backbone of the Congress. He wanted to be a leader of the Dalits-Harijans, as he called them-outsmarting Ambedkar and other Dalit leaders. Under the garb of non-violence, he sought to discredit and defame the real fighters for freedom, the revolutionaries like Rash Behari, Sanyal, Bhagat Singh, Azad and others. Those who would not toe his line, he managed to either throw them out of the Congress, or rendered them irrelevant. Most unethically, the ‘Apostle of Truth’ manoeuvred to sideline,
Factors-III: Clueless Congress Leadership
(1) Wrong Notions Gandhi, Nehru and a number of Congress leaders entertained imaginary notions on Islam and Muslims, and their mind-set, and their views on nation and religion. They saw them through the liberal prison of Hindu civilisation, religion and culture. They ignored the fact that the latter two Abrahamic religions were exclusivist, and believed that only their religion was the true religion.
Muslims felt that democracy being majority-rule, they would be under Hindu-rule, and would be condemned to live in what the Islam calls Dar-al-Harb, when what they looked forward to was living in Dar al-Islam, under the majority-Muslim rule.
There were enough explicit pronouncements and articulation right since the time of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98) wanting Muslims to be treated as a separate nation. Wrote Sir Ross Masud, son of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and once VC of AMU, in 1929:
“The differences of the Muslims with Hindus are deep seated and Muslims feel they would be swamped in a self-governing India… The Punjab Muslims have long been talking among themselves of a union of northern Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and Afghanistan.”{Mak/33}
Through his acts, Gandhi also ensured severance of Jinnah from the Congress. Jinnah’s stand on Khilafat was far more sensible than that of Gandhi. Jinnah was against encouraging fundamentalist Muslim and Mullah elements through the Khilafat movement, and had warned Gandhi and the Congress of the error of their ways. But, Gandhi felt that by supporting Khilafat he would also become the leader of the Muslims, sidelining Jinnah and other Muslim leaders. While living in London during 1930-34, Jinnah had told Durga Das:
“…I came away to London because I did not wish to meet that wretched Viceroy [Willingdon] … I was hurt, besides, when my very reasonable proposals at the Calcutta All-Parties Convention were turned down by Motilal Nehru and his lot. I seem to have reached a dead end. The Congress will not come to terms with me because my following is very small. The Muslims do not accept my views…” On the forthcoming RTCs in London, Jinnah told Durga Das: “What can you expect from a jamboree of this kind? The British will only make an
exhibition of our [Hindu-Muslim] differences…”{DD/154-5} (Please also check the subchapter on Jinnah in the next chapter.)
Besides the above, it reflects very poorly on the Indian pre-independence leadership that despite a millennium of rich ground-level experience of India with Islam and Muslims, coupled with welldocumented global experience about them, they [the Indian leadership) failed to fathom the outlook, thinking and psychology of majority Indian Muslims, and the way Islam moulds and orients them, and the direction into which it propels them.
(3) Ignoring Nationalist Muslims Wrote MC Chagla: “I have always felt that the real opinion of the Muslim masses was never elicited by any democratic method before agreement was arrived at regarding the partition and that the Congress had no right to assume that what Jinnah said and did was acceptable to all his co-religionists. The proper method should have been to hold a plebiscite in the whole of India to determine this issue. At least the views of the Muslims should have been ascertained by this obviously more reliable method than by merely treating Jinnah as the Quaid-e-Azam, and the Muslim League as the only representative association of the Muslims. Although publicly they praised us, in reality the Congress leaders ignored and neglected Muslim nationalists for all practical purposes. If they had given us full support, I am sure we could have countered, to a considerable extent, what Jinnah was trying to propagate. At least in the earlier stages of the partition movement, a large section of the Muslims could have been won over to the cause of nationalism.”{MCC/100-1}
(4) No Self-Defence Gandhi’s non-violence strategy turned Hindus into sitting ducks. The Muslim League freely made use of violence and riots to demonstrate why Hindus and Muslims can’t live together, and a separate country was needed for the Muslims. Deterrent violence would have had the salutary effect of making the Muslim League realise why its violence would backfire and harm Muslims more. It was the duty of leaders of the
violence and riots to demonstrate wny Hinaus ana muslims can t live togetner, and a separate country was needed for the Muslims. Deterrent violence would have had the salutary effect of making the Muslim League realise why its violence would backfire and harm Muslims more. It was the duty of leaders of the Congress to prepare people for self-defence. But, Gandhi parroted the Christian bilge of “turning the other cheek”, something that the real Christians (the British, the colonists) never made the mistake to follow. Also, Gandhi believed in yet another biblical myth that “the meek shall inherit the earth”, without realising that in real life the meek only get slaughtered, and that’s why the real Christians always believed in being strong. The deeply-religious Hindu Gandhi forgot his own roots of shakti-worship, and the teachings of Gita and Ramayana! Indeed, he misinterpreted Hindu scriptures to suit his (wrong) notions on non-violence.
Had Gandhi and the Congress fulfilled their basic responsibility of ensuring safety of the people by training and preparing them in self-defence, and in deterrent violence, the Muslim League would not have dared to use violence to achieve their ends.
(5) Innocent on Foreign Policy & External Security Matters Apart from the above incompetence in handling the Muslim League and the Muslim leadership, Gandhi, Nehru and the Congress leadership in general showed strange lack of grasp on what considerations were driving the British policy on granting freedom, and on Partition and Pakistan. This is already detailed under the sub-chapter”British Vested Interests” above. Had the Congress leadership been wiser they could have outsmarted Britain by promising them all cooperation and favours they sought (like Jinnah did), but ultimately, after independence, done whatever was in the best interests of the nation. Rather than being engaged in realpolitik, Gandhi and the Congress were busy upholding ideals divorced from reality. Wrote Sarila:
“But the Indian leaders remained plagued by the Indians’ age-old weakness such as arrogance, inconsistency, often poor political judgement and disinterest in foreign affairs and questions of defence.”{Sar/405} “Protected by British power for so long and then focused on a non-violent struggle, the Indian leaders were ill prepared, as independence dawned, to confront the power play in our predatory world. Their historic disinterest in other countries’ aims and motives made things none the easier. They had failed to see through the real British motivation for their support to the Pakistan scheme and take remedial measures…”{Sar/406} “By the end of 1946, they [Indian leaders] had been manoeuvred into such a corner that if Sardar Patel had not stepped forward to have a limb amputated’, as he put it, and satisfy Britain, there was a danger of India’s fragmentation, as Britain searched for military bases in the bigger princely states by supporting their attempts to declare independence.”{Sar/406}
nationality. What did the movement achieve?
“First, Muslim fanaticism secured a position of prestige in Indian politics; thereafter their religious loyalty took precedence over national loyalty. Two, the Muslim population hitherto divided among various groups and political pulls now became a solid force. Three, a new fanatic leadership riding on the crest of the Khilafat wave came to wield the reigns of the Muslim leadership…”
India, in their conflict with initially the proposed Pakistan, and then the real Pakistan! In April 1947 Gandhi wanted Jinnah to take over from Nehru as the head of the then undivided Indian government, with Mountbatten as the referee to decide if Jinnah was acting in the interest of the nation as a whole! So, in Gandhi’s considered views the British were just, fair and neutral party! What could be more bizarre!!
The above is but a sample from the pre-partition days. Here is another from the post-partition days from NS Sarila’s book: “Earlier, in September 1947, Gandhiji had approached Mountbatten with the suggestion that Attlee be requested to mediate between India and Pakistan to avert a clash between the two countries… Gandhiji wanted Attlee to ascertain in the best manner he knows who is overwhelmingly in the wrong and then withdraw every British Officer in the service of the wrong party…. Mountbatten, after a while, wrote to him [Gandhi] as follows: ‘An alternate means is to ask the UNO to undertake…… this is how a reference to the UN [on J&K] came to be broached.”{Sar/366-7}
(7) Communist Perfidy Communists contributed to the creation of Pakistan, as effectively brought out by the famous writer Khwaja Ahmad Abbas, himself a communist, in his book ‘I am not an island: An experiment in autobiography: “Who killed India? India was killed by the Communist Party of India which provided the Muslim separatists with an ideological basis for the irrational and anti-national demand for Pakistan. Phrases like ‘homeland’, ‘nationalities’, ‘self-determination’, etc. were all ammunitions supplied by the communists to the legions of Pakistan.”{Mak/142}
Wrote NS Sarila: “Zhukov then explained how the Indian communists saw the matter, views that he probably heard from them during his visit to Delhi. “The Indian Communist Party wished to see the country divided into independent states,’ Zhukov observed, ‘with the right of self-determination and social and cultural development, economic unity, and the right to join or remain outside an all-India Union. This was the only correct way to grant true independence to different communities.’ They obviously saw greater opportunities if Indian was Balkanized.”{Sar/310)
The demands made by Jinnah on the Congress in 1938 included: “… The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism. Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute. The Muslims’ right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way. Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter. Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial re-distribution or adjustments. The ‘Bande Mataram’ song should be given up. Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged. Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength. The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance. Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims…”
Wrote Ambedkar in ‘Pakistan or the Partition of India'{Amb3}:
“…With this new list, there is no knowing where the Muslims are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that is, between 1938 and 1939, one more demand and that too of a substantial character, namely 50 per cent share in everything, has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands there are some which on the face of them are extravagant and impossible, if not irresponsible. As an instance, one may refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India.
“Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not spoken all over India but is not even the language of all the Musalmans of India. Of the 68 million of Muslims only 28 million speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national language means that the language of 28 million of Muslims is to be imposed particularly upon 40 million of Musalmans or generally upon 322 millions of Indians.
“Another illustration of this spirit of exploitation is furnished by the Muslim insistence upon cowslaughter and the stoppage of music before mosques. Islamic law does not insist upon the slaughter of the cow for sacrificial purposes and no Musalman, when he goes to Haj, sacrifices the cow in Mecca or Medina. But in India they will not be content with the sacrifice of any other animal. Music may be played
Ambedkar: When was Pakistan conceived?
Wrote Dr Ambedkar in 1941: “… There is evidence that some of them knew this [Pakistan] to be the ultimate destiny of the Muslims as early as 1923…
“Many believe the Khilafat Movement (1919), a protest by Indian Muslims against Turkey’s abolition of the Caliph, religious leader of the Arab world, to be the first step towards India’s Partition. Gandhi spearheaded this movement but failed to realise that the Pan-Islamic idea cut at the very root of Indian nationality. What did the movement achieve?
“First, Muslim fanaticism secured a position of prestige in Indian politics; thereafter their religious
only non-effective, non-violent preachers) to see the country sail successfully through a civil war. Had Netaji Subhas been there, it would have been different.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwa. “The second thing that is noticeable among the Muslims is the spirit of exploiting the weaknesses of the Hindus. If the Hindus object to anything, the Muslim policy seems to be to insist upon it and give it up only when the Hindus show themselves ready to offer a price for it by giving the Muslims some other concessions…”
Could the Partition have been avoided?
Yes and No. Let’s examine both the aspects below.
The answer to the captioned question is “Yes” had the Congress and Hindu leadership been sharp, knowledgeable, analytical, realistic, competent, clever and visionary enough to have not allowed the situation to descend to the level it descended by 1946–this should have been obvious from the details systematically covered in this book.
The factors responsible (already detailed in this book) can be summarised as follows. (1)Gandhi’s overweening ambition to be the sole leader and spokesman of the Indian Muslims too, not wanting to share power with the likes of Jinnah. (2)Nehru’s arrogance and conceit (Gandhi too was partially responsible) in not accommodating Jinnah and the Muslim League in the power-structure in provinces post the 1937 elections. (3)The overall Congress position, thanks to Gandhi and Nehru, that made the British feel the Congress was inimical to its foreign policy interests both with regard to the Middle-east Oil and the cold-war with the Communist USSR and China. The British felt their interests would be wellserved by a pliable Muslim Pakistan. Hence, the British concluded that the Partition and Pakistan was in their best interest.
Reasons why the British thought negatively on the Congress: Gandhi’s Quit India call and noncooperation with the British when they were in dire difficulties in WW-II; Nehru and his leftist groups’ pro-Russia bend.
The answer to the captioned question is “No” if one analyses the situation as it existed in 1946 and 1947. From the details given in this book, it would be seen that the (a)the Muslim position had so hardened by 1946, and (b)the British foreign policy and security interests had so crystallised in favour of having a pliable Pakistan that not yielding on Pakistan would have led to a spate of communal riots and civil war in which the British as the interested party would have definitely favoured Pakistan with all their diplomatic and military might.
Sadly, the Congress, wedded to the Gandhian non-violence, had most irresponsibly failed to prepare the country for self-defence, and for facing up to the mobs. The Congress had no Abraham Lincoln (it had only non-effective, non-violent preachers) to see the country sail successfully through a civil war. Had Netaji Subhas been there, it would have been different.
{4}
Muslim Leaders & Parties
Main Muslim Political Parties
Congress (Nehru, in particular) following the 1936-37 elections that the AIML adopted a vigorous and militant anti-Congress line that culminated in its Lahore Resolution of 26 March 1940 indirectly hinting about Pakistan. However, most likely, given the mind-set of Jinnah and the Muslims leaders, AIML would have done what it did, even if the Congress had accommodated it post the 1936-37 elections. Because, between 1923 (post-Khilafat) and 1937 the AIML had been pre-occupied in sabotaging the freedom movement, and cosying up to the Raj, having returned to the pre-1914 era of Muslim politics of sucking up to the British.
Post-1937 elections, with the Congress ruling in 8 of the 11 provinces, and the AIML not ruling a single one on its own majority, the AIML resorted to the Goebbelsian method of spreading outright lies, carrying out false propaganda, and engaging in disinformation campaign against the Congress-Goebbelsian technique dictated that the greater the lie the greater the chances of its acceptance by the gullible masses. It started referring to the Congress governments as the ‘Hindu Raj’. Secular’ Jinnah turned rabidly communal, appealing to Muslims in the name of Allah and Holy Koran. Jinnah and AIML’s Goebbelsian techniques proved so effective that within two years the Muslim masses began gravitating towards the AIML.
Pakistan became a realty not so much by the efforts of Jinnah or the Muslim League (Even the crease of the suites of Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders never got crumpled in any agitation.) as by the machinations of the British, particularly Churchill and other like-minded politicians, as it was in the vested interests of the British and the West to have Pakistan to protect their oil-interests in the MiddleEast, and to have a useful ally in their cold-war.
All India Muslim League (AIML) All India Muslim League (AIML) was founded at a conference of 3000 delegates in Dhaka in December 1906. It was fuelled by the Bengal partition of 1905. AIML was a product of the divide-and-rule policy of the British.
The name ‘All-India Muslim League’ was proposed by its co-founder Sir Aga Khan III. Political formations to counter the growing nationalism and the Congress were being actively encouraged by the British Raj. Aga Khan had pleaded with the British Raj to consider Muslims as a separate nation.
The formation of the Muslim League in 1906 and the putting forth of its demands to the Raj like “separate and privileged representation in any electoral system that might be set up” were actually encouraged, facilitated, and stage-managed by Viceroy Lord Minto and the British officials. Upon success of their efforts in ensuring that the Muslim League was formed, J. Dunlop Smith, private secretary of Minto, sent this effusive message to Viceroy Minto: “I must send your excellency a line to say that a very, very big thing has happened today. A work of statesmanship (on the part of the British Raj] that will affect India and Indian history for many a long year. It is nothing less than pulling back of sixty-two millions of people (Muslims) from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition (Congress).”{Akb/68}
Expressing his loyalty to the British, the AIML’s first President Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk (or Waqar-ulMulk) Mustaq Hussain had stated at its opening session: “…the political rights of a subject race thrive best in the soil of loyalty, and consequently the Mussalmans should prove themselves loyal to their Government before they can ask for any of their rights…”
Later Waqar-ul-Mulk had said, addressing a student-gathering at Aligarh: “God forbid, if the British rule disappears from India, Hindus will lord over it… The only way for the Muslims to escape this danger is to help in the continuance of the British rule… Let the Muslims consider themselves as a British army ready to shed their blood and sacrifice their lives for the British Crown.”{Mak/117}
AIML was almost moribund during the 1920s and early 1930s. It was revived by Jinnah post Dec-1934 after his return from London. One opinion is that after AILM’s (Jinnah’s) overtures were rebuffed by the
The Unionist Party The Unionist Party represented the interests of Punjab’s feudal classes, landlords, and landed gentry, and was pro-British. It was secular in the sense that it represented the interests of the upper feudal classes of all three major religions of Punjab: Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh. Sir Fazli Husain, Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, Chaudhry Sir Shahab-ud-Din, and Sir Chhotu Ram were its co-founders. The Unionists dominated the Punjab Provincial Legislature all through: from 1920s till the Partition. Its leaders served as Prime Ministers of Punjab.
Unionist leader Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan was Punjab’s Premier from 1937 to 1942, in alliance with the Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal-despite opposition by the Jinnah’s Muslim League.
Sir Malik Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana took over from Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan after the latter’s death in 1942. Although Jinnah’s Muslim League pressured him to add ‘Muslim’ to the party’s name, he refused, not wanting to alienate his Hindu and Sikh supporters. However, in the run up to the partition the Unionists integrated with the Muslim League.
If the Congress leadership had worked with the local Muslim leadership in Muslim-majority provinces
of Punjab, Sindh, and Bengal, and reassured them of their position, they could have beaten Jinnah, and avoided Partition and Pakistan. The Unionist Party of Sikandar Hyat Khan and Khizr Hyat Khan Tiwana that ruled Punjab was a Muslim-Hindu-Sikh coalition. The Krishak Proja Party headed by Fazlul Huq, a nationalist Muslim, dominated Bengal. Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah had formed a Hindu-Muslim coalition in Sind, independent of the Muslim League. NWFP was controlled by the Khan brothers, who were close to the Congress. If the Congress had intelligently coordinated its efforts with these parties, it could have sidelined Jinnah and his Muslim League. But, Gandhi and the Congress leadership lacked that tact, vision, and strategic thinking.
Pendrel Moon was told by Sikandar Hyat Khan of the Unionist Party as long back as in 1937 that “Pakistan would mean a massacre.”
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali Born: 25 December 1876 at Karachi, Pakistan. Died: 11 September 1948 at Karachi, Pakistan.
A Biographical Profile Family Background Muhammad Ali Jinnahbhai (original name) was born to Jinnahbhai Poonja and his wife Mithibai on 20 October 1875; but after joining Christian Mission High School, Christmas looked like a better date to him, so he changed his birthdate to 25 December. Name Jinnahbhai sounded too traditional, so he chopped off bhai’ from it.
He was a Gujarati, and was born a Khoja Ismaili (Shia) Muslim, who were the disciples of Aga Khan. After they fled Persian persecution, thousands of Khojas had settled in Western India, mainly Gujarat, during the 10th–16th centuries. Jinnah later followed the Twelver Shi’a teachings, before finally converting to the Sunni sect.
His father was a merchant and a money-lender born in a family of weavers in Paneli village in Gondal, Kathiawar, Gujarat; and moved to Karachi in 1875. Jinnah was the second of three brothers and three sisters, including sister Fatima Jinnah.
Premjibhai Meghji Thakkar, a Hindu Lohana from Paneli village in Gondal State in Kathiawar, was the paternal grandfather Jinnah. He had converted to Islam. There is a story that Premjibhai entered the fishtrading business in the coastal town of Veraval in Gujarat to support his family. The nature of his business was contrary to the vegetarianism of the Lohanas, who therefore ostracised him from the community. After making enough money, he attempted to rejoin the community by discontinuing his fish business. However, the Lohana leaders refused to accept him back. Enraged at their father’s humiliation, his sons
his sons prevailed upon him to convert.
Jinnah married Emibai Jinnah from his ancestral village of Paneli before leaving for London. She, however, expired during his absence in England.
In 1918, Jinnah, at the age of 42, married his second wife Ruttie (Rattanbai Petit) aged 18, a Parsi, and 24 years his junior-she had fled from her father Sir Dinshaw Petit’s palatial bungalow less than a mile away from Jinnah’s on the day she had turned 18. Her father had disowned her till she separated a decade later from Jinnah.
Jinnah-Ruttie had a daughter, Dina. They separated a decade after marriage. Ruttie died in 1929. Thereafter, Jinnah’s sister Fatima looked after him and the child Dina. Dina was educated in India and England. Dina’s relations with Jinnah soured after she married a Parsi Neville Wadia (of Bombay Dyeing). When Jinnah insisted Dina on marrying a Muslim, she reminded him that he too had married a nonMuslim. Dina did not visit Pakistan in Jinnah’s lifetime, and only went there for his funeral.
Jinnah had been suffering from TB since the 1930s, and died of TB and lung cancer on 11 September 1948 at the age of 71 at Karachi, where he now rests in a large marble mausoleum, Mazar-e-Quaid.
Education & Professional Career Jinnah was sent to London in January 1893 by his father to work as an apprentice book-keeper with Douglas Graham & Co. However, Jinnah soon abandoned it in favour of studying at Lincoln’s Inn. Jinnah was an independent-minded, self-contained, strong-willed, and arrogant man.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, like most politicians of his time, was a lawyer-a very successful lawyer, like Rajaji, CR Das, Sarat Chandra Bose, Vithalbhai Patel, Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra Prasad. Born in Karachi, he was trained as a barrister at Lincoln’s Inn in London. At age 19, he was the youngest Indian to be called to the bar in England in 1895. Jinnah began his practice in Bombay at a young age of 20. He was then the only Muslim barrister in Bombay.
Jinnah was offered a permanent post of Bombay presidency magistrate in 1900, on which he was working temporarily, on a princely monthly salary of rupees 1,500 (equivalent to about 5 lakhs now)! Yet, he declined it, for he planned earning that sum per day through his private practice!!{Akb/21}{Wolp/17}
Jinnah rose in his profession and acquired huge wealth through sheer dint of his disciplined hard work, intelligence, professional competence, and a burning passion to shine and succeed.
Between 1930 and 1934 Jinnah remained mostly in Britain along with his sister Fatima and daughter Dina, perhaps unhappy and disillusioned with the Indian political situation; and would have settled in England, but for the urging and persuasion of the Muslims from the United Provinces like Liaquat Ali Khan and Iqbal to return to India. In London, Jinnah stayed in a house in Hampstead Health surrounded by eight acres of garden! He returned to India in December 1934.
Jinnah was charging a fee of Rs 1,500 a day in 1937–among the highest in India. Additionally, he earned about Rs 40,000 annually from his investment in stocks, besides rental income from his seven flats in the upscale Mayfair in London. He had huge bungalows at both Bombay and New Delhi: his Malabar Hill bungalow in Mumbai on Mount Pleasant Road was on a wooded land measuring a massive 15,000 square yards; and that in Delhi was at 10 Aurangzeb Road (now thankfully Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Road), taken over later by Dutch embassy. (Akb/294}
Sartorial Elegance Jinnah adopted Western dress in London, donning smartly-tailored Saville Row suits and heavily starched detachable-collared shirts. All through life he used to be immaculately dressed in a suit and tie. He reportedly owned over 200 suits of finest cloth{Wolp/9}, and innumerable silk ties. Wrote New York Times about Jinnah: “undoubtedly one of the best dressed men in the British Empire.”
Political Career Jinnah led All-India Muslim League from 1913 right till the creation of Pakistan on 14 Aug 1947, after which he served as Pakistan’s first Governor-General until his death. Unlike Nehru-Gandhi, Jinnah refused to have a British-Mountbatten, who did much damage to India’s cause in J&K and elsewhere-as its first Governor-General.
Jinnah’s Transformation: Nationalist to Communalist
Jinnah’s Liberal Background vs. Gandhi While Jinnah was a very successful London-educated lawyer, Gandhi had failed to establish his practice in Mumbai upon return from London in his very first case he found himself tongue-tied when he rose to address the court-and had shifted to Rajkot, writing petitions. Unlike Gandhi, Jinnah was not only totally westernised, he was also irreligious: he preferred bacon and ham at breakfast; never read Koran, or offered namaz, or fasted during Ramzaan; had little interest in religion; and enjoyed his evening drink. Jinnah regarded Gandhi’s ideas and religiosity in politics as backward thinking, Hinduisation, and contamination of secular politics. He considered the overall Gandhi’s persona as a bit of a sham and a puton. Jinnah, during the initial decades of his political career, was rightly against mixing religion with politics.
leaders like Gopal Krishna Gokhale. He worked with both Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Lokmanya Tilak. He was instrumental in getting through ‘The Lucknow Pact 1916’ between the Congress and the Muslim League, the clauses of which were later accepted by Government and embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919.
He was among the most prominent leaders of the ‘All India Home Rule League’ (1915-1920) that drew participation from both the Congress and the Muslim League, and which had Tilak, Annie Besant, Joseph Baptista, GS Khaparde, and Subramania Iyer as its other prominent leaders.
Given the above background Jinnah expected due respect and appropriate position for him at the top rungs of the Congress. However, what Jinnah felt was his due was frustrated by the arrival of Gandhi on the scene, who sought to be the topmost leader of all sections, including Muslims and Dalits.
Rational, Modernist, Nationalist & Anti-Communal Jinnah had opposed the partition of Bengal in 1905, of which most Muslim leaders were in favour, as they wanted East Bengal to be an Islamic state. At the 22nd session of the Congress in 1906 in Calcutta, Jinnah had stated:
“The foundation upon which the Indian National Congress is based is that we [Hindus and Muslims] are all equal, that there should be no reservation for any class or
community.”{Akb/63} In 1906, when the Aga Khan lead a delegation to Viceroy Lord Minto to plead Muslim interests, Jinnah wrote in a Gujarati newspaper what rights the unelected and self-appointed members of the Aga Khan delegation had to speak on behalf of the Indian Muslims. Jinnah also opposed their meeting in Dacca in December 1906 in which the All-India Muslim League was formed.
Jinnah had refused to become a member of the All-India Muslim League founded on 31 December 1906 -in the initial years. He advised the Muslims not to go along with the British game of divide and rule’. Aga Khan, the first honorary president of the Muslim League, had remarked in 1906 that Jinnah was the doughtiest opponent of the League, and that Jinnah had said that “our principle of separate electorates was dividing the nation against itself’. (Akb/69}
Jinnah was not enthused with the Morley-Minto Reforms (Act of 1909) that provided for separate Muslim electorates, and commented that the separate electorates were “a poisonous dose to divide the nation against itself.”{Sar/78}
Some hardline AIML leaders like Maulana Hasrat Mohani became so antagonistic to Jinnah that they labelled him as a Hindu agent. (Akb2/243}
Jinnah started his political career as an ardent nationalist, a constitutionalist, a liberal, and as a prominent Congress leader. Jinnah had joined the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1906. However, he
Jinnah with the Congress Stalwarts In London, Jinnah became an admirer of Dadabhai Naoroji (first British Member of Parliament of Indian origin) and Sir Pherozeshah Mehta. Jinnah had worked as secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji, the Grand Old Man of India, and of the Indian National Congress.
He was a leader of the Indian National Congress in the first two decades of the 20th century. He attended the 20th annual meeting of the Congress in Bombay in December 1904; and began following
joined the All Indian Muslim League (AIML), after considerable pressure and persuasion of Muslim leaders, in 1913. In those days one could simultaneously be a member of the INC and of AIML. Still regarding himself as a secular all-India leader, above communal considerations, he advised the AIML that his “loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated.”{Wolp/34}
He fought the case of Bal Gangadhar Tilak who was arrested for sedition in 1908; and although he could not secure his bail in 1908, Jinnah won him his acquittal in 1916. In those times Jinnah advocated HinduMuslim unity, and helped forge the 1916 Lucknow Pact between the Congress and the Muslim League.
Writes Patrick French: “Swaraj,’ he [Jinnah] told the Muslim League at a meeting in Lahore in 1924, ‘is an almost interchangeable term with Hindu-Muslim unity … the advent of foreign rule, and its continuance in India, is primarily due to the fact that the people of India, particularly the Hindus and Mohammedans, are not united and do not sufficiently trust each other.””{PF/60}
Addressing the Muslim League session on 30 December 1924, Jinnah had said: “The objects of the AIML] was to organise the Muslim community, not with a view to quarrel with the Hindu community, but with a view to unite and cooperate with it for their motherland…”{PP/205}
Jinnah had written to the Times of India on 3rd October 1925 decrying the charge that the Congress was a Hindu body… He [Jinnah] had declared: “I am a nationalist first, a nationalist second, and a nationalist last.”{DD/169-73}
To a question by a young Muslim, he had opined: “You are an Indian first, and then a Muslim.”
After the 1932 Communal Award he had stated: “Now that the Communal Award has given the necessary safeguards, we can work for the early achievement of Swaraj.” In 1933 he had made a strong appeal for Hindu-Muslim unity. While in London during 1930-34, Jinnah read ‘Grey Wolf: An Intimate Study
30-34, Jinnah read ‘Grey Wolf: An Intimate Study of a Dictator’, a biography of Kemal Ataturk, by HC Armstrong.
“It so impressed him [Jinnah] that he never ceased talking about it to his daughter and friends… In Ataturk he found his ideal; he was fascinated by what the Turkish dictator did to reform his co-religionists and to overhaul and modernise their outlook. He wanted to do the same for Indian Muslims. He was no less keen to free them from the clutches of the mullahs and rid them of the stranglehold of orthodoxy. He felt that they had to moulded to live as people in the West did and that unless they shed their obscurantism, their future was doomed.”{RZ/60-61}
resolution of related issues by the British before Indians could whole-heartedly support the British in WW-I and help them in recruitment of Indians in the army; Gandhi exhorted Indians to “think imperially” and wanted Indians to give unconditional support to the British in WW-I, including in armyrecruitments.
In his telegram to Viceroy Chelmsford on the support in WW-I and army-recruitment, Jinnah had stated, inter alia:
“…We cannot ask our young men to fight for the principles (like freedom), the application of which is denied to their own country. A subject race cannot fight for others with the heart and energy with which a free race can fight for the freedom of itself and others. If India is to make great sacrifices in the defence of the Empire, it must be as a partner in the Empire and not as a dependency. Let her feel that she is fighting for her own freedom as well as for the commonwealth of free nations… Let full responsible government be established in India within a definite period to be fixed by statute with the Congress-League scheme as the first
stage and a Bill to that effect be introduced into Parliament at once.”{Wolp/55} Despite the above, Gandhi failed to close ranks with Jinnah, else history might have been different. On the contrary, he again wrote to Jinnah urging him to make an emphatic positive declaration on armyrecruitments. Gandhi, however, soon had a taste of the bitter truth when he travelled to villages in Gujarat for recruitment. In Gandhi’s own words: “…We had meetings wherever we went. People did attend, but hardly one or two would offer themselves as recruits. ‘You are a votary of Ahimsa, how can you ask us to take arms? What good has the Government done for India to deserve our co-operation?’ These and similar questions used to be put to us.”{MKG/L-6485}
Significantly, the attitudes and roles of Gandhi and Jinnah reversed in the context of WW-II: Jinnah and the Muslim League whole-heartedly supported the British and vigorously helped in armyrecruitment; while Gandhi and the Congress, rather unwisely (as the history proved), refused to support the British, and opposed army-recruitment-ultimately making the Hindus, the Congress, and India a big looser.
What Triggered Jinnah’s Transformation 1915: Gandhi insults Jinnah Starting with an incident soon after Gandhi’s return from South Africa, a series of events happened that only served to widen the gap between Jinnah and Gandhi-mostly of Gandhi’s making.
In the reception held for Gandhi’s return from South Africa in 1915 by the Gujarat Society (Gurjar Sabha), Jinnah, who was a Gujarati and led the Gurjar Sabha, was also in the reception team. Invited to speak, Jinnah began in English. Gandhi indelicately interjected to state that in a Gujarati sitting it was desirable to speak in Gujarati rather than in English. That naturally put off Jinnah-a person [Gandhi]
Nationalist Jinnah vs. “Pro-Imperialist” Gandhi! It might surprise readers but during 1918 and earlier while Jinnah insisted on self-government and resolution of related issues by the British before Indians could whole-heartedly support the British in
To add insult to the injury, Gandhi, in his address, patronisingly mentioned that he was glad to find a Mohomedan not only belonging to his own region’s Sabha, but chairing it.”{Wolp/37} Jinnah considered himself to be a senior all-India leader, with ambitions to lead India, and not a communal leader. Gandhi’s condescending remarks served to lower his stature.
“He [Jinnah] was oversensitive and had his own notion of self-respect, regardless of the price he might have to pay; this often awed his opponents. He would not tolerate the slightest insult or humiliation and was quick to retaliate,” wrote Rafiq Zakaria.{RZ/14}
Not being the forget and forgive type, Jinnah returned the gratuitous insult in later years in full measure -the tragedy being it was not merely at the personal level, it cost India dear.
Gandhi considered himself to be above others, and freely furnished gratuitous advice. For example, he wrote to Jinnah’s wife Ruttie: “… Please remember me to Mr. Jinnah and do coax him to learn Hindustani or Gujarati. If I were you, I should begin to talk to him in Gujarati or Hindustani. There is not much danger of your forgetting your English or your misunderstanding each other. Is there ?…”{MD/Vol-2/141}
Oct-1920: Gandhi’s rebuff to Jinnah in the Home Rule League Gandhi called a meeting of the Home Rule League on 30 October 1920, and introduced changes in its constitution, including renaming it as ‘Swarajya Sabha’. Being a hurriedly called meeting only 61 members out of a total of about 6,000 attended. 41 supported Gandhi’s resolution. Jinnah objected-he rightly stated that the changes in the constitution required a 3/4th majority, besides only 61 of the 6,000 had attended the meeting. Gandhi, happy at having successfully (even though in an inappropriate manner: what happened to “God, Truth, High Morals”?) manoeuvred to wrest an important organisation, simply ignored Jinnah. Not only that Gandhi arrogantly stated that anyone not agreeable to the majority decision was “free to resign”. Jinnah resigned. Incidentally, Jinnah was a senior member of the Home Rule League, and had joined it earlier than Gandhi.
“Jinnah wrote to Gandhi that it was ‘with great sorrow’ that he was resigning from the Home Rule League. Gandhi advised him to take his share in the new life that was opening before him. Jinnah replied, ‘If by “new life” you mean your methods and your programme, I am
afraid I cannot accept them, for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster.'”{Gill/187) Abbas Tyabji wrote to Gandhi on his arbitrary action:
“…many of my friends consider your action autocratic and point out the danger of placing the whole movement under an autocrat who holds himself above all rules of procedure!”{Gill/45}
Dec-1920: Jinnah booed for not addressing Gandhi as ‘Mahatma’! In the Nagpur session of the Congress in December 1920, Jinnah (he was a member of the Congress too) strongly deplored participation in the Khilafat Movement saying it would encourage reactionary Mullah elements. But, he was hooted down. During his speech, Jinnah referred to Gandhi as “Mr Gandhi”. The
In the Nagpur session of the Congress in December 1920, Jinnah (he was a member of the Congress too) strongly deplored participation in the Khilafat Movement saying it would encourage reactionary Mullah elements. But, he was hooted down. During his speech, Jinnah referred to Gandhi as “Mr Gandhi”. The audience yelled: “No, Mahatma Gandhi!” When Jinnah refused to address Gandhi as Mahatma he was booed, and had to finally leave the stage. Gandhi was present, but didn’t have the modesty to tell the audience that he need not be addressed as Mahatma. Said Jinnah in an interview in 1942 to Louis Fischer:
“I have been in this movement for thirty-five years. Nehru worked under me in the HomeRule society. Gandhi worked under me… My goal was Hindu-Muslim unity… In 1916, I… persuaded the two organisations [Congress and League] to meet simultaneously in Lucknow and was instrumental in bringing about the Lucknow Pact (please see details earlier in this book]… So it was until 1920 when Gandhi came into limelight. A deterioration of HinduMuslim relations set in….”{LF} 1920-22: Gandhi Supported the Regressive Khilafat Movement, which Jinnah
Rightly Opposed. Gandhi whole-heartedly supported the backward-looking Khilafat Movement of 1920-22, started by the Maulanas and Maulvis, not to gain freedom for India, but to save the regressive and cruel Ottoman Empire and Khalifa responsible for the Armenian genocide (pl. see details elsewhere in this book). Jinnah rightly opposed it, but was sidelined. Gandhi thought that by supporting Khilafat he would become the top leader of the Muslims too, and would bring about Hindu-Muslim unity. The results were opposite. Opportunism and support for wrong causes does not pay.
1928: Jinnah & Motilal Nehru Report Jinnah had suggested certain amendments to the Motilal Nehru Report 1928 on India’s future constitution, which were not accepted, nor was the matter deferred, as he had requested. Disappointed, Jinnah had stated: “If we cannot agree, let us at least agree to defer, but let us part as friends. Believe me there is no progress for India until the Musalmans and Hindus are united, and let no logic, philosophy or squabble stand in the way of coming to a compromise, and nothing will make me more happy than to see a Hindu-Muslim union.” Frustrated, Jinnah came up with his 14-Points.
1930: Jinnah left for London Gandhi’s stars rose 1919 onwards, while those of Jinnah dimmed. So much so that Jinnah left India for London with his sister and daughter in 1930 never to return-he had sold his personal effects in India.
He set up a lucrative legal practice there. In London, Jinnah began earning over 25,000 pounds a year{PF/87), and stayed in a house in Hampstead Health surrounded by eight acres of garden!
He remained in London for the next four years, and returned to India in December 1934 after being persistently persuaded by the Muslim leaders from the United Provinces like Liaquat Ali Khan and Iqbal.
1937: Election Results & Gandhi-Nehru Rebuff to Jinnah Please see details under “Timelines of Run-up to the Partition==> Rebuff to Jinnah by Gandhi-Nehru that proved costly”.
Nehru’s Arrogance Nehru had stated that the Muslim League “represents a group of Muslims, no doubt highly estimable persons… functioning in the higher regions of the upper middle classes and having no contact with the Muslim masses… May I suggest to Mr Jinnah that I come into grater touch with the Muslim masses than most of the members of the Muslim League.”{Wolp}
Contrast the above unwise and arrogant claim of Nehru with what Nirad Chaudhuri observed: “Nehru was completely out of touch with the Indian life even of his time, except with the life of the selfsegregating Anglicised set of upper India who lived in the so-called Civil Lines… Towards anyone who had the Hindi or Bengali accent in his English he would almost behave like an Englishman to a ‘native? “{NC2}
Dismissing the Muslim League, Nehru had arrogantly stated: “In the final analysis there are only two forces in India, British imperialism and Congress representing Indian nationalism.”{Shak/193}
Mar-1940: Jinnah: Pakistan more as a bargaining counter As late as March 1940 Jinnah expected to be recognised by Gandhi and the Congress as the sole spokesman of the Muslims. Congress, instead, elected Maulana Azad as its President at the Ramgarh Congress held on 19-20 March 1940 to demonstrate they did not recognise Jinnah as the sole spokesman.
Remarked Jinnah to Durga Das: “No, Durga, if only Gandhi would join hands with me, the British game of divide and rule would be frustrated.”{DD/194} Net result: Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution indirectly hinting about Pakistan was passed on 26 March 1940. Later, when a journalist asked Jinnah if the resolution meant “a demand for Pakistan”, Jinnah skirted the question, and did not use the word Pakistan.
Wrote Durga Das: “When I met Jinnah after the [Lahore] session and pointed out that Sikandar Hayat Khan had categorically told me that the [Lahore] resolution [hinting at Pakistan] was essentially a bargaining counter, Jinnah replied: A bargain, my friend, is struck between two parties. Let the Congress first accept the League as the other party.'”{DD/195}
1939-40 Onwards: Jinnah Rebounds & Turns the Table Excellent showing of the Congress in the 1937 Provincial Elections (following the 1935 Gol Act) thanks to stewardship of Sardar Patel, and corresponding dismal performance of the Muslim League which could not form a government in any province, and could not even win a single seat in the almost fully Muslim NWFP (where the Congress formed the government), coupled with the unwise and arrogant rebuff by the Congress (Nehru) to the Muslim League (Jinnah) to not form a coalition with it in the United Provinces,
NWFP (where the Congress formed the government), coupled with the unwise and arrogant rebuff by the Congress (Nehru) to the Muslim League (Jinnah) to not form a coalition with it in the United Provinces, jolted Jinnah into action, into drastically expanding the Muslim League influence and membership, and into an even more strident communal and bigoted position to wean the Muslim community all over India to his side. From being highly Westernised, Jinnah also turned more Islamic from 1937 onwards, both in the contents of his speeches, and in external forms, like dress.
The AIML’s performance was poor in the 1937-elections. However, (a)thanks to the provincial Congress governments resigning in 1939 in protest against the British India declaration of war in WW-II without taking the Congress into confidence-a suicidal Nehruvian move; and (b)thanks to the unwise noncooperation of the Congress in WW-II, in sharp contrast to the wise, willing, unconditional, and wholehearted cooperation extended by the Muslim League, Jinnah and the AIML earned full British favour, even as Gandhi and the Congress began to be shunned by the British. That opened the path for the Partition and Pakistan.
Jinnah was clever enough to even use his defeat in 1937-provincial-elections to his advantage. He picked up on minor or imagined injustice to Muslims to haul up the ruling Congress provincial governments so as to demonstrate to the Muslim population how Congress would only favour the Hindus, and why therefore it was necessary in their own self-interest to support the Muslim League in all future elections. Jinnah also managed to persuade the powerful non-Muslim-League Muslim leaders Fazlul Haq of Bengal and Sir Sikander Hayat Khan of Punjab to join the All-India Muslim League (AIML). The Lahore Resolution presented by Fazlul Haq hinting at Pakistan was passed by the AIML in March 1940.
1939 onwards, particularly after Britain came into WW-II, Jinnah played his game, actively encouraged by the British (who had their own massive vested interests), so skilfully that he managed to outmanoeuvre Gandhi and the Congress into ensuring Pakistan. Jinnah, who had a major role to play in the creation of Pakistan, came to be called as Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) and Baba-i-Qaum (Father of the Nation).
1944: Gandhi’s Immature Attempts to Soften Jinnah The scenario of rebuffing Jinnah dramatically reversed in the 1940s after the Muslim League gained an upper hand with the British following their full and unconditional support in the WW-II. Being the type who respected and gave greater regard to the powerful and the adversaries, while riding rough-shod over lesser beings or those he thought he had power over, Gandhi, realising the power of Jinnah post-1942, started addressing him as “Brother Jinnah” after he [Gandhi] came out of jail in 1944. However, Jinnah stuck to his old address: “Mr Gandhi”, or, at the most, the formal “Dear Mr Gandhi”. Gandhi entertained the immature notion that if he was over-courteous to (or buttered-up) the powerful or his adversaries, he could extract personal or political advantage. For example, he visited Aga Khan several times in London with Koran in hand thinking it would impress upon him his secular credentials! Similarly, suggested by one Muslim lady Amtus Salam, Gandhi gave currency to the title Qaid-i-Azam'{Azad/97} for Jinnah in 1944
after learning that his adversary Gandhi was himself calling him Qaid-i-Azam’.
Wrote Durga Das on what Sardar Patel told him in March 1947: “Patel commented at the end of my recital that Gandhi must bear part of the blame for the unhappy developments. Why did he listen to his samadhi (son’s father-in-lar, namely C.R. [Rajaji]) and hold talks with Jinnah? This recognition had ‘made a hero of Jinnah in Muslim eyes’. Had not Gandhi talked of self-determination for the Muslims? Why only for the Muslims? Why only for them?… Patel said his principal anxiety was to save India from chaos by countering Anglo-Muslim moves in the opposite direction. Maulana Azad was only worried about the Muslims. ‘Jawahar is the only nationalist Muslim today’ (This is how Patel jocularly described Nehru time and again.)…”{DD/240}
(d)The British supported the Muslim League and Jinnah to the hilt in their own self-interest. The Congress, Gandhi and Nehru were too naïve to grasp the British game.
Jinnah: Nationalist to Communalist The transformation of Jinnah from a nationalist to a communalist to a rabid communalist was gradual, and the reasons for the same can be summarised as under:
(1) The British who badly needed a strong, cunning, communal Muslim leader (a) to delay freedom to India; and (b) in case of grant of freedom, demand partition to ensure the creation of West Pakistan, which was critical to the British and the West for their Middle-East Oil interests and Cold War.
1944: Gandhi’s Parleys with Jinnah Spurned by the British, Gandhi commenced parleys with Jinnah. In just one month in September 1944, Gandhi visited Jinnah’s home 14 times! That further enhanced the prestige of Jinnah in the eyes of the Muslim masses, who till then were not too enamoured of him. Such come-down moves of Gandhi were resented by Sardar Patel and others, who were still in jail. The zilch results of the move made Gandhi bitter: “I could not make any headway with Jinnah because he is a maniac.”
Gandhi-Congress Naivete’ & Arrogance in Handling Jinnah Had the adverse Congress-Jinnah and Gandhi-Jinnah relation been only personal in nature one would not bother much, but they resulted in severe damage to India’s interests. In summary, what were the reasons for it? There were four sides to it: (a)Gandhi, (b)Congress, (c)Jinnah, and (d)the British.
(a)In so far as Gandhi was concerned, he overestimated his personal popularity with the Muslims in 1920s after having supported the Khilafat Movement, and in his quest to also become the top leader of the Muslims, he tried to sideline and ride rough-shod over leaders like Jinnah. Gandhi was too full of himself and grossly underestimated Jinnah. His initial behaviour with Jinnah was insensitive and arrogant. Jinnah gave Gandhi back in equal or greater measure later.
(b)The Congress used to arrogantly think it was the only political party that mattered, and that the Muslim League was only a minor game-spoiler. This despite the fact that even in 1937 in which the performance of the Congress was far superior (compared to that in 1946) to that of the League, the Congress had garnered less than 50% of the votes. Yet, the Congress spurned the chances of making adjustments with the League.
(c)Jinnah was a very competent, self-respecting, ambitious and arrogant person. His mishandling by the Congress leaders proved costly for the nation.
(d)The British supported the Muslim League and Jinnah to the hilt in their own self-interest. The Congress, Gandhi and Nehru were too naïve to grasp the British game.
(2) Jinnah’s own ego and personal ambitions. There were too many stalwarts in the Congress to compete with; while the field for the top leadership in the AIML was open, and waiting to be grabbed-in fact, during the early 1930s when Jinnah had left it all and shifted to London for good, he was persuaded by top Muslim leaders to come back to India and take charge of the AIML. (3) It paid to be communalist. Although Jinnah had been a nationalist during the beginning of the twentieth century, and had even opposed partition of Bengal and communal electorates; when it came to becoming a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in 1910, Jinnah didn’t walk the talk-he readily stood from a reserved Muslim constituency in Bombay, and got elected. If you can get position and posts on communal grounds, the talks and principles can take a backseat. He discovered, in due course, that promoting communal interests, rather than national interests, paid far, far better dividends to him in his political career. Jinnah, for many years, did the balancing act between nationalism and Muslim communalism; but, finally, realising the benefits of the latter, plumped for rabid, out-and-out communalism. (4) The unwise, ungenerous, and arrogant handling of Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Muslim interests by the Congress, Gandhi and Nehru. (5) Jinnah was a constitutionalist, who regarded politics as a gentleman’s game. He was not comfortable with the Gandhian agitational politics, and dreaded the prospect of going to jail, sacrificing his luxury lifestyle. He had said in 1919 in the wake of the Gandhi-supported Khilafat Movement: “I will have nothing to do with this pseudo-religious [of Gandhi] approach to politics. I part company with the Congress and Gandhi. I part company with mob hysteria. Politics is a gentleman’s
vangen. “The evolution of Jinnah from a national to a communal leader remains an enigma. To me, it was inconceivable that Jinnah should ever have come to be the main architect of Pakistan… Why did Jinnah change?… Jinnah’s besetting fault was his obsessive egoism. He had to be a leader, and the prime mover in whatever cause he worked… Jinnah was the complete antithesis of Gandhiji. While Gandhiji believed in religion, in abstract moral values, in nonviolence, Jinnah only believed in hard practical politics. Even sartorially it was impossible for Jinnah to subscribe to Gandhi’s views… Jinnah was also antipathic to Jawaharlal Nehru. These two were never… on the same wave length… After he was dropped from the Third Round Table Conference (1932), Jinnah became convinced that if he had to have a place in the sun, he would have to stand on a communal platform… Jinnah’s dominant characteristic was tenacity. Once he made up his mind, nothing in the world could divert him from his chosen objective. No temptation, no bribe, no pressure had the slightest effect and it is a measure of the man that he succeeded in creating a new country…”{MCC/79-80} “…From a strongly nationalist position, he [Jinnah] gradually drifted to the communal camp, which then consisted of men like the Aga Khan and Sir Mahomed Shafi….”{MCC/97}
ne nimseli diant know urdu!
He never took on the economic issues in his politics, and pronounced little on poverty and its amelioration (Why annoy the powerful Muslim landlord class?). He focussed only on the negatives: the religion, the imagined Hindu-Muslim divide, and how a ‘Hindu’-India would be harmful to the Muslims in every way. In this, Jinnah cleverly used the religiosity of Gandhi as a weapon to paint the Congress as the ‘Hindu’-Congress, representing interests of only the Hindus, and being anti-Muslim-Gandhi’s articulation of ‘Ram-Rajya’ further helped Jinnah drive hard his deliberate misrepresentation. Jinnah had begun to claim since the late 1930s that the only thing common between the Hindus and Muslims was their slavery to the British-beyond that there was nothing common.
Always suited-booted, it was only in later years that he started wearing the so-called Islamic dress-code of churidar-sherwani.
Thanks to the willing collusion of the British for their own vested interests in oil in the middle-east, and in containing Communist Russia, Jinnah was able to force Pakistan. In fact, if Jinnah had not done what the British wanted, they would have picked up an alternate Muslim leader, and made a Jinnah of him. Credit for Pakistan goes not as much to Jinnah as to the British!
Jinnah Achieves His Goal Said Stanley Wolpert: “Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three.”{Wolp/vii}
Wolpert could have added that this achievement” of Jinnah would not have been possible but for two major factors: (a)the active encouragement, co-operation and scheming of the British to achieve their own strategic aims; and (b)the Gandhian path adopted by the Congress.
Jinnah and the Muslim League leaders never went to jail or sacrificed anything to get Pakistan. Even the crease of the suites of Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders never got crumpled in any agitation.
Jinnah helped create a Muslim state although he himself was not a practising Muslim: He never read Quran, was unfamiliar with the Quranic precepts of prayers, used to snub mullahs (earlier in his career) for dreaming of an Islamic state, had contempt for Gandhi’s religion-in-politics, didn’t perform Haj, didn’t abstain from the Islamic taboo of drinking alcohol or eating pork, and had opposed both Sir Sayyad Ahmad Khan and the Aga Khan for their two-nation theory.
A chain-smoking lawyer, he spoke neither Hindi nor Urdu, and addressed public meetings in English, even if the audience didn’t understand a word. He created Pakistan whose official language was Urdu, but he himself didn’t know Urdu!
He never took on the economic issues in his politics, and pronounced little on poverty and its
Jinnah: Pakistan-a Mistake! Addressing the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947, Jinnah had said:{URL18}
“…in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish. Indeed if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free people long long ago… “…You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan… You may belong to any religion or caste or creed-that has nothing to do with the business of the State… We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State… Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State… “… If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past,
make…”{URL18)
–woven.
The statement, as above, went straight against Jinnah’s own two-nation theory; but not for Jinnah the consistency or truth, he wanted to create a Pakistan, and he did-of course, thanks to all out help of the British, who had a vested interest in Pakistan.
While mullahs in Pakistan, notably Maulana Maudoodi and Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, began to talk of turning Pakistan into a truly Islamic state; Jinnah contemptuously dismissed the same and the idea of a theocratic state as sheer nonsense.
When Sikandar Mirza, an ICS officer, who later became the head of Pakistan, enquired of Jinnah a few days before the formation of Pakistan, “What kind of polity are you going to have? Are you going to have an Islamic state?” Jinnah replied, “Nonsense. I am going to have a modern state.”{RZ/161} Well, if that was so, why create a state based on religion? It meant Jinnah and the British had simply exploited Islam and Indian Muslims to achieve Pakistan.
When the leading Ulamas of Pakistan urged Jinnah to implement the Shariah, Jinnah responded sternly with irritation: “Whose Shariah? Hanafis? Hambalis? Sha’afis? Ma’alikis? Ja’afris? I don’t want to get involved. The moment I enter this field, the ulama will take over for they claim to be experts and I certainly don’t propose to hand over the field to the ulama. I am aware of their criticism but I don’t propose to fall in their trap.”{RZ/162} Jinnah continued with the British laws in Pakistan-he wanted to follow in the footsteps of his favourite hero Kemal Ataturk, and turn Pakistan into another Turkey, a westernised state.
Jinnah’s faith in Islam and Islamic practices can be gauged from the fact that on 14 August 1947 he had invited Mountbattens to a special lunch when the month happened to be the month of Ramzan-it was later rescheduled to dinner after others brought the would-have-been-sacrilege to the notice of Jinnah.
Colonel Elahi Baksh, the doctor who had attended Jinnah during his last days, reportedly heard Jinnah confess: “I have made it [Pakistan] but I am convinced that I have committed the greatest blunder of my life.”{Sar/94}{Akb/433}
Born: 2 November 1877 at Karachi, Pakistan.
Died: 11 July 1957. Sir Sultan Muhammed Shah, Aga Khan III, was the 48th Imam of the Nizari Ismaili/Khoja community. His father Aqa Ali Shah, aka Aga Khan II, was a member of the Iranian royal family, and was the 47th Imam of the Nizari Ismaili Muslims.
Thanks to his British loyalty, he was conferred the title “Knight Commander of the Indian Empire’ by Queen Victoria in 1897, ‘Knight Grand Commander in 1902 by King Edward VII, and ‘Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Star of India’ by King George V in 1912. He was nominated to serve as a member of the League of Nations during 1934-37, and served as its President in 1937.
The concept of Hindus and Muslims as two nations was initially floated by the Aga Khan III. Aga Khan was the first-back in 1883-to put forth the idea of reserving a certain number of seats in elections for Muslims; and that the Muslim electorate should vote only for them. {Sar/76} Thus, the divisive proposal of a separate electorate for Muslims emerged that ultimately led to Partition and Pakistan.
He was co-founder of the All-India Muslim League. The name ‘All-India Muslim League’ was proposed by Aga Khan. Political formations to counter the growing nationalism and the Congress were being actively encouraged by the British Raj. Curiously, when in 1906, the Aga Khan lead a delegation to Viceroy Lord Minto to plead Muslim interests, Jinnah (then a liberal) questioned his credentials to speak on behalf of the Indian Muslims.
The curious thing, however, was that when the British left in 1947 after partition and creation of Pakistan, Aga Khan foreswore his citizenship, and vanished from the Indian subcontinent, leaving crores of his co-religionists (Muslims) behind in India and Pakistan.
It is significant that the Shias have been at the receiving end of the Sunnis in Pakistan, although the two principal advocates and founders of Pakistan, Jinnah and Aga Khan, were Shias!
Ali Brothers
Even Premier Liaqat Ali Khan had remarked one day after coming out of the ailing Jinnah’s room: “The old man [Jinnah] has now discovered his mistake.”{Sar/94}
Altaf Hussain, leader of the Mohajirs (or Muhajirs), Muslims from various regions of India (mostly UP) who immigrated to Pakistan (mostly to settle in Karachi and Sindh), had publicly condemned the partition of India, calling it “the biggest blunder in the history of the world.”{RZ/xv}
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar
Born: 10 December 1878 in Rampur, UP.
Died: 4 January 1931 in London. Muhammad Ali studied at the Darul Uloom Deoband, Aligarh Muslim University, and at Lincoln College, Oxford (1898: Modern History). Upon return from England, he served as the Education Director in the Rampur State, and then in the civil services in Baroda. He wrote for several British newspapers, and also edited/published newspapers and periodicals. He helped expand Aligarh Muslim University (then
Aga Khan
Born: 2 November 1877 at Karachi, Pakistan.
years between 1896 to 1913.
He supported revolutionary movements too: he reportedly supplied guns to the revolutionary Sachindranath Sanyal.
He became a member of the Muslim League in 1936, and a close associate of Jinnah.
Fazli Husain
called Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College), and co-founded Jamia Millia Islamia in 1920 (which later moved to Delhi).
He co-founded the All India Muslim League in Dhaka in 1906. He was also elected the President of Indian National Congress in 1923 (dual membership was allowed then).
He, along with Shaukat Ali (his elder brother), Maulana Azad, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, Gandhi, and others, led the Khilafat Movement during 1919-22 (for details on the Khilafat Movement, please check under the chapter “Interesting Indian Timelines”). He was also a member of the delegation that visited London in 1919 to convince the British government to influence the Turkish nationalist Mustafa Kemal Ataturk not to depose the Sultan of Turkey, who was also the Caliph of Islam (Khalifa). Their demand rejected, they formed the Khilafat Committee to start the Khilafat Movement against the British in India. These people were apparently more worried about Caliph, Khalifa, and Turkey, then about the independence of the country they were living in.
Gandhi’s calling off of the Khilafat Movement alienated the Muslim leaders. Muhammad Ali and other Muslim leaders increasingly began to share a feeling that Swaraj (independence) would be a gift for the Hindus only, unless the Muslims fought for their share of spoils. He broke with Gandhi, and began supporting Jinnah.
He died of a stroke in London on 4 January 1931, and was buried in Jerusalem. The inscription on his grave near the Dome of the Rock (Islamic shrine located on the Temple Mount) reads: “Here lies al-Sayyid Muhammad Ali al-Hindi”.
Muhammad Ali Pronouncements at Various Times Maulana Mohammad Ali wrote to the British PM on 1 January 1931: “The real problem before us is to give full powers to Muslims in such provinces as those in which they are in majority, whether small or large, and protection to them in such provinces as those in which they are in a minority.”{Mak/32}
Maulana Mohammad Ali later wrote{Mak/32-33}: “Unless in these few provinces [referring to reorganization of states in such a way that Assam and Sind become Muslim majority states] Muslim majorities are established by new constitution, I submit, not as a threat but as a very humble and friendly warning, there will be civil war in India. Let there be no mistake about it.” In this context it is worth noting that Sind got subsequently separated from the province of Bombay through the Gol Act of 1935.
(1877 – 1936) While there were bigots like Iqbal, and Muslim leaders like Aga Khan, and later Jinnah who advocated ‘Partition and Pakistan’, there were also Muslim leaders like Sir Mian Fazl-i-Husain who were opposed to the idea. He was the co-founder of the Punjab Unionist Party. When he was nominated by the British Raj to the Central Government, he made a Hindu, Chaudhry Sir Chhotu Ram, the leader of the Punjab Unionist Party to emphasize the importance of communal harmony. This is what Durga Das writes of his interaction with Fazl-i-Husain:{DD/169-73}
“Most Muslims of today, he (Fazli] said to me (Durga Das], belonged to families that were Hindus not so long ago. Two generations back, the forefathers of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the poet, were Saprus-Kashmiri Brahmins-and Jinnah’s ancestors not so far removed either were also Hindus. In his self-interest, the Muslim was inclined to flatter the British by protestations of loyalty… Fazli threw considerable light on the plan for Pakistan… Those who fathered the idea in the early thirties had been financed by the British Intelligence in London, he said… The best way to protect the interests of the minorities, according to Fazli, was for them to form provincial parties which could join hands with other parties to improve economic conditions. Communal differences, he added, were not based on religion but on sharing political power and the meagre economic resources of the country… ‘I do not want Punjab to be the Ulster of India,’ he added… Fazli expressed total opposition to Jinnah’s plan to fight the elections through a communal party, the League. He would see to it, he said, that Muslims everywhere joined non-communal parties… He recalled that Jinnah had written to the Times of India on 3rd October 1925 decrying the charge that the Congress was a Hindu body… He [Jinnah] had declared: ‘I am a nationalist first, a nationalist second, and a nationalist last.’… “Here was a tragic situation. Fazli, a communalist-turned-nationalist, envisaged co-operation with the Congress on the economic plane, and Jinnah, a nationalist-turned-communalist, sought a coalition [in 1930s] with the Congress on communal basis… The idea of partitioning the country took root among the Muslims only after Fazli’s death…”{DD/169-73}
Maulana Shaukat Ali Born: 10 March 1873 at Rampur, UP.
Died: 26 November 1938 (aged 65). Shaukat Ali, like his elder brother Muhammad Ali, was a leader of the Khilafat Movement. He was educated at the Aligarh Muslim University, and served in the civil services in the United Provinces for 17
AK Fazlul Huq
Born: 26 October 1873, Barisal, Bengal.
Died: 27 April 1962 in Dhaka. Huq graduated from the Presidency College, Calcutta in 1894 obtaining honours in Chemistry, Physics and Maths. He did his Masters in Mathematics in 1896 from the University of Calcutta; and Bachelor of Law in 1897 from the University Law College.
He was in Civil Service between 1908 and 1912 working as the Assistant Registrar of Cooperatives. He subsequently joined the bar, and practiced in the Calcutta High Court for many years.
Huq attended the conference that led to the formation of the All India Muslim League (AIML) in 1906. He was elected to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1913. He became the President of the AIML in 1916, and was jointly instrumental with Jinnah in hammering out the Lucknow Pact with the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1916. In those days simultaneous membership of the AIML and INC was permitted, and Hug also functioned as the Joint Secretary of INC in 1917, and its General Secretary during 1918-19.
Huq, like Jinnah, opposed the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movement (KNCM) of 1919-22 that was supported by Gandhi, INC, and many Muslim leaders. Like Jinnah, he was opposed to conservative, fundamentalist, backward-looking Muslim leaders and Khilafists; and did not approve of noncooperation, and boycott of legislatures and colleges-again, like Jinnah, he favoured constitutional methods to gain independence.
The ‘All Bengal Tenants Association’ morphed into the ‘Krishak Proja Party’ under Huq, and fought 1937 Bengal elections on the platform, winning 35 seats in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, and emerging as the third largest party after the Bengal Congress and the Bengal Provincial Muslim League. In coalition with the Bengal Provincial Muslim League, he formed the government, and became the first Premier of Bengal in 1937, and remained in that position till 1943. At the instance of Jinnah, Huq moved the AIML’s Lahore Resolution in 1940 that indirectly hinted at creation of Pakistan. In 1941, Huq joined the Viceroy’s Defence Council in the context of WW-II. Hug was associated with the founding of many educational institutions in Bengal.
After independence, Huq held various positions in Pakistan: Advocate General of East Bengal (19471952), Chief Minister of East Bengal (1954), Home Minister of Pakistan (1955-1956) and Governor of East Pakistan (1956-1958).
Born: 8 September 1892, Midnapore, Bengal.
Died: 5 December 1963 in Lebanon. Educated at Calcutta and Oxford, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy practiced law at the Gray’s Inn in London, before returning to India in 1921. Soon after he was elected to the Bengal Legislative Assembly on Muslim League’s ticket.
He subsequently joined the Swaraj Party, which was formed on 9 January 1923 by Deshbandhu Chittaranjan Das, Motilal Nehru, Vithalbhai Patel, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Subhas Chandra Bose, Satyamurti, Srinivasa Iyengar and others, who were unhappy with Gandhi’s withdrawal of the ‘Khilafat & NonCooperation Movement’ (KNCM) on 12 February 1922 on the unconvincing excuse of the Chauri-Chaura incident, and for the stand of the Gandhi-faction against the council entry”. As member of Swaraj Party, he was elected as the Deputy Mayor of Calcutta under Chittaranjan Das.
1925 onwards, after the death of Chittaranjan Das, Suhrawardy began promoting the Muslim causes and unity on the AIML platform, and started advocating the two-nation theory, and became one of the Founding Fathers of Pakistan.
In 1936, he became the Secretary-General of the Muslim League’s Bengal chapter. He won in the general elections held during 1934-37, and was appointed the Minister of Commerce and Labour, in which post he functioned during 1937-43, under the Bengal Premier Abul Kasim Fazlul Haq. He was the Minister of Civil Supplies during the Great Bengal Famine of 1943-it reflected on incompetence of the British (main culprit), and of his ministry. He aggravated famine conditions through his blunders.
He became the Premier of the Muslim League led government in Bengal after the elections of 1945-46, and remained in that position till independence-on 14 August 1947 he ceded the Chief Ministership of East Bengal to K Nazimuddin. He co-established the Awami League in 1949, after he parted company with the Muslim League. He became the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1956, but resigned in 1957. Giving up politics in 1960, he moved to Beirut.
Suhrawardy played a despicable role in the Calcutta Carnage of 1946–please read details under “Timelines of Run-up to the Partition==>1946: Muslim League’s Direct Action (Riots)”.
Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah
He was referred to as Sher-a-Bangla, and many places and institutions in Bangladesh are named after
him.
Born: 1879, Shikarpur, Sindh.
Died: 4 October 1948 at Karachi. Hidayatullah obtained his law degree in 1902, after which he began his legal practice in Hyderabad (Sindh). He worked in various positions during his public career: Vice President of the Hyderabad Municipality; President of the Hyderabad District Board; Member of the Bombay Legislative Council; a Minister in the Bombay Government (till 1928), a Member of the Executive council of the Governor of
HS Suhrawardy
Bombay (till 1934).
Sindh was included as part of the Bombay Province by the British after it came under them in 1843. Hidayatullah, jointly with Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto and others, represented Sindh in the Round Table Conferences in London in the early 1930s; and ensured that Sindh was hived off from Bombay in 1936. After its separation from Bombay, following the 1937-elections, Hidayatullah became the Chief Minister of Sindh, and remained in that position till independence, but for minor breaks. After independence Hidayatullah became the Governor of Sindh.
The Sindh Assembly under Hidayatullah passed a resolution in 1938 for a separate homeland for the Muslims; and in 1943, it became the first Assembly to pass an official resolution in favour of creation of Pakistan.
He was knighted in 1926, and was appointed a Knight Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India (KCSI) in 1933.
Sir Muhammad Iqbal
connections with him.
The second-generation-convert Muhammad Iqbal had a major influence on Jinnah in gradually turning him from a liberal, advocating Hindu-Muslim unity, into a bigot.
Iqbal’s Pronouncements at Various Times “Sare Jahan se Accha” (aka Tarānah-i-Hindi) was penned as a patriotic song for children by Iqbal, and was first published in the weekly Ittehad on 16 August 1904. It was recited by him in 1905 at Government College, Lahore. The song also had the wordings “Mazhab nahin sikhata apas men bair rakhnā; Hindi hain ham, watan hai Hindustan hamara” (Religion does not teach bearing ill-will among ourselves. We are of Hind, our homeland is Hindustan.). However, soon after Iqbal turned a bigot, he penned another song in the same metre: Tarana-e-Milli, that is, “Anthem of the Religious Community”. One of its stanza read: “Cin-o-Arab hamara, Hindustan hamara. Muslim hain ham watan hai sara jahan hamara” (Central Asia and Arabia are ours, Hindustan is ours. We are Muslims, the whole world is our homeland.). Stated Iqbal in 1929:
“I would like to see Punjab, the NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state… the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be
the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India. In the Allahabad session of the Muslim League in 1929, Iqbal said in his Presidential address:
“I confess to be a Pan-Islamist… The mission for which Islam came into this world will ultimately be fulfilled: the world will be purged of infidelity and the worship of false gods;
and the true soul of Islam will be triumphant.” Muhammad Iqbal said in his Presidential speech at the annual session of the Muslim League in Allahabad on 29 December 1930 {Iqb}: “… The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified… I would like to see Punjab, the NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state… the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India…”
Wrote Iqbal in his letter to Jinnah of 28 May 1937{Mak/35-36): “…But the enforcement and the development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States… If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots…”
Born: 9 November 1877, Sialkot, Punjab.
Died: 21 April 1938 at Lahore. Iqbal was knighted by King George V in 1922. While in England studying law and philosophy, Iqbal became a member of the London branch of the Muslim League.
Although Jinnah and the British were the main factors in the creation of Pakistan, the concept of Hindus and Muslims as two nations was initially floated by the Aga Khan III, and later by Sir Allama Mohammad Iqbal in the late 1920s.
It would be hard to find a more bigoted poet! And, it would be even harder to believe that Iqbal’s ancestors were Kashmiri Pandits. Their surname was Saprus, and they belonged to village Saprain (hence the name Saprus) in Kashmir.
As remarked by Steven Weinberg: “With or without religion good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil-that takes religion.” Or, what Blaise Pascal said: “Men never commit evil so fully and joyfully as when they do it for religious convictions.”
What is astounding, Iqbal was only the first-generation convert. Perhaps new converts are more passionate to show off their religious loyalty. As per an article “Iqbal’s Hindu Relations” by Khushwant Singh in ‘The Telegraph’ of 30 June 2007{KS2}, Mohammad Iqbal’s father was one Rattan Lal Sapru. He was the revenue collector of the Afghan governor of Kashmir. He was caught embezzling money. The governor offered him a choice: he should either convert to Islam or be hanged. Rattan Lal chose to stay alive. He was named Nur Mohammad after conversion. The Saprus disowned Rattan Lal and severed all
Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan
Born: 5 June 1892 in Multan.
he had severely criticised Syed Ahmad Khan for his strategy of Christian-Muslim friendship, and had even called him as an Islamic equivalent of Anti-Christ!(Akb2/187}
Died: 25 December 1942 in Lahore. Captain Sardar Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan was educated at Aligarh Muslim University and had joined the British Army. After 1920, he turned to business, and thanks to his business and managerial talent, he set up a large number of well-known companies in diverse segments, including tea, sugar, cement, railway-lines, electricity production and supply, and so on.
He was briefly the acting deputy-governor of the newly established Reserve Bank of India in 1935. He was non-communal, and used to say, “I am Punjabi first then a Muslim”.
He co-founded the Unionist Party in Punjab and remained at its helm till his death. He was the Punjab Premier from 1937 to 1942.
Following his pact with Jinnah in October 1937 (Jinnah-Sikandar Pact) he advised the Muslim members of his party (Unionist Party) to also become members of the AIML. He was later party to the Lahore Resolution of March 1940 calling for an autonomous or semi-independent M within the larger Indian confederation—what subsequently led to Pakistan.
He strongly influenced other Muslim leaders like the bigot Allama Iqbal. He considered Muslim madrasas utterly futile, and to promote education among Muslims, he helped found several schools, Gulshan School at Muradabad, Victoria School at Ghazipur in 1863, etc.—and most notably the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (that later became Aligarh Muslim University) in 1875. He established a scientific society for Muslims in 1864. He promoted Urdu as the lingua franca of all Indian Muslims. He wrote a number of works in Urdu, including Asaar-us-sanadeed (Great Monuments) documenting antiquities of Delhi. He also wrote a pamphlet establishing Muslims were not disloyal to the British, and to asking the British to end their hostility to Muslims.
Zafrullah Khan
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan
Born: 17 October 1817 in Delhi.
Died: 27 March 1898 (aged 80) at Aligarh. Syed Ahmad Khan’s family had strong ties with the Moghul court. He joined as a clerk in a court in 1838 in the service of the East India Company, and gradually rose to be a judge in a Small Causes Court, and retired in 1876. He remained loyal to the British during the First War of Independence 1857. He was critical of the Indian National Congress; and exhorted Muslims to be loyal to the British. He advocated strong interfaith relations between Islam and Christianity. He was the original founder of the two-nation theory, and influenced Iqbal and Jinnah.
Initially he was all for Hindu-Muslim unity, and even said: “We (Hindus and Muslims) should try to become one heart and soul and act in unison; if united we can support each other…” However, he wrongly thought that democratic, representative governments were suitable only for ethnical and religiously homogeneous societies. And, this wrong belief led to his advocating ways to prevent likely domination of Hindus. He stated at various times to the effect that democracy would be a subterfuge for Hindu rule, since the Hindus outnumbered Muslims four to one; only the Christian British were worthy of friendship because the Quran said so: ‘our [Muslim] nation cannot expect friendship and affection from any other people’.{Akb/46-47}
Born: 6 February 1893 in Sialkot, Punjab.
Died: 1 September 1985 (aged 92) at Lahore. Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan had an illustrious career. Educated at London’s King’s College, he was the foreign minister of Pakistan (1947-54), the president for the UN General Assembly (1962), and the judge (1954-61, 1964-73), vice-president (1958-61) and the president (1970-73) of the International Court of Justice. He had been a member of the All-India Muslim League, and had served as its president between 1931 and 1932. He was the Minister of Railway of British India in 1935. He sat on the British Viceroy’s Executive Council as its Muslim member between 1935 and 1941. He represented India at the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939. He was the Agent-General of British India to China in 1942. He became judge at the Federal Court of India.
Zafrullah Khan was the man behind both the critical Lahore Resolution of March 1940 that led to the creation of Pakistan (he had authored the resolution), and the make-or-break presentation of Pakistan’s case on J&K in the UN in 1948.
When India and Pakistan presented their cases on J&K at the UN in January 1948, Zafrullah Khan represented Pakistan. The Indian case, on the other hand, was presented by Gopalaswami Aiyangar, Minister for Kashmir Affairs, specifically appointed by Nehru in his cabinet. Aiyangar was the leader of the Indian team that also included Sheikh Abdullah. Quipped Zafrullah Khan, when he came to know about Gopalaswami Aiyangar as India’s representative: “You are offering me Kashmir on a platter.” Expectedly, while Zafrullah Khan’s presentation was brilliant, and received all-round praise, that of Aiyangar’s was an unmitigated disaster!
Incidentally, Zafrullah Khan was an Ahmadiyya, like Abdus Salam (1926–1996), a Pakistani theoretical physicist, who shared the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physics. Abdus Salam left Pakistan in 1974 in protest
Jamaluddin Afghani or Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī or, simply, Al-Afghānī was a political activist, an Islamic ideologue, a propagator of Pan-Islamic unity. He had come to India in the late 19th century as an emissary of the Caliph Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman emperor. Being an advocate of Islamic dominance,
Pakistan.
the passage of the parliamentary bill declaring the Ahmadiyya Community as not-Islamic. Jinnah and Aga Khan, both Shias, were the prime movers of Pakistan. Shias too are at the receiving end in Pakistan.
majority Hindu community, and exemplified such joint threats to them as the anti-cow-slaughter agitation by the Hindus.{Akb/63}
Timelines of Run-up to the Partition
1881 Census As per the 1881-census, the undivided India’s population had 20% Muslims (over 50 million). 40% (20 million) of total Muslims were in Bengal, 20% (10 million) in Punjab, 14% (6 million) in Gangetic plains, and the remaining 26% (14 million) in the North-west and elsewhere in India. Muslims formed about half the population of Bengal.
1883: Separate Muslim Electorates-Aga Khan In 1883, Aga Khan put forth the idea of reserving a certain number of seats in elections for Muslims; and that the Muslim electorate should vote only for them. Thus, the divisive proposal of a separate electorate for Muslims emerged.
1905: Partition of Bengal On the excuse of better administration, the proposal for the Partition of Bengal, floated in January 1904, and announced by Viceroy Lord Curzon in July 1905, was given effect to on 16 October 1905, separating the largely Muslim eastern areas from the largely Hindu western areas, mainly with a view to curb the growing nationalism and the increasing efforts of the Indian National Congress for the independence of India. In those days, Bengal included Bihar, Assam and Odisha. West Bengal, Bihar and Odisha were clubbed together with their capital retained as Calcutta; while East Bengal and Assam were to have Dacca (Dhaka) as their capital.
Incidentally, it was Viceroy Lord Curzon who had said in 1901: “While we hold onto India, we are a first rate power. If we lose India, we will decline to a third rate power. This is the value of India.”{URL30}
Earlier, Lord Randolph Churchill, father of Winston Churchill, had remarked: “Without India, England would cease to be a nation.”{AH/35}
Wrote Arthur Herman: “Randolph [Churchill] had remarked often on how India’s vast import market kept the British manufacturers in business, and how it mattered more than Europe and America… As Winston Churchill himself put in years later, the loss of India would be final and fatal to us”.”{AH/50}
While the partition was resented by the Hindus, it was generally welcomed by the Muslims of East Bengal. The most destructive impact of the partition was the much more enhanced Hindu-Muslim communal dissonance. In a significant way, the partition partitioned Hindus and Muslims further. It also activated the Muslims into forming their own national organisation on communal lines.
Bengal was later reunited in 1911.
The malafide intention of the British behind the partition of Bengal in 1905 was communal: to drive a wedge between the Hindus and Muslims. While carrying out that nefarious act, Lord Curzon had cynically remarked that Bengalis only “howl until a thing is settled and then they accept it.”{Akb/65} However, when that led to a massive spurt in revolutionary activities in Bengal, the successor Viceroy Lord Hardinge annulled the partition in 1911, and remarked “the political power of the Bengali has not been broken.”{Akb/65}
1886: Muhammadan Educational Conference Muhammadan Educational Conference founded in 1886 by Syed Ahmad Khan at the Aligarh Muslim University, sowed the seeds of Muslim separatism.
Act of 1892 Although the Muslim League session of 1940 is regarded as the watershed in the creation of Pakistan, seeds of Muslim separatism were sown by the British as far back as in 1892.
Says Ambedkar{Amb3): “… In 1885 the Indian National Congress was founded… Accordingly the British Parliament passed in 1892 what is called the Indian Councils Act. This Act is memorable for two things. It was in this Act of 1892 that the British Government for the first time accepted the semblance of the principle of popular representation as the basis for the constitution of the Legislatures in India. It was not a principle of election. It was a principle of nomination… Secondly, it was in the legislatures that were constituted under this Act that the principle of separate representation for Musalmans was for the first time introduced in the political constitution of India. … The introduction of this principle is shrouded in mystery. It is a mystery because it was introduced so silently and so stealthily…”
At a meeting in the house in Aligarh of Sir Syed (or Sayyid) Ahmed Khan in 1894, Theodore Beck argued for an alliance of the two minorities, English/Christians and Muslims, in India against the majority Hindu community, and exemplified such joint threats to them as the anti-cow-slaughter agitation by the Hindus.
1906: Founding of the Muslim League The origin of the Muslim League lay in the Muhammadan Educational Conference founded in 1886 by Syed Ahmad Khan at the Aligarh Muslim University. At its major conference attended by 3000 delegates in Dhaka in December 1906, it removed the self-imposed ban on discussing politics, and adopted a
commercial Muslim interests of the United Provinces (today’s UP).
called.”{DD/50-51}
The League’s principles and constitution were incorporated in the ‘Green Book’, written by Maulana Mohammad Ali.
Wrote Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi (I.H. Qureshi: 1903-1981), a Pakistani historian (Ali):
“The Simla Deputation occupies a crucially important place in the history of Muslim-India. For the first time the Hindu-Muslim conflict was lifted to the constitutional plane. The rift in the society was now to be reflected in legal and political institutions. The Muslims made it clear that they had no confidence in the Hindu majority that they were not prepared to put their future in the hands of assemblies elected on the assumed basis of a homogenous Indian nation. By implication the Muslims rejected the idea of a single Indian nation on the ground of that the Muslim majority had an entity and could not be merged into Hindu
majority.”{URL17} Having articulated Muslims as a separate nation’ in the first two decades of the 20th century, Aga Khan repeated in 1929: “The Muslims of India are not a community, but a nation…”
The curious thing, however, was that when the British left in 1947 after partition and creation of Pakistan, Aga Khan foreswore his citizenship, and vanished from the Indian subcontinent, leaving crores of his co-religionists (Muslims) behind in India and Pakistan.
1906: Role of Aga Khan The name ‘All-India Muslim League’ was proposed by Sir Aga Khan III (Sir Sultan Mohammed Shah, 1877–1957), Imam (leader or head) of Nizārī Ismā’īlīs/Khojas.
Aga Khan was appointed the first president of the Muslim League. He had earlier met Viceroy Lord Minto at Shimla on 1 October 1906, as head of a 35-member Muslim delegation. Among the demands put up by the delegation were: election of Muslims through exclusive Muslim electorates; number of elected members in various elected bodies over and above the proportion of the Muslim population, the additional weightage to be given to their political importance and the Muslim contribution to the defence of the British Empire; guaranteed percentage of jobs in services; promotions without competitive examinations, etc. The delegation also expressed its concern against democracy, as it would have the effect of putting their interests at the mercy of the unsympathetic majority [Hindus]. {Akb/67-68}
Aga Khan pleaded with the British Raj to consider Muslims as a separate nation. The British Raj was only too willing to oblige the Muslims. In fact, they went out of their way to encourage the Muslims to form a political organisation, so as to counter the nationalists and the Congress. The Muslim leaders heading the Muslim League were not there to fight for India or for independence from the British-all they sought was protection of the interests of the Muslims, particularly of the rich and landed elites like them.
Lord Minto gave a patient hearing to the Aga Khan deputation. Expressing his complete agreement with the principles of separate electorates, Minto promised sympathetic consideration of the demands, and assured the deputation he would do his best to meet their demands. Responded Viceroy Lord Minto to the Aga Khan’s delegation:
“…I am grateful to you for the opportunity you are affording me of expressing my appreciation of the just aims of the followers of Islam and their determination to share in the political history of our Empire… The pith of your address is that in any system of representation, whether it affects a municipality, a district board, or a legislative council… the Mohammedan community should be represented as a community… I am entirely in accord
with you…”{DD/50} Commented Calcutta’s Anand Bazar Patrika on the Aga Khan deputation and its outcome: “The whole thing appears to be a got-up (set-up] affair, and fully engineered by interested officials… So the All-India Muhammadan Deputation is neither all-India, nor all-Muhammadan, nor even a deputation socalled.”{DD/50-51}
1909: The Indian Councils Act (Morley-Minto Reforms) The Act of 1909, aka Morley-Minto Reforms, while providing for election of Indians to the various legislative councils in India for the first time, conceded the Muslim demand for separate electorates, thus laying the foundation of Hindu-Muslim disunity, and the ultimate Partition and Pakistan.
Under this Act the Muhammadans were given (1)the right to elect their representatives, (2)the right to elect their representatives by separate electorates, (3)the right to vote in the general electorates as well, and (4)the right to weightage in representation…”
Wrote Patrick French in ‘Liberty or Death’: “To many Indian nationalists (and their ranks at this stage included a considerable number of Muslims) the creation of these new electorates was simply a Machiavellian move designed to spread discord and division among different groups in Indian society, a classic use of a ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy, whereby one community was set against another in order to buoy up the position of the imperial power. In the view of many Indians today, the creation of divided electorates was a deliberate strategy to provoke the demand for a Muslim homeland, and thereby destroy the coherence and unity of India.”{PF/44}
1916: The Lucknow Pact The Lucknow Pact refers to the agreement between the Congress (INC), then led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and the Muslim League (AIML), then led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, which was confirmed at their respective annual sessions at Lucknow on 29 and 31 December 1916. The Pact earned for Jinnah the title
Wrote Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi (I.H. Qureshi: 1903-1981), a Pakistani historian (Ali):
factor in the national politics. Indians and Hindus have always lost through their foolish, self-defeating generosity, lack of foresight, and inability to learn lessons from their oppressive history.
It was bizarre that even after the bitter Partition and Pakistan, the Muslim political groups in India pushed for communal electorates in post-Independence India, and leaders like Maulana Azad supported it. It was only thanks to Sardar Patel that the mischief was nipped in the bud.
A number of Muslim leaders were put off by the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911, which had given them a Muslim-majority East Bengal. Many Muslims also became hostile to the British on account of the treatment meted out to the Caliph of Turkey in the First World War-Caliph or Khalifa of Turkey was regarded as the religious head of all Muslims all over the world.
The Pact stipulated, inter alia, the following: Provincial Legislative Councils (PLCs): PLCs shall comprise 80% elected and 20% nominated members – the elections being on as broad a franchise as possible; the term of office shall be 5 years; adequate provision for representation of important minorities; Muslims to be elected through special/separate electorates, the seats reserved for them being 50% in Punjab, 40% in Bengal, 33% in Bombay, 30% in United Provinces (UP, etc.), 25% in Bihar, 15% in Central Provinces, and 15% in Madras (whole of South); no Bill shall be proceeded with if 75% of the members of a community in the particular Council, Imperial and Provincial, oppose the Bill; except customs, posts, telegraph, mint, salt, opium, railways, army, and tribute from Princely States, all other sources of revenue shall be provincial; all bills passed by PLCs shall have to receive assent of the Governor before they become law, but may be vetoed by the GovernorGeneral.
Imperial Legislative Council (ILC): 80% of the members to be elected; the electorate shall be the elected members of the PLCs; the term of office shall be 5 years; all bills passed by ILC shall have to receive assent of the Governor-General before they become law; the Crown may exercise its veto on any bill passed by PLCs or ILC.
The Government of India (Gol): Gol will be headed by Governor-General, who will have an Executive Council, half of whose members shall be Indian, who shall be elected by the elected members of ILC.
Other Matters: The Secretary of State of India shall be assisted by two permanent under-secretaries, one of whom shall be Indian; both the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks shall be thrown open to Indians in the military and naval services of His Majesty.
Certain parts of the above were accepted by the British, and were embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919.
1919-22: Khilafat & Non-Cooperation Movement (KNCM)
I have nothing to do with this pseudo-religious approach
that Gandhi is advocating.
– Muhammad Ali Jinnah Khilafat (Caliphate) & Khalif (Caliph) Khalifah or Khalifa or Khalif or Caliph (Caliph is the corrupted version) is supposed to be the supreme religious and political leader of all Muslims around the world. The word is derived from the Arabic ‘Khalf, which means successor. What the Khalifa or Caliph rule over is called the Caliphate or Khilafat. The Ottoman Empire, with its capital in Istanbul (Constantinople), Turkey, ran a Caliphate or Khilafat. It was founded in 1299 CE.
Armenian Genocide Khalifa and the Ottoman Empire perpetrated the dastardly Armenian Genocide, also known as the Armenian Holocaust, during 1915-17 involving the systematic extermination of about 15 lakhs (1.5 million) of its minority Armenian subjects inside their historic homeland, which lies within the presentday Republic of Turkey. The genocide commenced with Ottoman authorities rounding up and deporting around 250 Armenian intellectuals and community leaders from Constantinople to Ankara, and eventually murdering most of them. The genocide then expanded to the wholesale killing of the ablebodied male population; subjection of army conscripts to forced labour; and deportation of women, children, the elderly and infirm-deprived of food and water, and subjected to rape robbery and murderon death marches to the Syrian desert.{AG1} Many women were raped, stripped naked, and crucified-in testimony, there are photographs of rows of naked women nailed to cross!{AG2}
It was the first modern genocide, and precursor of Hitler’s Holocaust-indeed Hitler was inspired from, and took lessons from the same. Hitler was reported to have remarked in the context of his order to exterminate the Polish race: “…Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?”
Despite enough and mounting evidence, Gandhi had refused to acknowledge the Armenian genocide, saying “I distrust the Armenian case.” What can be said of leaders who choose to deliberately ignore even the current history and facts, stick to their concocted reality and airy notions, and fail to fashion their national policies based on ground reality.
Through the Lucknow Pact, the Congress effectively endorsed both the communal electorates, and the communal veto. This proved to be yet another major step in the communalisation of politics that ultimately resulted in Partition and Pakistan.
Its leaders being mostly selfish and self-seeking, protecting their turf and narrow group interests, and being all supplicants of the British, the Muslim League was on the fringe of national politics. However, the Lucknow Pact suddenly made the Muslim League a force to reckon with, and launched them as a major factor in the national politics. Indians and Hindus have always lost through their foolish, self-defeating generosity, lack of foresight, and inability to learn lessons from their oppressive history.
thereby we could advance the interests of Khilafat.”{012/01)
How could the “Apostle of Non-Violence” lead a movement to save a regime that had perpetrated genocide? Modern day ISIS, the perpetrator of indescribable crimes on the Yezidis and Kurds and others, is headed by a Khalifa, and their aim is to establish Khilafat all over the world! Gandhi was therefore supporting those whose modern incarnation is ISIS!
Defeat of the Ottomans in WW-I & its Consequences Upon defeat of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire) in World War I (28 July 1914 – 11 November 1918) by the Allied (or Allies) Powers (British Empire, US, France, Belgium, Italy, Russia, Romania, Serbia and others), the US President Woodrow Wilson called for the principle of self-determination for post-war reorganization of the territories formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire.
The various countries that were carved out from the Ottoman Empire after its defeat in World War I were as follows: Yemen in 1918, Jordan in 1921, Turkey in 1923, Iraq (Mesopotamia) in 1932, Lebanon in 1943, Syria in 1946, Israel in 1948, and Kuwait in 1961. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formed in 1932. It included Mecca which had been under the Ottomans.
Khilafat & Other Muslim Countries With the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, an outcry on behalf of the caliphate was raised by the Khilafatists’ (those who supported Khilafat) to restore the institution of Caliphate. It implied restoring the pre-war status for the Ottomans. But, why would a defeated empire be given that privilege?
Besides, it would have meant re-imposition of the Ottoman rule over Arabs, Egypt, and so onsomething those Muslim countries least wanted, for they desired their own independent existence. Significantly, the Arabs and the Egyptians and the Muslims of other countries did not shed a tear at the demise of the Ottoman Empire
Khilafat & Indian Muslims In sharp contrast to the Muslims of other countries like Egypt and Arabs, the Caliphate cause evoked religious passion among a section of the conservative Indian Sunni Muslims elites, who decided to make a huge hue and cry about it. Oxford-educated Muslim journalist, Maulana Muhammad Ali, his brother, Maulana Shaukat Ali, and many others, including Dr Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, Hasrat Mohani, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr Hakim Ajmal Khan formed the All India Khilafat Committee. They published the Khilafat Manifesto in 1920 calling upon the British to protect the Caliphate, and exhorted the Indian Muslims to unite and hold the British accountable on that count.
severe its links with the Raj in protest. When the College rebuffed the Khilafatists many students walked out, leading eventually to the foundation of Jamia Millia Islamia in 1920 in Delhi, at the initiative of the Khilafat leaders like Dr Ansari, Maulana Azad, Hakim Ajmal Khan and others. (Akb/135)
Thousands of Indian Muslims even migrated to Afghanistan to fight for the cause-such was the fanaticism. King Amanullah of Afghanistan had to persuade their leaders to abandon the movement. Following the same, most returned to India thoroughly upset.
It was queer that the Muslim educated class, and even the illiterate ones, were more concerned about the extra-territorial issue of Khilafat than about the gaining of freedom from the British in India! What was even more curious was that while the Muslims of the regions who had been under the Ottomans actually sought freedom from them, the Indian Muslims effectively wanted their slavery to continue! Indeed the Mughals never acknowledged the temporal authority of the Caliphate of the Turkish Sultan. Even Sir Syed Ahmad, the originator of the idea of Muslims as a separate nation and the founder of AMU, had never acknowledged the Caliphate. Another interesting aspect was that a large number of Muslim soldiers in the British Indian army had fought against the army of Khalifa in WW-I.
Stand of Jinnah & Agha Khan Jinnah was against the Khilafat Movement, and had advised against supporting fundamentalist elements. Agha Khan and his companions remained loyal to the British. The Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha had opposed the Khilafat Movement.
Gandhi & Khilafat Khilafat Movement began with the celebration of ‘Khilafat Day on 27 October 1919. Gandhi was elected as President of the All-India Khilafat Conference at Delhi on 24 November 1919, and said in his presidential address: “It ought not to appear strange for the Hindus to be on the same platform as the Muslims in a matter that specially and solely affects the Muslims. After all, the test of friendship is true assistance in adversity and whatever we are, Hindus, Parsis, Christians or Jews, if we wish to live as one nation, surely the interest of any of us must be the interest of all… We talk of Hindu-Muslim unity. It would be an empty phrase if the Hindus hold aloof from the Muslims when their vital interests were at stake.”{Akb2/237)
Gandhi supported the Khilafat movement and worked out an alliance of the Congress with the Khilafat leaders in 1920. Together they launched a nationwide non-cooperation movement, and a campaign of mass, peaceful civil disobedience.
Gandhi failed to appreciate that Khilafat was a moribund institution; and that those under it were themselves sick of it. Further, many Arab and non-Arab regions were straining to throw off the yoke of the Ottoman Empire. Why fight for what many Middle-East Muslims themselves wanted dead?
Gandhi returned the medals the British Raj had given for his services in South Africa. He returned the
Maulana Muhammad Ali wanted Sir Syed Ahmad’s Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College (later AMU) to severe its links with the Raj in protest. When the College rebuffed the Khilafatists many students walked out, leading eventually to the foundation of Jamia Millia Islamia in 1920 in Delhi, at the initiative of the
him in 1934 and forbidden to any other person by the Turkish parliament), leader of the Turkish National Movement in the Turkish War of Independence, overthrew the Ottoman rule, abolished the role of Caliph, and established a modern, secular republic in independent Turkey in 1924, after his victories in 1922 and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. In March 1924, Atatürk formally abolished the Caliphate (Khilafat) and expelled the Caliph/Sultan from Turkey.
have confirmed me in the opinion that the Imperial Government have acted in the Khilafat matter in an unscrupulous, immoral and unjust manner and have been moving from wrong to wrong to defend their immorality. I can retain neither respect nor affection for such a government…”
The ‘Apostle of Non-Violence’ also returned the Zulu War Medal and the Boer War Medal earned by him from the British for help in the British wars against the native Zulus and Boers in South Africa. Gandhi was a rare fighter against the tormentors on whom the tormentors conferred medals!
Gandhi could return his medals in favour of the regressive cause of Khilafat, but didn’t think Jallianwala massacre of a year before was reason enough to return his war medals!
Gandhi’s Inexplicable Calling-off of KNCM! The KNCM had gathered steam and was going full throttle. Inexplicably, undemocratically and unilaterally, Gandhi suddenly suspended the KNCM on 12 February 1922, without consulting any of the stakeholders, including the Muslim leaders of the Khilafat Movement. The reason, or the excuse, was the perishing of 23 policemen when the Chauri Chaura Police Station in the Gorakhpur district of UP was set on fire in a retaliatory violence on 4 February 1922. Police had arrested leaders of a group picketing a liquor shop in the market place. In protest, a crowd gathered in front of the police station shouting slogans. The police opened fire into the crowd killing three and wounding several. Angered by the unprovoked firing, the protestors set fire to the police station, killing the policeman as a result.
At the time Gandhi was over 800 miles away in Bardoli in Gujarat. So, linking his agitation to the incident was far-fetched. Further, in a big country like India where the British freely resorted to unjust acts, exploitation, violence, firing, and humiliation of the natives, such incidents were bound to occur.
Even if one grants Gandhi his indefensible logic of calling off the agitation on account of the violence, the question is why didn’t he do so earlier in the face of far more ghastly violence? Reference is to the terrible Moplah Anti-Hindu Attacks of August-September 1921 in the Malabar region of Kerala (please see next subchapter).
Kemal destroyed the Pan-Islamic movement by deposing the Sultan and abolishing the Caliphate. He thus effectively cut the ground from under the feet of the Khilafists in India, including Gandhi. Ataturk modernized Turkey-he created a secular republic, did away with Ottoman religious foundations and paraphernalia, and banned veil and fez. Jinnah then (late 1920s, 1930s) had “became a fan of the Turk [Mustafa Kemal Ataturk] who first saved and then reformed his country. Jinnah told his sister that if he ever got as much power as Ataturk he would westernize Indian Muslims.”{Akb2/245}
Reverse Effect on Hindu-Muslim Relationship It is said that Gandhi supported the Khilafat Movement to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, and to garner the support of the Muslims for national freedom. But, the net effect was reverse.
The Ali brothers disapproved of Gandhi’s move to withdraw KNCM, and severed their ties. Many Muslims felt Gandhi had betrayed Khilafat by suspending the movement. Jinnah denounced Gandhi for causing schism and split “not only amongst Hindus and Muslims, but between Hindus and Hindus, and Muslims and Muslims, and even between fathers and sons…”. {Jal/8}
Gandhi, the Apostle of truth’, was not really supporting a just and truthful cause. There was no Islamic canon that only the Sultan of Turkey could be the Khalifa. The Sultan was actually garnering support for his personal vested interest: to continue his oppressive, feudal rule. As BR Nanda wrote:
“He [Gandhi] failed to see that the Khilafat was a moribund institution, that the Turks themselves were sick of it, that the Ottoman Empire could no more remain intact after the war than the Hapsburg Empire, and that smaller nations, Arab and non-Arab, were
struggling to be free from the stranglehold of Turkey.”{Nan/185} Why bring about Hindu-Muslim unity on the foundations of regressive, fundamentalist, feudal, backward-looking Islam, and promote pan-Islamism at the cost of nationalism? Why promote the retrograde Islamic group-consciousness? In fact, Jinnah, who later became a rabid communalist for the sake of power, had advised against support to Khilafat and to the fundamentalist elements. Jinnah felt alarmed at the emergence of the reactionary mullah elements. He wondered why the Hindu leaders were not realising that the movement was fostering Pan-Islamic sentiments. At that time, Jinnah believed that it was wrong to mix religious faith with politics. Gandhi had not realised the danger of mixing religion with politics, and it cost India dear. Patriotism ought always to be territorial, and not communal or
Caliphate, Atatürk & Gandhi’s Indefensible Stand! The height of irony was that while Gandhi and the Indian Khilafat Committee poured venom during 1920-22 against the British for destroying the Caliphate, the Caliph (Mehmet Vahideddin) himself (facing local opposition, and after his royal band deserted him), had written to the British General Sir Charles Harington on 16 November 1922 seeking British protection and refuge, as his life was in danger. (Akb2/141}
The second irony came in 1924 when Caliph’s compatriots themselves overthrew him-the Khilafat Movement lost its raison d’être when the forces of the young, dynamic, revolutionary military officer Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938: the surname, Atatürk, meaning “Father of the Turks”, was granted to him in 1934 and forbidden to any other person by the Turkish parliament), leader of the Turkish National Movement in the Turkish War of Independence, overthrew the Ottoman rule, abolished the role of Caliph,
“I have always felt that Gandhiji was wrong in trying to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity by supporting the cause of the Khilafat… So long as the religious cause survived, the unity was there; but once that cause was removed the unity showed its weakness. All the Khilafists who
had been attracted by to the Congress came out in their true colours…”{MCC/78} Gandhi’s move was thoroughly opportunistic. He thought that by lending support to and leading the Khilafat Movement he would become a leader of Muslims too, and outmanoeuvre Muslim leaders like Jinnah. In that sense, Gandhi’s move had a strong element of personal ambition.
Rather than Hindu-Muslim unity, the KNCM ultimately resulted in deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations; its unfortunate high watermark being the terrible Moplah Rebellion of 1921 in the Malabar region of Kerala.
Many Muslim leaders who were with Gandhi in the Khilafat Movement turned anti, and joined Muslim League. In a way, the movement laid the foundation of future Pakistan. The sidelined Jinnah became rabidly anti-Gandhi, anti-Congress, and anti-Hindu.
By supporting the Khilafat Movement Gandhi ended up communalising the freedom movement. Even Jinnah had cautioned Gandhi and the Congress against it.
KNCM proved to be a big failure in so far as the Hindu-Muslim relationship was concerned. Many Muslim leaders, instead of joining the national mainstream or coming over to the Congress, joined the Muslim League. Moderate, educated Muslims, thanks to the Khilafat effect, became more conservativemany started growing beard. Commented Jawaharlal Nehru:
“Owing to the prominence given to the Khilafat Movement in 1921 a large number of Maulvis and Muslim religious leaders took a prominent part in the political struggle. They gave a definite religious tinge to the movement, and Muslims generally were greatly influenced by it. Many a Westernised Muslim, who was not of particularly religious turn of mind, began to grow a beard and conform to the tenets of orthodoxy.”
Rather than teaming up with the progressive and secular elements (like Jinnah) among the Muslim leadership, Gandhi aligned with the backward-looking, conservative, fundamentalist and undesirable elements for Khilafat, giving fillip and exposure to those dangerous pan-Islamic (and generally antinationalist) leaders and their followers. Where was the so-called urgent need for forging Hindu-Muslim unity in 1919 when that had already been achieved and forged through the Lucknow Pact of 1916, thanks to Tilak and Jinnah. Or, was it that Gandhi wanted to establish his own leadership by undermining TilakJinnah work, unmindful of the possibility of its terribly negative consequences. That the elements Gandhi had gone along with were undesirable would be obvious from the following:
During the Hindu-Muslim bonhomie of 1919-22, many Muslim leaders had called upon the Muslims to voluntarily given up beef, and stop cow-slaughter, as a gesture to Hindus, for their support for the Khilafat Movement. Gandhi had, however, insisted that the Hindu co-operation would be unconditional, saying, “Conditional assistance is like the adulterated cement which does not bind.” Maulana Abdul Bari had stated: “Muslim honour would be at stake if they forgot the co-operation of the Hindus. I for my part say that we should stop cow-killing, irrespective of the cooperation, because we are children of the same soil.”{Akb2/237}
However, after the withdrawal of the KNCM by Gandhi, the Muslims resumed the practice of cowslaughter even more ostentatiously. Since the Muslim invasions of the eighth century cow-slaughter has been the Muslim device to desecrate the Hindu holy places, and to insult the Hindus. It has far more to do with humiliating Hindus, than it has to do with food-habits. It has been a symbol of Muslim aggression and intolerance. Wrote BR Nanda:
“The very Muslims who, as a gesture to their Hindu neighbours, had voluntarily given up cow-slaughter [in the wake of Gandhian/Hindu support to Khilafat] during the favourable climate of 1920-22, now [after Gandhi called off the movement) insisted on ostentatiously
exercising it as a religious obligation.”{Nan/257) The great Indian novelist, Sarat Chandra Chatterjee (Chattopadhyay), had commented in his speech at the Bengal Provincial Conference in 1926 that the Hindu-Muslim unity, particularly of the kind fostered by Mahatma Gandhi, was a dangerous illusion as ‘battles for a false cause can never be won’.{Akb2/225}
There were wide-spread communal riots all over India during 1918-24, both during and after the Khilafat between 1918 and 19, as if Hindus were responsible for what befell the Ottomans and the Khalifa!
1921 Moplah anti-Hindu riots were the worst ever. Kohat anti-Hindu riots of 1924 claimed lives of over 155 Hindus and Sikhs, and the entire Hindu and Sikh population had to flee the town to save their lives. In 1926 alone there were 35 Hindu-Muslim clashes. Swami Shraddhanand was murdered in 1926. Said Gandhi in 1927: “I dare not touch the problem of Hindu-Muslim unity. It has passed out of human hands and has been transferred to God’s hands alone.” Sadly, despite ample contemporary evidence, and the surfeit of it through the centuries, Gandhi, Nehru & Co failed to grasp the nature of Islam, and the
Jamait-Ulama-e-Hind was founded to provide political leadership on the ‘universal’ values of Shariah. The emerging conservative, maulvis-driven leadership became a challenge to (the then) secular Muslims like Jinnah.
Wrote Mahommedali Currim Chagla (1900–1981), who later became India’s Chief Justice:
“I also think that the alliance between Mahatma Gandhi and the Khilafists considerably accentuated the communal and religious aspects of Indian public life… It also resulted in a great set-back both for Jinnah and men like him, and for the Muslim League, which were
working on secular lines.”{MCC/81} Rather than teaming up with the progressive and secular elements (like Jinnah) among the Muslim leadership, Gandhi aligned with the backward-looking, conservative, fundamentalist and undesirable
psychology of Muslims.
Lajpat Rai, Madan Mohan Malviya and Swami Shraddhanand were of the opinion that thanks to Khilafat there was a dangerous awakening and turn among the Muslim masses leading to more frequent and brutal communal incidents, and that therefore the Hindus needed to prepare suitably for their selfdefence against the increasingly aggressive Muslims.
Stated Viceroy Lord Reading in his speech: “A few Europeans and many Hindus have been murdered, communications have been sacked, houses of Europeans and Hindus were burnt. The result had been temporary collapse of civilian government. European and Hindu refugees of all classes are concentrated at Calicut and it is satisfactory to note that they are safe there. Those who are responsible for this grave outbreak of violence and crime must be brought to the justice and made to suffer the punishment of the guilty…”{PG1}
Gandhi’s close Khilafat friends and colleagues turned foes. Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, and their Muslim followers, began to say it was a mistake to align with the Hindus! Maulana Shaukat Ali went to the extent of alleging that while the Khilafat Committee had subsidised Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement, Gandhi had turned his back on the interests of the Muslims. Gandhi was so piqued by Shaukat Ali’s remarks that while rebutting him and asserting the finance was given unasked, Gandhi promised to return back the amount with interest.
Sadly, Gandhi’s suspension of non-cooperation cost India Hindu-Muslim alliance, and created almost a permanent wedge between the two communities, leading ultimately to partition. In a way, Gandhi’s first mass agitation resulted, not in communal bonhomie, but in communal disharmony, and laid the foundation of Partition and Pakistan.
The women of Malabar, led by the senior Rani of Nilambur, petitioned the Vicerine Lady Reading:
“…your Ladyship is not fully appraised of all the horrors and atrocities perpetrated by the fiendish rebels of the many wells and tanks filled up with the mutilated, but often only half dead bodies of our nearest and dearest ones who refused to abandon the faith of our fathers; of pregnant women cut to pieces and left on the roadsides and in the jungles, with the unborn babe protruding from the mangled corpse; of our innocent and helpless children torn from our arms and done to death before our eyes and of our husbands and fathers tortured, flayed and burnt alive; of our hapless sisters forcibly carried away from the midst of kith and kin and subjected to every shame and outrage which the vile and brutal imagination of these inhuman hell-hounds could conceive of; of thousands of our homesteads reduced to cinder mounds out of sheer savagery and a wanton spirit of destruction; of our places of worship desecrated and destroyed and of the images of the deity shamefully insulted by putting the entrails of slaughtered cows where flower garlands used to lie, or else smashed to pieces; of the wholesale looting of hard earned wealth of generations reducing many who were formerly rich and prosperous to publicly beg for a piece or two in the streets of Calicut, to buy salt or chilly or betel leaf,rice being mercifully provided by the various relief agencies. These are not fables…”{Sans}
1921 : Moplah Anti-Hindu Attacks Over a thousand years back a horde of Muslim traders landed at the coast of Malabar. In keeping with the Hindu traditions of kindness and generosity, the then Hindu king allowed them to settle, carry on their trade, and build mosques. In Malayalam ‘Mopilla’ means ‘a bridegroom’ or ‘a great child’. Hindus endearingly called those incoming Muslims ‘Mopilla’; and their descendants came to be called as ‘Moplah’ Muslims.
Forgetting the favours done to their forefathers by the Hindus, the Moplah Muslims, rather than targeting the British responsible for defeating the Ottomans, butchered the Hindus, and perpetrated indescribable atrocities on them in the terrible Moplah Anti-Hindu Attacks in 1921 in the Malabar region of Kerala: rape, loot, killings, forcible conversions, and driving Hindus out of their homes. The hatred spread through the mosques, and the fiery speeches of Ali brothers and other Khilafat leaders added fuel to the fire. If one reads the horrid details of what the Muslims did then, one would find that what the ISIS has been doing in current times does have a history.
Statements on the Moplah Attacks Sir Sankaran Nair wrote:
“For sheer brutality on women, I do not remember anything in history to match the Malabar rebellion. It broke out about the 20th of August. Even by the 6th of September the results were dreadful…”{Nair}
A conference held at Calicut presided over by the Zamorin of Calicut, the Ruler of Malabar issued a resolution:
“That the conference views with indignation and sorrow the attempts made at various quarters by interested parties to ignore or minimise the crimes committed by the rebels such as: brutally dishonouring women, flaying people alive, wholesale slaughter of men, women and children, burning alive entire families, forcibly converting people in thousands and slaying those who refused to get converted, throwing half dead people into wells and leaving the victims to struggle for escape till finally released from their suffering by death, burning a great many and looting practically all Hindu and Christian houses in the disturbed areas in which even Moplah women and children took part and robbed women of even the garments on their bodies, in short reducing the whole non-Muslim population to abject destitution, cruelly insulting the religious sentiments of the Hindus by desecrating and destroying numerous temples in the disturbed areas, killing cows within the temple precincts putting
friendship… My belief is that the Hindus as a body have received the Mopla madness with equanimity and that the cultured Mussalmans are sincerely sorry of the Mopla’s perversion of the teaching of the Prophet [What presumption in the face of gross cruelty!]’…”{Amb3}
their entrails on the holy image and hanging skulls on the walls and the roofs.”{MR} A Committee of Distinguished Citizens comprising KP Keshava Menon, Secretary, Kerala Provincial Congress Committee, TV Mohammed, Secretary, Ernad Khilafat Committee, K Madhavan Nair, Secretary, Calicut District Congress Committee, K Karanakura Menon, and KV Gopal Menon, appointed to tour the affected areas, stated, inter alia, in their fact-finding report:
“Truth is infinitely of more paramount importance than Hindu Muslim unity or Swaraj and therefore we tell the Maulana Sahib and his co-religionists and India’s revered leader Mahatma Gandhi-if he too is unaware of the events here—that atrocities committed by the Moplahs on the Hindus are unfortunately too true and that there is nothing in the deeds of Moplah rebels which a true non-violent, non-co-operator can congratulate them for… Their wanton and unprovoked attack on the Hindus, the all but wholesale looting of their houses…; the forcible conversion of Hindus…; the brutal murder of inoffensive Hindus, men, women and children in cold blood without the slightest reason except that they are ‘Kaffirs’…; the desecration and burning of Hindu temples, the outrage on Hindu women and their forcible
conversion and marriage by Moplahs…”{Nair/137} Wrote Ms Annie Besant: “It would be well if Mr. Gandhi could be taken into Malabar to see with his own eyes the ghastly horrors which have been created by the preaching of himself and his loved brothers’ Mohammad and Shaukat Ali…”{AB}
Significantly, Gandhi never called upon Muslim leaders to condemn the brutality. Without doubt, the Moplah Rebellion was the result of the ‘Khilafat & Non-Cooperation Movement’ (KNCM) launched by Gandhi jointly with the Muslim leaders. So, in a way, Gandhi was indirectly responsible for the ghastly fate that befell the unfortunate Hindus in Malabar at the hands of the Moplahs.
Statements by Dr Ambedkar Wrote Dr BR Ambedkar{Amb3}: “…The blood-curdling atrocities committed by the Moplas in Malabar against the Hindus were indescribable. All over Southern India, a wave of horrified feeling had spread among the Hindus of every shade of opinion, which was intensified when certain Khilafat leaders were so misguided as to pass resolutions of congratulations to the Moplas on the brave fight they were conducting for the sake of religion’. Any person could have said that this was too heavy a price for Hindu-Moslem unity. But Mr. Gandhi was so much obsessed by the necessity of establishing Hindu-Moslem unity that he was prepared to make light of the doings of the Moplas and the Khilafats who were congratulating them. He [Gandhi] spoke of the Moplas as the brave God-fearing Moplas who were fighting for what they consider as religion and in a manner which they consider as religious’…
“Speaking of the Muslim silence over the Mopla atrocities Mr. Gandhi told the Hindus: ‘The Hindus must have the courage and the faith to feel that they can protect their religion in spite of such fanatical eruptions. A verbal disapproval by the Mussalmans of Mopla madness is no test of Mussalman
Statements by the Muslim Khilafat Leaders Khilafat leaders passed resolutions after resolution congratulating Moplahs for the brave fight they were carrying on for the sake of religion.(Mak/102}
Gandhi’s inexplicable comments on various occasions were: “The Moplahs are among the bravest in the land. They are God fearing. Their bravery must be transformed into purest gold. I feel sure, that once they realize the necessity of non-violence for the defence of the faith for which they have hitherto taken life, they will follow it without flinching.”{CWMG/Vol24/190}
“…Why is it ‘strange’ that I consider the Government solely responsible for the trouble? They could have avoided the trouble by settling the Khilafat question, they could have avoided it by allowing non-cooperators to take the message of non-violence to the Moplahs. The outbreak would not have taken place if the Collector had consulted the religious sentiment of the Moplahs. I do indeed accuse the Government of punishing the Moplahs after they have done the mischief instead of protecting the Hindus from Moplah outrage…
“…Hindus must find out the causes of Moplah fanaticism. They will find that they are not without blame. They have hitherto not cared for the Moplah. They have either treated him as a serf or dreaded him. They have not treated him as a friend and neighbour, to be reformed and respected. It is no use now becoming angry with the Moplahs or the Mussulmans in general…”
“[Commending/defending Maulana Hasrat Mohani who had defended the Muslim attackers, Gandhi wrote] …Maulana Hasrat Mohani is one of our most courageous men. He is strong and unbending. He is frank to a fault. In his insensate hatred of the English Government and possibly even of Englishmen in general, he has seen nothing wrong in anything that the Moplahs have done. Everything is fair in love and war with the Maulana. He has made up his mind that the Moplahs have fought for their religion. And that fact (in his estimation) practically absolves the Moplahs from all blame… I advise my Malabar friends not to mind the Maulana. In spite of his amazingly crude views about religion, there is no greater nationalist nor a greater lover of Hindu-Muslim unity than the Maulana. His heart is sound and superior to his intellect, which, in my humble opinion, has suffered aberration…”
Handing out atrociously infuriating prescription of non-violence for the Hindus to die “bravely”, Gandhi stated the following absurdity: “…I see nothing impossible in asking the Hindus to develop courage and strength to die before accepting forced conversion. I was delighted to be told that there were Hindus who did prefer the Moplah hatchet to forced conversion. If these have died without anger or malice, they have died as truest Hindus because they were truest among Indians and men… Even so is it
a Hindu to love the Moplah and the Mussalman more, when the latter is likely to injure him or has already injured him… Hindu help is at the disposal of the Mussalmans, because it is the duty of the Hindus, as neighbours, to give it…”
For Gandhi, no price was too great for appeasing Muslims. The price for Gandhi’s Hindu-Muslim unity was always to be paid by the Hindus. That Gandhi woefully failed to grasp the Muslim psychology was obvious from the pronouncements of the prominent Muslim leaders, the attitude of the Muslim League, and the conduct of the Muslims, and ultimately the vivisection of the country.
Mohammad Ali, among the leading lights of the Khilafat Movement, who had earlier been hailing and praising Gandhi, declared in 1924, after the failure of Khilafat:
“However pure Mr. Gandhi’s character may be, he must appear to me from the point of view
of religion inferior to any Mussalman though he [Muslim] be without character.”{Amb3} In 1925, Mohammad Ali again emphasised:
“Yes, according to my religion and creed, I do hold an adulterous and a fallen Mussalman to be better than Mr. Gandhi.”{VKM} {Amb3}
Mohammad Ali also commented:
“But between belief and actual character there is a wide difference. As a follower of Islam I am bound to regard the creed of Islam as superior to that professed by the followers of any non-Islamic religion. And in this sense the creed of even a fallen and degraded Mussalman is entitled to a higher place than that of any other non-Muslim irrespective of his high character, even though the person in question be Mahatma Gandhi himself.”{CWMG/468}
Jawaharlal Nehru & Moplah Attacks Nehru mysteriously overlooked the brutality of the Moplah anti-Hindu attacks in his autobiography published in 1936. He wrote a paragraph on the Moplah rebellion(JN2/86-87), but mentioned not a word on their anti-Hindu brutality!
What was Gandhi’s remedy? A zero-effect 21-day fast in October 1924, and an irrelevant advice:
“I can only suggest solutions of questions in terms of Swaraj. I would, therefore, sacrifice present individual gain for future national gain. Even if Mussalmans refuse to make approaches and even if the Hindus of Kohat may have to lose their all, I should still say that
they are able to live at peace with the latter without the protection of the British bayonet…” Rather than condemning the anti-Hindu/Sikh attacks by Muslims, the Congress, true to its irrational and blind Muslim appeasement policy, looked for an escape route: while it deplored the incident, it requested the Muslims to assure safety to their Hindu brethren! Motilal Nehru moved an inconsequential resolution on the matter, and himself said: “The resolution is a non-controversial one and commits the Congress to nothing.”{Mak/105}
Rather than honestly stating the bitter truth and condemning the Muslim attacks, Gandhi chose to indirectly absolve the Muslims by doing a balancing act between the Hindus-Sikhs and the Muslims, and blame the government in his speech at Rawalpindi on 9 December 1924:
“The truth is that the tragedy at Kohat would not have occurred and Hindus would not have run away if the Government had done its duty… The bandits on the frontier rob anyone and everyone; hence it is difficult to assert that all this storm was raised for looting the Hindus only. I would, however, affirm that the looting and arson was perpetrated not by the people but by the officials of the frontier… I would not be sorry if this Government collapses and then Hindus and Muslims fight a civil war and loot each other to their heart’s content. As long as there are rancour, weakness and fear in the hearts of both the communities, they will fight each other and cause rivers of blood to flow… I would say only this to you, you should prepare yourself to die with Rama’s name on your lips if the Government is furious with you and incites the Muslims… I would ask the frontier Hindus in a locality with 95 per cent of Muslims never to seek the advice of the Government. You should return only if the frontier Muslims request you to do so, if they desire to take you back after assuring the perpetual preservation of your life and honour. You have been staying there for many generations. How can you stay there without their consent?… How can you stay there in peace and comfort without their co-operation and goodwill? No Government can guarantee safety against a majority community. Even when swaraj is attained, and Shaukat Ali is the Commander-inChief and I am the Viceroy, if somebody were to ask me to protect a community, I would say that I could not protect it from a community comprising 95 per cent of the population… That is the only way to stay in the frontier with honour and goodwill. I wish to say to you one thing before leaving. You should tell the Government that you would not move from here as long as you do not come to terms with the Muslims and they do not invite and conduct you there…”{CWMG/Vol-29/432}
1924: Kohat Anti-Hindu Attacks The 1924 Kohat riots were major anti-Hindu attacks in British India. During 9-11 September 1924, over 155 Hindus and Sikhs were killed by Muslims in the Muslim-majority Kohat (not very far from Rawalpindi) in NWFP. The entire Hindus and Sikh population had to flee the town to save their lives.
Even earlier, for many years, the local Muslims were in the habit of abducting Hindu women, married as well as unmarried, and converting them to Islam. Upon complaint, even if the court decided in favour of the Hindu husband, the Muslims would not agree to returning the wife, considering her connection with her Hindu husband illegitimate, and claiming it as their religious duty not to let the woman who had been converted to Islam to go to her Hindu husband!
Gandhi should have understood the nature of the AIML leadership when Shaukat Ali gave his report on
the Kohat riots after visiting it in early 1925 that differed from Gandhi’s{RG3/95). Much later, Muhammad Ali had said he prayed for the day when he would convert Gandhi to Islam!{RG3/100}
dwindled to a micro-minority, and is an unfortunate persecuted minority, thanks to the bigoted nature of Pakistan; while the Muslim-minority in India has grown disproportionately high, thanks to the in-built liberalism of Hinduism!
Rahmat Ali later included creation of two more Muslim countries in his scheme: (a)Banga-i-Islam, comprising Bengal and Assam; and (b)Usmanistan, comprising Deccan and Hyderabad.
1932: Name ‘Pakistan’ At the time of the Third Round Table Conference held in London between 17 November and 24 December 1932, attended, among others, by Muhammad Ali, Agha Khan, Fazlul Haq, and Jinnah, Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, a college student at Cambridge, proposed “Pakistan” as the name of the new land to be carved out of India for the Muslims. In his pamphlet{CRA} ‘Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish Forever?’ issued on 28 January 1933 Chaudhary Rahmat Ali constructed the word Pakistan as an acronym: “P” for Punjab, “A” for Afghania representing Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP), “K” for Kashmir, “S” for Sindh, and “stan”, the suffix, for Baluchistan (although the state then was called Kalat). East Bengal did not figure in this! East Bengal in the scheme of Pakistan was added much later in 1940.
Of course, Pakistan is also a join of two Urdu words, “pak”, which means pure, or sacred, and “stan”, which means a place, hence Pakistan means a pure or a sacred place, or Land of the Pure; as opposed to the place for the “napak”, that is, the “impure”, that is, Hindustan for Hindus—there is no limit to being bigoted!
Rahmat Ali argued that India was neither a country nor a nation-its heterogeneity was a fact, and that the Muslims were a separate nation. He stated in his pamphlet: “We, therefore, deserve and must demand the recognition of a separate national status by the grant of a separate Federal Constitution from the rest of India… Our religion, culture, history, tradition, economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are basically and fundamentally different from those of the people living in the rest of India. The ideals which move our thirty million brethren-in-faith living in these provinces to make the highest sacrifices are fundamentally different from those which inspire the Hindus. These differences are not confined to the broad basic principles-far from it. They extend to the minutest details of our lives. We do not inter-dine; we do not inter-marry. Our national customs, calendars, even our diet and dress are different.”{CRA)
1936-37: Provincial Elections In the 1936-37 provincial elections in 11 provinces, the Congress won an absolute majority in 5 (UP, Bihar, Madras, CP (Central Provinces) and Orissa), and emerged as the largest party in 4 (Bombay, Bengal, Assam and NWFP). The Congress ministries were formed in a total of 8 provinces. They were headed (called Premiers) by Govind Ballabh Pant in UP, Shrikrishna Sinha in Bihar, NB Khare in CP, BG Kher in Bombay, Rajaji in Madras. Bishwanath Das in Orissa, Gopinath Bardoloi in Assam, and Dr Khan Sahib in NWFP.
Overall, in the assembly (provincial) elections, the Congress had won 715 of 1585 seats-less than 50%and it had polled about 94 lakh votes against the total of all the opposition of about 110 lakh votes-again less than 50%: as such, the Congress had no reason to be too arrogant! Jinnah’s Muslim League won a total of 108 seats across India, including 20 of the 30 Muslim seats in the Bombay Assembly; and 27 seats in UP against 134 of the Congress. Further, the Congress had contested only 58 of the 482 Muslim seats and won just 26–15 in NWFP, and only 11 in the rest of India.
Result of Provincial Elections 1937
Won by
Won by Total Province General Won by
Other Muslim
Won by Seats Seats Congress
Muslim
Others
League Assam 1081 40
9
25 Bengal 2501
40
@ 77 Bihar
152 Bombay
175 112
이 Madras*
2151 NWFP Orissa
38 Punjab 34
# 83 Sind 60
0 2281 120
37 Total
7151 1081 372)
390 *CP=Central Provinces, *UP=United Provinces
*Madras=Whole of South @ Mostly Krishak Proja Party, #Mostly Unionist Party
Sources: {RPD/522} {MAK/40}
Groups
01
201
CP*
50
60 1751
18|
36
UP*
27
30
Rahmat Ali’s proposal was only circulated in the Round Table Conference, it was not officially put forth. Some from the Muslim League had privately sounded the British Government on the proposal, but it was declined by the British, as they felt it might amount to revival of the old Muslim Empire.
When Rahmat Ali was reminded that in his geographical definition of Pakistan only about 40% Muslims lived, and that he would be jeopardising the fate of the rest (almost 60%) of the Muslims who lived all over India as minority of less than 10% of the population, he had, like Iqbal and other Muslim leaders, no rational solution to offer. What they talked about was an awful counter-balancing, reciprocal hostage situation: Hindu-minority as hostage in future Pakistan vs. Muslim-minority as hostage in India! But, what has been the actual situation after the creation of Pakistan? Hindu-minority in Pakistan has
657
Jinnah.{Gill/179-80}
The Muslim League gave a poor showing. It secured less than 5% of the Muslim votes. It won a mere 6% (108/1585) of total seats. Its share (108/(372+108=480) in the Muslim seats was also low: 22.5%. It failed to form a government on its own in any province. Described Ayesha Jalal:
“But for Jinnah the results of the 1937 elections proved another setback in a career marked more by snakes than by ladders. In the Punjab, the Unionists swept the board; in Bengal,
Jinnah and the League had to accept a coalition led by Huq who did not acknowledge their writ; in Sind they faced an independent ministry; and in the N.W.F.P., where almost the entire population was Muslim, the worst humiliation of all, a Congress ministry. In each of the [Muslim] majority provinces, Jinnah’s strategy had been repudiated by the voters’ choice. In the Muslim-minority provinces, where the League did best, the Congress did much better than anyone had expected, and did not need the League’s help to form stable ministries.”{Jal/353
Rebuff to Jinnah by Gandhi-Nehru that proved costly Before the 1936-37 provincial elections, the Congress did not expect to get enough seats to form a government on its own in UP. That was because of the other parties in the fray who had strong backing of landlords and influential sections. So as to be able to form a government, it had planned for a suitable coalition with the Muslim League. So that the Muslim League got enough seats for a coalition to be successful, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai of the Congress (who had been private secretary of Motilal Nehru, and after his death, a principal aide of Jawaharlal Nehru) had persuaded, jointly with Nehru, several influential Muslims, like Khaliq-uz-Zaman (third in the AIML hierarchy after Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan) and Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, who had the potential to win, to fight the elections on behalf of the Muslim League, as Muslims fighting on behalf of the Muslim League had better chances of winning. They fought and won. But, after the elections, when the Congress found it could form the government on its own, without the help of the Muslim League, it began to put unreasonable conditions.{DD/181-83}
To Jinnah’s proposal of inclusion of two Muslim League Ministers in the UP cabinet, Nehru, who was the Congress President then, and was also looking after the UP affairs, put forth an amazing, arrogant condition: the League legislators must merge with the Congress! Specifically, the terms sought to be imposed, inter alia, by Azad-Nehru were:
“The Muslim League group in the UP Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group. The existing members of the Muslim League party in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party… The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces will be dissolved, and no candidates will thereafter be set up by the said Board at
any by-election…”{Shak/187} The above humiliating condition that was the death warrant for the League was naturally rejected by
In Bombay, with the Congress Chief minister designate BG Kher willing to induct one Muslim League minister in the cabinet in view of lack of absolute majority of the Congress, and the fact that the Muslim League had done well in Bombay in the Muslim pockets, Jinnah sent a letter in the connection to Gandhi. Gandhi gave a strangely mystical and elliptically negative reply to Jinnah on 22 May 1937:
“Mr. Kher has given me your message. I wish I could do something, but I am utterly helpless. My faith in [Hindu-Muslim] unity is as bright as ever; only I see no daylight out of the
impenetrable darkness and, in such distress, I cry out to God for light…”{CWMG/Vol-71/277} Jinnah then wanted to meet Gandhi; but Gandhi advised him to rather meet Abul Kalam Azad, by whom he said he was guided in such matters.
Rebuffed and humiliated Jinnah then decided to show Congress-Nehru-Gandhi their place. The incident led other Muslim leaders also to believe that a majority Congress government would always tend to ride rough-shod over the Muslim interests. It is claimed that, thanks to the above, the badly hurt pride of the Muslims led them to move away from the Congress and quickly gravitate towards the Muslim League, and ultimately to separation.
The incident actually proved a blessing-in-disguise for Jinnah and the Muslim League for they realised their politics needed to be mass-based to counter the Congress. Membership fee for the AIML was dramatically dropped to just two-annas. There was a huge move to increase membership among the Muslim masses, and it paid rich dividends: the membership dramatically rose from a few thousand to well over half a million!
Jinnah told his followers that he had done enough of begging the Congress in the past; he would see to it now that the Congress begged of him.{RZ/70-71}
The humiliated Muslim League aspirants Khaliq-uz-Zaman and Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan whose ambitions were thwarted by the Congress and Nehru thereafter became the pillars of Muslim reaction and played a critical role in swinging the Muslim opinion in favour of partition and Pakistan.
The British were only too glad at the development. The Secretary of State Birkenhead wrote to the Viceroy: “I have placed my highest and most permanent hopes in the eternity of the communal situation.”{Muld/42}
It was unwise of the Congress and Gandhi-Nehru not to show a little generosity towards the League. Reportedly, Sardar Patel and GB Pant were willing for a coalition with the Muslim League as per the preelection understanding, but Nehru, in his “wisdom” and hubris, decided to act arrogant, and led the way for the ultimate parting of ways with Jinnah and the Muslim League, and for Partition and Pakistan, Nehru was the Congress President in 1936 and 1937.
butchered. Women and girls raped and kidnapped. Hindu life, property unsafe. Situation most critical. Government policy not firm. Pray send enquiry committee immediately to see situation personally…”
Gandhi’s inexplicable response was: “Now the only effective way in which I can help the Sindhis (is) to show them the way of non-violence. But that cannot be learnt in a day. The other way is the way the world has followed hitherto, i.e. armed defence of the life and property. God helps only those who help themselves. The Sindhis are no exception. They must learn the art of defending themselves against robbers, raiders and the like. If they do not feel safe and are too weak to defend themselves, they should leave the place which has proved too inhospitable to live in…” Why are you a leader if you are unwilling to take concrete steps to save the innocents?
Jinnah’s bitter reaction on 26 July 1937 to Nehru’s unjust act was:
“What can I say to the busybody President [Nehru] of the Congress? He [Nehru] seems to carry the responsibility of the whole world on his shoulders and must poke his nose into
everything except minding his own business.”{DD/181-82} The fissure caused by Nehru’s impetuosity was never healed.
There is an opinion that had the Congress been accommodating towards the AIML post-1937 elections, AIML may not have hurtled forward towards Partition and Pakistan. Surely, the accommodation by the Congress would have been a wiser move-it might have delivered some positives. That possibility should have been exhausted. Besides, it would have prevented counterfactual speculations. Wrote Maulana Azad:
“…I have nevertheless to say with regret that this [Nehru’s goof-up on Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946: pl. see elsewhere in this book] was not the first time that he [Nehru] did immense harm to the national cause. He had committed an almost equal blunder in 1937 when the first elections were held under the Government of India Act [of 1935]{Azad/170)… “Jawaharlal’s action gave the Muslim League in the UP a new lease of life. All students of Indian politics know that it was from the UP that the League was reorganised. Mr Jinnah took full advantage of the situation and started an offensive which ultimately led to Pakistan{Azad/171}… “The [Nehru’s] mistake of 1937 was bad enough. The mistake of 1946 [of Nehru re: Cabinet Mission Plan] proved even more costly.”{Azad/170-172}
Wrote MC Chagla:
“To my mind, one of the most potent causes which ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan was what happened in Uttar Pradesh (United Provinces in 1937). If Jawaharlal Nehru had agreed to a coalition ministry and not insisted on the representative of the Muslim League signing the Congress pledge, perhaps Pakistan would never have come about. I remember Jawaharlal telling me that Khaliquz Zaman [to whom Nehru had denied a birth in the UP cabinet in 1937] was one of his greatest and dearest friends, and yet he led the agitation for Pakistan… Uttar Pradesh was the cultural home of the Muslims. Although they were in a minority in the State, if Uttar Pradesh had not gone over to the cause of separation, Pakistan would never have become a reality.”{MCC/81-2}
Nov-1939: Resignation of Congress Ministries
(Nehru’s Mega Blunder) At the CWC meeting at Wardha on 22-23 October 1939 it was decided not to co-operate with the British in WW-II, and that the Congress Provincial Governments would resign by the month-end in protest against the Congress not having been consulted prior to declaration of war by the British on behalf of India.
The move was spear-headed by Nehru and the leftists. Patel and Gandhi were not in favour of noncooperation with the British in the war, and of the ministries resigning; but Nehru & Co-the leftistsinsisted upon it. The resignations were effectively a victory of the Congress Left.
It was politics of futile gesture-a big blunder; a political suicide. The responsibility for this great act of folly rested with Nehru and his socialist supporters. Wrote Balraj Krishna:
“Yet, he [Patel] seemed to be in agreement with Gandhi insofar as the continuance of the Congress Ministries was concerned. This was typical of him as the party boss and as an administrator, who saw obvious political gains in holding on to power. Linlithgow’s thinking tallied with Patel’s. He had written to the King that ‘Jinnah had become alarmed by the defection of a growing number of Muslims from the Muslim League to the Congress’, because the Ministers could help their friends’ and ‘inconvenience their opponents’. Such defections, however probable, could not have taken place because of the Congress giving up power in the provinces. The Editor of The Hindu, K. Srinavasan,… ‘blamed Nehru for “the dreadful blunder” of withdrawing the provincial Ministers from office.'”{BK/199-200} “The withdrawal was a triumph for the Congress Left-a triumph which had serious political repercussions. It threw the Congress into wilderness and gave Jinnah absolute freedom to play a game that strengthened his position with the British and helped him, in the end, get Pakistan. The inappropriateness of the resignations lay in their being most inopportune and untimely, especially when Linlithgow had formed a favourable opinion of the Congress
1939 : Anti-Hindu Riots in Sindh Dr Choitram Gidwani, Vice President of the Sind Provincial Congress Committee, telegrammed Gandhi in October 1939: “Riots, loot, incendiarism in Sukkur district [Sindh] villages. Hindus mercilessly
leaders and the Congress as a party. He considered the latter to be ‘the only one worthy of the name, and certainly the only one possessing an active and widespread organisation in the constituencies.’ It was an achievement due to Patel’s effective Chairmanship of the Congress Parliamentary Board. In Patel, Linlithgow had found ‘a sense of humour, a shrewd and active brain and a strong personality’, and Patel clearly saw the point about avoiding speculative
hypothesis as a basis of argument.”{BK/199-200} The hard-won (thanks mainly to the efforts of Sardar Patel) Congress ministries in the provinces since 1937, under the strict vigilance of Patel, had begun to perform better than expected. To guide and coordinate the activities of the provincial governments, a central control board known as the Parliamentary Sub-Committee was formed, with Sardar Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Rajendra Prasad as members. A number of measures in the interest of the general public had been taken. Many Congress ministers set an example in plain living. They reduced their own salaries. They made themselves easily accessible to the common people. In a very short time, a very large number of ameliorative legislations were pushed through in an attempt to fulfil many of the promises made in the Congress election manifesto.
Emergency powers acquired by the provincial governments through the Public Safety Acts and the like were repealed. Bans on illegal political organizations such as the Hindustan Seva Dal and Youth Leagues and on political books and journals were lifted. All restrictions on the press were removed. Securities taken from newspapers and presses were refunded and pending prosecutions were withdrawn. The blacklisting of newspapers for purposes of government advertising was given up. Confiscated arms were returned and forfeited arms licenses were restored. In the Congress provinces, police powers were curbed and the reporting of public speeches and the shadowing of political workers by CID agents stopped. Another big achievement of the Congress Governments was their firm handling of the communal riots. Rajaji’s premiership of Madras during 1937-39 was brilliant.
The success rankled both with Jinnah, and the British: they never wanted the Congress to get popular. Besides, it reduced the British dependence on the provinces under the Congress rule to mobilise resources for the WW-II. Both for the British and for Jinnah the Congress Ministries’ resignations were therefore “good riddance”.
It was like giving up all the gains of the 1937-elections; and passing them on to the then defeated Muslim League. This self-emasculation by the Congress not only greatly weakened it and drastically slashed its bargaining position, it threw the Congress into wilderness, and led to the rise of the Muslim League, separatism, and ultimately partition. The miscalculated move infuriated the British, drastically curtailed the Congress influence and clout, and gifted a new lease of life to the Muslim League.
Jinnah couldn’t help calling it the ‘Himalayan blunder of the Congress, and was determined to take full advantage of it. Jinnah and the Muslim League went to the extent of calling upon all Muslims to celebrate
22 December 1939 as the “Deliverance Day”-deliverance from the “misrule” of the Congress. Thanks to Nehru’s blunder, the stars of the Muslim League began to rise.
The worst effect of the resignations was on NWFP. This overwhelmingly Muslim province (95%) was ruled in conjunction with the Congress by the Khan brothers. It was a show-piece for the Congress, and a negation of all that Jinnah and the Muslim League stood for-majority Muslim province under the Congress. Resignation by the ruling Congress-Khan brothers was god-sent for Jinnah and the British. Both quickly manipulated to install a Muslim League government, and make popular the divisive agenda. In the Pakistan that the British had planned inclusion of NWFP was a must, and that was only possible if the Congress and the Khan-brothers were dislodged. Linlithgow did all he could to install a Muslim League government in NWFP, including meeting Jinnah personally(Sar/48), and instructing the then Punjab Governor Sir George Cunningham to render all necessary assistance to Jinnah{Sar/49). Viceroy Linlithgow had been playing a dangerous and irresponsible divisive game in India’s North-West, particularly in Punjab and NWFP that ultimately led to the Partition carnage. Wrote VP Menon in ‘The Transfer of Power in India’:
“Had it [Congress] not resigned from the position of vantage in the Provinces the course of Indian history might have been different… By resigning, it showed a lamentable lack of foresight and political wisdom. There was little chance of its being put out of office; the British Government would surely have hesitated to incur the odium of dismissing ministries which had the overwhelming support of the people. Nor could it have resisted an unanimous demand for a change at the Centre, a demand which would have been all the more irresistible after the entry of Japan into the war. In any case, it is clear that, but for the resignation of the Congress, Jinnah and the Muslim League would never have attained the position they did…”{VPM2/152/L-2901}
1940-46: Congress Descent & Muslim League Ascendency Once the Muslim League’s agenda became explicitly divisive after the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, it gained ascendency in popular Muslim perception on the hope of a separate country. Nothing like hate and divisiveness for a destructive agenda!
The Muslim consolidation under the above hate and divisive agenda got coupled with the following four major factors that led to Muslim ascendency, and ultimately the Partition and Pakistan: (1)Resignation of the Congress from the Provincial Ministries they were ruling in 1939 at the insistence of Nehru and the left, leaving the field open for the Muslim League. (2)Misreading of how the WW-II would unfold by Gandhi and the Congress, making them adopt the wrong strategy of opposition and non-cooperation with the British during the WW-II, turning the British hostile towards the Congress, and to the interests of India and the Hindus. (3) With all the top Congress leaders in jail for a couple of years between 1940 and
Khan had categorically told me that the [Lahore] resolution [hinting at Pakistan] was essentially a bargaining counter, Jinnah replied: ‘A bargain, my friend, is struck between two parties. Let the Congress first accept the League as the other party.'”{DD/195}
1946, even as the Congress hold suffered, the Muslim League came up, as was obvious from the 1946 election results. (4)The Muslim League strategy of full co-operation with the British, and being dog-like, paid them rich dividends.
Essentially, the Gandhism and the Congressism was out of its depth, and lacked the knowledge, sharpness, realism, comprehension, and guts to face up to the challenges. Other than the self-defeating non-violence and ineffective non-cooperation they had nothing in their arsenal.
1942: Cripps Mission Following the successful Japanese navy attack on the Pearl Harbor situated in the US territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, the Japanese blitzkrieg triumphantly rolled through the Wake Island (then under the US), the Philippines (then under the US), Malaysia (then under the British), Indonesia, Singapore (then under the British), and then Burma (Myanmar, then under the British). Rangoon fell on 7 March 1942. With that, the attack on India seemed imminent.
Looking to the critical situation, the US President Roosevelt and the Chinese Generalissimo Chiang KaiShek urged the British PM Churchill to make a reconciliatory move towards the Indian National Congress to gain co-operation in the ongoing war. Churchill was reluctant, but once Rangoon fell, he was forced to make a move. He announced a mission to Delhi under the Leader of the House, Sir Stafford Cripps.
Sir Richard Stafford Cripps (1889-1952) arrived in Delhi on 22 March 1942 along with his team. Cripps was a Labour MP, the leader of the House of Commons, and a member of the British War Cabinet. He had brought with him a new constitutional scheme approved by the British Cabinet. In return, the British sought co-operation in the war-efforts. The team spent three weeks in India in March and April 1942, and had prolonged discussions with the concerned parties. Nehru and Maulana Azad were the official negotiators for the Congress.
1940 : League’s Lahore Resolution In its three-day general session in Lahore on 22-24 March 1940 the All-India Muslim League (AIML) passed a resolution authored by Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan and others, and presented by Bengal Premier Fazlul Huq at the instance of Jinnah, the portions of which read:
“…3. Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign…”
This resolution that clearly hinted at Pakistan came to be known as the Lahore Resolution.
Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman (1889-1973), a top AIML leader, narrated in his autobiography ‘Pathway to Pakistan’ that a year earlier to the Lahore Resolution he had met Under-Secretary of State (for India) Colonel Muirhead and Secretary of State (for India) Lord Zetland in March 1939 in London, and had discussed with them ‘Partition and Pakistan’, something that was enthusiastically encouraged by them. Upon his return to India he had apprised Jinnah on the discussions, and had expressed confidence that the British would ‘ultimately concede partition’. (Akb/322-23}
As late as March 1940 Jinnah expected to be recognised by Gandhi and the Congress as the sole spokesman of the Muslims. Congress, instead, elected Maulana Azad as its President at the Ramgarh Congress held on 19-20 March 1940 to demonstrate they did not recognise Jinnah as the sole spokesman. Remarked Jinnah to Durga Das: “No, Durga, if only Gandhi would join hands with me, the British game of divide and rule would be frustrated.”{DD/194}
Net result: Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution indirectly hinting about Pakistan was passed on 26 March 1940. Later, when a journalist asked Jinnah if the resolution meant “a demand for Pakistan”, Jinnah skirted the question, and did not use the word Pakistan.
Wrote Durga Das: “When I met Jinnah after the [Lahore] session and pointed out that Sikandar Hayat
Cripps announced his proposals in the form of Draft Declaration on 30 March 1942: (1)Right away, India could have a national government composed of representatives of the leading political parties. (2)Formation of a post-war Constituent Assembly whose members would be chosen by provincial legislatures or nominated by the princes. (3)India to be granted full Dominion Status after the war, with the right of secession from the Commonwealth. (4)Secession clause: Once India became a Dominion after the war, every province would have the right to secede and obtain a status equal to that of the Indian Dominion.{BKM}
Both Gandhi and Patel rejected the proposal, mainly on account of the secession clause. Rajaji, Nehru and Maulana Azad, however, desired continuance of talks with Cripps. Though Patel was of the opinion “no more mischievous scheme had been conceived”{RG/306} about the Cripps Plan, he didn’t mind continuance of talks, something Gandhi felt was pointless, and was annoyed about.
If one examines the above, and what India got in 1947 (Dominion Status), the only objectionable clause appears to the fourth-clause, the secession-clause. Both the Congress and the Muslim League had problems with it, but in an opposite sort of way. Jinnah termed the secession clause as an implicit recognition of Pakistan; but rejected the proposal, as what he wanted was an explicit recognition of the
cooperation during the war. Forced into it, Churchill and Viceroy Linlithgow deliberately introduced the secession clause to ensure the Mission was aborted. In any case the terms could have been better and reasonably negotiated by Nehru and Azad who were entrusted with the responsibility; because it was not as if India got better terms in 1947—the secession did happen!
right of the “Muslim nation” to separate. Gandhi, and many other Congress leaders expressed their disapproval of the proposal principally on account of the secession clause. The British had perhaps put the clause to make it partially acceptable to both: No explicit Pakistan, to satisfy the Congress; and a possibility of Pakistan through the secession-clause to satisfy the Muslim League, and serve their [British] own selfish intentions too.
Gandhi had called Cripps’s offer “a post-dated cheque”, to which someone added “on a failing bank”. Why? Looking to the way Japan was trouncing the British and the US in SE-Asia, and was in Burma, at India’s doors, the Congress was elated Japan was doing their work of evicting the British. They had already written-off the British! Hence the term “the failing bank”, and the “post-dated cheque” that was bound to bounce as the British would not have anything to give anyway. Such a faulty reading of the likely scenario was thanks to Gandhi-Nehru&Co’s naivete on military and international affairs! Rather than considering the offer seriously and negotiating on the secession-clause; driven by hubris thanks to Japan’s military success, and over-confident they had an upper hand, and that the British were in dire need of their co-operation, they acted difficult and unreasonable. Had they made sensible negotiation on the secession-clause India could have got the self-government five years earlier, and there would perhaps have been no partition and Pakistan. Attlee had commented: “It was a great pity that eventually the Indians turned this down, as full self-government might have been ante-dated by some years.”{JA/232}
Nehru and Company (Maulana Azad, etc.) were most vehement in their rejection of the Cripps Plan, and it was their inflexibility, along with that of Gandhi, that carried the day. Surprisingly, for them, the irritant was not the secession clause (Had they indirectly and implicitly conceded Pakistan? During the discussions, Nehru and Azad had even clarified that they could not “think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will”. {RG2/L-5260}). Nehru had two objections. One: the proposed new cabinet to be installed right away of the Congress and other politicians would not have the final authority, and that the Viceroy would not just be a constitutional head, but would have a veto. In war-time, could the British have left things to quibbling and sissy Congress politicians!? )In this context it is worth noting that it was principally Nehru who ensured Mountbatten as the first Governor General of Free India after independence, and allowed him to take crucial decisions, including that on Kashmir-which proved disastrous for India!) Two: The defence would remain in the charge of the British Commander-in-Chief. Nehru wanted full control over the armed forces. The British handing Defence Ministry to the Congress politicians during the war-time was unthinkable. Did the Congress politicians have any knowledge and expertise in defence matters and war? (What happened post-independence in J&K and in India-China war is well-known! Further, post-independence Free India indeed had a British Commander-in-Chief. How did Nehru accept that as PM of Free India?) In short, among the main leaders responsible for the failure of the Cripps Mission was Nehru. Unsuccessful, Cripps left India on 12 April 1942.
he Cripps Mission was forced on the British by the US to get the Indian
1942: Rajaji Formula on Pakistan In the background of the AIML’s Lahore Resolution of March 1940 hinting at Pakistan, and its subsequent pronouncements and actions, C Rajagopalachari (aka CR or Rajaji) interpreted the CWC’s clarification during the talks with Stafford Cripps in 1942 that they could not “think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will” as acceptance of the principle of Pakistan’. Patel and several others totally differed with such an interpretation.
Rajaji’s rationale for his proposal or formula was the following. Rather than making futile attempts at adjustments with the Muslims, the Muslim League, and other Muslim parties to somehow maintain a fragile unified Central Government, Rajaji felt it was better to let the Muslim-majority areas secede to form Pakistan so that the Congress could form a strong Central Government for the rest of India. As per the CR’s formula, at the end of WW-II a commission be appointed to demarcate the districts having a Muslim population in absolute majority and in those areas plebiscite be conducted on all inhabitants (including the non-Muslims) on the basis of adult suffrage. That is, as per the CR’s formula, the areas that could form Pakistan were not to be on the provincial basis (that is, the provinces like Punjab or Bengal could not decide as a whole whether to go to Pakistan or not), but on district-by-district basis.
Rajaji’s purpose was also to bring forth the contradictions in Jinnah’s stand (Provincial vs. Communal basis of partition) that could have made Muslims rethink on their Pakistan demand. CR’s Proposal to accept the Muslim League’s claim for separation of the Muslim-majority areas was put up to the AICC on 24 April 1942 by the Congress legislators of Madras, guided by Rajaji. However, the AICC rejected the proposal 120 to 15. Thereupon, Rajaji began canvassing the proposal with the general public. That was violation of the Congress discipline. While he didn’t mind Rajaji’s free expression of his views, Gandhi did mention to Rajaji: “It will be most becoming for you to sever your connection with the Congress and then carry on your campaign with all the zeal and ability you are capable of.” Rajaji resigned both from the Congress and the Assembly, but stubbornly stuck to his views.
However, when Gandhi engaged Jinnah in talks in 1944, the basis of his talks was the CR Formula. The ultimate Partition and Pakistan too was close to what CR had proposed back in 1942.
Notably, Jinnah had rejected the CR Formula. Why? Jinnah wanted the whole of Punjab and Bengal to be in proposed Pakistan on the provincial basis (province as a whole), rather on the district-by-district basis that would have partitioned the two provinces. There lay the contradictions in Jinnah and AIML’s
demands. If Pakistan was to be on communal basis (Muslim-majority), how could they demand inclusion of Hindu-majority areas of Punjab and Bengal, and of Assam! Jinnah rejected the CR Formula on the ground that it offered “a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan.”{RG3/248}
Aug-1942: ‘Quit India’ & its Adverse Fall-out The CWC prepared a draft Quit India resolution on 7 August 1942 which was presented to and passed by the AICC at the end of its two-day meeting (7-8 Aug) at Gowalia Tank in Mumbai on 8 August 1942.
After the passing of the ‘Quit India’ resolution, Gandhi, in his address to the delegates after midnight, had said, inter alia: “…The actual struggle does not commence this very moment… My first act will be to wait upon His Excellency the Viceroy and plead with him for the acceptance of the Congress demand. This may take two or three weeks… What are you going to do in the meanwhile? There is the spinningwheel…”{CWMG/Vol-83/319}
Gandhi sent Miss Madeleine Slade (Miraben) to the Viceroy to personally explain the resolution. Gandhi did not expect any immediate action from either side, or any confrontation. He wanted to use the resolution as a bargaining counter, and expected talks and negotiations. However, being war-time, and having noted the threat of Gandhi’s rebellion, the Viceroy was in no mood to play soft and patient. He refused an interview to Slade, and let it be known that the government would neither stand any rebellion, violent or non-violent, nor would it discuss with anyone who talks in such terms.{Azad/84}
Churchill’s War Cabinet’s best offer in the form of Cripp’s Proposals having been rebuffed, the Raj was fully prepared to crush the Congress. They had learnt a lesson from the Salt March-not to give a long rope to Gandhi. This time they decided to swoop down, arrest all leaders, and nip the agitation in the bud.
Gandhi, Sardar Patel, Kriplani, Maulana Azad, Nehru, and the rest of the CWC, along with Mahadev Desai, Sarojini Naidu, Mirabehn, Asoka Mehta and others were arrested on the morning of 9 August 1942.
Thus, hardly had the “Quit India” started when all the top leaders were in jail. Gandhi was much dejected by the arrests. He expected negotiations, not arrests. Wrote Maulana Azad in his autobiography:
“…We walked down the strain] corridor to his [Gandhi’s] compartment [while being taken to jails on 9 August 1942 morning, after arrest] which was some distance away. Gandhiji was looking very depressed. I had never seen him looking so dejected. I understood that he had not expected this sudden arrest. His reading of the situation had been that the Government would take no drastic action. I had of course warned him again and again that he was taking too optimistic a view but obviously he had placed great faith in his own judgement. Now that
the calculations had proved wrong, he was uncertain as to what he should do…”{Azad/88-9} Gandhi had indeed told his secretary before going to bed in the early hours of 9 August 1942 that, “After my last night’s speech, they (the British) will not arrest me.”{Nan/463}
‘Quit India’ momentum petered out in about three months. The impotence of the ‘Quit India’ became obvious from the fact that, despite Gandhi’s call to the contrary, about half a million Indians joined the British army between August and December 1942!
About two years after the “Quit India” call, when Gandhi was released, there was no sign of the British packing up and quitting India. In fact, while the British Raj remained unaffected, and the strength of the Muslim League and Jinnah multiplied, the position of the Congress took a nose dive. While the British had not “Quit India’, it was as if the Congress had “Quit” the national scene.
Logically, that was expected. If you don’t do any planning and preparation, if you do no hard work, and instead, you just issue a call for “Quit India”, how can you, and why should you expect it to succeed. You don’t even anticipate the crackdown, and make no plan to go underground to be able to direct the movement. You just get arrested soon after the call, and waste away precious time in jail. You claim to be leaders, but sitting in jail you wish the people would do the needful to somehow deliver freedom. What wishful thinking!
Stated Churchill’s friend Page Croft: “The failure of Gandhi to rouse India against the King-Emperor is one of the happiest events of the war.”{PF/178}
For the first time in the overlong Gandhian Freedom Movement was a call given for the British to quit, with “Quit India”. And, that too at a time when Britain was fighting with its back to the wall for its own survival in the WW-II. That spoiled the special relationship between Gandhi and the British-thanks especially to the Gandhian methods (of non-violence and Gandhi’s opposition to the revolutionaries and the revolutionary methods) that ensured little real harm to the British interests-and the British turned anti-Gandhi and anti-Congress.
Gandhi actually miscalculated. Developments on the WW-II battlefronts with the Axis powers advancing at lightning speed, and Allies on the retreat, made Gandhi conclude the British were on the losing side. By acting tough he thought he could therefore bargain better with the British, if they needed India’s cooperation to help them. However, the scene soon reversed, when the Allies gained an upper hand. Further, Gandhi had expected the Raj to negotiate with him, like it had done on earlier occasions. But, to his dismay, the Raj just ignored him. Gandhi’s erroneous reading of the situation resulted in his marginalisation by the British, who later dropped him in favour of Nehru, who, behind the scenes, appeared more amenable to them. Had Gandhi been smarter, he would have got the hint when he had sent Mirabehn (Miss Madeleine Slade) to the Viceroy before giving the “Quit India” call. The Viceroy had not only rebuffed her he had made it amply clear that during the war-time the government won’t tolerate any agitation-violent or non-violent-nor would it talk to any representative of such planned agitation {Gill/73} {Azad/84}. Had Gandhi been pragmatic, and had he not miscalculated, he wouldn’t have given the “Quit India” call then.
The fact of the matter was the British never considered Gandhism as a threat, or as a force they could
not easily tackle. They had been indulging Gandhi in the past only because it suited them. The moment it sought to become inconvenient, they simply crushed the movement, and ignored Gandhi, and the Congress.
In retrospect it can be said that if Gandhi had continued to be on good terms with the British, like he had been earlier, had he helped the British unconditionally in WW-II, and had not got into “Quit India”, perhaps India and the Congress would have been far better placed to negotiate the terms of “Transfer of Power” with the British. Further, if the pro-Russia Socialists-Leftists-Nehruvians had not come in the way, and Gandhi and the Congress had assured Britain and the US co-operation in joint defence matters, perhaps there would have been no Pakistan and Partition, or, at least, Kashmir would have been settled in favour of India in 1947 itself.
Thanks to the dog-like loyalty of the Muslim League towards the British; thanks to the resignations of the Congress ministries in 1939 following the declaration of war (WW-II) by the British on behalf of India without consulting the Congress, resulting in severe contraction of the clout and the power of the Congress; thanks to the Congress defying the British power through “Quit India”, and coming in their bad books; and thanks to the disappearance of the Congress from the national scene (most were jailed) following the “Quit India” call, Jinnah and the Muslim League had gained hugely.
Jinnah and the Muslim League managed to spread themselves wide. They had formed ministries in Sind and Assam in 1942, and in Bengal and NWFP in 1943. Besides, the British had become even more proPakistan. Those Muslim leaders who had kept a distance from the Muslim League began to curry favour with Jinnah & Co now that they knew where the power lay, and who the British favoured. Similarly, proCongress Muslims, or those among the general Muslim public who were hitherto not too enamoured by the Muslim League and Jinnah began to gravitate towards them realising Pakistan was a possibility.
offered to Jinnah what he [Gandhi] was totally opposed to earlier.
Gandhi wanted the Congress and the Muslim League to jointly demand a national government from the Raj-the mutual understanding being that the contiguous Muslim-majority areas could secede upon gaining independence, if the majority adult population of those areas so desired. That amounted to conceding Pakistan-what Rajaji had proposed way back in April 1942.
Jinnah, however, rejected the offer for several reasons: (a)Pakistan on offer was not big enough. It excluded the Hindu-majority areas of Punjab and Bengal. (b)Gandhi’s offer of Pakistan was postindependence, while Jinnah desired Pakistan prior to independence, or simultaneously with it, and under the aegis of the British, for he didn’t trust the Congress. (c)Gandhi’s offer tended to dilute Pakistan’s sovereignty by stipulating a written agreement on Hindustan-Pakistan alliance. (d)The Pakistan on offer was subject to a plebiscite.
Rebuffed, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah on 15 September 1944: “I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children.”{CWMG/V-84/381} {Par/178}
In an interview to “News Chronicle” on 29 September 1944, Gandhi commented: “I think he [Jinnah] is suffering from hallucination when he imagines that an unnatural division of India could bring either happiness or prosperity to the people concerned.”{CWMG/Vol-84/424}
Viceroy noted in his diary on the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting: “The two great mountains have met and not even a ridiculous mouse has emerged.”{PF/187}
Those like Patel, Azad, Nehru and others who were in Ahmednagar jail then were unhappy with Gandhi’s moves, when they came to know of them.
The land-mass that Jinnah ultimately got for Pakistan in 1947 was much like what the CR Formula of 1942 and the Gandhi’s offer of 1944 contained. Had Jinnah agreed, perhaps the independence could have been earlier, and there might not have been the partition-mayhem on the scale that happened in 1947.
1944: Gandhi’s Parleys with Jinnah After release from jail on 6 May 1944 Gandhi went in for physical recovery. While recuperating in the hill-station of Panchgani Gandhi began planning on how to get the Congress up from its down and out status-the net result of its own making!
After consultations with Rajaji at Panchgani Gandhi wrote to Viceroy Wavell that subject to the formation of a national government responsible to the Central Assembly he would advise the CWC that the Congress must withdraw “disobedience”, and should fully cooperate with the war efforts. Gandhi’s offer to the British was a huge come down from the “Quit India” demands. Yet, the Viceroy spurned the offer! Showed how little the Raj cared for the Congress or Gandhi.
Spurned by the British after release from jail on 6 May 1944, Gandhi commenced parleys with Jinnah. In just one month in September 1944, Gandhi visited Jinnah’s home 14 times! That hugely gave boost to Jinnah’s stature, particularly in the eyes of the Muslim public, and the Muslim leaders. This time Gandhi
1945–1946 Elections Elections to the Central and the Provincial Assemblies were scheduled at the end of 1945, and were to extend into 1946. The franchise for the elections was still limited to about 10% of the population for the Provinces, and less than 1% for the Centre. Sardar Patel was not in favour of elections at that juncture for several reasons: many Congress leaders and cadres were still in jails; Patel and others were released from jails only in June 1945, and have had little time to prepare for elections; electoral rolls were not revised, leaving many young out of the fold. Yet, Maulana Azad, as the Congress President then, agreed for elections. Why? Did he secretly desire an advantage for the Muslims, and the Muslim League? One doesn’t
bitter pill for Jinnah to swallow. He had laboured long and hard for an independent province of Sind. Now the Sardar, the Congress’s strong man, the shrewd organisational hand…had snatched the plum from Jinnah’s lips just as he was about to savour its sweetness.”{Wolp/164}
200.
know. In any case, why didn’t he heed the wise counsel of Patel?
The Congress did manage to get considerable Muslim votes a decade earlier in the 1936 elections. However, in the 1945-46 elections, it was almost a clean sweep by the Muslim League in Muslim areas. The Muslim League decidedly commanded the Muslim vote, except in NWFP, thanks to the Seemant Gandhi Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The Muslim League (AIML) got all the 30 Muslim seats (100%) in the Central Assembly, and 429 of the 492 Muslim seats (87.2%) in the 11 provinces (against less than 100 in 1937-elections). Notably, the AIML won 29 out of 29 Muslim seats in Madras, 30 out of 30 in Bombay, 4 out of 4 in Orrisa, 114 out of 119 in Bengal, 54 out of 66 in UP, 75 out of 86 in Punjab, 34 out of 40 in Bihar, 13 out of 14 in CP&Berar, 31 out of 34 in Assam, 28 out of 34 in Sind, and 17 out of 36 in NWFP. Vote percentage wise, the AIML got 86.7% and 74.7% of the Muslim votes cast for the Central Assembly and the Provinces respectively, while the Congress got mere 1.3% and 4.67% of the Muslim votes respectively, the remaining going to other Muslim and non-Muslim parties.
Many factors led to such favourable results for the Jinnah’s Muslim League: resignation of the Congress ministries in 1939, leaving the field open for the British and their collaborators, the Muslim League: “Quit India” call of 1942 that amounted to the Congress quitting the political scene for the next 3 years; growing Raj-League bonhomie at the expense of Raj-Congress relationship; Islam-in-danger cry; hope for creation of Pakistan; perception in the Muslim mind of Jinnah as a powerful leader, what with Gandhi repeatedly knocking at his doors, and Viceroy Wavell [deliberately, and as per a well laid-out British plan] capitulating to his conditions in the Shimla Conference.
The results further boosted Jinnah’s stature, and he became even more aggressive, uncompromising, intransigent and intractable in his unreasonable demands.
Azad, however, was involved in his own pointless exercise in Sind of aligning with the Muslim League to form a ministry, against the advice of Patel, and without the approval of the CWC. He undid the work of Patel; and ultimately it was the Muslim League which formed the ministry in a coalition that excluded the Congress.
Similarly, Azad messed up both Punjab and Bengal. As the Congress President, and as a Muslim, he had ruled that it would be he who would deal with, and take final decisions on the Muslim-majority provinces. Azad was devoted to protecting and furthering Muslim interests. He was in the Congress because he felt he could advance Muslim interests better by being in the Congress, rather than by being in the Muslim League. In his arrogance, he ignored Patel. Azad lacked the organisational ability, wisdom and tact of Patel, and the Congress suffered at the critical juncture. The magic that Patel could weave in 1937elections, he could not do in 1945-46, thanks to Azad trying to be one up. Azad’s secret machinations visà-vis the Cabinet Mission Plan that favoured the Muslim-dominated Groupings so disturbed Gandhi that he was compelled to ask for his resignation from the post of the Congress President.
Apr-1946: Congress Presidential Election Congress Presidential election of 1946 was the most critical, as whoever became the President would also have become the first PM of the Interim Government, and of independent India.
The Congress won 56 seats in the Central Assembly and 930 in the provinces, thanks to the non-Muslim vote which was firmly with it.
In Sind, out of a total of 60, the Congress had won 22, and the Muslim League 27 seats. In Punjab, out of a total of 175, Muslim League won 75, Unionists 21, Congress 51, Sikhs 21, and independents 7. In Bengal, out of a total of 250, Muslim League won 115, Other Muslims 3, Congress 62, Other Hindu Parties and Scheduled Castes 31, Krishak Praja Party 5, Communists 3, Christians and Anglo-Indians 6, and Europeans 25.
The overall position could have been much better had Azad, as President of the Congress, not acted dictatorial, and heeded Patel’s advice.
Azad’s Blunders in Sind, Punjab and Bengal In Sind, Patel had brought several non-Muslim League Muslims to his side, notably the Chief Minister Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Maula Bux, and his brother Allah Bux; and was confident of managing a majority of 35 seats out of 60. Wrote Stanley Wolpert in his book ‘Jinnah of Pakistan’: “It was a most
As per the laid down procedure in practice for many decades, only the Pradesh Congress Committees (PCCs) were the authorised bodies to elect a president. There were 15 such PCCs They were supposed to send their nomination to the Congress Working Committee (CWC).
The Congress Working Committee (CWC) met on 29 April 1946 to consider the nominations sent by the PCCs. 12 of the 15 (80%) PCCs nominated Sardar Patel{RG/370); and 3 PCCs out of the 15 (20%) did not nominate anyone. It therefore turned out to be a non-contest. Sardar Patel was the only choice, and an undisputed choice, with not a single opposition.
What was noteworthy was that on 20 April 1946, that is, nine days before the last date of nominations of 29 April 1946, Gandhi had indicated his preference for Nehru. Yet, not a single PCC nominated Nehru!
Yet, the “Mahatma” and the “Apostle of Truth”, illegally, immorally, unethically and dictatorially, manoeuvred to have Nehru installed as the President of the Congress (and hence the first PM), and the “democratic” Nehru shamelessly usurped the position. Strong words have been used here because the act ultimately cost the nation dear. For details, please read the author’s books on Nehru and Patel available on Amazon.
Mar-Jun 1946 : Cabinet Mission
Undemocratically, Gandhi Anoints Nehru Massive public support in favour of the INA soldiers in the INA trials, and a consequent surge in patriotic fervour and unrest in the army and navy leading to mutiny, convinced the British they could no longer rely on the Indian army to continue to rule India, and must pack up.
On 17 February 1946 Lord Pethick-Lawrence announced in the British Parliament that a Cabinet Mission would be sent to India to discuss Indian freedom. Prime Minister Clement Attlee told the House of Commons on 15 March 1946: “If India elects for independence she has a right to do so.” The Raj had, at last, decided to pack up.
A British Cabinet Mission comprising three cabinet ministers-Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and AV Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty-arrived in India on 23 March 1946 at the initiative of Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister of the UK, to discuss and plan for the Indian independence, and the transfer of power to Indian leadership.
Their discussions with the INC (Indian National Congress) and the AIML (All-India Muslim League) did not yield a common ground acceptable to both.
16-May-1946 Cabinet Mission Plan So as to make headway, the Cabinet Mission unilaterally proposed a plan (what has come to be known as the “16 May Cabinet Mission Plan”), that was announced by PM Attlee in the House of Commons on 16 May 1946.
The State Paper comprising the Cabinet Mission proposals first stated why the conflicting demands of the INC and the AIML were not accepted. The Cabinet Mission Paper stated that even though they appreciated the anxiety of the League to protect themselves from the perpetual majority Hindu rule, the AIML’s demand for a separate nation was rejected on the following grounds:
(e)As West Pakistan would be separated from the East Pakistan by hundreds of miles, their joint administration and defence would be very challenging.
The main provisions of the “May 16 Cabinet Mission Plan” were as under:
(1)Independence to be granted to a UNITED dominion of India, which would be a loose confederation of provinces. AIML’s demand for Pakistan was turned down.
(2)Central Government at Delhi would handle nationwide affairs like defence, currency and finance, communications and foreign affairs, while the rest of the powers and responsibility would belong to the provinces.
(3)British paramountcy over the Princely States would lapse upon transfer of power; it would NOT be transferred to the new Government, making them (Princely States) independent. It was hoped the Princely States would negotiate their way in the Union Government.
(4)To frame the constitution, a Constituent Assembly would be formed comprising 293 representatives of the Provincial Assemblies (in proportion to population) and 93 members of the Princely States.
(5)Provincial Legislatures would be grouped as detailed below.
(a)Pakistan was no solution for the Minority, as, on one hand, it would leave sizable number of Muslims in “Hindu” India, while, on the other hand, it would leave sizable number of non-Muslims in Pakistan.
(b)There was no justification in including the predominant non-Muslim districts of Punjab, Bengal and Assam in Pakistan.
(c) Creation of Muslim-majority Pakistan would necessitate partition of Punjab and Bengal: something which is contrary to the wishes and detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants of those provinces.
(d)Division of Punjab would mean division of the Sikh community, which would be most unjust and unfair to them.
Groupings & the Catch therein As per the “16 May Cabinet Mission Plan” Provincial Legislatures were to be grouped as under: (A)Group-A: Madras, UP, Central provinces, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa. (B)Group-B: Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan. (C)Group-C: Assam and Bengal. Assam then included the whole of Northeast.
Whether the groupings were compulsory or voluntary was left vague. Did Assam, for example, had a right to opt out of Group-C? This was left vague.
The grouping, as above, effectively gave weightage to the idea of Pakistan, even though the Cabinet Mission rejected the demand for a separate nation of Pakistan. Group-B comprised Muslim-majority provinces. 22 of the 35 seats were allocated to Muslims in Group-B. Hindu-majority Assam too came under Muslim-majority Group-C by being clubbed with Bengal. 36 of the 70 seats in Group-C were allocated to Muslims. As such, two of the three groups became Muslim-majority groups.
Compared to what happened upon Partition in 1947 Group-B represented greater West Pakistan, by including whole of Punjab; and Group-C represented greater East Pakistan, by including whole of Bengal plus Assam, and Assam then included the whole of North-Eastern States. Group-B and Group-C being Muslim-majority groups were effectively Pakistan.
(e)As West Pakistan would be separated from the East Pakistan by hundreds of miles, their joint
On 16 June 1946 the Cabinet Mission outlined the procedure for the formation of the Interim Government: a council of 14 members comprising 6 Congress Hindus (Nehru, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Rajaji, Dr HK Mahtab and Jagjivan Ram), 5 League Muslims (MA Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar), Baldev Singh as a Sikh, NP Engineer as a Parsi and Dr John Matthai as a Christian.
Jinnah’s Stand Jinnah was initially reluctant to accept the “16 May Cabinet Mission Plan” as it did not provide for a separate nation of Pakistan which his Muslim League had been campaigning for. However, after deliberations with the British politicians and officials he realised that the provisions for the Muslims in the “16 May Cabinet Mission Plan” were the best Britain could offer and the Muslim League could secure, and it would be foolish to reject it. There were, of course, many Muslims who wondered why they were led astray with the false promise of a separate nation if the “16 May Cabinet Mission Plan” was acceptable to the Muslim League. However, after various clarifications and assurances, Muslim League accepted the “16 May Cabinet Mission Plan” on 6 June 1946; and subsequently it accepted “16 June Plan” too for the Interim Government. However, the resolution adopted by the Muslim League on 6 June 1946 reiterated that its unalterable final objective was to ensure a sovereign State of Pakistan.
Congress Stand Maulana Azad, the then President of the Congress, finding the proposed Groupings overall favoured the Muslims, wrote secretly to Viceroy Wavell, and to the Cabinet Mission, without consulting the CWC, on the possibility of bringing the Congress around on Groupings. He was also willing to have no Muslim representative from the Congress side in the government, as Jinnah had been demanding. Such acts of Azad were like stabs in the back. Gandhi was so hugely disturbed that he compelled Azad to resign.{BK/242}
The Congress and Gandhi were not comfortable with either of the two plans of the Cabinet Mission, particularly after the nature of clarifications given by the Cabinet Mission and Viceroy Wavell on the groupings. They didn’t accept either plan. Given this situation, Jinnah was on the seventh heaven, looking forward to be invited to form the interim government.
Patel’s Critical Initiative However, Patel was determined to thwart the Muslim League and Jinnah. He was determined he won’t let Jinnah walk away with the trophy. Given Gandhi’s hang-ups and muddle-headedness, and the confusion and uncertainty prevailing among the other members of the CWC, including Nehru, Rajaji, Kriplani, Azad, and others, Patel risked his all and took a private, personal initiative to negotiate the matter with the British.
‘May 16 Plan’ had to be accepted, even with its flaws, if ‘June 16 Plan’ was to be rejected, for it was the only route to power, and the only way to scuttle Jinnah. Once in power, the flaws could be addressed. During the critical period between 22 and 24 June there were several private discussions between Patel and members of the Cabinet Mission and Raj officials. Sudhir Ghosh, a go-between for the Raj had stated: “I told Cripps and Pethick-Lawrence that the only advice I could give them about salvaging something out of the wreckage was that they should have a private talk with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who was the only man amongst the Congress leaders who was a practical statesman.”
The ultimate result of Patel’s individual exertions was that the Congress accepted the ‘May 16 Plan’, while rejecting the ‘June 16 Plan’, even though Gandhi was not agreeable, and had this to say to the CWC: “I admit defeat. I cannot advise you to accept the May 16 proposition… But you should follow my intuition only if it appeals to your reason.”
When Jinnah came to know that the Congress had accepted the ‘May 16 Plan’, while rejecting the June 16 Plan’, he impressed upon Viceroy Wavell that as the League had accepted both the plans, in all fairness, the League should be invited to form the Interim Government. Jinnah was certain that he would be called upon. But, thanks to Patel’s play of the dice, that didn’t happen.
Jinnah was furious at the proverbial slip between the cup and the lips. He termed what happened as a deceit of the Congress, and a betrayal of trust by the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy, and alleged a secret deal between Vallabhbhai Patel and the Cabinet Mission.{VT/37}
Rajaji, in a letter to Patel, later conceded that the CWC’s decision of 25 June 1946 to accepted the ‘May 16 Plan’, while rejecting the ‘June 16 Plan’ was “all due to your [Patel’s] firm and thoughtful stand.”
Patel was clear in his goal: bringing the Congress to power, and scuttling the Muslim League’s strategy of getting inflated share in power. Thanks to Patel’s initiative and his firm lead, the CWC rejected Gandhi’s advice. In the national interest, Patel had to defy Gandhi, and he did, and succeeded in thwarting the formation of Jinnah’s government.
Viceroy Wavell could not help feeling he had been outmanoeuvred by Patel, and in a letter to King George VI wrote: “Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel is the recognized ‘tough’ of the Congress Working Committee and by far the most forcible character amongst them. He is probably the only one of them capable of standing up to Gandhi.”{VT/37}
During the earlier discussions stage, Wavell had remarked: “Patel’s face of cold angry disapproval was a study… in khadi, but wearing it more like a Roman toga, and with rather a Roman face, powerful, clever, uncompromising, very seldom speaking, but listening with obvious disapproval.”{BK/249}
The Cabinet Mission left India on 29 June 1946, but before leaving told the Congress and the League that the ‘June 16 Plan’ was dead; and that in view of both having accepted the May 16 Plan, a new way forward would be attempted shortly.
Sir BN Rau, a Raj official, called privately on Patel around 20 June 1946. Patel realised that ‘May 16 Plan’ had to be accepted, even with its flaws, if June 16 Plan’ was to be rejected, for it was the only
see below), so that the situation descending into a chaos could be controlled, and the Muslim League shown its place. When Jinnah realised he would be left out in the cold, he hurried to ensure the Muslim League too joined the Interim Government.
July 1946: Nehru’s Monumental Blunder Thanks to Gandhi, Nehru had become the President of the Congress at the end of April 1946, and hence the would be first PM. Nehru did a blunder at the very start of his Presidency. After the AICC ratification of the CWC’s acceptance of the ‘May 16 Cabinet Mission Plan’ on 25 June 1946, Nehru remarked at the AICC on 7 July 1946: “…We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly… When India is free, India will do just what she likes…”{Mak/83}
At a press conference in Mumbai 3 days later on 10 July 1946, he declared that the Congress would be “completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise”{Azad/164), and that the central government was likely to be much stronger than what the Cabinet Mission envisaged.”
Nehru also emphasised that the Congress regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best.{Azad/165} How could Nehru talk of unilaterally changing what was mutually agreed upon by the Congress, the Muslim League, and the British? What then was the sanctity of the agreement? Nehru then made controversial remarks on the grouping proposed in the May 16 Plan.
As it was, Jinnah was under severe pressure from his colleagues and supporters for having accepted the May 16 Plan’, and thus giving up on an independent Islamic State of Pakistan. Nehru’s statement gave Jinnah an excuse to repudiate his earlier acceptance of the Plan, and demand a separate state of Pakistan.
Nehru’s indiscretion (remarks quoted above) put paid to the scheme of united India, precipitated Jinnah’s call for Pakistan, and resulted in the AIML’s ghastly Direct Action (Riots) in Calcutta. Patel was aghast both by Nehru’s blunder, and by Jinnah’s momentous decision. Patel wrote to DP Mishra:
“Though President [Nehru) has been elected for the fourth time, he often acts with childlike innocence, which puts us all in great difficulties quite unexpectedly. You have good reason to be angry but we must not allow our anger to get the better of ourselves… He has done many things recently which have caused us great embarrassment. His action in Kashmir, his interference in Sikh election to the Constituent Assembly, his Press conference immediately after the AICC are all acts of emotional insanity and it puts tremendous strain on us to set
matters right…”{Mak/86} Maulana Azad called Nehru’s act “one of those unfortunate events which change the course of history.”{Azad/164} Wrote Maulana Azad, who had always favoured Nehru over Patel, in his autobiography:
“… Taking all facts into consideration, it seemed to me that Jawaharlal should be the new
“….Taking all facts into consideration, it seemed to me that Jawaharlal should be the new President [of Congress in 1946–and hence PM]. Accordingly, on 26 April 1946, I issues a statement proposing his name for Presidentship… [Then] I acted according to my best judgement but the way things have shaped since then has made me to realise that this was perhaps the greatest blunder of my political life… My second mistake was that when I decided not to stand myself, I did not support Sardar Patel. We differed on many issues but I am convinced that if he had succeeded me as Congress President he would have seen that the Cabinet Mission Plan was successfully implemented. He would have never committed the mistake of Jawaharlal which gave Mr. Jinnah an opportunity of sabotaging the Plan. I can never forgive myself when I think that if I had not committed these mistakes, perhaps the
history of the last ten years would have been different.”{Azad/162} Maulana Azad also wrote:
“… The Working Committee (CWC] accordingly met on 8 August (1946] and reviewed the whole situation. I pointed out that if we wanted to save the situation, we must make it clear that the statement of the Congress President [Nehru) at the Bombay Press Conference [on 10 July 1946: pl. see above] was his personal opinion… Jawaharlal argued that he had no objection… but felt that it would be embarrassing to the organisation and also to him
personally…”{Azad/1663 The Congress tried its best to back-track on Nehru’s statement, and issued statements reassuring its commitment on May 16 Plan’. But, the deed was done. Jinnah had got the excuse and the opportunity he wanted. Perhaps Jinnah also believed that Nehru’s statement exposed the real mind and intention of the Congress.
However, it was not as if Nehru’s views were wrong (many others too held similar views), but what was expected of a senior leader was discretion: when to speak what, and when to keep quiet.
Aug-1946: Muslim League’s Direct Action (Riots) Jinnah and the AIML, who were actually averse to the Cabinet Mission Plan because they wanted a sovereign Pakistan, but had reluctantly gone along, got a golden opportunity thanks to Nehru’s faux pas (pl. see above), and exploited it to the hilt. Jinnah contended with the British that Nehru’s remarks amounted to “a complete repudiation” of ‘May 16 Plan’, and therefore he expected the British government to invite him, rather than the Congress, to form a government. In the absence of any action in that respect from the British government, the Muslim League Council met at Bombay during 27-30 July 1946. Jinnah took the extreme step: he got the Muslim League to revoke its acceptance of the ‘May 16 Plan’, and gave a sinister call for the launch of “direct action to achieve Pakistan”. Asking the qaum to observe 16 August 1946 as Direct Action Day, Jinnah said on 30 July 1946:
“Today we bid goodbye to constitutional methods. Throughout, the British and the Congress
unfortunate statement that the Congress would be free to modify the Cabinet Mission Plan
reopened the whole question of political and communal settlement…”{Azad/170} It was unfortunate that innocent Hindus paid too heavy a price through numerous communal riots since 1919 for the imagined and doomed Hindu-Muslim unity and the Muslim-appeasement policies of Gandhi and Nehru, and for the self-defeating Gandhian non-violence.
non-cooperation. Today we have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it… We will
have either a divided India, or a destroyed India.”{BK/250) The date 16 August 1946 was cleverly chosen. It was a Friday in the month of Ramzan, on which the Muslims were likely to gather in large numbers in mosques. Handbills exhorted:
“Let Muslims brave the rains and all difficulties and make the Direct Action Day meeting a
historic mass mobilization of the Millat.” Instigated another:
“Muslims must remember that it was in Ramazan that the Quran was revealed. It was in
Ramazan that the permission for jihad was granted by Allah.”{PF/253} This is from a pamphlet written by SM Usman, the then Mayor of Calcutta:
“…By the grace of God, we are crores in India but through bad luck we have become slaves of Hindus and the British. We are starting a Jihad in your name in this very month of Ramzan… Give your helping hand in all our actions-make us victorious over the Kaffirs-enable us to establish the kingdom of Islam in India… by the grace of God may we build up in India the
greatest Islamic kingdom in the world…”{Mak/110} HS Suhrawardy, the then Premier of Bengal, also held the portfolio of Law & Order. He transferred Hindu police officers from all key posts prior to 16 August, and ensured that while 22 of the 24 police stations had Muslims as in-charge, the remaining 2 had Anglo-Indians. Further, to mobilise large Muslim crowds, he declared 16 August as a public holiday. Goondas and bad characters were mobilised by the AIML from within the city and outside to create trouble. While Muslim leaders gave provocative speeches on 16 August, Suhrawardy crossed all norms for a Premier and told the gathered mammoth crowd that he had seen to it that the police and military would not interfere… Suhrawardy even usurped the charge of the Police Control Room on 16 August. He made sure that any Muslim arrested for rioting was released immediately! However, after the initial heavy set back and casualties, once the Hindus and Sikhs began to hit back causing counter damage, something the AIML had not reckoned, Suhrawardy promptly called in the army. {Mak/111-15}
The cumulative result of all the above was the Calcutta Carnage, the Great Calcutta Killings, the worst communal riot instigated by the Muslim League, that left 5,000 to 10,000 dead, 15,000 injured, and about one lakh homeless! Like Dyer, the butcher of Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of 1919, Suhrawardy came to be known as ‘the butcher of Bengal and the butcher of Calcutta’. {Swal} Wrote Maulana Azad:
“Sixteen August 1946 was a black day not only for Calcutta but for the whole of India…. This was one of the greatest tragedies of Indian history and I have to say with the deepest of regret that a large part of the responsibility for this development rests with Jawaharlal. His unfortunate statement that the Congress would be free to modify the Cabinet Mission Plan
Sep-1946: Interim Government Nehru, who had since (most undemocratically) become the Congress President (thanks to Gandhi’s grossly unethical partiality-pl. see above), was invited by Viceroy Wavell on 12 August 1946 to form an Interim Government. It was formed on 2 September 1946. It comprised 7 Congressmen (Nehru, Sardar Patel, Rajaji, Rajendra Prasad, Sarat Chandra Bose, Jagjivan Ram and Asaf Ali), 2 non-Congress Muslims (Shafaat Ahmad Khan and Ali Zaheer), and 3 from other minorities (Baldev Singh, John Mathai and CH Bhabha). Nehru kept the External Affairs ministry, while Sardar headed Home and Information & Broadcasting.
15-Oct-1946: AIML joins Interim Govt Rather than acting against the Muslim League for their repudiation of the Cabinet Mission Plan, followed by their Direct Action Day of 16 August 1946, and inciting the ghastly Calcutta Communal Carnage, Viceroy Wavell invited the Muslim League to join the Interim Government at the Centre. The Muslim League, keen to get into power, joined the Interim Government on 15 October 1946.
Upon League’s entry Sarat Chandra Bose, Shafaat Ahmad Khan and Ali Zaheer left the ministry; and five Muslim League members became ministers, which included Liaqat Ali as Finance Minister, and Jogendra Nath Mandal, a Scheduled Caste Hindu from Bengal (perhaps in revenge of the Congress retaining a Muslim, Asaf Ali).
With the joining of the League, trouble started, and the government’s functioning was badly hampered. Indeed, the very purpose of Jinnah for the Muslim League to join the government was to “wreck it from within”! A League nominee in the government, Ghaznafar Ali Khan frankly admitted: “We are going into the Interim Government to get a foothold to fight for our cherished goal of Pakistan… The Interim Government is one of the fronts of Direct Action campaign.”{Jal/227)
Sardar Patel had prophetically remarked to Wavell as early as on 12 June 1946: “Jinnah would only use his position in the Interim Government for purely communal and disruptive purposes and to break up India”. {BK2/84}
Refused Home Portfolio by Patel, the League snatched Finance, a critical portfolio, and made Liaqat Ali its head. Nehru did the blunder of giving the Finance portfolio to Liaqat Ali. Liaqat made full misuse of his portfolio to choke finance to the Congress ministries, and tighten the screws on the industrialists
defence units across the country to save innocents, considering the recurrence of such cases? Leadership is not mere talking. It has a responsibility for the safety of people. Gandhi’s advocacy of non-violent resistance to violence was not only absurd, irrational, and illogical; it was actually a case of shirking leadership responsibilities.
The Congress Ministers found to their dismay that they could not even appoint a peon without an approval from the Finance Ministry headed by Liaqat Ali. Ministries and departments controlled by the League became like Muslim jagirs, so much so that it was as if every Muslim officer had become a guard of the League. The aim of the Muslim League, encouraged and aided by the British, was to achieve Pakistan by sabotaging the government from inside, and by Direct Action (riots), disorder, and chaos outside. They succeeded. Nehru, Patel, and other Congress Ministers realised it was not possible to run a government with the Muslim League, and the sooner they got rid of them the better. Perhaps the only way to do so was Partition and Pakistan, which is what the Muslim League and the British had conspired for.
Dec-1946: Developments on Groupings The British government invited Viceroy Wavell, Nehru, Patel, Jinnah, Liaquat and Baldev Singh for talks in London in December 1946 to resolve issues related to groupings. Patel declined to go, judging well the intentions of the British. But, Nehru went, even though Patel asked him not to go.
Oct-1946: Noakhali Anti-Hindu Riots The Muslim League’s Direct Action (anti-Hindu attacks) in Calcutta from 16 August 1946 onwards was extended to Noakhali district in the Chittagong Division in East Bengal in October 1946. The Muslim community perpetrated a series of massacres, rapes, abductions and forced conversions of Hindus, desecration of temples, and looting and arson of Hindu properties in October-November 1946. The carnage came to be known as the Noakhali genocide.
What happened in Noakhali was far worse than the Calcutta carnage that preceded it! About 5000 Hindus were killed, hundreds of Hindu women were raped, thousands of Hindu men and women were forcibly converted to Islam, and about 75,000 survivors had to be sheltered in temporary relief camps, even as about 50,000 Hindus remained marooned in the affected areas under the cruel Muslim surveillance, needing permits from the Muslim leaders. Even Jiziya, the Muslim protection tax for Dhimmis, was levied on Hindus.
Gandhi camped in Noakhali for about four months to restore peace and communal amity. But, he failed. Despite the hard facts of Muslim atrocities and carnage, and their practised tradition of bestial attitude against non-Muslims (Kaffirs) for over a millennia; and what they themselves claimed to be religionsanctioned intolerance towards non-Muslims, and spate of evidence during Gandhi’s own life-time, Gandhi failed to grasp the nature of Islam as it was practised.
Muslim League leader AK Fazlul Huq, addressing a rally in February 1947, claimed that Gandhi’s presence in Noakhali had harmed Islam enormously, and had created Hindu-Muslim bitterness. Rather than feeling ashamed of their acts, the Muslims resented Gandhi’s stay in Noakhali, and gradually their opposition to Gandhi assumed vulgar forms, like they began to dirty the route Gandhi would take. A goat that Gandhi had brought along with him was stolen by Muslims-they killed, and ate it.
Gandhi himself admitted later that the situation in Noakhali was such the Hindus should either leave or perish! The question is what did the Congress as an organisation, and Gandhi as its top leader do for over three decades that they couldn’t even raise capable, well-organised, well-funded, and well-equipped selfdefence units across the country to save innocents, considering the recurrence of such cases? Leadership is
HMG declared there on 6 December 1946 what the Muslim League wanted: Section-C, that is Bengal, could vote Assam into a Muslim Group even if Assam wished to keep out; and that NWFP and Sind could be compelled to join the group dominated by Punjab! That was contrary to the interpretation of the Congress.
In the AICC meeting on 5 January 1947, the members from Assam insisted on the Congress keeping its pledge of ensuring that Assam was not forced into Group-C. They took strong exception to the two major unwise acts of Nehru that adversely affected the position of Assam: (1)Contrary to the official Congress statement of 16 May 1946, Nehru had agreed to the provinces going into groups (also called ‘sections’) in a broadcast on 2 September 1946 upon becoming Vice-President in the Interim Government. (2) Ignoring wise counsel, Nehru went to London in December 1946, and indirectly became party to the negative statement of the HMG of 6 December 1946.
Sensing this ominous possibility of Assam being absorbed into East-Pakistan, Gopinath Bordoloi opposed Assam being clubbed into Group-C, contrary to what Nehru had agreed to. With Nehru remaining unamenable, Bordoloi started mass agitation. He fought the Muslim League’s effort to include Assam and other parts of the Northeast Region (NER) in East Pakistan.
The Congress Party at the national level, led by Nehru, would have acquiesced to the Muslim League had it not been for a revolt by Bordoloi, backed by the Assam unit of the Congress Party.
{6}
Timelines of the Partition Process
Dec-1946: VP Menon Plan VP Menon had outlined to Patel in late December 1946 a scheme of partition, transfer of power and Dominion Status to which Patel had responded positively. Partition was to save India from civil war; while the Dominion Status would ensure the British cooperation in smooth transfer of power, particularly with the military under their command.
Feb-1947: Attlee’s “Quit India” Deadline Declaration On 20 February 1947 the British PM Clement Attlee announced that Britain would quit India by June 1948. He also announced: “HMG will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India, or in some areas to the existing provincial governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people.”
The hint was for partition and Pakistan. Former Secretary of State of India, Samuel John Gurney Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood, commented that Attlee’s declaration was an “unconditional surrender, at the expense of many to whom we have given specific pledges for generations past, which would lead to a division of India under the worst possible circumstances” and that it would “imperil the peace and prosperity of India”. {VPM2/340/L-6446}
While Patel maintained his discreet silence on Attlee’s declaration, intriguingly, Nehru termed it as “wise and courageous”{SG2/337), even though it was an invitation to anarchy and chaos, as became apparent very soon.
Mountbatten on 1 April 1947:
Dissolution of Interim Government then headed by Nehru. Inviting Jinnah to take over. Allowing Jinnah to form a cabinet of his choice. If Jinnah ran the government in India’s interest, the Congress would continue to cooperate with him, and not use its majority to thwart him. Who would decide if Jinnah was running the government in India’s interest? Not Congress or Gandhi, but Mountbatten! Further, Jinnah could continue to advocate Pakistan
-but peacefully!! Absurd proposal! But, that was Mahatma. Who gave authority to Gandhi to condemn the majority to the mercy of the minority, and the Muslim League. What were the credentials of Jinnah and the Muslim League that they could be entrusted with the fate of the majority? Why would Mountbatten decide whether or not Jinnah was running the government in India’s interest? Was Mountbatten an impartial observer? Didn’t he represent India’s tormentors of two centuries? Wasn’t Gandhi aware that Mountbatten was there to safeguard and advance the interests of Britain, and not of India? Even assuming Mountbatten was an impartial observer, was he competent to determine what really was in the interest of India? Even if he were both impartial and competent, how long was he to remain in India to act as a referee? What sort of self-respect was it if those “fighting” for India’s freedom were to depend upon a representative of the power from whom they were seeking freedom to act as a referee and adjudicate what was in India’s interest?
Taken aback by Gandhi’s extraordinary proposal, Mountbatten sought Gandhi’s permission to discuss the proposal with Nehru and Maulana Azad in confidence. Gandhi agreed. Mountbatten didn’t include Patel with Nehru and Azad. He knew Patel would dismiss it as a fantastic nonsense.
Gandhi repeated his proposal to Mountbatten the next day on 2 April 1947. Mountbatten told him he was interested in the proposal when Gandhi asked him specifically if he supported it. Gandhi advised Mountbatten he would try to persuade the Congress to accept it, and would tour India for support.
Shortly after the above meeting, Mountbatten met Maulana Azad, who not only expressed his approval for Gandhi’s proposal, but was enthusiastic about it, and encouraged Mountbatten to get Jinnah to accept it. Maulana Azad generally used to be in favour of anything that gave more weightage and power to Muslims.
Having favoured Nehru undemocratically-overriding the 80% support of the PCCs for Patel—with the post of PM, Gandhi had expected to bring Nehru to his side. Gandhi should have known that a person like Nehru who unabashedly demanded to be anointed PM most undemocratically-not a single PCC had voted in his favour-for the sake of power could not be expected to yield his position to Jinnah. Although Mountbatten deployed people to talk to Nehru to dissuade him from accepting Gandhi’s plan should he be so persuaded, the same was really not necessary.
Curiously, Mountbatten never discussed Gandhi’s plan with the person Gandhi wanted to hand over
22 March 1947: Mountbatten Arrives Lord Mountbatten, the new Viceroy, arrived in India on 22 March 1947 and took charge two days later. In the course of his first speech, he said that his was not a normal viceroyalty. The British Government were resolved to transfer power by June 1948 and a solution had to be found in a few months’ time.
April 1947: Gandhi’s PM Offer for Jinnah To explore the possibility of averting partition, Gandhi had made the following proposal to Mountbatten
When shown, VP Menon had expressed his disapproval for the plan. Menon was against giving initial independence to the provinces or to their groups. A patriot, he had even stated that if the plan was accepted, he would resign.
Nehru’s reaction to the plan was fortunately negative. Nehru opined the plan would adversely affect Central Authority, provoke civil conflict and unrest, and would give a fillip to the Balkanisation of India, resulting in multiple Ulsters. Having assured London he would bring Nehru over to his side on the plan (What was the source of his confidence?), Mountbatten faced deep embarrassment. With his buoyancy punctured, Mountbatten desperately looked for a face saver.
power to: Jinnah. In a meeting, Mountbatten had only indirectly mentioned his wish of seeing Jinnah as PM, something about which Jinnah showed keen eagerness; but Mountbatten did not deliberate on the matter further.
Gandhi & Co failed to appreciate the simple fact that Mountbatten was no do-gooder for India, he was HMG’s representative, and HMG had a vested interest in the partition of India. No wonder Mountbatten would have exerted his all to ensure Gandhi’s scheme never succeeded.
It makes one’s heart sink, and leaves a bad taste in one’s mouth, to find that our top freedom fighters were not really fighters, but pleaders with their adversaries, and dependent on their “good-will”, their “fairness”, their “sense of justice”, their commitment to what was good for India”, and their “empathy” to deliver us in one-piece, and in good shape, from their clutches!
As expected, Patel had firmly opposed the plan. Patel hated Muslim appeasement. Being a wise and practical person, Patel also knew that given the embittered and surcharged atmosphere there was no way Hindus would tolerate or suffer Muslim rule.
On the evening of 10 April 1947. Nehru, Patel and many members of the CWC met Gandhi and told him they were opposed to his plan. Only Badshah Ghaffar Khan supported Gandhi. On 11 April 1947 Gandhi advised Mountbatten of his defeat vis-à-vis the plan, and left Delhi. Rajaji noted in his diary entry on 13 April 1947: “Gandhiji’s ill-conceived plan of solving the present difficulties was objected to by everybody and scotched.”{RG3/270}
One wonders why Gandhi didn’t fast-unto-death to prevent partition, if he indeed so desired. Was it because even if he had fasted Jinnah would not have bothered? Were his past fasts, like for the Poona Pact, devised only to browbeat the weak? Or, where the same would be non-risky? He could fast-untodeath to force the Indian government and Patel to part with rupees 55 crores to Pakistan after independence, knowing they would succumb to save his life; but not to prevent creation of Pakistan.
10 May 1947: Patel & Partition, the Lesser Evil Patel realised that governing India along with the Muslim League would be a nightmare. To placate the Muslim League, Sir Norman Smith had offered a wild solution: 7 seats in the Council to the League against 6 of the Congress! Patel had responded to Smith: “If you think that generosity will placate the Muslim Oliver Twist then you do not understand either the Muslim mind or the situation.”{RG/387} Patel had stated to Sir Richard Stafford Cripps on 15 December 1946:
“If strong action had been taken or allowed to be taken, when Direct Action Day was fixed by the Muslim League, all this colossal loss of life and property and the blood-curling events would not have happened. The Viceroy took the contrary view and every action of his since the Great Calcutta Killing has been in the direction of encouraging the Muslim League and
putting pressure on us towards appeasement.”{RG2/L-6664} Having experienced the machinations of the Muslim League in the Interim Government, Sardar Patel rightly concluded it was not possible to govern the country jointly with the Muslim League then or in future. He realised the inevitability of the Partition around December 1946, and was perhaps the first tall Congress leader to do so, apart from CR (Rajaji), who had expressed such a possibility long ago. It took Congress another six months to reach the same conclusion.
VP Menon had outlined to Patel in late December 1946 a scheme of partition, transfer of power and Dominion Status to which Patel had responded positively. Partition was to save India from civil war; while the Dominion Status would ensure the British cooperation in smooth transfer of power, particularly with the military under their command.
May 1947: Mountbatten’s Initial Plan that Failed Just over a month into his job, Mountbatten prepared a plan for Britain to quit India, and sent it to London with Ismay and Abell on 2 May 1947. He moved to Shimla in summer, and invited Nehru there with a view to get him on his side. On 10 May 1947 Mountbatten received back his plan from London, revised and approved. Full of hope and enthusiasm, Mountbatten showed the plan to Nehru.
The outline of the plan was to transfer power to the provinces or groups of provinces for an interim period, who would then decide whether to join India or Pakistan or remain independent. Some kind of central authority would be formed to deal with overall defence. Members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and Punjab would decide whether or not to partition their respective provinces. The plan also envisaged holding re-election in NWFP.
Concluding there would not be peace in united Punjab, and no place for them, Hindus and Sikhs demanded East Punjab. Seizing the opportunity, and as a rebuff to the League, Patel promptly agreed to the demand for partition of Punjab, and of Bengal, by implication. Other Congress leaders agreed, and on 8 March 1947 the CWC proposed the same. Jinnah and the Muslim League, who had coveted the whole of Punjab and Bengal as part of Pakistan, irretrievably lost East Punjab by their ill-thought violent act. The CWC resolution meant the Congress was ready to yield Pakistan. Earlier, on 4 March 1947, Patel had
written to Jinnah’s close friend K Dwarkadas: “If the League insists on Pakistan, the only alternative is the division of Punjab and Bengal.”{RG/390}
The above initiative for partition taken by Patel, and Patel’s ensuring the necessary resolution was passed as above on 8 March 1947 by the CWC came as a bolt from the blue for Gandhi. Gandhi was not consulted.
Wrote Gandhi to Patel: “Try to explain to me your Punjab resolution if you can. I cannot understand it.”
Responded Patel: “It is difficult to explain to you the resolution on Punjab. It was adopted after the deepest deliberation. Nothing has been done in a hurry, or without a full thought. That you have expressed your views against it, we learnt from the papers. But you are, of course, entitled to say what you feel right.”{BK2/80}
consider Sardar Patel as our leader”{RG/400); Sarojini Naidu had stated that Sardar Patel was “the man of decision and the man of action in our counsels”{RG/400}. It was Sardar who convinced the rest on the wisdom of partition.
The CWC ratified Patel and Nehru’s acceptance of the partition plan on 2 June 1947 by 157 votes to 27, with 32 remaining neutral. Sardar Patel delivered a key note address at the CWC as under:
“I fully appreciate the fears of our brothers from [the Muslim-majority areas]. Nobody likes the division of India and my heart is heavy. But the choice is between one division and many divisions. We must face facts, cannot give in to emotionalism and sentimentality. The Working Committee has not acted out of fear. But I am afraid that all our toil and hard work of these many years might go waste and prove unfruitful. My nine months in office have completely disillusioned me regarding the supposed merits of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Except for a few honourable exceptions, Muslim officials from top to bottom are working for the League. The communal veto given to the League in the mission plan would have blocked India’s progress at every stage. Whether or not we like it, de facto Pakistan already exists in Punjab and Bengal. Under the circumstances I would prefer a de jure Pakistan which may make the League more responsible. Freedom is coming. We have 75 to 80 % of India, which we can make strong with our genius. The League can develop the rest of the country.”{RG/403}
The resolution indeed was the only answer to Jinnah demanding partition, for it meant he would neither get full Punjab, nor full Bengal, and not Assam either. But for Patel and the resolution he sponsored, the vicious stalemate that had gone on for too long would not have been broken. Patel had firmed up his resolve to get as much territory for India as possible, and to totally frustrate Jinnah’s grand design of a large Pakistan with full Punjab, full Bengal and Assam-Jinnah ultimately got what he himself admitted: “moth-eaten Pakistan”. {RG3/248} Patel had also hoped that confronted with the crumbs of “truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan”, Jinnah might still desist from demanding partition. It was like catching the bull by the horns.
Patel got the above resolution passed also to checkmate Gandhi lest he came up with some harmful appeasement move, or a move of some ‘large-hearted’ surrender.
Patel had grasped that continued resistance to partition and Pakistan would only mean further spread of communal strife and riots, cleavages within even the police force and the army leading to a situation that would have further favoured Jinnah’s and British interests, and might have lead to whole of Group-B and Group-C becoming Pakistan.
Back in the sixteenth century, Tulsi Das had given his pearl of wisdom: “Budh ardh tajain, lukh sarvasa jata”-realising that the whole would go, the wise surrender half.
In the event, India surrendered only one-fourth, and retained three-fourth! Although Pakistan had been claiming the whole of Assam, Bengal and Punjab; India retained the whole of Assam (but for one district), while forcing partition of Bengal and Punjab.
30 May 1947: Patel Refuses East-West Corridor to Jinnah Unlike Nehru, Sardar Patel was very firm in his dealings. Writes Rajmohan Gandhi in his book ‘Patel-A Life’: “Returning from London on the night of May 30, Mountbatten, in his own words, ‘sent V.P.Menon to see Patel to obtain his agreement to six months joint control (with Pakistan] of Calcutta’, which is what Jinnah had been pressing for. The Viceroy recorded Patel’s reply: ‘Not even for six hours! Earlier…Jinnah had demanded an 800-mile ‘corridor’ to link West and East Pakistan. Patel called the claim ‘such fantastic nonsense as not to be taken seriously’. It died a quick and unremembered death.”{RG2}
Sardar Patel was the first prominent Indian leader who agreed to go in for the partition. The initial concurrence for the Partition was on 10 May 1947. It demonstrated his decisiveness, ability to take unpleasant, but necessary decisions, and high order of statesmanship. On 11 May 1947, while Acharya Kripalani confessed, “When we are faced with thorny problems, and Gandhi’s advice is not available, we
June 1947 : VP Menon-Mountbatten Plan VP Menon, the Constitutional Adviser and Political Reforms Commissioner to the Viceroy, came to Mountbatten’s rescue (please see “May 1947: Mountbatten’s Initial Plan that Failed” above), and suggested a way out for the British to transfer power. He gave Mountbatten an outline for transfer of power that he had prepared earlier, but which was not favourably seen by the authorities prior to Mountbatten.
Menon’s scheme, prepared in 1946, envisaged transfer of power by the British to two Central
“I fully appreciate the fears of our brothers from [the Muslim-majority areas). Nobody likes the division of India and my heart is heavy. But the choice is between one division and many divisions. We must face facts, cannot give in to emotionalism and sentimentality. The Working Committee has not acted out of fear. But I am afraid that all our toil and hard work of these many years might go waste and prove unfruitful. My nine months in office have completely disillusioned me regarding the supposed merits of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Except for a few honourable exceptions, Muslim officials from top to bottom are working for the League. The communal veto given to the League in the mission plan would have blocked India’s progress at every stage. Whether or not we like it, de facto Pakistan already exists in Punjab and Bengal. Under the circumstances I would prefer a de jure Pakistan which may make the League more responsible. Freedom is coming. We have 75 to 80 % of India, which we can make strong with our genius. The League can develop the rest of the country.”{RG/403}
During December 1946-January 1947 Menon had discussed the matter with Sardar Patel. Menon had opined that a unitary India under the Cabinet Mission Plan was an illusion; and the proposed 3-tier constitution would be unwieldy and difficult to work. It was better for the country to be divided than gravitate towards civil war. Menon had suggested that the best solution was partition and transfer of power to two central governments based on the Dominion Status; the advantages being (a)avoidance of civil war; (b)peaceful transfer of power; (c)greater likelihood of its acceptance in Britain, particularly by the Conservatives like Churchill on account of the “Dominion Status”, and membership of the two dominions in the Commonwealth; (d)continued services of the British bureaucracy and the British army officers during the transitional period; (e)reassurance to the Princes on continuity, and better possibility of their peaceful merger with either of the two dominions; (f)strong central governments for each of the dominions to guard against centrifugal forces; and (g)facilitation for framing a constitution unhampered by communal and provincial/regional considerations. Sardar Patel had given Menon a positive response.
Mountbatten and Nehru broadly agreed with Menon’s outline of the scheme, and asked him to prepare a draft plan. Knowing that without Patel’s backing the plan would be a non-starter, Menon sent an advance copy of the plan to Patel. Patel’s response was expectedly positive, for the plan had his preapproval. On Nehru’s hang-ups on membership of the Commonwealth as a condition in the plan, Patel assured Nehru that he would take care that the plan was approved by the Congress, provided the other conditions were met. Patel knew the Commonwealth-condition was put to satisfy conservatives like Churchill, and obtain their approval for the passage of the Indian Independence Bill. All that Patel wanted assurance for was that the British parliament pass a bill to grant independence to India, and that the British actually quit within two months; and importantly, while they let the paramountcy for the Indian Princely States lapse, they don’t interfere or take sides on their merger with India.
Jinnah, as usual, did act difficult, and stipulated additional conditions, including the wild one like an 800-mile corridor to link East and West Pakistan; but his tantrums didn’t work, and he had to ultimately agree to what Mountbatten (or rather, VP Menon) had proposed, and what the Congress was agreeable to. Why that change in Jinnah? With their goal (Pakistan) achieved, Jinnah’s mentors in London like Churchill (who had propped him up to get Pakistan as it was in the strategic interests of the British) conveyed to him to not act difficult any more, as he couldn’t get more than what was on offer.
Apprehensive that Gandhi may yet come in the way of the partition plan, Mountbatten personally met Gandhi to explain the position. Gandhi accepted the position.
3 June 1947: Mountbatten Announced the Partition Plan On 3 June 1947, Mountbatten announced the Partition Plan: Power to be relinquished to the two Governments of India and Pakistan on the basis of Dominion Status by 15 August 1947, much earlier than the original date of June 1948. In regard to the Princely States, the plan laid down that the policy of His Majesty’s Government towards the Indian Princely States contained in the Cabinet Mission memorandum of 12 May 1946 would remained unchanged-the British paramountcy would lapse, and their status would revert to what it was before.
On the night of 3 June 1947, Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh on behalf of the Congress, AIML, and Sikhs respectively aired their acceptance of the VP Menon-Mountbatten Partition Plan. Jinnah was not happy with the truncated Pakistan that he was getting, but when Mountbatten firmly told him he could get no more, and that the only alternative was united India, Jinnah agreed. Mountbatten wrote to his mother on 14 June 1947:
“I must stress the importance of Patel in the agreements so far reached. He has a rough exterior and an uncompromising manner… he has never wavered and has stood firm against inner voices and neutral indecisions that have sometimes afflicted his colleagues. Patel’s realism has also been a big factor in the acceptance of the Dominion Status formula.”{ACJ/136/L2430}
2 June 1947 : CWC Ratification of the Partition Plan The CWC ratified Patel and Nehru’s acceptance of the partition plan on 2 June 1947 by 157 votes to 27, with 32 remaining neutral. Sardar Patel delivered a key note address at the CWC as under:
“I fully appreciate the fears of our brothers from [the Muslim-majority areas]. Nobody likes
14 June 1947 AICC Ratifies Partition, backed by Gandhi Although Gandhiji had hang-ups, most of the top leadership of the Congress had realised the inevitability of the Partition. Gandhiji had told the CWC on 2 June 1946 when it took the decision in
an alternative.
Gandhi had earlier commented:
“Today I find myself all alone. Even the Sardar and Jawaharlal think that my reading is wrong and peace is sure to return if partition is agreed upon… They did not like my telling the Viceroy that even if there was to be partition, it should not be through British intervention…
They wonder if I have not deteriorated with age.”{RG/401} Patel had himself admitted:
“For several years, Gandhi and I were in perfect agreement. Mostly we agreed instinctively; but when the time for a big decision on the question of India’s independence came, we differed. I felt that we had to take independence there and then. We had, therefore, to agree to partition. I came to this conclusion after a great deal of heart-searching and with a great deal of sorrow. But I felt that if we did not accept partition, India would be split into many bits and completely ruined.”{ISS1}{NS/90}
Gandhi advised that political realism demanded acceptance of the Mountbatten Plan, and acceptance of the partition-resolution moved by Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant. While 29 voted for the resolution, 15 voted against-notwithstanding Gandhi’s appeal to vote in favour of
the resolution.{Azad/215} A senior leader who stood out against partition, and voted against the Pant resolution, was Purshottamdas Tandon. He stated he was prepared to suffer the British rule a little longer than pay the heavy price of partition. He claimed the Nehru government had been intimidated by the Muslim League. He got a huge applause when at the end of his speech he said: “Let us fight both the British and the [Muslim] League.”{DD/248}
Wrote Maulana Azad:
“…Gandhi’s conversion to the Mountbatten [Partition] Plan had been a cause of surprise and regret to me. He now spoke openly in the Working Committee [CWC] in favour of partition.”{Azad/210}
Gandhi’s role as a guide, or the one with a veto-power, had ended long back. Much earlier when he had expressed his wish to quit, none in the CWC had asked him not to do so. Wrote Durga Das:
“When I met him [Gandhi in 1946], he said there was too much deceit all round and added
that Patel and Rajen Babu (Rajendra Prasad) had ceased to be his ‘yes man’.”{DD/226} But, Gandhi had finally acquiesced to the Partition. Perhaps he also took into account the alternate consequence Patel reportedly talked of:
“It is a question of civil war or partition. As for civil war, no one can say where it will start and where it will end. True, the Hindus might win in the end but only after paying an
unpredictable and huge price.”{RG/401} Indeed, the Muslim League call for Pakistan and partition could only have been resisted if the Congress was prepared for a strong, sustained retaliatory violence, and a long drawn-out communal strife in cities, towns and villages. However, that was apparently beyond the Congress leadership brought up on Gandhian non-violence. The Congress leadership was incapable of American style civil war. If Netaji Subhas had been there, one could have thought about it.
Aug-1947: Partition Boundaries & Radcliffe Award Initially, a Partition Committee chaired by Lord Mountbatten was formed comprising two members each from the INC and the AIML–Sardar Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Liaqat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab Nishtar. It was replaced by a Partition Council comprising Sardar Patel and Dr. Rajendra Prasad from the INC (with C. Rajagopalachari as an alternate member), and Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan from the AIML (with Abdur Rab Nishtar as alternate member), with Lord Mountbatten as the Chairman.
The above Partition Council created two Boundary Commissions, one for partitioning Punjab, and the other for Bengal. At the suggestion of Jinnah in the Partition Council, Cyril John Radcliffe (1899-1977), a British lawyer, was charged with the Chairmanship of the two Boundary Commissions. Radcliffe had never visited India, and had expressed no opinions about it. His name was unanimously accepted. Each Boundary Commissions had four high court judges as members, two nominated by the INC, and two by the AIML. The members of the Bengal Boundary Commission were Justices CC Biswas, BK Mukerji, Abu Saleh Mahomed Akram and SA Rahman; while the members of the Punjab Boundary Commission were Justices Mehr Chand Mahajan, Teja Singh, Din Mahomed and Muhammad Munir.{VPM2/Loc-7550)
Radcliffe reached New Delhi on 8 July 1947, and he and the members of the Boundary Commissions had about five weeks to draw up the boundaries. As the work progressed, the members differed on boundaries, and could not reach unanimity. It was then left to the Chairman Radcliffe to take the final call where differences among the members persisted.(VPM2/Loc-7565}
Radcliffe was ready with his award by 9 August 1947; but, Mountbatten chose to announce it only on 17 August 1947. Why? For details, please check below under the subchapter ‘Gross Mismanagement by
It is also worth noting that the Hindus and Sikhs of East Punjab and the Hindus of West Bengal had openly demanded partition. Gandhiji had himself admitted in his prayer meeting on 10 June 1947 that as “non-Muslim India is overwhelmingly in favour of partition”, he could not coerce public opinion.”{RG/401}
The AICC met on 14 June 1947 to consider and ratify the CWC decision in favour of partition. There were voices against the partition. When Nehru and Patel failed to persuade some members, Gandhi intervened and appealed to members to support the CWC and its decision for partition, in the absence of an alternative.
{7}
Diabolical League-British Design
Groupings, Partition & Pakistan
Mountbatten’. Wrote VP Menon:
“The Congress had claimed for West Bengal about fifty-nine per cent of the area and forty-six per cent of the population of the province. Under the Radcliffe award, only thirty-six per cent of the area and thirty-five per cent of the population were assigned to West Bengal. Of the total Muslim population of Bengal only sixteen per cent came under West Bengal, while as many as forty-two per cent of non-Muslims remained in East Bengal. The non-Muslims of Bengal complained that the area of West Bengal under the award, as compared with that in the notional division, had shrunk by about 4,000 square miles; they protested against the transfer to East Bengal of Khulna and the Chittagong Hill Tracts and deplored the absence of any link between Darjeeling and the rest of West Bengal. The Muslims, on the other hand, deplored the loss of Calcutta, Murshidabad, and part of Nadia district.”{VPM2/Loc-7568} “About thirty-eight per cent of the area and forty-five per cent of the population were assigned to East Punjab. West Punjab, on the other hand, obtained under the award about sixty-two per cent of the area and Fifty-five per cent of the population, together with a major percentage of the income of the old province. The non-Muslims of the Punjab, especially the Sikhs, bitterly resented the loss of Lahore and the canal colonies of Sheikhupura, Lyallpur and Montgomery, while the Muslims protested against the retention of the Mandi hydroelectric project by East Punjab and the severance of certain tehsils from the notional West Punjab.”{VPM2/Loc-7581}
The British and the Muslim League had started working in tandem to ensure partition and Pakistan, and to make as large a Pakistan as possible-as per the “16 May 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan” groupings, where Group-B (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan), combined with Group-C (Assam and Bengal) could form Pakistan; leaving just Group-A (Madras, UP, Central provinces, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa) for India.
The achievement of the same required practical proof on the ground that Muslims and Hindus could live together, and that Muslims dominated those provinces. That required violence and riots-Jinnah and the Muslim League were willing to invest on that; and the British were willing to look the other way when that happened. Gandhians were for non-violence, and hence for non-retaliation. That suited both the adversaries-the Muslim League and the British-tremendously.
Ghaznafar Ali of the Muslim League had stated: “Mohammad Bin Qasim and Mahmud of Ghazni invaded India with armies composed of only a few thousands, and yet were able to overpower lakhs of Hindus. God willing, a few lakhs of Muslims will yet overwhelm crores of Hindus.”
Jinnah’s Absurd ‘Logic’
Neither India nor Pakistan was happy with the Radcliffe Award, but Mountbatten had secured an agreement from both of them on 22 July 1947 that they would accept the Award, whatever it might be. Radcliffe had himself written three days earlier:
“Nobody in India will love me for my award about the Punjab and Bengal, and there will be roughly 80 million people with a grievance who will begin looking for me. I do not want them to find me.” He left by plane for London on 17 August 1947, and burnt all his papers relating to the partition. (Tunz/248}
14-15 August 1947 14 August 1947: Pakistan Independence Day. 15 August 1947: Indian Independence Day.
On one hand Jinnah had been arguing for and justifying Pakistan on the plea that Hindus and Muslims formed two nations, and that they couldn’t live together; while on the other hand he wanted the whole of Group-B (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan) and Group-C (Assam and Bengal) provinces to form Pakistan; leaving just Group-A (Madras, UP, Central provinces, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa) for India. If Hindus and Muslims formed two nations, and they could not live together, as Jinnah argued, why would Hindu-majority Assam go to form Pakistan; and how were Hindus to live with Muslims in undivided Punjab and Bengal?
When the question of partition of Bengal and Punjab rose, Jinnah pleaded with Mountbatten “not to destroy the unity of Bengal and Punjab, which had national characteristics in common: common history, common ways of life, common language, and where Hindus have stronger feelings as Bengalis
irony that his logic also went against the logic of Pakistan!
Mountbatten promptly pointed out the contradictions in Jinnah’s argument, telling him that if his (Jinnah’s) logic were to be accepted there could be no case for Pakistan too!“I am afraid I drove the old gentleman quite mad,” reported Mountbatten jovially, “because whichever way his argument went I always pursued it to a stage beyond which he did not wish it to go.”{Tunz/182-3}
wavel rerused saying it was not necessary!
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1892–1963), the then premier of Bengal, who had been responsible for the Calcutta Killings of 1946, was desperate to avoid any partition of Bengal, for he had ambition to head Group-C, Bengal plus Assam, as a separate nation. He had the backing of Jinnah, and of the British Governor, and had also secured the backing of the Congress Leaders, Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Ray, who desired an undivided Bengal. Kiran Shankar Ray was from East Bengal, and was leader of the Congress in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. Suhrawardy even proceeded to threaten those who supported division, and stated that “Calcutta will be sacked and burnt in case the partition idea is favoured.”{Das/113}
Bengal
Jinnah and Muslim League’s diabolical design behind the Calcutta riots was to somehow make Calcutta a Muslim-majority city, and ensure its inclusion in Pakistan. The idea was to force exodus of Hindus out of Calcutta, trigger counter-riots against Muslims in Bihar, and thus force migration of Muslims out of Bihar, and into Calcutta, increasing its Muslim population.
Given such a situation, Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and KC Neogy beseeched Sardar Patel: “…all our eyes are turned towards you in the hope that you will not fail to take whatever action is possible to save Bengal and Calcutta from utter ruin and bloodshed.”{DD2/39}
Patel responded: “Bengal cannot be isolated from the Indian Union. Talk of the idea of a sovereign republic of independent Bengal is a trap to induce the unwary and unwise to enter into the parlour of the Muslim League. The Congress Working Committee is fully aware of the situation in Bengal. Bengal has got to be partitioned if the non-Muslim population is to survive.”{DD2/43}
Patel thereafter wrote to both Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Ray. It had the desired effect. Jinnah, rattled by the Congress demand for partition of Bengal and Punjab, called it a “sinister move actuated by spite and bitterness.”{VPM2/355)
Assam
The riots spread to Bihar, UP, Punjab and NWFP. It all suited Jinnah: Hindus and Muslims can’t live together; Pakistan must be granted. The British didn’t bother much to quell the riots. They watched bemused-happy to let the world know what would happen without them. Further, the British had a vested interest in the creation of Pakistan; and they were delighted the ground was being readied for the purpose.
Law and order was a provincial matter, and Bengal was under the majority control of the Muslim League, which, rather than quelling riots, was instigating it. Sardar Patel as Home Minister in the Interim Government asked for central takeover of the areas, but the demand was rejected by Viceroy Wavell. Patel wrote to Viceroy Wavell on 25 October 1946: “It would indeed be a tragic paradox if we who have undertaken the responsibility of the Government of India should be powerless to do anything to terminate the reign of terror.”
The British were blatantly favouring the Muslim League over the Congress. This became further obvious when Viceroy Wavell, who remained blind to the riots in Calcutta and Noakhali in Bengal, promptly sent his Deputy Private Secretary Ian Scott on a mission to enquire into the riots in Bihar, where the Provincial Government was under the Congress. Significantly, Jinnah issued a press-statement on 26 November 1946 in the context of the Bihar riots asking for “Transfer of Population”: transfer of Muslims out of Bihar. Ian Scott conveniently suggested Bengal as the location of the Muslim evacuee camps. The Muslim League and the British administration were working in tandem to ensure Bengal became Pakistan!
Both the British and the Muslim League wanted the riots and chaos to spread across Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and other areas. More the chaos and riots, more the justification for partition and Pakistan. When Patel insisted with Viceroy Wavell for enforcement of Martial Law in disturbed areas, Wavell refused saying it was not necessary!
Among the biggest problems of the Northeast, including Assam, is the problem of the migrants. With the annexation of Assam by the British in 1826, British brought in the peasantry from the over-populated East-Bengal, now Bangladesh, for tea plantation and other purposes. The All India Muslim League (AIML), in order to dominate the predominantly non-Muslim Assam and the Northeast, and make it yet another Muslim-majority region, strategized back in 1906 in its conference at Dacca to somehow increase the Muslim population in Assam, and exhorted the East-Bengal Muslims to migrate and settle in Assam. The fact of large-scale migration was also noted in the Census report of 1931. Strangely, none of these disturbed Gandhi and the Congress leaders.
In 1938 when a Muslim League-headed coalition fell in Assam, Netaji Subhas Bose favoured a bid by the Congress to form a government. Several Congress leaders were opposed to the idea, particularly Maulana Azad. Sardar Patel backed Subhas Bose fully; and finally a Congress ministry led by Gopinath Bordoloi took office. With Bordoloi in office it was hoped that the Muslim migrations would be stemmed,
However, thanks to the unwise move of Nehru and his socialist supporters, the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned in 1939 in protest against the declaration of war (in WW-II) by the British on behalf of India, without consulting the Congress, despite the reluctance and opposite opinion of Patel. This forced Gopinath Bordoloi to also resign in Assam, although Netaji Subhas Bose and Patel were not in favour of such a move. This was God-sent, rather Allah-sent, for the Muslim League. Pro-British Sir Syed Mohammad Saadulla of the Muslim League, from whom Bordoloi had wrested power, again took over. With the Congress in limbo on account of the unwise surrender of power in the provinces thanks to Nehru, followed by its leadership in jails thanks to 1942 Quit India, Saadulla ruled uninterrupted for the next seven years shoring up the Muslim base in Assam and actively encouraging Muslim-migration into Assam, with the tacit support of the British.
Saadulla brought in a Land Settlement Policy in 1941 that allowed immigrants (Muslims) from East Bengal to pour into Assam, and hold as much as 30 bighas for each homestead. He boasted to Liaquat Ali Khan that through his policies he had managed to quadruple the Muslim population in the lower four districts of the Assam Valley.
Accounting for the better Muslim demographic position in Assam, thanks to the efforts both of the British and Saadulla , the initial British Plan of 1946 for the Indian Independence clubbed Assam and Bengal together in Group-C. Such an inclusion would have had the consequence of Assamese being in a minority, to be overruled into ultimately being absorbed in East-Pakistan. Sensing this ominous possibility, Bordoloi opposed being clubbed into Group-C, contrary to what Nehru had agreed to. With Nehru remaining unamenable, Bordoloi started mass agitation. He fought the Muslim League’s effort to include Assam and other parts of the Northeast Region (NER) in East Pakistan. The Congress Party at the national level, led by Nehru, would have acquiesced to the Muslim League had it not been for a revolt by Bordoloi, backed by the Assam unit of the Congress Party and supported by Mahatma Gandhi and the Assamese public.
When we talk of the Northeast we must first pay our tributes to Gopinath Bordoloi but for whom Assam and the Northeast may not have been part of India.
Notwithstanding the Muslim migration background, and its adverse effects on the Northeast prior to independence, the Congress and the Central Government under Nehru remained most irresponsibly ostrich-like after independence, and allowed the demographic invasion from East-Pakistan to continue. Why? It was a cheap way to win elections through Muslim votes. In due course, this became a major source of ethnic bitterness and tension. The ongoing Bodo-Bangladeshi Muslim clash is an offshoot of this bitterness.
Here are extracts from an article titled ‘How Bangladeshi Muslims wiped the Assamese out in their own land'{URL40}
“After partition, the Assamese people expected that there would not be any further transmigration of Muslims from East Pakistan to their new political territory. Muslim populations in Assam considerably decreased in 1947 partly due to inclusion of Sylhet in Pakistan and also return of sizeable number of earlier immigrants to their original land due to fear of backlash. But the situation changed, when Mainul Haq Chaudhary, the Private Secretary of Jinnah and also a prominent leader of the youth wing of AIML till partition, joined Congress party along with the supporters of Pakistan en-mass. On the eve of partition, he was shaky whether to opt for Pakistan or stay back in India. He was however told by Jinnah, ‘wait for ten years, I shall present Assam on a silver plate to you’. Jinnah died in 1948 but the Congress Party fulfilled his promise by inducting Chaudhary in the Cabinet of Congress Government led by Gopi Nath Bordoloi. It is often alleged that Chaudhary stayed back in Assam on the advice of Jinnah and other Pakistani leaders to help the immigrants from Pakistan for their settlement in Assam… “…he successive governments in Pakistan pursued the twin policy of squeezing out the Hindus and infiltrating the Muslims to settle down in Assam and other bordering states in India… “Against the evil geo-political design of Pakistan, which scared the Assamese middle class of the threat to their marginalisation in their own land, Government of India never had any organised plan or definite policy. Nehru-Liaquat Pact (April 1950)… rather facilitated the Pakistan Government to accelerate infiltration… It is said that the Congress leadership applauded the increase of Muslim immigrants as a God sent opportunity to consolidate the ‘Muslim vote banks’ and accordingly ruled Assam without any break for thirty years… “Moinul Huq Choudhury, who later became a Minister in the Union Cabinet of Indira Gandhi Government and former President of India Fakharuddin Ali Ahmad were widely known for being instrumental in the settlement of illegal Muslim immigrants. Late B.K. Nehru, the Governor of Assam between 1968 and 1973, condemned the infiltration as vote bank politics
People often do not appreciate that one of the reasons that a state like Assam is in India today is due to the courageous stand of Gopinath Bordoloi, the first Chief Minister of Assam, who fought the Muslim League’s effort to include Assam and other parts of the North-East Region (NER) in Congress Party at the national level, led by Nehru, would have acquiesced to the Muslim League had it not been for a revolt by Bordoloi, backed by the Assam unit of the Congress Party and supported by Mahatma Gandhi and the Assamese public.
-Sanjoy Hazarika, “Writing on the wall”{SH/11}
Congress leaders Bordoloi, Medhi, Bimala Prasad Chaliha and others raised this serious issue of migration, but did not get due support from Nehru and the Congress leadership at the Centre.
Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’:
“The state subsequently paid the price…when illegal migration from the then East Pakistan reduced the Assamese-speaking population in Assam to a minority… It was not Chaliha who initiated the issue of illegal migration but his senior in the Congress, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, who rose to be India’s president. In fact, the entire party was guilty. Its simplistic solution was to win elections in Assam by allowing would-be settlers from across the border into the state thus creating a vote bank… [Gobind Ballabh]Pant [the then Home Minister in Nehru’s cabinet] knew that large number of people were coming across the border. After all, his party
had connived at the migration since independence…”{KN} The problems of the Northeast have their roots in the Nehruvian era on account of faulty understanding of the issues, distorted world view, defective grasp of national security interests, and the faulty policies and remedies that flowed from them. Nehru, thanks to his unwise policies, managed to make all our international borders and the regions in the border areas sensitive and insecure, costing us a fortune to maintain them. Nehru could have and should have put in place a reliable and robust mechanism to plug the migrations from East-Pakistan after Independence; but he remained casual and indifferent-winning elections was a priority.
With the gradually changing demography in West Bengal, Assam, Northeast, and elsewhere, thanks to the Congress, the CPM and the TMC, India is creating huge difficulties for itself.
in riots, rapes, killings and mayhem for over a month, the police fired upon the Hindu-Sikh mobs demonstrating in protest.
The Chief Minister of Punjab Khizr Hyat Khan Tiwana of the Unionist Party, who had arrested many Muslim Leaguers for riots and for spreading communal virus in 1946, suggesting to Bhim Sen Sachar, his Finance Minister and leader of the Congress Legislative Party, that Hindus and Sikhs must start a counter-agitation to teach the Muslim Leaguers a lesson, so that the government has enough grounds and gets an opportunity for coming down heavily on the Muslim League goons. Expectedly, Bhim Sen Sachar, wedded to the Gandhian non-violence, expressed his inability in the matter. Pendrel Moon was told by Sikandar Hyat Khan of the Unionist Party as long back as in 1937 that “Pakistan would mean a massacre.”
Patel’s appeal to Viceroy Wavell to act against the rioters fell on deaf ears. Even though Patel was the Home Minister, he lacked jurisdiction to act in Punjab or Bengal, as the law and order was a state subject. Mountbatten soon had a taste of Patel’s forthrightness when he told him what he had earlier told Wavell, and was deliberately ignored: “If you will not act yourself, then turn over the full authority to the Central Government and let us stop the Muslim League war in Punjab and the NWFP; let us stop the Muslim League army being mobilised in Bengal to attack Assam; let us govern.”
Eventually, Sikhs and Hindus also formed their private armies for self-defence.
Sindh
Punjab
Attlee’s announcement on 20 February 1947 of quitting India by June 1948 led to uncertainty in Punjab. Barely days after–from 2 March 1947-cadres of the Muslim League at the provocation of its leaders began to hoist League flag over government buildings and demonstrating against the Punjab Premier Khizr Hyat Khan of the Unionist Party (ruling Punjab in coalition with the Congress) who was seen as inimical to the interests of the Muslims and the Muslim League.
The Muslim League unleashed Calcutta-type Direct Action in several cities in Punjab. Riots started. Markets in Lahore and Amritsar were set ablaze. League-provoked mobs of several thousand equipped with guns, and led by demobilised (after the World War-II) Muslim soldiers, attacked defenceless Hindus and Sikhs in cities, towns and villages, particularly in West Punjab, and perpetrated unspeakable atrocities on men, women and children. Thousands were killed. Significantly, while little action was taken against the Muslim mobs, and the Muslim League agitators, who had been spreading chaos and indulging in riots, rapes, killings and mayhem for over a month, the police fired upon the Hindu-Sikh mobs demonstrating
Brutal Islamisation of the Hindu Citadel Sindh is the home of the oldest civilization in the world,the Indus or Sindhu Valley Civilization, highlighted by the excavations at Mohenjo-daro. It dates back to over 7000 BCE. The 3,180 km long Indus or Sindhu River that originates near Lake Mansarovar in the Tibetan Plateau runs through Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan, Western Punjab in Pakistan, and merges into the Arabian Sea near the port city of Karachi in Sindh. Sindhu means water in Sanskrit. Name India is derived from Indus. Sindhu river has a number of tributaries: Its left bank tributaries are Zanskar in Ladakh, and Chenab in the plains, which in turn has four major tributaries, namely, Jhelum, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej; and its major right bank tributaries are Shyok, Gilgit, Kabul, Gomal and Kurram. The Indus delta (current Pakistan) is mentioned in the Rig-Veda as Sapta Sindhu (Hapta Hindu in the Iranian Zend Avesta), meaning ‘seven rivers’.
Aryans were indigenous to India, and hence to Sindh. The Aryan-Invasion Theory has long since been conclusively debunked. Genetic studies also prove it. Aryan-Dravidian divide was also a deliberate myth floated by the colonists to serve their divide-and-rule and proselytization strategy.
Sindh was part of the empire of Dashrath (father of Shri Ram) during the second Vedic period. After Shri Ram returned from vanvas defeating Ravana, and became king, he gave the responsibility to his
(east: Sindh province surrounded it from three sides). To its east was Rajasthan, and Gujarat was to its south.
As per the last census of 1931 before independence, Sindh’s population was about 4.1 million people, of which 73% were Muslims, 26% were Hindus, and the remaining 1% were Christians, Sikhs, etc.
Hindus were concentrated in urban areas, while Muslims dominated the countryside. Hindus were in absolute majority in four of Sindh’s five largest cities (for example, Hyderabad was 70% Hindu), the exception being Karachi which was about 48% Muslim, 46% Hindu, and the remaining 6% non-Muslims belonged to other religions—there also Muslims were not in absolute majority.
Four sub-districts to the southeast-Umarkot, Nagar Parkar, Mithi, and Chachro-adjoining India had Hindu majority of 57%. Several nearby sub-districts too had about 40-45% Hindu population.
goes the credit of building the cities of Peshawar and Taxila.
Sindh was in good hands till the reign of Harshavardhana who ruled India and Sindh during 606-647 CE, after which it went into weaker hands. Buddhism, which vigorously taught non-violence, and which had its presence in Sindh, too contributed to weakening its defence capabilities. There were several hundred Buddhist Sanghas in Sindh at the time, and many thousand Buddhist monks.
There were 15 attempted invasions of Sindh both from land and from sea between 638 CE and 711 CE, but all were repulsed. Mohammed Bin Qasim finally managed to plunder Sindh in 712 CE. He first attacked Debal, a temple town near sea, in April 712 CE, won it, and then proceeded to defeat the then king of Sindh, Dahir, which he did on 16 June 712 CE. Qasim and his army plundered the riches of Dahir’s territories, and carted away the booty to the court of Hajjaj in Baghdad. Many women were abducted to Baghdad. All males over 17 years who refused to convert to Islam were killed. But, finding there were too many Hindus to kill, they were granted Dhimmi status upon regular payment of Jizya tax.
There is an interesting tale on the death of Mohammed Bin Qasim. As per Chachnama, the Sindhi chronicle of the times, Qasim had sent the two daughters of King Dahir as presents to the Khalifa for his harem. To avenge their father’s death by Qasim, the daughters lied to the Khalifa that Qasim had violated them before sending them. Enraged, the Khalifa ordered that Qasim be wrapped and stitched in oxen hides, and brought to Syria. That resulted in his death from suffocation. Upon discovering the sisters’ subterfuge, the Khalifa then ordered that the sisters be buried alive in a wall.
Here is a telling statement from Ram Jethmalani in his foreword to the book ‘The Sindh Story’ by KR Malkani:
“The rest of the Indians across the borders of Sindh were doubtless aware of the Arab conquest. It produced not a ripple on the quiet waters of their placid existence. Life went on as usual for them. There was neither a sense of territorial loss of a fellow Hindu King, nor an understanding of the nature of the new (Islamic) menace. The conquest of Sindh was dismissed as one more dacoity. Afflicted by a debilitating pacifism, corroded by the idea of non-violence, Indians seemed to have left it to professional soldiers to fight the invaders. The rest of the neighbouring people lifted not one finger to defend the Hindu homeland. Invaders who thirsted for the tremendous wealth of India and its delicate and beautiful women, never met with the resistance that the nation could have generated.”
Why was Sindh not Partitioned? Looking to the overall position, Sindh could have been partitioned to give space to the Hindu Sindhis. Southeast Sindh, plus certain adjoining areas to compensate for Hindu Sindhis leaving other parts of Sindh, could have been Hindu or Indian Sindh.
But, nothing of the sort was done for the Hindu Sindhis. They were deprived of their homeland of thousands of years. They became the new Jews, although their history and homeland was several thousand years older than those of the Jews and Israel.
Why that injustice? Why Gandhi, Nehru, Patel and other Indian leaders did little for them?
One argument is that the Thar Desert formed a natural boundary between India and Pakistan, and Sindh fell beyond the Thar Desert. That’s a reasonable argument if India-Pakistan partition was done taking the natural boundaries into account. But, that was not the case. Where was the natural boundary between the East Punjab that became part of India, and the West Punjab that went to Pakistan-allowing drug pedlars and terrorists to cross into India from Pakistan. Or, that between the East Bengal (Pakistan, now Bangladesh) and West Bengal (India), that has allowed Bangladeshi refugees to inundate India. Or, that between J&K and Pakistan and POK, that allows terrorists from Pakistan to filter through. If Punjab, Bengal, and J&K could do without a natural border, why not Sindh? Why shouldn’t there have been a Hindu or Indian Sindh?
Another argument is that this kind of partition could not have been done in all regions. Otherwise, why not earmarked areas say in UP for Muslims? There are several reasons for this. There was NO Muslimmajority district then in UP. Partition was restricted to border areas, and not anywhere within India or within Pakistan. Sindh fell in the border area. Initially, the concept of Pakistan was restricted ONLY to northwest India-it did not even include East Bengal.
When the Muslim League proposed Sindh as one of the components of their future Pakistan in the
Pre-Independence Population and Geography Sindh came under the British in 1843, and was included as a part of the Bombay Presidency. At the time of partition Sindh was a British India province. It was bordered by Baluchistan and West Punjab (to the north), and by the Princely States of Bahawalpur (northeast), Las Bela (west), Kalat (west), and Khairpur (east: Sindh province surrounded it from three sides). To its east was Rajasthan, and Gujarat was to its
leave, especially after the influx of the Muslim refugees (Mohajirs) who started looting their (Hindu Sindhis) properties and evicting them from their homes. By June 1948, about a million Hindu Sindhis had left Pakistan for India. Migrations continued thereafter, and tapered off in 1951.
Although Hindu Sindhis were deprived of their homeland, cultural identity, businesses, land, shops, properties, residential quarters-making beggars out of prosperous families-no one batted an eyelid, not the UN, or a Human Rights Organisation, or the US, or the UK, or the Pakistanis with whom they had stayed for centuries, or even the Indians! They became like the Jews of the past (before Israel was created in 1948), or the Tibetans of the 1950s, or the Kashmiri Pandits of 1990s, or the Kurds and the Yezidis of the current times.
1930s and later, or when the Groupings (Group-A, B, C) were proposed, Indian leaders and Hindu Sindhis should have objected to the inclusion of whole of Sindh as a Muslim-majority area in Pakistan. They didn’t.
However, the real reason nothing was done to retain a part of the homeland for them, like it was done for the Punjabis and Bengalis, seems to be that unlike the Sikhs or the Hindu Bengalis, the Hindu Sindhis did not fight for it. Hindus of Sindh were generally not aggressive or bellicose like the minority nonMuslims in Punjab. The world at large is too cruel and indifferent to the plight of any given section of people unless they themselves fight and sacrifice for their rights. Jews suffered for centuries till they asserted themselves with the creation of Israel. Tibetans, with their non-violent Buddhism, have been deprived of their nation. Yezidis and Kurds, who have been at the receiving end for centuries, are now fighting back. On account of their cultured past of thousands of years, and their engagement in businesses, the Hindu Sindhis had been too peaceful to resist, agitate and fight.
Yet, something was expected from the India leadership of Gandhi & Co, in whom the Sindhis had reposed their faith. All one can say is that perhaps the nature of our freedom movement and the quality and competence of our national leaders left a lot to be desired. Sadly, Gandhi-Nehru & Co suffered from inherently defective world-view, thinking and vision, and were too poor as strategists, tacticians and implementers on the ground to be able to outsmart the British or the Muslim League, or stand up to their designs-not just with regard to Sindh, but in all other matters too! Sardar Patel had that genius, but Gandhi-Nehru combine often overlooked him, or did not allow him a free hand.
Looking to sub-regional Hindu-Muslim ratio of Sindh, the Congress could have carved out part of Sindh for the Hindus. Considering that the Muslim League had secured only 46% of the votes in Sindh, and the nationalist Muslims had polled three votes for every four polled by the League, the Congress could have insisted for a plebiscite in regions with Hindu dominance. However, the Congress seemed to have abandoned Sindh as ‘a far off place’, like Chamberlain had abandoned Czechoslovakia to Hitler in 1938 on the pretext that it was ‘a far off country about which we know little’.
India was a poor country, and thanks to Nehruvian economic policies, it remained a poor country. There was little that Nehruvian India offered to the hapless Hindu Sindhi refugees, who had lost everything. They were condemned to their miserable fate, and dumped in outer areas of several cities and towns, without any worthwhile help or facilities.
Yet, one has to salute the spirit and hard work of the Hindu Sindhi community which without any governmental help gradually stood on its own feet, and became prosperous.
If the Indian leaders, that is, Gandhi & Co, had followed the Ambedkar-suggested model (detailed elsewhere in this book) of partition, and peaceful population and property exchange, not only would the Hindu Sindhi community have been adequately compensated for the loss of their assets in Pakistan, they would not have suffered violence and deprivation.
Congress without an Answer, thanks to ‘Non-Violence’
Nehru declined Khairpur offer Khairpur was a Princely State adjoining India on the east, and surrounded on the other three sides by Sindh. Its Mir had offered to Nehru its merger with India. But, the offer was declined by Nehru, and India sent their accession papers back to them! Had the offer been accepted, Khairpur plus the adjoining Hindumajority area could have been Hindu or Indian Sindh.
Sadly, the Congress had to depend upon the state power; and had to be at its mercy; because their impractical and nonsensical Gandhian non-violence—that did little else than make a “Mahatma” out of one person at the cost of grave insecurity to millions-not only prevented them from mobilising, training and arming Hindu and Sikh masses to defend themselves from the Muslim League and Muslim goons, but allowed the Muslim League to freely use violence to implement their nefarious agenda.
Thanks to Gandhi and the Gandhian non-violent methods, the Congress had no answer to the gundas of the Muslim League. Indeed, the Congress had done nothing-criminally nothing-to protect the innocents, whether Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs, during the riots. They had NO answer against the Muslim League storm troopers and the rioting Muslim mobs.
The tame Congress remedy was Gandhi undertaking long tours of Noakhali and surrounding areas to try and reason with the Muslims, and give courage to the Hindus. Effectively, it did little to lessen the woes of the Hindus.
Making Jews of Hindu Sindhis At the time of independence there were about 1.4 million (accounting for the increase in population since the 1931 census) Hindu Sindhis, most of whom, to save themselves from the violence, decided to
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Patel’s call at the Meerut session of the Congress in November 1946 that “the sword will be met with the sword” didn’t do anything to awaken the Gandhians to rise up to the challenge of the Muslim League and Muslim goons. Pacifist Gandhi and Nehru, with their deficit grasp of the Islamic ways, Islamic history, Indian history, and Muslim mind, and their consequent distorted world-view, had no answer to the suffering of Hindus and Sikhs, and even of affected Muslims.
Partition of Assets
Left to Sardar Patel, with his advocacy of “meeting the sword with the sword”, Jinnah and the Muslim League would have received so strong a rebuff that they would have regretted their strong-arm methods; but the non-violent votaries like Gandhi and Nehru came in the way. Patel believed that the Muslim League would come to its senses only when it realised through the Congress-Hindu-Sikh retaliation that violence was a game “at which both parties can play”{Das/105).
In that sense Patel’s problems were really Gandhi, Nehru and Azad who came in the way. In May 1946, following his interview with Sardar Patel, Wavell had recorded: “He was, to begin with, uncompromisingly hostile to any settlement, except on the basis of complete Hindu supremacy [Congress supremacy: the British equated the Congress with Hindu), and said that they were bound to have it out with the Muslims [Muslim League] sooner or later, and that it was better to have a conflict now and get it over… he is always likely to be on the side of direct action and, if necessary, violence.”
Muslim-majority provinces Punjab, Bengal, Sind and NWFP were NOT in the sway of Jinnah or the Muslim League. The Muslim leadership in those provinces had their own standing, and they ruled in collaboration with the Hindu leadership there. The Muslim League systematically started creating trouble in each of those Muslim-majority provinces to discredit the Muslim leadership there that differed with Jinnah, provoked communal riots, and vitiated the atmosphere so as to pave way for Pakistan. The British turned a blind eye, for they too wanted Pakistan to serve their strategic interests.
Among the many shocking episodes was that of the Chief Minister of Punjab Khizr Hyat Khan Tiwana of the Unionist Party, who had arrested many Muslim Leaguers for riots and for spreading communal virus, suggesting to Bhim Sen Sachar, his Finance Minister and leader of the Congress Legislative Party, that Hindus and Sikhs must start a counter-agitation to teach the Muslim Leaguers a lesson, so that the government had enough grounds and got an opportunity for coming down heavily on the Muslim League goons. Expectedly, the Gandhian Bhim Sen Sachar, wedded to non-violence, expressed his inability in the matter.
Gandhi’s non-violence not only put the lives of millions of Hindus and Sikhs at grave risk, but also proved counter-productive from the national angle as it opened the way for the Muslim League to resort to violence and riots to achieve their goal of partition and Pakistan.
Geographical partition was not the only partition. There had to be partition and equitable distribution of cash in treasuries, bank balances, records and archives, railways, institutes, printing presses, hospitals, army, government employees, and so on-a formidable task, with potential for massive controversies and disagreements. Formidable tasks requires formidable people. Sardar Patel was the natural choice to head the task for India. Heaviest burdens fell on him. And, tasks that others did not dare to touch, like the integration of the Princely States, were left to him to tackle.
The two main officials were HM Patel for India, and Chaudhary Muhammad Ali for Pakistan. They were overall in-charge, and guided ten expert committees looking into various division of assets and liabilities. What the expert committees could not resolve went to HM Patel and Chaudhary Muhammad Ali; what they, in turn, could not settle went to a Partition Council. The Partition Council comprised Sardar Patel and Rajendra Prasad, with Rajaji as alternate member. Pakistan was represented by MA Jinnah and Liaqat Ali, with Abdur Rab Nishtar as an alternate member.
The Partition Council held a number of meetings till 15 August 1947 to divide the assets. However, the work was so massive it continued till December 1947.
Despite Sardar Patel’s other critical engagements, particularly related to integration of the Princely States, and massive work relating to law and order and refugees, he was a regular at each meeting, and kept a hawk’s eye on its working and decisions. The reports of the Partition Council, including those of its expert committees, fill thirteen volumes! HM Patels words on Sardar Patel and his leadership of the Partition Council:
“…farsightedness, generosity and breadth of mind… [Sardar Patel] made himself available for consultation at all hours… It was he who made decisions on behalf of India… With an almost unerring instinct he knew precisely what the right course was, and it can be said that we have gone wrong only where we somehow succeeded in persuading him against his own
instinctive view.” The Pakistan side was much impressed by Patel, his positive attitude, and his decisiveness. At the concluding session of the Partition Council, Abdur Rab Nishtar voiced his admiration for the constructive approach and statesmanship of Patel, and went to the extent of saying that the Pakistani Ministers would continue to look upon him as their elder brother!
55 crores to Pakistan & the Kashmir Issue
kowtowing to Mountbatten and Gandhi was a priority, rather than standing up for the Cabinet decision, of which he was a part. People like Sardar Patel were out of place in such a scenario.
Gandhi went on a fast to force the issue (one of the reasons, and not the only one, for the fast) in his favour. Patel yielded, Gandhi won, and India lost.
India and Pakistan had agreed in November 1947 that Rupees 55 crores remained to be transferred to Pakistan, as its share of the assets of undivided India.
However, at the insistence of Patel, India informed Pakistan, within two hours of the agreement, that the actual implementation of the agreement would hinge on a settlement on Kashmir. Said Patel: “In the division of assets we treated Pakistan generously. But we cannot tolerate even a pie being spent for making bullets to be shot at us. The settlement of assets is like a consent decree. The decree will be executed when all the outstanding points are satisfactorily settled.”
Pakistan had been pressing India for rupees 55 crores. In the Cabinet meeting in January 1948 Patel stated that the money if given would surely be used by Pakistan to arm itself for use in Kashmir, hence the payment should be delayed. Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, NV Gadgil and Dr BR Ambedkar backed Patel. Nehru too expressed his total agreement. The Cabinet therefore decided to withhold the money. Patel told in a Press Conference on 12 January 1948 that the issue of 55 crores could not be dissociated from the other related issues.
Gandhi conveyed to Patel the next day (13 January 1948) that withholding 55 crores from Pakistan was what Mountbatten had opined to him as “a dishonourable act… unstatesman-like and unwise”, and what he [Gandhi] thought was immoral. Gandhi was apparently innocent of the fact that Mountbatten and the British were bent upon favouring Pakistan-even on Kashmir, despite their aggression. How could a top leader be so blind to the realities?
Patel was furious and asked of Mountbatten: “How can you as a constitutional Governor-General do this behind my back? Do you know the facts?…”
Unfortunately, Nehru, rather than supporting Patel, and sticking to what he had himself fully agreed to, and had got passed in the Cabinet, went back on his commitment, and commented to Gandhi: “Yes, it was passed but we don’t have a case. It is legal quibbling.”
Gandhi and Nehru, rather than being prudent about what was in the best interest of the nation, went by what the British colonial representative Mountbatten, having his own axe to grind, had to say, and the Cabinet decision was reversed to let Pakistan have the money, and trouble India further in J&K! Going by the net results, effectively, it appears that for Gandhi maintaining “Brand Mahatma”, and its associated “morality”, was more important than the national interests.
Why didn’t Gandhi and Mountbatten consider the immorality of Pakistan in attacking Kashmir which had already acceded to India? If Pakistan had agreed to desist from its illegal action in Kashmir, it would have got the money anyway. Further, Gandhi wanted to look good in the eyes of the Muslims in Pakistan and India. Ignore national interest for the sake of appeasement, and your own image! And for Nehru,
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Hurried, Irresponsible Partition
therefore their strategy was that “brute force or overwhelming fear would drive non-Muslims to leave their ancestral homes in Bengal and the Punjab to make room for incoming Muslims.”{Moon/69}
Earlier, Pendrel Moon was told by Sikandar Hyat Khan of the Unionist Party that governed Punjab as long back as in 1937 that “Pakistan would mean a massacre.”{Moon/29}
It is worth noting that Jinnah ultimately got only that (truncated) Pakistan in 1947 that Rajaji had proposed over 5 years back in April 1942 under the CR’s Formula (contemptuously rejected by Jinnah), and which was re-offered by Gandhi to Jinnah in a modified form in September 1944. Had Jinnah accepted the CR’s Formula then, most likely the partition would have been far less violent.
Partition Mayhem
Partition caused sudden displacement of about 14 million Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, and loss of their properties; and murder and slaughter of an estimated one to three million: there are no definite figures, an exercise for a proper count was never carried out! Wrote Patrick French:
“The number of people killed during the creation of independent India and Pakistan has never been established. It was in the interest of the governments of Attlee, Jinnah and Nehru to play down the scale of the massacres, since they all bore a measure of responsibility for what had happened. …As Marn Singh, an eye specialist [a victim of Punjab partition)… remembered: ‘Personally I believe it was the fault of politicians, who were keen for power, especially that Mr Jinnah, who hoped to gain a nation without even damaging the crease of
his trousers, like some lord of England.””{PF/348, 351} Trains carrying refugees from either side were looted, and passengers were slaughtered. There was mass dishonouring, brutality and rapes.
Jinnah’s silence was taken as tacit approval for the orgy of violence by Muslims. Firoz Khan Noon, a former member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council and a British stooge, called upon Muslims to outshine Genghis Khan and Halaku, saying:
“The havoc which they will cause will put to shame what Genghis Khan and Halaku did. “{RZ/109)
Unplanned & Mismanaged Partition
Joint Culpability Once the partition was agreed upon in principle by all the concerned and contending parties, it should have been carried out in a well thought-out, planned and professional manner. That responsibility lay principally with the British, and particularly with the Viceroy Mountbatten. Of course, the responsibility also lay with the Congress, the Muslim League, and the other political parties and organisations, and their leaders. Sadly, everyone failed the people.
That provoked arson, murder, loot, and rape and abduction of women on a frightening scale in West Punjab, leading JA Scott, the British DIG of Police in Rawalpindi, to state:
ld never believe that such barbarous acts as were committed on innocent people in rural areas of Rawalpindi district could be possible in Punjab. “{Bali/18} Punjab Government Home Secretary, AA MacDonald claimed it was all pre-planned: mobs of a few thousand led by demobilised army men, armed with sten-guns and bren-guns, attacked defenceless Hindus and Sikhs. Pendrel Moon, a senior British bureaucrat in Punjab, claimed the Muslim leadership thought the strong, sturdy, virile Sikhs in Central Punjab would be stumbling blocks to their plan; and
British Culpability &
Mountbatten’s Gross Mismanagement For such a hugely major operation like partition of a country, and creation of a new country, no blue print was prepared, no planning was done either to ensure security and safety of people and their property, or to provide for their rehabilitation. It was just hurriedly and haphazardly put through, exposing millions to grave risk.
The bitter, unfortunate truth was that having decided to quit India, the Raj didn’t really care. They had already decided to withdraw British troops from active service and repatriate them before the transfer of power. The British were too much in a hurry to get out. If they could be here for about two centuries to exploit and oppress, why not a few months more to secure Indians, as a compensation? But, Mountbatten and the British were least bothered about the Indians. They maintained only limited British troops to secure the left-over British. Having decided to leave, the Raj had no longer any vested interest in risking British lives. If Hindus and Muslims indulged in killing, looting and raping each other, so be it! Would demonstrate all the more how things would degenerate without them! British colonialism was a hugely cruel, greedy, selfish project.
It was he who fooled Nehru and messed up the Kashmir issue for India in multiple ways, including its reference to the UN. He was playing the same trick with Hyderabad and Junagadh, but Sardar Patel put his foot down, and did not allow either Nehru or Mountbatten to mess up.
Mountbatten was widely (and rightly) held responsible for his gross mismanagement resulting in the horrifying scale of the partition mayhem. Nehru had adopted Mountbatten as his guru and guide. Reflects much on Nehru’s competence and his judgement of people.
Winston Churchill had accused Mountbatten of killing two million Indians!{AA/12} Mountbatten’s critic Andrew Roberts had commented: “Mountbatten deserved to be court-martialled on his return to London.”[Tunz/252}
Why the British who had managed law and order covering millions for many, many decades in India failed at this critical juncture? Accusing the Raj of dereliction of duty, Sardar bitterly complained to Mountbatten: “The British had little difficulty when it was a question of putting down Indian freedom movements.” Nehru and Patel demanded martial law.
Couldn’t partition have been managed better? Why the blame has been put on general public on either side, and their inhumanity? Why those responsible—the leaders on either side-have not been singled out and made accountable? How could Mountbatten, the main person responsible, escape the blame, and lord it out? Why was compensation not demanded from the British, the actual party responsible?
If what is described below was possible, why thousands were allowed to be brutalised and slaughtered? It is from “Empires of the Indus” by Alice Albinia{AA/15):
“In 1947, Hameeda Akhtar Husain Raipuri was a young mother… She came to Karachi at Partition with her family from Aligarh… As the wife of a civil servant in the Education Ministry, Hameeda’s introduction to Karachi was comparatively orderly. The train that brought her from Delhi was one of the first to be attacked; but it was full of government employees, and thus was well defended by the army. ‘A gentleman was waiting at the station at Karachi with the keys to our flat in Napier Barracks, she says, ‘another was holding out a ration card.’ So the family settled into their new country, full of hope…”
That is, had all trains been well-guarded, like in the above case, thousands of deaths, loot and rapes could have been easily avoided. Similarly, had proper planning been done, and had a bigger and stronger military, para-military, police or armed volunteer force deployed well in advance, with political leaders, social workers and volunteers to assist them, most of the other tragedies could also have been avoided.
Instead of doing the above, Mountbatten and his British staff had done the opposite-they had ensured that all the British troops were withdrawn before the partition. This is what Sir Evan Meredith Jenkins, the last governor of the Punjab, had advised Mountbatten (who too was of similar opinion): “I think it will be wise to avoid postponing the relief (withdrawal] of British troops for too long. It would be awkward if trouble on a large scale started while the relief was in progress. My own advice would therefore be to make the change before the end of July (1947].”{Wolp3/165}
Much is made of Mountbatten, but he had been a failure in most of his past assignments. He belonged to navy, and in the Admiralty he was long known as the “Master of Disaster”{Tunz/156},
He was reckless and a show-off, and the Raj thought he might be the right person to ensure fastest possible exit for the British, who were getting desperate to quit. No wonder with his coming into the viceroyalty the original date of the British departure of June 1948, which itself was considered too tight and ambitious, was preponed to 15 August 1947. True to his “competence” and recklessness, little proper security arrangements were ensured resulting in the uncontrolled partition mayhem.
After the partition and its tragedy, there had been three assassination attempts on Jinnah by the aggrieved victims. Jinnah was so rattled he had remarked that the person most responsible for the disaster of partition was Dickie Mountbatten.Tunz/301} Wrote Maulana Azad:
“I also asked Lord Mountbatten to take into consideration the likely consequences of the partition of the country. Even without partition there were riots in Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar, Bombay and Punjab… If the country was divided in such an atmosphere there would be rivers of blood flowing in different parts of the country and the British would be responsible for such carnage… Without a moment’s hesitation Lord Mountbatten replied, ‘At least on this question I shall give you complete assurance. I shall see to it that there is no bloodshed or riot. I am a soldier, not a civilian. Once partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue orders to see that there are no communal disturbances… If there should be slightest agitation, I shall adopt measures to nip the trouble in the bud… I shall order the Army and the Air Force to act
and use tanks and aeroplanes to suppress anybody who wants to create trouble.”'{Azad/207} Wrote Durga Das: “I concluded my report by stating that Mountbatten had hurried through with partition without making sure that the Boundary Force would be able to maintain peace.”{DD/264}
Wrote Alex Tunzelmann in another context: “…Churchill and Mountbatten shared another trait: their love of the grand gesture, untampered by concern for human lives.”{Tunz/115}
Mountbatten was well aware that terrible disturbances would occur once the Radcliffe Award on boundaries would be announced. Radcliffe had submitted his Award well before 14 August 1947–on 9 August. But, Mountbatten didn’t announce it. Why? For any disturbances before 14/15 August 1947 the British would be held responsible, but if the announcement was made after 15 August 1947, the two new dominions of India and Pakistan and their governments would get the blame. So, postpone announcement. He announced it only on 17 August 1947. He didn’t care that earlier announcement (say on 8 August itself) would have given sufficient time to people on the two sides of the border to shift to
their new country, and save their lives. Mountbatten was only concerned with shirking the responsibility, and letting the blame fall on the two new dominions.
Nehru-Liaquat Pact 1950
Mountbatten had asked his staff on 9 August 1947 “whether it would in fact be desirable to publish it (the Radcliffe Award) straight away,” since “without question, the earlier it was published, the more the British would have to bear the responsibility for the disturbances which would undoubtedly result.”{Wolp3/166)
Indian Leaders’ Culpability The British ensured security for their own people and families while quitting India as fast as possible; even as both the real and the so-called freedom fighters hurried to occupy bungalows in Lutyens Delhi, and in the state capitals and civil lines; while the millions uprooted were left to get looted, raped, murdered, or to somehow save their lives, and fend for themselves.
Nehru had grandly declared: “I would rather have every village in India go up in flames than keep a single British soldier in India a moment longer than necessary.” But, if Nehru was happy having the highest post of the Governor General (till June 1948), and the highest posts in the Army with the British after independence, why not the soldiers to save poor citizens?
Further, why shouldn’t Mountbatten, Nehru, and the Congress have planned for augmenting the strength of the police and army by induction of Indians. Well-trained returning INA soldiers were readily available. But, the British and the Congress (especially Nehru) bias against anything remotely related to Netaji came in the way!
The point, however, is why the Indian and the Pakistani leaders, whose people were to be so frightfully affected, failed to read the writing on the wall? That terrible things were bound to happen should have been very well known to them after what happened on the ‘Direct Action Day in Calcutta in August 1946, in Noakhali in East Bengal, and in Bihar, and in scores of other places down the decades, including the most horrible Moplah Rebellion of 1920s in Malabar, Kerala, where Muslims butchered Hindus! So the leaders, including Gandhi, Jinnah, Patel, Nehru and others, had little reason to be smug. Weren’t they well aware of history of Hindu-Muslim riots? Weren’t they aware that what actually happened was bound to happen if they didn’t take sufficient care? What precaution and care did they take? Can they escape the blame-be they Gandhi, Nehru, Patel or Jinnah?
If things had been planned well and foreseen, there could have been an agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League for a well-designed protocol for smooth and orderly transfer of population (Ambedkar had suggested something similar many years back), as per the wishes of the concerned families and groups. Further, if the time was deemed too short to make adequate preparation for smooth transfer of power to the two domains, partition/independence could have been delayed by a month or so. Where was the tearing hurry?
With indescribable atrocities against Hindus in East Bengal going unabated, the Gol made an appeal to Pakistan to call a halt on the same. But, there was little response. It is worth noting in this connection that Gandhian non-violent principles yielded NOTHING. It was only tit-for-tat that brought Pakistan to the negotiating table.
In Rajlakshmi Debi’s Bangla novel Kamal-lata, quoted by Tathagata Roy in his book ‘My People, Uprooted: A Saga of the Hindus of Eastern Bengal (Chapter 6), there is a conversation described between a Hindu from Mymensingh town and a Muslim from a Calcutta suburb sometime just after partition. In the process of haggling the Muslim says “Excuse me, but your position and ours are not the same. So long as Mahatma Gandhi is alive we have no fears. But you won’t be able to live here [East Bengal] much longer.”
There was a marked difference between Punjab and Bengal in respect of the partition. In Punjab, the carnage was on both sides, East Punjab and West Punjab, although more in the Muslim-dominated West Punjab. In Bengal, the mayhem was mostly in the Muslim-dominated East Bengal. In Punjab, the migration was both ways: Muslims migrating from East Punjab in India to Pakistan, and Hindus migrating from Pakistan to East Punjab in India. In a way, there was a population transfer between West Punjab and East Punjab. In Bengal, the predominant migration was that of Hindus from East Bengal (Pakistan) to West Bengal (India). There was a reverse migration of Muslims too, but comparatively far less.
However, the continued violence against the Hindus in East Bengal had begun provoking retaliation in West Bengal. For example, the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah turned serious from 26 March 1950 onwards, leading to the beginning of migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal by March 1950. That is, the population transfer that had happened in Punjab in 1947-48 began to happen in Bengal belatedly by March 1950. It is this which alarmed Pakistan and the Muslim League leaders, who had hitherto been inciting the mobs in East Bengal, and were happy at Hindus being at the receiving end.
It was only when the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah, in retaliation of the on-going carnage in East Bengal, took a serious turn from 26 March 1950 onwards that the Pakistan PM Liaquat Ali made his first conciliatory gesture in a speech at Karachi on 29 March 1950, and expressed his intention to travel to New Delhi on 2 April 1950 to work out a solution with Nehru.
Liaquat Ali hurried to New Delhi on 2 April 1950, and signed the Nehru-Liaquat Pact, also called the Delhi Pact, on 8 April 1950. It provided for safety of refugees when they returned to dispose of their property; return of abducted women and looted property; derecognition of forced conversions; complete and equal right of citizenship and security of life and properties to minorities; and setting up of Minority Commission in each country.
As expected, while India firmly implemented the Pact, not Pakistan. While the anti-Muslim violence in West Bengal was put down with a firm hand, and the migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal ceased; the violence against the Hindus in East Bengal continued unabated, so also the migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. That is, the carnage became only one-sided: that of Hindus in East Bengal. Also, the migration became only one way: Pakistan to India.
Looking to the track-record of the Muslim League leaders, who had themselves been inciting the mobs, Nehru should have known what the result of the pact would be. Sardar Patel was unhappy with the Pact, but being in the cabinet, didn’t oppose it. However, Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and KC Niyogee, the two central ministers from West Bengal, immediately resigned from the Union Cabinet in protest against the Pact.
Rather than facilitating transfer of population between West and East Bengal, and removing forever the problem and the poison, Nehru extracted the following “benefits” for India from the Nehru-Liaquat pact: (1)Checked depletion of Muslim population from West Bengal and Assam by stopping their migration to Pakistan. (2)Increased the population of Muslims in West Bengal and Assam by allowing their reverse migration-allowing Muslims to return who had migrated. (3) Allowed fresh migration of Muslims from East Bengal. (4)Condemned the Hindus in East Bengal (a)to violence, (b)to second-class status, and (c)to remain at the mercy of Muslims. (5)Forced subsequent migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal (as the atrocities did not subside in Pakistan).
“This is what happened in Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. Those, who scoff at the idea of transfer of population, will do well to study the history of the minority problem, as it arose between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. If they do, they will find that these countries found that the only effective way of solving the minorities problem lay in exchange of population. The task undertaken by the three countries was by no means a minor operation. It involved the transfer of some 20 million people from one habitat to another. But undaunted, the three shouldered the task and carried it to a successful end because they felt that the considerations of communal peace must outweigh every other consideration.
“That the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy for communal peace is beyond doubt. If that is so, there is no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims should keep on trading in safeguards which have proved so unsafe. If small countries, with limited resources like Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, were capable of such an undertaking, there is no reason to suppose that what they did cannot be accomplished by Indians. After all, the population involved is inconsiderable and because some obstacles require to be removed, it would be the height of folly to give up so sure a way to communal peace.
“… The question was put to Mr. Rehmat Ali, the protagonist of Pakistan and this is the answer given by him: ‘As to the future, the only effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those safeguards to non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan… [But, what actually happened? Hindus in West and East Pakistan were hounded out. While the Muslim population has sharply increased in India, the Hindu population in Pakistan and Bangladesh has sharply declined.]…”
“… [Solution] is to provide for their transfer from Pakistan to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution and would be ready and willing to consent to Pakistan if it can be shown that an exchange of population is possible. But they regard this as a staggering and a baffling problem. This no doubt is the sign of a panic-stricken mind. If the matter is considered in a cool and calm temper it will be found that the problem is neither staggering nor baffling… Experience shows that it is not a problem which it is impossible to solve…”
Ambedkar then provides in his book a very detailed framework on how to manage population exchange in a systematic manner.
Fortunately for India and future Pakistan, Ambedkar provided a detailed ready-made practical solution several years in advance of the Partition. Had it been followed, the terrible Partition mayhem could have been avoided. What is more the communal problem that still vitiates our body politic would have disappeared. The kind of politics that has been happening in West Bengal, UP, Bihar, and in several other states to pocket Muslim votes at any cost, even at the cost of the nation (by going soft on Muslimfundamentalist terrorism), would have been avoided.
Unfortunately, both the then Indian National Congress leadership and the Muslim League, lacking in vision and foresight, and incapable of dispassionate analysis like that of Ambedkar, ignored Ambedkar’s
Ambedkar’s Sensible Solution: Population Exchange
Ambedkar emphatically asked if Pakistan solved the Communal Question for India. His answer was that with the severance of a large portion of the area with an overwhelming Muslim majority into Pakistan, the problem did diminish drastically, but NOT wholly. Because, it left lakhs of Muslims in India, and lakhs of Hindus in Pakistan. What did Ambedkar propose to meet the vexing problem? Please read below. {Amb3}
Ambedkar: “…Some scoff at the idea of the shifting and exchange of population. But those who scoff can hardly be aware of the complications, which a minority problem gives rise to and the failures attendant upon almost all the efforts made to protect them. The constitutions of the post-war states, as well as of the older states in Europe which had a minority problem, proceeded on the assumption that constitutional safeguards for minorities should suffice for their protection and so the constitutions of most of the new states with majorities and minorities were studded with long lists of fundamental rights and safeguards to see that they were not violated by the majorities. What was the experience? Experience showed that safeguards did not save the minorities. Experience showed that even a ruthless war on the minorities did not solve the problem. The states then agreed that the best way to solve it was for each to exchange its alien minorities within its border, for its own which was without its border, with a view to bring about homogeneous States.
Clueless Gandhians
sane advice. India has been paying a heavy price for ignoring Ambedkar.
Earlier Suggestions of Bhai Parmanand and Lala Lajpat Rai Following the 1905 partition of Bengal, Bhai Parmanand had demanded: “…the territory beyond Sindh should be united with North-West Frontier Province into a great Musulman Kingdom. The Hindus of the region should be expelled, while at the same time the Musulmans in the rest of the country should go and settle in this territory”. Sick of the communal situation, Lala Lajpat Rai had demanded way back on 14 December 1923, in an article in ‘The Tribune’, for “a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and nonMuslim India”.
Planning for Population Exchange Why thrust ‘secularism’ down the throat of unwilling population? Apart from the Muslim-majority regions of the Northwest and East-Bengal that later became Pakistan, an overwhelming majority of Muslims of regions that later became part of India (UP, Bihar, Bombay, Punjab, Bengal, Assam, etc.) voted in the 1946-elections for the Muslim League, and their agenda of Partition and Pakistan. The Muslim League (AIML) got all the 30 Muslim seats (100%) in the Central Assembly, and 429 of the 492 Muslim seats (87.2%) in the 11 provinces (against less than 100 in 1937-elections). Notably, the AIML won 29 out of 29 Muslim seats in Madras, 30 out of 30 in Bombay, 4 out of 4 in Orrisa, 114 out of 119 in Bengal, 54 out of 66 in UP, 75 out of 86 in Punjab, 34 out of 40 in Bihar, 13 out of 14 in CP&Berar, 31 out of 34 in Assam, 28 out of 34 in Sind, and 17 out of 36 in NWFP. Vote percentage wise, the AIML got 86.7% and 74.7% of the Muslim votes cast for the Central Assembly and the Provinces respectively, while the Congress got mere 1.3% and 4.67% of the Muslim votes respectively, the remaining going to other parties.
The above brings out that predominant Muslims wanted Partition and Pakistan, even if they resided in regions in India which were unlikely to be part of Pakistan, like UP, Bombay, Bihar, etc. Apparently, most of them preferred dar al-Islam, or Pakistan, rather than dar al-harb Hindustan. Why then didn’t they migrate to Pakistan? Many of the moneyed did. But, most of the poor remained. Had the necessary arrangements been in place, like transportation, safety of transit, something to look forward to by way of residence and livelihood at the destination, and so on, most would have migrated. Similar was the position of the Hindus and Sikhs in the region that became Pakistan.
It was therefore the responsibility of the leaders of India and Pakistan to plan out population exchange in a phased, safe and secure manner over a mutually agreed time period of say 2 to 10 years. Why force people to stay in a country, or give them little alternative but to stay in a country, when they do not really have allegiance to that country, where they don’t really wish to stay, and where they feel unhappy and insecure?
While India has behaved well with the minority-Muslims in India-there numbers have increased dramatically over the years at a rate of growth much higher than those of Hindus-not so Pakistan with the Hindus and Sikhs there, whose numbers have drastically dwindled in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Expectedly, our clueless, non-violent Gandhian leaders had done absolutely nothing to keep people safe – it was a repeat case of criminal negligence and gross irresponsibility not to have ensured proper advance preparation! If Gandhians could launch what they called their major assault on the British colonialism, the “Quit India” Movement, without any preparation and planning, and without any strategy and tactics on how to keep themselves out of jail to be able to steer the movement properly; little could be expected from them by way of caution and preparation in the wake of partition. They could have heeded Dr BR Ambedkar’s wise and elaborate plan in his book “Pakistan or the Partition of India”{Amb3} given several years back on peaceful transfer of population (please see above). But, with “Mahatmas” as leaders who would listen to the genuinely learned and wise people like Ambedkar? Although leaders and administrators tried to blame people for being communal so as to rid themselves of the accountability, all the three parties-the British headed by Mountbatten, the Congress leadership, and the Muslim League leadership-were guilty, and NONE can claim they were not aware of what might happen.
Any responsible political party would have done all it could to prepare and equip the people for selfdefence by all means possible-violent and non-violent-learning from the spate of horrid anti-Hindu attacks through the past decades. Not doing so was criminal negligence and unpardonable irresponsibility on their part.
Wrote Patrick French: “In 1946 Nehru had naively told a journalist: ‘When the British go, there will be no more communal trouble in India.’ As his biographer points out: ‘He was wrong, but so was everyone else in a position of responsibility at this time. There was a stunning incapacity among the politicians of all kinds to realise what was likely to occur. Even Jinnah, who might have been expected to foresee the impact of the creation of Pakistan, did not request a neutral military force either before or after 15 August…”{PF/344}
Gandhi was particularly to be blamed, what with his arrant nonsense of non-violence. Here is an example. During his prayer meeting on 1 May 1947, Gandhi, seeking to prepare the Hindus and Sikhs for the anticipated massacres in the wake of the upcoming state of Pakistan, exhorted:
“I would tell the Hindus to face death cheerfully if the Muslims are out to kill them. I would be a real sinner if after being stabbed I wished in my last moment that my son should seek revenge. I must die without rancour… You may turn round and ask whether all Hindus and
all Sikhs should die. Yes, I would say. Such martyrdom will not be in vain.” Gandhi never cared to explain what purpose would be served by senselessly getting oneself killed! When the killings finally started upon partition, Gandhi refused to sympathise with the Hindu victims, or blame the Muslim perpetrators.
Rather than trying to save lives, commented Gandhi on 6 August 1947 to the Congress workers on the
Bibliography
communal conflagration in Lahore:
“I am grieved to learn that people are running away from the West Punjab and I am told that Lahore is being evacuated by the non-Muslims. I must say that this is what it should not be. If you think Lahore is dead or is dying, do not run away from it, but die… When you suffer from fear you die before death comes to you. That is not glorious. I will not feel sorry if I hear that people in the Punjab have died not as cowards but as brave men…
A Note on Citations Citations are given as super-scripts in the text, such as {Azad/128).
Citation Syntax & Examples {Source-Abbreviation/Page-Number} e.g. {Azad/128} = Azad, Page 128
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*
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{Source-Abbreviation/Volume-Number/Page-Number} e.g. {CWMG/V-58/221} = CWMG, Volume-58, Page 221
{Source-Abbreviation) … for URLs (articles on the web), and for digital books (including KindleBooks), that are searchable, where location or page-number may not be given.
e.g. {VPM2}, {URL15}
{Source-Abbreviation/Location Number}… for Kindle Books e.g. {VPM2}, {VPM2/L-2901}
Bibliography
C1
Column Contains
Abbreviations used in citations.
B-Book, D=Digital Book/eBook on the Website other than Kindle, K=Kindle eBook, U=URL of Document/Article on Web, W=Website, Y=YouTube
Book/Document/Web URL Particulars
B
ACJI. K
C2 C3 AA
Alice Albinia-Empires of the Indus. John Murray, London, (2008) 2009.
Article ‘Malabar’s Agony’ by Dr (Mrs) Annie Beasant dated 29-Nov-1921. AB
U https://rsajan.wordpress.com/2011/09/23/malabar%E2%80%99s-agony-article-by-drmrs-annie-beasant/
Allan Campbell-Johnson-Mission with Mountbatten. Jaico. New Delhi. 1951. https://archive.org/details/Mission With Mountbatten
Armenian Genocide. AG1
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian Genocide
Armenian Genocide Photos. AG2 U https://www.google.co.in/search?
tbm=isch&q=armenian+genocide&chips=q:armenian+genocide, online_chips:crucified АН ТВ | Arthur Herman-Gandhi & Churchill. Hutchinson, London, 2008. Akb в M.J. Akbar-Nehru : The Making of India. Roli Books. New Delhi. (1988) 2002. Akb2 B M.J. Akbar-The Shade of Swords. Roli Books. New Delhi. 2002.