India’s War Since Independence | Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh
1
THE REVOLT
When I reported on posting to Major General (later Lieutenant General) K.K. Singh, then Director of Military operations, on 12 March 1971, as his deputy, he said in his characteristic man-of-few-words style: “Events are moving fast. It is better that you get into the picture fast.” K.K. had over the years earned the reputation of being a military thinker and man of vision. Whatever he said, one always pondered over every word, for it had much deeper meaning than normal in a casual conversation. K.K. was never casual Events were indeed moving fast. In East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had raised a cry for rebellion against President Yahya Khan’s deliberate attempt to retard the democratic processes by indefinite postponement of convening the National Assembly of Pakistan. On 1 March 1971, Mujib called a general strike for the following day and a halfday strike the rest of the week, shuttering offices, shops and factories, and halting trains, buses and planes.1
The infuriated Bengalis rallied around Mujib and the functions of government in the eastern-province came to a halt. The offices of the central and provincial governments and of semi-government agencies closed their doors.22 Radio Pakistan gave accounts of militant students and agitated crowds taking the law into their own hands and indulging in the open plunder of non-Bengali property and killing of non-Bengalis.
This was an outburst of the simmering discontent that had engulfed the eastern wing of Pakistan under the “neocolonialism” perpetrated by successive military dictatorships. Except for religion, there was nothing common between the two wings. The Bengalis language, their culture, their dress, their food habits, and their very way of life was different from that of the West Pakistani. Even the economies of the two wings had a different basis, and the west, having held political sway from the formation of Pakistan, had exploited the eastern wing’s economic resources for the benefit of the western wing. Although jute and tea grown in East Pakistan earned most of the country’s foreign exchange, the major portion of it was used to develop the western wing. The more populous East Pakistan was denied protection from floods and cyclones which brought periodic devastation of life and property in their wake.3
Under the tyranny of partisan rule, the politically conscious Bengali had raised a protest in the person of Mujibur Rahman and his six-point programme demanding autonomy for the eastern wing4. To suppress the voice of dissent, he was tried for conspiracy,5 and India was blamed for allegedly aiding and abetting treason, the rulers in Islamabad little realising that the happenings in East Pakistan were a manifestation of their own misdeeds. The clear mandate Mujib won in the 1970 general elections brought Bengali aspirations at least so they thought-to the threshold of self-rule. Instead, they found they were being thwarted initially by political manoeuvring between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Mujib, and later by the threat of being crushed under the heel of the military jackboot. Unable to bear injustice any longer, the Bengalis took to the streets to seek a solution for their continued oppression By 3 March 1971, Mujib’s writ ran wide in East Pakistan. After the imposition of curfew in Dacca on 2 March6 units of the Pakistan Army moved into the city and resorted to firing on the demonstrators. This caused some casualties, which further inflamed Bengali passions. The wounded were displayed at a public meeting addressed by Mujib. In his speech, he asked the army to go back to its barracks. In case the troops did not comply with this demand, he threatened that the people would have no alternative to offering resistance. The troops were promptly with drawn7 by the well-meaning Lt Gen Sahabzada Yakub Khan, who had been appointed Governor and Martial Law Administrator a little earlier8. This was a clear demonstration of Mujib’s power, derived from the people’s mandate, against the repressive policies of West Pakistan’s military dictatorship and was hailed as a popular victory.
Yahya Khan also resiled from the hard line he had adopted by announcing a new date, 25 March, for summoning the National Assembly9 and comparative calm ensued for a while. Speaking at a mammoth gathering at Ramna racecourse on the afternoon of 7 March, Mujib announced his willingness to participate in the session of the National Assembly provided his four demands-withdrawal of martial law, return of troops to their barracks, inquiry into army killings, and transfer of power to duly elected representatives of the people were met before the start of the session. He also outlined a weeklong programme of non-cooperation starting 8 March to cripple the army regime.10 So overwhelming was the response to Mujib’s call that he and his associates had virtually become the rulers of East Pakistan. It seemed as if Bangladesh had in fact come into existence.
This was amply evident when Lt Gen Tikka Khan, newly nominated Governor and Martial Law Administrator, arrived in Dacca on 7 March to take over from Yakub Khan. The Chief Justice of the High Court of East Pakistan refused to administer the oath of office to the new Governor,” duly appointed by the President of Pakistan as notified in the official gazette. Other judges of the court are also said to have declined to perform the ceremony. In the event, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan had to be rushed to Dacca to do so.
This incident was a clear defiance of the military regime’s authority. Perhaps the dictatorship’s ever-weakening hold on East Pakistan had impelled Yahya Khan to appoint Tikka Khan for the task of bringing Mujib to heel. Tikka Khan was known as a tough, no nonsense soldier who would not hesitate to use military force, even to the degree of brutality, to restore the military regime’s authority. He was known to have employed such methods against a tribal rebellion in Baluchistan with considerable success. After the swearing in, Tikka Khan is said to have summoned Mujib to his presence, but Mujib agreed to see the Governor only if he came to his house.
This was the parting of the ways between Tikka Khan and Mujib, and perhaps between East and West Pakistan. Unable to stomach this personal insult, Tikka was bound to react violently against ostensible defiance on the part of Mujib and his Awami League. To Pakistan watchers, as well as to the General Staff of the Indian Army, a strong military action appeared imminent. Meanwhile, Mujib’s civil disobedience and non-cooperation movement was visibly affecting the governmental machinery and people of Bangladesh. It encompassed the provincial law and order agencies such as the police and paramilitary forces. 12 The tirade against the Pakistan Army in the newspapers of Dacca, denouncing it as “alien and barbarous,” continued unabated and must have had some effect in subverting the loyalties of the Bengali rank and file, in the East Bengal Regiment in particular and the Pakistani armed forces in general, especially those stationed in East Pakistan and sensitive to the mood of the people.
Mujib was gradually paving the way for a total confrontation which would engulf the armed forces in its sweep. Tikka Khan, professional that he was, was hound to be preparing to combat such an eventuality. The news had trickled into Dacca from Sri Lanka that Pakistan Army personnel were flying over the island from the western to the eastern wing in civilian clothes, New Delhi had earlier banned overflights of Indian territory by Pakistani aircraft after the Pakistan-inspired hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane in January 1971. This made it necessary for Pakistani craft to take the circuitous route through Sri Lanka, and this was both expensive in terms of money and time-consuming Intelligence reports indicated that a part of Pakistan’s 16 Infantry Division, stationed at Quetta, was being inducted into East Pakistan to strengthen Tikka Khan’s hands. Reliance on air transportation at first restricted immediate reinforcements to lightly armed manpower, but in due course heavier weapons could be expected to fetch up by sea. Mujib, according to the Dacca press, openly objected to this surreptitious buildup of armed strength and questioned its motive. But the airlift of troops continued throughout Yahya Khan’s parleys with Mujib and Bhutto in Dacca in the second half of March.14
As the political negotiations between the President and the elected representatives of the majorities in the two wings were extended, there was a general feeling that an acceptable solution would be found. It was believed that Yahya Khan would not throw away the only chance of keeping the two wings of Pakistan together, especially so when both the Soviet Union and the United States gave the impression that they were helping to narrow the differences between the opposing stands. And if the problem still defied a political settlement, it was thought that it would be handled by Tikka Khan by means of military action, with partial success at least, to tide over this period of inflamed passions.
It was not beyond the realm of possibility for Tikka Khan to suppress the rebellion by imprisoning the Awami League leaders, suspending political activities, and generally forcing the people to acquiesce by the well-recognised method of carrot and stick commonly used by rulers. In either eventuality, the problem would remain within the confines of Pakistan’s internal affairs and would not concern India directly. But a crackdown on the democratic processes would arouse Indian sympathy for Mujib and his followers, perhaps also a few tears and some loud protests in international forums, but no more. India very much wished at that time to be left alone.
India had its own problems. The Indian leaders had been busy in the preceding winter in parliamentary elections to consolidate their own position after the split in the ruling Congress Party. The elections brought a dazzling victory to Indira Gandhi, and this spurred her to establish a stable government in anarchy-ridden West Bengal. 18 From the collapse of the coalition government in March 1970 and the imposition of presidential rule, some political murders were reported to have been committed in clashes between the Naxalites led by Charu Mazumdar and other political groups.19
Guerilla-type action against law and order agencies, both in the urban and rural areas, had led to a shutdown of schools and colleges, and law-abiding citizens feared to tread the streets. The Naxalites denounced the elections as “treachery” and vowed to block them by eliminating candidates who opposed their ideology. Threats were uttered that political scores would be settled by bullets. To ensure orderly elections in the state in this atmosphere, about a division plus of the Indian Army was moved into it to supplement the state and central police agencies. All eyes were focused on the West Bengal elections, and the little news that filtered across the border from East Pakistan was only of academic interest, at least for the time being.
Our military intelligence was well served with information from East Pakistan. It was known with a degree of exactitude that traditionally the region had only one infantry division comprising four brigades with adequate supporting arms, a squadron or two of fighter and transport aircraft, and some naval presence in Pakistan’s territorial waters as well as in riverine waterways. Detailed analysis revealed that the composition of about 18 infantry battalions was all West Pakistanis and six all East Pakistanis while the supporting arms, comprising one armoured and seven artillery regiments, were mixed, with about 70 percent of West Pakistani and 30 percent of East Pakistani elements, the former predominating, at least in the higher ranks.
In addition, there was a paramilitary organisation called the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), comprising about 16 wings with an approximate strength of 13,000. With the exception of the majority of officers and junior commissioned officers, these wings were manned by East Pakistanis. This formation was responsible for manning the border in times of peace to ensure its integrity as well as to keep a check on the movement of civilians across it. It was estimated that reinforcements by air could have augmented the East Pakistan garrison with three or four infantry battalions with light arms. It was also known that this airlift had slowed down somewhat after Mujib’s protest and the threatened strike action by members of the staff of Pakistan International Airlines stationed in Dacca, but exact figures relating to this operation were not available.
The impact of the happenings in East Pakistan on the loyalty of rank and file of military personnel belonging to the province and their leaders conclusion, but to what extent this would erode the battle efficiency of Pakistani units drawn from both wings could not be accurately forecast. It was felt that on the whole the West Pakistan units would remain unaffected, as the small proportion of junior Bengali officers on their establishment could easily be relegated to positions of lesser responsibility or be neutralised by house arrest and other action. On the other hand, the East Pakistan units, whose higher ranks were mostly officered by West Pakistanis, upset the calculations of observers.
The degree of cohesion and loyalty of a unit depends on a given situation, the pressures brought to bear upon the group, and its leadership. Since all these factors were of an indeterminate nature, the assessment could be only in broad terms, especially when the extent of penetration of Awami League influence in the army was not known. The possible effect of defections, desertions or outright mutiny and revolt by East Pakistani elements could not thus be accurately gauged. But considering the predominance of West Pakistanis in positions of responsibility, and their control of the channels of communication and other facilities for exercising command and control, their monopoly of heavier weapons in the
way of artillery and armour, their numerical strength and their traditional martial background indicated that in an open trial of strength Bengali military personnel would come out only second best.
On the whole, it was felt that the situation would not deteriorate militarily to the extent that Tikka Khan’s professional,”business-like” hand would not be able to controll developments, ruthlessly if necessary. And it would still remain Pakistan’s internal problem, albeit with some irritation to India, and nothing more. Politically, India looked forward hopefully to a fruitful conclusion of the political parleys in Dacca.
The negotiations between Yahya Khan and Mujib dragged on, but from cryptic press communiques and radio quotes they appeared to be leading nowhere. Rumours were afloat that these were stalling tactics on the part of Yahya Khan to build up the requisite military strength for the final crackdown. Now it is known, through Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem’s book Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, that Tikka Khan had been preparing for quite a while to update the plan titled ‘Operation Blitz’ and gear up the necessary machinery to put it into operation at short notice.
Although the press communique issued on 3 March looked hopeful, Pakistan Republic Day was celebrated in Dacca as Resistance Day. Bangladesh flags appeared on rooftops and rejoicing crowds paraded the streets while the army was confined to barracks. On the night of 25 March, Yahya Khan left Dacca unannounced, and the same night Tikka Khan struck throughout East Pakistan with a heavy hand. This led Bhutto to say “Thank God, Pakistan has been saved,” but news of this action was blacked out in the rest of the world for some time.
About midday on 26 March, as the Vice Chief of Army Staff was interviewing me as a routine on my posting, his telephone rang to convey the news that an East Pakistani noncommissioned officer and about 30 other ranks had walked over to one of our border observation posts on the periphery of the Belonia salient in Tripura and had reported that the Bengali elements in the Pakistani armed forces in the eastern wing had revolted and fierce clashes were raging, especially in the Chittagong area.
This was the first news India got of Tikka Khan’s crackdown. All contacts with East Pakistan had been severed and Radio Dacca was silent. Terrified civilians started pouring. into India across the entire India-East Pakistan border, an exodus which finally resulted in about 10 million refugees becoming India’s responsibility. The thunder of artillery, the crackle of machine guns and other noises of war began to be heard from the peripheral border areas, and blazing fires and spiralling smoke told a tale of destruction.
The refugees spoke of the devastation, ruthless killing, rape, loot and plunder they had fled from. Then came about 40 foreign news correspondents, photographers and television cameramen, hurriedly deported from Dacca. They vividly described the tank battles which had raged in the streets of the city on the night of 25/26 March. From the Intercontinental Hotel, they had witnessed the razing of the university.
They had heard heavy mortar fire and the crack of rocket launchers. According to them, the military were employed against unarmed Bengalis with brutal ruthlessness. They feared that Mujib and his associates had either been murdered or imprisoned. They felt that the genocide perpetrated in Dacca was of the worst type, even more cruel than that in the Nazi concentration camps of World War II. Although the Pakistan Army had confiscated their films, cameras and tape recorders, some of them managed to smuggle out horrifying pictures of devastated towns and villages and streets littered with the dead and the maimed.
Meanwhile, Radio Chittagong came on the air with Maj Ziaur Rahman, a Bengali officer, announcing the formation of the provisional government of Bangladesh on 26 March 22 This was welcome news indeed to supporters of the liberation struggle, but the fate of Mujib and other top leaders of the Awami League still remained unknown.
The pattern of the Pakistan Army’s repressive operations between 25 and 31 March remained confused as the information available from the refugees and defecting troops was mostly confined to the peripheral areas. Except for the stories of correspondents coming from Dacca, and for those of affluent refugees who had bought their way out, nothing was known of events in areas deep in the interior. From all accounts, Tikka Khan was rather thin on the ground.
of the 12 to 15 fully West Pakistani battalions at his disposal, he was committed to having a brigade’s worth in and around Dacca, the seat of the rebellion, one brigade in Comilla looking after the region east of the Meghna river, including the major port of Chittagong and the tea-growing area of Sylhet, another in the general area of Jessore and Khulna, south of the Ganga, and a fourth deployed in the northerly area bounded by the Yamuna and the Ganga.
The troops were deployed in battalion and company group strength to hold important towns and communication centres, and columns were sent to relieve beleaguered garrisons. One column was reportedly making its way from Feni to Chittagong. The discernible pattern of operations seemed to be to secure Dacca, to break the local administration, to ensure the use of Chittagong naval base as the major port of entry for shipping from West Pakistan, to safeguard the functional airfields, to facilitate an aerial buildup in troublesome regions, to guard cantonments and arsenals, to clear the road, rail and inland waterway systems, to ensure the security of main towns, and in the process to disarm the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles and police.
News trickled out from Chittagong that Operation Blitz was kept an absolute secret from Bengali officers although all ranks could sense the impending clashes the day before. Chittagong housed the East Bengal Regimental Centre (EBRC), estimated to hold about 2,500 rank and file, including the newly raised 9 Battalion. 20 Baluch, the West Pakistan battalion in the cantonment, struck at EBRC personnel, who although mostly raw recruits gave a stiff fight, which resulted in heavy casualties. But most of the trained personnel, consisting of the permanent staff, managed to get away.
8 EBR, an all-East Pakistani battalion, killed its commanding officer and moved to the hills overlooking the base under its second in command Ziaur Rahman. He took over Radio Chittagong and raised the first cry of armed revolt against the military dictatorship 24 Zia was joined by elements of EPR and EBRC, and together they attacked 20 Baluch, which was firmly entrenched in the EBRC lines, with much success. Later, they occupied the whole of Chittagong town, causing damage in its non-Bengali colonies. They destroyed textile mills set up by some of West Pakistan’s 22 ruling families to exploit the protected markets of East Pakistan.
But in their enthusiasm they lost their sense of priorities. The naval base was untouched. With the help of newly arrived reinforcements, the naval establishment
managed to secure Tiger Pass, connecting the town with the port, and that kept the base out of reach of the rebels. Later, a relief column from Comilla, as well as the efforts of the beleaguered 20 Baluch, cleared the town by 31 March and took control of the Chittagong radio station two days later. Ziaur Rahman made his way along with his comrades towards India. On his way, he occupied the Belonia bulge till ousted by a heavy Pakistani punitive attack mounted on the arrival of reinforcements.
Almost simultaneously, five other EBR battalions stationed in East Pakistan, the whole of EPR and the armed police revolted. On the heels of the Chittagong mutiny, 2 EBR Battalion, located at the heels of the Chittagong mutiny, 2 EBR Battalion, located at Joydevpur, north of Dacca, with its companies dispersed at Tongi, Ghazipur, Tangail and Mymensingh, revolted around 28 March, killing the few West Pakistani officers and their families. They stiffly resisted efforts to disarm them and gradually made their way to Tura in the Indian state of Meghalaya.
1 EBR Battalion, located at Jessore, was disarmed about the same time after a heroic but unequal struggle. 10 EBR, a national service battalion consisting of students under training, was sent on forced leave and later disbanded after seizing their arms. But 3 EBR, located in the Saidpur area, and 4 EBR, in the Comilla sector, escaped being disarmed humiliatingly. Along with their officers and arms, they moved first towards Hilli and Sylhet respectively, and later came to India under heavy military pressure from Pakistani troops.
Bengali elements in mixed units were easily subdued, but some of them managed to get away to join their comrades in open revolt. The revolting EBR battalions organised EPR, the Mujahids, the Ansars, the police and ex-servicemen as well as civilians to resist alien army rule in the name of the newly emerging Bangladesh. In addition to their own arms, the rebels looted Pakistani armouries and police stations, gathering considerable quantities of arms in the process. The EBR battalions organised resistance sectorwise, and wherever they entered India they coordinated the activities of EPR and other rebellious elements in their respective areas. But overall coordination of the revolt and its connected activities was however lacking.
EPR detachments concentrated on attacking Pakistani border outposts and surrounding isolated garrisons. Exploiting the minimum Pakistan presence in inaccessible areas, and the undue time Pakistani troops took to react in others, the sector commanders organised some bold forays deep inside Pakistani-held territory. Some enterprising local commanders of the Border Security Force who had learnt of Pakistani atrocities from the refugees and revolting Bengali elements, often joined in the raids, especially in the Jessore and Sylhet regions. Finding a vacuum in these areas and full of enthusiasm, some of them told visiting news correspondents covering the refugee exodus that the occupation of East Pakistan would be easy. Such talk created a powerful lobby in India which urged the Prime Minister to take immediate action to liberate Bangladesh.
Meanwhile, Tikka Khan asked for and got more troops to deal with the troublesome province. Pakistan 9 Infantry Division and 16 Infantry Division were flown from the western wing to strengthen Tikka Khan’s hands. This was achieved at the considerable risk of denuding the striking forces north and south in that wing. It is said that 9 Infantry Division was ordered to move from Kharian in the west on 30 March. Its flight in PIA Boeings started from Lahore on 1 April and the whole divisionless heavier arms, had concentrated in East Pakistan by 5 April. This speaks well for Pakistani military efficiency.
9 Infantry Division quickly reinforced the thinly held region east of Meghna from Sylhet to Chittagong. One of its brigades was airlifted to Sylhet, where the besieged garrison was in great difficulty. The second brigade was flown to Comilla to take over from the old 14 Infantry Division Brigade, which in turn moved to Chittagong. The third brigade moved to Mymensingh, thus achieving adequate strength closer to the border to push the rebels out of the peripheral areas.
The mode of operations was to send strong battalion columns into the outlying areas to crush the general revolt, clear the rebel-held areas and generally pacify the affected civil population. The Dacca brigade, having accomplished its task, was rushed north to relieve Rajshahi. The columns are claimed to have moved at great speed, covering about 300 miles in seven days in an assortment of transport from cycle rickshaws to river boats with ad hoc logistic support.
The rapidity of these operations seemed to have a salutary effect on the rebel strongholds, especially in the interior. These columns devastated villages and towns in their path, slaughtered resisters, and generally created havoc of the Chengez Khan type. The heroic resistance of politically inspired freedom fighters in Chandpur and Akhaura was overcome at great cost to the Pakistanis.
Meantime, Pakistan 16 Infantry Division enabled Tikka Khan to rationalise the formation’s operational boundaries so as to dominate the rebelaffected areas with greater, and perhaps crushing, strength. 9 Infantry Division was assigned the area east of the Meghna, including the Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong sectors, 14 Infantry Division Mymensingh, Dacca and Jessore, and 16 Infantry Division the whole northern region. With this added strength and more stabilised logistic support, the columns fanned out over the entire countryside, especially near the border with India. They pushed the rebels towards India and sought the pacification of these areas with an iron hand.
These operations mainly involved fighting small company and battalion actions, with tank, gun and air support. Tikka Khan’s mode of operation seemed to be to hit hard and crush rather than pacify. To secure two vital crossings at Bhairab Bazaar on the Meghna and Golando Ghat on the Padma, he attacked with brigade groups and a preponderance of air and gun support. In the former action, 4 EBR Battalion, holding the bridge, was badly mauled and lost a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. It was militarily imprudent for the revolting troops to engage in set-piece battles in such circumstances, but then the habits of regular soldiers die hard.
By about 10 April, Tikka Khan was able to restore a semblance of normalcy in that after having pushed the rebellious troops, the Hindu and other minorities and noncooperators across the Indian border, and also having crushed the Awami League, he contrived to carry out his mandate of reestablishing Yahya Khan’s writ in Bangladesh. Having accomplished this, he relinquished the soldier’s role in favour of Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, who took over as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Pakistan Eastern Command. Tikka Khan reverted to the role of Governor and Martial Law Administrator. For the time being, there was nothing much for Niazi to do except stabilise what he had achieved and further strengthen the army’s hold on the land and people.
The tempo of the operations continued unabated. By the end of April, the army had reoccupied most BOPs, recaptured the rebel stronghold of the Belonia bulge, covering approximately 57.9 sqaure kilometres, cleared the rivers and sea routes to the ports of Chalna, Khulna and Chittagong, and restored rail communications in most areas. Except for a few small pockets in outlying and inaccessible peripheral areas, the rebellion had outwardly been suppressed by the end of May.
In its early stages, news poured into India of the barbarities perpetrated by Tikka Khan and his West Pakistanis, and the Indian press glorified the heroic defiance of the rebels. So over exuberant were the Indian publicity media over the rebel activities that they headlined Tikka Khan’s supposed killing by a daring assailant. Sympathisers of Bangladesh were jubilant, but their jubilation soon died down when Tikka Khan appeared in person in a live television show which was beamed from Dacca all over the world. This was an immature propagandist gimmick which for quite a while destroyed the credibility of its perpetrators.
Sources of information which had dried up in the period of repression were reactivated and a clearer picture of the situation in East Pakistan became available. The press in Dacca painted Tikka Khan as a benevolent ruler who had promised that nobody under his protection would be allowed to die of hunger” and had honoured his promise in deed. India was painted as the inspirer of the revolt which had resulted in wanton destruction of life and property.
The beaming Niazi was depicted as a soldier’s general, constantly visiting forward troops and having a crack or two with a lonely soldier. The soldier was praised for his forbearance, professional efficiency and deep concern for the coreligionist population. Normalcy was shown through reopened schools and colleges, functioning of secretariats and the administration at the district level, reopening of mills, rehabilitation of the tea industry, and general shopping activity in the streets of Dacca. Giving credence to this news as only half the truth, it was estimated that at least normalcy was on its way back and would return fully unless something was done to disrupt it soon.
To relieve the regular army from border-holding duties, Tikka Khan raised a paramilitary force, known as the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF), to replace the old EPR by enlisting about 6,000 officers and men-but this time with a difference in that about 90 per cent of the rank and file was from West Pakistan. A start was also made to raise Mujahids from among the loyalists Biharis, as also Razakars. This force was to protect railway and road bridges, industrial and electrical installations and communication centres and other vulnerable targets from terrorist attack as well as create confidence amongst the local population. Maj Gen Jamshed, a former director of EPR, was flown posthaste from West Pakistan to command this force. These measures were designed to strengthen Tikka Khan’s grip on the administration of the province and win back the confidence of the Bengalis.
But the exodus of bewildered refugees continued unabted, and by the end of May India had about 10 million of them as its responsibility 25 The financial burden of refugee relief was estimated by the World Bank, as quoted in the New York Times, at about $700 million in a full year. This was roughly half of India’s defence budget in 1970, and the nation groaned under this additional economic pressure.
It may be said to the credit of the Pakistani military machine and Tikka Khan that, defying the logistic nigntmares of a distant overseas base, long and circuitous air routes, lack of an administrative infrastructure and stockpiling for a force not more than a division plus, and utter disruption of road, rail and sea communications, it crushed a movement, at least temporarily, launched by 75 million people acting unitedly. Internationally, Pakistan’s
military image soared for the time being, and India’s credibility sank correspondingly low. The Indian people watched the entire drama helplessly. But then they had their own problems.
————–
1.Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 15. “National Assembly Postponed indefinitely.” 10092
2. Ibid. “Hartal Continues.p. 10093
3.On 13 November 1970, cyclone havoc in East Pakistan claimed 2 million lives, as reported by The Times, London, 4.The six-point programme was spelt out on 24 February 1971 by Sheikh Mujib in addressing a news conference in
Dacca. 5 In his broadcast to the nation on 25 March 1971, President Yahya Khan charged Sheikh Mujib with treason.
Asian Recorder. “Violent Demonstrations, Curfew Imposed, p. 10092 On 6, March it was announced that the troops called out in Dacca would return to barracks following an improvement
in the situation as a sequel to Sheikh Mujib’s appeal to remain peaceful. 8 Radio Pakistan announced on 1 March the appointment of Lt Gen Shahbjada Mohammad Yakub Khan as the
province’s Martial Law Administrator in place of the Governor, Admiral S. K. Khan. 9 Asian Recorder. “President Yahya Khan’s broadcast. p. 10093. 10 Ibid., “Mujib’s Conditions for Attending Assembly,” p. 10094 u Ibid., Vol XVII, No 20,”March 9.” 12 Ibid. “SM Rahman Asks Defence Workers to Defy Martial Law,” p. 10096 13 A Deutsche Presse Agentur report said that despite Ceylon’s restrictions Pakistani military aircraft had been passing
from the west to the east wing through the island. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIL, No 18, Ceylon’s Restrictions on
Pakistani Aircraft. p. 10132 14 Ibid. Vol XVII, No 18. “General Yahya Khan in Dacca. Negotiations with S. M. Rahman,” p. 10130 15 Ibid. p10130 16 After the split in the Congress in November 1969, it had lost its status as a majority party. Asian Recorder, Vol
XVII, No 3, “Lok Sabha Dissolved, Fresh Election Ordered,” pp. 9957-58. IZ The Congress Party won more than a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha 18 President’s rule was revoked on 2 April and Bangla Congress president Ajoy Mukherjee was invited to form a ministry. 19 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, Nol. “Total Naxalite-CPM Murders in W. Bengal,” p. 9940. 20 Op.cit., Vol XVII, No 18. “Pakistan Day Observed as Resistance Day:”p. 10132 21 lbid.. under chronology or events since 1969, p. 10150. 22 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 20,”Provisional Government formed,” p. 10153 23 Opcit. Vol XVII, No 20,”The Fighting. p. 10150. 24 Op.cit.. “Directives to Civilians, p.10153. 25 Free Bangla Radio claimed that the Bengali elements of the East Bengal Regiment and the East Pakistan Rifles had
raised the strength of the liberation forces to 50.000 armed men. Op. cit., p. 10153 26 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 38. Total of Refugees. p. 10370
. 27 Op.cit. Vol XVII, No 41. “Effect of Refugee Influx on Economy, World Bank Report” p. 10400
2
THE PROBLEM
Undoubtedly India’s national interest lay in having a friendly regime in neighbouring East Pakistan as the economic and cultural affinities of the two Bengals were linked indivisibly. Part of the same province in undivided India, the correlation of industries and sources of raw materials had not foreseen the effect of the artificial territorial partition in 1947. At that time jute was grown in the Pakistani part of the province while the factories producing finished goods were in and around Calcutta. The tea grown and processed in the Sylhet area of East Pakistan was sold in Calcutta along with the Assam product. Fish caught in the eastern rivers was eaten in Calcutta. Cheap river transport carried tea, teak and other commercial goods from Assam and northern Bengal to the markets of Calcutta. Although India had developed its own rail and road links with Assam after partition through the Siliguri-Charduar corridor, for reasons of economy it had used East Pakistan’s rail and river transport facilities till this was stopped by the Ayub regime when hostilities broke out in 1965 and never resumed despite the Tashkent agreement.
Above all, unlike in West Pakistan, there had always been a sizable Hindu minority in the eastern wing as rightful citizens of Pakistan. This minority looked to India for moral sui port, and in difficult times for their security. It was in this context that India had all along followed a two-faced policy towards Pakistan, comprising continued and outright confrontation in the west and an extended hand of friendship and cooperation in the east. For instance, the Nehru-Liaquat pact of 1947 regarding the transfer of population from certain areas of India and Pakistan did not apply to the east. Later, the evacuee property law enforced by the two governments did not apply to this region. It was in pursuance of this policy of friendship towards East Pakistan that Lal Bahadur Shastri did not permit the extension of hostilities to this region in the conflict of 1965 despite the temptation of easy victory.
India did not have to work, as Bhutto and other Pakistani politicians alleged, for the alienation of the eastern wing from the western or covertly encourage secessionist activities. The Pakistani rulers themselves encouraged this tendency over the years by treating East Pakistan like a colony rather than a part of their country. The economic development of the western wing was carried out at the cost of the east to the extent that, enjoying the benefit of a captive market, West Pakistan industries monopolised the sale of products in the east and repatriated their profits to the west. The foreign exchange earnings from exports of tea and jute produced in the east paid for the west’s development.
Mujib often accused the 58 million people of West Pakistan of keeping the 72 million of East Pakistan in a state of subservience in that the west took 70 per cent of the foreign aid the country received and 70 per cent of its imports, and practically monopolised the central bureaucracy and the army, its share of posts being 85 and 90 per cent respectively. By contrast, the more populous East Pakistan remained the world’s most densely populated region and one of the poorest, as well as prone to disaster, afflicted with seasonal floods and cyclones which took a heavy toll in lives and property yearly,5
This ruthless economic and political exploitation by successive West Pakistanidominated governments and military dictatorships drove the east wing in desperation to open revolt. And the Pakistani Army, the instrument of power which was used or threatened to be used, became the target of Bengali hatred. The years of suppressed resentment against regional inequities and the military power responsible for it ignited the spark which engulfed the entire subcontinent in the crossfire of revolt.
After narrating the brutalities of the Pakistani Army and the horrifying tales of genocide, the Indian press and other propaganda media advocated using this opportunity of a lifetime to settle scores with Pakistan. All eyes were now focused on Indira Gandhi, known for her decisive, resolute and timely actions. Since she made no move, her colleagues, her party men, opposition politicians and the impatient public began to chafe at her inaction at such an opportune moment, although their protests were muffled. Some retired generals publicly argued in favour of immediate military action for the liberation of the eastern wing before the Pakistani forces there could be strengthened by the arrival of heavier weapons and ammunition by sea. The more time India allowed Pakistan, they argued, the more costly would the venture become militarily. It was time to act now, they echoed.
Some of them accused Gen S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, Chief of Army Staff, of developing cold feet. It was remoured that Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, backed by Finance Minister Y.B.Chavan, had urged Mrs Gandhi to resort to armed action immediately, adding that if Manekshaw had any misgivings he should be replaced. But under no circumstances, they are said to have argued, should this opportunity, providentially offered to India, remain unavailed of.
But Manekshaw had his own justifiable reservations about instant action. He was the right Chief for this time of national crisis. He was the only senior general of his generation who combined military knowhow with acute political and strategic sense. Having risen in stature along with the growth of the Indian Army, he knew and understood India’s military capability so well that he was not prepared to fumble in a situation which he could not dominate in full measure. He was against halfbaked, inconclusive involvements, and he had the moral standing to withstand pressures against his convictions. He wanted to lead a victorious army and not a hastily committed rabble. And there he stuck, and for very valid reasons.
Firstly, he assessed that India’s strategic planning always envisaged the decisions to be obtained in any Indo-Pakistani conflict in the western wing, while contingency planning in the east catered only for the security of the Siliguri-Coach Behar corridor and the city of Calcutta. For this limited task in the east, only one infantry division plus was earmarked on the presumption that Pakistan would not reinforce this region. In the event, Pakistan had built up its eastern force to about three or more divisions, counting the communication troops and paramilitary forces.
armour and artillery had not fetched up yet, the combined war potential of such a force level was nonetheless considerable in relation to our earmarked resources. Besides, the eastern region of Tripura lacked the necessary administrative and communication infrastructure to support worthwhile operations. Manekshaw felt, and quite rightly too, that the Indian Army was not well attuned to reorient operational plans rapidly at such short notice, nor had it the wherewithal to conduct operations without the necessary administrative infrastructural backing.
Secondly, the quantum of force he needed to launch this operation would require time to collect, especially when the immediately available formations were tied up with the West Bengal elections and others had to be found from operationally committed troops engaged in counter-insurgency and other holding roles in far-flung areas. By the time the force was collected the monsoon would be on its way, thus leaving a very tight schedule for the operation.
Recalling his Burma campaign days, Manekshaw did not want his army to get stuck in the quagmire of the monsoon. Moreover, this would give China, a sympathiser of Pakistan and a foe of India, a chance to retaliate on India’s northern borders. China would have about eight months of campaigning, till the Himalayan passes closed sometime in November, to annexe the maximum Indian territory. Manekshaw preferred to fight one enemy at a time, and the weaker one first. He proposed to time his military action for November, when the possibility of Chinese participation was considerably reduced because the Himalayan passes would then be closed.
Thirdly, a reason he kept to himself was the shortage in stockpiled reserves of essential specialised and armoured vehicles and of bridging equipment which would need some time to make up and recoup. In addition, raising new units and formations and the introduction of newly acquired equipment was in progress, and this needed time to assimilate. Even with crash programmin, these tasks, could not be completed before the onset of the monsoon, and then it would be too late.
But political compulsions clinched the issue. What was the invasion of East Pakistan based on, what ostensibly was its internal problem to be justified in international circles? If the creation of an independent Bangladesh was achieved by Indian military action, how was its domestic and external viability to be assured without its recognition by the international forum, the United Nations? If India intervened without clearly justifying this action in foreign eyes, the charge that it was engineering the breakup of Pakistan would be established and Bangladesh would be refused recognition by the majority of nations. After considering the issue carefully, the Prime Minister accepted the postponement of intervention to an opportune moment in the future and supported Manekshaw in his stand.
After this decision was taken, the Indian military planners proceeded to assess two vital parameters. One was: When would war come? India’s basic political philosophy did not envisage resort to force to seek solutions to national problems unless there were grave provocations to do so. The initiative would always lie with Pakistan, and as a result Yahya Khan could start hostilities at a time of his choosing. He could be called a “political novice” and an “unpredictable drunkard,” but he had a good professional reputation. It could be safely assumed that he would not commit his fighting machine to battle unless there was a reasonable chance of success. And more so when his survival as a military dictator depended solely on the outcome of a war which he might start or which might be imposed on him.
The ideal time for hostilities from the Indian point of view would be December. The period from the time of this appreciation in April to December may be conveniently divided into pre-monsoon and post-monsoon. Militarily, the pre-monsoon period-April to midJune 1971–was perhaps the most favourable to both countries provided the campaign could be successfully concluded well before the monsoon set in. India was however strategically unbalanced at that time because of the peacetime location of its reserve formations in the hinterland, as a result of which they would have taken some time to be concentrated on the battlefield.
Before this deployment could be executed, Pakistan could launch a preemptive attack and follow its initial success to a tenable conclusion. Moreover, major reorganisation, equipping and repair programmes were afoot in this period, and war at that juncture would have meant committing ill-equipped and half-trained units hastily to battle. Yahya Khan could easily have found an excuse for overrunning the guerilla bases in Indian territory as part of Tikka Khan’s counter-insurgency operations, but he had his own difficulties.
He had recently transferred from the western wing two old and well-trained divisions, 9 and 16 Infantry, forming part of the Pakistani strike force north and south. In addition, counterinsurgency operations in East Pakistan had claimed considerable numbers of paramilitary and communication zone troops at the cost of reducing military capabilities in the west. Although these two divisions had left behind their integral artillery and other heavy weapons in the west, the woeful shortage of infantry with his strike force deterred Yahya Khan from undertaking a meaningful operation. He also had some shortages in his reserve war stockpile which needed recoupment. The US resource having dried up.12 he had to look around for other avenues of supply to make up at least his critical shortages. 13
Politically, Yahya Khan still relied upon Tikka Khan to finish the counter-insurgency operations launched to suppress the revolt and the subsequent guerilla movement. “Give me a few days.” Tikka Khan was reported to have said, but Yahya Khan saw those days stretch into weeks and months and last deep into May that year. By the time some semblance of control could be assured, June had arrived and the impending monsoon was very much in sight. The heavy rains for the next three months hampered military operations in the eastern wing. The riverine nature of the terrain and low-lying paddy land turned the countryside into a swamp of mud, immobilising armour and other vehicular traffic. No serious campaigning could therefore proceed at a meaningful pace.
Similarly, in the western wing, where decisions were envisaged through mobile warfare employing a predominance of armour, the armour would bog down in the rainsoaked plains of Punjab. There was no alternative for Pakistan but to wait till October, when the earth would harden after the rains, to enable military means to be employed in both wings. This gave India a much-needed respite for preparations to redress the strategic imbalance and to make up the critical shortages in arms and ammunition. India woefully lacked the requisite infrastructure in the eastern theatre to build up a sizable force for either defence of its own territory or for launching an offensive. This was particularly so in Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura, opposite the Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong line. Creation of this infrastructure meant developing roads, communications and administrative dumps to sustain a war, and these needed a considerable lead period to develop. In addition, the buildup of troops in the eastern as well as the western theatres had to be completed to meet a likely preemptive attack. Troops for the eastern theatre had to be found from formations engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram, those facing the Chinese on the northern borders, and also what could be garnered from formations earmarked for the western theatre. Troop movements involving long distances from the hinterland and from the western to the eastern theatre needed from six to eight weeks to complete. The welcome monsoon would cover the time required to execute this buildup.
The next possibility was for war after the monsoon from the middle of October onward. This would have suited India if the deadline could be pushed beyond the first week of December, as it was visualised that the Himalayan passes would then close for about five months. It would reduce the potentiality of Chinese collusion and would enable India to take greater risks against the Chinese by thinning out its holding force in the Hmalayas to create the required buildup of troops against Pakistan, particularly in the eastern theatre. It would also enable India to tilt international opinion in favour of Bangladesh, with a view to seeking help in meeting the crushing economic burden of looking after millions of refugees as well as a political solution with Yahya Khan which would create stability in the subcontinent.14
The next question which confronted the Indian military planners was whether the Chinese would act in collaboration with Pakistan, and if so in what strength? By the middle of April some indications were available from the statements of Chinese and Pakistani leaders. On 13 April, Prime Minister Chou En-lai promised all help to Yahya Khan in maintaining the “territorial integrity of Pakistan” against all “external interference,” which included the “handful of people” waging guerilla war in Bangladesh.
On 30 April, Bhutto, the most ardent pro-Chinese politician in Pakistan, declared that China would intervene in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh. This statement was soon followed by the Pakistani Ambassador in Peking, who hailed the ready Chinese support in Pakistan’s difficulties with India. On 19 July, Yahya Khan commented in an interview with a foreign correspondent: “Pakistan will not be alone if India forces a war on it.” Such loud claims continued to be repeated by different voices till he actually forced war on India. So far as Yahya Khan’s and Bhutto’s professions indicated, Chinese support was likely to be of a meaningful degree for Pakistan if war broke out.
At the beginning of November, Yahya Khan told Newsweek magazine that war with India was imminent and the Chinese could be counted on to come to Pakistan’s aid with supplies of arms and ammunition. He went a step further the following week in an interview with Columbia Broadcasting System when he asserted that China would intervene if India attacked Pakistan’s About the same time, Bhutto rushed to Peking, presumably for last-minute arrangements for intervention. At a banquet in Bhutto’s honour, the acting Foreign Minister of China promised that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people.” On his return to Islamabad, Bhutto triumphantly claimed: “We have achieved concrete results. 16 China watchers in India however read differently between the lines of the Chinese and Pakistani statements. Firstly, the promise of Chinese support did not mean military intervention. This could mean only diplomatic support abroad and economic aid at home and supply of arms to equip additional formations being raised in Pakistan. Secondly, such intervention was conditional on “foreign aggression” against Pakistan. Since India had no intention of starting a war with Pakistan, the only question that would arise was that of Pakistani aggression against India.
Nevertheless, Chinese intervention could not be discounted altogether. But the indications available until then did not suggest such an eventuality. For instance, no joint statement was issued at the end of Bhutto’s visit to Peking. The foreign press in Islamabad accordingly concluded that Bhutto had returned without any specific commitments or assurances. He remarked in a press interview that the question whether China would take any diversionary action in the north was a superficial matter.” In fact, militarily nothing was more pertinent than the correct answer to this question at the time.
Indian strategists had however to rely on their own political and military appreciation. Politically, with China’s isolation having decreased as a result of detente with the US, it was at the moment seeking an ideality and rightful role in international politics through the United Nations. It was therefore improbable that the Chinese would jeopardise their national interests by a military engagement in aid of Pakistan at this critical juncture of entry into the UN, including the Security Council. Moreover, there had been no antiIndian propaganda in the Chinese mass media to indicate a psychlogical buildup for intervention although Pakistan projected such a possibility even up to the time of the Indian unilateral ceasefire.
The latest intelligence reports from Tibet assessed the Chinese strength there at approximately 150,000 troops. This was estimated to be composed of about eight divisions and communication zone troops for administrative backing. Of these eight divisions, five to six were employed in a holding role along the India-Tibet border while the remainder were stationed in the hinterland for internal security duties. 18 In 1970, the law and order situation was generally reported to be fairly stable in Tibet and the Chinese could muster two or three divisions to develop a thrust at a chosen point.
Lateral communications on the Tibetan plateau enabled the Chinese to concentrate speedily in any one of the four main sectors: Ladakh; UP-Tibet: Sikkim and western Bhutan; and eastern Bhutan, NEFA. In addition, they had a good network of roads leading to the Indo-Tibetan border from bases in the rear. On the Indian side however, the countryside is furrowed by high mountainous ridges forming deep and narrow valleys. These valleys canalise ingress. Thus, it is possible for China to develop several parallel thrust lines, but for India, because of intervening heights and lack of lateral communications, these cannot mutually support each other. Offensive deployment can therefore be plugged by moving troops in a given time frame according to the signs of a Chinese buildup across the passes. Road development since the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 ensures this capability in good measure.
One thing was certain: China was so conscious of its international prestige as a military power of consequence that it would not make an overt move, however small, unless assured of sufficient superiority in arms to guarantee success. China would take no action which, if escalated, would land it in difficulties. No Chinese build-up along the Himalayan border had thus far been noticed by Indian intelligence, but our planners, having been bitten once in 1962, could not rely implicitly on intelligence agencies alone. They would have placed more reliance on closure of the Himalayan passes to discourage China from a military venture.
But history was in India’s favour. It was a fact that in 1962 the unilateral Chinese ceasefire and hasty withdrawal after the triump. hant march into NEFA against weak and panicstricken Indiantroops was less inspired by political magnanimity than by impending snowfall in the Tibetan passes. Cut off from their administrative bases, the Chinese troops could not have sustained further military operations against superior Indian strength hurriedly mustered in the plains of Assam to meet the incursion.
In 1965 however it was a different story. The Chinese coalition with Pakistan did not go beyond bellicose verbal threats on the flimsy excuse of alleged abduction of goats and graziers on the part of India. 19 Without firing a single shot in support of its friend Pakistan, China managed to keep India on tenterhooks to the extent that we were not able to move a substantial number of our troops facing China in the north to reinforce the western front till well after the conflict was over. Later analyses revealed that the Chinese had not built up their logistics as much as Indian intelligence had assessed. But then India could not afford to take chances with China. Snowfall could start as early as November or as late as December. Except for the two eastern passes at Khinzemane and Diphu, the snows are usually so heavy that no sizable trans-border movement is possible, at least not large enough to sustain major operations. In addition, there was an approach along the old Ledo Road through northern Burma. But an incursion through a third country, especially when Peking was trying to establish an international image, was ruled out.
The Ledo Road was in such a state of disrepair that it would have taken months of Chinese roadmending effort to make it serviceable for the heavy traffic required for a major thrust. Within that time the Burmese would certainly have noticed the unusual Chinese activity, even in that sparsely populated area, and raised serious objections. It was unthinkable that the Burmese Government would connive tacitly at the roadbuilding activities and subsequent invasion of India on account of the friendly relations between New Delhi and Rangoon. At the same time, minor border incursions would not work, for India had travelled far on the road of military preparedness since 1962 and could look after hit-and-run raids with the prevailing level of holding forces facing the Chinese.
India’s normal allocation of forces against East Pakistan was about a division plus against some eight or nine divisions for the north against the Chinese. The impending operations in Bangladesh needed a force level of some six to seven divisions to deal with Pakistan’s three to four divisions then operating in the eastern wing. Since the western theatre could not be denuded of manpower without jeopardising the offensive defence capability, additional formations had to be found from the holding force against the Chinese. This inevitable thinning out had however to be achieved without upsetting the security of the region to any appreciable degree, as politically China remained as inscrutable as ever. In any case, China could not be taken for granted.
Against the Chinese, the Indian planners leaned heavily on the snows. They proposed to maintain a maximum presence in sensitive sectors right up to the time the passes closed and denude the remainder of the northern front to the minimum desirable level so as to create the force required for the Bangladesh operations. But what would happen if Pakistan did not obligingly wait for the snows and China came to its aid much earlier? They believed that the magnitude of conflict China could generate within the force level obtaining in Tibet could be contained by the Indian resources available in the region-by accepting an initial loss of territory if necessary. What would happen if China attacked in a big way? In that
case India would have to seek refuge behind more powerful protection, which we did through the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971.
The Indian planners decided to hold these sensitive sectors against the Chinese with sufficient strength to prevent a walkover and employ the withdrawn forces in such access of time and space that they could swiftly reinforce the threatened sectors from other deployment areas. This implied that the withdrawal from more sensitive areas had to be held up till the last moment, and the deployment of these forces in the Bangladesh operation had to be such that they could be withdrawn at short notice without jeopardising the vitals of the operational plan as such. This called for the closest coordination between the intelligence agencies and the operational planners, something hitherto unpractised in India.
There could be some miscalculation because of failure of intelligence or faulty weather forecasting, resulting in a premature pullout of reserve formations. But this miscalculation could be offset by making the holding formations sufficiently strong to withstand a Chinese attack till the reserve formations could be switched back if required. The mountainous terrain near the passes and the years of effort in developing our defence potential had endowed India with the capability to hold such an attack for a week or so. Any marginal loss of territory, if enforced by Chinese superiority, was acceptable temporarily.
This much risk had to be taken if India was to muster sufficient forces for the envisaged Bangladesh operations. But the operational plan for intervention had to be so contrived that its objectives would be secured with such speed that the borrowed formations from the north could revert in time to meet the likely Chinese re-action. This fitted well with the overall concept of a short war the Indian planners envisaged in view of the fear of international pressures. Even the overt intervention of the US in one form or other was not discounted. It was better to finish the war in Bangladesh before extraneous pressures came into play.
Although it would have paid India to keep the war localised to Bangladesh so that all effort could be concentrated there, unlike in 1965 when Pakistan wanted to confine the coflict to Kashmir, Yahya Khan now preferred to escalate it into a fullfledged confict on two fronts. In addition, he would spare no effort to persuade China to open a third front-if only to create more difficulties for India. He also had an eye on the naval and air might of the US to bail him out of his difficulties in Bangladesh if the evacuation of Pakistani troops from the region became necessary. In that event, the US Marines were expected to hold a beach head to permit the US Navy to do so.
It seemed very unlikely that Pakistan would allow the surrender of the four divisions in the east. As most of the Pakistani soldiery came from West Pakistan, their being taken captive could create such a political furore in the western wing that the military regime might topple. Yahya Khan was expected to ask for help to save his men only if things become operationally hopeless and withdrawal was absolutely imperative. This was expected to happen when the war in Bangladesh reached its final decisive stages.
This implied that India had perforce to keep adequate forces on the West Pakistan border, in Jammu and Kashmir, and also against China along the northern border, to maintain a proper strategic balance, and then to contrive such a concentration of strength in the east as to liberate Bangladesh swiftly and allow the Indian formations to be redeployed on other fronts. The order of priorities for India appeared to be Bangladesh, then
West Pakistan, and finally China, if it chose to intervene overtly to aid Pakistan
The only way to cope with the problem of US intervention was to finish the job in East Pakistan before President Nixon was in a position to react. The nearest US naval presence which could be used to evacuate the Pakistani garrison was in the Pacific, and this would take some time to reach its destination in East Pakistan. Although the Indo-Soviet treaty would theoretically look after such US action, 22 it was very unlikely that the two superpowers would come into open conflict on this issue, especially when detente was drawning in international politics. This was a pertinent matter, and the Indian planners were fully aware that in the end India must be prepared to fight alone.
———————–
1. Lal Bahadur Shastri, broadcast to the nation on 23 September 1965
2.Stated by Sheikh Mujib in an interview with BBC on 18 March 1971, Cited by Sheikh Mujib at a public meeting in Chittagong in November 1971. Ibid. These charges were confirmed in a special World Bank report which stated that the disparities between the two
wings of Pakistan were causing a great deal of bitterness and recrimination.” 5 Sheikh Mujib in BBC Interview.
Asian Recorder, Vol XVII. No 20, “Demand for Indian Recognition of Bangladesh. p. 10158.
West Bengal elections were scheduled on 9 March 1971. 8 Troops engaged in quelling sporadic Naga rebellion. 9 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 51, Mrs Gandhi’s statement in Parliament, p. 10511. 10 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 18, “More Troops Arrive from West wing. p. 10134 u Asian Recorder. Vol XVII, No 20, report of Free Bangla Radio, p. 10152 12 US embargo on military aid to Pakistan on 25 March 1971. 13 Asion Recorder, Vol XVII, No 34. French Arms Supply,” p. 10320. 14 Asian Recorder. Vol XVII, No 31. Mrs Candhi’s statement, in Parliament on developments in East Bengal, p. 10281 15 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 51, President Yahya Khan on Chinese helpp. 10520 16 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 49, Chinese Support,” p. 10496 12 The UN General Assembly voted on 25 October 1971, to give China’s seat in UN to the government of the People’s
Republic of China. 18 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 30, Defence Ministry’s annual report, p. 10271. 19 Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 4, “Intrusions on Sikkim Border Chinese Allegation,” p. 6259 20 Asian Recorder. Vol XI, No 41, “Chinese Activity along Border,” p. 6716. 21 Thirteen divisions were deployed in the western theatre, six out of ten mountain divisions in the Ladakh and NEFA
areas, withdrawing only four for action in Bangladesh. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII No 24. Institute of Strategic
Studies annual survey, p. 10815.
22 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 48, “Indo-Soviet Consultation. p. 10479
3
THE MUKTI BAHINI TAKES SHAPE
About the end of the first week of April 1971, most of the revolting Bengali troops had been flushed out into India by the sheer brute force of the Pakistani Army. Some of them were badly mauled, others had lost their weapons, all of them were torn away from their families and homes. Despite the elation of early victories in the wake of the declaration of Bangladesh’s freedom, the later privations of a hazardous trek, heavy casualities, and the sight of brutal atrocities, wanton destruction of property and ruthless genocide had left them bewildered. Their spirits were low, and the flame of freedom, which had glowed brightly in their hearts for a few days, seemed to be flickering to extinction. For all purposes, the insurgency started on 26 March had virtually died. It was time to protect its spark and nourish it back to life again. After some reorganisation and rest, these forces began to conduct small operations against Pakistani outposts with BSF support. Unfortunately, these efforts were not very effective.
Why did the insurgency fail? According to Fazal Muqeem Khan, writing in Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, the Awami League had earlier formed a military committee headed by a retired Bengali officer, Col M.A.G. Osmani. This committee, says Muqeem Khan, had made a comprehensive plan in December 1970 to seize power if political negotiations failed. Whatever the truth, the revolt did not achieve any results. It is unlikely that it was properly planned. There could be no other explanation for the lack of coordination in the rebels’ operations.
Maybe their failure was due to the suddenness of Operation Blitz and its sledgehammer blows had been more than Osmani had bargained for. And the rebels had adopted wrong methods, for with a tremendous military balance in favour of the Pakistanis they should have gone in for guerilla warfare. Instead, they chose to fight pitched battles and in consequence suffered heavy loses as at Bhairab Bazaar. Another reason for failure was that the operations were conducted by junior officers who in the flush of initial success forget the systematic achievement of nearer aims and objectives.
It can now be said that despite the Awami League’s hold on the Bengali troops in the name of patriotism, Mujib’s charisma and the professional contacts in the armed forces of Col Osmani, the organisers of the insurgency had not been able to draw up and implement an integrated plan lying down aims and objectives in proper priorities. Nor was an effort made to establish a countrywide and regional system of command and control by nominating leaders and defining areas of operational responsibility. The regular troops and their adjunct, the paramilitary forces, had no contact with the clandestine militant organisations raised by various political parties in the period of political uncertainly. As a result, the revolt had no strong popular base. It had jubilant spectators and many sympathisers, but no organised infrastructure of insurgency to sustain a prolonged effort.
After the rebel forces had crossed into India, a rough and ready command structure evolved and operations in the various sectors were taken over by certain Bangladeshi officers. Maj Khalid Musharraf, Maj Ziaur Rahman and Maj Safiullah become sector commanders in the Sylhet-Comilla, Chittagong-Noakhali and Mymensingh-Tangail areas respectively. The Kushtia-Jessore and Faridpur-Barisal-Khulna-Patuakhali areas became the responsibility of Maj Usmanand Maj Jalil respectively. They were all well-trained officers of the Pakistani Army, and the first two had been through special training and service with commando companies. The failure of the revolt and the poor results obtained by the rebel forces in their operations after crossing into India led to a detailed appraisal of the situation by the Indian Government in the last week of April. Initially, it had been strictly neutral, treating the affair as an internal matter of Pakistan. But with refugees pouring into India at the rate of 60,000 a day, it could no longer remain a silent spectator. Huge refugee camps had sprung up all along the 2250-kilometre border, and they presented a bewildering picture of a mass of homeless humanity. They had brought with them what little they could carry, but most of them were in rags—and they were hungry. Providing food, shelter and clothes for them became the responsibility of the Indian Government, but, saddled with its own financial problems, it was not possible for it to carry this burden for long. Sealing the borders to stop the inflow was considered but rejected as this would have meant further massacres of Bengalis. Confining the refugees to camps was essential as their penetration of the country’s interior areas would have created economic and social complications. The majority of refugees were Bengali Hindus. Their prolonged presence on Indian soil could cause serious communal trouble in India.
The biggest worry of the Indian Government in regard to the revolt was the threat it posed to India’s own security. Extremist elements had already been active in West Bengal and had created a law and order problem in the previous two years. The Army had been called into assist the civil authorities in quelling them. In the other eastern states too subversive elements had been active for some years. If the leadership of the movement in East Pakistan fell into the hand of extremists, a very dangerous situation could have arisen for India. Hence the need to support the moderate element among the Bangladeshis, represented by the vast majority that had voted for Mujib in the December 1970 polls. The Indian aim was to get the refugees to go back, and this could be achieved only with the installation of an elected government in Dacca.
Two types of support were thought of at this stage. Firstly, a limited supply of arms was to be made available together with facilities for training in guerilla warfare. BSF had been giving such support, but it had proved ineffective. The Army was therefore asked to take on this responsibility. The other form of support was diplomatic. Though the Indian Government had not recognised the provisional Bangladesh Government as yet, this government had started functioning from Mujib Nagar in Calcutta with Tajuddin Ahmed as Prime Minister
The world’ press had given wide publicity to the atrocities committed in East Pakistan, Indian diplomatic missions abroad had also projected New Delhi’s problem with regard to the refugees and the need for an elected government in Dacca so that this uprooted humanity could return to its homeland. Most foreign governments expressed sympathy for the refugees and for India’s predicament, but those who were in a position to apply pressure on Pakistan to bring democratic rule to Bangladesh did nothing. To apprise the heads of governments of important countries of the situation in the subcontinent personally, Mrs Gandhi went on two foreign tours which took her among other countries to the US and the Soviet Union.
For the time being, the Indian Government did not wish to involve the country’s armed forces in the conflict. But while India had been urging the Pakistan Government to bring about a peaceful solution of the Bangladesh problem by handing over the province to its elected leaders, Yahya Khan was becoming bellicose. It was therefore appreciated that a stage might come when war would be forced on India. Machinery was accordingly set in motion to plan for such an eventuality. On 14 April, the provisional Bangladesh Government appointed Osmani Commander in-Chief of all its armed forces. Osmani styled himself the de Gaulle of Bangladesh and set about his task with great zeal. He came from a highly respected family of Sylhet, had been educated at Aligarh University, and had later joined the Indian Army as an emergency commissioned officer in the Second World War. He was commissioned originally in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps but later changed over to the infantry on the partition of India. He was largely responsible for raising and promoting the East Bengal Regiment. In recognition of his role he was termed “Father of the Regiment.” It is to his credit as a professional that he was selected to be Deputy Director of Military Operations before he resigned because of a difference of opinion with Field Marshal Ayub Khan, then Pakistan’s C-in-C.
Disenchanted with West Pakistani domination of the eastern wing, Osmani dedicated himself on retirement to the Bangladesh independence movement and gave it the desired impetus when others wavered in the face of difficulties. He was certainly a pillar of strength to the provisional government, and he brought a rare sense of integrity to all his dealings. He lived and carried himself with dignity and, stickler that he was for protocol, insisted on being treated as the head of the armed forces of an independent country. I remember his refusing to land from an aircraft till the Indian Army commander was ready on the runway to receive him, although Osmani had arrived over the airfield earlier. The poor pilot of Osmani’s craft had to circle over the field for about ten minutes to allow the Army commander to land first and be ready to receive him.
Osmani’s attitude was that he was exiled from his country but not disinherited. His country needed help, not alms. His men had failed in battle, but were not defeated. Although junior in rank, he was no less in stature than his Indian counterparts. At times, a few mocked at his self-acquired prestige, unrelated to realities. Some of his officers thought him old, orthodox and out of tune with the times, but nobody ever questioned his patriotic zeal or integrity of purpose. It is creditable that he did not promote himself in rank as many a lesser men in his position would have been tempted to do at that time.
Osmani soon took stock of his assets in terms of manpower, weaponry and war potential so as to plan their reorganisation, re-equipping and training to achieve his aim? Among regular troops, about five EBR battalions had trickled into India at widely dispersed points in a battered condition. Their numbers had been reduced because of casualties and me defections en route, and they were short of ammunition and heavy weapons.
They had brought whatever could be carried on a man’s back and were short of
officers, especially in field ranks. Their JCO and NCO cadres were low. As a result of these combined factors, the units and subunits had lost their cohesion. But what they lacked in material they more than made up for with their burning zeal to fiuht the hated Pakistani Army.
In modern Warfare however spirit alone is not enough. Forging these groups into a single, cohesive force was necessary before undertaking bigger tasks, especially when this regular element was to be the nucleus of the envisaged Bangladeshi forces to liberate their country. Paramilitary forces comprising EPR, Mujahids, Ansars and the police, an assortment of about 10,000 ill-armed men, also arrived in India. Since its officer and junior leader cadre were mostly from West Pakistan, this force was leaderless, and as such ineffective as a fighting force.
Nonetheless, both the regular and paramilitary forces had been active all along the border, carrying out deep forays. They had held out in some enclaves in inaccessible areas with the active support and guidance of BSF. Since this force was operationally responsible for policing the border, such limited operations as continuance of the insurgency fitted well with its role and were left under its control.
After the Indian Army was asked to take over the guidance of all aspects of guerilla warfare on 30 April, it was realised that to wage warfare of the Vietcong type and magnitude a much larger effort of an entirely different discipline was required along with entirely different strategic and tactical concepts. Manekshaw viewed the problem both from the shortterm and long term angles and concluded that if the Bangladeshi forces were to participate as equal partners of the Indian armed forces in a combined offensive to liberate the territory this force should be organised promptly on a planned growth schedule.
The level proposed for these forces, called Mukti Bahini, was about three brigade groups organised to function independently. Five EBR battalions, below strength, were immediately available and they were to be brought up to strength with the inclusion of EPR personnel and equipped at par with Indian Army establishments. It was also planned to raise another four battalions according to a phased programme. In the event, only three additional battalions could be made effective before the war began.
In the process of reorganisation, the main bottleneck was lack of officer cadres and the time required to train fresh entrants. About 130 cadets, recruited mostly from students, were put through a crash programme of training. Pakistan-trained officers holding senior appointments in the Bangladeshi forces felt that Indian weaponry, firepower and establishments were not up to the mark, not knowing that the Indian Army was equipping them at considerable cost to its own military capability,
I had discussions with Ziaur Rahman and other officers on this subject and got the impression that they had imbibed American military concepts in the heyday of military aid to Pakistan from the US. They indicated a preference for imported weaponry. I found these officers professionally well educated but lacking the flexibility to apply their knowledge to the problem in hand within the prevailing constraints. No wonder they failed to gain much from the preceding insurgency.
By the end of October 1971, the Bangladeshi forces were able to raise eight regular battalions and one artillery regiment which were grouped into three brigades called Z, K and S forces, each consisting of two or three infantry battalions and one battery of artillery consisting of 105-nmm Italian pack howitzers. These were on the Indian pattern, but they unconsciously continued to follow Pakistani tactics, obviously because of their background. There were different schools of thought regarding their mode of deployment. Osmani preferred a separate sector to be allotted to them with independent tasks. This was perhaps inspired by his fierce pride in his country’s independent status. In no way did he wish his forces to be considered an adjunct of the Indian Army.
Lack of the heavy support integral to the Bangladeshi regular formations forbade such deployment on military considerations alone and it was prudent politically to project broadbased Bangladeshi forces participating as allies. The concept of their dispersed employment with Indian Army tormations therefore eventually prevailed. There was a difference of opinion between Ziaur Rahman, commander of the First Brigade, and Osmani on the manner in which they were to be employed. Rahman wanted the battalions split into companies which would fight in special groups, commando fashion, while Osmani insisted on conventional warfare. I think Rahman was unnecessarily carried away by his commando service background.
To give representation to each of the services, the Bangladesh Government had raised naval and air force components also, although in comparatively reduced strength. The naval complement consisted of about 40 ensigns drawn from defectors from the Pakistani Navy. They mustered two light-class ships, MV Polish and Padma, and armed them with 40-mm Bofors. These vessels proved adequate for warfare in the estuaries. The air force complement consisted of a Dakota, an Otter and an Alouette helicopter. The crew were Pakistani Air Force defectors, consisting of about ten officers and 30 airmen. The Otter and the Alouetle were armed with rockets and machine guns. The air wing was mainly employed in communication duties with the Bangladesh Government and with top brass of the armed forces during the insurgency, and in combat roles in the hot war.
—————–
1.On 26 March 1971, civil war broke out with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declaring a sovereign, independent People’s
Republic of Bangladesh, See Asian Recorder, Vol. XVII, No 20, p. 10147, Opcit. “Reorganisation of Liberation Forces. pp. 10153-54, Op.cit., Vol XVII, No 25, “Refugee Influx from Bangladesh, Appeal to UN,” p. 10209. Opci. Vol XVII, No 20, Democratic Republic of Bangladesh proclaimed, p. 10154 Op. cit., Vol XVII, No 26,”World Press Criticism of Genocide. p. 10228 OP cit., Vol XVII, No 20, “India’s Request to U Thant”. p. 10158 Op.cit. Vol XVII, No 43, “Cin C of Liberation Army on War Situation,” p. 10427
4
THE PREPARATION
As in other Eastern countries, the Indian public is easily swayed by sentiment. Important issues are taken to the streets instead of being debated calmly. Slogan-shouting crowds are used by political leaders to build-up public opinion on issues of the moment. Even the news media lend a hand with subjective reporting and comments. Under such conditions, a government may sometimes be forced into a corner by vociferous public opinion and commit itself to a course of action it may later repent. This happened in 1962 when, to placate public opinion, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru ordered the Army to take on the Chinese. A supine Chief of Army Staff obeyed, though he knew he hardly had a chance of success. Fortunately for the Army and the country, India had a strong Prime Minister and an equally strong Chief in 1971.
Mrs Gandhi had won the parliamentary elections held early that year with a thumping majority. She was known for her boldness and political astuteness. Gen Manekshaw had acquired a stature that none of his predecessors except Thimayya had. He possessed rare professional acumen and was extremely popular with officers as well as troops. His greatest asset was that he could stand up to people. This quality stood him in good stead when the Indian public, agitated over the mass killings and other excesses of the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh, began to urge the government that the Indian Army should immediately march in to liberate that oppressed land so that the Bengali refugees could go back to their homes.
Pressure increased when the revolt failed. Some retired generals and several cabinet ministers also joined in the cry for immediate liberation. But Manekshaw was not the man who could be stampeded into action. As mentioned earlier, Government had directed him to assess the situation and draw up contingency plans and his experts were on this job. He advised the Prime Minister against immediate military intervention and she accepted his advice.
Immediate intervention was inadvisable for many reasons. A nation cannot make war successfully without proper preparation. That needs time. Military planners have contingency plans, but these have to be updated to meet the changing situation. Many questions face them. For example, what is the enemy’s strength and how is it disposed? What are the options open to him? Who are going to be our allies and who will side with the enemy? What is the time frame? What is the state of communications and what is the terrain in the area of operations? What is the state of our own forces and their equipment? Have we the necessary superiority? If not, how can we arrange to tilt the balance in our favour in the strike area? There are many other factors such as weather conditions and the attitude of local people that have to be taken into consideration by the planners. Some of the answers lay with the politicians.
By the middle of April, Pakistan had three infantry divisions in the eastern wing. It
was also raising another division (36th) and enrolling large numbers of paramilitary forces such as EPCAF, Razakars, Mujahids and Ansars. India therefore had to muster six or seven divisions to get the necessary numerical superiority. Normal contingency plans required the presence of only about one division in West Bengal to ensure the security of the Siliguri corridor and Calcutta. The rest of the troops would have to be found by partly drawing upon reserves and partly by temporarily withdrawing some formations facing the Chinese in the eastern sector and those employed in a counter-insurgency role in Nagaland and Mizoram. Though there had been no open hostilities with the Chinese after 1962, except for an artillery duel in 1967 around Nathu La, India could not be sure of China’s attitude if we went to war with Pakistan. That country’s leaders had consistently wooed China and had been receiving assurances of friendship and considerable aid in weapons and equipment. In the 22-day war of 1965, China had issued an ultimatum to India and had moved some troops threateningly, but had refrained from intervention.
Sensing the likelihood of war over Bangladesh, Pakistan’s rulers had been at great pains to cement their friendship with China. At the military level, India’s planners proposed to neutralise the Chinese threat to some extent with a winter campaign, when the passes connecting India and Tibet would be snowbound. But the Chinese would still have some potential for intervention. At this stage, the politicians came to the rescue with the IndoSoviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The clause on mutual help in case of aggression was intended to deter the Chinese in case they wanted to come in on Pakistan’s side.
Another question that was purely political was the justification for a campaign. Could India arrogate to itself the right to walk into East Pakistan to evict the Pakistani Army and set up a democratic government there? It could claim that it was doing so to send back the 10 million refugees who had been sitting on its doorstep for many months. But would international opinion accept such justification? The answer lay in: (a) projecting India’s case to the world community so that international opinion could
force Pakistan’s rulers to instal a government of the elected representatives of the
country in Bangladesh; and. (b) leaving the commencement of hostilities to Pakistan should it choose to decide the
issue by force of arms.
We have already spoken of the action the Indian Government took to put India’s case before the world. In regard to Pakistan’s options for military action, even a layman could see that its potential for an offensive lay only in the west. With the resources at its disposal, it was in no position to launch one from Bangladesh, though the possibility of large-scale forays was there. Hence the Indian planners had to provide for containing a Pakistani offensive in the west.
India’s experience of international reactions in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani hostilities had been quite disconcerting. While no one lifted a finger when the two countries were heading for a collision, many jumped into the arena to separate the combatants once the fighting started. The ceasefire that resulted from this intervention did not bring lasting peace. This time, India did not wish to face a similar situation. There had to be a decision before the peacemakers could come in or any possible allies of the enemy could sway the issue. It had therefore to be a short war and a time frame of three weeks was laid down. After Tikka Khan’s Operation Blitz, the Pakistani Army in the east was busy in May consolidating its hold over the country. Though the Pakistanis achieved some success in this, Yahya Khan did not follow it up with any political measures to instal a democratic government in the province. All he did to placate Bengali sentiment was to appoint Dr A.M. Malik as governor in place of Tikka Khan. This move did not mollify the Bengalis as Niazi was at the same time made Martial Law Administrator. Real power lay in his hands.
With the onset of the monsoon the threat of a preemptive strike by Pakistan had receded. Though the rains in Punjab are not as severe as in B: ngal, the sodden plains do not permit the deployment of armour. Even other transport cannot move off the road till the ground dries by mid-September. India therefore got a breather.
No country can afford to be in a state of preparedness for war at all times. The cost would be colossal. All that can be done is to have updated contingency plans, and to deploy the available resources judiciously. Manekshaw, Chief of Army Staff at this time, also functioned as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He had been Chief for about two years. In the process of making the Army battleworthy, he had become aware of its strong points as well as its shortcomings. One of the reasons for his recommendation against immediate military action was the Army’s shortfalls in preparing for war, and he started to remedy them straightway.
In all democracies, more so in India, it is generally the habit to economise on defence expenditure in peace. Since it is difficult to make drastic cuts in the recurring establishment charges of a large standing force, the axe usually falls on reserve holdings of equipment and ammunition, stockpiled to sustain a war of a visualised duration. The erosion of reserves lowers the level of holdings in peace and recoupment becomes very difficult in case of war. Production has to be geared afresh both in the private and public sectors for items manufactured indigenously. This often takes a considerable lead period, especially when supplies of raw material and power are so sluggish and uncertain, with attendant labour troubles and other constraints. Much greater difficulty is confronted in procuring items of foreign manufacture.
Equipment held by underdeveloped countries like India is usually obsolescent if not actually obsolete. Its manufacture has usually been stopped by the supplying countries, and their inventories have usually run out of complete equipment and spares. The required items can usually be procured from private concerns dealing in junk, or those with limited manufacturing capacities, or from third countries still holding the equipment. Since the selling parties are generally aware of the pressing need of the buyer, the prices quoted are generally exorbitant. The time required for scouting, entering into international contracts and for transportation is long, and these delays are reflected in the preparation schedules.
Such last-minute hurry can be avoided by systematic turnover and recoupment of inventories with a continuous flow in the pipeline. This requires planned and timely allocation of funds in the defence budget, but unfortunately this is not done. In April 1971 the Army’s reserve holdings were generally low, enough for approximately 60 days in common-run items and considerably lower in those which were critical and in short supply. One of the first acts of Manekshaw as Chief was to see that the reserves were made up expeditiously. The entire government machinery was geared to step up production and procurement to achieve this in the shortest possible time.
The next action was to make units and formations fit for war, and he applied himself energetically to this task. Making up their deficiencies in manpower, equipment and ammunition became difficult as a major reorganisation and reequipping of the Indian Army was then in progress, especially in the Armoured Corps and Artillery. Some units were under raising, others were converting to newly introduced equipment, and yet others were getting familiar with specialised equipment.
The Army had been equipped with a heterogeneous mixture of equipment and ammunition. Some of it was from Western countries, received during and after the debacle in 1962. Some had been recently procured in the Soviet Union and other East European countries, and the rest had been produced indigenously. This equipment was spread indiscriminately as the units and formations were equipped as and when equipment became available and frequent change overs had taken place. Urgent rationalisation of equipment holdings, first theatrewise and then formationwise, was essential to fascilitate administrative and repair backing.
Rationalisation was ordered in good time and was over by the end of August. Rationalisation of stockpiling General Staff (GS) reserves of equipment and spares backing needed more time. After the rationalisation of equipment, the GS reserves were also so placed that replacements and spares were available to the demanding unit at short notice, and a steady flow in the pipeline in time of expenditure was ensured on systematic feedbacks.
Placing ammunition stocks presented certain difficulties, especially of imported varieties because the required quantities were not available. Although some stocks were under procurement abroad, these could not be counted as assets till they actually landed in the country. Items in short supply were proportionately distributed in such a manner that the immediate requirements of a short and intense war would be met in the battle zone, at least in the initial stages. Replenishment was to be controlled by planned expenditure. The redistribution was completed surreptitiously by the middle of October under cover of monsoon and winter stocking, and it served the war well.
In weapons and other equipment there were critical shortages in unit holdings, and a considerable backlog in their repair because spare parts were short. The situation became more acute when after an armoured formation exercise it was found that 70 to 80 per cent of its tanks needed repair. This needed a major repair organisation to get them back into service. The work was taken up on a war footing and the manufacture of indigenous tanks was temporarily stopped to expand the production of spare parts. Wishing to show greater production of complete units, the management of the factory had starved users of spares. This anomaly was redressed, and the manufacturer and the repair organisation made a coordinated effort to make the damaged and defective tanks battleworthy. This was achieved in good time, and Manekshaw personally presided over meetings of the coordinating committee to give it an extra fillip.
In the earlier conflicts of 1962 and 1965, many formations were thrown into battle with units with which they had not trained before, and this accounted for some of the setbacks they suffered. The annual changeover of a proportion of units from operational to non-operational areas was largely to blame for this. Almost one-third of the fighting strength gets shifted and changes formation affiliations in peace. This changeover means the induction of one-sometimes even two–new infantry battalion into a brigade and the withdrawal of an equal number. But the system is accepted as a necessary evil as it gives the jawan a chance to serve in a family station with his wife and children. The Chief did not however want the annual turnover to affect the conduct of operations he was planning. Accordingly, the change over programme for 1971-72 was suspended on the ground of railway transport constraints imposed py civilian priorities.” Not to cause despondency among the troops in operational areas, they were informed that their tenure in family stations would be suitably extended to compensate them for the extra time spent in the field.
Manpower shortage was another problem confronting the Chief. Units were under strength, having been milked for new raisings and because of normal wastage through retirement and release. This was tackled by a crash programme of training recruits at the regimental training centres and reducing the training period by some weeks. Fresh intake was surreptitiously increased to cater for war wastage as the normal manpower pipeline did not cater for this. Reservists were called for training in the monsoon and were kept on till well after the conflict. Used as reinforcements, their performance was poor. Only about 60 per cent responded to call notices and even they became disgruntled as their period of mobilisation dragged on.
During the period of preparation, it was essential that units should maintain a battleworthy level of manpower. Leave was therefore restricted to 10 per cent of unit strength, and that too only on extreme compassionate grounds. This meant forgoing leave for most of the rank and file. To avoid discontent on this account, Government was prevailed upon to extend the privilege of availing of leave entitlement for 1971 up to 1973. This was later extended to 1974.
The officer situation was more serious. It was estimated that 30 to 35 per cent of the authorised officer strength in a unit was away at any given time on leave, courses of instruction and other duties. To remedy this, the Chief ordered the staff at Army Headquarters and the headquarters of other formations to be drastically pruned to spare officers for posting to field formations. He also ordered the cancellation of courses of instruction involving the absence of essential command elements from their units on the ostensible ground that important training institutions were to be reorganized Plans were also made to use the instructional staff of the training institutions and students of the National Defence College in war establishments of field formations on mobilisation. The campaign and new controlling headquarters to be raised needed the services of experienced and fairly senior officers who would be forthcoming from such sources. The Chief was also keen that continuity in the command and control of fighting units and formations should not be upset on the eve of war. To implement these schemes all changes already planned in command and staff of formations and units were suspended.
The existing mobilisation plan envisaged the embodiment of both urban and rural units of the Territorial Army (TA) to be effective well before the war began. The process involved sending out call notices, gathering manpower, collecting equipment, giving refresher training to marry men with their arms and movement to their respective areas of operational responsibility. The whole period required for making these units fully effective was anything from four to eight weeks, depending upon the response to embodiment from employers and the Territorials themselves. Even under normal conditions, the response was rather poor. The most essential TA elements were the air defence units, which were required to be positioned at forward airfields or in radar units well before the start of hostilities to afford protective cover in case of a preemptive strike.
Another aspect of TA that worried the Chief was the alarm that the very announcement of its embodiment would create in the country. It would imply war was in the offing, and this always affected commerce adversely. Internationally, it would afford Pakistan an opportunity to accuse India in world forums of aggeressive intentions.
To circumvent this, the Chief announced a change in its mode of training. The prevalent system was for urban units to carry out norrmal training on weekends and holidays for a minimum three days a month for nine months. Collective training was carried out at the sub-unit level for 36 to 60 days, depending upon the state of training of each unit, including a camp of eight to 14 days duration. The idea of sparing their employees for about two weeks was not altogether attractive to employers. In the case of provincial units, training was organised in camps of two months’ duration once a year. Timings were staggered to suit the local farm cropping pattern.
The system did not meet the requirements of surreptitious embodiment. To do this in a smooth and orderly manner without attracting attention, it was decided that as an experimental measure all TA units should hold their annual training camps for three weeks from 1 September. This was ostensibly done to try out the contemplated change in policy. The Director of TA issued a directive on the new procedure for trial and comment. There were a few representations from those charged with implementing it, but nevertheless the changed policy was pushed through.
In the event, war did not come till the beginning of December. To cover the period from 22 September to the day of embodiment, sometime in the third week of November, the training camps were extended to overcome the shortcomings noticed. Thus, when war broke out, a fully effective Territorial Army was already in the field. The units were gradually moved closer to their respective areas of responsibility from the training camps and were in battle positions when Yahya Khan struck.
To give flexibility to operational plans and provide options in their execution, it is essential that a network of roads, with adequate laterals for a quick build-up and switchover, should be available near the intended lines of thrust. The western theatre was well served with a road system built under the strategic roads programme initiated in the 1960s, but this was not the case in the east, especially in the underdeveloped states of Meghalaya and Tripura. Since roadmaking needs time, work was started on new networks as well as to improve existing roads in that region.
The Border Road Task Force, assisted where possible by central and state roadbuilding agencies, was put on the job. Built under a crash programme, essential roads were ready in time. But this was not the case with forward airfields. It was soon realised that the field at Kumbigram could not fully cover operations in depth in Bangladesh. A decision was therefore taken to build a new air field somewhere in depth near Agartala, but despite the best efforts of the construction agencies the monsoon-soaked paddy fields did not dry in time to permit construction as planned, and this field had not become operational when the war began.
Along with the lack of a proper road and rail system, the eastern theatre lacked the requisite administrative infrastructure in the way of accommodation and communication facilities. This hampered an administrative build-up as no meaningful stocking could proceed without covered accommodation. To dump supplies in the open in that rainsoaked region would have been suicidal.
Taking a cue from the experience of the Fourteenth Army in World War II, a programme for the construction of huts was pushed through, and these were ready to store material when the stocking programme got under way. Similarly, new telegraph routes were laid, some old ones rerouted, and others taken over from the civil authorities so that before the start of hostilities the communication network was fully operative.
Our mobilisation plan provided for raising communication zone administrative units on the approach of war. This system was a legacy of British concepts, when wars were long and allowed enough time for a build-up of a nation’s war potential. It was entirely unsuited for a short war. Such units are really required well before the start of hostilities so that in the stage of building up the administrative infrastructure they can make a useful contribution. In 1971, these units actually came into being only a month or so before Pakistan struck, and well after the completion of the buildup. As a result they made very little contribution to the war effort, except perhaps in winding up its aftermath.
Such raisings at short notice do not serve the purpose of a short war. On the other hand, they prove harmful. Their manpower has to be found by milking existing units. Fresh recruitment for the purpose at such a late stage would be meaningless. Milking results in the deterioration of the fighting efficiency of existing units, and the hurriedly raised new units fare no better. In fact, all the directors of administrative service grumbled at this arrangement. Meanwhile, the commands concerned had contrived to raise ad hoc organisations to meet the contingency.
A major task in the preparatory stage was moving strike forces from the hinterland to their respective areas of responsibility. Apart from the holding troops, most of the reserve formations, including 1 Armoured Division, were located in the interior in farflung places like Jhansi, Babina, Hyderabad and Bangalore. The constraints on their movement were threefold. Firstly, there was the question of security. Once word of their movement leaked out and it was difficult to conceal such a largescale operation this would not only alert Pakistan and invite international pressures but would also spread a war scare among our people. These considerations apart, it was felt that if troops remained in their concentration areas too long, the pattern of their deployment would give away the general intentions of our operational plans.
It would therefore have been preferable to move our troops as late as possibly. But then Yahya Khan was almost daily threatening India with war in his drunken bouts, and the chances of his making a preemptive attack could not be ruled out. The location of the Indian cantonments and the availability of accommodation did not permit housing sufficient troops for deployment in such a defensive posture as to hold a Pakistani preemptive attack along the likely thrust lines and also provide a strong cover to allow concentration of troops from the hinterland. This entailed the movement of some formations soon after the monsoon.
The second constraint was the physical movement itself. It was calculated that if normal passenger and commercial traffic was not to be disturbed it would take a good six to eight weeks to complete our concentrations. This process could be accelerated by suspending civil traffic, but this was not acceptable for reasons of security and public morale. Then there was the limitation of loading and unloading facilities at the entraining and detraining stations. At most places no more than four or five trains could be served at a time. Besides, the layout of certain railway tracks, and their reduced capacity on the movement arteries, gave a funnelling effect to speedy build-up of forces for a short war. The availability of flats to carry tanks and the newly introduced Russian medium guns was limited. Some shuttling became necessary, and that proved time consuming. Concerted efforts were made to seek solutions for some of these limitations by rerouting trains, creating additional facilities for loading and unloading, and resorting to partial movement by motor transport.
Last, but not least, were the political compulsions. The Indian Government continued to solicit the help of the big powers in exerting political and economic pressure on Yahya Khan to seek a peaceful solution in Bangladesh. This process of political negotiations and diplomacy ran on well into the end of November 1971. While these negotiations were on, it was considered inexpedient to make any ostensible warlike movement which would convey impressions contrary to our public declarations.
The Chief held his hand till the beginning of October, but thereafter he considered it militarily imprudent to accept the risk of a likely Pakistani preemptive move any further. Orders were issued for the start of troop concentrations in their areas of responsibility in a steady trickle. The movement started in the first week of October and continued till well after the middle of November. But the tactical imbalance which existed because of the improper location of troops was redressed by the third week of October. Yahya Khan had waited too long.
Various measures were considered for keeping these movements a well-guarded secret. The planners were aware that no secret was safe in an open society like India, and least of all the movement of troops on a large scale. To conceal the layout of the Indian defensive posture, especially the positioning of its reserve formations, to the very end, it was proposed to move them to the depth-training areas for the ostensible purpose of running exercises with troops, and then move them to the operational areas only when war was imminent. To this proposal too the Chief did not agree. He said: I don’t like this fancy stuff. You should realise that my formations are not the German Panzer divisions. They take their own time to move.’ How well Manekshaw knew his army.
The formations were accordingly moved straight to their concentration areas in broad daylight, fully accepting the breach of security for the sake of orderly execution. Several other possible measures were however adopted to hide their destinations, such as cutting down various reports and returns, choosing wayside halts, confusing the wearing of formations signs and adopting altogether new tactical numbers for signposting. Despite these measures it appears from what the Pakistani-India ‘watchers’ said after the conflict that the Indian planners were successful in hiding the identity of only one formation in the entire movement.
The Chief paid great attention to building up the jawan’s morale, especially to strengthen his motivation to accept greater physical risks in the face of fire. Manekshaw had himself been severely wounded in World War II and fully understood the plight of disabled soldiers and their families, and above all of war widows. The British in the old days went out of their way to enhance the izzat (pride) of the serving soldier and gave liberal jagirs (grants of land) and other concessions such as educational facilities to the children of ex-servicemen, and were still more magnanimous to those killed or wounded in battle.
After independence, and the installation of a democratic national government, considerations of loyalty and devotion to duty were cast to the winds and rupees, annas and pies came to the fore. As a result the grants, pensions and other concessions for those killed or wounded in war fell so miserably low that it almost amounted to a soldier’s family being thrown on the streets. The transition from the British to the new Indian environment was so sudden that the soldier did not realise its full impact till the Jammu and Kashmir operations were over.
Lt Col (later Maj Gen) Rawind Singh Grewal, who had received a machine gun burst straight in his stomach and leg in the J and K operations, was hospitalised for a period longer than stipulated for retention of acting rank and was brought down to his substantive rank of captain after 28 days. This officer is said to have walked up to Cariappa, then Chief, and pointing to his scars, said: Sir, do you think I got these wounds for the benefit of my health? The reward for risking my life for the sake of my country has been loss of rank and pay. Trust me to fight for you again. Goodbye, Sir. Cariappa and his successors were aware of the problem, but nothing substantial could be achieved against the callous attitude of money-conscious politicians and the hidebound bureaucracy. A stalemate ensued and the morale of the soldiery continued to sag, especially in the materialistic environment of a developing country. The old soldier was fading out, and with him disappeared the old sense of loyalty and duty. The new soldier was brought up on the fast-changing value of the rupee.
It was noticed in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and in the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 that the Indian soldier was successively taking fewer risks under fire. Although some concessions were announced by various state governments at the end of the 1965 conflict, soon thereafter the soldier was quickly forgotten as fast as public enthusiasm diminished. Nothing was stabilised.
The Chief wanted these grievances redressed to ensure that the soldier would go into the oncoming war with the assurance that should he get killed his family would be looked after for life, and his children educated in a manner befitting his rank and status. And should he get wounded he would not have to fend for himself. Even those missing in war or taken prisoner would receive the same consideration because, so far as the families were concerned, the bread winner was lost.
On the Chief’s orders, a study of the problems confronting battle casualties was carried out in depth and rational solutions sought to alleviate the hardships of their families in a practical manner. His broad recommendations in the form of various allowances and pension benefits were accepted by the Government with very slight modifications. This was a significant contribution to building up the Indian Army which only a man of Manekshaw’s calibre could achieve despite bureaucratic redtape.
Among the new measures was the grant of full pay and allowances for two months to the family of a man killed in action, and an adequate allowance thereafter till the special family pension was sanctioned. The rate of this pension was also liberalised to make it three-fourths a man’s basic pay. The rights of war widows who remarried were protected, and liberal gratuities were provided for the families of those killed in action to soften the initial blow. Adequate provision was made for children, including allowances for education The rank and pay of those wounded in action were also safeguarded for the period of hospitalisation, and the rates of disability pension were liberalised.
A number of new medals were introduced to cover the coming campaign. A Silver Jubilee Medal to commemorate a quarter century of independence was also instituted. The most coveted among the new medals was the Wound Medal, which had a broad scarlet ribbon and could be worn ahead of other campaign medals with some pride. Entitlement for this award was backdated to cover all the campaigns after independence. Displayed on the chests of veterans, this medal instilled a sense of pride in having sustained wounds in the service of their country.
Steps were also taken to look after the families of soldiers suddenly moved to operational areas. These families were allowed to retain the accommodation they occupied. Those who wanted to shift their stations for reasons of personal convenience were allowed to do so, and “separated family quarters” were allotted to them at stations of their choice. Travel concessions were extended to the families for this purpose.
Thus, by painstaking care and great consideration for his men, Manekshaw built that psychological background which motivates soldiers to risk their lives. Never before did the Indian soldier go to war with so much assurance regarding his and his family’s well-being should misfortune befall him.
Meanwhile, the state of no war-no peace continued. There were the usual border incidents and instrusions on the uneasy ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir Counterinsurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram also went on. More troops was employed in maintaining internal security in West Bengal till August. The commitments relating to the insurgency in East Pakistan were mounting. A sizable organisation was needed to train and give operational guidance to the guerilla forces.
The reader may here like to know something of the system of higher direction of war obtaining in India. The Indian defence organisation is based on the British democratic system under which the elected head of government in the person of the Prime Minister is responsible to Parliament, and through it to the nation as a whole, for the defence of the country. Borrowed again from the British, there were various committees, like the Cabinet Defence Committee, to help the Prime Minister to carry out his duties. This role was later taken over by the Political Affairs Committee, the Defence Minister’s Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Briefly, the role of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was to render to the Prime Minister professional advice on military strategy and the conduct of military operations, and to point out the military implications of a particular policy. The Chiefs had direct access to the Prime Minister. The role of the Defence Minister was to coordinate the requirements and priorities of the three services and allocate resources to them. Beyond this he had no hand in formulating defence policy individually, but being a member of the Political Affairs Committee he shared responsibility for its decisions. His effectiveness depended entirely on the force of his personality and the influence he wielded with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as a whole.
Historically, this British-inspired committee system has not worked well in India under a monolithic political power system and the abysmal ignorance of most politicians regarding military affairs. In the Jammu and Kashmir operations in 1947-48, higher direction was provided by Earl Mountbatten, the British Governor-General, and his adviser, Lord Ismay, through Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister. The only flaw in the conduct of that war was the acceptance of a ceasefire when the tide of Indian military operations was
sweeping the invaders out of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This decision led to two more wars, and the problem of Kashmir still defies a political solution.
The chain of events which led to the Chinese military collision with India was the result of three-cornered consultations between Nehru, Krishna Menon and Lt Gen BM Kaul. The professional advice of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was bypassed. Only when enraged public opinion forced his hand after a humiliating defeat did the politically shattered Nehru seek refuge in an enlarged National Defence Council and the Cabinet Defence Committee and hurriedly sought the advice of some retired generals. But then it was too late both for him and the country. Along with Nehru, the overdone defence counselling disappeared and bureaucratic routine once again established its hold.
Thereafter, up to the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965, military advice from Gen Chaudhuri prevailed both in shaping the military machine and the conduct of the war forced on India by Pakistan. The politician, having learnt his lesson from Nehru’s debacle, left the soldier alone. Shastri, Nehru’s successor, proved amenable to Chaudhuri’s advice and was courageous enough to accept full responsibility for his decisions. The strategy for the 1965 conflict was purely of Chaudhuri’s conception, with the tacit concurrence of Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh. It is a well-known fact that the Indian Navy was left out of the war altogether, to the extent that the flotilla harboured in Bombay did not even know when it started.
Clearly, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was not functioning. The reason was obvious: the committee system visualised a corporate existence where the three Chiefs were equal in status. The committee was supposed to decide collectively, the Chairman not possessing a special vote or veto. Agreed solutions resulted, and it could be safely inferred that the committee’s recommendations would at best be a compromise, which may look attractive in peace but seldom wins wars.
It was not realised that, unlike Britain, India was a subcontinent, separated from potential enemies by only land frontiers. Its wars would be fought mainly on land, where the Army was bound to play the predominant part. The other services would only have a supporting role. It was therefore no wonder that Chaudhuri’s counsel prevailed, with Arjan Singh in support. But modern wars are total in nature, and cannot be fought in isolation and, as is aptly said, the serious business of war cannot be left to soldiers alone.
Manekshaw was a soldier of vision. He realised that major questions of defence policy could not be dealt with in purely military terms. They needed to be coordinated with foreign, economic and internal policies, and in the wider context they embraced the body politic of the entire nation. As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, he pressed for the political involvement of Government in evolving a broad strategy and laying down clearcut directives to achieve our aims. This was done through his direct contact with the Prime Minister, and through her with the Political Affairs Committee.
In fact, this direct access and the conviction with which he made his recommendations antagonised quite a few of his colleagues and superiors and was the main cause of his difficulties with Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram later. For the first time a political representative in the person of D.P. Dhar, designated Chairman of the Planning Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs, was inducted into war councils. Dhar worked closely with Manekshaw throughout the war, and thereafter to settle its aftermath. There could not have been a better combination for the conduct of war. Their understanding of the combined potential of political and military means and their effective use of it was superb.
On the military side, Manekshaw activated the old joint services organs, and created some new ones. A Joint Intelligences Committee, consisting of representatives of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Intelligence Bureau and the Directors of Intelligence of the three services, was formed under the chairmanship of the Vice Chief of Army Staff. This ensured coordination at the top. Similarly, the Joint Planning Committee dealt with the inter-service coordination of operational plans, and work started on establishing a Combined Services Operational Headquarters. Thus, South Block and Vayu Bhavan became a well-knit team.
Manekshaw knew all along that the Army, the predominant partner, would play the vital part, and he had no doubt that success entirely depended on the soundness of the Army’s operational plans and its ability to execute them. The Air Force and the Navy could only further these plans by efficient and timely support and their contribution would ease the Army’s task. It is to Manekshaw’s credit that with his charm and tact, he got the unreserved involvement of the other services in formulating the operational plans, and subsequently in their implementation. Throughout, he never let the other services feel they were not equal partners in the undertaking. In fact, he made it a point to magnify their contribution and was always lavish in his praise of them. Whenever there was a setback, as at a few places in the west, he gracefully accepted the whole blame.
Likewise, on the civil side, a Secretaries’ Committee was set up to take executive decisions dealing with preparations for war and their execution. The committee consisted of the Secretaries of Defence, Home, Finance and Foreign Affairs, and depending on the issues to be dealt with other secretaries were coopted. The committee’s business was transacted with dispatch. The Directors-General of the Border Security Force and of Civil Defence and other heads of para-military forces and allied war organisations were brought in at appropriate stages of planning. The apex of direction, coordination and supervision remained with Manekshaw and Dhar.
The Prime Minister was kept in constant touch with developments, and so was the Political Affairs Committee when considered necessary. But the decision-making processes were never allowed to get tangled in the maze of bureaucratic redtape. The Chief brooked no delay, whether in giving decisions or oiling the sluggish wheels of official machinery to get things moving. He was on the spot if a holdup occurred, whether at headquarters or in the field. He wielded such influence and commanded such respect that invariably the bureaucracy looked up to him rather than attempt to dictate terms. Secretaries were seen hurrying in and out of his office with ready decisions concerning the business of war.
Grateful for the opportunity afforded to him and considering himself lucky to be in the saddle at such a critical time, he set the course towards victory with patriotic fervour and a rare verve. He had pledged to seek a victory for India, and he was to redeem that pledge i no uncertain terms.
—————
1.Article IX of the Indo-Soviet treaty ensured mutual consultations in case of aggression or a threat thereof.
2.The Pakistan Times, Lahore, on 19 July quoted President Yahya Khan as saying that he would declare war “If India
made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan. I shall declare war, let the world not. Nor Will Pakistan be alone.
3.Speaking at a banquet given in her honour in the Kremlin on 28 September 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stressed
4.the urgency of creating conditions in which East Pakistan refugees could return to their homes without fear,
Reported by Tass, Pravda. Times of India. The report of the Third Pay Commission recommending a revision of pay, allowances and other benefits of Army
officers and other ranks was submitted on June 1971. Reported by The Statesman, New Delhi The Statesman, Calcutta, reported an exodus from West Pakistan on 10 September. The Statesman and The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, reported the setting up of a top-level Military Affairs Committee
which included three Chiefs of Staff and three distinguished retired generals, Gen K.S. Thimayya, Gen
Rajendrasinhji and Lt Gen S.P. Thorat, with Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan as chairman. Radio Pakistan on 5 September 1971, said the Pakistani Government had noted with much concem” the series of
meetings D.P. Dhar, Chairman of Policy Planning in the External Affairs Ministry, had with Bangladesh leaders in Calcutta
5
THE PLAN
On the map, Bangladesh looks like the head of a female stag with stunted horns pointing towards Siliguri, and its narrow neck is represented by the Agartala bulge. The country is landlocked on three sides: by the Indian states of West Bengal in the west; West Bengal and Meghalaya in the north; Tripura and Mizoram in the east, and Burma in the lower regions opposite Cox’s Bazaar. The southern portion is open to the Bay of Bengal. Three major rivers flow through Bangladesh, and they are so broad that it is difficult at places to see one bank from the other. Before they empty into the Bay of Bengal, they form vast deltas that run far inland, almost reaching the heart of the country. Most of the inland traffic consists of steamers and boats plying on these rivers, which are dotted with inland ports handling sizable quantities of commercial goods and passenger traffic.
The Brahmaputra, known as the Jamuna in Bangladesh, runs from north to south and divides the country roughly in the middle. The western half is again divided in two at the waist by the Ganga or Padma running northwest to southeast and joining the Jamuna north of Faridpur. The Meghna flows from the northeast parallel to the eastern border with India and joins the Jamuna south of Dacca. Thus Bangladesh is divided by these rivers into four distinct regions or sectors:
(a) Northwestern sector: includes the general areas of Dinajpur, Rangpur and Rajshahi north of the Ganga and west of the Jamuna. (b) Southwestern sector: includes the general areas of Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur and
Kushtia lying south of west of the Ganga and Padma. (C) Northern sector: covers the general areas of Dacca, Tangail and Mymensingh lying
between the Jamuna and the Meghna. (d) Eastem sector: lies east of the Meghna and includes the general areas of Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong.
With the exception of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Sylhet, the countryside is generally flat and lowlying paddy land, waterlogged and intersected by numerous rivers and rivulets. The southern regions are covered by a large number of hills or lakes and swamps. The monsoon breaks in full force by the middle of May and runs into the first week of October. The main crops are paddy and jute.
The road and rail systems generally run north to south between the rivers and serve the main towns. A peculiar feature common to both are the numerous ferries linking various segments. Bridging these mighty rivers would call for great engineering skill and effort. Only two rail and road bridges existed for trans-sector traffic, Hardinge Bridge joining the northwestern and southwestern sectors near Ishurdi and Pabna, and the Bhairab Bazaar bridge connecting the northern and eastern sectors near Ashuganj.
There were a few arterial roads and a number of subsidiary ones, both metalled and unmetalled. Much of the surface communication was by inland water transport. The airport for international traffic was at Dacca, which was connected with other sectors by subsidiary airfields near the main urban centres. These fields were fit for short-landing aircraft and were well served by the internal flights of Pakistan International Airlines The lowlying countryside, heavy monsoon rains, paucity of surface communications and mighty rivers combined to make Bangladesh a military planner’s nightmare. The Indian Army’s advance in this terrain, especially in the context of a short and swift campaign, needed vast engineering resources in the way of bridging equipment, assault and river craft and other requirements which could not be mustered even by pooling the entire country’s resources. Those who had fought in Burma in World War II knew the problems of fighting in lowlying paddy land, and as a result of this doubted our chances of quick success in the quagmire of Bangladesh.
From the early 1960s, the Indian high command had been forced to have contingency plans for defence against Pakistan in the west and east and against China in the north. On account of China’s active political support to Pakistan, the spectre of having to fight on three fronts had always been present. The Chinese did not come in on Pakistan’s side in the 1965 Indo-Pak hostilities, but they issued an ultimatum and we were forced to retain almost all our troops facing them in their operational locations. A similar situation now faced the country, except that we would have preferred to localise the hostilities to Bangladesh. The military planners had therefore to think how best we could achieve our aims within the resources available.
It would be worthwhile here to take a look at India’s strength vis-a-vis its potential enemy. In the west, Pakistan had about ten infantry and two armoured divisions, two independent armoured brigades, two artillery brigades, two independent infantry brigades and a couple of armoured regiments. The infantry divisions included the two being raised to replace 9 and 16 Divisions sent out to reinforce their Eastern Command in Bangladesh. Against this, India had 12 infantry divisions, one armoured division, three artillery brigades, two independent infantry brigades, two armoured brigades and one independent para brigade. Thus India had a marginal advantage in infantry, but this was offset by Pakistan’s edge in armour
India could muster about seven infantry divisions against East Pakistan. One of these had been originally earmarked for the contingency plan in East Pakistan, two divisions had been taken off counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram, three taken from reserves located in the Siliguri corridor against the Chinese, and one brought from the UPTibet border, accepting risk in the region. But this division was not to be committed in depth in Bangladesh so that it could be moved back quickly in case of a hostile Chinese reaction. In armour, India had three regiments, two independent squadrons and an APC battalion against Pakistan’s one armoured regiment and a couple of independent squadrons. Our superiority in ground forces over Pakistan was not overwhelming enough for the nvisaged speed of operations. Only audacity in planning and boldness in execution would clinch the issue.
In the air, India had a total of 45 squadrons in all of combat and transport aircraft
against Pakistan’s 13 compared with 34 and 12 respectively in 1965. The Indian Air Force had replaced most of its vintage Vampires, Toofanis and Mysteres with the Russian built SU-7. It had also gone in for the MIG-21, now being assembled in the country, while Pakistan had acquired the Chinese-made Mig-19, somewhat inferior in performance to Mig. 21. On the other hand, Pakistan had in service 24 Mirages which were superior in performance to any Indian aircraft. Both sides were however weak in deep-penetration bombing capacity and were numerically at near parity as in 1965.
After the Chinese invasion in 1962, India had improved its early warning radar system with the help of US military aid, but this was abruptly cut off after the conflict in 1965. The project was however continued with help from other sources and with indigenous production. By the time operations started in 1971, considerable progress had been made in improving the system. The western theatre from Kashmir to the Arabian Sea, apart from the mountainous section, was adequately covered, but the eastern theatre, especially in the context of war in East Pakistan, was rather neglected. Nobody had taken a war in this region seriously, and as such this aspect of the warning system had received low priority. In naval power, India had an edge over Pakistan in conventional warships like cruisers, destroyers and frigates besides an aircraft carrier. But these vessels were mostly obsolescent and not fit for fast manoeuvre. In fact, the aircraft carrier was chugging along at the time on only one boiler. The fleet’s overall performance had however been improved vastly through better organisation and the creation of western and eastern wings under separate naval command headquarters. The navy’s strike capability was further increased by procuring missile boats from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Pakistan had gone in for submarines of the Daphne and Midget class, hoping thus to neutralise India’s naval strength through underwater operations.
Before the war, the Indian Navy had found an answer to the Pakistani submarine menace by obtaining British Sea King helicopters which could operate from shore bases as well as from ships at sea. In addition, maritime reconnaissance was better organised by equipping the old Constellations with a more sophisticated radar system under Maritime Headquarters established by the IAF in Bombay.
Traditionally Pakistan had one infantry division of four brigades deployed in East Pakistan. After the events of March 1971, as described earlier, this force was built up to a strength of about four divisions comprising some 35 regular infantry battalions, seven wings of paramilitary forces brought in from West Pakistan, 17 wings of the locally raised East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces, some subunits of the industrial security force, and a large number of Mujahids and Razakars.
The artillery was limited to six field regiments and some independent mortar and field batteries which could be augmented from the artillery element left behind by the divisions hurriedly flown in from the western wing. Armour consisted mainly of about one regiment of Chaffee tanks, one independent Chaffee squadron, and one ad hoc squadron of Chaffee and PT-76 tanks. The few PT-76 tanks in service had been captured by the Pakistani Army in the conflict of 1965 in the Khemkaran sector, where India had destroyed or captured about a regiment worth of brand new Patton tanks. As regards airpower, Pakistan had some 20 to 25 Sabrejet fighters in Bangladesh and a few helicopters for intercommunication flights. An unspecified, but substantially large, number of gun-boats, some of them improvised, were operating both in the coastal and inland waters.
Initially, the Pakistani high command had develoyed its forces purely for internal security and counter-insurgency operations in widely spread penny packets. As the insurgency progressively intensified, the locations and groupings continued to alter to meet the changing circumstances. But in formulating the plan it was appreciated that in the event of a full-fledged war, the Pakistani Army’s sectorwise allocation of troops was likely to conform to the following pattern: (a) Northwestem sector: the hom jutting out of this sector pointed towards Siliguri and provided easy access for closing the Siliguri-Gauhati corridor as well as a linkup with the Chinese. The ground was firmer than in the other sectors and would facilitate the use of armour. Pakistan was likely to allocate to it an infantry division with a regiment of armour and about two field regiments. One brigade was likely to cover the areas of Dinajpur and Rangpur, the second would look after the Hilli-Ghoraghat waistline and the third would guard Raj shahi and Naogaon. If the Chinese coalition was not forthcoming, Pakistan might consider thinning out this sector to one infantry group of four or five battalions and using the remainder of the division elsewhere for offensive or defensive tasks, particularly in the sector southwest of Dacca. (b) Southwestern sector: This was likely to be held with one infantry division of three
to four brigades, with a brigade each in the general areas of Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, and Jhenida or Megura. From here Pakistan could develop a thrust towards Calcutta. Although such a move had no chance of success as India had already moved an infantry division to counter it, this area was close to Calcutta,
and even a temporary intrusion could induce serious repercussions in India. (c) Eastern sector: We expected this area to be held with one or two divisions, with a
brigade each at Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Comilla, Feni and Chittagong. It was very thinly held by India, and if Pakistan struck northeast or east at the soft belly of Meghalaya or Assam, or the still softer flank of Tripura, it could disrupt the only road from Silchar to Agartala, running parallel to, and at places within field gun
range of the international border. (d) Northern sector: One brigade was expected to be deployed in the general area of Jamalpur and Mymensingh.
We felt that Pakistan would initially have about a brigade defending Dacca, with a contingency plan for pulling back two or three brigades from any of these sectors to a depth defence of the city, depending upon the tactical situation. The strategic options open to Pakistan were limited. To make sure that India could not concentrate overwhelming superiority against East Pakistan, Yahya Khan had to ensure that any largescale operations by the Indian Army against that wing would be countered with an attack in the west. Pakistan could not thus afford to reinforce the eastern wing more than had already been done. As it was, Yahya Khan had depleted his strike forces in the western wing to send two urgently needed divisions to the east. Although raising had started to make up the loss, it would take about six months to make the new division battleworthy. On the other hand, there was the possibility of raising a fourth division by using unaffiliated formations and units. This the Pakistani high command began to do.
Yahya Khan’s next best bet was to bring China openly into the conflict so that the Indian Army would be unable to attain the required superiority in East Pakistan Pakistan strove hard to do this right up to the end of hostilities. Yahya Khan made full use of Bhutto’s diplomacy by rushing him to see Chou En-lai as late as November 1971. Evidently nothing substantial materialised except a promise for Pakistan and admonishment to India. But at the time our plans were being formulated collusion between Pakistan and China could not be ruled out. As such, borrowing formations from the holding force against China had to be very judiciously executed, both in terms of quantity and time.
Another option for Yahya Khan was to stabilise East Pakistan politically by creating even a faked normalcy so that India would find it difficult to justify military intervention The refugee problem could be underplayed through suitable propaganda and adroit diplomacy, especially in international forums. But the ever-growing strength of the Mukti Bahini and the failure of Tikka Khan’s measures combined to thwart this design.
Yahya Khan had a valid reason for crossing the international border in the easter wing in pursuit of the guerillas as well as to overrun their bases in India about the end of May and, if opportune, to enlarge the conflict into a full-fledged war by hitting India also in the west. That was India’s worst hour: its reserve formations were in the hinterland; it had serious shortfalls of war material, and the Indian soldier and civilian were not mentally attuned to immediate war. If Yahya Khan had struck at that time, he could have gained profitable objectives both in the western and eastern theatres before the onset of the monsoon.
By the time India could have fully geared up its war machine for battle, the quagmire of mud in both theatres would have negated the development of its full war potential. Pakistan could hold on to its hastily won territory during the stalemate of the rains. Meanwhile, it could strive to generate international pressure against India so as to effect a ceasefire and a political settlement suited to its interests before the monsoon lifted and the terrain permitted the resumption of military operations.
Yahya Khan however slipped up on this very feasible option, perhaps because of his belief in Tikka Khan’s ability to suppress the Bengali insurgency and bring back normalcy so that India would have no excuse to intervene. Perhaps his fears of the inadequacy of Pakistan’s own military preparedness for such lightning action in the west, especially after having lost two divisions of its strike force, influenced his judgment. Yahya Khan thus lost the opportunity of a lifetime.
After the monsoon, he expected Indian intervention in Bangladesh in support of the Mukti Bahini. By then, Pakistani diplomacy had b: en sufficiently active to gauge how much help would be forthcoming, and from what quarters, except perhaps the inscrutable Chinese. He had decided in case of a conflict in East Pakistan to escalate the war to embrace the western wing and resist the Indian and Bangladeshi forces long enough to bring about the end of hostilities under international pressure without losing any vital objective. Loss of a little unprofitable peripheral territory was acceptable as this could be negotiated for Indian territory that might be captured in the west.
In any event, Yahya Khan and his associates felt that India would be content with limited gains of territory, with the sole aim of establishing a provisional Bangladesh government in East Pakistan. Should he fail in both his estimate of India’s war aims and military capability, and should the war not be halted in time, Yahya Khan felt that Niazi
would be able to carry out an organised withdrawal, combined with a scorched-earth policy, in the direction of the ports of Chittagong and Khulna, from where the Pakistani forces in Bangladesh could be evacuated to the western wing with the help of the navies and merchant shipping of friendly nations. If East Pakistan was lost, at least the four divisions there would be back home to fight another day.
India’s planners had to find answers to all the military contingencies emanating from Yahya Khan’s options and evolve a plan that would thwart Niazi’s efforts to implement these concepts. Many claimed authorship of the plan for the liberation of Bangladesh after it resulted in a resounding victory. Truly, victory has many fathers but defeat is an orphan. So was the case with this plan. To set the record right, it can be said with all the emphasis it deserves that the master plan was evolved by Lt Gen K. K. Singh, then Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters. It went through many changes as a result of the alteration in the parameters of the original premises because of the developing situations. But then all good plans should have the flexibility to withstand reviews on feedbacks, and this one stood the test well. Others also certainly contributed to its progressive betterment.
Although Manekshaw was known for his sentimental leanings towards his old associates and liked to gather them around himself, he was a shrewd judge of professional ability. He was quick to spot talent and used it effectively. One such find was KK Singh. An Armoured Corps officer with outstanding professional ability and battle experience, he had gone in 1962 to NEFA with Lt Gen B. M. Kaul to serve as his Brigadier General Staff and stayed on with Manekshaw when he took over the corps from the much humbled kaul. A quiet, over the corps from the much humbled unassuming man, austere in living and moderate in habits, he was a thorough professional and a patriot, seemingly living only to further national interests. He preferred to lead by peruasion and the example of his tireless devotion to duty.
The Chief had implicit faith in K.K. and this faith could not have been better justified as he was one of the best conceptual brains of his time on the wider horizons of national strategy and the lower domain of tactics. In addition, he was perhaps the only officer, with the exception of his successor Inder Gill, who could stand up to a towering personality like Manekshaw and tell him what was right for the nation and the services.
Nothing, absolutely nothing, could deter K. K. from speaking out his mind or putting his views on paper. And no pressures, however great, could deflect him from the right path. It was the Chief’s practice to call K.K. to his office or walk straight to K.K. whenever some issue, operational or otherwise, was in his mind. K.K. would listen attentively, and in his characteristic quiet style undertake to get it examined in depth before commiting the Chief to a particular course of action. K.K’s examination in depth meant dissecting issues threadbare from all conceivable angles. After sifting the wheat from the chaff, he would present the various options with firm recommendations for a particular course of action.
In his examination, he encouraged his team to air their views frankly and picked up the pearls wherever they could be found. Although he did not sh and conformists irksome. He valued original, but solid, military thought wherever he saw it. Such was the man who led the team that formulated the plan for liberating Bangladesh. Needless to say, the plan went through Matnekshaw’s close scrutiny before it was accepted.
This scrutiny lasted several sittings, punctuated by occasional excursions for golf by K. K. much to the Chief’s annoyance. The first consideration confronting the planners was to work out the miximum quantity of resources of troops and equipment which could be mustered within the time frame of a short war of about three weeks duration to liberate Bangladesh. On these resources depended the aim and objectives of the plan, as also the scope of the military operations. The traditional contingency plan for East Pakistan had the limited aim of ensuring the security of Calcutta and the Siliguri corridor. For this, 9 Infantry Division, located in the Ranchi complex, was earmarked along with some brigades of 20 Mountain Division located within the corridor, in case they were not already committed against the Chinese.
To contend with a buildup of some four divisions by Pakistan, it was necessary to concentrate about seven or eight divisions if the campaign was to make any headway. From the reserves earmarked for employment in case of a Chinese attack, 4, 20 and 23 Mountain Divisions were selected with the proviso that at least two of them would go back to face the Chinese should they decide to enter the fray. But this was to be done only if the holding forces suffered a serious setback and restoring the status quo on the northern border became absolutely necessary
Two other mountain divisions, 8 and 57, occupied with counter-insurgency operations in Mizoram and Nagaland, were also to be employed for the liberation. Of the six brigades of 8 Mountain Division, two were to form an integral part of the Division, one was to be left behind in Nagaland, and two others were to function independently. The Mizoram counter-insurgency operations were to be handed over to two infantry battalions raised for the purpose so as to spare the entire 57 Mountain Division for the campaign. An independent brigade originally chosen as a reserve for Rajasthan was also allotted to Bangladesh.
Some risks were accepted in partially denuding the UP-Tibet border in the central sector by moving 6 Mountain Division and leaving only one brigade group behind to carry out the original role. 50 Independent Para Brigade, an Army Headquarters reserve, was also allotted to Bangladesh. Thus it was considered feasible to muster a strength of seven to eight divisions without upsetting the strategic balance in relation to Pakistan, but with some reservations with regard to China. In the way of armour, it was possible to gather about three regiments, out of which one was equipped with T-55s and another with PT-76s, and the third a collection of three independent squadrons with AMX-13 tanks and Ferret scoutcars.
There was an overall shortage of artillery. The six brigades of 8 Mountain Division operating in Nagaland did not have a single artillery unit. 57 Mountain Division, a newly raised formation, had a reduced artillery complement. Except 9 Infantry Division, all the other formations participating in the offensive operations were w mountain units equipped with guns with smaller range and lighter in eight of shell. Some calculated risks had to be accepted by moving artillery units from the holding force on the northern border to make up the shortfall. Two medium regiments were also nominated from outside Eastern Command to augment firepower. The availble resources needed to be rationalised to provide balanced support to all formations With the intensification of Mukti Bahini operations in the border areas and limited incursions by it in the way of raids and forays inside East Pakistan, the Pakistani forces were drawn more and more towards the peripheral areas. As a result, a wide dispersion in their deployment became apparent. The detailed Pakistani order of battle and locations down to infantry battalions became available. The intelligence agencies had considerably improved in their functions with the abundance of sources provided by the Mukti Bahini and the refugees pouring in across the border.
A comparison of the relative strength of India and Pakistan worked out at a ratio of 7:4, and this did not appear to the planners as such a preponderant superiority in numbers as to go for the stereo-typed British-style step-by-step operations relying more on attrition rather than superior generalship. To achieve quick success, as dictated by political compulsions, the planners had to search for an audacious plan which brought into play superiority of manoeuvre and psychological methods. Accordingly, the following strategy for liberating Bangladesh was projected to the Chief, and he accepted it as a framework for detailed working:
(a)
The capture or effective blockading of the two major ports of entry to stop further buildup in the region after the outbreak of war as well as to create a psychology of isolation among the Pakistani troops and the fear of being cut off from West Pakistan. The blockade was expected to prevent a third party from evacuating the retreating Pakistani forces by sea, although such intervention seemed farfetched. Securing such objectives forbade inter-sector movement. In the eastern sector, the bridge at Feni connected the Chittagong area with the rest of the sector. Certain ferry sites along the rivers which facilitated transsector movement along th inland waterways were to be rendered unserviceable. Airfields were to be secured and rendered unfit for use to prevent lifting of troops and equipment.
(b)
This aimed at separating the Pakistani formations in snch a manner that they would not be able to put up a united stand at any stage of the battle. It would also ensure that the formations deployed forward would be unable to withdraw to depth positions, especially those prepared for the defence of Dacca. The utmost speed was visualised in reaching these vital objectives, and in this context bypassing the opposition encountered en route was to be accepted.
(c) To further split and disorganise the Pakistani formations into penny packets, such
communication centres were to be secured within the sectors which, if in Indian hands, would further incapacitate the Pakistani Army’s capability to fight in strength. Thus widely dispersed units and sub-units and detachments would be an
easy target for piecemeal destruction. (d) Once the enemy was defeated in detail by this manoeuvre, the race for Dacca
would be started by any formation in a position to do so. It was fully appreciated that without the capture of Dacca the campaign could not be concluded successfully.
On the basis of this broad strategy, the planners proceeded to examine the objectives sectorwise in depth. In the northwestern sector, Bogra was the main communication centre, and its occupation would completely unbalance the Pakistani forces operating in this sector. The best way to reach Bogra was to advance along the Hilli-Gaibanda axis as this would ensure that the forces in the north would be cut off from the rest of East Pakistan, for a thrust along this axis would pinch the waist as it were. The Pakistani forces in the DinajpurPanch Garh-Rangpur area were to be pinned down by subsidiary actions while the main thrust in this sector would be aimed at Bogra via Ghoraghat-Gobind Ganj. The thrust to Ghoraghat would be two-pronged, one via Milli and the other via Pirganj.
The main objective in the southwestern sector was Khulna, and the direct route towards it lay along the Barisal -Satkhira-Khulna axis. This axis however ran against the grain of the country and involved crossing numerous river obstacles. It was therefore preferred to tackle Jessore first. The main communication centre, it was connected to Dacca through Jhenida-Magura-Faridpur. The communication centres of Jhenida and Magura were therefore of vital importance as their capture would split and disorganise the Pakistani forces operating in this sector.
Once Jessore, Jhenida and Magura were captured, Kushtia, Hardinge Bridge and Khulna could be reached. This visualised two sizable thrusts developing from Jessore or near it, one to the north and the other to the south, reaching towards Hardinge Bridge and Khulna respectively. Although this mode of advance reached the priority objectives last, the size of the initial entry and then its splitting north and south offered better opportunities of disorganising the Pakistani forces and thereby achieving the overall objectives quicker.
In the eastern sector, control of Meghna Bridge, between Chandpur and Ashuganj, was of prime importance as its capture would isolate Dacca from Chittagong, Comilla and Sylhet. It would further facilitate the operations to capture Dacca. The three key points along the river line were Ashuganj, Daud Kandi and Chandpur. The main objectives in the northern part of this sector were the airfield at Shamsher Nagar, the communication centre of Maulvi Bazaar and the town of Sylhet.
Since this part could be easily cut off by blocking the Agartala Ashuganj waistline, the objectives in the Sylhet complex were of lower priority than those of the Meghna bulge and could be dealt with at a later stage. The capture of Chittagong seaport was of vital importance, but its overall effect would be considerably lessened if the port could be cut off from the rest of East Pakistan by securing the Meghna bulge objectives.
In view of the strategic importance of Chittagong, its capture by developing a thrust along the Feni-Chittagong axis was considered in depth, but because of being costlier in resources and time this approach was abandoned in favour of a sea assault involving combined operations. Having taken part in combined operations in Southeast Asia Command in the Second World War, Manekshaw was sold on the idea. A feasibility study revealed that although the Indian Navy could, with the aid of the merchant marine, carry a brigade group worth on the high seas its capability to maintain the requisite rate of buildup on a beachhead by landing craft was a constraining factor, especially in unloading facilities from cargo carriers to such craft at sea.
While the planners were toying with the idea of combined operations and were finding it hard to make any headway, the Naval Chief of Staff, Admiral S.M. Nanda, offered to blockade both Chittagong and Khulna. He gave an assurance that access to these ports from the sea would be denied to the Pakistanis, and this was gratefully accepted. As a result the capture of these ports by land forces was relegated to a lower priority.
Dacca, the geopolitical heart of East Pakistan, was the prime objective of the campaign. A thrust from the north had to be aimed at capturing Jamalpur and Tangail and then working its way to Dacca. Mymensingh, though a communication centre of some importance, could by virtue of its distance from the main thrust line be bypassed and dealt with at a later stage. An overall assessment of resources needed for these tasks was also made. It was felt that the northwestem sector would require one division to develop the main thrust towards Bogra, while one or two brigades would be required to contain the Pakistani troops deployed in the Dinajpur-Rangpur area. It was considered feasible for Headquarters XXXIII Corps, located at Siliguri, to control these operations. 20 Mountain Division, already under their command, was chosen for executing the plan. This division’s responsibilities were handed over to 6 Mountain Division, less one brigade moved from the UP-Tibet border. In addition, two brigades, 340 Mountain from Southern Command and 71 Mountain Brigade from Nagaland, were earmarked for the Bangladesh operations in the sector.
The requirement of two independent thrusts north and south in the southwestern sector was two divisions. 9 Infantry Division, already detailed for the East Pakistan contingency plan, and 4 Mountain Division, employed for internal security duties in West Bengal, were nominated for the sector. But there were no controlling headquarters to coordinate the operations of these divisions. Initially, it was proposed to place this sector directly under Headquarters Eastern Command, but later, on consideration of the heavy preoccupations of command headquarters, the Chief accepted the necessity of raising new corps headquarters for controlling these operations. Government sanction was obtained in a few days and Headquarters Il Corps came into being.
The task in the eastern sector was assessed to require three divisions, one for the thrust towards Sylhet, another for the Ashuganj complex operations, and the third for the Chandpur-Daudkandi thrust. To control these operations, Headquarters IV Corps at Tezpur was split in two, the bigger portion moving to the Agartala area for operations while the smaller one remained behind for holding actions against the Chinese. 57 Mountain Division, was already in the area. 23 Mountain Division, the reserve formation for NEFA and Bhutan, and 8 Mountain Division comprising two brigades and engaged in counter insurgency in Nagaland, were nominated for operations in this sector.
The northern sector afforded the most direct, though longer, route to Dacca and did not appear to be so heavily defended. The axis offered a good opportunity to race towards Dacca once the Pakistani Army was engaged in other sectors. To exploit it fully, it was essential to conceal our intentions in this regard until the last moment. It was therefore envisaged that initially two brigades, including one East Bengal brigade, would be employed. One infantry battalion was allotted to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills for demonstration against Sylhet.
Headquarters 101 Communication Zone Area was nominated to control operations in this sector. A para drop of about a battalion was visualised in the general area of Tangail, where the friendly Siddiqi guerilla group was operating with considerable success. It was hoped that the reserve brigade facing the Chinese near Rangiya would be released for the drive against Dacca once it became clear the Chinese would not intervene.
Although the risk involved in employing the troops deployed against the Chinese in the central sector was accepted, this did not apply to the same extent in Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA. Two divisions therefore remained in Sikkim, two more in NEFA, one brigade near eastern Bhutan, and a truncated division west of Bhutan.
Throughout consideration of the plan, K.K. remained sceptical of the feasibility of capturing Dacca within the time frame of a short war, which the planners had envisaged to last no more than 21 days. He felt rather strongly that the Indian Army, with its inherent
inhibitions against anything unorthodox and a more speedy type of manoeuvre, and very short of the bridging equipment required to span the mighty rivers, lacked the capability to reach Dacca before the ceasefire likely to be brought about by international pressures. At his insistence, the task was limited to occupying the major portion of Bangladesh instead of the entire country. But the capture of Dacca had to be the main target in its implementation.
This plan was ready about early July 1971, when Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command, was brought into the picture and, apart from the existing commitments against the Chinese, was given the task of destroying the Pakistani forces in the eastern theatre and of occupying the major portion of East Bengal, including the ports of Chittagong, Chalna and Khulna.10 Manekshaw personally briefed Aurora, covering the political background, our aims, his forecast of the shape of things to come, the outline operational plan, with reasoning of the choice and strength of thrust lines, and emphasis on the vigour and determination required for its execution. Written operational instructions were later handed to Aurora, and the machinery started moving for preparations for the war to liberate Bangladesh.
The monsoon rains were beating down hard, and this gave both sides time for preparation. It was felt that although the Pakistani troops would be essentially oriented towards retaining a firm hold on the population and the territory, they might well undertake one or more of the following offensive actions in order of priority:
(a) An offensive against the Siliguri corridor, provided the Chinese coalition was
forthcoming. (b) A limited offensive against Calcutta astride the Jessore Bongaon and Satkhire
Basirhat axes with a view to causing largescale panic by threatening the
metropolis. (C) An offensive against the Indian lines of communication from Silchar-Agartala to
threaten and occupy a thinly held area of Tripura and some portions of Cachar district.
It became imperative to take steps to adopt such a defensive posture on the periphery of Bangladesh to dissuade Pakistan from gaining ground in these areas. These measures were scheduled for completion before the end of the monsoon, and definitely by the first week of October. Accordingly, Headquarters 1 Corps was raised in the beginning of October under Lt Gen T.N. Raina with 4 and 9 Divisions, and this corps was to take over the responsibility of preventing ingress astride various roads and tracks leading into West Bengal from the Jessore sector. The two divisions were already concentrated in the area when this corps was formed.
Farther north, 20 Mountain Division was moved into the Balurghat bulge from the Siliguri corridor. It was felt that with this division poised to cut the waist of the Pakistani northwest sector along the Hilli-Gaibanda axis no meaningful offensive was feasible in the direction of the Siliguri corridor. 303 Infantry Brigade from Nagaland was moved to look after such an eventuality. To regain the strategic balance against the Chinese, 6 Mountain Division less one brigade group took over operational responsibilities in place of 20 Mountain Division, already concentrated in the Balurghat area. To cloak these moves, all formations moving in wore the already familiar emblem of the 20 Mountain Division formation. This confused the Pakistanis for a while.
This force was placed under Headquarters XXXIII Corps, the commander of which was Lt Gen M.L. Thapan. 93 Mountain Brigade from Nagaland and one infantry battalion were concentrated at Tura in the Garo Hills and at Dawki in the Khasi-Jaintia Hills respectively astride the Tura–Barengura and Shillong-Dawki axes. This force was placed under Maj Gen Gurbux Singh, General Officer Commanding 101 Communication Zone Area, located at Shillong. Lt Gen Sagat Singh moved his main IV Corps Headquarters to the vicinity of Agartala in Tripura State.
23 and 57 Mountain Divisions were concentrated in the area to look after ingress astride the numerous routes between Karimganj and Dharamnagar leading into Tripura and Cachar district. 8 Mountain Division was still operating in Nagaland and was to join only later in liberating Bangladesh. By the first week of October, the Indian defence posture was strong enough to withstand preemptive Pakistani efforts in the region.
Our troops on the Indo-Tibet border as well as our intelligence had not so far reported any appreciable Chinese buildup in areas close to the border to reveal their aggressive intentions, if any. The post-monsoon period was still ahead, but in view of the long lead period required for such a buildup it was felt that Chinese participation might be confined, as in the conflict of 1965, merely to making threatening noises.” Small border incidents might be envisaged here and there, but the Chinese potential did not appear to be of a scale to cause serious concern or need special attention. But a careful watch was to be kept along the border as intervention could not be ruled out altogether.
In Nagaland and Manipur, there was a likelihood of the underground taking advantage of the Army’s preoccupation elsewhere. But the shortfall caused by pulling out troops from these states was proposed to be redressed by beefing up the Assam Rifles and narrowing the objectives of the counter-insurgency operations during the period. An infantry brigade group was to stay behind to back the Assam Rifles and the objectives were scaled down to control of the main centres of communication and to generally containing the insurgency. The divisional second-in-command, Brig Jagjit Singh, was elevated to the rank of local major general and made responsible for the counter-insurgency operations.
As regards the Mizo Hills, the bulk of the insurgents were operating from sanctuaries in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan. It was feared that they might aid the Pakistani Army during the operations. In Mizoram, as in Nagaland, two infantry battalions of regular troops were located in the state to back up the Assam Rifles and BSF units deployed in the area. The need was also felt for an independent thrust along the Chittagong Hill Tracts so as to contain the Mizo hostiles and the Pakistani paramilitary forces operating in the area.
Considering the poor state of communications and the woeful lack of a competent administrative infrastructure, preparations were geared to starting the buildup of stocks sometime in July, and by the end of October it was possible to stock a month’s requirement for two divisions in Tripura, one in Tura, two in Krishnagar and another in Raigunj. The buildup from scratch of the infrastructure for a corps each at Telimura and Krishnagar was completed long before the respective corps headquarters moved to the area. It was a colossal task, involving handling some 60,000 tons of material at monsoon time on indifferent roads. This operation was a tribute to good administrative planning and resolute implementation u
Artillery, engineer and signal resources were generally in short supply, and there was a critical shortage of weapons and equipment Solutions were found by rationalisation and judicious denuding of formations and units of lower priority. Some new units/sub-units, especially of signals, had to be created on an ad hoc basis by milking other formations for both equipment and manpower. This was necessary as the new units being formed took time to materialise.
The whole theatre of operations was served by metre-gauge rail tracks, and this necessitated transhipment of stores corming from the hinterland on broad gauge, thus causing bottlenecks at points of transhipment. The problem was acute in the eastern region of Tripura, which was served by a single metre-gauge line with a capacity of 30 to 40 wagons a day running from Gauhati to the ailhead at Dharampur, 160 to 240 km from the dependent formations. From there a narrow road ran to Agartala and beyond, crossing numerous rivers and rivulets. The rail line and road, running close to the international border with Pakistan, were vulnerable to interruption by saboteurs.
These difficulties were further compounded by abnormally prolonged rains and resultant floods. In addition, the mass exodus of refugees from East Pakistan clogged the transport facilities and absorbed most of the local resources. As a result, load carriers had to be requisitioned from states as distant as Madhya Pradesh. At the peak period of operations, some 2,000 trucks were plying on the road, which had been improved for the induction of formations. But despite the many constraints the buildup continued. The area being devoid of local resources, even items in common use had to be brought from outside, thus adding to administrative difficulties. But all these problems were solved with grit and determination.
The Army Plan was presented to the Air Force and the Navy towards the end of July to enable them to formulate their plans of support and thus evolve an integrated plan for the three services. In any war fought on the land frontiers of India, the Air Force and the Navy had perforce to be utilised essentially to further the aims of the master plan, singly or in combination. Since the Indian seas were far from the points of decision, the Navy’s contribution had to be indirect, in the form of blockading enemy seaports so as to interrupt shipping bringing in war material. On the other hand, the role of the Air Force was more intimate and direct.
It was felt that the IAF had not acquitted itself well in the 1965 conflict as it had followed outmoded ideas. It was still taking on strategic targets in depth to cripple Pakistan’s war machine and striving to achieve air superiority when the war ended. Like the Army, the Air Force had also not studied the implications of a short war. As a result, the troops fighting the battle on land seldom saw much of their own aircraft in the air. On the other hand, they were so harassed constantly by the Pakistani Air Force that it became difficult for them to operate by day,
The priorities were planned to be reversed in 1971.12 The highest priority was accorded to close air support to the land battle by way of short interdiction and taking on targets directly interfering with our ground operations. In addition, such air operations were to be undertaken as helped in achieving an air situation which was locally favourable in the tactical area. For this, integration of air defence, artillery, civil defence and Air Force effort was essential, and their plans accordingly provided for it.
Left out of battle in 1965, the Indian Navy was determined to come in this time in a big way, Blockading the ports of Chittagong, Chalna and Khulna and of the Bay of Bengal were enthusiastically accepted by it as tasks.
——————–
1 On 19 September 1965, in a note handed on behalf of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the Indian Charge d’Affaires, J.S. Mehta, in Peking, the Chinese Government extended to the midnight of 22 September, the deadline of its ultimatum to India for dismantling military structures which it alleged had been built on the Chinese side of the Sino-Sikkim
border. 2 The MIG division in Hindustan Aeronautics Lid took steps in 1971 to manufacture under licence a modified version of
the Mig-21 with an eye to improved performance. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No. 1, p. 10537, “Strength of Pakistan Air Force, an Indian Assessment.” Daphne class submarines, spareparts for torpedoes, tank and artillery ammunition were supplied by France to Pakistan
This was revealed by Mr SC Shukla, Minister of State for Defence Production, in the Rajya Sabha on 4 August
1971. In April-May 1971, Pakistan raised 35,000 armed Razakars and 25,000 recruits for the East Pakistan Civil Armed
Forces. These formations were recruited mostly from non-Bengali and collaborationist Bengali elements Peking Radio and Duwn, Karachi, reported the meeting of the politico-military delegation led by ZA Bhutto with
Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lain 7 November, India was accused by Chinese Acting Foreign Minister Cheng Pengufel of having interfered in Pakistan’s intemal affairs. He said the Chinese Government would resolutely
support the Pakistani Government in its just struggle to defend Pakistan’s sovereigly. z Yahya Khan is reported by The Statesman, Calcutta, to have said that bonefide Pakistani citizens were welcome to
return to East Pakistan, where life was fast returning to normalcy.” and should not be misled by false propaganda
by anti-state elements and highly exaggerated and distorted reports. 8 The Statesmon, Calcutta, reported that on 29 May Pakistani troops in East Pakistan opened two new fronts on the
International boundary, one along Assam” Goalpara district and the other in the 24 Parganas district of West
Bengal 9 The operations of Mukti Bahini had by the end of September 1971 intensified considerably and scored success against
Isolated garrisons and patrols of the enemy. Their sacarles, where they went into hiding and sought training
were string out along the whole border with India, 10 The Indian Armed Forces were cast in a unique role in the eastern sector in the sense that they were called upon to join
hands with the Mukti Bahini, which was already operating there. Notwithstanding the lack of previous experience in this regard, comradeship was established within the framework of extraordinary political rapport, which cme to
be known as a joint command set up under the leadership of India’s GoC-in-C Eastern Command. u Adequate procedural innovations were introduced to expedite action through the normal appointed channels such as the
Directorate General of Supplie and Disposals. 12 The specific mission of the Indian Air Force in the 1971 total war was the air defence of Indian air space and of the air space over the tactical area; meeting the demands of the Army for close support, counter air operations to reduce the capability of the Pakistan Air Force interdiction of enemy communications and supplies and maritime
reconnaissance to keep an eye on enemy naval and merchant shipping
13 Except for a very minor commitment during the police action against the Portuguese in Goa and later in the war of 1965, the Indian Navy had no operational experience of any major commitment on the high seas. The Pakistani buildup prior to the outbreak of hostilities this time, and the persistent rumours that some other vies might help Pakistan, brought the Indian Navy in 1971 to the highest level of alert, operational efficiency and effectiveness.
6
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PLAN
Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command, who was to command the land forces of India and Bangladesh and coordinate the functions of the Air Force and the Navy in liberating Bangladesh, had come up the professional ladder with ease, both through his personal endowments and the influence of powerful connections. He had held prized appointments in the Army, but his most notable contribution was as Brigadier General Staff to Lt Gen Umrao Singh in NEFA before the Chinese invasion in 1962. It is said that he was the author of Umrao Singh’s appreciation bringing out the ill-matched capability of the Indian Army at the point of decision opposite the Namka Chu river.
At the time of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965, Aurora was serving at Army Headquarters with Chaudhuri as Director of Military Training. Being generally pleasant and mild-mannered, he was acceptable to all camps which came to power, but his chief mentor was Manekshaw. Their relations were very warm, and as a result Manekshaw had taken him along as he rose in the hierarchy. The Chief trusted him fully and considered Eastern Command an extension of his personal command. He expected his instructions to be implemented there according to the spirit of his own thinking. Aurora played the part of a trusted subordinate well in the beginning, but as his own stature grew as a result of success in battle he started asserting his individuality and their friendship began to cool.
Aurora had apparently everything, a smart and impressive bearing, a sound professional background and an incisive mind. Yet his command did not take him seriously as a fighter because he did not display the flamboyance of a soldiers’ general. That is why in the final count his contribution to the unqualified success in Bangladesh, however genuine, remained suspect in the professional eye. Many others, orbiting in lesser spheres of responsibility, later claimed credit in shaping the plan without serious challenge.
Based on Army Headquarters directions, Headquarters Eastern Command issued operational instructions sometime in August 1971 which spelt out the sectorwise allotment of resources in terms of troops and material, the objectives to be achieved, and the broad time frame of operations, with the necessary coordination instruction between the sectors. The stage was then set for sector operational plans to be worked out in detail, covering the formulation of thrust lines, formation of objectives and sub-allocation of resources. This was done during the greater part of September, and the plans were examined during war games right up to the end of October, down to brigade level. Modifications were incorporated as a result of the examination, and in the light of the latest information on Pakistani dispositions gathered in border skirmishes.
I was deputed to tour Eastern Command in September to sense the reactions of the
executors to the operational plan and generally verify on the ground the progress achieved in setting up the infrastructure, the buildup of troops and logistic backing. I met the formation commanders at corps and division level and discussed the plans and their attendant problems. Most of the commanders were old friends and colleagues, and as a result the discussions were free and informal. They yielded frank briefings.
I found the formation commanders had a good knowledge of the local topography and a fair idea of the deployment of Pakistani forces and their fighting potential. They had a reasonable measure of the tasks in hand and were confident of success, provided some latitude was allowed to them in planning and the conduct of battle. In one voice, they disdained “spoonfeeding” from the top.
Like the top half of an hour-glass, the northwest sector is divided in two, with the pinched waist in the middle. It was bounded by the Tista and its tributaries in the north, Jamuna in the west, and Ganga in the south. The Atrai and numerous other rivulets, running northwest to southeast, cut up the entire area. Road and rail communication follow the grain of the country and run between the river obstacles.
The main communication centres were Thakurgaon, Dinajpur and Rangpur in the northern half of the sector and Rajshahi and Bogra in the southern. The Balurghat bulge pointed like a sword at the waist, ready to sever the north from the south along the HilliGhoraghat line. Banking on the possibility of Chinese collusion, Niazi had given great importance to this sector. The operational responsibilty for its defence was assigned to Pakistan’s 16 Infantry Division under Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah, who was holding it. apart from the paramilitary forces, with approximately one brigade group in the north in the general areas of Thakurgaon, Dinajpur and Rangpur, another in the Hilli and Ghoraghat area and a third in the south in Rajshahi, Ishurdi and Naogaon.
Indian intelligence had been juggling its estimates to suit the purpose of the assessor, both at the higher and lower levels. Army Headquarters estimated a buildup of five to six battalions in the sector while Eastern Command claimed a count of eleven. Both erred purposely, one on the conservative side and the other on the liberal, to suit their own requirements. Army Headquarters wanted to keep down the allotment of troops, and Eastern Command to raise its bid for extra resources. Despite the improved means of information now available through the Mukti Bahini, intelligence estimates oscillated between these two stands and were never reconciled till the conclusion of the campaign. Eventually, this sector proved to be held by nine battalions.
Lt Gen Thapan was in charge of operations in this sector while Maj Gen Lachhman Singh Lehl, General Officer Commanding 20 Mountain Division, was to carry out the invasion and execute the plans. Thapan was known to his colleagues as a “copybook” general who followed Army pamphlets in letter and spirit. A typical infantry officer, he had the courage of his convictions but lacked imagination and was rigid in his views.
It was well known in the Army that in the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965, when Thapan was General Officer Commanding 26 Infantry Division, he sat some three miles from Sialkot watching the top of its high buildings without stirring out of his firm oases. When questioned afterwards, replied that his orders did not include raiding Sialkot. A dutiful soldier, he only carried out orders. And yet our defective systems elevated him to command a corps commited to invading Bangladesh.
Aware of Thapan’s lack of enterprise, Aurora wanted to hand over the conduct of the Bangladesh part of the corps operations to Maj Gen J.S. Nakal, Chief of Staff XXXIII Corps, leaving Thapan to deal with the Chinese side. But Thapan insisted on retaining this command too and Aurora was not strong enough to get his wish implemented. The unsatisfactory arrangement continued, resulting in one blaming the other for the subsequent setbacks in the sector.
Thapan’s force for capturing the northwestern sector consisted of 20 Mountain Division and two independent brigade groups. Out of these, one group had been committed to hold the Balurghat bulge for general security of the area and provide a firm base for developing thrust lines. Thus the opposing strengths gave Thapan only an edge of one brigade or so, and this did not lend itself to assured success if he decided to go in for systematic attrition by fighting and eliminating each defended locality.
The Pakistani pattern of deployment divided Shah’s force broadly into three separate sectors–the head of the hour.glass with one brigade group, the waist with one brigade, and the bottom with the third brigade group along with Divisional Headquarters. The northwestern sector was connected with the rest of Bangladesh by rail and road communications only over Hardinge Bridge, and by ferries with the southwestern sector at Pabna and Kushtia, and with the northern sector at Sirajganj. The logical course would have been to swiftly sever these access routes to frustrate Niazi’s effort to reinforce the sector and deny Shah a route of withdrawal for his force to join hands with the troops operating in the southwestern sector or to fall back on the Dacca defences.
Since the possibility of overt Chinese collusion had now receded, priority for capture lay in the southern portion. Rich dividends could accrue if the Pakistani force was cut in two by driving a wedge at the waist in strength and then fanning out north and south to deal simultaneously with the forces deployed there. The balance of strength of the thrusts should have been tilted towards the southern portion as the success in the south automatically affected the north. The Pakistani deployment was dispersed in localities defended by independent battalions. It was therefore prudent to interpose Indian thrust lines between the localities so as to split the Pakistani force in penny packets, thus facilitating its piecemeal destruction.
Thapan could not however grasp the intricacies of lightning warfare and decided that after establishing a firm base in the Balurghat bulge with one brigade group he would develop three simultaneous thrusts. One brigade group was to advance along the IslampurRuhea-Zhakurgaon-Atrai Bridge axis to secure the bridge. The second thrust was to be towards Dinajpur from the south to link up with the first by D-3 day. This brigade was then to advance towards Palasbari. The third brigade group was to capture Hilli by D + 1 day and was then to advance and capture Palasbari in conjunction with the second brigade group. After its capture, sufficient forces were to be dispatched to cut the DinajpurGaibanda road and, depending upon the prevailing situation and the availability of forces, to advance and capture Rangpur or Bogra, whichever offered greater chances of success.
This plan was ill-conceived. It committed the force piecemeal on independent axes, so far apart from each other that mutual support was not feasible. Each thrust was expected to progress on its own, and yet for crucial objectives like Atrai Brigade and Palasbari the brigades were visualised to join for action. Since the progress of each thrust was an indeterminate factor, it was unwise to plan for securing vital objectives on an imponderable combination of forces which might not arrive in time for combined action.
This plan also visualised using the obvious approach along Hilli-Gaibanda, which was heavily defended. The brigade group allocated for the task was not likely to make much headway on its own. Besides, one brigade group was tied up in the firm base holding the Balurghat bulge throughout the operations, as none of the thrust lines, even when making good progress, could relieve this commitment.
Thus, Thapan’s force was depleted by one brigade group at the very outset, further reducing the edge it enjoyed in strength. Moreover, clearing the area south of the HilliGaibanda road was not planned, and as such Thapan’s operations in the sector could not influence the projected operations of 11 Corps in the southwestern sector in any way. In fact, it left the door open for Niazi to reinforce the sector or withdraw from it whenever he chose to do so.
At that stage, a suggested improvement on the plan was that only three thrust lines should be developed. One brigade group was to operate along the Islampur-Rurea
Thakurgaon-Atrai Brigade axis to secure the Siliguri corridor. A second was to move along the Phulbari-Nawabganj-Palasbari axis to protect the northern flank of the main divisional thrust with the inherent flexibility of joining hands in the reduction of Rangpur or Bogra, as the opportunity aftered itself. It was also suggested that the main divisional thrust should develop along the Hilli-Jaipur Hat-Bogra road and the Balurghat-Patnitola-Naogaon-Bogra road axes. The division could thereby fight a concerted action along two mutually supporting axes with adequate reserves in hand. This would help separate the Pakistani forces deployed in the sector and lead to their piecemeal destruction Since it visualised the clearance of the southern portion of the sector, it also influenced 11 Corps’ operations in the southwestern sector. Because the main thrust was to be lanuched from the firm bases in the Balurghat bulge, the security of the area would be automatically ensured as the divisional thrust line progressed deeper towards Bogra. It would also release one brigade group committed to the security of the bulge, giving greater punch to the division’s main thrust line. But Thapan’s view prevailed and he hung on to his own plan with all its inherent disadvantages.
The main objectives in the southwestern sector were the inland ports of Chalna and Khulna, Hardinge Bridge, the only link between this sector and the northwestern sectors, and Golandoghat/Faridpur, connecting with communications leading to Dacca. Great weightage was given initially to Chalna and Khulna, but with the naval blockade envisaged in the overall plan priority for securing them had receded. This sector was held by Pakistan 9 Infantry Division, comprising about two infantry brigade groups with proportionate supporting and service elements and paramilitary forces. This was a well-trained formation, but its command had recently been entrusted to Maj Gen M.H. Ansari. It is believed that there was some controversy over his promotion, and it was said that he became a general for reasons other than merit. The division was deployed to defend the sector with one brigade group protecting Jessore and its approaches and the second covering the northern approaches to Megura and Kushtia, with one battalion deployed along the Satkhira-Khulna axis in the south.
The force allocated to capture the sector comprised 4 Mountain and 9 Infantry Divisions, which had been performing internal security tasks in West Bengal earlier. These formations were to function under Headquarters 11 Corps, still to be raised under Gen Raina. But before Raina could come on the scene the operational planning had gone well ahead under the direction of Headquarters Eastern Command.
The command plan visualised the simultaneous development of two divisional thrusts. 4 Mountain Division was to advance along the Karimpur-Hardinge Bridge axis and secure D+2 day with one brigade group. The second group was to develop a thrust along the Meherpur-Kushtia road to secure Kushtia by D-9 day. The third brigade group was to provide the firm base for these two thrusts in the general area of Karimpur and Meherpur, and on command reserve for the sector. In the second phase, 4 Mountain Division was to capture Jhenida, an important communication centre, by D+4 day and, depending upon the situation, was either to secure Golandoghat and Faridpur or reinforce XXXII Corps sector.
9 Infantry Division, after establishing a firm base with one brigade group, was to develop two simultaneous thrusts towards Jessore along the Bongaon-Jessore and BograChuagacha Jessore axes, securing Jessore and its airfield by Dt 10 day. The brigade group committed on the firm base was thereafter to be lifted to secure Barisal by Dt 21 day.
The effort was so dispersed under this plan that it was not possible to make use of the available armour, artillery and engineer resources in a concerted manner. But for one mountain brigade which would be available after completing the first phase of 4 Mountain Division’s operation, there were no reserve in the hands of the divisional commanders to influence the immediate battle. Moreover, the limited resources in the way of bridging equipment and engineer personnel did not permit exploitation of a large number of routes of ingress. There were numerous water obstacles on each axis. Bridging them would have retarded the momentum of advance, especially as adequate transport was not available to put the required equipment on wheels. Ferrying the equipment would have been time-time consuming.
To overcome these shortcomings, it was suggested that 11 Corps should break in on a narrow front, with a division each on the Bongaon-Jessore and Chuagacha Jessore axes, capture the town and the airfield, and then fan out north and south to secure Kushtia and Khulna. Depending upon the prevailing situation, they were to then secure Faridpur and Barisal. The whole operation was to be completed in 21 days. This plan ensured the launching of both formations in mutual support, thus strengthening the initial thrust by concentrating artillery and engineer resources. It also ensured the capture of Jessore, the key objective in the sector.
Its capture would also separate the troops defending Khulna and Kushtia, thus enabling their piecemeal destruction. It ensured flank protection in the initial stages, and the line of thrust would have the least number of water obstacles, thus saving time and engineer effort. Adequate reserves also became available with formation commanders to influence the battle. Raina eventually used this plan with some modifications. In the northern sector, the routes of ingress from India ran north to south towards Dacca. The Brahmaputra ran diagonally from northwest to southeast and presented a major obstacle for an advance southwards. This sector was to be held in the event of war by Pakistan’s 93 Infantry Brigade Group, with one battalion each holding Jamalpur and Mymensingh along the Brahmaputra, and with paramilitary forces holding the international border, stiffened by one regular infantry battalion north of the river.
This force was visualised as falling back on Jamalpur and Mymensingh for the main defensive battle in the sector. The brigade group with its headquarters functioned under Maj Gen Mohammed Jamshed Khan, General Officer Commanding of the newly constituted 36 Infantry Division which was responsible for the defence of Dacca. This division remained with only one brigade as others brigades, which were to be formed by grouping loose units, were not raised by the time war came.
On the Indian side, this sector came under a controversial figure, Maj Gen Gurbux Singh Gill, General Officer Commanding 101 Communication Zone Area, based at Shillong. A burly Sikh, well known for his gruff and rather abrasive manners, he was considered professionally sound and a determined man who could produce results. He had earned notoriety in the Army for wielding his stick like a sergeant major, and as a result ran a rather unhappy team. But he had tremendous drive and was expected to reach his objectives anyhow.
His plan was simple. He proposed to develop three simultaneous thrust lines. One Indian brigade group was to advance along the Rajendra Ganj-Jamalpur-Mymensingh axis. This brigade was given one Bangladesh battalion to strengthen its reconnaissance element. The axis ran north of the Brahmaputra, which could be exploited by infantry carried in boats for outflanking the opposing forces astride the road. Country craft could be utilised to a certain extent to provide logistic support to the column.
The second thrust line was to be developed by one Bangladesh brigade group, suitably beefed up by one Indian infantry battalion along the Tura-Phulpur-Mymensingh axis, while the third thrust line was to be implemented by the advance of one BSF battalion along the Baghmara-Maila-Kanda-Mymensingh axis. The above operations were to be supported by freedom fighters of the Siddiqi group operating in the Tangail area and disrupting the lines of communication serving the Pakistanis in the area. Gill was confident of capturing Mymensingh, but he felt that within the available resources he had no scope to develop a worth while threat to Dacca. It was possible that Niazi, apprehensive of the potentiality of this threat towards Dacca, especially after the capture of Mymensingh, might rush some resources from Dacca to meet it. This should have been welcome as it would proportionately ease out IV Corps operations. On the other hand, if the thrust in this sector was further strengthened after crossing the Brahmaputra, it had a chance of leaning on the Dacca defences the earliest.
But more troops were just not available, at least not till the possibility of active Chinese collusion had dissipated, when the thrust could be reinforced with one more brigade group without jeopardising the border defence in the Himalayas. Another constraining factor in this sector was the shortage of bridging equipment and other engineer resources. The situation could not be redressed quickly during operations. Such resources have to be positioned beforehand, but because of the overall shortages and the priorities in other sectors this could not be done.
The eastern sector comprised the districts of Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The main rail and road communications south and north from Chittagong to Sylhet lay parallel and close to the international border, running the gauntlet at Feni. The only connections with the road and rail systems in the northern sector were the bridge at Ashuganj over the Meghna and the ferry services from Chandpur and Daudkandi.
In the southern portion of this sector, control of the Meghna bulge between Chandpur and Ashuganj was of prime importance as its capture would isolate Dacca from Chittagong and Comilla. It would further facilitate operations for the capture of Dacca. The three key points along the river line were Chandpur, Daudkandi and Ashuganj. In the northern part of this sector, the Shamshernagar airfield and the communication centres of Maulvi Bazaar and Sylhet town were of strategic importance. Sylhet could easily be isolated from the rest of East Pakistan as its communications by surface transport passed either through Maulvi Bazaar or Habibganj and could therefore be dealt with at a lower priority.
According to intelligence estimates, the eastern sector was likely to be held by about two infantry divisions in a war situation. The southern portion was the operational responsibility of Headquarters 39 Infantry Division, a new formation under Maj Gen Rahim Khan, One infantry brigade group held the general area of Comilla, including Maynamati and Lalmai Hills, with some elements at Laksham. The second brigade group was likely to hold the general area of Feni, while the third occupied the vital seaport of Chittagong.
Chittagong Hill Tracts was the operational responsibility of paramilitary forces, suitably beefed up by regular elements under a controlling headquarters. The Pakistani deployment in the northern portion was likely to be one brigade group in the general area of Sylhet, the second group in the general area Maulvi Bazaar-Shamshernagar, and the third group in the general area of Akhaura and Brahmanbaria. This was under the overall operational control of Headquarters 14 Infantry Division under Maj Gen Qazi Abdul Majid Khan.
On the Indian side, capture of all territory east of the Meghna was assigned to Lt Gen Sagat Singh, General Officer Commanding IV Corps. For control of operations, corps headquarters were split in two, the main body was moved to Telliamura, near Agartala, under Sagat Singh, who was to command the Bangladesh portion of the operations, while rear headquarters under Maj Gen O.P. Malhotra, Chief of Staff, remained at Tezpur to look after the Chinese side.
Sagat Singh was a typical field commander with a clear head who knew his priorities and never lost sight of his goal. He had shown his mettle as commander of 50 Para Brigade in the Goa operations and in other key appointments later. A practical soldier, he had scant respect for the copybook outlook and was expected to drive his commanders and troops to their objective with a heavy hand. He had three mountain divisions 8,23 and 57–for his task.
Operations in the Sylhet sector were to be undertaken by 8 Mountain Division, withdrawn from Nagaland. It was to pose a threat to Sylhet with the development of two simultaneous thrusts towards the town with one battalion along the Dawki-Sylhet axis and one brigade group along the Latu-Charkhai axis. After securing Charkhai with one infantry battalion, the remainder of the group was to clear the Kharimganj-Kanairgha bulge eastwards and advance from there along the Charkhai-Gopalganj-Sylhet axis. The operation aimed at eliminating the threat to the Indian lines of communication in the KarimganjBadarpur area.
The second brigade group was to advance along the Dharamnagar-Kalaura-Maulvi Bazar axis and capture Maulvi Bazaar by D:12 day and Shamshemnagar by Dt 14 day. The aim of this thrust was to capture the airfield of Shamshernagar and eliminate interference with the India lines of communication in the general area of Dharamnagar. Depending upon how the situation developed, this brigade group was to capture Sylhet in conjunction with the brigade operating east of Sylhet. Operating from the Kumbigrarn airfield, IAF was finding it difficult to strike deep into Pakistani territory, especially in the Chittagong area.
The new airfield in the vicinity of Agartala not having become operational, it was necessary to capture one of the Pakistani airfields in this sector-Shamshemnagar or Comilla for this purpose. Capture of the Shamshernagar airfield as late as D-14 day did not fit this requirement. This was pointed out to Sagat Singh, who argued that since he was in a position to capture Comilla earlier, the timing of securing Shamshernagar had no bearing on future air operations. In any event, the Air Force would require four to six days to rehabilitate the airfield and establish the necessary maintenance facilities before it could be accepted operationally. By that time, he felt, he would secure his objectives. But when the importance of denying its use to the foe was pointed out to him he did some rethinking on his priorities.
In the Agartala sector, 57 Mountain Division was to capture Akhaura with one brigade group to ensure the safety of Agartala. Simultaneously, the rest of the division was to advance along the Kasba-Chandla axis and then assist 23 Mountain Division in capturing Comilla. Akhaura lay across a major river obstacle and appearedto be beyond the capacity of one brigade group to secure. Maj Gen Ben Gonsalves, General Officer Commanding 57 Mountain Division, who was to carry out the task, felt that the maximum he could achieve was to dominate the river line. That however did not eliminate the threat to Agartala as four routes of ingress from Pakistan-held territory led from the north to the city. The KasbaMaynamati-Comilla axis was about 30 miles long, had 16 water obstacles en route, and was liable to disruption from the northwest since a large number of tracks and roads join the axis from that direction.
As the brigade group at the firm base could not be moved without jeopardising the security of Agartala, the force which could be spared for the advance to Comilla was no more than a brigade group, and this would expand itself on the security of its line of communication before it reached anywhere near Comilla. The security of Agartala lay in the capture of the Brahmanbaria-Kalashahr area. Once that was in Indian hands the threat to Agartala and the Kasba-Maynamati axis was automatically eliminated. This would release two brigade groups unnecessarily tied up for the defence of Agartala and opposite Akhaura.
It was put to Sagat Singh that the greater priority lay in capturing Brahmanbaria rather than in reducing Comilla, a well fortified position. The capture of Brahmanbaria opened the door for the seizure of the vital Ashuganj Bridge and the wider horizons for the race to Dacca beyond. He saw the point, and the very mention of the promised race to Dacca brought a glint in his eyes, but he said that unless the task assigned to him by Headquarters Eastern Command was changed he would have to go for Comilla, and in that event there was little he could do to change the already projected operational plan. But it could be assumed that once battle was joined Sagat Singh was not the one to be bound constraints of terms of reference of allotted tasks. He would head the race to Dacca himself although this had never been specified as one of his tasks. When goaded, he said he would keep this in mind. In the Comilla sub-sector, 23 Mountain Division was to capture Comilla by D+14 day and, depending upon the situation, also clear Feni by D-18 day. On the fall of Comilla, 57 Mountain Division was to secure the airfield frontally with one brigade group so as to deploy artillery to support operations on the Lalmai-Maynamati Hills. The short range of the Indian mountain gun, 75-mm/24, was to restrain bolder action over and over again in the Bangladesh operations.
Thereafter, one brigade group was to advance along the Dharampur-Lalmai axis and secure Temple Hill by D+2 day, while the third brigade was to capture Lalmai Hills, excluding Maynamati Cantonment. As described earlier, one brigade group from 57 Mountain Divisions was to advance and secure Maynamati, working along the KasbaJafarganj axis. While the operation to secure the Comilla complex was on, one Bangladesh brigade group was to secure Feni, and one of its battalions was to secure Laksham by D +3 day by advancing along the Chandagram-Laksham axis.
In the subsequent phase, after securing Lalmai and Laksham with one brigade group each, the advance was to continue towards Chandpur and Daudkandi with the same strength so as to secure them by D-14 day. Meanwhile, one battalion group from the Laksham brigade was to clear the Noakhali area of Pakistani troops. It was felt that priority should be given to taking Comilla so as to be able to choke the river routes at Daudkandi, Chandpur and Noakhali. This operation could cut off Dacca from Chittagong and the southern portion of the eastern sector, but on its own could not achieve the capture of the provincial capital.
It needed a fleet of river craft to mount a sizable threat to Dacca from this direction, yet the bulk of the strength available in this corps zone was employed in developing this thrust, which was bound to fizzle out on reaching the Meghna river line. On the other hand, tilting towards Brahmanbaria and Ashuganj would open better opportunities for exploitation in the direction of Dacca, especially if we were able to secure Ashuganj Bridge intact. But at that stage the higher command had serious misgivings about its capability to reach Dacca. It was hoping to achieve the city’s surrender through a prolonged siege rather than direct assault.
Dacca lay in a triangle formed by the Jamuna, the Meghna and the Brahmaputra, with its apex resting south of the city. The entire triangle formed a natural defensive position. Its defence potential was so great than it needed a comparatively small force to hold the entire Indian Army deployed in the theatre for months. It therefore became imperative to draw as many Pakistani troops as possible from this triangle towards the border, leaving the geopolitical heart land weak.
All thrust lines led to Dacca, some better than others. The city could be approached from the northwestern sector, after the capture of Bogra, from Phulchari Ghat and Sirajganj Ferry sites across the Jamuna, and thence to Tangail. This involved securing the HilliGaibanda line and the area south of it. Access was also possible from the southwestern sector through Jessore-Jhenida-Megura-Faridpur-Golandoghat. This entailed crossing two major river obstacles, the Madhumati and the Padma. The approaches from the eastern sector through Chandpur-Daudkandi-Bhairab Bazaar involved crossing the Meghna and the Lakhya.
The approach from the north generally followed the grain of the country, but it was the longest approach. The land along this approach was mostly inundated and the Brahmaputra, flowing diagonally across the area, was estimated to be over 1,000 feet wide along most of its length, thus presenting a formidable obstacle. It was apparent that to reach Dacca within the planned schedule of 21 days would require a high degree of mobility, short, snappy actions to overcome Pakistani resistance, and a large quantity of bridging and rafting equipment as well as engineer resources to cross the formidable river obstacles. The required engineer resources could not be mustered along all the approaches but could with some effort be collected for the main thrust when required.
Because of these limitations the higher command, in assigning tasks to Eastern Command, did not spell out the capture of Dacca but left it to be considered during the conduct of operations as and when opportunity offered itself. There was some differnce of opinion as to the relative weightage of resources to the various sectors. The overall superiorty in the theatre was no more than about 7 to 4, which by no means could be termed overwhelming. As such, it was considered prudent to give more importance to the eastern sector, especially its southern portion, for valid reasons. This approach was not expected because of the difficulty of buildup over long and precarious lines of communication. It was closest to Dacca, and crossing the rivers was relatively easier here than from the northern and southwestern sectors. Further, an offensive in the eastem sector provided indirect security to Tripura.
The experience gained in reducing certain fortified border outposts in, various sectors had proved that these posts were difficult to tackle because they resulted in disproportionate casualties and were time-consuming. It appeared that if the step-by-step concept hitherto followed by the Indian Army was persisted in the campaign would end in stalemate in a short war. The formation war games conducted in October amply brought out that if speed in operations was to be achieved the Indian Army had to learn to bypass fortified defence and operate off main roads along indifferent country tracks.
After a few abortive attempts at reducing fortified border out posts, the younger elements vehemently advocated the concept of bypassing such localities, which Headquarters Easter Command later successfully sold as the concept of the expanding torrent” enunciated in the mid-1930s by Liddell Hart.
The strategy that finally evolved from the war games at all levels was that the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh should be drawn out by keeping the border alive through continuous and vigorous skirmishes in all sectors under cover of Mukti Bahini action. At the same time, every effort was to be made to create the impression that India was interested only in the capture of a niche where the Bangladesh Government could be installed, and no more. It was expected that this would induce Niazi to strengthen his border defences at the cost of the interior and, in the process, dissipate his reserves. When the crunch came, our thrust lines would aim at securing the key communication centres in the interior so as to disrupt the enemy’s command and control completely and paralyse the capability of his forces to fall back on positions of depth. His formations and units would be cut off from each other and would become incapable of giving a concerted battle. Scattered in penny packets, they would be easy to mop up. Should the opportunity arise, any of the thrust lines across the Meghna, the Jamuna and the Padma could be rapidly developed in conjunction with the northern thrust along the Jamalpur-Tangail route to capture Dacca.
As a result of this appraisal, the final objectives of each formation were spelt out to enable them to work out various permutations and combinations to finalise the plan. A careful watch was kept throughout on the day-to-day political and military developments in Bangladesh so as to modify the operational plan where necessary.
———
1.One of the authors of modern strategy,” which according to him means not merely the movement of forces but also the
effects and consequences and essentially is the act of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of political policy
7
GRADUAL ESCALATION
When news trickled in of the revolt of the Bengali elements in units of the Pakistani Army stationed in East Pakistan and of Tikka Khan’s crackdown on the nationalistic civil population, voices were raised in India for intervention in support of the movement for Bangladesh. K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, aired his much-quoted views at a symposium of the Indian Council of World Affairs organised on 31 March 1971, within six days of the outbreak of the revolt. “What India must realise is the fact that the breakup of Pakistan is in our interest, an opportunity the like of which will never come again,” he declared.
In subsequent discussions at the symposium it was described as “an opportunity of the century.” These views found favour with a considerable section of public opinion and were supported by some retired senior generals as well as one or two ministers of the Union Cabinet holding pivotal positions in the Political Affairs Committee. Perhaps these opinions were inspired by accounts of the easy success of the forays BSF conducted at the commencement of the general uprising in the wave of misplaced enthusiasm of some local commanders. Luckily, the Prime Minister and her military advisers thought otherwise as war, being a serious business, could not be waged just at the dictates of popular demand. A valid excuse, if not a sound reason, was necessary to do so.
The problem Mrs. Gandhi faced was complex. She had to heed public opinion and, if feasible, satisfy it. At the same time she needed a valid excuse for military intervention which would be international by acceptable, and meanwhile so increase or refurbish the Indian military capability that if she went to war victory was assured. She had the example of her own father’s fall from his pedestal after the NEFA debacle, and she could not take a chance. For her, victory had to be certain, nothing less. Accordingly, she, aided by her advisers, orchestrated the three wings of national policy political, military, and economic-in perfect accord. She planned and executed a step-by-step approach in terms of action and sense of timing, and soon achieved perfection in this.
On 31 March, she reacted in a strong but dignified manner by personally moving a resolution in the Lok Sabha demanding immediate cessation of the use of force and the “massacre of the defenceless people of East Bengal.” In doing so, she said “the tragedy which has overtaken our valiant neighbors in East Bengal so soon after their rejoicing over the electoral victory had united us in grief for their suffering, concern for the wanton destruction of their beautiful land, and anxiety for their future.”
The resolution read: “This House records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge of 75 million people as East Bengal would triumph. The House wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the wholehearted sympathy and support of the people of India.” Answering a question, she said: “We are deeply conscious of the historic importance of the movement…. I would like to assure the honourable members who asked whether decisions would be taken on time that obviously that is the most important thing to do. There is no point in taking a decision when the time for it is over.”
Thirty-odd foreign correspondents, thrown out from Dacca as part of the crackdown, told harrowing tales of military brutality against unarmed and helpless civilians. Stories of merciless genocide, rape, loot and destruction spread like wildfire, inflaming passions. The militant political opposition, egged on by self appointed experts on strategic matters, started clamouring for immediate intervention. Little did they realise how preposterous this demand was. Hasty action by India at that time would have meant interference in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country, contrary to the United Nations Charter and against the bilateral agreement arrived at in Tashkent in 1966 pledging abstention from such action. Any of this international commitment would have been difficult to justify. Some quarters argued that Pakistan had actively supported the rebels in Nagaland, which was very much India’s internal affair. So why should India adopt such a correct attitude in a situation which closely affected its national interests?
Admittedly, Pakistan had actively encouraged insurgency both in Nagaland and Mizoram by providing equipment, cash and training facilities in East Pakistan. In collusion with China, it had permitted the transit of rebels to that country in many ways. A.Z. Phizo, the rebel Naga leader, had travelled to Britain on a Pakistani passport and had been used as a vehicle of anti-Indian propaganda by Pakistani diplomats abroad. Similarly, Pakistan had provided refuge to Laldenga, the Mizo rebel leader, and afforded all facilities to the rebels to perpetuate insurgency. Mizo hostiles had received sanctuary in the Chittagong Hill Tracts whenever hotly pursued by Indian security forces. In short, Pakistan had been aiding and abetting insurgency in federal units of the Republic of India covertly but had not intervened until then openly.
Another limitation the supporters of armed intervention failed to understand was that to undertake military action at such short notice as the situation demanded required a very high degree of preparedness in military capability, especially when there was no warning of such an eventuality. No underdeveloped country, much less India, can have that pushbutton capability which can launch instant operations.
The reasons are simple. Paucity of funds forbid purchase of armaments and munitions as part of the planned growth of the country’s military machine. Purchases are made only to meet a contingency whenever it arises. Since the lead period required to equip, refurbish and revamp fighting formations is long, stretching over months, and hard currency is in short supply, a nation’s options are limited to a few monopolist suppliers who take their own time to strike a bargain. Besides, India’s hands were full with the West Bengal elections and the attendant Naxalite threat to wreck them. Indian formations usually allotted for a limited contingency against threats from East Pakistan were totally committed to internal security duties in connection with these elections.
With hindsight, some armchair strategists suggested after the conflict of 1971 that India could have prevented Pakistan’s reinforcement of troops in the eastern wing by moving its forces on the borders against West Pakistan in February 1971 on the plea of retaliating for the hijacking to Pakistan and subsequent destruction of an Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship aircraft. Indian concentration on West Pakistan’s borders, they argued, would have acted as a check on denuding Pakistan’s military strength in the western wing And they felt that the Bengali elements among the Pakistani forces in the eastern wing could, with active and all-embracing support of the local population, have easily dealt with the beleaguered Pakistani garrison, consisting of no more than a division’s strength of demoralised soldiery.
Because suitable cantonments were lacking close to the border with West Pakistan, our formations earmarked for such contingency plans were located so far from it that it needed three to four weeks to concentrate the strength required to pose a credible threat. By that time Pakistan could have easily transferred two divisions to the east, which they actually did by the end of the first week of March. The fly in of these formations over the circuitous route through Colombo was well known, but there was very little India could do about this under the prevailing conditions. But then who visualised the magnitude of the rebellion brewing in the east?
Hit hard by the brute force of the ruthless military dictatorhip, a terrified mass of humanity poured over the border into India like flood waters from all directions. Starting as a stream, it gradually turned into a river of about 60,000 a day. There was no sign of its abating, and it was estimated that by the end of October the figure would jump to about 10 million. Apart from the administrative and financial strains caused by the maintenance of the refugees, this influx was creating a massive socioeconomic problem in the already troubled region of West Bengal. Financial experts calculated that at the prevailing rate of inflow expenditure on the upkeep of the refugees would mount to about Rs 4,500 million The hawks suggested that it would be more economical to fight a war rather than bear this burden, especially when the supplementary budget presented by Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan levied additional taxes, but could not restrain further escalation of the already rising price level. Pressures for a speedy settlement of the refugee problem grew rapidly. As a result, a strong note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs went to Islamabad.’ It said India reserved the right to claim appropriate compensation for the expenditure on refugee 3 “The Government of India therefore hold Pakistan fully responsible would facilitate the return of these refugees. Tikka Khan’s sudden and intense crackdown had left East Pakistan shocked and completely benumbed. Its people could act only in humble submission. This atmosphere gave the impression of faked normalcy. The rebellion, which started with great elan, slowly subsided against ruthless repression by superior strength. The rebels had also been flushed out by Pakistani troops manning the border and either went underground in anguish or sought sanctuary on the other side of the border to prepare afresh for the struggle ahead. Conditions both on the refugee and insurgency fronts looked grim, and with this the image of Mrs Gandhi as a resolute and decisive leader began to sag. Yahya Khan scored over her for a while by displaying signs of normalcy in East Pakistan rather triumphantly and accusing India of meddling with what he called the internal affairs of Pakistan.”
On 24 May 1971, Mrs. Gandhi vindicated her position in Parliament, saying “We all felt our country was poised for rapid economic advance and a more determined attack on the age-old poverty of our people. Even as we were settling down to these new tasks, we have been engulfed by a new and ‘gigantic problem, not of our making… so massive a migration in so short a time is unprecedented in history. Three and a half million have come in the last eight weeks. On the present estimates, the cost of relief may exceed Rs 1,800 million for six months.”
Rejecting Yahya Khan’s charge, she added that “it is mischievous to suggest that India has had anything to do with what happened in Bangladesh. This is an insult to the aspirations and spontaneous sacrifices of the people of Bangladesh, and a calculated attempt by the rulers of Pakistan to make India a scapegoat for their own misdeeds. It is also a crude attempt to deceive the world community.”
Over and over again, Mrs Gandhi appealed to the big powers and to other democratic countries to ask the military dictators of Pakistan to stop committing atrocities in East Bengal and keep their population within their borders. Otherwise, she warned that “what began as an internal affair of Pakistan was gradually turning into an internal affair of India, and would soon be turning into an international issue.”10 Addressing the Lok Sabha, she said: “I must share with the House our disappointment at the improbably long time the world is taking to react to the stark tragedy.”
She added that not only India but every country has to consider its interests. I think I am expressing the sentiments of this House and of our people when I raise my voice against the wanton destruction of peace, good neighbourliness and elementary principles of humanity by the insensate action of the military rulers of Pakistan.” She further urged that “conditions must be created to stop any further influx of refugees and to ensure their early return under credible guarantees for their future safety and well being. I say with all sense of responsibility that unless this happens there can be no lasting stability or peace on this subcontinent.”
Voicing the thinking of the hawks in New Delhi, Subrahmanyam pleaded vehemently that the breakup of Pakistan was in India’s interest and that the developments in East Pakistan provided India with the unprecedented opportunity to dismember Pakistan. Obviously answering the Prime Minister’s statement, he said: “We must act in a constructive way and not do anything which adds to to the difficulties of the people there.” He added: “The so-called international forum has not deterred any major power from taking action to protect its interests… A bold initiative on our part to help the struggle in Bangladesh to end quickly and victoriously is therefore called for.”
As part of Tikka Khan’s crackdown, Mujibur Rahman had been arrested and his fate was not known. Some other leaders had either been arrested or conveniently done away with. A few went underground in East Pakistan, now in the stranglehold of the Pakistani Army of the remainder, most followed the refugee trail and reached India completely bewildered. Senior Edward Kennedy of the US described the tragedy thus: “A story of indiscriminate killings and executions of dissident political leaders, students, citizens and civilians suffering and dying. It was a tale of total disruption of administration machinery, compounding an already difficult situation that threatened millions with starvation, epidemics and disasters. 12
These events had left gaping holes in the Awami League leadership, and the directing hand of its founder was now missing. Out of these inheritors of East Pakistan’s destiny, a provisicral government in exile was formed on 17 April 1971. Sheikh Mujib was appointed its president in absentia, and Tajuddin Ahmed was nominated prime minister to carry out the functions of government. This provisional government was afforded all the facilities required to continue the struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh from the oppression of the Pakistani Army. The seat of government was named Mujib Nagar, and a radio station was installed to Project the voice of freedom towards those who had stayed behind to organise the Mukti Bahini.
Correspondingly, diplomatic relations between Pakistan and India deteriorated and Pakistan directed the Indian Deputy High Commission in Dacca to be wound up and closed its own mission in Calcutta. 14 Pressures started building up, especially in eastern India, in favour of India’s recognition of the Bangladesh Government, and of Bangladesh as a separate entity. Backed by Jayaprakash Narayan, 15 other political personalities of some stature derided Indira Gandhi for showing weakness in refusing to recognise what had become a “political reality.” The Prime Minister however remained firm on the issue of recognition and categorically stated: “Not yet. At the appropriate time. Leave that to the Government to decide.”
What prevented India from giving recognition at this juncture? Political considerations demanded that the viability of an independent Bangladesh should be established both in domestic and international eyes irrefutably before it could be given official blessing. Otherwise, this was likely to be misconstrued as an Indian machination, especially when Yahya Khan and his diplomatic representatives abroad were clamouring for support against Indian interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Recognition could have led to immediate rupture of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, and might perhaps have precipitated armed conflict between them, with unpredictable international repercussions.
The country’s mood and military capability did not allow such a hasty step at this juncture. It was considered prudent to keep recognition on a low key on the political front while keeping the insurgency going with increasing intensity so as to sap the fighting capability of the Pakistani Army by prolonged and destructive guerilla operations in the inhospitable environment of monsoon rain, slushy terrain and hostile population Meanwhile, New Delhi could get the exodus from East Pakistan and the resultant economic burden accepted as an international problem. All relief agencies, both official, and unofficial, were geared to achieve this acceptance.
Accordingly, Mrs Gandhi made a significant statement: “We are convinced that there can be no military solution to the problem of East Bengal. A political solution must be brought about by those who have the power to do so. World opinion is a great force. It can influence the most powerful. The great powers have a special responsibility. If they exercise their power rightly and expeditiously, then only can we look forward to durable peace on our subcontinent. But if they fail, and I sincerely hope they will not, then the suppression of human rights, the uprooting of people and the continued homelessness of a vast number of human beings will threaten peace.”
After taking the opposition fully into confidence, the Indian Cabinet declared for the benefit of the international community that India had no intention of allowing the refugees to settle in its territory permanently. The refugees were being accommodated temporarily mainly on human considerations and at a considerable strain on India’s own economy. The responsibility of sending them back rested on the entire international community and not India alone. In this regard, an organised campaign was put into effect all over the world. Indian embassies put across the theme that the refugee problem was so gigantic that it was no longer an internal affair of Pakistan and India. Other powers must prevail on Pakistan to see reason and create suitable conditions for the refugees to go back. Otherwise, India would have no alternative to taking such steps as necessary to safeguard its interests. Stress was laid on the fact that India could not be expected to bear the crushing burden of expenditure on the refugees on its own. Various official and nonofficial delegations headed by half a dozen ministers and Jayaprakash Narayan in his personal capacity toured world capitals, “putting the world powers in the dock for their apathy towards the East Bengal development.”
At home, several drives were organised to collect funds and relief goods for the refugees, and these actions carried realisation of the plight of the refugees in a house to house drive to all corners of the country. On his return from a tour of some 46 countries, JP issued a passionate call for active support to the Freedom Fighters in Bangladesh and deplored the Government’s in action in this regard.
Meanwhile, after the initial setback to the Mukti Bahini operations caused by Tikka Khan’s repressive measures, the insurgent movement was organised on a firmer footing by setting up several camps for equipping and training the force properly, as well as for coordination, planning and better command and control of guerilla operations. It took much time to restore momentum to the Mukti Bahini operations. JP added his powerful voice in its support in addressing a two-day Bihar State Conference on Bangladesh on 6 July 1971, declaring that “the country, the Government and the people are unworthy if these are not prepared for a war,” implying that India should be prepared to fight Pakistan to solve the Bangladesh problem. He stressed that the “defeat of Bangladesh will be defeat of India. It is significant that this call for war to settle the issue was given at the onset of the monsoon, when a major offensive in the western and eastern wings was no longer feasible.
The magnitude of the problem created by the refugee influx was never appreciated correctly by the international community, which viewed developments from a distance and was fed with contradictory facts and figures by India and Pakistan which were utterly confusing. On 6 May, R. K. Khadilkar, Mrs Gandhi’s Minister for Labour and Rehabilitation, told newsmen that about one and a half million refuges had arrived in West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Bihar and had been lodged in about 150 camps. The Government expected many more millions to come, and the cost of these relief operations finally will obviously be beyond the capacity of India to bear singlehanded.” Till then, India had spent about Rs 100 million on the refugees, but the costs were ultimately expected to be much more. Accordingly, the Indian Government requested the UN Food and Agriculture organisation (FAO) for emergency assistance in the form of rice, wheat, pulses, milk powder and cooking oil. 16
India also appealed to the “democratic forces of the world to rise above normal diplomatic and political considerations and help in finding as early and satisfactory solution of this great and tragic human problem.” Various international aid agencies, including the World, Food Programme, the World Congress of Churches and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), contributed generously to meet the urgent needs of the refugees. UN Secretary General U Thant appealed on behalf of all the UN organisations on 19 Mayız to both member-governments and private bodies and other sources and hoped his appeal would have a positive and generous response. He said that while the extent of refugees and their needs could not be assessed with accuracy “in view of the fluid situation, there was “conclusive evidence of the presence of large numbers of people from East Pakistan in India,” and emergency assistance was required to provide them with food, clothes, shelter, medical relief and other essentials. He
70
added that he fully shared the serious concern of the international community at the plight of these refugees, and expressed the hope that these unfortunate people will be voluntarily repatriated at the earliest possible time.” Meanwhile, massive external assistance on an emergency basis was warranted.
A UN mission, led by Charles Mace, visited the relief camps to assess the refugee problem at firsthand. After the visit, he stated: “I was depressed to see the situation in which the refugees were coming over to India, which despite its difficulties had taken care of the refugees well.18 Mrs Gandhi made it absolutely clear to all concerned that the “cruel tragedy” in East Pakistan was damaging India economically, socially and emotionally. This was no propaganda, nor a figment of anybody’s imagination. The Happenings there were no longer only India’s problem but a worldwide one. She appealed to the international community to appreciate the very critical situation that had developed. Any failure to do so would lead to disastrous consequences. She asserted that any foreign help to Pakistan would be used against the people of Bangladesh.
Senator Kennedy had already warned the Americans that it is our military hardware, our guns, tanks and aircraft which are contributing to the sufferings, and this is being done in violation of negotiated agreements on the use of US military aid.”20 Mrs Gandhi made it known that unlike in the past India would not suffer the burden of the deliberate expulsion of such a large number of people by Pakistan without demanding a price for it. She also demanded that Pakistan should halt the terrorism of its army. In a note to Pakistan on compensation, India referred to the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guaranteed the right of persons to return to their country. Pakistan was reminded that it had shown utter indifference to the fate of the refugees, who were after all Pakistani nationals 21 Exasperated by the inaction displayed by the international community, and having gained a breathing space from the onset of the monsoon, Mrs Gandhi assumed a militant tone in her speeches. She rebutted Yahya Khan’s allegation of Indian interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs and affirmed India’s right to retaliate, adding that she was not deterred by threats. She said “if a situation is thrust upon us, then we are fully prepared to fight.”22 She challenged Yahya Khan’s claim that normalcy was returning to East Pakistan and said “if that is so, Pakistan should immediately call back the refugees.”
Meanwhile, the flow of refugees into India went on unabated, further burdening the country’s sagging economy and inflaming popular passions. Impartial foreign dignitaries like Kennedy and Mace appreciated India’s concern and attempted to invoke world opinion to make Yahya Khan see reason. A notable contribution, albeit a little partisan towards Pakistan, was made by Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, then United Nations Commissioner for Refugee Relief, who visited Pakistan immediately after a tour of the refugee camps in India and persuaded Yahya Khan to move in the matter.
On 30 June 1971, Prince Sadruddin rebutted the Pakistani allegation that India was obstructing the return of refugees to East Bengal 23 This was in answer to Tikka Khan’s allegation, made to a group of visiting members of Parliament from Britain, that left to themselves, 99 per cent of the refugees would come back. A British MP had reported earlier that fear and lack of confidence pervaded the refugees, and that there were no signs that the situation would improve significantly or rapidly. He favoured a political settlement in East Bengal, and felt that this would be the only real incentive to the refugees to return to their homes.
The Pakistani side of the story is summed up by Fazal Muqeem thus: “As far as the armed forces were concerned, till the end of May 1971 there was a purpose behind the operations the establishment of the government authority. After that a political solution should have followed, but unfortunately it was not forthcoming. Therefore, from June onwards there was no purpose in a military action and the futility of the fight was becoming obvious. The use of force without the backing of political and diplomatic action was achieving nothing. East and West Pakistan could not be kept together with force alone. If there was any misunderstanding that Bengali nationalism was still confined to a minority of extremists, it should have been cleared by the happenings of the preceding few months.” The President and his advisers were however adamant in keeping East Pakistan under the heel of the military boot.
Fazal Muqeem further describes Yahya Khan’s dilemma thus: “The President had placed himself in an extremely difficult political position. After having declared Mujibur Rahman a traitor, and having dispersed the Awami League higher command, he could not easily fill the vacuum. Whatever the difficulties, he had to move fast to produce a political solution… However, the urgency of the situation seemed to escape the President. Later, he did make a half-hearted attempt to recreate the central authority in the province, but only with the rejected people, and that too when it was too late.”
In response to the Prime Minister’s call, and also in deference to international and humanitarian pressures, Yahya Khan offered to take back the refugees, but with certain stipulations. He said that bona fide Pakistani citizens who had left their homes “owing to disturbed conditions and for other reasons” were welcome to return to their homes in East Pakistan, where, according to him, law and order had been restored and “life was fast returning to normal.” He charged India with circulating highly exaggerated and distorted accounts of events, and this had led to the refugee influx. The number of refugees had been inflated by adding to them the unemployed and homeless in West Bengal 24 Yahya Khan asserted that the genuine refugees from East Pakistan numbered only 2 million, and he was prepared to accept back only this number and no more. This would have left about 8 million as India’s responsibility. As a pre-requisite for their return, he proposed that an observer group under the aegis of the UN should be stationed along the international border between East Pakistan and India, ostensibly to superintend the return of the refugees but actually to observe and report on India’s involvement in the Mukti Bahini movement.
As for a political solution, he promised to call the National Assembly in due course. This was only a pretence as most of the members had either been killed or driven into India, About a hundred of them had been detained unlawfully by presidential decree and the seats thus declared vacant had been filled by uncontested elections under Tikka Khan’s rule. A puppet had been appointed Prime Minister in Islamabad, and another as Governor of East Pakistan, replacing the unpopular Tikka Khan. Power still remained with Yahya Khan at the centre as President, and in East Pakistan with Tikka Khan, and later with Niazi, as Martial Law Administrator. These conditions for the return of the refugees were unacceptable to India. According to New Delhi the pre-requisite for their return was the creation of a favourable political atmosphere, which meant handing over power to Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League, the duly elected leaders of the people of Bangladesh, and nothing less. Posting UN observers in India was ridiculous as the international press had free access to the border and their reports were there for the world to see and hear. These conditions could only be created by Yahya Khan. And if he failed to do so on his own it was for the world powers to persuade him to do so.
Hope of a solution through Mukti Bahini action had receded, for it was apparent that it would take such a movement years to unloosen the military stranglehold on Bangladesh. On the other hand, Yahya Khan was threatening total war on India if New Delhi decided to back up the return of the refugees with force. Under the circumstances, restive public opinion forced the Government to contemplate the extreme step of military intervention if other alternatives failed. The service chiefs were given the go ahead to plan and carry out preparations to meet the contingency.
Initially, most foreign governments, including that of the US, had reacted favourably to New Delhi’s diplomatic approaches, but only so long as they sensed that the Indian demands were “moderate,” namely stopping Tikka Khan’s crackdown, releasing Mujibur Rahman and granting some sort of provincial autonomy to East Pakistan. But the moment India echoed the voice of the Bangladesh government-in-exile, that nothing less than complete independence would do, these governments recoiled from their earlier conciliatory mood. Especially so when India turned down the proposal for UN observers, 25 as they suggested that India definitely had something to hide.
The more international pressure became ineffective the more India was pushed closer to thinking of war, and the closer thinking got to war the more it alienated international opinion. Yahya Khan fully exploited this in many capitals, actively encouraged by his chief backer President Nixon. He repeated his earlier offer, which on the surface seemed to meet India’s demands. The US openly supported him. The visit of Nixon’s special adviser Henry Kissinger to Islamabad, and going from there on a secret flight to Peking, underlined the understanding between Washington and Islamabad, and to this development India could no longer remain passive.
On 19 July 1971, Yahya Khan declared in an interview with a correspondent of the Financial Times, London, that “if India made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan” this would be treated as an attack on Pakistan. “I shall declare war, let the world note. Nor will Pakistan be alone.25 Replying to the threat of war, India’s Minister for External Affairs Swaran Singh said Pakistan had been all along trying to mislead world opinion by asserting that Pakistan’s problem was with India and not with the pepole of Bangladesh. The Pakistani military regime’s reckless brutality had landed it in a morass. Pakistan must realise that only a settlement with the representatives of Bangladesh would solve the problem. But so long as it did not realise this, the activities of the Mukti Bahini would increase. And if Pakistan made this an excuse to launch an attack on India, “we will defend ourselves. “27
Friendly diplomatic circles suggested India should seek its own solution rather than wait for others to solve its problems. New Delhi, alienated by the US, turned to the Soviet Union in its difficulties. After a dramatic exchange of visits between D.P. Dhar, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, signature of an Indo-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship was announced on 9 August 1971. The news was received in India with great acclaim by all sections of political opinion. It was akin to a breath of fresh air in the existing tension-laden atmosphere.
Article 9 of the treaty was particularly significant. It “provided for consultation between the two countries in case of war or threat of war to either of them with a view of removing the threat.” This treaty took care of the threat of Chinese intervention in the event of hostliities between India and Pakistan and ensured better procurement of much-needed weaponry and other equipment for the armed forces. Pakistan and China reacted violently to the treaty. The Russians offered a similar treaty to Pakistan if it pulled out of SEATO and CENTO, but this was rejected. Considerably emboldened, Mrs Gandhi told the nation on Independence Day from the ramparts of the Red Fort in Delhi: “We do not want war. We do not rattle sabres. But India is prepared for any emergency.” The warning was very clear. Meanwhile, the monsoon rains were nearing their end and within a month or so military operations would be possible. Tension was mounting on either side of the India-Pakistan border. In a widely publicised interview with Pierre Bois, special correspondent of Le Figaro of Paris, on 1 September, Yahya Khan declared that “if the Indians imagine that they can take part of my territory without provoking war, they will commit a grave error… Let me warn you and the world that this means war, total war, which I hate. But I will not hesitate for the defence of my country.”
For international consumption, Yahya Khan made a semblance of handing over the civil administration of Pakistan to the so-called duly elected representatives of the people in a broadcast to the nation on 18 September. He offered to consider proposals from the reconstituted National Assembly of amending the constitution he planned to give Pakistan. He made it clear however that he would retain the right to veto the amendments. His plan envisaged the preparation of a constitution by a committee nominated by him.
This constitution was to be presented to the National Assembly when it met after byelections to fill the seats of the Awami League members whom he had disqualified. He set the date for these elections between 25 November and 9 December 1971. This was a deliberate attempt on his part to delay the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. Pakistan People’s Party chief Z.A. Bhutto, whose party won 85 of the 144 assembly seats from West Pakistan and was the largest party in the country after the ban on the Awami League, warned Yahya Khan that “chaos would result from a delay in the power transfer.”
To crown it all, a statement was issued by the presidential office on 28 September to the effect that 20 prosecution witnesses had been heard in the secret trial of Sheikh Mujib and wamed against speculation, which would prejudice the case. This was the first official word on the proceedings.29 The outcome of this rigged and one-sided trial was a foregone conclusion. The trial provoked serious reactions in India, Bangladesh Government circles inflaming passions further among the refugees and in the outside world. India and Pakistan were slowly moving to the point of no retum.
More stories poured in from East Pakistan through Senator Tumey, who charged the martial law authorities with misuse of American aid. On 4 October, he said in the House of Representatives that US relief funds were apparently being used to bribe people to conform or starve them into submission. “Too much of our present effort is being converted by the Government and the army into their own use rather than being used to assist the starving people,” he said, adding that the US had made the mistake of allowing its food supplies to be distributed by the Martial Law Administration.” He asked: “How can one possibly expect that an army which has spent the last several months murdering, raping, ravaging and torturing people of East Bengal will suddenly distribute food in a humanitarian manner? 30
Official US policy was “counter-productive,” he said, and “has not produced peace. It had not produced a realistic promise of heading off the impending starvation. All that it has produced is cruelty, bloodshed, and horror. American military equipment has been used to transport troops, and American arms have been used to kill Bengalis, and drive them out of their country.” This was a poor reflection on the Nixon Administration’s pro-Pakistan policies.
It became necessary in September to take precautions to counter Pakistani thrusts into sensitive Indian territory. No responsible government could take chances with Yahya Khan, who might plunge both countries in war to avenge imaginary Indian wrongs. Troops hitherto located in the interior of India were concentrated close to the international borders opposite the eastern and western wings of Pakistan, especially along likely routes of ingress. This was done to reduce the time required in moving troops and material to their tactical positions vis-a-vis Pakistan. By virtue of its cantonments close to the border, Pakistan always had the advantage of quicker reaction over India.
Yahya Khan had completed the deployment of his troops in West Pakistan by about 12 October while the Indian formations were still on the move. His propaganda machine accused India of a thinly separated armed confrontation which might ignite into a shooting war any moment. By this propaganda, Pakistan emerged as the aggrieved party and India as a big bully who wanted to cow a weaker neighbour with threats of war. Despite Pakistan’s accusations, the Indian Army and Air Force barely managed to complete their war deployment in a defensive posture by the third week of October.
In an address to the Pakistani people on 12 October, Yahya Khan complained bitterly about India’s attempts at disintegrating Pakistan and the war-like concentration of Indian troops on Pakistan’s borders. He decried what he described as the enhanced belligerency of the Indian leaders. Fully conscious of the fresh accretion of strength India had derived from the Indo-Soviet treaty, he assured the Pakistanis that they were not alone. He was overplaying his American and China cards to achieve this effect Once militarily secure, Mrs Gandhi embarked on a final attempt to persuade the international community to persuade Yahya Khan to see reason and create a “favourable situation for the refugees to return to their homes. She first went to Moscow and voiced India’s concern at events in East Pakistan at an official banquet. She said: “The growing agony of the people of East Bengal does not seem to have moved any governments. Our restraint has been appreciated only in words. The basic issue involved and the real threat to peace and stability in Asia are being largely ignored.” She further pleaded: “We cannot but be perturbed when a fire breaks out in a neighbour’s house. What happened in East Bengal can be no longer regarded as Pakistan’s domestic affair. More than 9 million East Bengali’s have come into our country. We cannot be expected to absorb them. We have problems enough of our own and we certainly do not need to add to our vast population. The message was clear for the world to heed.
On her return to New Delhi, a foreign correspondent asked her at a press conference how she would respond to Yahya Khan’s proposal for a dialogue. She replied: “Nobody can
75
prophesy these things. We can only say that we have been doing, and will continue to do, everything possible to avoid conflict. But the situation is a grave one. All along the border troops have been brought closer to the border on either side. Naturally, we have to look to our interests.” Then she added sardonically: “Everybody admires our restraint. We get verbal praise, but the others are not restrained, and they get arms as well.” On 23 October, the Prime Minister proceeded on a three-week tour of several Western countries, including the US, France, West Germany. Britain, Belgium and Australia. She explained that her mission “was necessary in the present situation to put across to the world leaders the reality of the situation in the subcontinent.”2 When questioned about the wisdom of leaving the country at such a critical juncture, she argued: “The final decision ultimately rests in our hands. But because the situation is so grave it is important that India should not speak or act in haste or anger.” In the Western capitals she visited, she mainly appealed for aid for the refugees, who were proving an unbearable burden on India. She emphasised the need for their early return to their homes, and in this regard she urged that pressure should be applied on Pakistan for an expeditious political settlement in East Pakistan.
She showed her willingness to meet Yahya Khan and discuss the issues facing the two countries, but any settlement in East Pakistan must be negotiated with its people and their elected leaders. That meant negotiating with Sheikh Mujib, then in captivity. Unless he was freed, no negotiations were possible as any settlements otherwise arrived at was likely to be misconstrued as having been contrived under duress. But Yahya Khan was in no mood to negotiate with a rebel. In Paris, repeating her offer to meet him, Mrs Gandhi commented: “But you know his position. How can you shake hands with a clenched first?” She assured the world that India would not assume the role of aggressor. But India was being pushed by Pakistan and its mentors into provocative situations which might force it to war.
Mrs Gandhi also allayed Western fears about India’s involvement with the Soviet Union. She reiterated that the Indo-Soviet treaty was not directed against any particular country and did not in any way compromise India’s neutrality or freedom of action. She was able to a great extent to internationalise the refugee question, and also succeeded in winning sympathy for the aspirations of the people of East Bengal and India’s interest in a just solution of their cause.
But in Washington Nixon remained unconvinced. Advised by Kissinger, he had his own solution to offer. He proposed that both sides should withdraw their troops from the common border as a pre-requisite to talks between India and Pakistan to settle the East Pakistan and connected problems. Meanwhile, a UN observer group should be posted on both sides of the India-East Pakistan border. Nixon assured Mrs Gandhi that Yahya Khan was moving towards democratisation of East Pakistan and should be given time to find mutually satisfactory solutions. Although the President did not specify the time frame in which Yahya Khan was working, one may assume that his proposals were intended to serve three purposes. Firstly, the Mukti Bahini would be denied the momentum of their guerilla operations in East Pakistan. Secondly, sealed off by the UN observer group from outside interference, the Pakistani Army would be able to come down on the Mukti Bahini with a heavy hand.
Thirdly, India would miss the opportunity of military intervention once the cold season, when the risk of Chinese collusion was at its minimum, was over. India might then have to wait another year, and by that time the situation would be quite different. World opinion, and the international sympathy painstakingly won by the Indian political campaign, was likely to wane with the passage of time.
These proposals were obviously contrived to bail Yahya Khan, a staunch friend of Nixon, out of a crisis of his own making. Their net outcome appeared to be that the refugee burden would continue to be inflicted on India, until Yahya Khan created “favourable conditions which were never to materialise. The type of phony democratisation he had in mind would never have satisfied the Bangladesh leaders. This was not acceptable to India, and so Mrs Gandhi had to return home empty handed except for the vocal sympathy of some Western leaders.
Nixon claimed later in a message to the US Congress that he had projected a timebound programme for a political solution for East Pakistan. On the other hand, Mrs Gandhi was asked in a TV interview: “Did the United States suggest some plan of action which you felt you could not accept?” She replied: “No plan of action has been suggested to us.” This was never contradicted. In pursuance of its pro-Pakistan policies, the US Administration allowed previously committed arms shipments to Pakistan to continue despite the earlier precedent set in the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965 when economic aid and arms supplied to both countries were immediately stopped. Nixon justified his decision by saying that the discontinuance of supplies would be construed by Yahya Khan as leverage to influence the domestic policies of Pakistan. By continuing aid, he argued, the US Administration would be able to have some say with the Pakistani authorities, and this would help in the long run. But India did not see much sense in this double-faced policy. In practice, however, the US maintained a flexible response to the prevailing situation, keeping its options open to back any individual or party which gained the upper hand. It supported Yahya Khan when he appeared to be winning and conveniently dropped him when he was not. Right up to 25 March, Washington advised him to come to terms with Sheikh Mujib as it was feared that armed action would mean the loss of East Pakistan. The Sheikh’s right-of-centre policies were at that time considered a safe bet for the US. In fact, it was rumoured that the Awami League had been financed by the US in the assembly elections in 1970. When Yahya Khan stayed on in East Pakistan against American advice, the official reaction in Washington was unfavourable. But it progressively improved with the initial success of the Pakistani Army’s repressive action.
American public opinion however protested against Tikka Khan’s brutal methods of repression and ruthless genocide, and the onset of the monsoon added to the army’s difficulties against the Mukti Bahini guerillas. From this period, US support on the political front appeared to be in a low key, but as soon as the rains were over and the army asserted itself, Washington’s support once again came to the fore. This fluctuation in American response was noticeable even in the Bangladesh war in December. If Niazi had not given up the struggle when he did, it was likely that the US Seventh Fleet would have intervened to get him out of his difficulties and the conflict would not have ended as swiftly as it did.
On the other hand, Yahya Khan counted heavily on China’s help for various reasons. From the time of the Chinese showdown with India in 1962, Peking’s foreign policy had always tilted towards Pakistan. To demonstrate this practically, aid in the form of military hardware had been pouring in to equip the Pakistani Army, especially when the US pipeline was blocked after the 1965 conflict. President Ayub’s border settlement with China in the Karakorams, in the disputed territory in the Pakistani-occupied region of Kashmir, and the subsequent construction of the highway joining Sinkiang in China with Gilgit in Pakistan, had ensured that Pakistan would get favoured treatment from Peking in time of need. On 13 April, Chou-En-lai promised to help Pakistan in maintaining its “territorial integrity” against all external interference and the handful of people in the eastern wing.
In an interview with Columbia Broadcasting System on 9 November Yahya Khan said: “The Chinese would intervene if India attacked Pakistan.” This impression was encouraged by the powerful pro-China lobby in Pakistan led by Bhutto. After acting the honest broker between Nixon and the Chinese rulers, Yahya Khan and his advisers counted on the Chinese adopting a more politically active, if not military, role than they had played in 1965. The more the pro-Chinese lobby encouraged Yahya Khan in this thought the more heavily Pakistan strategy began to hinge on active Chinese support. The Pakistani, military planners calculated at least on their activating the northem frontiers of India so that the Indian Army would be so involved in holding actions against the Chinese that it would not be able to concentrate superior strength against East Pakistan. Anyhow, planning the potential threat of Chinese intervention was paying dividends to Pakistan. This was sufficient to deter India from pulling out troops facing the Chinese on the Himalayan border.
Bhutto, who led a Pakistani delegation to Peking as late as November 1971 to seek a defence pact with China as a counter to the Indo-Soviet treaty, told the press: “China will give any measure of support we need. It depends what we ask.” Pressed further, he elucidated: “China is fully and enthusiastically supporting Pakistan. We can expect the maximum assistance… India should have no illusion on this. This was empty to talk and in fact if anybody was under an illusion it was Bhutto and his pro-China lobby, as the realities were altogether different. The Chinese were pragmatic to the extent that no joint statement was issued at the end of Bhutto’s negotiations. Moreover, after the serious border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969, China had been worried about a possible pre-emptive strike on its northern border, where about 40 Russian divisions were poised for action. With a threat of this magnitude close to its borders, China had to think twice before embarking on an adventure on the Indo-Tibetan border, especially in view of the Indo-Soviet treaty. Foreign correspondents based in Pakistan filed reports saying Bhutto had retumed without any specific commitments from China. Answering a newsman, Bhutto said: “The question whether China would take any diversionary action in the north is a superfical matter.”
Although the Chinese leaders continued to lead Pakistan on with promises of joint efforts to overcome difficulties, they showed great pragmatism in handling the issue. In his book Pakistani Crisis of Leadership, Fazal Muqeem accuses Yahya Khan of overplaying the “China card.” According to him, one Chinese diplomat, when questioned about the possibility of active Chinese aid to Pakistan, replied: “You know Russia is not afraid of China.” But India could not take a chance, unpredictable as the Chinese had proved earlier, Where did the Soviet Union stand in the conflict? Ever since the partition of British India into Pakistan and India, these two countries had been antagonistic to each other on the very basis of this partition. Their outstandig disputes, especially Kashmir, had seen them
moving in diametrically opposite directions. If one turned to Washington, the other veered towards Moscow and or Peking. The dominant factor for such contrary reactions was the mutual fear of undoing the partition by military action.
Weaker in economic and military potential, and awkwardly divided into two widely separated wings, Pakistan harboured a genuine fear that its bigger neighbour would swallow it. Lacking an industrial base and other necessary infrastructures, Pakistan knew fully well it would never compete with India in shaping a military machine on its own. Thus, in sheer desperation, it welcomed Dulles proposal that it should join pacts like SEATO and CENTO contrived to contain the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia in 1950.
India had been made the same offer earlier, but Nehru had declined it in pursuance of his policy of non-alignment and thus won the esteem of both communist giants. Moscow and Peking were on the friendliest terms with New Delhi at that time. US military aid poured into Pakistan progressively enhancing its armed might, while India preferred to place its hope in Panchsheel. In the 1950s, military power on the Indian subcontinent tilted gradually but definitely in Pakistan’s favour in qualitative terms and this coupled with the emergency of a military dictatorship, made Pakistan more cocksure and aggressive in international political forums. Pakistan got the full backing of the Westem bloc in adopting this stance while India thrived on Soviet and Chinese support, and Nehru assumed leadership of the Third World. This strange power balance between Pakistan’s military strength and Indian diplomacy might have continued without precipitating armed conflict for some time, but the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 upset the political equilibrium of the subcontinent, setting a new course of power polarisation.
Faced with a military debacle of Chinese creation in the Himalayas, Nehru openly
for the urgent intervention of US air power against the Chinese, in addition to a request for arms and equipment, on 20 November 1962. The Chinese very prudently extricated themselves the next day by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. Throughout the crisis Moscow remained neutral. Khrushchev termed it a domestic quarrel between a brother, China, and a friend, India. Mention of China as a brother was a significant pointer to where the Soviet preference lay.
After the conflict, relations between India and China became very sour. Pakistan, more out of antagoinsm to India than compulsion, wooed China and had by 1963 entered into a border treaty ceding a goodly chunk of Pakistani-occupied Kashmir. Construction of a highway linking Sinkiang with Gilgit was begun as a prelude to cultivating China as an alternative source of supply of arms and equipment. Bhutto and other militarist elements in Pakistan had accused Ayub Khan of not exploiting India’s difficulties with China to force a solution of the Kashmir problem by military action. The Americans and the British extracted on assurance from Ayub Khan at the time of the 1962 conflict that he would not add to India’s difficulties at that critical juncture, promising that after the crisis had blown over the Kashmir tangle would be sorted out to the entire satisfaction of Pakistan. Kashmir defied a political decision despite prolonged negotiations between representatives of both countries. Frustrated by its inabiltiy to find a solution of the problem to its satisfaction and alarmed by the fast-growing tilt of military balance in India’s favour, Pakistan launched a war against India in 1965 with the active connivance of China. Although Ayub pitched high hopes on Chinese help China contented itself with loud verbal threats, saying that unless India dismantled within three days all the military works for aggression… and returned all the Chinese sheep which had strayed across the China-Sikkim border, it must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences.”
India did not act on this warning, but no grave consequences followed. The pro-China lobby in Islamabad said later that China had “meant business and would have come in on the side of Pakistan in a big way had Ayub Khan prolonged the conflict to allow them to complete their build-up. Ayub Khan’s unwillingness or inability to carry on a prolonged military campaign however prevented enlargement of the conflict. The subsequent role of the Soviet Union as a mediator and signatory to the Tashkent Agreement alienated China from Pakistan for a while. Stoppage of arms supplied by the US and Britain in 1965 and the lack of hard currency to buy arms in the open market resulted in bringing India closer to Russia as its supplier. Although Russia offered the same facilites to Pakistan, that country chose to lean more on China China was helping Pakistan in setting up armament production at Taxila, and the fact that the Chinese pipeline for supplying arms could be maintained along the new Sinkiang-Gilgit highway even during hostilities with India might have prompted Pakistan to make this choice. Russia, on the other hand, continued to treat India and Pakistan on equal terms, and this attitude continued till the breakdown of Sino-Russian political relations over the border incidents in 1969. This breakdown led to the enunciation of Brezhnev’s plan for Asian collective security. The plan visualised an economic, political and military grouping in the region with the object of isolating China and further containing its influence in Southeast Asia. The Russian initiative for such a grouping of countries with common national interests came when the much-maligned policies of Dulles were being ushered out by Nixon’s disengagement from the area. From then onwards the Russians followed swiftly on the heels of the American withdrawal. Accordingly, they unfolded the Brezhnev plan both to India and Pakistan .
Pakistan chose to reject the proposal outright as it was not willing to seek any benefit from Russia at the expense of its dependable friend China, which had by now become its principal supplier of arms. On the other hand, India did not join the proposed grouping but, understanding Russian interests, was prepared to go along with Moscow without making any firm commitment. As a result, the Russian attitude to Pakistan hardenend considerably, and that brought New Delhi proportionately closer to Moscow. In this type of polarisation, two distinct camps – Russia and India, and China and Pakistan – should have emerged, making interdependence clearcut. Unfortunately, this did not happen as the Russians continued to strive to wean Pakistan away from China. Moscow therefore kept its resentment at the Pakistani refusal to join the regional grouping Brezhnev had proposed in a low key. Diplomatically, a door was kept open for Pakistan to walk into the Russian camp any time it liked. This was almost a favourite mistress treatment which puzzled India.
Moscow’s first reaction to Pakistan’s crackdown in East Pakistan was a strongly worded letter from the President to Yahya Khan on 2 April 1971 cautioning the Pakistani leader on the course of events in East Bengal. But the letter did not even urge autonomy for the eastern wing, leave alone independence. The Russian leaders remained silent spectators of the genocide, the refugee exodus and the ruthless suppression of the voice of freedom, apparently waiting for the situation to crystallise in a manner favourable to their interests. Like Washington, Moscow felt Yahya would be able to crush the rebellion, reestablish
80
his authority in East Pakistan and eventually work out some sort of settlement with the political heirs of Sheikh Mujib. In any event, they always considered the Sheikh an American stooge. Up to the time of signing the Indo-Soviet treaty, the Russians continued to advise Yahya Khan and Mrs Gandhi “not to let the situation get out of hand.” This attitude was amply evidenced at the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in the first week of September, and Podgorny played the same tune as late as October, saying: “We consider that further sliding towards a military conflict must be prevented.35 Moscow perhaps felt that a political solution was still possible, and if brought about would keep Pakistan on its side without antagonising “faithful” India. Little did the Russian leaders realise that events in East Pakistan had already slid out of control.
Yahya Khan had hastened the process by arranging Kissinger’s clandestine flight to Peking in July, The Russians did not view the developing US-China axis connived at by Pakistan with favour, and this possibly hastened the signature of the treaty between India and the Soviet Union. The treaty encouraged India to adopt a stronger stance in relation to Pakistan than possible until then. The Indian Foreign Minister declared that India could count on Soviet aid under the treaty. Although he did not spell it out in so many words, it was construed that he implied aid against Chinese intervention. The visit of a Soviet military team to assess India’s needs was announced, and this left no doubt among the countries concerned about the scope of the treaty. Throughout this period, till Yahya triggered the war in December 1971, Moscow continued to dissuade New Delhi from intervening militarily in East Pakistan. It is now known that the Russian leaders advised Mrs Gandhi on her Moscow visit the previous October against such a step. Reportedly, Brezhnev cautioned her saying: “Remember Vietnam.” What worried the Soviet leaders was perhaps the extent of involvement Indian military action might lead the Soviet Union into if India got bogged down on the battlefield. China might be tempted to intervene to take advantage of India’s military difficulties.
And how would Washington react to Chinese intervention? The US might come to the rescue of Pakistan, its friend and ally, in coalition with China, a newly found friend. In that event, the Soviet Union was expected to come to India’s aid, and this might lead to global war. This was a course Moscow wished to avoid. But after years of waiting the Chinese had recently won the respectability of a place in the UN and its Security Council. They were not likely to risk tarishing their new image and embarking on a course of collision with the Russians in a hurry, especially when 40-odd Red Army divisions stood on the northern border of China in instant readiness for combat. The very great temptation of an easy military victory was accordingly necessary to make China intervene militarily in the quarrel between India and Pakistan. It was imperative that military action to solve the Bangladesh issue should be brought to a swift conclusion. The Soviet leaders doubted India’s military as well as political capability to do so till events later belied their fears in this regard. That is why, up to the very end, they went on advising restraint and favoured a political solution short of war. India was in a great predicament for Yahya Khan, abetted by China and the US, was leading India into a war of Pakistan’s making while India’s friend Russia, hoping to retain some influence with Yahya Khan, was holding India back. Eventually, India decided to go it alone, hoping the Soviet Union would intervene if the other big powers came to the aid of Pakistan. India’s self-assurance at this juncture surprised friend and foe alike.
Along with political parleys, military preparations were continuing on both sides of
the border to meet any contingency. The aim of Tikka Khan’s toughness had been amply achieved by the end of May 1971. Military repression had flushed out dissidents and terrified the remainder of the population into submission and they were looking forward to normalisation. The time was ripe for a political solution, but Yahya Khan and his advisers preferred to hold East Pakistan in the grip of terror. Actually, he had put himself in an awkward situation politically. By outlawing the Awami League, dubbing Mujibur Rahman a traitor, and generally expelling the insurgent leadership to India, he had created a political vacuum difficult to fill.
Yahya Khan’s dilemma was that the longer he delayed a political solution the more fertile ground he provided for guerilla warfare. The absence of a political leadership which could fill the vacuum denied him the opportunity of a viable solution. As generally happens in such situations, he let matters drift, in the hope that they would find their own solutions, till August 1971, when a compromise came his way. Tikka Khan was replaced as governor by Dr A. M. Malik, a retired East Pakistani civil servant, thus giving the impression that civil authority had been restored. Tikka Khan, who had after the initial brutalities of the military managed to settle down to dealing with the economic and political problems of East Pakistan, was recalled to West Pakistan for another assignment. It was believed that his transfer was brought about by international pressures backed by adverse public opinion at his atrocities. The prevalent tension in East Pakistan could not be eased while he continued at the helm of affairs.
The choice of Niazi to replace Tikka Khan was unfortunate for Pakistan. Whereas Tikka Khan had a dedicated application to national aims and political vision, Niazi was essentially a battalion commander in a general’s uniform. He inherited a delicate task of great politico-military significance, coupled with fighting insurgency in his command, well away from the hub of the decision-making headquarters in Islamabad. The situation in East Pakistan was out of the usual run and too complex for a conventional soldier. The post Niazi held required a man capable of thinking for himself and taking momentous decisions in a crisis, and then executing them without guidance or supervision as his higher-ups were too far removed physically to be aware of developments.
Niazi was not a man of that mettle. Although he was liked by his subordinates, his manner of handling the situation showed that his vision did not extend beyond deployment of companies and platoons, an unfortunate trait of senior infantry officers in both India and Pakistan. He was unimaginative and relied too much on his subordinates to run things while he indulged in the worldly pleasures his status bestowed on him. As a result, he was never master of the situation throughout his tenure as Martial Law Administrator.
Before Niazi took over, an operational instruction for the defence of East Pakistan was issued. This was based on a series of war games held at formation levels under the code name Titu Mir. The aim of this plan was to defend the territorial integrity of the eastern region at all costs. Its defence was organised in tiers which visualised giving battle at a series of defence lines based on urban builtup areas and river obstacles. The troops, if hard pressed, were to fall back on the defences of Dacca, where the final battle was to be given. The plan envisaged uninterrupted lines of communication which would enable the withdrawal of formations without interference. By the time Niazi took over, the parameters on which this plan had been prepared had changed considerably. With the reported training of large numbers of guerillas in India in the monsoon months, the insurgency was likely to be stepped up after the rains by the large-scale induction of such forces along the border from the Indian side. Pakistani intelligence evaluated about this time that the insurgency would not only be stepped up but Indian intervention in aid of the Mukti Bahini was very much on the cards. In view of the Indian support to the guerilla operations, the assessors recommended sealing the border to thwart. infiltration by Freedom Fighters. As it was, much damage and resultant demoralisation of civilian morale was caused by sabotage in the tea industry and in shipping, apart from the disruption of essential services throughout the province.
Based on intelligence reports, as also on his own observations after taking command, Niazi started revising the operational plan. After the surrender in December, he explained that he had not expected a major attack from India and felt that the Indian efforts would be confined to capturing a large chunk of territory adjacent to its own as a base for establishing a Bangladesh government. He therefore reoriented his plans for a forward posture of defence. This posture involved occupation of border outposts strongly and backing them with adequate reserves to restore the local situation in case they were attacked. Since effective sealing of the border meant establishing a large number of such BOPs, troops meant for setting up depth lines of defences, particularly around Dacca, were consumed. Niazi sacrificed depth for strength of the forward border posture, but this was a fatal mistake for which he was to pay dearly later.
Rebel activities progressively increased on the border as well as in the interior. Large scale sabotage, attacks on police stations and other centres of government authority and killing collaborators instilled fear among the population and created a sense of insecurity. Yahya Khan warned India that if Indian troops attempted to enter East Pakistan this would be considered an open war against Pakistan and would be suitably dealt with. Niazi personally identified himself and his command with this policy without understanding its implications in the context of the developing possibility of Indian intervention. He kept on telling his troops “not an inch of territory would be allowed to be lost.” As events moved to a climax, he became obsessed with the idea that a tactical withdrawal from the forward posture would be a personal defeat for him and a stigma on his honour as a soldier.
Niazi was gradually squeezed by Mukti Bahini, and this inflamed the entire border with well-planned attacks on BOPs accompained by efforts to capture some salients inside East Pakistan which would help India’s eventual full-fledged intervention. These raids across the border were gradually built up from a low pitch to a crescendo from early October to the end of November with a purpose. The pattern of these nibbling operations, widely spread along the border, may be compared to an attack by ants on a sleeping lion. By the middle of November, Niazi was provoked to such a degree that the Pakistani troops started sallying very close to the Indian border, and at times even crossing it.
The pattern these forays followed was that the Mukti Bahini operated inside Pakistani territory supported by Indian artillery deployed on our side of the border. If Mukti Bahini men got into difficulties they were helped out by BSF and the Indian Army. To the extent possible, the use of regular Indian troops was avoided inside East Pakistan as this would have been an act of war, but there were occasions when the intensity of operations like those at Bayra, Hilli, Kamalpur, Akhaura and Belonia-made this unavoidable. These Mukti Bahini actions were so numerous in terms of numbers and spread of time and space that it is difficult to describe them individually. It may be said however that by the time Yahya Khan declared war the net gains of these nibbling operations were considerable.
The biggest action in the southwestern sector was fought at Bayra, in the Jessore area, northeast of Calcutta. In an offensive defence action, 9 Infantry Division troops pl Pakistani intruders across the border in strength. A fierce battle, involving the use of armour and air support on both sides, raged near the village of Gharibpur, about five miles inside Pakistani territory. The village exchanged hands a few times, but was eventually secured by the Indians on 23 November. Chaughacha town was also captured at the same time.
Mrs Gandhi made a statement on the incident in Parliament on 24 November: “On 21 November, Pakistan Infantry, supported by tanks and artillery, launched an offensive on the Mukti Bahini, which was holding the liberated area around Bayra, five miles from our eastern border, Pakistani armour, under heavy artillery cover, advanced to our border, threatening our defensive positions. Their shells fell in our territory, wounding a number of our men. The local military commander took appropriate action to repulse the Pakistani attacks. In this action, 13 Pakistani Chaffee tanks were destroyed.
“On 22 November, the Pakistani forces called up an air strike of four Sabrejets on our positions. These were intercepted within Indian territory by our Gnats, which destroyed three Sabrejets. Two of the Pakistani pilots who bailed out were captured in our territory, indicating the Pakistani air intrusion into Indian air space. We regard this as a purely local action.32 Enunciating policy regarding such local actions, sho said: “Pakistan armed forces have been shelling our border areas, inflicting damage on life and property. Its air force has wantonly violated our air space several times, and once came right up to Srinagar. Spies and saboteurs have been blowing up trains and bridges. Since March 1971, we have lodged 66 protests for border violation scovering 890 incidents.
“However, these protests have had no effect, and to cover up their incessant violations Pakistan propaganda media have been putting out the story that we are engaged in an undeclared war and have launched massive attacks with tanks and troops. This is wholly untrue. In fact, it was Pakistan which threatened total war and moved its entire armed strength into operational positions on our borders and launched massive hate-India campaign with the slogan “Crush India. We had therefore to take appropriate measures and moved our forces to defensive positions in order to protect the integrity of our country and the lives and property of our citizens. It has never been our intention to escalate the situation or to start a conflict. To this end we have instructed our troops not to cross the border except in self-defence. We cannot ignore our experience of 947-48… and August September 1965.38 On November 22, India claimed the destruction of 13 Pakistani tanks against six of our own and three Sabrejets shot down by IAF units supporting the land battle. This action prompted Yahya Khan to declare a national emergency the next day and complain to U Thant about an alleged Indian violation of the UN Charter. Mrs Gandhi replied that “even though Pakistan has declared an emergency, we shall refrain from taking a similar step unless further aggressive action by Pakistan compels us to do so in the interest of national security.”
In the meantime, the country should remain “unruffled.”39 The net gain of this action at Bayra was that India reached almost halfway to Jessore up to Arpara on the ChaughchaJessore road and came in contact with the Pakistani defence west of Jessore town.
Farther north, the liberation forces had captured Jiban Nagar, Uthalo and Darsana and were leaning on Khalispur on the Jiban Nagar-Kot Chandpur road. In the northwestern sector, some areas north and south of it had however been captured, but the Pakistanis continued to resist at Hilli. This small railway town on the border on top of the Balurghat bulge was held by 4 Frontier Force Battalion beefed up by elements of EPCAF, and these forces were a foil to activity in support of the Mukti Bahini. Attacks were launched on Hilli with about two battalions but did not make much headway because of the stout resistance of the defenders.
These attacks went in frontally, in a (typically orthodox World War I manner, and suffered heavy casualties in 67 killed and 90 wounded. The first attack went in on 24 November. Fighting continued with varying intensity, and Hilli could eventually be cleared only as late as 11 December, and that too only because Indian out-flanking movements some distance away had made it untenable.
In the Dinajpur area, Khanpur and Mukandpur had been occupied on its southern approaches, and both banks of the Icchamati river were secured along the Sanjia-Phulbari axis. Meanwhile, a force advancing south on the Mirganj-Dinajpur road had secured the town of Thakargaon. In the Barakhata salient, Barakhata had been captured and Hathi Banda had been contacted and effectively contained. In the Nageshwari salient, all the area north of the Dharla river had been completely cleared.
In the northern sector, the Kamalpur garrison, comprising a strong company group. had been completely surrounded by about a brigade strength, but it continued to hold out till the evening of 4 December after having beaten back two attempts at its capture. This position was held by a company of 31 Baluch Battalion augmented by elements of paramilitary forces under Capt Ashan Malik. In the northeastern sector, Radhanagar had been captured north of Sylhet after overcoming BOPS at Takiganj and Atgram. In the area opposite Karimganj, the salient east of the general Chargram-Karimganj line had been secured. Similarly, Gazipur had been captured in the Kalaura area while Kalaura itself had been successfully invested. The Shamshernagar airfield fell into Indian hands, but a few Pakistani pockets continued to hold out. In the southeastern sector Ganganagar had been captured in the Akhaura area. The Akhaura defences were surrounded and expected to fall any moment. Farther south, the entire Belonia bulge had been cleared, and Mukti Bahini were holding positions directly threatening rail and road communications between Comilla and Chittagong in the area of Feni. This threat forced Niazi to rush reinforcements to the area, thus denuding some other important sectors of their defenders.
A special force operating towards Rangamati had pushed back Pakistan’s forward posts in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and was leaning against the Rangamati lake area and in occupation of the salient north of Ramgarh. This force was operating on a manpack basis, supported by helicopters and air supplies. The Pakistani opposition in this region was minimal. It appeared that Niazi, had given this area a low tactical priority. In addition, Freedom Fighters’ raids were directed towards dislocating the local economy. They had damaged the tea and cement factories at Chhatak and the gas pipeline in Sunamganj. A tea estate at Dhalai was also captured and extensively damaged. The Dhalai position had repulsed the first attack with heavy casualties. An unorthodox second attempt carried the position and saved the day. Along with these attacks and raids close to
85
the border, the intensity of the Mukti Bahini guerilla operations in the interior, particularly around Dacca, were stepped up to a high pitch. The rear lines of communication were extensively disrupted. Ambushes of convovys and raids on small bodies of troops were common. To hold the border, Niazi had to disperse his troops more widely, eventually leading to a breakdown of formations and of fire units in support to plug holes, here and there, and reinforce the defences at points where threats were increasing. To complicate matters, a number of clearing operations were undertaken in the interior. Three noteworthy operations were organised: one to clear both sides of the Brahmaputra from Nagalbari Chat to Phulchari Ghat the second to flush out guerillas of the Siddiqui group from the general area of Tangail-Mirzapur; and the third in Dacca city itself and in its vicinity. This resulted in a wide dispersal of troops and consequently loss of cohesion. Deployed on the forward posture along the border in a thin, long line, Niazi’s troops were getting into fixed positions, thus losing the ability to manoeuvre and obtain freedom of action. The sector reserves envisaged in the operational plan had by now been dissipated, and the original concept of fighting from strong points had gone by the board.
Meanwhile, the Indian Army had absorbed some good lessons from these preliminary engagements to modify suitably its original tactical plans. It was realised that wherever troops attacked fortified defensive positions the Pakistanis fought with courage and rare doggedness, as at Hilli and Kamalpur. The attacking troops suffered heavy casualities, and took inordinately long to clear the opposition.
It became apparent that the orthodox concept of step-by-step reduction of fortified defensive positions would not only prove costly in casualities but in time as well, and this was not acceptable in the context of the short war envisaged in the Indian operational plan. The solution therefore suggested itself that for speedy victory bypassing fortified positions was imperative. The collapse of the Pakistani Army in the eastern wing could only be achieved by out manoeuvring it and not by sel-piece battles In this regard, the policy of provocative occupation of sensitive areas paid off. Niazi reacted very violently, launching repeated and often hurried counterattacks, suffering heavy casualties and causing his troops to lose their spirits well before the start of the actual war. For instance, Niazi lost 13 tanks and three aircraft in the Bayra battle besides large numbers of men, which he could illatford, especially because of the precarious and long sea routes to his parent bases. These initial Mukti Bahini operations helped the Indian Army, which got to know the Pakistani pattern and concept of fighting. In some instances, the initial ingress helped to cross obstacles close to the start lines well ahead of the opening of hostilities. The complete switchover from the original concept of direct to indirect approach, later explained as an “expanding torrent,” was itself a great achievement for a tradition-bound orthodox army, This switchover laid the foundation for the eventual Indian victory. Bypassing the Pakistani defensive positions completely threw Niazi’s forward posture of balance, and he was never able to recover from it.
The day after the Bayra battle, Yahya Khan appealed to the UN once again saying: “I am addressing this message to you with a deep sense of urgency in view of the grave situation which has arisen in my country as a result of unprovoked and largescale attacks by Indian armed forces on various parts of Pakistan.” The Indian spokesman, replying to his charges of Indian aggression, said: “It is Bengali guerillas who are described as the Indian Army.”
At a banquet held in honour of a visiting Chinese delegation led by Li-Shui-ching, Minister of Machine Building, Yahya Khan declared almost prophetically: “In ten days time I may not be here in Pindi. I may be fighting a war.” The war did come off within this period, triggered by the gradual escalation of pressures exerted by the Mukti Bahini. On 2 December, a battle raged in the general area of Akhaura in defence of Agartala, headquarters of the Indian state of Tripura. Mrs Gandhi visited refugee camps in Calcutta on 3 December. She told a mass rally in the city: “India stands for peace, but if a war is thrust on us we are prepared to fight.” Denying the accusation that India was out to dismember Pakistan, she added: “No country would want an unstable neighbour… But at the same time India cannot ignore the fact that it has hrice been attacked by Pakistan.” And she conveyed in no uncertain terms that “India could no longer be pressurised and prevented from doing what she considered to be in her national intrest.” Obviously referring to American and other international pressures, she declared: “Today India can stand on her own legs if all foreign aid is stopped. We are not dependent on anyone, and we have the strength to overcome all difficulties.”
The same day, at 5.30 p.m., Yahya Khan opted for allout war against India, Pakistani aircraft appeared over the forward Indian airfields, and started taking warlike action in the style of the preemptive Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967. The first news of it trickled Army Headquarters after about five to ten minutes through the wife of an officer of the Military Intelligence Directorate who was visiting her parents at Amritsar. She vividly described the strafing of an air force radar station as seen from her bedroom window. The news with his usual nonchalance and remarked to the officer giving him the tidings: “Don’t look so scared, sweetie. Do I look worried?
How unexpected the timing of this war was to New Delhi may be judged from the fact that the Prime Minister was visiting Calcutta, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram was visiting his constituency in Bihar, Finance Minister Chavan was in Bombay, and President Giri was attending a reception on the lawns of Parliament House when an air alert was sounded at 5.45 p.m.40 When Mrs Gandhi was informed in Calcutta, she flew at once to Delhi to address the nation. “The war in Bangladesh has become a war on India,” she said. Proclaiming a state of emergency, she assured the nation that the wanton and unprovoked aggression by Pakistan will be repelled. As she spoke, Indian forces both on the western and eastern fronts were engaged in war. This was the culmination of the gradual escalation which started with the Pakistan crackdown in East Pakistan on 25 March.
—————
1.Reported by the Times of India New Delhi, and the Statesman, Calcutta For the full text of the resolution see Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 20, p. 10657-580 Reports of British and US correspondents who were flown out, confirmed that Pakistani troops were on the rampage in
a mood of revenge. See Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 26, p.10229. This agreement followed the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 through the mediation of the Soviet Union A Fokker Friendship aircraft of the Indian Airlines with a crew of four and 28 passengers aboard was hijacked to
Lahore on 30 January, On 2 February it was blown up by the hijackers at Lahore airport in full view of Pakistani
troops and aviation personnel According to figures released on 21 August 1971, the number of refugees from East Bengal to India had reached the
million mark as reported by the Hindu Madras The New York Times quoted the World Bank to the effect that the upkeep of the refugees in the fiscal year 1971
72 would be $ 700 million “The Times of India New Delhi, reported that supplementary demands totalling Rs 2.000 million were
presented to the Lok Sabha by the Minister of State for Finance on 5 August to meet the additional expenditure on
7 million refugees from Bangladesh up to 31 December 1971, 9 The Times of India, New Delhi, reported that on 14 May, a note was handed over to the Pakistan High
Commission by the External Affairs Ministry 10 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 25. Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Waming. p. 10218. Radio Pakistan announced on 27 March the arrest of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This was promptly denounced by three
secret radio stations operated by Freedom Fighters which said he was free. There was no independent confirmation of either claim. According to other reliable reports, the Sheikh and other top Awami Leaders had gone
underground 12 The Times, London, and The Newyork Times reported Senater Kennedy’s protest in the US Senate on 11 April against
the killings in East Pakistan. Asian Recorder. Vol XVII, No 20, p. 10162 13 The Democratic Republic of Bangladesh was proclaimed amid thunderous cheers from a 10.000 strong crowd which
included contingents of EPR Ansars and Mujahids as a formally constituted state to be run by a presidential form
of government. 14 See Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 24. “Pakistan demands closure of Indian Mission in Dacca” p. 10200 15 In the international conference on Bangladesh which was held in New Delhi on 18 September under the chairmanship
of Jayaprakash Narayan and others, a demand for the recognition of the Bangladesh Government was raised 16 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 25, Refugee Influx from Bangladesh, Appeal to UN,” p. 102216 17 Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 25. lbid. “U Thant’s Appeal for Relief.” p. 10217. 18 Ibid. “UN Mission’s Visit to Refugee Camps.p.10217. 19 Ibid. “Mrs Indira Ganhi’s Warning pp10217-218. 20 Raising his voice in the US Senate on 1 April against the killings in East Pakistan, especially of dissident leaders and
Intellectuals, he asked the US Government to condemn them and use its services to stop them. Reported by Le
Monde, Paris. 21 Asian Recorder. p. 10218 22 Op.cit. “Mrs Gandhi’s Warning”. 10217. 23 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 30. “On Return of Refugees to East Bengal. p. 10273. 24 Asian Recorder. “President Yahya Khan’s Statement.” P. 10218. 25 The Time of India, New Delhi, reported that according to official sources in New Delhi, India had rejected on 2
July suggestions that it should agree to posting UN observers on the Indian side of the border because this would
amount to an unfriendly act on the part of countries sponsoring such a move. 26 Quoted by BBC Asian Recorder Vol XVII, No 36. “President Yahya Khan Threatens War, 101306. 27 Reported by the Times of India, New Delhi, and Statesman, Calcutta, on 20 July. 28 Asion Recorder. Vol XVII, No 41, “Constitutional Proposals Amended President Yahya Khan’s broadcast, P
10405 29 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No S1, “Military Tribunal Recommends Death Penalty for S.M. Rahman.p. 10520 30 Asion Recorder, Vol XVII, No 47. “Further Development on Bangladesh, Misuse of US Relief Funds, Senater
Tumey’s Charge.p.10471. 31 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 43,”Mrs Indira Gandhi’s visit to USSR.” p. 10419 32 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No. 52. “Mes Indira Gandhi’s Six Nation Tour” P. 10526 33 Senator Kennedy disclosed in Washington on 5 October that the US had offered military equipment worth $9 million to
Pakistan despite an administrative moratorium on arms shipment and to which US officials replied that they were
supplies already in the pipeline. 34 Asian Recorder. Vol XVII, No 20, “Russian Reaction – President Podgomy Sends Letter to Gen Yahya Khan, p.
1060. An appeal of this kind was said to be unprecedented in Soviet diplomatic history. 35 Said at a banquet hosted in President Podgormy’s honour on 10 October on his stopover in Delhi on his way to North
Vietnam 36 Asian Recorder. Vol XVII, No 51. Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Sutement in Parliament.” pp. 10511-512. 37 Ibid., Asian Recorder, 10512 38 Ibid. Pp. 10512, 10513 39 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No. 51. “Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Statement in Parliament,” pp10512. 20 Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 1. “Pakistani Attack on Nine Air-Fields National Emergency Proclaimed.”
10335 41 lbid, “Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Statement, 10535
88
8
BLITZKRIEG
When Tikka Khan landed in the political turmoil of East Pakistan on 7 March 1971 as governor-designate of the province, he combined in himself the office of Martial Law Administrator (MLA) and General Officer Commanding in Chief Pakistan Eastern Command. The quantum of troops on the command Orbat was one infantry division, a training establishment at Chittagong, and attendant supporting arms and services. The Pakistani Air Force had only one Sabre F-86E squadron operating from Dacca airfield. There was a navy establishment at Chittagong, but the naval presence in East Pakistan waters was negligible. 14 Infantry Division, comprising four brigades, was the traditional formation located in the east wing from the inception of Pakistan to meet extetnal and internal contingencies. At the time Tikka Khan took over, Maj Gen Khadim Hussain Raza was its commander. To cope with the Awami League-inspired insurgency, he deployed his troops in farflung areas to show a presence and should the situation demand, take firm action. 53 Infantry Brigade was located at Comilla and was operationally responsible for the entire area east of the Meghna river.
31 Punjab was stationed at Sylhet in the north, 2 East Bengal Regiment (EBR) at Brahmanbaria opposite Ashuganj, brigade headquarters, along with 4 EBR and 24 FFR Battalions, in the Comilla-Maynamati complex, and 20 Baluch with 8 and 9 EBR Battalions in the Chittagong area. In addition, there was the EBR Training Centre at Chittagong with about 2,500 instructors and recruits under training. This included the rank and file of 9 EBR, which was under raising at the time. 23 Infantry Brigade was operationally responsible for the northwestern sector, north and west of the Padma and Jamuna, with 25 Punjab at Rajshahi, 26 FFR at Dinajpur and EBR at Saidpur. 107 Infantry Brigade controlled the southwestern sector, south of the Padma and west of the Jamuna, with 25 Baluch and 1 EBR, later reinforced by 12 Punjab, at Jessore. 57 Infantry Brigade was concentrated in the general area of Dacca, with 2 EBR located in Joydebpur, north of Dacca.
There were some supporting arms units, namely one armoured regiment, five field artillery regiments, one anti-aircraft regiment, and two mortar batteries. It may be presumed that they were also distributed along with their respective affiliated brigades. In addition, there were 16 wings of East Pakistan Rifles of a total strength of about 13,000, mostly manning outposts along the border with neighbouring countries.
Thus it may be seen that out of a total strength of 18 infantry battalions six were completely composed of Bengalis. Of the remaining 12 battalions, Bengalis formed about 30 per cent of the officer cadre in each unit. The armoured and artillery units had mixed rank and file, the ratio being 30 per cent of Bengalis to 70 per cent of West Pakistanis.
Fazal Muqeem explains in his book that of the 12 West Pakistani battalions two were to return to the westem wing on relief. As such, their strength was as low as 400 all told because large advance parties had been sent westward earlier.
The shortage of troops to implement the planned crackdown on the Bengali nationalists was realised by Gen Yaqub Khan, Tikka Khan’s predecessor, and he had asked for an additional division as early as the beginning of February. By the end of the month an infantry brigade from 16 Infantry Division at Quetta was earmarked for induction in East Pakistan. About two battalions were airlifted to Dacca without heavy weapons and baggage in reduced strength in the first week of March 1971. The airlift was however halted on the threat of mutiny by the Bengali personnel of the Pakistani Air Force, constituting about half the strength of the force in East Pakistan.
Tikka Khan had a threefold problem. Firstly, there was the ever-present possibility of mutiny in the services in his command. This required firm surprise measures to disarm the disaffected Bengali elements, without at the same time alienating loyalists. Secondly, there was the threat of a province-wide armed revolt against established authority, and for this the army had to be widely dispersed. Because the paucity of unmixed West Pakistani units and the operational necessity of dispersal had reduced the strength of isolated pockets, they became vulnerable to rebel groups.
Tikka Khan contrived to bolster the strength of such isolated garrisons by reinforcing them with artillery in an infantry role. Thirdly, the civil administration had completely collapsed and the day-to-day routine of this administration was falling upon the Pakistani Army. On the day of launching the crackdown, code-named Operation Blitz, the army strength went down from 18 to 12 infantry battalions and the supporting elements by about three artillery units. Worst hit were the paramilitary forces. Disaffection in EPR, whose strength was about 13,000 rank and file, left the border outposts unmanned. After the severe counter insurgency operations described earlier, whatever remained of the Pakistani Army and a few loyal elements of Bihari troops were committed to border defence.
At this stage, in the first week of March, Pakistan 9 Infantry Division was airlifted eastward at the cost of denuding the strike force in the western wing. The formation was inducted without heavy weapons and baggage and was deployed against the insurgents immediately on arrival. Maj Gen Shaukat Riza, General Officer Commanding 9 Infantry Division, was made responsible for the whole area east of the Meghna, where he took over 53 Infantry Brigade from 14 Infantry Division, already operating there.
His broad deployment was 313 Infantry Brigade in the Sylhet and Maulvi Bazaar area, 117 Infantry Brigade in the general area of the Comilla-Maynamati complex, and 53 Infantry Brigade from Comilla was pushed to the Feni-Chittagong area. 27 Infantry Brigade, belonging to 9 Infantry Division, was sent to the Mymensingh area and placed under the command of 14 Infantry Division. The induction of Pakistan 16 Infantry Division under Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah soon followed. This division came with only two brigades and was made responsible for the area west and north of the Jamuna and Padma. 23 Infantry Brigade from 14 Infantry Division, already operating in the area, was placed under the command of this formation.
Eventually, this division was so deployed that 23 Infantry Brigade was operating in the north of the Dinajpur-Saidpur complex, 205 Infantry Brigade in the general HilliGaibanda area, and 16 Infantry Brigade in the south in the Rajshahi-Nator-Ishurdi area. As
a result of the induction of these two divisions from West Pakistan, and the resultant bifurcation of operational responsibility, 14 Infantry Division was left with the northern sector covering Mymensingh and Dacca and the southwestern sector covering Jessore and Khulna. Efforts continued thereafter to induct more manpower to meet the ever-growing needs of counterinsurgency operations.
A new paramilitary force called the East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces (EPCAF) with about 6,000 rank and file enlisted from loyal elements, mostly Biharis, was raised in April. Maj Gen M. Jamshed, an ex-Director General of the erstwhile EPR, was appointed to raise and command the force. Hurriedly collected and committed to border duties, this force suffered from chronic shortages of equipment and manpower and lack of training. About five Mujahid battalions were also raised, but their war potential remained doubtful. In addition, some Razakar units were brought into being to protect vulnerable points in the rear, but since their members were mostly Bengalis their loyalty was uncertain and as a result their contribution was rather marginal. Till the outbreak of full-scale war on 3 December, reinforcements continued to arrive in East Pakistan. The Frontier Scouts, a paramilitary organisation employed on the northwestern frontier, contributed substantial strength, while one field regiment and two “Azad Kashmir” battalions arrived in November. It is estimated that the total strength of the Pakistani Army in the east wing was never more than about 30-odd infantry battalions, one armoured regiment, six artillery regiments and three to four mortar batteries. Niazi tried to put up a false front of armed strength by assigning the names and numbers of battalions in West Pakistan to the “Azad Kashmir” and Mujahid battalions. This confused Indian intelligence, which accordingly estimated the Pakistani strength at about 35 regular battalions.
Niazi’s decision to hold the border in strength put further pressure on the existing resources of regular troops and caused their wider dispersal. As the struggle for the border posts increased in magnitude and intensity, Niazi discovered the paramilitary forces and newly mustered Mujahids and Razakars were not able to hold out on their own against the Mukti Bahini attacks, especially when backed by Indian support. He thought it expedient to strengthen these posts with a hard core of regular army element. The process was carried so far that by the time war came all the fighting formations and units, from brigade downwards, were mixed. Even in a company it was common to find a platoon of regulars, a platoon of EPCAF and another of Mujahids. This expedient grouping no doubt increased the number of fighting subunits, units and formations, but it reduced their military potentital greatly. The accompanying dispersal in deployment also diluted the supporting arms units. It was not uncommon to find single tank-and-gun supporting detachments well away from their parent units. This affected the command and control aspects, and in his effort to rationalise the situation Niazi organised two ad hoc divisional headquarters and three or four brigade headquarters. But these hurriedly organised headquarters suffered the attendant shortcomings of ad-hocism, lacking adequate communications, trained staff and other ancillary units, and were therefore not fully effective.
Ad hoc 36 Infantry Division, under Gen Jamshed, was allotted operational responsibility for the northern sector, including the defence of Dacca. The troops employed in the general area of Mymensingh and Kamalpur were grouped into ad hoc 93 Infantry Brigade. The eastern sector was divided in two, the northern half, from Sylhet to Akhaura and Brahmanbaria, going to Maj Gen Qazi Abdul Majid, General Officer Commanding 14 Infantry Division. To make up his third brigade, the troops deployed in the general Sylhet area were grouped into ad hoc 202 Infantry Brigade. The southern half of the eastern sector from Comilla to Cox’s Bazaar was placed under the command of Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan by grouping it into ad hoc 39 Infantry Division. The troops deployed in Chittagong complex were grouped into ad hoc 97 Infantry Brigade.
For some inexplicable reason Headquarters 9 Infantry Division, under Maj Gen Ansari, were moved to the southwestern sector to take over two brigades originally belonging to 14 Infantry Division, while Headquarters 14 Infantry Division were commanding two brigades of 9 Infantry Division in the eastern sector. 16 Infantry Division under Gen Shah, who was responsible for the north-western sector, was perhaps the least disturbed. Otherwise, from 25 March the command of all divisions, and perhaps of some brigades, changed hands, and about one-sixth of the brigades were commanded by alien divisional headquarters and lacked mutual understanding, so very essential in battle. These hotchpotch arrangements of Niazi did not help matters but compounded his difficulties. Niazi had obviously not learnt from Lt Gen B.M. Kaul’s mistakes in the Indian debacle against the Chinese in 1962, when stray formations were hurled into battle under 4 Infantry Division to face inevitable disaster.
Niazi finally had about 30 regular infantry battalions which bad been grouped into infantry brigades. Four of these brigades belonged to 14 Infantry Division, three each of 9 and 16 Infantry Divisions were inducted in 1971, and the remaining two brigades were raised by grouping some loose battalions, augmented by about a battalion strength of paramilitary forces. To rationalise command and control, Niazi raised two additional divisional headquarters, but because of poor communications and logistic resources they remained only in skeleton form.
In addition, there were one armoured regiment and two independent armoured squadrons equipped with Chaffee light tanks and six or seven PT-76 amphibious light tanks which Pakistan had captured from India in the Khem Karan sector in 1965. There was however an acute shortage of artillery, and the heavier weapons of 9 and 16 Infantry Divisions were left behind when the hurried induction of these formations took place by air. Overall, Niazi’s complement of artillery consisted of six field regiments and four independent mortar batteries equipped with 25-pounders and 4.2-inch mortars respectively. There were also about four light anti-aircraft batteries.
There was therefore a shortfall of about six field regiments to meet the requirements of his Orbat. There were no medium or heavy guns in the theatre. A sizable paramilitary organisation consisting of about seven wings and five Mujahid battalions augmented the regular army in performing counterinsurgency tasks, providing general protection for vulnerable points and manning border out-posts. In short, Niazi had about four divisions backed by a divisional strength of paramilitary forces. Although artillery fire-power was inadequate for offensive operations, it was sufficient to fight a defensive war, especially when East Pakistan’s terrain lent itself ideally to defence. The Pakistani Air Force had one squadron of Sabrejets and a few helicopters, but in view of the overwhelming superiority of Indian air strength based on the periphery of East Pakistan the war contribution of this element, if any, could only be shortlived.
From its very inception in 1947 till the outbreak of there bellion in East Pakistan in March 1971, the Pakistani Army had comparatively easy going in peacetime soldiering in West Pakistan. Unlike the Indian Army, it had no counterinsurgency commitments, and as a result it was not acquainted with the morale-sapping effects of fighting an elusive adversary in an inhospitable and hostile environment. East Pakistan in the monsoon was such a theatre, for the West Pakistani troops had never experienced such incessant and heavy rain in their lives. Continuous marches on slushy ground, nights spent in flooded trenches without proper waterpoof clothing or overhead protection, living and fighting in this rainsoaked environment for about six months had brought footrot, dysentery and other diseases and had wom out both human bodies and fighting equipment.
Inadequate logistic backing had not helped matters. The logistic area established in East Pakistan was originally meant to cater for one infantry division and the attendant administrative units. Stockpiling had taken into consideration the likelihood of the eastern wing being isolated for a limited period, but it did not visualise that the force level would be increased fourfold in a crash programmed time schedule, especially when the new inductions could not bring in their integral transport and stores because of the limitations of airlift. Surface transport could be mustered locally from unwilling owners, from a truck to a cycle rickshaw on the roads and the water transport of country boats. Troop deployment in pursuit of Mukti Bahini guerillas was spread so far from the existing lines of communication that the administrative backing could not catch up with the fighting troops. Things were so bad that according to Fazal Muqeem “a brigade commander was getting one chapati to eat in 36 hours.” That is saying a lot about a feudalistic army.
Added to the physical discomfort was the psychological pressure of being isolated amid a hostile population. Sustained operations for about eight months in an unfavourable environment of climate, terrain and positively antagonistic population had resulted in battle fatigue. Battle casualties were mounting and could not get proper attention because of inadequate facilities for their evacuation. Thus there was a steady erosion of morale, aggravated by international communications media which condemned outright the part Tikka Khan and his West Pakistani troops played in Bangladesh. The atrocities they committed in the way of genocide, rape, loot and destruction of property received worldwide publicity and lowered the self-esteem of the Pakistani soldier, and this eroded his fighting capability to a great extent.
Above all, Indian propaganda as well as the realities of the situation created the impression in the minds of the Pakistani soldiery that in the event of war they would be isolated from their homes and would face inevitable surrender and incarceration as prisoners of war. Thus, on the outbreak of hostilities on 3 December, the Pakistani troops were tired and disillusioned. Nevertheless, judging from the fight they put up in fixed defences, it may be said that mental and physical fatigue had not impaired their battle efficiency as much as Pakistani apologists make out.
Terrainwise, Bangladesh covers an area of about 56,000 squaremiles with a population, in 1971, of approximately 75 million. Except for a small portion of its boundary touching Burma in the southeast, its eastern, northern and westem boundaries are with India. It is a flat deltaic plain, about 40 feet above sea level, interspersed with mighty rivers running north to south. These rivers break into countless streams as they approach the sea. The heavy monsoons leave the entire land covered with lakes and vast stretches of marshes, making cross-country movement very difficult. The only elevated areas are in the northeast (Sylhet district) and in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the southeast. These hills are thickly wooded.
The three major rivers are the Ganga, known as the Padma in Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra and the Jamuna. These are formidable obstacles. Since the emphasis on economic development was laid on West Pakistan, Bangladesh was completely neglected so far as building surface communications was concerned. Some roads existed to connect important urban centres, but they were in a poor state of repair. Two railway systems served the eastern and western halves of the province independently without any links. In most places, transport across the rivers was only by ferry. There were only two rail and road bridges over the major rivers, one over the Padma near Paksay called Hardinge Bridge and the other over the Meghna at Ashuganj. Lack of surface communication and their widespread disruption by the guerilla actions of the Freedom Fighters and the succession of water obstacles along planned thrust lines could be a bugbear to any advancing army.
Gen Aurora had a strength of about seven divisions, comprising six divisions and three independent infantry brigades, with a full complement of artillery, three armoured regiments (one equipped with T-54 and the other two with PT-76 tanks), three independent armoured squadrons and two mechanised battalions. Thus, India did not have any substantial edge over Pakistan in terms of superior strength in this theatre. The normal yardstick in military assessment is three attackers to one defender. In this instance, the proportion was less than two to one.
On the face of it, the strength of the Pakistani forces, coupled with the defence potential of the terrain and concrete field fortifications, was more than adequate to cope with the Indian offensive, and certainly adequate enough to gain sufficient time for international pressure to bear till the little war was stalemated. Admittedly, the Pakistani troops had been engaged in counterinsurgency operations continuously since 26 March, and not being used to this intangible activity over a sustained period must have developed fatigue. The hostile environment, combined with the unsure logistic backing of the disrupted communications in the rear and the evermounting guerilla activity, might have further aggravated their mental stress and demoralised them. The sense of isolation from their homes in West Pakistan, the uncertainty of early return and lack of news about their families increased the soldiers’ anxiety, as prisoners revealed later.
The Indian formations committed in the Bangladesh operations had also been diverted from active commitments. Border clashes with Pakistani troops in support of Mukti Bahini had become a continuous commitment for these troops, especially after the end of the monsoon, and was equally fatiguing, but the spirit generated by the cause of liberating Bangladesh had given the desired fillip to the Indians to create the morale needed for the coming war.
With the preemptive Pakistani air action against Indian airfields on the western front on the evening of 3 December, a full-fledged war broke out. The formations poised for a pre-planned strike in East Pakistan were accordingly ordered to put their offensive plans into action. The master plan described earlier envisaged crippling the Pakistani war machine in the easter wing and liberating the entire territory within three weeks. The task before Aurora was not as easy as appeared after its swift execution. The campaign is described sectorwise below to enable events to be followed more easily.
SOUTHWESTERN SECTOR
The sector, terrainwise, looks like the oblongish first quadrant of a circle, its vertical represented by the Ichhamati running north to south, its base resting on the sea, and its circumference formed by the Padma and lower Meghna. Halfway between the Ichhamati and the Padma runs the Madhumati. The main road and rail communications ran between these rivers. One such artery ran from Kushtia to Jessore and from thence to Khulna between the Ichhamati, and the Madhumati, and the other from Kushtia to Madhukhali and thence to Faridpur between the Madhumati and the Padma. A few laterals linked these arteries, with ferry services across the Madhumati, with one another, and with the Indian road network across the Ichhamati.
Niazi was defending the sector with Pakistan 9 Infantry Division, consisting of two infantry brigade groups under Gen Ansari, apart from the paramilitary forces manning the border. 57 Infantry Brigade Group was to deny the northern approaches to Hardinge Bridge and Kushtia by deploying one battalion each along the Ichhamati at Berhampore and Meherpur to block the routes of ingress from India by the Berhampore-Paksay and PlasseyMeherpur-Kushtia roads, with the third battalion at Kushtia. This battalion was later drawn towards the area between Chaudanga and Jhenida when the Indians captured Jiban Nagar and were developing a thrust northwards. 107 Infantry Brigade Group was concentrated along with Headquarters 9 Infantry Division and divisional troops in defence of the Jessore fortress. Jessore, an important communications centre, was heavily fortified and well stocked to fight a last-ditch battle.
After deploying one battalion each at Benepole and Satkhira to deny expected Indian entry routes along the Bongaon-Benepole Jessore and Basirhat-Satkhira-Daulatpur-Khulna roads, the rest of the troops, consisting of about two battalions and divisional troops, were deployed in defence of Jessore. The fortifications were originally sited to cover the obvious appoaches along the main routes, but the action fought on 22 November at Bayra and the newly developing threat from an unexpected direction made some re-adjustments necessary. Ansari accordingly reorganised his defences west of Jessore by linking various marshes and pulling in troops earlier deployed forward in the Chaughacha area, and he possibly got a battalion’s worth of reinforcements from Rajshahi. There were thus good chances of the newly organised Jessore defences holding out.
A little background history of Pakistan 9 Infantry Division and its commander is necessary at this stage. This formation was raised after the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 in the vicinity of Gujrat to form part of the Pakistani Strike Force North. It was hurriedly inducted into East Pakistan by air when Tikka Khan’s crackdown was imminent. This formation left its integral armour and artillery in West Pakistan as it was felt that such heavy weaponry would not be needed to crush a civilian rebellion. On induction, the formation was employed with its own brigades east of the Meghna from Sylhet to Chittagong, but it appears that as part of a later rationalisation of command and control of operational sectors.
Niazi moved Headquarters 9 Infantry Division to Jessore to command the southwestern sector. Ansari had just replaced Maj Gen Shaukat Riza, who had moved with the division to East Pakistan. The two brigades, 57 and 107 Infantry, originally belonged to Pakistan 14 Infantry Division. So the division commander and the formations were new to each other.
Pitted against Ansari was Gen Raina, in command of the newly raised Il Corps. Raina had proved his mettle as a brigade commander at Chushul against the invading Chinese in 1962. He had an admirable soldiering reputation and was expected to achieve solid results. Under him was Maj Gen Dalbir Singh, commanding Indian 9 Infantry Division, and Maj Gen Mohinder Singh Barar in command of 4 Mountain Division. Dalbir Singh had been in command for a couple of years and was responsible for the execution of the limited Indian contigency plan in East Pakistan. He knew the terrain and the Pakistani capability in the sector extremely well and exuded confidence. He had acquired the reputation of being an aggressive personality as he was ever ready to attack whatever the occasion, whether at mess parties or in military exercises. He was a big, burly man, a good infantry soldier who was expected to undertake copybook fighting with verve and dogged persistence, even against heavy odds.
Indian 9 Infantry Division had at the start of Yahya Khan’s war got sucked into the Bayra salient, secured in the defensive operation carried out in the area, and was in contact with the reorganised Jessore defences along the marshes west of the town. This had closed other options of out-manoeuvering the Jessore defences. Dalbir Singh therefore started, rather bull-headedly, a series of hammering attacks to achieve a breakthrough. Starting at first light on 4 December, the pounding continued till late 6 December, but still there was no sign of a dent in the defences. When the Chief was beginning to lose his patience at the sluggish progress Dalbir Singh’s persistence paid. After putting up a stubborn and determined stand for two days, Ansari decided to vacate Jessore. Why he took this decision, when his troops were well entrenched, holding out stoutly and inflicting heavy casualties, and no encroachment on his defence line had yet been effected, is not discernible. Brig distinguished himself in this battle by personally leading the attack from the northwest which eventually achieved the breakthrough. He was wounded in the action. It is significant that though the Pakistanis vacated Jessore by dawn on 6 December, it was not occupied by the Indians till late on the 7th afternoon.
After the fall of Jessore, Ansari and his headquarters and divisional troops fell back first on Magura, and later crossed the Madhumati river, covering the ferry crossings, while 107 Infantry Brigade Group withdrew to Khulna leaving a covering force of about a batallion group to delay the Indian advance. Contrary to Fazal Mugeem’s assertion that after the capture of Jessore the Indians resumed their advance towards Khulna with a fresh division, Dalbir Singh continued the attack with 32 Infantry Brigade. The Pakistanis had prepared a series of delaying positions in the built-up area along the main road. The terrain astride the road was marshy and the Indian advance encountered stiff resistance.
Further delay was caused by demolitions of bridges and culverts all along the route. In characteristic Indian Army style, Dalbir Singh systematically cleared the delaying positions step by step in deliberate attacks supported by air and a heavy concentration of artillery. The slow march towards Khulna continued till the main Pakistani defences were contacted at Daulatpur on 11 December. It took four days for the division to cover a distance of about 30 miles against an opposition of no more than about one battalion strength. Daulatpur was connected with Khulna by a narrow strip of continuous built-up area extending in all about ten miles. It was flanked by marshes in the west and the Bhairab river in the east, making it difficult for the defences to be outflanked. Dalbir Singh perforce tackled the defences frontally, and the operation for the capture of the Daulatpur-Khulna strip turned into a hard slogging match. Between 11 December, when contact was made, and 15 December a series of attacks were launched on Daulatpur, held by Pakistan 6 Punjab, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. But practically no dent was made in the defences. In the process the whole of Indian 9 Infantry Division was built up, but its full combat power could not be exploited because room for deployment was lacking,
An outflanking move was attempted on the night of 15/16 December with 42 Infantry Brigade crossing the Bhairab to the east and then working south up to the junction of the Bhairab and Atrai, where a crossing was to be effected towards the west to establish itself on the main road. By the morning of 16 December, 2 Sikh Light Infantry, the leading battalion, had occupied some positions overlooking the main road, but the subsequent crossings met stiff opposition. Efforts were still on to push the crossings when the ceasefire was effected. By then the division had also managed to nibble three of the forward localities at Daulatpur frontally. The Indian Air Force was very active throughout the operations and gave a good account of itself by providing timely and close support. So zealous were the airmen in executing their task that, according to Fazal Muqeem, they destroyed two Indian gunboats which were trying to enter Khulna harbour. Some of the officers and crew of the boats were taken prisoner by the Pakistanis.
It is said that Brig Malik Hayat Khan, commander of 107 Infantry Brigade Group responsible for the defence of Khulna, was greatly perturbed when Niazi ordered him to Suspend hostilities and surrender his men and equipment to General Officer Commanding 9 Infantry Division. He had kept the division at bay on his own for a good ten days, and yet the real fight for Khulna had not begun. He was justifiably confident of holding out for another week or so till the much-promised American help materialised. He felt badly let down by the Pakistani higher command, he said later in interrogation. Up north, 4 Mountain Division, under the command of Gen Barar, had established a foothold in the general area of Jiban Nagar and Darsana and was poised to attack Kot Chandpur with a view to developing a thrust towards Kaliganj. 4 Mountain Division was raised by the British in the Second World War and had many epic-making battles to its credit in the Middle East campaigns and in Italy. This formation faced the Chinese in NEFA in 1962, although not with credit. But its failure was not due to any fault of its own as described in many an “untold story.”
In the 1965 conflict, this division fought the crucial battle at Khem Karan and was mainly responsible for frustrating Ayub Khan’s Grand Slam plan of marching on to Delhi. It has always represented the best fighting quality of the Indian Army. Barar took over only a couple of months before the battle and was thus fairly new to the formation. Although he was professionally well qualified, he came in for notice only when he was selected to be Military Assistant to Gen P. P. Kumaramangalam, then Chief of the Army Staff. His subsequent rapid rise had set a trend for the personal staff’s divine right to find room in the military higher command. Although he himself had not seen much fighting after independence he had taken over a seasoned and war-tried formation which needed no nursing.
Barar held the salient of Jiban Nagar with 62 Mountain Brigade and captured Darsana and Kot Chandpur by 5 December. Instead of developing a thrust towards Kot Chandpur and their advancing on Jhenida along the main road axis, he executed a brilliant move towards the north. A road block was established between Chaudanga and Jhenida with a combat group of ark infantry battalion and an armoured squadron. Several attempts by the enemy to break through the block were foiled. Instead of falling back on Jhenida, the force deployed west of the block had perforce to be diverted towards Kushtia. Meanwhile, 41 Mountain Brigade, led by Brig Michigan, made a dash for Jhenida along a very difficult dirt track and took the town by surprise on 6 December. Ansari was so taken a back by the speed of the Indian advance that not only was he not able to reinforce Jhenida in time but also lost his nerve and decide to evacuate Jessore, the strongest fortress in East Pakistan, itself.
Barar did not give him any respite. 62 Mountain Brigade was pushed through towards Magura with the utmost speed and took the town by 8 December, to see Ansari and the remnants of Pakistan 9 Infantry Division fleeing across the Madhumati. By now Ansari’s forces had split in three. 107 Infantry Brigade had withdrawn to Khulna in the south, 57 Infantry Brigade made its way to Kushtia to the north on the capture of Jhenida, and whatever of the remainder of divisional headquarters and troops Ansari could gather fell back across the Madhumati towards Faridpur. Pakistan 9 Infantry Division had ceased to be a cohesive fighting formation and Ansari had lost control of it.
After the capture of Magura, 62 Mountain Brigade under Brig Rajendra Nath commenced advancing on Faridpur. The enemy had demolished the bridge over the Kumar and withdrawn east of the Madhumati, leaving some delaying elements west of it. These elements were however energetically eliminated, the brigade occupied the west bank of the river by the evening of 9 December, and preparations were afoot for an assault crossing the next day. Meanwhile, Barar, fearful of the flank threat from the north to his overstretched line of advance to Faridpur, directed 7 Mountain Brigade under Brig Zail Singh, on reversion from corps reserve on 8 December, towards Kushtia and Hardinge Bridge. Finding the going rather easy, 22 Rajput, the advance guard battalion, raced towards Kushtia, but as its vanguard company, led by tanks, entered the town it came under fire. Within a few minutes it lost five tanks and suffered very heavy casualties in men. As transpired later, this engagement took place with the rear elements of Pakistan 57 Infantry Brigade, which was to cross the Padma and move northward to join Pakistan 16 Infantry Division deployed in the northeastern sector. Almost two-thirds of the brigade crossed the river on 10 December night.
Raina however over-reacted to this casualty-ridden action, and in his own military wisdom diverted the whole division to deal with the opposition at Kushtia, leaving only battalion or so holding the west bank of the Madhumati. This diversion wasted three precious days beating the thin air in and around Kushtia. On 12 December, when Hardinge Bridge was contacted, it was found that 57 Infantry Brigade had crossed over almost intact and demolished the bridge. It is a matter of wonder why Raina made Barar divert his effort to a questionable objective and why Barar did not object strongly enough to this order when the road to Faridpur and Dacca lay almost bare. Thus both Raina and Barar lost a godsent opportunity to lead the first Indian troops to reach Dacca.
After the Kushtia and Bheramara areas had been cleared of the enemy, Barar left Michigan behind and moved the remainder of his division back to the Madhumati. 62 Mountain Brigade built up on its battalion by 13 December, and 7 Mountain Brigade reached Magura the next day. The Madhumati was a major obstacle about 500 yards wide and at places deeper than 40 feet. The river forms a deep salient towards Magura, and as a result the road running to the ferry is flanked on both sides by the river for about a couple of miles or so.
Ansari was holding the east bank, with remnants and divisional troops adding up to about two weak battalions supported by a battery of guns and mortars. But even with these arms their war potential was very low. This force was organised into an ad hoc brigade and put under the command of Colonel General Staff of the division. The original plan envisaged a river crossing by 62 Mountain Brigade in the South and outflanking the main enemy position on the east bank to capture Kamarkhali on the main road. Barar however decided to cross the river with two brigades, 62 Mountain Brigade in the north and 7 Mountain Brigade in the south.
His plan visualised outflanking the enemy position with a pincer movement and cutting the road east of the ferry. He thereby hoped to cut off the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces holding the river bank and deal with them in detail. Both the brigades crossed the river on the night of 14/15 December, using an assortment of country boats mustered with the help of the Mukti Bahini. Zail Singh and his brigade had to reach the crossing place after a cross-country move of about 20 miles, and this left him very little time for reconnaissance. The crossing went on unimpeded, and the pincers closed in on the main road between Kamarkhali and Madhukhali by the morning of the 15″.
Leaving 7 Mountain Brigade to hold the roadblock, Rajendra Nath proceeded to clear the enemy defences. After the initial fight, Ansari tried to pull back towards Faridpur but hit Zail Singh’s roadblock. After making desperate attempts to break out, he offered to surrender with his men and weapons in the early hours of the 16th Ansari himself surrendered with his staff to Barar in a dishevelled state and without any badge of rank. Barar marched with his gallant division into Faridpur in triumph soon afterwards.
Up to 16 December, before the wholesale surrender, the corps had captured or destroyed about 500 personal arms in the nature of assorted rifles, sten guns and pistols, 18 Chaffee tanks, 13 guns and four heavy mortars. Figures of Pakistani casualties in this period are not available, but from the arms captured it may be assumed that these could not have been more than 600 to 700 in all. On the other hand, 11 Corps suffered 367 killed, including 17 officers, 1,292 wounded and five missing, and lost 19 tanks.
Raina’s victory lay in Niazi’s surrender in the overall context of the Bangladesh operations. Otherwise, about half the force he was pitted against was still fighting at Khulna, and the other half had escaped to join Pakistan 16 Infantry Division. Only the remnants with Ansari fell into Raina’s hands. What part did 11 Corps operations play in bringing about Niazi’s collapse? According to Niazi himself, it was negligible, as these operations neither threatened Dacca nor impaired his fighting capability. In fact, he heard of Ansari’s capture only after he had asked for a ceasefire.
Perhaps Raina would have earned greater dividends if he had followed the master strategic plan enunciated by Army Headquarters to the letter. This visualised blocking the escape routes at Hardinge Bridge in the north and Khulna in the south first, and then the destruction of the Pakistani armed forces deployed in the sector. Instead of making an entry in the centre and then breaking out north and south, Raina, after making Ansari concentrate in Jessore, could have converged on the fortress in a pincer movement from north and south on securing the bridge and Khulna. That would have ensured the utter destruction of the Pakistani forces trapped in the sector. Even if Niazi had displayed more toughness than he did and had decided to put up a fight at Dacca, the total destruction of this force would have shortened the war and eroded Niazi’s will that much. In this context, the corps operations do not seem to have achieved results commensurate with the effort.
EASTERN SECTOR
The eastern sector comprised the area east of the Meghna in the destricts of Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Comilla and Chittagong, and Chittagong Hill Tracts. The approach to Dacca lay across the Meghna, a river of great width ranging from 4,000 to 4,500 yards. It was spanned only by the railway bridge at Ashuganj, which was about 2,950 feet long. The terrain, except the hill tracts, is generally low-lying and waterlogged by paddy fields. Like the rest of Bangladesh, it is interspersed with numerous rivers and drainage channels. Cross-country movement is generally difficult till the first week of December. Since the rivers frequently change course and cause bridging problems, ferries are the only reliable means of crossing.
Sylhet district is pocked with numerous haors bheels, perennial lakes with several feeder streams, and extensive marshes surrounded them. The landscape is broken by high mounds called tillas, ranging from 100 to 200 feet. These tillas are surrounded by lowlying Jangai land which remains waterlogged for nine months a year.
In Comilla district, the Lalmai Hills extend north to southwest of Comilla town. These low hills are about 16 kilometres long and four wide and have numerous elevations covered with low vegetation. The average height of the range is about 225 kilometres. and rail communications on the Indian side, a single-track, metre-gauge railway took off from the trans-Assam artery at Lumding and terminated at Dharampur after running a considerable distance close to the Indo-Pakistani border. The stretch between Karimganj and Dharampur was prone to disruption by Pakistani saboteurs. Several attempts were made to blow up the track at various points, but vigorous security measures, including regular trolley patrols, searchlight specials and tracker dogs, kept trains running throughout the period of preparation for and conduct of the war.
On the East Pakistan side, a similar single metre gauge track ran north to south connecting Sylhet with Chittagong. For most of its distance it ran close and parallel to the international border. Besides being connnected across the Meghna with Dacca and Mymensingh, it fed the river ferries of Chandpur and Noakhali. The strategic bottleneck along these communication arteries was the Brahmanbaria area, as the Ashuganj bridge connected the Dacca and Mymensingh sectors with the eastern sector. Laksham was the hub of the road and rail communications to Chittagong. The capture of Brahmanbaria could cut off all the Pakistani forces in the eastern sector, especially the Sylhet and Maulvi Bazaar garrison, and the capture of Laksham would cut off the Comilla garrison.
Similarly, on the Indian side, an arterial road connecting Assam with Tripura ran north and south from Silchar to Belonia via Teliamura, a communication centre which fed Kamalpur, Khowai, Agartala, Sonamura and other border towns. In addition, a road running parallel to the international border, particularly south of Agartala to Chanddegram, had been newly constructed and improved to enable the quicker deployment of troops. Agartala was also connected with Sabrum, a border town overlooking Chittagong Hill Tracts. Various laterals connected the Silchar-Belonia artery with the Agartala-Sabrum road for flexibility in diverting traffic.
On the East Pakistan side, the main road artery ran parallel to the railway from Sylhet to Chittagong. Various feeder roads linked the border towns and the river ferries. It was easy to link the two road systems at a chosen point of entry. On the other hand, the railway system could be linked only at Latu, opposite Karimganj. The road and rail tracks on the
100
Pakistan side ran over an embankment four to eight feet high. A large number of bridges and culverts were destroyed by Freedom Fighters or the retreating Pakistanis. Road construction was difficult because materials were not available locally. Decking of railway bridges did not help as the width of the track did not allow passage of heavier vehicles The operational airfields available to Pakistan were at Dacca, Sylhet, Shamshernagar, Comilla, Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar. Most of them had been built by the Allies in the Second World War to serve the Burma theatre and the Pakistani Government had kept them in good condition. They could handle Sabrejets. On the Indian side, Silchar airfield was available to jets while Kamalpur, Khowai and Kailashabar were fit only for transport planes. Most of the Indian fields were too close to the border, Agartala airfield being within the range of small arms in Pakistani posts overlooking the runway.
The Pakistani forces in the sector were built up gradually as the insurgency mounted. Originally, 53 Infantry Brigade Group, of 14 Infantry Division located at Comilla, controlled the whole eastern sector with a battalion each at Sylhet and Chittagong. When Pakistan 9 Infantry Division was inducted into the east wing on the outbreak of hostilities, it was made operationally responsible for the area east of the Meghna and 53 Infantry Brigade Group came under its command. The broad deployment of the division before the monsoon was 313 Infantry Brigade in the area of Sylhet, 117 Infantry Brigade at Comilla, and 53 Infantry Brigade in the Chittagong area. 27 Infantry Brigade of 9 Infantry Division was deployed in Mymensingh and placed under the command of 14 Infantry Division, then operationally responsible for the area, including Dacca and Jessore.
With the growing intensity of the insurgency and Niazi’s concept of holding the border in strength, the troop requirements increased. Niazi accordingly raised 202 Infantry Brigade at Sylhet, pulling 313 Infantry Brigade southward to the general area of Maulvi Bazaar. 27 Infantry Brigade reverted to the eastern sector and was deployed in the general area of Brahmanbaria and Akhaura. These three brigades in the northern half of the sector were grouped under Headquarters 14 Infantry Division commanded by Maj Gen Abdul Majid. With 117 Infantry Brigade at Comilla in the southern half of the sector, 53 Infantry Brigade was pulled back to the general area of Laksham and Feni, and the newly raised 97 Infantry Brigade at Chittagong was placed under the command of Headquarters 39 Infantry Division, raised on an ad hoc basis, under Gen Rahim Khan.
None of these brigades had full combat power because they consisted of one or two regular battalions, one “Azad Kashmir” unit and a battalion strength of paramilitary forces The supporting fire units were ad hoc collections of guns and mortars, but even those were deployed in penny packets. To conceal this weakness, non-regular Ranger and Scout units were given the designations of regular infantry battalions located in the western wing.
This was a clever ruse indeed as it confused Indian intelligence for quite a while with the same units appearing in their Orbat in the eastem and westem wings at the same time. The puzzle could not be solved till the very end of the conflict. It is difficult to understand why, in undertaking this reorganisation, Niazi moved Headquarters 9 Infantry Division from its original formation to the Jessore sector and kept Headquarters 14 Infantry Division in this region commanding brigades belonging to another division. Gen Sagat Singh, General Officer Commanding IV Corps, was operationally responsible for the eastern sector. His task was initially to ensure the security of rail and road communications in the sector during the administrative and troop buildup in the region, as also to provide protection to administrative installations, airfields and Air Force establishments under
development in the corps zone of responsibility. This was to be achieved by denying the enemy ingress into Tripura and Silchar district, with particular emphasis on the security of Agartala town and its airfield.
Later, on the outbreak of hostilities, Sagat Singh was to launch an offensive to destroy the Pakistani forces deployed east of the Meghna and the Bulai. The directions issued to him by his army commander indicated the interception of surface communications, including road, rail and waterways, between Chittagong and the main hinterland and to the north. Thereafter, he was to capture Comilla within seven days and, depending upon the situation, he was required to secure Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Feni within another ten days. Simultaneously, Sagat Singh was to secure Shamshernagar airfield and Maulvi Bazaar in the north and, if circumstances permitted, capture Sylhet. On completing these tasks he was to develop operations for the capture of Chittagong, which was to be achieved by the 21″ day. It is significant that the capture of Dacca was not even mentioned in the commander’s directive at this stage.
The resources allotted to Sagat Singh to carry out this task were, as mentioned earlier, three mountain divisions. Subsequently, as plans were finalised, a contingent of eight Bangladesh battalions with a couple of artillery batteries also came under his command. On the army commander’s directive, the initial plans of the corps were made sometime in September and wargamed in October. It was about this time that I met Sagat Singh at Teliamura to discuss these plans as a representative of the Military Operations Directorate. I had known him earlier, when he was Brigadier General Staff of XI Corps and I was General Staff Officer Grade 1 of 4 Mountain Division in the April deployment of the Indian Army against Pakistan after the Kutch incident in 1965. He had a fine reputation as a frontline soldier and was known to have an unrthodox and aggressive attitude to military matters, especially in war. He had proved his mettle by spearheading the Indian advance in the liberation of Goa in 1960.
As discussed earlier, Sagat Singh’s plan broadly envisaged 8 Mountain Division’s securing Shamshernagar airfield and Maulvi Bazaar and thereafter investing Sylhet town. After ensuring the security of Agartala, 57 Mountain Division was to help 23 Mountain Division in capturing the Comilla and Maynamati complex and then developing operations to secure Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Feni. On completing this action and depending upon the prevailing circumstances, operations were to be developed to capture Chittagong. I did not agree with the limited aims of this offensive but had not been able to convince my superiors of the need to aim at the vital objective of Dacca. I suggested this to Sagat Singh indirectly. I said: “General, why are you wasting your energies in knocking your head against Lalmal height defences? Why don’t you secure the BrahmanbariaAshuganj area, and then the road to Dacca will open itself for you to stage a triumphant march in the heart of Bangladesh polities?” “But that is not my task,” he snapped back. “I’m only suggesting.” I said with a smile. A glint came into his eyes, and he took me away from his operation room in the darkness of evening, beyond the hearing of eavesdroppers. “Tell me, does India mean business this time or are they wasting our time?” he asked. “It appears almost a certainty,” I replied. He said: “Then leave it to me. I will get there.” We left it at that. I knew he would, orders or no orders.
Sagat Singh sized up the Pakistani deployments and their capability by the end of October, and with his characteristic flexibility of approach changed the original concept of his plans. He realised that Niazi had overstretched himself and put far too much faith in
fixed defences. The Pakistani troops had been engaged in sustained counterinsurgency operations in a hostile environment and were hardpressed and suffering from battle fatigue. The casualties they had sustained in the process both in terms of personnel and equipment could not be recouped. Shortage of artillery and air support and further dispersal of these resources had considerably reduced the fighting potential of Niazi’s force. Sagat Singh felt greater dividends would be obtained if the Pakistani forces were unbalanced by a swift and vigorous offensive to secure Chandpur and Daudkhandi, isolating all the troops deployed east of the Meghna and south of the Brahmanbaria Akhaura complex through bypassing the strongly held ComillaMaynamati fortress. At that time Pakistani 117 Infantry Brigade, under the Olympic hockey player Brig Atif, was manning the Comilla-Maynamati defences while 53 Infantry Brigade was deployed in the general area of Laksham covering the approaches to Chandpur. Sagat Singh had quite a few of his troops tied up to secure his lines of communication and Agartala town and its airfield, and he did not have enough resources to carry out the type of swift and vigorous offensive he had in mind if 53 Infantry Brigade continued to hold Laksham. He therefore devised an elaborate deception to lure the brigade away from its location.
Roads and bridges on the road from Shatir Bazaar to Sabrum were improved to indicate an Indian interest in the general area of Feni. Administrative dumping for a division was created north of Shatir Bazaar, giving the impression that the impending offensive could develop thrust lines along the Shatir Bazaar-Belonia and Shatir Bazaar Sabrum axes. In addition, a phantom radio network simulating brigade traffic became active. Niazi’s suspicions were confirmed by Sagat Singh’s preliminary operations, using 23 Mountain Division in the Belonia bulge to pose a direction threat to Feni. After the withdrawal of East Bengal Regiment units in March through the bulge, the Mukti Fauj managed to maintain a presence in its northern tip. Sagat Singh decided to extend the area of operations farther south. Containing the Pakistani defences frontally, he established roadblocks behind them southward and, developing attacks from that direction, he was able to capture Parshuram and Belonia. Sensing a sizable threat to Feni town and the only road and rail link from Chittagong to the hinterland, Niazi moved his 53 Infantry Brigade or a major portion of it forward to meet this threat. Sagat Singh estimated the new induction to consist of two to three battalions and a battery of field guns and some mortars. He was tempted to trap the Pakistani troops in the bulge to avoid fighting them at the Laksham defences later.
He repeated the earlier manoeuvre by exerting frontal pressure from the north and west along the Fulgazi-Koteshwar-Muhamadpur line and then established strong roadblocks between the enemy forces at Fulgazi and Feni. Before the battle of attrition or the apprehension of the Pakistani troops thus trapped could begin, they withdrew the next night with their guns and equipment through a gap of no more than 2,000 yards between the two roadblocks. Having failed in his manoeuvre, Sagat Singh switched back his thrust lines westward so as to catch Pakistan 53 Infantry Brigade on the move and off balance.
It was known that Pakistan 117 Infantry Brigade was holding the Comilla-Maynamati Lalmai Hills complex while 53 Infantry Brigade was to occupy the Laksham defences. Both these complexes were held in strength, leaving very little in depth. Sagat Singh therefore decided to isolate Laksham, bypass the Lalmai defences and make a dash for Chandpur and Daudkhandi. 61 Mountain Brigade under Brig Tom Pande, functioning under direct command of Headquarters IV Crops, was directed to cross the Gomti and cut off the
Maynamati-Companyganj and Maynamati-Daud-khandi roads and close in on the Maynamati complex from the west and help in its reduction by 23 Mountain Division. On receiving information that the enemy had withdrawn from Burichang on 7 December, in a characteristic dash Pande crossed the Gomti speedily and established roadblocks at Chandina and Jafarganj. In relentless pursuit, he pushed 15 Kumaon and a troop of armour forward to secure Daudkhandi. No organised opposition was encountered en route except for minor resistance of about a platoon strength at Elliotganj. This position was overcome in no time and Daudkhandi secured on 9 December.
With the fall of Daudkhandi, the Pakistani commanders were in utter confusion Comilla was vacated and fell on 9 December. The Pakistani troops holding border defences fell back rapidly on the Maynamati defences. About 1,500 of them were trapped and surrendered to Pande. This was the first major Pakistani surrender in the war. With the remainder of his brigade, Pande closed in on the Maynamati defences from the north and west, and on 12 December he was placed under the command of Headquarters 23 Mountain Division for reduction of the fortress.
Meanwhile, 301 Mountain Brigade infiltrated between the Lalmai Hills and Laksham on the night of 3 December and secured Madaffarganj by 6 December. They overran a battalion defences on the way and were able to capture the major portion of 25 FF, including its commanding officer. About this time, Rahim Khan was proceeding towards Laksham to visit his forward troops with his tactical headquarters when he and his party were involved in a fire fight on the outskirts of Madaffarganj. It was then he learnt of the presence of Indian troops behind his Laksham brigade. He beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind his commando escort of about a company in the general area of Hajiganj as a covering position.
At the same time, Brig Niazi, commander of Pakistan 53 Infantry Brigade, made a desperate effort to break through the Indian roadblocks to join his divisional headquarters at Chandpur. In its advance to Chandpur, Indian 301 Mountain Brigade hit its leading elements, consisting of two companies of 2 “Azad Kashmir” Battalion and the commandos, at Hajiganj. The town was captured on 8 December after a fierce battle in which Pakistani troops suffered heavy casualties. Chandpur was secured the next day without opposition.
As the brigade reached the east banks of the Meghna, a steamer and two launches were seen moving in midstream. These were promptly engaged and damaged heavily. The day before Gen Rahim Khan had managed to get away, only to be intercepted by IAF planes and was badly wounded. He managed to fly later to Burma before the general surrender. Failing in his attempt to break through towards Chandpur, Niazi fell back on Laksham, but not for long.
On the night of 8 December he made another bid and, breaking through the Indian cordon, made his way to the Maynamati fortress. Most of his party under Col Naim, numbering about 1,500 including some 40 officers, were captured by Pande in the north, while the Brigadier got through to the fortress with the rest. This brigade had earlier infiltrated on 3 December night and established roadblocks between Changram and Laksham. In the same way, 181 Mountain Brigade, following on the heels of 301 Mountain Brigade, had established roadblocks west and north of Laksharn on the Laksham-Hajiganj railway and astride the Lalmal-Madaffarganj road.
Combined with 181 Mountain Brigade roadblocks, the Indian cordon was complete. But the Laksham garrison managed to get away through the roadblocks with some casualties and at the cost of abandoning its heavier weapons and equipment. After the withdrawal of the garrison, Laksham was occupied on 9 December, Hira’s 23 Division had reached the key river ports of Chandpur and Daudkhandi. Leaving two brigades, 6land 181 Mountain, to reduce the Maynamati defences, he focused his attention on Narayanganj, across the Meghna, and Chittagong.
Hira employed 181 Mountain Brigade from the south and 61 Mountain Brigade from the north. Successive attacks by both brigades, supported by a preponderance of artillery fire and air strikes, could not make a significant dent on the Maynamati defences. Brig Atif, in command of the fortress, had repeatedly refused the Indian demand to surrender. The Stalemate continued till hostilities ended on 16 December, when 86 officers, including two brigadiers, 175 JCOS, 3,918 other ranks and 102 civilians surrendered.
It was later discovered that the Maynamati defences had been systematically organised into three-tiered field fortifications to meet threats from all directions with an elaborate obstacle system. After withdrawal of 53 Infantry Brigade from Laksham, the garrison swelled to about 4,000, with four tanks and a battery of artillery. In retrospect, Sagat Singh felt that the reduction of such strong defences would have been expensive both in terms of life and material, and very time-consuming. Bypassing the Maynamati fortress was therefore wise.
Originally, 57 Mountain Division under Gen Gonsalves was to capture Akhaura and thereafter build up north of Maynamati and capture Daudkhandi. Having demonstrated in the northeast, he encircled Akhaura and captured it by 5 December. Its defences were manned by Pakistan 27 Infantry Brigade under Brig Saadullah with a mixed force of regulars and a paramilitary force of about battalion strength. The defences had been sited along the Tista, with an anti-tank ditch to take a frontal assault. The position had considerable defence potential, but Gonsalves tricked the garrison commander, simulating tank noises in the northeast using five-ton trucks without silencers at night and outmanoeuvering the defences from the rear.
On the fall of the Tista bridge, Saadullah started withdrawing to the main defences in the general Ashuganj-Bhairab Bazaar area on the Meghna, where Headquarters 14 Infantry Division had already fallen back and were busy improving the defences. 30 Baluch covered 24 Infantry Brigade’s withdrawal to Ashuganj. In the battle for Akhaura, one of the battalions of 301 Mountain Brigade established a roadblock in the Kodda area and found that the railway line between Brahmanbaria and Akhaura had been dismantled and the track used by motor transport. The bridge over the Tista fell into its hands intact. A further probe towards Brahmanbaria indicated that it was lightly held as only a delaying position
Advance along this axis to Dacca was not initially considered as it was calculated that the Brahmanbaria bottleneck would be strongly held, and its capture would become all the more difficult when the troops deployed in the Maulvi Bazaar-Shamshernagar area would fall back on it. Moreover, according to Indian intelli-gence, no road linked Brahmanbaria with Ashuganj. On learning that Pakistan III Infantry Brigade had moved north from Maulvi Bazaar to Sylhet and that there was a perfectly good road between Brahmanbaria and Ashuganj. Sagat Singh quickly decided to change the thrust line of 57 Mountain Division to Brahmanbaria-Ashuganj instead of Maynamati-Daudkhandi. Gonsalves organised a three-pronged advance on Brahmanbaria over waterlogged paddy fields. One of
105
these prongs worked along the Meghna from the south towards Ashuganj. But by the time the pincers closed, Saadullah had crossed the river, leaving behind small pockets of resistance at Sahuganj. According to Fazal Muqeem, Saadullah had to fight his way through the southern pincer with 39 Baluch, capturing seven Indian PT-76 tanks of 63 Cavalry in the process, and this had heartened the Pakistani troops a great deal. The division reached Ashuganj on 9 December and found the bridge had been demolished. By 8 December, the Indians had reached all three river ports and key points of communications along the Meghna at Chandpur, Daudkhandi and Ashuganj and had secured the vital Meghna bulge. All roads to Dacca from the east now lay open.
INVESTMENT OF SYLHET
It had been decided by the end of November to carry out transborder operations in support of the Mukti Bahini to improve the Indian defensive posture. Accordingly, 8 Mountain Division under Gen Krishna Rao was ordered to capture Shamshernagar and Kulaura with a brigade each. 81 Mountain Brigade under Brig Apte was to advance along the Kailashabar-Shamshernagar-Maulvi Bazaar axis, and 59 Mountain Brigade under Brig Quinn was to do likewise along the Dharamnagar-Kulaura-Brahmanbaria-Maulvi Bazaar axis. 81 Mountain Brigade secured the Shamshernager complex by about midday on 2 December against stiff resistance by one company each of 22 Baluch and Tochi Scouts. The Indian casualties were 31 killed and 87 wounded against 26 Pakistanis captured and quite a few killed and wounded. On the other axis, 59 Mountain Brigade contacted Kulaura the same day but was not able to capture it till 6 December, and that too only after flushing out the opposition with a heavy dose of napalm bombing. The commencement of hostilities with the pre-emptive Pakistani strike in the western sector on 3 December brought a greater sense of urgency, and Sagat Singh ordered Krishna Rao to speed up the operation.
81 Mountain Brigade resumed its advance and secured Munshi Bazaar by 5 December. A company of 30 FF defending the town put up a brave fight, suffering about 22 killed, including the company commander, and 31 taken prisoner. Maulvi Bazaar was contacted by 7 December. Meanwhile, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles from 59 Mountain Brigade was lifted by helicopter across to southeast of Sylhet town and was soon in touch with its defences. The garrison commander had got the town vacated and converted it into a fortress which was held by Pakistani ad hoc 202 Infantry Brigade consisting of remnants of units falling back from the border defences. Fearful of being cut off by the Indian heliborne force and also being saturated daily with napalm, the commander of Pakistan 313 Infantry Brigade pulled his troops back to Sylhet without any interruption.
This brought the number of the garrison to some six battalions, one artillery regiment and a mortar battery, but all these units were on reduced strength. Apte walked int. Maulvi Bazaar on 9 December without meeting any opposition, and he was able the next day to secure Saidpur and Sherpur ferries, which were found unoccupied. Having secured all its assigned objectives, the brigade was pulled out to Agartala airfield as corps reserve, as planned for a possible fly into Dacca.
Meanwhile, 59 Mountain Brigade advanced towards Sylhet and was able to capture Fenchugunj on 11 December and link up with its battalion 4/5 Gorkha Rifles on 13 December. 5/5 Gorkha Rifles, advancing south from Dauki in Khasi and Jaintia Hills along the Jaintiapur-Darbasth-Sylhet road, captured Chandghat and was able to invest Sylhet from the northeast, and then came under the command of 8 Mountain Division. Working its way cross-country from Kanairighat, Bangladesh Battalion also joined 5/5 Gorkha Rifles by 9 December.
From 13 December onwards, after 59 Mountain Brigade had built up on 4/5 Gorkha Rifles, Krishna Rao besieged the Sylhet fortress from all directions, but for some air strikes he awaited the garrison’s surrender on its own. This took place on 17 December and involved 109 officers, including three brigadiers, 191 JCOs and 6,124 other ranks, almost double the strength of Krishna Rao’s forces. The battle of Sylhet, like that of Khulna, was lost by Pakistan elsewhere. It was remarkable that, despite battle fatigue and the prospect of an unequal fight, a company each at Shamshernagar and Kulaura, with a few paramilitary troops and very little artillery and air support, held Krishna Rao’s brigades for days. And in spite of the great odds against them they managed to slip away to Sylhet.
ADVANCE TO CHITTAGONG
An ad hoc force named Kilo and comprising two I battalions, two Bangladesh battalions, one battalion each from BSF and CRP, an artillery mountain regiment, a Mujib battery and a BSF post group, was created and placed under Brig Anand Sarup. In view of the change of corps thrust lines from Belonia to the Laksham area, the Pakistanis had vacated Feni, and this town was secured by the Kilo force on 6 December. Extending their operations, the force also occupied Kaberhat and Zorarganj by 8 December The force was then ordered to advance on Chittagong, and this began on 8 December. Opposition encountered at Sitakund was overcome by 12 December. Meanwhile, 83 Mountain Brigade, from 23 Mountain Division assigned to capture Chittagong, had also fetched up at Sitakund. Mukiraghat, held by a Pakistani force of about two mixed companies, was cleared on the night of 13 December. The combined force reached Faujdarhat on the outskirts of Chittagong by 15 December, when operations were suspended, against negligible opposition. The Chittagong garrison,comprising 161 officers, 305 JCOS, naval petty officers, and airforce warrant officers and 8,618 other ranks from all three services, surrendered after the ceasefire.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION
Despite all advice to the contrary, the Chief had not given up his pet idea of an amphibious operation as part of his overall plan for liberating East Pakistan. Watching the rapid collapse of organised resistance in the province, he ordered a battalion group to be sent by sea to Cox’s Bazaar to prevent Pakistani troops from escaping through that point to Burma. A group comprising 1/3 Gorkha Rifles, two companies of 11 Bihar and some mortars was hastily collected, named Rome Force, placed under Commander Artillery, 8 Mountain Division, and put on a merchant ship to sail to a rendezvous off Cox’s Bazaar. MV Vishva Vijay set off with the force in the early hours of 12 December. A naval contingent of 50 which was to accompany the force did not arrive before the ship sailed. Reaching the rendezvous on 14 December, the force was transferred to two LSTS, INS Guldar and Gharial. As the operation had been planned on the basis of maps, the actual survey of the landing coast was carried out on nearing the beach. To everybody’s horror, the place was not suitable for beaching LSTs and no other landing craft were available with the force. There was no option to beaching somehow, and one of the LSTS beached on a runnel. Only 12 men could disembark, and two of them drowned.
With another effort, some 30 more were put ashore. The commander of the force was in an awkward predicament when the men already ashore flashed back the news that there were no Pakistani troops in the area. Instead, they had contacted a group of Freedom Fighters. With their help the remainder of the force was transferred to shore in local fishing boats between 16 and 18 December. These country craft could carry very little heavy equipment, vehicles, guns and ammunition. This was one instance where the Chief overruled his advisery and pushed through a pet operation. It was undertaken without suitable craft and equipment and combined operations training. But for the coast being devoid of the Pakistanis and aid from the Mukti Bahini, this adventure would have ended in a fiasco.
—————-
1.Gen Kaul admitted in his book. The Untold Story, that hasty concentration led to men arriving in operation areas
physically unfit and mentally unprepared Tanks captured by the Pakistani Army upon a tactical withdrawal of the Indian Army from this sector which was
rendered untenable by enemy shelling In the cause of national integration the Indian Army had to act to the highest standards of counterinsurgency with regard
to Naga and Mizo hostiles The Commonwealth Parliamintary Conference at Kuala Lumpur, September 1971, and the Ministerial Conference of
Non aligned Countries, New York, unanimously criticised President Yahya Khan’s suppression of the Bangladesh
movement. For world press criticism of genocide see Asian Recorder. Vol XVII, No 26. p. 10228 The code name of the Pakistani offensive operational plan in 1965 Commanding IV Corps was the strongest army corps under the Eastern Command and was given the longest stretch of
border the castem sector) as its operational front The Kutch incident was claimed to be a laboratory test and grand rehearsal on the part of Pakistan, whose main
objective in 1965 was Kashmir Landing ships.
8.Transportation of troops by the merchant ship Vishwa Vijaya, which was of 6,000 tons and happened to be anchored in
the Hooghly, was one of the first combined operations landings ever made by the Indian armed forces.
108
9
THE NORTHWESTERN SECTOR
Lt Gen Thapan, General Officer Commanding XXXIII Corps, was operationally responsible for the sector in addition to his commitments against the Chinese in Sikkim and Bhutan. His headquarters were at Siliguri, from where communicationwise he could adequately control both battles. A divisional commander in the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965, he was a copybook general and had the reputation of being overcautious. In view of his reputation, the Army Commander tried to spilt corps headquarters in two on the analogy of IV Corps and place Bangladesh operations under Maj Gen J.S. Nakai, Thapan’s Chief of Staff, but Thapan would not hear of this. He insisted he would stay in charge of operations on both sides and was not countermanded. Personal relations between Thapan and his Army Commander were somewhat strained and led to irksome disagreements in the planning and conduct of operations throughout
Territorywise, the sector lay north of the Padma and Jamuna in the shape of the western half of an hour glass. The Balurghat bulge pinched the waist. The grain of the country runs from north to south, as do the rivers and road and rail communication. The three perennial river obstacles in the sector, affecting movement from east to west, were the Jamuna, Atrai and Karatoya. East Pakistan trunk route No 3 ran along the alignment Titalaya-Pachagarh-Thakurgaon-Saidpur-Rangpur-Bogra-Raishahi. It was a tarmac oneway road capable of bearing heavy traffic. Several small feeder roads and tracks took off it, running east-west and connecting the border towns. The main broad-gauge railway line ran north to south from Hardinge Bridge via Ishurdi, Santabar, Hilli, Parbatipur and Saidpur to Chilabati. A metre-gauge network connected Dinajpur with Lalmunirhat and Rubed.
Because of poor road communications, indifferent tracks and frequent ferries, the Pakistani forces in the region placed great reliance on the railways and waterways for movement of men and material. The only connection with the other sectors was either the rail and road bridge at Paksay, called Hardinge Bridge, and the steamer services on the Jamuna from the ferry sites at Phulchari, Bera and Serajganj. The ground level in the sector was comparatively high and it was presumed that after the monsoon, when the surface dried, it could be negotiated by tanks.
The strategic importance of the sector lay in its proximity to the Siliguri corridor in case Pakistan chose to choke Indian road and rail communications to Assam, and to the routes leading from Sikkim along the Tista Valley to the sector in case the Chinese chose to come to Pakistan’s aid in Bangladesh. In the overall Indian strategy, it would have been profitable to capture this sector with speed to eliminate both threats.
Apart from ensuring the security of the corridor and the Balurghat bulge, Thapan was initially assigned the task of capturing all territory east of the Atrai in the northern part of
the sector, including the important towns of Pachagarh, Thakurgaon, Kantanagar and Dinajpur, within five days of the start of war. At the same time he was to capture Hilli and advance towards Gaibarda to cut off the waist and thereby sever the Pakistani lines of communication running north to south through it. Depending upon the situation, he was to capture either Rangpur in the north or Bogra in the south. As discussed earlier under the evaluation of plans, the war games in October 1971 brought to the notice of the Army Commander that the direct Hilli-Ghoraghat thrust line was the most obvious one, but being strongly held by the Pakistanis it would prove costlier both in time and casualties. Some alternatives were suggested to gain surprise and speed in advance, but he turned them down.
Thapan’s resources for the impending Bangladesh operations were 20 Mountain Division, under the command of Maj Gen Lachhmari Singh Lehl, a well-decorated combat soldier with a fair amount of war experience, and two loose independent brigade groups, of which 71 Mountain Brigade Group under Brig P. N. Kathpalia was moved from Nagaland and 340 Mountain Brigade Group from Southern Command. The second brigade had changed hands, the previous commander being replaced by Brig Bakhshi Joginder Singh, an instructor in the Counter-Insurgency School
In addition, Thapan was allowed one brigade from 6 Mountain Division, which was concentrated in the Siliguri corridor, for limited tasks from which it could be extricated within 24 to 48 hours for tasks against the Chinese if required. The final offensive plan the Army Commander approved was for 71 Mountain Brigade to advance along the MirgarhPachagarh-Thakuraon axis to secure Pachagarh and Thakurgaon, and for one brigade from 20 Mountain Division to advance from the south along the Gangarampur-DinajpurKantanagar road to link up with 71 Mountain Brigade in the vicinity of the bridge over the Atrai on the road to Saidpur.
Meanwhile, 20 Mountain Division was to advance with two brigades up using the Samjia-Phulbari-Palasbari and Hilli-Gaibanda axes, with onebrigade acting as firm base. The time frame for the capture of Thakurgaon, Dinajpur, the bridge on the Atari and Palasbari was five days from the start of hostilities. The subsequent development of operations towards Rangpur or Bogra was to be decided according to situation prevailing in the sector.
Niazi held the sector with Pakistan 16 Infantry Division under the command of Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah. This division was moved from the western wing with two brigades. On induction, it took over the third brigade of Pakistan 14 Infantry Division already deployed in the sector. The broad deployment at the outbreak of hostilities, as evidenced from a marked map captured in an ambush of the Divisional Commander, was primarily dispersed for internal security. 23 Infantry Brigade Group under Brig M. Shafi was operationally responsible for the area north of the waist. Having placed a light screen forward wast of the Atari and the Tista pocket at Lalmunirhat, he had organised the fortress defence of Dinajpur, Saidpur and Rangpur towns. He had two squadrons of 29 Cavalry (Chaffee tanks) and a field regiment in support.
Brig Tajamul Hussain, in command of 205 Infantry Brigade Group, looked after the waistline. He held the Hilli cominplex organised as a fortress with a couple of battalions, adequately supported by a squadron of armour and a field regiment. He proposed to man the rear defences at Palasbari, Pirganj, Gobindganj and Bogra with his third battalion and troops falling back from Hilli. 34 Infantry Brigade Group under Brig N.A. Nayeem was operationally responsible for the area south of the waistline, with a battalion each at Panitola and Nawabganj, and Ishurdi. Nator had been organised as a fortress where troops falling back from any of these defended localities were expected to fight a last-ditch battle.
In addition, General Officer Commanding 16 Infantry Division had 12,000 to 15,000 paramilitary forces under his command which he had used to beef up the army garrisons. In appeared that the Pakistani deployment was primarily meant for internal security in a dispersed fashion to show presence in the entire area. It was later adopted to hold the routes of ingress in strength to prevent East Pakistan territory from falling into Indian hands. They planned to occupy rear defences on withdrawal but had no reserves to influence the battle at any stage.
By 1 November, Thapan was able to concentrate his force around the periphery of the northwestern sector, with 6 Mountain Division in the north in Cooch Behar district, 71 Mountain Brigade Group in the northwest in the Siliguri area, and 20 Mountain Division in occupation of the Balurghat bulge. Until the outbreak of hostilities a few preliminary operations were undertaken in support of Mukti Bahini. The pocket between the Dhudkumar nullah and the Dhurla river, known as the Bhrungmari salient, was occupied against marginal opposition The salient lay on one limb of the sector and was inaccessible to Pakistani armour and heavier weapons. The Tista pocket comprised the area between the Tista and Dharla rivers. Since movement across the rivers was not possible because bridging equipment was lacking in the pockets, Thapan took some time to shift his resources from the Bhrungmari salient to the Tista pocket. But he was still able to induct 9 Mountain Brigade into the northern portion of the pocket before the outbreak of hostilities. This brigade occupied Lalmunirhat and Kurigram by 6 December, and in conjunction with other measures of deception continued to pose a threat to Rangpur from these directions. As transpired later, Maj Gen Shah was indeed duped. To meet this threat he had created an ad hoc force under his Colonel General Staff, using a portion of divisional headquarters as brigade headquarters.
After his surrender he boasted: “My concept is to split one company into two, thus stretching one battalion into two. I never used my staff as staff. They were commanding troops. I had three brigades, but I was able to make five out of them. Actually, I had no headquarters except my A and Q branches.” No wonder the General was thin all over and nowhere strong enough to make a stand. And he had completely lost control of the battle even before it started.
71 Mountain Brigade Group under Brig Kathpalia made a spectacular advance of some 60 kilometres from Mirgarh to Thakurgaon and by 4 December had captured the towns of Pachagarh and Boda without significant opposition. His advance was pushed further south to capture Birganj on 5 December, and working along the Dinajpur road contact was made with the Kantanagar bridge the next day to find it demolished as expected. Pakistani troops were holding the area behind the Dhepa river in considerable strength and Kathpalia’s effort to cross this obstacle invited heavy casualties. Unable to overcome the opposition, the brigade managed to put up a battalion roadblock between the Pakistani-defended locality and Dinajpur on the night of 9 December. But that did not invite any Pakistani reaction as the line of maintenance remained open from the Saidpur side. From then onwards, Kathpalia could not make much headway in overcoming the opposition. Not content with carrying out raids on the outskirts of Dinajpur town from the north, he decided to shift the direction of his thrust line towards Nilphamari.
He accordingly crossed the Dhepa river about ten miles up north and captured Khansama on 13 December, and by the time hostilities ceased on 16 December the brigade was within five miles of Nilphamari. The brigade cleared the entire area west of the general line of the corps. It was claimed however that Kathpalia’s relentless pressure tied down the Pakistani garrisons at Dinajpur, Saidpur, Parbatipur and Rangpur and prevented a pullout of troops to reinforce threatened areas farther south.
If these fortresses were not denuded to reinforce these areas, this was due more to the inept conduct of battle by the General Officer Commanding Pakistan 16 Infantry Division than to Kathpalia’s pressure. For at no time was 71 Mountain Brigade Group ab the routes of withdrawal of the Pakistani troops deployed in Dinajpur, Parbatipur, Saidpur and Rangpur fortresses. In the later stages, 9 Mountain Brigade and two battalions were also moved south of Dinajpur, but despite encirclement by both these brigades the garrison there held out till the end of the war.
20 Mountain Division was to advance along two axes, with a brigade on each, to cut the waist. One of the axes selected was the Hilli-Gaibanda road. Hilli is a small town on the tip of the tongue of the Balurghat bulge, sprawling along the north to south railway line. The international border, running immediately west of the railway, divided the town in two. The town itself was thus on the Indian side and the railway station and a newly developed educational complex of schools and colleges on the Pakistani side. The tip of the tongue, in which the Pakistan defences were sited, is about 4,000 to 5,000 yards wide.
The Hilli defences were held by putting up a screen of platoon-defended localities along the railway line at Naopara, Basudebpur BOP, checkpost and railway station complex, and Hilli BOP, while compact defended localities were sited in depth to cover all the routes of ingress into East Pakistan emanating from the tongue at Bara Chengram, Morapara, Baigram, Chandipur, a girls’ school at Dingapara North and South, deploying about six riffle companies of 4 FF and 13 FF battalions. The defensive position was supported by a field regiment, a mortar battery and a weak squadron of Chaffee tanks. The depth of the entire position did not extend more than 2,000 yards from the international border. 20 Mountain Division, having been concentrated in the Balurghat bulge by the end of October, was in contact with the position and having access to Mukti Bahini elements operating in the area, should have known the layout and preparations carried out there in fair detail. The defended locality at Hilli formed the gateway which had to be opened if the Hilli-Gaibanda axis road was to be exploited. Accordingly, it was decided to clear the Hilli defences as a preliminary operation forming part of Mukti Bahini actions. The Pakistani commanders had converted villages into strong points catering for all-round defence. Skilful use had been made of natural bogs and ponds as obstacles in siting their weapon pits and fortifications, which were solidly constructed to take on heavy shelling.
The defended localities were mutually supporting and interconnected with communication trenches to allow reinforcing if outrun or because of heavy casualties. Weaponswise, these localities had been further strengehened by moving in medium machine guns and recoil-less guns from reconnaissance and support elements. Administrative backing in the way of supplies and ammunition had been provided for by stockpiling material to last 30 days or so.
202 Mountain Brigade under the command of Brig Farhat Bhatti, who had earlier shown promise in the battle of Khem Karan in 1965, was given the task of capturing the Hilli defence complex in order to clear the axis for 20 Mountain Division’s advance to Gaibanda. Bhatti planned to tackle the defences from the north. One infantry battalion, adequately supported by a squadron of T-55 tanks and three assorted artillery regiments, was to clear Naopara, Morapara and Basudebpur BOP. The plan in outline was to capture Naopara as phase 1 of the operation and follow this up by capturing Morapara from the direction of Naopara as phase 2 while Basudebpur BOP was to be kept engaged from the Hindu Mission position. Some simulated activity by armour was also visualised from the south. The operation was to be carried out in darkness. Accordingly, 8 Guards moved out from their forward concentration area and launched an attack with one company at Naopara, which was held by a platoon of Pakistanis. In their endeavour to surround the village, the attacking troops encountered extensive marshes, paddy fields with standing water and occasional ponds which slowed the pace of advance. The surprised Pakistanis withdrew in good time, abandoning some equipment and ammunition. Our men suffered some casualties because of mine blasts, but on the whole the defenders offered no fight. Naopara was secured by about midnight.
The next phase of the attack, for the capture of Morapara, was launched by two companies from south of this target soon after. As they emerged from their forming up positions, they were subjected to withering machine gun crossfire from all the defended localities, which had by then come alive. In spite of this the companies managed to close in on the forward defended localities although they had to wade through waistdeep water. They were further impeded by mines, barbed wire obstacles and a heavy concentration of artillery, mortar and automatic fire.
The going was extremely slow and the casualties heavy. A company commander had fallen, and out of the entire rank and file only about 50-odd men reached the southern and western edges of the village to grapple with the defenders in hand-to-hand combat. The second company almost met the same determined resistance as the assault line approached the village from the northeast. Despite these impediments, the company managed to secure a foothold in the southeastern part of the village, but the Pakistani defenders tenaciously held on to the major part of the objective. Time was getting on and the operation was stalled.
At this juncture, the battalion commander committed his fourth company to clear the rest of the objective. In a fast and fierce encounter, it secured the northern and western ends of the village, and for the rest of the night a hand-to-hand battle ensued in which the company commander was killed. Daylight was fast approaching, and the situation in Morapara was still in stalemate as neither side had achieved a clear success. Bhatti decided to develop another thrust towards the objective from the east. He launched one company of 5 Garhwal Rifles under Maj A. S. Thapa, a spirited company commander, to capture Basudebpur BOP, a little fortress in itself with a ten-foot-high wall round it. The company however got over the wall in one rush and caught the dazed defenders in their bunkers. In a matter of minutes, the surprised garrison was rounded up and the objective captured.
The situation in Morapara still remained confused. 8 Guards had by now lost two each of company commanders, platoon commanders and two forward observation officers, killed or wounded. As day broke, the tank squadron sent forward to support the attackers got bogged down in the paddy fields as it emerged from its forward concentration area. Replenishment of the troops still fighting in Morapara and the evacuation of casualties became impossible because of the accurate Pakistani machine gun fire from neighbouring localities. Left to themselves, the exhausted troops fell back helter Skelter on Hilli and Naopara. The brigade attack on the Hilli complex was stalled in its very first phase and the prospect of putting through the original plan looked gloomy.
Encouraged by his easy success at Basudebpur BOP, Bhatti planned a hurried attack on Morapara by the Garhwalis, but the Divisional Commander intervened and ordered a deliberate and well-prepared attack after thorough reconnaissance and preparation the next day. At night, the Garhwali patrol contacted Capt V. S. Sharma of 8 Guards, who unknown to all concerned was holding a little pocket on the objective with some 20 men. He had seen the Pakistani defenders vacate and reoccupy the Morapara defences. The next morning. 8 Guards was built up on this valiant party and managed to clear the village about midday. Total casualties suffered in this operation were four officers killed, three wounded, two JCOs killed and wounded, 61 other ranks killed and 85 wounded. All efforts to capture the Hilli complex had failed.
From then onwards, the Pakistani defences continued to be contained by 202 Infantry Brigade till 11 December, when it became possible to clear the opposition with the aid of Indian columns operating behind these defences. The Pakistani garrison, about a battalion plus, managed to hold a complete Indian brigade group for about 19 days despite the fact that the Pakistani defensive complex was only about 3,000 yards deep, that the Balurghat bulge tongue was in Indian hands, and that intelligence of the terrain and Pakistani deployment was available through Mukti Bahini and sympathetic locals. The initial heavy casualties had imposed caution on the Indian troops and commanders. The battle of attrition was proving costly in casualties and time schedule.
The battle for the Hilli complex has been described in some detail with a purpose. It was the only battle the Indian Army fought to reduce the Pakistani fortress in the entire Bangladesh operations. This operation demonstrated to the Indian higher commanders the futility of attacking heavily defended Pakistani strongholds. It enabled earlier plans to be revised, thus permitting Pakistani strongholds to be bypassed or contained instead of being cleared. The El Alamein concepts, so deeply ingrained in the old school of generals, met their doom.
In consultation with General Officer Commanding 20 Mountain Division, Thapan accordinly modifed the original plan of advancing on two axes to cut the waistline. They now decided to advance only on 128. It was in this sector that the divisional thrust met the stiffest resistance, the enemy defences being strongly constructed. In some places, entire railway coaches had been dug into the ground to serve as pillboxes, one axis, the Phulbari – Charkhai-Pirganj road. The plan visualised this advance by two brigades, 66 and 202 Mountain Brigade. 165 Mountain Brigade was already deployed south of Hilli for the security of the Balurghat bulge, and 340 Mountain Brigade Group, having shed two battalions, one each to 66 and 202 Mountain Brigades, was investing Dinajpur from a southerly direction.
Initially, the pressure on the Hilli complex was to have been maintained in the hope of misleading the Pakistani commanders regarding the change of plans. At a suitable opportunity, 202 Mountain Brigade was to link up with 66 Mountain Brigade in the Dangapara-Charkhai area after handing over Hilli to 165 Mountain Brigade and continue a concerted advance to cut the waistline. The bogging down of T-55 tanks in the Morapara attack had imposed constraints on their employability on their own. Thereafter, the armour was grouped in complementary combinations of T-55 and PT-76 tanks as ‘the cross-country performance of the PT-76s in marshy terrain was found to be better, thus overcoming to some extent the constraints of terrain and night functioning.
66 Mountain Brigade Group, under the command of Brig Sharma, advanced rapidly along the Nabogram-Bajai-Phulbari axis and covering about 20 kilometres contacted Phulbari in the afternoon of 4 December. The town was cleared an hour later. The Pakistani garrison had earlier withdrawn to Parbatipur, after having partially demolished the bridge over the Jamuna. The advance continued, led by a combat group of a composite regiment of T-55 and PT-76 tanks and a mechanised battalion equipped with wheeled APCs. It could not operate off roads and was employed in a normal infantry role towards Charkhai. The town was secured by the evening of 4 December after traversing some ten kilometres from Phulbari against minimal opposition.
As the advance progressed in depth, the problems of following it up with administrative echelons increased. Indian intelligence reported the Phulbari-Charkhai road as brick-paved, but it turned out to be only a wet dirt track which even tanks found difficult to negotiate. Most of the wheeled APCs were bogged down en route. These difficulties were reduced somewhat when engineers creditably converted the railway embankment into a high classification road in two days. While the build-up for crossing the Karatoya river was in progress, 6 Guards, the follow-up battalion, had on its own initialve moved further north, and finding Nawabganj empty occupied it on 5 December evening. Pushing ahead at night, they also secured the ferry site at Kanchdaha and established a bridgehead by midday 6 December.
But this fact was not known at divisional headquarters. Joginder Singh was ordered to secure Nawabganj and advance farther south to secure Bhaduria and Hathbangi ferry site with 2/5 Gorkha Rifles, and 63 Armoured Regiment. 2/5 Gorkha Rifles found the ferry site unoccupied but mined indiscriminately. Moreover, the road leading to it was found badly broken and therefore considered unfit for heavy vehicular traffic. The way was now open for the advance to Pirganj, but Sharma had overstretched himself and was in no position to exploit the unexpected success of his rapid advance. Lachhman Singh had earlier planned a link-up between 66 and 202 Mountain Brigades north of Hilli, hoping that this would make 202 Mountain Brigade available to resume the advance from the Karatoya. An effort was therefore made to build up pressure from the north and south with both brigades. But for the capture of Khatta along the Charkhai-Hilli road by 66 Mountain Brigade, this plan yielded no meaningful progress.
Lachhman Singh then thought of handing over the Hilli complex operations to either 340 or 165 Mountain to allow Bhatti to collect his brigade and resume the advance from the 6 Guards bridgehead as planned. But Bhatti showed his helplessness and felt so inextricatably involved that he would not be able to collect himself for quite some time. Left with no option, Lachhman turned to Joginder Singh, affectionately called Jogi. commander of 340 Mountain Brigade Group, to execute the plan. The plan visualised the advance of the brigade towards Pirganj, capture of the town and establishing roadblocks to
115
sever
Rangpur from Bogra and Nator.
Joginder Singh’s brigade was at that time, on Lachhman Singh’s earlier orders, scattered all over the divisional sector. One battalion was allotted to 202 Mountain Brigade, another investing Dinajpur from the south, and the third spearheaded Sharma’s advance. The only force available with Joginder Singh on the afternoon of 6 December was his skeleton headquarters and himself. But he energetically set about assembling the troops allotted to him. straight away, he collected his original battalion, 2/5 Gorkha Rifles, which was already in the area, took over 6 Guards, which was holding the bridgehead under his wing, and ordered 5/11 Gorkha Rifles to pull out expeditiously.
This regrouping and the movement of the allotted armour and artillery took some 36 hours to complete, an inexcusable delay in mobile operations. From then onwards both Sharma and Bhatti continued to edge forward towards the linkup without making substantial progress. Sharma captured Bhaduria, a defended locality held by about company strength, on 11 December at considerable cost. 17 Kumaon suffered two officers, three JCOs and 67 other ranks wounded in that action without achieving any tactical advantage. It was claimed that 82 bodies, including one major and one artillery officer, were counted in all. The attrition rate in fighting for prepared defences was high on both sides and did not yield commensurate results.
Jogi commenced the advance after midday on 7 December from the bridgehead over the Karatoya with one combat group of 2/5 Gorkha Rifles and 69 Armoured Regiment (PT76 tanks), less one squadron, along the Nawabganj-Chandipur-Lal Dighi Bazaar-Pirganj axis. One squadron led the advance and the followup squadron carried 2/5 Gorkha Rifles, an infantry battalion, on tanks. The second infantry battalion was to catch up by marching flat foot. The combat group made rapid progress and secured Chandipur town in a couple of hours or so by overcoming minor opposition. It pushed ahead speedily and captured Pirganj by afternoon without a fight. A few troops were seen fleeing the town when our forward tank columns started enveloping the position.
Roadblocks were soon established along the Rangpur-Bogra highway at Lai Dighi Bazaar in the north and close to Barabila lake in the south in addition to the crossroads at Chandipur in the west and Bahadurpur in the southwest. The roadblocks were in the process of occupation when a Pakistani jeep column travelling from Rangpur towards Pirganj hit the block at Lai Dighi Bazaar and was fired upon by the tanks there. One jeep blew up, but the rest managed to escape in the darkness prevailing at that time. Next morning two jeeps, including one belonging to Nazar Hussain Shah, and one soldier, some marked maps and other valuable documents fell into our hands.
After his surrender the General gave a colourful account of his narrow escape from death. Along with Brig Tajamul Hussain, Commander 205 Infantry Brigade, he was on his way to Bogra to prepare for the fast-developing Indian threat towards Pirganj. Since nothing had happened for almost 36 hours to 48 hours after the capture of Nawabganj, he did not endow the Indians with the capability of disrupting the highway so far. The ambush surprised his party greatly and nearly cost him his life. In a hurry to get down and escape, the General sprained his ankle and had to lie in a bamboo clump for quite a while till a search party found him. The same night, on the way to Rangpur, his jeep collided with another vehicle. Once again, Shah was lucky to escape unhurt.
On hearing of the roadblocks, the Pakistani garrison commanders at Rangpur and
Bogra reacted sharply. Two companies from 32 Baluch led by their commanding officer, rushed from Bogra and hit the 2/5 Gorkha Rifles roadblock near the lake a little past midnight. In the ensuing exchange of fire the Pakistani commander was killed. His body was recovered the next morning. The rest of the force withdrew before dawn. It transpired later that they were advance elements of 32 Baluch ordered to occupy the Pirganj defences before the Indian thrust reached the place. They arrived too late. About the same time, two companies of Pakistan 8 Punjub, accompanied by tanks, came from Rangpur and attacked the Laldighi roadblock in a spirited charge.
By then, two companies of 5/11 Gorkha Rifles had also arrived and adequately strengthened the block. The Pakistani assault was soon broken b Indian tanks, artillery and mortars. Unable to make much headway, the force withdrew. This perhaps constituted the search party for the General, and he went back to Rangpur with it. Shackled by constraints on using 6 Guards, the closest troops available, and undue caution to hold Pirganj in strength, Jogi wasted a precious 24 hours there and could resume his advance only at first light on 9 December.
By that time another battalion had been fetched up, and by lifting 6 Guards from the bridgehead he divided these two battalions and his armour into four composite task forces. The infantry being carried on tanks, these highly mobile and hard-hitting groups swept the entire countryside in no time. Sadhullahpur was occupied at 1000 hours and Palasbari captured by midday. Except for odd nuisance mines, there was no organised resistance. On 10 December, news was received that the Pakistani garrison in the RangpurSaidpur area was expected to withdraw across the Jamuna towards Dacca. To thwart such an eventuality, Joginder Singh ordered a roadblock to be set up in the area of Gaibanda. The town was occupied at 1600 hours on 10 December. His men moved the same day across to the Phulchari ferry, where they destroyed the jetties and uprooted the rail track serving it. With the occupation of Gaibanda and the ferry, the Pakistani troops were denied an escape route. Simultaneously, other task forces which had contacted the Pakistani defences east of the Karatoya in Ghoraghat area, cleared the opposition on the home bank of the river by 1730 hours.
Attention now turned towards the main task of capturing Bogra. The immediate objective was Gobindganj, a small town lying along the Rangpur-Bogra highway south of the Karatoya. The Air Force had reported that the river obstacle and the town were held by a weak battalion with some tanks and guns. After leaving strong firm bases in the general area of Pirganj, Laldighi Bazaar and Chandipur to meet any threat from the Rangpur side, Joginder Singh decided to tackle the Gobindganj defences by pushing one combat group along the main highway to exert pressure from the north while the second combat group, comprising one armoured regiment less a squadron and an infantry battalion less a company, was to make a wide outflanking movement over some 56 kilometres to tackle the defences from the south and southeast The advance on both axes started at 1100 hours on 11 December. Contact was made about midday on the highway. The outflanking column crossed the river in the east in the Kajla area, where it split in three. One group moved south to establish a roadblock in the area of Kamar along the highway, and the other two moved independently to tackle the defences from the south and southeast. The advance elements reached the crossroads immediately south of the town without detection.
The Gobindganj garrison was taken completely by surprise, but put up determined resistance. Night fell, and fighting continued throughout it. The position was mopped up by T-55 tanks giving fire support at night, using an infrated sighting system. By the first light of 12 December, Gobindganj was in Indian hands. In this action, 340 Mountain Brigade Group killed 90 Pakistanis and captured 12 other ranks in addition to a booty of five 105mm guns, three Chaffee tanks, 35 vehicles of sorts, and about 20 odd truckloads of gun ammunition, a large dump of mines and some anti-tank guns. It appears that this position was under preparation for occupation by a battalion group, but when attacked it was manned by an assortment of five companies from odd units. The Pakistani garrison tried to escape, but was trapped by Joginder Singh’s block at Kamar. The whole operation was a brilliant envelopment manoeuvre, boldly executed by 340 Mountain Brigade Group, and it paid good dividends.
The advance was resumed at 1130 hours the next day by 69 Armoured Regiment and 5111 Gorkha Rifles group along the highway to Bogra Contact was made with the Pakistani defences holding the Ichhamati river by the same evening. The northern bank was soon cleared, and on discovering a gap in the Pakistani defences a company was infiltrated to establish a roadblock in the rear before tackling the main defences. The company on the way to the road lock accidentally stumbled on the battalion headquarters. They took it by surprise and captured Maj Mohammed Ajmal, the officiating commanding officer, the adjutant and the regimental medical officer of 32 Baluch.
They also destroyed the communication links with their forward troops, thus disrupting the entire Pakistani command and control structure in the area. The Ichhamati position was cleared by midday on 13 December, and a detachment which hurried to capture the bridge over the Karatoya at Mahasthian the next morning caught Pakistani engineers in the act of priming demolition charges. A couple of them were shot and the others fled. The bridge was captured intact.
The Pakistanis had prepared defences for a company or so as a strong delaying position, but they did not get the chance to occupy it either because of the speed of the Indian advance or the general lack of troops in the area, as the troops holding the Hilli complex had not fallen back by then. The brigade claimed about 97 killed in both actions, but produced small arms worth only about a platoon or so as booty. It may be assumed that both positions were held by remnants of 32 Baluch elements falling back from Pirganj.
The 340 Mountain Brigade Group operations in the rear areas had by then outflanked the Hilli complex defences. It had forced the Pakistanis to withdraw their troops to hold their sensitive areas in depth. As a result, the forces at Hilli had been gradually thinned and withdrawn to Bogra. Exploiting this thinning process between 10 and 12 December, 66 Mountain Brigade advanced and occupied Ghoraghat. After a stalemate of about 20 days, 202 Mountain Brigade had cleared Hilli and having linked with 66 Mountain Brigade had advanced along the Ghoraghat-Saidpur-Khetlal axis. It captured the town of Khetlal after a sharp action.
Originally, this brigade group was to have advanced towards Bogra and helped Joginder Singh in reducing the garrison there. This became all the more necessary as Headquarters Eastem Command asked for the release of 340 Mountain Brigade Group after the fall of Bogra for induction across the Jamuna to reinforce the thrusts converging on Dacca. But this plan had to be changed for two main reasons. Orders came from the higher command for the transfer of the T-55 squadron allotted to the brigade.
Bhatti was reluctant to advance without support from armour, and any regrouping of armour from the Pirganj-Bogra axis would have resulted in inordinate delay. The argument was however put forward that the Khetlal-Bogra road had been badly damaged and this would delay the advance to the extent that Bhatti would not be in time to join Joginder Singh in the reduction of Bogra. In any event, 340 Mountain Brigade Group made such rapid progress that Bhatti’s encircling movement was considered infructuous. 202 Mountain Brigade was then ordered to concentrate in the general area of Ghoraghat as a divisional reserve. Meanwhile, by the evening of 13 December, 165 Mountain Brigade had also progressed towards the south of Hilli and had occupied Panchbibi and Jaipurhat unopposed.
Bogra was reported to be held by Baluch with some artillery and tanks in support, although the exact dispositions were not known. Pakistan 205 Infantry Brigade Headquarters were also to move to the town, but whether it had already reached it was not known as on the previous day the Brigadier had visited the detachment holding the Ichhamati river and given them a pep talk. Emboldened by his earlier success, Joginder Singh rapidly moved along the highway and encircled the town from all directions on the night of 13/14 December. He outflanked the town with a combat group and established two blocks in the south along the Sirajganj-Bogra and Singra-Bogra roads. 2/5 Gorkha Rifles worked its way with one squadron of armour along the highway from the north, clearing the city block by block and house by house up to the railway line. At the same time, two battalions tackled the town, one from the south, using the road-blocks as their firm base, and the other from the northeast. The area north of the railway line was cleared by 1300 hours, although the Pakistani defences on the rail embankment were still active. The divisional and brigade headquarters also fell into Indian hands. The town was surrounded by a tight cordon and the position of the Pakistanis was hopeless. The capture of Bogra was an inounced at that time although isolated pockets continued to hold out.
Large numbers of Pakistani troops gave themselves up. They reported that Headquarters 205 Infantry Brigade, along with elements of 4 FF, 13 FF and Baluch, were bottled up in the town. The tight cordon drawn by Joginder Singh foiled all attempts at escape. The relentless pressure of the Indian mopping up operations and the psychological affect of the encirclement, coupled with the frequent appeals by loudspeaker to Pakistani soldiers to surrender had some effect, but on the whole the resistance continued till the first light of 16 December,
In all five officers, 56 JCO, 1,613 other ranks and 33 civilians surrendered in the town. Three large ammunition dumps, one supply depot, one workshop and about 500 numbers of small arms, ten guns and five Chaffee tanks fell into Indian hands. It appears that although this position was meant to be held by brigade strength it was actually held by only one battalion and elements of other units which managed to withdraw from forward positions when they fell By 14 December, Pakistani resistance in Bogra was crumbling and the potential threat from the south was completely eliminated. It was then decided to capture Rangpur. Plans were made for a two pronged attack on this town by Sharma and Bhatti simultaneously, along the Mitapukar-Rangpur and Mitapukar-Nasirabad-Fatepur-Rangpur axes. Sharma secured Mitapukar by midday on 15 December and reached the outskirts of Rangpur town by the time the ceasefire became effective on 16 December. The start of Bhatti’s advance was held up by perpetual delays in regrouping armour. At first light on 16 December, Bhatti pushed his advance guard forward to clear minor opposition some distance away, but by the time his main body started moving the ceasefire was announced. Thus Bhatti’s brigade never became effective in the offensive tasks of the division. It appeared as though the spirits of Bhatti’s troops had been sapped in the defensive operations at Hilli.
Some 450 Pakistani officers, 670 JCOS, 16,800 other ranks and 250 enrolled noncombatants surrendered to XXXIII Corps during and after the ceasefire with abut 3,000 rank and file of the paramilitary forces. Unfortunately, the actual figures of prisoners taken in the hostilities are not available, but it is believed that the total was no more than about 2,000. This shows that most of the Pakistani units were up to operational strength and had a considerable potential to continue the war if Niazi had not accepted such an early ceasefire.
The Indian casualties in the sector were 16 officers, 11 JCOs and 344 other ranks killed, 54 officers, 33 JCOs and 874 other ranks wounded. Most of the casualties were suffered in attacks on prepared defences in Hilli and Bhaduria. 340 Mountain Brigade Group, which bore the major burden of winning the war in this sector, suffered only 46 ranks killed and 95 wounded, proving the point that a war of manoeuvre is less costly in attrition.
What contribution did the campaign in this sector make towards the overall collapse of the Pakistan forces in the eastern wing? According to Niazi, he had made up his mind to effect a ceasefire around 12 December. At that time, the leading elements of Thapan’s offensive thrust were near the Ichhamati river delaying position, well away from the Bogra defences where Nazar Hussain Shah was to give battle to the already overstretched 20 Mountain Division. Niazi testified later that the threat to Bogra, or even its eventual capture, was so distant from Dacca, the area of decision, that Thapan’s campaign had a very insignificant influence on his decision.
Did Thapan capture territory? At the time of the ceasefire, he had captured all territory east of the Atrai river and north of the Balurghat bulge as well as a substantial area of the waistline, but all important towns like Dinajpur, Saidpur, Rangpur, Rajshahi and Nator were still holding out and had the capability of sustained resistance.
Did this campaign achieve the degree of attrition of both manpower and equipment which would cripple the will and potential of the opposing force? Apparently not, as no more than 500-odd rank and file out of a total of some 20,000 who surrendered after the ceasefire fell into Thapan’s hands. The equipment captured or damaged in actual combat was marginal and in no way impaired the Pakistani force commander’s military capability. It would thus be seen that the campaign in the northwestern sector did not make a significant contribution to bringing about Niazi’s collapse..
Why was this so? The failure lies in the ambiguity of the tasks allotted to Thapan by his Army Commander. These tasks were to secure the general area of Thakurgaon, Dinajpur and Hilli and cut the Hilli-Gzibanda waistline by D plus eight days and then, the situation permitting, be prepared to converge on Rangpur or Bogra. It is difficult to discern what the Army Commander was trying to achieve. Did he intend to ensure added security to the Siliguri corridor? With about division strength already deployed in the corridor, no such assurance was warranted. In any event, Shah was not capable of mounting such an operation in the direction of the corridor with the Indian division plus strength deployed in the Balurghat bulge threatening his waistline.
Was the Army Commander’s intention to prevent the whole of Pakistan 16 Infantry
120
Division or the major part of it from falling back on Dacca?
Then the early capture of the ferries at Phulchari, Serajganj and Beraghat should have been planned, and not only that portion which fell north of the waistline. Did the Army Commander intend to push Thapan’s thrust across the Jamuna towards Dacca? Certainly not at the time of initial planning, but it appears that he had some after-thoughts.
Between 12 and 15 December, when Dacca presented an easy target, the Army Commander made frantic but futile efforts to move one brigade group with some tanks and medium artillery across the river. The only ferry site Thapan’s troops captured, that at Phulchari, had been severly damaged by air and ground action and was unusable. The other sites at Serajganj and Beraghat had not been secured. These were well away from Bogra, where the leading elements were still fighting. But their capture did not form part of the corps’ tasks.
It appears that the Army Commander’s conception of the overall plan, and the contribution to it of each sector, was not directed and dovetailed for its achievement. For instance, the initial planning made no effort to ensure an early link with II Corps at Hardinge Bridge so as to develop a concerted threat towards Dacca from the sector which offered better facilities for such action at that time. And at no time did the Army Commander stress the importance of the tight scheduling of operations so as to finish the war before there was outside political and military intervention and compel the early surrender of the Pakistani forces. It looks as though he vacillated between what he wanted his troops to achieve and his assessment of their capability to do so, and as a result failed to enunciate his war aims. His subordinate commanders and their troops fumbled from objective to objective without any substantial contribution to the overall aim.
In the conduct of operations, Thapan failed to exploit his combat power to the full of some six brigades employed in his sector after 7 December (after three days of war) only one brigade group was on the offensive, the other five remaining on the defensive and laying siege to the Pakistani town fortresses. It was only after 12 December, when 340 Mountain Brigade Group had already disrupted the rear areas, that two more brigades became available, but they played a very insignificant part in expediting the end of hostilities. They were rushed to invest the Rangpur fortress, which would have remained within the defensive bars of Pakistan’s basic concepts. But this move of Thapan made no difference at all.
Whatever tangible gains were made in the way of developing the thrust line some 130 kilometres deep in Pakistan territory up to Bogra can be attributed to the decision of Joginder Singh to break away from typical Indian World War II concepts and restore the power of manoeuvre on the battlefield. The use of combat groups, consisting of tanks and tank-mounted infantry, enabled him to move faster and reach the Pakistani contingency positions earlier than the troops earmarked to occupy them.
It also allowed prepared defences to be outflanked, encircled and effectively contained while the main thrust developed well behind their rear and unnerved the defenders. Joginder Singh exploited unused routes of ingress and appeared from unexpected directions, mostly from the rear, to deliver his final blow. He also made extensive use of roadblocks to interrupt the Pakistani withdrawal. These highly unorthodox moves by Indian Army standards paid dividends far greater than the resources employed.
The Pakistani defensive posture in the sector did not show much resilience either in
concept or execution, and thereby Shah, General Officer Commanding 16 Infantry Division, failed his country and his command. Initially, in pursuance of Niazi’s policy of not allowing any territory to fall into Indian hands, Shah had deployed his troops in the form of strengthened BOPs near the border and for internal security in the inferior to cope with Mukti Bahini operations up to the middle of November. When Indian pressure started building up on the periphery of the border in support of Mukti Bahini to annex weakly held areas, Shah pulled to the prepared town fortress areas, blocking the main routes of Indian ingress in three distinct complexes.
These were the Dinajpur-Saidpur-Rangpur complex in the north, the Hilli-Ghoraghat complex in the centre, and the Bogra-Nator-Rajshahi complex in the south. Approximately one brigade group was stationed in each. All these fortresses were located on nodal points of internal communications and had elaborately prepared and well-coordinated defences. The main routes of ingress into the northwestern sector ran from the north between the Tista and Atrai rivers and were covered by the Saidpur-Rangpur complex, from the Balurghat side between the Dhopa and Bhelmati rivers, which were blocked by the Dinajpur complex; the waist by the Hilli-Ghoraghat complex, and the approaches from the south through Hardinge Bridge by the Nator and Bogra complexes.
This posture endowed Shah with the ability to halt the Indian thrusts before they reached sensitive areas in the interior from whichever direction the threat materialised, and after the threat was discerned, to create reserves from the uncommitted complex and frustrate their further progress. But the Pakistani General tailed to comprehend this fully and instead allowed each complex to fight its own battle independently.
After his surrender, Shah boasted that by splitting an infantry company in two he had increased the strength of some battalions so as to occupy more sensitive areas. He also explained how he had dirtributed his divisional headquarters staff and communications to create more ad hoc formation headquarters, and he himself functioned from tactical headquarters comprising no more than three or four vehicles. This was his first mistake, for the dilution of integrated units and ad hocism adversely affected the combat power of the fighting units and achieved nothing more than adding to the number of thinly held defended localities with low potential. This lent itself to defeat in detail.
His second and bigger mistake was not to react strongly after having been ambushed north of Pirganj. Even at the cost of pulling out the entire Rangpur garrison, he should have counterattacked Pirganj, if not the same night at least by first light on 8 December. The strength mustered by Joginder Singh at that time was thin, and any spirited, violent and
ction on the part of Shah would have put the Indian offensive out of gear.
Between 8 and 12 December, Thapan could deploy only one brigade group along the Rangpur-Bogra highway and no more. Shah had the option of strengthening the BograIchhamati complex by moving the brigade from the Nator-Rajshahi complex as by then Hardinge Bridge had been demolished and no threat could possibly materialise to such depth areas. If nothing else, he could have diverted 57 Infantry Brigade from Pakistan 9 Infantry Division, which had become available from the 11 Corps offensive along Hardinge Bridge. Instead, Shah let Tajamul Hussain withdraw his brigade from Hilli and at the same time do battle in the rear areas up to Bogra.
As a result only one battalion, earmarked to prepare and look after the rear area defences, opposed 340 Mountain Brigade Group operations throughout. However heroic the
actions of 8 Baluch and its commanding officer, they were not equal to containing a brigade group with a regiment of armour. They invariably reached the prepared defences a little too late to be effective. The Pakistani movement might have been hampered by lack of transport and Indian air supremacy, but Shah did not appear to have even made an effort. No determined armies can be completely immobilised by such constraints.
There was also a possibility of mustering a brigade group by denuding the garrisons at Dinajpur, Saidpur and Rangpur to stage a counteroffensive to disrupt the lines of communication serving 340 Mountain Brigade Group, functioning about 65 kilometres from Pirganj. Shah talked vaguely about plans for a limited offensive towards Farakka and Balurghat. The threat to Farakka had been nullified by the Indian occupation of the territory east of the Atrai, but the option to carry Malda-Bansibari in the Balurghat bulge with two brigades available in the south was however still open.
Such an offensive at this juncture, when Thapan’s entire force was committed deep inside East Pakistan, with no reserve nearby to restore the situation, would have paid heavy dividends. It would have forced 20 Infantry Division to withdraw, but Shah was not of the mettle of commanders who use such opportunities in war. There lay Pakistan’s weakness in leadership. The battle was lost not because the Indians had gained a victory, but because the Pakistanis had conceded it without even a fight.
——–
1Progress made by the northern thrust in the northwestern sector was also very slow on account of enemy resistance.
123
10
THE NORTHERN SECTOR
The northern sector comprised the U-shaped territory between the mighty Jamuna in the west and Meghna in the east, with the Ganga forming the base. The Brahmaputra ran diagonally from northwest to southeast dividing the sector in two, with about one-third north of the river. A large number of routes led into the sector from India, but all these arteries led to the two focal communication centres of Jamalpur and Mymensingh towns lying across the Brahmaputra, a water obstacle about 1,000 feet wide.
The roads and tracks from there onward ran from north to south and converged on Tangail, from where they led to Dacca. Terrain-wise, except for the Madhopur forest in Tangail district, the landscape was covered with paddy fields, punctuated with occasional lakes and marshes. A few villages stood here and there amid clusters of trees. Numerous streams interlaced the flat paddy lands in a zigzag manner, thus restricting free crosscountry movement. Movement by wheeled and tracked vehicles off the main roads and byways was difficult except in the dry season.
Maj Gen Gurbux Singh Gill, General Officer Commanding 101 Communication Zone Area based in Shillong, was made operationally responsible for this sector. Normally, the charter of his duties as an Area Commander was mainly confined to logistic support of the troops deployed in Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal, Nagaland and Mizoram, but he was appointed to this operational command for two main reasons. Communicationwise, this sector on the Indian side was comparatively underdeveloped, and its capacity to sustain any larger forces on the existing roads over a long haul from the nearest base at Gauhati was considered inadequate, thus restricting the size of the force which could be employed. In the overall context, the role of the Indian force in the sector was to be mainly containment of the Pakistani troops deployed in the sector, while the thrust lines of the II and IV Corps converged on Dacca.
The troops allocated to the sector consisted of 95 Mountain Brigade Group, moved to the area from Nagaland in September 1971, under a colourful character, Brig Hardev Singh Kler, who was later to join in the triumphant entry into Dacca. Later, one more infantry battalion was brought in from 23 Infantry Division to augment the sector resources. Before the outbreak of hostilities, intensive Mukti Bahini guerilla activity was going on in the sector, both along the international border and in depth areas of Tangail district under the redoubtable “Tiger” Siddiqi.”
Much coordination was required to dovetail these activities with military operations in the event of war and to relieve the brigade commander from logistic duties so that he could focus his attention on purely operational tasks. Gurbux Singh was brought in to take over these onerous tasks. He was no ordinary general who was content with a chairborne job when the country was at war. Aggressive and brusque, he welcomed the opportunity and set about his task energetically, stockpiling to carry the war beyond the original objectives set by the planners. In peace, he was sidetracked by our systems and was out to prove himself in war.
It appears that Niazi had also relegated this sector to a low priority. Initially, on the induction of Pakistan 9 Infantry Division into East Pakistan, its 27 Infantry Brigade was moved to Mymensingh to control the area and later eliminate the guerilla menace. Later, on post-monsoon reorganisation, this brigade was moved out of the area and ad hoc 93 Infantry Brigade was raised under the local Martial Law Administrator, Brig A. Qadir. This formation was created by grouping two regular battalions, 31 Baluch and 33 Punjab, with the paramilitary forces, consisting of two wings of the newly raised EPCAF and some Mujahid units, and a battery of mortars It was known that Qadir had planned to fight the main defensive battle from fortified battalion defences elaborately prepared behind the Brahmaputra obstacle of Jamalpur and Mymensingh with approximately a strength of one battalion. But he had pushed delaying positions north of the river along the expected routes of ingress right up to the border. Along the Kamalpur-Bakhshiganj Jamalpur and Hitibanda-Sherpur-Jamalpur axes, Freedom Fighters were already in touch with the Pakistani-defended localities at Kamalpur and Hatibanda, and they had reported that both Bakshiganj and Sherpur were held in depth with one company each. These axes appeared to be the responsibility of 31 Baluch, while the Dalu Haluaghat Mymensingh axis was the operational responsibility of 33 Punjab.
Delaying positions were known to have been prepared at Halwa ghat, Phulpur, Gobrakura, Sarchapur, as well as at Durgapur, Birisiri and Pureb Dhala, but actual occupation was confined to Haluaghat. No tanks, field or medium guns had been reported in the sector, which considerably reduced their defence potential. It was considered highly unlikely that Niazi would reinforce this sector in the battles of Jamalpur and Mymensingh. But the Pakistani force was expected to hold the Indian advance as long as possible and then fall back intact if possible on the Dacca fortress main defences. Should Niazi however decide to reinforce the sector, he would be doing so only at the cost of denuding the Dacca defences, and this would be welcome as it would facilitate the task of the II and IV Corps thrust lines from the west and the east.
In addition to its logistic, charter of duties, 101 Communication Zone Area was assigned the offensive tasks of destroying the Pakistani forces deployed in Tangail and Mymensingh districts within 14 days of the outbreak of hostilities. It was visualised that the destruction and capture of Pakistani 93 Infantry Brigade Group and other paramilitary troops under its command would deprive the Dacca fortress of its potential strength. If this was successfully achieved, it would contribute significantly to the campaign.
Gurbux Singh, a shrewd professional, quickly grasped the essence of the plan. He appreciated that although his own superiority was only marginal the weakness of the enemy lay in the division of his forces into two defended localities at Jamalpur and Mymensingh, held by about battalion strength each. Gurbax Singh cast his plan to exploit this weakness. He decided to develop the main thrust broadly along the less-expected approach, the Kamalpur-Bakhshiganj Jamalpur axis, in strength with 95 Mountain Brigade Group while keeping the Pakistani forces engaged along the other two axes with subsidiary thrusts simulating a brigade group advance the more-expected approach of Dalu-HaluaghatPhulpur-Mymensingh with one infantry battalion suitably augmented by Mukti Bahini elements under Brig Sant Singh, a fighting soldier of repute, and one BSF battalion working
along the Baghmara-Jari Jhanjal-Mymensingh axis.
Progress on the containment axes was to be deliberately retarded to facilitate the fall of Jamalpur earlier than Mymensingh to allow each garrison to be defeated in detail one after the other. But there was a snag. After its fall there was a possibility that the Mymensingh garrison might not wait in situ to fight but might withdraw instead towards Tangail and Dacca. Gurbux Singh therefore rightly calculated that he should rush for Tangail after the fall of Jamalpur instead of working towards Mymensingh. Tangail formed a critical bottleneck as all approches from Jamalpur and Mymensingh towards Dacca passed through it. Once this bottleneck was effectively choked, no force could fall back on Dacca, at least not as a cohesive fighting unit. The countryside around Tangail was completely dominated by Siddigi and his gallant Freedom Fighters, who could be relied upon to deal properly with stragglers making their way cross-country.
The quickest means of choking Tangail was by vertical envelopment. Since the required number of helicopters were not available to Gurbux Singh, he projected the use of paratroopers for the task. The importance of a timely linkup by the advancing troops necessitated a paradrop to coincide with the development of his land thrust lines approaching the bottleneck of Tangail. This meant speeding to Tangail after clearing Jamalpur or Mymensingh towns rather than waiting for them to be destroyed. On his insistence, the scope of the offensive was enhanced to capture Jamalpur in seven days, Tangail in eight and, depending upon the situation, to contact the Dacca fortress defences within 14 days of the outbreak of hostilities. The last task was considered feasible once the Pakistani forces deployed in Tangail and Mymensingh districts were either captured or destroyed.
Kamalpur lay on the main thrust line no more than 1,000 yards from the international border. The Pakistani forces had developed it into a fortified locality of considerable defence potential, with concrete pillboxes covering all the approaches leading to it. The total perimeter, approximately 600 square yards, was reportedly occupied by one company of 31 Baluch augmented by paramilitary elements. In view of its proximity to the border, it was decided that the Kamalpur post should be captured as a preliminary operation by the Mukti Bahini with the support of regular troops. The post was accordingly first attacked after saturated artillery bombardment. The assaulting troops almost reached the mouth of the Pakistani bunkers, but when the supporting fire was lifted they were mown down by machine-gun fire. The attack had to be called off because of heavy casualties.
Thereafter, the post was put under siege by a tight cordon of about two battalions. Supplies and reinforcements on the way to it were interrupted by roadblocks to the south. Subsequently, the Pakistani bunkers were engaged by direct artillery fire, and the locality was subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire intermittently day and night. Kler had been closely observing the enemy tactics and had noted that he kept his heavy mortars in a central position and moved them up to support any threatened sector. He therefore decided to go for the mortar battery. He infiltraed 1 Maratha Light Infantry into an area where the mortars were likely to be deployed in the event of an attack on Kamalpur. A feint attack was launched on it.
As expected, the heavy battery moved out of Bakhshiganj in thick early morning fog and deployed in the middle of the ambush. As the fog lifted, the ambush became alive and the mortar battery was mowed down. Four mortars were destroyed, their vehicles set ablaze and heavy casualties inflicted. Some of the enemy got away through sugarcane fields. Maj Vatsa of the engineer company personally destroyed these mortars with the aid of landmines he carried. While preparing to blow up a fourth mortar, he was mortally wounded by a stray bullet from a canefield.
After accomplishing its task, 1 Maratha Light Infantry pulled back with just one casualty. It was then that Kler decided to lay siege to Kamalpur and break down its will to resist. Hoping that the intervening period would have worn down the enemy, it was decided to attack again. It was a silent attack from the northeast, and the assaulting troops had almost closed in on the bunkers when someone coughed or made some noise and the enemy machine guns came alive resulting in heavy casualties. Perhaps if the attack had been pressed home, and at the cost of many more casualties, the post might have been captured. But Kler was not prepared to write off one-third of his force even before the operation had begun, thus jeopardising his ultimate aim.
The third attack met the same fate. The failure of two successive attacks and the resultant casualties dispirited the attacking troops, and the higher command developed second thoughts about Kler’s ability to handle live operations, especially since he belonged to the Corps of Signals and considerable resentment existed against higher command appointment of other arms officers in the Indian Army.
Kler had earlier distinguished himself as general staff officer of a division in the IndoPakistani conflict in 1965, and later as a brigade commander in charge of counterinsurgency operations in Nagaland. Getting wary because of casualties, successive failures and demoralisation among the attacking troops, he decided to starve out the garrison by a prolonged siege. The siege continued till its surrender on the evening of 4 December.
In fairness to Kler, it should be realised that his mountain brigade had no suitable weapons for tackling reinforced concrete pillboxes as were encountered at Kamalpur. The only artillery pieces available to him, 76-mm guns of Yugoslav origin, were like peashooters and had absolutely no effect on these defences. His request for a couple of 106mm recoilless guns was turned down, like an earlier request for one medium gun. Higher headquarters kept reminding him that his was a dormant sector and such precious weaponry could not be wasted there. On the same grounds, two recovery vehicles allotted to him initially were shifted to IV Corps sector as that was considered more important.
Kler was further handicapped in as much as one of his battalions had just been organised from an I battalion, raised initially for counterinsurgency with no support elements. In tackling a weak platoon post, another battalion brought out some major weaknesses of leadership under fire. The battalion reached its objective with relatively few casualties. As expected, the enemy turned artillery fire on the objective. A mortar bomb landed on a trench occupied by four men close to the commanding officer. He saw limbs fly and lost his nerve.
His mortar officer also appeared to have fired on another position just captured by one of his own companies, causing casualties. In a moment kler, who was in the forming up place (FUP), found the whole battalion falling back in complete disarray, led by the commanding officer and his subedar major. The two men were removed and Kler took some time to get this battalion in fighting shape once again. He therefore had only one regular battalion he could rely upon in war.
At the outbreak of hostilities, it was decided to contain Kamalpur while Bakhshiganj should be tackled by infiltration. Kler accordingly proceeded towards Bakhshiganj with the bulk of his brigade group, leaving one battalion to keep up the siege of Kamalpur under the direct supervision of the General. No attempt was made to capture the post by assault again. In the early morning of 4 December, exchange of wireless messages between the post commander and his battalion commander were intercepted. They indicated that the post had asked permission to withdraw, but this was refused. Gurbux Singh applied psychological warfare to the post by alternative use of the stick and carrot. About 0930 hours, after withdrawing his troops from close siege, he hammered the post with seven sorties of MIG21s firing rockets and cannon, and this was repeated twice later in the day,
After the first strike, Gurbux Singh sent a note to the post commander through a Mukti Bahini courier, saying: “You have during the last few days made frantic efforts to bring in supplies and ammunition, and you know you have not been successful. These supplies have fallen in our hands… The time of your post is up and whatever you decide to do we have every intention of eliminating Kamalpur post. It is to save you and our side casualties this message is being sent to you. Since yesterday we are at war with Pakistan, and we hope you are aware that our troops at this moment are operationg many miles to your south.”
There was no response from the post commander except in terms of renewed intensity of machine-gun fire. The General ordered the second air strike and pounded the post once again about midday, and followed it with another note: “You did not take note of the first message sent to you. This is our last attempt to request you to see reason. You will get a taste of the medicine administrated a short while ago (a reference to the air strike on the post). In case you decide to surrender, I give you assurance that you will be accorded honours due to an enemy who has put up a gallant fight…”
There was no reply to this note either except defiance shcwn by more fire from the post bunkers. There was a further exchance of wireless messages between the post commander and his commanding officer, who promised the post assistance in the way of reinforcements and a retaliatory air strike, but nothing materialised. The General was by then getting impatient and more belligerent. He ordered another air strike on the post in the aftemoon and followed this up with his third and final message: “Please let me know definitely by 1600 hours whether you wish to surrender. I cannot give you more time for certain reasons. It would be much better if you come along with the messenger. I give you my word of honour that you will come to no harm.” In cold contempt, the post opened up with all its weapons with renewed vigour. This left Gurbux Singh fuming and frustrated.
He was planning a night attack when Capt Ahsan Malik, the post commander, came out with a white flag at about 1900 hours and offered the surrender of his garrison. He said he was doing so on the instructions of his superiors and not on account of the notes sent by the opposing commander. He had put up a courageous stand throughout the siege and had surrendered after holding a brigade of besiegers for 21 days with a company strength of a mixture of Regulars, Rangers and Razakars totalling about 140 men. Hardly any casualties had been suffered as a result of the Indian artillery bombardment and air strikes. The brave stand by the courageous Baluchi captain was recognised by his adversaries. Manekshaw sent a personal congratulatory message to Malik, commending his defiant stand. He instructed the concerned formation commander to treat the Kamalpur prisoners of war with the respect and kindness due to brave soldiers. The next day, Kler came back from Bakhshiganj to meet the young Captain who had kept his brigade at bay for almost three weeks and to see the fortifications for himself. The air attacks had not even made a dent on the concrete pillboxes. On the way, he collected Gurbux Singh and was driving with him in a jeep near the post when they hit a stray antitank mine. The jeep blew up under them and the General had one of his feet shattered, thus becoming the first general officer casualty of the war in Bangladesh. Kler got away lightly with damage to his knees and spine, but was badly shaken. The General was evacuated from the sector and it fell on Maj Gen Gandharav Nagra to take over operations the next day. Nagra was moved from 2 Mountain Division, which was stationed in a dormant sector against the Chinese. He brought with him his skeleton staff advisers and some signal and services detachments.
Bakhshiganj was the next defended locality held north of the Brahmaputra along the Mahendarganj-Bakhshigang-Jamalpur axis. The Pakistani forces were holding Sherpur on the parallel axis, thus denying both axes effectively. It was reported that the outer defences at Bakhshiganj were based on concrete fortifications on the periphery of the village and spread over a perimeter of about 800 to 600 yards, and the inner defences on the builtup area. 1 Maratha Light Infantry group, based on manpacks and bullock carts, proceeded towards Bakhshiganj along the village track by passing Kamalpur on the night of 3 December. By first light the following morning, they had managed to establish a firm base northeast of the village and created a roadblock cutting off Bakhshiganj from Sherpur, and were poised to attack the village.
Similarly, 13 Rajputana Rifles Battalion Group followed a dirt track two kilometres east of Kamalpur and established itself north of the village, cutting off the KamalpurBakhshiganj road. By dawn, the Bakhshiganj defences were effectively cut off from the north, northeast and southeast by regular troops, while the south was covered by the Mukti Bahini. The siege of Bakhshiganj defences was ostensibly complete. The garrison tried to tackle the roadblock, but was promptly dealt with by the Maratha roadblock company, as a result of which some vehicles were destroyed and nine men, including the company commander, Maj Ayub, were killed. The rest got away. Throughout the day of 4 December, the garrison remained surrounded and subjected to artillery and long range machine-gun fire, and it retaliated in a rather half-hearted manner.
The garrison commander had presumably been in touch in the day with happenings at Kamalpur and was aware that he would be subjected to the same treatment. Night descended, but there was not much exchange of fire. In the early hours of 5 December, Indian patrols discovered that Bakhshiganj had been abandoned. The garrison had withdrawn at night along the souther road towards Jamalpur through Mukti Bahini roadblocks without interference, as the Mukti Bahini felt that the strength of the withdrawing columns was far greater than they could cope with.
Some 50 assorted small arms were found in the village, but all the Pakistani troops managed to get away intact. Questioned later, Kler revealed that he had no heart in the deliberate reduction of the locality and that he did not intend attacking Bakhshiganj unless it was absolutely necessary. His aim was to hustle the troops out of their prepared defences and trap them en route. With that in view, pressure was mounted on Bakhshiganj and an escape route, lightly guarded by the Mukti Bahini, was left open for him. This plan worked, but the mine accident delayed the pursuit operation almost 20 hours.
Lt Col Sultan Mahmood, Commanding Officer 31 Baluch Battalion, who was
responsible for the area, explained when questioned after surrender that he withdrew his troops from Bakhshiganj to build up sufficient strength to give battle mainly on the Brahmaputra obstacle at Jamalpur. Although Bakhshiganj was captured in the early hours of 5 December, Kler was not able to resume his advance till the next day, thus allowing the withdrawing Pakistanis to fall behind the river unhindered. The delay in resuming the advance was caused by the time taken to move the logistic columns forward with the opening of the maintenance axis after the capture of Kamalpur, the change in command of the sector and Kler’s accident.
Kler’s plan envisaged that 13 Rajputana Rifles Battalion Group would pursue the withdrawing Pakistani force along the main Bakhshiganj-Panchargarh-Jamalpur axis and secure the river line on the northern bank to allow the deployment of the supporting artillery following the group. 13 Guards, by now relieved from Kamalpur, were to advance along the Bakhshiganj-Kuma-Sherpur-Jamalpur axis to protect the flank of 13 Rajputana Rifles as well as to facilitate the advance along the main axis by dividing the Pakistani troops in delaying positions. The third battalion of 1 Maratha Light Infantry was to move cross-country on a manpack and bullock cart basis to the Shyampur area, about six miles west of Jamalpur, where country craft mustered by the Mukti Bahini were to ferry them across the Brahmaputra.
The battalion was to use more bullock carts gathered by the Mukti Bahini workers on the far bank to advance and establish roadblocks on the Jamalpur garrison’s escape routes. The battalion was required to traverse about 22 kilometres up to the river bank at Shyampur, and then another 12 kilometres south of the river to its objectives. After 1 Maratha Light Infantry Battalion had established the blocks, 13 Guards were to be brought up after release from the Sherpur axis to attack the defended locality of Jamalpur. Nagra, the new sector commander, approved this plan although it suffered from an initial lack of adequate strength south of the river line. In any event, the rate of build-up the plan envisaged was much too slow to administer the coup de grace to the enemy.
13 Rajputana Rifles group resumed the advance at 0400 hours on 6 December along the main axis and encountered the first delaying position on the bridge north of Panchar Dhar about 1000 hours the same day. It was cleared by plastering it with air strikes, but at the cost of some 13 dead the withdrawing Pakistani force destroyed the bridge. While our engineers erected a Bailey bridge to overcome the obstacle, the advance was resumed and Panchnar was captured by last light. The bridge was ready by 0600 hours on 7 December, when the guns and the column of vehicle joined the marching troops. The pace of advance was painfully slow.
On 6 December, Kler ordered 13 Rajputana Rifles to send out a company block to Kamarer Chak to entrap the withdrawing column. But the company did not move fast enough, and when it got into position at 0400 hours on 7 December the enemy had pulled out an hour before. Kler had to push the battalion personally to contact the river line by 1900 hours the same day, but it was not till about 0800 hours the next day that the battalion was in a position to dominate the line from the northern bank effectively. The battalion had taken more than 48 hours to traverse some 20 kilometres after fighting no more than one platoon action en route.
Under its energetic commanding officer, Lt Col D. S. Brar, 1 Maratha Light Infantry set off from Bakshiganj about 1300 hours on 6 December and reached the crossing over the river near Shyampur by 1700 hours. It covered 22 kilometres in six hours. Good going
130
indeed. But the battalion had to wait for the bullock cart column till the next morning and was not able to cross the river till 1730 hours the same day. Having reorganised his battalion on the south bank, Brar planned and executed a brilliant night approach to his objective so silently that by 0200hours on 8 December it was established in its roadblock position-the Bhapki area two miles southwest of Jamalpur-completely unnoticed by the Jamalpur garrison According to plan, 13 Guards, who had by now reached Kurna against negligible opposition, were directed to follow 1 Maratha Light Infantry to the south of the river. Leaving one company on the Sherpur axis, it used the same facilities as 1 Maratha Light Infantry and eventually concentrated behind the roadblocks on the Jamalpur-Mymensingh road by 0600 hours on 9 December. The roadblocks around the Jamalpur defended locality were by then in position, and there was an opportunity to destroy or capture the garrison so as not to fight the same troops over and over again. At 1400 hours on 9 December, while the helicopter carrying Kler’s party was hovering over the area to land, he noticed signs of fighting in it. Some red Very lights were also fired, warning him off. He however ordered the pilot to land.
On landing, he was told that about a company of the enemy had tried to outflank one of our companies in an attempt to clear the roadblock. The enemy however suffered heavy casualties, and leaving behind two prisoners of war and 13 weapons, including two machine guns, pulled back at the cost of one havildar of 1 Maratha Light Infantry killed. The enemy also attacked 13 Guards’ bullockcart column carrying three-inch mortars and ammunition under the command of Maj S. R. Singh. He fought resolutely and threw the enemy back. In this action, one JCO of 13 Guards was killed, shot through his helmet. The casualties were loaded in the returning helicopter for proper cremation.
Kler commanded the operation from his command post alongside 1 Maratha Battalion HQ. His problem was that although the cordon was complete both north and south of the river he had no troops left to attack. He had no option but a stalemate of a siege in which he hoped to squeeze the enemy gradually. This was a time-consuming process. At 1500 hours on 9 December, Kler sent a note through a Mukti Bahini courier to the Officer Commanding 31 Baluch at Jamalpur to surrender as his routes had been cut and he would get an even heavier pounding if he continued to resist. In the evening, Lt Col Sultan Mahmood replied rejecting the offer. A Chinese bullet accompanied the reply. “Hope this finds you in high spirits. Thanks for the letter. We here in Jamalpur are waiting for the fight to commence. It has not started yet. So let us not talk but start it. Forty sorties, I point out, are inadequate. Please ask for many more… Hoping to find you with a sten in your hand next time instead of the pen you seem to have so much mastery over. I am most sincerely, Commander, Jamalpur fortress.”
Patrol clashes occurred between the roadblocks and Jamalpur on the night of 8/9 December, but Mahmood leart of the strength of the Indian forces behind him only when a Toyota car carrying a commando officer, Capt Jamsher Ahmed, on a visit to Jamalpur was ambushed by the Marathas at about 1000 hours on 9 December. The car was captured but the Captain escaped to tell the story.
Meanwhile, artillery and air activity was concentrated on the north bank to stimulate an attack from that direction, but it did not appear that Col Mahmood was deceived on that account. He set about breaking out of the siege before Kler could master sufficient strength to attack. He felt that since the Indian columns progressing towards Mymensingh were far
off he had a chance to break out as he had done at Bakhshiganj, before the Indian columns joined up for his destruction. He had not taken into account the Indian capability to build-up nearly brigade strength across such a formidable river obstacle without clearing Jamalpur, but this had happened.
Pakistanis captured in patrol clashes had revealed that Mahmood was holding Jamalpur with a garrison strenth of some 1,500 rank and file, including the major portion of 31 Baluch, with a battery of 120-mm mortars and some six-pounder anti-tank guns and a large number of medium machine guns. The garrison fortifications were mainly sited along the north bank of the river, covering the approaches from the north, and the railway embankment on the south. The maximum use had been made of built-up areas. The weapons were sited in strong bunkers with enough stockpiling to last him weeks. The position had a great defence potential and was a difficult nut to crack.
The Indian light guns carried by Kler’s affiliated artillery had practically no effect on the Pakistani fortfications, and so reliance had to be placed increasingly on air strikes. The Jamalpur defences could not be bypassed if any meaningful advance was to be carried out beyond. And yet how was this position to be tackled? That was Kler’s dilemma. To ensure that no enemy element escaped, the cordon of two battalions committed to the roadblocks could not be lifted. The third battalion was holding the northern bank and was keeping the garrison engaged frontally, and there were no more infantry troops close at hand to assault the position. Nagra had asked for more resources from Headquarters Eastern Command but did not place much hope in getting his request acceded to. The request was made only to put the record right.
He was toying with the idea of diverting 6 Bihar, the only other infantry battalion under his command, from the Mymensingh axis to Jamalpur. At that time, quite unexpectedly, the Army Commander released 167 Infantry Brigade to Nagra and ordered it to move from Rangiya and concentrate at Tura as fast as possible. Welcoming this gesture, Nagra ordered its leading battalion, 6 Sikh Light Infantry, to move south of the river to tackle the defences swiftly. Two companies of the battalion arrived west and southwest of Jamalpur by the first light of 11 December.
Meanwhile, expediters were pouring in to hasten the clearance of Jamalpur. The higher command was getting apprehensive of the delays and could not understand why, having made contact with the fortress on 7 December, the brigade had not even made a single attack so far. There were fears that the story of Kamalpur might be repeated at Jamalpur. It was even proposed to postpone the paradrop at Tangail, originally scheduled for 11 December, as this was fraught with danger without a timely linkup. Kler’s critics failed to realise that the troops across the Brahmaputra, a major obstacle, had moved on a manpack basis, carrying only two three-inch mortars and a minimum of ammunition. According to normal army teaching, attacking troops require at least two nights reconnaissance before tackling fully prepared positions. Having put the first battalion across on 8 December and the second on 9 December without any rafting equipment, they were trying to hustle Kler into launching a half-hearted attack. In the final analysis, he was proved right in exercising caution.
On the night of 9/10 December, Kler ordered the two battalions to close into within 1,000 yards of the Jamalpur defences to carry out detailed reconnaissance. Systematic air and artillery bombardment was kept up on the enemy defences and battalion headquarters in daytime on 10 December. To unnerve his troops completely, the last air sorties were asked to drop napalm bombs. Although these were dropped far from the target, they had the desired effect. The will to withstand a similar attack the next day began to break down.
As the same time, Mahmood was asked by Brig Qadr, Commander Pakistan Ad Hoc 93 Infantry Brigade Group, whether he could get his force to Dacca. He had appreciated the total Indian strength across the river as a weak battalion spread over 8,000 square yards and did not expect to encounter more than two companies along the road to Tangail. He told the commander confidently that he saw no problem and would break through the roadblock and take his troops back to Dacca. In discussing the battle with Kler later in Dacca, he said that being a staff college graduate he could not comprehend how the Indians could put across anything more than one weak battalion with no bridging or rafting equipment to do so. Kler told him that the only snag he did not take into consideration was that he had been only a student whereas Kler had taught at staff college. The second mistake Mahmood made was to try to soften up the likely roadblock localities with artillery fire, but this gave away his intentions of breaking out that night.
About 2350 hours on 10 December some Pakistani movement was heard along the Tangail road coming towards the forward company localities of I Maratha Light Infantry. The battalion held its fire till the Pakistani troops came within 20 yards of the depth company locality. Then a hail of machine-gun fire mowed down those who tried to escape. Throughout the night the Pakistanis reportedly came in wave after wave shouting warcries and the battle raged till 0430 hours on 11 December. To release pressure on 1 Maratha Light Infantry, Kler ordered 13 Guards and companies of 6 Sikh Light Infantry to close in on the fortress from the flanks and 13 Rajputana Rifles to cross the river. Throughout the battle, the affiliated artillery 66 Mountain Regiment gave close support by bringing down concentrations near the roadblocks and was a great help in beating off the attacks. Brar displayed good leadership by the cool and calm manner in which he conducted the battle.
With sunrise, fog lifted from the battleground, which was seen littered with bodies and discarded weapons. About 235 bodies, 23 wounded and 61 prisoners and assorted weapons were collected by Kler’s search parties. A wireless intercept picked up an appeal from a Pakistani officer for acceptance of surrender. At 0630 hours on 11 December Kler, accompanied by Brar, drove in triumph to accept the surrender.
But by then the valiant Mahmood had escaped with some 200 men to fight in defence of Dacca. His second in command offered the surrender of 376 all ranks, of whom two officers, nine JCOs and 209 other ranks belonged to 31 Baluch, nine other ranks to artillery, and the remainder to paramilitary forces, including a doctor. A large booty of small arms, three 120-mm mortars, one 106-mm and three 57-mm guns with 2,500 tons of assorted ammuntion and 1,500 tons of rations fell into Indian hands. The Indian casualties were ten killed and eight wounded, all belonging to 1 Maratha Light Infantry, and 1 JCO of 13 Guards killed.
Interrogation of prisoners later revealed that Mahmood’s brigade commander had ordered him to pull out on the night of 10/11 December and occupy the rear defences near Tangail. Although Mahmood had persistently refused to withdraw, he was obliged to obey the order. He personally led the breakout attacks the same night and managed to get away with some strength to meet the advance of 95 Mountain Brigade Group at Jaydebpur defences along the Turag river. Qadir’s decision to withdraw was lucky for Kier as it saved many Indian lives. Attacking such a fortified locality as Jamalpur fortress would have proved very costly in casualties.
A comparison of casualties on both sides reveals the miscalculation on the part of Mahmood. He sent out jitter patrols along the Jamalpur-Tangail road around midnight of 10/11 December and asked them to fire at random, but the discipline of 1 Maratha Light Infantry was so good that this fire was not returned. Mahmood there upon deduced that the Indians had vacated these positions. He marched his troops through the roadblock defences and lined up his transport. The leading troops, marching in three columns, were allowed to go through unmolested till they got to just about 20 yards from the trench where Kler had taken position.
It was pitch dark and difficult to make out who the marching troops were. Kler however concluded that it could not be our troops marching in three columns. So he ordered the machine gun next to him to open up. At that signal the other gunners also let loose. The first confirmation that the troops in the open were enemy came when the let out a shout of “Hai Allah.” The battle was now on. Caught in the open, they tried to organise themselves into the semblance of a fighting unit and started assaulting what they thought were our position in the dark. They kept shouting “Pakistan Zindabad,” “Niazi tadbir, Allah ho Akbar.” The Marathas held their fire till the enemy came within 20 to 25 yards and then opened up. Similarly, the artillery observer directed fire towards the areas from where they heard the sound of warcries. This continued about four hours. As the early morning fog lifted around 0500 hours on 11 December, the battle ended.
The Pakistani JCOs told Kler next morning at Jamalpur that they had advised Mahmood to accept any terms for surrender and prevent useless bloodshed. The taste of bombing had unnerved them. But Mahmood told them that the note was only a hoax and that he was quite capable of breaking through the roadblock and taking the battalion to Dacca.
Along with the 95 Mountain Brigade group’s main thrust on the KamalpurBakhshiganj Jamalpur axis it was planned to develop two subsidiary thrusts along the Haluaghat-Sarchapur-Mymensingh and Baghmara-Jaira Jhangail-Shyamganj-Mymensingh road axes to contain the Pakistani troops deployed in the area. 6 Bihar, supported by Mukti Bahini elements of some two to four company strength, was to advance along the Haluaghat-Sarchapur-Mymensingh axis, while two or three companies formed from the BSF battalion holding border outposts were to work their way along the Baghmara Jaria Jhangail-Shyamnagar-Mymensingh axis. Both subsidiary thrusts were placed under Brig Sant Singh and named FJ Sector.
Qadir was holding the sector with 33 Punjab Battalion suitably beefed up with paramilitary forces and Razakars. He had planned to give the main battle at Mymensingh while causing delay and attrition ahead of this position by occupying a series of delaying positions along the river obstacles. Qadir was expected to hold such delaying positions at Haluaghat, Sarchapur, Phulpur and Taka-Kando with approximately one company strength each along the Haluaghat-Sarchapur axis.
On the night of 4/5 December, Sant Singh infiltrated 6 Bihar near Dalu, and having overcome a defended locality at Charbangli, some 3,000 yards southeast of Haluaghat, was leaning on the Haluaghat defended locality by the last light of 5 December. At night, when 6 Bihar was closing with its defences, the other two Bihari companies were sent to tackle the Sarchapur defences by outflanking the Haluaghat locality. The fire fight between the Biharis and the Pakistani defenders at Haluaghat continued on 6 December. Two air strikes, including napalm bombing, were employed to soften the locality. The Pakistanis vacated
Haluaghat the next day without interference from Mukti Bahini stops established in the rear. They left behind large quantities of ammunition and rations. On 7 December, the advance was resumed along the axis and Sarchapur defences were contacted by the same evening.
While these defences were tackled, two companies were sent to capture Phulpur in depth. After extensive reconnaissance during the day, and leaving a minimum force to contain the axis along the road, Sant Singh crossed the Bughat river east of Sarchapur unopposed and contacted the defences from the flank. Menawhile, the other two companies posed a potent threat to the Phulpur defences. This unnerved the Sarchapur garrison, which vacated its positions on the night of 8/9 December. Once again, the withdrawing Pakistanis got away intact. Sarchapur was occupied the next day and the advance resumed.
The withdrawing Pakistani troops had demolished three big bridges between Sarchapur and Phulpur, and it took some 36 hours to restore the broken communications with local help. The bridge at Phulpur over the Kharia river, with a 100-foot span over water eight feet deep, proved beyond repair, but the enthusiastic inhabitants of the neighbouring villages voluntarily built a causeway with stones and bricks in about 20 hours. The advance south Phulpur could only be resumed on 10 December. The Pakistani layback position was contacted at Paschim Taldigha. It was held by about a company or so. The position was vacated by the defenders after sunset.
Some wireless intercepts had indicated that Qadir planned to vacate both Jamalpur and Mymensingh on the night of 10/11 December. While Kler was already besieging Jamalpur, Sant was still about 11 miles north of Mymensingh. He was ordered to push forward with speed. Marching all night, he reached Mymensingh the next morning, only to find it vacated. Qadir seemed to have left in a hurry as the pursuers found cooked food in warm pots, and a large dump of ammunition and rations. 6 Bihar was now overstretched because of lack of transport and did not fetch up as a body till the last light of 11 December. The BSF companies working along Baghmara-Shyamganj also joined up about the same time. Except for an initial fight at Durgapur they did not meet opposition.
Nagra later boasted about this thrust as having duped the Pakistanis regarding its strength. According to him, Qadir felt it was a division less a brigade. He felt this impression was based on the physical presence of Sant Singh with the forward troops at two places at almost the same time while shuttling between the two columns. Nagra’s performance belies his boasts. The Pakistani troops managed to impose a holdup of more than 24 hours at every delaying position they occupied. At no time were they attacked or trapped, and they managed to get away intact each time.
In fact, Sant Singh, having split his battalion in two, had taken a great risk, as he was nowhere capable of tackling a delaying position of company strength had the Pakistanis decided to fight on. The Bihari columns lacked both manpower and fire support to simulate brigade strength each. Nagra was just kidding himself. In the overall context of sector operations, the progress of the main thrust at Jamalpur was jeopardising the holding of Mymensingh. Qadir feared that once Jamalpur was gone there would be no depth position in the rear to cover the withdrawal of the Mymensingh garrison. His decision to withdraw from Mymensingh was therefore based on sound military logic to take a defensive position somewhere near Tangail and not due to any threat Nagra posed.
1.A powerful group of Mukti Bahini guerillas were under Siddiqi, whose headquarters were at Tangail.
2.The main tanks of the parabattalion were(a) to capture the bridge and the ferry site across the river to prevent the enemy
from escaping towards the south, (b) to capture Tangail (c) to link up with the local detachments of Siddiqi, and (d)
after linking up with the Indian brigade, moving from Jamalpur to Dacca A battalion of an Indian parachute brigade together with its supporting arms was however dropped in the Tangail area
in the afternoon of 11 December Effectiveness of operations depends on intelligence, speed, accuracy and completeness of knowledge of the enemy
target
136
11
THE MARCH TO DACCA
On 9 December, Sagat Singh had secured the waterline of the Meghna in the general area of Ashuganj and was poised for an advance to Dacca. All the approaches to Dacca lay across the Meghna, which was about 4,000 yards wide in this area. A 2,950 feet long bridge crossed it at Ashuganj, but two of its spans had been destroyed by the retiring Pakistanis. Engineer resources of the magnitude required to span the river obstacle were not immediately available, and were not likely to be so early enough to keep up the momentum of the advance. 57 Mountain Division, established on the waterline, was ordered to push across the river by all means locally available and build up sufficient strength on the other bank to be able to move ahead to Dacca.
On the night of 9/10 December, the helicopter force in the theatre, numbering some 14 MI-4s in all, were brought into service, and for the next 36 hours an air bridge was established, flying some 110 sorties. The MI-4 has a limited load capacity and can carry hardly a section of infantry with full loads at a time. 311 Mountain Brigade Group was the first formation to be lifted. One landed in the Raipura area. It secured Methi Kanda railway station by the evening of 9 December. 19 Punjab crossed the river and worked its way along to dominate the Pakistani pocket still holding out at Bhairab Bazar. 4 Guards advanced simultaneously to Narsingdi and secured it on 11 December.
With Narsingdi in Sagat Singh’s hand, the Bhairab-Bazaar-pocket contained and his north flank fully secured, the stage was set to break out towards Dacca, especially when no resistance was encountered anywhere. The buildup across the Meghna was proceeding almost in a vacuum, but its rate was painfully slow. The main reason for the slow progress was lack of transport. The capacity of MI-4 helicopters and country boats was limited, and the river gap formidably large, and this added to the turnround timings. Even PT-76 amphibian tanks, which could be used to ferry troops and equipment, had to be towed across by country craft as they got overheated after an hour’s operation. The fast current and the Meghna’s width would take anything up to three hours to negotiate. By 11 December, Headquarters 311 Mountain Brigade, with four infantry battalions, one troop of PT-76 tanks, one mountain artillery regiment less one battery, one battery of 120-mm mortars, four medium guns and only two Kraz tractors, had crossed. When the units organised themselves, they were pushed to make contact with the Pakistani opposition. At times, troops were leapfrogged by helicopters along the line of advance to achieve speed.
Broadly, 311 Mountain Brigade advanced along the Narsingdi-Demra axis. Having secured Narsingdi on 11 December, it contacted Demra on 14 December and found it held by about a company strength supported by a couple of tanks. 2 Bangladesh Battalion crossed the Satlakhya river in the north and secured Rupganj the same day. Another battalion also crossed in the general area of Puligaon on the night of 13/14 December. 71 Mountain Brigade Group, advancing along the Narsingdi-Pubail-Tungi axis, secured Pubail
on 14 December and contacted the Tungi defences the same evening. At this stage, further advance by 57 Mountain Division was halted on the orders of the Army Commander to avoid a clash with 101 Communication Zone Area troops advancing from the north and reportedly already in contact with the Dacca fortress defences.
As adequate river craft could not be mustered, 301 Mountain Brigade was ordered to concentrate after the capture of Chandpurat Daudkandi for an advance on Narayanganj by helicopter and with whatever river craft could be found there. Brigade headquarters and two battalions without supporting arms and heavier weapons were lifted by helicopter from
a Bazaar on the night of 14/15 December. The remainder of the group moved by river and road. This brigade reached the easter bank of the Satlakhya only on 15 December, but before they could cross the ceasefire had become effective.
Crossing the Meghna and advancing to the Satlakhya by 57 Mountain Division under Gen Gonsalves was a great feat of logistics and movement achieved with rare ingenuity and enterprise. Heli-lift operations of such magnitude, using an aging fleet of MI-4 helicopters, was tried out for the first time in India although not visualised in the operational plans. Credit for this must go to Sagat, and to Gonsalves, for its bold and enterprising execution.
Because the crossing units lacked basic transport, Gonsalves used anything which moved on wheels, from a cycle rickshaw to a bullock cart, to carry his troops and equipment. Brig Jangi Bawa, his artillery commander, did even better by mounting his guns on railway flats and firing them from these mobile platforms which were propelled by everwilling local civilian labourers. He later managed to infiltrate some heavy mortars and medium guns across the Satlakhya and the Balu to shell Dacca from the night of 13/14 December onwards.
Despite Gonsalves’ best efforts, he was not able to create a balanced force to tackle prepared defences based on built-up fortifications and manned by spirited troops. He was woefully short of suitable types of tanks and anti-tank weaponry. A couple of Pakistani tanks were noticed in the defences at Demra and this made his troops cautious. Thus the position was not taken till it surrendered on its own after the ceasefire. Artillery support for even a deliberate battalion attack was short, and there was speculation what the outcome might have been if Niazi had the resources to make a stand at Dacca, a natural fortress covered by the formidable river obstacles of the Budhi Ganga in the west and the Satlakhya and Balu in the east. Sagat’s build-up for assaulting Dacca would have taken some days, and by that time Niazi might have received outside political or military help as the Pakistani leaders promised. His mistake lay in not making proper preparations to man the Dacca defences.
The fall of Jamalpur and Mymensingh in the northern sector acted as a spur to the plans for the advance on Dacca. Nagra issued orders for their execution on 11 December He calculated that his advance was likely to be opposed by a battalion group or set fighting delaying actions at Madhupur, Tangail, Kalaikar and at Jaydebpur based on the Turag river. His advance was to be carried out broadly in three phases with two brigade groups, each brigade leapfrogging alternately. 95 Mountain Brigade Group, now comprising I Maratha Light Infantry, 6 Sikh Light Infantry and 2 Para Battalion after a drop in the general area of Tangail, and all available artillery under Kler, were to capture Tangail in the first phase.
It would have been preferable to use a fresh unit, 167 Infantry Brigade, which had by then become available, but it would have taken the formation much time to cross the Brahmaputra because river craft and ferry arrangements were lacking. Wishing to give hot pursuit to the withdrawing Pakistani garrisons, Nagra decided to use Kler’s brigade with the new grouping. In the next phase Brig Irani, in command of 167 Infantry Brigade Group, was to advance from Tangail and capture Jaydebpur. Finally, depending on the prevailing situation, the entire force under Nagra, including Sant Singh’s group, was to invest Dacca. 13 Rajputana Rifles, one of Kler’s battalions, was to stay back at Jamalpur to look after crossing arrangements and provide a firm base. Siddiqi’s Freedom Fighters, already operating in the Madhupur forest in the Tangail area, had created havoc along the routes of Pakistani withdrawal. They had destroyed some 18 bridges and mined the bypasses. This force was asked to intensify the disruption of the Pakistani withdrawal by laying ambushes on their lines of retreat.
2 Para Battalion was paradropped about 1600 hours on 11 December in Tangail withthe aim of capturing the bridge over the Johajang at Poongli and interrupting and destroying the Pakistani troops retreating from Jamalpur and Mymensingh, and in the process facilitating the advance of the main Indian force towards Dacca. The drop and para action of this battalion has been described in great detail elsewhere in this narrative while discussing the airbome Indian forces. Suffice to say that in the context of the advance to Dac-a 2 Para Battalion achieved its objective of capturing the Poongli bridge and the ferry site by 2000 hours the same day, and ambushed a Pakistani mortar battery convoy about midnight. But it transpired later that the main column of the Mymensingh and Jamalpur garrisons had passed through before the para roadblock became effective.
After the surrender of Jamalpur in the early hours of the morning of 11 December and the discovery that Mymensingh had been evacuated about the same time, it was imperative that the advance should be resumed expeditiously if the garrison withdrawing from Mymensingh was to be trapped. The routes of retreat from Mymensingh joined the main road from Jamalpur at Madhupur and Tangail, a distance of approximately 30 and 50 miles respectively. It may be safely assumed that sufficient motor transport was available to Qadir to enable his garrison at Mymensingh to pass through Tangail before the para battalion’s block became effective. The mortar battery column which was trapped was perhaps a straggler which took too long to get away. Inthe event, Kler’s brigade group did not get going till 0300 hours on 12 December, 21 hours after Qadir’s likely start from Mymensingh, and the para roadblock at Poongli became effective at 2000 hours on 11 December, thus giving a clear 14 hours for the Withdrawing Pakistanis to get away, but not without some interference. The Siddigi group harassed their movements throughout with an extensive network of ambushes and mines. This forced some Pakistani troops to disperse in the 11 Madhupur forest and the countryside. Some of these parties were captured when travelling on foot along the Mymensingh-Dacca railway line and elsewhere. But, on the whole, Qadir was successful in extricating the bulk of his Mymensingh garrison intact.
It has already been brought out that Kler’s brigade had moved on manpack basis. After the capture Jamalpur, it had to be replenished. Sufficient transport was recovered and some buses and other civilian vehicles mustered on 11 December. One battery of 66 Mountain Regiment was ferried across, and rations and ammunition were replenished by airdrop. 1 Maratha Light Infantry Group was made ready to resume the advance at 0300 hours on 12 December. This would therefore explain the timelag of 21 hours.If Nagra had planned to trap the withdrawing Pakistanis he should have foreseen such delays and advanced the paradrop accordingly. Having occupied Mymensingh on his own, Sant meanwhile sent 6 Bihar in pursuit of the retreating Pakistanis. After a sharp skirmish enroute, this unit occupied Madhupur about 0830 hours on 12 December. Leading elements of 95 Mountain Brigade advancing along the main axis joined it there three hours later. Continuing the advance, the brigade linked up with the para battalion at the Poongli bridge about 1600 hours the same day, and by 1800 hours it secured. Tangail with little opposition on the way. The linkup was historic. At 1600 hours on 12 December, Kler, a paratrooper himself, got ahead of the leading elements and was the first to shake the hands of the 2 Para Company commander. The Officer Commanding, who had promised to meet him, was waiting under the bridge along with his subedar major. Qadir was so harassed by Freedom Fighters in this area that he decided to clear out of it in good time, Kler’s brigade had moved some 64 miles in one day with inadequate transport facilities, and without any mobile Screen, ahead of his advance. The credit for conceiving the idea of fitting jeeps with machine guns goes to Gurbux Singh. Since Kler’s brigade had no spare jeeps, he had requisitioned those of all officers commanding units in his area and had them fitted with 30 Brownings. These vehicles were driven by their permanent drivers belonging to service units. One such jeep, driven by another rank of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, was shot up at the Mirpur bridge while carrying a party of 2 para. The driver was also killed. Jeeps modifide to carry machine guns came in very handy at this stage of operations.
After reaching Tangail, Nagra discovered to his great dismay that he could not sustain the advance administratively any more, for some time at least. The prospects of a buildup across the batallion Brahmaputra were not very bright. Kler and his leading of 1 Maratha. Light Infantry had set off from Jamalpur with all the vehicles he could muster, including eight civilian trucks, and his artillery regiment, but had no petrol to proceed farther. Despite the best efforts of Siddiqi, no more than ten additional could be found in the area, and they were equally short of fuel. Man of the 6 Sikh Light Infantry, the followup battalion, hadridden in cycle rickshaws up to Madhupur and were later picked up the the third Maratha’s transport sent from Tangail. 13 Guards, battalion, was also similarly ferried forward and reached Tangail in the early hours of 13 December, 2 Para Battalion collected itself and joined the brigade by the last light on 13 December.
The remainder of 167 Infantry Brigade had by there crossed the Brahmaputra, but was in no position to join battle without itsi fghting transport. Since all the administrative units and services the ralious and still had their installations north of the river, ammunition of the force were replenished with what had been captured at Jamalpur. But this did not prove satisfactory, and the replenishment of Kler’s brigade was therefore carried out by a airdrop. While looking for a suitable dropping zone, Kler’s every etc. staff captain discovered a disused landing strip near Tangail. With the assistance of Siddiqi’s men, he commissioned it within a matter of hours. In the afternoon of 13 December, welcome transport aircraft started landing the much-wanted supplies, including petrol.
As 167 Mountain Brigade was unable to fetch up in time, Nagra decided to resume the advance with 95 Mountain Brigade, which had already managed to concentrate. Kler resumed the advance from Tangail with 6 Sikh Light Infantry Group at 1200 hours on 13 December. The unit was held up by a Pakistani section which had taken up position in a reinforced concrete house about 40 yards astride the road east of Mirzapur. The unit tried all the weapons it had, including the direct firing of a 76-mm Yugoslav gun, but this had no effect on the building, and the enemy kept firing on the advancing column. Boggy ground on either side of the road forbade outflanking moves.
When told of this holdup, Kler went forward and made his way to a position about 50 yards from this building where the officer commanding and his subedar major were conferring with the leading company commander to find ways of tackling the positio. The situation was explained to Kler, and he was thinking of a way out when he heard a cry of “Bole so nihal” from east and west of the house and saw a JCO leading the platoon in an assault on it.
Covering fire was given by machine guns on the roadside, and within minutes the position was cleared, with six Pakistanis killed and two captured. 6 Sikh Light Infantry lost one JCO and one other rank. Later, when questioned, the subedar major told Kler that in his 30 years service he had never seen a brigade commander who had come so close in actual battle. He had therefore decided that instead of waiting another 30 minutes for it get dark they should go in straightway and preserve the honour of the platoon.
The advance continued in the hours of darkness, and by moming on 14 December the battalion had contacted the enemy position on the west bank of the Turag river. The opposition was estimated to be no more than a company supported by medium machine guns and some pieces of artillery sited west of the river, while east of the river the Pakistanis had about two companies with a troop of tanks, and their defence was sited in the general area of the crossroads. The approaches to the river line north and south of the Pakistani defences were marshy and difficult to negotiate. Nagra realised that it would take days to tackle this position in the systematic and deliberate manner visualised in army manuals. A way had to be found to circumvent these defences somehow.
Flying over the area, he accidentally noticed a newly constructed road running south from near Kalaikar, but he could not make out where it led. Meanwhile, an engineer patrol assessing the crossings over the river captured a Pakistani major, who on interrogation gave the information that Qadir and a few others officers were hiding close by. A patrol of 6 Sikh Light Infantry sent out for the purpose soon rounded up the Brigadier, his brigade major and eight other officers. They confirmed that the new road joined the Man ikganj-Sabhar-D acca road, and also that the remnants of the Jamalpur and Mymensingh garrisons were holding the river line and the area of the crossroads behind it.
The air strikes on 14 December could not locate the Pakistani tanks which were causing damage to the attackers, but they destroyed a few vehicles. It was clear that the Pakistani forces in the area had organised strong and well-coordinated defences on the river line and in and around the crossroads. By the afternoon of 14 December, the followup battalion, 1 Maratha Light Infantry, had also come forward and deployed south of the Kashimpur ferry. About this time, the other two battalions, 13 Guards and 13 Rajputana Rifles, were ferried forward with all the available transport.
An effort was made to outflank the Pakistani opposition west of the river by sending one company each from the north and south of the road against it. The companies moved at 1500 hours on 14 December but crossed the river too close to the road. They drew heavy machine gun and artillery fire but held their ground. Soon a few Pakistani tanks rushed towards the companies from the crossroads and threw them across the river. The next morning two companies of 6 Sikh Light Infantry were again sent forward, but this time they carried out a wide outflanking movement and, crossing the river by country craft, established themselves west of it. The bridge along the main axis was assaulted subsequently Unnerved by the outflanking movement, the Pakistani troops deployed west of the river withdrew after destroying a 150-feet span of the bridge. 6 Sikh Light Infantry captured the bridge and established itself on the eastern bank of the Turag by 1500 hours on 15 December with minimal casualties on either side. But no further progress could be made as any forward movement invited heavy machine-gun fire. With no suitable antitank weapons, the Indians feared a few tanks supporting the Pakistani pockets at Bussi and Jagannathganj along the Jamuna. These pockets were ultimately cleared by 13 Rajputana Rifles, killing some 36 and capturing 23 Pakistani troops with a few arms and ammunition in the process.
The unexpected speed of the operations towards Dacca in this sector emboldened the Army Commander to allot 340 Mountain Brigade Group, then engaged at Bogra under Thapan, to harden the punch towards Dacca, little knowing that the allotted brigad was inextricably involved in the Bogra battle and there were no other formations handy to relieve it. And even if the bridge had been available the ferry sites across the Jamuna were either in Pakistani hands or rendered inoperable. This promise of support elated Nagra for a while, but the reality soon dawned on him and he set about dealing with the situation with his own resources, although he was looking forward to some armour to deal with the tanks holding up his advance beyond the Turag.
By the last light of 14 December, Nagra managed to establish a firm base on the Turag with 95 Mountain Brigade Group. 13 Guards and 13 Rajputana Rifles were on their way from the rear areas but had not yet fetched up. 167 Mountain Brigade Group under Irani was in the process of concentrating in the area of Tangail. 2 Para Battalion was also collecting itself. Although the essential fighting transport with the unit had come over its entire administrative transport fleet, as well as that of the sector, was still north of the Brahmaputra, Kler’s force had got stuck along the Turag, and the development of further operations along this axis would have to wait for the buildup of the remainder of the forces. But time was running out fast.
Nagra brought Sant Singh forward and, allotting him 13 Guards, just concentrated in the Chandpur area, asked him to advance along the Chandpur-Sabhar-Mirpur axis to secure Sabhar by the first light on 15 December and capture Mirpur Bridge by the next day. En route, Sant Singh was required to establish a roadblock in the area of Nayarhat to intercept Pakistani troops crossing from the west. On completing this forward movement, 167 Mountain Brigade Group was either to resume the advance towards Dacca if Kler had been able to establish a bridgehead across the Turag or cross the river south of Kler’s brigade and establish a roadblock astride the Tungi road, about three miles north of Tungi.
Sant Singh started his advance with 13 Guards along the Chandra-Sabhar-Mirpur axis about 2200 hours on 14 December. No information regarding the expected opposition along this route was available, but it was expected that some would be met near Sabhar, and that the bridge would certainly be held in strength and was likely to be supported by some tanks. Any advance beyond Sabhar in daylight would therefore have met with disaster. Nagra’s weakness in antitank potential was becoming apparent. After having established a block at Nayarhat, 3 Guards contacted Sabhar in the early hours of 15 December, and while the position was being outflanked the Pakistanis withdrew in haste without a serious fight. A military farm and transmitting station areas were cleared by 0900 hours while intermittent fire continued from the builtup area of the town. A prisoner of war later revealed that a composite force of some 400 Razakars and Rangers under a major had been hastily dispatched and had reached Sabhar only on the afternoon of 14 December. According to him, about 800 men had followed them through the place from Magura to Dacca. By the end of the day, Sant Singh secured the town, causing casualties to the Pakistani holding troops to the tune of 18 killed and 20 wounded at the cost of his own two killed and 14 wounded, and capturing some 60 small arms. Fearful of the Pakistani tanks operating on the axis, Nagra brought in 2 Para Battalion, the only unit equipped with four 106-mm recoilless guns and RPG7s, to take over the advance from Sabhar in darkness.
The Para Battalion resumed the advance at 2200 hours on 15 December, leading with the modified jeeps on which medium machine guns were mounted. After overcoming a few minor delaying positions it contacted the Mirpur bridge defences about 0200 hours on 16 December. The battalion had firmed in on the western side of the bridge and made a bold effort to rush it with a modified jeep party and a commando platoon, but suffered heavy casualties. The casualties, both in jeeps and personnel, lay on the bridge, and the raiding party rejoined the battalion’s firm base to the west of the bridge.
Although the bridge was not physically secured, the Para Battalion dominated it with fire to the extent that although the bridge was prepared for demolition the Pakistanis were not able to execute this task. The Indian casualties comprised one officer wounded, four other ranks killed and one taken prisoner. Two jeeps were destroyed. This was a foolish, but nonetheless bold, action which failed.
Mirpur Bridge, across the Budhi Ganga, is the gateway to Dacca. It was surrounded by a sprawling colony on both sides of the river. The very fact that the Pakistanis were not able to destroy the bridge speeded the entry of Indian troops into Dacca the next morning. Otherwise, the construction of a bridge, with no equipment within easy reach, would have taken days.
Meanwhile, 167 Mountain Brigade was taking time to concentrate forward. To speed up the operation, Nagra pushed up 10 J and K Rifles, the only battalion concentrated so far, and two companies of 7 Bihar. These battalions crossed the Turag on the night of 15/16 December, at sites already reconnoitred and prepared for them by Kler’s brigade, and established themselves between Autpara crossroads and Tungi, on the main axis facing north and south, about midnight. A convoy of nine vehicles carrying troops and ammunition from Jaydebpur to Dacca was ambushed by this force about 0400 hours on 15 December. All the vehicles were set ablaze, 16 Pakistanis were killed, three captured, and the remainder got away.
Prisoners confirmed that about 400 to 500 men under the redoubtable Col Mahmood of 31 Baluch were holding the crossroads with two or three tanks. About midday on 16 December, when preparations were afoot for Niazi’s formal surrender of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, Mahmood attempted to break through the road-block and join the defences of Tungi. But this bid failed at the cost of heavy casualties to both sides. Fighting went on till late in the afternoon, when a ceasefire was effected by whiteflagged emissaries. It appeared that Mahmood had not received orders to halt hostilities. This valiant officer, who had earlier refused to withdraw Prom Jamalpur, had now spurned surrender orders and tried to break through with no more than 100 men of his own battalion and a few stragglers from other units. With this came the end of the hostilities in East Pakistan. Although officially the northern sector had been placed under the operational command of Headquarters IV Corps, they had no contact with each other till the surrender ceremony.
The British Broadcasting Corporation had announced in its evening newscast on 15 December that India had agreed to a ceasefire in East Pakistan at Gen Niazi’s request from 1700 hours to 0900 hours the next day. Later, at 0400 hours on 16 December, Kler picked up a wireless intercept from Niazi’s headquarters at Dacca advising his troops to observe a ceasefire from 0500 hours. Nagra was to pick up Kler at 0600 hours on 16 December and was apprised of this message. No such information had been received from Headquarters Eastern Command.
Nagra, accompanied by Kler and Sant Singh, moved to 2 Para Battalion position east of Mirpur Bridge to examine the possibility of a quick entry into Dacca city. On reaching there, he was briefed that there had been no exchange of fire at the bridge from 0500 hours on 16 December. The wireless intercept, as also the ominous silence over the battlefield, prompted Nagra to send through his ADC and two officers of 2 Para Battalion this message to Niazi: “My dear Abdullah, I am here. The game is up. I suggest you give yourself up to me, and I will look after you.” Nagra had been some years earlier Indian Military Attache in Pakistan and knew Niazi personally.
His ADC and the Adjutant 2 Para Battalion drove across the bridge in a whiteflagged jeep to deliver the message about 0900 hours. They returned after an hour and a half, followed by a staff car bringing Maj Gen Mohammed Jamshed, General Officer Commanding Pakistan 36 Infantry Division, operationally responsible for the defence of the Dacca fortress. A major incident was providentially avoided. A whiteflagged jeep carrying a Pakistani captain was on its way to inform Nagra that Jamshed was waiting on the other side of the bridge. Some trigger-happy jawans of Para Battalion opened fire on the jeep, hitting one of their own majors and inflicting a bullet graze wound on the Pakistani officer who had come as the representative of Gen Niazi with an offer of surrender.
Nagra, Kler, Sant Singh and Siddiqi got into Jamshed’s car (Nagra flew his 2 Mountain Division flag on its bonnet) and drove to Jamshed’s headquarters. From there they got in touch with Niazi’s headquarters, and at 1100 hours on 16 December they were received outside Niazi’s office by Brig Bakar, Chief of Staff, Pakistan Eastern Army. Niazi arrived later from his underground bunker, which was some distance away. After informing Headquarters Eastern Command at Calcutta, and also Headquarters IV Corps, Nagra drove straight to Niazi’s headquarters.
On seeing Nagra enter his office Niazi broke down, and sobbingly commented: “Pindi main bethe hue haramzadon ne marwa diya” (Those bastards at higher headquarters at Pindi have let me down). After crying on Nagra’s shoulder, Niazi turned to Kler, who was wearing a maroon turban and wings, and asked him if he was in command of the Para Brigade dropped at Tangail. He was told that they had dropped only one battalion and he did not quite believe this. He then asked Kler to name his regiment. When told that he belonged to the Corps of Signals, he quipped that in their army they did not give brigades to signal officers. Kler retorted: “No wonder you lost the war.”
When the Indians entered Dacca, the roads were deserted, but soon word went round that they had arrived. In no time, people were out on the roads shouting “Jol Bangla, Joi mittar bahini, Joi Indira Gandhi.” Soon after, Nagra’s troops, led by 2 Para Battalion, entered the city and took up positions at strategic places. At 1300 hours, Gen Jacob, Chief of Staff Easter Command, arrived by helicopter to finalise the surrender terms with Niazi and arrange the surrender ceremony. The ceremony took place at the race course, and the instrument of surrender was signed at 1631 hours by Gen Aurora on behalf of India and
Gen Niazi for Pakistan. Appropriately, Air Marshal Dewan and Vice Admiral Krishnan, the Air Force and Navy commanders in the theatre, and Group Captain Khondakar, representing the Mukti Bahini high command, attended the ceremony. Some nine months earlier, the same race course was the scene of Sheikh Mujib’s address demanding complete independence for Bangladesh,
For a while, jubilant mobs took over and went on the rampage, but order was soon reestablished. Niazi had to be extricated from the crowd at the race course and placed under strong escort to prevent him from being lynched. On the other hand, his Indian counterpart Aurora was carried shoulder high with acclaim as the liberator of Bangladesh.?
Lieut Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi was selected to take over from Gen Tikka Khan in August 1971, when under local and international political pressures Yahya Khan made an effort to establish some measure of civil control in East Pakistan. Dr A. M. Malik was accordingly installed as Governor and Niazi as Martial Law Administrator and Commander Eastern Command. From the Pakistani point of view, it would have been preferable to retain Tikka Khan in command of the troops in view of his knowledge of local problems, but his image as the “butcher of Bangladesh” was becoming an obstacle to the pacification programme to be carried out under the new setup.
Niazi’s selection proved unfortunate for Pakistan. He was unimaginative and did not grasp the situation in the province in its true perspective. He was engrossed in platoon and company actions in the border outposts and failed to see the magnitude of the military, political and economic problems facing him. Although personally brave and known for his daring visits to forward troops under fire, he did not inspire confidence in the perception and conduct of operations at the higher plane.
The eastern theatre, far removed from the Pakistani General Headquarters in Rawalpindi needed a man of crisis who could face up to the sensitive and ticklish problems confronting him both in the short and long terms and conduct operations with the minimum supervision and guidance. On the other hand, Niazi liked worldly pleasures and the pomp and show of the status he enjoyed, and he indulged in them freely. He was certainly not the man for the job in hand. He lost the battle before it started. Fear of defeat started germinating in Niazi’s mind from 6 December onwards, that is two days after the start of all-out hostilities in East Pakistan. His appraisal of the situation, passed on to Pindi for the benefit of his superiors, was that India had invaded the province with eight infantry divisions, four armoured regiments, 39 BSF battalions, and 60,000 to 70,000 Freedom Fighters. Against superior air strength, the Pakistani Air Force had been shot out of the skies and as a result the Indian Air Force operated in complete freedom. Attacks by Indian troops were supported from the air with rockets and napalm. The Freedom Fighters were extremely active in the interior and had attacked bridges, ferries and lines of communication. Because of the extensive disruption they had caused, replenishment of supplies, reinforcing troops and readjustment of defensive positions had become extremely difficult.
Niazi’s fortresses at Dinajpur, Rangpur, Maulvi Bazaar, Brahmanbaria, Laksham, Chandpur and Jessore were under heavy pressure although still holding out. Chittagong was likely to be cut off any moment. His troops had been involved in counterinsurgency and other active operations for nine months and were battle-weary. Niazi counted the war in the east as having started on 17 November with the battle of Bayra, and the attrition of both
145
men and material had greatly increased without hope of recoupment.
Paucity of armour, artillery and air support had aggravated the situation. Desertion of Razakars and Mujahids to the Indians had increased manifold. Niazi however assured the Pakistani higher command that his troops were in good spirits, had inflicted heavy casualties on the Indians, and would fight to the bitter end. He also informed them that they would fall back on the rear defensive positions, resorting to the fortress defences. He reiterated that he and his men would fight to the last man and to the last round,” a course that was belied by this earlier note of despondency.
This massage was picked up by the Indian intercept services and was exploited in building up psychological pressure against Niazi and his troops. With the ever-increasing pressure of the developing Indian thrust lines and psychological warfare, the tone of Niazi’s messages to Rawalpindi became more and more despondent. He went on emphasising the critical shortage of men and material, knowing fully well that these deficiencies could not be remedied at that stage. Battle conditions on 6 December were not however as grim as he reported to his superiors.
The Pakistanis had given a good account of themselves in fighting the initial battles closer to the border, and by and large had fallen back intact on the main defensive fortresses. In fact, they were putting up a spirited fight and resisting the Indian efforts to overcome them. The Indian thrusts had managed to bypass the islands of resistance at places, but no serious threat had developed in the rear areas so far. Instead of taking charge of reorganising and readjusting his defence zone, Niazi went on lamenting on the hopeless situation he and his troops supposedly found themselves in.
On 7 December, Yahya Khan, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, commended Niazi for the brave resistance put up by his troops against heavy odds and advised him to hold on to his defensive positions regardless of loss of territory. The Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army assured Niazi that Chinese and American intervention was soon likely and that he should sustain the resistance long enough to make this possible. But there did not however seem to be any tangible basis for such an assurance. Perhaps it was given to encourage Niazi to keep his end up while efforts were made to seek a political solution in the United Nations, which was debating the issue.
Governor Malik joined Niazi in painting a hopeless picture of the situation, obviously based on Niazi’s briefing. He confirmed the collapse of the civil administration because of increasing rebel activities. The movement of supplies was paralysed, and he warned Rawalpindi that Dacca would be without food in seven days. Law and order had broken down and the writ of the Freedom Fighters ran in the entire countryside. Non-Bengali and other loyal elements faced sure butchery the moment the Indians broke through the Pakistani defences. Malik emphasised that if any friendly foreign power meant business nothing less than physical intervention would help, and that too should materialise within the next 48 hours.
If no help of this nature was possible, Malik asked for permission to open negotiations for a ceasefire on honourable terms. This would save unnecessary destruction of property and loss of lives. To prolong the struggle when the end appeared inevitable was, according to him, utterly futile. Yahya Khan could do little more than reassure the Governor that the world powers were making serious efforts at the UN to pass a ceasefire resolution. On 7 December, Pakistan managed to secure a favourable resolution in the General Assembly,
and it was apparent that within a short period a ceasefire would be forced on the warring nations by overwhelming world pressures.
This impelled the Indian forces to intensify their operations to make the maximum gains before hostilities ceased. Niazi should have made efforts to frustrate the Indian attempts to make further ingress, but he seemed to have given up altogether. He reportedly informed the Chief of Army Staff on 9 December that regrouping troops and readjusting defences had become impossible because of Indian mastery of the skies and the extreme hostility of the local population. He emphasised that movement even by night was difficult because of the extensive disruption of surface transport facilities. He however assured his superiors that his troops were putting up a good fight and would continue to do so as long as required by the national interest.
Exploiting Niazi’s pessimistic conclusions about the outcome of the war, the Indians stepped up their psychological warfare. A personal message from Manekshaw was repeatedly beamed by All India Radio to the beleaguered Pakistanis. Leaflets bearing the message were also dropped over the Pakistani defences. The message was addressed to the officers and jawans of the Pakistani Army and invited them to “lay down your arms before it is too late.” It warned: “The Indian forces have reached all round you. Your air force is. destroyed. You have no hope of help from them. Chittagong, Chalna and Mangla ports are blocked. Nobody can reach you from the sea. Your fate is sealed. The Mukti Bahini and the people are all prepared to take revenge for the atrocities and cruelties you have committed. Why waste lives? Do you want to go home and be with your children? Do not waste time. There is no disgrace in laying down your arms to a soldier. We will give you the treatment befitting a soldier.” To demonstrate the futility of resistance, the air attacks on the Pakistani defences were intensified, especially on the approaches to Dacca within 20 miles of the city.
On 9 December, Dr Malik made concrete proposals to end hostilities in East Pakistan. According to Fazal Muqeem, “…the gist of the Governor’s proposals was that as the conflict in East Pakistan had arisen as a result of political causes it must end with a political solution.” He pleaded for the UN to effect an immediate ceasefire and arrange for a peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives of East Pakistan. He asked for the repatriation with honour of the Pakistani armed forces as well as the peaceful evacuation of West Pakistan civilians opting for transfer to the western wing. The safety of those settled in East Pakistan since 1947 should be ensured and a guarantee should be given against reprisals.
These proposals were however not approved by Yahya Khan as he felt that the Governor’s suggestions were tantamount to accepting an independent East Pakistan. Yahya Khan believed that Malik’s efforts should be confimed to securing the end of hostilities and a guarantee from the UN for “peace, tranquillity, and against reprisals.” Meanwhile, Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali, Niazi’s adviser on civil affairs, had with the tacit consent of the Governor passed on the proposal to Paul M. Henry, representative of the UN Secretariat in New York.
The proposal was at once brought to the notice of the President of the Security Council. It propounded a five-point plan that sought a ceasefire and the evacuation of West Pakistani civilians, transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan, and the phased withdrawal of Pakistani forces. The proposal visualised that the Soviet, British, French and US representatives in Dacca and the Chinese delegation in New York should jointly take control of East Pakistan and implement its provisions. Yahya however promptly countermanded Farman Ali’s offer, but by that time it had become abundantly clear that the Pakistani ability to sustain military operations in the eastern wing were limited and that the end of their resistance was imminent. Making use of this indication, delegations friendly to India and sympathisers of Bangladesh kept the Security Council debate alive to enable it to bring the campaign to a successful conclusion. Collin Smith, representative of the London Observer in Rawalpindi, reflecting the mood of the time, wrote that Yahya Khan was completely resigned to the loss of East Pakistan. The question was no longer if and when the Pakistani forces would leave the liberated territory but only how Nevertheless, Yahya kept exhorting Niazi to continue fighting and promised that “something big” was in the offing. Flash messages hinted that friends both from the north and south were coming to Niazi’s aid soon. Perhaps Yahya Khan firmly believed that Chinese armed” intervention would materialise when his position in East Pakistan seemed hopeless, and he might have been aware that the US Seventh Fleet was steaming towards the Bay of Bengal. Niazi however refused to believe him and gave up all hope of outside help. A successful offensive in the west might have revived the fight in him for a while, but that was not forthcoming. Instead of appreciating the need to keep the war going to backup the efforts of Pakistan’s friends in the Security Council and in the Bay of Bengal Niazi was intent on seeking a ceasefire quickly. The politico-military implications of his decisions were beyond his comprehension. Nothing was yet lost militarily. His fortresses were still giving a spirited fight. A well-coordinated withdrawal to the Dacca fortress would have prolonged the war for some weeks. In the event, the Indians were able to commit no more than four weak brigades with artillery and armour support and inadequate logistic backing to the battle. It would have taken days to achieve the desired buildup to tackle the Dacca defences, and if Niazi could have managed to muster a division or more to man this natural defence line the war would have lengthened by weeks. But Niazi had lost heart and had no control over operations in the filed. Left to themselves, the field formations were putting up a fight, each according to its own lights. Futlie efforts to keep Niazi in the fight continued almost every day, with promises of help from the yellow and white nations, “2 but Niazi no longer believed them.
Events were moving fast. Bypassing islands of Pakistani resistance, the Indians were making good speed in their advance on Dacca from the north, the northeast, the east and the southeast. The continuous pounding of Dacca and its surroundings by air had completely paralysed Pakistan’s Eastern Command, and there were no orders for the troops in the field. Far removed from the events in the east, Yahya and his coterie were not aware of the conditions prevailing there. Ironically, on 12 December, the Pakistani delegation at the UN still sought a simple ceasefire without a political settlement for transfer of power when the Indians were poised for a decisive victory on the battlefield. But India’s friends could not possibly allow any settlement which would deprive it of the fruits of the impending victory. In Pakistani policymaking circles, there was obviously no coordination between military means and political bargaining.
Niazi put on a brave front by saying: “It does not matter if I don’t have men to defend the city. It is now a question of living or dying and we shall fight to the last man.” But by 13 December he was a defeated man. The same day, he sent the final distress signal to Rawalpindi, persumably seeking permission to negotiate a ceasefire in the field. In reply, he was told that the Security Council was in session and likely to bring about a UN-sponsored ceasefire within a matter of hours. He was urged to keep the fight going and hold on to as much territory as possible. Niazi was however urging for exhortation. Meanwhile, the Indian was exerting capture Dacca before the oncoming ceasefire itself to race for time was on.
On 14 December, the flow of panic signals between Dacca and Rawalpindi suddenly increased, clearly indicating the moral collapse of the authorities in Dacca. About 1000 hours a message read: “We have been living on hope… Please confirm something. Whatever has to happen should happen fast.” Obviously, this referred to the help from outside. Another message followed: “We have no missiles. What are we to fire? And no ai force. Air raids are worrying us a lot.” A little later, another said: “Only Chittagong is left All else is gone. It looks as though they will destroy Dacca. Everything is being destroyed. We are lost.” The most frutful information was: “At 1200 hours we are going to Government House.”
Inferring that a high-level meeting was in the offing, the Indian command ordered an air raid to disrupt the deliberations. The pilot who was chosen to undertake it had to be briefed in a hurry with a tourist guide map of Dacca obtained from a foreign airline. A rocket fell in the hall where the meeting was in progress, and this decided the issue. The Governor took cover in an air raid shelter nearby and borrowing a reporter’s ballpoint pen hurriedly wrote out his resignation. He thereafter dissociated himsef from Yahya Khan’s Government and sought refuge in the Hotel Intercontinental along with his cabinet under the Red Cross flag. Now it fell on Niazi, the sole representative of the Martial Law Administration, to carry on the fight. But Niazi had given up much earlier, as he told his captors two days ater. He had not slept for 12 nights and he just could not carry on any longer.
Eventually recognising realities, Yahya Khan addressed Niazi and the Governor the same afternoon with these words: “You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds. The nation is proud of you and the world full of admiration. I have done all that is humanly possible to find an acceptable solution to the problem. You have now reached the stage where further resistance is no longer humanly passible, nor will it serve any useful purpose. It will only lead to further loss of life and destruction. You would now take necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of armed forces personnel, all those from West Pakistan and all loyal elements. Meanwhile, I have moved the UN to urge India to stop hostilities in East Pakistan forthwith and to guarantee the safety of the forces and all other people who may be the likely target of miscreants.” This put the final seal on further resistance.
Niazi immediately approached the American Consul General in Dacca to arrange a ceasefire. The conditions he suggested were broadly four: regrouping the Pakistani armed forces by mutual agreement in designated areas; the safety of all those settled in East Pakistan since 1947; and a guarantee against reprisals for those who had helped the administration from March 1971. In the end, he gave an assurance that he would abide by whatever resolutions the UN passed. This message was transmitted by the Consul General to Delhi, and it was soon flashed all over the world. The Indians had however made known by then that they would accept nothing less than an unconditional surrender.
On 15 December, Malik and Farman Ali informed the UN Secretariat that the authorities in East Pakistan were prepared to end hostilities but desired a ceasefire of a few hours to discuss its terms. This message was also intercepted, and before Niazi or anybody else could change his mind the air attacks on Niazi’s headquarters were intensified. Late that same evening. AIR repeatedly broadcast a message from Manekshaw to Niazi at short intervals. Quoting Niazi’s signal, the message read: “Since you have indicated your desire to stop fighting. I expect you to issue orders to all forces under your command in Bangladesh to ceasefire immediately and surrender to my advancing forces, wherever they are located.” Manekshaw gave his solemn assurance that armed Pakistani personnel who surrendered would be treated with the dignity and respect soldiers were entitled to under the Geneva Convention. The wounded and the sick would be cared for the dead given a respectable burial.
He added: “No one need fear for their safety, no matter where they come from. Nor shall there be any reprisal by forces operating under my command…” As soon as he received a positive response, he said he would direct Gen Aurora to refrain from all air and ground action against the Pakistani forces. To demonstrate his good faith, he ordered stoppage of all air action over Dacca and its neighbourhood from 1700 hours on 15 December to 0900 hours the next day and emphasised that India had no desire to inflict casualties on Niazi’s troops. And then he warned: “However, should you not comply with that I have stated, you will leave me with no alternative but to resume my offensive with the utmost vigour at 0900 hours 16 December.”
Radio links were activated on listening watch to pick up Niazi’s response to Manekshaw’s message. But the whole night passed in silence. Manekshaw was getting exasperated at what seemed an endless wait. Next morning arrived without any response. At 0800 hours on 16 December, when Manekshaw was in the process of giving directions for the day’s operations, the radio link became suddenly active, conveying Niazi’s request for an extension of the moratorium by six hours and for an Indian Army representative to come down to Dacca to negotiate the terms of surrender. The extension was at once granted, and this time the moratorium was extended to the ground forces as well.10 A couple of hours later Nagra, accompanied by his brigade commanders, walked into Niazi’s headquarters.
In Pakistan’s higher direction of war there did not seem to be any coordination between political diplomacy and military means. When this surrender drama was being staged in Dacca, Bhutto was addressing the Security Council thus: “Perhaps this will be my last speech in the Security Council. If the Security Council wants me to be a party to the legalising of abject surrender, then I say that under no circumstances shall I be. I take back a document of surrender from the Security Council. I will not be a party to the legalisation of aggression. For four days the Security Council had procrastinated. Why? Because the object was for Dacca to fall… Why should I waste my time here in the Security Council? I will not be a party to the ignominious surrender of a part of my country. You can take your Security Council. Here you are, I am going. With that, he walked out of the chamber. This defiant political stance was not matched by Niazi’s armed resistance.
In the early hours of 16 December, Niazi passed orders for a ceasefire to his formations. He lauded their stout and heroic stand against heavy odds and explained that a stage had been reached when further resistance was futile and would end only in unnecessary loss of life. He ordered their withdrawal to specified areas of assembly and gave directions for preparations for surrender. It appeared that either his message did not reach all concerned or some commanders deliberately ignored it for at the time of surrender the defenders at Khulna, Rajshahi, Nator, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Jaydebpur, Sylhet, Maynamati and Chittagong were still putting up a stiff resistance. After the formal surrender, most of the commanders blamed Niazi for the collapse and felt they had been unnecessarily disgraced.
In all 1,606 officers, 2,345 JCOS, 64,109 other ranks, 1,022 non-combatants enrolled in the regular army, 79 officers, 448 JCOs and 11,665 other ranks of the paramilitary forces (not including those paramilitary forces of Bangladesh origin who were handed over to the Bangladesh Government), 91 officers, 30 petty officers and 1,292 ratings of the Pakistani Navy, 61 officers, 31 warrant officers and 1,049 airmen of the Pakistani Air Force, 166 all ranks of the West Pakistan Police and 7,555 civilians surrendered in various garrisons all over East Pakistan. The Indian losses were 1,421 killed, comprising 68 officers, 60 JCOs and 1,293 other ranks, and 4,061 wounded, comprising 211 officers, 160 JCOs and 3,690 other ranks, and 56 missing.
In the excitement and confusion of the surrender drama, the Pakistani Army Aviation Squadron, consisting of some eight heli-copters (four MI-8s and four Alouettes) under the command of Lieut Col Liaqat Bokhari and carrying important wounded personnel, including Gen Rahim Khan, and their families, flew on 15 December night to Akyab, in Burma, and thence to West Pakistan.
Niazi had no control over his command. On surrender, his headquarters were unable to indicate the exact strength of his forces and where they were located. Large quantities of arms and ammunition stowed in various dumps fell into the victor’s hands. The number of troops at Niazi’s disposal, the amount of stockpiled material available and the defence potential endowed by mighty rivers and marshy ground proved that if Niazi had the heart to fight he could have prolonged the war long enough to enable Pakistan’s foreign friends to push through a resolution in the Security Council to safeguard its territorial integrity and compel Indian acceptance of it.
The US even went to the brink of direct intervention by ordering a naval task force into Bangladesh waters. The force had a flagship of more than 90,000 tons, the nuclearpowered aircraft carrier Enterprise, capable of launching Phantom fighter-bombers carrying nuclear warheads. The Tripoli, another aircraft carrier, was a commando helicopter launcher. There were six other warships, including destroyers and escorts, some marine troops and administrative elements.
Although the proclaimed role of this task force was only to evacuate a handful of US citizens, New Delhi understood this to be an act of international arm twisting by a superpower. But the Indian Government and the military high commend refused to be intimidated. Instead, they were spurred to accelerate the progress Dacca’s surrender. A Washington newspaper columnist, Jack Anderson, later revealed that the tasks assigned to the US force were “to compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the task force, to weaken India’s blockade of the East Pakistan’s waters, and force India to keep planes on defence alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistan ground troops.”
The task force moved too late to carry out any of these assignments. If it had established a beachhead on East Pakistan territory a week earlier and started evacuating Pakistani armed personnel and equipment under its combat arms protection, India and its armed forces in the theatre would have been placed in a very embarrassing position. Action against the task force would have meant open war against a superpower, and this would
have prompted other powers to intervene, with the possibility of an escalation into an international conflagration, an eventuality India did not want. But Niazi’s rapid collapse saved India this embarassment. The abject surrender brought Pakistan humiliation which it would find it difficult to live with
———-
1 Gen Manekshaw, following the offer of ceasefire from Gen Niazi, ordered as a token of good faith to halt air action
over Dacca from 5 A.M. on 15 December. He indicated that if his ultimatum of surrender was accepted by Niazi, he
would direct Gen Aurora to stop all action, air and ground. 2 For a full account of the surrender see Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 2, p. 10563 3 Operation Air Superiority IAF launched on 4 December in the eastern sector reached the historic height of total air
superiority on 8 December after knocking out two Sabrejets, the remnants of the Pakistani Air Force in the eastern
wing 4 The resolution to call upon India and Pakistan to cease fire immediately and withdraw their armed forces was voted on
7 December in the General Assembly with 104 for the resolution, 11 againist and ten abstentions. The Soviet Union
had vetoed this resolution in the Security Council on 5 and 6 December 5 For the full text of Gen Manekshaw’s third message beamed to the Pakistani occupation forces in Bangladesh over All
India Radio, see Asia Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 2 p 10563. 6 The Soviet veto three times and the abstention of Britain and France prevented the passage of the US resolution till 14
December 2 The New York Times quoted official sources to report that the movement of US Navy ships (the nuclear powered 7th
Fleet) towards the Bay of Bengal was intended to provide “political support for Pakistan, whose army in
Bangladesh was disorganised.” 8 for a full account of the Government of East Pakistan’s resignation en masse, see Asian Recorder. Vol XVIII,
No 2, p. 10563. 9 Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 2 p 10563. 10 For an hour-by-hour account of the events leading to the surrender of the Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, see Asian
Recorder, Vol XVIII, No. 3 p. 10566.
152