Charge of a Mountain Brigade in creations of A Nation BANGLADESH by Lt Gen PN Kathpalia

Charge of a Mountain Brigade in creations of A Nation BANGLADESH by Lt Gen PN Kathpalia

Introduction
2/Lt Air OP BOP Brig BSF Capt Col Coy EBR EPR FUP Gen GOC Hav HQ IAF J&K JCO L/Nk Lt Col Lt Gen Lt Maj Gen Maj Maratha LI Nb Sub NCO Nk PA PAF POW PS Raj Rif Sep Sub UN VrC
Second Lieutenant Air Observation Post Border Out Post Brigadier Border Security Force Captain Colonel Company East Bengal Regiment East Pakistan Rifles Forming-up Place General General Officer Commanding Havildar Headquarter (s) Indian Air Force Jammu and Kashmir Junior Commissioned Officer Lance Naik Lieutenant Colonel Lieutenant General Lieutenant Major General Major Maratha Light Infantry Naib Subedar Non Commissioned Officer Naik Personal Assistant Pakistan Air force Prisoner of War Personal Secretary Rajputana Rifles Sepoy Subedar United Nations Vir Chakara
In the twenty-four years of existence since its birth in 1947 to its disintegration in the dying hours of 1971, Pakistan, in effect consisted of two different nations separated by more than a thousand miles of Indian heartland. West and East Pakistan were distinct and different in terms of their history, geography, racial identity, culture, food, dress and geopolitical orientation. Confrontation with India on the basis of Islamic unity could perhaps be seen as the only element of commonality of interest between them.
However, even this perceived ‘commonality’ was deceptive because the boundary line between West Bengal and Bihar represented and still represents a cultural watershed within the so-called Islamic brotherhood. From Bihar to Morocco the cultural link is Arabic (Persian-Urdu). West Pakistan belongs to this group. From West Bengal to Indonesia, however, it is ‘Sanskritised’, the epic Ramayana being part of the national ethos and culture of both Malaysia and Indonesia. East Pakistan belonged to this segment of ‘Eastern Islam’.
Pakistan thus faced a crisis of identity vis-a-vis its two wings, whose internal relationship becoming increasingly irksome threw up their inherent contradictions and compulsions to the fore, creating bad blood between them. Pushed against the wall, in that troubled scenario, Pakistan President Yahya Khan like a demented desperado ordered a massive crackdown on the people of the then East Pakistan. His dictate was implemented with merciless vigour by Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Tikka Khan, causing widespread genocide of the Bengal population and arrest of their popular leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.
The Awami League then pursued a course that, in its reckoning, was perhaps the only one available to them – even though it involved locking itself to acts of commitment that were not only difficult to undo, but also loaded with the possibility of further dividing East and West Pakistan. The proclamation of ‘Swadhin Bangladesh’, establishment of a provincial government, ‘formation of ‘Mukti Bahini’ and increasing armed retaliation by it, involving partisan and guerrilla warfare were undertaken in the hope that by these acts the people of Bangladesh would keep moving towards their professed aim of achieving freedom. The surmise was that these actions would keep the world’s attention riveted to the region and provide international support for the cause of Bangla freedom, which it finally did.
On the international front, however official reactions were apathetic with most Governments remaining
generally forthcoming. By end June 1971, statesmen in Moscow, London and Washington were merely extorting, demanding and advising Pakistani leaders to settle the East Pakistan issue politically and create conditions credible enough for Bangla refugees in India to return to their homes in peace, honour and safety; while at the same time the US Government continued to provide arms and assistance to Pakistan.
Throughout this period the Chinese reaction remained unique as their Government did not say a word – one way or the other – on the prevailing situation. This was, indeed understandable because any action that might result in the break-up of Pakistan, their bounden ally would weaken an important countervailing power against India – a possibility that did not fit into the Chinese scheme of things. They did not, therefore, do anything to stop the, third biggest armed struggle of twentieth Century, after the two World Wars.
It goes to the credit of India’s leadership that in these troubled times, despite voices at home to act decisively and as early as possible against Pakistan so as to relieve pressure on India it did not allow itself to be pushed into any knee-jerk reaction. Instead, displaying political and military sagacity and maturity, it chose to wait and watch – allowing itself time to plan and prepare, waiting for the right moment to strike and lead the country to a favourable ultimate outcome. The problems which confronted Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at this stage were complicated, and she very prudently stated that “war being a serious business, could not be waged at the dictates of popular demand”. She brought the Indian Armed Forces into her planning rather reluctantly and only after it became clear that the BSF-backed Mukti Bahini was making little headway against the Pakistani crackdown. Her military advisers were fully in line with her thinking and by proceeding cautiously and without undue haste they managed to get adequate time before the final all out offensive into East Pakistan to mobilise and concentrate the armed forces in their operational locations without disturbing civil life or giving out the intentions.
In this scenario the Soviet Union felt that any US-China-Pakistan axis would not only pose a threat to India but also to the interests of Soviet Russia. The disadvantages presented to India being obvious led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty on August 9, 1971, which made India feel more secure and not isolated in its efforts to act effectively in the prevailing situation.
As a last ditch effort to resolve the issue peacefully Mrs Indira Gandhi toured the Western countries in October/ November 1971, to find a political solution. But it did not fetch a positive response from anyone of them.
Bengali defections from Pakistan Army had begun in April 1971, and civil officials had also started defecting from Pak diplomatic missions in August 1971. At the same time, due to widespread atrocities in East Pakistan, the world was witnessing a migration unprecedented in the annals of history where millions of Bengali Hindus and Muslims had moved to India for safety. Put under pressure by this influx and shocked by the turn of events the Indian nation wondered why the armed forces were not pressed into action immediately to fight a war to end all wars with Pakistan.
By this time, it was also clear that Pakistan Government would like to fight it out rather than enter into a political settlement. Its ruthless actions added an element of inevitability wherein Yahya Khan lost control of the situation foreclosing all peaceful options and drifting into the possibility of a war.
Towards, the end of March 1971, the news of revolt and defiance in East Pakistan with subsequent repressive measures adopted by Lt Gen Tikka Khan had started reaching India.
Mr Subramanium, Director, India Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses aired his view thus: “What India must realise is the fact that the break-up of Pakistan is in our own interest”. His opinion was echoed by many a minister in the Union Cabinet and retired senior generals. Dr Mankekar also referred to these cataclysmic events as “the raising of an axe against the body politic of Pakistan”.
It goes to the credit of India’s leadership that in these troubled times, despite voices at home to act
Outbreak of All Out War for Liberation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
Pakistan.
On December 1971, the six months old undeclared war between India and Pakistan erupted into an all out war when India did finally go on the offensive in East Pakistan. Within thirteen days three Indian Army thrusts had reached Dhaka forcing Pak Army in East Pakistan to accept defeat and surrender. This could justifiably be celebrated as an epical event for India as there are few, if any, modern wars, that have resulted in giving birth to a new nation.
This conclusive Indian victory in record time made possible, interalia, by the fact that India fought the war in exceptionally favourable circumstances. East Pakistan was surrounded by Indian territory on three sides (Sketch B) and the Indian Air Force and Navy had dominated the airspace and seas respectively, thus preventing any reinforcement or escape for Pak Forces, Indian Army, on the other hand, enjoyed superiority of 4:1 and, in some areas even 10:1.
On the Pak side, things were not at all rosy because they, besides facing the Indian forces, were also involved in fighting against a civilian uprising. Tikka Khan, the tormenter of East Pakistan, was removed from command and replaced in September 1971 by Lt Gen AAK Niazi, who was later to suffer defeat at the hands of Indian Army and bear the humiliation and ignominy of surrender to India on 16 December 1971.
It must, however, be said in defence of Niazi that he was sent in a hurry to take over from Tikka Khan and not even given a written directive, but merely asked to “prevent internal subversion” and “defend East Pakistan against external aggression”.
Even the resources allotted to him were inadequate as he had only three divisions when he reached Dacca. As the prospect of war became apparent, the entire strategy was recast in a hurry which, as would be seen later, resulted in the adoption of a faulty plan involving obvious strategic disadvantages to Pakistan.
PART I
Creation of a Nation – Bangladesh
Creation of a Nation – Bangladesh
Genesis of the Conflict
Before anyone sets out to study military history in its entirety, or a particular military campaign, or a battle in isolation, it is imperative for the student to delve into the reasons for a particular conflict. As is well-known, warfare is an extension of political manoeuvres which, in turn, might be based on social or economic compulsions imposed on a nation through choice or by chance. In what was once East Pakistan, and now Bangladesh, such an environment existed. It is relevant here to point out that the emergence of Bangladesh altered the map of Asia and brought about a distinct change in the cultural, geo-political, and socio-economic relationships that existed within the sub-continent. Almost without willing it, the Partition settlement of 1947 was undone by a short, swift, but sure stroke launched by the Indian Army assisted by Mukti Bahini. The structure and relationship that had developed over the years were completely changed within a span of fourteen eventful days. In the eyes of the world, the Indian Armed Forces had come of age. Military historians, all over the world, showered unprecedented praise on the Indian Armed Forces, while the country experienced such euphoria that could be compared only with what was felt on achieving Independence.
The basis of the 1947 partition was that the sub-continent was to be divided into Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority areas. All major Muslim states, except East Bengal, formed a contiguous area and became West Pakistan. East Bengal, separated by a thousand miles of Indian Territory, became East Pakistan. It was a partition within partition.
Physically, both wings of Pakistan were a total contrast. West Pakistan is larger than both Britain and France put together (310,000 sq. miles). It comprises of The Great Indus Plain, arid hills and in the North the mountains of Hindu Kush, the Karakoram, and the Western Himalayas. West Pakistan is a hard, harsh land of extremes of climate with the annual rainfall averaging about 55″ (140 cm). Its population is today about 75 million, which means the population density is only 207 per mile. One of the most popular modes of transport outside the cities, and sometimes even there is the camel and bullock carts. In the former East Pakistan, the camel is not to be seen. The most common form of transport is the boat. East Pakistan was different in almost every other way. It is small (55,000 sq. miles). It is extremely populous – 75 million – or more than half the population of the then combined Pakistan, in its tiny area, giving a population density of 1,360 per sq. mile – nearly seven times as dense as West Pakistan and probably the highest rural concentration of population anywhere in the world. In contrast to the Western wing, the East is almost entirely waterlogged, as it forms the catchment area of the Brahmaputra-Ganga river systems. Much of it is flooded every year and is subject to cyclones. The region faces heavy monsoon – over 200″ (508 cm) in some parts. Roads are few, and travelling is interrupted by delays at ferry crossings. There is only one city of any significant size – Dacca – whereas in West Pakistan, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Islamabad are modern cities. East Pakistan is almost entirely rural.
The people of the two contrasting wings, wheat-growing West Pakistan and rice-growing East Pakistan (Bangladesh), also differ sharply. In the West, they are tall and lighter skinned, in the East, short and dark. Indeed, the two people had nothing in common except Islam, and that, as the acrimonious quarrels of West Asia prove, is barely a binding factor. Peoples, like the martial and assertive Punjabis, along with the warrior tribesmen of Baluchistan in the Western wing, are a world apart in temperament, character, methods, and background from the lackadaisical, all-tale-and-little-action Bengalis. The people of the West have always fought for their lands, and practically all of Pakistan’s soldiers had come from the West with Punjab dominating. The Easterner, by contrast, was not a natural fighter and was ready to let life take its own course. For that matter, it needs no effort to make his lush green river lands fertile. The tropical, steamy heat seems to have generated an air of indolence. The Urdu-speaking Muslims of West Pakistan differed utterly and decisively from the Bengali-speaking Muslims of Bangladesh.
From the start, West Pakistan and East Pakistan had been economic invalids. Pakistan was born as a full-fledged nation, but it lacked what was perhaps the most essential attribute of any large modern state – a strong industrial base. Practically almost all of the sub-continent’s resources of coal, iron, bauxite, and other minerals were on the Indian side. The strong economic concentration in the ports of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras compared favourably with that of Karachi, a comparatively minor and more recently
Interpretations are certain to differ regarding how and why this happened and who was responsible.
Within Pakistan, there were really two Pakistans which were rather much different more than merely separated by a thousand miles of the Indian heartland. West and East Pakistan were distinct and different in terms of history, geography, race, culture, food, dress and geopolitical orientation. Confrontation with India provided a bond of Islamic unity. Even this, however, was deceptive. The boundary between West Bengal and Bihar represents a cultural watershed even within the so-called Islamic brotherhood. From Bihar to Morocco, the cultural link is Arabic (Persian-Urdu). West Pakistan belongs to this group. From West Bengal to Indonesia, however, it is “Sanskritised” The Ramayana is part of the national culture of both Indonesia and Malaysia. East Pakistan belonged to this segment of “Eastern Islam,” thus creating the problem of integrating the Urdu-speaking Biharis with the Bengali-speaking Muslims of the former East Pakistan.
Pakistan, therefore, faced a crisis of identity which it could not resolve. This internal relationship became increasingly irksome to both wings of Pakistan which, in turn, brought the inherent compulsions and contradictions to the surface. Pakistan President Yahya Khan’s actions added an element of inevitability wherein he lost control of the situation, foreclosed his options, and drifted into war.
The basis of the 1947 partition was that the sub-continent was to be divided into Hindu-majority and
Loontion 204
for the construction of the giant Mangla and Tarbela dams, a new capital at Islamabad, the modernisation of Karachi port, and for setting up major industries.
Until General (Gen) Yahya Khan became President, the Bengalis were kept out of almost all key posts in the central services at Islamabad, in the diplomatic service, and in the judiciary. In the army, all the senior officers and nine out of ten other ranks came from the West. This meant that people in the East received only a fraction of Rs 1,500 million paid to the soldiers every year. This money could have been tantamount to an agricultural subsidy, as much of it would have been saved and sent home.
India were Hindus who left Pakistan for India after partition. Pakistan, therefore, began with only a weak string of secondary industries, like textiles, glass, leather, and food processing. Combined with this, Pakistan’s power resources were also meager. Partition was particularly cruel to East Pakistan. Before partition that is in an around 1905 when Bengal was one unit, jute was the mainstay of the economy. Nearly three quarters of the world’s jute was produced by the former East Bengal, yet it did not have any jute mills. They were all located in Calcutta, thus blocking the outlets for raw jute. Apart from jute, East Pakistan had no cash crop other than tea. It needed every ounce of rice it grew for its own consumption. Partition cut off East Pakistan from the only major port in the area, Calcutta which, in turn, cut off its economic lifelines with the outside world, particularly with India, on which it was so economically dependent. East Pakistan had even less industry than West Pakistan, A few tea factories in the Sylhet district and one or two jute mills in and around Dacca – that was all. Partition dismantled an whole economic infrastructure at a stroke, and of the two halves of Pakistan, the smaller and weaker took the brunt of economic punishment.
West Pakistan always displayed very little regard for the sentiments of the East, and this was further amplified by Mr Jinnah when he declared, in a speech at Dacca, that Urdu would be the national language notwithstanding the fact that 55 million Pakistanis spoke Bengali at that time and only six million in the west spoke Urdu. Mr. Jinnah was hooted down by his Bengali audience, scores of whom were imprisoned. The seeds of conflict were too visible to be missed.
The Bengali is an avid politician. Under Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s regime, all political expression and dissent was curbed with a heavy hand. It can, therefore, be seen that seeds of disunity and ultimate disintegration of Pakistan were sown much before 1971. The lion’s share of development effort went to the Western part, because of better prospects of earlier dividends. Defence requirements also made it important to build up West Pakistan. The East wing’s situation was summed up by President Ayub a month before his enforced resignation:
“People want direct elections on the basis of adult franchise. I realise also that the intelligentsia feels left out. People in East Pakistan feel that in the present system, they are not equal partners and also that they do not have full control over the affairs of their province.”
Given this background, the consequences were many and varied. To start with, the West Pakistani held his Eastern counterpart in open contempt. The Bengali Muslim was looked down upon and was given the status of a C class citizen fit for exploitation.
With this as the prelude, it would be worthwhile taking a look at the political and psychological situation that existed before the outbreak of war and led up to the ultimate crisis. To be precise, inept political handling of the country by the inexperienced generals who came to power brought about this situation.
The maintenance of a strong standing army, even though Pakistan could ill-afford it, was prompted by
East Pakistan, the majority wing at that time, earned two thirds of Pakistan’s foreign exchange with its exports of jute and tea. In return, it received annually less than a third of the nation’s imports, less than half of its development funds, and less than a quarter of its foreign aid. The per capita income in East Pakistan was only two-thirds of that in the West. West Pakistan, with a smaller population, had really four times as many hospital beds and three times as many polytechnic institutes. The coteries of “27 families” in West Pakistan, in whose hands economic power had been concentrated, also sought to exploit the Eastern wing which became a dumping ground for their sub-standard produce. Besides, even out of the imports, goods which were either rejected or could not be sold in West Pakistan were marketed in the East.
Apart from setting up a few jute mills in Dacca and some feeble attempts at modernising Chittagong port, no other major investment was made. The planners and policy-makers were so biased that even an adequate cyclone warning system was not provided, nor was any relief organisation created for the East which was considered a natural disaster prone area. The bias was so evident that the West received funds for the construction of the giant Mangla and Tarbela dams, a new capital at Islamabad, the modernisation
(a) Kashmir: The state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has remained a bone of contention
between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s foreign policy was aimed solely at wresting Kashmir from India which, in turn, led to a policy of maintaining a strong army in case
of a war over Kashmir; (b) Jihad: This again has been a constant cry. In order to divert the people’s attention from
internal problems, the cry of Jihad’ and ‘Holy war against India was resorted to,
fuelling the policy of hatred and confrontation with India. c) The Northwest Frontier: The problem of Baluchistan and Pakhtoonistan also dictated
the need for a strong standing army.
later, the assassination of his right-hand man and first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, left Pakistan bereft of political leaders of stature. With a man of strength and authority at the helm, like Jinnah, Pakistan could perhaps have been steered to a stable political entity. Consequently after his death its political life degenerated rapidly into a tangle of corruption caused by self seeking generals and politicians. Tensions, basically economic, but needing sound political solutions, grew between the two wings and between the provincial units within West Pakistan itself. Wrangling and delay in the legislature over the framing of the Constitution resulted into a game of political intrigue. By 1958, Pakistan’s political affairs had reached a state of chaos, and the nation was on, the brink of bankruptcy.
By now the East had been reduced to the role of a ‘Colony of the West. Bengali sentiment had hardened, and widespread riots broke out preceding the downfall of President Ayub Khan. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the most popular Bengali leader, voiced the prevailing feeling of the East Pakistanis thus: “Does the mouth, belly and stomach of East Pakistan lie in West Pakistan?” He put forward a sixpoint formula:
In October 1958, a ‘coup d’etat’, with Gen Ayub Khan as the leader, brought the army into power. This coup marked the end of what was passed for parliamentary democracy till then. It was the army which henceforth ran Pakistan and fired the spirit of revolt amongst a mass of unrepresented and underprivileged people, and it was under the army that Pakistan descended into its most desperate crisis which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.
In spite of Gen Ayub Khan’s attempts at revitalising the economy and introducing the system of “basic democracy,” his efforts towards normalising the situation in the country failed. Corruption raised its head again, involving even members of President Ayub Khan’s family. Subsequently, the emergency imposed because of the 1965 war was exploited, and the regime became increasingly harsh in its treatment of the people. Even Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was tried on a trumped up charge in the Agartala Conspiracy case. The war also caused deep disquiet in the East for the Kashmir issue meant little to the Bengalis, whereas East Pakistan remained a major contributor to the war effort. Added to this was the fact that the East had been left undefended for 17 days; and only one division was located there. The feeling that East Pakistan’s security had been jeopardised for the sake of West Pakistan acutely riled the Bengali sentiment. This seriously intensified an anti-West wing opinion in the East, which was already hardening because of the reasons enumerated earlier. The overall situation was aptly summarised by Air Marshal Asghar Khan: “graft, nepotism, corruption, and administrative incompetence are affecting the lives and happiness of millions. Social inequality and economic disparity are increasing. Telephones are tapped, opinion is shackled, the opposition is shadowed and jailed, and no one can express his views fully.”
In this prevailing situation, the students were the first to revolt. In March 1968, they launched an agitation, which sparked off widespread disorder in both wings. The masses of Pakistan’s disparate wings had formed common cause and were making sweeping demands like direct elections, full democracy, end of press censorship, abrogation of emergency regulations, wide scale nationalisation and, above all, a large measure of autonomy for the Eastern wing. On March 24, 1969, President Ayub Khan resigned. Martial law was reimposed and the Army Commander-in-Chief, Gen Yahya Khan, took over.
(a) The establishment of a federal form of government, with the parliament to be the supreme
point of power, directly elected by universal adult suffrage. (b) The federal government would have control of only defence and foreign policy, leaving all
other subjects to the federating states of East and West Pakistan. (c) The two wings would have separate (but freely convertible) currencies, or if one currency,
separate fiscal policies to prevent the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. (d) The federal government would have no powers of taxation; it would share the state taxes
for the needs of foreign and defence affairs. (e) Each of the federating states would have the power to enter into trade agreements with
foreign countries. They would also have full control over foreign exchange they earned.
(f) The states would have their own militia or para-military forces. Such a system hit at the very foundations of Pakistan as it existed. It might have called for more autonomy and not spelt out secession, but secession would have been its ultimate effect. The West had so much to lose and so little to gain from such an agreement. Yet, the paradox was that while the six-point formula went far beyond what West Pakistan could concede, it was the least that East Pakistan could demand. The formula, in short, implied the fundamental irreconcilability of the two parts of Pakistan as it existed then.
In the wake of mass strikes and disturbances, Gen Yahya Khan disclaimed any political ambitions and he promised restoration of a civilian government in his nationwide broadcast on March 26, 1969. He also declared that dissatisfaction in East Pakistan was fully justified, and maintained that it was entirely for the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan to decide what they wanted. President Yahya Khan then held a series of talks with the leading politicians and promised general elections within 18 months. Ten civilian cabinet members, including five from the East were sworn in. He declared October 5, 1970 as the election date on a one-man-one-vote’ basis. This would provide a built-in majority for the East, but he still maintained that provincial autonomy must be consistent with a strong federal government at the centre. On January 1, 1970, all restrictions on political parties were lifted and the Legal Framework Order of March 28, 1970 laid down a detailed blueprint for the return to civilian government.
By now the East had been reduced to the role of a ‘Colony of the West. Bengali sentiment had hardened, and widespread riots broke out preceding the downfall of President Ayub Khan. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman,
which killed, an estimated 500,000 people in the East. The complete absence of cyclone warning measures and relief organisation made the situation all the more unbearable for those who suffered.
President Yahya Khan was at that time on a visit to Peking and he did not think it fit to return home immediately. Even on his return, he only made a cursory flight over the affected areas and proclaimed that nothing serious seemed to have happened. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman promptly denounced West Pakistan for its callous disregard of the East’s sufferings. In general it was taken as an insult with regard as the feelings of Bengalis.
Pakistan’s first one-man-one-vote general election, on December 7, 1970, gave a sweeping victory to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League in the East and ZA Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party in the West. The provincial election results confirmed the general election results, and President Yahya Khan even described Sheikh Mujibur Rehman as Pakistan’s next Prime Minister. The National Assembly was now scheduled to meet in early March 1971. Then started some political wranglings which, ultimately, led to the army crackdown and the consequent civil war in East Pakistan. To start with, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman refused to budge from the Six-Point Formula. Bhutto retorted with a threat to withdraw from the constitution-making process, and proclaimed that to attend assemblies would be pointless in the light of the East’s inflexibility.
details of this agreement however have not been revealed. Then came Bhutto on the scene. He was not willing to make any concessions on the Six-Point Formula. The points on which hopes were centered for a meeting of March 10, 1971 proved false and the discussion degenerated into haggling. There was just one point on which they could agree viz. a further postponement of the inaugural Assembly meeting scheduled for March 25, 1971. The ostensible excuse for this was, in President Yahya Khan’s words, “to facilitate and enlarge the area of agreement among the political parties.” But, by now the pretence that apolitical solution was going to be possible had worn through. There was no area of agreement to be enlarged. Consequently, March 23, 1971, Pakistan’s Republic Day, became Resistance Day in its Eastern Wing.
Prior to the crackdown, the Pakistan Army was building up. The force levels were raised to nearly three divisions and by March 6, 1971, this buildup was nearly complete. There were now approximately 60,000 West Wing soldiers in East Pakistan who were highly trained, well-equipped, and thoroughly indoctrinated in the dogmas of race hatred; to regard Bengali Muslims as traitors, inferiors, and ‘India lovers’, deserving to be butchered.
On March 25, 1971, Yahya Khan and ZA Bhutto left Dacca for West Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was arrested, and the army launched its mass attacks on unprotected civilians in an attempt to subjugate the Bengali people through sheer brute force. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was denounced as a traitor, and the Awami League was banned.
On February 12, 1971, President Yahya Khan dismissed the civilian cabinet and appointed military governors for all provinces, with Lt Gen Tikka Khan taking over East Pakistan. On March 1, 1971, the proposed assembly meeting was postponed indefinitely, to which Sheikh Mujibur Rehman retorted with a call for a general strike in Dacca. This resulted in a week-long disruption of normal life and disturbances, during which Bihari Muslims, Punjabis, and some army personnel were attacked and killed by enthusiasts of Awami League. Yahya Khan, thereafter, climbed down, from his position and sought to bring about a compromise by calling a round table conference of political leaders. This invitation was rejected by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and he even refused to attend the proposed opening of the Pakistan National Assembly on March 25, 1971 till a series of preconditions involving the withdrawal of martial law and return of troops to their barracks, followed by inquiries into the killings committed by the army were met. To these conditions Sheikh Mujibur Rehman added that the army reinforcements coming into the East from the West must cease forthwith. A stalemate followed. Gen Yahya Khan’s famous ‘crackdown’ now became imminent.
March 1971 saw some unprecedented events in the history of mankind. The violence, turbulence, and turmoil unleashed during this period had yet to be matched. Yahya Khan’s brutal crackdown on March 25, 1971, led to the launching of a massive genocide inside East Pakistan. Dr Mankekar has referred to this as the “raising of an axe against the body of Pakistan…” Like a demented desperado, Yahya Khan’s action was pursued with greater vigour, and history recorded a migration unprecedented in its annals when millions of Bengali Muslims and Hindus migrated to India for safety. Shocked at this carnage, the nation wondered why the armed forces were not pressed into action immediately to fight a war to end all wars with Pakistan.
On March 15, 1971, Yahya Khan arrived at Dacca for talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to resolve the dispute. The talks held between March 16 and 20 produced a some kind of shaky compromise which would be acceptable to both President Yahya Khan’s Generals and Sheikh Mujib’s Awami Leaguers. The details of this agreement however have not been revealed. Then came Bhutto on the scene. He was not willing to make any concessions on the Six-Point Formula. The points on which hopes were centered for a meeting of March 10, 1971 proved false and the discussion degenerated into haggling. There was just one
The reactions that followed were many and varied. An Indian Fokker Friendship plane was blown up on February 2, 1971 at Lahore airport in full view of Pakistani troops and policemen. As a retaliatory measure, India banned flights of Pakistani aircraft, over India. This kindled new sparks of hatred between India and Pakistan – the already uneasy relationship went closer to levels of open confrontation. After the infamous military crackdown, hundreds of thousands of refugees from East Pakistan streamed into Indian camps, imposing a massive economic burden on India. The Mukti Bahini took to arms in order to protect the exploited and suffering masses facing unimaginable cruelties at the hands of the West Pakistani soldiers. Indian support for the Mukti Bahini was now, forthcoming for the simple reason that India’s hand had been forced.
By June 1971, statesmen in Delhi, Moscow, London, and Washington were exhorting, demanding, and
did not fit into the Chinese designs and China, therefore, did not say a word to stop the third biggest armed struggle of the twentieth century. The Nixon Government also watched from the sidelines, but kept adding fuel to the fire. The US administration did not relent from providing arms assistance to Pakistan. Two ships (Sunderbans and Padma) brought additional arms supplies to Pakistan in June and July 1971.
By now, inside East Pakistan the ‘Awami League’ leadership had also locked itself on to an unalterable course perpetrated by the Pakistani genocide and by a genuine desire for complete freedom from the Western wing of Pakistan. A mountain of corpses divided East and West Pakistan. The proclamation of ‘Swadhin Bangladesh’, formation of the Mukti Bahini, the establishment of a provisional government, and the increasing armed retaliations by the Mukti Bahini, were all acts of commitment that were difficult to undo. It was also clear, that the Pakistani leadership would prefer to fight it out rather than enter into a political settlement with Awami League.
The Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis now made itself omnipresent. Islamabad sought to bring Washington and Beijing closer by providing a means to Kissinger for conducting his own cloak-anddagger style of secret diplomacy. On July 6, Kissinger visited Delhi with the proclaimed intention of bringing about a rapprochement between India and Pakistan. In pursuance of this aim, he proceeded to Pakistan and was declared ill on July 9. It is now known that this period was utilised by Kissinger to make a secret trip to Beijing which, in turn, led to the announcement of a visit to China by President Nixon in May 1972. Significantly, this announcement was made on July 15, 1971. Pakistan was able to score a diplomatic victory and sought to exploit this advantage to preserve the unity of Pakistan and also to the establishment of a new power equation in the sub-continent, which would assist Pakistan in its malafide designs.
guerillas. A total freeze on military activities was also sought by Pakistan. In response to Pakistan’s diplomatic manoeuvres, the UN Secretary General, U Thant, proposed to the Security Council in July that UN troops should be stationed on the borders. Pakistan accepted this offer without any hesitation, but India opposed it, realising that she would be saddled with the burden of feeding and looking after the refugees, while the somewhat ‘impotent United Nations debated the issue over a period of time. India felt and realised that US manipulations and machinations in the UN Assembly could see the issue dragging on for years. Indian statesmanship of that time deserves unreserved applaud.
The Military rulers of Pakistan in general and the then dictator Yahya Khan in particular sought a totally military solution to a purely political problem. This indicated absolute bankruptcy of political understanding as well as of maturity. The Sheikh was now declared a traitor, and the Awami League was banned. The Bengalis in the East were left with the ‘Hobson’s Choice’, of only fighting for their independence in order to prevent western exploitation and colonial pressures. The doors had been closed and no reasonable means of compromise were available to either side.
Bengali defections from the Pakistani Army had commenced in April 1971 and now Bengali officials also started defecting from the diplomatic missions in August 1971. Within East Pakistan the Awami League was gaining political stature and clout. A provisional government was initially formed on Indian soil, but subsequently it moved into some liberated areas of “Bangladesh”. This government launched an international campaign for seeking understanding of the problems by other countries of the world. The official reactions, however, were apathetic, while the general sympathy of the people for Bangladesh’s problems was genuinely forthcoming but this was not enough to solve the problem. Most governments remained indifferent to appeals for help.
The Awami League could pursue the only course available to it – partisan and guerrilla warfare, with the hope that the people of Bangladesh would keep moving towards the professed aim of freedom and all actions in support of this aim would keep world attention riveted on the region with the ultimate hope of getting some support for the cause internationally.
Pakistan now hoped to gain the ‘tacit’ support of both China and the USA in order to deter India from launching military operations. The aim was to cajole India into accepting a solution based on military bluff rather than on the prevailing political, social and economic environment in the sub-continent. The intention was to side-track the issue of refugees along with the heavy burden imposed on India and to ignore the explosive realities existing within East Pakistan.
At the same time, Pakistan launched a massive diplomatic offensive directed at the neutral nations for seeking a favourable world opinion. In order to influence the neutral nations, Pakistan made a show of reasonableness and indicated a desire for a political settlement of the problem. She sought to internationalise the issue and raised the bogey of war, seeking United Nations (UN) intervention. Concurrently, Pakistan also tried to mobilise world opinion with the ostensible aim of preventing India from using its armed forces for decisive military operations as well as to deter India from assisting the guerillas. A total freeze on military activities was also sought by Pakistan. In response to Pakistan’s diplomatic manoeuvres, the UN Secretary General, U Thant, proposed to the Security Council in July that UN troops should be stationed on the borders. Pakistan accepted this offer without any hesitation, but
The Indian Government had apparently been taken by surprise. The intelligence sources were unable to predict the overall magnitude and suddenness of events in East Pakistan. It goes to the credit of India’s leadership that in spite of being somewhat surprised, it displayed a political sagacity and maturity in dealing with the situation which led to the final favourable outcome. The leadership was quick to realise that a friendly government in Bangladesh could assist in solving the insurgency problems of its Northeast, which were getting Chinese and Pakistani support through bases and sanctuaries in East Pakistan. A friendly country in the east could also remove the omnipotent threat to the Siliguri corridor – more about it later. The Indian Parliament, therefore, assured the people of East Pakistan that their struggle and sacrifice would receive the sympathy and support of the Indian people in its entirety.
At this stage, India realised the futility of seeking international assistance through the UN and thus
otner. Attempts were also made to justiiy various actions by both sides, put inaia and Pakistan were now drifting towards war – the third round between these two nations of South Asia.
kept the issue alive by constantly reiterating the economic burden imposed on India by this human exodus.
In pursuance of the Indian Parliament’s earlier commitments to the people, India now sought to help strengthen the guerilla movement inside East Pakistan. In July 1971, the Minister for External Affairs admitted that India was helping the Mukti Bahini and supporting the freedom fighters.
War clouds were gathering on the horizon.
Internationally, the change precipitated by Pakistan in the overall balance of power had its ramifications felt in the sub-continent. The warming up of relations between Beijing and Washington offered new perceptions and possibilities in the region. The India-Pakistan balance was upset with China and the USA supporting Pakistan. The Soviet Union also felt that the US-China-Pakistan axis could pose a threat to India and also to Russia’s interests. The disadvantages presented to India were obvious, and this probably led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty on August 9, 1971. India now felt more secure and did not feel isolated in its efforts to counteract the prevailing situation.
India, nonetheless, still nurtured a hope of finding a political solution to the problem and was, therefore, slow in changing its political objective of providing full support to the Awami League’s bid for complete freedom. India realised the need for a friendly government in Dacca free from the influence of the Western World in the sub-continent. India did, however, veer around to finally providing full and unreserved support to the people of “Bangladesh” and their aspirations in the region. In a last ditch effort, Mrs Indira Gandhi also toured the western nations in October/ November 1971 in a final bid to find a political solution, but no positive western response did materialise.
India and Moscow came closer at this stage to counteract the Pakistan-China-US axis. The Soviet Union, initially, kept an appropriate distance from both sides, but slowly realised and understood the Indian point of view and the magnitude of the problem faced by India. Moscow, therefore, turned around to support India, while the USA understood the importance attached by China to its friendship with Pakistan and sought to please China by supporting Pakistan, though Washington had no desire of getting directly involved in the fighting after having ‘burnt its fingers’ in Vietnam.
Bilaterally, India and Pakistan were unable to resolve the problems. International manipulations, machinations, and wranglings added fuel to fire, instead of applying balm to the festering wounds. By September 1971, propaganda had intensified; both nations freely traded accusations condemning each other. Attempts were also made to justify various actions by both sides, but India and Pakistan were now drifting towards war – the third round between these two nations of South Asia.
War clouds were gathering on the horizon.
(b) No route denial plans were made particularly along the rivers and major highways which
could not be physically guarded. This left them open for exploitation by Indian forces.
(c)
Strategic Plans — Opposing Forces
A grave error had been made in the timing of their actions whereby they allowed the Indian Army to enjoy the benefit of a vital time span of almost ten months from March to December 1971 in which they were able, without hindrance or impediment, to prepare and deploy their forces for offensive in East Pakistan.
Pakistan Army
(d) This delay also allowed the Indian Army to operate in winter when, in East Pakistan, the
ground is dry, firm, facilitating offensive mobile action.
As mentioned earlier, Lt Gen AAK Niazi was appointed commander of Pakistan Army in East Pakistan quite late in the day. After analysing and assessing the ground situation he came to the conclusion that there were three options available to him, as follows:
(e) This very delay also obviated the possibility of any Chinese intervention in the North to
ease pressure on Pakistani forces in East Pakistan because, due to heavy snowfall in Himalayas in winter, all mountain passes and routes leading to them get closed.
Indian Army
(a) To deploy all along the borders and thereafter gradually withdraw behind major rivers to
defend the Dacca Bowl, i.e., Dacca and its environs. (b) To deploy concentrated for the defence of Dacca Bowl whose fall, by virtue of its strategic
and political importance, would determine not only the overall result of the war, but also
the fate of East Pakistan. (c) To use the ‘Theatre Fortress’ concept which implied converting important border towns
and communication centers located well forward on the main avenue(s) of ingress into veritable fortresses by building strong defence works in and around them. These ‘fortresses’ were to be held strongly and defended determinedly – to which end they were to be well stocked with ammunition, food and supplies – the basic concept being that any force bypassing a fortress would have its flanks exposed to another fortress or fortresses.
Indian planners had decided to delay the launching of military offensive in East Pakistan till the onset of winter towards the end of 1971 because an earlier-than winter offensive would have been undesirable both politically and militarily. Politically because it would have substantiated Yahya Khan’s claim that India was trying to wage war against Pakistan without any provocation. And militarily because a delay upto the winter months was required not only to prepare for the operations but also to avoid getting bogged down in adverse operating conditions, for mobile operations, obtaining in the monsoon and premonsoon months in riverine terrain of East Pakistan. As mentioned above this delay was also necessary to allow the Himalayan passes to close and thus pre-empt any Chinese designs in the North, as pointed out earlier.
Courses Open To Indian Forces – Under the circumstances India could adopt one of the two under-mentioned courses:
In September 1971, C-in-C Pakistan Army, Gen Hamid, visited Dacca to discuss the operational plans with Lt Gen Niazi. The Theatre Fortress’ concept was finally approved, while Naizi was advised that raids on Farukka Barrage and offensive action in Malda (Sketch 12) should also be planned and dovetailed into the overall strategy for defence of East Pakistan.
Flaws in Pakistan Plan – This concept of Pak Army had a number of flaws in basic planning and overall execution, as for example:
(a) A speedy capture of Dacca to ensure the surrender of Pakistani forces and liberate East
Pakistan at the earliest. It involved crossing big rivers along chosen approaches in strength; but for such an operation India did not have adequate river crossing equipment. Even though a judicious allotment of forces and engineering resources, together with the possibility of using helicopters for vertical envelopment of rivers, (especially in view of India’s air supremacy and support of the local population), offered great opportunities for achieving the desired speed in action but the risk in adopting this course was real because there was every likelihood of a cease-fire taking place before Dacca was captured. This would have left the advancing troops in a tactically
(a) There were practically no reserves. (b) No route denial plans were made particularly along the rivers and major highways which
could not be physically guarded. This left them open for exploitation by Indian forces.
move lacuics. Cven sleei nemes, uie vasic neaugear II Commal, were not available ior more ulan 25 per cent strength of each unit. In such a state of readiness, in April 1971, soon after I took over its command, the brigade was alerted for operations.
Dacca for subsequent operations. This involved a limited advance to most of the peripheral areas in all sectors. As we were the stronger side we could have hit the Pakistanis at several points and thus accentuate their weakness on ground by further
dissipating their forces. This was the safest strategy to ensure the capture of maximum territory and important towns, even though Dacca would not have fallen early. The danger in this strategy, however, was that anything less than the capture of Dacca, would have given the Pakistanis a bargaining handle to use.
Task – Eastern Command – Adopting Course (b) given above, the task allotted by Army Headquarters (HQ) to Eastern Command was to destroy bulk of the Pakistani forces in Eastern theatre and to occupy major portion of East Pakistan, including the entry ports of Chittagong and Chalna/ Khulna (Sketch B). There was no mention of capturing Dacca.
Task – 33 Corps and 71 Mountain Brigade – Eastern Command HQs carried out its own assessment for allotting tasks and resources. Thus, in the North-western Sector (i.e. Pachagarh-DinajpurRangpur Sector – Sketch 2) 33 Corps (Lt Gen ML Thapan) with 20 Mountain Division (Maj Gen Lachhman Singh Lehl), an additional Brigade i.e. 340 Infantry Brigade, two armoured regiments less one squadron and one engineer brigade was ordered to operate against the Pak 16 Infantry Division in area Hilli complex. In addition, 71 Mountain Brigade was to advance from the North along PachagarhThakurgaon-Dinajpur axis and capture Dinajpur.
Later that year the Brigade was moved for the defence of Siliguri Corridor, where we reached on 8 October 1971. But two days later I was told that the Brigade would assume an offensive role and advance along Axis Mirgarh-Panchagarh-Boda, on to Thakurgaon (Sketch 2) as an Independent Brigade group operating directly under HQ 33 Corps. The task was designed to ease pressure on 20 Mountain Division operating further North-west on my right and to provide them with an additional brigade – in this case 340 Mountain Brigade.
In the performance of this task 71 Independent Mountain Brigade Group, fighting shoulder to shoulder with Mukti Bahini, played a vital role in the Bangladesh War. From the time it left its location in Limekong till it finally settled down in Barrackpore after the war, it went through eight formations in the short span of seven months, while moving from place to place. It was the first Formation to enter East Pakistan (Bangladesh) from the North and the first to take surrender and return to India. While doing so, it completed the longest advance in the shortest possible time forcing even the Pakistanis to comment that in “the entire action of Indian 71 Mountain Brigade was carried out with clock-work precision” and earning for it the title of the Brigade of the year”.
Background – 71 Mountain Brigade
Now, a word about 71 Mountain Brigade:
Originally an integral formation of 9 Mountain Division, this Brigade had been placed under command 8 Mountain Division (Eastern Command) in 1968 for counter-insurgency operations. In April 1971 when it was located at Limekong Manipur I took over its command on promotion from Defence Services Staff College where I was posted as Directing Staff.
Having been engaged in counter-insurgency operations for three years its battalions were lacking in training and use of heavy anti-tank weapons. Even the basic infantry weapons, which are employed for self defence and bunker busting at section and platoon levels, were held at less than hard scale, i.e., 50 per cent of the authorization; thus, every section could not have the basic weapons for standard ‘fire and move’ tactics. Even steel helmets, the basic headgear in combat, were not available for more than 25 per cent strength of each unit. In such a state of readiness, in April 1971, soon after I took over its command, the brigade was alerted for operations.
Later that year the Brigade was moved for the defence of Siliguri Corridor, where we reached on 8
Order of Battle – 71 Independent Mountain Brigade Group
Jagdalrat
Titulya
INDIA
The change in plans from defence of Siliguri Corridor to offensive in East Pakistan brought about a change in the order of battle. Additional troops were allotted to the Brigade, as under:
INDIA
Pachagarh Maidandichi
(a) Under Command
Boda
TISTAR
• ‘D’ Squadron less two troops, 69 Armoured Regiment. • 98 Mountain Regiment ex 8 Mountain Division. • Engineer Task Force, comprising of one Field Company each from 11 and 111
Engineer Regiments. • 12 Garhwal Rifles less two companies. • 107 Territorial Army Battalion less two companies.
Thakurgaon
Darwani
KARATOYA R.
Rangpur
Khansama
Birganj
BRAHMAPUTRAR
• 73 Battalion BSF.
Saidpur
Kantanagar
• 75 Battalion BSF less elements in Karkutta.
Dinajpur
Phulbari Nawabgan
• 78 Battalion BSF. • 82 Battalion BSF less two companies. · 103 Battalion BSF.
• Seven companies of Mukti Bahini. (b) Under Command and in Location (until required by 8 Mountain Division)
Pirganj
Not to Scale
• 1812 Light Battery, 181 Light Regiment.
• Two Post Groups, Artillery, BSF (4 guns each 3.7 inch How).
of Nilphamari and facilitate an outflanking move against Dinajpur.
Area of Operations —71 Mountain Brigade
Refer to Sketches 2 and 3
The area of operations of 71 Mountain brigade was flat and open, interspersed with a number of ‘nalas’ as well as two water obstacles – Karatoya River and Tangan Nala. Water level in these being insignificant at the time of proposed operations and paddy crop having already ripened or even harvested, the ground had became harder, thereby improving conditions for the movement of light armour and other tracked vehicles.
In the north, townships of Amarkhana, Jagdalhat, and Pachagarh were close to the Indian border. Amarkhana and Jagdalhat were in the neck that jutted into India, with Titulya and Phulbari at the other extremity of the neck. Both Amarkhana and Jagdalhat were near Titulya highway and dominated all North-South movements. They, therefore, had to be the initial objectives of 71 Mountain Brigade as it advanced southward. Pachagarh was also located very close to the Indian border and a number of lateral roads converged on to it. It was the first important focal point in the path of 71 Mountain Brigade as it controlled the North-South as well as the East-West movements to Berubari and Atwari respectively.
Similarly, in the centre, Boda also occupied a pivotal position with laterals leading to Raniganj, Bakshisgunj and Thakurgaon on the main North-South highway. The capture of this communication centre (Boda) and Bhuli Nadi could open an axis of advance to Thakurgaon.
In the South, Birganj located astride the main highway was another important communication centre. It controlled all movement towards Bachaganj, Khansama and Saidpur. The importance of these three town’s lay in the fact that they were located on a lateral road which, if followed, would allow the bypassing of Nilphamari and facilitate an outflanking move against Dinajpur.
making the whole Brigade compact on ground and ready for the next battle at Pachagarh.
Drawing First Blood — Amarkhana BOP
Refer to Sketch 3
It was now November 16. 20 Mountain Division on my right had already concentrated in Belurghat and by now they had also taken one of the enemy’s Border Out Posts (BOP). It was now my turn to take Amarkhana BOP. I decided to give 12 Raj Rif a chance. Since it was a completely new battalion, I wanted them to draw blood and that, too, early in the morning. They did a fine job and, by 0900 hours, had captured the enemy BOP, without any causalities. By now the Brigade HQ had also shifted to Dassapara making the whole Brigade compact on ground and ready for the next battle at Pachagarh.
Battle of Pachagarh
Refer to Sketches 4 and 5
forces and making the task of our attacking battalions easier. This force was also required to establish Road Block No 3 in the East. This road block, in conjunction with the other two was meant to seal off the enemy’s withdrawal route(s).
26 November was the ‘D’ Day and the time available till then was used for tying up loose ends and deployment of guns. Thus, the guns of 40 Medium Regiment were deployed near the Brigade HQ in Area Dassapara on 24 November and the two Air Observation Post (AirOP) helicopters, which were in direct support for this operation, commenced engaging the enemy with artillery fire soon thereafter.
With planning completed and orders issued, the units went about their task of collecting information and drawing up detailed plans. Reconnaissance was carried out in civilian clothes along with the Mukti Bahini, ‘Lungi & Kurta’ having been adopted as the dress for patrolling. The International Border could now be crossed and the civil population which had crossed over to India, as well as the Mukti Bahini personnel, were found to be useful as they provided guides, interpreters and valuable information of the area of operations.
Enemy
34 Punjab of Pakistan (Reece and Support Battalion) was opposing 71 Brigade in Pachagarh.
Our Brigade Plan
The plan for the capture of Pachagarh in nutshell, had envisaged encirclement and siege of the town, accompanied by an outer ring closing in towards the centre of the town. This action was to be reinforced by three road blocks for cutting off the enemy withdrawal routes.
In the initial phase, 7 Maratha Light Infantry (Maratha LI), going in from the North-west, was required to tackle the Pachagarh Railway Station and road junction immediately North of it. This operation was to be completed by 0500 hours on 27 November 1971 and they were, therefore, required to tackle the bridge on Karatoya River and East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) Company HQ located South of the bridge. In the exploitation phase they were required to establish a link-up towards the North with 12 Raj Rif and the BSF elements. This last part of their operation was scheduled to be completed by 1200 hours on 28 November 1971.
Simultaneously, 21 Rajput moving from the same direction, but further to the South, were assigned the task of capturing Fakirhat Bridge by 2100 hours on 26 November and thence go in for the Sugar Mill and Staff Quarters in the Southern part of the town, completing operations by 1000 hours on 28 November 1971. This unit was required thereafter to link-up with the Marathas in the area of EPR Company HQ by 1200 hours on 28 November 1971. It was also assigned the task of establishing two road blocks to complete the encirclement from south and east. Road Block No 1 was to be established on Pachagarh – Boda Road and Road Block No 2 on Pachagarh – Debiganj Road.
From the North, after the capture of Amarkhana BOP, 12 Raj Rif, less two companies along with one BSF company were to advance from Jagdalhat onto the Northern outskirts of Pachagarh town, with the aim of diverting the defender’s attention and put pressure on him from this direction, thereby dividing his forces and making the task of our attacking battalions easier. This force was also required to establish
Execution of Brigade Plan
to Thakurgaon.
The operations of 7 Maratha LI generally proceeded as planned, while 21 Rajput deviated from the original plan during the conduct of operations. The firm base of unit was planned to be established in area Jalpesh Narayani, nearly 2 km away from the one which was actually established at Arazi Shakarpur.
None of the three “road blocks’ reached their planned destination. This allowed the enemy to escape as the ring that was to encircle its troops at Tenganabari could not be established.
These are the imponderables of war and plans rarely proceed as visualized. However, the Brigade of the Year 71 Mountain Brigade – now a group had scored its first major victory and was poised to advance on to Thakurgaon.
– the enemy having been completely surprised by the quick and bold moves of the battalion and armour.
On to Boda and its Capture
Refer to Sketch 3
Pachagarh having been captured and secured, a quick re-grouping of the Brigade was carried out and orders for an advance to Boda and thence to Thakuraon were issued. 12 Raj Rif, with ‘D’ Squadron, 69 Armoured Regiment under command, commenced advance at 1430 hours on 29 November. The enemy, while withdrawing had occupied a delaying position at Maidan Dighi, but since it had been hastily prepared in the face of our rapid advance a quick action by Raj Rif dislodged him from this position by 1500 hours on 30 November 1971. The leading battalion, i.e. 12 Raj Rif, were in good form and pressed home their advantage by continuing their advance on to Boda.
Contact with Boda was established by 0900 hours on 1 December. A quick reconnaissance revealed that it was held by one company. An outflanking move by armour to bypass the position from the West was initiated, with Major General (Maj Gen) Sarkar, Director Operations at HQ Eastern Command and myself on the leading tank. A quick attack by 12 Raj Rif at the same time, dislodged the enemy company, which beat a hasty retreat towards Thakurgaon. The bridge over the Patyaj Nala at Boda was also captured intact – the enemy having been completely surprised by the quick and bold moves of the battalion and armour.
Advance to Thakurgaon and Change of Pak
Brigade Commander
My plan to overcome this position envisaged a full-fledged brigade attack with all available support placed at the disposal of the Rajputs for the initial breakthrough into the enemy’s defences. 7 Maratha LI was to establish a road block with one company astride the Birganj-Thakurgaon Road so that the enemy was not allowed to escape again and the remaining battalion (Marathas) was to act as reserve to 21 Rajput As the battle proceeded, the enemy withdrew, but was not trapped as the road block could not be established. Rajputs suffered some casualties in the action but the town was cleared and occupied by 1200 hours on 3 December.
Refer to Sketch 3
Change of Pak Brigade Commander
As a result of the above-mentioned action, it became impossible for the enemy to stem the tide of advancing 71 Mountain Brigade they decided to replace their Brigade Commander. Brigadier (Brig) Shafi, a logistics officer, reputed to be more aggressive and full of ideas, was placed in command of their forces in the Sector.
Once again, the situation was gauged and a quick reshuffle was carried out, with 21 Rajput now leading the advance, commencing at last light 1 December. It would be pertinent to note that it was one of those rare occasions when an advance to contact was being carried out at night. This was in keeping with the maxim of maintaining relentless pressure on an unbalanced enemy, both by day and by night, so as to keep him off balance in order to prevent his regrouping and reorganising for subsequent resistance to the advancing forces.
With Rajputs in the lead, Marathas ware following and acting as reserve to the Rajputs. The Brigade was blocked for the first time by Pakistani Sappers, when it was discovered that the bridge over Bhuli Nadi had been damaged. Our Sappers, however, quickly constructed a bypass approximately 300om North-east of the damaged bridge.
While the bypass was being constructed, the Brigade Signal Officer picked up a conversation on the existing enemy lines, where the detachment commander of their listening post at road-junction South of own bridge was wondering whether the Indians would attack at night? But, unfortunately, despite my prodding and much against my hope, 21 Rajput did not resume the advance as they were “very tired” and “it was getting dark”. Thus, they missed an excellent opportunity to grab this outpost and capture valuable prisoners, besides denying the Brigade some vital intelligence and an opportunity for early contact with Thakurgaon. Anyway, the advance was resumed at 1400 hours on 2 December and the main defecnces of Thakurgaon were contacted by 1600 hours the same day.
It was reported that Thakurgaon was held by approximately two companies and protected by extensive minefields. The town itself provided in-built potential for defence, as the built-up area could be effectively used for conducting defensive operations. However, being relentlessly pushed by our advancing troops the enemy had been forced into hastily occupying a delaying position here, as a consequence of which the defences were not fully coordinated, thereby reducing the resistance that could be offered. This was a situation tailor-made for a quick, bold and decisive action exploiting the enemy’s weakness.
My plan to overcome this position envisaged a full-fledged brigade attack with all available support
with impunity, the role of the same has been dealt with in the Chapter Air OP Flights.
Air Supremacy.
As the battle at Thakurgaon was closing on that fateful day in December, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike on Indian airfields in Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh etc. But, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was more than prepared to counter, this Israeli type strike. No meaningful results could be achieved by the Pakistanis as our own ‘boys in blue’ retaliated furiously and struck back into Pakistani heartland in the West Pakistan. They then went on to annihilate the enemy air force in East Pakistan, gaining complete air supremacy and leaving the Eastern skies clear of enemy aircrafts.
After seeing the performance and the results achieved by PAF in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) it became clear that Pakistanis had already given up air struggle in the East before the war. There were only some helicopters and about a dozen and half of F-86 Sabres jets, which were mainly operating around Dacca (now Dhaka). The network of various airfields was not activated and as such their air force was not poised for causing damage to the advancing Indian Army.
Mukti Bahini and its operatives were a very big threat and it was not easy to keep the air assets at places not fully guarded. PAF seemed to be more worried about the role of the IAF in the Western Sector and hence had already moved the major part of their air force to that front. The lone Sabre squadron had no decisive role to play. Consequently, IAF had established complete mastery of the skies and as such Indian Army could move without any threats from the enemy’s air force.
My formation did not have much of the problem from PAF and infact our Air OP Flights could operate with impunity, the role of the same has been dealt with in the Chapter Air OP Flights.
hours.
Advance to Kantanagar Bridge
Refer to Sketch 3
Our advance was resumed at 1130 hours on 4 December, with ‘A’ Company, 7 Maratha LI acting as vanguard. It met with four small oppositions, which it cleared – the last one at 1530 hours after covering a distance of 10 km. The Battalion now harboured for the night.
In the evening, information was received through the locals, that a bridge located some 5 km away was held by a platoon of the enemy and had about 18 bunkers across a wide nala.
‘D’ Company 7 Maratha LI was ordered to move cross-country at night, cross the nala, and attack the position from the rear. Captain (Capt) Vijay Patil was the young Company Commander of this Company. The bridge was captured by him intact by 0500 hours. Later, by 0800 hours the same day, rest of the battalion joined this company.
It now resumed the advance with ‘B’ Company as vanguard. At 0900 hours, opposition of about a platoon strength was encountered. The enemy also resorted to heavy, but indiscriminate, artillery and mortar fire. ‘B’ Company maneuvered from a flank and the enemy, anticipating an attack on its position, withdrew. The same company continued the advance and cleared another minor opposition at about 1230 hours.
10
Birganj and Battle of Kantanagar Bridge
Birganj was the next objective enroute to Kantanagar. This was at the junction of four road axes and thereby controlled all Southward movement towards Kantanagar Bridge. It was, therefore, imperative for 7 Maratha LI to clear this town at the earliest. Contact with the enemy was established by leading elements of ‘B’ company at 1600 hours. The battalion moved ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies, to carry out an encirclement. Seeing this quick and bold move with determined action, the enemy withdrew hastily in the fading light. Birganj was thus cleared by 1700 hours on 5 December and advance resumed to Kantanagar bridge, whose capture was expected to be a tough nut to crack because, the enemy, withdrawing under our relentless pressure, had been able to occupy previously constructed defences there.
The Marathas, for their advance to Kantanagar, evolved a plan which entailed the “Battalion less one company” to advance along the axis, and the remaining company with a squadron less two troops of armour to advance further West, across country with a view to conducting an encounter crossing the river nearly 3 km North of Kantanagar Bridge and securing a bridge-head for the remainder of the Brigade.
Advance thus commenced from Birganj at 0800 hours on 6 December. About 3 km short of the objective, the advancing company saw some bricks placed on the road in a uniform pattern. A closer examination revealed that they had been placed there to mark the outer edge of a mine field. Battalion’s Pioneer Platoon went into action and lifted 76 mines in two hours, during daylight under enemy shelling, after which the advance was resumed.
At 0900 hours on 7 December, the assault commenced. By about 1100 hours, a few bunkers had been captured, but both the companies had suffered heavy casualties. The enemy reacted quickly and, besides a counter-attack, brought down very heavy volume of observed artillery, mortar and automatic fire.
The Marathas had crossed the Dhap River from an area North of the bridge during the night of 6/7 December but two subsequent attempts to clear the far bank proved abortive. In spite of persistent efforts by the unit and a number of air strikes on the enemy position success eluded the Marathas. In order to intercept enemy movement and capture prisoners, road blocks were established between Mile 10 and Dinajpur on nights 7/8 and 9/10 December. 12 Raj Rif also carried out a successful long range raid on Dinajpur during night 9/10 December to confirm whether this town was still occupied or not. The force for this raid consisted of two companies and was commanded by Major (Maj) Naresh Chander. Artillery support was provided by a troop of 5.5 inch medium guns.
The main problem arising during this raid was the absence of long range, reliable and portable radio sets on which information could be passed to the Brigade HQ. In spite of providing Radio Set CU734 meant for air support communication to this column, it failed to function satisfactorily during the crucial stages. An agonising wait for the completion of the mission thus ensued.
Finally, at 1530 hours on 10 December, the column returned with the information that 26 Frontier Force was holding the town and a troop of tanks was also in location. The raid party however brought back a number of Pak prisoners and weapons, thus setting up the morale boosting stage for a change in plans to break the impasse and capture the Kantanagar bridge.
Battle of Kantanagar Bridge (Sketches 3 & 6)
Around midday, ‘C’ Company of the unit contacted enemy defences across the river with the bridge having been completely destroyed. The company suffered some casualties and any move forward drew heavy and accurate fire. They, therefore, firmed in and started the process of gaining more information.
From information available with ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies, it was appreciated that the enemy opposing the Battalion consisted of the battered remains of 34 Punjab, reinforced by a large number of Razakars. A plan for attack was then made, fire plan was initiated at the appointed time and the Battalion formed up amidst enemy fire. ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies were given the task to attack, while ‘B’ Company was kept in reserve.
At ogoo hours on 7 December, the assault commenced. By about 1100 hours, a few bunkers had been captured, but both the companies had suffered heavy casualties. The enemy reacted quickly and, besides a
ci ilupuu
uppuunku 11 iu – Birganj (also denying the axis from the town of Khansama)
• 12 Raj Rif
Change in Plans
Refer to Sketch 3
A stalemate was setting in and I was getting little restive. Two attacks had been launched on Kantanagar Bridge but the desired results were not achieved. And though our overall losses were not serious some casualties had certainly been suffered. The Marathas had made valiant efforts to capture the bridge and it was now considered futile to launch any further attacks. At the stage three courses presented to me:
• Bypass the bridge. • Enter Dinajpur from the North and secure it with the help of 20 Mountain Division, operating
against the town from the South.
• Switch own forces to the East towards Khansama.
The last course was adopted and ultimately proved to be right.
At this stage the deployment of my Brigade was:
• 7 Maratha LI • 21 Rajput • 12 Raj Rif
– Kantanagar Bridge – Opposite Mile 10 – Birganj (also denying the axis from the town of Khansama)
12
•
The flanking attack was being planned very near the river line, thus restricting room for maneouvre.
Capture of Khansama and Ichhamati River
• Three companies were to be used in the assault with only one in reserve.
Refer to Sketch 7
Khansama was located East of the Bhuri Tista River, which was a major obstacle for the attacking troops. It was heavily mined on three sides and well fortified with shell-proof bunkers. The position was strongly held by Pak troops with a group of 48 Punjab consisting of 153 Regulars and 78 Razakars. Apart from its normal complement of automatic weapons it was supported by field and medium artillery, 82 mm Mortars and heavy machine guns. The enemy had also made full use of the built-up area of Khansama to strengthen his defences which had been very well coordinated.
• Tanks were not being used at all. • As the unit was required to check the routes up to a certain point only no information had
been obtained about the enemy or about the ground beyond that point. The unit seemed to be relying on bookish tactical knowledge and also, for some unknown reason, appeared to be hidebound to launching only a night attack, In such an environment, the overall situation and the urgency of defeating the enemy at the earliest because of international pressures had to be taken into account. This was impressed upon the Commanding Officer and remedial measures were promptly instituted, Plans to assault the position from the South-east, or, rear were suggested to him and it was emphasised that a daylight attack would be carried out as it had more advantages.
Ingredients of final outline plan emerging after discussion were:
On 11 December, 21 Rajput was ordered to capture Khansama, which denied the subsidiary axis to Saidpur, by first light of 14 December. There were 11 Officers, 15 JCOs and 683 OR available in the Battalion and, in addition, the following supporting arms were allotted to them:
• Armour
– 7x PT-76 tanks.
• Securing a crossing place on Bhuri Tista River by one company by first light 13 December. • Ensuring security of Forming-up Plance (FUP) near Govindpur by one company. • In Phase 1, capturing initial objective by two companies by 1200 hours 13 December.
In Phase 2, capturing subsequent depth objectives by one company by 1300 hours 13 December.
• Artillery
– In direct support – In Support – Air
– 983 Mountain Battery. – 98 Mountain Regiment less 983 Mountain Battery. – Two sorties of Hunter aircraft on 13 December.
Based on reconnaissance carried out and available information of the enemy, as well as the ground, the crossing site was selected South of Khansama where Dhepa Nala and Atrai Nala join together and run as the Bhuri Tista River. In the prevailing overall situation and keeping the urgency of defeating the enemy at the earliest, particularly when, over the past few days, we had already snatched the initiative from his hands, I was keen on an early attack to press home the advantage we had by now gained by our relentless action.
• In Phase 3, exploitation up to Jahangirpur on the far bank of the Nala running East of
Khansama by one company. • Using seven PT-76 tanks initially in fire support role and subsequently to block enemy routes
of withdrawal South-west of Khansama. • Air strike of two sorties at 0900 hours 13 December.
Orders were given to the Rajputs for capture of Khansama. They planned to attack either by day on 13 December, or, by night 13/14 December. When the plans made by them were, however, discussed on 12 December, it was found that –
Thus, as planned earlier, 21 Rajput moved back on 12 December from the area of road block and concentrated at Birganj by 2100 hours. ‘C’ Company under Maj MS Malik, moved out at 2300 hours and secured a crossing place on the Bhuri Tista River by 0300 hours on 13 December. Rest of the battalion crossed over as scheduled by 0530 hours and dug in to avoid casualties likely to be caused by enemy shelling. When the complete battalion was on the other side of the river, D Company under Maj RDS Chauhan was sent to secure the FUP 1000 yards South of Khansama near Gobindpur. The Company did not meet any opposition. At 0915 hours on 13 December, our aircraft (two sorties) engaged the objective.
1000 yards to the East held by two companies of 48 Punjab under the second-in-command of the battalion. (This last fact came to light only after the battle had started). This was the enemy’s last defensive position before Saidpur, on axis Pachagarh – Saidpur. He, therefore, made a last ditch stand here and fought tenaciously. Hand-to-hand fight at this position and the casualties suffered by him are a testimony to the ferocity of the battle that raged here.
0930 hours, all available artillery fire was brought down on the enemy while our battalion was forming up. The enemy was by now alive to the situation.
At 1000 hours the battalion attack was launched through the enemy mine field, with A company on the left and B Company to its right. Initially the attack progressed with full momentum, but when the situation became clear to the enemy, he gave a determined fight form every bunker and built-up area. Both the companies had received a heavy dose of shelling in the FUP itself and the subsequent attack was required to be executed through the enemy’s well-coordinated and interlocked screen of light, medium and heavy machine gun fire.
At this critical stage of battle, there was every possibility of the attack petering out, but the company and platoon commanders, by their personal example, maintained aggressive spirit amongst the troops and attack proceeded with the desired momentum. Having overrun the first line of enemy defences, the companies had to clear the enemy from the built-up area.
This involved hand-to-hand fighting and decentralisation of control down to section level. During this phase of attack, it was heartening to see some valiant and laudable individual acts of courage and bravery. Phase 1 of the battalion attack was over as per plan by 1200 hours.
The Rajputs then launched their c Company in Phase 2 from the North-east, firstly to clear Khansama from that direction and secondly, to block the enemy’s route of withdrawal. Though A and B Companies had established a strong foot-hold on the initial objectives, C Company had to fight fiercely throughout in the built-up area. By 1330 hours, Phase 2 was completed. During this phase again there were some inspiring individual acts of gallantry.
At 1330 hours, in Phase 3, D Company carried out exploitation up to Jahangirpur under enemy’s intense artillery shelling and through widely scattered nuisance mines.
The fall of Khansama unbalanced the enemy, and he had to denude the defences at Dinajpur in order to either recapture Khansama or reinforce Saidpur. As for us, its capture helped not only in opening a new axis of advance for capturing Saidpur, but also to maintain the momentum of advance.
Capture of Ichhamati River (Sketches 7 & 8)
12 Raj Rif now took over for the Battle of Ichhamati River.
Saidpur was an important cantonment in East Pakistan; and Ichhamati River was a major obstacle across the line of advance of our Brigade from Khansama to Saidpur. The enemy had prepared strong and well fortified defences along this river. These defences consisted of two well co-ordinated and mutually supporting company defended localities – one at Ichhamati and the other at Kharkaria, approximately 1000 yards to the East held by two companies of 48 Punjab under the second-in-command of the
After the capture of Khansama on 13 December by 21 Rajput, the battalion was ordered to spearhead the advance of 71 Mountain Brigade Group on axis Khansama-Darwani-Road Junction-Saidpur. The plan was to invest Saidpur from the North-east along this road, and from the East along the Rangpur-Saidpur Road. The battalion was allotted the following troops for its advance:
In view of the situation that had arisen, 21 Rajput turned in at Area Mile 10 to obtain detailed information about the enemy dispositions and terrain, and a deliberate attack was planned in two phases as follows:
(a) Phase 1: Capture Area Bridge by D Company.
Phase 2: Capture Area 13r by C Company.
Reserve: B Company for both phases. (b) A Company less a platoon was to fix the axis and provide close fire support by observation. (c) D Squadron less three troops and one platoon ex A Company were to move behind the
enemy across Ichhamati River and engage enemy located astride the Bridge and in Area Masjid. Remainder armour was to assist A Company in fixing the axis.
• Under Command
– ‘D’Squadron (ad hoc) less two troops,
– 69 Armoured Regiment (7xPT-76 tanks). • In Direct Support
– 98 Mountain Regiment less one battery. – 54 Mountain Regiment less two batteries.
– Troop 5.5 inch medium guns, ex 46 Medium Regiment. • Air
– Three close support sorties on demand.
– Air OP(helicopter-borne) on demand. The advance commenced from area Bridge on Khansama-Darwani Road at 1600 hours on 13 December with A Company 21 Rajput acting as vanguard. No opposition was met till 1400 hours on 14 December. As the leading elements of vanguard and armour emerged from the trees, they came under heavy automatic and anti-tank fire from across the bridge on Ichhamati River. The vanguard immediately fixed the axis and the plan for capture of Ichhamati position was made. From the intensity and type of fire and extent of the enemy deployment it was assessed that he was occupying the position with approximately one company supported by a troop of tanks. The enemy was well entrenched in fortified bunkers and, therefore, a frontal attack was not considered feasible. (This was also confirmed later by the prisoners who were captured and those who surrendered before the battalion at Saidpur.)
As certain localities could not be seen from the ground, it was necessary to have these registered with the help of Air OP. In addition, time was required for B Company to secure the FUP, which entailed an approach march over difficult and boggy terrain. Keeping these considerations in mind, the H hour was fixed for 1100 hours. However, in view of the speed, required and on my instructions, it was advanced by one hour and fixed at 1000 hours.
A quick attack by the battalion was planned from the North, but they were ordered not to proceed with it for the following reasons:
The attack was launched by D Company in Phase 1 as scheduled. Enemy offered stiff resistance and fought tenaciously. However, area Bridge was captured intact in a swift action. The ferocity of attack unnerved the enemy so much that he beat a hasty retreat from his depth locality too, to occupy his other position at Kharkharia. Thus, the second phase of attack was not required. However, the Rajputs had to fight another battle at Kharkharia after a short advance, which they did successfully. Even though we lost two tanks, the objectives were captured by the battalion by 1700 hours. Quick and decisive action after the first battalion attack greatly assisted the unit in the capture of this location. Complete surprise was achieved and the enemy was caught off guard.
(a) Our mountain guns were out of range as they had not yet been able to cross the Bhuri Tista
River because our Engineers were still in the process of constructing a floating bridge on
it after the capture of Khansama. (b) Our Air OP had reported the movement of an enemy column in the area of Pakerhat, about
10 km to the South of Ichhamati. This column was reported to be heading towards Khansama and threatened the Southern flank of the bridge. To counter this movement, I moved 5 Grenadiers who had been placed under command on 14 December to intercept the column and, thereafter, move South along track Pakerhat-Sutipar-Oarwani Railway Station to protect the Southern flank of Raj Rif.
It would be of interest to note that besides the lightening speed of attack, a ruse played on the enemy greatly assisted in diverting his attention. A, B and C Companies were moving to their FUPs when a platoon of ‘A’company was pushed out in assault formation from the firm base and astride the road. This platoon drew heavy automatic fire from the enemy and diverted his attention, besides this, the assault by D Company in Phase 2 astride the road axis had misled the enemy as to the size of the force attacking them. It was later confirmed from the Pakistani Prisoners of War (PsOW) that they had given up the objective for the following reasons:
(a) Their battalion second-in-command, Maj MA Saeed had been killed.
infantry action, leading to the final capture of this position.
of attack; thus, when the attack from the North built up, they were caught off guard. (c) Assault by one company in Phase 2, astride the axis had misled them as to the quantum of
force attacking them and they thought that a whole brigade had attacked them.
(d) They were sensitive to the move of 5 Grenadiers to Darwani Railway Station and could not
comprehend what our real intentions were.
The enemy armour coming alive at a late stage caused considerable anxiety to us, especially when the size of our meager armour had already been reduced due to direct hits received by our two tanks resulting in their complete destruction. Our armour was at a further disadvantage because the enemy’s Chaffe tanks had a better gun and extra protection for the crew compared to ours, even though our tanks were more manoeuverble. In this scenario, the capture of a complete troop of Chaffe tanks of Pak 69 Cavalry was no mean achievement. The problems posed by the enemy armour were quickly solved by bold and resolute infantry action, leading to the final capture of this position.
PART II
13
The Exploits of 71 Mountain Brigade
Advance to Saidpur
Enemy concentrations were engaged by the IAF and medium guns, from 1000 hours onwards on 14 December, at 1400 hours the enemy started withdrawing. 5 Grenadiers, who had come under my command at 0800 hours on 14 December, were ordered to occupy Dangapara and advance along axis Dangapara-Darwani-Saidpur. This protected the Southern flank of the main advance. They reached Darwani Railway Station at 1600 hours. 21 Rajput now took over from 12 Raj Rif and they reached Darwani by 1000 hour on 15 December.
In the scenario, the capture of a complete troop of Chaffe tanks of Pak 69 Cavalry was the achievement to celebrate. The problems posed by the enemy armour were quickly solved by bold and resolute Infantry action, which became the final capture of this position.
14
roads existing in the battle zone then, they may not have the required stores at the right place and time. Similarly, if the logistics people have not been able to analyse correctly the state of the roads and the local resources available, they may find that the initial build up for the battle may not meet the requirements of the fighting elements, thereby unbalancing them and jeopardising the success of operations. This would be applicable not only for the initial build up before the commencement of a battle, but also during the battle itself.
In evaluating the ground, some commanders may have a natural eye for ground’, while some others may have developed it over the years through training and practice. Whatever be a particular commander’s trait, the need for this ‘eye for ground cannot be over-emphasised. I have deliberately laid stress on this aspect, as this book is addressed to the relatively junior set of officers.
In my experience of nearly 36 years of army service, I have found this quality sadly lacking in our junior and middle rung leadership – the ones who deliver the goods in war. I myself had followed the old but very reliable method that was advocated by Field Marshal Slim. It is a very simple division of the ground into three parts, viz, Near Distance, Middle Distance, and Far Distance. These parts are then studied individually and subsequently this study is combined to form an overall picture. It is primarily a mental study but some notes, sketches, and annotations supplementing the information available in maps will help.
The Area of Operations
With this as the prelude, I intend presenting the reader with a broad spectrum analysis of Bangladesh as a whole, and a detailed analysis of the area of operations of 71 Mountain Brigade.
Bangladesh Rivers & Towns (Refer to Sketch 11)
Soldiers – to be precise, commanders – at all levels of the army are constantly required to carry out an evaluation of the terrain over which their troops will be required to operate. The study of ground is an all important factor for the final and successful outcome in any battle whatever be the level, from the lowliest rifle section to the highest Army levels. It must also be remembered that an evaluation of the ground cannot be done on any mathematical basis by calculators or computers. Nor can a reliable assessment be obtained by putting it into a balance and weighing it against another known quantity. Terrain analysis is a systematic and logical process, but it is based on many and varied factors – a large number of which are fairly nebulous. Complete, correct, and reliable data is very rarely available to commanders for carrying out a totally reliable assessment. The reasons are not far to see – the maps may be outdated, having missed out the development and construction done by human agencies to alter the lie of the ground; or the information provided may not have been obtained by a “practised military eye” and analysed by a similar military mind. It, therefore, becomes imperative that before and during military operations, of whatever size they may be, information on the terrain has to be constantly collected and integrated into the available information for developing a reliable mosaic of the area of operations in order to assist commanders in their overall planning and the subsequent execution of operations.
The needs of all the integral components of the army are different and commanders, therefore, must be aware of these and analyse the ground accordingly. Errors may lead to an incorrect and injudicious employment of available resources which are always limited. For example, if armour is employed on ground unsuitable for it, the results may be disastrous, or if infantry alone has been employed where armour could have done the job, thus adversely tilting the scales of battle. This can be further supplemented by the fact that if crest clearances have not been correctly obtained by the artillery, the crucial artillery fire support required at a critical juncture of a battle may not be available; or if the engineers have not correctly gauged the gaps to be covered by them during the battle and the state of the
In general terms, it can be said that Bangladesh is typical riverine terrain, having a number of major rivers which spread out their tributaries like tentacles all over the country. During the monsoon, all these rivers are in spate, flooding the countryside and making cross-country movement practically impossible. Even during the dry season, the large number of water obstacles preclude the use of massed armour. Operations, therefore, have to be infantry-oriented. As dictated by the grain of the country, all the rivers flow from North to South into the Bay of Bengal and consequently, it would be prudent to conduct military operations in the North-South direction. The entire country is plain except for some hilly areas in Comilla Chittagong, and Sylhet in the East. Bangladesh is bounded by Meghalaya in the North, the Mizo and Lushai hills in the East; the Southern part of Bangladesh juts into the Bay of Bengal, and in the West are the plains of West Bengal.
As for rivers, Bangladesh has three major rivers which divide the country into four parts. These are the Padma (Ganga), Brahmaputra (Jamuna) and the Meghna. The Padma, after flowing through India, enters Bangladesh, as also the Brahmaputra which, after flowing through Assam, enters Bangladesh. The
Sketch-11: Bangladesh
JAUAGURI
Meghna, too, has its origin in North-eastern India and thereafter flows into Bangladesh assuming fairly gigantic proportions. All these rivers are very wide and have shifting channels within them, thus constituting major water obstacles for any invading force which would require large quantities of rivercrossing equipment supplemented by helicopters for the successful conduct of operations in the country. The rivers also act as major communication life lines for Bangladesh. A large number of river-craft ply over these rivers providing a means of transportation for people and goods. Naturally, trade and commerce in Bangladesh is heavily dependent on its rivers and their tributaries, as the road communications are not adequately developed.
GO PARLBBAJU PUTRA B GAUHAT
TV
SALLONG
MAL’PUR
BOGRC
MENSING
IMPHAL
(d) The North-western Sector
The Central Sector
Before the 1947 partition, the rail and road communication systems of Bangladesh hinged primarily on Calcutta, with Chittagong acting as a relatively less important communication centre. The prime reason for this was that being a part of India, the road and rail systems were also a part of the existing Indian system, with Dacca a relatively less important district town.
After partition, however, Dacca was developed and it became the political capital of East Pakistan as well as the most important communication hub for the country. Life in East Pakistan, therefore, revolved round Dacca, with the other cities and towns assuming the role of satellites. Dacca was, therefore, the most important military objective for our invading force. The entire communication system was, however, ignored by Pakistan and remained under-developed. The prime reason for this was the ‘coloured attitude’ of the Western wing towards its Eastern counterpart. The roads all over the country, particularly in the border regions, remained poor. The railways were also in a similar state. It must be remembered that Dacca, though linked with all the important towns of Bangladesh, cannot be reached by road from any direction without crossing a water obstacle, at one place or the other. As a foil to Calcutta, Chalna was developed as an important river port along with Chittagong.
At the time of operations, the rather under-developed rail system had a major broad gauge line linking the South-western and North-western regions with Calcutta through the Hardinge Bridge. This line then continued into the Indian border town of Jalpaiguri. Some metre gauge routes linked this major trunk line with other smaller towns and ferry sites mainly on the Brahmaputra. Reconstruction of the Hardinge Bridge became the prime task for Indian Sappers at the termination of operations in Bangladesh.
In the North, this sector is bounded by Meghalaya and Tripura, while the Brahmaputra and Meghna defined its Eastern and Western limits. In the South lay Dacca with Tangail, Jamalpur, and Mymensing has the other important communication centres dominating the approaches into Dacca. The roads from Jamalpur and Mymensing converged on Tangail, with all the roads following the grain of the country. There was only one major obstacle to be crossed for launching operations against Dacca, but this was the second longest approach to Dacca.
The road and rail network on the Indian side (West Bengal) was fairly well developed, with Calcutta and Siliguri being the important communication centres. These two cities were used for controlling all movements all the other important roads inside could be linked with roads on the Indian side. Meghalaya and Tripura, however, provided rather poor communication systems on the Indian side. The broad gauge railhead of Gauhati was far away and was linked with Lumding as well as Dharmanagar by a narrow gauge line. This line had a very poor carrying capacity, and the rolling stock, too, was rather ancient.
Tripura and Meghalaya are the least developed of Indian states even today. Local transport and other sources were practically non-existent. The road systems were poor and limited in number; as these were only designed for meeting the limited traffic generated by the tea gardens in the region. The Indian side, therefore, had to overcome numerous problems while carrying out its build up prior to operations in Bangladesh.
The other important towns of Sylhet, Comilla and Akhaura were linked with the railway line starting from Chittagong which ran nearly parallel to the international boundary at a number of places. Chittagong was also linked with Dacca, as well as the other important towns and cities of Bangladesh. The roads and railways, though running parallel and close to the Indian border, were not linked with these systems on the Indian side for reasons political rather than prudence. During operations in Bangladesh, these links had to be created to facilitate the movement of forces advancing into Bangladesh. This, in turn, involved a great deal of planning and positioning of engineer stores as well as plant.
The saving grace, however, was the fact that a complex of modern airfields were available at Calcutta, Siliguri and Gauhati, from where the IAF could provide tactical as well as logistical support to Indian troops operating in the Northern and Western sectors of Bangladesh. As events proved, the air force had a major role to play in the final successful outcome of the Indian blitzkrieg in East Pakistan.
The Eastern Sector
This book will be primarily concerned with the North-western sector; yet it would be appropriate to have a cursory glance at the other sectors so as to understand the country. Bangladesh could be divided into:
(a) The Central Sector (b) The Eastern Sector (c) The South-western Sector
The Eastern Sector was the farthest from the urban and developed areas of Bengal. The communications system in this sector was the poorest, and the road links with bases in India were the least developed and, therefore, the poorest. On the other hand, it provided the shortest approach to Dacca, the capital city and pivot of Pakistani defences. The terrain in this area is generally flat, but some areas in Sylhet, the Lalmai Hills, and in the Chittagong tracts are hilly. These areas also had a number of tea gardens which provided cover to an invading force, but the numerous tracts inside these gardens could make navigation a nightmare. This sector is bounded by Meghalaya on the North, Tripura, Mizoram and some Burmese areas on the East; the Bay of Bengal is located in the South, and in the West the Meghna
river flowed.
Comilla happened to be the most important communications centre, linked with Dacca by rail and Daudkandi by road. Important rail and road links were also available with Sylhet, Chandpur, and Chittagong. The capture of Comilla would open up two important road links leading to Daudkandi and Chandpur for crossing the Meghna. Dacca would, then, be the next objective.
non-availability of local resources. This, in turn, adds on to the overall logistic requirements of the troops positioned on the North-eastern borders. As result an extremely heavy flow of road and rail traffic passes through the Siliguri corridor in support of the civilian population and troops in the North-eastern region. This flow is further augmented by the requirements of the air force which has airfields, air bases and command as well as control formations located in the region. The air force provides a vital lifeline for the army in the North-east, for which its own requirements have to be met through the ground support systems, failing which, logistics support for the army could be seriously jeopardised.
The communication in this sector could be linked up with the road system on the Indian side with relative ease because of the fact the pre-partition road and rail systems linked Chittagong with Silchar in India running parallel as well as in close proximity to the border. The major rail system comprised the metre gauge line running from Akhaura to Mymensing and thence onto Dacca. The bridge at Ashuganj was not decked for road traffic.
The South-western Sector
The Padma (Ganga) forms the Northern extremity of this sector and it also defines its Eastern limit. The Bay of Bengal is in the South and in the West the Indian Border runs along Sakhira, Kaliganj and Krishnagar. The Madhumati river also flows through this sector.
The second shortest approach to Dacca was available through this sector along Magura which controlled all the road links to Dacca. It provided access to the ferry across the Madhumati river and controlled the ferries at Faridpur and Goalundo Ghat. In addition to Jessore and Jhenida, Magura was the other important communication centres till this sector. Jessore had a very large military cantonment besides an airfield and it controlled road communications to the Port of Chalna and Dacca. Before partition, Jessore was also linked with Calcutta and Krishnagar in India, both by road and rail. This sector was the closest to Calcutta which could act as the logistics base for an invading force launching a thrust towards Jessore and thence on to Dacca.
The North-western Sector (Sketch 12)
The hunting grounds of 33 Corps, ably led by Lt Gen ML Thapan and 71 Mountain Brigade lay in this sector where the Pakistan Army was battered, mauled, and forced to surrender. The strategic significance of this sector cannot be over emphasised. The vital and all-important Siliguri corridor was located adjacent to this sector. The sensitivity of the Siliguri corridor can be gauged by the fact that all vital road and rail communications linking North-eastern India with the hinterland passed through this corridor. A very large proportion of the Indian Army is deployed on the North-eastern borders; and the communication systems passing through Siliguri are the very lifeline of troops stationed on these borders facing the omnipresent Chinese. The importance of logistics support passing through this corridor is further heightened by the fact that the entire North-eastern region is under-developed, which implies the
Sketch-12: The North-western Sector
at the North-western sector.
SILIGURI
The North-western sector comprised the districts of Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra, Pabna and Rajshahi covering nearly one-third of East Pakistan. The Brahmaputra and Padma practically isolated this sector from the rest of East Pakistan except for the all-important Hardinge Bridge, which linked it with the South-western sector. This sector, however, provided the longest approach to Dacca, involving the crossing of a large number of water obstacles including the forbidding Brahmaputra river.
TITUL
PACHAGARH
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N
DOMARI
THAKURGAON KHAN SAMA DARWAN BIRGANJ
RANGPO SALDPUB
TISAK
BRAHMAPUTR
KANTA NAGAR
OINTIPUR
PHULBARI SÁMJALNAYABGANJ PIRGAN
SHARKAIB HADURIA
PATIRAM WEST BALURGILAT BENGAL
GOBINDGANTI PATNITOLA
L MALDA?
HETALII BOGRAPGABALI
In addition to the Siliguri corridor and the Chumbi valley, the other areas of tactical significance were Malda, and the narrow waistline linking Hilli with Gaibanda. Malda, which lies further South, could provide access to the nearly complete and controversial Farakka Barrage. Destruction of this barrage, with Malda as the take-off point, could have serious economic and psychological repercussions in India. Right in the middle of this sector lay the Hilli-Gaibanda axis which is linked up with the Phulchari ferry on the Brahmaputra. A thrust along this axis could divide the sector into two, cutting off reinforcements and upsetting the logistics support.
Most of the rivers in this sector flow from the North to the South, which also determines the general lie of the land as well as the course of operations that are required to be conducted in this area. The important rivers are Depa, West of Dinajpur; Brahmaputra, East of Hilli, Mahanadi, Icchamati, and the Karatoya, West of Saidpur. The entire sector is interspersed with numerous nalas which form water obstacles.
The main all-weather high way runs from Titalya right through to Bera Ferry opposite Dacca, passing through the towns of Thakurgaon, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Bogra, Pabna, and onto Bera Ferry. Lateral roads link up Bera with Nawabganj and Rajshahi. Another road runs from Dinajpur to Phulbari, and a subsidiary road leads upto Hilli via Charkhai. The important towns of Jalpaiguri, Siliguri, Bongaigon, and the airfield at Bagdogra on Indian ride were connected to the border areas by a fairly good road network.
DHL!
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***
NAOGAONE NAWABGANJ
F
SIRAJGANJ
PADMAR
KRAJSHAHI LINATOR
BERA
PABNA
With particular reference to the area of operations of 71 Mountain Brigade (refer to Sketch 3), I would like to highlight the fact that the main highway taking off from Titalya connected the townships and towns of Amarkhana, Jagdalhat, Pachagarh, Maidandighi, Boda, Thakurgaon, Birganj, and Dinajpur. This was the most important highway in the area of operations of 71 Mountain Brigade, providing an important North-South axis of advance as well as thrust for the ultimate capture of Dinajpur. This axis also followed the North-South grain of the land and would thus facilitate operations of the Brigade. It was a class nine all-weather road upto Dinajpur, capable of sustaining fairly adequate two-way traffic of load carrying vehicles. This road runs practically parallel to the Karatoya river and the Tangan Nala right upto Birganj. An advancing force does not, therefore, have to cross any major water obstacle till Birganj. The highway after Thakurgaon is a fully metalled two-way class nine road, with a number of laterals connecting it to other communication centres in the region. The other important road took off from Lakhipur, on the Indian side, and linked up Madhupur as well as Thakurgaon. Similarly, further to the East the road from
This sector is bounded in the East by the Brahmaputra and in the South by the Padma, while the border defines the Western and Northern extremities of this sector. The Chumbi valley in Tibet is close to this sector, and any collusive operations by China and Pakistan could be gainfully conducted in this area with the aim of cutting off the Siliguri corridor.
As 71 Mountain Brigade had operated in this sector, it would be pertinent to have a more detailed look
of tanks. Light armour and other tracked vehicles could, therefore, be utilised for conducting operations in this area in the winter of 1971.
The small townships, towns, and important communication centres were situated on the main highways taking off from Titalya and Haldibari.
Haldibari, in India, linked Domar, Nilphamari, and Saidpur. From Saidpur, a fully metalled lateral road linked up with the main Titalya highway leading on to Dinajpur.
The road network in the area of operations is fairly extensive, with most of the major highways interconnected with a large number of laterals. Village tracts further supplemented the road network. All these roads, however, were not in a good state of repair. While the large number of roads and tracks would facilitate the movement and switching of forces, the state of maintenance made such moves timeconsuming, which was not in the overall interest of speed as well as the maintenance of momentum during an advance into this part of East Pakistan.
The rail network, on the other hand was very sparse. The Pakistan Eastern Railway main line (broad gauge) also commenced from Haldibari, linking Domar, Nilphamari, Saidpur, Parbatipur, and Phulbari in the South. Between Jalpaiguri and Haldibari, this was a metre gauge railway, which implied a limited carrying capacity for providing logistics support to the troops operating in this sector. This was further accentuated by the fact that the location of this railway line required the capture of large areas inside East Pakistan before it could be used – and Nilphamari, in this case, was not an important military objective. The conversion of this railway line into broad gauge from Haldibari Southwards also posed the problem of bringing up suitable rolling stock from the Indian side unless sufficient Pakistani rolling stock was captured. The other metre gauge railway line; in this area, connected Madhupur, Thakurgaon, Bachaganj, Dinajpur and Parbatipur. This limited capacity railway line was about 15 km away from the Indian border and the nearest Indian railway station was at Islampur, another 40 km away. It could not, therefore, be linked up with the Indian railway system for use by the Indian army. All logistic support for 71 Mountain Brigade was, therefore, entirely dependent on the road network that existed in the area of operations.
The Karatoya river formed one of the major water obstacles in the area of operations of 71 Mountain Brigade. Luckily, however, it followed a North-South direction and would have to be tackled much later during the course of operations. In the North, in the area of Pachagarh, it was a narrow rivulet becoming progressively broader in its Southward course. At ‘Khansama, it becomes a major water obstacle with a tributary joining from side of Birganj. A number of its other tributaries branch off towards Dinajpur. These triliutaries constitute fairly significant water obstacles protecting Dinajpur. In the West, the Tangan Nala, flowing parallel to the Pachagarh Thakurgaon road and the Indian border, is a partial tank obstacle. Between Mirajpur and Thakurgaon, it is fairly narrow and can be bridged anywhere. South of Thakurgaon this nala becomes broader. During the dry season, the Karatoya river and Tangan Nala do not have much water and can, therefore, be crossed with ease by tracked vehicles.
The area of operations of 71 Mountain Brigade was flat and open, interspersed with a number of ‘nalas’ as well as the two water obstacles – Karatoya River, and Tangan Nala. The water level being insignificant, the movement of armoured vehicles was not hindered at that time of the year. The paddy crops had also ripened or had been harvested, which made the ground firmer, thereby improving the overall movement
In the North, the townships of Amarkhana, Jagdalhat, and Pachagarh were located close to the Indian border. Amarkhana and Jagdalhat were in the narrow neck which jutted into India, with Titalya and Phulbari at the other extremity of this neck. Both these small towns were near the Titalya highway controlling all North-South movements. They, therefore, had to be the initial objectives of 71 Mountain Brigade advancing Southwards. Pachagarh also was located very close to the Indian border, and a number of lateral roads converged onto it. Pachagarh was the first important focal point in the path of 71 Mountain Brigade. It controlled the North-South movement as well as the East-West movement to Berubari and Atwari respectively.
Similarly, in the centre, Boda also occupied a pivotal position with laterals leading to Raniganj, Bakshiganj and to Thakurgaon on the main North-South highway. The capture of Boda and Bhuli-Nadi would open an axis of advance to Thakurgaon. After Thakurgaon, the road network towards the South became more extensive, thus offering a better choice of options to an advancing, force. Thakurgaon itself had a fairly large built-up area and would require a concerted effort on the part of 71 Mountain Brigade to overwhelm it.
In the South, Birganj, located astride the main highway was another important communication centre. It controlled all movements towards Bachaganj, Khansama, and Saidpur. The importance of these two towns lay in the fact that these were located on a lateral road which, if followed, would allow the bypassing of Nilphamari and would facilitate an out-flanking move against Dinajpur.
Having looked at the genesis of the conflict and the area of operations, with particular reference to the operations of 71 Mountain Brigade, it would now be appropriate to consider the strategies followed by the opposing sides. The need for such a review becomes pertinent due to the fact that operations of all Formations are ultimately dovetailed into the overall strategy that is formulated at the higher echelons.
military aid. She also joined the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) pacts, while India chose the path of peace and non-alignment. Pakistan also befriended an unfriendly regional power, China, to oppose India, and also developed special relations with the Islamic Nations to seek financial help for oiling its war machine.
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Militarily, Pakistan had a strategic disadvantage, because both its wings were widely separated and she could not, therefore, switch forces quickly from either of those wings. Pakistan chose to develop the Western wing militarily to follow its policy of confrontation with India. Its decisive strength was located there. East Pakistan, at that time, was ignored and only a token force of one division, comprising four brigades, was located in the East. India, on the other hand, had a strategic advantage which allowed her to switch forces along interior lines and to cut off Pakistani movement by land, sea, and air. Both sides, however, had plans for the western wing primarily, and as the situation deteriorated between March and December 1971, plans for the Eastern wing were formulated.
The Opposing Sides: Plans and Prospects
The Plans
“A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”.
-Walter Lipmann
“I earnestly desire peace… I will be the last person to start a war, but if war is thrust upon us, we are prepared to fight in defence of our
freedom and our ideals”.
-Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi (A public address in
Calcutta on December 3, 1971)
Every nation, be it small or large, great or insignificant, seeks to maintain its entity, self-respect, and pride. These very needs of a nation in comparison with those of another may give rise to a conflict primarily due to the fact that perspectives, based on self-interest, are bound to differ which, in turn, would lead to a clash of interests. Clausewitz has amplified this very fact by stating: “War is not an act performed by the military men alone but is an expression of the conflict of ideas, objects, and the way of life of an entire society with those of another society”.
These conflicts, when left unresolved through diplomacy or political means, give rise to surcharged emotions and an increase in tensions leading to an explosive release of violence for settling the issue once for all. Since March till December 3, 1971, when war finally broke out on the sub-continent, this was the state of affairs.
Lt Gen Niazi was well aware of the strategic disadvantages conferred on him by his position in East Pakistan. He knew that he could be blockaded and isolated from the Western wing and that he should be prepared to fight without logistic support or reinforcements from West Pakistan. He was also correct in his assessment that the IAF would be able to gain complete mastery of the skies. This implied that his forces would be extremely vulnerable to an Indian air action and that his entire communications system would be paralysed by the IAF and the Mukti Bahini guerillas.
Niazi, after carefully analysing and assessing the situation, determined that there were three options open to him. First, to deploy all along the borders and thereafter gradually to with draw behind the major rivers to defend the Dacca Bowl. This, in turn, implied a dispersion of his forces into penny packets with little or no reserve. This dispersal of forces would check minor Indian incursions or infiltrations, but it would allow the Indians to concentrate her forces at selected points of decision. An added disadvantage was posed by the fact that any lack of reserves would completely curb Niazi’s ability to restore a difficult situation, thus inhibiting his overall flexibility. At the same time, the thin crust of defences along the borders, once penetrated, would allow the Indian army a free run upto the important nodal points within East Pakistan and thence on to Dacca – the pivot of defences in East Pakistan and its capital city.
Since the very inception of India and Pakistan, their relations had been based on ever-increasing jealousy and antagonism provoked by a smaller and economically weaker Pakistan. Pakistan never realised that India is economically very much bigger in size. Nonetheless, she chose to follow a path of confrontation with India, based on very narrow religious concepts. In order to maintain this confrontation and in her quest for power, Pakistan chose to align herself with the USA and China, seeking economic and
The second course available to Niazi was to deploy his forces concentrated for the defence of Dacca and its environs, i.e., the Dacca Bowl, which would determine the overall results of the war and the fate of East Pakistan. Such a course had the obvious disadvantage of allowing the Indian army free access right into the hinterland of East Pakistan and Dacca itself. The other implication that arose from this course was that this adoption would mean the surrender of large tracts of East Pakistani territory with little or no fight; and if a stalemate occurred, the Bangladesh Government in exile would come into the country and
gain control over a major portion which, in turn, would mean a boost in the morale of the local populace and the Mukti Bahini, who would, then be strengthened in their resolve to continue the struggle against the West Pakistani occupation forces. This option was, therefore, politically unacceptable to the then rulers of Pakistan, who were bent upon subjugating the Eastern wing at any cost.
The third option envisaged the adoption of the Theatre Fortress concept. This implied that important border towns and communication centres were to be converted into veritable fortresses, by holding them in strength and building strong defence works in and around these towns/townships. They were to be located well forward on the main avenue of ingress and were to be strongly defended. These nodal points were to be well stocked with food, ammunition, and supplies. The basic theme was that any bypassing force would have its flanks exposed to another fortress. These could also be used as launching pads for offensive operations.
In September 1971, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, Gen Hamid, visited Dacca to discuss the operational plans with Gen Niazi. The Theatre Fortress concept was finally approved for adoption in defence of East Pakistan, with Dacca acting as the pivot. Niazi was also advised that raids on the Farakka barrage and an offensive action in Malda should also be planned and dovetailed into the overall plans for the defence of East Pakistan.
At this stage, Niazi made his famous claim of fighting to the last man and last round’ in order to please his bosses who had come from the West. But, the Theatre Fortress concept had a larger number of flaws in the basic planning and overall execution. To start with, Niazi had practically no reserves and he had not drawn up any route denial plan, particularly along the rivers and major highways. They could not be physically guarded and hence were available for exploitation to the Indian forces. The powers that were in Pakistan also committed a grave error in the timings of their actions against India. On the one hand, the time lag from March till December allowed the Indian army ample time for preparations, thereby ensuring a balanced disposition for the forces which had ringed East Pakistan and were poised for action. At the same time, the winter months are drier in East Pakistan and the ground is firmer which, in turn, facilitates mobile operations. This aspect was fully exploited by the Indian army.
The possibility of Chinese intervention in order to reduce pressure on the Pakistani forces was also reduced; it was snowing heavily in the Himalayas, and all the mountain passes as well as routes leading up to them were closed. The campaigning season in the Himalayan mountain regions had come to an end. Whether China would have intervened physically, even if weather permitted, is still a point for debate. The winter months in East Pakistan also favour aerial action, because there are practically no clouds and even if there are clouds, the ceiling is high enough to allow unrestricted use of aircraft. It was also quite clear that political considerations did not allow Niazi to follow a military sound plan, as it was obvious that Niazi’s resources would be stretched and he would be thin on the ground without adequate reserves. The Threatre Fortress concept also did not cater for adequate depth in defence, a fact that was subsequently
exploited by the Indian Army’s march onto Dacca. Even the Dacca Bowl did not have any troops for its close defence – Niazi had adopted a forward posture with little of no reserves and, most, important of all, he did not exploit the natural defensive potential offered by the major water obstacles that exist in East Pakistan. He had all the major rivers behind him, rather than ahead of him.
In defence of Niazi, however, it can be said that he was sent in a hurry to take over from Gen Tikka Khan. He was not given any written directive, but was merely asked to prevent internal subversion and to defend East Pakistan against external aggression. Even the resources allotted to him were inadequate as he had only three divisions at the time he reached Dacca. As the prospects of war became apparent, the entire strategy was recast but in a hurry leading to the adoption of a faulty plan and the selection of an inopportune moment – December 3, 1971- which, combined with the overall strategic disadvantages conferred on Pakistan, led to disastrous results for her. The Indian Government and Army were forced into carrying out a military surgical operation removing the Eastern wing of Pakistan.
On the Indian side, the planners had opted for gaining a longer reaction time so as to be fully prepared and also to pre-empt any Chinese designs which could have imposed some additional and dangerous burdens on the army and the air force. It must also be said in frankness that the Indian army was not prepared to conduct operations – at the scale envisaged – at short notice, although, between March and, the onset of the monsoon, Indian forces could have exploited the disorganised state of the Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan. At that time, there were very few troops in East Pakistan and they were also involved in serious fighting with the East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and EPR as well as in subjugating the populace which had risen in revolt. On the other hand, a pre-monsoon offensive by the Indian forces would have been politically undesirable, as it would have substantiated Yahya Khan’s claims that India was trying to wage a war against Pakistan without any provocation. In spite of the Pakistani army being disorganised in the East – the heavier supporting weapons were still in transit and the logistics systems were not functioning – the Indian side decided on undertaking deliberate and well prepared operations.
Consequently, the decision was to concentrate the maximum efforts on offensive operations against East Pakistan, while exercising an economy of effort with the adoption of a general defensive posture in the West. Making full use of the eight months’ respite, the overall Indian plan was based on achieving unquestioned supremacy and blockade of the East Pakistan, supported by a complete mastery in the skies. The navy and air force had very important roles to play in the final dismemberment of Pakistan and, therefore, time was required for achieving the coordination and dovetailing of plans of the three Services.
The Indian planners had a choice of two options. The first one was based on the final capture of Dacca. This would have liberated East Pakistan at the earliest and ensured the surrender of the Pakistani forces. It involved crossing big rivers along chosen approaches in strength. As India lacked adequate river crossing equipment, this would have involved a judicious allotment of forces and engineering resources. The use of helicopters for vertical envelopment of rivers offered great opportunities for speedy operations,
especially in view of India’s air supremacy and the support of the local population. The risk in adopting this course would have been a ceasefire before Dacca was captured. This could have left the advancing troops in a tactically unfavourable situation, without proper and secured axes of maintenance to the forward troops. At worst, the advancing troops would have no prestigious towns to show to their credit. In addition, sufficient territory might not have been cleared to rehabilitate the Bengali refugees.
The second option required clearing of territory upto the river lines and surrounding Dacca for subsequent operations. This would have involved a limited advance along most of the peripheral areas in all sectors. As we were stronger, we could have hit the Pakistanis at several points and thus forced them to accentuate their weakness through dissipation of their forces. By following a peripheral and constricting strategy, we could have safely expected to achieve a breakthrough at a number of points and cleared the areas upto the river lines.
This was the safest strategy to ensure the capture of maximum territory and important towns, even though Dacca would not have fallen early, especially if the Pakistanis had been permitted to fall back uninterruptedly and gradually to defend the Dacca Bowl. Such a course might have ended in a stalemate. But it would have ensured publicity, particularly as we could have hoped to announce the capture of one key town or other every day to impress the public.
The danger in this course was that anything less than the capture of Dacca would have given the Pakistanis a bargaining lever to manipulate under the auspices of the UN. Of course, if conditions were favourable, plans could have been improvised to press for the capture of Dacca after reaching the rivers.
Detailed plans were formulated in Calcutta for each sector, giving allotment of troops to each axis of advance and a programmed progress along each axis on a D-day basis, which gave little scope to field commanders to plan operations in their sectors based on the local knowledge of terrain, enemy dispositions, and their own aptitudes. War games were then conducted and on the basis of the operational plans, tailored in Calcutta, though some changes were made.
Tactical benefits through full employment of helicopters in such terrain and circumstances were not incorporated in our plans in time. The Army HQs and Command HQs did not see through the campaign to its ultimate objective – obviously Dacca. Planning and preparations for crossing the major rivers and the subsequent advance to Dacca were not worked out in any detail.
North. The tasks were to cut the Hilli-Gaibanda waistline and subsequently, if the situation permitted, thrusts were to be launched for the capture of Bogra and Rangpur. We were the least strong in this sector, for it had been assessed that if there was no Sino-Pak collusion. Pakistan was likely to thin out this sector, leaving one infantry brigade to delay the advancing forces.
It is clear that the plans were aimed at clearing territory only to the river lines. As the quantum of force to be employed depends on the type of victory which will satisfy the chosen political aims, priorities of resources and definition of objectives indicate the aim and objectives of the planners. Our priorities of resources indicated that more satisfying results were expected in the South-western and Eastern sectors.
The plans did not give any indication that the ultimate objective was Dacca. In fact, the macro planning in Delhi as well as Calcutta did not indicate focussing sights on Dacca. It was directed towards clearing the territory upto the rivers and was silent about the ultimate objective. The lack of a clear directive that Dacca was the ultimate objective made it difficult for subordinate commanders to select the intermediate objectives along which they could direct their full energies for capturing Dacca with the least delay.
Our troops moved nearer their designated sectors according to a coordinated schedule after the monsoon. The logistic build up had also been completed smoothly, even though the bridging equipment was not released by the Army HQs till August. The Pakistanis had not been able to gauge the intentions and plans of the Indian strategists. Modern technology was employed to collect reliable intelligence to further the strategic plans. The riverine terrain involving major rivers posed the most serious obstacle to the advance of a conventional force to Dacca.
Efforts were made to employ some helicopters for vertical envelopment, but the IAF could provide only a very small number for this role. Because of their limited availability, they were located in the Eastern sector, possibly for lifting troops for tactical deployment if a suitable situation arose. In addition, Gen Manekshaw, Chief of the Army Staff, planned to make the maximum use of psychological warfare. In the mini war stage in November, he conducted operations in such a way that Niazi was induced to move his troops forward to defend important towns and approaches ahead of the rivers. Niazi thus denuded the Dacca Bowl of all fighting troops and so deployed his army that it was incapable of falling back on the capital across the rivers. Manekshaw thus gained a strategic advantage initially, and Niazi played into his hands.
The task allotted to the Eastern Command was to destroy the bulk of Pakistani Forces in the eastern theatre and to occupy the major portion of East Pakistan, including the entry ports of Chittagong and Chalna/ Khulna. There was no mention of capturing Dacca. The Command HQs carried out its own assessment for allotting tasks and resources. In the North-western sector, against Pakistan’s 16 Division, our 33 Corps had 20 Mountain Division with an additional brigade, two armoured regiments less one squadron, and one engineer brigade. In addition, the ‘Brigade of the Year – 71’ was to operate from the
This war offered the first opportunity for joint operations by the three defence Services. The Services cooperated willingly, but could not fully overcome the practical flaws resulting from the absence of an integrated command in Delhi and Calcutta. On the first day of the war, there was wireless jamming in Calcutta, and this was eventually traced to mutual interference by the army and navy networks.
Even though plans had been made to use air support from INS Vikrant in support of ground operations, this did not work effectively, because joint training was lacking in peace time. Getting naval gunnery to
systems, and surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile systems around important targets in India.
support ground operations was found difficult, as forward naval bombardment officers had not been trained with the army in this role.
The Opposing Sides
The Pakistani army in early 1971comprised thirteen infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, and two independent armoured brigades. Two extra divisions were in the process of being raised to meet the additional requirement necessitated by the upsurge in the Eastern wing, but were not fully operational when the war began.
The PAF consisted of six squadrons of MIG 19 supersonic interceptors, six squadrons of Sabre fighters, one squadron of Mirage supersonic fighters, two squadrons of B-57 bombers, and one squadron of IL-28 bombers – in all seventeen combat squadrons. Of these, only one squadron of Sabres was located in East Pakistan.
The Indian navy consisted of some 40,000 men. The main units were one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, three destroyers, two destroyer escorts, five-Petya class patrol vessels, four F-class Russian ocean-going submarines, and some landing craft and mines sweeping vessels.
Territorially, the Indian army was organised into four Commands the Western Command consisted of three army corps of a total of thirteen infantry and one armoured division, and some armoured brigades. The Western Command had also two mountain divisions facing the Himalayan front, from Ladakh to Simla in the Central-Northern sector of the Himalayas. The Eastern Command consisted of three army corps – and its operational responsibility extended to Sikkim, Bhutan, and the NEFA sectors in the North; Nagaland, Mizoram, and the border with East Pakistan. The Southern Command’s area of responsibility was in the Kutch sector and in Rajasthan.
The Pakistani navy consisted of four submarines, one light cruiser, three destroyer escorts, two frigates, and four patrol boats. Pakistan’s para-military forces numbered some 250,000 men, located mainly for watch and ward duties over the border areas.
Of the Pakistani armed forces, one division of four brigades – 14 Pak Division – was normally located in East Pakistan. The only heavy elements available to this division were an armoured regiment (about 50 Chaffee tanks) and a few artillery units. Air support was provided by one squadron of Sabre fighters, some helicopters, and various light transport aircraft. The EPR consisted of some 20,000 men – mixed West Pakistanis and Bengalis, but most of the officers were West Pakistani. By early March, this garrison was reinforced by rapid and secret induction of two divisions from the Western wing. Thereafter, the build-up continued until October, and four infantry divisions, totalling some 50 battalions, as well as 20,000 or more West Punjab Rangers, had been inducted to replace the EPR.
The Indian army, at the beginning of 1971, with a total strength of just over eight and a quarter lakhs of men, was organised into thirteen infantry divisions, ten mountain divisions, several independent infantry brigades, two parachute brigades, one armoured division, and some independent armoured brigades. In armour, the Indian army had increased its strength since 1965 by about 450 T-54 and T-55 Russian medium tanks, 300 Vijayantas, and some Centurians. Its light armour consisted of AMX-13 French tanks and the Russian PT-76s.
The IAF had an approximate total of 90,000 men and 625 combat aircraft in 1965, but was considerably expanded and modernised in the following years. It had seven squadrons of MIG-21 supersonic interceptor fighters, five squadrons of Sukhoi -7 fighter bombers, seven squadrons of Gnat interceptors, six squadrons of Hunter fighter bombers, two squadrons of HF- 24 trans-sonic fighters and three squadrons of Canberra bombers. It was also equipped for radar surveillance, better communication
The Brigade of the Year was engaged in counter-insurgency operations under the Eastern Command since 1968 in Manipur. Its battalions were lacking completely in heavy anti-tank weapons. Even the basic infantry weapons, which are employed for self-defence and for bunker bursting at section and platoon level, were held at scales lower than hard scales, i.e., 50 per cent of authorisation; thus a section did not have the basic weapons for the standard fire and move tactics. Even the steel helmets, the basic head-gear in any combat, was not available for more than 25 per cent strength of each unit. Such was the state that year when the Brigade was alerted for operations.
The air force was organised into four commands – the Western, Central and Eastern Operations and the Maintenance Command. The navy had two fleets – one each for the Eastern and Western waters.
In the past, Pakistan, being aware of her incapability to be strong in both her wings, based her strategy on retaining decisive strength in West Pakistan. She assumed that any war with India would be short in duration, because international pressure would enforce a ceasefire before any decisive results could be achieved by either side. She, therefore, maintained only minimal forces in the East and was prepared to accept any loss of territory there. The aim was to economise troops for a profitable offensive in the West, so as to offset the territorial losses in the East. She also hoped that China would come to her help, specially by tying down a large number of Indian forces in the North, thus reducing the margin of Indian superiority against East Pakistan. Therefore, until 1971, Pakistan’s plan was to fight India on one front only, while India had to plan for war on two fronts: Pakistan in the West and China in the North.
However, the civil war compelled the Pakistanis to reinforce their forces in the East, thus throwing out of gear their strategic plans which upset their military potential in the West. Three divisions had to be moved from the West to East. The men of EBR and EPR had to be disarmed, fought, and replaced with West Pakistani para-military forces. To add to the dilemma, many Bengali military personnel in the West deserted and crossed over to India in a bid to join the guerrillas in the East. Although the Bengali units in
the West were neither disbanded or disarmed, they could not be relied upon in the event of a war with India.
(a) 23 Infantry Brigade under Brig Ansari in Saidpur-Rangpur-Dinajpur area. (b) 205 Infantry Brigade under Brig Tejjamul Hussain in the waistline, including Hilli,
Goraghat, Patnitola, and Bogra. (c) 34 Infantry Brig under Brigadier Mohammed Nayeem in Rajshahi, Nawabganj and Nator. (d) 29 Cavalry was to support 23 and 205 Infantry Brigades. (e) Later, 57 Brigade, under Brig Manzoor Ahmed, fell back into the sector from the Kushtia
area on December 10.
The PAF and navy were equally affected by the disaffection of the Bengalis. They had a squadron of Sabre jets in the East of the Tejgaon airfield in Dacca. They tried hard to build another airfield at Kurmitola to add to their fighting capability. But on account of their poor warning system and limitation of operative airfields, they stood no chance in an all-out fight against the IAF. Similarly, the Pakistani navy was virtually non-existent in the East.
The Pakistani army, which was strategically prepared to fight on one front was forced to be deployed on three fronts – West, East, and also against the guerrillas. In East Pakistan, it was more or less shunned by the population, which deprived it of its intelligence sources. In West, the potential to undertake an offensive had diminished considerably.
A large number of infantry formations had moved to the Eastern wing without their supporting arms like armour, artillery, and engineers. The formations were split up in battalion and company groups and scattered over wide areas for internal security duties. Adequate logistical support was not catered for, to maintain the increased strength of armed forces effectively. Consequently, Pakistan’s armed forces were unbalanced and disorganised for a major war in either wing and needed much time and resources to regain their equilibrium as an effective fighting force.
On the Indian side, 33 Corps, commanded by Lt Gen ML Thapan, was responsible for the operations in this sector. The main offensive was to be launched by 20 Mountain Division under Maj Gen Lachhman Singh, VrC. It had been allotted two armoured regiments less one squadron. The task allotted were as follows:
(a) 71 Mountain Brigade to advance along Pachagarh-Thakurgaon- Dinajpur axis and capture
Dinajpur. (b) 202 Mountain Brigade, under Brig FP Bhatty, SM, to capture Hilli and then Palasbaria
along the Goraghat axis in conjunction with 66 Mountain Brigade. (c) 66 and 340 Mountain Brigades, under Brigadier Joginder Singh Bakshi, VSM, and Brig GS
Sharma, VrC to contain Dinajpur and act as reserve.
The North-western Sector
16 Pakistan Division, commanded by Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah, with his HQs at Rangpur, was responsible for the security of this sector. He appreciated that the Indian army would concentrate its major efforts against the waistline and the Rangpur area. He assessed that a total of two divisions would advance against him along the following axes:
(a) Two brigades along the Domar-Saidpur axis to Rangpur. It was an attractive approach, for
the capture of Rangpur was easier, in the absence of any water obstacle. (b) A minimum of one brigade along the Pachagarh, Thakurgaon, and Dinajpur axis. (c) A major thrust by one division along the Hilli-Goraghat axis to divide his force, with the
aim of destroying it in detail. (d) Because of the poor approach routes, from Balurghat and Malda, a threat to Bogra via
Patnitola or Nawabganj was not possible.
To meet this threat, Nazar Hussain deployed his forces as follows:
had been marked by ever-growing signs of antagonism with the realisation that India was much bigger and stronger territorially, economically, and militarily, Pakistan chose to assume the role of a political and military competitor with India. However, her comparatively diminutive size, political instability, and paucity of economic resources rendered her far too weak, leaving a singular course for the attainment of the much longed for parity – borrowing power from outside benefactors. Therefore, Pakistan religiously followed Chanakya’s axiom – “when a king finds himself unable to confront his enemies single-handed, then he should make the expedition in combination with other kings.” In doing so, Pakistan ignored what Mao Tse-tung had to say on the subject, which more or less is an exposition of the finer points of Chanakya’s diplomacy: “In this world,” Mao propounded, “friendship exists between one cat and another, not between a cat and a rat.” And when Pakistan sought powerful friends, she actually ran into puppeteers – world powers desirous of drawing her into their politico-economic sphere or as an instrument to meet their own ends.
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No War, No Peace
“You have sided with us in our peril. You trained our boys, gave them arms and joined in our struggle. I have no language to express my gratitude”.
-Sheikh Mujibur Rehman
Pakistan’s campaign of deliberate extermination in East Pakistan and the unabated influx of refugees resulted in a direct threat to the internal values and policies of the Indian Union. The presence and pressure of millions of refugees, whose eviction was a preplanned act of demographic aggression on the part of Pakistan, confronted India with problems of unprecedented character and intensity and the economic burden caused by the need to maintain the refugees on humanitarian grounds became unbearable. In West Bengal and Tripura States, where accentuated social disparities had actuated the danger of revolutionary strife, matters were driven to a point of explosion, and a tremendous diabolic potential was created for nationwide disruption of communal harmony and the resultant riots. To sum up, Gen Tikka Khan’s crackdown in East Pakistan accentuated an imminent threat to India’s national security.
While Pakistan, in her quest for power and prosperity, chose to align herself with the Western Block by joining pacts like the CENTO and the SEATO, India opted for a policy of non-alignment. Following the breach of friendly relations between India and China in 1962, Pakistan quickly grabbed the opportunity for closer connections with the latter. The policy of Pakistan’s Government was based on confrontation with India, and the armed conflagration in 1947-48 and 1965 poured oil over troubled waters, because, unfortunately for India, Pakistan’s foreign policy also afforded the major powers of the world, the scope to influence and interfere with the mutual relations of the two countries. In addition, Pakistan further widened the gap by providing sanctuaries, training, and arms aid to the Nagaland and Mizo insurgents, inciting the rebellious elements like Naxalites and also the minorities, thus attempting to create unrest and disunity in the Indian sub-continent.
Walter Lippman has defined national security in the following words: “A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.” Thus, the aim of national security is to protect internal values, primarily by political and domestic endeavour, but if necessary by deterrence, the threat of force or, in the extreme, by the use of force.
It is imperative to fathom the depths of the past and prevailing social and political environment, geopolitical catalysts, international compulsions, and national expediency to get a clearer view of the fateful consequences that followed the repressive campaign launched by Pakistan in its Eastern wing.
From the very inception of the new states of India and Pakistan, the relations between the two countries had been marked by ever-growing signs of antagonism with the realisation that India was much bigger
Consequently, towards the end of March 1971, when the news of revolt and defiance in East Pakistan and the subsequent repressive measures adopted by Tikka Khan reached India, the Bengali National Movement struck a sympathetic chord in the hearts of the Indian masses. Foreign correspondents, who had eye-witnessed the rape of East Pakistan and were shunted out from Dacca as part of the crackdown, poured out the stories of merciless genocide, mass rape, wanton looting, and destruction. Within six days of the outbreak of the revolt, Mr S Subramanyam, Director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, aired his views on a vital subject: “What India must realise is the fact that the breakup of Pakistan is in our own interest.” His opinion was echoed by many a Minister in the Union Cabinet and a retired senior General.
However, the problems which confronted Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, at this stage were complicated, and she very prudently stated that war being a serious business, could not be waged at the dictates of popular demand, and her military advisers fell in with her line of thinking. First there should be a valid excuse, if not a substantial reason as essential to justify a military intervention in the eyes of the world. Little did the supporters of armed action realise that a premature step by India would have meant
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Army. President Yahya Khan quickly scored a point over Mrs Gandhi by accusing India of meddling with what he reiterated as “the internal affairs of Pakistan”.
In an attempt to explain to the world of the predicament India was pushed into, Mrs Indira Gandhi, on May 24, 1971 said: “So massive a migration in so short time is unprecedented in history. Three-and-a-half million have come in last eight weeks. On the present estimates, the cost of relief may exceed \1,000 million for six months”. She added: “It is mischievous to suggest that India had anything to do with what happened in Bangladesh. This is an insult to the aspirations and spontaneous sacrifices of the people of Bangladesh and a calculated attempt by the rulers of Pakistan to make India a scapegoat for their own misdeeds. It is also a crude attempt to deceive the world community”.
She then appealed repeatedly to the big powers and other democratic countries to ask the military dictators of Pakistan to stop committing atrocities in East Bengal and keep their population within their borders. “Otherwise,” she warned, “What began as an internal affair of Pakistan was gradually turning into an internal affair of India, and would soon be turning into an international issue”. As a result, diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan took a turn for the worse and eventually broke up altogether.
agreement concluded at Tashkent in 1966 pledging avoidance of such action. Secondly, there was an urgent need to strengthen the military machine to ensure a victory; for, the lessons of the debacle of 1962 were not easy to forget. The militant political faction in the country, however, failed to appreciate the high degree of military preparedness required for such a venture, which could not be attained without adequate time. Therefore, Mrs Gandhi, aided by her advisers, proceeded to orchestrate the three cardinal aspects of national policy and security – political, economic, and military, in perfect accord.
On March 31, 1971, the Prime Minister reacted to the crackdown in East Bengal by personally moving a resolution in the Lok Sabha demanding “immediate cessation of the use of force and the massacre of the defenceless people of the province”. She proclaimed: “The tragedy which has overtaken our valiant neighbour in East Bengal so soon after their rejoicing over their electoral victory has united us in grief for their suffering, concern for the wanton destruction of their beautiful land, and anxiety for their future.”
In the meantime, hard hit by the brute force of ruthless military dictatorship, a terrorised mass of humanity kept pouring over the border into India – the number rising to 60,000 a day. It was estimated, and not without sufficient reason, that by the end of October, the figure, would reach to about 10 million. Massive socio-emotional repercussions apart, financial experts calculated that at the prevailing rate of inflow, the expenditure on the upkeep of the refugees would amount to Rs 4,500 million. The aggressive political elements propagated that it would be more economical to fight a war and to put an end to the refugee problem than bear this burden, which had led to additional taxes and a corresponding rise in the price index in the country. K Subramanyam’s earlier views gained currency as the “opportunity of the century.” The result was a strong admonition to Pakistan by Mrs Gandhi: “The Government of India holds Pakistan fully responsible for creating such conditions forthwith as would facilitate the return of these refugees.”
By now, despite the courage and resolution of the people of East Bengal, Tikka Khan’s inhuman crackdown had broken them to such an extent that they could not act only passively. Yahya jumped on this opportunity by presenting to the world a phoney picture of normalcy in the province. He also outlawed the Awami League leaders who had either been arrested or eliminated earlier. A few went underground in East Bengal and were now in the stranglehold of the Pakistani army. Of the remainder few, most followed the refugee trail to seek shelter in India. This mass disappearance of the yeomen of the Awami League resulted in a sudden void in its leadership. The forebearers of the Bengali cause, who had entered India, formed a provisional Government-in-exile on April 17, 1971. Mujibur Rehman was appointed its President-in-absentia, and Tajuddin Ahmed was nominated Prime Minister to carry out the functions of the government. The seat of the government was named Mujib Nagar, and a radio station was installed to project the voice of freedom towards those who had stayed behind to organise the Mukti Bahini. At this crucial juncture, India decided to provide all support to the provisional government to continue the struggle for the liberation of the people of East Bengal from oppression by the Pakistan Army. President Yahya Khan quickly scored a point over Mrs Gandhi by accusing India of meddling with what he reiterated
Simultaneously, pressure started building up in India, especially in the Eastern parts, in favour of official recognition of the Bangladesh Government and Bangladesh as a sovereign and independent political entity. Influential leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan and many others derided Mrs Gandhi for her “weakness and hesitancy”. The Prime Minister, however, firmly and categorically asserted: “Not yet. At the appropriate moment”. The exactitude of her decision was obvious, though it failed to pacify the prevailing sentiment in the country. An official recognition of Bangladesh at this stage would have convinced the world of Yahya’s distortive version of the role India had been playing in support of the Bengali aspirations. Also, it would have probably precipitated an armed confrontation between India and Pakistan, with a predictable international reaction.
Mrs Gandhi, using all her political and diplomatic shrewdness, continued to gain time in an endeavour to tilt world opinion in favour of India. She propagated that issue of the refugees was not an internal problem of either India or Pakistan or both, but an international affair involving human considerations. Efforts were made to procure financial assistance from world powers to maintain the refugees, making them “a responsibility of the world community”. A house to house drive’ was organised in the country for collection of funds to ease the economic burden, to which people reacted with unparalleled spontaneity and generosity.
On July 6, Jayaprakash Narayan once again added his weighty voice to the opposition parties’ demand for armed intervention. He declared: “The country, the Government and the people are unworthy if they are not prepared for war”. However, the monsoon had just set in, making major military operations against either wing of Pakistan hazardous, if not impossible, at this time. Therefore, the Mukti Bahini,
UHARGEUF A MUUNTAIN BRIGADE! IN CREATIUNSUF ANAITUN BANGLADESH
and training the forces properly. Its important aspects like command and control, planning and coordination, were given proper attention. Preparations also commenced to facilitate the Indian army’s drive into Bangladesh in case of a contingency.
By now world opinion was showing a considerable change and the refugee problem was no longer considered a “psychological hoax”. A UN mission visited India to assess the situation at first hand. “I was depressed,” Charles Mace, the leader of the mission, stated, “to see the situation in which the refugees were coming over to India which, despite her difficulties, had taken care of the refugees well”.
Mrs Gandhi’s point that the “cruel tragedy” in East Pakistan was damaging India – economically, socially, and emotionally – was at last driven home and she now pronounced that any economic or military aid to Pakistan by a foreign power would be used against the people of Bangladesh. Her remarks were endorsed by Senator Edward Kennedy, who visited the refugee camp saying that the military hardware supplied to Pakistan by the United States was accentuating the sufferings of the people of Bangladesh.
This was followed by a gradual and definite change to a militant tone in the speeches of Mrs Gandhi. She made it known to Yahya Khan, in no uncertain terms, that unlike in the past, India would not suffer the burden of deliberate expulsion of such a large number of people by Pakistan without demanding compensation for it. She rebutted Yahya Khan’s allegations of Indian interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs and affirmed India’s right to retaliate; adding that she would not be deterred by threats. She blasted Yahya Khan’s claims that normalcy had returned in East Pakistan and challenged: “If that is so, Pakistan should immediately call back the refugees”.
had been appointed as Prime Minister in Islamabad and another the Governor of East Pakistan. However, the actual power in the Eastern wing was still in the hands of Tikka Khan as the Martial Law Administrator.
Pakistani stipulations for the return of the refugees were unacceptable to India, for she stood for democracy. Mrs Gandhi pronounced that the prerequisite for their return was the creation of a favourable political atmosphere which meant handing over power to Mujib and his Awami League, the duly elected leaders of the people of Bangladesh. The hope of a solution through the Mukti Bahini was at a low ebb, for it was apparent that it would take years for such a movement to unloosen the Pakistani stranglehold on East Pakistan. These developments, together with the increased internal pressure, compelled Mrs Gandhi to contemplate the extreme step of military intervention, if other alternatives failed. The Service Chiefs, accordingly, were given instructions to go ahead with the plan for an offensive in Bangladesh and carry out preparations accordingly.
Although, initially, most foreign governments had reacted favourably to New Delhi’s diplomatic approaches, for they sensed that the Indian demands were moderate and justifiable, but when India echoed the voice of the Bangladesh Government in exile, propagating that nothing less than complete independence would do, these governments reversed their earlier conciliatory attitudes.
Throughout this period, the flow of refugees into India continued without respite, further burdening the country’s sagging economy and inflaming popular passion. By this time, it had become apparent to Yahya Khan that the two wings of Pakistan could not be kept together by using force; but he refused to acknowledge and accept it. As a result, he found himself in an extremely difficult political situation of his own creation. By using brutal force, he had antagonised the people of East Pakistan to such a high degree that a reconciliation at this stage was a political “impossibility”.
In deference to international pressure and the changing tone of Mrs Gandhi, Yahya Khan now offered to take back the refugees, but under certain conditions: only bonafide Pakistani citizens could return, but not those unemployed and homeless in West Bengal, whom the Indian Government had “deliberately” categorised as “refugees”. He asserted that the genuine refugees from East Pakistan were only two million, leaving the remaining eight million as India’s responsibility.
On the political side in Pakistan, he promised to call the National Assembly in due course; a pretence as most of the elected members of East Pakistan had either been killed, arrested, or driven to India. A puppet had been appointed as Prime Minister in Islamabad and another the Governor of East Pakistan. However,
International pressures increased as India’s intention to go to war took a more definite form and as such eventually all such pressures became ineffective. Yahya Khan exploited the changing international mood, repeating his earlier offer which, on the surface, seemed to meet India’s demands. He was sure of the US backing, which became evident when Mr Kissinger visited Islamabad and later went secretly to Peking. These developments, which revealed a close understanding between President Nixon and Yahya Khan, further reinforced the Pak President’s militant mood. He declared: “If India made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan, it would be treated as an attack on Pakistan and I shall declare war, let the world note”. In reply to the threat of war, the Indian Foreign Minister, Mr Swaran Singh, pointed out: “Pakistan had been all along trying to mislead world opinion by asserting that Pakistan’s problem is with India and not with the people of Bangladesh”. He said that unless Pakistan came to terms with the people of Bangladesh, the Mukti Bahini activities would not wane, and that if Pakistan used it as an excuse to launch an attack on India, “we would defend ourselves”.
After the US alienation of India, the Government was left with no alternative but to seek friendship elsewhere. Following a series of visits between Mr DP Dhar and Mr Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, an Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed on August 9, 1971, which added a breath of fresh air to the tension-laden atmosphere in the country. The Treaty was markedly significant, because it strengthened India’s military stature immeasurably; first, it provided for consultation between the two countries in case of war or threat of war to either of them, with a view to removing the threat; secondly, it took care of the Chinese intervention in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan,
Emboldened, Mrs Gandhi pronounced on August 15 – Independence Day: “We do not want war, we do not rattle sabres. But India is prepared for any emergency”. The warning meant business, because the monsoon was clearing up and the campaigning season was nearing. The tension on the border began mounting and Yahya Khan reacted violently: “Let me warn you and the world that this means war, total war which I hate. But I will not hesitate for the defence of my country”.
For international consumption, on September 18, Yahya Khan made a semblance of handing over the civil administration of Pakistan to the duly elected members of the people. This, however, failed to mitigate the internal disorder, for he also announced an intention to amend the new Constitution, retaining his right of veto. This Constitution was to be presented to the National Assembly when it met after the bye-elections to fill the seats of the disqualified Awami League members. The date for these elections was set between November 25 and December 9. However, this deliberate attempt to delay the transfer of power was unacceptable to Bhutto, whose political stature was unquestionable, and he immediately warned Yahya Khan that chaos would result from a delay in the power-transfer”. To crown his follies, Yahya Khan also announced a secret trial of Mujib for “treason against the State” and warned against speculation, which would “but jeopardise the case”. The trial provoked serious reactions in India; the anti-West Pakistani sentiment of the refugees reached its apex, and world opinion awoke to the “realities” of Yahya Khan’s game. India and Pakistan, spurred by political blundering of Yahya Khan began moving slowly to the brink of an armed confrontation.
Preliminary moves for deployment of forces for the eventual confrontation were thus commenced in September by the Indian army. As Pakistan enjoyed the advantage of having cantonments close to the border, which could enable rapid mobilisation, such a step was essential from the point of view of military strategy
On the Pakistan side, Yahya completed the deployment of his troops in West Pakistan by about October 12, while the Indian formations were still on the move. By the third week of October, the Indian mobilisation was completed. In the meanwhile, Yahya Khan accused India of ‘provocations with the aim of sparking off a shooting war. Pakistan thus attempted to emerge as the aggrieved party, while painting India as a monster who wanted to dominate a weaker neighbour with threats of war.
Mrs Gandhi, on the other hand, despite the assurance of military security, embarked on a final endeavour to entreat the world powers to persuade Yahya Khan “to see reason” and arrange for a return of the refugees. She first went to Moscow and voiced India’s concern at the events in East India. “We cannot but be perturbed when a fire breaks out in a neighbour’s house. What happened in East Bengal can no longer be regarded as Pakistan’s domestic affair. More than nine million East-Bengalis have come into our country. We cannot be expected to absorb them. We have problems enough of our own and we certainly do not need the added ones”. On her return to Delhi, she expressed her exasperation over the US policy while talking to foreign correspondents:”Everybody admires our restraint. We get verbal praise, but the
while talking to foreign correspondents:”Everybody admires our restraint. We get verbal praise, but the others are not restrained and they get arms, as well.”
On October 23, the Prime Minister proceeded on a three week tour of several Western countries, including the United States, France, West Germany, Britain, Belgium, and Australia. There, she mainly appealed for aid for the refugees and emphasised the need for their early return. She also advocated that pressure should be brought to bear on Pakistan for an immediate political settlement in East Pakistan. She expressed her willingness to meet Yahya Khan, to settle the differences between the two countries, but also asserted that any settlement in East Pakistan must be made with its people and their elected leaders, which spelt the immediate release of Mujibur Rehman. But Yahya Khan was not in a mood to negotiate with a rebel. In Paris, Mrs Gandhi reiterated her offer to meet Yahya Khan and commented, “How can you shake hands with a clinched fist?” She assured the world that India would not assume the role of aggressor, and expressed her fear that she might be pushed into a war by compulsion. She was, to a great extent, able to apprise the world of the realities and consequences of the refugee problem and succeeded in winning sympathy for the cause of the people of East Bengal and India’s interest in a just solution for their aspirations.
Although the US administration assured Yahya Khan of full support in the event of a war with India, in practice it maintained only a flexible response to the fluctuating situation, keeping its options open to back any individual or party which gained the upper hand. It supported Yahya Khan when he was winning, and conveniently gave him a cold shoulder when he managed to get himself in trouble. Also, public opinion in the United States protested against Tikka Khan’s brutal methods of repression and ruthless genocide.
The uncertainty of any US support became apparent to Yahya Khan who, thereafter, counted heavily on China’s help. Consequent to the Indo-Chinese showdown in 1962, Peking’s foreign policy had always tilted towards Pakistan. The relations between these two countries were greatly improved in the succeeding years. On April 13, 1971, Chou-en-lai had promised to help Pakistan in maintaining its “territorial integrity” against all “external interference”. In an interview with the Columbia Broadcasting System on November 9, 1971, Yahya Khan said: “The Chinese would intervene if India attacked Pakistan”. Bhutto, who led a Pakistani delegation to Peking in November 1971, to seek a defence pact with China as a counter to the Indo-Soviet Treaty, told the Press:” China will give any measure of support we need. It depends on what we ask”. He further elucidated: “China is fully and enthusiastically supporting Pakistan. We can expect the maximum assistance, India should have no illusions on this”.
As mentioned earlier, to offset the international recriminations of the repressive measures in East Pakistan, Yahya Khan, in August 1971, had replaced Tikka Khan by Dr A.M. Malik, a retired East Pakistani civil servant, as Governor, thus giving the impression that civil authority had been restored. Lt Gen Niazi later succeeded Tikka Khan as the Martial Law Administrator and Commander of Pakistan’s Eastern
soldier. The post which Niazi held, required a man capable of thinking for himself and taking shrewd, quick decisions at the moment of crisis. It also entailed independent execution of these decisions without guidance or supervision by higher authorities. It was unfortunate for Yahya Khan that by appointing Niazi in place of Tikka Khan, he put a square peg in a round hole.
During September/October, the rebel activities increased manifold along the border as well as in the interior of East Pakistan. Large scale sabotage, attacks on police stations and other centres of government authority, and killing of collaborators by the Mukti Bahini instilled fear among the people and created a sense of insecurity. Niazi was gradually squeezed by the Mukti Bahini, and this inflamed the border with well planned attacks on BOPs, accompanied by efforts to capture important tactical features inside East Pakistan, which would, by and by, help India’s full-fledged intervention, if and when it came. Yahya Khan warned India that if her troops were to enter East Pakistan, it would be considered an open war against Pakistan and could meet with retaliation.
By now, an armed intervention in East Pakistan became inevitable for India. The Soviet Union, despite the Indo-Soviet Treaty, was not in favour of such a drastic action for fear of a direct involvement and armed confrontation with the United States. The USA was playing a double game, but was trying to bail out Yahya Khan from the tight spot he had managed to get into. They stood for a policy of peaceful appeasement which entailed an indefinite postponement of the return of the refugees. India was aware that although China supported Pakistan politically, despite her unpredictable nature, she would not dare help the latter militarily by an active intervention, in case of an Indo-Pakistan war, because of the Russian threat to her Northern borders. The decision-making now depended on India alone, and when the decision to resort to armed intervention in East Pakistan – an expediency caused by the blunders of the Pakistani leaders – was finally taken by Mrs Gandhi, it came as a surprise to India’s friends and foes alike.
The Mukti Bahini elements operating inside East Pakistan were now supported by Indian artillery. When they got into trouble, the Indian army and the BSF assisted in extricating them. In the initial stages, the use of Indian troops inside East Pakistan was avoided, as this would have been an act of aggression. But, as the intensity of the Mukti Bahini operations grew, the decision to cross the border was taken without hesitation. As a result, by the time Yahya Khan ultimately decided on an all-out showdown, India had made some tactical gains, which facilitated operations by the army later.
been our intention to escalate the situation or to start a conflict. To this end, we have instructed our troops not to cross the border’ except in self defence. We cannot ignore our experience of 1947-48 and AugustSeptember 1965″.
While events were unfolding in East Pakistan causing consternation and uncertainty in the subcontinent, the “71 Mountain Brigade” was involved in its primary role of counter-insurgency operations. To be precise, the formation was located at Leimakhong on the main highway connecting Kohima with Imphal. The Brigade HQs was located 18 km short of Imphal amidst lush green and placid surroundings. The outward calm and serenity could lull any person into a sense of complacency, but that was not the actual case, for the Indian insurgents “cauldron was boiling” in Manipur. This territory had seen a great deal of unrest and turmoil created by the Naga insurgents, who had been carrying out their acts of depredation for a long time in the countryside as well as the cities and towns. 71 Mountain Brigade, which was under 8 Mountain Division, had been assigned a counter-insurgency role in this area and had its hands full carrying out anti-guerilla activities based on small unit actions.
In such a role, it is appropriate to highlight the fact that a formation has a large number of assorted problems that arise from the constraints imposed by unconventional warfare. To start with, units and subunits are widely dispersed with command and control decentralised. This is not a happy state for any formation of the regular army, for it breeds a lack of cohesion. This, in turn, can have an adverse effect on the fighting efficiency of the formation when it is required to revert to conventional warfare mainly due to the fact that units and sub-units have had very little chance to operate together, thereby depriving commanders at all levels the chance of detecting and rectifying faults. This dispersion also creates problems of administration, security and, at times, discipline which is the very bedrock of a good army.
The unconventional methods adopted by the guerrillas also force the army into adopting such tactics causing units and formations, to move further away from their conventional roles. The soldier at times has to “unlearn” what he had been practising, all his life. He may have to adopt certain tactics, methods, and ruses which he may never have used before in his life. The soldier’s main task, in such an environment, is not fighting alone – he may be required to help in the construction of social projects, render medical assistance, participate in disaster relief, provide succour to civilian victims of the guerrillas, conduct intelligence operations, and participate in social as well as religious functions of the people. It must be remembered that a counter-insurgency campaign is aimed at the “hearts and minds” of the people and not at merely eradicating the guerrilla bands. A soldier, therefore, in such an environment has to be a “well rounded” personality.
A large number of myriad problems arise from this “hearts and minds” part of the counter-insurgency campaign. These are connected primarily with civil administration. A great deal of close cooperation and mutual understanding is required between the army and civil administration while operating in these areas. Both these organisations have their own rules and methods of functioning which, in turn, can cause
Meanwhile, in the Western Sector, the Pakistani Armed Forces had become active. Mrs Gandhi made a statement on these incidents in Parliament on November 24: “It was Pakistan which threatened total war and moved its entire armed strength into operational positions on our borders and launched a massive hate India campaign. We had, therefore, to take appropriate measures and move our forces to defensive positions in order to protect the integrity of our country and lives and property of our citizens. It has never been our intention to escalate the situation or to start a conflict. To this end, we have instructed our troops not to cross the border’ except in self defence. We cannot ignore our experience of 1947-48 and August
again, anu me ua wil was slowly emerging will we arrival or a new brigaue major. 11gs starteu improving, but in the absence of a permanent commander, the staff lacked direction.
Brigade, the Brigade Commander used to deal with the civil government on behalf of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 8 Mountain Division, who was located at Zakhama, approximately 150 km away.
Brig SK Sinha, the erstwhile Brigade Commander, had developed good relations and personal understanding with Shri Baleshwar Prasad, Chief Commissioner of Manipur. A situation of cordiality and understanding had been created, as a result of which both organisations could function in harmony to achieve the desired results. The operational performance of 71 Mountain Brigade had also been good. A large part of the underground organisation had been either destroyed or neutralised. The civil population had been spared of the consequences of their depredations and was, therefore, enjoying a period of relative calm and tranquility hard to achieve in such an environment. Nonetheless, beneath this outward calm and tranquility, petty jealousies were simmering. The army had been cornering all the glory and limelight for its rightful achievements, and the civil administration and police officials to be true were not quite happy at this state of affairs.
The civil administration and police officials were feeling frustrated because they had not achieved any positive and meaningful results as compared to these of the army. They were, therefore, biding their time, politely and patiently, till an opportunity became available for cornering some limelight at the expense of the army. Such an opportunity was not very far away. 14 Mahar presented one such opportunity when three alleged terrorists had died in their custody during interrogation. This was quickly seized by the civil administration and the police. Suddenly, the tide had turned and the army was now on the wrong side of the law. Whatever the army did was either incorrect, or unacceptable. The rapport that had been established between Brig Sinha and the civil administration was suddenly destroyed by the posting out of the Lt Governor and the Brigade Commander. Misfortunes did not come singly and the army now found itself being swept away by the waning tide, while the police rode crest high on the waxing side.
A distinguished soldier and hero of the Battle of Dograi, Brig DE Hayde, MVC, took over from Brig SK Sinha. Brig Hayde was, however, unable to continue as unfortunately, he fell ill within three months of assuming command. The brigade was now to be without a commander for four months and at the time the civil-military relations were also deteriorating day by day. The staff at HQs could neither handle the situation nor carry out the tasks required of it because of a lack of mature guidance and direction that a permanent commander can provide. Under these circumstances, the staff felt helpless and frustrated, as a consequence of which it adopted the policy of live and let live’. Complete relaxation and euphoria had set in and the formation had practically come to a standstill. Needless to say this was practically the undoing of the formation – one with a glorious past and which was destined to win further laurels in the ensuing months. Nonetheless, a thin silver lining had started forming around the large grey cloud that had been hanging over 71 Mountain Brigade. “The darkest (aimless drift)hour is before the dawn” was proved once again, and the dawn was slowly emerging with the arrival of a new Brigade Major. Things started improving, but in the absence of a permanent commander, the staff lacked direction.
On my arrival in Leimakhong, the first surprise that greeted me was that 71 Mountain Brigade was to be made available to 57 Mountain Division for operations. This fact was discovered while browsing through old files and the handing/taking over notes. No planning had been done for such an eventuality as, like everybody else, HQs 71 Mountain Brigade was also convinced that such a contingency was a far cry, considering the prevailing situation in Manipur and the commitments of the Brigade. No other brigade in 8 Mountain Division was so heavily committed and spread out in the performance of its counterinsurgency tasks.
On March 28, 1971, as I was driving up to my HQs in Leimakhong, I visited the Divisional HQs of 8 Mountain Division. The GOC, as is customary for new formation commanders, briefed me in detail with regard to the overall insurgent environment in Nagaland and Manipur. During the course of this briefing, I realised that the days ahead would be challenging and interesting. Counter-insurgency operations always are, because of the simple fact that action is being taken against one’s own misguided countrymen and, as a consequence therefore, the principle of minimum force has to be adopted with an accent on the “hearts and minds” campaign. All actions by the troops and their commanders have to be “corrective” and not “punitive”. The implications are that no heavy weapons can be used and only small arms are utilised and that, too, when absolutely necessary. While I did realise that the coming days would be challenging, the extent of this challenge was to dawn upon me reaching my new HQs. I was in for more surprises.
Interestingly, during this briefing, it never occurred that there would be a more than historic war with Pakistan which would lead to the emergence of a new nation – all in the short span of 14 eventful days which shook the world at large. 8 Mountain Division, at that time, was sitting pretty and was smug in the conviction that, without them, the Naga problem could never be solved and moving any troops from here could mean the secession of Nagaland from India. This belief was to be rudely shattered as coming events would prove – nobody could visualise the speed with which the situation changed and the subsequent events unfolded.
The fire was further fuelled by the fact that ever since the brigade arrived in Leimakhong about four years earlier the HQs had never moved. And as it happens in most HQs, commanders tend to overlook their own HQs while keeping a close watch on the units under command. Such was the situation here too. No standing orders could be found; there were no mobilisation plans or load tables and no field office equipment. Similarly, the officers mess had nothing resembling a field mess, even though we were located in a field area. A round of the stores revealed further surprises – no ledgers seemed to exist and even if these existed, they were not readily available or traceable in the junk that had slowly accumulated over the years. When something resembling a field shelter was discovered, nobody quite knew how to set it up or what its uses were. At times, some parts of these shelters were missing and efforts to put them up were more than amusing. Our venerable HQ had truly adopted the “field system of accounting”. Chaos and
confusion prevailed till the Brigade Major – Maj LK Gupta – set about the task of restoring order in the HQs. Writing like this may look a bit of exaggeration on my part, but truly speaking things were not upto the mark.
It must be admitted that Maj Gupta had no mean role to play in setting our house in order. He set about his somewhat daunting task with gusto and fervour. The officer burnt many gallons of midnight oil and also compelled others to do so in order to restore a semblance of order in our own house. The spring cleaning had commenced with a rather large broom. All ranks could now be seen engaged in feverish activity during the day as well as at night. Amidst the junk and dust that had accumulated over the years, boxes were opened, files, papers and paraphernalia were laid out on the ground, and the process of shifting as well as sorting out commenced.
While all this was going on, somebody suddenly emerged from amongst the heaps of junk with an old copy of standing orders – somewhat battered and moth-eaten. At the same time, some old ledgers also appeared but were in a similar shabby condition. All stores were thoroughly checked and deficiencies/surpluses ascertained for future rectification.
New standing orders were now made. A mobilisation scheme was drawn up and load tables were made. New ledgers were also made for the stores and these were made to look like stores with all items laid out as per the mobilisation plans and properly accounted for. Attention was now focussed on the offices and the officers mess. Equipment and furniture for mobile field service conditions were procured. Mess rules were drawn up and office procedures streamlined. Besides all this, the brigade camp, mechanical transport, and the signal company were similarly tuned up to fulfill their designed roles and tasks. It can now be stated that these actions were to pay handsome dividends later as the situation changed rapidly. The state of immobility and lethargy that existed was quickly changed and a certain amount of vigour, zest and mental mobility was injected into all ranks of the Brigade HQs.
While all the work was going on in my HQs and was progressing satisfactorily, I undertook visits to the units and their picquets. These visits were useful for establishing the required rapport with the units under command and also for giving them an inkling of the way the brigade commander functions, so that we could all be on the same grid”. At this stage, the unit commanders were also taken into confidence to indicate my perception or likely events in the not-too-far-distant future. It would be in the fitness of things here to indicate that formations and units changing over from counter-insurgency operations to conventional warfare require time. This time element can be reduced with a little foresight and simultaneous preparatory actions. The units also started making some preparations of their own for conventional warfare. These, however, could not be centrally coordinated because of overriding requirements of counter-insurgency operations.
On return to HQs, I found two distinct facts staring me in the face. First, the deteriorating civil-military relationship had to be restored on a basis of faith and trust leading to amicable solutions to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. Secondly, a concerted drive was to be launched for clearing the territory of Manipur of all the underground and undesirable elements. Manipur was given the status of State on 21st January 1972.
The question of achieving a healthy civil-military equation in an insurgency environment is easily said than done. Both sides have various pushes and pulls imposed by their respective departmental requirements. Petty jealousies and intrigues also play their part in vitiating the atmosphere, thereby harming this relationship much to the benefit of the underground and other interested parties. All actions, therefore, must be well thought out and deliberated avoiding the problem areas that may hurt the susceptibilities of either side. “Corns” must be carefully avoided.
The units under command, having seen such feverish activity in the HQs, also started looking into their own affairs. They were now psychologically prepared for a shock and for the unfolding of future events.
The formation had not received any formal orders for the impending operations against East Pakistan. It was just the mention of a likely operational commitment with 57 Mountain Division that set the ball rolling in our minds. Although the extent of the Indian Army’s involvement in East Pakistan could not be, foreseen, the media reports and personal analysis of events did give an inkling of what could, but might not, happen. In spite of the overall smugness that troops were most unlikely to move out from this region for operations elsewhere, somehow, I commenced preparations for future operations. These preparations could not override the commitments of our formation in situ and, therefore, had to take a back seat in the overall perception and activities of the formation. These preparatory tasks for future operations were, therefore, on a relatively low key. Nonetheless, this anticipation of future events was to stand us in good stead subsequently.
The key figure in this restoration of civil-military relationship was Mr TJ Quinn, the Deputy Inspector General of police. Mr Quinn was a professional police officer, who had risen from the ranks by dint of hard work. He was, therefore, very experienced and a difficult person to deal with. He also had a very good command over the language and was an astute officer. Brig CJ Quinn happened to be this officer’s younger brother and he was commanding 59 Mountain Brigade which was our neighbouring brigade in Manipur.
Bunty Quinn, like me, was a staunch infantryman well versed in the techniques of counter-insurgency warfare and its attendant problems. We both could speak the same language and understand each other clearly. At the same time, we were well known to each other, having undergone infantry soldiering through the same schools and environment. We did not need to establish any rapport as it already existed and I realised that the DIG could be tackled through his younger brother, Bunty.
Meetings and conferences were arranged, both formal and informal. DIG Quinn and I, with some assistance from Bunty, were able to resolve our major differences. We spoke freely and frankly, realising each other’s position and peculiar problems. We also arranged meeting at lower echelons to develop
slowly but surely closed. Rapport and rapprochement was achieved.
Brigade would be launched into the fray.
The reputation of a man travels faster than himself, and, of course, if luck is on his side, then half the battle is won. Nothing succeeds like success. Fortunately, luck was on my side, as I found my civilian counterparts thawing as my reputation preceded me. To be precise – Mr DR Kohli, the Lt Governor, smiled only when his facial muscles needed relaxation and during my first courtesy call on him, he was all smiles.
The improvement in civil-military relations had now become evident. To ensure that there was no let up in this relationship, further concerted efforts were launched. Attempts were now made to improve the welfare of the civil population through the civil administration. This was done by visiting villages in remote areas – some of these had not seen any responsible visitor for two years. The village elders were interviewed and their requirement/ grievances ascertained. They were then projected to the civil administration and their progress monitored.
The units under command also made their contribution to the “hearts and minds” campaign. They oversaw the execution of civilian welfare measures launched for alleviating the villager’s grievances and reported back on the progress which, in turn, was followed up with the civil administration. They (the units) also helped in improving the social, cultural, recreational, and religious environment in the areas where they were located. “Shramdan” for building schools, churches and playgrounds was offered by the troops and their leaders. They also took part in local sport, religious, and cultural activities. The aim was to restore faith in the army and its civilian counterparts. We achieved this in more than good measure.
We were now able to alienate the undergrounds from their means of sustenance which, in turn, helped our military operations. The brigade scored some significant successes in its operations against the underground hostiles. To be precise, the entire Manipur was practically cleared of the hostile elements and civil administration was restored in a number of areas.
It can, therefore, be seen that during this uneasy “no war-no peace” period, the ’71 Mountain Brigade’ had set its own house in order,’ acquired the desired working relationship with the units under command, undertook some anticipated preparatory actions for the future, achieved the required meaningful relationship with the civil administration, successfully executed a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in the area of operations, and finally achieved superb operational results in counter-insurgency warfare.
But the wait was not yet over for bigger things – an interlude was to follow before the 71 Mountain Brigade would be launched into the fray.
Interlude
army’s much vaunted professional capabilities, equipment has always been in short supply and improvisation remains the order of the day. The signal stores were to be deposited with the ordnance authorities in order to equip other formations. It was merely a question of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul, but the operational efficiency of our formation was adversely affected.
Despite these problems, the brigade moved to Chakhamba and this proved to be a blessing in disguise. Units feeling the pinch now started discarding their heavy baggage, thereby trimming the fat and becoming more streamlined for moves. This could be called an exercise in “on the job training” as remedial action for rectifying faults noticed during the move were promptly put into practice.
Like jockeys all keyed up and were awaiting the opening of the starting gates, and our brigade was also similarly keyed up for the operations. But the eagerness to see action was to remain unfulfilled for some more time, as no information was available regarding the dates of move.
Nonetheless, one could feel a sense of urgency and anticipation in the air. The media reports were becoming increasingly grim and accusatory. India and Pakistan were exchanging accusations on border violations. Successes of the Mukti Bahini were also being aired, and an independent radio station was established by the Bangladesh Government in exile to take up arms against the genocidal regime in East Pakistan. Reports were also now available of the Indian army’s support to the Mukti Bahini as well as desertions/ defections by Bengalis from the Pakistani armed forces. These defectors were also sources of valuable information, which were subsequently to be put to good use by the Indian army. War clouds were gathering on the horizon, and the Indian army was slowly but surely getting into its battle positions as well as launching pads aimed into the heartland of East Pakistan.
In case conventional operations were to take place in the North-East, 71 Mountain Brigade was to be made available to 57 Mountain Division and placed under operational control of that formation. During the last week of June 1971, as events were still unfolding in East Pakistan, a formation commanders’ conference was convened by HQs 57 Mountain Division, and as we were to be undertaking operations within the jurisdiction of this formation, I made a request for attending this conference. The GOC 8 Mountain Division did not, however, accede to this request for reasons of security. Nonetheless, I proceeded on casual leave and visited Silchar en route. During this visit, the shape of things to come was quickly realised and it became fairly clear that operations were impending. Meanwhile, in Nagaland, the police force was drawing up plans for relieving the army units and formations at short notice. The credibility of these reports was emphatically denied by the GOC 8 Mountain Division.
Realising and appreciating the forthcoming changes in the situation, the urgent necessity to switch over roles, from counter-insurgency to conventional warfare, and for training required for the same was projected to HQs 8 Mountain Division. During a subsequent conference, therefore, it was decided that in the event of a war, 59 Mountain Brigade would be the first to move, as the formation could be concentrated quickly and with relative ease as compared to the other brigades. Consequently, some readjustments were ordered and 71 Mountain Brigade had to concentrate 7 Bihar ex 59 Mountain Brigade under its own arrangements. The concentration of a battalion is normally a simple affair, but doing so under monsoon conditions in Nagaland and Manipur was quite another story. We had to utilise surface transport, boats and helicopters under extremely marginal weather conditions over torturous terrain. The IAF was magnificent in its contribution, which was obtained through personal liaison. The over willing and undaunted pilots obliged, to an extent unimaginable, taking bold and calculated risks while fulfilling their missions. Our brigade had by now completed its concentration and was ordered to relieve 81 Mountain Brigade at Chakhamba. This formation was moving down to Dimapur for training in order to fit itself for a role under conditions of conventional warfare.
We now faced administrative problems. The Ordnance authorities, realising that 71 Mountain Brigade was likely to move out from their area of responsibility, started dragging their feet over our pending demands with them. The demand for stores would not materialise and the unit commanders now spent many a sleepless night devising ways and means of keeping their units operationally fit. In spite of our army’s much vaunted professional capabilities, equipment has always been in short supply and
At this stage, HQs 33 Corps organised a war game for discussing the battle plans of the formations under command. Commander 71 Mountain Brigade was also required to attend these war games. GOC 8 Mountain Division was away on reconnaissance and, therefore, the formation HQs was informed that unless otherwise instructed, I would be attending the war game. This was the first time I had learnt that I may be required to take over the defence of the Siliguri corridor.
On termination of the war game and on the advice of GOC 20 Mountain Division as well as the Corps Commander, I spent time on reconnaissance, collection of maps and other information that was relevant to the tasks assigned. As this went on, I issued orders to my brigade less one battalion to move and concentrate at Jalpaiguri. It would also be pertinent to indicate that even though 81 Mountain Brigade had concentrated earlier for training, it was 71 Mountain Brigade that moved out before them.
The moves combined with the fluidity of the situation precluded the organisation of any kind of training for my troops and commanders. The units and sub-units were still tuned to an insurgent environment and could not really understand the requirements of conventional warfare fought with armour and air assuming very significant roles. At my constant insistence, we were able to get about ten days for training
Even this period, could not be effectively utilised for training, as we were required to move twice. Therefore, very little training could be carried out, but we did spend the available time on reconnaissance, unit administration, and on infantry-tank cooperation at the company level. Our units were seeing tanks after a long time and I felt that, at the least, the troops must get acquainted in order to understand each other’s requirements so as to be able to function effectively in war. This did pay us handsome dividends subsequently
These two moves, coupled with the insistence on camouflage and digging forced the units into shedding more of their heavy baggage. Our mobilisation plans were practised and load tables streamlined. The entire formation could now move at just two hours’ notice. The deficiencies were also being slowly made up.
The brigade reached Siliguri on October 18, 1971 and was received by a representative of 33 Corps at the railway station. It was now indicated that my formation should place one battalion at the Kamla Tea Estate, one battalion at Cooch Behar, and the remainder brigade less two battalions at Jalpaiguri.
rauar stauons, anu nys 33 corps against ground and all pornie allacks. (d) To secure vulnerable areas points within the area of responsibility. (e) To be prepared to reinforce any other divisional sector/sectors in the corps zone.
f) To patrol important roads and railway lines in the area of responsibility. (g) To coordinate with the civil authorities for the protection of vulnerable areas and points. (h) To assist the civil authorities in the overall coordination and implementation of various
civil defence schemes.
20 Mountain Division was now concentrating in Belurghat, and it handed over responsibility of the 71 Mountain Brigade area to a battalion of 6 Mountain Division and some units of the BSF. The two salients of Bangladesh, i.e., Bhajanpur and Baura, which were the responsibility of 9 Mountain Brigade (comprising two battalions only), ex 6 Mountain Division was taken over by our formation on the night of October 31 – November 1, 1971. The order of battle and deployment of the brigade changed again and was
now:
a) 12 Raj Rif. Pachagarh salient with:
(i)
After our arrival, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen ML Thapan, had visited the Brigade at the first available opportunity to acquaint himself with the state of the ‘Brigade of the Year’. Earlier, during my first meeting with him, on being told that the brigade was ill-equipped and was not fully self contained, I had to quip that given the logistic support and equipment, the troops would prove their worth. At this, he had a good laugh and this set the ball rolling for us to get ready for the impending battle.
The Brigade HQs, along with 12 Raj Rif, established itself at Jalpaiguri and the other unit moved to their respective locations. This deployment, however, was required to be changed two days later and the brigade was now required to take over the defence of the Siliguri corridor, relieving 20 Mountain Division, and carry out some training on its own. All good intentions with regard to training could not be realised, in spite of all efforts. The units were too widely dispersed, as a consequence of which the required supervision could not be exercised. This situation was also not conducive to any kind of collective training and the units had to be left on their own.
Under command three companies of 103 Battalion BSF, Mukti Bahini
deployed in the area. In direct support until withdrawn for the brigade’s offensive tasks was 98
Mountain Regiment minus 982 Mountain Battery.
(ii)
(b) 12 Garhwal Rifles. Located in Patgram salient with:
During this period, the task assigned to the ‘Brigade of the Year’ were:
(a) To deny the liberated areas of Pachagarh and Patgram to the enemy. (b) To block the following ingress routes:
(i) Chilahati – Jalpaiguri
(ii) Lalmanirhat – Cooch Behar (c) To protect Bagdogra, Hashimara, and Cooch Behar airfields; Sahabad and Cooch Behar
radar stations, and HQs 33 Corps against ground and airborne attacks.
(i) Under command three companies of103 battalion BSF. All Mukti Fauj and
Frontier Force troops. (ii) Under command until relieved by third company of 12 Garhwal Rifles were
two companies from 4 Rajputs and one company from 107 Infantry
Battalion (Territorial Army). (iii) Under command until withdrawn for the Brigade offensive tasks was one
troop from D squadron of 69 Armoured Regiment. (iv) In direct support was one post group artillery (4 guns, 3.7 howitzers) BSF. (v) In direct support until withdrawn for the brigade’s offensive tasks was 982
Mountain Battery. (c) 21 Rajputs were located in the area of Islampur and 7 Maratha was located in the Kamla
Tea Estate protecting Bagdogra airfield.
(b) Under Command and until required by 8 Mountain Division In Location.
Division. Command and control became practically non-existent, as it was quite impossible to speak to anybody on the line. 12 Raj Rif could, however, be contacted on telephone, and as radio was not being used, it became practically impossible to get through to the other units. Improvisation was again the order of the day, and the Brigade Signals Officer was now pressed into service for organising the communication system without which it had become impossible to exercise command and control. He was able to get in touch with 9 Mountain Brigade, and we could now pass some instructions to 12 Garhwal Rifles in the Patgram Salient. This was still not a happy situation.
Other problem areas also came into focus. The brigade was now required to assume a defensive posture and, consequently, its requirements of equipment were overlooked in favour of formations going into the offensive. In the meantime, however, the Army Commander, Lt Gen Aurora, after prolonged discussions, with regard to the threat once again assigned our brigade all additional offensive task. In the event of the hostilities breaking out, this task envisaged an advance along axis Mirgarh-Pachagarh-Boda and on to Thakurgaon. The task was designed to ease pressure on 20 Mountain Division and to provide them with an additional brigade – in this case, 340 Mountain Brigade. This formation was to be made available to 20 Mountain Division in Belurghat and was released as such. The existing task of 340 Mountain Brigade, with slight modifications, was assigned to the ‘Brigade of the Year’.
This change in plans brought about a change in our order of battle. Additional troops were now allotted to 71 Mountain Brigade. They were:
(i) 1812 Light Battery ex 184 Light Regiment.
(ii) Two post groups artillery (4 guns each 3.7 How) BSF. It would also be worthwhile referring to the state of some of the units. The armoured squadron less two troops was an ad-hoc raising. It had been formed in a hurry, from the eight tanks available with the armoured delivery squadron of the Corps. The crew was also rounded up in an ad-hoc manner and was nowhere near the standards that one would expect. Immediately before war, no unit would like to part with its best soldiers for reasons that are best known and need no further amplification. The crew members were, therefore, raw and inexperienced without having had a chance of training together, which develops efficiency, cohesiveness, an espirit-de-corps as well as a camaraderie – all battle-winning factors. At the Corps Commander’s personal insistence, the regimental commander, however, sent a sprinkling of some good soldiers. The soft vehicles were in a state that cannot bear description – by any standards, they were just horrible. The advanced workshop detachment of our brigade spruced up these vehicles, practically overhauling them from their meager resources. It must be appreciated that this kind of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers detachment is designed for carrying out only field repairs and not major overhauling tasks. But, in spite of our efforts, luck was not with us in this case – these one ton vehicles had to be given away as second line transport shortly afterwards. Whoever got them must have been lucky. Instead, three ton vehicles were released to this so-called squadron, which, in a way, was good because greater loads could be carried.
A word about the squadron commander, too, will not be out of place. He was inexperienced but was prepared to learn. His regimental commander, located with 20 Mountain Division, had come down to brief him, thereby instilling confidence in the young officer. But somehow he was either unable to or was unwilling to understand despite detailed and deliberate briefings by his own regimental commander and by me. Simple and normal armour tactics were beyond his comprehension and required detailed discussions. About his subsequent conduct in battle – the less said the better. One aspect clearly discernible in his attitude, after his commanding officer’s briefing, was that his enthusiasm suddenly declined and touched a very low ebb. The exact reason was not known at that time, but it was revealed later by some of his colleagues that he had been warned not to stick his neck out too much, particularly, when he had only PT 76 tanks without spares. That is also one way of fighting a war.
In complete contrast was the young and enthusiastic unit – 12 Garhwal Rifles. It was a newly raised battalion and, to be precise, it had, completed raising only a few days prior to induction into this sector. The role of this unit was defence of the airfield and it was, therefore, sub-allotted by companies and deployed accordingly with each one of the companies functioning independently. Nonetheless, through the Corps Commander’s personal efforts and liaison by the GOC 6 Mountain Division with the air force station commander, this unit was relieved of these duties and allowed to concentrate as a cohesive whole.
(a) Under Command
(i) Dsquadron less two troops 69 Armoured Regiment. (ii) 98 Mountain Regiment ex 8 Mountain Division. (iii) Engineer Task Force, comprising one Field Company each from 11 Engineer
and 111 Engineer Regiment. (iv) 12 Garhwal Rifles less two companies. (v) 107 Territorial Army Battalion less two companies. (vi) 73 Battalion BSF. (vii) 75 Battalion BSF less elements in Calcutta. (viii) 78 Battalion BSF. (ix) 82 Battalion BSF less two companies. (x) 103 Battalion BSF.
(xi) 7 Companies Mukti Fauj. (b) Under Command and until required by 8 Mountain Division In Location.
in providing the necessary help. The Corps Commander was not really happy to deal with a brigade commander directly, but Maj Gen Nakai, Chief of Staff, and Maj Gen Lachhman Singh persuaded the Corps Commander to allow this brigade independent action and to function directly under the Corps.
The tasks now assigned to the formation were to advance along the axis Mirgarh-Pachagarh-BodaThakurgaon to:
The Garhwalis were relieved by elements of 107 Infantry Battalion (Territorial Army) at the airfield. The battalion was new, but the commanding officer had a firm grip and was the main driving force behind it. It was later amply proved what a good commanding officer can do – and it also proved the age old maxim that troops are never bad, and the officers are the ones who make or mar a unit.
The BSF, too, had an important role to play. Out of the forces placed under command, two units require mention, as the others, although under command, really did not function with the brigade. The Commanding Officer of 73 Battalion, an energetic Gurkha officer, who had done the Junior Command course at the Infantry School, was quite unlike most police officers. He was keen, enthusiastic, and hardworking. In spite of limitations imposed by his parent organisation, he was somehow able to carry out the tasks assigned to him without any fuss. Then there was Mr CP Singh, Commanding Officer, 103 Battalion BSF. He was a police officer of the IPS cadre, and a willing worker who made his second-incommand, an ex-army officer, work for him in so far as tactics were concerned. The staff had to be very tactful with him, and this helped getting things done. At the same time, both these commanding officers were friends and did not quite see eye-to-eye with the DIG, BSF. Perhaps the Brigade HQs provided them with a more congenial atmosphere, thereby achieving the desired Army/BSF cooperation.
(a) Secure Pachagarh by last light D-day and then advance onto and secure Thakurgaon by D
plus 3. (b) Thereafter, situation permitting, exploit upto Kantanagar bridge South of Birganj.
From a mountain brigade as part of mountain division that it was, 71 was now becoming an Infantry Brigade Group with greater responsibilities and with not much change in the state of equipment and training. The major deficiencies at this stage were in:
(a) Transport (b) Radio sets at platoon level (c) Batteries for radio sets (d) Steel helmets (e) Ground sheets (f) Recoilless guns and sights
(g) Light and Medium Machine Guns. As stated earlier, the reputation and luck of a commander are of great help. The efforts of GOC 20 Mountain Division, Maj Gen Lachhman Singh, and personal liaison by the commander proved very useful in re-equipping the brigade. In fact, even the radio batteries and the steel helmets and light machine guns arrived a day before the brigade went into action.
Inspite of the task having been clearly spelt out, initially only the capture of Pachagarh had been cleared. The exact reasons for the piecemeal execution of the task assigned could not be discerned. This hesitancy and the “stop-start” method of conducting operations was not conducive to the conduct and effective execution of operations.
The problem now was to prepare for the attack. The brigade had to be concentrated. It was soon realised that as long as the brigade stayed in Siliguri, in close proximity of the Corps, most of the time would be spent attending various conferences at the Corps HQs. It was good to a certain extent, as I would be in the latest picture of the entire plan, but, at the same time, I was getting lesser and lesser time for my own brigade. Therefore, the Corps HQs was persuaded to allow the brigade to concentrate at Dasapara.
It was now November 16. 20 Mountain Division had already concentrated in Belurghat. In fact, they had, by this time, taken one of the Pakistani BOPs. Such taking over of BOPs was originally started in the 4 Corps and 2 Corps sectors. This disease spread pretty fast. Hence, when HQs 33 Corps was pressurised, it had no option, but to produce some results. After 20 Mountain Division came the turn of 71 Mountain Brigade, and the formation was ordered to take the Amarkhana BOP, which was quite strongly held. Plans were made and the attack was to be launched on the night of November 18/19. Two infantry battalions (one in reserve) and four companies of the Mukti Bahini were to be used. At this stage, it was suggested to the Corps that it would be much better if Pachagarh was taken, instead of fighting a battle of attrition and doing what the enemy wanted. This meant the use of the tanks and one more infantry battalion. However, this was not agreed to and the brigade had to be contented with taking Amarkhana only. It was obvious that Pachagarh had to be taken some time or the other. If so, why not take it first? It would have saved a lot of effort and yet would have brought a very big chunk of territory in one go. Perhaps, it was over cautiousness on the part of the Corps and the limitation that no tanks were to be used and none of the men was allowed to be in such a position who could be taken POW and that prevented us from going in for Pachagarh.
From November 13 to 20, I was required, more or less every day, to discuss my plans and I invariably
This brigade was directly under the Corps; as such, the Corps felt that it would be an insult, if anything went wrong with the only fighting brigade they had as Corps troops. Therefore, they went out of their way
(a) Brigade HQs – at Saidpur, a central hub. (b) 25 Punjab – To protect area Hathibanda-Lalmanirhat-Nageshwari – Korigram. (c) 26 Frontier Force. To protect areas Dinajpur-Phulbari against any thrust from South and
West. (d) 48 Punjab. To protect areas Thakurgaon and Pachagarh. (1) 8 Punjab. To protect areas Lalmanirhat and Rangpur.
18
Into the Fray
(f) 85 Punjab (Reconnaissance and Support Battalion). To deny areas Boda, Thakurgaon and
Nilphamari.
(g) 86 Mujahid. Elements of this battalion were stretched from Hathibanda to Hilli. The above deployment of enemy was ideal for hunting in ‘Brigade of the Year’, for the brigade was destined to go into the fray that had been eagerly anticipated and awaited, with 12 Raj Rif and the Mukti Bahini maintaining relentless pressure on the axis Amarkhana-Jagdalhat-Pachagarh and the area around it, and 12 Garhwal Rifles maintaining an alert vigil in Patgram salient.
“He who is skilled in attack flashes from the topmost heights of heaven”.
-Sun Tzu
The Capture of Amarkhana BOP (Refer to Sketch 16)
The days of waiting and watching for 71 Mountain Brigade were also slowly coming to an end; the cat-andmouse games, too, were developing into bigger operations. The snatch-and-grab tactics were giving way to purposeful operations aimed at securing definite tactical objectives. I state this to highlight the fact that till now the operations were aimed at capturing small BOPs which had very little tactical meaning but were at times expensive in men and material. This little game started by 2 and 4 Corps had spread to the other formations, who could not afford just to sit and watch for fear of being accused of inaction and having a defeatist mentality. Such operations had not only been wasteful but also contributed to creating unbalanced dispositions of formations and units poised for action elsewhere. It was all very common to see such formations and units moving hurriedly to secure objectives of doubtful value. The subsequent regrouping, replenishment, and provision of reinforcements became time-consuming. Another interesting fact was that credit for these operations was to be given to the Mukti Bahini and no Indian soldier was to be lost as prisoner so as to avoid adverse publicity – a most unreasonable order for units and commanders. In spite of all precautions, some of our soldiers were taken as prisoners and the myth was exploded when photographs were published in the international media. This leads one to wonder whether during times of war, sane counsel disappears due to pressures and pulls wholly non-military. It is definitely hard to imagine that our leadership acquiesced to such demands which were not based on any kind of logic and good sense.
It was now the middle of November 1971. Even at this stage, vacillation seemed to be the order of the day. The question was of selecting the objectives – Amarkhana or Pachagarh. I had suggested that, instead of fighting a battle of attrition, by capturing a relatively unimportant post like Amarkhana, which was just what the enemy would have desired, it would be better to go straight for Pachagarh, which would open up the Main Titalya axis and give us a larger chunk of territory, in one go. Reflecting on the situation now, this was the implementation of the teachings of Sun Tzu on how to achieve the objective. He, in his profound wisdom, has very rightly stated that “in war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact: to shatter and destroy it is not so profitable. So, too, it is better to capture an army entirely rather than to destroy it. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence”. To achieve such an end also entails adopting certain means. Supreme excellence, therefore, consisted of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting according to the pattern imposed by him. In the light of this thinking, the plan for the capture of Pachagarh was proposed but not accepted. ‘The Brigade of the Year’ was now ordered to capture Amarkhana.
Plans for the capture of Amarkhana were evolved, studied, reviewed, and were also re-cast. The problem areas were the use of tanks and the Mukti Bahini. The main reason for this debate was that war had not yet been declared which prevented the use of tanks during assaults and, at the same time, the overall operational efficiency of the Mukti Bahini was suspected. The debate continued and it was ultimately decided that armour could be used in fire support only and that, too, from within our own
Opposed to the ‘Brigade of the Year’, Brig Ansari had deployed his forces in Saidpur-Rangpur-Dinajpur Sectors as follows, with the aim of denying maximum territory for maximum time:
The plans crystallised the process of gathering information as initiated, which primarily involved patrolling mostly with the Mukti Bahini in clothes similar to theirs. Since active reconnaissance for the capture of Amarkhana was being carried out with little secrecy, I decided to pay an early morning visit to 12 Raj Rif and personally assess the ground situation from the direction in which we were in direct contact with the enemy. At the view point and while listening to the resume about enemy activities, I got an uneasy feeling that the enemy had vacated the post. However, I was assured that the enemy was still there. On returning to the Brigade HQs at about 0900 hours, I asked for the situation report of the morning. While briefing, the Brigade Major shared the same feeling about the enemy not being there, which I had experienced at view point. Thereafter I spoke to the commanding officer and expressed my doubt whether the enemy was still occupying the post. I then ordered him to close in with the post at the earliest, to confirm the same. The unit commander, sensing the urgency of the situation, immediately organised a column which marched triumphantly into a vacant Amarkhana post.
In its very first conventional operation the unit had faced no resistance. In Manipur and Nagaland, too, organised resistance by the underground rebels was never offered and as a consequence, the realities of war were not within the battalion’s comprehension. Flushed with the success of its first operation, the unit was in a gay mood, and a sense of euphoria had set in leading to irresponsible actions by all ranks. The unit had somehow, forgotten its basic military training and battle procedures. Digging was ignored, camouflage and concealment was not thought of, and there were no attempts to control movements in the open and on the skyline. I had to nip this situation in the bud as it could lead to disastrous consequences. Prompt action shattered the dream world of the battalion and its picnic had come to an abrupt end. In a somewhat harsh manner the unit was made to realise the realities of war and its horrific results brought about by carelessness. This lesson was not forgotten by the unit for the rest of the war much to its overall performance subsequently.
The township, itself, was located astride the Karatoya river, which, would slow down the momentum of the attacking troops if the direction of attack involved an obstacle crossing during one of its phases. Such a pause would allow the enemy to regroup unhindered and pose greater resistance during the subsequent phases. This would have been not only time consuming but also costly in terms of men and material. The plan, therefore, had to be evolved in such a way that positions on the Karatoya river were tackled in the later stages of the battle.
The planning stage had been set into motion earlier, with November 23 or 24 as the tentative dates for the launching of the attack. Preliminary orders for this operation were discussed with HQs 33 Corps and issued to the units under command on November 15/16. But, at the time when final orders were being issued on November 23, the Rajputs raised a number of irrelevant ‘A’ and ‘Q’ queries, viz, the means of evacuation of casualties, insufficiency of steel helmets, batteries for radio sets, all totally unconnected with the forthcoming operation. These points had not been raised earlier either. The other units, too, did not seem to show their earlier enthusiasm, probably because the initial successes were easily gained as a result of which the enemy was being under-estimated – an extremely dangerous state of mind.
Operation Gangway – The Capture of Pachagarh (Refer to Sketch 17)
The importance of Pachagarh had already been highlighted to the powers that be. This township, located close to our salient into Bangladesh, controlled all North-South movements on the TitalyaThakurgaon highway as well as East-West movements on the Atwari-Berubari and Atwari-Haldipur highway. Its capture from the Indian side did not involve a long advance to contact and the build-up could be carried out in own territory without being discovered by the enemy. The most important fact, however, was that its early capture and subsequent link up towards either Haldibari or Berubari would have cut off the jugular vein of the Titalya neck sticking into Indian territory. These facts were, however, ignored and instead the capture of Amarkhana was ordered as mentioned earlier. This task any way was successfully accomplished.
Sketch-17: Battle of Pachagarh
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The plan for the capture of Pachagarh, in a nutshell, had envisaged an encirclement and siege of the town with an outer ring closing in towards the centre of the town reinforced by three road blocks for cutting off the enemy withdrawal routes. In the initial phase, 7 Maratha, going in from the North-west was required to tackle Pachagarh railway station and the road junction immediately North of it. The operations were to be completed by 0500 hours on November 27. The unit was, thereafter, required to tackle the bridge on the Karatoya river and the EPR Company HQs located South of the bridge. The exploitation phase entailed a link up towards the North with 12 Raj Rif, and the BSF elements. This last part of the operation was scheduled for completion by 1200 hours on November 28.
Simultaneously, the Rajputs, moving from the same direction, but further to the South, were assigned the task of capturing Fakirhat bridge by 2100 hours on November 26 and thence to go in for the Sugar Mill and Staff Quarters in the Southern part of the town, completing the operations by 1000 hours on November 28. The unit was, thereafter, required to linkup with the Marathas in the area of EPR Company HQ by 1200 hours on November 28. The unit was also assigned the task of establishing two road blocks to complete the encirclement from South and East. Road block No 1 was to be established on the PachagarhBoda road, and road block No 2 was to be established on the Pachagarh-Debiganj road.
From the North, 12 Raj Rif less two companies along with one company BSF were to advance from Jagdalhat on to the Northern outskirts of Pachagarh town with the aim of diverting the defender’s attention and to put pressure on them from this direction, thereby dividing their forces which, in turn, would make the tasks of the attacking battalions easier. This force was also required to establish road block No 3 in the East. This road block in conjunction with the other two was designed to seal off the enemy’s withdrawal routes.
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Deployment of the brigade after the capture of Amarkhana was for 12 Raj Rif to exert pressure on area Jagdalhat and along axis Jagdalhat-Pachagarh from the North and West, while 7 Maratha and 21 Rajput were to concentrate in area Pachagarh bulge. November 26 was the D-Day, and the available time was utilised for tying up loose ends.
On November 24 the medium guns of 40 Medium Regiment were deployed near the Brigade HQs in the area of Dasapara. The two Air OP helicopters, which were in direct support for this operation, now undertook to shoot on enemy targets. On hearing the booming guns, the brigade head clerk responded and, showing “great presence of mind,” ducked under the first available steel chair. Needless to say he is now the proud occupant of a modest office somewhere in a peace station recollecting thoughts of those challenging and interesting days.
With the planning completed and orders issued, the units too proceeded about their tasks collecting information and drawing up their own plans. The earlier lack of seriousness and enthusiasm on the part of the commanders required to be eliminated. Unit activities were personally supervised and all ranks were
motivated into achieving their objectives. For a brigade commander, this involves personal contact, providing, advice, assurances, and at times cajoling his subordinates, into action. It must be remembered that in our system of command and hierarchy, the brigade is the last rung of the ladder where the commander is still in direct contact with the unit and sub-unit commanders as well as troops. Thereafter, one tends to move away from these realities into the world of conferences of subordinate commanders and staff. Conducting the orchestra of war at the brigade level, therefore, has different connotations.
Reconnaissance had to be carried out in civilian clothes along with the Mukti Bahini. The lungi and kurta were adopted as the dress for patrolling. The border could now be crossed and the civil population which had crossed on to our side along with the Mukti Bahini personnel were helpful and enthusiastic, seeking revenge on the oppressors. They provided guides and valuable information on the area of operations 34 Punjab (Recee and Support Battalion) was opposing the brigade in Pachagarh.
Marathas were to assault on the night of November 26. Though a reconnaissance had been carried out, there was need to draw the fire of the enemy and locate its positions and automatic weapons. On the night of November 24, a company commanded by Maj NB Karkhanis was sent to draw enemy fire. The firing of enemy weapons and from the local information obtained from time to time, it was inferred that the road junction was held by a company of regulars and some Razakars. The road junction was such that the trenches extended towards Ayub Park and the bridge over the Karatoya.
In the morning the Marathas were to attack Pachagarh. A small patrol of four men from the intelligence section, led by Lance Naik (L/Nk) Shripat More, was carrying out reconnaissance of a concealed route. They captured three armed Razakars. This was considered a good omen by the unit, but on interrogation they provided information of dubious value which raised doubts and uncertainty.
The pattern of defences occupied by the enemy is shown at Sketch 18. They had prepared a number of bunkers which could be occupied in different modes or combinations as required by the pattern of attack. First, they would shift from bunker to bunker, fighting from each one successively. Secondly, depending on the direction of attack, they would occupy the bunkers in such a pattern that maximum possible fire could be brought on the assaulting troops. Some positions were vacated and re-occupied subsequently to meet the demands of the situation.
the main thrust. At 2300 hours on November 26, the attack was launched as planned. A Company commanded by Maj NB Karkhanis sent a platoon commanded by Naib Subedar (Nb Sub) Dattatrya Shinde. This platoon quickly captured the Godown. The Company HQ followed this platoon closely. The remaining two platoons were to be given the further task of exploiting, from the West by probing in. As the platoon of Nb Sub Dattatrya Shinde tried to move forward, it came under heavy fire of medium and light machine guns from three directions. The other platoon led by Subedar (Sub) Damodar Phule tried to make progress from yet another direction and was held up. The aim of diverting the attention of the enemy to the West and of capturing the Godown was achieved. Now the crux of the problem devolved upon the progress of B and C companies. Both these companies went into the assault, with B Company on the left and Company on the right. The attack of both these companies was launched in platoon echelons. The leading platoon of C Company commanded by Nb Sub Mahadeo Parab assaulted the bunkers. In this assault, the normal method of shouting the war cry was not followed, but, the normal fire and movement tactics were employed. The platoon managed to capture one strong point of the enemy. During this attack, Naik (Nk) Shahaji Khot got a burst from enemy machine gun fire in the right palm while he was trying to throw a hand grenade into the loop hole of the enemy’s bunker. The C Company commander, Maj DM Nijamuddin, was closely following this leading platoon, exhorting his boys by personal example even amidst the heavy volume of fire directed by the enemy. He was moving about nonchalantly and made frantic efforts to communicate with his remaining two platoons, to exploit the initial gains. At this stage, while trying to destroy a bunker, he was hit by a bullet in his mouth. But luckily for him, the bullet did not cause much serious harm. It miraculously emerged from his cheek and this gallant young officer became unconscious. Quickly seizing the initiative, the artillery officer, Capt Prasad, who was with Maj Nijamuddin, made efforts to exploit the initial gains. Unfortunately, however, the remaining two platoons, under Sub Shantaram Mahal, failed to contact the leading platoon as they had lost direction and the communication between the two platoon failed. It was now a problem to evacuate Maj Nijamuddin who lay unconscious barely ten yards from the enemy bunker. Sep Narayan Malusare, his radio operator, remained with him, in spite of heavy fire, guarding him all the time. This young jawan made valiant efforts to pull back his company commander and in doing so he was seriously wounded but carried on with his efforts. For this act of devotion to duty, Sep Narayan Malusare was awarded the Sena Medal. After about an hour, Maj Nijamuddin regained consciousness. He spoke to the commanding officer on radio, making frantic requests to trace out and send his remaining two platoons as he was determined to capture the assigned objective despite his wounds. He was doing this only a few yards away from the enemy positions. Efforts were now made to locate the missing platoons, but in the darkness they had got involved in fighting against an unexpected temporary enemy position on the North-west. The leading platoon, however, held on to the area captured.
The road junction had only one obvious direction of assault from the North. The approach was through broken ground with plenty of undergrowth. As this was the only approach, the enemy could bring down heavy and well coordinated fire from the area of Road Junction and Ayub Park both the mutually supporting, forming a part of the overall defence complex, and fortified by a large number of concrete bunkers.
The plan of attack was to launch a company from the West with the task of capturing Godown, draw the attention of the enemy to the West, and at the same time to launch B and C companies from the North as
Sketch-18: Battle at Pachagarh
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On the other flank, B Company commanded by Maj DB Jadhav was attacking simultaneously. This company attacked with two platoons, one commanded by Second Lieutenant (2/Lt) Suresh Bagwe, with Nb Sub Shankar Koli, and the other by Nb Sub Shanker Shirture. The platoon of Sub Ghansham Sawant was in reserve. Both platoons made reasonably good progress. Despite a large number of casualties, they captured a part of the objective by silencing the enemy medium and light machine guns entrenched in well-fortified bunkers, concrete pillboxes and two concrete buildings. It was in this assault that Havildar (Hav) Manohar Mane captured two enemy bunkers single-handed. As he was going for the third one, he was hit by a burst of enemy machine gun. By this personal example, this Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) had inspired his men to such an extent that, even in the face of heavy machine gun fire, they pressed hard their attack, forcing the enemy to withdraw. For this act of gallantry, Hav Manohar Mane was posthumously awarded the Sena Medal. The other platoon also made some gains but with heavy casualties. Lance Hav Vithoba Patil had also done a good job of inspiring his men into taking enemy positions. The third platoon, too, fetched up to exploit the initial successes. The Company Commander, Maj DR Jadhav, thereafter, collected a few men and crawled up to the Road Junction and secured it. The company had by then sustained heavy casualties.
The time now was 0200 hours on November 27. The situation was fluid. In the darkness, under heavy fire from the enemy, the platoon sets had failed to work and two platoons were lost. Taking advantage of this situation, the enemy launched two quick counter attacks on the objectives captured by the Marathas. Similarly, in the area of Godown, where one platoon and Company HQ were located, the enemy made desperate efforts to dislodge them by launching counter attacks one after another. A company of the Marathas, however, held on tenaciously, displaying grit and determination of a very high order. Ultimately, the enemy gave up his efforts. All the while, D Company of the Marathas had been kept as a reserve for tackling unforeseen situations that could arise in the confusion and mayhem prevailing. This normally happens, and they are the imponderables of war which has very few rules.
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By this time, at about 0400 hours, the PT 76 tanks, a squadron less two troops were moved to the West to assist in destroying some of the strong points and pillboxes. By the time the tanks could get into position, it was daylight and the enemy opened up with his recoilless guns. In the face of this fire, our tanks did not press home the attack and withdrew.
By this time the situation had not fully stabilised. A Company of the Marathas had a tenuous hold on the area of Godown; B Company had partially captured its objective, and similarly C Company, too, had partial success with two of its platoons missing. It could be said, that at this stage, a ring had been formed around the enemy’s positions and these footholds had to be enlarged in order to exterminate the enemy.
The platoons, from their positions, continued to take on targets with the 57 mm recoilless guns, which had improvised sights, and managed to damage three enemy strong points. Similarly, some fighting
patrols also harassed and maintained pressure on the enemy from all directions. The enemy made all possible efforts, including bringing down heavy artillery fire, on all these positions with a view to evicting the Marathas from their positions. But with determined efforts, despite heavy casualties, the unit continued to hold the positions. Immediately after last light, the enemy reinforced his positions. The same night, a road block by another battalion was to be established behind enemy positions. Based on the success and the effect produced on the enemy by this road block, the Marathas were to attack again. But by the time the road block was established and became effective, it was morning. The road block unit had lost its direction and gone astray.
At this stage, the ‘Brigade of the Year’ was in the news. The BBC announced that 71 Mountain Brigade had attacked Pachagarh, with 7 Maratha LI as the spearhead. Pakistan Radio, too, made its usual propaganda announcements of having inflicted more than two thousand casualties on the Brigade. This was nowhere near the truth, but these announcements did provoke the battalion into making fresh and determined efforts for securing its objectives.
A new plan for the attack was now evolved and the unit was to continue despite heavy casualties. This plan entailed an attack from three directions with one company each during the day. The artillery preparation could not be elaborate because of the close proximity of our troops to those of the enemy. At about 1000 hours, the attack re-commenced with D Company of the Marathas, commanded by Capt Vinay Patil, with Sub Ganpat Kalgutkar, Sub Daulatrao Fadatare, and Nb Sub Marute Garde as platoon commanders. B and C Companies also went in simultaneously. The Battalion HQs, with the Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) SR Bidkikar, the Second-in-Command Maj NS Phadnis, and Capt M Bharte the Adjutant, followed closely behind the leading elements of B and D Companies. The personnel of the Battalion HQs had been organised to act as a rifle platoon. The attack progressed and heavy handto-hand fighting ensued – all in broad daylight. Bunker after bunker was captured by the Marathas. In spite of the limited artillery fire, the progress was fairly good. Nonetheless, it took nearly four hours of fighting before the enemy was compelled to withdraw, and the objective was captured by 1600 hours on November 28. The enemy, in the meantime, had withdrawn successfully as our road block had not got into correct position.
the attack commenced, the enemy brought down heavy artillery and mortar fire inflicting a few casualties. Capt Prasad, the artillery officer, and Nb Sub Mahadev Parab, beside a few other ranks, were seriously wounded. Orders then were changed and the battalion was now required to capture these positions only the next morning. A patrol, under the command of Capt A Imtiliba Ao, SM, was sent during the night to gain more information and to harass the enemy. Maj RK Ale, with his C Company, next morning quickly captured Ayub Park and, exploiting further, captured the bridge over the Karatoya intact. Enemy snipers continued to fire from across the river. Again, the medium machine gun, commanded by Nb Sub Ananda Patil, dropped these snipers from the trees. A few Razakars with their weapons were captured on November 29. The battalion was now ordered to become a part of the advancing column of the brigade, led by 12 Raj Rif going on to Boda.
The Rajputs also opened their innings on the night of November 23/24, with a patrol under 2/Lt NK Appaiah, which was sent behind the enemy lines with the aim of gaining information and causing confusion in the enemy’s ranks. On the following day, a similar patrol was sent under 2/Lt Manjunath. This patrol stayed behind the enemy lines for more than 24 hours in spite of having been detected. This young officer just went on changing his patrol base and kept the enemy guessing about the direction of attack and future plans.
The Fakirhat Bridge was held by an enemy patrol, with one heavy machine gun, in order to guard the axis Gwalguch-Pachagarh. There was more than four feet of water on either side of the Bridge which, by itself, posed a major obstacle for the attacking troops.
On the night of November 26/27, C Company under Maj MS Malik, attacked the Bridge. Leaving the forward assembly area by 1900 hours, the company moved into the forming up place and came under heavy artillery as well as automatic fire. The company was surprised, and the attack was disrupted but command and control was regained and the assault was launched once again. The heavy machine gun on the Bridge was bringing down devastating fire holding up the company’s assault. It was at this stage that Nk Raja Singh took up the cudgels. Regardless of his personal safety, this NCO crawled towards the heavy machine gun with the aim of destroying it. As he was about ten yards away, he got up and threw a grenade towards the loophole of the bunker, but while doing so he was wounded in the legs. The machine gun kept firing and undeterred, in spite of his wounds, the NCO crawled closer to the bunker and lobbed a second grenade into the loophole but while doing so he was mortally wounded. The heavy machine gun had been silenced but Nk Raja Singh had paid for it with his life. On the other flank, Hav Bane Singh’s section was held up by a light machine gun, which was also inflicting heavy casualties. He ordered his light machine gun group to give covering fire and led the remainder of his section in a charge onto the enemy machine gun. Most of his comrades fell wounded, but this gallant NCO charged into the position and with his bayonet proceeded to decimate the crew manning the enemy’s light machine gun. Both were awarded the VrC for conspicuous gallantry in the face of the enemy, with Nk Raja Singh getting the award posthumously. On the night of November 27/28, the battalion resumed its advance with armour and
While recounting the events, it must be said that the battalion had a difficult time reorganising itself after the objective was captured. The enemy was bringing down heavy fire and accurate artillery and mortar fire on to the objective area. At the same time, the enemy had also positioned a large number of snipers, who were harassing the Marathas. It must be said to the credit of the unit that it withstood the shelling and was successfully able to eliminate the snipers by some bold and resolute actions. A medium machine gun was very profitably employed against the snipers.
The battalion was also given the task of capturing the adjoining areas of Ayub Park and the Bridge. C Company, the sub-unit, which was now taken over by Maj RK Ale, regrouped itself for the attack, and as
established a firm base about 2,000 metres South-west of Pachagarh. This sudden move in the enemy’s rear unnerved him and the Punjabis (Pakistan) withdrew leaving behind one company to fight a rear guard battle. On the morning of November 28, one rifle platoon each commanded by Capt PN Chakaraborty and Lt SK Bedi, along with a troop of tanks, attacked and captured Pachagarh Sugar Mill and Staff Quarters.
To view the entire battle in a nutshell, it would be worthwhile recalling events and comparing them with the overall plan. The artillery was deployed on November 24 and carried out harassing fire as well as registration. This was followed by an attack on the night of November 26/27 by 21 Rajput. The unit captured the Fakirhat Bridge as planned, but 7 Maratha attack by B and C Companies did not progress as planned. The unit firmed in on the portion occupied. On the night of November 27/28, A Company of 12 Raj Rif relieved the Rajputs at 1300 hours who, in turn, proceeded with their subsequent task of establishing a firm base. This action was completed, and the firm base was established in the area of Arazi Shkarpur by midnight in spite of enemy raids. It was also reported that road block No 1 was in position on the Pachagara-Boda road. This was not quite correct.
By last light on November 29, 21 Rajput had cleared and occupied area Sugar Mill and Staff Quarters. Road block No 2 was established in the area of Nayabandar. The remainder 12 Raj Rif now concentrated at Fakirhat Bridge and reduced the gap between itself and the firm base established by the Rajputs. 7Maratha had captured the Pachagarh Bridge, but on account of the heavy casualties suffered, the unit had to regroup. Pachagarh was subsequently cleared by 21 Rajput. At this time, 12 Raj Rif less one company occupied the firm base vacated by 21 Rajput.
On looking back, it would also be worthwhile comparing the execution of these operations with the original plans. While the operations of 7 Maratha generally proceeded as planned, 21 Rajput deviated from the original plan during the conduct of operations. The firm base of this unit was to be established in the area of Jalpesh Narayani, nearly two km away from the one which was actually established at Arazi Shkarpur. None of the road blocks reached their planned destination. This allowed the enemy to escape. The ring that was to encircle the enemy at Tenganabari could not be established.
29. The enemy, while withdrawing, had occupied a delaying position at Maidan Dighi, but that had been hastily prepared. As a matter of fact the Brigade had maintained the momentum of operations, thereby preventing the enemy from offering any meaningful resistance at Maidan Dighi. A quick action by the unit dislodged the enemy from this position by 1500 hours on November 30. The Raj Rif were in good form and pressed home their advantage by continuing their advance on to Boda. Contact with Boda was established by 0900 hours on December 1. A quick reconnaissance revealed that Boda was held by one enemy company. An outflanking move by armour to bye-pass the position from the West was initiated with Maj Gen Sarkar, Director of Operations at HQs Eastern Command, and the Brigade Commander on the leading tank. A quick attack by 12 Raj Rif was also organised, at the head of the assault. The battalion pursued its objective with determination and vigour. A stiff fight ensued and the enemy company was dislodged and it beat a hasty retreat towards Thakurgaon. The bridge over the Patraj Nala at Boda was also captured intact – the enemy having been surprised by the quick and bold moves of the battalion. At this stage, as the rear communication of the Brigade with Corps HQs had become over-extended, 6 Mountain Division Signal Regiment was stepped in the chain, to provide and maintain our direct communication with Corps HQs, thus removing a worry that was developing on this account.
The Advance to Thakurgaon
Once again the situation was gauged and a quick reshuffle was carried out, with the Rajputs now leading the advance at last light on December 1. It would be pertinent to note that it was one of those rare occasions when an advance to contact was being carried out at night. This was in keeping with the maxim of obtaining relentless pressure on the enemy by day and by night so as to keep him unbalanced in order to prevent his regrouping and reorganising for subsequent resistance to the advancing forces.
The Rajputs were now moving and the Marathas were following, acting as reserve to the Rajputs. The Brigade of the Year was thwarted for the first time by Pakistani sappers, when it was discovered that the bridge over the Bhulinadi had been damaged. Our sappers were quickly called up and with their usual efficiency they constructed a bye-pass approximately 3,000 m North-east of the bridge. While there was a pause for the advance to commence because of the construction of the bridge, the Brigade Signal Company Commander Maj Kaul, picked up an enemy conversation on the existing enemy telephone lines. In this conversation, the detachment commander of the enemy listening post at the road junction South of the bridge was wondering whether they would be attacked the night by the Indian army. Despite prodding, 21 Rajputs, to my chagrin, did not commence advance, as they were very tired and it was getting dark, thus missing an excellent opportunity to grab this enemy outpost and the valuable prisoners, thus denying the brigade vital intelligence and an early contact with Thakurgaon. Anyway, the advance was recommenced at 1400 hours on December 2, and the main defences of Thakurgaon were contacted by 1600 hours.
These are the imponderables of war, and plans rarely proceeded as visualised. The Brigade of the Year had scored its first major victory in that fateful year of decision and was now poised to advance on to Thakurgaon.
The Advance to Boda
Pachagarh having been captured and secured, a quick regrouping of the Brigade was now carried out, and orders for an advance to Boda and thence on to Thakurgaon were also given. 12 Raj Rif, with D Squadron 69 Armoured Regiment under command, commenced the advance at 1430 hours on November
so as to formulate the plan of attack. It was reported that Thakurgaon was held by approximately two enemy companies and protected with extensive minefields. The town itself provided an in-built potential for defence as the built up area could be profitably utilised for conducting defensive operations.
The plan now envisaged a full-fledged brigade attack with all available support placed at the disposal of the Rajputs for the initial break into the defences of the town. 7 Maratha was ordered to establish a road block with one company astride the Birganj-Thakurgaon road, so that the enemy was not allowed to escape again and the remaining battalion to act as reserve for 21 Rajput. The enemy had been forced into occupying a hasty delaying position, as a consequence of which the defences were not fully coordinated, thereby reducing the resistance that could be offered to our advancing troops. This was a situation tailormade for quick, bold, and decisive action exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses. But the Rajputs were not quite enthusiastic about carrying out such an interesting task. A personal intervention was called for, and the unit was now assisted in formulating its plans. Minor and irrelevant objections were, however, raised and these had to be brushed aside for the larger interests at stake.
Notwithstanding the imaginary fears of the Rajputs, the battle proceeded as planned. In view of the uncoordinated and hasty defences occupied by the enemy, the Rajputs were able to overcome their objectives but not before suffering some casualties. This adversely affected the unit’s confidence. At the same time, the Maratha Company could not establish the planned road-block because it got delayed en route and could not reach the road-block site on time. Their efforts were also hampered by the presence of an enemy patrol based on infantry and tanks. The enemy, now withdrawing from Thakurgaon, could not be trapped, as a consequence, and was allowed to escape. The town itself was cleared and occupied by 1200 hours on December 3. The battle of Thakurgaon cannot, therefore, be called an unqualified success.
The ‘Brigade of the Year’, conducting operations in the ‘Year of the Brigade’, was not far behind in keeping up with the general policy. With effect from December 5, 1971, the brigade became a part of 6 Mountain Division. Maj Gen PC Reddy, the GOC, 6 Division, was a wonderful gentleman soldier, who, thereafter, visited the brigade HQs almost daily, so that I did not have to look over my shoulder for any advice or help, as was the case earlier. During his visits, he made particularly sure that there was no disturbance at all in the functioning or the frequent moves of the brigade HQs.
It must, however, be remembered that all operations of 71 Mountain Brigade Group had been dovetailed into the plans of 33 Corps. It is, therefore, worthwhile to have a glance towards the activities of the Corps leading up to the final capture of Rangpur.
In November, Lt Gen Aurora visited Belurghat and issued orders for the capture of Noapara, Morapara, and Basudebpur in the Hilli complex of Pakistani defences, with 202 Brigade. The Pakistanis had been preparing defences in Hilli for several days, developing it into a strong defensive position. The bunker type defences were strengthened by the use of wire obstacles and mines. The area around Hilli had become marshy and cross-country movement was difficult even for infantry.
The attack on Hilli was planned in three phases and, on November 23, it was attacked by a battalion supported by a squadron of armour. But the operation ended up in a dismal failure, because the armour was immobilised by the marshes and failed to support the infantry. However, 8 Guards, the first battalion, again attacked and Noapara fell without much resistance. With efforts continuing through the night, Morapara was also captured by 8 Guards, the next day, after a 24 hour delay Bhatty then decided to capture Basudebpur with a battalion, to secure the Western flank of Morapara. Basudebpur was captured after a battalion attack.
As a result of this attack, the Pakistanis appreciated that the major Indian effort would be a break-out to the East along Hilli and sealed all exits from it into the waistline in order to prevent the splitting of their entire force in the North-western sector. They also put in a counter-attack on November 25, which, being ill-prepared, was easily beaten back. After this, a stalemate occurred and both sides resorted to heavy shelling, but no major operations were launched in this area till December 3.
The Command HQs, following the bitter struggle for the capture of Hilli by a direct attack, decided to switch over to the contingency plan. It was now decided to avoid capturing strongly held defensive positions, like Hilli and Dinajpur, and to launch a Northward thrust to Charkhai. The aim of this change of plan was to concentrate a strong force of two brigades, to be launched along the Charkhai-NawabganjPirganj and Charkhai-Bhaduria-Gorakhat axes to cut the waistline at Gaibanda and Govindganj. These axes, being close to each other, offered the advantage of concentration of armour, artillery, and mutual support to the advancing brigades.
Despite Bhatty’s determined efforts to link up with Sharma at Charkai on December 3 and 4, his leading
At this stage, as it had not been till then possible to stem the advancing tide, of the ‘Brigade of the Year’, the enemy decided it replace its brigade commander. Brig Shafi, a logistic officer reputed to be more aggressive and full of ideas, was placed in command of the Pakistani forces in this sector.
As the battle of Thakurgaon was closing on that fateful December day, the PAF launched its pre-emptive strike on Indian airfields in Punjab and at Agra. But our own air force was more than prepared to counteract this Israeli type strike. No meaningful results were achieved by the PAF, and our own “boys in blue” recoiled to strike back into the Pakistani heartland and annihilate the enemy air force in East Pakistan. A task which was achieved with relative ease, leaving the East Pakistani skies clear of enemy aircrafts.
The President of India now declared that India was at war with Pakistan. The theory that ‘it is proper to attack the other state if it is to bring welfare of the people of that state was replaced by another theory: ‘War is an affair of the state’. Contraband control was affected by the Indian navy and the enemy also felt the sting of the IAF, while the Indian army maintained its pressure on all fronts.
The ‘Brigade of the Year’, conducting operations in the ‘Year of the Brigade’, was not far behind in
Lachhman Singh now decided to revise his plan, in order to destroy all the Pakistani troops in the waistline in one major stroke. The new plan was as follows:
Gor
In the meantime, 66 Brigade had advanced to Phulbari from Samjia, and the town was captured on December 3, by a battalion attack. However, the existing bridge over the river was blown up by the retreating Pakistanis. By putting in a major engineering effort, a track was developed to linkup Samjia with the Dinajpur-Phulbari road by the Indian forces and a bridge was constructed over the river near Phulbari.
On December 4, the advance began, led by an armoured regiment, which surprised the Pakistanis at Charkai by a cross country approach. As the Pakistanis fled, it was discovered that the track linking Phulbari with Charkai, being unsuitable for vehicular traffic, was inadequate for a divisional advance. After a quick reconnaissance, it was decided to convert the railway track into a motorable road from Phulbari to Charkai by the evening of December 5. As speed was the key to success of operations in this sector, engineers with working parties from the infantry battalions along with local labour collected by the Mukti Bahini put in a herculean effort. By midnight of December 6/7 the route was made vehicle-worthy, a remarkable feat that involved construction of a number of bridges.
(a) 202 Brigade to capture Hilli and advance eastward to link up with 66 Brigade in the
Goraghat area and then advance to Bogra and capture it. (b) 340 Brigade to advance from Pirganj to capture Govindganj and then advance along the
main road to Bogra and capture it. (c) 66 Brigade to advance from Nawabganj to capture Bhaduria and advance to Goraghat and
Govindganj to link up with 340 Brigade. On December 9, 340 Brigade led by armour advanced and captured Palasbari. Priganj was held strongly by a battalion, to face a likely attack by the Pakistanis from Rangpur side. Information was also received that the Pakistanis were planning to escape from Rangpur towards Dacca by river using the Phulchari ferry. Two companies were immediately sent to demolish the jetties over the ferry site.
The bridge near Govindganj was blown up by the retreating Pakistanis, who had also mined the road, which delayed the advance of 340 Brigade. On December 12, the armoured regiment grouped with it was moved to the Western front.
While the work of connecting the road track was on, the divisional commander decided to concentrate 66 and 202 Brigades in the Charkhai and Nawabganj areas to make a strong drive towards Pirganj and Goraghat. He also began moving 340 Brigade with nearly two armoured regiments in the NawabganjCharkai area. As this movement was being carried out, Nawabganj and Dakhabhana were captured. However, by December 5, it became apparent that 202 Brigade was having problems in linking up with 66 Brigade at Charkai, because of difficulties in disengaging itself at Hilli because of close contact. It was, therefore, decided to contain Hilli with 202 Brigade and advance over the newly constructed track with 340 Brigade on December 7 to capture Pirganj. 66 Brigade was ordered to hold the firm base and the bridgehead in the vicinity of Nawabganj over the Karatoya river.
In the meantime, 202 Brigade undertook operations to clear the Hilli complex. One battalion captured Duria and Barachangram by December 10. Another battalion captured Bisapara and Baigram the same day. A third battalion captured Chandipur, Hakimpur, and Denajpara. The Pakistani resistance at Hilli diminished by December 10. 202 Brigade then advanced to Goraghat, after handing over Hilli to 165 Brigade and reached there on December 11. The next day, it resumed the advance to Bogra via Khetal.
During this period an ad hoc brigade, comprising the Mukti Bahini and the BSF, under Brig Prem Singh crossed the Mahananda. It captured Nawabganj on December 12 and dominated the area upto the outskirts of Rajshahi.
The advance of 340 brigade was delayed by a congestion of vehicles at the bridge site. Led by the armour, it continued despite minor opposition. By last light on December 7, the armour captured Pirganj without opposition.
re of Pirganj, the Pakistani forces in this sector were cut into two. During the days that followed, the Pakistani divisional commander commanded his division from Rangpur, though his tactical HQs was at Nator, because a personal security was ensured at Rangpur as the Bihari muslims formed the majority of the local population. He also did not wish to return to his HQs through an area in the hands of the Indian forces. Consequently, utter confusion prevailed among his division, and his troops were forced to fight piecemeal actions. He eventually flew out in a helicopter on the night of December 9/10.
On the night of December 7/8, the Pakistanis tried to recapture Pirganj. But the weak and disjointed attacks were easily repelled by the Indian forces.
On December 7, 66 Brigade advanced from Nawabganj by a motorable track to Govindganj. A belated battalion attack was launched on Bhaduria on December 10. Bhaduria was captured the next day after heavy fighting, and 66 Brigade linked up with 202 Brigade in Goraghat area by first light on December 12.
The divisional advance led by 340 Brigade along the highway began on December 9. The North bank of the Karatoya river was cleared by first light of December 10. The Pakistanis were holding the South bank in strength. It was decided to outflank them by a wide Eastward hook. On December 11, the road was cut off South of Gobindganj. The Pakistani troops in Gobindganj panicked and fled, and a large number of them were taken prisoners.
The advance was continued without waiting for the construction of the bridge over the Karataya. By
Lachhman Singh now decided to revise his plan, in order to destroy all the Pakistani troops in the
afternoon, the Indian troops reached the Icchamati river, where they were held up by enemy’s artillery and small arms fire.
Sketch-19: Battle at Kantanagar
CUP
A company followed by a battalion crossed the river in the night and put the defenders to flight. The brigade pushed on relentlessly and captured the bridge on the Karatoya intact. Bogra was only a few kilometers away now and its defences were contacted on December 13. A combat group, consisting of a regiment less a squadron of armour and a battalion, was sent on a wide hook via Gabtali to cut off both roads South of Bogra by first light on December 14.
On December 14, 340 Brigade pressed on the attack from the North as well as from the South. The Pakistanis put up a stiff fight. On the morning of December 15, Pakistan’s 205 Brigade HQs surrendered to the Indian troops.
In the meantime, the division was ordered to capture Rangpur without delay. 66 Brigade was diverted towards Rangpur and on December 14, 202 Brigade followed it. The defence of Balurghat was taken over by 9 Mountain Brigade under Brig T Verma and the brigade was ordered to concentrate in the Bogra area.
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On December 15, 66 Brigade began the advance to Rangpur, but was held up at river Ghagat. 202 Brigade was also held up along ale river South-west of Rangpur. However, on the morning of December 16, the Pakistanis holding Rangpur surrendered to the Indian forces.
MUKUND PUR
BHATGOPUR
Having seen the operations of 33 Corps, one could now corelate the operations of our formations from December 3, till the enemy’s final surrender.
De
MUHAMMADPUR
The Advance to Kantanagar Bridge (Refer to Sketch 19)
Not to Scale
The advance commenced at 1130 hours on December 4, with A Company of the Marathas acting as vanguard. Company, commanded by Maj NB Karkhanis, with Sub Damodar Phule, Nb Sub Dattatraya Shinde and Nb Sub Vishnu Patil as platoon commanders, made good progress. Before commencing the advance, the locals flocked round the battalion shouting Joy Bangla. The local populace provided refreshments to the advancing force. About 150 civilians also volunteered to assist the Marathas. They were used for carrying ammunition. In four hours, from 1130-1530 hours, the company cleared four minor oppositions. The first opposition was at 1215 hours of about two sections, the second at 1320 hours of about a section, the third at 1415 hours again of about a section plus strength, and the fourth opposition of a section was at 1530 hours. During this, the unit covered a distance of 10 km.
upon himself the task of supervising the digging of other trenches. From all reliable sources, it is understood that these trenches were better than the demonstration trenches constructed at the College of Military Engineering, Pune. Besides, the head clerk was also found instructing the defence and employment platoon commander on the tactical disposal of his platoon on the ground in defence of the brigade HQs. It could be said that the HQs was now fully operational.
Contact with the enemy was made by leading elements of B Company at 1600 hours. C Company was moved from the North-west, and A Company moved in from the North-east to encircle the enemy. D Company was kept in reserve. The companies moved swiftly to carry out this encirclement. Seeing this bold and determined action, the enemy withdrew in the fading light, and thus Birganj was cleared by 1700 hours on December 5.
Battle of Kantanagar Bridge
The battalion now harboured for the night. In the evening information was received, through the locals, that a bridge of about 5 kms away was held by a platoon of the enemy having about 18 bunkers across a wide nala.
D Company was ordered to move at night cross-country to tackle the enemy from the rear after crossing a nala. Capt Vijay Patil was the young company commander of this task force. His platoon commanders were Sub Ganpat Kalgutkar, Sub Daulatrao Fadatare (later awarded Sena Medal posthumously) and Nb Sub Maruti Garde. The company left its harbour area at about midnight moving cross-country. It reached the enemy position at about 0330 hours, taking the enemy completely by surprise. The enemy had not expected this move by the Marathas and fled in the darkness carrying its dead and wounded. Some arms and ammunition were captured. The company carried out this task successfully, capturing the bridge intact by 0500 hours. It was then discovered that the bridge had been prepared for demolition and the enemy while fleeing had made half-hearted efforts to blow it up. One pier was slightly damaged. The remainder battalion, 7 Maratha LI, now joined this company by 0800 hours the same day.
The battalion now resumed the advance with B Company acting as vanguard. B Company had Maj DR Jadhav, 2/Lt Suresh Bagwe, Nb Sub Shanker Kill, Sub Ghanshyam Sawant, and Nb Sub Sharnker Shirture. The leading elements had gone about two kms from this bridge. When, at about 0900 hours, opposition of about a platoon strength of enemy was encountered. The enemy resorted to heavy but indiscriminate artillery and mortar fire. B Company manoeuvred from a flank and the enemy, anticipating an attack on its position, withdrew. The same company of the Marathas continued the advance and cleared another minor opposition at about 1230 hours.
Birganj was the next objective. This communication centre was located at the junction of four road axes and thereby controlled all Southward movements towards Kantanagar bridge. It was, therefore, imperative for the Marathas to clear this town at the earliest. Own sources of information had indicated that this position was possibly held by nearly two enemy companies. The battalion commander planned a multi-pronged attack aimed at encircling the town and thereafter clearing it. It was expected that Birganj would be contacted by late evening the same day and, in anticipation of this contact, an air strike was called at 1515 hours to deal with the enemy’s armour reported to be crossing the Karatoya river.
Meanwhile, the PAF in East Pakistan had been knocked out of the skies. When air support mission materialised at 1600 hours, fortunately or unfortunately, the brigade HQs lay on the flight path of the Indian aircraft. At this time, two of our own tanks were crossing the bridge of this nala. As the aircraft flew overhead, all ranks stood out to observe, but because of pilot error, our own aircraft dived to attack the brigade HQs and the tanks. Fortunately no damage was done. Our head clerk, though he loathed the idea of parting company with his valuable chair, discovered that the trenches afforded him better protection from bullets and other assorted missiles. Henceforth, he religiously dug his own trench and also took upon
Our next objective, the capture of Kantanagar bridge, was expected to be a tough job, as the enemy, withdrawing under our relentless pressure, had been able to occupy the defences constructed earlier. This was primarily because our road blocks had proved unsuccessful, as a result of which, the escaping enemy troops were given a chance to reorganise themselves. I thought it would be worthwhile to be with the battalion commander during his planning stage, as any subsequent change of plans would have entailed further delay in launching operations with results that would obviously be beneficial to the enemy. On the morning of December 6, I reached the Maratha’s battalion HQs. A plan was subsequently evolved which entailed the battalion less one company advancing along the axis, while another company along with a squadron less two troops of armour was to move West, cross-country to carry out an encounter crossing at an area 3 km North of Kantanagar bridge and secure a bridgehead for the remainder brigade.
Accordingly, c Company, commanded by Maj RK Ale along with his platoon commanders Sub Shantaram Mahale, Sub Bhimrao Chavan, and Nb Sub Bajirao Bhosle, commenced advance from Birganj at 0800 hours on December 6. A Company, commanded by Maj NB Karkhanis with his platoon commanders Sub Damodar Phule, Nb Sub Dattatraya Shinde, and Nb Sub Vishnu Patil, proceeded to carry out the task of securing an encounter crossing in conjunction with the armour.
About three kms short of the objective, the advancing company observed some bricks placed on the road in a uniform pattern. A closer examination revealed that these had been placed to mark the outer edge of a minefield. The units pioneer platoon went into action, but found it quite difficult to remove the mines expeditiously. The pioneer platoon commander, Nb Sub Dattatraya Kanse, nonetheless, carried on with his task in the face of enemy shelling. The platoon was able to lift 76 mines in about two hours, and that too by daylight. The advance was resumed and around midday, C Company of the unit contacted enemy defences across the river with the bridge completely demolished. They came under good observation of the enemy and attracted heavy fire of enemy artillery mortars and small arms. They
and any move forward brought heavy and accurate fire. C Company firmed in and was now in the process of obtaining information of the enemy’s defences.
The progress of A Company grouped with tanks was also very eagerly watched. To exploit the initial gain A Company was likely to make, the other two rifle companies were kept in readiness, well poised. A Company and the tanks got involved in a fight on the bank of the river. The enemy had an extensive network of bunkers extending to about two kms opposite the West bank of the river. A Company with such heavy opposition could not make much progress but managed to destroy a few bunkers and also dropped an enemy artillery observation officer from a tree. L/Nk Tukaram Karande proceeded to destroy another enemy bunker in the face of heavy enemy fire. This young NCO moved undeterred and lobbed a hand grenade into the bunker destroying the machine gun as well as the crew. As he was doing the final bayonet work inside the bunker, an enemy shell landed and injured this gallant NCO. The injuries were not fatal and as he emerged from the ruins, he was fired upon from an adjacent bunker and was again wounded in the chest. Nonetheless, he charged at the bunker and lobbed another hand grenade before he was finally cut down by a hail of bullets. Even in his final death throes, he still managed to reach the loophole and pulled the barrel of the enemy machine gun and at the other end, too, the gunner was dead. Having obtained detailed information of enemy defences on the West and inflicted a few casualties, this column was ordered to return to Birganj, which they did by 2100 hours. The original task had not been fulfilled.
From the information obtained from A and C companies, it was appreciated that the enemy had deployed two companies. Information from locals also gave an indication that they had about 200 Razakars. The dispositions of the enemy are shown in the Sketch. The pattern of enemy defences encountered was the same as the one met with earlier. A large number of positions had been prepared, which allowed the defenders a wide variety of defensive patterns to be adopted by just moving the troops. This implied that the enemy could present a two-company front, interjected with Razakars in all expected directions of attack. The enemy had also a troop of tanks on the East, behind their defences, possibly for counter-attacks. The battered remnants of 34 Punjab, reinforced by a large number of Razakars, was opposing the unit.
At about 2100 hours on December 6, after observing that very little progress had been made for launching the final attack, I moved up and ordered the battalion commander to proceed with his task post-haste. I also discovered, much to my chagrin, that adequate reconnaissance had not been organised or carried out. The battalion commander required more time for this purpose, which was not acceptable.
Immediately, a patrol of about two platoons strength led by Maj NS Phadnis, the Second-in-Command, with Capt Vijay Patil, D Company commander, and 2/Lt Salish Patil, the Intelligence Officer, was sent at about 2200 hours. This patrol was given the task to select a route and the crossing place for the battalion’s attack as well as forming up place and to obtain any additional information of enemy defences on the East. The battalion was to cross the river and join this patrol before going into assault. Guides were sent by the
East. The battalion was to cross the river and join this patrol before going into assault. Guides were sent by the patrol leader and the battalion less C Company moved at about 0200 hours. By 0400 hours, the battalion concentrated on the other side of the river. Meanwhile, one platoon under Capt Vijay Patil closed up with the enemy’s forward defended localities. Early next morning, at about 0500 hours, the patrol commander realised that he was surrounded. There was a heavy mist and the patrol could neither observe much nor bring down any fire onto the enemy. The young officer had displayed initiative in closing with the enemy, but his efforts did not produce the desired results. They were involved in a minor skirmish with the enemy and the patrol extricated itself under fairly heavy but undirected enemy fire.
Nearly 400 rounds of artillery ammunition had been allotted for the fire plan. The guns and infantry mortars had also been positioned and a quick fire plan was made by Maj PV Mithran, who had been with the battalion at Pachagarh. The fire plan was initiated at the appointed time and the battalion started moving. Amidst the fire, the battalion formed up. A and D Companies were given the task to attack and B Company was kept in reserve. At 0900 hours on December 7 the assault commenced. There were a few casualties before actual contact with the enemy was made. The daylight attack proceeded and the Marathas displayed their usual verve and determination, but a final success was still elusive and far from reach. And, as it happens in war there were individual as well as collective acts of gallantry. One such case was that of L/Nk Asharam Tanpure, who braved the enemy’s automatic fire and snatched a firing machine gun from one of the bunker loopholes. He then proceeded to attend to one of his wounded comrades in the open, when an enemy shell landed and Tanpure was killed on the spot while offering succour to his buddy in the heat of battle.
By about 1100 hours, when a few bunkers had been captured, both the companies had sufferd heavy casualties. The enemy reacted quickly and, besides a counter-attack, brought down a very heavy volume of observed artillery, mortar, and automatic fire.
A few casualties, including Sub Daulatrao Fadatare, were lying close to the enemy bunkers. A determined and deliberate effort was made by a patrol sent under Nb Sub Maruti Garde and Hav Narayan Powar to evacuate the casualties. Sub Daulatrao Fadatare, the Platoon Commander of D Company, displayed great qualities of leadership, leading his platoon boldly and capturing the bunkers one after other. While doing so, he was killed and was awarded the Sena Medal posthumously.
Sep Gyanu Chavan of another platoon proved a terror to the enemy. Moving from bunker to bunker under heavy crossfire of the enemy medium and heavy machine guns, he captured them in utter disregard to his personal safety. This young Jawan was seriously wounded and for his actions, which were in keeping with the best traditions of our army, he was awarded the Sena Medal.
A large number of casualties had taken place. Some of them were evacuated across the river. The distance covered in evacuating these casualties was about four kms upto the road-head. At this place was 2/Lt KN Rao, who with a Jonga promptly evacuated the casualties to the advance dressing station located
evacuation of casualties from the forming up place. Capt DS Parab, the Quartermaster, Sub Maj Jagannath Rane, and Sub Dhyanu Baskar also played an important role in casualty evacuation.
December 6/7 and two subsequent attempts to clear the far bank proved abortive. In spite of persistent efforts by the unit, success eluded them despite a number of air strikes on the enemy position.
Having suffered heavy casualties, A and D Companies were reorganised into one company. B Company, which was in reserve and had also suffered a few casualties, was ordered to attack and a second assault was now made in broad daylight. It must be said to the battalion’s credit that it made valiant attempts to capture the assigned objective. The reserve company and the reorganised ad hoc company were allotted the available armour.
The task given to these tanks was to destroy enemy strong points and bunkers. The tanks arrived at the forming up place at about 1400 hours and managed to destroy about six bunkers. The assaulting companies captured a portion of the objective. It is in this assault that Nb Sub Vishnu Patil of A Company was seen charging alone onto enemy bunkers and later found missing. One of the tanks was hit by enemy recoilless fire and was damaged. By this time, it was dark and the tanks could not take on any more bunkers and withdrew.
C Company was trying to probe in, but it could not cross the river obstacle. Maj RK Ale and Capt A Imitiliba Ao, SM brought down accurate mortar fire on the enemy position. The enemy made a determined effort to hold on to its positions, though repeated attacks were launched from two directions. The main assault was from the North-east, while C Company made the assault from the West. The unit suffered a large number of casualties. In the forming up place, under heavy shelling, the Regimental Medical Officer, Capt RR Tambe, was treating the casualties. For this act of devotion to duty in disregard of his personal safety, he was awarded the Sena Medal.
The objective had been partially captured and a weak company of the Marathas had a very tenuous foothold in the objective area. This small body of troops had not been able to reorganise itself and was being subjected to very heavy artillery shelling and observed small arms fire from the flanks. The unit was shaky, and both command and control had been lost when, suddenly, an enemy company appeared presumably for counter attack. This enemy movement was pre-empted by the battalion and the unit was ordered to move back for re-grouping to avoid needless casualties.
In order to intercept enemy movement and capture prisoners, road blocks were established between Mile 10 and Dinajpur at night on December 7/8 and 9/10. The Raj Rif also carried out a successful long range raid on Dinajpur during the night of December 9/10 to confirm whether this town was still occupied or not. The force for this raid consisted of two companies and was commanded by Maj Naresh Chander. Artillery support consisted of a troop of 5.5″ Medium guns. The main problem arising during this raid was the absence of long range, reliable and portable radio sets, with which information could be passed to the brigade HQs. However, the available radio set CD 734 meant for air support communication, was provided to this column but it failed to function satisfactorily during the crucial moment. An agonising wait for the successful completion of the mission then ensued. Finally, at 1530 hours on December 10, the column returned with the information that 26 Frontier Force was holding the town. It was confirmed that a troop of tanks was also located there. The raid party brought in a number of prisoners and weapons, thus setting the morale boosting stage for a change in plans and thus break the impasse in the capture of Kantanagar bridge.
Change in Plans
A stalemate was setting in and I was feeling a little uneasy. Two attacks had been launched on Kantanagar bridge, but the desired results were not achieved. Casualties had also been suffered, and yet the overall losses were not that serious. The Marathas had made valiant efforts to capture the bridge and it was now considered futile to launch any further attacks. At this stage, two courses presented themselves. The first was to bypass the bridge, and the second to enter Dinajpur from the North and secure it with the assistance of 20 Mountain Division operating against the town from the South. A third alternative was also available, and this entailed switching of forces to the East towards Khansama. As events proved subsequently, this course was finally adopted and was successful.
In view of the prevailing situation, a bid was made for two more infantry battalions. But, this was not acceptable to the Corps. At this stage, the deployment of the brigade was:
The battalion now concentrated on the main axis about two kms from enemy defences. The unit was now ordered to maintain its posture and threat to the enemy in order to prevent them from withdrawing and reinforcing defences elsewhere. In discharging this task, two companies of the battalion were deployed to maintain “eyeball-to-eyeball contact” and to harass the enemy. Additional artillery resources were also allotted for this purpose. The battalion now remained in position and carried out this task till the ceasefire was declared.
(a) 7 Maratha LI – Kantanagar Bridge (b) 21 Rajputs – Opposite Mile 10 (c) 12 Raj Rif – Birganj they also had to cater for denial of the axis from the town of
Khansama. (d) 4 companies of the Mukti Bahini – Opposite Khansama
The Marathas had crossed the Dhap river from an area North of the bridge during the night of December 6/7 and two subsequent attempts to clear the far bank proved abortive. In spite of persistent
ground, the crossing site was selected south of Khansama where the Dhepa Nalla and the Atrai Nalla join together and run as the Bhuri Tista river. Ingredients of the outline plan were as under:
Corps HQs for tackling Dinajpur and also with a request if one more battalion could be made available from the resources of 6 Mountain Division. This was feasible and Maj Gen Reddy was also in agreement. But, at 10 p.m. the same day Maj Gen Reddy called again to say that he had discussed the proposal with the Corps Commander, and it was finally agreed that 71 Mountain Brigade should go for Khansama and continue on that axis to surround Saidpur till the link up takes place with 20 Mountain Division from Rangpur. The defences of Saidpur were to be reduced thereafter. He also confirmed that 71 Mountain Brigade was not responsible for Dinajpur any longer.
There was no surprise at this juncture. The capture of Khansama had also been anticipated. The process of gaining information, with regard to the enemy’s defences at Khansama, had already been initiated as an anticipatory action. Patrols were sent out from the Raj Rif and Mukti Bahini elements. The Air OP had also been assigned this task.
This flexibility of mind and forethought were to pay handsome dividends as the formation was now prepared to undertake this task at short notice. We were ready to switch forces for the capture of Khansama.
The Capture of Khansama (Refer to Sketch 20)
Khansama was located East of the Bhuri Tista river, which was a major obstacle for the attacking troops. It was heavily mined on three sides and well fortified with shellproof bunkers. The position was strongly held by a company group of 48 Punjab (Pak Army) consisting of 153 regulars and 75 Razakars and was supported by field and medium artillery, 82 mm Mortars and heavy machine guns, apart from its normal complement of automatic weapons. The enemy had also made full use of the built-up area of Khansama to strengthen his defences which had been very well coordinated.
On December 11, 21 Rajput was ordered to capture Khansama, which denied the subsidiary axis to Saidpur, by first light of December 14. There were 11 Officers, 15 JCOs, and 683 ORs available in the battalion. In addition, the following supporting arms were allotted:
(a) Armour – PT 76 tanks (b) Artillery
(i) In direct support – 983 Mountain Battery (ii) In support – 98 Mountain Regiment less 983 Mountain Battery (iii) Air – Two sorties of Hunter were allotted on December 13
Based on the reconnaissance carried out and the available information of the enemy as well as of the ground, the crossing site was selected south of Khansama where the Dhepa Nalla and the Atrai Nalla join
Sketch-20: Sketch Showing the Outline Plan of 21 Rajput for Battle of Khansama 13 Dec
CAEON PUR
KAIM
TU SPUR
(a) Securing a crossing place on the Bhuri Tista by one company by first light of December 13. (b) Ensuring security of forming up place near Govindpur by one company. (c) Capturing initial objective by two companies by 1200 hours on December 13 in Phase 1. (d) Capturing subsequent depth objective by one company by 1300 hours on December 13 in
Phase 2. (e) Exploitation, upto Jhangirpur on the far bank of the Nalla running East of Khansama by
one company in Phase 3. (f) To use seven PT 76 tanks initially in fire support role and subsequently to block enemy’s
routes of withdrawal South-west of Khansama. (g) Air strike of two sorties at 0900 hours on December 13.
PHASE JAHANGIRPUR
COY-
PHASE 2
COY
SIBIN DAPUR
OKUNGANA
RASULPUR
-PHASE-1
KASIPUR KRISHNANAGAR
TO DARWANE
48 COY
COLINDAPUR
Finally, the orders to the Rajputs were to capture Khansama by an attack either during the day on December 13 or at night on December 13/14. When the plans were being discussed on December 12, it was discovered that:
BELPUKUR
SAHAJPUR
MADANPUR
BURTISAR
(a) A flanking attack was being planned very near the river line, thus restricting room for
manoeuvre.
HOSSENPUR Not to Scale
ULACN
OSSING PLACE
CHAK RAMPUR
Not to Scale
LEMIND VOLANTE A Fare
–
(b) Three companies were to be used in the assault with only one in reserve. (c) The tanks were not to be used. (d) As the unit was only required to check the routes upto a certain point, no information had
been obtained about the enemy or about the ground beyond a stipulated point. Remedial measures were promptly instituted and the plan to assault the position from the South-east, or rear, were suggested to the unit. In addition, it was discussed that a daylight attack would be carried out, as it had more advantages. The unit seemed to be relying on bookish tactical knowledge which recommends only night attacks. In such an environment, the overall situation and the urgency of defeating the enemy at the earliest because of international pressures had to be taken into account.
As planned earlier, on December 12, 21 Rajput moved back from the area of road block and concentrated at Birganj by 2100 hours. C Company, under Maj MS Malik, moved out at 2300 hours and secured a crossing place on the Bhuri Tista by 0300 hours on December 13. The rest of the battalion crossed over as scheduled by 0530 hours and dug in to avoid casualties likely to be caused by enemy shelling.
When the complete battalion was on the other side of the river, D Company under Maj RDS Chauhan
was sent to secure the forming up place 1000 yards south of Khansama near Gobindpur. The company did not meet with any opposition.
close to the bunker, he threw a hand grenade into the bunker before he became unconscious. The bunker was thus silenced. For this bravery of an exceptionally high order, he was awarded a Sena Medal.
At 0915 hours on December 13, our aircraft (two sorties) prepared themselves for engaging the objective, but it was not of much use as the enemy position was very much concealed from air observation. At about 0930 hours, all available artillery fire was brought in while 21 Rajput was forming up. The enemy by now was alive to the situation.
Another young Jawan, Sep Daya Chand of the same company, Performed creditably in battle. During the assault, Sep Daya Chand spotted a command post from where the enemy company commander was giving orders. He immediately rushed forward and crawled very close to the command post. When he was trying to look around for the enemy company commander, the enemy spotted him and fired at him with automatic weapons. He quickly appreciated the situation, leaped up a charge straight towards the trench, and threw a grenade. When he subsequently got into the trench, he found that all the three enemy occupants were dead. He then rushed forward to the command post and injured the company commander by firing at him from the hip. By this act, Daya Chand had displayed extreme valour and courage, for which he was awarded the Sena Medal.
At 1000 hours, the battalion attack went in with A Company on the left and B Company on to its right through enemy’s minefields. Initially, the attack went in with full momentum, but when the situation became clear, to the enemy, he gave a determined fight from every bunker and built-up area. Both the companies had received a heavy dose of shelling in the forming up place itself and the subsequent assault was required to be executed through enemy’s well coordinated and interlocked screen of light, medium and heavy machine gunfire. At this critical stage of battle, there was every possibility of the attack petering out, but the company and the platoon commanders, by their personal example, maintained the desired aggressive spirit amongst the troops. The attack proceeded with the desired momentum. Having over-run the first line of enemy’s defences, the companies had to clear the enemy from the built-up area, which involved hand-to-hand fighting and decentralisation of control down to the section level. During this phase of the attack, there were individual acts of courage and bravery which need to be cited.
To start with, L/Nk Bisheshwar Singh of A Company was ordered by his platoon commander to go and destroy one of the enemy’s bunkers. Being a day attack, any movement of our troops was immediately detected by the enemy. He, therefore, crawled up this bunker, lobbed a hand grenade into it, killing the crew inside. He, then, on his own, rushed to the second adjacent bunker and tried to find his way through, but in the process he was wounded in the thigh, yet he inched his way upto the bunker and blew it up with his second grenade. When he was coming back, he heard a cry of pain from one of his comrades who had been lying wounded in a minefield. Bisheshwar Singh, knowing fully well, that the area was mined, went and tried to recover him. When he was coming back with the man on his shoulder, he stepped on a mine that blew his leg. L/Nk Bisheshwar Singh was awarded VrC for displaying bravery and extreme courage in the face of the enemy.
Then there was Sub Prem Singh Bhati of B Company. As his company reached the enemy position, the enemy opened fire with a heavy machine gun and several other automatic weapons. Being a day attack, the enemy’s firing was proving very effective and had almost checked the assault on one of the flanks. Sub Prem Singh Bhati, who was leading one of the platoons of the company, took his recoilless detachment ahead and tried to blast off the bunker from where the heavy machine gun was firing. The bunker was so strongly built that recoilless fire failed to make any impression on the bunker. He then snatched the light machine gun from one of the groups and dashed forward firing from his hip. He reached about 15 yards from the bunker, when he got a burst of fire on his face and chest. He fell, but observing that he was so
The Company Commander, Maj SB Chhillar, had also done his job. During the assault, because of enemy’s effective fire, B Company was almost pinned down, but Maj Chhillar led his men successfully in complete disregard of his personal safety. Maj Chhillar, in this action, displayed cool-headed determination, good leadership, and courage of the highest order. His act was Mentioned in Dispatches.
Young officers, too, had made their contribution. 2/Lt NK Appaiah was one of the platoon commanders of A Company. On reaching the objective, he noticed that there was an enemy position located in depth, which was still interfering with the immediate reorganisation on the objective. He, therefore, at once rushed with his platoon to that post and evicted the enemy from there. As he was returning, he found two bunkers with medium machine guns holding up the assault of one of the platoons of B Company. He immediately got his men into a covered position and engaged the enemy from the rear. The enemy was confused and thus abandoned the bunkers. In this action, Appaiah displayed acts of gallantry, presence of mind, and offensive leadership. His name was also mentioned in despatches.
Phase 1 of the battalion attack was over by 1200 hours and as per plan, C Company of the Rajputs was launched in Phase 2 from the North-east, first to clear Khansama from that direction and secondly to block the enemy’s route of withdrawal. Though A and B Companies had established a strong foothold on the initial objective, C Company had to fight fiercely throughout in the built-up area. By 1330 hours, Phase 2 was completed. During this phase of the battalion attack, there were individual acts of gallantry which deserve mention.
Like L/Nk Bhanwar Singh of B Company. The assault of C Company had gone through and the troops were clearing the bunkers. The company had reached very close to the section defended post, in depth, when suddenly two medium machine guns opened up from two sides covering the defended post. All of a sudden, he saw his section commander, Nk Ranjit Singh, falling, after being hit. He ran to him under heavy fire and carried him back on his shoulders. After bringing back Nk Ranjit Singh, he again charged, and this time with a light machine gun in his hand rushed towards the other medium machine gun
east along this road and from the East along the Rangpur-Saidpur road. Accordingly, the unit commenced its advance from area bridge on the Khansama-Darwani road at 1600 hours on December 13.
The battalion was allotted the following troops for its advance:
position of the enemy firing from the hip. He ultimately silenced that position, killing two crew members in the weapon pit. For this gallant and courageous action, he was mentioned in despatches.
Maj Mahinder Singh Malik also led his troops with distinction. As c Company’s attack progressed, the enemy started abandoning the depth locality. Maj Malik and his company were also given the task to block the enemy’s withdrawal route with two platoons. He led his men with great speed and blocked the enemy’s withdrawal route. He personally killed two of the fleeing enemy. Meanwhile, he noticed that the enemy had started firing from a bunker in the depth locality. He immediately took a platoon from the flank leaving a platoon to block the route of withdrawal and silenced it. This action of Maj Malik led to the surrender of 18 enemy soldiers. The officer had displayed drive, initiative, and presence of mind of a very high order.
(a) Under Command. D Squadron (ad hoc) less two troops 69 Armoured Regiment (7 X PT 76
tanks). (b) In Direct Support
(i) 98 Mountain Regiment less one battery (ii) 54 Mountain Regiment less two batteries
At 1330 hours, D Company carried out exploitation upto Jahangirpur under enemy’s intensive artillery shelling and through widely scattered nuisance mines, in Phase 3. The battle of Khansama was over, and, in retrospect, the results achieved were:
(a) The capture of Khansama helped the brigade to maintain the momentum of advance.
(b) A new axis of advance was opened for capturing Saidpur. (c) The fall of Khansama unbalanced the enemy, and he had to denude the defences at
Dinajpur in order either to recapture Khansama or to reinforce Saidpur.
The Raj Rif now took over for the battle of the Ichhamati river.
The Battle of the Icchamati River (Refer to Sketch 21)
The Ichhamati was a major obstacle across the line of advance of our brigade from Khansama to Saidpur, an important enemy cantonment in East Pakistan. The Pakistanis had prepared strong and wellfortified defences along the river. The defences at Ichhamati consisted of two well-coordinated and mutually supporting company defended localities – one at Ichhamati and the other at Kharkaria approximately 1,000 yards to the East. The position was held by two companies of 48 Punjab under the command of the second-in-command of the battalion. However, this fact came to light only after the battle had started.
This was the enemy’s last defensive position before Saidpur on axis Pachagarh-Saidpur. He, therefore, made a last ditch stand here and fought tenaciously. The hand-to-hand battle fought and casualties suffered by the enemy are a testimony to the ferocity of the battle. After the capture of Khansama on December 13, by 21 Rajput, the battalion was ordered to spearhead the advance of 71 Mountain Brigade on axis of Khansama-Darwani-Road Junction-Saidpur. The plan was to invest Saidpur from the North-east
Sketch-21: Sketch Showing Battle of Ichhamati Fought by 12 RAJ RIF
LINE
TFUP SEC. ATTACK
VIHVHVION
(iii) Troop 5.5″ medium guns ex 46 Medium Regiment (c) Air
(i) Three close support sorties on demand
(ii) Air OP on demand (helicopter-borne) The advance commenced from area bridge with A company acting as a vanguard. No opposition was met till 1400 hours on December 14. As the leading elements of vanguard and armour moved ahead out of the trees, it came under heavy automatic and anti-tank enemy fire from across the bridge on the Ichhamati. The vanguard immediately fixed the axis and the plan for the capture of the Ichhamati position was made.
From the intensity and type of fire and the extent of the enemy, it was assessed that the enemy was occupying the position with approximately one company supported by a troop of tanks. The enemy had constracted and occupied fortified bunkers, and, therefore, a frontal attack was not considered feasible. This was also later confirmed by the prisoners, who were captured after the battle and those who surrendered before the battalion at Saidpur.
C COY
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UTTARBALAPAYA BANO C COYS
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B COY FUP
CAPTURE 1200 HHR
15 DEC 71
HAMATI
A battalion quick attack was planned from the North. However, at this stage, the battalion was ordered not to proceed with the attack for the following reasons:
HR 1000 5 DEC 71
Season
MARKET (TUE À SAT)
MARKET (MON & FRI)
– ICONS
14 DEC ZIL
INDIAN FORCES NFORCES
(a) Our mountain guns were out of range as they had not crossed the Bhuri Tista. The
engineers were still constructing a floating bridge on it after the capture of Khansama. (b) The Air OP had reported the movement of an enemy column in the area of Pakerhat about
10 kms to the South of Ichhamati. This column was reported to be heading towards
Khansama and threatened the Southern flank of the bridge. To counteract this enemy movement, I moved 5 Grenadiers (placed under command with effect from 0800 hours on December 14) to intercept this column and, thereafter, move South along track PakerhatSutipara-Darwani Railway Station to protect the Southern flank of Raj Rif.
BHURIR HATS
MARKET SUN & TUE:
PLANNTO ATTACK ACTUA ATTACK
In view of the situation that had arisen, the battalion firmed in at area Mile 30 astride the road. An intensive patrolling was carried out to obtain detailed information about the enemy dispositions and the terrain. A deliberate attack was planned from the North. The plan, in brief, was to attack in two phases:
(a) Phase 1: Capture of area bridge by D Company (b) Phase 2: Capture of area 13r by C Company (c) Reserve was B Company for both phases
(d) A company less one platoon was required to fix the axis and provide close fire support by
observation. (e) Dsquadron less three troops and one platoon ex A Company to move behind the enemy
across the Ichhamati and engage enemy located astride Bridge and in the area of Masjid.
The remainder armour to assist A Company in fixing the axis. The H hour was fixed at 1100 hours. As certain localities could not be seen from the ground, it was necessary to have these registered with the help of the Air OP. In addition, time was required for B Company to secure the forming up place, which entailed an approach march over difficult and boggy terrain. However, in view of the speed required and on my instructions, the H hour was subsequently advanced by one hour and fixed at 1000 hours.
The attack was launched by D Company in Phase 1 as scheduled. The enemy offered stiff resistance and fought tenaciously. In the meanwhile, armour was manoeuvring around from the South-east to engage the enemy in area Bridge and Masjid. At this stage, enemy recoilless guns opened up from area south of 1or. As a result of this fire, two tanks received direct hits and were completely destroyed along with the crew. D Company, however, pressed home its attack with determination, and a fierce hand-to-hand fight took place on the objective. Area Bridge was captured intact in a swift action. The ferocity of the attack unnerved the enemy so much that he beat a hasty retreat from his depth locality as well as the position at Kharkharia. The second phase of the attack was not required.
After the capture of Ichhamati, A Company less one platoon moved forward from firm base and recommenced advance. This was considered essential as speed was of paramount importance. As the leading elements of A Company moved out of wooded area, heavy automatic and artillery fire was brought down by the enemy on our troops.
registration of few known enemy localities was done while the troops were moving into the forming up place.
The plan, in brief, was the capture of the area North of the road by B and C Companies, with their objective as Road Junction and 10r respectively in Phase 1. Phase 2 comprised the capture of the area South of the road by D Company with the assault being launched along the road axis. The H hour was 1400 hours.
The attack, as planned, was pressed home at the stipulated time. As the troops crossed the start line, the enemy became active in general area of Nilphamari to the North-east of Kharkharia position. The enemy had sent a column from Nilphamari to reinforce the troops at Ichhamati and to prevent their being overwhelmed. It now became necessary to secure the Northern flank of the attack and prevent a linkup between the enemy forces. B Company, which was to the East during the assault, was diverted immediately to clear the enemy in that area. C Company alone pressed on with the attack with great vigour and aggressiveness. On contact with the enemy, enemy armour also became active. One tank was sighted to the South of the road, just South of 10r. Our armour, which was in position, was ordered to engage the enemy tank and prevent its move towards the North of the road, where a fierce hand-to-hand fight was in progress.
By 1600 hours, C Company was in the process of mopping up their objective and that of B Company which had been diverted. B company, during their interception of the enemy, had cleared the area extending from Pond to Mile 25. At this stage, D Company was ordered to commence Phase 2 of the attack, which they did, and the whole objective was captured by the battalion by 1700 hours. D Company, in the course of their approach to the objective from the forming up place, were deployed in assault formation in copybook fashion, and it looked as though a well rehearsed demonstration was in progress where, at best, the troops advance under simulated battle noises and fire. At this time, one was reminded of the Charge of the Light Brigade. The task of this company was made all the more difficult as it had to face (and finally liquidate) the enemy armour and cross the Kharkharia in knee deep water before the final assault could be launched on the tenacious enemy.
During the dog-fight for the capture of 1or and Road Junction, Sub Abhe Ram on his own crawled under a heavy machine gun bunker, which had pinned down the assault of c Company. During his advance to this bunker, he was hit by shrapnel on the chest. This did not deter him. Instead, he kept inching forward and grabbed the red hot barrel of the heavy machine gun and killed the complete crew. The action of the JCO in silencing the enemy heavy machine gun in utter disregard of his life provided immediate inspiration to all ranks in reducing the formidable enemy positions on the banks of the Kharkharia, where resistance was in the proportion of one to one. For this act of valour and dedication to duty, the JCO was awarded a Sena Medal.
In another incident, 2/Lt Tamir Asharaf 48 Punjab (Pakistan) came out from his bunker with his hands
From the quantum and direction of fire, it was estimated that the enemy was also holding the Eastern bank of the Kharkharia with approximately one company and elements of reconnaissance and support battalion. He also had a troop of tanks. The situation at this stage was:
(a) B and C Companies were still on the move to rejoin the battalion on the axis of advance. (b) D Company was reorganising in area south of the Khansama-Saidpur road. (c) One platoon of A Company and three remaining tanks were south of the Khansama
Saidpur road and had not yet rejoined the battalion. Considering the situation, another battalion attack was immediately planned from the North. B and C Companies were ordered to move to area Pond instead of joining the battalion on the axis of advance. Due to paucity of time, a complete fire plan with pre-registration was not possible and only a limited
of their comrades, had been killed.
(b) The initial move of one platoon astride the main axis misled them as to the exact direction
of attack. When the attack from the North built up, they were caught off guard. (c) Assault by one company in Phase 2 astride the axis had misled them as to the quantum of
force attacking them. They, thought that a brigade had attacked them.
raised. As our troops advanced to apprehend him, a medium machine gun from behind this Pakistani officer opened up. As a result of this treacherous action by the enemy officer, our troops had to shoot this officer down and, thereafter, liquidate the remaining crew with cold steel. PSS 4612 Maj MA Saeed, Second-in-Command, 48 Punjab (Pakistan), was found dead near a bunker astride the road with his body riddled with bullets. He was identified by a chain hanging from his neck. It appeared that this officer had been killed by a heavy volume of fire brought down from the firm base position (A Company). The weapon used to bring down this fire was a Chinese heavy machine gun captured earlier by the battalion, in one of its actions. The fierce fight put up by the enemy is evident from the fact that the Pakistan Government had announced the highest gallantry award to Maj Saeed (Posthumous) for his heroic fight in this location.
L/Nk Sanwat Singh, during Phase 2 of the attack, was wounded while crossing the Kharkaria. This did not deter this gallant son of the soil and he kept pressing forward. The assault had been momentarily halted due to heavy and accurate firing from one machine gun sited in a fortified bunker. He crawled under this heavy belt of fire and, single-handedly destroyed the bunker and killed the complete crew. For this gallant action and single-minded devotion to duty, this Jawan was Mentioned in Despatches.
(d) They were sensitive to the move of 5 Grenadiers to Darwani railway station and could not
comprehend as to what our real aims, were. The enemy armour coming alive at a late stage, caused considerable anxiety. The capture of a complete Chaffee troop ex Pakistan 69 Cavalry was no mean achievement, especially when the size of our meagre armour had been further reduced due to the direct hits received by two tanks earlier, resulting in their complete destruction. Our armour was at a disadvantage as they had thus been badly shaken, not discounting the fact that the Chaffee tanks have a better gun and extra protection to the crew compared to ours which, however, was more manoeuverable. Nevertheless, the problems posed by the enemy armour were quickly solved by bold and resolute infantry action, leading to the final capture of this position.
The Advance to Saidpur
The Commanding Officer, Lt Col R Dhawan, was awarded the Vishist Seva Medal for his outstanding performance as the advance guard commander in reducing the formidable enemy at Ichhamati. His cool and balanced judgement was largely responsible for the success of the battalion in overcoming the stiff resistance offered by the enemy.
After C Company had come into the clearing near the road axis, they observed a Pakistani jeep mounted with a recoilless gun racing away from the scene of battle towards Darwani. This vehicle was effectively engaged with a 57 mm recoilless gun and completely destroyed. The sole occupant of this vehicle, a Pakistani soldier, was also killed in the process.
Enemy concentrations were engaged by the IAF and the medium guns from 1000 hours onwards, and at 1400 hours the enemy started withdrawing. 5 Grenadiers who came under command at 0800 hours on December 14, were ordered to occupy Dangapara and advance along axis Dangapara-Darwani-Saidpur. This protected the Southern flank of the main advance.
Quick and decisive action after the first battalion attack greatly assisted the battalion in the capture of this location, as complete surprise had been achieved and the enemy caught off guard. A study of the ground would show that any delay at that stage would have resulted in very heavy casualties of our men and loss of material. The enemy had built bunkers which were well sited and fortified. It would be of interest to note that besides the lightning speed of attack, a ruse played on the enemy greatly assisted in diverting his attention. A, B and C Companies were moving to their forming up place, when a platoon of A Company was pushed out in assault formation from the firm base astride the road. This platoon drew heavy automatic fire from the enemy and diverted his attention when it was most required. Besides this, the assault by D Company in Phase 2 astride the road axis, had misled the enemy as to the size of the force attacking them. It was later confirmed from the Pakistani POW that they had given up the objective for the following reasons:
As the guns required a redeployment the advance of 12 Raj Rif was halted and 21 Rajput firmed in on Khansama. 5 Grenadiers occupied Dangapara by last light of December 14.
Continuing the advance, 12 Raj Rif cleared two company positions in areas Kharkaria River and in Mile 13. The assault went in from the North – from a flank and the rear, after a long detour. The enemy positions were cleared by last light of December 15.
5 Grenadiers, advancing along the subsidiary axis, reached Darwani Railway Station by 1600 hours. This outflanking move assisted 12 Raj Rif to complete their tasks. The road block, which was to be established 2 kms South of Darwani, could not be established and the enemy made use of this lapse to pull back from Nilphamari the same night.
As 12 Raj Rif were reorganising themselves after last light of December 15, no patrols were sent out during the night to Nilphamari. On the morning of December 16, Nilphamari was found abandoned.
(a) Their battalion Second-in-Command, Maj MA Saeed, and another officer, along with many
The Enemy Surrenders
The Rajputs now took over from the Raj Rif and they reached Darwani by 1000 hours. Having had more than their share of war and when they found that they had been cornered, the enemy decided to surrender. The opposing Commander 23 (Pakistan) Infantry Brigade and our 71 Mountain Brigade met each other and the surrender of 23 (Pakistan) Infantry Brigade took place at 1545 hours on December 17 at Zam Zam Airport in Saidpur.
Just at the time when the white flag was seen, the brigade command post was busy with two messages that were being received simultaneously. The first was from the Corps HQ informing the formation that the enemy was likely to surrender and, therefore, they were required to cease further offensive action. However, it was to be ensured that no tactical advantage was lost and the maximum vigilance was to be maintained at the same time. The second message was more significant and was being received following the enterprising efforts of interception of enemy communications by our brigade signaller on duty. This was from Pakistan Eastern Army HQ, Dacca, addressed to formation HQs. It gave orders to all Pakistani troops and para-military personnel to surrender to the nearest Indian army units without any fear of reprisals.
I had just returned from a visit to 12 Raj Rif when I was informed of the first message, I said, “We shall carry on with our task. No stopping yet. Immediately, when I was given the second message and was informed that a white flag had been seen, I ordered all firing to cease forthwith and that 21 Rajput were to take up a defensive position with all precautions and permit the white flag holder to come near and surrender.
(c) The new responsibilities of the units were:(i) 21 Rajput: To take charge of all captured/ surrendered weapons and equipment. (ii) 12 Raj Rif: To take charge of the PsOW. (iii) 5 Grenadiers: To take charge of the law and order situation and the civilian population at
Saidpur and the surrounding areas. (iv) 7 Maratha LI: To reach Saidpur earliest and act as reserve. (v) Brigade HQs: To establish itself at Saidpur by last light of December 17 after making
necessary arrangements for moves and issuing of surrender orders. I then returned to the Brigade HQs. The units, 21 Rajput, 12 Raj Rif, and 5 Grenadiers moved to Saidpur the same day to take over the assigned duties.
It was a strange sight at Saidpur when, on December 17, I reached there to take the enemy surrender. Here I was, for the first time, greeted by a very dumb and unenthusiastic Bihari civilian population. The Biharis had never liked the freedom march of Bangladesh. This was quite evident from their faces. They were prepared to shout Jai Hind and not ‘Joy Bangla’ the cry which had welcomed the advance of this Brigade so far. Saidpur town was itself full of Bihari refugees, who had left their homes in the countryside to seek refuge with the Indian army from the vengeful Mukti Bahini. It was plain to the formation that the post-war period was going to be busier than what it was during the war that had been won.
After receiving the surrender, I called a conference of my orders group to sort out the post-surrender problems which were:
A little later, a message was received from 21 Rajput that Commanding Officer 48 (Punjab) had sent his Dhobi (washerman) with a message of surrender, which stated that the Commanding Officer 48 Punjab would like to meet the Indian army commander immediately to negotiate the terms of the surrender. Permission was granted to this enemy commanding officer to come up. On his arrival, he informed the Raj Rif that 23 Pakistan Infantry Brigade would like to surrender now. On receiving the message, I agreed to receive the surrender of 23 Pakistan Infantry Brigade. Commander 23 Pakistan Infantry Brigade was also directed to meet me at Darwani at 1430 hours. GOC 6 Mountain Division, Maj Gen PC Reddy, was also present and gave assent to all these actions. He now wanted to know the requirements of barbed wire for guarding the POW. On receipt of the news that Brig Shafi, Pakistani Commander, had arrived, I along with my remainder order group flew to Darwani in a helicopter. We were received by the Commanding Officer 21 Rajput and Brig Shafi, the Pakistani officer. The request of Brig Shafi that he be allowed time till December 17 afternoon to collect all his scattered forces was granted. The other aspects were:
(a) Restoring law and order in the countryside and gaining the confidence of the civilian
population. This involved persuading the Biharis to return to their original homes and
occupations. (b) Care of the PsOW and preventing our officers from fraternising too much with the enemy.
Further, it involved curbing of the aimless wandering of PsOW, as well as enforcing control and discipline in their routine.
(c) Restoration of railway and road communications as far as possible.
(a) The surrender ceremony was to take place at Zam Zam airfield at 1545 hours on December
17. (b) Details of the surrender ceremony were finalised.
(d) Taking over of enemy weapons, transport, and property and preventing its loss/ damage
by enemy troops. Ensuring that our and Mukti Bahini troops did not take away weapons
as souvenirs or for personal use. (e) Taming the Mukti Bahini and seeing that no revengeful actions were started by them.
(f) Interrogation of the Psow. (g) Escorting the PsOW to the PsOW reception centres in India.
orders to concentrate at New Mall by January 4, 1972 and be ready for a new role in the Northern Mountain. Thus once again it was to fulfill its duties as a Mountain Brigade.
With this, the war was now over and the brigade took time off to rest, recoup, and reorganise itself for the other mammoth task, namely, the safety of the PsOW and to draw up a balance sheet of the gains and the losses. To take losses first, the brigade had the following casualties:
Separate responsibilities for the above tasks were given clearly and I instituted a system of daily evening conferences to ensure the required coordination. All those responsible for the execution of the above tasks attended these conferences. They outlined their daily progress and their problems and obtained whatever decisions they required at the same time. I used to give out my assessment of the situation or any points which had been noted during my daily rounds. The results were astonishing, in that, within a period of two days, the situation was brought completely under control. The captured transport, weapons, equipment, and stores were collected at the central dumps under the charge of different units. The PsOW were confined to their barracks. The earlier apprehension of the GOC 6 Mountain Division that barbed wire would be required to ensure the security of the PsOW was not anymore needed, as they did not quite relish the prospect of any escape because of the hatred and hostility of the Mukti Bahini.
The problem of control of the civilian population, however, was more tricky. Whatever effort was made to move the people out, in the morning, was found to be nullified in the evening. The same people would have returned to Saidpur by another mode of transport. The Mukti Bahini Commander, Capt Sheryar, made repeated attempts to enter the town to avenge the atrocities of the Biharis but was persuaded every time not to precipitate the situation. At his urging, however, the town was searched for hidden weapons and men.
(a) Troops.
(i) Killed – 59 (ii) Wounded – 277
(iii) Missing – 14 (b) Equipment. See Appendix A
On the positive side, the gains were as follows:
(a) Enemy casualties including irregulars:
(i) Killed – 134 (ii) Wounded – 60 (approximately) (iii) Captured – 39 including 14 Razakars
(iv) Surrendered – See Appendix B (b) Gallantry awards: See Appendix C
5 Grenadiers moved out shortly afterwards from Saidpur, and their place was taken by 7 Maratha LI for keeping a watch on the internal security situation. The battalion did an admirable job by unearthing a large number of weapons from the ponds full of water around Saidpur. These weapons had been thrown into the surrounding ponds by the enemy force before they surrendered.
The brigade was now taken out from the orbat of 6 Mountain Division and ordered to function directly under HQs 33 Corps from December 20 – as before on December 5. During this period, 71 Engineer Task Force was also kept busy. The task force was asked to dismantle the class 9 bridge at Khansama and reconstruct it along the main highway from Thakurgaon to Dinajpur, near the demolished Kantanagar bridge. This was done on December 24 and 25. Just after its completion, an oil-filled lorry of the Indian Oil Corporation damaged this bridge badly and this interrupted the flow of essential supplies to Bangladesh. Luckily, Maj Malhotra (popularly known as JK – officer commanding Engineer Task Force) repaired it quickly, showing his usual enterprise and initiative.
Finally, the PsOW were ordered to be moved to India. I was also told that the brigade would have to provide escorts for nearly 16,000 PsOW, whereas the formation had only 5,000 of them approximately. This task was accomplished despite the usual handicaps of transport, and timely and clear orders.
As soon as the last POW moved out of Saidpur on December 30, the ‘Brigade of the Year – 71′, received
sometime back and were posted out, were brought back, in 15 Air OP Flight, a new outfit. They had the complete knowledge of the area and experience of flying in all types of weather there. They were well conversant with various formations, their locations and tasks to be performed and their own role in supporting them. The officers were given the proper training for handling new Chetak helicopters. They were Maj KK Mittal, Maj JN Agnihotri, Capt Radhakrishnan, Maj HS Wadalia, Capt Gogna and Capt GS Chatwal, who were given to three sections of the flight which could be combined or reorganised depending upon the requirement. One section each was given to 71 Mountain Brigade, 6 Mountain Division and 20 Mountain Division in the month of November 1971.
19.
Deployment
Air Observation Flights
Section given to 20 Mountain Division located was at Belurghat. It had two well qualified and capable officers in Maj Agnihotri and Capt Gogna. Flight less a section were kept at Sukhna with HQs 33 Crops. However Maj Wadalia and Capt Chatwal had been earmarked for my brigade, who met us all and were
urroundings. They were made to be acquainted with the wherewithal of our formation by the staff on all aspects of the commitments. They were initially located at Sukhna only, as mentioned earlier and could be called by any formation, with the permission of Corps HQs.
They being highly qualified and experienced pilots, gladly accepted the following responsibilities and tasks:
Although Infantry is anchor arm of any operation and is known as “Mother Queen of the Battle,” but alone it will not be able to achieve the desired goals. It has become more difficult and cumbersome with the introduction of new technology in all aspects of the war machinery. It does require support of all other arms and services for fulfilling its obligation towards the winning of the war. Without their support, it is very difficult for infantry to soften the target, dislodge the enemy and once it is done then to hold it firmly and on permanent basis. Whenever the infantry has gone alone, without the requisite support, it has suffered very heavy casualties first in capturing the objective and then holding it against the well determined counter-attack by the enemy supported by its other arms like armour, artillery and air etc. While fighting the war for ‘Liberation of Bangladesh’, I being the Commander of the 71 Mountain Brigade realised this more than once where my infantry battalions could have done much better and secured larger areas in a short span of time had we had adequate support of other arms and services. Anyway whatever we could manage and the senior HQs could provide, my ‘Formation’ did a commendable job in serving the nation and satisfying my superior HQs. Whatever support was provided to me, I made full use of the same.
• Aerial photography. • Carrying out reconnaissance of area and targets. • Taking artillery shoots when required. • Engaging the impromptu targets on their own, if felt so, but with immediate information to
the formation.
• Flying the commanders for their air reconnaissance of their objectives. • Evacuation of casualties wherever necessary.
As has already been made clear that 15 Air OP flight was only meant for supporting the operation of 33 Crops which had its formation located at the following places:
Here what I want to bring out is the role of the IAF and particularly the part played by the Air OP flight given to us. I, as a soldier do not want to bemoan the fact rather I feel happy to say that whatever was available the ‘Helicopter Boys’ were always at the back and call of the formation. I would certainly like to elucidate the contribution and good jobs done by these fliers.
In view of the new situation emerging, a new unit by the name of 15 Air OP Flight was raised in June 1971 well before the commencement of the 1971 Bangladesh War. It was raised at Bagdogra and was meant to provide air support to 33 Corps deployed in that sector. There was another flight by the name of 659 Air OP Flight in that area meant for other formations. Certain officers who had served in this old unit
• 20 Mountain Division at Belurghat
• 6 Mountain Division – South of Cooch Bihar • 71 Mountain Brigade – General area Siliguri Corridor
All the three formations were to undertake operations in their respective areas and the Air OP sections of the sister formations could be made available if needed.
71 Mountain Brigade operated in general Siliguri Southwards and carried on till it was stopped by the declaration of ceasefire. The Air OP section allotted to my formation was extensively used by me and their contribution was praise worthy and with impressive results. The section led by Maj HS Wadalia and Capt GS Chatwal provided very intimate support to my formation for the capture of Amarkhana BOP of Pakistanis. I used them for carrying deep recce of the enemy area of my operations and at times I myself moved on recce missions alongwith unit and sub-unit commanders of the respective units. They very effectively brought the artillery fire on the enemy guns, which were shelling the forward positions of my brigade. These pilots at times undertook very risky but calculated missions flying over the enemy positions, who could be fired at by their small arms as well as automatic weapons. The Air OP section in clearing the initial hiccups was responsible for the speedy success of operations, which cleared the axis for the thrust for the capture of Birganj.
The enemy had deduced from our moves and the way the border posts were cleared that Pachagarh could be the next target for our formation and as a result, he consolidated his defences making full use of bridge over the rivulet. For the clearing of Pachagarh two Air OP sections were combined that is one of 71 Mountain Brigade and the other which was with 6 Mountain Division. Commanding officer and sub-unit commanders were taken up by helicopters and shown their objectives. They were also provided with the air photos including that of the depth localities. On 22 November, my Air OP registered the defences around Pachagarh. The element of Recce and Support Battalion of the enemy, which was on move to join Pachagarh was effectively engaged by the Air OP section stopping and then causing heavy damage to them. As a result of efforts by all Pachagarh was captured on 29 November 1971 by 71 Mountain Brigade.
Brig RC Butalia and CO 40 Medium Regiment with a captured enemy tank
MANUALS – RANPus *53?liana E; }ரு பாடிய நோய்,
Sures
2 MAJGEN. NHSHAH
GOC 16. INE DAV (DAK) 14+ RANGPUR To BAGDOGRA CAPT Vasapere SA RANDUL Leer erval RAN
D OLA CAM VASVAVAD
: Suite
Air OP sections were again busy in doing their recce and registering targets for capture of Birganj. It goes to the credit of Maj Wadalia and Capt Gogna that this section destroyed three enemy tanks, whereas the other team led by Maj Mittal and Capt Chatwal destroyed the enemy mortar position. Same way they played an important role of carrying out aerial recce for the defences of Birganj, Kantenagar and Khansama.
Finally, Maj Mittal and Capt Gogna flew me for accepting the surrender of Pakistanis along with their Commander Brig Shafi. During the surrender, the role of 71 Mountain Brigade was appreciated by Pakistanis, with a special reference to the Air OP Flight for their very courageous missions and causing heavy damage by taking accurate artillery shoots.
Flight log book of 15 Air OP Flight signed by Maj Gen NH Shah GOC, 16 Inf Div (Pak)
Sudentaland during the Second World War. The feeling of ease and comfort on finding the whole thing so simple was something like an end of normal collective training period atmosphere. All this gave the unit a wrong impression of the war to come.
Pachagarh
Here, the Rajputs were to go into the assault and, as given out earlier, a number of modifications were required on very minor grounds. On closer analysis, the following points should be considered:
20
(a) Far too much emphasis is laid on the A and Q duties in peacetime. This, however, is a
dangerous trend as operational duties tend to be subordinated to the other duties, if not ignored totally.
Comments on the Operations
(b)
Commanders at all levels, dread failures in their first action, and this tends to a lack of confidence, which permeates downwards very rapidly, and apart from the fact that morale is likely to be affected, the commanders forget to take the pros and cons of a given situation before arriving on a course of action. This is a dangerous tendency, and steps should be taken to eliminate this fear complex.
As one can clearly understand from the accounts of capture of various objectives by the battalions that till now I have utilised units’ accounts for basing the narrative of this book, though I have added some minor variations at places to create the proper perspective. This has been done, because my position at the Brigade HQs allowed me to oversee the planning and conduct of operations, thereby providing a better insight into all that transpired from the time the Brigade of the Year went into action at Amarkhana and took the final surrender of the enemy at Saidpur on December 17, 1971. I would also like to reiterate the fact that the intention is not to be critical of any unit, organisation, or any individual personality. The aim is to analyse the events that took place in relation to the situation encountered.
(c)
Amarkhana
The Raj Rif was seeing action for the first time. The battalion had also been converted to a regular battalion from an ‘l’ battalion, and its operations were mainly against the Naga hostiles in the counterinsurgency role. The following aspects would, however, require to be looked into for future operations:
Although the Rajputs were clear about their task, they did not go into the details of the plan, and visualise the actual conduct of the battle. They had not catered for the loss of direction or for any contingency if they were surprised by the enemy while moving to establish the road block. The unit commander’s practical knowledge of tactics was rather weak. These aspects could not have been judged earlier, as the brigade had very little
time for collective training before the operations. (d) When the operation was postponed, the Rajputs were asked to patrol the area to collect
more information. It was found that no thought was given to this important aspect, and one patrol of 8 officers and 32 other ranks was being sent along just one route. Fortunately, this was remedied in time. The patrol was recalled on wireless, briefed, and despatched in smaller groups along different routes and timings. If executed as planned by the battalion, the security of the plan would have been compromised and casualties, if any, might have affected the efficiency of the battalion. This further highlights the
necessity to check that their plan conforms to the overall plan of the commander. (e) When the battalion sent out a protection party for scrutiny of the firm base after the
capture of Fakirhat bridge, the protection party lost contact with the battalion. The battalion then moved on its own, but never reached the correct place; and near Arzi Shikarpur, they were fired upon by an enemy patrol en route. In fact, they firmed in at the same spot, and moved in for the Sugar Mill the next morning.
(a) The mental attitude of the troops and the commanding officer, because of the restrictions
placed from top (make use of the Mukti Bahini and not allow your own troops to be
captured) was a big factor initially in the commanders and troops not being aggressive. (b) This particular battalion was an ‘l’ battalion raised four years ago, in Nagaland, and did
not have a chance to do any collective training prior to its being launched into battle. Hence, their concept: about operations was different and the specialists, though trained
individually, had not been able to knit themselves as a team. (c) The battalion had marched into Amarkhana similar to the German march into
On analysis, it is seen that:
(a) Troops tend to exaggerate the reports to justify their actions. This is a dangerous tendency
formed in most exercises, which must be curbed.
(f) Initiative was lacking on the part of the sub-unit commanders most of the time. (g) The forward troops had a habit of passing exaggerated reports. Neither the adjutant nor
the battalion commander ever analysed these reports, but just passed them on to the Brigade HQs. For example, they had reported seeing an armoured personnel carrier which was, in fact, a tractor with a mounted machine gun. They also heard the noise of tanks at different stages of the Pachagarh battle. All these were found to be baseless, but at last stage, they could have a wrong influence on the reaction and conduct of a commander’s plans if he had accepted the information in toto. However, it did bring caution. If these had been properly analysed at lower level, time would have been saved,
possibly resulting in better execution. (h) Despite clear instruction to the contrary, troops were held back for clearing the Staff
Quarters. The net result was, when the troops were finally despatched to execute the other planned tasks, they were too late and never reached the proper place, which resulted in the enemy pulling back a large portion of his forces.
(b) In the fog of battle: many things go wrong. Troops at this time look up to a leader for cool
thought and balanced action. If this is absent or neglected, the sub-units start acting independent of each other, resulting in chaos. As no firm action was taken by the Rajputs to remedy this, the operational efficiency of a fine unit was slowly on the decline. This clearly shows the value of leadership.
(c) As mentioned earlier, fear on account of a failure tends to make one overcautious.
Khansama
Advance to Thakurgaon
The Rajputs had executed their task well and a large number of prisoners were taken. All this was achieved as a result of the positive directions and the control exercised by commander at all levels in the brigade. Looking back into the pages of history, an almost similar situation existed in the Eighth Army during the battle of El Alamein. This was really very encouraging as we were very close to Nilphamari and its capture could have jolted the enemy completely. Our move in this direction unhinged the enemy who could not guess as we were upto what.
Spectacular Advance from Mirgarh to Nilphamari
On December 2, when the Rajput’s advance to Thakurgaon was held up by a demolished bridge across Bhuli Nadi, the battalion was found resting on either side of the road and the tanks parked under a tree. The unit had made no effort to find a suitable detour to cross the obstacle; instead, they waited for the Engineers to construct a bridge. This is a habit learnt in most of our exercises. If any rest is to be given, troops should be tactically deployed on the ground before being permitted to rest. To amplify the situation, Maj Gen Sarkar, Director of Operations at HQs Eastern Command (he had arrived at 0830 hours) and I carried out reconnaissance from a tank and were across the river within one hour. This lack of initiative on the part of the Rajputs gave the enemy ample time to pull back intact and to reorganise his defences at Thakurgaon. To maintain the momentum I had personally to post sentries for diverting the traffic through new routes.
On December 3, when the advance was halted by the enemy in area across roads around 1600 hours, the battalion firmed in and the patrols brought in a lot of exaggerated reports on the enemy strength and minefields. This, therefore, necessitated the planning of a deliberate operation, which was not needed. Despite the fact that information was given to the Rajputs, about the move of 7 Maratha LI to establish a road block on the Thakurgaon-Birganj road, the mortars of the Rajputs opened up on the Marathas, thus giving away surprise. This road block column did not reach the site, much to the benefit of the enemy, on December 4. The reserve battalion commander of Raj Rif, and I reached the location and, after having been briefed, drove into Thakurgaon – way ahead of the Rajputs, only to find the town vacated. No mines were encountered.
71 Mountain Brigade Group had made quite satisfying start and advanced more than 65 kms from Mirgarh to Thakurgaon with in a shortest possible time. Towns of Pachagarh and Boda were in our hands by evening of 4 December 1971, which was a great moral boosting for my formation. We carried on regardless and by 5 December, we had Birganj in our hands, which made the move towards Dinajpur feasible. The troops were relentlessly following the Pakistanis and by 6 December we were able to contact Kantanagar bridge which was, though demolished by the withdrawing enemy. The enemy was holding the well prepared defences on Dhepa river and crossing at this place would have caused us very heavy casualties which was not acceptable to me at least, because, with great difficulties I had been able to muster the required strength for my formation and more so where other alternatives were available to me.
We established a battalion size road block on 9 December, South of Dhepa river defences of the enemy on road to Dinajpur but the enemy did not react. I could feel that the enemy in this location was being maintained from Saidpur side. We then conducted raids as mentioned earlier on the fringe defences at Dinajpur and caused the enemy to have firmly committed to his location at Dinajpur. I had learnt the hard way during my soldiering in previous operations that new moves, deception and speed will give new
opportunities. Rather than hitting my head against the cemented pillboxes at Dinajpur, I made a move towards Nilphamari and accordingly crossed Dhepa river from North and captured Khansama on 13 December. This was very satisfying as we could have gone in for Nilphamari immediately, but cease fire was declared on 16 December. We were just on the outskirts of that place.
71 Mountain Brigade had cleared the complete area on the Western side of the 33 Corps axis of advance and as such no mean achievement. I respectfully submit and claim that extreme pressure exerted by 71 Mountain Brigade was the main cause of tying down the Pakistanis at Saidpur, Dinajpur and Rangpur and preventing them to reinforce the other threatened locations in the South and South-east, which ultimately added to our success in completing our mission earlier than expected.
21
Afterthoughts
The Brigade of the Year, fighting in the “Year of the Brigade,” happened to be a somewhat loose brigade a situation imposed on the formation due to its deployment in an insurgency environment, which precluded the organisation and conduct of meaningful collective training for the formation as a whole. As a consequence, the officers and men of the units were not fully acquainted with each other. Nor was the Brigade HQs fully integrated with the battalions, for the simple reason that officers hardly met their counterparts in units. In our environment, it became a case of on-the-job training – we fought and we trained simultaneously. At the outset, the desired cohesiveness within the formation was not existing. Nonetheless, the onlooker were astonished at the speed and the distance covered by this ad hoc Independent Brigade Group in 13 days. It would be worthwhile mentioning that we started off as a Mountain Brigade and the resources kept on accumulating, commensurate with the tasks assigned, while the size of the HQs remained the same. This, in turn, entailed additional pressure of work on the commander and staff but the brigade marched on, accomplishing its mission within the overall framework of the design of battle evolved.
Many have also asked as to how this cohesiveness was achieved, which led to ultimate success. The answer is simple. It was human relationship at its best, the will to carry out the task at any cost, and the spirit of adventure – where risks were taken, knowing fully well that there were going to be no “sackings”.
Looking back over the years, one tends to reflect and think. These afterthoughts are not based on hindsight, but were recorded at the time the events were taking place. I will, therefore, endeavour to bring out some lessons learnt by us during that fateful period upto December 17, 1971.
The Higher Direction of War
Comments on the overall planning and conduct of operations in Bangladesh do not fall within the
related to that already available with the units and formation HQs. The information provided by PsOW at Pachagarh is a point in example, that a brigade supported by a squadron of Chaffee tanks had been deployed in area Thakurgaon-Birganj; whereas only an infantry battalion was opposing the advance of the brigade, at this stage.
Road Blocks
The establishment of road block is a difficult operation. It requires a considerable amount of minute and detailed planning as well as rehearsals on similar terrain if possible. Night navigation and actions to be taken by own troops, in the case of enemy reaction, are of prime importance. None of our road blocks got into the right position at the right time, thus allowing the enemy to escape.
Advance by Night
purview of this book, but an interesting fact does emerge. The planners in Delhi had not really planned for the capture of Dacca. It, therefore, must be said to the credit of our leadership that, as events unfolded and opportunities presented, these were quickly seized and turned to our advantage. Dacca, the ultimate prize, was acquired and all credit should go to the commanders. It can, therefore, be said that the planning was not quite upto the mark, but the conduct of operations was brilliant.
A look at the negative side should take us into examining the constant and hurried changes in plans that kept occurring prior to the launching of operations. Objectives were given by higher ups and purely on ad hoc basis. As was the case with our brigade, other units and formations, too, were constantly moving about – and this cannot really be attributed to any deception plan or security measures. To my mind, it was simply crisis management caused by over centralisation and lack of forethought and foresight on the part of commanders and staff. As a result, even the short period of 10 days allotted to my brigade for training could not be utilised.
Then there was the question of nibbling at the BOPs – disease that had started in the 4 Corps Zone quickly spread to other areas. I somehow felt that it was fanned by the need to be ‘one-up’, as these actions did not produce any meaningful and tangible results. More often than not, the importance of other objectives, which could provide more meaningful results, was lost sight of and the troops were launched into action. Amarkhana and Pachagarh are cases in point. At the same time, the units were required to carry out their tasks against these outposts under absurd conditions, like – no prisoners are to be lost, armour is not to be used, and only infantry mortars will be utilised, etc. I sometimes wonder what really happened to our leadership at that time, for, these actions not only remained exercise in futility but caused needless loss of men and material, as well as creating lopsided dispositions before formations were launched into actual battle.
As regards the tactical handling of the ‘Brigade of the Year’, fulsome praise is deserved by my Corps Commander, Lt Gen Thapan, who concerned himself not only with allotting tasks but also balancing the requirements of its security, unleashing at the right moment, encouragement, and above all ensuring superb logistic support during its hurricane-like advance from Pachagarh to Saidpur.
As a concept, this has been discussed and debated in our schools of instruction, but it is rarely put into practice. “The Brigade of the Year’, however, carried out advance by night from Boda to Thakurgaon. This action paid us handsome dividends and we in the army need to practise this concept for future wars – ‘we will have to fight at night.
Junior Leadership
As always, our junior leadership proved its mettle to the hilt. The young officers were bold, dashing, and courageous in all their actions. They went about their tasks with enthusiasm and audacity, executing the same with little or no supervision. The same, however, cannot be said about our junior commissioned officers. They constantly look over their shoulders, both in peace and war. During the operations in Bangladesh, they required constant goading and prodding. It would be really worthwhile examining a new orientation of their role and training for it.
Having made some general observations, it would now be worthwhile taking a closer look at the other lessons learnt.
Information
Armour – The PT 76 Tank
Information in war can never be complete. Bits and pieces will keep trickling in, and a mosaic has to be formed. I would like to highlight the fact that the enemy had quickly withdrawn from Amarkhana while we were planning a deliberate operation against the enemy position. Similarly for the enemy, while the Rajputs had lost their way from Fakirhat onwards and established their firm base well away from intended site, the enemy got jittery and fled. This enemy action can also be attributed to the lack of information about their enemy. At the same time, we must also remember that PsOW can plant incorrect information which may have an adverse effect on our plans. Such information must be sifted and co-related to that
(a) Mobility: The mobility of PT 76 in water-logged terrain and paddy fields was very
satisfactory, both during day and night. (b) Radio Communications: The squadron net functioned satisfactorily on Radio Set R-113.
However, screening on account of the large number of bamboo grooves was very pronounced. The communications with infantry battalions and the brigade HQs were
unsatisfactory, as the PRC 25 sets were left unattended, whenever the tanks were
engaging targets, as both the gunner and commander were busy at this stage. (c) Gunnery: The tank armaments were satisfactory. The high explosive ammunition used was
fairly effective in destroying enemy bunkers.
Its absence materially affected the outcome of the operations – particularly in the attack when there was little or no information, or incorrect reports were given to the formation.
It is, therefore, suggested that a flight should be given to each formation and they should be positioned in close proximity of the formation HQs being supported. This will eliminate the time lag and facilitate closer liaison between both.
Infantry-Tank Cooperation
Helicopters
As most of the battalions were used in the counter-insurgency role, very little training could be carried out on this aspect. On account of the problems explained earlier – raw inexperienced crew assembled together from the Corps Armed Delivery Squadron; no spares being made available for PT 76 tanks, and the armoured squadron was shy when asked to move out without infantry. The tank commanders lacked dash and drive in the execution of their wide hooks. This enabled the enemy to pull back intact.
As these had been just introduced then, their employment lacked forethought and planning. This aspect led to a wastage in helicopter effort. It must be ensured that all concerned understood the employment of this valuable asset for its effective use. These resources should be located near the support formation HQs which would also ensure that security and surprise is not compromised.
Artillery
Fire Support/ Fire Planning
The only artillery proved integral to the brigade was a regiment of 76mm howitzers, which however were pea-shooters as compared to the enemy artillery. Hence, for any major attack, I had to depend on the additional artillery support, especially medium guns which could be made available from 6 Mountain Division, on call. Both Maj Gen Reddy, GOC 6 Division, and Brig Butalia, Commander 6 Division Artillery Brigade, treated us belonging to 6 Division and ensured that artillery requirement was made available on priority, thus truly integrating the ‘Brigade of the Year’ as part of their Division. It was this fact which later made 71 Mountain Brigade part of 6 Division, after the author had left the Brigade. Notwithstanding the above, it is a must that whenever any fast moving operations are being planned, guns having adequate range should be grouped with the formation, besides avoiding frequent redeployment/ regrouping of artillery, which slows down the operations/ advance.
It is noticed that the unit commanders did not go into the detailed mechanics while making out the fire plans. The fire plans lacked details and were expensive in ammunition. Most of the time, the objectives were engaged by artillery units without coordinating the move plan of the units. It was also felt that troops were under the impression that the enemy would move out of his well-entrenched position prior to the assault only by the fire of the artillery guns and mortars. These tendencies require to be corrected at the earliest.
Capability of the Infantry Battalion
Observation Posts
As a result of the actions, it was found that infantry battalions were not capable of maintaining the momentum of the advance, by resuming it the next day, if a battalion attack was launched the preceding night. Though, the teaching is that they should be capable of an advance immediately after the assault, in practice this was seldom possible. But I agree that it is easier said than done in view of casualties, damage to weapons and equipments and loss of certain key commanders etc.
Whenever available, they proved invaluable for the execution of the following tasks:
(a) Gaining of information about the army and his movements.
Intelligence Shortcomings
(b) Providing air photos. (c) Conveyance of commanders for aerial reconnaissance.
(d) Registration and correction of fire in the difficult terrain where visibility was restricted. (e) Counter bombardment and counter mortar tasks.
(a) Information from higher HQs about flanks were not readily available. (b) Battle information gained by forward troops was exaggerated and the little that was gained
was mostly hearsay rather than by own patrols. (c) The units did not fully understand the value of passing quick and reliable information to
higher HQs and to sister organisations.
(d) Analysis of the information so gained was not carried out at unit level. This resulted in
either a false picture being presented or wastage of time in shifting and analysing the reports received.
and very successfully in Vietnam war by the United States and the Australian armies. It is, therefore, suggested that the airborne air control team should be made available to a formation. In the initial stages, till adequate helicopters are available, this task can be combined with the Air OP.
Suggestions for Improvement of the Intelligence Aspect
Air Strikes on Own Troops
(a)
This took place because of the following possible reasons:
(b)
The second-in-command or the adjutant of an infantry battalion must be trained in intelligence duties. The adjutants of an infantry battalion must be junior command course trained. During battle, it is preferable to have a Major, who will understand the progress of the operation better.
(a) Poor briefing by Ground Liaison Officers. (b) Bad map reading by pilots. (c) Air control team not having ground observation of target area.
(c) Staff work by the adjutants needed considerable improvement.
Some Weaknesses
Self Reliance and Confidence in Own Weapons
Infantry units placed little reliance on their own fire power. Instead, they expected elaborate artillery and armour support for all operations. Similarly, other arms expected the infantry battalions to provide protection for them whenever they were deployed for their tasks.
Battalion Support Weapons
Leadership: Battalion commanders required more practice in the handling of troops in battle. There were many instances where attacks were not pressed home because of strong and heavy automatic fire from the enemy, even though, it was not particularly effective. Thus, the units halted short of the objective suffered unnecessary casualties because of shelling and mortar firing by the enemy. Further, the units fought shy of closing in with the enemy and preferred to wait for the enemy to vacate his defences because of own artillery fire. This can be eradicated by good junior leadership and proper motivation of troops.
Patrolling: There is a lot of scope for improvement in the conduct of patrolling, particularly briefing and debriefing of patrols, and finally the analysis of the information so gained. No effort was made at the unit level to check the accuracy or the feasibility of the information gained, before passing it on to higher HQs. Most of the time, the patrol obtained and believed the information given by the civilian or Mukti Bahini sources. The planning of patrolling and the briefing of men going out for the same requires to be more imaginative. The stereotype instructions given in this aspect at our schools also requires rethinking.
Tank Hunting: There is a need to carry out intensive training in tank hunting. The subunits fought shy of engaging tanks with their own weapons. This was because of lack of
confidence in the 57 mm recoilless gun and the antique 3-5 inch Rocket Launchers. (b) Pioneers: Infantry units were very apprehensive of enemy mines and required engineer
support, even to deal with scattered nuisance mines.
(c) Signal Security: This was poor at all levels, and steps should be taken to remedy the same.
Passage of Information
Reorganisation
Reorganisation after a battalion attack takes much more time than we generally teach in our schools of instruction. In practice, it generally took 4 to 5 hours for a battalion to reorganise itself after an attack.
(a) Passage of information, both from the higher HQs and the units under command, required
further improvement in its collation and dissemination. Whenever information from forward troops was obtained, it was always late, and at times exaggerated. Most of the time, the units instead of gaining battle intelligence depended on the formation HQs to
provide them with information that could easily have been obtained by their own troops. (b) There was no direct communication with the neighbouring formations. Passage of
information regarding progress of operation by daily sitreps forwarded as letter
Air Control Team
On account of poor visibility, the air control team on the ground was generally not very effective. The airborne air control team was, however, very effective. The airborne air control team was used extensively
telegrams was extremely slow, unsatisfactory, and time-consuming.
Battle Procedure
As the adjutants were junior inexperienced officers, most of the work had to be done by commanding officers. Therefore, whenever the commanding officers moved forward, the battle procedure and information came to a standstill or the commanding officer did not move forward to influence the battle, in order to obviate this difficulty. Instructions should be issued to appoint only those officers as adjutants who had requisite service and qualifications.
22
Night Operations
The Enemy Surrenders
Night training, and particularly the establishment of road blocks, require more emphasis at all levels.
Having had more than his share of the war and having realised that he had been completely cornered, the enemy decided to surrender.
Pak 23 Infantry Brigade Commander, who was opposing us, and I met each other on 15 December and the surrender of Pak Brigade took place at 1545 hours on 17 December, at Zam Zam Airport at Saidpur. With this surrender the war was over.
My Brigade Group now took time off to rest, recoup and reorganise for the other mammoth task, mainly the safety of PsOW, as also to draw up balance sheet of our gains and losses, which revealed the following tally of our casualties.
(a) Own Troops
Killed-59 Wounded-277
Missing-14 (b) Enemy (Including Razakars)
Killed-134
Wounded-60 Missing-39 (including 14 Razakars).
man with the engineer troops allotted to me, his mind moved much faster than my advance. I did not have to tell him, but his work would have started what was required to be done before I could tell him.
The aim given by the Indian Government was to liberate as much territory as possible so that a provisional Bangladesh Government could start functioning from their own country and that was the main reason why capture of Dhaka was not given initially.
The only reliable intelligence we were able to obtain was through signal intercept by the Signal Intercept Unit of the Corps of Signals. The other source that my brigade got, was that while the Pakistani were retreating, they forgot to cut the telephone lines running along my route of advance therefore I came to know about their plan and movement in advance, however this was only up to Thakurgaon, beyond which lines were disconnected.
23
Lessons/Reflections
Our senior commanders took a calculated risk in moving up equipment and stores on the basis of our concept of impending operations. Once war was declared almost everything was in place. This was the most important factor which was the key to the decisive campaign in the East.
Finally, some of our battalions were lacking training in establishing speedy road blocks and were not very efficient in laying road blocks at the correct place, otherwise, the enemy would have surrendered much earlier.
In a short war of thirteen days, the allied forces of Bangladesh including Mukti Bahini and India did a wonderful job. 71 Mountain Brigade group was the first to enter from the North-western Sector, and also the first to return to India on finishing the given tasks. This is how a new nation called Bangladesh was created (Formerly known as East Pakistan).
The estimated casualties, both killed and wounded of the Pakistan forces in the Eastern Sector were around 8,000. The total PsOW taken were 93,000. Besides a large amount of Pakistani vehicles and equipment were captured/destroyed during the campaign. Our total casualties were 421 killed, 4,058 wounded and 56 missing presumed killed. As far as my brigade was concerned, killed 59, wounded 277, missing 14 who were found immediately after the war with the enemy surrendering.
The Pakistani army in this campaign fought with courage and determination from their defensive position.
The enemy did not expect our strategy of “bypassing heavily defended positions and then attacking them from the rear”.
It would be pertinent to note that it was one of those rare occasions when an advance to contact, the enemy continued, both by day and night. This was in keeping with maxim of maintaining relentless pressure on an unbalanced enemy, in order to prevent his regrouping and reorganising for subsequent resistance to the advancing forces.
The guerrilla operations by the local and Mukti Bahini isolated the Pakistanis, hampered their movements and were largely responsible for lowering their morale. Their contribution to the victory of the joint Indo-Bangladesh forces was therefore enormous.