THE WAY IT WAS – Z A Khan
FOREWORD
This book is about soldiering in the Pakistan Army from the days less than two years after the creation of Pakistan. It is an autobiography that describes the various stages in an officer’s career, it analyses the training, tactics, methods and discusses the shortcomings in retrospect. Several themes run through the book. It describes working and living conditions of officers and the men, the training imparted to the army and where and how mistakes were made in the concept of operations and methods of training. It describes the attitude of officers, the relationship between seniors and juniors, the demand of some seniors for personal loyalty over loyalty to the army and the country. In the description of the 1965 war with India the book digresses from an autobiography but discusses the war in a perspective that makes it thought-provoking and soul-scarching.
The 1971 Rajasthan operation is described in detail, this is the first time that this has been written about and it should also provoke some serious thinking.
Throughout the book there is an undercurrent implying that the administrative and legal powers of seniors officers is excessive and is misused because it is without checks and balances, and the right of defence
The Pakistan Army, in the book, has not been made out to be an army of perfect soldiers and officers or full of self-sacrificing heroes but a fighting army that reflects the society and culture as it has developed since the creation of Pakistan.
The book is interesting and should appeal to soldiers and civilians alike.
Maj Gen A. O. Mitha (Retd),
HJ, S Pk, SQA
Chapter 1
T appeared for the Senior Cambridge and the European High
School examinations in December 1945 and passed both. After
the examinations were over and before the results were announced, I sent for the application forms for the Indian Military Academy and was disappointed to find that I would have to wait for over two years before I became eligible to apply.
At this time, my father, who was serving in the Indian Army, in the Corps of Engineers, in FM Slim’s Fourteenth Army Headquarters, at Rangoon, was transferred to Singapore. On his way to Madras, where he was to board a ship for Singapore, he came to Bangalore, where our family had resided since 1941 when my father was called up for service in the Army and was posted to Iraq. One of the problems that he had to resolve was my further education. I inforined him that I had decided to join the army and did not wish to go to college. He told me that he wanted me to be an engineer and since I was not old enough to join the army, I had to decide which college I would like to go to. He said I could not sit at home doing nothing for two years and should go to Aligarh where he and my uncle band been educated. I argued for a local college and he agreed because I was the eldest and was expected to look after the family in his absence. I joined St. Joseph’s College in Bangalore in the first year.
In December 1946 my father was reverted to his civil job in the Survey of India and was posted to Rawalpindi with the summer headquarters at Murree. Since the schools and colleges in Murree opened in March he asked us to move to Murree in the first week of March. All our belongings were packed, the furniture, collected over years, was divided into three lots; one was returned to my grandmother, another was auctioned at throw away prices, much to my mother’s annoyance and the third lot booked by train to Rawalpindi.
We boarded the train from Bangalore to Bombay with all our friends at the railway station to see us off, promises were made to write and hands were waved. The train steamed out of the station creating a distance between us and Bangalore, where we had lived for over five years and carried away happy memories of our life there.
We had lived on the perimeter of the cantonment, a few minutes by bicycle and we were out of the town and in the open country side. There were lakes, wells and streams to swim in, birds and animals to shoot and all sorts of things to do, from flying kites to collecting human skeletons from a Hindu cremation ground. On one occasion my younger brother, Shuaib, found a fine specimen of a human skull and brought it home to put it in his shelf in the clothes cupboard that he shared, my mother opened the shelf and out fell a human skull. Shuaib was called and ordered to get rid of it, he took it outside and hid it under the water meter cover. After hiding it, every little while he would go and look under the cover, my sister noticed this and looked under the cover, there were loud shrieks and Shuaib was suitably disciplined.
On cycles we ranged up to Mysore, the State capital, with its palace, a temple on a hill, the Maharaja’s stable with elephants and zebras, the Krishnarajasagra Dam with its coloured fountains and to Seringapatam, the capital of Tipu Sultan. One year our school, Bishop Cotton’s, arranged a trip to the jungle on the border of Mysore State. We went by train and then by bus to a rest house on the bank of the river Cauvery at a place called Fraserpet. For this trip we had contributed the princely amount of twenty rupees and food items. At the rest house we were met by an Englishman called Maddock who had a plantation across the river from the rest house and lived there with his wite. He had settled at Fraserpet after the First World War and had a lot of stories about the jungle. One story he told us was about a rogue elephant that he was called upon to kill, he tracked it for two days without catching up with it. On the third day le stopped to have his afternoon meal. He and the shikari accompanying him left their rifles propped against a tree and started eating. He said that suddenly the elephant that he had been tracking charged out of the bamboo and lantana bushes, picked up the weapons with its trunk, threw them into the bushes and then attacked him. The elephant first thrashed him with its trunk, then tried to stomp him, then attacked him with its tusks and finally picked him up and threw him into the bushes. The local hunter who had accompanied him had safely climbed a tree. He showed us the scars on his body and we were duly impressed.
The next day he took us into the jungle, we saw plenty of deer but no tigers and elephants. At one place he suddenly told us to be quiet and stand against tree trunks. We wondered and obeyed. The ground under our feet shook, there was a sound of hooves and a herd of bison thun dered past. Late in the afternoon he shot a deer and we all gathered around it. One of the boys went up to the carcass and touched it with his foot. Much to our surprise there was instant hubbub amongst the villagers who had accompanied us. Mr. Maddock explained that the deer had been defiled and would not be touched by the villagers and people of another caste would have to be sent to collect it.
Bangalore was a large military cantonment. There was an Officers Training School, a lot of British and Indian troops, Italian pris. oners of war who roamed the streets without escort, and later the United States Army and Air Force personnel arrived in large numbers. The Americans became very popular with the Anglo-Indian population and were well liked by all the people that they came in contact with due to their generosity with chocolates and similar items which were not locally available. One peculiarity of the Americans used to be that they would stand on the pavement leaning against the shop walls and watch the street scene.
In the cantonment where we lived, there were either retired English or Anglo-Indian couples or army wives with husbands either posted away all over the world or prisoners of war or missing in action. We, twelve to sixteen years old, were under our mothers’ care who do not have any control when you are out of the house. Keeping ourselves busy required ingenuity and there was no lack of it. No garden or backyard with a fruit tree was safe from us. There was a large lake near our house, we discovered that snakes came to the water’s edge to catch frogs and devised a system of shooting snakes with air guns under torch light. The poor snakes, specially the ones with frogs half swallowed, did not stand a chance, one night we killed fifty six.
The end of the Second World War brought major changes. The Americans and the Italians disappeared, the American radio station closed down, some people arved away but the biggest change was that our friends who only had mothers suddenly had fathers. We were adjusting to these changes when we were also required to move. We packed and caught a train, as the train steamed north, little did we realize that we were lucky in moving when we did and that the world as we knew it was about to go crazy and change entirely in a few montis.
After half a day and a night we reached Victoria Terminus in Bombay. On that day there were communal iots, and though we had a whole day to spend in Bombay, we couid not leave the railway station. In the evening we boarded the Frontier Mail, the next day in the late afternoon the train passed through a city made out of red marble, whereas the rest of India was drab khaki mud coloured. We also found several compartments full of school children returning to Lawrence College in Murree which we were also to join.
At the dawn of the second day the train halted at New Delhi, the station was deserted, and inquiry from the railway officials on the platform produced the information that the Sikhs were rioting in the Punjab and the train would not go any further. The only evidence of rioting I could find was one man on the platform bleeding from his back. After waiting for sometime word spread that the train would continue on its journey with its yacuum brake system disconnected so that it could not be stopped between stations. When the train moved out after a few hours we could see Sikhs marching in single file with swords and spears. Jullunder was on fire and so was Amritsar, Lahore was reached at night, the station was dark, the train arrived at Rawalpindi early in the morning. My father was at the railway station to receive us and told us that there had been rioting in Rawalpindi and Murree, a lot of buildings had been burnt, there was curfew in Rawalpindi and we would have to move into a hotel till the curfew was lifted and the road to Murree opened.
We moved to the Mall Hotel, where my father was staying and had booked rooms for us. We stayed in the hotel for about a week. The curfew continued, columns of smoke would rise and word would spread that so and so Sikh or Hindu’s business premise or house had been burnt. Word also came from Murree that hundreds of houses belonging to Hindus and Sikhs had been burnt. Gurkha soldiers wandered on the streets and roads of Rawalpindi, when they saw a Sikh he was stopped and searched. Usually a Sikh, on spotting the Gurkhas, ran, was chased a short distance, caught and searched and a sword of sorts, placed up his sleeve, was found and he was marched off, unceremoniously.
After we had been about a week in Rawalpindi it was decided to move to Murree. We went by bus. In those days there were two bus companies that operated between Rawalpindi and Murree, one was called Murree Hill Transport and had its buses painted a light green colour, the other one was called Pindi-Murree Transport and its buses were painted red. We boarded the bus in the Cantonment and went through the city which ended well before the present Satellite Town. The first stop after the city was the “Seventeen Mile Stone”,
a barrier stopped the traffic and a notice informed everybody that a toll had to be paid. In case of bus passengers, it was included in the fare. At this stop boiled eggs were sold which were bought and eaten as ritual. After a halt of about a half hour the bus continued its journey. The climb to Murree began, the bus engine whined as the bus spun around the hairpin bends. The hillside was covered with shrubs and as the bus gained altitude, the shrubs changed to pine trees. We passed places whose names sounded strange at that time but will remain with us all our lives, Tret, Company Bagh, Charrapani, Ghora Gali, Sunny Bank. When we arrived at the Murree bus station our luggage was unloaded and Kashmiri porters called “hathos” were hired. We went up a steep climb to the Mall, past the General Post Office to a small house that my father had rented on an annual basis. We saw snow for the first time and shivered in the cold.
As soon as Lawrence College opened my brothers Firoz, Shuaib and I joined it, my sister Bilquis joined St. Deny’s and my brothers Shamim and Shamoon joined Jesus and Mary’s Convent.
Lawrence College, when we went there in March 1947, consisted of teachers training college, called Chelmsford Training College, usually referred to as the CTC, the intermediate college section, referred to as the College, the boys school and the girls school. The students were largely children of Anglo-Indian employees of the railways, telephone and telegraph department etc from northern India extending to Bombay. In the teachers training college there were no Indians, in the college section about half the students were Indians and these had joined Lawrence College only for the Intermediate classes and had not studied in the school section. Khaquan Abbasi, who joined the Pakistan Air Force, retired as a Air Commodore, became a MNA and a Minister, Mohammad Riaz Khan, Abbasi’s cousin, who joined the Pakistan Army and became a Major General, were the senior students and remained till the Intermediate examination of 1947. In our Intermediate class there was Akram Hussain Syed, who joined the Pakistan Army and retired as a brigadier, Shaukat Ali Ghauree, who also joined the Pakistan Army and retired as a lieutenant colonel and M. A. Dodhy who became a doctor. Besides the Muslim students there were three Indian Christians and one Hindu. The Indians lived in rooms separate from the Anglo-Indians.
After the riots in early March, Murree remained peaceful. With the announcement that India would be partitioned the Hindus and the
Sikhs quietly moved away. There were newspaper and radio reports of massacres and migration of Hindus and Sikhs from the areas that were to constitute Pakistan and of Muslims from India. Schools and colleges closed elsewhere but Lawrence College was not affected, the students remained unconcerned and waited for the school year to end so that they could go home.
On August 14, 1947 we became independent. With independence, we who had been Indians became Pakistanis, nobody felt any different. On Eid day, soon after Independence Day, Eid prayers were offered with Gurkha soldiers deployed and machine guns covering the congregation on the Murree football ground. The maulvi and the congregation thanked God for the independence and prayed for a prosperous Pakistan.
A few days after the Independence Day, the Muslim Staff of the Survey of India, who had opted for Pakistan, started arriving. My father became responsible for the reception and housing them. Houses belonging to Hindus and Sikhs, lying closed and abandoned were opened and handed over. Many of them, in 1962, were to buy these houses. In the Survey Department the changes were dramatic, suddenly the British were gone, the top posts were still with a few of them but the senior posts that were normally held by the British were opened to Pakistanis. For some the benefits of independence were immediate.
In October the Kashmir war started. We could see fires burning in the villages in the distant Kashmir Hills and stories of atrocities committed by the Kashmir Maharaja’s troops spread. Bands of tribesmen on their way to fight in Kashmir passed through Murree. One weekend we had come home to Murree, at about 11 P.M., an aircraft was heard circling over Murree, ominously the air raid warning siren sounded. A little later there were loud explosions, the Indian Air Force had bombed us. The consequences of the bombing were seen the next morning. The bombing aircraft had dropped its bombs on the convoy moving on the Rawalpindi-Murree road, between Clifden and Murree, the bombs landing safely in the British graveyard.
On the day of the bombing, a well known mulla had delivered a speech from the steps of the General Post Office in Murree, and told the people that the war in Kashmir was a jehad. After the bombing a lot of people started leaving Murree. They left by bus, walked a portion of the road damaged by a landslide, their belonging carried by
coolies, vehicles waiting on the other side took them away from the war zone. The mulla was said to have been the first man out.
In the last week of November, students of Bishop Cotton’s, Simla, who were due to appear in the Senior Cambridge examination came to Lawrence College. Omar Ali Khan, who had been with me in Bishop Cotton’s, Bangalore, was one of them. The school year of 1947 ended in December, with the announcements that the CTC, the College section and the girls school would be closed down, a lot of the staff would not return. Only we, the Intermediate Class students who had to appear in the Intermediate examination in 1948 would return to complete our curriculum and appear in the examination.
As a hill station, Murree had a season, 15 April to 15 September. In April when the heat in the plains of the Punjab and the Frontier started becoming oppressive, the rich in the cities and landlords in the rural areas moved to Murree. There were very few cars, most people came by bus, some could afford a taxi. Houses were hired for the season, hotel rooms could be taken for shorter periods. The British Army had the ‘Uniacke’ Club for other ranks and the ‘Lady Robert’s Home’ for officers to spend their leave. No vehicles were permitted on the Mall Road, everyone walked or rode a rickshaw pulled by Kashmiris. The town had an air of a holiday every day. Everyone paraded on the Mall in the morning and then again in the evening with spells in the cafes. The same faces, the same groups trailing one another, children riding donkeys and adults riding ponies, could be seen monotonously. On weekends boys from Lawrence College, girls from St Deny’s and the convent would join the promenade. After spending nearly six months, doing nothing, in September the crowd would start thinning out and by October the Survey Department, the Army and government offices staff would only be left. The winter of 1947-48 we spent in Murree which was deserted after sunset.
For the winter of 1947/1948, we moved into a house near the Survey of Pakistan office so that my father would not have to walk a long distance in the cold and the snow. That winter the Survey Party that my father was in charge of, was given the task of surveying the area of Rawalpindi, Campbellpur, Tallagang, Musa Khel, Mianwali, Kalabagh and Isakhel. Since the college was closed and I had nothing to do, I accompanied my father when he went on an inspection tour. When I was about five years old, I had accompanied my father during a mapping season, the area was around a place called Jhersuguda, in Orissa. At that time everyone walked, the baggage was loaded on camels, I was included in the baggage and had a seat on a camel. The terrain being surveyed was usually jungle and sometimes where the camp was established, the orderly assigned to me used to show me the pug marks of the wild animals that had visited the camp during the night. Bears used to be the most frequent visitors at night and troops of monkeys and langurs during the day. In West Pakistan the terrain was the arid broken country of northern Punjab. There was practically no wildlife. Movement was by motor vehicles called “weapon carriers’, bought by the Indian Government, from the US army surplus.
For the first part of the inspection tour we camped in Rawalpindi on the rifle ranges which were off Peshawar Road, near the present Radio Pakistan, some days the Army would bang away at the butts. Rawalpindi Cantonment with four English cinema houses, no hustle and bustle, was a quiet town except for bands of tribesmen, who were either on their way to Kashmir or were returning from Kashmir, they roamed the streets armed with their rifles and sometimes fired a shot. After a few days we left for Campbellpur by the Sind Express, we boarded a first class four-berth compartment whose sole occupant was a second lieutenant from 11 (Prince Albert Victor’s Own) Cavalry, a group of tribesmen, finding the compartment half empty, trooped in and ousted everyone from the window seats. The tribesmen talked to each other in their own language which at times seemed as if they were quarrelling rather than talking. Between Rawalpindi and Golra one of the tribesmen saw a dog some distance from the railway track, he fired at it with his rifle and missed, this drew a big laugh from the others and they promptly opened fire on the dog. The tribesmen on the other side of the compartment, as if not to be outdone, also opened fire. This continued till they were tired of the game.
Campbellpur consisted of a railway station, a small market and a small cantonment, on the whole it was boring. Our next stop was Pindi Gheb, on the bank of the Soan River, from there we moved to Musa Khel and then on to Mianwali. We arrived at the Mianwali Rest House in the evening, the next morning there were police and a crowd in the Rest llouse. We were informed that about a dozen people had been murdered during the night. Some official explained that Mianwali had the highest murder rate in the world. Next we went to the barrage at Kalabagh, there seemed to be some survey problem with the canal off-take and the left bank of the canal was flooded. The last place we went to was Isa Khel, a railway station and sand dunes.
1948 came and with it snow, we looked forward to the show as we expected a lot of fun. I found an old toboggan and bought it, but “When the snow came we found that it was only enough for snowball lights and ended our hopes of winter sports. In January Gandhi was shot dead and there was a sigh of relief when it was learnt that his killer was a Hindu.
In March Lawrence College opened and we trooped back, Shamim joined us in the newly created Junior School. Some boys from the Royal Indian Military College (RIMC) and Sam Brownes, Dehra Dun, joined Lawrence College. Ahmad Kamal, Ahmad Nawaz, the Isanis, Mahmood Kamal, to name a few from RIMC and Zafar Meyer and his brothers came from Sam Brownes, Dehra Dun. The Meyer line of brothers became as long a line as our Alam Khan line.
To impress the new comers, an initiation programme was organized in which the finale was the branding of the new entrants with a knife cooled in snow. The person being initiated was made to feel the heat from a hot knife held near the body and then suddenly the spot was touched with the ice cold knife. This procedure brought a loud scream from the victim and it took him sometime to discover that he had not been branded.
For those of us waiting for our Intermediate examination, the stay was short; in April we moved down to Gordon College in Rawalpindi. The living accommodation, feeding arrangements and toilets really surprised us. The college feeding arrangements did not cater for any breakfast, for this we went to a milk shop near the college and drank a glass of hot milk. Our stay lasted about two weeks in which the examination was held, and after the examination we went home to await the results.
In June 1948 the Intermediate examination results were announced. I got a second division, missing a first by five marks and getting zero in Urdu. The problem of what I was to do next arose again, in May I became eligible to appear for the Army, but when I applied for the second PMA course I was told to come back when I was older. applied for the Navy, passed the competitive examination in the sec ond position and went to the Inter-Services Selection Board at Kohat and was told that the result would be sent to Naval Ticadquarters, Karachi, and would be intimated by them. I received no intimation. My father was still against my joining the Army and wanted me to continue my college education. In September my father moved to his winter camp, this time to Hyderabad, in Sind, where the survey work for the building of the new barrage at Hyderabad was to be started. My mother and my younger brothers not in Lawrence College accompanied my father. My brothers in Lawrence College and my sister in St. Deny’s were to join them when their schools closed. For a few days I accompanied my father on his tour of the Hyderabad – Badin area which was to be irrigated by the new barrage planned on the Indus at Hyderabad, later to be named the Ghulam Mohammad Barrage. The area was completely barren except for the land alongside the Fuleli inundation canal, built some hundreds of years ago. In 1948, some six years after the Hur operations were started by the British, the Hurs were still considered active and movement usually stopped after sunset, though the Hyderabad – Badin area was not a Hur area. My father had requested the authorities for a house and a magnificent building, in what is now known as ‘Pucca Qilla’, was given to him on a temporary basis. The next year when we returned the building was in shambles, the refugees had occupied it and removed everything except the walls of the building.
Several months after my Intermediate examination results had been announced, I was still avoiding going to college but finally my father decided that I had to go. I then spent a day seeking admission in colleges of Karachi but all the colleges informed me that I was late and could not get admission. I then went to Lahore where both Government College and Forman Christian College were willing to accept me. I decided on FC College because it had better accommodation.
I joined FC College, Kennedy Hall, in October 1948 and spent six months there. The teaching technique of the college was of indicating important passages from the prescribed books and asking the students to memorize them for examination purposes. Even in applied and pure mathematics which were my subjects, one had to memorize which formula had to be applicd to which problem, no method of reasoning was indicated. Because of laziness, loitering over breakfast in the cafeteria etc I soon had a poor attendance record and it was becoming apparent that I was not going to qualify the third year to go to the final year. At the end of the year the Army asked for applications for the 3rd PMA and the 1st OTS courses, I applied for the 3rd PMA Course and was selected for the 4th PMA.
In our batch at the Inter-Services Selection Board three of us were selected, Raza Khan, later Lieutenant Colonel; Tahir, later Colonel, Signal Corps, for the 3rd PMA course and myself for the 1st Pre-cadet Training School Course which was to be the 4th PMA course. The Pre-Cadet Training School was to be set up at Quetta, when I received the call-up letter from the Army to report to the PCTS at Quetta I left Forman Christian College and went home to spend the few days I had before my reporting date of 1st April 1949.
I arrived at our house in Hyderabad and surprised my parents by announcing that I had joined the army and was on my way to Quetta. My father, unexpectedly got very annoyed and told me to go back to college. He told me that he had served in the army and that temperamentally I was unsuitable, I was inclined to question authority and would be a misfit in the army. My father had volunteered in 1936 to serve in the Indian Army as a reserve officer, his terms of service were that he would be called to colours in the event of a war and commissioned as a lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers for employment in the Field Survey Units at Army Headquarters. He was called up in August 1941, received a fortnight’s training at Risalpur and was sent to Iraq. In Iraq his commander was Brigadier Haney of the Royal Engineers with whom my father had had differences previously. Haney was a major seconded to the Survey of India, he was my father’s superior and had been rude to my father while carrying out an inspection, my father had threatened to take off a shoe and beat him with it. My father was transferred to another survey unit then but found himself serving under Haney in the army. For two years wherever Brigadier Haney was posted he had my father posted under him and lost no opportunity to give my father a dressing down. After the Japanese inflicted a defeat on the British in Burma, volunteers were called to fight on the Burma front. My father volunteered, he joined the 14th Army headquarters at Comilla, and went all the way to Rangoon, he was mentioned in dispatches and as a major commanded a Field Survey Company. After the war ended he was posted to Singapore from where he reverted to the Survey of India and was posted to Rawalpindi. With this background he disliked the armed forces and tried to dissuade everyone of us from joining the armed forces but all his sons joined the armed forces, Firoz, Shamim, Aijaz, Javed and joined the army, Shuaib, Aftab and Mushtaq went to the Pakistan Air Force and Shamoon joined the Pakistan Navy.
Chapter 2
My father, mother and my younger brothers who had not yet started boarding school came to the Hyderabad rail
way station and saw.me off. On the train to Quetta, in the same compartment where I had my reservation, were Mohammed Ataus Suboor, later major, and Hashmat Ullah Khan, later lieutenant colonel, also on their way to the Pre-Cadet Training School (PCTS). I soon discovered that Suboor was from Bishop Cottons,
Nagpur and we talked all the way to Quetta.
From the Quetta railway station we were collected in army trucks and taken to the newly established PCTS which was housed in the vacated wards of the Quetta Combined Military Hospital. The 106 cadets of the Ist PCTS Course were formed into three platoons. I was in the No 1 Platoon commanded by Major Sarwar, 8 Punjab Regiment, later lieutenant colonel, Hashmat Ullah Khan was in No 2 Platoon, commanded by Major Mohammad Aslam, 13 Lancers, later brigadier, and Suboor was in No 3 Platoon, commanded by Captain Fazal Karim. The School was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sarfaraz Khan, MC, later major general, the Chief Instructor was Major Azhar, later liutenant general.
The PCTS was probably hurriedly organised to avoid wastage of large number of applications received for the 3rd PMA course. The age limits for applying for a regular commission were minimum eighteen and maximum 23. My guess is that those who qualified were divided into an upper and lower age brackets. We in the lower age bracket were sent to the PCTS to wait six months before going to the PMA.
Five wards had been taken from the Combined Military Hospital, in three of which the platoons were housed. One served as the dining room and one was lecture hall. The drill and PT grounds were some distance away and still further away, vacated barracks served as classrooms. We received no uniforms but were given a blue blazer, a pair of grey trousers and a tie for walking out, a pair of white shorts and a pair of PT shoes for Physical Training’; we drilled in our private shoes.
Soon after our arrival at the PCTS the Adjutant General of the Army gave us a talk. He congratulated us for selecting the Army for a career but warned that if anyone of us had come with the idea of earning a lot of money, he had come to the wrong place and should leave. Major General Raza, the Adjutant General, referred to the Army as ‘my army’, we were too new to understand that he meant that he would be the commander-in-chief.
The School gave us numbers, mine was fifteen. We were housed in a hospital ward of thirty beds. On one side I had Shujauddin Butt, Pakistan’s test cricketer, later lieutenant colonel, and on the other side Saeed Nawaz, later major.
We had to have a military hair cut, my hair when trimmed stood
on end and every now and then my platoon commander would ask me to do something about it, no amount of combing and brushing did any good.
The pay that we received, all found, was thirty five rupees a month, my mother used to send me fifteen rupees a month to make up for the “deficit”.
Our training consisted of physical training and drill, classes in English, simple mathematics, general knowledge and games in the evening. We were all issued with cycles and on them our platoon commanders used to take us out for leadership training exercises on roads of Quetta. Having arrived at a chosen point, the platoon commander would describe a situation and then pose a problem whose solution we had to find. Drill and physical training followed the normal recruit training pattern. The education syllabus did not seem to have any organization or purpose though the instructors were good, one Pakistani, one English and one Irish. In the evening there were games and on weekends we were permitted to go to town. We all walked out in our blue blazers and grey trousers to go to Bars, of which there were quite a few, to see an English or Urdu movie or to go to the Railway Institute and play ‘tombola’.
After about four months, when our course ended, about seyenty cadets were selected for training at the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), the remainder were either relegated to the next PCTS course or dropped completely. Suboor and I became friends and always went to town together, unluckily he was relegated. Those who were selected for training at the PMA, were given about three weeks leave, I spent mine in Abbottabad where my father had his office and my parents were living.
We reported at the Academy on a Saturday evening, a notice indicated where we were to report and off load our baggage, we off loaded and waited. At the appointed time a British sergeant major arrived on a motorcycle, he shouted at us to ‘fall in’, we did, our names were called and we formed into Khalid, Tariq, Qasim and Salahuddin company platoons. I was assigned to Salahuddin Company, 15 Platoon and my number was 592.
After this formality was completed the sergeant major walked through the ranks of each platoon, looked at us closely, then walked up the steps of the barrack in front of which we stood and introduced himself as Regimental Sergeant Major Duffield of the Coldstream Guards. He told us that we were to address him as Mr. Duffield, sir and he would address us as ‘sir’. Then he told us that we were the most miserable lot that he had ever seen, and would do his best to make something out of us as the Pakistan Army had selected us to be officers.
When RSM Duffield finished we were handed over to the cadets who had been relegated from the 3rd PMA Course, there were three or four in each platoon, who led us to our company lines.
The 1st Pakistan Battalion, (Quaid-e-Azam’s Own), as the PMA battalion was known, had three companies, Khalid, Tariq and Qasim, when our course joined the Academy, a new company, Salahuddin, was formed and our platoon, one platoon each from the three courses preceding ours, and a ‘special’ platoon of graduate engineers who were to receive six months training, made up Salahuddin Company.
On Sunday the senior cadets reported back for the term commencing on Monday. We, the ‘juniors’ as the first termers were called, were told to assemble in the Khalid Company mess ante-room after dinner. We assembled and for about an hour an attempt was made, not very imaginatively, to rag us. The finale as far as our platoon was concerned, was that we had to run from Khalid Company to Salahuddin Company across terraces in the dark, the object was to make us fall, luckily no one was hurt.
The PMA Regular Commission course was of two years duration of four terms of roughly six months each, the first term was called Juniors’, the second ‘Inters’, the third ‘Uppers’ and the fourth Seniors’. The different terms were indicated by gold stripes on the company flashes, one for each term, except Under-Officers who wore tabs and were from the senior term. There was a Battalion Senior and Junior Under Officer, a Company Senior and Junior Under Officer, each platoon had an Under Officer and there were the Regimental Sergeant Major, Company Sergeant Majors etc. The Battalion Senior Under Officer was Raja Aziz Bhatti, later major and winner of the highest gallantry award of Nishan-e-Haider. Our company SUO was Mohammad Zafar Khan, later colonel, and each platoon had a platoon Under Officer. Other appointments of corporal and lance corporal were temporary. Those not holding any appointments had the rank of ‘Gentleman Cadet’, commonly called ‘GC’. Our Platoon Under Officer was Muzaffar Khan Malik, later brigadier, on Sunday he arrived and assumed the command of 15 Platoon. We were rounded up and he gave us a long lecture about what he expected from us, how we were to behave, how we were to turn out and that he would accept nothing less than the highest standard from us.
After the training started, our day began about an hour before the first training programme started. We formed up in front of our barracks for inspection, the Platoon Under Officer inspected each one of us and found fault in our turnout, and those who were faulted were punished. This remained the pattern for the first three terms. After the inspection we marched to the place of training, usually physical training or drill was in the first period. This was followed by breakfast then military training or education classes till the lunch break. This was followed by a study period, then games, dinner, finally ‘lights out’ was about ten o’clock. Like all army units there were bugle calls at reveille, ‘retreat’ when the flags were lowered at sunset, dinner calls and last post’ when the lights were supposed to be put out.
The PMA was located in the Second World War Indian Army Service Corps officers training school at Kakul. It had accommodation for about three hundred officers in single rooms with attached bathrooms in temporary wooden barracks and Junior Commissioned and Non-commissioned officers accommodation in small barracks. Salahuddin Company being the last to be raised got the accommodation that was probably for Junior and Non-commissioned Officers. We were accommodated three to a room, with bathrooms a hundred yards away and with commodes that had to be cleaned by sweepers, and since the company commander designate and the rest of the company staff had not worked out the logistics, poor man-management as we were to learn, we usually found the pots used and often the commode bombed as someone sitting on his haunches had not aimed properly. Washing up in the morning was another problem but this some of us solved by asking the bearer to bring water in jugs from the bathroom and we washed out of the rear windows of the barracks.
A change from the PCTS was the bearer, one to a room, he brought us our tea in the morning, cleaned all the brass, saw that our uniform was in order, made our beds etc. As Juniors we were required
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to shine two pairs of greased new army boots. Our Platoon Under Officer had warned us that we were to polish our boots till we passed what was called ‘the drill square’, we also could not go to Abbottabad until we had passed this. We tried shining the boots but no amount of polish would put a shine on the boots, we tried water with the polish and someone told us that spit was the secret of shining boots, none of these worked. The Platoon Under Officer told us we were lazy and could not do simple thing like shining a boot. We tried again and again until we learnt the secret, pay the bearer and he would shine the boot and polish it everyday.
The greatest usefulness of the bearer was the help he could give in punishment parades. These parades required a turnout inspection, a layout of specified items of kit and in our first days, a quick change from one uniform to another. The bearer helped because he knew the requirements we were yet to learn.
Our first few days were taken up in kit issue, haircut, measurements by the tailor, introductory lectures by the commandant, the battalion commander, the company commander and the platoon commander. The Commandant of the PMA was Brigadier F. A. B. Ingall, formerly of 6th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Lancers, which he had commanded in Italy with distinction. He had an imposing personality which he made more impressive by being rarely seen.
In the first term military training consisted of foot drill, physical training, training in fieldcraft, construction of field defences, such as digging of trenches, erection of field wire obstacles and map reading. After the mid-term break rifle drill and weapon training was included. About half way through the first term we went on our first exercise; we marched about fifteen miles and camped, the object being to teach us the erection of tents, layout of a military camp, camp hygiene and sanitation. When we returned Mr. Duffield was waiting for us and drilled us for about half an hour to check how well we reacted to drill commands after a march, apparently a left over from the days of Wellington when the troops after marching to the battlefield had to form squares and move about in formation. Luckily no one thought about the modern day requirement of digging on arriving at a battlefield.
In the second half of the term a map reading exercise was held in which we were taken to Mansehra, about ten miles from Kakul, dropped in our sections at various points and told to find our way to a rest house on the Mansehra-Balakot road. Gentleman Cadet Salman, later lieutenant colonel, was given the command of the section and had the job of taking the section to the rest house. We all looked at the map and decided that we should follow a nullah which was near the point at which we were standing and ran straight to the rest house. Having decided this we folded the map and put it away and started walking in the dry nullah bed, the company commander, Major Abdul Hamid Khan, accompanied our section. We went some distance in the nullah bed and came to a vertical cliff of a considerable height. We tried finding a way around it but did not find any, we conferred and decided to climb down the cliff, carefully finding foot holds and holding the rock out croppings we soon reached the bottom. When we looked up we found the company commander still at the top of the cliff and hesitating. We again conferred and decided to bring the company commander down by climbing up and helping him climb down. We then climbed up and the company commander came down, stepping on our shoulders with all his weight of nearly two hundred pounds. Once he was down, off we went along the nullah and soon came to a second cliff and climbed down. When we looked back for the company commander we found he had disappeared. We followed the nullah and reached our destination. GC Salman was relegated and had to do the first term again.
In the Junior Term I got seven days of ‘restrictions’ for not saluting an officer, Captain Golwala, later brigadier. He was walking down the Kakul-Abbottabad road wearing a white shirt and white trouser and I was walking in the opposite direction in games kit. As I saw him I debated whether to salute or not to salute, if he was a cadet and I saluted I would be punished, since there were more cadets than officers, I decided not to saluto and had my number taken. The restrictions involved parading in front of the cadet company offices, standing inspections of turnout and kit packed in our 08 back-packs, enduring any punishment ordered by the senior cadet inspecting the punishment parade, extra drill on Wednesdays and Saturdays, no cinema and no visits to the canteen. The no-cinema restriction was ingeniously overcome by getting into the cinema hall and watching the film from behind the screen, this was very seldom resorted to as one of the inspections was timed about the time the films ended. After we qualified in foot drill we were introduced to rifle drill.
Just after we started our rifle drill, the Army changed the drill from the ‘trail arms’ to ‘slope arms’ drill and GC Sabir Hussain Rizvi. later lieutenant colonel, had the unique distinction of hitting the rifle buti so hard with his left palm, while sloping arms, that he broke the butt. RSM Duffield collected us and gave us a talk saying that in all his years of service he had neither seen nor heard of a butt being broken in the manner that GC Rizvi had broken it and he was going to make a special recommendation commending GC Rizvi.
With the rifle came rifle cleaning, it would be announced that rifle cleaning would be held after lunch, we would deposit our rifle discs’ and draw our rifles. The rifle disc’ and the ‘identity card’ were two items we were warned not to lose and the loss was to be reported at once. Later we were to learn that losing a weapon was a serious crime. We learnt that a rifle was a soldier’s best friend and had to be kept clean at all times, what we could not figure out was why did it have to be cleaned in our spare time. The rifle collected grime in all sorts of inaccessible places for which a pipe cleaner, a tooth brush and a rag was necessary, the barrel had to shine and no rust was to appear. In the beginning we tried cleaning with pipe cleaners etc but soon found that dipping in hot water got rid of all the grime and saved a lot of time, but this was not permitted and had to be done surreptitiously.
Our pay increased from thirty five rupees a month that we received at the PCTS to one hundred and twenty rupees a month, married cadets received one hundred and seventy rupees. Needless to say some cadets who were not married had cleverly declared themselves as married and got the extra pay. On pay day we signed against our names, received the amount left over after compulsory deductions, the tip to the bearer and the canteen where we signed for purchases and teal, came next. Then if we were lucky there were still a few rupees to jingle in our pockets. Usually at the end of the term when we had to settle our canteen accounts before proceeding on – leave for the term break, I had to ask my mother to help which meant that I went home without any money to spend in the break.
Boxing was a sport disliked by all cadets who had not been to public or military schools. In the Junior term when we were made to box, the officers turned out in uniform because it was considered a parade and not a sport. It was rumoured that a GC, in the past, had been so unnerved when made to box that he had dirtied his pants and the officers were on the look out for cadets who lacked fighting courage. Many cadets after finding out their opponents sought a ‘no hard hitting’ compromise. Since I had boxed in school and college I had no difficulty except that I was selected for the company boxing team and had to box for the company in the first, second and final terms.
Other inter-company competitions, that were only held in our junior term and not in subsequent terms were the inter company debating competition and the ‘CQB’ (close quarter battle), pistol and sten gun shooting competitions. For the inter-company debate I was called by the Battalion Senior Under Officer Raja Aziz Bhatti and told I was a volunteer for the company debating team and to prepare for it, I took part in the inter company debate, did well but the way I spoke English was not appreciated by the judges. I was also a member of the ‘CQB’ team.
During this term, one evening, the whole battalion was collected in Ingall Hall to hear a talk by Major General Akbar Khan, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. A large model of Kashmir was made and General Akbar talked about the Kashmir war which had started a few months after independence and had ended with the cease fire which had taken place in January 1949. His theme was that now was the time to fight India, as India with more resources would rapidly gain military strength and Pakistan would not be able to match the Indian strength in time to come, the talk did not make any impression on us. A little later General Akbar and some officers were arrested on a conspiracy charge. As a result of this conspiracy, the terms of service for officers were radically changed by introducing retirement due to the fault of the officer’, a punitive retirement without defining the fault.
During the term we formed friendships which were to last our stay in the Academy and later in life. My particular friends were GC Syed Sultan ul Islam, later lieutenant colonel and GC Khushdil Khan Afridi, later lieutenant general and Governor of Baluchistan. Syed Sultan ul Islam was a very peculiar person, he belonged to Allahabad in UP, India, never spoke about his background, was very frail in built, very quick in picking the weak points in a person who had antagonized him and would mimic a person’s speech perfectly. He and I became friends and remained friends until he died of cardiac arrest in 1973.
Towards the end of the term we heard that the cadet companies of the Academy would be re-organized from the next term. Each regular course would be organized in three platoons instead of four, that our course platoon in the Khalid company would be broken up and the cadets distributed amongst the other companies, and that in the next term there would be no junior term platoon in our company, which meant that we would remain the junior most in the company for another term. The term ended, the 1st PMA Course passed out and got their commissions and we looked forward to our second term.
When our second term began, with the break up of the Khalid company platoon of our course, a third of the Khalid company platoon joined our platoon. The term began with surprise changes of our platoon commander and the company commander. Captain Syed Ali el-Edroos, later brigadier, of 5/13, Frontier Force Rifles became our platoon commander, in his opening address he informed us that either the whole platoon would be commissioned or no one would get a commission. This bolstered our confidence and made the platoon act collectively, for instance when the physical training instructors punished us collectively and announced that the first person completing the punishment would be allowed to rest, the whole platoon would complete it together to the disgust of the instructor.
Major Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi, Punjab Regiment, later major gen: eral, became our company commander in the place of Major Abdul Hamid Khan. In the enthusiasm of his new command he collected us in the Salahuddin Company Cadet Mess and informed us that hard work and keenness was required from all of us and to this end we would work an extra day in the week. He was cut short very abruptly by GC Mansoor ul Haq Malik saying “Sir we are willing to work an extra day in the week, you create the day and we will work on it, but we will not work on Sundays”. The company commander did not say a word after that and we were all relieved that we didn’t have to work on Sundays.
In the second term drill and physical training became my weak points. In every drill period I had my number noted and collected an extra drill. Physical training developed into gymnastics, mat work, horse and parallel bars, try as much as I could, I could not perform on these and was reported to the company commander who decreed that I would do two hours of PT on Sundays and on two Sundays I attend
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ed the extra PT class. Luckily for me someone in the Army decided that physical efficiency would be tested by a number of specified tests like running a hundred yards in a specified time, jumping a given distance etc, when these tests were held I qualified in all and my rating went up and the Sunday physical training classes were called off. Strangely enough these tests were held in the second term only and not in the following terms; however it changed the form of assessment of physical fitness.
As ‘Inters’, as the second termers were called, still the junior platoon in the company, we remained at the beck and call of our seniors. As the junior most platoon in the company we had the barracks farthest away from the bathrooms but closest to the battalion barber’s and tailor’s shops. Since the new intake had to come to the barber and the tailor, anyone from our platoon, having nothing better to do, would stand in the barrack veranda, call a junior cadet passing by and torment him.
The military training and the education classes continued on the same pattern as in the first term. There were no books issued except *The Strategy of Indirect Approach’ by Liddel Hart, I read a part of it; it made no sense. Apart from this we were given a set of Pakistan Army pamphlets but these also were not used for any training purpose. Similarly for the education classes there were no books, before and after some classes precis were issued but no one took them seriously. On the whole the attitude was that the education part of the training was not important only the outdoor work counted in the grading. The army officers instructing in subjects like military law, military history and such like subjects were none too sure of themselves, an officer giving us a lecture on the Battle of Bannockburn had the map upside down and he went through the memorized lecture.
The medical arrangement at the PMA consisted of a Regimental Medical Officer, some nursing orderlies and a few rooms to hold patients before transferring the seriously ill to the Combined Military Hospital at Abbottabad. Captain Wajihuddin was the RMO before whom the sick, lame and lazy lined up every morning. These consisted of those who had been injured in training, were really sick and those who were experts at feigning sickness. The sick and injured were categorised, ‘attend A’ for those who got ‘medicine and duty’, ‘attend B’ for those who got treatment and were to perform light duties,
meaning no outdoor work but had to attend indoor classes, the most prized ‘attend C was medicine and rest in quarters. The serious cases were referred to CMH Abbottabad.
In the first term I had diarrhea and spent a day and a night in the PMA dispensary and then in the third term my wisdom tooth came out impacted and grew into another tooth which caused me considerable pain. I reported sick but the doctor, who considered all pains, headache, stomach ache, tooth ache, as feigned, sent me back without any treatment. I reported sick a second time and got no treatment, by the third day my jaw had almost locked, then I was referred to the dentist in CMH Abbottabad. The dentist in the CMH was a Latvian lady who inspected my tooth and asked why I had not come earlier, told her that I had gone to the RMO but he had not referred me to the dentist. She then got a pair of pliers and proceeded to apply them to my tooth, every time the tooth hurt I would make a noise or move my head, she would stop, look at me, ask me whether was a man or mouse and start the proceedings again. I was told to report again after a few days to the dentist, when I went to the RMO to be included among those going to the CMH, I received favoured treatment from him, he also asked me why I had not reported sick earlier, apparently the dentist had put in a report against the RMO.
The 2nd PMA Course, who were now the Seniors’, ran into serious trouble in final exercise called “Qayadat’. The Battalion Senior Under Officer lost his appointment and a number of other cadets were also punished just before the passing out parade, the term ended on this note and we moved on to the third term, ‘Uppers’.
The 3rd term routine was very much the same as in the previous terms. We still marched as a platoon to the classes etc, we now had two terms junior to us and only one term senior to us. In this term we had to do an exercise called ‘Yarmuk’ which was a series of marches starting at Havelian. On the first day we marched from Havelian to an Army camping ground about seven thousand feet above sea level on a hill between Murree and Nathia Gali. We carried an army 08 pack with all sorts of prescribed items and had to march uphill all day, the track disappeared round a bend and when we reached the bend, there was another bend to reach. We arrived at our destination just when it was getting dark, food was provided and we slept in an army barrack.
The next day we were to march to the forest rest house at Ghora Gali, about a mile from Lawrence College. Our section, which included GCS K. K. Afridi, Mansoor ul Haq Malik, Sultan ul Islam and myself, decided that we would spend a few hours in a restaurant in Murree. When the march started we ran till we were well ahead of everyone, then we thumbed a ride in an army truck to Murree, walked unto the Lintotts restaurant on the Mall and spent a good two hours there. Refreshed, washed and fed we walked along the Mall to Kashmir Point from where the track to Lawrence College starts, we were walking along using our bivouac poles as walking sticks, some PMA officers suddenly drove up from behind, shouted at us that we looked like beggars and collected the poles, a very subdued section marched the rest of the way to Ghora Gali. We spent the afternoon resting in the grounds of the rest house and after sunset started on the next leg of our journey, arriving at a roadside camping ground at night where we spent the next day. The next evening we started again and marched to a camp site between Rawalpindi and the Murree hills. We stayed a day and a night at this place and had to cook our own meals. The last leg of the march was about twenty miles to the Taxila Museum from where we were carried in lorries back to PMA. If the exercise was held to test endurance, it achieved its aim to some extent, it achieved nothing else.
In our third term a wooden barrack of Tariq Company burnt completely and all the possessions of the ten or so cadets that it housed were destroyed. In the PMA practice fire calls were held at irregular intervals, never during working hours. This was the third real fire in which the drill was solemnly carried out and the structure burnt down. In the first term the Battalion clothing stores had mysteriously caught fire at night though the building was made of stone blocks. In the second term the wooden hut in which a civilian instructor and his family lived caught fire and was destroyed, and in this term the Tariq Company barrack. At all these fires there was no water to fight the fire with and no one thought of arranging for a fire tender for fire fighting in the PMA.
The term ran to its end, the 3rd PMA course went on their final exercise ‘Qayadat’ and some cadets got into trouble and were relegated. It was traditional at the PMA that when a course was about to pass out the next junior course ragged it for a day or two. On the evening before the passing out parade we caught all the 3rd PMA cadets with moustaches and shaved one side, leaving the individual no alternative but to shave the other half. The next day, the 3rd PMA went to their passing out parade looking like shorn sheep, the most surprised and annoyed person was RSM Duffield because his most fierce and grim looking stalwarts looked like school boys who had not started shaving. Immediately after the passing out parade, word spread that RSM Duffield was asking for disciplinary action against our course. We left for the term break and when we returned the incident had been forgotten.
When the PMA opened for the next term, there were changes, Captain Ali el-Edroos, who had been our platoon commander for the last two terms, became the adjutant of the battalion. When we heard about it at the close of the previous term there was apprehension that this could mean a lot of changes in our assessment because the new man would have new standards to which we would have to adjust. We had enjoyed the two terms that we had spent with Captain elEdroos, whenever we were unruly and indisciplined he would threaten to make us march to “Thandiani’, a mountain peak about 8.500 feet near Kakul. He never actually did it, but on one occasion when we had done something which we should not have, he did make us draw our rifles and go on a march. On one occasion GC Abdul Qayum Anjum, in the middle of lecture on some military subject, suddenly asked Captain el-Edroos “Sir how old are you?”, he was told to sit down and see the platoon commander after the class.
Our luck held. Captain Ghulam Jilani Khan, Frontier Force Rifles, became our new platoon commander, he soon established rapport with the platoon with his relaxed, considerate and gentlemanly approach and dealings with us, everyone referred to him as ‘GN’ and we considered ourselves very lucky in having him as our Platoon Commander.. The other change was that Brigadier Ingall, the Commandant of the Academy, retired and Brigadier Tarver took his place. Brigadier Tarver was rumoured to have been the commanding officer of General Ayub, the Commander-in-Chief, he did not make a good impression on the cadets The fourth term made us ‘seniors’, we now became the top of the roost, Khushdil Khan Afridi became the Battalion Senior Under Oflicer, the senior most cadet appointment in the Battalion, Sultan ul Islam became a Platoon Sergeant, Mansoor ul Haq Malik and I became corporals, since permanent appointment holders could not be punished without first being demoted, Mansoor and I were quite happy and we convinced the third corporal, who according to his PMA number was senior to both of us, that as the senior most corporal it was his duty to present the parade state and perform all the routine chores which corporals were supposed to perform.
The 7th PMA Course now joined the PMA after completing their training at the PCTS, at Quetta, my younger brother Firoz, and Mahmud Kamal from Lawrence College and Nusrat Ullah all became the new juniors. Firoz came in for considerable ragging as soon as it became known that he was my brother.
Captain el-Edroos, our old platoon commander, made a very smart adjutant of the Battalion, an immaculately turned out officer, it was rumoured that his Batman carried his uniform to the Salahuddin Company mess opposite the parade ground and that Captain el-Edroos would put on his uniform there and come on parade. When Captain elEdroos became the adjutant, a change in the form of the passing out parade was made, the adjutant now had to command the parade from horseback, hand the parade over to the Battalion Senior Under Officer and ride of the parade ground. A passing out parade of a Short Course of engineers was to be held about a month after the term started and the battalion was drilled every morning to prepare for this passing out parade, one morning, the horse decided to leave early and walked off the parade ground, with the adjutant. The horse never did that again, it was rumoured that the adjutant made sure that the horse was properly doped before a parade. When the Short Course passing out parade was held, the Battalion Senior Under Officer forgot to slope arms before ordering ‘advance in review order with the result that the parade was in shambles for some time with chaos prevailing, eventually it formed up again and continued according to the set procedure.
Early in the term it was announced that the new commandant had ordered that a very long battalion route march of the whole battalion was going to be held as an endurance march. Mansoor ul Haq, Sultan ul Islam and I decided that we would report sick and miss the march. The day before the march was scheduled, the three of us reported sick, having taken some laxative. The doctor admitted us in the PMA observation room, during the day more and more cadets arrived with all sorts
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of ailments. In the evening it was announced that all the cadets admitted during the day would be discharged and would take part in the march. The three of us had no choice, next morning we took part in the march. I had taken only one tablet of the laxative and the effect wore off by the morning and I had no difficulty during the march, those who had over insured broke from the ranks at least once to get behind bushes.
Just after the term began, Ata Mohammad Malik and Hikmat Ullah Jan from our platoon, because of their excellent performance in science subjects were selected to join the Military College of Science in the United Kingdom to study for Mechanical Engineering degrees, they both qualified and served in the Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers with distinction.
In the final term the emphasis was placed on tactics, we patrolled. advanced, attacked, defended and withdrew. On these exercises the prize job was to be detailed as mortar numbers as there were no mortars and the mortar numbers remained static pretending to fire a nonexistent weapon while the rest of the platoon struggled uphill or dug trenches. The General Staff Oficer, Grade 11, (Training), Major M Rahim Khan, later major general, was responsible for organizing and conducting these exercises, most of the time he told us how essential it was that we maintain a well dressed line while attacking and since we had not, we had to do it over again.
In one of the patrolling exercises, GC Mohammad Masud, later lieutenant colonel, from our platoon captured a prisoner and while telling us how he had captured him, he put his rifle against my chest and fired a blank, a black burnt patch appeared on my shirt right pocket and the wadding lodged in my chest. I was sent to the Mi Room but much to my disgust I was patched up and sent back with not even a day off and what’s more, I had to do the last training exercise ‘Qayadat’ with a bandaged chest.
“Qayadat’, the last exercise that we had to do, was a test of all our tactical training. We were taken to the starting point in motor transport, from there we advanced and the enemy’ obligingly withdrew. After a night attack I remember waking up in a graveyard, the following day we dug trenches but somehow could not get them more than about a foot deep. The next night we put in silent night attack and captured the enemy’ position. I found a nicely dug enemy trench and went to sleep in it to be woken up by the enemy’ shouting ‘charge’. I remained sitting in the trench while the demonstration company carried out its weapon and equipment check and left, then I walked back to the position from where we had attacked. The next day we staged a withdrawal and occupied a hillock where we had to dig trenches and put up barbed wire fences. The barbed wire had to be brought from the bottom of the hill, carried to the top and then to the bottom of the hill where the fence had to be constructed. In the 2nd and 3rd PMA courses cadets had been relegated for rolling the barbed wire rolls down the hill, we did the same, none of the platoon commanders and other officers supervising the exercise saw us doing this and no one got into trouble.
After returning from exercise ‘Qayadat’ we heard the news that relations between Pakistan and India had deteriorated, the Pakistan Army, the whole three and a half divisions of it, had moved to the border and war appeared imminent. Because of the likelihood of a war, it was decided by GHQ that the 5th PMA Course would also be commissioned with our course. The 5th PMA Course did an intensive course in tactics for about six weeks and were ready for commissioning, they became known as the ‘Nehru’ commissioned course.
After ‘Qayadat’ we began thinking that we were through and would get our commissions, and began giving serious thought to the choice of arms and services. At that time cadets could not go to the Supply and Ordnance, the fighting arms, armour, infantry, artillery and Corps of Engineers and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers were the popular choices, for some unknown reason the Corps of Signals was little known and not popular. I gave my choice as armour, infantry and artillery, in that order of preference. Most cadets with F.Sc non medical education opted for Corps of Engineers or the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, the majority opting for the latter because it held the charm of several years training in the UK. When the list was announced I was surprised to find that I had been earmarked for the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. When I protested I was informed that GHQ had decided that those of us who were FSc nonmedical had to go to the EME, I protested that if I wanted to be an engineer I would have gone to the engineering college rather than join the army. On this protest my arm was changed to Corps of Engineers, I again protested and finally was given the Armoured Corps.
Almost everyone with FSc non-medical was sent to the Corps of Engineers or EME, in the Engineers about half the number failed to qualify the basic course at Risalpur and a one got an engineering degree from Risalpur from the 4th PMA Course. Those who went to EME, the majority with the hopes of going abroad for training, the Army decided to send the older cadets to UK to train for a diploma while those below a certain age were sent to the engineering college in Lahore, my friend Sultan ul Islam was included in this group and spent about two years in engineering college before being transferred to the Corps of Signals. Muhammad Abdul Majid, later colonel, was the only one from the 4th PMA Course to qualify from the engineering college at Lahore. Those who went to the UK obtained their diplomas and returned, some with English wives.
In the choice of arms the Corps of Signals fared the worst of all; almost no one opted for it and people had to be sent compulsorily, Mansoor-ul Haq Malik and Saeed Nawaz, whose bed was next to mine in the PCTS, were amongst those who compulsorily became signallers.
After it was decided that I would go to the Pakistan Armoured Corps, I had to give my choice of regiments. I knew very little about the Armoured Corps and its regiments so I went to Ingall Hall where the badges of the Armoured Corps regiments were displayed in their order of seniority. There were three armoured regiments, 5 (Probyn’s) I lorse, 13th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Lancers and 19th (King George V’s Own) Lancers and three reconnaissance regiments, 6th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Lancers, 10th (Queen Victoria’s Own) Guides Cavalry and 11th (Prince Albert Victor’s Own) Cavalry, to choose from. I decided to go to an armoured regiment and chose the senior most which was the 13th (DCO) Lancers, with 5 Horse and 19 Lancers as my second and third choice and in due course I was informed that I was to go to 13th Lancers.
When a few days were left for our passing out, we decided to invite our platoon commanders, Captain Ali el-Edroos and Captain Ghulam Jilani Khan and our company commander Major Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi to a farewell tea party. The platoon contributed and an elaborate tea party was arranged near the swimming pool. After the tea and the ‘thank yous’ we caught the platoon commanders and the company commander and gave them a good ducking in the swimming pool. The company commander whom we had to chase, catch and carry to the pool assured us that he could still prevent us from getting our commissions but we decided to duck him all the same.
A couple of days before the passing out parade the 6th PMA
Course, who were to become ‘Uppers’ and the senior course remaining behind, went on the war path and caught most of us and ducked us in the swimming pool. A funny sight was M. Aslam Mirza from our platoon, six feet tall, he was held in the shallow end of the pool with his legs up and head down. In the end we thought that we had got off light On our long awaited day, the 25th of August 1951, the Ist Pakistan Battalion (Quaid-e-Azam’s Own), formed up on the parade ground for the passing out parade of the 4th and 5th PMA courses. Battalion Senior Under Officer Khushdil Khan Afridi won the Sword of Honour as the best all round cadet, Company Junior Under Officer Sardar Hasan Mahmud won the Norman Gold Medal awarded for the best academic record, both the awards going to cadets from our platoon. The Governor General of Pakistan, Khawaja Nazimuddin took the salute and we ‘slow marched’ up the steps out of the parade ground with the massed bands playing The Auld Lang Syne, “should old acquaintance be forgotten”.
In a few hours after the passing out parade was over we dispersed, 15 Platoon and 4th PMA Course became a record in the archives of the Pakistan Military Academy. At the passing out parade of the 4th PMA Course, 72 of us passed out, 15 were from the 2nd and 3rd PMA Courses and Z. U. Abbasi who had joined us from the Officer’s Training School at Kohat, leaving a total of 56 out of the 106 of us who had started at the PCTS two and a half years earlier. The 4th PMA Course faded out of the Pakistan Army over a period of approximately 35 years, Khushdil Khan Afridi and Mujeebur Rehman retired with the rank of lieutenant general, the former became the governor of Baluchistan, there were three major generals, ten brigadiers, six colonels, and twenty one lieutenant colonels, Major Zia Ud Din Ahmad Abbasi, Guides Cavalry, Major M. Asaf Hussain, 12 Cavalry, Major Choudhry Shamsul Haq, Baluch Regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Yakub were decorated with Sitara Jurrat in the 1965 war with India, apart from other honours and awards that were won and awarded.
How well did the PCTS and the PMA prepare us to be professional, regular officers of a standing army? At the time of our passing out we would have answered that the training was as good as the best in the world if not better but in retrospect and with a better knowledge of the requirements of regular officer my comment is that the
PMA authorities, planners, trainers and educators had no idea of the requirements and methods of creating the foundation required for the regular professional officers of the army. The basic military training was the same as given to a recruit of the army and the standard achieved was about the same as that achieved by a recruit, we could handle a rifle, a sten and a pistol. We never fired a machine gun or a light machine gun and our siting of weapons was very poor due to lack of experience. We learnt the basics of fieldcraft but never used it on the tactical exercises. Our drill standard was very good. We had some knowledge of the organization of an infantry battalion, a good idea of the functioning of an infantry company due to the organization and functioning of the PMA companies and had vague ideas of the role and organization of all other arms and services. Our knowledge of the administrative procedures of the army were almost non existent and we did not know how military everyday correspondence was carried out. Similarly we had no knowledge of military law because the few lessons that we had were poorly organized, the military history that we were taught was not systematic and objective, we were not taught the effect of the evolution of weapons, the basic manoeuvres, the impact of industrial development, military geography and the geography of Pakistan and the surrounding countries was not taught at all. In the academic subjects great emphasis was placed on Muslim history, Dr. Hai used to tell us in every period that the Muslims fought ‘hip and thigh’, but the syllabus was not organized to give us useful and purposeful history of the sub-continent or any other part of the world. In English no effort was made to improve English writing or teach written presentation. Science and mathematics were divided into classes with different standards. I never found out how a person in elementary arithmetic class who scored high marks was compared with a person in advanced mathematics who scored low marks. Lieutenant General Atiq ur Rehman, in his book ‘Back to the Pavilion’ stated that when he came from the Indian Military Academy, where he was an instructor, he brought all the training material used there and the PMA training was based on it, since the aim of the Indian Military Academy was to train officers for the company command level and not to prepare a foundation for regular officers who would rise to the highest commands, the PMA also prepared us for the company command level and we were good company commanders.
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Chapter 3
From the 4th and the 5th PMA Courses the officers posted to the infantry were ordered to proceed to the School of Infantry and Tactics at Quetta, while those of us who were posted to other arms were sent on a month’s leave and ordered to report to the schools of their respective arms. When we reported at the Armoured Corps Centre and School the reception was excellent 2nd Lieutenant Riaz Ahmad Sheikh and I arrived at the Nowshera railway station and telephoned someone whose number the Station Master gave us. The Mess Car came to take us to the Mess where the Mess Clerk, Shadman Khan, showed us our quarters. We were housed in a bungalow near the Mess, two and three to a room, the eight of us from the 4th PMA Course and eight from the 5th PMA Course. Furniture had been hired and we had a bearer to a room. On the evening following our arrival Lieutenant Colonel Pir Abdullah Shah, Guides Cavalry, the Chief Instructor and second in command of the Armoured Corps Centre, visited us in our quarters and inquired if we were comfortable. He apologised that we could not have separate rooms as the Armoured Corps School was running two Young Officers Courses due to the emergency and its other normal courses. We thought it was very nice of the Colonel to enquire about our welfare and of course all this was adding to our conceit of belonging to the Armoured Corps. On the Young Officer’s Basic Course there were seventeen of us, eight from the 4th PMA, 2nd Lieutenants Akram Hussein Syed, 5 (Probyn’s) Horse, Riaz Ahmad Sheikh, 6th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Lancers, Zia Uddin Ahmad Abbasi, 10th (Guides) Cavalry, Aziz Ur Rehman, 11 (Prince Albert Victor’s Own) Cavalry, M. Asaf Hussain, Mohammad Afzal Khan and myself, 13th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Lancers, Sardar Hasan Mahmud, 19th (King George V Own) Lancers; eight from the 5th PMA Course, 2nd Lieutenants Shah Rafi Alam and Shamsur Rehman Kallue, 5 (Probyn’s) Horse, Choudhry Abdul Malik, 6th (DCO) Lancers, Stanley Gordon Purves, 10th (Guides) Cavalry, Mohammad Sarwar and Syed Sabir Ali Shah 11th (PAVO) Cavalry, Mohammad Ataus Suboor, 13 (DCO) Lancers, Anwar Wajih, 19th (KGVO) Lancers, and Ali Ahmed Khan, 6th (DCO) Lancers, from an OTS course. The YOS
course consisted of three legs, Driving and Maintenance, Wireless and Gunnery, of six weeks each and with our course a two week course of tactics was added.
Six weeks before our course started, sixteen officers commissioned from the 2nd and 3rd PMA courses had started their Yos course and were now one leg ahead of us. A total of thirty three lieutenants and second lieutenants were on the YOs course and other officers were attending other courses.
The Armoured Corps Centre and School was commanded by Colonel Eccles with Lieutenant Colonel Pir Abdullah Shah as the second in command and chief instructor. It had a Recruit Training Wing, a Technical Training Wing for the technical training of recruits, a Vehicle Wing which provided all the training vehicles, a Boy’s Wing located at Cherat, a Workshop, and the Armoured Corps School. All the wings and the school were commanded by majors. Major Sultan, Guides Cavalry, commanded the school, the school adjutant was Captain M. Zia ul Haq, later general and President of Pakistan, Captain M. A. Cardoza, 13 Lancers, later brigadier, and Captain Mukhtar, 6 Lancers, were instructors in D&M, Captain Ali Imam, Guides Cavalry, was the instructor in Wireless and Captain Ahmad Khan was instructor Gunnery. In D&M and Gunnery we were divided into armoured and reconnaissance regiments because of the different types of tanks.
We soon got adjusted to the routine and environment and settled down, PT in the morning, breakfast, classes, lunch and we were free till the next day. Transport was limited to cycles so most of our after class activities centered around the Nowshera Club, in the evening squash and then tea, rush back if a dinner night once a week, there was tombola which was regularly attended by us. There was a cinema in Nowshera but it was not very popular and sometimes we cycled to Risalpur to see a movie at the Pakistan Air Force Academy. On weekends visits to Peshawar, Kohat, Rawalpindi were common while some enterprising lieutenants managed lifts in PAF Harvard Trainers to Lahore and back.
Because war was imminent with India, there was an emergency and one of us was detailed as “telephone duty officer’ after working hours till the next morning. On the day Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan was assassinated, 2nd Lieutenant Sabir Ali Shah was on duty but was absent when the message came from GHQ. The next day we were lectured on responsibility and punished by having our weekend leave stopped, the only difference it made was that no one asked for weekend leave and went on leave.
For returning from weekends Nowshera was nicely located. The Khyber Mail from Peshawar stopped at Nowshera at about ten o’clock at night, the Sind Express left Rawalpindi at about three in the afternoon and arrived at Nowshera at about six and the Khyber Mail left Rawalpindi at about four in the morning and arrived at Nowshera at about seven. On weekends officers who had decided to return by the Khyber Mail from Rawalpindi would have their bearers bring their PT dress and their cycle to the railway station, they would change in the waiting room and cycle to the PT ground if the train was on time but if the train was late the option was reporting sick or making a good excuse. Many a Monday morning the Khyber Mail would steam past the Armoured Corps School PT ground with anxious faces looking out of the train’s windows.
For the first three months we did not get any pay. Our credit was good in the mess, in the club and a general store called ‘Cheap Jack’ commonly called ‘cheat jack’. Captain Zia ul Haq hauled us up for not paying our mess bills after we had defaulted on the first bill on the fifteenth of the month and threatened dire consequences. This was only to tell us that we should have informed the mess secretary our inability to pay the bill as we had not been paid.
Without pay we were terribly short of cash. When we had reported at the school we had about one hundred rupees each, this carried us through the first month, then we became dependent on the mess clerk Shadman Khan, who was the sanctioning authority of the petty cash allowance of twenty rupees that an officer could borrow from the mess. On a Sunday morning a number of us would get together, go to Shadman Khan and sign a receipt for twenty rupees and with this amount in our pockets, cycle to the bus stand, buy a ticket for Peshawar and load our cycles on the bus. In Peshawar we would loaf about on our cycles, visit shops and bazaars, have lunch in a restaurant, see a cinema show, have dinner usually at ‘Sabri Hotel famous for its kabaabs, then catch the Khyber Mail back to Nowshera, everyone content that the day had been well spent.
When our pay was paid to us after three months we were rich for a short while till our creditors caught up with us and then we were : back to our previous state. Also after we started receiving our pay a
new source of credit and cash opened up, ‘Framji’ a wind and general merchants shop owned and run by a Parsi family and located near the Nowshera railway station, would cash our cheques, both current and post dated, at different rates of commission.
Just as S. S. Islam had been my particular friend in the PMA, in the Armoured Corps School Zia Uddin Abbasi and I became close friends. I was called ‘Z A’ and Abbasi was called ‘Z U’. He did not join the 4th PMA Course with us but came from the 1st Officers Training School Course, when after completing the nine months OTS course, he was given the option to go to the PMA, he joined us in the second term. ‘Z U’ was a very good athlete, spoke and wrote well in both English and Urdu, was known for his quick and humorous repartee and his ability to turn an incident or remark or an occasion into a humorous episode. In the PMA he and another cadet were awarded the punishment of presenting themselves dressed in overalls with full field service marching order called FSMO, at reveille every morning for one week. He and the other cadet duly presented themselves at the room of the under officer who ordered them to let themselves into his room and put on the light, the under officer looked at them and told them to go back. ZU and the other cadet presented themselves the next morning and when they turned the light on, the light did not light. The next day again the light failed to light but on the fourth day when the light was switched on it came and showed ZU and the other cadet standing in their pajamas and unlaced boots. The two previous days ZU had switched off the barrack main switch and clumped along the veranda in his unlaced boots. Unfortunately for him there was an early riser in the barrack who complained to the under officer that every morning the electricity failed and that he heard steps outside and after a while the lights came on again. The under officer realised what was happening and told him that when the lights went out next morning to step outside and put the main switch on again. Not knowing this, ZU very confidently turned the light on and much to his horror he found himself standing in his pajamas in the under officer’s room. He and his friend ran out quickly but their punishment was extended by a week.
ZU had a habit of thinking up competitions, sometimes they were interesting and some times the end would be comical. One afternoon we were standing in the veranda of the building in which we were living, when ZU proposed that we have a competition of kicking
both our feet backwards and upwards. Everyone protested that it could not be done because with the feet kicked backwards a person would land on his face. ZU insisted that it could be done, and agreed to give a demonstration. He ran into the compound, kicked his feet backwards and landed on his face. A man who had been sitting on a small culvert outside the compound saw the demonstration, he stood up and laughed till he doubled up.
On one weekend a number of us were returning to Nowshera by the Sind Express, 2nd Lieutenant Agha Javed Iqbal, 5 Horse, had acquired a dog while in Rawalpindi and was taking it to Nowshera. He was sitting near the window with the window glass down and the dog in his lap. Suddenly the dog jumped out of the window, Javed Iqbal leaned out of window and yelled ‘Jefford’, the lieutenants in the compartment pulled the chain for stopping the train from all the places from which it could be pulled, ZU not finding a place went into the bathroom and pulled the chain there. The train stopped on a curve, Javed Iqbal got out of the compartment and ran to rear of the train, passed the train guard walking towards our compartment, shouted ‘dog’ and ran on. The guard arrived at our compartment puzzled and said that he had passed a man running and he called out ‘dog’. The story of the dog jumping out was narrated to him by the passengers of the compartment and was so confusing that the guard was not clear about what had actually happened till Javed Iqbal returned and explained it. For weeks ZU related this story with embellishments to all and sundry.
The Young Officers’ course was enjoyed by all of us because of the congenial atmosphere and attitude of the officers and the staff of the school. In the Driving and Maintenance and the Wireless legs of the course we went out to the surrounding area of Nowshera, Swabi, Mardan, Pabbi and Peshawar. On these trips we would pool money and buy ‘chapli kabaabs’ and tea from wayside shops, making each outing a picnic of a sort.
While we were on the course the Pakistan Army Rifle Association inter-regiment, armoured fighting vehicle shooting competition was held, with the armoured regiments competing amongst themselves and the reconnaissance regiments amongst themselves. We then witnessed the inter-regiment rivalry that existed between the regiments and the cheating that went on in competitions. In the inter-armoured regiment competition the regiments that fired before
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13 Lancers crossed the line at which they were required to stop and fire and were not penalised. Major Mohammad Umar, later colonel, the 13 Lancers representative objected to this but was ignored. Major Umar then asked me to go to the start point and inform the troop leader that he should also cross the demarcating line. I did so and was reported by the umpire, a 6 Lancers officer, to Lieutenant Colonel Pir Abdullah Shah, who placed me under arrest. The 13 Lancers troop leader did not cross the restricting line and 13 Lancers lost. I remained under arrest in my room till the evening when I was sent for by Lieutenant Colonel Pir Abdullah Shah and after a dressing down, was released from arrest. Since then whenever I have met Colonel Pir Abdullah Shah he has reminded me that he had placed me under arrest.
After the wireless leg we did a two weeks tactics course in which the officers from the 2nd and 3rd PMA courses were combined with ours. This course was run by Major Sultan, the Officer Commanding the Armoured Corps School. He was a good instructor and made tactics interesting and very enjoyable by having the Armoured Corps Centre Mess come to the sites where the “Tactical Exercise Without Troops’ (TEWT) were held and serve a buffet lunch on tables laid out under a shamiana. This really made us think that we had been lucky to be selected for the Armoured Corps.
After the ‘tactics course the 2nd and 3rd PMA Course officers left to join their regiments, we did our Gunnery leg and finished the YO’s Conversion. We had now been officers for about six months, had really enjoyed the course and looked forward to joining our regiments which were still on the border, confronting the Indians.
In retrospect, after learning what a junior officer should know, the YO’s Course at that time was badly planned. The purpose was not to train tank commanders and troop leaders but to give officers a basic technical training in driving, communications and gunnery training, as a gunner. The course would have been better and more objective if it had been planned to train ‘Troop Leaders’ by teaching the absolute minimum of the technical aspects and emphasizing the command and control aspects of a tank and a troop of tanks. The connection between the technical training and the tactical or batthe field application was missing. The tests, as elsewhere in Pakistan, were tests of memory rather than that of application of the acquired knowledge. This resulted in people with good memorising capability getting good results. The application of the learning
was missing.
and the other officers posted to 13 Lancers joined the regiment in the last week of February 1952, at Gujrat. The regiment was deployed on the Gujrat airfield.
13 Lancers, at that time, was the 13th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Lancers. It ranked after the Governor General’s Bodyguard in seniority and was the senior most of the six regiments which composed the then Pakistan Armoured Corps. It traces its history from the Bombay Squadron of Cavalry raised for service under Lord Lake with whom it served at the siege of Bhurtpore in 1805 and in 1817 formed the ‘Ist Regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry’ at Beerah and the ‘2nd Regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry’ at Baroda in the Bombay Province of India. After the reorganisation of the Indian Army and the amalgamation of the three East India Company armies, the two regiments emerged as the 31st and 32nd (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Lancers. In 1923 on further reorganisation and reduction of the Indian Army, the 31st and 32nd Lancers were amalgamated into 13th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Lancers. The class composition of the regiment was A Squadron Pathans, B Squadron Ranghars, C Squadron Sikhs. In the Indian Army before the partition of India, 13 Lancers was a regiment well connected at the Army headquarters in Delhi, either the C-in-C or the Adjutant General or the Quartermaster General were from the regiment, with 14th (Scinde) Horse it was amongst the first two regiments to be mechanised. During the Second World War, it served in Iraq and fought in Iran against the Iranians. The JCOs of the regiment used to tell a story about the action against the Iranians, A Squadron equipped with armoured cars supported an attack by a Sikh Battalion on an Iranian position. Before the Sikhs reached the Iranian positions, the Iranians stood up and raised white flags but the Sikhs started bayoneting them. The Senior Viceroy Commissioned Officers of the squadron ordered the squadron in Pushto, on the wireless, to fire on the Sikhs which the squadron did causing a considerable number of casualties amongst the Sikhs. The squadron commander Major J. E. A. Maberly was removed from the command of the squadron but after the inquiry the regiment was awarded a battle honour for this action. It spent about a year in North Africa and was reputed to have served as the reconnaissance regiment for the British 7 Armoured Division ( The Desert Rats) for a short while when Major
General Frank Messervy, a former commanding officer of 13 Lancers, commanded the division. After serving with Pai Force in Iraq, Iran and Syria and in North Africa, the regiment returned to India, the officers and the VCOs went to Burma to train for jungle warfare and prepared to land in Malaya but the war ended before the invasion of Malaya and the regiment found itself in Indonesia, then the Dutch East Indies, fighting against the Indonesians who had proclaimed their independence.
In the Indian Army, before the partition of India, one lot of units were ‘Indianised’ which meant that these units had a number of Indian officers. 13 Lancers was a non-Indianised regiment, the British officers of the regiment allowed only three Indian Officers at a time in the regiment. When it was decided to divide the Indian Army and 13 Lancers was allocated to Pakistan, there were three officers in the regiment, Captains S. H. A. Bokhari, M.A. Cardoza and Ishaq who were the three original officers of the regiment and came to Pakistan. General M. Zia ul Haq was commissioned in the regiment and joined it in Indonesia in 1945. According to General K. M. Arif in his book
Working with Zia’, Zia ul Haq was posted out of the regiment because he attended a function in the VCOs mess in a shalwar kameez. According to the story told by the JCOs, he attended the function and spoke to the VCOs saying that they as Muslims should not fight the Indonesians who were also Muslims. This was reported and the same afternoon Zia was returned to India on an adverse report.
At the time of the division of the Indian Army, 13 Lancers was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel C. C. C. Faran, an officer who had served in the Sikh squadron of the regiment and opted to stay on in India. In money 13 Lancers was the richest regiment in the Indian Armoured Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Faran legally tied up the substantial regimental funds of the regiment in a bank in Bombay on the grounds that the funds should not be transferred because a lot of pensioners in India would be deprived of the benefits. The funds were not transferred but the regiment received a portion of the interest till the 1965 war with India when it ceased. Captain Cardoza brought the advance party by train under very trying and difficult circumstances. Major J. E. A. Maberly brought the regiment to Pakistan and commanded it till January 1948, when Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Drew assumed the command. The Sikh squadron of the regiment was
replaced by the Ranghar squadron of the 14 (Scinde) Horse. The regiment took over the Sherman tanks of the 17 (Poona) Horse, in Risalpur, the tanks and vehicles were found to have been sabotaged by the Poona Horse by putting sugar in the petrol tanks and destroying all the batteries before leaving for India. The tanks were overhauled but were never reliable again. With these unreliable tanks the regiment had moved to the border in 1948 and again in 1951. It was deployed on the Gujrat airfield to block an expected Indian thrust from Chamb through what was called the ‘Munawwar gap’.
Lieutenant Colonel I. U. Babar, the first Pakistani commanding officer of the regiment took over the command in May 1950 and was commanding it when we joined. The squadron commanders were Major Shahzada Alam, A Squadron; Major Mohammad Umar, B Squadron; Major Ghouse Mohiuddin, C Squadron; Major Ali Zaheer, Headquarters Squadron, and Major Hafeez Ur Rehman, second in command. I was posted to A Squadron with Captain Qutubuddin as the officiating squadron commander with Major Shahzada Alam away at Quetta doing the ‘Tac Armour’ course. M. Asaf Hussain was posted to B Squadron while Mohammad Afzal Khan and M. Ataus Suboor were posted to C Squadron.
As soon as we joined the regiment we were taken by Major Ghouse Mohiuddin and shown the positions we were to occupy in the event of war, the fields of fire were shown and we were explained the possible enemy manoeuvres. With our pistols and six rounds, web equipment and jungle hats we were all set to receive the Indians but we found that we had come too late, the disengagement had already started.
In the regimental camp we had one forty-pound tent for living and another one for a bathroom. The tent was dug down about three feet and since I did not have any camp kit my orderly, Sowar Nawab Khan, borrowed a stretcher from an ambulance and it made a narrow bed. For lighting I was provided with a kerosene lamp.
The officer’s mess was housed in two large tents called EP/IP, one tent served as the ‘ante-room’ while the other was the dining room, and was lighted with petromax kerosene lamps, a very comfortable arrangement complete with sofa sets. The mess was run by Daffadar Akbar, an Afridi from Kohat, who had been with the Mess since before the start of the Second World War. Another person, Mess Waiter Khan Zaman was a young waiter then and is still with the reg
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Sher Afzal Khan, a Pathan from Jallozai, village on the Pabbi – Cherat road, who was the troop leader of No 3 Troop. In the Troop! became the second driver of a tank, a sort of a general help of the crew.
The routine of the regiment was physical training or drill in the morning, an hour’s break for breakfast, then maintenance for about an hour followed by technical training classes, then education classes for the other ranks, followed by games in the evening. We did physical training with the troops, drilled our troops in the drill periods and then helped the crew in maintenance which was based on a daily task system. The maintenance system did a lot of damage to the vehicles as nuts had to be checked for tightness, adjustments had to be checked, levels had to be checked irrespective of whether the vehicle had been run or not.
I got the commanding officer’s displeasure in no uncertain terms one morning on maintenance when it was called off due to a drizzle and tanks had to be covered with tarpaulins, I did not help the crew while they were covering the tank, the Commanding Officer saw this and dressed me down properly.
After maintenance the four of us and 2nd Lieutenant Qaiser Pervaiz, 3rd PMA Course, had to attend tactics and administration classes run for us by Captain Qutubuddin.
The commanding officer usually made one round of the regiment everyday and sometimes twice. Lieutenant Colonel I. U. Babar, accompanied by the Risaldar Major Abdul Qadir, the Woordie Major, the Regimental Police Daffadar, Daffadar Musa Khan, with a couple of regimental policemen and sometimes the adjutant of the regiment, would walk in single file, the Commanding Officer walking very fast with his team following and trying to keep pace, would go around the regiment in about an hour, covering a distance of about three miles. As soon as the Commanding Officer and the team would leave the Regimental Headquarters, the regimental telephone exchange would inform all squadrons, which squadron the team was headed for and by the time they would reach the squadron everything would be in proper order, the squadron commander would meet the CO and make a report, the number present and accompany him till he was out of the squadron area. The CO, when he found anyone unkemptor anything improper, on the spot awarded twenty eight days rigor us imprisonment and the person was doubled by the accompanying eg.
imental police to the guard room, the documents were completed later. Some officers in order to avoid the CO on his round were known to close down’ in a tank till he had gone.
The Pakistan Army units were composed of men from various areas of Pakistan and Ranghars and Kaimkhanis who had migrated from India. The companies and the squadrons of units were composed of, men from one area. Each unit had a ‘class composition’ laying down the area from which the men would be recruited and their percentage. This system gave the Junior Commissioned Officers virtual control of the squadrons and companies because they were the village elders, had the men enrolled and controlled the men’s lives in the village. Sometime before we joined the regiment it was decided to experiment with the mixing of the men of the various classes. 13 Lancers was selected for the experiment, probably because Lieutenant Colonel L. U. Babar had served in 3rd Cavalry, which was airborne, where the various classes were mixed because the men were volunteer paratroopers. A Squadron was originally the Pathan Squadron of the regiment but when we joined the regiment the squadrons had been mixed down to tank crews. Later this mixing was carried out in all the units of the army.
The Senior JCO of A Squadron was Risaldar Mir Haider from Kohat. He and Risaldar Sher Afzal were always at loggerheads because Mir Haider, who was senior to Sher Afzal, had been transferred to a regiment raised during the Second World War and disbanded after the war ended and there he was promoted a JCO later than Sher Afzal who had remained with 13 Lancers. Lieutenant Colonel Drew, who commanded 13 Lancers before Lieutenant Colonel L.U. Babar, had been Mir Haider’s commanding officer in the war-time raised regiment and promoted him risaldar superseding Sher Afzal. With these two JCOs disagreeing the Pathans in the squadron were divided between Mir Haider and Sher Afzal. Those from Kohat sided with Mir Haider and those from Pabbi sided with Sher Afzal, while those from other areas were divided between the two.
The tanks of the regiment were two squadrons of Sherman V (M4A4) with five banks of six cylinder Chrysler engines and one squadron of Sherman III (M4A3) with two GM Marine Diesel engines, all the tanks were equipped with 75mm guns. There were four troops of three tanks each and the Squadron Headquarters Troop had three tanks, one dozer tank and one armoured recovery vehicle.
The other vehicles were three 15 hundred weight trucks and fourteen three-ton lorries in the administration troop, making the Squadron capable of operating independent of the regiment. The regimental headquarters had three tanks, the Headquarters Squadron consisted of a reconnaissance troop of nine light Stuart tanks with a 37mm gun and eight jeeps fitted with machine guns and wireless sets, and an inter-communication troop of eight jeeps fitted with wireless sets. The tanks and wheeled vehicles had scen their best days and were in a poor state, the drivers of vehicles were responsible for the state of their vehicles. Most vehicles were started by hand cranking the engine, one of the rules imposed by Lieutenant Colonel I. U. Babar was that if vehicle did not start on the third hand crank of the engine the driver got twenty eight days rigorous imprisonment.
A few days after we joined the regiment, forty eight T-16 Bren gun carriers were received as substitutes for tanks for training. Five carriers per squadron, one for the squadron headquarters and one per troop, were fitted with No 19 wireless sets for communications. Within the troop flag signals were used. This was the start of the mistake in armour training which emphasised movement rather than fire because the carriers could move but there was no practical method of simulating gun-fire.
The first big army exercise, called ‘Exercise Hazard’ started about a week after we joined the regiment. In this exercise 10 Infantry Division, the Lahore garrison, was to operate against a controlled enemy, 101 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier M. Atique Rehman, with A Squadron, 13 Lancers under command. 1, with Risaldar Sher Afzal as my second in command, was sent as the advance party commander of the squadron to 101 Brigade Headquarters. After driving all day, in convoy with restricted speed, we arrived at a place called Sukeke, near Pindi Bhattian, and I went to the brigade headquarters which consisted of 40 pounder and 180 pounder tents. Not a soul was visible so I started peeping in the tents. In one I found two parallel trenches dug and two officers sitting facing each other, with their legs dangling in the trenches. I pushed my head in the tent through the tent flaps and announced that I had brought the 13 Lancers advance party. One officer, a major, came out of the tent, pointed out an open field and told me to set up my camp there and come back. I took my advance party to the site and had Risaldar Sher Afzal set up the camp.
When I returned to the brigade headquarters the two officers were still sitting with their feet dangling in the trenches, Brigadier Atiqur Rehman, later lieutenant general and governor of Punjab and Major B. M. Mustafa, later major general. I put my head in the tent and wished good evening, I was asked to come in. I guessed that the tent was an officers’ mess and took off my hat and my belt, with my pistol in the holster and not finding a place to put it, threw it in the corner of the tent, then I walked in and introduced myself. The brigadier – I had no idea who he was- asked me what was it that I had thrown in the corner of the tent. I replied that it was my belt and hat. He asked about my pistol and I admitted that it was in the holster. The brigadier then asked me if that was the way my regiment had taught me to treat my personal weapon. I said that there were no arrangements for hanging belts in the tent so I had put it in a corner. The brigadier then asked me to fetch the pistol and give it to him. I went over to the corner, removed the pistol, brought it over and gave it to him with the muzzle pointing at him, saying ‘its not loaded’. The brigadier said ‘is that the way you have been taught to hand over a pistol’ and told me to give it to the major. When I gave it to the major the brigadier asked him for the pistol and the major went through the most elaborate pistol handing over drill and I was told to remember it. Next I was asked how long I had been in the regiment and I said one week. Then I was asked how had I managed to grow long hair and I answered that I had spent six months in the Armoured Corps School, to which the brigadier replied ‘is that where the Armoured Corps is sending its officer to grow their hair?’. After this they lost interest in me.
The T-16 carriers of the squadron arrived by train and a few days later 101 Brigade moved to its exercise location. We drove to our location and passed the brigade marching with the Brigade Commander and the Brigade Major marching at the head of the column.
When the exercise started Captain Qutubuddin was detailed as an umpire with 6 Lancers and I was sent as an observer. 6 Lancers, the reconnaissance regiment of 10 Division, was to advance along both banks of a major canal, the 6 Lancers came with an armoured car troop on each canal bank, contacted the enemy and when the armoured cars tried to manoeuvre by getting off the canal banks,
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they got bogged in water logged areas along the canal banks. My jeep was parked on the canal bank, my driver Acting Lance Daffadar (ALD) Musa Khan, a Khattak from Kohat, complete with bobbed hair, who retired as an ALD, saw the armoured cars bogging down and remarked that we will now see if the squadron commander is good officer or a poor one, if he remains cool the squadron will overcome the problem, if the squadron commander shouts and loses his temper the squadron will not go any further’. ALD Musa Khan was correct, the squadron did not go any further.
The next day Risaldar Sher Afzal’s troop was detailed to fight a rearguard action on one of 6 Lancers routes of advance. I was commanding a carrier as ‘Bravo’ tank in the troop and in the dim morning light I gave a false contact message about which Sher Afzal reminded me for a long time. I found the exercise confusing as no one explained to me what it was all about and I did not have a map of the exercise area.
One day I saw General Ayub, the Commander in Chief, on horseback, with some officers, he stopped across a ditch where my carrier was in position. Apparently 10 Division did not fare too well as the exercise became known ‘haphazard’, but as far as our squadron was concerned the exercise had gone very well, 101 Brigade Commander came and congratulated Captain Qutubuddin. We then packed up and went back to Gujrat, I went with the road party driving all night.
Liso in the regiment now followed a routine, starting with physical training and ending after dinner. The dinners on some nights were followed by games in the mess, the common ones were ‘cock fights’ which required the rolling over of a person by entangling your legs with his while lying on the floor, complicated crawling over and under tables and the favourite of everyone a game of rugby played with a tennis ball in the mess ante-room which normal ly ended in torn clothes. One day the commanding officer, thinking himself clever put the ball in his pocket and walked over and scored a goal. Thereafter whenever the ball went under a sofa and was lost, the commanding officer was chased and his pockets were searched with dire consequences to his private parts and to avoid the search he used to run around shouting that he did not have the ball.
There were two ‘attached officers’ with the regiment, one was Captain Noor Elahi, later lieutenant colonel, from the Pakistan
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers commanding the Light Aid Detachment, a small workshop which formed a part of a tapk regiment, the other was the Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) Captain Sharif Bhatti, later an eye specialist. Both had really become a part of the regiment and everyone treated them as regimental officers. Captain Bhatti was a bit of prankster and when one went with the complaint of an ailment he invariably said he had those symptoms also and it did not mean anything. Every morning after the morning sick report Captain Bhatti had to go to Gujranwala in an ambulance, with those people who required treatment that he could not provide and for medical supplies. At the junction of the 13 Lancers out track and the main road, the Military Police had their check post and every morning they would stop the RMO and check his ambulance and personnel for necessary documents. One day two Military Policemen reported sick and came to Captain Bhatti for treatment and were given an enema, the check post relocated itself immediately so that they came in another doctor’s jurisdiction.
At the start of the summer the regiment moved to a large garden, located a few miles out of Gujrat on the Wazirabad road, for shade during the oncoming summer. Major Shahzada Alam and Major Ali Zaheer joined the regiment and Captain Qutubuddin left for a course at the School of Military Intelligence.
Major Shahzada Alam was commissioned in 16 Cavalry, a regiment which had gone to India. He had a good war record having fought the Japanese in Burma and come out with a reputation for bravery. He was practical, crude in his methods and lacked written and verbal power of expression and like all the other majors in the regiment and the commanding officer, had not qualified in his promotion examination and for Staff College. After he took over the squadron he found that I had not served in the ‘Administration Troop’ and ordered that I take charge of a 3-ton truck which I was to maintain but not drive. A truck was selected, all the truck’s equipment and tools were laid out, I checked them and was given the key to the tool box. After that it was my duty to keep the truck clean, maintained and ready to go on duty. The driver of the vehicle took the truck on duty and when he arrived back in the vehicle park’, he informed me and I had to wash and get the truck ready again. After two weeks I was ordered to hand over the truck to the driver. When I opened the tool box all the tools were missing and a ‘loss statement’
was made in my name and I had to pay for the tools. From that day onwards I never forgave a soldier for losing any item and they always paid for losses.
After doing all crew duties and having functioned as a tank commander during ‘Exercise Hazard’I was given the command of a troop whose JCO troop leader had gone on leave. Every morning when the maintenance parade was handed to the squadron commander, Major Shahzada Alam, he would start by asking questions regarding my troop. Every morning I would come on parade and find out the answers to the questions that had been previously asked and invariably the squadron commander would continue with questions till l. could not answer one, for which I would receive a dressing down. In those days if I had been allowed to shoot one person, my choice would have been my squadron commander. Years later I realised that I had developed a system of quick checks which gave me all the necessary information when I took over a parade from a subordinate, only then I was grateful to Major Shahzada Alam for the training he had given.
In June, in the heat of the summer, the regiment moved out to the Gujrat – Phalia area for regimental training. After the regiment arrived in the selected training area the officers mess was established under a big ‘peepul’ tree. When all the officers sat down for lunch the colonel called a waiter and whispered in his ear, the waiter took a stone and threw it hitting a very large hive of big black bees, every one left the table and dived for cover. I got behind a bush and lay still, the colonel sat at the head of the table and got stung on his face. Waiters and officers ran in all directions with streams of bees chasing and stinging them. Some people ran to a canal about three hundred yards away and ducked under water but every time they put their head, up, the bees would attack. In the fiasco, lunch was completely forgotten and nobody dared to go near the dining table.
Colonel Babar organised and ran the training very systematically. For each phase of war he ran a sand model to revise procedures, then a static signal exercise and then an exercise on the ground in which all the squadrons went through the phase.
In the advance, when our squadron was in reserve, we would advance and halt. At one village where my troop halted, Daffadar Amil Gul, a Pathan, played a joke on the villagers by calling his crew by Hindu names. Soon a large number of villagers gathered and
enquired whether we were from the Indian army, they were told that we belonged to the Indian army and had captured all the area from the border. Soon a delegation arrived enquiring about some former Hindu residents and praising them, we were ordered forward before things could develop further.
The reception at most villages was very cordial and often after we had halted village women would arrive with ‘lassi’ in large pitchers. At one such stop I switched off my wireless set and when I switched it on the squadron commander was calling me desperately; the squadron had been ordered to attack a position and I was holding up the attack by being out of communication.
During this training, one night I went to have my dinner at the Officers Mess and before eating left my belt with my pistol and my hat on the petrol tank of the mess vehicle and forgot to collect it when leaving. I went to sleep and when I woke at the morning ‘stand to’l could not find my belt and pistol, then I remembered that I had left it on the mess truck. I went to look for the mess truck but found that it had gone back to the administrative area, I then reported to my squadron commander that I had lost my pistol. After the morning ‘stand to’ 2nd Lieutenant Qaiser Pervaiz came and handed over my belt and pistol saying I had left it on the mess truck and he had picked it up. I put on my belt and a little while later Major Shahzada Alam noticed that I had my pistol and asked me how I had got it back. I told him that Lieutenant Pervaiz had it and had given it back. A little later Lieutenant Pervaiz was called and was given a good dressing down for playing practical jokes, he could not understand what the joke was and complained that he had been dressed down for nothing.
Soon after we returned from the regimental training we were informed that the brigade was to move to its peace station which had been changed from Risalpur to Rawalpindi. 5 Horse and 19 Lancers located at Gujranwala moved first, the Grand Trunk Road from Gujranwala to Rawalpindi was littered with their vehicles. We were the last to move and made a good move with very few breakdowns. I, as the junior most officer in the squadron, was given the task of commanding the tank train of the squadron. The tanks had to be loaded on tank transporters and taken to Gujrat railway station where they were to be loaded on the tank train. The task being left entirely to me, I devised a method of loading all the tanks on the transporters
simultaneously by having a tank follow a transporter till all the tanks were behind their transporters on which they were to be loaded, then the transporters halted and the tanks mounted. The whole process was carried out very smoothly and to my satisfaction. Six months later the Public Works Department reported that about a mile of the Grand Trunk Road has been destroyed by tanks.
In Rawalpindi 13 Lancers was accommodated in former Royal Artillery lines known as ‘RA Bazaar Lines’. The barracks had electricity, fans and lights. The officers mess was located on Peshawar Road in an old mess building adjacent to the Race Course, with a squash court, a tennis court, stables for six horses and a number of servants quarters. The bachelor officers were accommodated two to a room, in a building near the mess which was called the white house because of its white wash.
We soon settled down to peace time, soldiering, qualifying classification fire with personal weapons and rifles before a soldier proceeded on leave, trade upgrading classes and tests, education classes and promotion examinations. Officers attended physical training or drill in the morning, followed by a breakfast break of about forty five minutes, then maintenance for an hour, followed by whatever training was scheduled and office work till lunch. After lunch the other ranks had education classes, then games. In the evening officers had a choice of playing games with the troops or squash, tennis or riding. Four nights a week there were dinner nights’ on which prescribed uniform had to be worn and there were three ‘supper nights, on which dinner jackets, without coats in the summer, had to be worn and when the commanding officer permitted, suits could be worn on supper nights.
As second lieutenants getting four hundred and fifteen rupees a month, nearly twelve times the pay of the average sowar and four and a half times the pay of a naib-risaldar (then called a jemadar), aster paying the mess bill, the dhobi, sweeper, cycle hire, club bill, tailors bill, we had no money left over and relied on the mess for all our requirements. Messing was three rupees filty paisas per day maximum, cigarettes, drinks and petty cash could be had from the mess. Al the club our credit was good but bills had to be cleared every month. The prominent tailors of Rawalpindi, Ismails, Shah Mohammad etc also worked on credit, so, after bills which could not wait were cleared, we had no money.
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On supper and dinner nights when we planned to go to the pictures, as the movies were then called, we had our batmen take our shirts and trousers to the mess, changed into informal clothes, with cinema tickets and a tonga arranged through the mess, we went to the cinema and returned in the same tonga, the tonga would then be paid off by the mess. Some of us, while the regiment was in the field and we were allowed to draw money from a field cashier, drew our pays in cash from the cashier and when it was also shown as credited in our bank accounts, drew it from the bank with the result that when the accounts were adjusted, we received no money in the bank for a long time. The source of additional money was TA/DA (travelling and daily allowance) for temporary duty while on courses and loans from banks, usually about fifty or a hundred rupees without collateral and up to about a month’s pay with the collateral of an insurance policy. Once Z. U. Abbasi applied to Lloyd’s, Rawalpindi, for a loan of a small amount and the bank turned him down. He applied again and was again turned down. He then wrote to the manager, saying ‘My dear Manager’, then in the next line in small letters ‘HELP’, then in the next line in larger letters ‘HELP’, repeating this a number of times and ending by stating the amount that he required; the bank manager helped.
Living in these financial conditions, not paying mess bills by the fifteenth of the month at once resulted in being marched before the second in command for disciplinary action and therefore all second in commands were considered tyrants while commanding officers were considered ‘good chaps’. A dishonoured cheque, no matter to whom it had been issued, meant a court martial. After the 3rd Armoured Brigade returned to its peace station a number of officers were placed under arrest for financial irregularity. A lot of them were those who had risen from the ranks but there were some who were not from the ranks. All were court martialled and dismissed and this spate of financial irregularity ended.
Late in 1952, the Guides Cavalry joined the 3rd Armoured Brigade. They got the best cavalry lines in Rawalpindi with the best mess and officer’s quarters. They deposited their obsolete tanks and armoured cars and prepared to convert to M36 tank destroyers with 90 mm guns. Z. U. Abbasi came with the Guides and he and I got into the habit of seeing each other once or twice a week.
While the regiment was on a ‘wireless exercise on the Rawalpindi – Fatehjang road, while driving a jeep without a driving licence and the necessary commanding officer’s permission, lost control and the jeep rolled over injuring the driver, wireless operator and myself. I was evacuated to CMIT Rawalpindi under sedation. After X-rays and other tests it was found that I did not have any serious injuries and I was moved from a small room to a large general ward called ‘Raja Bazaar’ and while there, one hot summer afternoon, I smoked a cigarette, threw the butt into the fire place and went to sleep. When I woke up I was informed that the matting running down the centre of the room had caught fire, there had been a fire call to extinguish the fire and I after causing the fire had slept through the hustle and bustle. The next morning I was called by the commanding officer of the hospital, I admitted responsibility and he ordered me to pay fifty rupees as damages.
As far as the jeep accident was concerned after an inquiry fixed the blame on me. I had to pay the cost of damage which had been reduced considerably by the Technical Officer Captain Barkat Ali by replacing damaged parts from his surplus stores. The commanding officer put me in the dog house and kept me there for about six months.
In early 1953 the regiment moved out to Fatehjang for col. lective training. A Squadron was now commanded by Lieutenant Sardar Ahmad from the 1st PMA Course, I was the squadron second in command and a troop leader. For troop training I took my troop with carriers and for seven days camped independently without any interference from the squadron commander and the commanding officer although both came and observed the training. After the troop training the squadron training was conducted in a similar manner, Lieutenant Sardar Ahmad was left completely alone to train the squadron. This independence and trust disappeared later. Even when troops were commanded by officers they were not left alone, so much so that in armoured divisions and brigades, generals and brigadiers supervised troop training shattering the confidence and the initiative of the junior officers.
While we were at Fatehjang Second Lieutenant Abbas Ali Khan, 6th PMA Course, joined the regiment. We now put him through the regimental initiation of not talking to him for six months.
Alter squadron training all of us from 4th PMA Course were promoted Lieutenants and left for the Infantry Weapons Course at the Infantry School at Quetta. On the train to Quetta all of us who had attended the YOs course at the Armour School were there with the Artillery officers from the 4th and Sth PMA Courses. The new “General Electric diesel electric locomotives had just been introduced and we all took turns riding in the driver’s cabin with the driver explaining the pre-setting of the speed and the function of the dead man’s pedal’.
At the Infantry School we were treated badly by the Infantry School authorities who were used to dealing with officers who had just been commissioned. In the course we did not learn anything new as we had done exactly the same training in the PMA except the antitank rocket launcher, which had just been inducted in the Army was included. Apart from this a very impressive display of fire from fixed lines of a battalion in defence was given with the fire over our heads from behind us.
The Infantry School joining instructions laid down that officers were not allowed to bring their orderlies. We had been allowed to take orderlies with us, this was resented by the school authorities and the civilian bearers employed by the Infantry School. My orderly Sowar Nawab Khan compounded the situation by bringing a woman to the bachelor officers quarters while we were at our classes. The civilian bearers reported this and we were made to send the orderlies back, Sowar Nawab Khan went back to the regiment and was dismissed from service. I also got into trouble with the school authorities because I complained about the service at dinner nights.
The Director Armoured Corps, Brigadier “Hesky’ Baig visited Quetta and all the Armoured Corps officers were invited to the Quetta Club where he talked to us. We told him our woes and he had the Infantry Weapons course excluded for armoured corps officers. I got a bad report from Infantry School and had to explain why, fortunately the explanation was accepted.
When we returned from the Infantry Weapons course the 3rd Armoured Brigade had been re-equipped with M4A1, Sherman !! tanks, rebuilt in America and equipped with 76mm long barreled guns out-ranging the 75mm on the old tanks. Now the Brigade consisted of four regiments equipped with new tanks but the other vehicles were still poor.
In the new tanks the SCR 528, the American wireless set had
been replaced with the British No 19 set and in carrying out the modification the outlets for the headsets were wrongly located in the turret. When I noticed this I ordered the squadron radio mechanic to correct it on all squadron tanks and it was done. About a year later the fault was discovered by the authorities and an order was issued for the modification, when A squadron tanks were examined it was found that they did not require any modification, to everyone’s surprise.
Another modification that was carried out on all the tanks was the marking of sixteen segments on the elevating hand wheels of the tank main gun for ‘semi-indirect fire’, a high explosive fire supposed to be carried out when the target could be seen by the tank commander but could not be seen by the gunner. Why the target would not be visible to the gunner when it was visible to the commander, we could not understand.
After spending a month on leave in Lahore where my mother was waiting to go to Commilla in East Pakistan, we again went to Infantry School to attend the Junior Officer Leader’s Course. The atmosphere in this wing of the Infantry School was much more pleasant than in the Weapons Wing but the problem of civilian orderlies and the thieving by them persisted. The civilian orderlies apparently paid the officer who had the authority to hire and fire and no complaints against the orderlies were entertained.
While we were at the Infantry School, in the regiment an anonymous letter against the commanding officer was placed on his table while he was holding a ‘durbar’. The letter accused the commanding officer of being a tyrant and misusing government property by using his staff car for private purposes. At that time the commanding officers of armoured regiments were authorised staff cars and 13 Lancers had a most dilapidated Chevrolet car which was mostly off road’. The commanding officer on reading the letter called the Risaldar Major and the four senior JCOs of the squadrons, ordered them to pack their belongings and be prepared to board a train leaving in the afternoon for Nowshera for termination from service if the author of the anonymous letter was not found by eleven o’clock that morning. Risaldar Mir Haider, the senior JCO of A squadron, produced the author, the Pay NCO of the squadron, a Pathan lance daffadar from Pabbi, who was court-martialed and dismissed from service that same day.
The command of the regiment changed before we returned from the
course. Lieutenant Colonel I. U. Babar was posted to Azad Kashmir and had left the regiment without a proper dining out by the lui tal officers, I never understood why this honour was denied to him after a very good command period. Major Hafeez ur Rehman became the commanding officer, Major Moinuddin came from 11 Cavalry as the second in command and Major Farooqi became the squadron commander of A Squadron. I was now, the acting and without pay, squadron second in command. This was my first experience of changes that come about with a change in command, the change of old loyalties and the development of new ones, the ousting of old favourites and the creation of new ones.
The Senior JCO of the squadron, Risaldar Mir Haider, replaced my batman who had been dismissed from service for the Infantry School affair, with Sowar Rasul Khan, a Saghri Khattak from the mountains of Kohat with hair bobbed at the back and heavily oiled, he remained with me for nearly six years. A wonderful man, completely illiterate when he was enrolled, after about ten years of service he was a grade three gunner and had a ‘second, second certificates’, meaning he had qualified in second class Roman Urdu, and second class map reading. Roman Urdu was written in English alphabets.
One evening Rasul Khan had a very worried look on his face while he was laying out my clothes for the evening, I asked him the reason and he said that in the education classes that day he had been told that the world was round. He said that he had been from Karachi to Cairo and found the earth flat all the way. I explained that the world was round and was still explaining it to him when Lieutenant Qaiser Pervaiz walked into my room and I explained what I was doing. When I had nearly convinced him, Pervaiz told Rasul Khan that it was not written in the Koran that the world was round and that I was making a fool out of him, Rasul Khan gave me a dirty look and walked out of the room and continued to feel hurt about it for several days. On another occasion a salesman left a sample stethoscope in Suboor’s room. In the evening aller games we amused ourselves by listening to each other’s heart beats. Then Sowar Khyber Khan, Suboor’s batman was called and his heart beat was listened to, after this Rasul Khan’s heart was examined and he was told that his heart was not beating. On hearing this the colour drained from his face and he insisted that his heart was beating. He was then told that Khyber Khan would listen with the stethoscope and give an impartial opinion. Khyber Khan, a person
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always in trouble, who held the regimental record of about 365 days RI (rigorous imprisonment) awarded for numerous military offences. a much cleverer person than Rasul Khan, listened to Rasul Khan’s heart and told him in Pushto that his heart was not beating, Rasul Khan almost collapsed and with great difficulty we convinced him that there was nothing wrong with him.
When I was doing the Gunnery Instructors Course at the Armoured Corps School, the evening before an examination Rasul Khan came to my room and found that I was not studying for the examination. He asked me whether an examination was scheduled for the next day, and when I confirmed it he asked me why I was not studying. I told him I knew everything and did not have to study any more. He asked me if I was sure and whether I was prepared to answer questions, I said yes. He then asked me the weight of the 75mm M4A4, Sherman V tank gun which I did not know. Ile then told me the weight, 980 pounds, and remarked that since I did know the weight of the gun how could I claim to know everything. He knew everything by heart about his gunnery trade that had been taught to him. On one occasion I decided to learn Pushto by speaking in Pushto with Rasul Khan but this arrangement was terminated very quickly when Rasul Khan, on a cold winter morning, placed ice cold water for my bath when I had asked for hot water. He claimed that he had done exactly what he had been asked. He offered his prayers five times a day and read the Koran every day, yet when I acquired an Alsatian bitch called Zeb, he supervised the feeding and general look-after. The dog when not with me accompanied him everywhere, but somehow understood that she was not to touch him. In all the years that he was with me he never addressed me ‘aap, he always said ‘tum’. He retired in 1958, with one stripe, Acting Lance Daffadar, returned to fight the 1965 war and then disappeared.
From the time the regiment had come to Rawalpindi I was either the food member or the secretary of the Officers’ Mess. Dalladar Akbar, the Mess Daffadar, ran the Mess, Daffadar Habib, an accounts clerk, managed the accounts, I was responsible to the officers for the efficient running of the Mess. The other key Mess staff members were Sher Jung, the ‘wine waiter’ called the ‘abdar’, a very impressive bearded figure. There were two brothers who were the gardener’s (one of them, Din Mohammad, is still with the regiment) and numerous cooks came and went. The regimental mess had a very large
amount of ‘silver’ consisting of trophies, decoration pieces, goblets, tea services etc. The regimental crockery had crested plates starting from 1st and 2nd Bombay Cavalry, 31st and 32nd Lancers and for everyday use 13th Lancers crested crockery. For breakfast every ofticer had a silver tea service to himself, at meals there were silver goblets for water and on the floors there were tiger skins, old carpets, on the walls paintings of Risaldar Majors, Risaldars and a few former commanding officers. The Mess had a large quantity of wine that it had brought from Indonesia stowed in the tank ammunition racks, some of it had been sold to Framji, the Nowshera merchants, but a large amount still remained with the Mess and was the cheapest drink that was available at the Mess bar.
For the bachelor officers the officer mess was home away from home. On one occasion three or four of us returning from a jaunt in other messes and the club, at about two o’clock in the morning, while passing the mess remembered that we had not had any supper, we went to the mess and ordered the guard commander to wake up the mess staff. The mess dalfadar appeared and we told him that we wanted our supper, he and the mess staff turned out in full uniform and we ceremoniously had our supper. The next morning the adjutant of the regiment asked us to see the second in command of the regiment who gave us his displeasure and find us about twenty five rupees cach, the total amount to be divided amongst the staff who had been routed out of their beds, the adjutant gave us one week’s extra duty to each of us and the incident was forgotten.
A long spell of training started towards the end of 1953, I took niy troop out for troop training, this time to Golra where the Vehicle Depot is now located. For squadron and regimental training we moved to Fatehjang, regimental officers and officers from 11 Cavalry, from 6 to 8th PMA Courses, attending the YOs course, joined us.
Alter completing the regimental training the regiment moved back to Rawalpindi and A Squadron moved to Mari Indus. Before the inove, as the only oflicer in A Squadron, I went to Bannu to liaise with the 102 Brigade for the infantry-tank cooperation training between A Squadron and the brigade. From Bannu I went to Kalabagh and Mari Indus to check the railway facilities and the camping site. When 1 returned I found that Major M. A. Cardoza had taken over the command of the squadron and the squadron moved with tanks and carriers and cumped at Mari Indus.
Before the training commenced I went to Peshawar to appear in the Part III, practical examination of the lieutenant to captain examination. The lieutenant to captain examination and the captain to major, in those days, had three parts. Part I was tactics, current affairs, military history, military law, and administration. Part II was one paper, special to arm, and Part III was an examination in tactics on the ground. Promotion examinations were not regarded as very important except for those appearing for the Staff College, a lot of officers held majors and lieutenant colonel’s rank without passing the lieutenant to captain examination, a relaxation made during the Second World War and continued. 1 appeared in the examination and failed.
Major Cardoza’s wife was in Peshawar with her parents and he gave me a letter to deliver to her, the time of the year was around Christmas. I delivered the letter and was entertained to a high tea by Mrs. Cardoza and given a large basket full of cakes and other eatables and a letter to be delivered to her husband with instructions not to eat the contents of the basket on the train journey and that Major Cardoza would share the contents with me. When I returned to Mari Indus found that Major Cardoza had been admitted in hospital because his cocker spaniel dog had bitten him and died. I became the squadron commander and Second Licutenant Abbas joined the squadron, on loan lirom B Squadron, he and I shared the contents of the basket that Mrs. Cardoza had very thoughtfully sent.
The 102 Brigade of 7 Division, with whom we were to carry out tank infantry cooperation exercises consisted of 7/1st Punjab, 3/8 Punjab, and 5/14 Punjab, (all the battalions were later renumbered). The first exercises were with 7/1 st Punjab. We went through the preliminary of explaining the characteristics and capabilities of our tanks and how to indicate targets to them, then the commanding officer of 7/1 st Punjab planned an advance exercise and gave out his orders to his company commanders and me, the supporting squadron commander. The battalion commander ordered that his four companies, mortars etc were to lead and my squadron was to follow the infantry. When my turn came to ask questions I told the battalion commander that his orders were all wrong, this stunned the audience and everyone glared at me. The commanding officer asked me how the advance should be carried out and I explained that the tanks should lead and capture a feat ture and wait there till the infantry arrived and took over and then the tanks should advance again, the plan was accepted and new orders were issued.
The next exercise with this battalion was an attack exercise, the battalion commander fixed the time for the issue of orders at four in the morning, Major Cardoza had rejoined by this time, we went to the appointed place and the Intelligence Officer of the battalion proceeded to indicate landmarks, it was still dark, when everyone protested the orders were postponed to after day break. The battalion commander became a brigadier but for some reason was not promoted general though he held some important appointments in the army. The rest of the training with this brigade was uneventful, Major Cardoza after spending a few days with the squadron was recalled to the regiment and appointed adjutant and I again became the acting and without-pay squadron commander.
One evening Major Cardoza and I went for a walk and he told me that early in the year the Army had asked for the names of officers whose services should be terminated, Major Ali Zaheer and I had been recommended by Lieutenant Colonel J.U. Babar, Major Ali Zaheer was retired, I was now on my second life.
Major Ali Zaheer who was commissioned in the Indian army in the Pioneer Corps had served in Burma during the Second World War and had transferred to the Armoured Corps after the war. Known as ‘nawab sahib’, he came from a very rich family of Lucknow and behaved as a nawab. He was my squadron commander for a while and his instructions to me were to bother him only when things had gone wrong and were beyond my capability and powers. It was a sight watching him deal with Risaldar Mir Haider, the Senior JCO of the squadron, he would tell Mir Haider that he was not satisfied with him, and turn his face away. Mir Haider would change his position and face him and he would again turn away. This would happen two three times then Mir Haider would be allowed to explain and receive the squadron commander’s displeasure. Once when Second Lieutenant Nusrat Ullah, an officer from 7th PMA Course who had joined the squadron, had not paid his mess bill on time and had received a notice to explain why action should not be taken against him, Nusrat, very perturbed, showed the note to Nawab Sahib who took the note, walked into Lieutenant Colonel Hafeez ur Rehman’s office, signed a chequc for the amount owed and admonished the colonel for threatening to ruin the career of an officer for a small amount of money. In the inonth of Ramazan, he did not list but in the evening at inari’ timu ho would
stand on the road outside his house and anyone passing on the road that he knew, would be invited to his house for ‘iftari’, where his table would be laid out with all sorts of delicacies. He retired while I was on a course, all those who served with him remembered him.
After completing the training with 102 Brigade the squadron received orders to move to Bhakkar where the 3rd Armoured Brigade had concentrated for an exercise. A regimental signal exercise was held in which I commanded ‘A’ Squadron, during the exercise my squadron was required to execute a manoeuvre for which was required to navigate on a compass hearing. I set the bearing sitting in my jeep expecting a small compass error but the error was a large one and I was punished to do a long distance navigation in the desert every day till the army exercise was held. The punishment taught me desurt navigation, using a sun compass and a magnetic compass.
The Army exercise, Vulcan, as the exercise was called, went badly for 13 Lancers. For some odd reason orders were issued that once tank engines were started they would not be switched ofl’ at halis though the tank was fitted with auxiliary power generators for use when the tank engine was off. The regiment remained in reserve for most of the first day but late in the evening it was employed. I com manded A Squadron and remained in reserve till just before sunset when I was called upon to put in a Nanking attack which I did see cessfully. When the regiment was ordered to leaguer for the night the tanks started running out of petrol, they were refuelled during the night and we put in a dawn attack ending the exercise. The running out of fuel created a rift between the commanding ofticer and the brigade commander with the result that the commanding ollicer was removed from command about six months later.
After Exercise Vulcan ended and we were waiting for the tanks to be transported to Bhakkar railway station. I borrowed a jeep from the Headquarters Squadron, drove it to the top of a sand June, lelt it with out applying the parking brakes and walked away. When I returned found that the jeep had rolled down from the sand dune and hit a tree. the windscreen, which was already shattered fell apart. When the reg iment returned to Rawalpindi 1 reported the damage but was told that the windscreen had been originally broken by C Squadron and had been written off’ in an inquiry conducted by Lieutenant Oat et Pervaiz. A few days later I was called by Major Khattak, the oldi. ciating commanding officer, and told that the c Squadron inquiry
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been lost and an explanation would have to be submitted to the Brigade Headquarters to explain the delay but if I took the blame for the damage only a loss statement would be made in my name for which the regiment would compensate me. I agreed to this and was shocked when the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hafeez ur Rehman, after resuming command, marched me before the Brigade Commander who gave me a ‘severe reprimand and I had to pay for the damage. Neither Major Khattak nor Lieutenant Colonel Hafeez ur Rehman ever talked about the circumstances under which had agreed to take the blame.
The corollary to this incident was more amusing, Lieutenant Z. U. Abbasi made an amusing story about my driving and ‘hitting the only tree in the entire desert’, this story spread throughout the Armoured Corps and is still told about me.
An amusing story about Vulcan involved Lieutenant ‘Bunty’ Sarwar, Il Cavalry. He was detailed as a temporary ADC to General M. Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to accompany him on a tour of the exercise area, no one explained what his duties would be. As instructed ‘Bunty’ reported at the appointed time and they set off to the exercise area with Bunty driving the jeep, General Ayub in the front seat and the official driver in the rear seat. At one place the jeep got stuck in the sand, General Ayub at once jumped out and when Bunty tried to get down, the General ordered him to continue driving and he and the driver pushed the vehicle till it was free. Accompanying General Ayub, following in another vehicle, was the Director of the exercise, a British general, seconded to the Pakistan Army as an advisor on training. After visiting various headquarters and observing various aspects of the exercise General Ayub chose a spot and told Bunty that he would have his lunch there and walked over to talk with the British general. No one had instructed Bunty about the General’s lunch and he had not made any arrangement. Panic stricken he looked around and his eyes fell on a nice basket in the British general’s jeep, he walked over, looked in it and found a picnic lunch packed in it. Ile took the basket out and much to his relief found that it contained lunches for two people and included two bottles of beer. Without obtaining permission from the British general he laid out the picnic lunch and told General Ayub that his lunch was laid out. General Ayub very graciously asked the British advisor to have lunch with him, the British general saw the layout, looked at General Ayub’s
ADC, smiled and he and General Ayub enjoyed the lunch. After the regiment returned from Exercise “Vulcan’, I was ordered to take a squadron of tanks and all the regiments tank gunners to Nowshera for tank gunners classification fire. During the firing a tank fired when I was standing very close to the muzzle and for two days I could not hear anything, then my hearing returned. After that a few people told me that I was hard of hearing and after I retired I suddenly lost the hearing in the ear that had received the blast. During the firing I saw something white about five thousand yards away and through the binoculars it looked like a pillar, I directed a troop of tanks to fire on it and it disappeared. The next day the Nowshera police arrived with a report that a man and his two cows had been killed by our firing. I quickly went and lodged a complaint with the police that a villager had been killed on the ranges and that they had certified that the surrounding villages had been warned that the ranges would be used for firing and no one was allowed on them. This was necessary because the villages around the ranges were known to file claims for damages. One story went around that on one occasion a Pathan villager had tied his aged mother in a tank hulk which was placed on the ranges as a target, luckily she was discovered before the firing began.
After completing the firing I telephoned the regiment that I had completed the firing and was told to fire all the ammunition. With only a few hours of range allotment time left, I lined up the squadron of tanks, distributed the remaining ammunition amongst them, designated single target and ordered all tanks to fire simultaneously till the ammunition was expended. In the evening when I went to the Armoured Corps Centre mess everyone inquired about what I had been doing on the ranges which had made the windows rattle in Nowshera.
The training requirement was that units should expend all training ammunition, so any ammunition left over had to be fired off. On one occasion a soldier of 13 Lancers was checked, by a general out riding, firing a .22 rifle into a butt without any target, when questioned he said he had been ordered to expend the ammunition. The training ammunition had to be expended to demand ammunition again and to complete firing records.
I bought a Second World War surplus U.S. Army Harley Davidson 980 cc motor cycle, on instalments. When I went to Nowshera or to Peshawar I raced all vehicles on the road and was beaten only twice. Once I hit a boulder on the road and only managed to regain my balance with great difficulty. The second time between Pabbi and Peshawar a big American car allowed me to line up with it and then just drove away leaving me behind. The motor cycle had a constant parts problem, some parts were made for me at the 502 Workshop where Captain Noor Elahi our former LAD officer was posted, but most of them had to be found from junk shops. Besides the parts problem, there was a money problem also, with petrol at about Rs 2.80 per gallon and the motor cycle doing 45 miles to the gallon, Lisually after the fifteenth of the month I had to use my cycle.
I attended two tank gunnery courses at the Armoured Corps School and while I was on the Gunnery Instructor Course, the command of the regiment changed because of a difference between the brigade commander and our commanding officer. On joining the regiment after the instructor course, I was promoted captain and officially became the second in command of A Squadron, Major ‘Freddi’ Fazlur Rehman was the squadron commander.
In November the Army exercise called ‘November Handicap’ took place, 13 Lancers and a squadron of Guides were part of South Force’ consisting of 10 and 15 Divisions while the rest of the 3rd Armoured Brigade was part of ‘North Force’ with 7 Divisions Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Nawaz, ex-commanding officer of 6 Lancers, who had taken over the command of 13 Lancers, very effectively employed the reconnaissance troop of the regiment as an economy of force unit to cover a wide front while advancing, to find areas lightly defended or not defended and while withdrawing to inform about the strength and direction of threats, the timely information, enabled him to effectively neutralise the much larger armoured element of the North Force’.
Towards the end of the exercise 13 Lancers was placed in Corps reserve at Kharian. About the sametime the previous year when I had gone to Peshawar and was given a letter and a basket of cakes etc by Mrs. Cardoza to give to Captain Cardoza, who was my squadron commander then but was the adjutant now. While rummaging in my attache case I found the letter which I had not delivered, now a year old. I walked over to the regimental command post delivered it to Captain Cardoza and started walking back. I was called by him and asked how I had gone to Peshawar during the exercise. I told him that I had gone with his permission and when he denied he had given the permission and started getting annoyed, I asked him to look at the date on the let ter, he then realised that the letter was a year old but said that he was pleased that he had received a letter from his wife at that time of the year – Christmas time.
Soon after the regiment returned to Rawalpindi, the American Military Aid to Pakistan, announced towards the end of the previous year, began in earnest. The commanding officers of the armoured regiments were sent to the United States on a short ‘Career Officers Course’ at Fort Knox and it was announced that two reconnaissance regiments would be raised. The two remaining reconnaissance regiments, 6 Lancers and 11 Cavalry had been converted to armoured reg. iments equipped with the tanks which had belonged to the 3rd Armoured Brigade units. Two new Corps Reconnaissance Regiments, 12 (Sam Brown’s) Cavalry and 15 Lancers, were raised. These were old Indian Cavalry regiments which had been disbanded to form training centres, the Pakistan Armoured Corps Centre, and School was known as 12 (Sam Brown’s) Cavalry and had the mess silver etc which had belonged to that regiment, when they were re-raised the silver was given to them. For raising the new regiments each old regiment lost a squadron; 13 Lancers lost C Squadron, Major Shahzada Alam, Captain Aziz Ur Rehman, Captain Zia Raja to 15 Lancers and Captain Asaf Hussain, 4th PMA Course, to 12 Cavalry. The new regiments received new M24 ‘Chaffee’ light tanks with 75mm guns. Under the US Military Aid Pakistan, Pakistan Armoured Corps was to receive 504 medium tanks and 220 light tanks for reconnaissance out of which 110 were the M24s which came in the first lot. The 504 main battle tanks were received over a period of eight or nine years ending in 1963 and the 110 remaining reconnaissance tanks were not received. With the new tanks the replacement of the motor vehicles with rebuilt American vehicles also went on in all the regiments.
I had now completed three years in A Squadron. I knew everyone by name and everyone, excluding the squadron commander, looked on me to settle all the problems that arose. One constant problem was, the running feud between the two risaldars of the squadron, Risaldar Sher Afzal was constantly accusing Risaldar Mir Haider of being a homosexual, Risaldar Mir Haider lost no opportunity to accuse Sher Afzal for being indisciplined and for irregularities. Risaldar Mir Haider did not like my attitude towards him because as the acting and without-pay squadron commander’ I constantly had to deal with problems brought to my notice by him and often I did not agree with
his suggestions. He complained to Captain Pervez a number of times that he had more years of service than my age and I should give him more respect.
I was serving in a squadron with about one hundred and fifty men, Second World War veterans, who had been from Cairo to Jakarta, talked about having worn out as many as five tanks, each man as proud as Lucifer. There was one daffadar from Swabi-Mardan area who to avoid going into battle in the North African desert, had cut his armoured car’s battery lead, when the order to move was given, his armoured car did not start, it was examined and the cut lead was detected, he was punished to sit outside on the tank turret whenever the squadron went into action, he did this and survived. There was a lance daffadar, a huge man, a Pathan from Kohat with hair heavily oiled and bobbed at the back, he was a very good tank driver and was pointed out as a tank driver who had charged an anti-tank gun with his tank and run over it because when the gun fired at his tank, his tank commander and the gunner panicked and started arguing how it should be dealt with. He had been promoted several times but had been reduced because when he lost his temper, he used his strength to settle arguments. One day he was marched before me charged with picking up a newly posted Punjabi squadron clerk in the dining room and throwing him against the wall. He admitted that he had done so but stated that he was sitting at the dining table, quietly eating his food when the clerk said that all Pathans were mad, and it was only to prove the observation he had picked up the clerk and thrown against the wall.
During exercise ‘November Handicap’, Risaldar Sher Afzal created a problem by beating up a Ranghar sowar. In those times it was an accepted fact that a senior JCO would take a sowar or a junior NCO *behind a tank’ and there would be sounds of slaps but there never was complaint since the man receiving the beating used to be from the same area as the JCO beating him and was probably responsible for his recruitment. In Sher Afzal’s case he had beaten up a Ranghar who complained officially and demanded justice, which if denied, could create a fight between the Ranghars and the Pathans with dire consequences to the officers of the squadron and regiment. The squadron commander, Major ‘Freddi’ Rehman, ordered me to investigate and report, after delaying the inquiry for a considerable time I was able to kill the proceedings by transferring the sowar to 15 Lancers. Sher Afzal was saved from a court martial but about four years later he beat
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up another Ranghar soldier and was dismissed from service, he then took up a job as a security supervisor in the Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah. He later had a heart attack, had to leave his job and return to his village, Jallozai, half way between Pabbi and Cherat, from there he wrote to me in 1983 about his illness and the difficulty he was having in going to Peshawar Combined Military Hospital every fortnight for medical check ups and medicines. I wrote to Brigadier Tariq Mehmud (TM), then commanding the Special Service Group, and asked him to help Sher Afzal, he very kindly detailed his senior medical officer to visit Sher Afzal once a week at his village and provide the necessary medicines. Risaldar Sher Afzal died about a year later.
After returning from ‘November Handicap’ was again detailed to take the regiment to Nowshera for the tank gunners annual classification fire as the ‘gunnery officer of the regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Nawaz, the commanding officer, came on an inspection visit and with his loud voice and rough manners caused panic amongst the officers. One officer I found firing a tank gun at its maximum elevation which would land the shells well outside the range area. I measured the gun’s elevation and took a compass bearing of the direction of fire and sent Naib Risaldar Mohammad Zarif to check whether any shells had landed in any villages. Luckily none had landed in a village but had fallen close to one and he was able to placate the villagers. I informed Major Mohammad Umar, the senior officer present, he within the hearing of the officer who had fired outside the range area asked me to comment on a report he had received about shells falling in some village. The officer concerned could not do anything immediately as the regiment returned to Rawalpindi but sent Naib Risaldar Zarif with money to pay off the villagers. Zarif who lived near Nowshera, spent a few days at home and reported that he had settled the matter.
“For the 1955 inter regiment Pakistan Army Rifle Association competition was detailed as the officer in charge of the regimental team. I selected Naib Risaldar Rashid, a very good Ranghar JCO from my squadron, as the troop leader and selected the personnel who were to make up the troop. The competition was divided into competitions, one for anti-tank shooting and the other for ‘semi-indirect shooting’ with high explosive shells, I concentrated on winning the anti-tank shooting. I studied the rules and found that the points were dispropor
tionately high for command and control and for hitting all the targets, hits on all targets had never been achieved in all the previous competitions. Command and control points were arbitrary while points for hitting all the targets could not be disputed and it was not stipulated that tanks would fire only on targets to their front. I therefore briefed the troop leader to hold his fire after hitting his targets and if any target was not hit to fire and hit it, a normal method of fire control. As in previous years all the regiments failed to hit all the targets, when 13 Lancers fired, one of the tanks missed one target but the troop leader, who had been briefed to hold his fire after hitting his targets, fired and hit the remaining target making the regiment eligible for the large bonus points. Promptly the judges riding the tanks for judging tank commanders for command and control, gave a zero or very low marks to neutralise the bonus we had earned. Major Moinuddin who was officiating as the commanding oflicer was present and lodged a protest but was over-ruled, we lost the competition.
My Harley Davidson landed me in trouble twice. I had gone to visit my parents living in Satellite Town, Rawalpindi. While returning to the regiment, at the Mall Road crossing near Shah Mohammad tailor’s shop a car shot out of a side street, I collided with it and became unconscious. When I recovered consciousness in the evening after five or six hours I found myself in the Rawalpindi CMH with my parents and my sister anxiously waiting for me to recover consciousness. Except for being very sore in the head and hurt in one knee, I had no recollection of the accident. In a few days I was out of the hospital but limped for a long time. Because of the state of war between Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Nawaz, the commanding officer of 13 Lancers and the brigade headquarters staff, an inquiry was ordered into my accident but when it was found that I had not committed any offence under the Army Act it was quietly called off.
The next time I got into trouble because of my motorcycle was outside the 3rd Armoured Brigade lecture hall where I had gone to appear in the lieutenant-to-captain examination. After the examination a number of officers were standing in small groups discussing the question papers. When I started my inotorcycle and revved the engine, the engine noise startled an ollicer who threw his hands outward in fright and hit me in the face with a clipboard. This made me bend backwards accelerating the motorcycle which jumped across the road, climbed into the veranda of building, ran a short distance in the veran da, jumped over a flower bed and then I brought it under control. All .this created a lot of noise and Lieutenant Colonel Bir Abdullah Shalı, the commanding officer of the Guides Cavalry, who was the senior invigilator of the examination enquired into the noise and I had a difficult time explaining that it was not my fault.
During this period I met Captain Z. U. Abbasi several times a week. He was always up to some escapade. In the summer, one hot afternoon Captain Z. U. Abbasi, who lived in the bachelor quarters in the Guides Cavalry officers mess compound, went to the mess to get a drink of cold water, there he found the mess waiters and cooks sleeping on the dining table with all the fans working at full speed. He left the mess without disturbing the sleeping staff and went to the quartermaster’s room, woke him up made him open the ammunition store and give him the biggest marriage bomb, he brought the bomb to the mess, placed it under the dining table and lit the fuse. The bomb went off with a tremendous blast, the sleeping mess staff got up and ran out of the building, one of them went running down Peshawar road, shell shocked.
The CMH Nurses mess was close to the Guides Cavalry mess. On one occasion the nurses invited some Guides bachelor officers to dinner, Z. U. Abbasi got a seat near the Matron, who sat at the head of the table. He looked around and loudly asked whether it was laid down in the joining instructions of the nurses that they had to be dark and ugly, there was pin drop silence, everyone looked at Abbasi and then there was a spontaneous burst of laughter.
Abbasi noticed that a lot of importance was given to the cricket team while no importance was being given to Roshan Khan who had won the World Championship in squash. He wrote a letter to the Pakistan Times but since army officers had to get permission to have anything published in the newspapers, he gave the address of the Guides mess and the name of the ‘mali’ who was illiterate. He then wrote a rejoinder with another name and address and followed it up with a letter from the ‘mali’. He then showed the letter published in the 4 newspaper to the second in command of the Guides Cavalry and told him that the ‘mali’ was writing letters to the newspaper. The second in command called the ‘mali’ and interrogated him in English much to the amazement of the ‘mali’ and he naturally did not answer any questions. It took the second in command some time to realise that his leg had been pulled.
As a part of officers training, every few months, officers had to write essays which were collected by the units and sent to the brigade where they were supposed to be checked. An inter regiment borrowing system developed, whereby an essay written in one regiment was borrowed and copied by officers in another unit. But if you were not lucky enough to borrow an essay you had to produce one of your own and normally this was a painful effort. Everyone suspected that no one really read the essays after they were submitted, to check whether the essays were actually read, Z. U. Abbasi wrote an essay in which he wrote a few lines of the introduction and then completed the required number of words by copying a fairy tale. After some time when he was sure that no one had read his essay, he put up an application stating what he had done and asking why officers were required to write essays if no one was there to read and evaluate them. He did not get any reply but someone must have considered it because the writing of essays was done away with.
Abbasi and I were the Signal Officers of our regiments at about the same time. Abbasi demanded some replacement valves for the 19 Wireless Sets then in use in the armoured corps and was horrified to receive valves about a foot in height. When he inquired he was told that he had demanded them and they had been especially procured for the Guides Cavalry, he had got the specification wrong and the valves were specially purchased for the Guides Cavalry. Non-plussed for some time he waited for a while and returned them as surplus to requirement and no questions were asked.
The No 19 Wireless Set when used in vehicles other than tanks required four 12 volt batteries which had to be periodically charged, with each set a charging engine had to be carried for recharging and a large charging engine, under the Signal Officer, recharged and issued charged batteries daily. The old charging engines, seldom worked and were notorious for not working when most required. One officer of 13 Lancers, Lieutenant Dost Mohammad Utra, brother of Ata Mohammad Malik from my course, while commanding the administrative echelon of the regiment on an exercise got out of communications. The commanding officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel I. U. Babar drove to the administrative area and asked Lieutenant Utra why he was out of communications. Utra explained that his wireless set batteries required charging and his charging set was not starting. The commanding officer asked him to start the engine and it roared into life, Utra earned an adverse report and was transferred to 6 Lancers. To overcome the perpetual battery problem I demanded and received almost hundred per cent surplus batteries. About a year or two later, at the Annual Adm Inspection by the General Officer Commanding the 1st Armoured Division, whose criteria for administrative efficiency was the checking of items held against the official ledger, the regiment buried about two hundred batteries to correct their ground balances. The battery problem and the battery charging problem was solved when the American Aid vehicles arrived, each vehicle from which wireless sets were required to be operated had the vehicle batteries of the same voltage as the wireless sets and were charged by the vehicle generator.
The Annual Technical Inspection, an inspection of the technical fitness of the regiment was carried out every year by a team from the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers who certified the maintenance state from ‘very good’ to ‘unfit for battle’. The inspection was wholly on the whims of the inspectors, there was no inspection standards and they could accept damage to equipment as ‘fair wear an 1 tear’ or ‘unfair wear and tear due to negligence’. During the inspection the inspectors had to be well fed with chicken, tea and “pakoras’, paid for from the squadron fund and given any item of clothing or equipment that was demanded from the regimental stores. The auditors who descended periodically were also similarly placated, usually they raised an objection and when suitably placated would also state how the objection was to be settled, the whole method and practice of the technical inspection and audit was corrupt. When the system was discussed with the old JCOs they assured us that even in the days of the British it was customary for the regiment to give bottles of whiskey to the technical inspectors and for the squadron to look after the auditors.
At the end of 1955 the regiment carried out its winter training in the Sangjani area near Rawalpindi. Major Mohammad Nazir, who was the adjutant of the regiment when I had joined the regiment, was the A Squadron commander. While he had been an efficient adjutant under Lieutenant Colonel L. U. Babar, as a squadron commander he was completely careless and left everything to me. While we were doing squadron training, we received a message that the brigade commander would be visiting the regiment, a thing that he had never done before. We hurriedly organised the training according to the programme and the visit went off fairly well, except for the fact that
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some of us were caught wearing coloured socks with our dungarees. About this time, the brigade commander started building a house in Rawalpindi. The brigade transport, including the tank transporter tractors were used to transport building material. On seeing this Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Nawaz also started building a house, using 13 Lancers vehicles and men as labour with the military police making an effort to catch the commanding officer mis-using transport and men. The house building led to some interest in real estate by officers. My squadron commander, Major Farzand Ali, advised me to buy a thousand square yards of cantonment land to build a house after I retired. It was available at one rupee a square yard but neither I nor anyone else gave it a thought. Two years previously a GHQ letter had come asking officers to apply for fifty acres of border land which was planned to be settled with servicemen. No one applied and another letter came stating that there was no disrespect in applying for this land, but again there were no applicants from the regiment.
While the commanding officer was away on a course in America, one day when I was the duty officer, I was summoned by the adjutant and told that the commanding officer’s buffalo was sick and had to be taken to the veterinary surgeon. I objected that it was not included in the duty officers duties, another officer was ordered by the adjutant and he happily complied.
By this time a number of officers had joined the regiment, Mohammad Abbas Khan, 6th PMA, Nusrat Ullah, 7th PMA, Khadim Hussain, 8th PMA, Syed Masood Ahmad, 10th PMA, Musheer Mohammad Khan, 11 PMA and Lieutenant Abdul Ghafoor Abid, Sth PMA transferred from the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. In A Squadron I remained the junior most officer till Nusrat Ullah was posted and after him Syed Masood Ahmad joined A Squadron.
In the three years that I had now spent in the squadron, I had fourteen changes of squadron commanders. The trend was developing that ‘good’ officers circulated and officers with no circulation value served in fighting units. Some commanding officers like I. U. Babar, kept some officers ‘good types’, serving in the regiment, none of them qualified for staff college and rose to any significant rank while officers who stayed away from regimental soldiering returning for short duration to earn Annual Confidential Reports by serving with troops for three months before the end of the year and getting an endorsement for commanding troops usually had very good service records because
as staff officers they had to please one superior and did not have innumerable people to control, answer for accidents, losses and depend on a remote superior officer’s opinion formed in a short visit and you did not have to spend weeks camping. In short, careers were made on the staff and as instructors, not as regimental soldiers.
Lieutenant Colonel I. U. Babar after commanding in Azad Kashmir sector was posted as the Pakistan Armoured Corps Centre and School Commandant and he had Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hassan Khan, who had commanded 5 (Probyn’s) Horse, as his second in command and chief instructor. I attended the Driving and Maintenance Course early in 1956, after completing the course I was detailed to attend the Technical Officers Course, one evening Major Mohammad Umar, the second in command of 13 Lancers after Major Moinuddin left the regiment to command Il Cavalry, was in the officers mess and I boasted that in a few days I would leave to attend the Technical Officers Course and after completing the course would be the most highly qualified officer in Armoured Corps as ” would have qualified every course in the armoured corps and obtained good results. A few days later I was informed that the vacancy on the Technical Officers Course had been surrendered by the regiment and I would not proceed on it. Very soon after this I was posted to the Armoured Corps Centre in the Technical Training Wing as a wireless instructor for recruits.
After three and half years of regimental service in which almost all the winter months had been spent on manoeuvres and on the ranges, the 3rd Armoured Brigade and all of us considered ourselves very highly trained and capable of giving a good account of ourselves on a battle field. The flaws in the training were that there was too much control due to the ‘regimental net’, that there came about a tendency to consider the manoeuvres as the decisive element of the battle rather than the fire light which would automatically follow a manoeuvres, the use of terrain remained poor because villages which provided the necessary cover were out of bounds, the training was carried out in areas which were not canal irrigated therefore the tactical use of canals was not learnt. In fact it hecame a habit with tank crews to avoid cover and to head for open spaces. In the use of the tank armament there was classification of individual gunners, not of tank crows and tank troops. Maps were used to locate the enemy positions and own positions, not to find cover and covered approaches. This is all in retrospect and latter day wisdom.
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Chapter 4
The Technical Training Wing of the Armoured Corps Centre, where I was posted from 13 Lancers consisted of three 1 troops, Driving and Maintenance, Wireless, Gunnery. I was posted to the Wireless Troop, Captain Aziz ur Rehman, originally from 13 Lancers but transferred to 15 Lancers, was in charge of the Driving and Maintenance Troop and Captain ‘Bunty’ Mohammad Sarwar, 11 Cavalry, was in charge of the Gunnery troop.
As troop commanders our job was to give recruits twelve weeks of technical training and pass them out as tank drivers, wireless operators and tank gunners. The recruits who came to us had already completed their basic military training and qualified as wheeled vehicle drivers. The recruits for the Armoured Corps had to have a minimum education up to the sixth class at a time when the infantry and other arms were accepting illiterates. With this education level we had the task of making tank drivers, wireless operators and tank gunners out of people who in their villages had not seen a bicycle. A very good system of training had been evolved in the Indian Army and was followed by the Pakistan Army, the recruits learnt drills and at the end of twelve weeks they could drive tanks or operate the wireless set or load and fire the machine gun and the main gun of the lank. They went to their regiments not as trained soldiers but soldiers who could function in their trade under supervision.
In many ways training recruits was much easier than serving in a regiment, the recruits came in batches to commence their training at the beginning of week, the same programme was repeated for every intake, all training equipment requirements had been worked out and demands for vehicles and tanks were placed according to the programme and the number of trainees on the Vehicle Wing of the Centre. The recruits were divided into the three Armoured Corps trades, tank drivers, wireless operators and gunners, half the number of recruits became tank drivers, and the other half were equally divided into wireless operators and gunners. The best educated became wireless operators because the voice procedure required the knowledge of a little English, the next best educated became tank drivers and the worst educated became tank gunners.
About the time I joined the Centre a half hearted attempt was made to evaluate the technical capability of recruits with tests which consisted of fitting blocks of various shapes in similar shaped spaces, the NCOs who conducted the tests and the recruits who took these tests called them “gutti mutti khilana’. No one knew how to evaluate the results and these tests eventually died a natural death.
The training in the trades of tank crews was not related to tank crew functions, for instance, wireless operators in tank crews load and remove stoppages in the main gun and machine guns but the training of wireless operators did not include this.
A little while after I joined the Technical Training Wing, the designation of ‘wing’ was changed to squadron. Recruit Training Wing became ‘A’ Squadron, Technical Training Wing became ‘B’ Squadron and ‘C’ Squadron was added as a Self Propelled Artillery drivers training squadron. The ‘Boys’ recruitment and training in which boys were enrolled and given education and military training followed by recruit and technical training was abolished in the army and the Boys Wing of the Armoured Corps was disbanded.
These boy recruits’ disciplined and regimented before their recruit training, had the guiles and the tricks of old soldiers and had to be handled in a manner different from soldiers who had been recruited directly, they made very good soldiers, NCOs and JCOS.
Recruits came to the Centre from Army recruitment offices. Army recruitment teams toured the areas froin which the people joined the army as a tradition, selected the men and sent them to the Training Centres. Some recruits were selected and sent by regiments who had selected them either because they had relatives serving in the regiment or were likely to develop into good sportsmen. Regiments competed for the recruits who showed athletic prowess, the JCOs and NCOS of the various regiments, involved in the recruit training, kept a look out for potential athletes and made them ask to be posted to their regiments.
Getting a man recruited in the Armoured Corps through the Centre had the peculiar problem that no matter how well built and healthy the recruit was, he could not pass the medical examination. The medical examiner always declared a recruit who had not come through the Centre’s normal channels medically unfit while skinny, half starved recruits came to us through normal recruitment. Sometimes a recruit with obvious medical shortcomings would be referred back and the
Helical authorities would invariably justify his fitness.
The first Bengali recruits came to the Armoured Corps after I was posted to the Centre. Transported into an alien world where they did not understand the language, bullied by NCOs and JCOs, taught tank driving, wireless and gunnery, things that they had not imagined, they went through the technical training in spite of the language difficulty and performed as well as the recruits from West Pakistan, their only complaint sometimes was when their rice ration was not provided to which they were entitled in lieu of wheat flour issued to West Pakistanis.
Mahsuds from the tribal area were also recruited in the Armoured Corps for the first time at about this time. Their difficulties were almost the same as those of the Bengalis as they also did not understand Urdu and were scantly educated. But Pushto speaking NCOS and JCOs were able to help them and because of this they did not feel as isolated as the Bengalis. Both Bengalis and Mahsuds usually formed groups which kept to themselves.
The Armoured Corps Centre and School with Colonel I. U. Babar in command, Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan Khan, 5 Horse, later Lieutenant General and Chief of Army Staff, as the Chief Instructor, Major ‘Momo’ Mohiuddin, Guides Cavalry, A Squadron (former Recruit Training Wing), Major Mohammad Sher, 11 Cavalry, later lieutenant colonel, B Squadron (former Technical Training Wing), and Major Ghouse Mohiuddin, 13 Lancers, later lieutenant colonel, Vehicle Squadron, were the squadron commanders. Amongst the junior officers Captain Abdul Rahim Khan, Guides Cavalry, later colonel and Captain Shah Rafi Alam, later lieutenant general were in Vehicle Squadron, Captain Agha Javed Iqbal, 5 Horse, later colonel. was the Training Adjutant and Captain Mukhtar Ali Syed, 11 Cavalry, later lieutenant colonel, was the Centre adjutant.
Colonel I. U. Babar had been my commanding oflicer in 13 Lancers. I knew him as a strict disciplinarian and a systematic trainer of troops. On parade he was all business but in the Officers Mess where he came at least three times a week he was a completely different man.
Due to the raising of 12 Cavalry and 15 Lancers in 1955, 20 Lancers in 1956 and 4 Cavalry later, the number of recruits required to be trained had increased considerably and additional NCO instructors had to be called from units. The equipment also changed, new
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wheeled vehicles were received under the Military Aid Programme, the M24 tank and the AN/GRC wireless set, known as the “Angry series’. of wireless sets were also inducted. In the wireless equipment and the M24 tank no formal training of instructors was carried out, for the wireless sets we referred to the excellent manuals and taught ourselves. The new sets were much easier to operate than the No 19 Wireless Set that was being phased out. The SCR 508 and 528 sets which had been removed from the Shermans when they were received in 1953, were brought out and put into use, the operation of this set was slightly more difficult than the AN/GRC 3 and 4.
The two time consuming tasks, in training recruits, were checking of the answer sheets of the finals tests of the trainees and conducting desertion inquires. After painfully reading answer sheets for some time, I devised quiz type answer sheets which could be corrected with a correction sheet with windows for the correct answers. For the desertion court of inquiry, I made out a standard inquiry in which the squadron clerk had to enter the name of the recruit, the dates and the details of the recruits kit which had not been accounted for, I and the members of the inquiry had only to sign and the inquiry was complete.
The routine of the Centre was boring, there was no going on exercises and courses to break the routine. Recruits came, progressed through twelve weeks of training and went to their regiments. No matter how poor the performance of a recruit was we were not allowed to fail him though the rules permitted the transfer of recruits to infantry and other arms, but so much correspondence and explanation was involved that the Centre did not permit any recruit to be failed in the technical training, sometimes a recruit was put back a few weeks but he eventually had to be passed.
Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan, referred to as ‘George’ behind his back, was the former commanding officer of 5 Horse. He was also well known to me because when 5 Horse was in Ojhri Camp, 5 Horse officers used to be in the 13 Lancers mess very often. Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan had a charming personality, charismatic as far as junior officers and the troops were concerned. He had very strong likes and dislikes, the people he liked he collected around him; others he ignored. The young oflicers and other ranks who served under him always gave the impression that he only had to lead them and they would follow him anywhere. I did not find this charisma in any
other officer of the Pakistan Army.
Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan, was a bachelor and dined in the mess. He demanded and ensured an all-round high standard in everything connected with the mess. He decided that the interior decoration of the Armoured Corps Centre mess was not good enough. He had the whole interior of the mess re-decorated using the resources available in the Centre, new lamp shades depicting the uniforms of the Indian Cavalry, copied from Captain Javed Iqbal’s book “Armies of India” were made by an artist employed by the Armoured Corps School, some new furniture was made by a local carpenter, hours went in shifting furniture till ‘George’ was satisfied.
After the mess was redecorated it was decided by Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan that every month there would be a regimental dinner night. These dinners were very formal affairs, in dress, in protocol, in seating, in the number of courses served, the drinks with each course and ending with toasts. After dinner the atmosphere would become completely informal and games would be played till late into the night.
At one of these dinners Captain Shah Rafi Alam, sitting facing Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan coughed covering his mouth with one hand. The colonel ticked him off saying “use your napkin”. Rafi replied “I used my hand”, then he whispered to his neighbour “he asked for it”. Everyone in the room heard the gruff whisper. Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan told Rafi to see him after the dinner. Conversation at the table stopped, the rest of the meal was eaten in pin drop silence, then Rafi and I were asked to report to Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan, who placed the mess out of bounds to Rafi and gave me strict instructions, as Mess Secretary I was not to allow him in the mess, all meals were to be sent to his room. For some days Rafi could be seen sitting on the steps, in front of his room, watching the world go by. After about a fortnight the restrictions were removed.
Having a colonel dining in the mess is always troublesome. 6 Lancers and 11 Cavalry had this problem because Lieutenant Colonel Sahibzada Yakub, later lieutenant general and foreign minister, who when he commanded these regiments, was not married and dined in the messes of these regiments much to the discomfort of the other dining members, because he had a habit of asking questions from the 0117cers who dined with him and they had difficulty answering him. It was said that he asked an officer of 6 Lancers “how many teeth does a
horse have?” To find out the officer went out on the road in Peshawar, stopped a tonga and tried to count the teeth of the tonga pony. In 11 Cavalry, every month there was a rush to buy the Readers’ Digest because Lieutenant Colonel Yakub used to test the vocabulary of the officers dining in the mess from the Digest. Lieutenant Colonel Gul -Hasan did not trouble the officers by asking questions or imposing any restrictions, just his presence in the mess was enough to restrain us. Once we decided not to allow him to sleep in the afternoon. A trumpet was borrowed from the Quarter Guard and it was blown outside his bedroom. He made some inquiries and found that some officers wanted to learn how to play the trumpet. The next day three of us were handed an order stating that we had to attend trumpet classes to be held, after lunch, on the tank firing ranges. It took us some time to convince the adjutant that we had decided not to learn the trumpet.
One Sunday morning we decided to shoot ducks on the Kabul river. Captain Rafi Alam, Captain Samiuddin Ahmed, 19 Lancers, later lieutenant colonel, and I went down into the river and waded in as the duck would only fly along the middle of the river. After spending about two hours we gave up without firing a shot and with muddy shoes and wet clothes decided to go to the mess for breakfast. Since we were not in a fit state we decided to enter through the bar and go to the room adjoining the dining room. We did not expect anyone to be in the mess that early in the morning but as soon as we entered we noticed the colonel sitting quietly in a corner reading a newspaper. We could only wish him good morning and leave. In the summer if a dinner was in the lawn and if the swimming pool was full, the dinner invariably ended with people being thrown in the pool in their dinner jackets. Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan always managed to escape a ducking.
Captain Shah Rafi Alam organised riding with the six horses of the Armoured Corps Centre. Besides Rafi, Captain Aziz and I rode every evening and after Rafi thought we were proficient enough he introduced slow chukkers of polo. I had the choice of two horses, a gray which used to suddenly stop when he was brought near a polo ball and send me flying off his back and another one which was not polo trained. I preferred the latter, I was not good at the game but on this horse I did not fall off. On the evenings that we did not go to the polo ground, we would ride on the road running along the river bank from the Centre to the Nowshera Club, stop at the Club and eat an ice cream and ride back on the Grand Trunk Road. One day, after it had rained a lot, we took the horses and jumped small streams that had formed. After jumping several streams my horse suddenly stopped at once sending me flying into the stream, then the horse ran to the Club and stopped where it used to be tied up every evening. The people sitting in the lawn were quite amused to see the horse arrive riderless and then I arrived completely wet.
In the Armoured Corps these were the days of plenty of everything, tanks, vehicles and ammunition. Captain ‘Bunty’ Sarwar and 1, when the range was allotted to the Centre for recruits training, sometimes used to draw half a truck of tank ammunition, take it to the ranges and fire it off and there were no questions asked. About this time Captain Habib Akbar, 6 Lancers, later brigadier, attended a tank gunnery course in Great Britain where tank gun fire in the artillery role, directed and corrected like artillery guns, using a specially devised fire correction board, was taught and was in use. The board used by the Royal Armoured Corps was for the British tanks and could not be used with our American tanks. The problem of converting the British board or ‘fan’ as it was called, was given to several officers to convert it to the American tanks in the Pakistan Armoured Corps, I was able to make the necessary change. For a time the Armoured Corps considered the employment of tank fire in the artillery role but with the increase of the artillery with the American Military Aid the whole idea died a natural death.
We became used to the routine of the Centre and were reconciled to spending our two years at the Armoured Corps Centre when towards the end of 1956 the atmosphere in the Centre suddenly changed due to a small incident. The mess car, the same one which had received me at the Nowshera railway station, was still driven by the same driver, Salim, from 5 (Probyn’s) Horse; in this incident he drove some wives to the Nowshera market and entered a one way road in the market from the wrong end, the police stopped him, there was an argument, hot words were exchanged and possibly some blows. Salim on returning went immediately and complained that the police had misbehaved with him. In the evening the DSP of the police, in charge of the Nowshera police, came to see Colonel I. U. Babar, who having already heard the mess car driver was very short with the police officer. The police officer put in a complaint against Colonel Babar, I do not know whether an inquiry was held but suddenly Colonel Babar was demoted and posted to command 11 Cavalry and Lieutenant Colonel Gul Hasan was posted to the Armoured Corps Directorate as General Staff Officer Grade I. Colonel I. U. Babar refused to accept the demotion and chose to retire from the Army. Colonel Raja Ghaziuddin Hyder, 19 Lancers, became the Centre Commandant and several adjustments took place, one of the casualties was my horse. Colonel Hyder, liked my horse and took it as his polo pony and finished my riding career.
During this period the light tank M24, Chaffee, and the M47, Patton, were received under the Military Aid Pakistan programme of USA. With the coming of these tanks and wireless sets, a problem in wireless communications and tank gunnery arose. The American VHF wireless sets provided line of sight communications and were based on providing a command net for a troop leader. The squadron commander had his own command net but the troop leaders on his net were on receivers and had to change the frequency to the squadron commander’s command net to reply. The commanding officer communicated with the squadron commanders in a similar manner and squadron commanders had to change the frequency. The Armoured Corps after trials decided to do away with the ‘regimental net’ with a hundred sets operating on one frequency, allowing only one person to speak at a time and adopted the ‘squadron net’ in which the squadron commander could communicate with all his tanks and other vehicles and had direct control over them. On the ‘regimental net the commanding officer was in direct communication with all tanks and vehicular stations. The American system was devised for control at the platoon/troop’ level, the level at which the maximum control was required in battle and each troop net was independent. On the squadron net only one station in the squadron could transmit at one time with its inherent drawbacks, it was good in peace time because it allowed the squadron commander full control.
In gunnery the Pakistan Armoured Corps instead of moving forward and adopting tank gunnery suited to the tank gun with a range finder preferred to retain the gunnery it inherited from the Lee-Grant tank, the elevating hand wheels of tanks were divided into sixteen sectors and numbered for semi-indirect fire’, a relic of the 75 mm gun in the side sponson of the Lee-Grant. No one in the Armoured Corps had been in a tank battle to understand the tank gunnery requirements. An American team came to the Armoured Corps Centre to teach a group of officers and NCOs the driving of the American tanks. The Americans taught us how to start, drive and maintain the tanks, they admitted that
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they did not know the technical aspects of the tank and were not bothered to know them. Very soon after the change of command in the Armoured Corps Centre, the Armoured Corps School was reorganised, it became a lieutenant colonel’s command. The Armour Tactics course was moved from the Staff College at Quetta and the Technical Officers Course was moved from the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Centre at Quetta to the Armoured Corps School. Lieutenant Colonel Aftab Ali, 6 Lancers, became the Officer Commanding Armoured Corps School. In the re-organised Armoured Corps School, a new post called Publications and Trials’ was added and I was posted as the first “Publications and Trials’ officer. I protested against the posting as I had completed about year and a half of my two years posting to the Centre and with the posting to the School I had to start the two years again. I took over the post of Publications and Trials Officer, there were no trials but I had to write training pamphlets which was done by converting the Royal Armoured Corps pamphlets to our requirement.
Due to the nature of my new post I became the ‘odd job man’. In 1957, in the Pakistan Army Rifle Association, in the inter tank reg. iment firing competition I was in charge of setting up of the targets and firing points for the direct fire competition. 13 Lancers troop taking part in the competition was under the charge of Lieutenant Syed Masood Ahmad, later lieutenant colonel. He had been a squadron officer in ‘A’ Squadron, 13 Lancers with me. The troop was to be commanded by Naib Risaldar Mohammad Zarif, later Honorary Captain. I decided to help 13 Lancers win and marked all the firing points and target locations. 13 Lancers practiced from those points and won the 32nd Lancers Cup which had been denied to my troop in 1955 by cheating in the points for command and control after we had hit all the targets.
Every year there used to be a Director Armoured Corps exercise in which technical and tactical innovation in the Corps was discussed and presented for adoption. For the 1958 DAC’s exercise I suggested that forty gallon drums should be carried on the tank, connected to the fuel system for approach marches and there should be a system to jettison the drums in an emergency. At first no one was prepared to believe that it could be done. I showed pictures of Russian T54 and T55 tanks with external fuel tanks to Lieutenant Colonel Aftab Ali, the Commandant of the Armoured Corps School who very reluctantly put up the idea to Colonel Hyder, the Armoured Corps Centre Commandant. It was referred to the Armoured Corps Centre Workshop and the opinion of the officer in charge of the Workshop was sought. Captain Ehsan Bhallee, EME, later lieutenant colonel, was the Workshop officer. He had been in 13 Lancers as OC, LAD and was well known to me. He agreed that it was possible to supply the fuel to the tank by making a small modification to the fuel line. Initial trials were carried with a forty gallon drum tied on the engine cover plate and two men walking behind the tank with fire extinguishers, the trials succeeded. The idea of the modification became the showpiece of the DACs exercise, Colonel Hyder, as the Centre Commandant became the originator of the idea which became a major modification programme of the Armoured Corps. I was never mentioned in connection with the idea and earned an indifferent annual confidential report.
In February 1958, without any previous thought of joining the Special Service Group I volunteered and was selected for service with the SSG. When the posting order came the OC Armoured Corps School, Lieutenant Colonel Aftab Ali tried to dissuade me from going to the SSG by telling me that I had developed a good reputation in the Armoured Corps and may not do well in the SSG, I left in spite of his advice.
Chapter 5
in 1955 the Army called for volunteers to serve in the Special
Service Group (SSG), no details of the Group were given
Lexcept that the volunteers would be required to parachute, the letter brought almost no response and volunteers, only Lieutenant Mahmood Kamal, Guides Cavalry, volunteered from the Armoured Corps. After a while word spread in the Army that a special unit of volunteers had been formed in Cherat where the Boys’ Wing of the Armoured Corps Centre was formerly located, Cherat Cantonment was declared a ‘restricted area’ and no one was allowed to enter it without permission from the SSG Battalion commander.
The forerunner of the SSG was a Frontier Force Regiment, Garrison Company, trained as commandos, originally advised or commanded by Grant Taylor, a Close Quarter Battle expert and an expert pistol shot, later a German officer was the advisor. Second Lieutenant ‘Sully’, Suleman, from the 5th PMA Course, later lieutenant colonel, was posted to it from the PMA and remained with the Garrison Company at Attock till it was amalgamated with 19 Baluch to form the Special Services Group.
After the American Military Aid to Pakistan began, the Americans proposed the creation of a special organisation. It was rumoured that General Ayub, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, asked Lieutenant Colonel Aboobakar Osman Mitha, later major general, Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ghaffar Mehdi, later colonel, and another lieutenant colonel to write papers on the concept and employment of the proposed Special Service Group. Lieutenant Colonel Mitha’s paper was accepted and he was entrusted with the task of the creation of the SSG. (The rumour was not true.) The Americans headed by Colonel Kelly Thompson and a team of about fifteen personnel, some of whom had military rank but mostly civilians, constituted the American training team called USTAMP, which was not under the American Military Aid to Pakistan’ but was controlled directly by the American embassy, which of course meant that the CIA was controlling. The Americans paid the ‘incentive’ allowance that the officers and the men received, two hundred rupees for officers and twenty rupees for ORs, per month,. For troops the Frontier Force Garrison Company and the 19th Battalion of the Baluch Regiment were provided, selected personnel from these two units were retained, Captain Suleman, from the Frontier Force Company, and some officers from 19 Baluch remained with the new organisation. All other officers and the men of these units went back to the regular units of the Army.
At the Armoured Corps Centre we sometimes. saw Lieutenant Colonel A. O. Mitha, in an American station wagon with civil number plates, coming from and going to Cherat, Sometimes Captain Suleman and more often Lieutenant Mahmood Kamal used to turn up in jeeps with civil number plates. Lieutenant Mahmood Kamal and Lieutenant Tariq Kamal, Pakistan Navy, later Admiral and Chief of Naval Staff, used to come to the Armoured Corps Centre mess, spend the evening and disappear during the night. Everybody connected with the SSG acted mysteriously giving the impression that they were on a secret mission. In 1957 some more officers joined the SSG including Captain Shamim Yasin Manto, Guides Cavalry, later brigadier, and Captain Nusrat Ullah, 13 Lancers from the Armoured Corps. The SSG while following the normal army channels of asking for officer volunteers also asked the officers serving in the SSG to obtain the names of friends and regimental officers who were volunteers. In January 1958, Captain Mahmood Kamal came to the Armoured Corps Centre Mess and announced to all and sundry that he was looking for volunteers for the SSG. I put up my hand and sometime later the Armoured Corps School received instructions to send me to the Attock Fort for SSG selection tests. I went to Attock and underwent a test similar to that taken by me at the Inter Services Selection Board. The tests started in the evening with the filling of questionnaires about our background, psychological and mental attitude, memory etc. The next morning a number of leadership group tasks were carried by us followed by a test designed to test the ability to withstand stress. This was followed by a test of agility and fitness by running through an obstacle course and finally an interview by the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel A. O. Mitha. In the interview I was asked if I considered myself capable of marching long distances and withstanding physical hardship, I answered in affirmative. Then I was asked what games I played, and I said that lately I had only been doing some riding, the questions continued along this line and then I was asked what books had I read. I named a few. Then I was asked to name the last book I had read, I named ‘The Legion of the Damned’. I was asked to explain the theme of the book, I did and the interview was over. The trend of the interview with the questions about reading surprised me. I had not met a commanding officer in my six years career who had ever bothered whether I read or not and here the commanding officer of the Special Services Group was questioning me about what I read.
I returned to the Armoured Corps School after the selection tests. Late in March, officers who had taken the selection test with me were ordered to report to Cherat to undergo training, I was not included. Then I received an immediate posting order ordering me to report to Cherat.
Cherat is located on a range of hills, about four thousand feet above sea level, between the Indus and the Kabul rivers. It is a cantonment built for one infantry battalion where, when the British ruled India, British battalions used to spend summers. Since Cherat did not have a train or bus service I telephoned and told the adjutant that I had received the posting order and he sent me a vehicle to take me and my baggage to Cherat. In the joining instructions it was mentioned that I was not to bring my batman, an orderly would be provided to me. Sowar Rasul Khan, who had been my orderly for about five years, had been promoted Acting Lance Daffadar and on completion of his colour service had retired, his replacement went back to 13 Lancers.
On my arrival at Cherat I reported to the battalion headquarters and was interviewed by the battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel A. O. Mitha. The interview was rather short, all the colonel said was that I was to report Captain Manto in ‘H’ Company, that I was to take over the command of a platoon and was to train it. I considered saying that I did not know anything about training commando platoons but then I thought the colonel knew that I did not have any commando training and if he still thought I should train a platoon, I should do it.
At the ‘H’ Company office Captain Manto, Guides Cavalry, 6th PMA Course, later brigadier, briefed me. I was to wear skeleton web equipment, from the first parade to the games parade I was to move at the double when going from one place to another, that every morning there would be PT except on Saturdays, that on Wednesdays there would be five mile run with the ’08’ pack, on Saturdays there would be a fifteen miles route march with full field service marching order’ and every evening, except Saturdays there would be games. Captain
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Manto then took me in his jeep a little distance on a track leading out of Cherat and indicated an area about three hundred feet below the road level and told me that it was my training area. Next I was introduced to the platoon that I was to train and in the process, get my own training. The men were volunteers and had been selected from all over the army, the incentives were the monetary allowance, certain deviations from the time honoured army routines and methods such as no roll calls. The men did not march in bodies to their place of duty and the most appreciated privilege was of being allowed to proceed on weekend leave by signing out and signing in on return. There were about forty men in the platoon, for some reason there was no Junior Commissioned Officer or a havaldar, the senior most NCO was a naik. I appointed him as the platoon havaldar and my second in command, and appointed other NCOs, according to their seniority, in charge of sections.
The training started with basic fieldcraft training and night training in stalking, this was followed by patrolling, then selection and occupation of hideouts. Night training would start about eight o’clock at night, continue till about three o’clock in the morning and the next morning would be off till eleven. I liked this because the only time I hated the army was in the morning when I had to get up early and go on
PT.
The Cherat hills were very steep, covered with wild olive bushes and were full of snakes, vipers around Cherat and kraits in the foot hills. In one stalking exercise at night I was going down-hill, holding bushes and feeling for foot holds, and while I was hanging from a bush a snake went over my chest touching my neck and I could feel it passing over me.
In the selection and occupation of hideouts, I was told to move my platoon to within a given area and hide there for three days, cooking our own food and the Demonstration Company’ who acted as the enemy in exercises, would search for us. If an officer got caught by the enemy 44 he had to pay a fine to the ‘Demo Company’men, a chit was signed and handed over to whoever was the commander and the amount was charged in the mess bill, besides this the ‘Demo Company’ men would dance a bhangra around the officer. We moved out of Cherat in the evening with all the things that we thought would be necessary, early in the morning we stopped in an area we considered safe, when the
sun came up we found that the area was open and we could be seen from miles around and decided to have our morning meal and move out. Captain Jaffer Shah, Corps of Engineers, later lieutenant colonel, was my umpire, we were sitting side by side when a small little krait snake came and started striking at Jaffer Shah’s boot toe. I noticed it first and was watching it repeatedly striking the toe of Jaffer Shah’s boot when Jaffer Shah noticed me staring at his boot, he looked down, saw the snake about to strike him and made the most spectacular jump backwards from a sitting position. On this exercise the Demo Company found our hide-out but they did not find me, I hid in a nullah bed when the attack alarm went. In the next exercise of this kind that we went out, we shed a lot of things that we had taken on the first outing, each individual worked out what his necessities were on an exercise and made his own arrangements. Weapons, communication equipment etc had to be carried according to the assigned mission.
As the training progressed, the number of men decreased every week, most of them quitting because they found that they did not have the physical endurance required. When I started the training, I did not own a pair of ariny boots because in the Armoured Corps we mostly wore rubber-soled shoes. I had not been on a route march after leaving the PMA, on the first route march I wore a pair of half Wellingtons and my feet blistered, I then bought a pair of army boots, broke them in and got used to wearing army boots again.
When we completed three months training, all platoons were given a test exercise, I was given the demolition of a bridge located on the Grand Trunk Road near the Kamra airfield. I was called from the games parade in the evening and given the mission, the only information given was that the bridge over the Indus was guarded. I assembled my platoon, briefed them and we moved out after having the evening meal, after marching all night we stopped about five miles from the Attock road cum rail bridge. I sent scouts to check how the bridge was guarded and to explore the availability of boats. My scouts returned and reported that all trucks were being stopped and searched and that the river was in high floods with no boats available. Since no vehicular traffic was permitted at night over the Attock bridge, my only alternative was the railway. We moved to the Khairabad railway station and waited for a train to stop, late at night a goods train stopped, I went to the locomotive and talked the driver into stopping at the Attock station
across the bridge, this way we crossed the Indus. ‘E’ Company, located at Attock Fort, was to act as our enemy and Captain Mirza Aslam Beg, later general and Chief of Army Staff, was to act as our umpire.
After the umpire joined us and we had given the map reference of our – location, the enemy found us and we had to shift our hideout. I carried
out a reconnaissance of the bridge, and we attacked. The attack was deemed successful and I was ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Mitha to report back at Cherat. We were not supposed to move during the day but calculating that the enemy would not venture out in the late afternoon of the summer I marched the platoon towards Cherat hoping to reach the foothills of Cherat in daylight. On the way my platoon was ambushed, after we scattered the enemy started shouting and asking us to stop running. Cautiously we contacted the men who had ambushed us and found it was a platoon of ‘H’ Company, also on a test exercise like us, and had ambushed us as joke. Captain Humayun Malik, 6 Lancers, later brigadier, was the platoon commander and he reminded me innumerable times about this ambush. After the ambush both the platoons marched together, all night we could see the red light over the PAF radio antenna in Cherat, all night it seemed around the next bend but we only reached it when dawn was breaking.
During our basic training a leopard started coming to Cherat. One night my dog chained outside my room, started barking in a manner which indicated that something was disturbing her seriously, I opened the door, looked and saw a leopard lying on the compound wall and looking into the compound, when I stepped outside it dropped off the wall on to the road and disappeared. A few days later it came again and again my dog raised an alarm, this time she was chained outside my bedroom, she broke her collar, scratched the bedroom door and barked, when I opened the door, she came in quickly. A few days later, one night when I was walking to the mess, an animal darted out of the bushes, crossed the road and disappeared. Sometime later news came that the leopard had killed a cow on the track leading to Cherat from Ziarat Kaka Sahib, Captain Humayun Malik and I went on the track and found the kill, the rear portion of the cow had been eaten, we considered sitting and waiting for the leopard to return but thought better of
• The test exercise marked the end of our ‘basic’ training and I was posted out of ‘H’ Company to a pool of officers. Because of my senior
ity I was causing an upset, Captain Suleman who had been with the old commando company for about six years and Captain Imtiaz Ali Khan, 5th PMA course, later major general, who had joined the SSG a year before me and were expecting to become majors with me and Major S. A. R. Durrani, Frontier Force, later brigadier and Governor Baluchistan, two vacancies were taken up by us and Imtiaz and Suleman were not promoted. Major Riaz, a 19 Baluch officer, was posted out which created a vacancy for Captain Imtiaz but to accommodate Captain Suleman I had to be gotten rid of. First I was tested for physical endurance, I was given a pack with a heavy load and had to march down the Cherat-Pabbi road about five or six miles out and back, then Captain Manto was detailed to march with me, he did so at a fast pace and I kept up with him. Next when ‘G’ and ‘H’ companies went for watermanship training, their company commanders did not accompany their companies, these companies and all the officers who had completed their basic training with me, were sent for the watermanship training at the canal at Sarai Alamgir, under my charge, Major Durrani, the senior most officer who had done the basic training with us was not included. The men moved by train while the officers moved by a truck which also carried the tentage, the camping paraphernalia was heavily over loaded, we made the Attock to Jhelum run at night and were not checked by the military police. The training was conducted according to the programme given by the battalion headquarters to end with a night crossing of the canal by all officers and men, irrespective of whether they could swim or not. Without warning the Second in Command of the Battalion, Major Aslam, with the company commanders of the two companies and Captain Suleman turned up at the camp and watched the canal crossing, there was no mishap and they returned to Cherat. After we returned there was some talk of my not controlling officers thereby causing ill feeling amongst them. A few days after the watermanship training, a major was posted out of the battalion, Imtiaz, Suleman and I were promoted majors and the atmosphere cleared.
After the watermanship, those officers who had just completed their basic training were made to do compass marches individually over long distances, with only the distance and the bearing given. After marching on bearing for eight or ten miles at night, you had to be within a hundred yards or so of the point that you had to reach for the guide marking the destination to acknowledge that you had arrived correctly at the check point. If you did not arrive at the check point you had to report at a prominent landmark and receive fresh instructions. After reporting to the guide you had to hide for the day, cooking your own food, the ‘Demo company’, as usual, acted as the enemy. I was caught twice, both times when I lit a fire to cook. I signed the note giving the date and time and then made ‘Demo company’ men cook ‘chapattis’ for me because I found that I could not. One night when I was doing a compass march across a sandy desert, in the Attock-Campbellpur area at night, in an uninhabited area, I suddenly became conscious of bells tinkling very faintly. I stopped to listen, the sound stopped, I took a step forward and again heard the tinkling, I stopped again and the tinkling stopped. I wondered what there was but was determined not to lose my bearing and continued a few steps at time, the tinkling got louder, then I came across a fence made of thorn bushes with cattle enclosed in the fenced area and the herdsmen were waiting for me alerted by the bells tied to the animals. When they saw me and found out that I was from the army, they wondered where I was going alone at that time of the night.
In the last quarter of 1958, I was given the task of visiting the units of the 1st Armoured Division and units located in Rawalpindi, Campbellpur and Mansar Camp, to address the men, explaining the requirements and the benefits of service in the SSG and taking down the names of volunteers for service with the SSG. Most unit commanders accepted the orders of the General Headquarters and raised no objections while a small number considered it an insult for a man to volunteer for the SSG and made things difficult for the officer asking for the volunteers and for those who volunteered, but the job had to be done.
I was in Rawalpindi on October 8, 1958, when Martial Law was declared. The ofticers of the 1st Armoured Division, that I met on the morning after the declaration of the Martial Law, described the dilemma that the commanding officers of units faced when they received the orders to deploy their units to displace the government. All of them knew that what they were being asked to do was not a ‘lawful command’ but they could not disobey the orders they had received because their superiors were giving the orders. As soon as it was known that the coup had succeeded, the initial fears were forgotten and everyone
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went about their ways of ‘sorting out the civilians who had ruined the country’. The commander SSG, Lieutenant Colonel A. O. Mitha had an order issued from the Chief of General Staff’s office that the SSG officers and men could not be employed on Martial Law duties.
All the officers who had joined the SSG with us and another batch selected after us, started our advance commando course together, this course was run by the Americans, the working week was reduced to five days with Saturdays and Sundays off. When volunteering we had understood that we were volunteering for commando operations behind enemy lines, at the start of the course we were informed that we would be trained for stay behind operations in case Pakistan was over run by an enemy country, this meant conducting guerrilla opera
tions and establishing an escape channel for Allied aircrews shot down Lover occupied areas. When we were informed, everyone was shocked, – but the effect wore off and we adjusted to the idea. The American meth
ods of training were excellent, films illustrated the main points and methods, the training exercises were well devised and everyone’s actions were critiqued in detail. At the end of the course a two week exercise was held in which an army unit acted as the enemy while we Lacted as the stay behinds. I was an area commander with Captain
Khwaja Naseem Iqbal as my second in command, Major S. A. R. Durrani, was the other area commander, on the whole, the exercise as all exercises are, was a success. During the exercise Lieutenant Colonel Mitha visited my hideout twice, the first time he spent a night with us and noticing that I had brought some books with me, asked me how 1 organised my reading, when I told him that my reading was not planned he told me how reading should be planned and organised, I found his advice very useful and have followed it since then. On the second visit I earned his displeasure because I had pulled in my outposts because it was raining and I considered that enemy would not move about in the rain. I was told that special service men were not made of sugar and would not melt if they got wet.
During the advance commando course we were supposed to get Saturdays and Sundays oll but on alternate weekends we were detailed to go to Attock where the men whose names we had collected as volunteers were called on weekends for selection tests, acted as the president of the selection board and we gave the volunteers a test almost the same as we had taken when we had volunteered.
Lach man selected was fit to be, at least, a platoon commander, he had to have a certain level of education and had to be physically fit. As soon as we returned after the final exercise after the advance commando course, an order was issued for the raising of three new companies, J, K, and L, and I was named as the ‘T’ Company Commander. I received the list of my platoon commanders, the duration of the basic training, a training programme and the list of volunteers. The company started with over two hundred NCOs and ORs including about sixty Pathan tribesmen, volunteers from the Scouts. My platoon commanders were Captain Abdul Hameed Dogar, 11 Cavalry, later brigadier, No 1 Platoon, Captain Amir Mohammad Khan, Punjab Regiment, later brigadier, No 2 Platoon and Captain Mohammad Khurshid Afridi, 15 Lancers, later lieutenant colonel, No 3 Platoon, the company senior JCO was Naib-Subedar Zardad Khan, later Subedar Major. I found that quite a number of the Scouts volunteers did not speak Urdu so I pooled them into one platoon under the command of Captain Afridi and put all the Pushto speaking men from the army under his command. The SSG had recently been equipped with American weapons and the new companies were to be trained in the use of these weapons. No other instructions were issued.
On the raising day of the company I collected the men on the parade ground and formed them into platoons, assigned platoon commanders and appointed Havaldar Major Manzur, an Army physical training instructor, as the Company Havaldar Major (CHM), Daffadar Murtaza Shah, 4th Cavalry, who had been my Tank Gunnery instructor when I attended the Gunnery Instructors Course, the Company Quartermaster Havaldar (CQMH) and made other company appointments, I next explained to the men what was expected of them, how they were to conduct themselves, that during the training personnel irrespective of their rank would be placed in command, that during training they were free to leave whenever they chose to and could go back to their units and that at the end of the training we would only retain the number of men that were required.
1 carried out the same training as we had underyone with ‘H’ Company during our basic training. For the training in the American weapons, volunteers were called forward to study the weapon manual and run classes with the platoon commanders to help the volunteers in the interpretation of the English weapon manual for the preparation
of the lesson in Urdu. At first only those who had some knowledge of English volunteered, when they successfully ran classes some others asked that since they could not read English, if the lesson could be explained to them in Urdu they would conduct it, and they did. As the men conducted their own training, under the supervision of their platoon commanders, they became more and more confident of their own capabilities. In the first few weeks there was a large number of men who gave up because they did not have the necessary physical endurance but gradually the attrition rate decreased. In the tactical training the men were given commands of sections and platoons by turns and their confidence and the ability to think, command and control improved. It was noticeable that the men from the Scouts were more original in their thinking, planning and had a better command capability.
During the basic training of ‘T’ Company I had some trouble with Captain Dogar who was commanding No 1 Platoon, my instructions to all platoon commanders were that the men would be restricted to a water bottle of water, between sunrise and sunset, when I went to Dogar’s platoon I found that he had allowed his men to go to fetch water during the day, I warned him, when I went again I found that he had again allowed some men to go to re-fill their water bottles during the day, I removed him from the command of the platoon and ordered an NCO to take over the command. Captain Dogar requested to see the commanding officer, we went to the Battalion Headquarters where I informed the commanding officer about what had happened and what I had done. Lieutenant Colonel Mitha heard me out called Captain Dogar and dressed him down for disobeying orders and setting a bad example and told him to go back to his platoon, Captain Dogar asked for a transfer which was refused. After Captain Dogar left, the commanding officer told me that Dogar was a good officer, he had done something wrong but I had been too harsh with him. Captain Dogar remained a platoon commander under me for three years and later was a squadron commander in 22 Cavalry, under me, and we became the best of friends.
One of the exercises of the company was in an area which had orchards of plums with trees loaded with nearly ripe plums hanging about four feet from the ground, I warned the company that they were to keep their hands off the trees, when the exercise finished I asked them whether they had touched the trees and they assured me that they
had not, I told them that I did not believe them they replied that they had kept their hands off the trees but eaten the fruit directly from the trees.
On one exercise in the area of Jallozai, about ten miles from Cherat, one of my platoons lost a binocular, the man who had been issued the binocular put it on the ground to drink water from a stream and left it there. At the end of the exercise when we checked equipment, the binocular was missing, the man concerned remembered that he had put it on the ground while drinking water, a party was sent to the place but the binocular was not there. Search parties were organised, all routes were back tracked and the binocular was not found, I and the company marched back to Cherat and while the company deposited weapons I reported to the Commanding Officer that we had lost a binocular, he told me to take the company back to the area where we had been training and not to return without the binocular. We marched back to Jallozai and again sent out search parties, that evening Captain Afridi told me that one the Mahsuds in his platoon wanted to see me and wanted to suggest a method of finding the binocular. A short young Mahsud from the Khyber Rifles named Khoon Wazir, came and suggested that ‘nst ad of physically searching for the binocular we should have it announced in all the schools that the binocular was missing and that the informant would be awarded. The next morning, in the area where we had trained, all the children were informed, in a few hours one came forward and told us where the binocular was kept, in a neighbour’s house, we collected the binocular, paid the award and returned to Cherat. After this the company did not lose anything while I commanded it.
At the end of the ‘T’ Company basic training, a test exercise was set by the commanding officer in which the trainee platoons had to march to Mansehra area to attack targets, more of an endurance test than anything else. After the exercise the final non-volunteers left and others whose discipline and fitness was doubtful were sent back. Amongst the Scouts volunteers a lot of men went back because they said that they had only volunteered for three months and had no intentions of joining the Pakistan Army. From the Scouts, those who were finally selected were inducted into the Baluch Regiment, enrolled in their existing ranks and received the benefits of their lengths of service etc. Amongst these Scouts personnel selected were four Mahsuds, Khoon Wazir, who later changed his name to Khan Wazir, was their leader, three of them were almost totally illiterate, they were selected with the understanding that they would pass the minimum education requirement of Second Class Roman Urdu and Second Class Map Reading within six months. After being selected the cour Mahsuds would sit under a tree, in the summer afternoon, and the fourth Mahsud, who was matriculate would teach them, this continued till all of them passed the required examinations. Khan Wazir served for about nineteen years in the SSG and retired as a subedar.
I had now served in the SSG for over a year in which I had commanded and trained a platoon, attended the advanced commando course and raised a new company. I found the working atmosphere very congenial though a certain amount of politics went on in inducting new officers and selection of staff officers. From the beginning I had got on very well with Lieutenant Colonel Mitha. He was commissioned in 1943 in the Bombay Grenadiers, served on the Burma Front during the Second World War, after independence he was posted to the 8 Punjab Regiment, he went to the Staff College and was Brigade Major with Brigadier Abdul Hamid, later general and Chief of Army Staff. He knew Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan, later general, Commander in Chief and President, from GHQ, India. When I joined the SSG Major General Yahya was the Chief of General Staff (CGS) and Brigadier Yaqub, later lieutenant general and foreign minister was the VCGS. As a lieutenant colonel, Mitha raised and commanded 9/8 Punjab, served in GHQ in the Military Training Directorate and commanded the Physical Training School, in 1955 he was selected to raise and command the SSG. In organising and training the SSG he held discipline, endurance, and initiative as the basic requirements for a commando. To inculcate discipline and initiative certain army restrictions on soldiers like marching under a senior when moving from one location to another, roll call, weekend leave by signing out were introduced and were valued by the men who had been highly regimented in original units. Lapses in discipline were not tolerated, prompt reduction in rank, twenty, eight days rigorous imprisonment and ‘returned to unit’ (RTU) were awarded. In the training of the commando companies the company commanders were given a fairly free hand in planning and execution, the annual leave was planned on a company basis so that companies could train as companies and not in bits and pieces. Company commanders had to get their company train
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ing plans approved two weeks in advance, the SSG Headquarters were responsible to provide the facilities required for training after the purpose, plan, etc had been approved. In certain ways Lieutenant Colonel Mitha’s training methods were unique, an officer who was reported by his company commander as irresponsible at times, was sent on reconnaissance, with his platoon, to the tribal area where he was completely responsible for his platoon with the tribesmen on lookout for security lapses. When he discovered that Captain Khurshid Afridi could not and would not learn to swim, he ordered him to have a raft constructed, take two other men with him and float the raft from Attock Fort to the mouth of the Indus, Captain Afridi was recalled when he reported his arrival at Sukkur. On the whole the SSG as trained and organised by Lieutenant Colonel Mitha was a very happy, confident and aggressive organisation. After the end of the basic training ‘T’ Company moved down to Attock Fort and by virtue of being the senior officer in the Fort, I became the Attock Fort commander, responsible for the administration and discipline of the troops stationed in the fort. Lieutenant Colonel Mitha called me and told me that I would be the senior officer in Attock Fort, I would be responsible for administration and discipline, the training of the other companies was the responsibility of their company commanders, the Fort administrative staff would be under my control, that construction work was in progress in the Fort and in dealing with the Military Engineering Services (MES), I should be careful and not accept any favours from the MES.
Attock Fort on the bank of the Indus was built to guard against invaders coming to India through the Khyber Pass, Emperor Akbar while defending his empire against his brother had spent some time in the Fort, after the rail and the road bridge was built it became very important and a British battalion was stationed there but it was reputed to be a punishment station. The fort had its own generator which generated DC electricity, it had running water, barracks had fans and electric lighting, when I went to the Fort the DC electrical system was being replaced with alternating current from the main grid line. The main gate of the fort opened on the Grand Trunk Road, across the road there were two barracks of excellent bachelor accommodation, an officers’ mess and some wooden huts built during the Second World War for officers’ accommodation.
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Chapter 10
My posting to 3 Commando Battalion in East Pakistan
came granting me one month’s leave before proceeding
Ito East Pakistan. Major Akhtar Mahmud Khawaja, 5 Horse, on promotion to lieutenant colonel was to relieve me which he did promptly. The usual farewell parties were held, when I finally went to the regiment to say goodbye to all ranks, the regiment was out in a training camp. I shook hands with all ranks present, the last man being the risaldar major who had always maintained a little distance after I had given him a warning, he shook hands with me and said I was the only officer he had known who had not taken anything from the regiment. This was the strangest compliment that was ever paid to me.
I expected to stay in East Pakistan for about a year, so my wife and I decided not to take our furniture, to sell our old Volkswagon car and get a new one in East Pakistan. We left our furniture and baggage in the custody of 22 Cavalry and the car with my younger brother Major Shamim Alam who sold it for five thousand rupees.
While on leave I got in touch with the Commander SSG Brigadier Sherullah Beg who asked me to come to Cherat before leaving for East Pakistan. I went to Cherat and was given a briefing about 3 Commando Battalion, it was said that an unfortunate incident had occurred and no one was to blame. In Rawalpindi I learnt that the report about the incident in Chittagong had reached the Commander-in-Chief and President General A. M. Yahya Khan when all the generals had collected for the annual formation commanders’ conference, he was very annoyed and had ordered 3 Commando Battalion to be disbanded, later Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, Commander Eastern Command, and Major General A. O. Mitha talked him out of it. On my way to East Pakistan stopped a night at Major General Mitha’s house in Rawalpindi and he told me that in commanding 3 Commando Battalion I should not do anything that would break the spirit of the battalion. It was a good, correct and timely advice.
On arrival at Dacca I was met by Lieutenant Colonel Nusrat Ullah who was AA&QMG at the Eastern Command Headquarters and whom
I had informed of my arrival, he received me at the airport, took me to his house and put me up. He informed me that I had to see Commander Eastern Command before leaving for Commilla where 3 Commando Battalion was located. The next day I saw Lieutenant General Yaqub and he said that he was giving me six months to straighten out 3 Commando Battalion.
3 Commando Battalion was stationed in Chittagong cantonment. In April 1970, Brigadier Sherullah Beg carried out the annual inspection of the unit and gave a holiday for the good performance of the unit in the inspection. After the inspection Lieutenant Colonel Shams-ulHaq with Brigadier Sherullah Beg left for Dacca from where the brigadier was to fly to West Pakistan and most of the officers went on leave on the holiday. Some men went to the city, two made sexual advances to some boys in the Chandni Chowk Market. The boys who were from a school near the market, spoke about it to other boys and men, a crowd collected and surrounded about eight men of the battalion who were in the market and a fight started. One of the men from the battalion who saw what was going on, telephoned the battalion duty officer and told him that some men had been surrounded by a crowd and a fight was going on. Major Abdul Mannan, the senior officer present, detailed Captain Sajjad Akbar and ten men with weapons and ammunition to go to the Chandni Chowk market and extricate the men. Captain Sajjad arrived at the market and surrounded the crowd, a little later a police detachinent arrived and surrounded the commandos, the district commissioner and the press also reached the scene. The commissioner talked to the press, including some foreign reporters, and the news that there had been a fight between the army and civilians was published in the local and international papers. The immediate action taken by the army was to shift 3 Commando Battalion to Commilla where it was placed under the administrative command of the 53 Brigade Commander Brigadier Iqbal Shafi, and under command of 14 Division. 53 Brigade Headquarters, its two infantry battalions, 4 Field Regiment and supporting Signal, Engineer, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers etc were located in Commilla, one battalion of the brigade was in Chittagong and the fourth one was in Sylhet. 3 Commando Battalion was given three barracks and vacant family accommodation of an infantry battalion for unit accommodation.
3 Commando Battalion was a battalion of two commando companies, (1 and 2 Commando Battalions in West Pakistan had three companies each ) a headquarters platoon, a signal platoon and frogman platoon. Personnel posted to East Pakistan had to serve there for two years, in 3 Commando Battalion this was done by rotating a company and half of the other personnel every two years which meant that half the battalion was rotated every year. When I joined the battalion it consisted of Ebrahim Company, commanded by Major Salman Ahmad, later colonel, which was due to return to West Pakistan at the end of the year, Hamza Company commanded by Major Abdul Mannan, later a minister in Bangladesh, the frogman platoon was commanded by Subedar Ramzan, later subedar major, Captain Sajjad Akbar, later major, and Captain Khokhar later brigadier, were the adjutant and quartermaster, respectively, there was no second in command, each platoon was commanded by a captain. The commanding officer of 3 Commando Battalion was Lieutenant Colonel Shams-ul-Haq Choudhry, SJ, from my course, on whose appointment as the commanding officer of 3 Commando Battalion I had asked to be reverted to the Armoured Corps from 2 Commando Battalion.
I arrived in Commilla and found that Lieutenant Colonel Shamsul-Haq Choudhry had gone to Rangamati and Chittagong on his farewell round and left word for me to join him in Chittagong at the address where he was staying and I was to stay there also. I drove to Chittagong and had a lot of difficulty in locating the address that had been given. While trying to locate the address, I inadvertently met Lieutenant Commander Mukhtar Azam, PN, later rear admiral, who was posted as the local Inter Services Intelligence Officer, he was a friend of my younger brother Lieutenant Shamoón Alam Khan, PN, later vice admiral. With great difficulty the address given by Lieutenant Colonel Shamsul Haq was located, sometime later he arrived with the host, Major Petafi who represented the Pakistan Ordnance Factory in Chittagong. I was informed that there was farewell party in the Chittagong Club and I was invited. That night the party went on till late at night, I was introduced to a lot of people, businessmen, officers from tea estates, some army officers. The next day I went to Rangamati, saw the detachment of frogmen training under Subedar Ramzan and returned to Commilla.
In Commilla the handing and taking over was scheduled over sev
eral days, I did not hurry it. Finally there was a big party with a band from Chittagong, a few officers from the Commilla garrison were invited but there were a lot of civilian friends of Lieutenant Colonel Shams-ul-Haq from Chittagong, dancing and singing went on till late at night. The dining out party of an outgoing officer is hosted by his relieving officer, this party was arranged before my arrival and there were no expenses, only the premises of the 3 Commando Officers Mess were used, apparently someone had borne all the expenses.
On the first day of my command of 3 Commando Battalion when I asked for my jeep to go somewhere, the driver brought the vehicle and parked it outside my office, when I entered the vehicle he did not salute, though he was standing on the side from which I got into the jeep. When I questioned him he did not have an answer, I gave him twenty eight days rigorous imprisonment on the spot. After completing his punishment he asked to be reverted to his parent unit and I reverted him.
The change in command of 3 Commando Battalion and the change of the subedar major of the battalion had coincided. Subedar Gul Zamir, 1 Commando Battalion, originally from the Ordnance Corps, had come from West Pakistan and relieved Subedar Major Mannan who left before I was officially in command.
While taking over the command I had gone around the area and the buildings that the battalion occupied. The barracks occupied by the battalion had been taken from an infantry battalion and the offices, stores etc were housed in the other ranks family quarters. While going around with Lieutenant Colonel Shams-ul-Haq I saw a civilian locked up in the quarter guard, I asked why he was locked up and was told that he had been found loitering around. One of the first things did after Lieutenant Colonel Shams-ul-Haq left was to tell the adjutant to hand over the man in the quarter guard to the Field Intelligence Unit (FIU). Later in the day, on my first day in command, Subedar Major Gul Zamir came to my office at about mid-day and reported that along with the man locked up in the quarter guard, there had been another man who had also been taken into custody by the detachment in Rangamati, he had died while being interrogated and the body had been disposed off in the Kaptai Lake.
The procedure for dealing with suspected enemy agents called for handing them over to the field Intelligence Unit or the police, they were
not supposed to be interrogated or kept locked up in the unit guardroom. In the next few days, almost daily, I was informed that various intelligence units were buzzing around the unit looking for some information, then the officer commanding the FIU telephoned and asked me that in Rangamati two men had been apprehended by the SSG detachment and asked for the whereabouts of the second man. I put him off and telephoned 14 Division Headquarters for permission to come to Dacca to report something which could not be discussed on the telephone. The next day I went to Dacca, met the General Officer Commanding 14 Division, Major General Khadim Raja, and told him that the battalion detachment in Rangamati had apprehended two men and had killed one of them.
Later I learnt that Captain Khokhar was in Rangamati with the frogmen detachment, the detachment was in a government rest house whose grounds were overlooked by a road, they were doing some training and these two men stood and watched the training, the frogmen noticed them and apprehended them as spies. Instead of handing them over to the police Captain Khokhar and the frogmen decided to interrogate them themselves. The men were taken into the rest house, one of them was hung by his feet and chillies were burnt near his face, the man died. The frogmen took the body, wrapped a fishing net around it, weighed it down and dropped it in the middle of Kaptai Lake. The chowkidar of the rest house had witnessed the whole proceedings, he reported the affair to the District Commissioner Rangamati who sent a report to the government, authorities. Apparently Lieutenant Colonel Shams-ul-Haq learnt about it, went to Rangamati but decided to keep quiet about the affair.
After taking over the command I met Brigadier Iqbal Shafi, the Station Commander. He was not happy with the Commando battalion being stationed in Commilla and not placed under his command. He told me to take over the duties of Martial Law in Commilla District, I objected to being given Martial Law duties and said that I had a command which would require my full attention. I also told him that SSG officers were exempt from Martial Law duties, but he insisted that I had to take them over till i produced the authority exempting me.
Talking to the officers I found out that Lieutenant Colonel Shamsul-lly had beon on Martial Law duties and land used the battalion quarter guard to lock up labour leaders etc and the personnel of the
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battalion to interrogate and intimidate civilians, this developed arrogance and a false sense of superiority in the men. Two incidents took place in the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) within a week of my taking over the command. In one a soldier went to the hospital when he was given his medicine, he said that he wanted another medicine, when it was refused he threw the medicine he had been given and walked out. In the second incident, two men went to the hospital in a jeep, the hospital was located on the outer perimeter of Commilla cantonment with the Commilla-Dacca road in between, there were two gates to the hospital, for some reason the nearer gate had been locked by the hospital authorities and the distant gate was used for entering and exiting. The two men lifted the nearer gate, threw it on the side of the road and drove in. Both incidents were reported to me and I had to take disciplinary action.
In a few days I had made an assessment of the state of the battalion, they had walked tall and proud in Chittagong, they had the backing of Martial Law and there was nobody to stop them from doing anything, suddenly they were in disgrace. They were hurriedly moved from Chittagong where the battalion was stationed since it had come to East Pakistan, they were restricted to Commilla cantonment and were only allowed to visit Commilla city on duty or in organised bodies on holidays. I talked to the battalion and told them wearing a red beret, a commando insignia on the shirt, swaggering and being undisciplined did not make commandos. To be called commandos they had to be better soldiers than the rest of the army, this required superior professional knowledge, skill and a very high standard of discipline. It was for the army and the country to point them out as the best soldiers, as the elite of the army, as commandos, it was not for them to claim being superior.
About a month after I had arrived in Commilla, a letter arrived informing me that my wife and children were to reach Dacca the next day. This put me in a fix. I had planned an exercise for that day and a MI 8 helicopter was to come in the evening to airlift the platoon being exercised. I solved the problem by flying to Dacca, receiving my family and flying them to Commilla in the helicopter. About a month later I received a letter asking for an explanation why I had flown my family in an army helicopter, I explained what had happened and heard nothing more about it.
About the time my family arrived in Commilla, 3 Commando Battalion was afflicted with dhobi’s itch’, this was something that had been taught to us as cadets in hygiene when we were cadets and I had forgotten all about it. I noticed that some officers while talking to me would suddenly ask to be excused and run, I had seen some men scratching their private parts vigorously, somehow our Regimental Medical Officer Captain Rehman did not take any notice of the situation, eventually I also got it and had to go to the hospital and have a purple lotion applied. Major Hussain, an officer in the CMH who had been our medical officer at Attock Fort, explained what it was and why it was spreading. The next day I inspected the ‘dhobi ghat’ where the battalion dhobi washed the battalion’s clothes. The ghat consisted of about ten concrete troughs in which clothes were supposed to be washed, the dhobi was using only one of them, he had filled it with water and everyday washed the clothes in dirty water which had green moss. A man was detailed to ensure that the trough was changed everyday and filled with clean water. It took about two weeks for everyone to recover.
I soon had everything under control, normal training and exercises were carried out, the only problem was that if anything went wrong in the cantonment, 3 Commando had to prove that they were not to blame. Major General A. O. Mitha, the Quartermaster General, while on a visit to East Pakistan visited the battalion and spoke to the officers. I explained to the general that the major hardship of service in East Pakistan was that officers and the men could not afford to go to West Pakistan when they had trouble at home. I told him that in 1965 I had gone on a course to the United States and there all armed services personnel were allowed to travel by air, on a fill up basis, that is, all seats leftover were given to armed services personnel at half the cost. I suggested that if this could be done between East and West Pakistan, for service personnel, it would be a big help. Some months later inter wing movement of troops was changed from ships to chartered air lights, warrants for travel by air were introduced, and personnel travelling on leave could travel at half price.
After I had been in command for about two months the SSG Group Commander Brigadier Sherullah Beg informed me that he would be coming on an inspection visit. On the appointed date he with his GSO 2, Major Iqbal Nazir Waraich, later brigadier, arrived and stayed
three days. I fully briefed him on all that had happened since I had taken over the command, he witnessed an exercise and went around the battalion. At that time I was limping with a problem in one of my ankles. He went back to Cherat and about ten days later I received a letter informing me that the Group Commander was not satisfied with the state of the battalion and my physical condition and warning me that he would place me on an adverse report if things did not improve. The letter came as surprise and shock to me and after thinking it over I telephoned Eastern Command and asked for a interview with Lieutenant General Yaqub which was granted.
I went to Dacca and was waiting in the office of Lieutenant Colonel Nusrat Ullah, the AA&QMG, when my adjutant telephoned from Commilla to inform me that the Frogman Platoon in Rangamati had beaten up a police officer. A little later I was called by the Commander Eastern Command, Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, I informed him that I had received a letter giving me a warning for an adverse report. The general asked for the letter, read it, told me to forget it and carry on. I then told him what had happened in Rangamati. He asked me what I was going to do. I told him that I would go to Rangamati, hold a summary court martial and withdraw the Frogmen from Rangamati.
I went to Rangamati and held an inquiry, it was found that a jeep belonging to the Frogman Platoon while returning from Chittagong was stopped by a police Assistant Sub-inspector who told the driver not to go around a bend as a bus was blocking the road, an argument followed and the driver beat up the police officer. I held the summary court martial in the compound of the rest house where the Frogman Platoon was staying and a crowd had collected to witness the court martial. I gave the accused three months’ rigorous imprisonment in military custody. The crowd was very impressed with the procedure, the policeman was surprised with the speed with which the matter had been dealt with and was satisfied with the sentence.
The terrain in the East Pakistan plains was water courses, parallel to these were clusters of trees which indicated houses built on slightly raised ground, this raised ground was narrow in width but seemed to run endlessly, parallel to a line would be another line and in between a lush green paddy field. The highest ground was the embankment on which roads and the railway ran. Houses were
raised off the ground, made of bamboo or wood, with thatched roofs, a very few which had galvanized iron sheet roofs, were government buildings. Every government building, bridge etc had the date on which it was completed; the dates were 1958 and after. In West Pakistan, even on the hottest day, farmers could be seen out in their fields working. In East Pakistan people were seldom seen working in fields, with a population of fifty million, very few were visible. Another peculiarity was that the people, probably due to climatic conditions, went to sleep very late and were not seen before ten or eleven in the morning. Villages did not have shops, in every area there was a periodic or weekly bazaar cailed a ‘haat’. At sunset if one walked in the streets of a village, from almost every house came the sound of the recitation of the Koran. While walking through a village or in a ‘haat’ the feeling was that you were in a foreign country, you could understand nobody and nobody understood you.
After my family arrived I moved into a house. The officers living colony was built on lanes taking off from the main road entering the cantonment. On my lane Major Karamat, martial law staff, officer, Major Tariq Khaleel, later brigadier, and I were the three from West Pakistan, the rest of the officers were from East Pakistan. My two year old younger daughter, Muneeza, got into the habit of slipping out of the house on her own, walking down to the main road and riding cycle rickshaws, the rickshaw driver would leave her at someone’s house and either we would get a phone call or the orderly would go from house to house to find her.
Servants were paid less than in West Pakistan, in Multan we paid our cook about forty rupees a month. In Commilla when we moved into our house, officers wives came to tell my wife that servants should be paid a maximum of twenty five rupees a month, the normal being twenty and not to pay too much as that would spoil the ‘rate’. West Pakistani wives quietly told us that some East Pakistani officers did not pay their servants but kept them on the terms of ‘food, clothing and 4 hair oil’. Another difference was that unlike in cantonments in West Pakistan, vegetables, eggs and chicken were brought to the house by vendors, prices were comparable with Multan. While shopping in Commilla city we discovered that we were not liked, when we entered a shop and stood at a counter the shopkeeper or whosoever was serving would move away and only come after being called a number of times and when he came he would only speak in Bengali which we did not understand, we assumed that the shopkeeper could understand some Urdu, often we left a shop without buying anything. At places like the railway station, the staff would speak only in Bengali leading to quarrels. Language was the great divide.
Since the PAF had no transport aircraft in East Pakistan, troops could not be para-dropped. Some MI 8 helicopters of the Army Aviation were based in Dacca, I started using these for transporting commando platoons and dropping them from hovering aircraft. In one exercise I went in a helicopter and selected the drop site, the area was flooded and I judged the depth of the water as about two feet from the tops of rice paddies showing above the water level. When the platoon being exercised was dropped the water level was found to be nearly five feet and the shorter men had to be helped. Although the battalion had been in East Pakistan for about six years no one knew that l variety of rice puddly grew with the water lovel and kept lis tip above the water level.
The Frogman Platoon training was altered to dropping them by helicopters in rivers from where they approached their target and attacked it both by day and at night. For long range communications the battalion was equipped with man pack GRC9 sets, these weighed about ninety pounds and the load had to be divided between three men. For short range communications infantry PRC 31 sets were issued which had line-of-sight communication, I introduced a system of locating the signaller on tall trees and we got ranges up to ten miles.
The nights in East Pakistan were much darker than in West Pakistan, this made night shooting with rifles difficult even at very short ranges. In night training, because of the darkness, it was not possible to judge what mistake the soldier was making, to overcome this I conceived the idea of night training during the day. It seemed impossible at first but eventually the problem was resolved with a very simple device, welding glasses with a tight strap and blue filters changed the daylight into darkness and the darkness could be varied from bright moonlight to starlight and pitch darkness by varying the number of filters.
With the monsoons came the floods and the 1970 floods were unprecedented. As the Martial Law administrator of Commilla I had to
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visit the flood affected areas, I went on the roads that were not submerged or by boat. The whole area was one mass of water, from one bank of a river you could not see the other bank. The President, General – A. M. Yahya Khan toured the flooded areas in a large boat belonging to the Inland Water Transport Authority. He came to Daudkandi, the site of the first ferry on the road from Commilla to Dacca, Brigadier Iqbal Shafi and I stood in a line and were introduced to him. He held a press conference and left.
Since the flood affected the normal distribution of food, the government arranged to supply wheat from West Pakistan, it was brought and distributed free of cost and given in accordance with the size of the family. At one place that I visited, wheat was being issued as per government instructions, everything seemed all right but I noticed that after collecting the wheat the persons would walk along the road towards the other end of the village. Curious, I walked along the rond, at other ond of the villago I found that allindu bunin hud set up a stall and was buying the wheat.
In my Martial Law duties I dealt with the Commilla district commissioner and the superintendent of police. They tried to avoid me as much as possible and I had to summon them whenever I wanted something done. What surprised me was that a few government officials administered the needs of five million people spread over the district.
After the floods had subsided the government decided to close the borders with India to prevent smuggling, immediately food prices fell and truck loads of fish and other commodities were found abandoned by the smugglers. Smuggling from East Pakistan to India was a major business, warehouses of rice and other commodities were located on the border from where these could easily be moved across the border. Also the major importers of medicines and other expensive for eign items were located near the border or at the border. At one point the railway line between Commilla and Dacca was just inside the Pakistan border and things could be dumped across the border from a train. Lieutenant Colonel Sikander, who had been with me in 13 Lancers, serving with East Pakistan Rifles as the Sylhet Wing Commander, told me that the Indians followed a policy of unofficially permitting the smuggling into India of items imported into Pakistan by paying with our scarce foreign exchange, and the
Indians permitted the smuggling out of India of Indian made cheap consumer items.
In the Martial Law duties I met politicians, none of them impressed me. The chief of the Communist Party of East Pakistan, when we discussed communism, knew nothing about it and could not explain what he represented.
As I had left my furniture and belongings in Multan I had to buy some cane furniture, a refrigerator and a car. For the car I asked Mr. Iqbal, the brother of Major Mahmood Kamal, Guides Cavalry and SSG, he arranged with the managing director of Ghandara Industries to sell a five-year old Vauxhall Victor. The car seemed to be in a pretty bad shape, but the managing director assured that there was nothing wrong with the car and I could drive it to Commilla. I bought it and drove it to Commilla, except for the hand brakes the car was all right. A few days after I bought the car my wife took a number of officers’ wives to a function in the cantonment and parked the car at the top of a hill intending to put it in the gear to prevent it rolling, before she could put the car in gear the car started rolling and with her passengers shrieking rolled to the bottom of the hill without turning over.
with my family drove in the car to Chittagong to meet my wife’s uncle by marriage, Mr. Zakir Hussain, who had been the Governor of East Pakistan and the interior minister in General Ayub’s Martial Law government. In Chittagong we also met Mr. David Shah Khan, he and my younger brother Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam Khan, SJ, had been classmates in Lawrence College. He had come to East Pakistan to take up a job with a tea estate but did not get it and stayed on in Chittagong, sub-editing a newspaper.
We also went to Dacca by car, on one of the trips my batman Sowar Abdul Aziz, 26 Cavalry, was with us. About ten iniles outside Dacca the diaphragm of the fuel pump gave way and the car stopped, Sowar Aziz and I put our heads under the bonnet and tried to fix it but could not repair it. A crowd collected and got bigger and bigger, there was no traffic on the road because the ferry on the river had closed for the day and it was getting dark. Sowar Aziz called me aside and showing me a big knife he was carrying said that if the crowd got rowdy he would use it, I told him most of the crowd were curious boys and calmed him down but he was not quite convinced. Talking to the crowd I learnt that there was jute mill owned by a West Pakistani about
a mile away, I asked the crowd to push the car and they willingly pushed it to the mill. The manager of the mill lived in the mill compound, he provided a car for us to go to Dacca and had my car towed to a workshop the next day.
After the announcement that elections would be held, Bengali soldiers from the Battalion returning from leave reported that the Awami League strong arm was well organised, it was mobile and was intimidating all other political parties. Sometime before the elections I had gone to Dacca and met Lieutenant Colonel Riaz Sheikh, 6 Lancers, who had been transferred to the Intelligence Bureau. He told me that their estimate was that Sheikh Mujib would win thirty seven per cent of the seats, Bhashani would win about an equal number and twenty five per cent would be divided amongst the smaller parties.
Living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the Rangamati District, were some thousands of Mizos driven out of the Assam province of India because they had revolted and were in armed conflict with the Indian government. The revolt had occurred just after the end of the ’65 war with India, when it was suppressed, the Mizos took refuge in Pakistan in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, in the Rangamati District where Pakistan provided them with food etc. The District Commissioner Rangamati constantly lodged complaints against them for being undisciplined, for destroying wild life and the forest, the Government of East Pakistan asked the army to look into the complaints and I was ordered to send a party to investigate. I sent a party under an oflicer and the finding was that they had caused some damage but they gave the reason that their food supply from the government was being withheld by the District Commissioner, Rangamati who wanted them sent back to India.
In November, a cyclone struck Chittagong, Noakhali and Patuakhali area. In Commilla strong winds rattled the windows, but electric power and the telephone system did not fail, about two days later we learnt about the extent of the calamity. 53 Brigade was called out in the aid of civil administration, Brigadier Iqbal Shafi, 53 Brigade Commander asked that 3 Commando Battalion be excluded from the relief duties because of our bad reputation and we were excluded, we were still in the ‘dog house’. Some British troops were flown in from an aircraft carrier which was in the Bay of Bengal, this made the Bengali press comment that our troops stayed in the can
tonment while foreign troops gave assistance.
The officers who were employed in the affected area told us about the complete indifference of the Bengali officials who gave no help in organising the assistance and burying the dead. We also heard about the operating methods of the ‘free world press’ reporters, they came by helicopters from Dacca, somehow the maimed, the starved looking and the most hideous, men, women and children were gathered in vicinity of the helipad, when reporters arrived they lined up, the reporters would pick and choose from them and for a price they would pose, similarly some sites with human bodies floating in water were kept to be photographed, these photographs would appear in the world press. The aid, blankets and other items, like the wheat distributed during the floods, was sold openly everywhere. The rank and file of the army gave their best, they worked day and night, but the publicity of the work done by the army was very poor. The cyclone relief publicity was mismanaged by the government and left a bad taste.
The Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan visited the battalion. I had been given his arrival and departure time and I prepared a schedule to keep him busy from his arrival to his departure, this included a demonstration of my innovation for night training with welding goggles, a discussion about the equipment for the battalion, my request was for better wireless equipment and a discussion about the plight of the Mizos. The COAS said that new wireless equipment could not be bought from a foreign country and we would have to wait for indigenous production. After the scheduled time was over I was expecting the COAS to make his departure remarks but instead he looked at his watch and said he had fifteen minutes more and would like to see my unit lines. In East Pakistan when we went for physical training in the morning the clothes that we wore were soaked in sweat and when they were taken off and left in the barrack, the barrack stank. I had ordered a clothes line to be rigged in the veranda of the barracks and after physical training all sweat soaked clothes were hung to dry. When the COAS asked to see the unit lines the clothes, were hanging in the veranda as I had not included a visit to the unit lines. Colonel Amir Gulistan Janjua, a former commanding officer of 3 Commando Battalion, Personal Secretary to the COAS, when he saw the clothes hanging in the verandas, was very upset and showed annoyance. When we got out of our vehicles the
COAS looked at me, I explained that the clothes were hanging by my order and the reason for it. I had not prepared for a barrack inspection but inside the barrack everything was well laid out, neat and clean.
A sand model exercises to plan the defence of East Pakistan, called Titu Mir, was held in Commilla to discuss how 53 Brigade, with four battalions would defend the area from Sylhet to Chittagong. I was ordered to attend the exercise as an observer, observers were not allowed to speak. For the area to be defended, four battalions were inadequate, to overcome this shortage a small sand model was made and very large company signs were used to obtain an almost continuous front from Sylhet to Chittagong. Not only this but the same troops were to fight in three successive positions. At the end of the exercise comments were invited and the observers were allowed to speak. I said that the troops were inadequate for the front that was to be defended, there were no troops to prepare the second and third positions and all the defence stores would be expended at the first position. Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan then stood up and said that a lot more thought had to be given to the problem and wound up the exercise.
With the year ending the turnover of the units in Commilla began. 53 Field Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yakub replaced 4 Field Regiment, 4 East Bengal Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Choudhry replaced an infantry battalion. The 4 East Bengal Regiment occupied the lines in which 3 Commando Battalion occupied some barracks. The battalion came with a bad reputation, they had been involved in a fight with a Punjab Regiment battalion in their brigade, in Lahore. Since we were sharing the lines the road to our offices ran through the 4 East Bengal Regiment lines, their offices were on one side of the road and their koles on the other. We soon noticed that the 4 East Bengal regiment did not salute the Commando Battalion officers, however we ignored it. Soon after the arrival of the battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Choudhry was posted to the East Bengal Regimental Centre and Lieutenant Colonel Khizar Hayat, a West Pakistani who was from the Ist PMA course and had been superseded, was approved and took over the command.
Ebrahim Company of 3 Commando Battalion was replaced by ‘Jangju’ Company and as soon as the company arrived I carried out the annual classification and the field firing. In the field firing 1 had rooms built and shooting up a room was practiced. Ambushing a convoy was carried out on a mock convoy with machine guns, rocket launch
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ers and rifle grenades, a wooden bridge was built and every section practiced demolition. All this was done with live ammunition and demolition charges were placed and fired. Night vision goggles were used to simulate night. The training was completed without an accident but after we had cleared the firing range the range chowkidar was killed when he picked up a rocket launcher round that had not exploded and was trying to take it apart. The Station authorities tried to make a case of negligence on our part but luckily for us the explosion had occurred in the chowkidar’s house which showed that he had picked up the rocket and taken it home.
The operational area of the commando battalion was the whole of East Pakistan and after the monsoons were over I decided to tour the border areas. I first went from Commilla to Sylhet; the road and the railway ran for some distance along the border, this was the tea estate area. The next trip I made, again by road, this was from Commilla to Dacca, by the ferry across the Brahmaputra river, to Bogra, Saeedpur and the most north eastern tip of East Pakistan. I spent an evening with Lieutenant Colonel Saghir Hussain Syed who was commanding 26 Cavalry and also met a 22 Cavalry officer, Captain Alam, posted to the East Pakistan Rifles and living at a border outpost with his wife. Captain Javed, my adjutant in 22 Cavalry and Captain Alam had been posted to the East Pakistan Rifles from 22 Cavalry at the end of the previous year. I told Captain Alam that he was very lucky to get a posting to East Pakistan Rifles, he bowled me over by saying that he had paid five thousand rupees to get the posting. The officer and his wife were killed by the East Pakistan Rifles when they revolted.
As the commanding officer of a corps troops’ unit, my report should have been initiated by the Chief of Staff of Eastern Command. The Eastern Command placed the battalion under command of 14 Division and the division commander became my reporting officer. Since my battalion was under the administrative command of 53 Brigade, the commander 53 Brigade obtained permission to initiate a ‘strip report’ on me and informed me accordingly. Soon after he got the permission there was some disagreement between us and the brigade commander called me to his office, when I entered the office I noticed that a copy of the Military Secretary’s Instruction for writing reports on officers was placed very prominently on the brigade commander’s table. In the ensuing discussion I did not change my stand though the brigade commander
glanced several times at the instructions and pushed it with his elbow as a very broad hint.
Also about this time I received a letter from 4 Armoured Brigade informing me that the Brigadier Saeed Azhar, 4 Armoured Brigade commander had decided to initiate a special report on me, I was to have myself medically examined and send the completed Annual Confidential Report form to the brigade headquarters, which I did. After some time I received an adverse report by Brigadier Saeed Azhar based on events which had occurred before he had assumed the command of the brigade which included the Annual Technical Inspection case which had been decided by the GOC I Armoured Division and the summary court martial in which the punishment awarded by me had been reversed. I signed the report and returned it, and followed it up with a representation stating that the incidents had occurred during the command of the previous brigade commander, Brigadier Nisar, and he had made a report on me for the period in which these had occurred. I also telephoned Lieutenant Colonel Qaiser Pervez, AA&QMG of the 1st Armoured Division reminding him that I had not served the mandatory three months under Major General Jahanzeb, so the report should be sent to Major General A. O. Mitha. In April 1971 I received a letter from the Military Secretary’s Branch informing me that the report had been expunged in toto.
At the end of the year, 53 Brigade went out for collective training in the area around Commilla and obtained a 14 Division order directing the 3 Commando Battalion to place a platoon under the command of the brigade and I sent a platoon under Captain Munir. The day after the 53 Brigade training started Captain Munir, commanding the commando platoon returned and told me that the brigade training had been called off and they were returning to the cantonment. I thought that the division headquarters may have cancelled the training, but the officer after saying this hesitated and said that he had been ordered to ambush movement on the road on which the brigade was carrying out its exercise, he laid an ambush and when some vehicles passed he opened fire with a machine gun and after firing withdrew to his base. When he went to the brigade headquarters he was told that the exercise was called off and he was to return to the cantonment, he inquired from the brigade personnel who were busy loading their trucks to return to the cantonment, that what had happened and was told that the Indians had attacked, the brigade com
mander’s group while moving had been fired upon with a machine gun. The officer then inquired where the firing had taken place and found that the site was the one where he had laid the ambush. Apparently the brigade commander did not know that with a simple adapter, blank ammunition could be fired to give a very realistic representation of a machine gun, when the machine gun opened fire not only was the exercise called off but 14 Division Headquarters was informed that the Indians had crossed the border and were firing on vehicles.
In December the promised elections were held, the army did not interfere in any way. A few weeks before the elections, Bhashani announced that he would not contest the election. The Muslim League, as Fazlul Quader Choudhry was to tell me, had been crippled by General Yahya Khan by freezing their bank accounts. The Awami League with its strong arm suppressed all other parties and won 167 seats out of 169.
With the announcement of the result of the elections the whole atmosphere in East Pakistan changed. The Bengalis became more assertive, West Pakistan was blamed for all the ills of East Pakistan, the theme was that the West Pakistanis were living off the foreign exchange that East Pakistan earned with the sale of their ‘golden fibre’. Mujibur Rehman, the Awami League leader’s, ‘6-Points’ became the topic of discussion everywhere. The Bengalis considered it as the basis of the political future of the country, the West Pakistanis considered it virtual secession. In West Pakistan the stubborn, uncompromising and aggressive attitude of the Pakistan Peoples Party under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto which had won eighty one seats out of one hundred and forty four in West Pakistan, demanded to be included in any future government and refused to attend the National Assembly session which was scheduled for the third of March, 1971. The political deadlock was apparent to everyone and everybody waited anxiously.
In February an inquiry started to investigate the use of troops in the Chandni Chowk incident in Chittagong, Major Mannan and Captain Sajjad Akbar were the officers against whom the inquiry was constituted. Another inquiry was constituted against Captain Khokhar and Subedar Ramzan to inquire into the Rangamati arrest of civilians, evidence was being recorded when the military crackdown started. In April in view of the changed situation I asked that
charges be dropped and the matter was forgotten.
. Considering the political situation, I expected the battalion to be employed in the aid of civil power and ran lectures and demonstrations on the subject. In mid-February an Indian passenger aircraft was hijacked and landed at Lahore. A few days later I received a telephone call from the Colonel Staff 14 Division, Colonel Saadullah, later brigadier, ordering me to move a company from my battalion to Dacca that very day. I asked the purpose for which the company was being moved so that the company could be equipped according to the task. He would not state it and told me to use my own judgment. I detailed Jangju Company commanded by Major Bilal, with Captain Humayun, Captain Saeed and Lieutenant Haider were the platoon commanders. I ordered the company to take its first and second line ammunition, explosives and other stores, because I did not know whether the company was going to take part in the parade on 23rd March or was to be deployed somewhere.
In February two infantry battalions were flown to Dacca and housed in the East Pakistan Rifles accommodation. It was rumoured that more troops were to come but Lieutenant General Yaqub had refused them. On 21 February India banned the Pakistan International Airlines from flying across India and PIA started flying to Dacca via Colombo.
On 25 February an order came from 14 Division ordering Brigadier Iqbal Shafi and me to come to Dacca by road and to be there by about ten the next morning. We drove to Dacca and there Major General Khadim Hussain Raja gave us a briefing, in my briefing was told that on the 1st of March it would be announced that the National Assembly session called for 3rd March was postponed indefinitely, that there would be a violent reaction and a list of about a hundred people was shown to me who had to be arrested, I was told to return to Commilla and instructions would be issued.
I returned to Commilla and waited expectantly on 28 February for instructions: none came. I thought that there had been a change of heart but on the ist of March at about mid-day the announcement was made. The reaction was immediate and well planned. In Commilla there was a total strike, shops, offices, banks, everything closed down. From the battalion a party had gone to collect the pay from the National Bank and since all the units in Commilla were collecting their pay, there was a long queue, as soon as the announcement was made
the bank closed and our party had to return without the pay.
From the next day the cantonment was under siege, no shops opened, milk, eggs, vegetable hawkers stopped coming, petrol and meat was not available, everyone became dependent on whatever food supplies they had in stock. However, after a few days the milk, vegetable, eggs and chicken vendors started coming at night and selling because they had no other market.
After the announcement of the postponement of the meeting of the National Assembly and the subsequent strike by the Awami League, a marked change appeared in the 4 East Bengal Regiment, they started saluting our officers and JCOs. On the third day of the strike Subedar Major Gul Zamir reported to me that he had been informed by a Bihari subedar in 4 East Bengal Regiment that after sunset, after locking the kotes, the kotes were being opened and arms were being drawn and kept in the family quarters at night. I immediately went to Brigadier Iqbal Shafi and told him this. The brigadier took the attitude that this could not happen in his brigade, he called Lieutenant Colonel Khizar Hayat and told him in my presence what I had said. Lieutenant Colonel Hayat vehemently stated that this was not occurring in his battalion and I was casting aspersions on his command, the brigade commander supported his commanding officer. I returned to my battalion and laid out a defence against a night attack. I ordered the drawing of weapons at night and establishing a kote in Subedar Major Gul Zamir’s house, telephone lines were laid connecting the quarter guard with the adjutant and the Subedar Major’s residence, the battalion jeeps, which were parked in the veranda of the barrack in which the quarter guard and the ammunition store was located, were moved so that their headlights would illuminate the 4 East Bengal barracks and machine guns were laid on fixed lines. Every night these precautions were taken. A few days later, when I went to the office in the morning, my adjutant Captain Sajjad Akbar reported that at about midnight the quarter guard had telephoned and informed him that 4 East Bengal had formed up opposite the quarter guard, Major Mannan who was the duty officer went to investigate and found 4 East Bengal formed up as they would be before an attack, on his inquiry they said that they were conducting night training. I again complained to the brigade commander who called the commanding officer who said that his battalion was carrying out normal training and I was unnecessarily casting aspersions.
The general strike by the Awami League and no counter action by the government and the army, caused the control of the whole of East Pakistan pass into the hands of the Awami League. Bad news was followed by worse news. On 2nd March the Governor of East Pakistan, Admiral Ahsan was removed, it was rumoured that he had disagreed with the postponement of the meeting of the National Assembly. Lieutenant General Yaqub replaced him and on 5 March he resigned, again it was rumoured that though he had planned the military action in East Pakistan, but when he was ordered to take action he had refused. On 7 March, Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, later general, assumed the dual charges of Governor East Pakistan and Commander Eastern Command, everyone expected some action but no orders and instructions were issued, it seemed that the military paralysis was complete and no one knew what to do. In this atmosphere Major General A. O. Mitha went around all the cantonments, we all thought that he was going around estimating the food and other supply requirements as the QMG, later we learnt that he briefed the brigade commanders about the intending military action and the dispersal of the East Bengal battalions in small packets.
On 21 March at about ten o’clock a helicopter landed on the ground in front of my office, Lieutenant Haider and all the Bengali personnel of Jangju Company got out of the helicopter. Lieutenant Haider came to my office and handed over the pay of the battalion, which we had not been able to draw from National Bank, and told me that he had been ordered to bring all the Bengali element of the company back to Commilla. On hearing this I was very annoyed with Major Bilal for not informing me about the decision to send back the Bengalis, I telephoned him but could not get him on the telephone. Next 1 telephoned the colonel staff 14 Division who told me that the action was taken on the recommendation of the GSO 1 (Intelligence). I told him that I was the commanding officer and should have been told about it before the action was taken. I then telephoned the Chief of Staff of Eastern Command, Brigadier S.A. el-Edroos and told him that as battalion commander, I did not accept that personnel of my battalion to be moved about on the orders of staff officers, the COS told me that on 23rd March a C-130 would come to Commilla with supplies and I should come to Dacca on it to sort the matter out. I went to Dacca and there the trouble, which led to the creation of Bangladesh and our defeat in the 1971 war, began.
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Chapter 11
on the 23rd of March at about mid-day I was informed that a C-130 had landed at the Commilla airport with food sup
plies for the garrison. With a change of uniform and the necessities for an overnight stay at Dacca I was leaving my house when my wife asked me to get her jewelry from the office safe as she would wear it at the party that was to be held in the officers’ club that evening. I had kept my wife’s jewelry in my office safe because we did not have any safe place at my house and there were no lockers in the banks at Commilla, I brought the jewelry and gave it to her. It was very lucky as the events turned out later.
Driving to the airport a small naked boy standing by roadside, saw my jeep and very ferociously shouted “joy bangla’. My two and half year old younger daughter also used to run around the house shouting ‘joy bangla’, chased by her older sister who tried to prevent her.
The Commilla airport had been secured with a platoon from Hamza Company of my battalion when the ‘General Strike’ started. The C-130 had brought rations for the Commilla garrison and as soon as it finished unloading tinned milk, sugar etc it took off. The pilot of the aircraft was Squadron Leader Abdul Munim Khan who was my younger brother Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam’s brother-inlaw and was well known to me, we flew to Dacca talking about the situation in East Pakistan.
Since it was the 23rd of March, Pakistan Day, buildings were supposed to fly the Pakistan flag, as we flew over Dacca we saw the whole city flying the Bangladesh flag. When I arrived at the 14 Division officers’ mess someone told me that there was only one Pakistan flag flying and that was in Mohammadpur, the Bihari colony in Dacca. I, with some other officers went to a vantage point to see the lone Pakistan flag.
Major Bilal had been informed that I would be coming by the C130 and he was at the airport to receive me. On the way from the airport to the officers’ mess he told me that he had instructions to take me to Colonel S. D. Ahmad of the Martial Law Headquarters. Since it was late in the afternoon we went to the colonel’s room in the oficer’s mess, there the colonel told me that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the
Awami League leader was to be arrested the next day or the day after and I was to make the necessary plan. He further told me that two cars had been placed at my disposal by the United Bank zonal manager and these were to be used for reconnaissance.
That evening Major Bilal, Captain Humayun and I drove around Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s house in Dhanmondi. In front of the house ran a lane which turned off from the road from Mohammadpur, on one side of the lane there was a lake. There was a large crowd near the house and a guard of the East Pakistan Police. As we drove past a group of Hindus came out of the house. No one challenged us because we had entered Dhanmondi and were driving out.
The next morning we looked at the routes from the cantonment to Dhanmondi, there were two, the main road from the cantonment to a road junction called Farm Gate’, from there a road went to Dhanmondi. The second went from the MNA Hostel, to the National Assembly building and joined the Mohammadpur – Dhanmondi road. At the Dacca airport all the entrances and exits were on the cantonment side but on the far side there was a gate which allowed exit to the MNA Hostel, and National Assembly road. This gate had been built to allow an Air Observer Unit, commanded by my younger brother Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam, entrance and exit to the airfield.
I was instructed to report to Major General Rao Farman at eleven o’clock on 24th March for formal orders to arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. I went to the general’s office and he told me that Mujibar Rehman was to be arrested the following night. I heard him, saluted and started to leave when he stopped me and asked me “aren’t you going to hear how it is to be done?”. I told him that it was not customary to state how orders were to be carried out, but since he had something in mind he could tell me. He then said that I was to take one officer with me in a civilian car and arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. I said in view of the crowd around the house it could not be done with less than a company. He said that he was giving an order and it should be done the way he had ordered it. I told him I was not taking the order and he could find someone else to do the job, and before he could say anything else I saluted and left his office. )
I knew that I was in trouble. For the rest of the day I did not go to any place where I could be contacted. I had been told that Major General A. O. Mitha was coming by a PIA flight which was scheduled
to arrive at five in the evening, when the flight arrived I was waiting on the airfield, met the general and told him about the orders I had received and that in view of the crowd around the house it was not possible to drive up to the house and arrest Sheikh Mujib. The general told me to meet him at nine o’clock at the Eastern Command Headquarters.
The next morning just before nine I went to the office of the Colonel GS of Eastern Command, Colonel Akbar, later brigadier. When I entered the office I found Major General Rao Farman sitting there and he asked me why I had come to Colonel Akbar’s office, I told him that I had come to see Major General Mitha. Major General Farman then ordered Colonel Akbar to arrange for a helicopter and fly me out of Dacca in fifteen minutes. Colonel Akbar looked at me and at the general, and telephoned the Ariny Aviation Baso, after finishing his conversation he said that it would take an hour for the helicopter to be ready. After this I asked Colonel Akbar whether Major General Mitha had come or was expected to come and he told me he was with Lieutenant General Tikka. I then positioned myself so that I could see the door opening into Lieutenant General Tikka’s office. After an uncomfortable fifteen minutes the door opened and Major General Mitha came out. In one bound I was out of Colonel Akbar’s office, intercepted the general and explained what had happened. The general’s staff car was standing there, he asked me to get in the car and we drove to where General Abdul Hamid Khan was staying.
At General Hamid’s residence I waited in a waiting room, after about an hour I was called in and Major General Mitha told me to tell General Hamid what I had told him. General Hamid heard me out and then telephoned Major General Rao Farman and told him that he was sending me to him and that he should meet all my requirements. General Hamid then told me that I was to arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and that he was to be taken alive. When I was leaving and had got to the door, General Hamid called my name and when I turned around he again called out “remember he is to be taken alive and I will hold you personally responsible if he is killed”.
I then drove to Major General Rao Farman’s office, he asked me what my requirement was and I told him that I required three troop carrying vehicles and the layout of the house. He had the plan of the house with him and gave it to me and told me that the vehicles would be avail
able. I then told him that the Japanese Consul’s residence was behind Sheikh Mujib’s house and if Sheikh Mujib crossed into the diplomat’s house what were my instructions, the general told me to use my discretion.
A model of the route and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s house was made, ammunition was issued and after the evening meal I briefed the company. The company was divided into three groups; one group of twenty five men, commanded by Captain Saeed, was to surround Sheikh Mujib’s house by blocking the lane at the turning from the Mohammadpur – Dhanmondi road, a second block was to be at the first turning to the right, a third at the second turning to the right and one back on the Mohammadpur – Dhanmondi road, cutting off the block of houses including the Japanese diplomat’s house. The second group of twenty five, commanded by Captain Humayun, was to follow the first group to the lane in front of Sheikh Mujib’s house, enter the compound of the house adjacent to the Sheikh’s house, jump over the wall, enter Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s house compound and form a perimeter around the house, taking special care to prevent anybody crossing into the Japanese diplomat’s house. The third group of twelve men was commanded by Major Bilal, these were equipped with electric torches, they were to search the house, the ground floor first then the upper floor. The assembly point was the gate on the airfield perimeter opening towards the MNA Hostel, the route was the airfield, National Assembly building, Mohammadpur, Dhanmondi; my jeep with full headlights was to lead. Captain Saeed, Captain Humayun and Major Bilal were to follow with their groups in trucks, without any lights, the idea was that anyone looking into the headlights could not gauge how many vehicles were following. I was told that the operation was to begin at mid-night and was given a password that was applicable throughout East Pakistan. Everyone taking part was briefed thoroughly and understood his part, the company moved and assembled on the airfield near the gate from which they were to exit. Captain Humayun, with two men, was sent to circle and observe the Sheikh’s house in a civilian car and in civil dress.
After dark, vehicles loaded with stores that the troops take with them when they move out of their barracks, started moving about in the cantonment and to anyone familiar with the army it would have been obvious that something was happening. Later it was said that Bengali
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officers had informed Sheikh Mujib that the army was going to act that night.
At about nine o’clock 1 drove to the airfield and when my jeep entered the airport area I was challenged by a soldier who demanded the password. I gave him the password and he told me that it was not the password, an argument followed, I told him that I was the commanding officer of the Commando Battalion, he said that without the password I could not enter the airfield. I then asked him what his unit was and he told me that he belonged to the Anti-Aircraft Regiment, I then told him to take me to his commanding officer and we marched right across the airfield to the Anti-Aircraft regiment headquarters with him pointing his rifle at me. The regiment commander apologised but was quite amused by the incident. He told that he had not been given the password that had been given to me and since his unit was guarding the airfield, he had issued his own password.
At about ten o’clock Captain Humayun came back from reconnoitering the area around Sheikh Mujib’s house and reported that road blocks were being constructed on the Mohammadpur – Dhanmondi road. I ordered all the company’s rocket launchers brought and two rounds per launcher, the men with rocket launchers were told to accompany Captain Saeed’s group. This group was instructed that on encountering the road block it was to form a single line with the rocket launchers in the centre, the rocket launchers would fire first, then all the rifles. I explained that the crowd around the road block had never heard the double crack and burst of rocket launchers and would disperse, the other groups were to observe the sides of the road. I also advanced the beginning of the operation from mid-night to eleven o’clock, on my own initiative, to reduce the time for strengthening the road block.
At eleven on the night 25/26 March we drove out from the airfield on the road going from the MNA Hostel to Mohammadpur. Street lights were off and buildings were dark, my jeep led with full headlights and the troop carrying vehicles, which belonged to the Signal Corps, followed without lights. Driving at about twenty miles an hour the column turned left on the Mohammadpur – Dhanmondi road and about a quarter mile from Dhanmondi, the road was blocked with trucks and other vehicles turned on their sides, as instructed, Captain Saeed’s group formed up, fired the rockets and opened fire
with their rifles, the groups on the sides of the road also opened fire. After about two or three minutes I ordered a ceasefire but found that the order was ignored and I had to walk from man to man and make him cease firing. Some of the vehicles in the road block, hit by the rockets were burning, a white Volkswagon Combi was blazing, the road block was still there but whoever was defending the block had disappeared. I was wondering how to create a gap in the road block, had not bothered to examine the troop transports but now when I looked at one I noticed that it was a five-ton vehicle with a winch fitted on it, with two vehicles we soon winched some of the vehicles to make a gap in the road block, mounted the vehicles and moved forward.
We went about two hundred yards and there was another road block, this time a number of pipes about two feet in diameter, the length of which completely blocked the road between two high walls. I tied the winch cable around middle of the pipes and had them winched, the block moved as a whole still blocking the road, then I had the winch cable tied around one end of the pipes and made Captain Saeed’s group sit on the other end, when the cable was winched the pipes pivoted and a gap large enough for the vehicles to pass was created, we again mounted our vehicles and continued.
We went another two hundred yards and there was another road block, this time of bricks stacked about three feet high and about four feet in depth. We tried ramming the block with the troop carriers but could not clear a passage for vehicles. I then ordered Captain Saeed’s group to manually clear a gap wide enough for the vehicles to pass and ordered the rest of the troops to dismount and proceed on foot.
We walked down the Mohammadpur-Dhanmondi road to the street on which Sheikh Mujib’s house was located and turned right on the lane between the house and the lake. Captain Humayun’s group entered the house adjacent to Sheikh Mujib’s house, ran across the compound and jumped over the wall into Sheikh Mujib’s house. Fire was opened, some people in the compound ran out of the gate, one man was killed. The East Pakistan Police guard outside the house got into their 180 pounder tent, lifted the tent by its poles and ran into the lake. Sheikh Mujib’s compound perimeter was secured, it was pitch dark, Mujib’s house and the adjacent houses had no lights.
The house search party now entered the house, a guard of Sheikh
Mujib was escorted out with a soldier walking by his side. After going a little distance from the house the guard pulled out a ‘dah’, a long bladed knife and attacked his escort, he did not know that he was being covered from behind and was shot but not killed. The ground floor was searched and no one was found there, the search party went upstairs, there was nobody there in the rooms that were open, one room door was bolted from the inside. When I went upstairs someone said that there was some sound coming from the closed room, I told Major Bilal to have the door of the closed room broken down and went downstairs to check if Captain Saeed had arrived and if there was any sign of a crowd.
When I came out on the lane in front of the house I found that Captain Saeed had arrived with the vehicles but in turning the long five ton vehicles he got them stuck in the narrow lane in front of the house. On the loudspeaker of the wireless set on my jeep I could hear Brigadier Jehanzeb Arbab, later lieutenant general, urging one of his units to use their ‘romeo romeos’.
While I was instructing Captain Saeed on how to sort out the vehicles, there was a shot, then the sound of a grenade exploding followed by a burst from a sub-machine gun, I thought that someone had killed Sheikh Mujib. I ran back to the house and upstairs and there I found a very shaken Sheikh Mujib outside the door of the room that had been closed. I asked Sheikh Mujib to accompany me, he asked me if he could say good bye to his family and I told him to go ahead. He went into the room where the family had enclosed themselves and came out quickly and we walked to where the vehicles were. Captain Saeed had still not managed to turn them around, I sent a radio message to inform the Eastern Command that we had got Sheikh Mujib.
Sheikh Mujib then told me that he had forgotten his pipe, I walked back with him and he collected his pipe. By this time Sheikh Mujib was confident that we would not harm him and he told me that we had only to call him and he would have come on his own, I told him that we wanted to show him that he could be arrested. When we got back, Captain Saeed had the vehicles lined up, Sheikh Mujib was put in the middle troop carrying vehicle and we started back to the cantonment.
I later learnt that after telling Major Bilal to break down the closed door upstairs when I went to check on the vehicles, someone had fired a pistol shot into the room where Major Bilal’s men were, collected, luckily no one was hit. Before anyone could stop him a soldier threw a grenade into the veranda from where the pistol shot had come and followed it with a burst from his sub-machine gun. The grenade burst and the sub-machine gun fire made Sheikh Mujib call out from behind the closed room that if an assurance was given that he would not be killed he would come out. He was given an assurance and he came out of the room. When he came out Havaldar Major Khan Wazir, later subedar, gave him a resounding slap on his face.
My instructions were to arrest Sheikh Mujib, I was not told where I was to take him and to whom he was to be handed over. As we drove back I thought’ over this and decided to take him to the National Assembly building and hold him there while I went to get instructions. I stopped at the National Assembly building, had a jeep seat removed, took Mujib up the stairs of the National Assembly building and made him sit on the landing. While we were doing this, from the direction of *Farm Gate’ came the sound of thousands of people running. We
thought that these people were running in our direction and prepared to defend ourselves, after a while the sound faded away. Later we learnt that this was the force that the Awami League had collected to storm the cantonment with and it was running away.
From the National Assembly building I went to the Martial Law Headquarters where Lieutenant General Tikka Khan had set up his headquarters. I met Brigadier Ghulam Jilani Khan, who had taken over as Chief of Staff of Eastern Command, and told him that I had arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and left him at the National Assembly building. He took me to the entrance of Lieutenant General Tikka Khan’s office and told me to go in and report to the general. General Tikka must have been already told that Sheikh Mujib had been arrested, he was sitting very composed expecting me to formally inform him that Sheikh Mujib had been arrested. Just for fun I told him that I had arrested a man that looked like Mujib and I thought it was Mujib but was not sure. On hearing this General Tikka shot out of his chair like a jack in the box, he called for Brigadier Jilani who had heard me as he was standing just inside the office entrance. He assured the Corps Commander that he would have the matter seen to immediately, Colonel S. D. Ahmad was sent for and told to go immediately to the National Assembly to see whether I had got the genuine Sheikh Mujib or a fake.
Waiting for Colonel S. D. Ahmad to return, I stepped outside the building to smoke. While I was standing and smoking, a light machine gun, sited at the headquarters perimeter wire, either accidentally or the gunner saw something, fired a short burst. For a while after the burst was fired it was quiet, then every weapon in the cantonment and in the city opened fire. Not to be outdone the anti-craft regiment on the airfield also fired, green and yellow tracer arcs criss-crossed the whole of Dacca, after a few minutes the firing ceased as suddenly as it had started.
After about twenty minutes Colonel S. D. Ahmad returned and confirmed that I had arrested the genuine Sheikh Mujib. When I asked where I was supposed to take him to, there was huddle as no one had given it a thought. Eventually it was decided that he was to be put in the same room where he was kept when he was under arrest for the Agartala Conspiracy case. We took him to the 14 Division officers mess, he was put up in an independent single bedroom annexe and a
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guard was placed on him. The next day Major General Mitha asked me where Sheikh Mujib was confined, when I told him, he got annoyed and said that there was a complete lack of understanding of the situation and an attempt could be made to rescue him. He later had Sheikh Mujib moved to the third floor of a school building.
Everyone who served in East Pakistan in March 1971 was of the opinion that East Pakistan was lost due to the lack of action immediately following the announcement of the postponement of the mecting of the National Assembly. It was believed that Admiral Ahsan had resigned because he had disagreed with the military action and it was said that Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan had planned the military action but when he was called upon to execute the action he refused and resigned. This refusal of Lieutenant General Yaqub, the delay by General Yahya in finding a replacement and Lieutenant General Tikka Khan not taking any action for eighteen days, allowed the Awami League to demonstrate to the public that it had paralysed the army and the Martial Law authorities and allowed it to prepare for resistance against subsequent action by the Pakistan government.
On the morning of 26 March, at about eight, I received a telephone call from Major General Mitha to report immediately at the helipad, there the general told me that the previous night 53 Brigade Headquarters and 24 FF had been ordered to move to Chittagong, contact with Chittagong had been lost and there was no contact with 53 Brigade. Major General Mitha said that we would take two MI 8 helicopters, go to Commilla, pick up two platoons from my battalion and go to Chittagong. At Commilla when the helicopters landed on the ground adjacent to the 53 Brigade Headquarters, there was no reaction from the brigade headquarters. The first officer to come to the helicopters was a East Pakistani major who was in charge of the InterServices Intelligence. In his vehicle we went to the brigade headquarters where the brigade major, Major Sultan, later lieutenant colonel, was sitting in his office, the general gave a bit of his mind for not checking why the helicopters had come. I telephoned my battalion headquarters and told my adjutant to bring sixty men with weapons and ammunition to the brigade headquarters and that they would be going to Chittagong and that Major Mannan, the Bengali company commander was to be included.
I next telephoned my house and spoke to my wife, she told me
that everything was fine, she said she had been asked to move to an area where the majority of the West Pakistani officers were living, I told her that was not necessary. While I was telephoning my wife, Lieutenant Colonel Yaqub Malik, commanding officer 53 Field Regiment Artillery came to the brigade headquarters, with Brigadier Iqbal Shafi away, he was the senior officer in Commilla, he had a dazed look on his face. Without any preliminaries he announced that he would use his guns if there was any opposition, he could not clearly explain the situation in Commilla and what he planned to do. Two platoons of Hamza Company with Captain Sajjad Akbar and Major Abdul Mannan arrived and got in the helicopters. One platoon was deployed on the Commilla airfield, this left Lieutenant Haider, the Subedar Major and the few battalion headquarters personnel in Commilla.
53 Brigade and 24 FF had been ordered to make a night move to Chittagong and had lost contact with Commilla and Dacca, our helicopters flew along the road Commilla – Chittagong, there was no sign of the brigade on the main road to Chittagong. On arrival at Chittagong the helicopters circled the Nautonpara cantonment, machine gun fire could be heard and on the hillocks at the edge of the cantonment weapons could be seen firing small arms, as the helicopters came from the hillocks and troops in the barracks away from the hillocks waved at the helicopters. We landed in an open ground between two barracks, the troops dismounted. Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Fatmi, the commanding officer of 20 Baluch, came and reported to Major General Mitha, he said that he had been ordered to take his battalion to the port where the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation ship M.V. Swat had berthed and had brought 105 mm gun ammunition which had to be unloaded by troops because the dock workers were on strike; a company of Punjab battalion which had just arrived from West Pakistan and was on its way to Sylhet, was already employed on the task, at about three o’clock in the morning 20 Baluch started moving. To go out of the cantonment, the Baluch battalion had to pass through the East Bengal Centre lines and as it approached the hillocks, it came under fire from prepared positions on the hillocks. Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi was in complete control of the situation though he was not in communication with any other army unit or the Navy and did not ask for any help. Colonel Shigri, Ist PMA Course,
officiating commandant of the East Bengal Centre, was there, in his night clothes, he had managed to get out of his house and come to the Baluch lines.
After ensuring that everything was under control, Major General Mitha told Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi that he would arrange communications with the Navy and we all got in the helicopters and flew to the Naval Base. We circled the Naval Base but there was no reaction, 4* no one came out of any building. The helicopters landed on a parade ground and after a while a vehicle came and took us to the office of Commodore R. A. Mumtaz, the commander of the Pakistan Navy in East Pakistan. Commodore Mumtaz said that a naval contingent had secured the Chittagong airfield, there was no problem at the Naval Base but he was not aware of what was going on in the port. Major General Mitha ordered one of my platoons to relieve the Naval contingent at the airport.
The Chittagong Airport had been seized by the rebels, a platoon of East Pakistan Rifles, withdrawn from a border post was hurriedly sent on 25 March to seize it. The platoon was not given clear instructions and was apparently not aware of the prevailing situation in Chittagong. In the hurry of the deployment the West Pakistani JCOS and NCOs were not screened out and a West Pakistani took charge of the machine gun covering the road to the terminal building. On the same day about a platoon strength of Navy personnel were sent under Lieutenant Commander Akhtar, later captain, to secure the airport, the West Pakistani did not allow the machine gun to fire. Lieutenant Commander Akhtar drove up to the terminal building, told the East Pakistan Rifles men that he had come to relieve them, to stack their weapons and rest. When the weapons were stacked they were seized and all the men were locked in the basement of the terminal building. Captain Sajjad with a platoon relieved the Navy personnel and took over the airport. The second platoon under Mujer Mannan remained at the Naval Base. A wireless set was obtained from the Navy and Major General Mitha and I went back to 20 Baluch, gave them the wireless set and established cominunications with the Naval Base.
In one helicopter, personnel who had to be evacuated from the Nautonpara cantonment, including Mrs Mazumdar, were sent off to Dacca. In the second helicopter Major General Mitha and I flew along the Chittagong – Commilla road looking for Brigadier Shafi and 53
Brigade, instead of following the main road we followed a minor road which made a loop near Feni and found the brigade. We landed and Brigadier Iqbal Shafi told us that after he had gone a few miles from Commilla he found that the wooden bridges on streams burnt and he had difficulty in crossing the numerous streams, which had delayed him the previous night and since the morning 24 FF was in contact with a East Bengal Regiment unit which was resisting his movement to Chittagong and told us that Lieutenant Colonel Shahpur Khan, Commanding Officer 24 FF, had been shot and kined by a sniper. From there we flew back to Dacca arriving just when it was getting dark.
Brigadier Mazumdar, 2nd PMA Course, had been transferred from the Punjab Regiment to the East Bengal Regiment to command the East Bengal Regimental Centre, his wife was in the 20 Baluch lines and was evacuated to Dacca with others. Some days before the military action started a non-Bengali lieutenant colonel went to see Brigadier Mazumdar in his office, the brigadier was not in his office, the officer entered the office, saw a signal message lying on the brigadier’s table and read it. It was a message from Lieutenant Colonel Massoudul Hussain Khan, 4th PMA Course, commanding 2 East Bengal Regiment at Jodeybpur north of Dacca, asking Brigadier Mazumdar for orders in the event of military action. The officer pocketed the signal and sent it to the authorities in Dacca. The story went that Major General Khadim Hussain Raja flew to the East Pakistan Regimental Centre for a visit and there involved Brigadier Mazumdar in a discussion about the state of 2 East Bengal Regiment and ordered Brigadier Mazumdar to accompany him to Dacca to inspect the battalion and make a report. Brigadier Mazumdar accompanied him but disappeared in Dacca. When the helicopter carrying Mrs. Mazumdar landed at Dacca, she went straight to where the brigadier was staying, she was being followed and both were taken into custody. Lieutenant Colonel Massoudul Hussain was also taken into custody.
Brigadier Mazumdar and his wife were flown to West Pakistan and Colonel Agha Javed Iqbal, Colonel Staff 6 Armoured Division, was informed that Brigadier Mazumdar and his wife were being sent to 6 Armoured Division and they were to be kept in custody in Banni Bungalow, a rest house on the Grand Trunk Road, between Kharian and Sarai Alamgir. Being thorough in everything he did, he had the
brigadier and his wife searched, Mrs. Mazumdar was carrying a pistol in her handbag. She had the pistol all the time she had been in custody and while flying to West Pakistan, why she or her husband did not hijack the aircraft bringing them to West Pakistan is anybody’s guess.
Lo Cavalry, deployed in the Saeedpur, Bogra area had two troops of tanks in Chittagong because the tank ranges were located at the base of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and it was difficult to move tanks to Chittagong and back so gunners were sent to Chittagong to fire. The two troops were under command of Captain Kayani and were housed in the 20 Baluch lines. Brigadier Mazumdar, in his capacity of Station Commander, ordered tanks to be moved to the East Pakistan Regimental Centre but Captain Kayani managed to evade the order.
After the East Pakistan Regimental Centre was cleared by 20 Baluch, I went to Brigadier Mazumdar’s house. In one room he had made an operations room’, on one wall there was a quarter inch map of the whole of East Pakistan with the deployment of the East Bengal Battalions, East Pakistan Rifle Wings, police and ad hoc units marked with chinagraph pencils, an obvious command headquarters of all the Bengali troops in East Pakistan and Brigadier Mazumdar was to control them.
When I returned in the evening to Dacca and went to the place where I was staying, I found Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Suleiman, commanding officer 2 Commando Battalion there, he and about a company of 2 Commando Battalion had been air lifted from West Pakistan and later another flight of PIA brought another company.
While having our evening meal we turned on the radio and heard an Indian radio station, probably All India Radio, Calcutta, announce that Sheikh Mujib had safely crossed over to India. We also heard Major Zia ur Rehman, the second in command of 8 East Bengal Regiment, broadcast declaring the independence of Bangladesh and proclaiming himself the commander-in-chief of the Bangladesh army.
The next day, 27 March, I again accompanied Major General Mitha to the Naval Base, Ghazi and Shaheen Company of 2 Commando Battalion, with Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman and his adjutant Captain Sikandar, flew in C-130s to Chittagong. In the late afternoon Major General A. O. Mitha ordered Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman to take his two companies and link up with 53 Brigade which was still held up on
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the Commilla – Chittagong road.
Since 2 Commando Battalion had come from West Pakistan, they were not familiar with Chittagong and required a guide to lead them. A Bihari officer, Captain Siddiqui whose parents were living on the outskirts of Chittagong and there was no news of them, had come to Chittagong from Azad Kashmir by getting lifts in the aircraft moving troops from West Pakistan. He had managed a lift in the C-130 bringing the commando battalion and he offered to guide 2 Commando Battalion to the outskirts of the city. Vehicles of the Pakistan Navy were borrowed and 2 Commando Battalion was ready to move at about five in the evening. Captain Sajjad came and told me that Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman had given orders to drive through the city in a convoy. I talked to Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman and told him that the situation was not a ‘aid to civil power’ situation and asked him to take precautions. He laughed and told me that all of us who were serving in East Pakistan had lost our nerves and ordered the convoy to move.
Major General Mitha also ordered reconnaissance of the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters, with a view to clearing it and releasing some West Pakistanis that were known to be held prisoners. After giving these orders and telling me to stay back the general flew back to Dacca.
Major Salman Ahmad, Ebrahim Company commander, who with his company had gone to West Pakistan in December after completing two years with 3 Commando Battalion in East Pakistan, had accompanied 2 Commando Battalion because he was the only officer in the battalion who had been in East Pakistan. Major Salman was given charge of the reconnaissance of the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters because he was familiar with the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters, Captain Zaidi, later brigadier, from 2 Commando Battalion and Subedar Ramzan of 3 Commando Battalion and some men of Hamza Company made up the party and moved off at about the same time as 2 Commando Battalion.
At the Naval Base, at about seven thirty in the evening, I was called to the telephone and told that there was a call for me from Tiger Pass, a Naval establishment in the city. On the line there was a lance naik from Ghazi Company, he told me that 2 Commando Battalion had been ambushed, everyone had been killed and he was the sole survivor. I told him that it was impossible for the whole battalion to
be killed, that he had deserted and asked the authorities at Tiger Pass to place him under arrest.
At about eleven o’clock Major Mohammad Iqbal, later brigadier, Ghazi Company commander came and reported to me that 2 Commando Battalion had been ambushed about half a mile from where the Commilla road started, that Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman, Captain Sikandar and Captain Siddiqui had been killed and he had brought the casualties. The Naval Base had a small Medical Inspection Room and a medical officer who was a lieutenant commander. The wounded were first taken out and laid out on the floor of the MI Room, then the dead. The medical officer, when he came and saw the dead and the wounded lying on the floor, fainted and had to be carried away. Then someone from the Navy said that there were some medical college students in the Naval Base, they were called and they with the nursing orderlies gave whatever aid that could be given. There were twenty three dead, Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman, Captain Sikandar and Captain Siddiqui, Subedar Allah Din and nineteen other ranks, and twenty wounded. Major Iqbal took the remainder of the company back to the ambush site to clear it but there was nobody there. We later learnt that the ambush was laid by a subedar major of the East Pakistan Rifles to ambush 53 Brigade when they entered Chittagong.
The place where the ambush of 2 Commando Battalion took place was near the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters. When the firing took place at the ambush site the personnel defending the headquarters took up their firing positions and intercepted the reconnaissance party, wounding Captain Zaidi. Major Salman and Subedar Ramzan carried Captain Zaidi for about four hundred yards, then Subedar Ramzan went and brought a vehicle, Captain Zaidi was put in it and the vehicle started moving towards the Naval Base. A sentry left by the reconnaissance party, signalled the vehicle to stop, the vehicle did not stop and as it went past the sentry he tired two shots in the dark, both bullets hit Subedar Ramzan in the thigh. Later Subedar Ramzan commented on the excellence of the man’s night shooting ability.
The next morning a troop-carrying C-130 came, I had all the dead and the wounded loaded on it and sent to Dacca because the hospital was in Chittagong cantonment in Nautonpara where 20 Baluch and the
East Bengal Regimental Centre were still fighting and there were no other hospital facilities. When the C-130 landed in Dacca and about fifty casualties were off loaded it had a stunning effect on the personnel on the airfield and in the cantonment. A few days later received a message that the wounded would be taken care of locally and the dead will be buried locally as sending them to Dacca had an effect on the morale there.
With Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman killed I assumed command of 2 Commando Battalion also and ordered both the battalions to always wear the commando insignia and the maroon beret to show the people that the commandos had arrived. I placed. a platoon from 2 Commando Battalion, commanded by Captain Pervez, later lieutenant colonel, at the airport, the task of the platoon was to protect the terminal building and aircraft while it was on the ground. The East Pakistan Rifles men were still locked up in the basement and were employed for loading and unloading cargo.
On 28 March the situation was grim, 53 Brigade was still on the road between Commilla and Chittagong with 8 East Bengal Regiment, commanded by Major Zia ur Rehman, fighting a rearguard action, 20 Baluch and East Bengal Regimental Centre were still fighting in Nautonpara, 2 Commando Battalion had been ambushed, and the reconnaissance of the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters had failed. Late in the day Major General Khadim Hussain Raja arrived to takeover the control of operations in Chittagong..
From Dacca, Major General Mitha ordered me to mount a raid on Radio Pakistan Chittagong whose transmitter was being used by Major Zia ur Rehman as the Bangladesh Radio. When I inquired from Major Salman, Major Mannan and Captain Sajjad if they knew where in Chittagong the transmitters were located everyone said they had seen the masts but did not remember the location. I tried the Navy, they also did not know. I was wondering what to do when I chanced to see a Chittagong telephone directory, I looked it up and the location of the transmitter was given as Kalurghat. On looking up a map it was found that to get to the transmitter site from the Naval Base you had to pass through the city, get on to the Chittagong – Kaptai road and go about six miles. This was not possible because the city was in the hands of Major Zia ur Rehman who was controlling the 8 East Bengal Regiment, the East Bengal Regimental Centre and East Pakistan Rifle
rebels. The map showed that the transmitter was located about a mile from the Karnaphuli River bank downstream from the Kaptai Dam and could be approached by going up river. The Navy was asked to provide a suitable craft to lift about fifty men and they agreed to provide a landing craft tank, two or three of these vessels had been captured from the Indians in the 1965 war. A plan was drawn up on surmises, Major Mannan was given the command because he was the senior officer and could speak Bengali. I reminded him that when he was commissioned he had taken an oath and now was the time to fulfil it. The party was to be landed at high tide but landing craft was late in arriving and the raiding party left at about nine at night.
By the time the landing party reached the disembarkation area, the tide was running out and the party had to wade through mud for a long distance. The signal operator carrying the thirty pound AN/GRC 9 wireless set dropped it in the mud and could not find it as it sank in the loose mud. After the party crossed the high water mark Major Mannan made inquiries about the location of the transmitter from the residents of houses on the river bank and the party moved in the direction indicated. After going for some listance it ran into a rebel patrol, Major Mannan talked to them and then grabbed the sten gun of the man he was talking to, the man fired and the bullet went through Major Mannan’s palm.
When the firing started the raiding party, which had crowded near Major Mannan, went to the ground, one man, who was armed with a rocket launcher, did not have the safety catch on and as he went to ground the rocket launcher fired. The rocket landed in the middle of the raiding force, the Bengali patrol ran away, in the raiding force a number of persons were wounded. The officers conferred and it was decided to find a suitable defensive position which the raiding party would occupy and Major Mannan would return to the cantonment and get help. Major Salman reconnoitered and found that the Chittagong – Kaptai road was a few hundred yards away, the transmitter was about a five or six hundred yards away, and very luckily, just off the metal road he found a concrete building with a long drive from the road. The raiding party moved its wounded to the building and prepared to defend it.
Major Mannan walked and ran along the Kaptai – Chittagong road to the Chittagong cantonment and reported the mishap of the raiding
party to Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi who reported it to Major General Khadim Raja on the wireless. I was sent for and spoke to Major Mannan who told me what had happened and told me the exact location of the transmitter.
I told Major General Khadim Raja that now that we had the location of the transmitter I would ask for an air strike and knock it out. I got in touch with Dacca, explained what had happened and asked for an air strike. About two hours later, two F-86 Sabres arrived, carried out a very impressive rocketing and machine gunning of the Radio Pakistan transmitters and the transmitter went off the air.
Major General Khadim Hussain Raja asked me what I was going to do to help the raiding force. Although I had a company of 2 Commando which had arrived the previous day. I told him that I was not going to do anything as I would be wasting troops to extricate the raiding party, and commandos were trained to extricate themselves. For about an hour the general paced up and down, then he called me again and said that he had decided to send a company of 20 Baluch and a troop of tanks to extricate the raiding party. He ordered Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi to send the force, he did so and the force, in the remaining day, was able to advance one mile on the Chittagong – Kaptai road and then withdrew.
The East Bengal Regiment defending the transmitter surrounded the building in which the raiding party had taken refuge, but made no determined effort to assault it, only rifles and rocket launchers were fired at the building. The commandos witnessed the air strike and were satisfied that the target had been destroyed. Major Zia ur Rehman, with his Rayban glasses and two flags flying on his jeep, drove up to the gate, a rifle shot and rocket was fired at him, he was standing in his jeep and was seen to drop down, then the vehicle disappeared from view. He was not identified in the Chittagong area after this.
Later in the day the East Bengal Regiment brought a six pounder anti-tank gun and fired solid shot which went right through the building making small holes in the walls, the whole day was spent like this. After dark the raiding party broke out of the building firing their weapons, leaving their dead and the wounded and started making their way back in twos and threes. Two days later the first men arrived, about ten days later the last man arrived, thirteen men died. Major
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Mannan was admitted in the Combined Military Hospital in Chittagong because of his bullet wound, every West Pakistani officer who met him either placed him under arrest or wanted to, I received several reports that he was being harassed. I requested General Mitha to have him posted to West Pakistan and he was sent to Cherat.
The next day I was again called by Major General Khadim Raja and told that 53 Brigade was being hampered in its advance to Chittagong by fire from the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters, and to ask the Navy to shell it with their destroyer at sea. The Navy provided an officer with a wireless set who climbed on the roof of the Naval Base building and established communications with the destroyer PNS Jehangir, commanded by Commander Tariq Kamal Khan, later admiral and Chief of Naval Staff. The East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters, a large complex just off the Chittagong – Commilla road, was indicated as the target. The destroyer fired a round and 53 Brigade gave a correction which was received by the general and given to me. I then went on the roof of the building and gave it to the naval officer and another round was fired. I went down and when I reached the general I could hear 53 Brigade screarning, the shell instead of correcting towards the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters had corrected towards the 53 Brigade Headquarters. The general told me to tell the ship to ceasefire, I went to the roof and told the naval officer who was communicating with the ship what had happened and between the two of us we decided to give a correction and to fire again. The destroyer fired and there was a more frantic call from 53 Brigade. The general asked me why the firing had taken place and I told him that I had given one more correction, he got very annoyed with me and told me to tell the Navy to ceasefire. Later the destroyer came into the port and all Bengali crew members were taken off the ship.
During this period I was staying at the Naval Base, almost every night there used to be firing around the perimeter of the Base. We from the Commandos suspected that the Navy patrol that went around the perimeter at night fired indiscriminately because there were no killed or wounded found in the morning. One night my signal havaldar was shot dead when he was putting up his antenna to communicate with Dacca, he had gone out of the building in civilian clothes. The Navy claimed that he was killed by fire from outside the Naval perimeter but we suspected the naval patrol..
On 31 March, 53 Brigade finally entered Chittagong and established itself in the Circuit House. Major General Khadim Raja left Chittagong, a day or so later 53 Brigade with Brigadier Iqbal Shafi and his brigade staff were replaced by 205 Brigade with Brigadier Asghar Hussain and his brigade staff, and the area came under the control of the newly arrived 9 Division.
The East Bengal Regiment of the Pakistan Army was the only regiment without class composition, it had Bengalis only although Biharis, Chakmas etc could have constituted part of the manpower. Major General A. O. Mitha, when he commanded 53 Brigade in Commilla 1963-1966, reported that promotion in all the East Bengal Regiments was being controlled by Colonel M. A. G. Osmani. This should have been a warning but the only action taken was that Osmani was retired and he continued to control the promotions. Major Sadiq Nawaz, 4 East Bengal Regiment, told me that when the battalion revolted it was noticed that certain NCOs who had been promoted out of turn, became the leaders.
It was foreseen that if military action became necessary the East Bengal Regiment battalions in all the brigades would have to be disarmed and this could not be done so long as the battalions functioned as units. Before the commencement of the military action on 25 March, Major General A. O. Mitha had gone around all the cantonments briefing the brigade commanders to disperse their East Bengal Regiment battalions in companies and platoons so that they would not be a cohesive force. 4 East Bengal Regiment who shared lines with 3 Commando Battalion instead of being split into platoons and companies, was split into two groups of two companies each; one group was ordered to go to Sylhet and the other to Brahmanbaria. Since the road ran Commilla – Brahmanbaria – Sylhet the battalion remained intact. It moved with its first and second line ammunition as if moving to a war location. As soon as the military action started, Major Khalid Musharraf who had joined the battalion as the second in command, arrested his commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Khizar Hayat, Major Sadiq Nawaz and other West Pakistanis and took up battle positions against the Pakistan Army. The battalion was first encountered at Bhairab Bazaar in April and later at Bramanbaria.
Lieutenant Colonel Yakub Malik, the commanding officer of 53 Field Regiment Artillery, the senior officer in Commilla, had the task
of disarming the East Pakistanis using the West Pakistani elements of his own and other units of 53 Brigade and “Jangju’ Company of 3 Commando Battalion which was moved from Dacca to Commilla. He had collected the West Pakistani officers’ families in the ‘Bhamani’ area of officers houses for safety and placed a guard over the area, the Bengali officers families were left where they were.
The disarming of the smaller mixed units like the engineer company did not pose a problem, they surrendered their arms, the rear party of 4 East Bengal posed a problem. Captain Saeed and three men of Jangju Company were killed by a light machine gun firing from the kotes of the 4 East Bengal Regiment when they went to ask for the surrender of weapons. Fighting broke out and the commando company had to fight house to house in the 4 East Bengal family lines where each house was prepared for defence with firing ports in the walls.
From the Commilla garrison Major Bahar, the 53 Brigade Signal Company commander, was the first officer to desert, he just drove away in his official jeep with his driver and wireless operator, on or about the 23rd of March.
When Jangju Company returned from Dacca, Major Bilal the company commander, had the Bengali element of the battalion locked up in the quarter guard. Weapons were issued to everyone except Lieutenant Ilaider, a platoon commander in the company. He asked to be given one like other officers, when Major Bilal refused he deserted by just walking out from the officers mess. A few days later he attacked the Commilla airfield with some men but was driven away by the Hamza Company platoon.
After the 4 East Bengal Regiment rear party was disarmed, all the East Pakistanis were collected in the 4 East Bengal Regiment barracks, there was no barbed wire etc to prevent the Bengalis from breaking out of the barracks, apparently they made an attempt, Bengali soldiers who were prisoners, officers and Bengali servants of West Pakistani officers were taken and shot. The Bengali element of the 3 Commando Battalion who had been locked up in the quarter guard, were also taken out and shot, some of them had been with the SSG from the time of its creation.
Captain Rehman, the Bengali Regimental Medical Officer of 3 Commando Battalion, was one of the few Bengali officers who survived. Captain Humayun, a Jangju Company platoon commander
handcuffed the doctor to himself and wherever he went he took him also. I arranged to fly him out to Chittagong and he remained with the battalion during my command. Most of the doctors of the Commilla CMH were Bengalis and did not survive, the officer commanding the CMII was from West Pakistan, he became a mental case because of the massacre of his officers.
In Commilla cantonment there was a scare that 4 East Bengal Regiment assisted by the Indians were about to attack the cantonment. Major Bilal, probably under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Yakub Malik, destroyed the secret and top secret documents of 3 Commando Battalion by burning the safe in my office from which I. had taken out my wife’s valuables before going to Dacca on 23 March.
Amongst the cantonments of East Pakistan the largest number of East Pakistani troops were located in Chittagong. Apparently Brigadier Mazumdar as the senior Bengali officer in East Pakistan was to command the Bengali forces in East Pakistan but when he was called away to Dacca Major Zia ur Rehman, later President of Bangladesh, assumed the command of the Bengali troops. On the night 25/26 March, he woke up his commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Janjua, took him to the offices of 8 East Bengal in his night clothes, made him sit in the commanding officer’s chair and made the colonel’s batman shoot him dead. From this moment there was no turning back for Major Zia ur Rehman.
When 53 Brigade, actually 24 FF, arrived in Chittagong only the port, airport, East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters and a portion of the cantonment was clear of the rebels. Eventually 20 Baluch fought their way out of the cantonment, and linked up with 24 FF at the Circuit House and the most important parts of the city were cleared but the rebels continued fighting in the city, street by street, and then withdrawing towards the Kaptai Dam. With the city gradually coming under control, the extent of the atrocities committed started surfacing; corpses, rapes and looting were common. The bizarre was human blood collected in drums.
in Chittagong, as in other cantonments, the military supply system had collapsed completely, there were no signs of the Army Service Corps. We depended on the Navy for rations, ‘dry rations’, that is atta, sugar, tinned milk, tea etc, was available from them, ‘fresh rations’, vegetables, meat was not available, after living on dal, roti
and tea for some days and with no fresh rations being supplied, stray COWs were slaughtered for meat. The cook houses of both 2 and 3 Commando Battalions were left in Dacca and Commilla so the men had to cook themselves. The other major problems were cigarettes and petrol for the civilian vehicles that we were using, cigarette vendors shops and petrol pumps were broken into and cigarettes and petrol was taken, however cigarettes remained in short supply.
With the city partly under the control of the army the activation of the functioning of the city became necessary. 2 and 3 Commando Battalions moved to the Chittagong Pert Trust Building from the Naval Base and I moved to the Port Trust rest house. Major General Mitha still sent instructions to me from Dacca, the first message regarding the re-activation of the city was to reactivate the airport. Up to then the Pakistan Air Force C-130s were flying troops, it was now decided that the PIA was to start flying to Chittagong. The East Pakistan Rifles personnel were removed from the airport, some airport employees living in the vicinity of the airport were located and through them more employees were found and brought to the airport and ordered to start working, some technical personnel refused. I ordered them to be lined up against a building, a firing squad was marched and prepared to shoot. As arranged the airport manager, a nonBengali, then dramatically intervened, spoke to the men lined up against the wall and they agreed to do their jobs, there was no further trouble from them. The PIA Fokkers started coming to Chittagong. Captain Pervez’s platoon at the airport became quite efficient in checking the passengers and their baggage before boarding. One day an aircraft piloted by Mr. Jan, the Director Flight Operations, PIA, developed a defect, nothing could be done till something was brought from Dacca. That night Captain Pervez’s platoon sat all night around the aircraft to protect it, Captain Jan, the other officers and I sat in the control tower till daybreak.
Every evening I used to attend a conference at the Naval Base which was presided over by Commodore R. A. Muntaz, the senior naval officer in East Pakistan. One evening an officer informed the commodore that a notice had been received from the foreign ships which were anchored in the outer harbour, awaiting berths, that they had been at the outer harbour for about a month, that their fresh water had run out and if it was not supplied they would sail. The com
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modore ignored the notice and did not give any orders. I realised that if the ships sailed it would mean very bad publicity abroad. I asked the commodore what was required, he said that water supplying craft had to be sent. I asked him why he was not doing it, he said it was a Port Trust function. I asked him whether the Navy could do it, he said that if the water supplying craft could be found it could be done. I told him that action should be taken to supply the water, he gave the instructions and the water was supplied.
The next instruction I got was to get the Chittagong port operating. On inquiry I was told that the labour to operate the port was not available. I asked if it was technical, skilled or unskilled, I was told it was unskilled. I ordered a commando company to surround an area near the port, line up all the able bodied men and march them to the port to work as labour. The next morning about three hundred men were marched to the port. In the front file was a man who protested all the way, he gave his name and said he was a singer known throughout the province and could not work as port labourer. When the forced labourers arrived at the port they were found to be completely useless and were allowed to go home. Some days later when the area in which Brigadier Hesky Baig was living was cleared I told him about the problem, he solved the problem by the simple expedient of sending a few motor cycle rickshaws around the cleared areas with a man announcing in Bengali that the port workers should return to work and the port started functioning again.
After the hijacking of the Indian Airline Fokker and when Pakistan started air lifting troops to East Pakistan in February, the Indians banned our over flying India, the PIA and the PAP started flying to East Pakistan via Colombo where the aircraft refuelled. A few days after the military action started Ceylon banned the landing of our aircraft. For sometime the PAF C-130’s brought fuel from Bangkok then somebody remembered that aircraft fuel was stocked at the Chittagong airport. I received a message to find out how much JP 4 was stocked, I had never heard of JP 4, I enquired from the airport officials, the figures were obtained and sent. Next a message came to send a sample to check whether the fuel was usable or not, the sample was approved, then a message came to send as much JP 4 as possible. The Chittagong Port authorities and the Navy were contacted to find out how the fuel was to be transported and it was found that
small river tankers were used but they had all disappeared. The Navy then carried out a search of the Kamaphuli river area and located about six such crafts, some with crews, they were brought, loaded and a convoy escorted by a Naval river patrol boat left for Dacca and the supply of petroleum products to the interior of East Pakistan re-started.
Two platoons of Hamza Company of 3 Commando Battalion, of which was the commanding officer and three companies of 2 Commando Battalion had moved to Chittagong under orders of Major General A. O. Mitha. I had assumed the command of both the battalions and was getting my orders directly from Dacca. After Brigadier Asghar Hussain’s 205 Brigade headquarters replaced the 53 Brigade headquarters, I attended his ‘O’ Group and heard his orders, the next morning when I went to brigade headquarters I found the commanding officers of 20 Baluch and 24 FF there and was informed by the brigade major, Major Anees, Corps of Engineers, that the brigade commander had locked himself in his room in the Circuit House and was not coming out. I knocked on the door, identified myself and asked him to open the door. I went in and asked him if he was unwell, when he said he was all right, I asked him why he was not coming out, he said that if he gave any orders and something went wrong he would be sacked. I assured him that if he did not exercise his command he would surely be sacked. I as the senior officer assumed command of the brigade and gave both battalion commanders their tasks for the day, they did not raise any objection to my ‘not belonging to their brigade.
The next morning when I went to the Circuit House where the brigade headquarters was located, both the commanding officers came and reported the extent that they had cleared. The area that 20 Baluch indicated as cleared included the area where my wife’s uncle by marriage, Mr. Zakir Hussain, and Brigadier Hesky Baig lived.
I had a blue coloured police jeep with a SSG driver and one other man, in commando uniform, we drove to Mr. Zakir Hussain’s house and found him safe and sound. Then we drove to Brigadier Baig’s house, on the way I saw 20 Baluch deployed well short of the area their commanding officer had shown as cleared and of the area in which Brigadier Baig lived. I did not stop and ask the Baluchis what they were doing and it did not strike me that where they were deployed was the limit up to which they had cleared the previous day. I drove to Brigadier Baig’s house, found him and his family safe and drove back. A few days later when I met Brigadier Baig he said that after I left there was several hours of fighting with tanks supporting 20 Baluch and then the area was cleared. Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi had incorrectly reported the area cleared and it was the police jeep which stopped the Bengalis from firing at me.
With the command of the brigade l also assumed the Martial Law responsibilities in which reviving the functioning of the city was the major problem. After the city came under the partial control of the army, all the senior civil services officers, the commissioner, deputy inspector general of police, deputy commissioner etc used to come to the circuit house where chairs used to be placed for them in the veranda and they would sit there waiting for orders. If they were called they would come running but they were ineffective because their organisations were not functioning.
I decided that to get the city functioning again, shops and businesses had to be opened, some shop-keepers and businessmen were rounded up and ordered to open their shops etc, they told me that they could not function without the banks being opened. The next day the bank managers, including the managers of foreign banks were collected but they contended that there was no point in opening banks unless the State Bank opened. We applied our old method, the chowkidars at the State Bank were interrogated, addresses of employees were collected, they were rounded up and the State Bank opened and gradually the shops and businesses also opened.
Word spread that the army was operating from the Circuit House and foreigners and civilians started coming to have their problems resolved. One Englishman turned up and said that his wife was going to have a baby and wanted to know what to do as there were no hospitals functioning, I told him I could not help him. An argument developed. I finally told him that we were doing our best, that I had not had the chance to change my clothes since the 25th of March and he could smell them if he had any doubts, he went away. A Russian diplomat came asking about some of his countrymen, someone from the American Consulate came and wanted to drive to Kaptai Dam where some Americans were working and wanted safe passage. I told him to fly a large American flag on his car and he would be safe from our side but I could not vouch for the other side. Two Canadian consultants to the East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority at the
Kaptai hydro-electric power generating station asked that they be provided with security guards. I asked them what they would do for me in return. They surprised me by saying that they would restore the electricity in Chittagong. I accepted this and sent a guard of two men, one guarded their adjacent houses and one went with them. These two consultants to EPWAPDA, using a vehicle to carry ladders, climbed electric poles and repaired the wiring and other things and the electricity was gradually restored.
The Pakistan National Shipping Corporation ship Safina-c-Arab brougnt hajis from Jeddah. On my way to the Circuit House from the Port Trust rest house I stopped to see the ship, one could smell it from a distance. The captain was nice and gave us a crate of ‘maltas’. When I arrived at the Circuit House there was an unusually large crowd, after dealing with the battalion commanders I had the waiting civilians lined up and inquired what they wanted. I was amazed when they said.” that they wanted my permission to leave Chittagong, I told them that there was no restriction on leaving Chittagong, that there was ship in the harbour, they could buy a ticket and go. As soon as I finished saying this there was a mad rush. I heard later that the purser of the Safina-e-Arab made a fortune that day.
Apart from reviving the city life I decided that it was necessary to get the co-operation of the Bengali residents of Chittagong. From various people hanging around the Circuit House I got a list of twelve prominent Bengali citizens, which included Fazlul Quader Choudhry, the Speaker of the National Assembly and Zakir Hussain, former governor of East Pakistan and interior minister in President Ayub’s government, and sent them a notice that they had to come to the Circuit House to attend a meeting to help in the restoration of law and order. Fazlul Quader Choudhry made an excuse and sent a relative instead, all others attended the meeting. They were asked to pass a resolution requesting the people to return to work, open businesses and not to do anything which would create a law and order situation. The announcement was drafted and signed and I sent it to Dacca thinking that it would receive wide publicity, but I heard nothing about it, not even a reprimand for exceeding my authority.
I met Fazlul Quader Choudhry about three weeks later, we had a long talk. He talked about his days as the Speaker of the National Assembly, and said General. Yahya had crippled him by freezing the
funds of the Muslim League, otherwise he would have been able to oppose both Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League and Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party and they would not have got the majorities that they did.
When the city came partly to life and with the airport secure visitors started coming from West Pakistan. Lieutenant Colonel Rathore, Signal Corps, 5th PMA Course, came to see what damage had been caused to the tele-communication system, Mr. Azhar of Pakistan Television came and made television recordings and a director of WAPDA came to assess the electricity distribution system. I do not know where the WAPDA director went and what he saw but he came to the Circuit House and started telling me his difficulties, I very rudely told him that I did not want to hear what his difficulties were, that I only wanted to hear how long it would take to get entire system working, that if he could not do so there was no use his coming all the way from West Pakistan and he could take the first flight out. He went back to Dacca and lodged a report against me for being rude and unhelpful.
The last order that I received from Major General Mitha was to get the Radio Pakistan transmitter at Chittagong working again because it was found that there was no way of communicating with the Bengali public without the radio station. I considered this a tall order and thought that the PAF must have caused serious damage to the transmitting station. I knew nothing about large radio transmitters and asked the Navy for help and they sent a lieutenant. We drove to the transmitting station, the building was pitted with bullet marks, the rockets had missed the building, we went inside and found no damage. The transmitter was switched on and it started working. For a while we were mystified why the transmitter had gone off the air as everything seemed all right. We went outside to examine the antennas and found that one wire had been cut by a bullet, we joined it up, turned the transmitter on and it started transmitting. After the transmitter started working we found that we had nothing to broadcast, we looked around and found a recording of the national anthem. I then had the national anthem played and when it finished, it was announced “Radio Pakistan Chittagong’ and the national anthem was played again, this continued for the whole day, the next day the Radio Pakistan staff began operating the station.
As 20 Baluch and 24 FF cleared the city, following them went a
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wave of looters, mostly West Pakistani unemployed labour. The East Pakistanis had looted the houses occupied by non-Bengalis, these looters did not discriminate and took whatever they could find in a house, the houses on the main roads and streets suffered the most.
When new units arrived from West Pakistan there was indiscriminate firing at night for a few days and looting. 39 Baluch when it arrived in Commilla looted the lines of the 4 East Bengal Regiment and the 3 Commando Battalion was not spared. The Baluchis went through the boxes of our men left in the barracks when the battalion left Commilla to go to Dacca and Chittagong. A suitcase that I had taken to Dacca and left there when I went to Chittagong, was brought back by Jangju Company when it returned to Commilla and left it in the barracks, only the empty suitcase was found. I was contemplating reporting the looting of our lines by 39 Baluch and asking them to compensate the loses of our men but before I could do this I was sacked.
After we left Chittagong and were operating from Rangamati, I came to Chittagong one day and was informed that commandos were looting in a certain area. I drove there and found an Army Service Corps second lieutenant with two men dressed as commandos were busy systematically looting all the shops on a street. I arrested them and handed them over to 53 Brigade. Later when the commandos started flying air guards on the PIA aircraft I found that while searching the passengers some of the guards were relieving the passengers of money and other valuables. To overcome this air guards were changed every two or three days.
The problem which remained after the army cleared Chittagong were the road blocks that had been set up while the city was in the control of the rebels. On one road block, on the road to Nautonpara cantonment, a rail car was across the road at a level crossing. I tried all the controls of the rail car but could not operate any of them, then I collected about two hundred men and made them push, it did not budge and we had to leave it there till the railway staff returned to work and moved it. After the Radio Station started working I had it announced that residents of every street or road on which a road block was located had 24 hours to clear these blocks after which the army would take action against the residents. The road blocks disap peared within the stipulated time.
53 Brigade with Brigadier Iqbal Shafi and his brigade staff returned to Chittagong with the move of 9 Division to Jessore and relieved Brigadier Asghar Hussain and his staff and 3 Commando was not placed under command of 53 Brigade. I was called to the Eastern Command headquarters for orders, when I landed at the Dacca airport it was just starting to get dark, I noticed a crowd of women and children sitting on the tarmac. Jangju Company was back in Dacca, someone from the company met me and told me that my wife and children were on the airfield and were to leave for West Pakistan that night. I looked for them and found my wife sitting on a suitcase holding our younger daughter while the older one was running around in the crowd. My wife was very annoyed with the army. She said that they were ordered to leave Commilla the previous afternoon and were taken to the airfield, each family was allowed to take one suitcase only. When a C-130 came in to land it was fired upon by Lieutenant Haider who had deserted from Jangju Company, and it could not land. It came again the next day to supply food to the Commilla garrison, and they were evacuated in it. My wife complained that they had been sitting on the airfield since the morning without food and there were no bathrooms. She had managed to get Major General Mitha’s telephone number from some officer and told him about the conditions. The general apparently knew that I was coming and informed my company who told me when I landed. I got SSG vehicles and moved my family and some other families which had formed a group to the ISI officers’ mess where Lieutenant Commander Shamoon Alam Khan, PN, my younger brother, posted to the Inter-Services Intelligence was staying. All the wives and children ate dal and roti and had tea and biscuits. After they had been fed and rested they were taken to the airport and left Dacca at about midnight.
Sowar Abdul Aziz, 26 Cavalry, who was with me as my batman, remained with my family they were evacuated from Commilla. A few days after the military action started he brought tins of powdered milk for my two-year old younger daughter who had been crying for milk and no milk was available. When my wife asked him where he got the milk from, he told her that soldiers were looting the “subedar’s” shop and he had taken the milk from there. The Bengali subedar from the Army Clerical Corps had been the personal assistant to the Commilla brigade commanders and after retirement had opened a
general store in the Commilla cantonment market from where most officers used to buy items of daily use, his shop was amongst the first to be looted by the troops in Commilla. After my wife left my batman collected my baggage and handed it over to the rear party of 3 Commando Battalion and joined me in Rangamati. He did not have a weapon so I gave him a shot gun and with it he used to sometimes accompany the commando patrols.
The morning after my family left for West Pakistan I went to the Eastern Command headquarters and met Brigadier Jilani. Lieutenant General Tikka came into the room and ordered me to make a waterborne landing at Rangamati and secure it. He further added that I would have to arrange for the required boats myself. I went back to Chittagong and ordered Subedar Ramzan to take a reconnaissance party to the Kaptai Dam and find out if sufficient boats were available. He came back and told me that boats were not available but bathing floats and out-board engines were available and he would be able to lift the entire force.
While we were preparing to move to Rangamati, the GSO 3 of 53 Brigade, Captain Zahid, FF, later brigadier, sent me a message to come to the 53 Brigade headquarters. When I got there he told me two men had come to the brigade headquarters, they had Burmese features and had very long hair, one was claiming to be the foreign minister of Mizoram’, a part of Assam which had declared independence, that no one at the brigade headquarters was taking them seriously. Captain Zahid told me that between the two of them they had a small attache case. I told him to take them to a room to await my arrival. When they left to meet me I had the lock of the suitcase picked, there were some clothes and a .45 calibre pistol. Captain Zahid introduced me to the Mizos as Lieutenant Colonel Shamsher, one of them identified himself as Paulian, the foreign minister of Mizoram and stated that the Mizoram army of about two thousand men and about three thousand civilians were living in the Pakistani territory, just across the border from Assam, that they were being supplied food by the government of Pakistan and that there had not been any supply for over a month, that they were starving and would have to move to Rangamati. I told the Mizos I would let them know what I could do to help them.
I flew to Dacca the next morning, met Brigadier Jilani and explained the Mizo situation to him. I said that we did not have the
Dam headworks. Just short of the dam we passed a place where about fifty bodies were lying beheaded, these were part of the non-Bengali staff of the dam and the generating station. The troops who had been carefree and bantering in their vehicles, became quiet and grim after they saw the ghastly scene.
The mixed force of 2 and 3 Commando Battalions arrived at the Kaptai Marina’, we found only one boat, belonging to an oil company and a lot of bathing floats. Under Subedar Ramzan’s supervision the ‘frogmen’ started organising the boats and outboard motors. Motors were started, tested and fitted on bathing floats, this took a lot of time. There was a steel boat, belonging to an oil company, moored near the *marina’. We started the engine, it started, everything was fine on it, it could take about a platoon, we wanted to use it but we could not find the fuel tank filler cap to check the amount of fuel and without checking the fuel and knowing the amount of the fuel we could not take the boat.
We were preparing the floats when my younger brother Lieutenant Commander Shamoon Alam Khan, PN, who was posted to the Inter-Services Intelligence, drove up in a Navy vehicle, and informed me that the Director General ISI, Major General Akbar, had sent him with a message for me. The message said that there would be no opposition to the landing at Rangamati as the opposing elements had withdrawn, this information had come from a very reliable source. Expecting opposition at Rangamati I had planned to start from the Kaptai Dam after dark and make a night landing at Rangamati. On the receipt of this information I changed my plan and decided to move as soon as we could get ready with a view to landing in daylight.
Texplained my difficulty of locating the fuel tank of the steel boat to Shamoon, he went on the boat, there was a large flat stone lying on the deck, he pushed it with his foot and pointed to the filler cap of the fuel tank, we measured the fuel level and found it nearly full.
Shamoon volunteered to accompany us to Rangamati and navigate on the lake, I accepted his offer. We set off with the steel boat leading, the bathing floats followed, each float had a frogman or a sailor loaned by Commander Tariq Kamal, in some floats the men sat with their feet dangling in the water. After a while I noticed that Shamoon would head the boat towards a bank of the lake, when near it turn and head for the other bank, I asked him what he was doing, he
showed me the navigation marks on the bank and explained that to avoid submerged obstacles you had to follow a cleared channel from one navigation mark to another. There were a number of submerged trees and we were lucky that we had not tried to navigate the river at night.
The sun had set in the haze before darkness, we sighted the lights of Rangamati. When we were about half a mile away, Subedar Ramzan, in a power boat led the way, he did not take us to the main landing jetty but to point about a mile from it, to the district commissioner’s house, behind which there was a cove and we landed there in the dark. The platoon on the steel boat quickly secured the area around the district commissioner’s house, the floats came in one by one and the men disembarked. There were no signs of anyone for a while, then two boys came running, as they went through our defensive perimeter they were held and searched, they had grenades on them and were placed under arrest although they said that they had come to surrender.
The whole landing seemed to have gone smoothly and without opposition, about half an hour after we had started the landing, there was sound of gunfire, it continued for a while and ended as suddenly as it had started. I could not work out who was firing and at what, all our force had disembarked and was with me. After nearly an hour a float commanded by Captain Pervez arrived in the cove, in the dark they had not seen us landing at the district commissioner’s house and were taken by the frogman on the float to the fishermen’s jetty. There they ran into a party of East Pakistan Rifles who opened fire, Captain Pervez returned the fire. The East Pakistan Rifles men got into powered country craft and went up the lake, they were about a company strong, when they saw our flotilla go past Rangamati, they hurriedly withdrew, we were lucky that we did not land at the main landing jetty.
The district commissioner’s house was also his office, the office and the house was found vacant, I made it my headquarters, a vacant house nearby was occupied by the officers and the men went to a government building, and defences were prepared. The frogmen of 3 Commando battalion knew Rangamati thoroughly and were of great assistance.
Shamoon then told me that he had not eaten since the morning and was very hungry. We had not carried any cooked meals, so we
decided to walk down to the Rangamati bazaar, about a mile from the district commissioner’s house. We went to a restaurant and Shamoon had a hearty meal of fish, I did not eat because I cannot stand eating fish. The next morning a frogman took Shamoon in power boat to Kaplai Dam headwork from where he went back to Dacca.
The Kaptai Dam on the Karnaphuli River formed a lake from Kaptai to Mahalchari, a distance of about fifteen miles, and about a mile wide, submerging the Karnaphuli valley where the Chakma tribe of the Chittagong Hill Tracts had lived. There were three main tribes in the Till Tracts, the Maugs adjacent to the Tripura border, the Chakmas in the Karnaphuli valley and the Bomaugs between the Karnaphuli valley and the borders with India and Burma. The Chakmas were a happy go lucky people, the Karnaphuli valley was very fertile and produced all their needs. When the Kaptai Dam was planned and they were offered compensation for their land, they readily accepted the sudden windfall and moved to the hills where the land had to be cleared and levelled which required continuous hard work that they were not used to. The money they got as compensation for their land was quickly spent, they carried on in their own irresponsible ways but with a feeling that they had been cheated.
The morning after we landed in Rangamati Captain Sajjad took the steel boat and about fifteen men and went to patrol the lake and a road block was established on the road Chittagong – Rangamati. I ordered government vehicles in Rangamati rounded up and told Major Hydayat Ullah Jan to form a vehicle mounted patrol.
While the above was being done, I called on Raja Tridiv Roy the Chakma Raja. He lived in an old bungalow on an island separated from the mainland by a water channel about fifty yards wide. I explained to the Raja that the army had come to re-establish the control of the Pakistan Government on the Hill Tracts and asked for his co-operation. I told him I needed information about rebel activity and he was in a position to provide the information, he agreed to help.
The East Pakistan Rifles rebels who had withdrawn from Rangamati the previous day when they saw us going up the lake instead of making for the landing at Rangamati, had quickly pulled out of Rangamati and set up a defensive position on islands where Karnaphuli River enters the Kaptai Lake. Captain Sajjad, with only fifteen or twenty men decided to attack the island nearest from the main
land to cut the rest of them from the mainland. He ran the boat to the island and beached it with his men firing from the boat. The East Pakistan Rifle rebels when they saw that the island nearest the mainland may be lost, abandoned all the islands and waded to the mainland leaving their heavy weapons which included two heavy machine guns on tripods, of Czech manufacture. Captain Sajjad brought all the abandoned weapons back with him, the steel boat had a number of bullet holes in the gunwale and in the super structure. My intelligence lance naik from 3 Commando Battalion was shot through the neck, we had no medical facilities and moved him to the Rangamati hospital, there was no doctor there, the man drowned in his own blood, his lungs filled with his blood and he died, we buried him the next day.
To get to the ferry landing for the Raja Tridiv Roy’s residence one had to go some distance from the road which came from Chittagong along an un-metalled track through an area covered by shrubs. In the shrubs we found a mass grave where all the non-Bengalis of Rangamati had been collected, killed and buried, later we were informed that this slaughter had been under the directions of the local administration. Among those killed had been a World War II veteran belonging to Murree, he had settled in Rangamati after the war ended, married there, lived there, owned property and had amassed some wealth as a contractor, the whole family was killed but somehow his ten-year old daughter survived. When my father died about two months later and I went to Murree, three different groups came to me and stated that they were the closest relatives and should be allowed to adopt the girl and control the property for her.
That day I informed the Eastern Command about our landing and securing of Rangamati, a few hours later I received a message from Lieutenant General Tikka ordering me to instruct the Mizos not to come to Rangamati. I received another message informing me that the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan was in Chittagong and where he was staying. After receiving the message from the commander Eastern Command I was in a quandary, the Mizos had started moving towards Rangamati. I had no communications with them to tell them to go back and when they arrived they would outnumber me about six to one. The message had come just before sunset, I took the power boat and went to the Kaptai Dam, the vehicles in which we had moved to the Dam were still there. I took one, went
to the hotel in Chittagong and to the CGS’s room, luckily I found him in his room. He was quite surprised to see me and thought I was just calling on him, I explained my dilemma and waited anxiously. He summoned a staff officer and dictated messages to Eastern Command and to the Director General ISI saying that he had allowed the Mizos to concentrate in Rangamati under my control. I went back to Kaptai and from there to Rangamati arriving late at night.
In the civilian vehicles that we had taken under our control there were some Toyota land cruisers and jeeps, with these I formed a mobile patrol from Quaid Company, 2 Commando Battalion, commanded by Major Hydayat Ullah Jan. After drilling them in mobile patrolling I sent them to reconnoitre the Rangamati-Chittagong road, the patrol returned and reported that there was no sign of the rebels, the next few days were spent in ensuring that the area around the Kaptai Lake was clear of rebels. A strong patrol was sent to Mahalchari, a large village on the left bank of the Karnaphuli River where it entered the lake. Subedar Ramzan and some frogmen went to Barkal, a village close to the Indian border but located on the lake, it was clear of rebels but some Assam Rifles men were seen in the village. Later Captain Munir and Subedar Ramzan took a strong patrol there to clear them and Captain Munir was wounded.
A patrol on the lake on the way to Mahalchari, found the bodies of some engineers and their family members who had been brought from the Kaptai Dam, they had been lined up on the bank of the lake, shot and their bodies left to rot.
Two days later the Mizo army started arriving, it consisted of three battalions of six hundred men each. With the army came the President of Mizoram, Mr. Laldenga, his government consisting of various ministers and the commander-in-chief of the army and his staff. Everything was very formal and government like; all messages were routed through their foreign ministry and their foreign minister Mr. Paulian. First of all we negotiated terms, I agreed to supply them with about one ton of rice per day, a pound per armed soldier that they would provide, to be issued daily, their labour would shift it from the government rice godown to the DC’s bungalow where they would load it on a boat and take it away. In return their army would be under my command and would act under my orders. They were allowed about four days for resting and a medical examination was arranged, these
people had been living in the jungle for several years without any medical cover. After their army had been given whatever medical assistance that could be managed locally, they asked to be allowed to bring their civilians to Rangamati for medical assistance. I agreed to this, allowed them to occupy a school building and they were given medical assistance in the Rangamati hospital. After about two weeks I asked the non-combatants to return and they did.
The Mizos, after they moved out of India into Pakistan, were permitted to maintain a liaison office in Rangamati which was located near the DC’s house, when the Bengalis revolted in March, the district commissioner Rangamati allowed an Indian raiding party to come to Rangamati and search the liaison office, the Mizos manning it were not present but their communication equipment was taken away by the Indians.
A few days after the Mizos arrived there were some incidents at night in the Rangamati bazaar and I had to impose a curfew on them. My main weapon for keeping the Mizos under control was the rice supply which was made daily and on any day that they misbehaved or disobeyed my order they lost a day’s ration.
After the Mizos had rested for a few days, I decided to move along the Karnaphuli River from Mahalchari to Manikchari, then to Khagrachari and the border, a force consisting of Ghazi Company which was about fifty strong and a battalion of Mizos, about two hundred men only, was moved in boats to Mahalchari with food, ammunition and other necessary stores and an arrangement was made for porters to be taken from Mahalchari.
The Chakmas are Buddhist by religion, they have matriarchy, women are the head of families and the villages. They have polyandry, women marry a number of men, and the women do not wear anything above the waist. A few days before the Ghazi Company force arrived at Mahalchari, we had negotiated with the village head-woman for porters. When the force arrived, the head-woman, with a cheroot in her mouth, asked Major Iqbal to line up all the loads that had to be carried, she then called all the adult males of the village, checked their biceps, checked the weight of the loads by lifting them and assigned them to the men according to their capability, a good JCO or NCO could not have done better. The Mizos, who were accompanying Ghazi Company, as soon as they arrived at Mahalchari, went
Through the village, killed all dogs that they could find and carried thein away slung on poles to cook and eat.
Ghazi Company and the Mizos advanced from Mahalchari along the left bank of the Karnaphuli River to Manikchari to a point across the river from Manikchari, which was the site of a ‘haat’ on the right bank of the Karnaphuli and no one lived there. When Ghazi Company arrived on the bank opposite the haat site there was no sign of any life in the ‘haat’, a number of boats were beached conveniently for the company to cross the river. The company got in the boats and started crossing the river, when they had gone a little way across the river, bottoms of the boats gave way and the boats sank, machine guns and rifles opened fire. The company waded back, ran up the steep bank of the river and a fire fight began, luckily there were no casualties. Major Iqbal now decided to move the Mizos well upstream and cross the river and gave the necessary orders. The Mizos, when they moved, taught us trick in deceiving the enemy, they moved in single file with one hundred yards interval between the men so that a person observing the movement from the opposite bank could only catch a glimpse of the movement through gaps in the bushes on the bank of the river and the movement seemed to be of a very long column of men much larger than the actual body. The East Pakistan Rifles opposing Ghazi Company over-estimating the number of the Mizos withdrew from Manikchari towards Ramgarh and Ghazi Company crossed the river to the ‘haat’ site and secured it.
The next morning I dispatclied Major Hydayat Ullah Ján’s mobile patrol to go from Rangamati to Mahalchari and from there to Ramgarh with instructions to go up to the outskirts of Ramgarh but not to enter the city. Major Hydayat Ullah successfully carried out the mission and waited there till 53 Brigade arrived two days later.
Leaving a small detachment to hold Manikchari, I instructed Major Iqbal to advance to Khagrachari. The Chakma porters left him at Manikchari, but he acquired an elephant to carry his stores. The company and the Mizos continued, crossed the Karnaphuli again but this time using a ferry and reached Khagrachari without opposition. At Khagrachari a vehicle was found and sent to the ferry to lift their stores which had been off loaded there from the elephant. From Khagrachari the company sent patrols to the border posts and found them unoccupied. The clearing of the area north of the Kaptai Dam was
complete, with five platoons of commandos and a little assistance from the Mizos we had cleared an area of about two thousand square miles and what was more important, we had the co-operation of the people.
At Khagrachari another mass grave of the engineers brought from the Kaptai was discovered. This time there was a survivor, a fourteen year old boy who had been shot but survived by hiding in bushcs, he told the story of how they had been rounded up at Kaptai and brought up to Khagrachari.
While the two company commanders were busy extending our control over the area I had a number of problems to attend to in Rangamati. When I had assumed the control of the operations of 205 Brigade in Chittagong we were informed that a company exploring for oil in the Hill Tracts had stored about two tons of explosives somewhere in the Hill Tracts. After securing Rangamati I took it on myself to find the explosives before they fell into the hands of the rebels. With the help of Chakınas, in a few days we located the explosives and transported it to Rangamati for storage.
In a building a little distance from the district commissioner’s house and office, nearly one crore rupees were found. This was part of the cash that had been given to the district commissioner to distribute to those who had been affected by the cyclone. The account showed that a few thousands had been paid to some Hindus, the district commissioner, when he escaped to India, took away two suitcases full of money, about a quarter million. I gave Major Iqbal the task of counting the money which took nearly a whole afternoon and informed the Eastern Command.
I had asked Raja Tridiv Roy to inform us of all the rebel activities in the Chakma territory. Apart from this we set about establishing information networks, one was controlled by Captain Sajjad with Mr. A. B. Chakma as the chief agent, this covered the Hill Tracts.
The second one was organised and operated by. Major Salman, this operated in Chittagong and kept us informed of the movement of the agents of the rebels by reporting arrivals of strangers in selected localities of the city. The arrival of an agent in a locality could only be pinpointed by the residents of the area who could tell who was a stranger in the area, as soon as information was received about an agent having arrived at a house it had to be quickly searched. The informants in Chittagong were Bengali boys who were promised good rewards, they
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were given a telephone number in Chittagong and they phoned in their information. The third one was our trans-border intelligence net organised by liaising with the Navy interrogating officer in the Chittagong jail and arranging the release of suitable personnel. We even managed to locate an agent who worked as a secretary in the Awami League headquarters in Tripura in India
Besides gathering information I also worked out methods of attacking rebel camps, for instance their food was poisoned. The Indian border posts collecting rebels were attacked by giving 303 rifles with an explosive charge in it to deserters and asking them to go and fire a few rounds at the camp, knowing that they would surrender and hand over their rifles which would be placed with other weapons and after sometime the charge would explode. These methods required continuous thinking to evolve variations.
In Rangamati the presence of a large number of armed Mizos required my constant attention. Apart from controlling their rice ration and imposing a curfew on them, I had to show them that we had the force to deal with them, I told them that the army had reinforced Chittagong and had a division there. This claim of mine was reinforced when I invited three brigadiers for lunch, a visiting brigadier, 53 Brigade commander and Brigadier Hesky Baig who had dug out a khaki dungaree, put on a brigadier’s rank and let it be known to all and sundry that he had been recalled to the army by Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, the commander Eastern Command.
At Rangamati I had about two companies of commandos, a brigade of Mizos, a number of boats on the lake manned by the frogmen which constituted my water-borne force. I had seen a number of light aircraft parked on the Chittagong airfield and thought that if I could find a pilot I could use an aircraft for reconnaissance and moving about over the Hill Tracts. I asked Major Salman, who had served in Chittagong with 3 Commando Battalion, to find a pilot, he found a businessman who was a licenced pilot. He checked out an aircraft which had been provided by some country for relief work after the 1970 cyclone, everything went fine, then the pilot finally asked if there was a likelihood of being shot at and when I told him that the possibility could not be ruled out, he quit and my grand scheme for my own air support was still-born.
I had a good supply of ammunition stored away, the commandos were equipped with the Chinese version of the AK 47, we called it the Chinese sub-machine gun, the 2 Commando Battalion had come with G 3 Rifles. We had no heavy weapons, I found out that the mortars of 4 East Bengal Regiment were lying in Commilla, not claimed by anyone. On a trip to Dacca I got an aircraft belonging to the Plant Protection Department and picked up the mortars from Commilla and loaded them in the aircraft, the aircraft was so overloaded that it barely managed to get airborne but nonetheless I got my mortars, I also picked up some rocket launchers with the intention of creating a heavy weapons platoon, the rocket launchers had been left behind by an FF battalion.
To maintain good relations with the Chakmas I started asking Raja Tridiv Roy over for drinks and dinner almost every evening and he became very friendly with me and my officers. One of the problems of the Chakmas, he told me was they had almost no government jobs. I arranged for the recruitment of about two hundred Chakmas in the East Pakistan Rifles, after receiving about a month’s training they were given uniforms of khaki shirts, shorts and a side cap which made them look very smart. When they came back after their training I gave them the task of guarding bridges, there were no rifles available so they were given shot guns. These probably became the nucleus of the ‘Shanti Bahini’, the Chakma guerrilla organisation which has been fighting the Bangladesh government. I also tried to get them other jobs but no one would agree to employ them.
When 53 Brigade re-took the charge of Chittagong, Brigadier Iqbal Shafi had an order passed by 14 Division placing the commandos under his command. When I was ordered to make a water-borne landing at Rangamati the brigadier asked for a platoon to be left in Chittagong which I did. While passing through Chittagong on my way to Dacca I met the platoon commander and asked him how his platoon was employed, he told me that they were doing guard duty at night, guarding the house where the brigade commander slept. At Dacca I told Brigadier Jilani that I could either hold the Hill Tracts or act as a fire brigade for 53 Brigade, he issued an order making 3 Commando Battalion independent of 53 Brigade and responsible for the Hill Tracts. I went back to Chittagong with a copy of the order and asked for the platoon to be reverted to me, the brigade commander
askeu two men to be left with the brigade and I did so. When I checked how the men were employed I was told that they were employed as guards at night at the door of the brigade commander’s bedroom. After I found this out, whenever the brigade commander rclused anything that I wanted, I would request that my two men be returned.
Major General M. Rahim Khan relieved Major General Khadim Hussain Raja and took over the command of 14 Division with the responsibility of Mymensingh – Dacca – Jessore area. In the Dacca area he started clearing the Dacca-Bhairab Bazaar railway line with a brigade and reached the near bank of the Meghna River, the far bank was held by our old friends, 4 East Bengal Regiment. I was called by Eastern Command for orders and I flew to Dacca, there Major Bilal of Jangju Company, which had moved to Dacca after the 4 East Bengal disarming operation, met me at the airport and told me that an operation had been planned by Major General. Rahim Khan in which Jangju Company was required to para-drop and secure the bridge over the river Meghna at Bhairab Bazaar, with Lieutenant Colonel Shakur Jan in command. Major Bilal said that a very narrow drop zone had been selected between the river and a high tension power line and if there was a slight drift the troops would either be electrocuted or drown. I told him that I could not imagine that Lieutenant Colonel Shakur Jan had not pointed this out to the general and that a major general of the Pakistan Army could not understand that he was putting the troops to the unnecessary danger of being electrocuted or drowned. I also told him that he must not have briefed the general properly and now wanted me to talk to him. He assured me that he tried his best but the general was adamant and not listening to him. I told him that I would talk to the general. Major Tariq Mahmood, later brigadier, Officer Commanding, Parachute Training School, was in Dacca, 1 called him and told him to take a helicopter, see the proposed drop zone and report its suitability, I also telephoned the general and asked for an appointment to discuss the para-drop, he told me to come at six o’clock that evening.
Major Tariq Mahmood returned from the reconnaissance and confirmed Major Bilal’s fears about the selected drop zone. I thought over the tactical problem, two methods were possible, one was the crossing of e river upstream, preferably at night, establishing a firm base
and advancing towards the bridge, the resources for this were available with the division commander. The second method was placing a company, on the home bank of the river and flying a company from Dacca to the far bank of the river, turning the helicopters around and lifting the company placed on the home bank, the whole concentration would take about twenty minutes from the time the first company landed. Both plans did not require special troops, ordinary infantry would have been good enough.
At the appointed time, Lieutenant Colonel Shakur Jan and I with Major Tariq Mahmood and Major Bilal went to the general’s residence, I explained to him that I had the drop zone reconnoitered by Major Tariq Mahmood and he had found it unsuitable for a para drop. I further explained that even if the drop zone were suitable, the troops would take about half an hour to collect and the drop would be seen from a long distance warning the defenders of the bridge. I then gave him my alternative plan of lifting companies by helicopters, the general heard me out and I was sure that I had convinced him but he bowled me over by saying that the para drop would take place. I tried arguing with him but he would not listen, I finally told him that I would not kill my troops by agreeing to such an irresponsible plan, that I was going to the Eastern Command headquarters to make a report about what the general was proposing to do and inform them of the consequences. I then put on my cap, saluted the general and walked towards the door, when I was a few paces from the door the general called me back and said that he would carry out the operation as I had planned.
The next day the operation was carried out, the two commando companies landed by helicopters, quickly captured the bridge and drove away the defending Bengali troops. The operation was a complete success and received wide publicity. The general had been the GSO 2 (Training) at the PMA when we were cadets, he had worked his way up as an instructor and on the staff, he had been chief instructor of the War Course, but he showed a complete lack of common sense as far as elementary tactics were concerned. Later I learnt that he had arranged for newspaper reporters and the television to cover the operation, he had already had a picture printed in a newspaper of himself in a Gurkha hat standing with weapons taken from the rebels lined up in front, prominently displayed were the heavy tripod mounted
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Nadir to take charge with instructions not to disturb the deployment of troops. I borrowed the fare money from Subedar Major Zardad Khan of 2 Commando Battalion and went home to Murree. When I returned at the end of my leave, I was instructed by the Eastern Command to prepare a plan for the Commando Battalion’s employment in the defence of East Pakistan in the event of war with India and give a presentation to Lieutenant General Niazi on a date to be given later.
While I was waiting for the presentation, Major General Mitha accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Jaffar Hussain arrived from Rawalpindi on a tour of East Pakistan. Since I did not have much to do I accompanied the general on his visits to Mymensingh, Bogra and Khulna. At Mymensingh, 27 Brigade Headquarters, commanded by Brigadier N. A. Hussain, was located, he showed Major General Mitha a signal from Major General Rahim Khan, his GOC, saying “sweep the Madhopur forest”, he said that he had sent a signal back asking for more “sweepers”. A few days later Brigadier Hussain was removed from his command and sent back to West Pakistan. At Bogra, as the Quartermaster General, Major General Mitha inspected the buildings that had been constructed to house refugees but had not been occupied, these were bought on behalf of the army as family quarters for the proposed Bogra cantonment. Major General Mitha had commanded 53 Brigade in Commilla 1963 to 1966 and had very good contacts with prominent citizens of Dacca, in the evening he would visit them to obtain their opinions and feelings on the situation, for these visits he asked me to provide him with two men in civilian clothes to accompany him and I did. Major General Rahim Khan learnt about it and voiced his resentment that he had not been provided similar SSG guards.
On 13 June, the GSO 1, 14 Division, asked for a platoon of commandos to arrest Mr. Ata Ur Rehman, ex-chief minister of East Pakistan who had been located in some village, he said that the sanction of the Eastern Command had been obtained. I protested that I did not have any troops in Dacca but when the GSO I insisted I told Subedar Major Zardad Khan to collect the cooks and clerks who were getting the SSG pay and go and arrest the ex-chief minister. The party went by helicopter, arrested the minister and brought him back. Later ! informed Brigadier Jilani who told me that no approval for the use of commando troops had been given.
After I returned from leave, on the Eastern Command grapevine i was rumoured that Major General Raluan Khan had lost his command
Sleepy occupant, Major Beg of the Ordnance Corps, who told us that the rest house was occupied. We then decided to drive to Rangamati, there was no ti ific, a few miles out of the city on the Rangamati road in the headl ht we saw a man flagging us to stop, we did with weapons cocked and expecting trouble. When the car stopped the man walked up to the vehicle and peeped inside, he was from the Tochi Scouts, he identified us and gave a signal, the commander stepped up to the vehicle and apologised for laying the ambush and aiming his weapons at us, we thanked our lucky stars that we had stopped. The next time I went to Dacca Brigadier Jilani, COS Eastern Command told me that a report had been lodged by Major Beg of the Ordnance Corps that I had been drunk and disorderly and tried to throw him out of the rest house.
The companies of 2 and 3 Commando Battalions had got mixed up due the initial deployment. Ghazi and Quaid companies of 2 Commando Battalion were with me in Rangamati, one platoon of Hamza Company was in Commilla, Jangju Company was in Dacca. I decided to sort out the companies of 2 and 3 Commando Battalions by bringing both the companies of 3 Commando Battalion to Rangamati and sending the 2 Commando Battalion companies to Dacca. Besides I had all the stores and baggage of 3 Commando Battalion moved to Dacca, this was done by moving the stores etc by road to Chandpur and then by boat to Dacca, while unloading at Dacca, the crane operator dropped my car and cracked the chassis.
On 1 May while the Commander Eastern Command was away in West Pakistan, Major General Rahim Khan called me and ordered me to mount commando attacks across the border on the bridges and vulnerable points on the Indian lines of communications from Mymensingh and other border points in his area of responsibility. The orders from Eastern Command were that no provocation was to be given to India and no Pakistan Army men were to be used for attacks across the border. I started locating the commandos at suitable points for these attacks and informed Eastern Command, on 21 May, Eastern Command very firmly stopped the attacks and I was just able to prevent the attacks jumping off.
A few weeks after the Bhairab Bazaar operation I again received orders to provide a platoon to assist 39 Baluch, a part of 14 Division, commanded by Major General Rahim Khan, in clearing Brahmanbaria where 4 East Bengal Regiment still had a hold. I had no troops to spare
as all my troops were stretched out from Rangamati to Khagrachari, Captain Sajjad, besides Captain Rehman the Regimental Medical Ollicer, was the only officer with me. He, probably to get away from me, at once volunteered to command an ad hoc platoon scraped together from the battalion headquarters personnel and I allowed him to go. Two days later he returned, the operation was successfully carried out but Captain Sajjad lodged a complaint with me that 39 Baluch had made the commando platoon attack all the points of resistance and had occupied the positions after they were captured. He said that Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Naeem, the commanding officer of 39 Baluch, an ex-commando officer had used the commandos to do all the fighting and the area had been cleared by a series of one platoon attacks by Captain Sajjad. The next time I went to Dacca I reported this to Brigadier Jilani, the COS of Eastern Command, I told him that we were not the only troops being paid for the job in East Pakistan. He issued an order that the commandos were Corps troops and their employment by the formations would require the prior approval of the Eastern Command.
When the Mukti Bahini started mounting raids from India into the East Pakistan border areas and withdrawing across the border, the Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, Brigadier Jilani discussed the problem with me. I told him that the Indians had declared a three-mile belt along the border as a dusk to dawn curfew area. I suggested that we declare a two-mile belt on our side of the border as a dusk to dawn curfew area in which anyone found moving about to be shot. He considered it a good idea and told me to go to the Governor’s House and get it approved by Lieutenant General Tikka Khan. I went to the Governor’s House, explained the purpose of my coming, the Governor heard me out and then started talking, he talked for over an hour about everything except what I had come to discuss, he kept me standing all the time and concluded without agreeing to the proposal. A rivalry had developed between Lieutenant General Tikka Khan and Lieutenant General A.A. K. Niazi and probably the Governor was not prepared to take any action to help in military operations.
While returning to Chittagong from a visit to Dacca I met Fazlul Quader Choudhry on the aircraft. While discussing the situation in East Pakistan he offered that he could provide some Bengalis who would act under our orders, I told him that I wanted some men who could be trained and sent to attack targets across the border. He agreed
to provide the men and I sought the approval of Eastern Command, it took sometime before the approval was accorded. The training was organised by me in Commilla, the first attack was launched after I was removed from the command of 3 Commando Battalion, the results were promising but the operation was not followed up and fizzled out.
At the end of May, Major Nadir, from the Ordnance Corps, was posted as my second in command although the battalion was not authorized a second in command, a replacement of Major Mannan, Hamza Company commander, who had been transferred to Cherat, was not provided. I did not consider that Major Nadir would be of much use to me in Rangamati so I kept him in Dacca in charge of the rear element of the battalion.
In the last week of May I received a telegram at Rangamati saying that my father had suffered a stroke and was in hospital, I could not ask for leave as I had not given any leave to anyone. On 4 June I took a country boat fitted with an outboard and went on the lake, I had done this previously also, but this time when I had gone about half a mile the motor quit, I tried starting it with the rope starter but it would not start and started drifting. When I started the weather had been bright and sunny, it suddenly became cloudy, started raining and a strong wind started blowing driving the boat towards the bank of lake till it reached a very small island, beached and I secured it. For about an hour the storm blew rocking the boat, fortunately the middle portion of the boat was covered and I was protected from the rain. The rain and the storm ended, I was wondering what to do now when two Maug tribesmen came in a small boat, I beckoned them but they would not come near me so I pointed my pistol at them and they came. I indicated that the engine of the boat was not working, when they understood my problem they got in the boat and using long bamboo poles punted it to the Rangamati boat landing and I got out. For about three days afterwards I felt that I was rocking in the boat.
When I got back to my battalion headquarters from my boating adventure, I found a message ordering me to report to the Eastern Command headquarters. The next morning I flew to Dacca, at the airport a SSG oflicer met me and told me that a message had been received from Rawalpindi saying that my father had died in the Civil Hospital in Rawalpindi. When I got to the Eastern Command Headquarters Brigadier Jilani, without my asking, gave me ten days leave. Since 1 could not leave Rangamati without a responsible oflicer 1 sent Major
and a replacement was on the way. Near Feni there was a salient, abou eight hundred yards wide and about two miles long protruding into the Indian territory of Tripura called ‘Belonia’ salient. 9 Division after arrival in East Pakistan was given the responsibility of clearing the area east of the Meghna river and had done so except that the Belonia salient had not been cleared because it required a lot of troops to hold and could be fired upon from Indian territory. 14 Division, commanded by Major General Rahim Khan, had taken over the responsibility of this area when 9 Division moved to Jessore. The COAS was scheduled to come to Dacca so Major General Rahim decided to clear the salient the day before the COAS arrived and present it as his achievement. Two infantry battalions were concentrated and artillery guns were lifted by helicopters. The attack was launched under the general’s direct control, the attacking infantry crossed the start line, went about three hundred yards and went to the ground and nothing could make them go again. The general, who had previously also used the commandos when he could not budge his own command, took two MI 8 helicopters to Rangamati and ordered Major Nadir to send two commando platoons to Feni to get his two battalions out of their predicament. Major Nadir sent me a signal inforining me, when I checked with the COS Eastern Command he told me that Eastern Command had not been given permission to use the commandos. I sent a signal ordering Major Nadir to refuse but he had picked up men from the outposts to make the platoons, they were taken to Feni and flown after dark into the salient. At about eight o’clock at night the GSO 3 of 53 Brigade telephoned me and told me that the GOC 14 Division had moved commandos to Feni and had launched them into the Belonia salient, that communications had been lost with the force, that I should do something about it. I told the GSO3 that “any i ‘ot could tell you that communications are tied up before an operation commences and not after it has started, nothing can be done now”. The next morning I went to the COAS Eastern Command and told him about the telephone message. He provided me with a helicopter and I went to Feni, on the Feni airfield I found that the commandos had successfully carried out the mission and returned. I asked for Major Nadir but he had taken off when he had heard that I had come ar uld not be found. I asked for the platoons to be paraded, and(–)the JCOs why the communications had not worked. After some hesitation they admitted that they had not taken wireless equipment with them. I told them that this was contrary to the standing orders of the battalion and I would take disciplinary action against those who were responsible for the lapse and dismissed the platoon. The GSO 1 of 14 Division had witnessed the whole proceedings.
That night I was invited to dinner by Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rehman, later brigadier, who was GSO I (Training) at Eastern Command, when I returned I was handed over a signal from Eastern Command relieving me from the command of 3 Commando Battalion with immediate effect and attaching me to Headquarters Eastern Command. On the second evening after I had lost my command, I received a message from Brigadier Jilani to come and see him at his residence the next morning. I went there and he asked me what had happened at Feni and I told him.
A few days later I was required to present my plan for the employment of the SSG in defence of East Pakistan, I was told to report to the Eastern Command Headquarters where after the evening review of the daily situation the Corps Commander would hear my plans. In the review all the incidents that had been reported during the last twenty four hours were marked on a map and were summed up by the various staff ofticers, then Lieutenant General Niazi walked over to the map, sat on stool and stared hard at the map, I expected a stream of orders, he stood up, looked at Brigadier Jilani and said “kuch karo”, walked back to his chair and sat down. There was no roar in the “tiger”.
During my command of 3 Commando Battalion I had given some thought to the employment of the battalion in the event of a war with India and had held planning exercises for my officers to get them used to thinking on the Eastern Command level. One of the plans that I had considered was an attack on Calcutta to seize the key points for a short time to upset Indian plans. The plan required the using of the 3 Commando Battalion as a nucleus to train two thousand men, movement by boats from Khulna or some other suitable place, at night, lying up in the Sunderbans for a day, moving up stream the next night and moving into Calcutta. I presented the plan. The general’s remark was “you want to become a brigadier!” and turned the plan down, flat.
General Abdul Hamid Khan the COAS did not come the day after the Belonia salient operation by Major General Rahim Khan but about a week later and in his honour a dinner was arranged. At the dinner I met Major Shujauddin Butt, Baluch Regiment, from my course, who had been posted to the Martial Law headquarters, we had met after a long time and were standing and talking in the middle of a large hall in the 14 Division
officers mess from which all the furniture had been removed. I had a glass in my hand, and there were groups of other officers around us. Major General Rahim saw me and walked over, I wished him and he stood with us, Major Shujauddin Butt and all the officers slipped away. I stood with the general for sometime, neither of us said anything, then emptied my glass, excused myself and went to the bar. The general had expected me to beg forgiveness.
A day or so before the dinner in honour of the COAS, Brigadier Jilani left Dacca on promotion to take over his new post of Director General ISI, about the same time Major General Rahim Khan handed over the command of 14 Division and was moved to the Martial Law headquarters. I received a signal attaching me to Martial Law headquarters also. I reported for my new assignment and was told to inquire into the sabotage of some electric power distribution transformers, I started the inquiry and asked for transport and other facilities, the next day I was handed a signal attaching me again to Eastern Command and I became one of the dozen or so sacked lieutenant colonels awaiting disposal.
In this period army officers would not move around the city without an escort, each officer would have at least three or four men in his vehicle, there was no movement after dusk. Since I had nothing to do I took to hanging around Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rehman’s office during working hours and going at night to play bridge at Mr. Kamal Zia ul Islam’s house in the city, he was known to me from Lawrence College. I went without a driver and an escort, only one night I was stopped by an air force patrol vehicle.
Sometime in July I was told to complete the forins for a confidential report, I submitted the forms and in due course received a report written by Major General Jilani, who as the Chief of Staff of Eastern Command was my reporting officer. He gave me a good report, emphasizing that rather than pressing me in the conduct of operations, I had to be restrained. About a week later I received Lieutenant General Niazi’s report on me as the ‘superior reporting ollicer’. he said “He was mostly employed by 14 Division for operations against rebels. GOC 14 Division found this officer to be dragging his feet, by-passing his orders, displaying despondency, negative in his attitude and an arm-chair soldier. I fully agree with the assessment of GOC 14 Division. His battalion has been doing a good job under enthusiastic and dedicated company coinmanders but he himself has been slow in his actions. He is argumentative and more of a theoretical soldier. He lacks personality and I do not think he
can inspire confidence in his subordinates. He by-passes his superiors.” I submitted a representation stating that both 2 and 3 Commando Battalions had never been under the command of 14 Division and gave copies of Eastern Command orders which showed that the battalions remained under command Eastern Command except for a short period when they came under the command of 9 Division. I said that I had only met Major General Rahim Khan once and had advised him against a parachute drop at Bhairab Bazaar, that the commandos had carried out very successful operations under my personal command, that I express my views on the practicability of orders, that my theory had been confined to the employment of Mizos and the employment of Bengali civilians to attack targets in Indian territory. About my personality I said that I had trained, commanded and employed the most confident and successful troops in East Pakistan. I stated that the basis of the report by Lieutenant General Niazi that my battalion had been under the command of Major General Rahim Khan was false and I attached signals and letters to prove my statement. Both Major General Rahim Khan and Lieutenant General Niazi were telling lies but I could not say so in so many words. I asked for the entire report by Lieutenant General Niazi to be expunged.
Lieutenant Colonel Iqbal Nazir Waraich arrived to take over the charge of 3 Commando Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel Hanif Malik to take over the charge of 2 Commando Battalion, I went to Rangamati and made a farewell round. I now prepared to go back to West Pakistan. 1 moved my household belongings and my car to Chittagong and arranged with 3 Commando Battalion to have my baggage shipped to West Pakistan. I asked my batman Sowar Abdul Aziz if he would like to come back to West Pakistan, he refused saying that fighting had to be done in East Pakistan and he would stay behind. My posting order came attaching me to Station Headquarters, Rawalpindi, the future looked gloomy.
On the evening before I was to leave Dacca, Lieutenant Colonel Iqbal Nazir Waraich and the elements of the commandos in Dacca arranged a farewell bara khana’. We were sitting in the men’s dining room eating when there was the sound of gunfire, I realised at once that the re-constituted East Pakistan Rifles, called East Pakistan Civil Anned Forces post at Farm Gate’ had been attacked. The weapons of the commandos were stacked in the next room, 1 quickly organised the men, we drove to the Farm Gate road junction and found that the Mukti Bahini had shot up the tents of the men manning the post and left, the EPCAF men were in the tents and had no guards or sentries. The next morning I was on the PIA flight to Karachi.
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Chapter 12
I left Dacca at the end of the second week of August, flying back to West Pakistan around Ceylon was a long Night, it gave Ime plenty of time to think over the events and to give some thoughts to my bleak future. Major General Rahim Khan had misconstrued and lied and Lieutenant General Niazi without investigating what Major General Rahim had alleged had confirmed it and given his own opinion of me which was that I was a below average officer. The army’s principle was that the senior officer must be supported to maintain discipline, therefore my representation on Lieutenant General Niazi’s report, though supported by copies of orders that had received from Eastern Command, would be of’ no avail and I should either settle down to spend a few more years as a lieutenant colonel or prepare to leave the army.
The PIA flight arrived at Karachi at about ten o’clock at night, I had not informed my wife that I was coming so there was no one to receive me. Coming out of the Karachi airport I left my luggage, which consisted of suitcase and a talking mynah in a cage, outside the airport building and went to find a taxi, as I was crossing the road in front of the airport building I heard the mynah talk. I looked back and saw a man carrying away the cage, I ran back and he dropped the cage and ran away,
My wife was surprised to see me back, after greetings were over I told her that I had been sent back on an adverse report by Lieutenant General Niazi, the commander Eastern Command, that my prospects in the army were bleak and that she should get used to idea of my leaving the army.
I spent a few days with my wife and children, and bought a twoyear old car with the money that was saved due to the accumulation of my pay after the military action started.
I left for Rawalpindi by car and drove from Karachi to Multan, leaving in the morning and arriving in Multan in the evening and stayed at Lieutenant Colonel Kallue’s house. He informed me that I had been posted as GSO I (Intelligence) Il Corps, at Multan, that Colonel Niaz Azim was the Colonel GS under whom I would be serving. Expecting to come back to Multan, I left my car at Lieutenant
Colonel Kallue’s house and went by train to Rawalpindi where the Station Headquarters gave me the posting order which ordered me to report to Il Corps.
Colonel Niaz Azim, Baluch Regiment, and I were from the same course, same platoon and same section at the PMA, we had been room mates in Salahuddin Company and were good friends, I had passed out of the Academy a few numbers senior to him. I took the posting order, went to GIIQ and from Lieutenant Colonel Aslam Mirza’s office, who was still in Staff Duties Directorate, I telephoned the Military Secretary, Major General Nasrullah, who had been my instructor in the Staff College, and told him that I had just been given a posting order posting me as GSO I (Intelligence) in Il Corps where the Colonel GS was junior to me. I said that if the posting order meant that I had been superseded, I would submit my resignation as I was not willing to serve under an officer who was junior to me. The Military Secretary took the number I was speaking from, rang back after a few minutes and told me that I was to proceed on one month’s expatriation leave, a leave given to people who served in a wing of Pakistan in which they were not domiciled. The rest of the day I spent with Lieutenant Colonel Aslam Mirza working out how much pension I was entitled to and how much I would lose if I asked for retirement.
I went on leave and my wife and children joined me in Murree, after about two weeks I was informed that I was to proceed to Kharian to take over the charge of Colonel Staff 6 Armoured Division. I went to Kharian, two of my brothers were there, Lieutenant Colonel Firoz Alam who had raised and was commanding 36 FF there, his family was there but he had moved to the field with his unit, Major Aijaz Alam was there commanding a squadron in 13 Lancers. In the evening of the day on which I got to Kharian, Major General Mitha telephoned me and told me the adverse report on me by Lieutenant General Niazi had been expunged in its entirety. On hearing this I was certain that I would be posted to Kharian and asked Lieutenant Colonel Kallue to have someone drive my car to Kharian and he sent it. I spent the next few days with 6 Armoured Division, the GOC, Major General Muhammad Iskandar ul Karim, with the nick name ‘Bachchu Karim’, a Bengali officer, had been the platoon commander of the Qasim Company platoon of our course in the PMA. The GOC and his staff, were reconnoitering the operational area of the division and I joined
them. Colonel Agha Javed Iqbal was the officer I was to relieve. When the reconnaissance was completed and no orders had come about me, I told the general that since the posting order had not come 1 would like to go and finish my leave and join the division when the posting order was issued.
I went back to Murree, my leave finished and I remained attached to Station Headquarters Rawalpindi. I went to Rawalpindi and arranged with the Station Headquarters that I would remain in Murree and they would inform me if any orders about me were received. While in Rawalpindi I met Lieutenant General Gul Hassan who had just
returned from a tour of East Pakistan, while talking to me he shocked me by telling me that “we should forget about East Pakistan”.
On 25 September the Station Headquarters Rawalpindi informed me that I had been posted to raise 38 Cavalry in Hyderabad, to be part of the 18 Division. I packed up and drove to Rawalpindi, when I saw the posting order it said that Lieutenant Colonel Shamim Yasin Manto, later brigadier, was posted to 28 Cavalry, the integral armoured regiment of 23 Division, which had been raised and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed had been posted to 22 Cavalry which I had commanded and was wearing their badges and I was to go to 38 Cavalry. I went to GHQ and telephoned the Military Secretary protesting against being posted to a new regiment when I was wearing the badges of 22 Cavalry. The Military Secretary told me these orders had been issued under the instructions of the CGS Lieutenant General Gul Hassan, I told the Military Secretary that I would go and see the CGS and protest against the posting order. I went to the CGS’s office and told his GSO 2, Major Javed Nasir, later lieutenant general, that I wished to see the CGS, Major Nasir went into the CGS’s office, he came out and told me that the CGS had said that he would not see me. I told Major Nasir to go back and tell the CGS that I would wait in the GSO 2’s office and see him when he left his office. I sat for about an hour then the CGS called his GSO2 and asked him whether I was still waiting and when he was told that I was, he called me in. I showed him the posting order and did not say anything, the general looked at the posting order and said “this MS is always making a cock up” and before I could tell him that the MS had told me that the order was issued on his instructions, he added that we were going to be at war in fifteen days, about the middle of October, that I had been posted to raise the new regiment and get it ready for war in fifteen days, after hearing this I could not say anything and left.
31 Cavalry, originally 31 Tank Delivery Unit located at Sialkot became 31 Cavalry after the ’65 war with India and moved to Hyderabad as the integral armoured regiment of 18 Division. In the middle of 1971 it was decided to equip the armoured regiment of 18 Division with T-59 Chinese tanks. Since 31 Cavalry was not trained on the T-59s it was decided that 22 Cavalry from the 1st Armoured Division would move to Hyderabad and take over new T-59 tanks and 31 Cavalry would move to the 1st Armoured Division to be trained on
T-59 tanks, the Sherman II tanks of 31 Cavalry would be overhauled and handed over to the newly created 38 Tank Delivery Unit, a nucleus tank regiment with the full complement of tanks, a few vehicles and about 115 men, to be located at Hyderabad and when necessary it would be converted into a regiment by posting the manpower and providing the necessary additional equipment and vehicles.
38 TDU was commanded by Major I. B. Khan, when I assumed the command on October, 38 Cavalry was formally raised. 18 Division had moved to its war location, so the Hyderabad cantonment was lying vacant, I asked the Station Commander, Brigadier *Andy Anwar ul Haq, for the 22 Cavalry lines and moved the tanks and the men there. The tanks moved about half a mile and one tank engine seized because of lack of lubrication.
A day or so after I arrived the officers and the men started arriving, I organised a reception party of an NCO and a vehicle which met every train that came to Hyderabad and brought the personnel to the regiment. Every morning 1 interviewed the officers and men who had arrived the previous day, the officers had been posted by the Military Secretary’s Branch at GHQ and were a fair cross section, except for Major I. B. Khan who saw the pace I was setting, went to the. hospital and then was posted out. Major Zia Ud Din Javed, later lieutenant colonel, 11 Cavalry and Army Aviation pilot, took over the post of second in command, Major Ghulam Mujtaba, 4 Cavalry, Major Javed Hussain, 15 Lancers, Major Nazar Malik, 12 Cavalry, later lieutenant colonel, took over as A, B and C Squadron commanders and later Major Mohammad Karim took over the headquarters squadron, Captain Pervez Khan, later brigadier, ex-28 Cavalry, Captain Tariq Shuja Javed Bhatti, later major, Captain Muhammad Nawaz Saqi Gujar, later major, were the adjutant, quartermaster and the technical officer. Amongst the JCOS, I could not have got a better risaldar major than Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan who had come from 5 Horse, he was a short skinny unimpressive man and I thought that 5 Horse had pulled a fast one on me to promote someone. I discussed it with Lieutenant Colonel Kallue and he assured me that it was a loss to 5 Horse and I could not have a better man, he was absolutely correct, as I soon found out. The other JCOs were a mixed bag, some good, some bad. The JCOS, NCOs and the men were posted on the Armoured Corps Directorate order stating that 38 Cavalry was being raised and
instructing various regiments to immediately post the number of personnel shown against them. Four things became obvious immediately, firstly I was getting the discards from all the regiments, secondly most of the men I was receiving had not served on tanks for a long time and had been employed as drivers or on administrative duties at headquarters etc, thirdly they wanted to avoid serving as tank crews and lastly there was almost no one who had served on Sherman Ils or would admit having served on them and knew how to operate them.
While I was busy raising 38 Cavalry I received an order to proceed to Lyallpur (Faisalabad) where Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was being tried by a military court headed by Brigadier Rahimuddin, later general. The evening before I was required to give the evidence, which was only how I had arrested him, the prosecuting officer briefed me, the next day after I had given the evidence I was cross examined by Mr. Brohi, Sheikh Mujib’s defending lawyer and in a minute he made me admit that I was briefed by the prosecutor.
As I had done with 22 Cavalry I now organised the training of 38 Cavalry, using the TDU nucleus who had some knowledge of Shermans and a few old Armoured Corps School and Centre instructors, now senior JCOs and NCOs who had been posted to the regiment. Classes were organised in driving, gunnery and wireless, tanks were driven around a field in the lines, they were loaded on tank transporters, one fell off and everybody gaped at it while it lay with its tracks in the air, I used it to teach tank crews how to recover a tank which had turned turtle. After about two weeks of training the tanks were moved to the tank firing range at Kotri, guns were zeroed, all gunners were made to fire and tank commanders and troop leaders were run through a ‘battle run’ with live ammunition. In the training twenty four persons received serious injuries and were sent to the hospital. Two tank engines seized.
The raising of a regiment requires a large number of items, indents were placed for the myriad of items that were required and promptly the Ordnance Corps started sending ‘NA’, “not available” certificates. Out of forty, three-ton lorries, which were authorised to an armoured regiment operating in the desert, we received nine, jeeps were not available but we got a few G/.Z, the Russian vehicle, jeep ambulances were not available but 3/4 ton ‘ambulances were issued as
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substitutes, we got a windfall with ten l-ton Dodge Power Wagons, a miraculous vehicle for the desert. NA certificates were also received for rifles, sten guns and pistols, though later some rifles and Indian sten guns captured in the ’65 war were issued.
A few days after I arrived to take over the command of 38 Cavalry the GOC 18 Division, Major General B. M. Mustafa, sent a message that he would be in Karachi and I should meet him. I had met the general when he was the BM of 101 Brigade in 1952 but he and I both had forgotten that we had met. He had been Major Zia uddin Abbasi’s instructor at the Staff College and ZU had depicted him as a tyrant, I was rather apprehensive about working under him, particularly as I had just come out of the dog house. We met at his residence, I found him a reasonable man, I explained how the raising of the regiment was progressing, my difficulties and my doubts about the engines. He arranged for me to go to GHQ to expedite matters, when I met the Director Armoured Corps, Brigadier Nazir, I told him about the condition of the tanks and the problem of the tank engines seizing after running a few miles. He arranged for me to visit the 502 Combined Workshop where I was showed how the overhauling of the engines was being carried and how every engine was bench tested under load before being passed, I could find no fault in the system.
An armoured regiment in 1971 had fifty tanks, including tank dozers and armoured recovery vehicles; for command, control, administration and communication, jeeps and 3/4 tons fitted with wireless sets capable of communicating with tanks were authorised, the Ordnance issued an NA certificates for these and considered the matter closed. I contacted the Signal Directorate who controlled the issue of wireless equipment and they told me that the cupboard was bare, 1 asked if any wireless sets were available and they told me that No 62 Sets, formerly used by the Artillery and replaced in 1958 were in stock, these sets were a variation of the No 19 Set used in the Armoured Corps when I was commissioned and I asked for them to be issued to me.
The Sherman tanks which 38 Cavalry inherited, supposedly base overhauled by the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME) at the 502 Workshop in Rawalpindi, were in a sorry state. The engines had been overhauled but every time the tanks were run a few miles, an engine seized, and every time this was reported the EME said that it was due to the negligence of the tank crew that they had failed to
ensure the correct amount of oil in the engine. The tank guns had a lot of play and in most of them, after firing a round the gun would move through several degrees upwards, downwards or to the right or left. The tanks were fitted with the SCR 508/528 wireless sets whose wiring had lost its insulation, headsets and microphones were not working and almost all the wireless sets fitted in tanks for communicating with infantry were out of order. The tanks had almost no tools, not a single ‘track puller’ for joining and breaking tank tracks was available in the regiment, the paint job and the stencil Class IIB’ was very good. Neither the Armoured Corps Directorate nor the Military Operations Directorate apart from providing the manpower for the TDU had assessed the state of the equipment and had ordered the raising of a tank regiment with useless tanks. The Ordnance Corps had got away by issuing ‘Not Available’ certificates for tools and equipment, the EME had chalked up output and set efficiency records in their workshops by overhauling the tanks, the Military Operations Directorate had marked up an additional tank regiment on its map. I had the option of making the best out of a bad lot of men and equipment or being condemned as a coward or as inefficient.
On 16 October 1 was called to Khairpur where the 18 Division headquarters was located, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Hussain Syed, who had taken over the command of 22 Cavalry was also there. The general, with his colonel staff, Colonel Wajid Ali Shah, present, told us that the plans of 18 Division were to conduct an offensive in the area Ramgarh and Jaisalmir, 38 Cavalry was to seize Ramgarh and 22 Cavalry was to neutralise the airfield at Jaisalmir, he asked for our opinion on the practicability of the planned operation from the armour point of view. Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I agreed that an offensive in the area would succeed if two conditions were met, the first one was that a night approach march should be made up to the border on the first night and the next night the march to Ramgarh and Jaisalmir, the second was that air support must be available from dawn to dusk for one day after Ramgarh and Jaisalmir were reached. The GOC accepted our suggestions, the plan was top secret and we were not to discuss it with anybody.
When I came to Hyderabad to raise 38 Cavalry I had left my wife and children in Murree, my brother telephoned me and told that my wife had had a Caesarean operation and was admitted in CMH
Rawalpindi, I asked for leave and was given three days leave. In Rawalpindi I found that my wife was recovering from the operation and was well, our child born prematurely had died because the hospital lacked proper facilities. I brought my two daughters and left them with my wife’s parents and rejoined the regiment.
I had left my baggage and my car with 3 Commando Battalion in East Pakistan, they were to return to West Pakistan and were supposed to bring it with them. While I was busy with the problems of 38 Cavalry I learnt that 3 Commando Battalion had returned and when I asked them about my car and my baggage they told me that they had not brought it with them. My baggage .was sent by Lieutenant Commander Mukhthar Azam who saw the boxes with my name on them and had them shipped. My car was taken by the officers of 2 Commando from the Embarkation Headquarters, used and left at Kaptai.
About the twentieth of October 38 Cavalry received orders to move to its war location. One squadron was to be placed under command 55 Brigade at Chhor, the rest of the regiment was to concentrate at Manthar, a village between Sadiqabad and Rahim Yar Khan. The holy month of Ramzan had started, I ordered the tanks to be stowed with ammunition, when I went to the ammunition store I noticed that all the store rooms were open but one was locked, I called the Quartermaster JCO and asked him why that room was locked, he gave a story about the key not being available. When I very firmly told him to open the store he reluctantly produced the key and opened it, when the door opened Risaldar Islam ud Din was found sleeping inside.
I selected ‘A’ Squadron to go under the command of 55 Brigade because I had found Major Ghulam Mujtaba a very good officer, a good organiser and during the three weeks that he had commanded ‘A’ Squadron, he had done better than other squadron commanders, he and his squadron were the first to move. The other squadrons moved to Sadiqabad, I brought up the rear ensuring that all the ammunition and stores were moved.
Amongst the personnel posted to the regiment was an Education Corps subedar and a regimental maulvi, both requested that they be left with the rear party in Hyderabad. I told the Education JCO that since one of his jobs was teaching map reading to the men, he would come along and maintain the battle map in my headquarters
in the regimental command vehicle. I told the maulvi that he would be responsible to see that those who were killed were buried properly. The Education Corps JCO objected very strongly saying that marking maps was not included in his duties and when he found that I was not going to change my mind, he arranged to be posted out of the regiment, the maulvi also disappeared. Just when the regiment was about to move a number of Bengali NCOs and ORs arrived and we were informed that the Bengali squadrons of regiments were broken up and the Bengali personnel were distributed amongst all the regiments.
At Sadiqabad the ramp for unloading tanks from a train was very badly designed and was awkward, one of our tanks fell off it, some main gun ammunition came out of the ammunition rack and fell inside the tank and petrol spilled, luckily there was no fire. I was watching the unloading and when the tank turned turtle on the railway track I was wondering what to do when a railway wreck clearing crane came from the direction of Sukkur and stopped at Sadiqabad, I sent a message to the station master and the tank was lifted and placed on its track. There were no tank transporters so the tanks moved on their tracks and another tank engine seized on the way to Manthar.
Sometime after the regiment arrived at Sadiqabad, General Hamid the Chief of the Army Staff and Air Marshal Rahim the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Air Force came to Rahim Yar Khan and the plans of 18 Division were discussed and approved, the question of air support for the division’s operations was raised and the C-in-C of the PAF accepted the responsibility.
A few days after this discussion with the COAS and the (‘. in-C of the PAF, the GOC called me and told me that he had changed the role of 38 Cavalry, it would go to Jaisalmir and 22 Cavalry would go to Ramgarh. He said that he knew that the mechanical state of the regiment was poor but in the Ramgarh area a tank battle would develop and 22 Cavalry was better equipped for it, therefore 38 Cavalry had to undertake the mission of neutralising the Jaisalmir airfield. I considered the operations, Jaisalmir was 120 miles from the rail head at Reti, l estimated that due to engine failure I would have a tank breakdown every fifteen miles, I asked for a team of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers with a crane to change engines and twelve reserve engines to be carried in trucks to replace engines as they broke down. The GOC agreed to this and said that necessary arrangements would be made. and all the officers carried out a reconnaissance for counter penetration positions covering the approaches to Rahim Yar Khan and Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I took all our officers along the route which we were to take to the border, Reti – Khenju – Gabbar – Masitwari Bhit – the border for the 18 Division offensive operation without telling the officers the actual purpose of the familiarisation.
About the middle of November the news from East Pakistan indicated that the Indian attack on East Pakistan had begun. The Indian Air Force began flying reconnaissance missions over Rahim Yar Khan and Sadiqabad. Once when visiting 206 Brigade area I saw a Canberra returning from Rahim Yar Khan and once two Hawker Hunters flew over our concentration area and over Sadiqabad.
With war imminent I decided to let my officers know the mission given to 38 Cavalry by the GOC although it was strictly against his orders, my object was to get them over the shock that the mission would create and get their minds working to solve the difficulties. I collected all the officers and the Risaldar Major and told them what I was going to tell them was ‘top secret and was not to be discussed. I then told them that 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion and a mortar battery was to capture the Jaisalmir airfield on the outbreak of war with India which was going to be any day. The regiment would move by train from Sadiqabad to Reti, then on tracks to the border, a distance of sixty miles, lie up for the day just short of the border and then move sixty miles at night to Jaisalmir and seize the airfield. I told them the tanks would have to carry about 200 gallons of petrol in drums, that the PAF would give us air support for one day and told them to start preparing for the operation. There was stunned silence, the officers looked at one another not believing what they were hearing. That night in the mess hardly anyone spoke, the next morning, having lived with the problem for night, the officers were reconciled and started resolving the problems. I had included the Risaldar Major hoping that in confidence he would tell the JCOs and the word would trickle down and the JCOs and other ranks would also reconcile and accept the challenge.
With the likelihood of operations beginning anytime now there was a lot of work to prepare the regiment for the planned operations and every morning I would go around and check the progress. ‘B’
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Squadron was commanded by Major Javed Hussain, everyday 1 would find something wrong in his squadron, one morning I went at about nine o’clock to his squadron and found him asleep in his tent, I gave him a good dressing down and made up my mind to put him on an adverse report if I found anything wrong again.
On 1 December I was surprised by the arrival of the ‘Inspector Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Colonel Saeed Qadir, later Lieutenant General and Production Minister, he came to investigate my complaints about the tank engines seizing. Colonel Saeed Qadir with Lieutenant Colonel Rehman, commander EME battalion of 18 Division arrived in my vehicle park, I showed them the state of the wiring inside the tank and told them about the engines seizing. An EME JCO, a reservist, who had served with the 72 Armoured Workshop of the old 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade and who had just joined the 18 Division EME battalion happened to be in my unit lines and heard the problem that we were trying to resolve, he at once said he knew what the problem was. He took us to a tank whose engine had seized, pointed to an object and asked for it to be removed from the hull of the tank, he took it and dismantled it and showed us that it was completely blocked with a black gooey substance. The Sherman Il tank engine was an aircraft air cooled radial engine with a full force feed oil sump system. The oil sump was attached to the engine housing of the tank and when the engine was removed for maintenance or overhauling it remained in the tank and probably had not been cleaned since the tanks had been received. An order was immediately given to take down all the engines to clean the sumps. The state of the electrical wiring, wireless equipment and the guns was shown to Colonel Saeed Qadir, he seemed to have been satisfied with having found the reason of the tank engines seizing and left.
On the morning of 2nd of December I received a message to report to the division headquarters. There the division commander told me that the 18 Division operations would start that evening, 38 Cavalry grouped with 1 Punjab and a mortar battery, under my command, was to follow 51 Brigade up to Loganewala and then to proceed independently to seize and neutralise the Indian Air Force base at Jaisalmir. “The GOC told me that since I had the engine problem and had to collect the task force I need not attend his orders. I telephoned the regiment and ordered that the tank engines taken down were to be re-installed and
the regiment got ready to be moved.
Next I went to the AA&QMG, Lieutenant Colonel Masood, Artillery, and told him that I required 16,800 gallons of 80 octane petrol for the operation. The AA&QMG, with a bleak look, told me he knew nothing about the requirement and did not have any petrol. I took him to the colonel staff, Colonel Wajid Ali Shah, the AA&QMG and the colonel staff held a discussion and the AA&QMG told nie he would have the petrol moved to Masitwari Bhit and my tanks could pick it up from there. It was obvious that the logistics of the operation’ had not been planned. I left the division headquarters to have my tank engines put back and to collect my task force.
The GHQ orders for the 18 Division had been brought by hand from GHQ. When the 18 Division ‘O’ Group, commanders who were to receive the orders from the division commander, assembled, the PAF Liaison Officer, a wing commander, stood up and announced that the PAF would not be able to provide support in the operational area of 18 Division because the Jacobabad airfield had not been activated. This announcement led the brigade commanders to request the GOC that the proposed offensive operations of the division be cancelled or postponed because of the lack of the necessary air support. A word had spread amongst the officers attending the ‘O’ Group that the division was to undertake an offensive operation in the rear of the enemy division deployed facing Rahim Yar Khan. The GOC telephoned the CGS, Lieutenant General Gul Hassan and after the conversation told the ‘O’Group that his orders were that he had to conduct the operation without the air support, in the “national interest”. The Brigade commanders then suggested that since there was every likelihood of the operation being unsuccessful the GOC should refuse to conduct them as on the failure of the operations he would be blamed. The general told the officers that if he refused to conduct the operations the whole army would label him as a person who lost his nerve when he was called upon to conduct operations to which he had agreed and planned and therefore the division would conduct the offensive plan.
The plan made by the Major General B. M. Mustafa required an initial approach march up to the border, then 51 Brigade commanded by Brigadier Tariq Mir, with two battalions, and 22 Cavalry under command was to bypass Loganewala and go to Ramgarh to position
itself to counter any reaction from the Indian 12 Division which was expected to be deployed on border facing Rahim Yar Khan. The third battalion of 51 Brigade was a East Bengal Regiment battalion, it was placed in a defensive position with a minefield around it, effectively neutralising it. I was to command a task force consisting of 38 Cavalry less squadron, I Punjab ex-206 Brigade and a mortar battery and was to follow 51 Brigade till the metalled road connecting Loganewala and Jaisalmir was reached and then head for the Jaisalmir airfield. 206 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab, later lieutenant general, was to leave one battalion to cover the routes to Rahim Yar Khan and with the third battalion was to capture Loganewala and form a firm base.
After these orders were issued Brigadier Jehanzeb Arbab objected to 38 Cavalry being sent to Jaisalmir with mechanically unsound tanks, the GOC changed the grouping, gave the Jaisalnzir airfield neutralisation to 28 Baluch less company, Recce and Support battalion, with two infantry companies ex-206 Brigade, a mortar Battery, and placed 38 Cavalry under command of 51 Brigade up to Loganewala.
The orders received from the GHQ differed from the plan which had been discussed by the GOC with Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and myself. The premise of our planning was based on making an approach march of about fifty miles to the border on the night D minus 1 and D-day and another march of about forty miles to Ramgarh and sixty miles to Jaisalmir on the night D-day and D plus 1. In the orders received from GHQ the approach march was to start at 1530 hours on D-day, 3 December, the international boundary which was the start line, was to be crossed at 2130 hours and the advance was to continue to Ramgarh and Jaisalmir, thus requiring the division to carry out a hundred and twenty mile march in one night. On a good metalled road this would have been difficult, in the desert moving cross country it was impossible. The GSO 1, an officer of the Azad Kashmir Forces and who had attended the staff course with me, solved the difficult movement problem by just increasing the speed and the number of vehicles to a mile, that is, shortening the distance between vehicles.
On 2 December, in the morning I held a durbar and informed the regiment that we would be going deep into Indian territory. I told them that the tanks would move by train to Reti, from there on tracks to
Khenju where they would refuel and continue to the border, refuel again and go to Jaisalmir. I was worried that some of the men would not accept this and may use their personal weapons on officers or JCOs. I told the regiment that due to the shortage of weapons all the oslicers, JCOs and men did not have personal weapons therefore all personal weapons will be deposited in the kotes with the rear party. I also told them that my second in command would be at the tail of the regiment and he had my instructions to shoot anyone running away.
Two or three days earlier 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal had joined the regiment from PMA and since I could not use him to command a tank, I gave him the command of the reconnaissance troop of the regiment and told him how the troop was to be employed and controlled. Captain Tariq Javed Shuja Bhatti who had a vehicle accident a few days earlier and was in hospital with a broken arm ran away from the hospital and rejoined the regiment to take part in the operations.
Later on 2 December I was informed that 38 Cavalry was placed under command of 51 Brigade and I went to the 51 Brigade headquarters to attend the brigade commander’s orders, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed was already there, he took me aside and told me that the brigade commander had lost his nerve. After a little while Brigadier Tariq Mir came to the tent where all the officers had collected to hear his orders, he was looking visibly shaken, the GSO 3 laid out the maps on the table, the maps had blank squares across the border and did not show any terrain features where the Brigade operations were to be conducted. The battle procedure is that when a commanding officer goes to a superior commander’s headquarters to receive orders, his intelligence officer accompanies him, to collect necessary maps and mark enemy dispositions. Neither the divisional staff nor the Brigade staff carried out this drill. The divisional ‘O’ Group met at 1100 hours, the 51 Brigade ‘O’ Group at 1900 Hours on 2 December, there was a lot of time in which maps could have been collected. I put my map on the table, it had terrain features on both sides of the border, and we started discussing the operation. It was soon apparent that the brigade commander’s mind had stopped working completely.
Nothing was known about the Indian deployment, I told the brigade commander that my guess was that an infantry battalion and a
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tank squadron would be at Loganewala protecting the left flank of the Indian division deployed in the Ramgarh area facing Rahim Yar Khan. I suggested to him that he advances along the track going from Masitwari Bhit to the road connecting Jaisalmir with Loganewala with 22 Cavalry and an infantry battalion on the tanks, bypass Loganewala and continue to Ramgarh, 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion to follow and to attack and capture Loganewala or wait for the arrival of 206 Brigade which was to follow 51 Brigade, no one objected and the brigade commander accepted the plan.
When the ‘O’ Group dispersed the artillery regiment commander asked me for my map saying that his guns could not fire with a map that did not have the land features.
According to the divisional plan, 38 Cavalry tanks were to move by train and arrive at Reti at 1800 hours. At about 1730 hours I arrived at Reti station and asked the station master when the tank train from Sadiqabad was expected, he reported that he had no knowledge of any tank train coming from Sadiqabad, I realised that the AA&QMG had not informed the railway that a tank train had to be moved. I then spoke to the railway Division controller in Sukkur and he also told me that he had no intimation that a tank train had to be moved from Sadiqabad to Reti. After a lot of threatening and shouting the controller agreed to move the train from Sadiqabad to Reti.
At the Reti station, a goods train was standing on the siding where the tank unloading ramp was located and the station master said that he had no ‘power’, meaning a locomotive, with which to move the goods train to another siding. While we were discussing this problem he started going through the procedure to allow a train coming from Sukkur to pass through without stopping. I made him stop the train and made him use its locomotive to move the goods train. By the time goods train was moved it was dark and a message was received by the station master that trains would run without lights, the passenger train that I had stopped moved out of Reti with the locomotive lights off and at a level crossing a mile from the station it collided with a 22 Cavalry vehicle, the Bengali Regimental Quartermaster Daffadar Technical of 22 Cavalry who was in the vehicle was killed. At about nine o’clock the tank train with 14 tanks of 38 Cavalry whose engines had been hurriedly refitted without cleaning the filters, arrived and the tanks were off loaded.
From the Reti railway station the 38 Cavalry tanks moved along the track and the canal bank road taken by 22 Cavalry to Khenju, after going some distance along the canal bank a 22 Cavalry tank was found broken down on the canal bank, getting around it we continued. About a mile short of Khenju a tank stopped, it had run out of petrol because the tank commander had not topped up his tank as ordered. The column continued to Khenju where Major Zia Uddin Javed, my second in command was waiting with lorries loaded with petrol, the tanks were refuelled and petrol was sent to the tank which had stopped on the way.
From Khenju the desert track started, the tanks in low gear started.grinding their way to Gabbar, at 0100 hours on 4 December we reached Gabbar, 19 miles from the border, we were running about five hours behind the schedule of the division and expected 22 Cavalry to have reached the border, I was surprised when I found 22 Cavalry in a leaguer. Thirteen out of the fourteen tanks which had started from Reti reached Gabbar, I reported our arrival to the GOC who was there and he told me that 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry were the only troops that had reached Gabbar. At 0400 hours on 4 December the GOC decided to call off the operation for that day and ordered 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry to disperse in the Gabbar area.
In the morning when I went around the regiment I discovered that one tank had entered a fenced area marked as a minefield, the tank was carefully reversed out of the minefield. That whole day we waited for the Indian Air Force but no aircraft came. Since the operation was to be resumed at last light I decided to top up the tanks again, there was no sign of the petrol promised by the AA&QMG, a search of the area revealed civilian petrol tankers stuck in the sand on the desert track from the Dharki gas field to Gabbar. I sent a message to Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan who was with the rear party at Manthar, he conducted a raid on the EME Battalion, collected all the 6×6 vehicles, loaded them up with petrol drums and brought them to Gabbar where our tanks topped up.
I then went to look for the tank that had broken down between Khenju and Gabbar, I found it a few miles from Khenju with the engine seized. I looked for the truck with the spare engines, it was standing a few miles from Khenju, the wheeled crane that was accompanying it, a Tatra with low ground clearance, was stuck in
the sand. I had not checked what sort of vehicle the EME Battalion had sent and they instead of sending a M 72 with good cross country performance had sent a vehicle with almost no cross country performance, this finished my scheme of replacing seized engines.
During the day the brigade commanders talked to the GOC into abandoning the attack on the Jaisalmir airfield, I Punjab was reverted to the command of 206 Brigade and we received instructions from the division headquarters that the operation would be continued after last light. At Gabbar just before last light 38 Baluch, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Anwar Shah, joined 22 Cavalry and a battery of 130 mm guns passed through to Masitwari Bhit. At last light, 22 Cavalry with 38 Baluch mounted on the tanks moved off and 38 Cavalry followed, at about 2100 hours 38 Cavalry reached Masitwari Bhit and found 22 Cavalry in a leaguer topping up their tanks with the diesel that they had carried on the tanks.
I met Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and he told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir, the brigade commander, was behaving very badly and saying that he had no intention of going beyond Loganewala. I met Brigadier Tariq Mir and he told me that he was not going to advance to Ramgarh, that he would go to Loganewala only. I told him that he did not have anything to fear and a squadron and a company astride the Loganewala – Jaisalmir road would give him ample protection to advance to Ramgarh. At about 2300 hours 51 Brigade moved off.
Six tanks of 38 Cavalry and the reconnaissance troop had reached Masitwari Bhit which was five miles short of the point where we were to cross the border. A platoon of a Punjab battalion of 206 Brigade, one lost FOO (forward observation officer) of the Artillery and Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab had joined us, the battery of 130 mm guns which had arrived at Gabbar in the evening was deployed there. While we were waiting for more tanks to join us, one of my officers, Captain Abdul Khalil Khan started making the most awful noise and complained of a stomachache, I allowed him to seek medical aid and the next time I saw him was after the ceasefire.
The operation so far had been a movement fiasco. 206 Brigade was to move from Manthar on a canal bank road to Khenju, the canal bank road had covered water channels which was not designed for heavy traffic and broke under the weight of the leading troop-carrying vehicle and the others could not follow. The troop-carrying vehi
cles were ordinacy civilian goods trucks which had been requisitioned after the emergency was declared on 1 December. The division commander had talked about requisitioning a large number of farm tractors with trailers that the local cultivators had, none were requisitioned, again obviously bad planning. 20 FF, a battalion of 206 Brigade, was not provided with transport and started off on foot, en route the transport vehicles joined them but they were civilian ‘4×2 vehicles and could not negotiate the desert track, when they got stuck, the commanding officer marched his battalion, the only case of marching to the sound of the guns” that I have known in the Pakistan Army.
At about 0200 on 5 December, Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab and I, at Masitwari Bhit, discussed our situation and decided that it was unlikely that anyone else would join us and the best thing to do was to follow 51 Brigade with the troops that were with us. In frustration Brigadier Jahanzeb ordered the 130 mm battery to fire one round gunfire at Loganewala, an irresponsible act because it would warn the Indians or hit our troops..
I gave out my orders, 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal with the reconnaissance troop was to lead, the regimental headquarters was to follow and Major Javed Hussain was to follow with the six tanks. Here 1 noticed that Major Javed Hussain, whom I had to drive hard to get any work out of him and would have placed him on adverse report if the operation had not begun for a few days, was the most active officer and volunteered for all the jobs.
We crossed the border, I had gone about two miles beyond it when I found 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal coming back, I stopped him and asked him what was wrong. He told me that all the jeeps of the reconnaissance troop had disappeared, I realised that the NCOs commanding the reconnaissance jeeps had driven off the track that was being followed and hidden their vehicles, I told Major Javed Hussain to take over the lead. Major Javed Hussain went 18 miles across the border, along the way four tanks broke down, two miles short of the metal road Jaisalmir – Loganewala, only two ruhners were left and he called a halt. I passed all the tanks which had broken down, Lieutenant Shahid Ansari’s tank had thrown a track which could easily have been repaired but none of the tanks had any tools necessary to break a track, two had seized engines and one had broken down on the crest of a high ridge with a transmission fault. Major Javed Hussain had
stopped the remaining two tanks in a valley, the next ridge line, Kharo Tar, was the highest before the Loganewala – Jaisalmir road.
At about 0730 hours explosions were heard from the direction of Loganewala and columns of smoke started rising, 1, in my rover, with my adjutant Captain Pervez Khan, drove towards the smoke columns, the first sign of the battle was two 22 Cavalry wounded men walking back. We arrived on a ridge overlooking the Loganewala – Jaisalmir metalled road and from there we could see five of the 22 Cavalry tanks and one Indian tank burning.
Four Hawker Hunters were in the air rocketing and strating, we dismounted from the jeep and sat on the ground to wait out the air attack. When I looked around I found my driver, with his head in a bush and his bottom sticking in the air, I walked over and kicked him in his behind, he extricated himself and stupidly grinned at me, I told him to sit down and keep watching the aircraft, if they lined up to fire in his direction to take cover. After firing all their rockets and machine gun ammunition the Indian aircraft wert away. A little later a helicopter took off from the base of the hill on which Loganewala was located, later I learnt that Major General Mustafa had come and ordered Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed to capture Loganewala, and complained that 51 Brigade was not in communication with him.
Looking down from the hill on which we had stopped we could see troops but could not make out whether they were ours or Indians. We did not have binoculars and weapons, the signal corps wireless operator on my jeep had a rifle. I was wondering what to do when I saw a soldier walking in our direction and when he had come some distance towards us we recognised him as one of ours and drove down and found ourselves in the 51 Brigade headquarters. Apparently someone in the brigade headquarters had recognised the bomber pilots leather jacket that I was wearing and sent a man to call us. I met the brigade commander and asked him what the situation was and he told me he did not know, so I decided to drive to Loganewala.
drove towards Loganewala and at the base of the hill on which Loganewala was located, two companies of 38 Baluch and a squadron of 22 Cavalry, commanded by Major Talat Saeed, were formed up to attack Loganewala. Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed met me and told me that he would be launching an attack on Loganewala in a little while. I had been the commanding officer of 22 Cavalry till May
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1970, I went from tank to tank, met the crews and Major Talat Saeed who was unshaven but had a wide grin on his face, in spite of having lost eleven tanks, 22 Cavalry was in fine spirits. When I returned to the place where I had left Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed. I found him with Brigadier Tariq Mir arguing vehemently, in fact abusing the brigadier. The brigade commander had ordered the cancellation of the attack while Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed wanted to attack, the Indians in Loganewala were waving white flags but none of us had the sense to talk to them under a flag of truce.
22 Cavalry was organised in four squadrons for this operation and each squadron carried a company of 38 Baluch. The regiment reached the Loganewala – Jaisalmir road three miles south of Loganewala at about 0200 hours, just about then the 130 mm salvo, fired on the orders of Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab, landed. The Loganewala defences facing our borders had been completely bypassed and 22 Cavalry was in the rear of the defences. The brigade commander was not there and in his absence, the commanding officers of 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch decided to clear Loganewala before advancing to Ramgarh. ‘A’ Squadron, 22 Cavalry, commanded by Major Muhammad Sikander Zai, left a troop on the road Loganewala – Jaisalmir, moved towards Loganewala, drew anti-tank fire and deployed on the road Loganewala – Ramgarh. Another squadron cut off the road to Tanot, completely surrounding Loganewala. At 0700 hours ‘B’ Squadron and ‘B’ Company, 38 Baluch attacked Loganewala, the enemy opened fire with some anti-tank guns and machine guns. Captain Waheed, a Bengali officer of 22 Cavalry knocked out an AMX 13 tank that came out of the defences, then six Hawker Hunters arrived and destroyed five tanks with rockets and due to strating the Baluch company went to the ground. ‘B’ Squadron suffered 4 killed and 4 wounded. Half an hour later 22 Cavalry formed up to attack again but a second air strike knocked out six tanks. At about 0900 hours 22 Cavalry again formed up to attack but Brigadier Tariq Mir overruled Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed in the argument that I had witnessed, and ordered the tank regiment to withdraw the squadrons cutting off the Loganewala – Tanot and the Loganewal – Ramgarh road and to concentrate in the area around the brigade headquarters. In the two subsequent air attacks 22 Cavalry lost six more tanks bringing the day’s losses to 17 tanks, 10 killed and 17 wounded.
The Indian Air Force which appeared a little after seven o’clock, flying without any opposition from the Pakistan Air Force, had four Hawker Hunters circling well away from Loganewala and our positions. One army aviation light aircraft also circled well away. Anything that moved was immediately attacked, otherwise the Hunters circled for their endurance and before returning to their base attacked the tanks that had been located. There were periods of about twenty minutes in which there were no aircraft over the battlefield, the last Indian air attack came about an hour before sunset on that day.
Later people commenting on the Loganewala battle, alleged that 22 Cavalry did not use their anti-aircraft machine guns. In the first air attack they found that their anti-aircraft machine guns had jammed due to the sand raised by the tanks in the long approach march in the desert, five tank commanders were killed trying to cock the jammed machine guns with their feet. Subsequently the guns were washed with diesel and fired and after the 550 rounds machine gun ammunition per gun finished the 100 mm main gun was fired at maximum elevation in frustration. Trials, when I had just taken over the command of 22 Cavalry, had proved beyond any doubt that the 12.7 mm and the .5 inch anti-aircraft guns of World War II vintage were useless against modern aircraft releasing their rockets and pulling up about five thousand metres from the tank.
At about 1200 hours after witnessing the breaking of the contact with the enemy by 22 Cavalry at Loganewala I went back to where Major Javed Hussain had halted his tanks and found Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab there. I recounted the details of the affair at Loganewala, he decided to go to the 51 Brigade headquarters and I accompanied him. We found the 51 Brigade deployed astride the Loganewala-Jaisalmirroad out of contact with Loganewala, Brigadier Tariq Mir told us that an Indian brigade had linked up with Loganewala. While we were at the 51 Brigade headquarters a helicopter piloted by Captain Maqbool, 12 Cavalry, later lieutenant general, landed with an order from Major General Mustafa ordering 51 Brigade to capture Loganewala and Ghotaru, about ten kilometres from Loganewala on the road to Jaisalmir. On receiving the division commander’s order Brigadier Tariq Mir announced that he would not comply with the orders because the Indians were now too strong for his brigade to attack.
The Indian aircraft again attacked and Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab and I went into the same trench, there I told him that it would be a shame if we withdrew after coming 20 miles across the border and losing so many tanks. He said that he was not in command and could not do anything. I told him that as the senior brigadier he should take over the command and try to retrieve the situation. He told me that I was going to get him into trouble but with a little persuasion he agreed to assume command.
After the air attack was over Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab informed Brigadier Tariq Mir that he would attack Loganewala with 206 Brigade and ordered Lieutenant Colonel Shah, the commanding officer of 28 Baluch the Reconnaissance and Support Battalion of 18 Division to advance along the Loganewala – Jaisalmir road and capture Ghotaru, Lieutenant Colonel Shah, saluted the commander 206 Brigade and disappeared. He was not seen till well after the ceasefire and when questioned stated that he understood that he was to make a wide outflanking movement to Ghotaru by withdrawing to the Sadiqabad-Sukkur road.
Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab returned to the point where my tanks had halted, the two infantry battalions of 206 Brigade, I Punjab and 10 Punjab had arrived. He made a detailed plan and gave out his orders to the brigade. At about 1700 hours he explained the details of the plan to me and told me to go to 51 Brigade, explain the plan to the brigade commander and ask him to mark the ‘forming up place’ (FUP), to provide guides and ask for a squadron of 22 Cavalry to support the attack. He set the ‘H’ hour at 0300 hours on 6 December.
I reached the 51 Brigade area at about 1800 hours, it had got dark and I ran into the 22 Cavalry leaguer. I met Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and explained the 206 Brigade commander’s plan, he told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir had decided to withdraw across the border and was not likely to change his mind. I went to the 51 Brigade headquarters and explained the attack plan to Brigadier Tariq Mir and told him the requirements from 51 Brigade. He said he was withdrawing across the border and remained adamant about it. I argued that 206 Brigade was moving and if 51 Brigade started withdrawing, the two brigades would be moving in the opposite directions and there would be no troops on the ground. He told me to go back and tell 206 Brigade not to move. At about 1900 hours 51 Brigade started moving back along
mand vehicle and told him to net the wireless set with the 51 Brigade and then take the vehicle to the 18 Division tactical headquarters at Gabbar. For several hours Captain Perwez tried to establish communications with 51 Brigade, every time the command vehicle moved about a mile it went out of communication, Captain Pervez came back and reported this to me, I could not understand why this should have happened.
In the afternoon it was reported to me that 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal had been wounded and after a while he was brought to the regimental headquarters with a bullet wound in the shoulder. I asked him how he had managed it, he told me that he had taken a machine gun from the reconnaissance troop, a 2nd lieutenant from 1 Punjab had taken a rocket launcher and they had gone tank hunting, when they thought that they were close enough to the tank they had fired a rocket and missed the tank. The tank fired back and hit him, only 2nd lieutenants could get up to that sort of thing, I drove him to the ‘advanced dressing station’ at Masitwari Bhit and he was evacuated.
At Kharo Tar 206 Brigade continued to hold its position. The brigade headquarters was located just off the track going to Loganewala and Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab could be seen standing there all day, I walked up the hill, met him and told him that he was visible for miles and was likely to be shot if he did not take cover, he replied that if he did not make himself visible the brigade would run away. A few days later he did get wounded and when he was being evacuated, a havildar, at gun-point, tried to get into the ambulance and was restrained with great difficulty.
One of iny tanks had broken down on the crest of the ridge before Kharo Tar with a transmission fault, on the night of 8/9 December 206 Brigade was to withdraw from its position and the tank had to be destroyed. Before preparing it for destruction, I laid its gun for indirect fire on Loganewala and fired all its HE ammunition, an enemy battery sent a salvo in return but it landed about a half a mile away. After firing all the HE ammunition and removing everything that could be carried prepared it for destruction and told the withdrawing infantry to drop a grenade in the turret when they left.
On the night of 8/9 December 206 Brigade withdrew from Kharo Tar and passed through the 51 Brigade position. I moved my headquarters, the reconnaissance troop and my two running tanks to
Masitwari Bhit. Two tanks, one at Kharo Tar which I had prepared for destruction and Lieutenant Ansari’s tank with a thrown track had to be destroyed. 51 Brigade took over the front and in the afternoon Brigadier Tariq Mir reported two tank regiments turning his flanks to cut him off. 22 Cavalry was moved from the Gabbar area to counter this, they promptly came under air attack and lost another tank. The two tank regiments were a figment of the brigade commander’s imagination.
Withdrawing from Kharo Tar we arrived at Masitwari Bhit at night. To defend my tanks from the Indian aircraft, I had the 50 machine guns dismounted and positioned for firing at some distance from the tanks. In the morning the Indian aircraft attacked, my tank was still one of the two running tanks, that morning I had taken off my bomber pilots leather jacket and left it on the .50 machine gun mount, the attacking aircraft put a cannon bullet through my jacket and a rocket hit the open tank commander cupola flap breaking the hinge and sending the flap flying. The machine guns fired from the emplacements and for the rest of the day the aircraft left us alone.
A little distance from my regimental headquarters at Masitwari Bhit the divisional gun area was located, to defend it against air attacks the training guns of the Anti-Aircraft School were deployed, they fired single shots but were enough to prevent the Indians from attacking the gun area.
On the night of 11/12 December I withdrew my regimental headquarters to Gabbar, while moving back I passed 2nd Lieutenant Shahadat Sher Lodi, later lieutenant colonel, trudging along on foot in front of his tank which was being towed by a small tracked dozer at the speed of about two miles an hour.
On the morning of 12 December I went to find out where the ‘forward defended localities’ (FDLs) were located. Major General Mustafa was standing where he had located his tactical headquarters, as I approached him with my second in command, Major Zia Ud Din Javed, someone whispered to me that the general had been relieved of his command and Major General Abdul Hamid Khan had taken over the command of 18 Division. I went and met Major General Mustafa, and asked the GSO 2 (Intelligence), who was standing with the general, where the FDLs were located. The general heard me, indicated the GSO 2 and himself and said that they were the FDL and there was nothing forward of them. Major General Abdul Hamid Khan, the
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new GOC, had come to Gabbar the previous day and ordered a general withdrawal. What followed was comparable with the famous “Gazala Gallop” in the North African desert during the Second World War. In the “Gabbar Gallop” both the brigades took off, later some men were rounded up and brought back from the Punjab Regimental Centre at Mardan.
When I heard that there were no troops ahead of where we were standing I called my Technical Officer Captain Muhammad Nawaz Saqi Gujar and ordered him to recover one tank of ours which was left between Gabbar and Masitwari Bhit. Captain Nawaz and a recovery team left immediately, a little while later news came that the vehicle that Captain Nawaz had gone in had run over a mine and he and the EME recovery crew were injured. I took a vehicle and about two miles ahead found one of our Dodges smashed and Captain Nawaz with a broken leg, I brought him back, borrowed the helicopter that had come to take Major General Mustafa back and sent Captain Nawaz to the Main dressing station at Sadiqabad. The divisional engineers had been ordered to lay a minefield ten miles ahead of Gabbar on the Masitwari track. But they had thrown the mines across the track about two miles ahead of Gabbar. The tank was later recovered.
While we were waiting for the helicopter to return, on the divisional command net information came from 51 Brigade that an enemy armoured brigade was advancing. An Army Aviation L-19, flown by some Naval officers, was there. I asked Major Zia Ud Din Javed, who was an Army Aviation pilot, to take the plane and check where the enemy tanks were located and which way they were heading. After about half an hour Major Zia Ud Din Javed returned and told us that there were no tanks, a lot of camels were hobbled behind a hill and that he was lucky to get back as he had come under heavy anti-aircraft fire.
That night I pulled back to Khenju, all my recovered tanks were collected there and the replacement of the engines was started. I drove to the 18 Division headquarters and reported my tank state and told the new GOC that in a day or two I would have them all running again. I also offered the hull machine guns of the tanks mounted on a tripod with a gunner and .50 machine guns in the anti-aircraft role. The general studied his battle map and approved the location of the tanks at Khenju. He then told me that he was deploying a
brigade at Gabbar and that if I was the enemy commander and had an armoured brigade what would I do. I told him that I would screen the Gabbar position and cut the National Highway and the main railway line between Dharki and Sukkur. I could see the shock on the GOC when I said this. The GOC then gave me an area of responsibility and told me to reconnoitre it which I did the next day.
When I was returning from reconnaissance in the evening I saw Indian transport aircraft flying in formation, I had a jeep with .50 machine gun but unfortunately the formation was well out of range. That evening I received a message that Dharki and Reti railway stations were constantly being attacked by Indian aircraft and to provide anti-aircraft defence, I sent .50 machine guns which were sited in the anti-aircraft role and fired once and the Indian aircraft did not return.
16 December 1971 was the day of the jackal’. The radio announced that Lieutenant General ‘Tiger’ Niazi had surrendered to the Indians in Dacca. It was unbelievable, the shock of the defeat was intense. Months later we were to see on the television ‘tiger’ Niazi trying to hug Lieutenant General Aurora, getting pushed away and then signing the surrender and lowering of the Pakistan Flag. Also we were to read that he asked for a copy of the photograph of himself signing the surrender and autographed it for Aurora, who has the autographed photograph hanging in the study in his house in Delhi. A jackal had masqueraded as a tiger.
On the night of 16/17 December, General Yahya, the President of Pakistan, announced that Niazi had surrendered but the war in West Pakistan would go on. Two days later, to everyone’s surprise there was ceasefire, everyone was stunned, we were defeated and lost half the country.
On 19 December 1 received a message saying that my brother Captain Aijaz Alam had been killed in a tank battle that had taken place in the Zafarwal area. This message was passed on the Corps of Signal channels by Lieutenant Colonel Zaka Khan Afridi, who had served in the SSG with me.
In the war, we, eight brothers, were all serving with troops and had fought, Lieutenant Colonel Firoz Alam had commanded 36 FF, Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam, declared medically unfit for flying due to a heart condition, had volunteered to fly and had flown eight bombing missions, Major Shamim Alam Khan was a squadron com
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mander in 29 Cavalry, Lieutenant Commander Shamoon Alam was on a Naval ship, Flight Lieutenant Aftab Alam had led the raid on Pathankot on 03 December, Captain Aijaz Alam was commanding a troop in 13 Lancers and 2nd Lieutenant Javed Alam was a battery officer in an artillery regiment.
I asked the GOC for a L-19 aircraft to go to Kharian for my brother’s funeral and on the 20th December flew to Sahiwal where we stopped for the night. I stayed with Lieutenant Colonel Saghir Hussain Syed, later lieutenant general, and there on the evening news . heard that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had become the president, Lieutenant General Gul Hassan the Commander in Chief and that twelve generals had been sacked. The next day we flew to Kharian where I stayed one night and flew back the next day.
My mother was staying with Shuaib’s wife at the PAF base at Badabher, Peshawar, when she was informed that Aijaz had been killed in action. The PAF very kindly flew my mother to Chaklala, from there she went to Kharian to Shamim’s house. Aijaz, with his head bandaged, was brought to Shamim’s house, my mother held his hand and sat there all night, she had not shed a single tear since hearing the news, she said “Aijaz was not dead, he was a “shaheed”. The next morning Aijaz was buried in the military graveyard of Kharian.
After I returned from Kharian, I was told to shift my regimental headquarters to Manthar where it was originally located. At Gabbar, before we pulled back to Khenju, I court martialled all the reconnaissance troop NCOs who had hidden their jeeps when they were ordered to advance on the night 4/5 December and reduced them to sowars. After arriving at Manthar I ordered the natures of all the tank breakdowns to be investigated, one tank was found to have been set on fire by its crew and disciplinary action was taken. One man had deserted and walked across the desert but was apprehended and returned to the regiment, he was also court martialled and sent to jail.
A few days after my headquarters moved to Manthar, Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali informed me that there were allegations of cowardice against Major Ghulam Mujtaba ‘A’ Squadron commander, whose squadron had been placed under command of 55 Brigade at Chhor. Knowing our infantry commanders, I was convinced that someone had given an outlandish order to the squadron commander, which he had refused to obey it and was charged with cowardice. I spoke to the
GOC, got permission to visit the squadron and went to Chhor. There I went around the squadron and met the Ss Brigade commander, Brigadier Anwar ul Haq, the brigade had done well, the ‘A’ Squadron had also done well except for Major Mujtaba.
‘A’ Squadron was initially placed in the brigade reserve with 26 Baluch, on 5 December No 1 Troop was moved to Suruna Oudha on the left flank of the brigade and another troop was moved to New Chhor where the enemy was pressing hard. On 11 December one tank of 3 Troop was hit by a rocket and three of the crew members were seriously wounded. On 13 December, 2 Troop while moving to a new position was attacked by Indian aircraft and three crew members were killed. On 15 December all the tanks of the squadron with a company of 39 FF attacked BP 405 and it was occupied without opposition, later another attack by 45 Punjab was supported. There were two black marks against the squadron, the first one was that enemy tanks had come within their range and they had not engaged them, one T-55 tank was standing in the minefield laid by the brigade. The second black mark was that Major Mujtaba had gone into a bunker as soon as the fighting started and had not come out till the ceasefire, leaving his squadron to the devices of the troop leaders. After investigating I was convinced that the charge of cowardice against the officer was justified and told the brigade commander so. Major Ghulam Mujtaba was court martialled and dismissed from service.
A few days after the ceasefire it was decided that all the Bengalis would be separated and sent to camps to await repatriation to Bangladesh. I interviewed all the Bengalis individually, everyone of them wanted to go back and all of them were dispatched.
Following the announcement that Lieutenant General Gul Hassan was to take over as the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed left 22 Cavalry to take over the charge of Personal Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief and Lieutenant Colonel Humayun Malik, later brigadier, who had served with me in the SSG took over the command of 22 Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Abid, later brigadier, who had been with me in 13 Lancers, replaced the GSO I in 18 Division.
Lieutenant General Gul Hassan visited 18 Division after assuming the charge of C-in-cColonel Mohammad Rinz, Artillery, Inter major general, the Deputy Director Military Operations, accompanied
him. He and I had been in the same dormitory in Lawrence College where he was a year senior to me. I asked him about the 18 Division air support fiasco, he evaded the issue and refused to give a straight answer.
GHQ sent an inquiry team to investigate the 18 Division debacle, Major General Awan headed the team and Brigadier Aijaz Azim was one of the members. For the inquiry the GOC 18 Division formulated a peculiar rule, I was given a seat at the back and told that I was not to speak. Before the committee Colonel Wajid Ali Shah explained how the orders for the operation had been received, how the plan had been developed, what resources in transport, air support etc the GHQ had promised and did not provide. This was followed by Brigadier Tariq Mir who explained his difficulty and how fiercely the Indians had resisted at Loganewala, at this point I stood up and said what the Brigadier Tariq Mir was saying was not true, that I was there and there had been no artillery fire or any serious small arms fire. Brigadier Tariq Mir addressed Major General Abdul Hamid Khan and said that I was not supposed to speak, but Brigadier Jehanzeb Arbab then spoke up and a verbal battle and recriminations followed. It became obvious that an effort was being made to cover up the short comings of Brigadier Tariq Mir and Major General Abdul Hamid Khan’s order for a ‘general withdrawal which led to the ‘Gabbar Gallop’.
Sometime after Lieutenant Colonel Humayun Malik took over the command of 22 Cavalry he told me that Major General Abdul Hamid Khan had come to visit 22 Cavalry and he accompanied the general showing him the tanks which were dispersed as a protection against air attack. He was walking along side the general when suddenly he found that the general had hit the ground and was lying there. He was puzzled for a while and then realised that the tank they were walking towards had an oil cooker burning and it was making a noise similar to a jet aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Abid also told me a similar tale, the general had a deep trench dug outside the operations room tent in the division headquarters, one day a jet fighter flew over the headquarters and he promptly jumped into the trench, the trench was nearly six feet deep and two men had to be sent into it to get the general out.
In Junuary there were rumours that something serious hud up pened in 6 Armoured Division but no one knew what exactly had hap
pened, word also spread that Major General Jehanzeb who was commanding 1 Armoured Division had been retired and Brigadier Zia ul. Haq had taken over the division.
Major General Abdul Hamid Khan left 18 Division to take over the command of 4 Corps where Lieutenant General Bahadur Sher had asked for retirement on the appointment of Lieutenant General Gul Hassan as the C-in-C. I went on a few days’ leave and shifted my family to Hyderabad. While on leave I received a message that I had been awarded “Tamgha-e-Pakistan’, I have yet to find out what it was for.
In the middle of February I was promoted colonel and posted as colonel stalt 6 Amoured Division. I handed over the command of 38 Cavalry to Major Zia ud Din Javed and left for Kharian.
At my dining out Second Lieutenant Shahadat Sher Lodi asked me why I had not informed the general about the condition of the tanks, I could only say that we should have managed and done the job with what we had
There has been a lot of controversy about the ’71 war with India, the way it was fought and particularly the operations of 18 Division. At the outset it must be said that the war was fought under very trying conditions, the Bengali element could neither be trusted nor removed from their posts, plans had to be kept secret from them.
Almost everybody condemns the 18 Division operations, code named Labbaik, as an exercise in futility. The mission assigned to 18 Division was to “Defend the area of responsibility in order to ensure the security of the main lines of communications Karachi – Multan and be prepared to carry out the war into the enemy territory under favourable conditions.” This implied the guarding of the 600 miles of road and rail communications which came precariously close to the border from Dharki to Rahim Yar Khan, the 18 Division attack surprised the Indians, it was a successful spoiling attack, the Indians never recovered their balance. The division’s mission was accomplished both on the Chhor front and the Sadiqabad-Rahim Yar Khan area.
Why was the 18 Division operation a fiasco? The plan, very bold in concept, was the brainchild of General Abdul Hamid Khan. Major General B. M. Mustafa who was to execute the plan, his divisional staff and brigade commanders had no knowledge of desert operations and how to move a division across country. The general instead of making
the necessary arrangements, ensuring that he had the right type of equipment for the desert, not fancy Tatra road bound vehicles and planning the logistics in detail, developed impractical ideas like using the hundreds of tractor drawn trolleys requisitioned from the local land owners. This in itself, could not be done till an emergency had been declared. The secrecy maintained by the division commander worked to defeat him. Colonel Wajid Ali Shah lacked an understanding of the nature of the operation and how it should have been executed, the plan was only in the minds of the GOC and the colonel staff. It was top secret, no details had been worked out, even after it became obvious from the news from East Pakistan that war was imminent, the division headquarters sat complacently. They had submitted a demand for hundreds of vehicles and innumerable other things and just waited for them to arrive and did not bother GHQ and GHQ did not bother. They did not innovate, a lot could have been done within the division. Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali showed more initiative than the divisional staff did in this respect when he commandeered the vehicles in the workshop to supply petrol to the 38 Cavalry. The GSO I and the AA&QMG did not know how to move a large body of troops, there was no traffic control, routes had not been reconnoitered by the staff and the commanders of the troops that were to make the march.
After the operations ended in a fiasco the brigade commanders claimed that they were not privy to the 18 Division plan to make a thrust to seize Ramgarh and Jaisalmir. There is evidence that Major General B. M. Mustafa had informed his brigade commanders because Brigadier Syed Mohammad Zaidi, 2nd PMA Course, who was commanding 206 Brigade, very strongly objected and stated that the divisional plans would end in fiasco. He was removed from his command and retired from service. We, the armoured regiment commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I were briefed on 16 October and had carried out the necessary reconnaissance. The divisional artillery commander definitely knew about the proposed operation, yet 51 Brigade artillery did not have proper maps giving the terrain details on the other side of the border. Both 22 and 38 Cavalry had the required maps.
The brigade commanders on hearing that the promised air support would not be available, adopted a negative attitude towards operation. The key was the neutralization of the enemy air, the divisional commander had correctly appreciated this and earmarked a strong force for this. Brigadier Jehanzeb Arbab argued against it and had the composition of the force earmarked to neutralise the Jaisalmir airfield changed and later on it was done away with completely.
In the conduct of the tactical battle, 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch, after arriving at Loganewala did not put in a night attack, they had about three hours of darkness. Brigadier Tariq Mir’s conduct from the time he held his first ‘O’ Group before the commencement of the operation to the end of the operation was disgraceful. He called off the attack on Loganewala and refused to cooperate with Brigadier Jehanzeb Arbab in the plan to attack Loganewala on the night of 5/6 December. Whenever he held the front in the withdrawal he reported an armoured brigade outflanking him, his brigade remained out of communication with the division throughout. After the ceasefire a Signal Corps NCO was charged with an offence, he threatened the brigade major that if disciplinary action was taken against him he would disclose the fact that the brigade major had kept his rear link set off and did not communicate with the division. There was a Mir Jaffar at Plassey and a Tariq Mir at Loganewala.
The commanding officer of 28 Baluch, the Reconnaissance and Support battalion of 18 Division when called upon to capture Ghotaru, pulled his battalion completely out of the operational area, which was a very irresponsible act by an officer in a very responsible position. All this happened because units and formations do not maintain a battle log, this allow people to lie and justify their actions.
After the war the Indian descriptions of the Loganewala battle admitted that the Indian 12 Division was deployed to attack and capture Sakhirewala, Islamgarh and Rahim Yar Khan with its main supply base at Ramgarh, Jaisalmir had almost no troops. At the Jaisalmir airbase there were six Hawker Hunter aircraft, including two 2-seater trainers. The Indian division commander was completely surprised, he did not believe the company commander at Loganewala that an armoured column had appeared at Loganewala and was threatening his supply base, our withdrawal was attributed to logistic failure.
The PAF was blamed for not providing the promised air support and jeopardising the whole operation. My younger brother, Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam was posted at the Air Headquarters, after the
ceasefire I asked him why the air force had not provided the air support. He told me that the only airfield from which the air support could be provided was the Jacobabad airfield which was manned and equipped to receive aircraft. Aircraft from a squadron were earmarked but the necessary orders for them to move to Jacobabad were not issued by the C-in-C of the Air Force. The C-in-C, PAF is on record to have said that he met Lieutenant General Gul Hassan on 4 December and told him that he was not informed about the 18 Division plans and therefore air support could not be provided, with Jacobabad ready to receive aircraft the support could have been provided on 4 December or later from bases other than Jacobabad but no effort was made. When the Indian missile boats approached Karachi and were spotted by a PIA Fokker, the Navy asked for an air attack, the PAF Base commander got the aircraft ready and asked Air Marshal Rahim Khan for approval, he told the Base Commander to tell the Navy to fight its own battle, in the desert, too, he left the army to fight its own battle.
The 18 Division operation has also been criticised as an operation that did not fit in the army plan and was not necessary. The Pakistan Army plan in East Pakistan was to conduct fortress type defence for forty five days for which all logistic requirements had been made. In West Pakistan, the army launched attacks in Azad Kashmir and Chamb to tie down the Indian reserves, we gave ground in the Shakargarh area to draw in the Indian armour. The Indian armoured brigade located in Dera Baba Nanak area was fixed by positioning 6 Armoured Division at Gujranwala, the front between the Ravi and Sutlej was stable due to the BRB canal, the Indian 1 Armoured Division was located at Faridkot, the 18 Division attack was launched to draw the Indian 1 Armoured Division or part of it to Jaisalmir. Air photographs showed that it had started entraining but stopped when it became obvious that the 18 Division operation had failed.
The army plan was to create a gap by drawing away the Indian Armoured Division to Jaisalmer. When the gap sought was not achieved due to the failure of 18 Division, the army plan was revised. 3rd Armoured Brigade from IV Corps was made the flank protection force for the Il Corps offensive. On 16 December II Corps, consisting of 1 Armoured Division, 7 Division, 36 Division and 3rd Armoured Brigade was ordered to launch an offensive in the
Bahawalnagar – Fort Abbas area. | Armoured Division was to move from its concentration area astride the Lodhran – Multan – Khanewal railway on the night of 16/17 December. A captain of 1 FF, commanding a train of his unit, drove the locomotive himself and derailed the train blocking the railway line. 3rd Armoured Brigade moved from Changa Manga to its concentration area with lights blacked out and had forty accidents in the approach march. The launching of the offensive was delayed by twenty four hours, the next night | Armoured Division could not move again, there seemed to be built-in hindrance. to the execution of the army plans. On 18 December we asked for a ceasefire.
Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Islam, Corps of Signal, was the 1 Armoured Division Signal Battalion commander during the war. He was sacked by Major General Zia-ul-Haq and was posted as a GSO 1, Lahore Logistic Area, he met me just after he was posted to Lahore in 1973 and told me “your Armoured Division chickened out in the war”. He did not elaborate but probably would have done so later, a few dnys later he died of a heart attack.
In 1979 I had gone to Lahore, with my younger brother, Lieutenant Colonel Firoz Alam, went to the airport to reserve a seat for my return to Karachi. When we were returning from the airport, my brother showed me a small house without a boundary wall and said that it was General Hamid’s house, I asked him to turn around and go to the house. It was two o’clock in the afternoon, we rang the bell and General Abdul Hamid Khan, the former Chief of Army Staff, came out and we sat and talked for about two hours about the war plans of the 1971 war, the disaster of 18 Division and the ceasefire. General Hamid held Major General Mustafa responsible for the disaster of 18 Division, he said that Major General Mustafa was a bad choice as the commander of 18 Division, he lost all sense of reality, he and his headquarters started fighting a telephone battle, giving exaggerated reports about the enemy and own casualties and asking for all sorts of assistance. I asked him why, after announcing on the 16th that the war in West Pakistan would continue, a ceasefire was announced two days later, his answer was that the generals were not obeying orders. A system must be evolved to make officers accountable for their inactions and actions, rank should not absolve anyone from account ability.
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Chapter 13
In the last week of February 1972 I and my family moved to
Kharian and I reported at the 6 Armoured Division headquarters
which was located in a canal department rest house at Satral. Major General M. I. Karim, a Bengali, who had opted to be expatriated had just left and Brigadier Syed Wajahat Hussain was the officiating division commander.
In the division headquarters just before my arrival, the colonel staff, Colonel Agha Javed Iqbal, the commanding officer of the Signal Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Khurshid, the commander 9 Armoured Brigade, Brigadier Iqbal Mehdi Shah, the commanding officer 9 FF, commander | Corps Artillery Brigadier F.B. Ali and Colonel Alim Afridi, Artillery, had been posted out from their posts. At the division headquarters the story was that after the ceasefire there was a telephonic conversation between Colonel Javed Iqbal and the Chief of the General Stall, Lieutenant General Gul Hasan Khan, then Brigadier F. B. Ali, Colonel Javed Iqbal and Colonel Alim Afridi dralled a letter asking President Yahya to resign and hand over power or else 6 Armoured Division would march on Rawalpindi and enforce his removal. Major General M. I. Karim the then GOC was asked to sign the letter and did so. Colonel Javed Iqbal and Colonel Alim Afridi flew to Rawalpindi and delivered the fetter to the CGS who conveyed the contents to President Yahya.
It was further said that General Hamid, the COAS) asked Major General A. O. Mitha, the Quartermaster General to deal with the problem. Major General Mitha was supposed to have asked Brigadier Ghulam Mohammad, the Commander SSG for a commando company to be dropped on the 6 Armoured Division headquarters. When Brigadier F. B. Ali and his associates learnt that commandos may be used to seize the division headquarters, they made the commanding officer of the Signal Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Khurshid organise the defence of the headquarters and asked Brigadier Iqbal Mehdi Shah to provide infantry and 9 FF was ordered to take over the defence of the division headquarters.
After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the President and Lieutenant General Gul Hassan was appointed the Commander-in-Chief all the officers, directly and indirectly involved, were posted out from their
posts. About a week after I joined the division headquarters, Lieutenant General Gul Hassan was forced to resign from the post of C-in-C of the army and Air Marshal Rahim Khan from the post of the C-in-C of the PAF, Lieutenant General Tikka Khan was promoted general and appointed C-in-C of the army. Soon after this an inquiry was held into the writing of the letter asking for the resignation of General Yahya and all the officers connected were compulsorily retired from service.
Before my posting as the colonel staff, I had worked as the Deputy Quartermaster General (DQ) of 6 Armoured Division in 1965. Lieutenant Colonel Mir Abad Hussain who was then GSO 2 (Intelligence) was now the GSO I, and Lieutenant Colonel Anwar Wajih was the AA&QMG. My main dealings were with the brigade majors of the two armoured brigades and the artillery brigade, with the Chief of Staff, I Corps, Brigadier N. A. Hussain who had asked for more ‘sweepers’ in East Pakistan and got sacked, the GSO 1 (Operations) I Corps, was Lieutenant Colonel Musheer Muhammad Khan from 13 Lancers, later brigadier.
As the colonel staff of the division I reconnoitered the whole of the division’s operational area. One of the areas I went to was the Barrapind battlefield where 13 Lancers had counter attacked and suffered heavy casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Syed Masood Ahmad, who had been a squadron officer with me in ‘A’ Squadron, 13 Lancers, and had commanded the regiment during the battle took me around the battlefield, and described the battle. Looking at the terrain I estimated that the Indians would have had six squadrons of tanks but Lieutenant Colonel Masood told me that after the ceasefire they had found that there were nine squadrons. There were a lot of reasons for the 13 Lancers disaster, I Corps commander launched a counter attack without sealing the breach in his front, Brigadier Mohammad Ahmad, commander 8 Armoured Brigade made no effort to find out the extent of the breach in the Corps front or the strength of the enemy he was counter attacking. The counter attack was launched on the information received at about ten o’clock at night that about six tanks had crossed the defensive minefield, the attack was launched at about seven o’clock in the morning and three tank regiments had moved across the minefield by then.
13 Lancers was trained to charge an objective, they used their tracks and not their guns, one tank was knocked out about fifty yards
from the Indian position. One squadron at a time was fed into the Indian horseshoe shaped field of fire held by nine squadrons, the regiment suffered heavy losses in tanks with about thirty men killed and about forty wounded. Amongst the five officers killed was my brother Captain Aijaz Alam.
After the 8 Armoured Brigade disaster, a FF battalion which had arrived in the area that evening was launched in a silent night attack on Barrapind, the correct battle procedure was not followed, the units on both flanks were not informed that a silent attack was being launched, a 13 Lancers squadron was deployed adjacent to the area from where the battalion attacked. When the battalion was close to the objective the enemy opened fire, the commanding officer got killed and the men started running back. 13 Lancers squadron hearing the sound of fire and not knowing that own troops had attacked and were running back, opened fire and caused very heavy casualties in the attacking battalion. The commanding officer of the battalion was awarded the Hilal-e-Jurrat and the. lapse was swept under the carpet.
The 6 Armoured Division peace station was Kharian, about sixty miles from the area where it was deployed, soldiers who had left their families in Kharian used to go there on casual leave by the local buses. Almost every day there were reports that soldiers were taunted for losing the war, that they were not allowed to get into buses which resulted in fights while boarding buses. After considering the problem ! requisitioned a bus and ran a bus service free of charge from the concentration area to Kharian.
I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik, revised plans to deal with eventualities in case hostilities were resumed and 6 Armoured Division was required to counter attack several areas. In one of the plans the division was required to cross a defensive minefield, re-cross it and then cross it again. As colonel stall of the division I pointed out this crossing and re-crossing of the minefield to Major General Wajahat Hussain but he did not allow me to question the Corps headquarters, so when the Corps commander visited the division headquarters and I had to present the divisional plans, pointed out the crossing and re-crossing much to the anxiety of the division commander but the Corps Commander did not take any note of it.
General Tikka Khan, the C-in-C of the Army and Major General M. Rahim Khan, the Chief of the General Staff visited the division head
quarters. Major General M. Rahim Khan was evacuated from East Pakistan in a helicopter that was supposed to bring out the nurses from the Military Hospital, he became known in the Army as “Bungal se bhagora” and was generally referred to as “bhagora Rahim”. ‘Bhagora’ is a soldier’s term for a person who has run away, a deserter. Both the visits were routine, we stood in line and were introduced, the situation map was seen and the visitors departed.
The 6 Armoured Division Artillery was commanded by Brigadier Wahid, 2nd PMA Course, in the division headquarters, at the Satrah Rest House, he had parked the caravan in which he slept, under a big tree. In the compound of the Rest House there was mosque with a maulvi, someone from the Signal Battalion of the division rigged up a loudspeaker on the tree under which Brigadier Wahid’s caravan was parked, ran the wires to a microphone in the mosque and the maulvi sounded the ‘aazaan’ five times a day with the brigadier getting the full blast of the call to prayers. He ordered the speaker removed but it was not, he had the wires cut but they were repaired, he fought the maulvi and the Signal Battalion for two or three days, then quietly retreated with his headquarters to the Pasrur airfield.
One day my youngest brother Second Lieutenant Javed Alam Khan, who was then battery officer in a field artillery regiment in the 15 Division artillery, telephoned and told me that he was in trouble because he had some trees cut down and a report had been made against him and his senior JCO. He implied that I should do something, though his commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Hanan Yasin, a coursemate of mine. I told him that if he had the trees cut to say so and give his reason, as long as he had not done it for personal use, there would be no problem. I did not hear anything about it again but years later my brother told me that the senior JCO using his influence got them both out of the trouble. A little later my brother applied for a transfer to the Armoured Corps and with a little help from the Director Armoured Corps, Brigadier S. R. C. Daniels, he was transferred and opted for 24 Cavalry.
My old friend Lieutenant Colonel Majeed who had been the commanding officer of the EME battalion in 1 Armoured Division was the commanding officer of the EME battalion of the 6 Armoured Division. The division headquarters started receiving copies of unfair wear and tear’ reports about the vehicles and equipment of an artillery regiment. I called the commanding officer and asked him what the problem was,
he told me that he and commanding officer of the EME battalion had fallen out over some repair problem and the EME battalion commander was raising unfair wear and tear’ reports and victimizing his unit. I arranged an inspection of the EME Battalion by the GOC and accompanied him. I pointed out a number of items in which there was “unfair wear and tear’ and equipment was not properly maintained, the battalion commander was then asked how many unfair wear and tear reports’ had been raised about his equipment which he was not maintaining properly.
Since the ceasefire there had been no training activity, the training of the division was started. An exercise was held for putting out a written operation order by the division headquarters. With the then typing and duplicating facilities, it was found that after the division commander had given his orders, it took nearly six to eight hours to produce the required number of copies of the order with its traces and attachments, which certainly required improvement. The training of the administrative units was carried out and brigades were exercised in planning, command and control. Telephone battles were set to make the commanders react to unforeseen situations and some commanders failed badly in this respect.
Brigadier Habib Akbar, while he was colonel staff 1 Armoured Division had initiated and supervised the making of mine lifting! ploughs copied from the Russians. When 6 Armoured Division received sets of this mine lifting equipment, I told the GOC that tank commanders and drivers must see the plough working to avoid inhibitions in their use. I arranged a presentation on the ploughs and a demonstration, a minefield was laid and a tank with the plough fitted tried to clear a path, the first anti-tank mine exploded blowing the plough away, a second one was tried with the same result, that ended the mine lifting plough.
In June 1972 I was posted to command the 3rd (Independent) Armoured Brigade in IV Corps, Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan was the corps commander. When the posting order was received I asked Major General Wajahat if the posting could be changed to the command of an armoured brigade in an armoured division but he told me that it could not be done.
I took over the command of 3rd Armoured Brigade from Brigadier Fazl-e-Haq, later lieutenant general. The 3rd Armoured Brigade, minus armoured regiments, was taken from 1 Armoured
Division, it consisted of the armoured infantry battalion 1 FF, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rana, later brigadier, 16 (SP) Field Regiment, Artillery, the services elements came from the armoured division, 4 Cavalry, equipped with M 48 tanks, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Khawar Rashid Peerzada, taken from 11 Division and 15 Lancers, equipped with T-34 Russian tanks, the IV Corps reconnaissance regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel M. Khurshid Afridi, who had been a platoon commander in ” Company, SSG, when I raised it, composed the armour element but 15 L’ancers was deployed to cover the Sutlej river from Hussieniwala to Sulemanki, 52 Punjab, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shafiq, later lieutenant general, a newly raised infantry battalion made up its order of battle.
The brigade major of the brigade was Major Hamid Gul, later lieutenant general and the DQ was Major Allah Baksh Tiwana, the brigade headquarters was located in the Changa Manga Forest Rest House. Although 3rd Armoured Brigade was supposed to be an ‘Independent’ brigade, its organisation had not been decided and powers of an independent brigade commander were not delegated, therefore the Corps commander held the administrative and disciplinary powers. The role of the brigade was to counter attack any lodgement by the Indians between the Ravi River and Sulemanki headwork.
Brigadier Fazl-e-Haq while handing over the charge, apart from explaining the plans of the brigade and giving me other relevant information, told me that there had been a theft from the second line ammunition kept in the Army Service Corps vehicles and disciplinary action was taken against the officer concerned. He had also said that some charges had been levelled against the commanding officer of 4 Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Khawar Rashid Peerzada, by an officer who had been placed on an ‘adverse report’ which had been investigated and there had been nothing in the charges.
The first month was spent in going over the operational plans of the brigade, in the plans there was the same shortcoming as in the attack of 8 Armoured Brigade at Barrapind, the enemy penetration was not contained before the counter attack.
As is customary, I visited all the units under my command, one major problem we faced was that the gauges of the transport vehicles of the American Aid vintage vehicles were not working with the result that vehicle engines seized. The officer commanding the work
shop, a very capable major who had been superseded for slapping a soldier, when faced with the problem said he was aware of the problem but the necessary parts were not available in Ordnance stores. I told him to check the motor spare parts market but there also they were not available, the OC workshop then asked for permission to make the parts in the workshop, I gave the permission and he bought the items required and made the gauges in the workshop. If the EME and the Ordnance had utilised the local manufacturing capability at the cottage industry level, probably we would not have such a big problem about spare parts.
About two months after I assumed the command of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Rashid Khan, SJ, took over the command of 16 (SP) Field Regiment, Artillery, he was a major in the 1965 war with India and had been decorated for engaging enemy tanks over ‘open sights’ with his guns, he had been superseded and had been posted to 16 (SP) for a review report for promotion. After he had settled down in command I visited the unit and a few days later received an album of photographs of the visit.
In the Changa Manga village there was resentment against the presence of the brigade, the ceasefire with the loss of East Pakistan was one reason for the resentment against the army, the newspapers published articles against officers and further fanned the resentment. Sometime after I assumed the command of the brigade I was told that the maulvi of Changa Manga village mosque was speaking against the army in his ‘khutba’ every Friday, I sent for the maulvi and the village headman and told the maulvi in front of the headman what I would do to him if I heard that he had uttered another word against the army. I was told later that the maulvi left the village and went away.
In November I was informed that the brigade was to return to its peace station Lahore and minefields were to be lifted. 15 Lancers was deployed along the Sutlej River and certain areas were mined. When the mine lifting started 15 Lancers was required to provide a medical officer to be present when the mines were being lifted, the medical officer of 15 Lancers was a conscript, he refused to go to the minefield. The second in command, officiating as the commanding officer reported this to me, I told him to tell the officer to go or I would take disciplinary action, the second in command came back and told me that the doctor said that he had been a student leader in the medical college and had very good connections with the Pakistan Peoples Party, he
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would have me and the second in command black listed if he was sent to the minefield. I sent a message back saying that if he did not go where he was ordered to go he would be court martialled, the doctor reported sick and was placed ‘sick in quarters’ and I was informed, sent an order that a medical officer could only ‘advise rest in quarters’, it was up to the officer in command to accept the advice or disregard it, in this case it was disregarded, finally the doctor went. The second in command also had to get a review report, I inspected 15 Lancers while he was officiating as the commanding officer, he had been commissioned in 15 Lancers and had about 16 years of service, when I asked him the organisation of the headquarters squadron of the regiment he did not know it.
From Changa Manga I used to go on weekends to Lahore where iny family resided. At a certain place on the highway a beggar used to stand by the roadside, after some time he changed his dress to a green shirt of a holy man, later he marked a rectangle by the roadside with stones, after a while a mound appeared in the rectangle. All the while the man stood and begged at the same point. Finally a tomb was constructed and the man now sat inside, a fine example of an idea developed into a lucrative business.
Once when I was going to Lahore, little beyond Bhai Pheru, a small town, reputed to have been named after a Christian priest Brother Turner, which translated into ‘Bhai Pheru’, a man on a bicycle, going in the same direction as my staff car but on the wrong side of the road, suddenly crossed to the correct side of the road, in doing this his cycle came in front of my staff car and was hit by it. The man flew in the air and landed on the flag pole on the bonnet of the car; the brass flag pole went through his groin, the staff car stopped, we took him down from the bonnet. I notice that he was bleeding profusely, I had a tourniquet tied on his thigh and had him put in a vehicle. I went to brief the driver of the vehicle to take him to the Bhai Pheru Civil Dispensary, when I went to the rear of the vehicle I found that the tourniquet had been removed and the body of the truck was full of blood, I asked who had removed the tourniquet and a man was pointed out, he was the local choudhry. I had the tourniquet put back, took the man to the dispensary where I found that apart from a chowkidar there was no stall, then i gave directions for the man to be taken to the civil hospital in Lahore and a report to be lodged with the police. The man was admitted in the hospital but he died during the night.
One weekend while I was in Lahore, Colonel Javed Iqbal telephoned me at my house, he was on leave pending retirement, we had been good friends and I called him over to the Services Club, my brother Squadron Leader Aftab Alam had come over for the weekend, he and I went to the club and Colonel Javed Iqbal, a cousin of his and another civilian, joined us. We had a few drinks and Colonel Javed Iqbal’s cousin told us that on the day that Lieutenant General Gul Hassan had been forced to resign, Lieutenant General Tikka Khan was the guest of honour at a cricket match in Sahiwal. During the lunch break while talking to the people around the lunch table, the general had commented that the government and the army command consisted of drunkards and vagabonds and he did not fit in, that afternoon he was called to GHQ and in the evening his assumption of the army command was announced. He became a very trusted lieutenant of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Colonel Javed Iqbal told me that he was going to Sahiwal the next day, I told him that I was going to Changa Manga, to accompany me and spend an evening with me in Changa Manga. The next day he accompanied me, during his stay he spoke about the army being unfair to him. I didn’t see how the army had been unfair because he and the others with him had involved themselves in the country’s politics.
Next weekend my brother telephoned me from Sargodha and told not to see the colonel with the foreign wife, meaning Javed Iqbal, I told him that I had known him for twenty years and saw no reason for not seeing him.
Since the brigade had been in the field for over a year and had not carried out any firing 1 planned a field firing exercise for all the major units, one third at a time. In the field firing, besides troop, platoon, squadron, company and unit level exercises, I planned unit level attack and defence exercises with live ammunition, with artillery fire and air support. Also during the field firing – armour, infantry and artillery officers were trained as artillery observers in the attack and defence using live ammunition, these exercises were organised by Lieutenant Colonel Rashid and were very instructive.
When the first field firing party went to the Cholistan desert, a 52 Punjab company commander frustrated with the shooting standard of one of his men tied him to a jeep and dragged him in the sand, disci
plinary action had to be initiated against the officer. The attack and defence exercises, carried out with live ammunition, with artillery fire and air support, with pop-up targets denoting the attacking and defending enemy, went very well and everything worked like clock work. To set up the range I had borrowed thirteen thousand rupees from 4 Cavalry after obtaining a promise from Colonel Abdur Rahman, the Deputy Director Military Training, that he would make a reimbursement and he did. The organisation of the pop up targets denoting the enemy attacking and defending was done by the OC Workshop and he set up a very good system.
When the second party went to the field firing range there were two accidents, in one a 2nd Lieutenant of 15 Lancers and a sowar were killed in the night firing. They had been sent to the target area to illuminate the target by firing illuminating ammunition from a trench which had been dug. Both of them, in sheer bravado, stood side by side outside the trench when the tanks were firing, a high explosive shell killed both of them. I was informed about the accident late at night and when I went to the 15 Lancers camp, the major in charge of the 15 Lancers party had completely collapsed and was crying in his tent, made him wash his face, get out of his tent and carry out everything necessary for the despatch of the bodies to their homes. In the second accident a 52 Punjab JCO while loading a recoilless rifle lost his arm due to incorrect loading drill. In this firing the Inter-Services Public Relations brought a host of newspaper reporters to see the training of the Pakistan Army.
The third time we went on the Cholistan field firing range, it was the middle of February. Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan, Major General Mumtaz, Brigadier S. R. C. Daniels and some other officers came to witness the attack and defence exercises. This time nothing went wrong.
After the exercise was over 1 asked the Corps Commander for permission to visit 22 and 38 Cavalry who were in the Sadiqabad area, after seeing the Corps commander off, I left for Sadiqabad, that night I spent with 22 Cavalry and after breakfast I left for Manthar to visit 38 Cavalry. Between Sadiqabad and Manthar a jeep drove up behind mine and started honking, my driver gave way, the jeep went ahead, stopped, and flagged me to stop. When I stopped I found Brigadier Ateeq, 18 Division artillery commander standing on the road, we met and walked off the road to talk. Brigadier Ater
inquired what I was doing in the area, I explained that I was on my way to 38 Cavalry, he said that he was coming from 18 Division headquarters and was going to his headquarters, some other small talk followed, then he said “I have heard from someone who has heard from F. B. Ali that he is plotting against the government, do you know about it” I told him that I did not know anything about such a thing and that he should report the matter. I went to 38 Cavalry, had lunch with the officers and caught the train to Lahore that night.
Immediately after returning from the final field firing exercise I was detailed to attend an exercise in 1 Corps, at Mangla and Sialkot. In the exercise I made myself very unpopular with the I Corps commander and his staff who were directing the exercise by pointing out that in planning an attack at the corps level, the attack has to be launched on a frontage three times the width of the breach sought in the enemy’s front if the enemy’s defences were prepared in depth. This was considered heresy, as far more troops and resources would be required and I was made to quote the authority for making such a statement.
In the second phase of the exercise we moved to Sialkot where a presentation had been arranged. In the tea break Brigadier Tariq Mir, who had come from Quetta where he was the Chief of Staff of the newly raised V Corps, accosted me and shouted that I was spreading false stories behind his back about his conduct in the 18 Division operations during the war, I told him that if he liked, I could tell the story to his face.
After the brigade returned to its peace station, I went around the accommodation and was appalled to find that the ‘cavalry’ lines in which 15 Lancers and 4 Cavalry were housed were without electricity, in the barracks lanterns were used as in the last century. In the twenty years that I had spent in the army this was the first time I had seen the ‘Indian Army’ lines, before this every unit that I had served with had been in ‘British Army’ lines. The newspapers had just published a report that jails would have electric lights and fans, in a conference which the Corps commander was presiding and the three division commanders were present, I raised the subject of the electrification of the troops barracks and said that now that jails were to get electricity our troops should also get it. This was not liked at all but about three months later all the barracks were electrified.
One day I had nothing to do and instead of sitting in the office and idling, I decided to call on all the brigade commanders in Lahore. I
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went around the 10 Division brigades and found none of the brigade commanders in their offices, in 11 Division I found Brigadier Wajid Ali Shah, commander 22 Brigade, in his office, I had a cup of tea with him and came away. A week or so later Brigadier Wajid Ali Shah came to my office, had a cup of tea and went away. Brigadier Ateeq, on leave from 18 Division, called on me at my office, spent a few minutes and left.
In planning the training of the brigade I had planned a visit by all the officers of the brigade to the Barrapind battlefield where 13 Lancers were badly battered in the 8 Armoured Brigade counter attack. The planning of the visit had involved obtaining permission from the Corps and GHQ, and coordination with 13 Lancers, a part of 8 Armoured Brigade in I Corps, who were to describe how the battle had been conducted. The visit was scheduled for the last week of March, all instructions had been issued and preparations made, the day before we were scheduled to leave for Barrapind, the commanding officer of 13 Lancers, Lieutenant Colonel Syed Masood Ahmad, telephoned and asked me to postpone the visit. I argued that it involved getting permission again and would upset my training schedule. Lieutenant Colonel Masood said that he could not help that and that he would not be able to conduct us on the battlefield, I told him that I would manage without him and instructed 15 Lancers to take their officers mess and cooked lunch for all the officers. At six o’clock in the morning of the day on which we were to leave for Barrapind, the COS of IV Corps, Brigadier Z. R. Shah telephoned me and asked whether my brigade officers were to go to the Zafarwal area, I confirmed it and said we would leave at 8 o’clock, he said that the Corps commander had ordered the cancellation of the trip. I then telephoned my brigade major, Major Roshan Ejaz to inform all units and the commanding officer of 15 Lancers cancelling the trip.
At about 8 o’clock I went to my office and was informed that at 9 o’clock the Corps commander would address all the officers of the garrison. In his address the Corps commander told us that a conspiracy to overthrow the government had been un-earthed in which Brigadier F. B. Ali, Colonel Alim Afridi, Brigadier Wajid Ali Shah, commander 22 Brigade, 11 Division, IV Corps, and some other officers were involved and had been arrested, that strict disciplinary action would be taken against them and any other officers involved in the conspiracy. The news had stunning effect on all the officers.
The previous evening a letter had been received by all corps and divisional commanders, from the Chief of the General Staff, Major General M. Rahim Khan, to be opened at 11 o’clock at night, it stated that there was a conspiracy to overthrow the government, it gave a list of officer who were to be arrested and stated that any officer who resisted arrest was to be shot. It further gave a list of those officers who were suspected of being involved in the conspiracy and were to be placed under surveillance. On the day the Corps commander addressed the officers, when I went to my house I noticed three men in civilian clothes sitting in cane chairs outside the electric grid station across the road from my house, I was under surveillance.
The names of officers Brigadier F. B. Ali, Brigadier Wajid Ali Shah, Colonel Alim Afridi and some other officers who had been arrested were published in newspapers. Soon word was passed on the army grapevine that apart from the officers whose names had appeared in the newspapers, a number of majors and captains had been arrested, most of them were from Public Schools like Lawrence College and Hasan Abdal and included some generals’ sons. Stories started circulating that the officers who had been arrested were not being treated as officers, they were blind folded and taken to unit guard rooms and locked up in cells like soldiers, one officer was rolled up in a carpet when he was arrested and moved to a cell. A lot of officers were arrested because they were friendly with those who were involved in the conspiracy, a major from 1 FF was arrested because he was friendly with an officer of 19 Lancers who had been arrested. Brigadier Inam ul llaq, Artillery, from my course was arrested and kept in solitary confinement in a cell for two months because Brigadier F. B. Ali had stayed in his house in Jhelum for a few days. Before the arrests a lot of officers used to criticise the going-ons of Bhutto and his government, after the arrests everybody was out to prove that he was ‘more loyal than the king’.
A day or two after the arrests Major General A. O. Mitha sent a message that he would be coming to Lahore. I went to the airport, received him and brought him to my house, I described to him what had happened and he remarked that there would be a witch hunt and many fine officers would be ruined. I invited him and some SSG officers to dinner that night, in the evening his daughter Yamima telephoned to tell me that the general would not be able to come, the next time we met the general told me that after he left my house he discov
ered that he was being followed.
About a week or ten days after the arrests, the COS telephoned me and told me to come to the Corps headquarters at eight at night, in civilian clothes, when I went there Brigadier Z. R. Shah was waiting for me and told me that it was known that I was very friendly with Brigadier Wajid Ali Shah and I was required to give an account of my meetings with him and the details of my relationship with him. I told him that we were from the same course at the PMA but from different companies, that after being commissioned we had not met till I had gone to command 38 Cavalry in 18 Division and of our two meetings in Lahore, I was then asked to write down what I had said and I did so. After about another week the same procedure was gone through and this time I was asked for the details of my meetings with Brigadier Ateeq including the one in Sadiqabad, I described them and again wrote out what I had said, a few days later the arrest of Brigadier Ateeq was published in the newspapers. About this time I received the information that my brother Squadron Leader Aftab Alam had been arrested in connection with the conspiracy
In May I was told to go to Rawalpindi to answer some questions, I went to Rawalpindi, moved into the Engineers mess and since I did not have anything to do I went to Murree where my mother was living all by herself, I spent about two hours with her and returned to Rawalpindi.
The next day Brigadier A. Q. Anjum, from my course and platoon at the Military Academy, interrogated me. One of the questions he asked me was why had my brother Squadron Leader Aftab told me not to meet Colonel Javed Iqbal. I told him that I thought it was because we had quite a few drinks and Aftab did not appreciate it. The next day I was called by the Director Military Intelligence, Brigadier Abdullah Malik, later major general, and told I was cleared of all connections with the conspiracy. A week later I was again called to GHQ by the Director Personal Services to repeat my statement before a lawyer and was told that I would be required to record evidence against Brigadier Ateeq.
About a month later I was ordered to go to the Attock Fort, where all the officers involved in the conspiracy were kept under arrest. The day before I was to go I got a telephone call from Mrs. Sabiruddin, the wife of Lieutenant Colonel Sabiruddin, S Horse, and the motherin-law of my younger brother Lieutenant Commander Shamoon Alam,
PN, asking me not to give any evidence to incriminate Brigadier Ateeq. I told her that whatever I had to say I had said already and I was not going to say anything else.
Before going to the Attock Fort I had written to the Pakistan Air Force that I would be coming to Peshawar to meet my brother Squadron Leader Aftab Alam who was under arrest in the Peshawar PAF officers mess. After reporting arrival at the Attock Fort I went to Peshawar and met my brother with another officer present in the room. My brother seemed to be in reasonably good spirits and I felt that things would be all right since he had not been charged with any offence. He was released about a month later. Later the Commander-in-Chief of the PAF, Air Marshal Zafar Choudhry was held responsible for ordering the arrest of about a dozen very good officers and charging them with the conspiracy to create a line of succession within the PAF.
At the Attock Fort my statement about my ‘chance meeting’ with Brigadier Ateeq and the conversation that took place between us was recorded in Brigadier Ateeq’s presence and he did not ask any question.
After about another month I was required to go to the Attock Fort to give evidence at the trial of Brigadier Ateeq. Accommodation for officers giving evidence was arranged at the Azad Kashmir Regimental Centre in Mansar Camp, about five miles from the Attock Fort. Again I had a day with nothing to do so I went to Abbottabad where my brother Lieutenant Colonel Firoz Alam was posted, he had been deferred by the promotion board, the objection to his promotion was by Lieutenant General Sharif, later general, on the grounds that his attitude towards senior officers was not correct. After the deferment he asked for a posting to the Frontier Force Regimental Centre with a view to winding up his affairs and leaving the army. His request for retirement was not approved by General Tikka till he himself got his retirement orders in 1976.
I returned from Abbottabad in the evening and found a message informing me that I was to meet Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf, Corps of Signal, the prosecuting officer, in the bachelor officers quarters at the Attock Fort that night. I went at the appointed time and Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf told me that since I was to give my evidence the next day he wanted me to read the statement which had been recorded in the summary of evidence to refresh my memory and handed me copy of my statement, I read through it and returned it. In the room, besides Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf, there was Brigadier “George’ Rabbani who
was also to give evidence on the following day. After l’returned the copy of my statement, Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf told me that the evidence I was going to give against Brigadier Ateeq was not enough to convict him and therefore I should change my statement. I told Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf that I had come to give evidence and not to acquit or convict Brigadier Ateeq, he answered that if I wanted to serve in the army I would do what he was telling me. At this point Brigadier Rabbani also advised me to do what I was being told. I told Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf that I would inform Major General Zia ul Haq about what had transpired, before I gave evidence before the court. The trial was being held in the other ranks dining hall where a partition had been made in the room to give the presiding general an office. Before the trial commenced the next morning I was at Major General Zia ul Haq’s office, when he arrived, I met him and told him the details of the previous night’s incident and told him that I was bringing it to his notice officially. The general listened to me but did not say any. thing.
Later in the day, I was called to give the evidence and I said what I had stated previously, there was practically no cross examination. After my evidence was over, the defending lawyer of Major Sajjad Akbar, who had been my adjutant in 3 Commando Battalion, asked me to verify the character of Major Sajjad. I said that he had served as my adjutant in 3 Commando Battalion, that I had found him an excellent officer, always a volunteer for any mission, outspoken and frank and should have been decorated.
Although I had been assured by the Director Military Intelligence that I had been cleared of all charges of being connected with the conspiracy my house continued to be surveilled. Since the arrests for the conspiracy, my house had been under surveillance by team of men who sat in a electric substation opposite my house, the surveillance team had a Morris Minor car parked in a small park opposite the substation. I had noticed the car parked in the park and had noted that when I went out in my car the car followed me but never followed my staff car, apparently they got a report from the driver. One side light in the Morris was not working so it was quite easy to locate it, sometimes the surveillance party in the car would get bored and leave when we took a long time in the shopping areas of Lahore. One day my wife and I went to the cinema, the car followed us and two members of the surveillance team came into the cinema and sat down on the seats in front of us. After the
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film was over the car followed us, on the way back at a very large round-about, I drove round and round the round-about and the Morris followed, there was no other traffic, after doing a number of rounds I drove home.
After dinner almost every night my wife and I used to take a walk on the road in front of my house. After returning from Attock Fort after attending the trial, when we went for our walk the surveillance team started following us. I told my wife that I was going to challenge the men surveilling and she should not get upset. I turned about, walked up to them and accused them of following me, I asked who they were and told them I was going to my house to telephone for the military police, the team hurriedly packed and left in their car, that was the last I saw of them.
After the trial of the conspirators the details of the conspiracy and its detection started coming out. Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Rafi, officer commanding the GHQ Signal Battalion revealed that one of the officers involved was a good friend of his and asked him to join in the conspiracy. Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Rafi made a report about the approach and was instructed to join the conspirators. The conspirators met at various places but a key meeting was held in Jhelum where almost all those involved met at a wedding. In the meeting my name was discussed but it was decided that I would make a report, probably Brigadier Ateeq had conveyed my reaction at the chance meeting with him. Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Rafi in reporting the details of the meeting mentioned my name and when the lists of those who were to be arrested and those who were to be watched were finalised, my name was added to those who were to be surveilled by Major General M. Rahim Khan, the Chief of the General Staff, and I became involved in the conspiracy.
On the 3rd of December, 1971, when the Pakistan Army attacked from West Pakistan, 4 Cavalry was employed in eliminating the Indian enclave of Hussieniwala. When the regiment crossed the border at Gandasighwala, at the customs post a car impounded by the customs was found at the Custom’s post. The officers of the regiment removed the car and other impounded items from the customs post. The car was taken to the regiment and the commanding officer was told that it had been removed from the Indian side of the border. After the ceasefire the commanding officer learnt that it had been removed from our customs post and ordered his quartermaster to
return it. The quartermaster handed it over to the police of the area but for some reason did not obtain a receipt for the car. The car belonged to a Frenchman who claimed it after the ceasefire and when the customs did not return it he sued the Government of Pakistan. Pressure was put on the police and the car was recovered, the press found out and published a news item saying that a car taken away by the army from the Gandasighwala customs post had been recovered in Lyallpur. An officer of 4 Cavalry, who had been placed on an adverse report by the commanding officer had made an allegation that a car had been stolen from the customs post with the connivance of the commanding officer but investigation by Brigadier Fazl-e-Haq had found no substance in the allegation. Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan’s wife’s nephew, Major Naeem was serving in 4 Cavalry, he was not getting on well with his commanding officer and had told the Corps commander about the removal of the car. On the publication of the news report the Corps commander asked for an inquiry by the Special Investigation Branch, (SIB), an agency in GHQ which investigates crimes relating to the army. A major was sent by the SIB who investigated and reported that the car had been returned to the police and the officers involved had not committed any offence. The Corps commander said that he did not agree with the findings of the inquiry, that the SIB officer had been bribed by the commanding officer and the officers involved in the case, that disciplinary action should be taken against the SIB officer and ordered another inquiry with a lieutenant colonel from the Corps of Engineers as the president of the inquiry, he also asked the Military Secretary’s Branch to demote Lieutenant Colonel Peerzada to his substantive rank of major.
The second inquiry took some time, during the inquiry one of the officers involved tried to force an OR to give evidence in his favour. ordered a summary of evidence and advised a summary disposal of the case but the Corps commander ordered that the officer be placed under arrest and tried by a Field General Court Martial. When the officer was placed under arrest he made a redress of grievance application to the Chief of Army Staff.
At the end of June I received extracts from my confidential report for 1972, the Corps commander considered me a capable brigade commander with good tactical and administrative capability, and that I handled my subordinates correctly but with sentiments and kindness.
In spite of having to attend to enquiries, recording of evidence
etc I made sure that the training of the brigade was carried on. I introduced reconnaissance trips by officers, they had to submit reconnaissance written reports which were filed. I pooled the intelligence sections of all the units under my command and made them make enlargements of maps and shade them to denote fields of fire, cover and important ground etc and I paid special attention to the training of officers, JCOs and NCOS.
The lieutenant colonel who was conducting the second inquiry into the car removal on being posted out from IV Corps, submitted the completed inquiry and left the corps. The finding of the inquiry was the same as in the previous inquiry. After receiving the inquiry, Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan sent for me, when I entered his office he asked me to sit down and ordered tea, he had never before asked me to sit in his office. While we had tea he told me that Lieutenant Colonel Khawar Rashid Peerzada was an officer without character and a thief, he then told me that he was sending the inquiry regarding the removal of the car from the Gandasinghwala customs post, to me for my opinion. When the inquiry came to me and I read it, I agreed with the finding, since the car had been returned on the order of the commanding officer and the police officer receiving the car had given a statement saying that he had received the car, I sent for the police officer who acknowledged that he had received the car. When I asked why the car was recovered in Lyallpur, he said that was a police matter and did not concern the army.
In my opinion I wrote that I agreed with the findings of the inquiry that since the commanding officer had returned the car there had been no dishonesty on his part, the only dereliction by the commanding officer was that he had failed to report an unusual occurrence’ which regulations required that he should, that he should be given a warning and that disciplinary action should be taken against the officer who had removed the car from the customs post and the officer who had returned it without taking a receipt from the police. Lieutenant General Abdul Hameed Khan disagreed with my recommendations and recommended administrative action against Lieutenant Colonel Khawar Rashid Peerzada and ordered me to take disciplinary action against the other two officers.
Six months earlier I had submitted the annual confidential report on Lieutenant Colonel Peerzada, Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan had kept the report pending and wrote his report on Lieutenant Colonel
Khawar Rashid Peerzada, as the superior reporting officer after the enquiry was completed. The report contained a number of adverse remarks on the character of Lieutenant Colonel Peerzada, Peerzada represented against the report and said that he had been victimized because the Corps commander’s wife’s nephew was serving under him and they had not got on well.
During this period I went on three days leave to Murree, when I returned I was told that the major commanding the Army Service Corps company of the brigade, had an NCO, from the Corps Army Service Corps Battalion, tied to a tree and beaten. Two inquires were held and they both blamed the officer for beating the NCO without any reason, the whole thing seemed rather odd to me. I asked the Corps commander for a few days to investigate and an inquiry with the help of the Military Police was carried out. It was revealed that the major had gone to the Koth Lakhpat industrial area which the army was using as a drivers training area, the Corps, Army Service Corps Battalion drivers were also training there. This particular NCO did not salute the major, the major reprimanded the NCO who’slapped the major, the major had him tied to a tree and beaten. The major and the NCO realized that they had committed offences and made an agreement not to make a report, the NCO came back and reported to his commanding officer that he had been tied to a tree and beaten. recommended that the officer be dealt with summarily while the NCO who had slapped the officer and the witnesses who had given false evidence be dealt with more severely. After 1 reported the details, the Corps commander ordered the major reduced to his substantive rank of captain and ordered a summary of evidence for disciplinary action. The officer wrote a letter directly to the Chief of Army Staff stating that the Corps commander had punished him by reducing him in rank and further disciplinary action was unfair.
Lieutenant Colonel Rashid the commanding officer of 16 SP Field Regiment, who was on review report had worked hard to be promoted, he demonstrated his knowledge of gunnery and its application and training methods, in war he had already demonstrated his determination and steadiness. His disadvantage was that he had not qualified from the Staff College and did not have the distinction of being a gunnery instructor, I strongly recommended him for promotion. When his name came before the promotion board the Corps commander did not recommend him for promotion and he was passed over.
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day I went to the Corps headquarters and met the Corps commander, he told me that he did not want me as a brigade commander and had asked that I should be posted out.
I handed over the 3rd Armoured Brigade to Brigadier Shah Rafi Alam and took over the command of 9 Armoured Brigade in 6 Armoured Division. The GOC Major General Syed Wajahat Hussain told me that General Tikka had asked him whether he would take me as a brigade commander and he said had yes. Later I was interviewed by Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik who gave me to understand that I had instigated my subordinates to represent against Lieutenant General Abdul Hameed Khan. In fact all the representations resulted from unnecessarily harsh and unfair disciplinary action by the Corps commander.
In October I heard that Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan had written a letter stating that I had been involved in the conspiracy by Brigadier F. B. Ali and others and that I had conspired with some of brigade officers to defame and malign him and therefore I should be retired from service. There was no formal report, charge sheet or intimation to me.
In command of 9 Armoured Brigade I seemed to have the division commander’s confidence but I was not liked by the I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik. On a sand model exercise when I had given a solution better than the Directing Staff solution he took it on himself to criticize it. I attended a senior officers training session which was attended by all the brigadiers in I Corps, at that time 12 Division was also included in I Corps. After the training session was over the Corps commander asked that if anyone had any queries about their operational role they could ask questions, one brigade commander from 12 Division said that his front was extended well beyond the brigades defensive capability, instead of discussing the problem the Corps commander said that if the brigade commander could not cope with the problem he would find someone who could, no one else had any more problems to discuss.
Major General Syed Wajahat Hussain happened to be away from Kharian cantonment at the end of the year, I as the senior brigade commander officiated as the division commander. Some officers requested permission to have a new year’s party at the Kharian Officers Club, I saw nothing wrong with it and gave the permission.
Quite a few officers and their wives attended the party, one or two officers got drunk but there was no misbehaviour. A few days later I learnt that an Army Service Corps officer who had himself been drinking and enjoying the party had sent a written report that I had allowed a party where officers had danced and drinks were served. I suppose I got another black mark wherever they were recorded.
My annual confidential report written by Major General Wajahat Hussain was very well written saying that I was a very good officer and could handle an armoured division etc but when it came for recommendation for promotion it was ‘not yet’.
I went on a few days leave in February to Abbottabad to meet my mother who was staying with my brother Lieutenant Colonel Firoz Alam. I went to Rawalpindi and I and my brother drove to Abbottabad in my car, on the way my brother named an officer in the Military Secretary’s Branch and said he had told him that I was to be retired from service shortly. I came back to Kharian and told the GOC what I had heard and he was non-committal. I was then told to run the oflicers training programme and the whole of March went in that. On the 31st of March, at about 1200 hrs I finished the officers training, went to my office and found a sealed envelope addressed to me by name, lying on my table. I opened the envelope, it contained my retirement order retired compulsorily due to the fault of the officer’ and was to be ‘struck off duty from 15 April.
I completed all the formalities of leaving the army, submitting photographs, filling forms, handing over charge, attended the farewell parties, gave away all my uniforms, manuals and the many other things that I would not require any more and left Kharian for Murree where I planned to stay for a few months with my mother. 1 had about six months leave pending retirement to decide what to do next.
From Murree on 1 May 1974, the day before my 45th birthday, 1 submitted a ‘Representation Amounting To Statutory Complaint’ to the Secretary of Defence, addressed to the President of Pakistan, asking for examination of my retirement from service on grounds of ‘fault of officer’. I received a letter dated 2 August 1974, informing me that my petition had been withheld and not submitted to the President. That is the end of the story.
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Chapter 14.
When Pakistan was less than two years old we joined the army, some of us because we had decided to be professional soldiers while for the most, after failing to get admission in the few engineering and medical colleges, it was one of the very few job openings at that time. After being commissioned we were prepared to serve the country at the cost of lives, for some a commission as an officer in the army was a job like any other profession, for others it was a trust given by the country to defend it and look after the men placed under command, not to waste their lives but if, where and when necessary to let them die, some did a job and some fulfilled the trust.
Just when we started our service, the terms of service of armed forces officers were radically changed. Compulsory retirement without assigning a reason was introduced and the right to ask for a trial, if an allegation affected the character of an officer, was withdrawn. These measures were presumably taken to discourage officers from trying to overthrow civilian governments but they did not prevent the three successful coups that have taken place and only resulted in shifting loyalty from the country to the superior officers. The power to recommend administrative action to the extent of retirement without giving a reason has given senior officers extraordinary powers and left the subordinates with no way of defending themselves. In an environment where senior officers after making mistakes shift responsibility and are not truthful, a revision of the existing rules to the extent of giving officers, against whom charges are levelled, option for a summary award or a trial and a hearing of both sides by a committee in cases where administrative action is contemplated, will prevent the misuse of power and regulations.
The promotion system, so I am told, has been improved with a requirement of command experience of a specified period in each rank. The training of lieutenant colonels and above, including lieutenant generals, in addition to the present training, should be to anticipate problems and to solve unexpected problems. A system should be evolved to detect officers who are likely to quit under stress or danger.
Like the officers, the men I served with and had the honour to command, came to the army to earn their livelihood; dying for the country was far from their minds. With tight discipline and good officers they performed satisfactorily but lacked initiative because of too. much man management’, spoon feeding and over supervision. Man managed’, spoon fed and over supervised in peace, in the loose atmosphere of the battlefield, the soldier, the NCO and the JCO misses the absence of his officer, his company commander, his commanding officer, the brigade commander and the general, who told him where to dig his trench and site his weapon, he wonders if they have run away. As the tank troop command has been given to officers, the infantry platoon command should also be given to officers or specially trained JCOs and posted on an Army basis so that the link of rank service is broken to enable them to enforce discipline. The JCO system of command in fighting units was effective as long as the platoons and companies were organised on ‘class’ basis of men from the same area and not with a mixed ‘class’ system.
The army must learn to shoot, not for the annual classification and the Pakistan Army Rifle Association, but field firing under simulated battle conditions, ‘without fear, without pity, without remorse’ as we were taught as cadets and second lieutenants. Tactics, I was told, “is fire and movement”, battles are won by killing the enemy to overcome his resistance, manoeuvres are to position troops in the most advantageous killing position, the personnel must understand that they are there to fight the enemy and kill him with their weapons and not to out manoeuvre him like the condottiere mercenaries. How this should be done, with the high cost of training troops, is a problem. Many age-worn methods and techniques should be revised. That is the way it was. Having said what I wanted to say and delivered the homilies, I would like to say that I served my country to the best of my ability, I served the officers and the men that I commanded without any reservations and respected those superiors who earned respect. I salute those who gave their lives carrying out my orders.
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