Introduction
The complex relationship between Islam and political power in the South Asian context (Taylor, 1983) is manifested in the diverse conceptions of an Islamic state (Ahmed, 1987) that highlight the diverse, often conflicting interpretations of Islam, as an ideological basis for a nation state. Further, the foundational basis of the creation of Pakistan as a state based on Islamic ways of life has led to the formulation of “cogent formulae” of an Islamic state. (Ahmed, 1987)
While Asad, Perwez and Javed Iqbal conceive of a state that harmonises “divine laws” and “modern values”, S M Zafar and Muhammad Usman formulate a “pragmatic Muslim state” which adapts to changes in contemporary society. (Ahmed, 1987:201)
Faruki (1987) posits a historical understanding of the problem of conceiving Islam as a basis for nationhood in the context of Pakistan. He points out the “recurring oscillation between a virtually secular policy and an assertion of Islam as the proper basis for the state” (Faruki, 1987: 53) during the Muslim rule in India. Ahmed (1987) locates the need for the use of Islam as an instrument of legitimation by political dispensations in Pakistan in the post-colonial context of nation states in Asia facing a crisis of legitimation as the “constitutional and legal system inherited from the past is identified with the former foreign or domestic exploiter.”(Ahmed, 1987:176)
This paper attempts to examine the engagement of successive dispensations, both democratically elected governments and military dictators, in Pakistan with the concept of an Islamic state to analyse the socio-political and economic conditions that influenced the ideological interpretations of Islam as an instrument for gaining political legitimacy. This paper attempts to explore the complex, often contradictory, ideological interpretations of Islam that inform the agenda of successive dispensations in Pakistan. The analysis of the state intervention in defining an Islamic way of life in Pakistan, especially by military dictators, needs to move beyond a simplistic expediency argument of Islam being used as an instrument to construct a legitimating discourse for an authoritarian regime to explore the complex ways in which socio-political and economic conditions facilitate the imposition of certain conceptions of Islam, which in turn influence the polity.
Origins of the conflict
The conflicting conceptions of a national identity based on Islam in Pakistan between the traditionalists and the modernists can be traced back historically to the distinct ideas of Islamic identity propagated by the Aligarh movement and the Deobandi school of thought. ( Faruki, 1987:34) However, the use of a traditional versus modernist paradigm in examining the role of Islam in the polity of Pakistan should not obscure the fact that the governing elite, including the drafters of the Constitution, did emphasize the significance of Islam in public life within theframework of a democratic polity.(Shaikh, 2009) The Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, which subsequently served as a Preamble to the successive Constitutions, recognises the “sovereignty of the Almighty God over the entire universe” and temporal sovereignty as a “sacred trust within the limits prescribed by God’s law”. The Resolution also included the obligation of the state to “enable Muslims to order their lives in accord with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna.” ( Shaikh, 2009:85)
The conflict between divergent ideologies of Islam in the conception of the nation state can be traced back to the Pakistan movement. Though the Muslim League enjoyed the support of the ulama, they had a subordinate role in the movement. (Taylor, 1985:189) During the movement, several ulama criticised Jinnah and claimed that “the League’s Pakistan would never be a truly Islamic state”. (Taylor, 1985:189)
Liaquat Ali Khan
Following the death of Jinnah in 1948, his successor Liaquat Ali Khan had to negotiate with the question of the identity of Pakistan as an Islamic state. (Taylor, 1985:190) Liaquat Ali Khan’s negotiation with the role of Islam in the constitutional framework of Pakistan demonstrates an attempt to counter the traditionalist discourse of Islam propagated by the Jama’at-i-Islami and the ulama with a discourse of Islam as a tolerant faith. (Shaikh, 2009: 85) Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of Jama’at-i-Islami, propagated the revival of an ideal Islamic state which would actively enforce the Shariah and would not recognize the division between the public and the private.(Ahmed, 1987: 113)
Liaquat Ali Khan’s attempts to resist the drive for overt Islamisation through a reasoned interpretation of Islam highlights the possibility of accommodating minority interests in a multireligious society even while the state actively engages in a project of “building up a truly Islamic society”(Shaikh, 2009). The manner in which Liaquat Ali Khan positions himself with respect to the role of Islam in the nation state provides a stark contrast to the subsequent overt Islamisation drive of military dictator Zia-ul-Haq. Khan’s model of a tolerant Islamic state approximates Javed Iqbal’s conception of an Islamic state where the divine law provides the public law but the non-Muslims enjoy civil rights and are guided by their religious laws in personal matters.(Ahmed, 1987:145)
Ayub Khan
The era of military dictator Ayub Khan can be seen as much as an attempt to implement a modernist interpretation of Islam informed by the ideological underpinnings of the Aligarh tradition (Shaikh, 2009: 89) as to invest the state with the power to define a rationalist conception of Islam, and thereby to weaken the hold of the ulama on the polity.
However, a conception of Ayub’s agenda of reforming Islamic socio-cultural and religious practices as a secularising agenda must also take into consideration the concerted efforts of the state to wrest power from the religious establishment in the public sphere. Taylor (1983) highlights how Ayub provided for a council of scholars to interpret if legislations were in line with Islam. The government retained the power of appointment to the council. (Taylor, 1983:192) Also, Ayub’s apparently ‘secularising’ agenda needs to be read in conjunction with his attempts to mobilise the support of rural Sufi saints(pirs) and guardians of local shrines when faced with opposition from ulamas. (Shaikh, 2009:91) This demonstrates an attempt to seek legitimation for an apparently secular agenda within a discourse of Islam.
Ayub’s landmark attempt to reform Muslim personal law through the enactment of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance in 1961 can be read as an attempt to consolidate the control of the state over the private, domestic realm through an instrumental use of Islam. In fact, an insightful analysis of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 by Pearl and Menski (1998) illustrates how the provisions of Section 7 of the ordinance merely makes procedural provisions which the “parties may use if desired, but non-compliance has few consequences in social reality.”(Pearl and Menski, 1998:336) Also, this section by laying out an elaborate bureaucratic framework (Pearl and Menski, 1998) demonstrates an organised and yet merely procedural, administrative approach by the state to conceptualise Islamic identity in a rationalist manner which contributes to the power of the state but does not in effect have a far-reaching impact in reformulating Islam in the public sphere.
Ayub’s project of modernising Islam in the public sphere is problematised further by his attempt to appeal to Islamic solidarity in the face of growing demands of regional autonomy from East Pakistan. (Talbot, 1998) Ayub’s formulation of a rational Islam was only used as a tool to forge a superficial national identity when his regime faced the challenge of regionalism which exacerbated the sense of Bengali grievances. (Talbot, 1998)
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
The emergence of Pakistan People’s Party under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during the 1960s and the consequent attempts by Bhutto to conflate a secular scientific Fabian socialism with a conception of Islam as a form of social justice (Hussain, 1996) is an instance of a complex engagement with the notion of an Islamic way of life in the public sphere as well as an attempt to counter an ulama defined understanding of Islam. Khalifa Abdul Hakim had defined the Islamic state as an organized form of social justice informed by the spirit of equity which constitutes the broad principles of Islam. (Ahmed, 1987) During the 1970 elections, Bhutto propagated the message of Islamic socialism as a remedy to the evils of capitalism and feudalism. (Hussain, 1996)
However, in tracing the trajectory of Bhutto’s negotiation with the role of Islam in the polity, one can discern a gradual shift from a notion of the broader principles of Islam to a politically expedient use of Islam to placate the grievances of the ulamas and Islamists. Following the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the issue of what constituted the national identity of Pakistan gained enormous significance for the political class ( Hussain, 1996:52). A national identity crisis exacerbated a renewed emphasis on the need for Islamisation. For instance, Maulana Maududi of the Jama’at-i-Islami linked the secession of East Pakistan to un-Islamic leaders who had given rise to the evils of sub-nationalism. (Hussain, 1996:52) Bhutto’s response to the challenge presented to his dispensation by the Islamist opposition was to create a legitimating discourse of Islam for his regime. (Shaikh, 2009) As Shaikh observes, “The strategy was the clearest demonstration yet of Bhutto’s part in consolidating a time-honoured tradition among Pakistan’s political leaders to call on Islam to meet the Islamist challenge.” (Shaikh, 2009:96) Bhutto’s attempts to forge links with the Muslim heartland of the Middle-East (Faruki, 1987) culminating in his hosting of the Islamic summit in Lahore in 1974 (Faruki, 1987) highlight his efforts to project himself as aspiring towards a position of prominence in the Muslim world. Bhutto’s manipulation of a discourse of Islam to forge links with the Muslim world yielded concrete material benefits for Pakistan in the form of increased economic aid, grants, loans, oil at concessionary prices, and investments. (Hussain, 1996)
Bhutto’s paradoxical position with respect to the conception of Islam is discernible in a gradual shift from an egalitarian vision of an Islamic society based on social justice and equity to a more traditionalist conception of an Islamic state which does not adequately address the interests of ethnic, religious minorities. The 1973 Constitution promulgated by Bhutto recognized Pakistan as the state religion of Islam and established a Council of Islamic Ideology to advise the national and provincial governments. (Talbot, 1988) Bhutto declared the Ahmadis as non-Muslims through a Constitutional amendment in 1974. (Shaikh, 2009:97)
Bhutto’s attempts at projecting a state-defined conception of Islam and his superficial attempts at making concessions to the demands of the Islamists only strengthened the Islamist opposition to his government.(Faruki, 1987) As Faruki observes, “In fact, each of the regime’s new concessions to opposition demands on Islamic matters strengthened the opposition’s conviction that the government was in retreat and charging it with being un-Islamic was their strongest weapon.” (Faruki, 1987:58)
Zia ul Haq
While the discourse of Islam and its relationship to the state has influenced policy formulations in successive military and democratically elected regimes, the regime of military dictator Zia ul Haq who dismissed the Bhutto government in 1977 witnessed a concerted endeavour to implement an all-encompassing agenda of Islamisation in the religious, legal, economic realms (Shaikh, 2009).While Bhutto’s superficial Islamic measures were ‘reactive’ in nature and undertaken to cater to the interests of specific interest groups (Hasan, 1985), Zia attempted a complete restructuring of socio-cultural and religious institutions in keeping with a certain paradigm of an Islamic state. (Hasan, 1985)The Islamisation programme of Zia has often been cited as an instance of the instrumentalist use of Islam to gain legitimacy for a military dictatorship (Shaikh, 2009). However, it is also important to analyse how Zia positioned his Islamisation programme with respect to sociological factors that generated support for Islamisation. (Hasan, 1985)
Hasan (1985) highlights the sociological factors that contributed to popular disillusionment with previous democratic and military regimes. These include economic and social insecurity experienced by a large segment of urban workers and their families (Hasan, 1985:277), erosion of traditional bases of authority and feudal patron client relationship with increasing urbanisation (Hasan, 1985:278) and the failure of oppressive and corrupt authoritarian regimes to solve problems of poverty and unemployment. (Hasan, 1985: 278)
Zia’s use of Islam as a legitimate basis for the reconstitution of the state involved a manipulation of this brewing discontent against corrupt, democratic regimes and a co-optation of the Islamists into his authoritarian dispensation. In a political climate of disenchantment towards secular, democratic regimes, Zia attempted to formulate policy in a way so as to project Islam as the raison d’etre of Pakistan.
After forcing Bhutto to give up power, Zia declared that Pakistan would “continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam.” (Shaikh, 2009:98) Zia also appointed several prominent leaders and scholars in the Islam pasand parties of the Pakistan Nationalist Alliance (PNA) to join his administration as advisers.(Hussain, 1996) The manner in which Zia positions his regime with respect to the conception of the role of Islam in the polity provides a contrast to both the feeble Islamisation attempts of Bhutto and Ayub’s concerted attempts to implement a state-defined conception of Islam in opposition to the ulamas. Zia’s Islamisation drive involves a co-optation of the ulamas to consolidate an authoritarian regime with religious support. This is in contrast to Bhutto’s gradual concessions to placate religious leaders as well as Ayub’s attempts to posit a rationalist, scientific understanding of Islam in opposition to the ulama-defined notion of Islam.
Notwithstanding attempts at co-opting the ulama, Zia’s Islamisation drive remained a powerful state-led programme which worked towards consolidating the role of the state as a custodian of Islam. Thus, the initial policy of co-optation of Islamists gave way to active hostility towards political parties leading to the banning of all political parties, including the Jama’at-i-Islami and the indefinite postponement of the 1979 elections. (Hussain, 1996:61) The ideological orientation of Zia’s Islamisation programme approximates Maulana Maududi’s conception of an Islamic state. (Ahmed, 1987) Maududi conceives of a state based on the tenets of “fundamental Islamic message from the Quran, the Sunna and other authoritative sources”.(Ahmed, 1987:111) Maududi called for a strict application of the sharia as an all-embracing divine law with little scope for innovate law-making. (Ahmed, 1987:113) He proposed political parties which would be merely nominating bodies with no right to oppose government policies. (Ahmed, 1987:114)
Zia’s Islamisation programme involved an organised attempt to secure ideological support for an Islamic way of life among the people. The extent to which his policy formulations sought to interpellate the citizens in an Islamic ideology is evident from his attempts to influence the educational system of the country. The government established “numerous cells, committees, commissions, university departments… to study, plan or implement the Islamic transformation of society.” (Hussain, 1996:63)
The systematic attempt to transform the legal system of Pakistan during Zia’s regime was in keeping with the overall attempt to order society in accordance with the provisions of the Quran and the Sunna and eventually establish the rule of the Sharia. Kennedy (1990) categorizes the legal reforms during the Zia regime as structural reforms, procedural reforms and criminal law reforms. In 1978, there were four Shariat apellate benches established in the High Courts which were then disbanded and replaced by a single Federal Shariat Court in 1980.(Kennedy, 1990:64) The jurisdiction of the FSC included shariat petitions and appeals against hudood convictions. However, even in the structuring and institution of the Federal Shariat Court, one can discern Zia’s attempt to invest the state with the authority to define an Islamic identity and contribute in effect towards a consolidation of power. Thus, all the eight judges of the Federal Shariat Court were appointed by the President and selected mostly from the judges of the High Court.
( Kennedy, 1990:64) In the realm of criminal law, the promulgation of hudood ordinances on the Prophet’s birthday constituted a potent symoblic gesture affirming the significance of Islam in the legal system as offenses related to theft, adultery, false accusation of adultery, extramarital sex (zina) including rape were to be covered by Islamic criminal law (Faruki, 1987) These offences were hitherto governed by the secular Pakistan Penal Code. (Lau, 2007) Zia’s Islamisation programme, especially the Zina ordinance and the Law of Evidence had an adverse impact on women’s rights and reduced their stature in society. (Shafqat, 1996)
The failure of capitalism during the era of Ayub Khan and Islamic socialism under the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government (Hussain, 1996) facilitated the formulation of economic policy based on an Islamic way of life. Zia’s enactment of the zakat and ushr ordinance whereby religious taxes were to be collected from Muslims was projected as a welfare measure meant to create an egalitarian Islamic society. (Hussain, 1996:64) Also, the attempts to introduce interest free banking in Pakistan was based on the aversion towards riba in Islam. (Hussain, 1996:66)
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
The extent to which Zia’s Islamisation agenda contributed towards the strengthening of a “religiously charged polity” is borne out by the subsequent resistance to the “secular politics” of Benazir Bhutto. (Talbot, 2005:294) The rise of Benazir Bhutto to a position of prominence in Pakistan was greatly facilitated by her support for the women’s movement which protested against the Islamisation drive during Zia’s regime. (Shafqat, 1996: 658) However, once in power Benazir was faced with opposition from religious groups and failed to amend the Zina ordinance. (Shafqat, 1996:658)
In contrast to Benazir Bhutto’s secular politics, the premiership of Nawaz Sharif witnessed a re-emergence of the Islamisation agenda. (Talbot, 1998:317) However, the Islamisation drive of Nawaz Sharif differs from the Islamisation agenda of Zia in its conception of Islam and in its socio-economic and political ramifications. Sharif’s Islamisation drive constituted a paradoxical enterprise in its encouragement towards economic liberalisation and its insistence on pushing through the Shariat Act. (Talbot, 1998:317) Sharif did not attempt to frame economic policy on the basis of a conception of Islam.
The enactment of the Shariat Act can be seen as a state-directed attempt to define an Islamic way of life. This is evinced by Sharif’s triumphant declaration following the passage of the Shariat Act that “the objective of the creation of Pakistan had been achieved.” (Talbot, 1998:318) However, the Bill failed to pacify the religious forces, especially the MQM and the JUI, as it did not amend the “constitutional provisions” limiting the scope of the Sharia courts’ jurisdiction. (Talbot, 1998:318)
Pervez Musharraf
The negotiation with a concept of Islam by military dictator Pervez Musharraf was complicated by his foreign policy aimed at rebuilding the relationship with the United States and positioning Pakistan as a “frontline state in the global war against terror”. (Haqqani, 2005:262) The wrath of religious conservatives irked by Musharraf’s foreign policy was further intensified by his attempts at “enlightened moderation”.(Zia, 2009) Musharraf’s secular, modernist enterprise of “enlightened moderation” provides a stark contrast to Zia’s Islamisation agenda. (Zia, 2009) However, the widespread resistance to Musharraf’s secularisation drive and the consequent concessions that he makes to religious conservative demands considerably alters his reformist agenda. The trajectory of Musharraf’s reform highlights the fact that he is compelled to operate within the overarching framework of an Islamic state despite his avowed pro-women, secular agenda. The Protection of Women Act 2006 promulgated during Musharraf’s regime thus reforms the Zina ordinance but is not able to repeal it completely in the face of opposition from Islamist women activists.(Zia, 2009)
Conclusion
The construction of a legitimating discourse of Islam by the rulers of Pakistan is informed by their conceptions of Islam. While there is a concerted endeavour, especially by military dictators Ayub Khan and Zia ul Haq, to consolidate the authority of the state as a custodian of Islam, the means employed by them as well their respective conceptions of an Islamic state are remarkably different. The contrasting methods of bureacratic control over religion and co-optation of religious conservatives employed by Ayub and Zia respectively, are informed by their divergent conceptions of Islamic ideology. Also, the formulation and implementation of a vision of Islam by the rulers of Pakistan is constantly shaped through a dynamic interaction with socio-economic and political conditions. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s agenda of Islamic socialism gradually gives way to a traditionalist conception of Islam to placate religious conservatives. Zia’s policy of co-optation of the ulama is replaced by active hostility towards political parties of all hues. The expedient use of Islam for consolidating a position of power, however, cannot be seen merely as an instrumentalist use of religion for personal aggrandisement as it involves a complex mobilisation of existing economic, political conditions which further problematises the relationship of the nation state with religion. Therefore, even an avowedly secular agenda of modernisation propagated by Musharraf cannot completely extricate itself from an overarching paradigm of Islam.
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