Jill Suzanne Kornetsky

HS210: Coexistence and Conflict – Theories and Analysis

Conflict Analysis: Pakistan

Introduction to Pakistan

          Pakistan, or “Land of the Pure” in Urdu and ancient Persian,[1] is a country in South Asia roughly twice the size of California with shoreline on the Arabian Sea, lying to the northwest of India and to the east of Afghanistan and Iran; to the north lays a small portion of a border with China.  It is one of the oldest areas of civilization known, dating back 8,000 years to the Indus Valley civilizations, the first literate culture on the subcontinent[2].  “The semiarid environment of the Indus basin is home to more than a quarter of a billion people, with some of the lowest human-development indicators in the world.[3]” “The British Raj had drawn on these peoples for its armies and they retain strong martial tendencies.[4]”  Modern day Pakistan consists of what was known at the time of independence and separation from India (1947) as West Pakistan, a swath of land to the north and west of India, while former East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh in 1971[5].  “An understanding of the country’s history and peoples must underpin any successful effort to promote stability.  In contrast to India [at independence], Pakistan had no pre-existing national identity.  Its disparate components, including different ethnic groups (Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, and Baluchis, each with separate languages), and religious communities (including Shia and Sunni Muslims, the latter divided into Deobandis, Barelvis, and Sufis) had little reason to cooperate towards any goal of state- or nation-building.[6]”

A majority Muslim (95%) population in Pakistan numbers 174.5 million as of 2010, up from an estimated 126 million in 1991 with 36.7% of the population aged under 15 years as opposed to more than 50% in 1991, a reflection of increases in basic health statistics leading to greater longevity (life expectancy at birth was 63 in 2009), and reductions in birth rates due to greater family planning and access to contraception (usage now standing at about 30%[7]).  What Pakistan lacks in religious diversity it more than makes up for in ethnic and linguistic diversity.  Major ethnic groups include 45% Punjabi, 15% Pashtun, 14% Sindhi, 8% Siraiki, 8% Mujahir, 4% Balochi[8] and the remainder comprised of tribal Hazara, Kalash, Burusho, Brahui, Khowar, Shina, Turwali, Sheedi, Tajiks, Balti, Hindkowans and Kashmiri[9]. Most of these groups are also associated with the Indo-European languages that they speak, written in Perso-Arabic script, including Punjabi (and its many dialects), Sindhi, Siraiki, Pashtu, Urdu, Balochi, Hindko, Brahui, Burushaki and others[10].  The national language spoken by only 8% of the population is Urdu, with a de facto national language of English (spoken by 50%) for greater access of the population to higher education in Britain, the US, and Australia.  Punjabi is spoken by nearly 50% of the population, as it is an ancient language native to the territory; however the variations in local linguistics mean that residents of areas within Pakistan, particularly in rural, agrarian communities not prone to frequent the major population centers often cannot understand one another[11].  In addition, “with 60% of the population, Pakistan’s Punjab province has a disproportionate share of the country’s wealth, dominates the armed forces, and is deeply unpopular among residents of the other regions.[12]”

Pakistan is divided into a federation of four political provinces: Punjab, Singh, Balochistan, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP or North-West Frontier Province); also part of the nation is FATA or the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Islamabad Capital Territory, and the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region.  Each of these areas is distinct, facing different but interrelated challenges from militants, government, external actors, and even the land itself; each territory will remain an essential part of the complex Pakistani societal fabric, and potential sources of unrest.  “In 1989, attention turned to Kashmir, where local separatists received increased support from the ISI and engaged in both proxy and actual hostilities with India.  Musharraf and the ISI continued to support ‘freedom fighters’, regarded by the West as terrorists, calculating that they could serve as paramilitary reservists in the event of hostilities with India.[13]”  “Harsh geography, poor education, and scare infrastructure have tended to drive a wedge between Pakistan’s tribal belt and the rest of the nation.  With an estimated population of 3.5M people, the FATA is roughly the size of the state of Maryland and shares a nearly 300-mile border with Afghanistan.  The FATA is the poorest, least developed part of Pakistan.  Literacy is only 17%, compared to the national average of 40%.  Per capital income is roughly $250, half of the national average of $500.  The FATA’s rough terrain serves to isolate tribal communities from markets, health care, education services, and other outside influence.[14]”  “The Baloch country is strategically situated at the tri-junction of South Asia, South West Asia, and Central Asia… shares a 1173km border with the Iranian province of Baluchistan (Sistan-Baluchistan) and shares an 832km border with Afghanistan… has an almost 1000km long strategic coastline which extends nearly to the northern shores of the strategically important Straits of Hormutz… Baluchistan will be the future passageway to the emerging energy-hungry India, China, and Asian Pacific markets… neighboring Iran has enhanced the importance for the U.S.  Its vast border with Afghanistan makes Baluchistan a key player in the “War on Terrorism”.[15]”

Politically, Pakistan has gone through several major transitions; since independence in 1947, there have been alternating periods of democratic and military rule.  Since 2008, the semi-presidential government of Pakistan has been led by President Asif Ali Zardari, who is in the process of transitioning his nation to parliamentary democracy, officially turning his own office into a ceremonial head of state with the parliament under the leadership of the Prime Minister retaining “authoritarian and executive powers.”  The transition to democracy has been difficult, especially since the late 1980’s when power changed hands multiple times due to allegations of corruption forcing leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif alternatively into office and exile multiple times, followed by a period of military rule.[16] “Civilian leaders must ensure that political infighting does not hamper consolidation of the democratic process and institutions… if the politicians fail to focus on effective governance of the country, the Army could decide to intervene once again, especially if extremists are threatening the integrity of the state.  In the past, democratic civilian rule in Pakistan has largely failed to advance stability and security in the country.[17]”  It is unclear, however, whether proposed evolution of the government will result in actual democratic governance for the country, given the power of the individuals and political parties involved.  It is anyone’s guess how the government in Pakistan will eventually be run, a factor which could have far-reaching effects on the lives of its citizens. “For now, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani has stated that he will keep the Army out of politics.[18]” Despite the uncertainty of leadership at the highest levels, over 40 Ministries[19] continue to work on essential issues of development, education, economic growth, health and more.

With regard to the internal dimension, three areas of conflict remain at the forefront. Pakistan has a problem with insurgencies and militant fundamentalists invading territories adjacent to Afghanistan.  This spillover from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda battles with the United States counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts within the region has meant territorial takeovers within Pakistan as well.  Despite Pakistani allegiance with the “War on Terror,” influx of both militant and refugees into Pakistani territory is ongoing, placing stresses on local ethnic coexistence as well as infrastructure and resources.  The UNHCR[20] is intervening in these areas in an attempt to defray the human costs of this influx on the local people.  A separate, ongoing battle over control for the Kashmiri territory has resulted in three wars with India as well as daily and ongoing conflicts in the region.  For their part, local Kashmiris would like to establish their own state, free from either Pakistani or Indian rule.  Because the local people have so salient military power, their desire of independence for Kashmir is overshadowed by the ongoing battle between two nuclear powers for control of the region, a mountainous pass that permits transit between the Pakistani and Indian high altitude regions.  Finally, a more pervasive but generally less newsworthy (to the international community) source of conflict is the ethnic diversity of Pakistan and it’s rather rigid divisions into regions[21]. Each of these conflicts has their own set of complexities, historical context, interacting parties, and goals.  As such, while these aforementioned conflicts (FATA/NWFP insurgency, ethnic tensions, and Kashmir) have separate negative effects on coexistence within Pakistan, they also require interrelated analysis and attempts at resolution due to the networking capacity of militant groups in Central Asia.

Pakistan is regarded by many as one of the more unstable countries on earth.  “It’s hard to remember a time when Pakistan didn’t seem on the brink of collapse. This coming year will likely be no exception. The country faces a humanitarian crisis in its mid-section where floods displaced 10 million people, a security threat from terrorist groups operating on Pakistani soil, and political instability from a weak administration still trying to wield civilian control over the all-powerful military.[22]”  Exacerbating the range of problems facing the stabilization and potential for coexistence in Pakistan are the massive and destructive flooding that stuck the country in the summer and fall of 2010. During the 2010 monsoon season, Pakistan has experienced “the worst floods in its history… a moving body of water equal in dimension to the land mass of the United Kingdom [has affected] more than 20 million people – one tenth of Pakistan’s population.[23]”    Given the convergence of the human, geographic, economic, ethnic and military factors converging within one nation, many analysts argue that Pakistan is a failing or a failed state: “we define a “failed state” as a condition of “state collapse” – eg, a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence. This term is used in very contradictory ways in the policy community (for instance, there is a tendency to label a “poorly performing” state as “failed” – a tendency we reject). The opposite of a “failed state” is an “enduring state” and the absolute dividing line between these two conditions is difficult to ascertain at the margins. Even in a failed state, some elements of the state, such as local state organizations, might continue to exist[24].”  The debate of Pakistan’s status as a failed state is an ongoing one without any obvious conclusion: there is much lacking in capacity for development, security, and governmental will yet there is a vibrant and active civil society at work in Pakistan, particularly among the middle class.  Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index ranks Pakistan at #10.[25]   By the CSRC definition, Pakistan in certainly a fragile state and possibly a crisis state, particularly with the intersection of longstanding tensions and underdevelopment with the effects the ‘war on terror’ has on the nation as a whole. Instability nationally has the potential to create greater levels of anarchy and conflict in neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan and Iran.  This instability is of great international concern as Pakistan has nuclear capability, and should internal governmental structure and controls breakdown, these nuclear powers could potentially end up in the hand of whichever group assumes power, despite efforts to secure the nuclear arsenal.

This paper will present and discuss the conflict actors, profile, causes, and dynamics, and attempt to gauge the current and near-future situation in Pakistan in line with the guidelines for analysis as presented in the International Alert Conflict Analysis document.  Given the breadth of the conflict situation, it would be nearly impossible to extricate the situation in any one region within Pakistan from that of the country at large; while military forces, militias and political groups ally themselves with a particular region based on tribal affiliation and ethnic unity (rather than national unity), the complex web of relationships among and between the groups make them active, or potentially active, in nearly any province or territory.  Affiliations and designations for these groups are nebulous and change frequently; political parties not in power attempt to influence national politics by working with militias, tribal militias operate autonomously within their areas but often act in coalitions or subsume their authority (voluntarily for monetary or ideological purposes, or involuntarily) to groups like the Pakistani Taliban, a porous and ill-defined border with Afghanistan fails to separate the Pashtun population and allow movement and sanctuary for fundamentalist insurgents, ethnic Baloch tribes share culture and history with Iranian Baloch tribes while resisting the central government of Pakistan… even the military establishment (army, intelligence) cannot be seen as monolithic or having a single purpose while fighting the Pakistani Taliban and foreign militants, but supporting or at least overlooking  the Afghan Taliban.  Pakistan is an enormously complex and diverse country with a conflict situation no less so.  This paper will attempt to organize the factors contributing to instability and insecurity to allow for a more coherent and thorough understanding of the conflict situation in Pakistan.

Actors

            All parties engaged in or being affected by conflict are the conflict’s actors.  Each will differ in their goals, interests, positions, capacity to realize goals and interest, and relationships to the other actors.  When analyzing conflict in Pakistan, it is important to note that there are a vast number of actors; individual leaders, political parties, religious organizations, insurgent and extremist groups, tribes and tribal armies or militias, urban and rural populations, neighboring countries and their own sets of actors, and the United States government and military.  In this section, each group of actors will be described, and a review of their interests and involvement in Pakistan will be presented.  This review will include factors essential to the understanding of the conflict profile, causes, and dynamics; each of these will be reviewed under the appropriate section in summary while the bulk of the details are presented here.

National Government

The political sphere in Pakistan is an active one, not only in terms of coups and exiles, but also in terms of parliamentary and legislative activism.  A LexisNexis search reveals hundreds of news stories have been published every year about reform in sectors such as education, health, harassment law, poverty reduction, good governance, economic reform and controls, and many others.  Despite these efforts, the general sense of government in Pakistan is one of inefficiency through corruption and infighting.  “Pakistan in its over six decade long history has indeed failed to evolve a coherent framework for efficient and honest governance. Most of the governance indicators for Pakistan paint a bleak picture of state of affairs. Various reports show that corruption remains pervasive, widespread and systematic and so is the unsatisfying state of other elements of good governance such as rule of law, regulatory quality, effectiveness, political stability and accountability and voice to people.[26]”  The Council on Foreign Relations[27] reports that as of April 2010 constitutional reforms limiting the power of the president and decentralizing power to increase socioeconomic equality and regional autonomy, effectively reversing the legacy of former President Musharraf, have been signed into law.    This 18^th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan is a big step forward in promoting democracy and good governance.  “Big challenges lie ahead for Pakistan’s politicians. Most importantly, the constitutional amendments need to be implemented. The four provinces need to develop significant capacity to take on additional powers. The federal parliament also needs to adopt electoral reforms to provide a credible and transparent framework for the next parliamentary elections, due in 2013. This is vital, since amendment of the electoral laws in line with international standards would not only enhance confidence in elections, but also reduce the potential for violence and instability[28]” Only time will tell if the government is truly transitioning towards democratic governance, or if developments within the legislature are merely measures for pacification of the electorate and stall tactics used to cover more egregious flaws with a patina of good governance.

            The current President of Pakistan is Asif Ali Zardari, a member of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).  He was elected in 2008 following calls (Zardari and others) for the impeachment of President Musharraf who had been in control for the previous eight years, and the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, who was a former Prime Minister and prime candidate for President killed in an attack by a suicide bomber and a gunman.  Zardari, current chairman of the PPP until his and Bhutto’s son Bilawal completes schooling at Oxford and assumes that role, is a Sindhi of Baloch origin from Sindh whose father was the leader of his Sindhi tribe, and a Shia Muslim[29].  While Zardari’s past is littered with allegations, imprisonment, and prosecutions for corruption, unsavory land deals, and murder, all of which he has been cleared for in Swiss and Pakistani courts, he has made some changes in government that underscore his sincerity to the democratic process by repealing constitutional amendments made by Musharraf to expand the powers of the President.

Musharraf set a precedent of working both with U.S./NATO forces as well as Afghani insurgent groups during his time as leader. “Musharraf made no secret of his distinction between al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters, whom he was prepared to kill, and the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani sympathizers, whom he was determined not to alienate for reasons of political expediency. [30]”  Given the history of regional insecurity, Zardari and the Pakistani military have followed the same pattern, seen as a means of ensuring allegiance with all potential neighboring leaders.  “Not only does Pakistan refuse to target some militant organizations, some are even backed by elements in the ISI, Frontier Corps, and Military.  This practice of supporting some proxy organizations and broader religious, political and financial networks has created an environment conducive to militancy and has undermined the ability of the government to maintain law and order.[31]”

            The memory of former president Musharraf is strong with Pakistan and the international community. The Pakistani public, the U.S. government, and international/multilateral groups all have residual gripes with his leadership and actions.  “Many Pakistanis hold former President Musharraf responsible for stoking militancy and extremism through actions designed to please American policymakers.[32]”  While the public blames the U.S. for the current insecurity and violence in Pakistan, lack of political and military will to engender change across all spectrums of society is a more salient reason. “Many of today’s problems are legacies of Musharraf’s years in power.  Most notable was his government’s willingness to allow extremism to fester in the tribal areas and elsewhere and his adherence to a strategic doctrine of Afghanistan that tolerated, if not assisted the Taliban.  He also failed to invest in building civilian political institutions and to reform the system so that it would function more effectively upon return to elected government.[33]”

 

Religious and Political Networks[34]

            Politics in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a dense quagmire of Islamic groups, democratic groups, tribal representatives, many of which retain ties to militias or groups who shift easily from politics to violence as a means of driving change within society.   Active in Pakistan is a Presidency as well as a Parliament and Prime Minister who ideally divide executive responsibility and power between them, though the stability and transparency of this system post-military rule is yet to be established.   Tied to individual leaders and their personal ideologies, these political parties must contend with the division of power between the military establishment and the elected government, shifting allegiances of individuals, groups, militias, and external factors such as foreign governments and multilateral organizations.  In terms of finding one leader or party to back as the future of a democratic Pakistan, this notion is illogical.  “The U.S. would be better served by focusing its diplomacy on shoring up democratic institutions rather than supporting particular personalities or political parties.  It should be prepared to work with any parties committed to participating in a peaceful democratic process and that oppose extremism and terrorism.[35]” There are multiple major political parties in Pakistan:

            The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP[36]) and Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians (PPPP), the associated electoral group was founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father and Zardari’s father-in-law; the party continues to be led in familial succession, from Zulfikar to Benazir to Zardari to Bilawal Zardari Bhutto.  It is the largest political party in Pakistan and one that has been active since the 1971 secession of Bangladesh, operating on democratic governance and socialist principles of “Roti, Kapra, Makan” or bread, clothes, and shelter.  The PPP forms the provincial government in Sindh and the opposition in Punjab, and was founded to bring more attention to the lower classes.  The late Benazir Bhutto moved the PPP towards the right; assumption of conservative, neoliberal economic policies was a necessary criteria in securing funding from the U.S. and the World Bank.  Currently President Asif Ali Zardari is the chairman of the PPP, while his son, Bilawal prepares to lead the party.  Prospects for democratic leadership through the PPP are strong, as Bilawal stated after his mother’s assassination “The party’s long struggle for democracy will continue with renewed vigor,” he said. “My mother always said, democracy is the best revenge.[37]”  Indeed Benazir Bhutto was likely killed for her liberal and socially just views and speeches.  “The bombing of the World Trade Towers killed people of all races, ethnicities and religions. It killed Muslims, Christians, Hindus and Jews who were working together building worldwide trade communication and cooperation. The biggest challenge before the countries of Asia, indeed the countries of the world is to overcome the forces of terrorism that spread hate, religious intolerance, conflict and bloodshed.  At this time of continuing crisis, the Asian people need to understand those who use violence in the name of Islam. They are not clerics. They are criminals.[38]”  It remains to be seen if her successors will follow the path she has laid out to a democratic and equitable Pakistan.  Zardari, in an article written for the Washington Post said of his late wife “she warned the world, in her speeches and her writings, in her last book and her very last words, that fanaticism is a threat to all people; that dictatorship had led to its spread within Pakistan; that my nation had to wake up; and that the world must take notice. She paid with her life for her prescience and her courage, and I have to answer to future generations and to my own children that she did not die in vain.[39]”

            The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) is divided into two groups based on agreement or not with the politics of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.  These two divisions, PML-N[40] (or PML Nawaz group) and PML-Q[41] (or PML Quaid-e-Azam group) are both conservative, centrist parties, divided by the alleged corruption and extrajudicial killings perpetrated by MQM (see below) allegedly under the direction of Nawaz that led to his arrest and exile.  PML-Q lost some political mass for supporting Musharraf in what was seen as American puppetry in the war on terror.  PML-N has lost mass for supporting extremist militant groups and through poor administration in Punjab province.  Both groups have come together to denounce the use of U.S. drones in the tribal areas of Pakistan, as they distinguish between those national militants who claim to be fighting for Pakistan such as TTP, insurgents looking for refuge and a new base of operations after being ejected from Afghanistan, and foreign fighters coming to join what they see as a holy war against non-Muslims.  Writing articulately in response to an article comparing the PPP and the PML-N, Natasha Raza said “Pakistan has been blamed by international community for supporting Taliban and extremists elements, despite numberless sacrifices in war on terror. We never tried to analyze critically, why we are blamed, why there is lack of interests?. Perhaps the sole reason is some pro-Taliban parties in Pakistan and their constant support to these elements which make Pakistan doubtful despite sincere efforts to curb extremism.  The only way to stop the world from labeling us as a citadel of terrorism is to improve our behavior. We have to distance ourselves from all such jihadi organisations that are considered as an asset by our major national political parties. The reliance on such non-state actors is because our few political parties are of the opinion that they could be outvoted without support of these parties, the recent example in Punjab. These political parties must understand that support to such banned extremist organizations damaging the national interests and national cause not only on national level but also at international level.[42]”

            Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM[43]), formerly the Muhajir Quami Movement, is the third largest political group in Pakistan, and the most liberal political party in Pakistan, with extensive influence in Sindh province.  The change ffrom Muhajir to Muttahida denotes a shift from recognizing the Urdu-speaking roots of the party to identifying itself as “united.”  “The MQM is one of few socially liberal political parties in Pakistan and organized the largest rallies in Pakistan in protest of the actions of al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 demonstrating sympathy with the victims of the terrorist attacks.”  The APMSO is the MQM’s student movement or All Pakistan Muhajir Student’s Organization, with socially just goals: “After a long struggle APMSO became very successful by protecting the rights of Muhajirs but there were lots of areas left where injustice was still on its peak some of these were rural areas of Balochistan, Punjab, N.W.F.P, Sindh and Kashmir. These areas hold the actual population of Pakistan and are the actual resource production units. People in these areas are not considered humans but are treated as animals. To provide a better environment of studies to those peoples A.P.M.S.O proudly converted into the “All Pakistan Muttahidda Students Organization” on 11’ June 2006. APMSO’, sole aim is to provide justice, and for this it has also established international communities which are spread all over the world.”  Despite this focus on the betterment of humanity, the tactics of the MQM, in their association with allegations of political killings, torture, journalist intimidation and violently enforced strikes in Karachi, are seen as perpetrators of violence.

            Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) is a clerical political alliance consisting of six or more religious parties.  A de-centrist party with political strength in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP or NWFP) and Balochistan, MMA is identified as “legally ultra-conservative and economically socialist.”  MMA consists of: Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) (Assembly of Islamic Clergy, Fazl-ur-Rahman Group), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-S) (Assembly of Islamic Clergy, Sami-ul-Haq Group) Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Assembly of Pakistani Clergy), Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, Jamiat Ahle Hadith and a few additional parties.  JUI has been cited as working with al-Qaeda in recruiting members through the network of madrassas, as well as encouraging Musharraf to strike (impotent) peace deals with the Taliban and other Deobandi groups.

Civil Society

          Despite its majority Muslim population, Pakistan is by no means a homogenous country; the preponderance of tribal affiliations, Islamic sects and subsects as well as other religious groups such as Christians and Hindis, provincial origin, languages and dialects makes civil society in Pakistan a complicated tapestry.  National unity has always been lacking, as individuals identify themselves by these characteristics and quite often use them to generate schisms between groups, an essential tool in fomenting violence.  “Fixing the terrorism problem in Pakistan will require empowering the public to hold its government accountable and building robust civilian – not military – policymaking institutions.[44]” There are a number of civil society groups working within Pakistan, and within the diaspora community, to eliminate the remaining sources of deprivation and marginalization within the country.  A quick internet search reveals well over 100 organizations and initiatives working through dialogue, art, theatre, peace education, alternative dispute resolution, confidence building measures, advocacy, and think-tanks[45].   Additionally, the Pakistani government is quite active both at the legislative level and within the many Ministries in the interests of generating positive change that will eliminate or address many of the underlying inequalities and secondary economies preventing Pakistan from becoming a more democratic society.  The 179 page Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has provisions for both secular judicial and Sharia laws – within these frameworks lie provisions to protect minority groups and women, prohibit exploitation and slavery, as well as “fundamental rights” protecting quality and freedoms in the pursuit of an egalitarian society[46].

            Unequal, inequitable distribution of wealth, resources, schools, and power combined with an overall state of underdevelopment contributes to national instability and frequent protests and local uprisings.  The capacity of the government of Pakistan to care for all members of its own society is limited by budgets, infrastructure, and biases against political, ethnic, and religious affiliation.  “It is sufficient to say that the police, the judiciary, basic utilities, education, agriculture and general managerial capacity are all in desperate need of reinforcement…  The emphasis on military operations and consequent lack of action to improve the well-being the Pakistani people fostered a popular belief among the body politic and civil society that Pakistani were fighting and suffering from ‘Washington’s War’.[47]”  Indeed, poverty seems to a major contributor to violence and insecurity in the Pashtun tribal areas; recent analyses of loyalties in the tribal areas indicate that allegiance to groups like TTP or al-Qaeda are overwhelmingly monetary.  “According to some observers, the Pashtuns in FATA supported Al Qaeda and other foreign militants and gave them sanctuary more for the lure of money than owing to ethnic or ideological affinity or sympathy with their cause.  According to a senior Pakistani government official, in the beginning, the support of local religious clerics (Mullahs) and militants to Al Qaeda was “not for jihad but revolved around economics and financial gains from foreign terrorists.”[48]”

The estimated 2010-2011 governmental budget for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan[49] is just under 2 Trillion Rs, or around $23B.  The percentage of a national budget that is spent on various services for the population can be seen as one measure of the importance a government places on those amenities. 22% of Pakistan’s budget is spent on defense in maintaining the seventh largest military force on earth; 0.33% is spent on Health, 1.5% on Education, and 0.02% on the Environment. Servicing of foreign debts, estimated at $52.12 billion at the end of 2009[50], requires 577B Rs or $6.7B towards repayment of foreign debts, every rupee of which remains inaccessible to civil society within Pakistan.  GDP per capita in Pakistan is estimated at $2400, however concentration of that wealth among the elites and urban population leaves many to live in extreme poverty.  “Large numbers of Pakistanis are disillusioned with the new government’s inability to address a wide array of pressing domestic problems, including rising inflation and food shortages.[51]” Pakistan, considered a Low Income country, falls at number 125/169 on the UN’s Human Development Index (Value of .490), and at 145/169 for unemployment (14% in 2009).   Estimates place 24% of its population living below the poverty line, 31-38% of children under 5 moderately to severely underweight, and 42% of children under 5 moderately to severely stunted in growth;[52] in 2005 22.6% of the population was living on less than $1 per day, and in 2006 23% of the population was consuming less than the minimum level of dietary energy consumption[53], “in 1992 some 35 million Pakistanis, or about 30 percent of the population, were unable to afford nutritionally adequate food or to afford any nonfood items at all .[54]”  Poverty will continue to be a major barrier not only to ensuring security and democracy in Pakistan, but also a barrier to national achievement of a minimum standard of living, and it will likely continue that those living far from Islamabad, Peshawar and other urban centers suffer the greatest degree of inequality.

The WHO Health Profile (2008) for Pakistan indicates significant disparities in the facilities relating to, and outcomes in health between urban and rural populations.  Where listed, the comparisons between the wealthiest 20% of the population and the poorest 20% are even more disparate.  These inequities are an indication of the level of deprivation and marginalization rife in Pakistani society.  Sanitation facilities were available to approximately 75% of the urban population in 2008 and have been since 1990, according to this document, while only about 30% of rural individuals have the same facilities; this represents an improvement since 1990, when less than 10% of the rural population had improved sanitation.  Health services utilization shows greater inequities, with 30% of rural birth being attended as compared to 60% in urban settings; 77% of wealthy births were attended compared to only 16% of the poorest mothers indicating a likely correlation with the availability of healthcare provisions for the poor.  Measles immunization showed a similar pattern with 56%/69%, rural/urban, compared to 36%/76%, poorest/richest quintile.  Child mortality for the poor was more than double that of the wealthy, with under-5 mortality at 121 versus 60 in 2008.

In a report from the National Institute of Population Studies (NIPS), “Pakistan: Demographic and Health Survey 2006-2007,” a lack of health education, and education for women in general, seems to be an underlying factor for many health disparities[55].  One measure of this lack of education is in the adult literacy rate.  In 2005, the literacy rate for Pakistan was 49.9%, with 63% of males and 36% of females over the age of 15 being literate[56].  Nearly 50% of the rural population has never been to school compared with 26% in urban settings, while 70% of the poorest quintile and 16% of the highest wealth quintile have no education.  In particular, only 4 out of 10 women have a basic knowledge about HIV and how it is contracted, only 55% of women use exclusive breastfeeding in the first six months after birth (with a high percentage of mothers feeding infants under two months water (13%), non-breast milk (43%), sugar or honey water (25%), ghee (10%) and green tea (17%) and other substitutes contraindicated by the recommendation of exclusive breastfeeding),  34% of mothers reduce fluids to a child with diarrhea which puts those children at risk of serious complications or death, and nationally only 6% of households have a mosquito net, a factor which contributes to the high malaria rates within the country.  Each of these barriers to health can be addressed with an education campaign that would ultimately save lives[57].

Additional factors related to the overall health status in Pakistan are relative to the political economic analysis of health and development, which “considers the political, social, cultural, and economic contexts in which disease and illness arise… the ways in which the societal structures (i.e. political and economic practices and institutions, and class interrelations) interact with the particular conditions that lead to good or ill health…[as] health problems can only be addressed beyond the behavioral or medical levels, through improved working conditions, social policies, and political mobilization.[58]”  As one of the lowest income countries on earth (173/177 in GDP per capita[59]), with ongoing gender inequality, child labor, hazardous working and living conditions, inadequate investments in health and education, human trafficking, famine conditions, environmental impacts including a 2005 earthquake and the 2010 emergency-level flooding, a refugee population resulting from the current ‘war on terror’ as well as leftover refugee populations from the Soviet-Afghani War, as well as large proportions of annual federal budgets dedicated for payments to service national debt, Pakistan is in a poor position to improve its various indexes of health and development.

Historically resources in Pakistan are seen as scarce; it is not surprising that the religious and cultural minorities in the country would be ostracized and denied access to the same national services that the higher classes and more powerful ethnicities enjoy.  This marginalization is exacerbated by religious extremism and fundamentalism, which looks for a religiously pure Pakistan, and would advocate discriminating against Christians and Hindus, or for their expulsion in the name of Muslim hegemony.  The majority of Hindus are poor peasants exploited as a source of labor; those who have become successful open themselves up to extortion and kidnapping, often having to pay exorbitant sums to see their family members returned or else risk their lives.  Hindu men are asked to identify themselves with a red patch on their turbans, so that passing Muslims can identify them and be sure not to touch them[60].   Many Hindu families living in Pakistan since the partition from India have migrated to India as a result of oppression across the social spectrum, and in particular, with the introduction of more radical Islamic factions to their areas.

Blasphemy laws make life for  non-Muslims difficult, as accusations of blasphemy are not well investigated, are subject to harsh punishment or death, and are known to inflame the local public leading to events such as the murder of two Christian brothers accused of creating a blasphemous pamphlet about the prophet Muhammad.  “Last year saw a sharp increase in the number of attacks on Christians in Pakistan, many under the pretext of blasphemy – a crime punishable by death. Rights groups are calling on Pakistan to repeal its controversial blasphemy laws, warning that they are being misused by extremists to settle personal vendettas with Christians.[61]”  With record flooding in 2010, marginalization of Christians, Hindus, and those in the tribal areas (KP, FATA, and Balochistan) are likely to continue to receive only small amount of aid and relief supplies due to corruption, graft, seizure of those resources by local Taliban proclaiming to be the arbiters of relief work in remote areas (“Contributing to the challenge of reining in these militant groups is the fact that they enjoy a degree of popular support for their charitable work in education and healthcare.[62]”) and lightly-veiled discrimination.  “The Bishop of Peshawar in Pakistan has warned that Christians there will receive “hardly anything” from the aid packages being distributed among victims of the country’s worst flooding in 80 years.[63]”  Aside from the support of religious institutions sympathetic to their brethren, there are few resources available to address the issue of religious violence and structural violence against non-Muslims in Pakistan.

National focus by the government must address the underlying causes of inequality within Pakistani society –class and ethnic divisions, gender disparities and wealth distribution would be some good places to start.  Infrastructure and political will are necessary to achieve better outcomes of development and coexistence within rural and minority populations.  Control and modification of the negative consequences of modernization an globalization such as pollution, hazardous work and working conditions, sweat-shop and child labor, human trafficking, sex work, water and sanitation for a growing urban population in addition to achieving baseline public works for rural populations will be key to empowering the public and improving their quality of life and coexistence.  Alliances with the United States and others will be essential to attaining development goals in Pakistan’s rural areas, however the means of organizing and delivering that aid are not straightforward, as Pakistani civil society is resistant to outside influence, and in particular, the presence of official U.S. operations of any kind on national soil.  “Conventional bilateral development-assistance techniques will not suffice, not least because of the difficulties for foreign-aid administrators in monitoring and assessing progress of development projects and programs… Progress will require maximum use of indigenous human resources, and some devolution of managerial responsibility to expert third parties including, for instance, the World Bank and reputable non-governmental organizations.[64]”  So, by developing and supporting the network of national and international NGOs at work in Pakistan, the government can alleviate some of the problems associated with a weak government unable to ensure basic services to all corners of the nation.  Ideally this network would be replaced with national, tax-funded governmental offices to do the same, sometime in the future when there is greater economic means, societal infrastructure, and political capacity to do so.

One critical area that needs reform is the educational system in Pakistan.  Because of the widespread poverty and lack of government supported schools in rural Pakistan, madrassahs or madaris have become a standard way for the poorest Pakistanis to get an education.  Unfortunately, many within the network of religious-based schools have been hijacked by Islamist militants who use them to preach a radicalized, anti-American, anti-Western version of Islam and then recruit new members from the ranks of fundamentalists they create.  “The Madaris located in Pakistan have played an important role in spreading militant jihadist ideologies and some have even labeled the Madaris “terrorist factories”… the whole purpose of a militarized madrassa is to produce mujahideen, where the students are conditioned in fighting tactics and narrow interpretations of religious ideology in order to legitimize the cause.  The idea of Madaris is not dangerous, but rather the select few that have become militarized are the major concerns for the international community.  With free board, and education, and job security afterward, Madaris are appealing to a class that may not have many options. [65]”

There have been attempts at reform in the madrassa system starting with the last regime.  “General Musharraf [had] been active in creating reforms for the Madaris in Pakistan.  In June 2002, the deferral cabinet approved the Deeni Madaris (Registrations and Control Ordinance 2002).  In this ordinance, Madaris must register with the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board and the respective Provincial Madrassa Education Boards… In addition, the ordinance states that it will not allow the masjid or madrassas to be a platform to discuss political views… Regrettably, this registration process is not the case of the Madaris located within the NWFP, and area plagued with lawlessness and militant Madaris.[66]”  Ensuring conformity with the registration process will be the first step in understanding the ideologies being taught, where, and how to modify the curricula to ensure a non-radical education, or eliminate the school entirely.  “Another critical component [of madrassa reform] is to allow madrassa students to voice their opinion about their curricula, and permit them to provide for a change within the system.  Having the madrassa students involved will open up the discussion and hopefully make the ulema realize how important it is to include secular subjects… Furthermore, by including secular subjects within all Madaris, this could benefit the poorer class in Pakistan by giving them access to an education from a young age, but continuing it into higher-level secular institutions… this will mainstream the poorer class, and it will allow them a better standard of life afterward.[67]”

The problem of conformity to a moderate Islamic curriculum that includes secular subjects necessary to building an educated population for economic growth lies in the funding for these madaris.  By pumping funds into schools in poor rural areas where there are no other options for education, Islamic fundamentalists can control the curriculum and influence the student population to create the next generation of terrorists and suicide bombers.  “By eliminating all sources of private funding, the government [could] in effect handicap the madaris, and could use this to their advantage… the United States has allocated $100M to the government of Pakistan for the reformation process, therefore Pakistan can afford to implement this [reform] strategy… but, the most effective way will be long-term dedication to the education system in Pakistan, where investing in a proper schooling system will eventually lead to the poorer class having the same opportunities as others in Pakistan.[68]” Pilot programs have been implemented to assess the sustainability of private schools in poor areas of urban and rural Balochistan[69] as well as adult non-formal education programs.[70] Results from Alderman et al. indicated that both types of schools could be sustainable with a small yearly investment from the government and minimal fees, calculations were based on $0.58 per student per month maximum with modest subsidies from the government.  Sheesh’s review shows that non-formal education (in the spirit of Freire’s dialogue about issues relevant to the students-teachers) is highly effective in both a federal program where 78% of adults enrolled became literate – over 20,000 – and in a separate program that taught women to read by piggybacking off of their familiarity with Quranic text; 10,867 women and girls became literate using this method in over 400 “face-to-face” learning centers.  Both of these initiatives indicate that with a minimal investment by government or donors, and with non-traditional methods of learning, a poor and oppressed population can become literate without becoming radicalized.

Human rights abuses are an ongoing problem in Pakistan.  These can vary from marginalization of minority religious and ethnic groups (and their subsequent mistreatment), austere application of Sharia law such as honor killings, the persistent violence against women which includes acid attacks, mistreatment of prisoners, extrajudicial execution of detainees in recent counterinsurgency operations.  Amnesty International (AI) lists the Pakistani military and government alongside the Pakistani Taleban as two main groups at fault, stating “arbitrary detention, torture, deaths in custody, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial execution are rampant.  The government of Pakistan has failed to protect individuals – particularly women, religious minorities and children – from violence and other human rights abuses committed in the home, in the community, and while in legal custody.  It has failed to ensure legal redress after violations have occurred. In addition, Pakistan continues to impose the death penalty on persons convicted of crimes.”[71] Despite some respite from these violations with the episodic insinuation of democratic influences in government beginning perhaps 30 years ago, abuses continue.  Originally created by Benazir Bhutto in the mid-1990s, the Pakistani Ministry of Human Rights is a small government agency dedicated to the UDHR, and the application of true Islamic values which honor and protect human rights; the division is now called the Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs, though ironically, Human Rights is frequently left off of the letterhead[72].  Also on the ironic side, in 2006, Pakistan applied for and was granted a seat on the UN Human Rights Council[73].   After many years of encouragement, AI reports that “On 17 April 2008, Pakistan moved to uphold [their] pledge, ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and signing both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT).[74]”  Of course, AI and similar international organizations as well as the UN are working with national government, community groups, NGOs and individuals to address these crimes against Pakistani citizens, the influx of refugees fleeing the fighting in Afghanistan, and the remaining displaced Afghanis from the Afghan-Soviet war.

Security Sector

Security forces in Pakistan are divided into national military, intelligence, and police forces; aside from normal operations such as policing and maintaining a deterrent standing army, these forces are occupied on three distinct fronts:  general and longstanding tensions with India, separatist violence in Kashmir, and the insurgency spillover from the Afghanistan campaign begun in 2001. Given anti-U.S. sentiments in Pakistan, it is politically untenable for either the civilian government or the military establishment to work extensively and openly with the U.S. military in counterinsurgency work within Pakistan.  “Unlike in Afghanistan, where NATO-ISAF troops will take the lead in pursuing COIN, the Pakistani army will be charged with implementing the strategy in Pakistan.  Following incursions, the military has tended to strike peace deals with the insurgents, leaving them largely in control of local affairs, as was the case in the Swat Valley… Adopting an effective military COIN would thus require a fundamental change in the army’s strategy and a shift of large number of troops to the tribal areas.  Many observers remain skeptical that the Pakistani military has the political will or the capacity to make this transition.[75]”

External governments have been largely excluded from assisting with internal security matters, but also with humanitarian efforts, which in Pakistan are needed in the best of years and so much more so with the confluence of instability and natural disaster that 2010 brought.  “An effective development approach incorporated into COIN strategies will need to be sensitive to these local conflict dynamics and address the local grievances that have both been fueling these conflicts and making populations in the tribal areas willing to tolerate, if not support the Pakistani Taliban:[76]” However, the U.S. dollars and equipment that have been supporting and modernizing Pakistan’s military in preparation for this campaign against militants are not in unending supply and should not be delivered without conditions.  “The Pakistan military should understand that its failure to embrace this fundamental shift in outlook [from conventional to counterinsurgent strategies] will significantly reduce U.S. military assistance.  Indeed, Islamabad’s continued unwillingness to cut its ties to terrorist groups and to collaborate with the U.S. in defeating these groups would leave Washington to conclude that the Pakistan military is disinterested in partnering with the U.S. and is therefore an unsuitable candidate for extensive U.S. aid.[77]”

            “The Pakistani army is a powerful, cohesive, and strategic organization.  Its decision-making is crucial to Pakistan’s political future and to the trajectory of Afghanistan, where the army has the capacity to support or at least partially rein in major militant groups.[78]”  The Pakistani Army has controlled the country cyclically since independence, with military coups replacing civilian government three times since independence.  “[One] aspect of the counterterrorism problem in Pakistan is that the Pakistan Army continued to dominate decision making in national security… The barriers to elected civilian governments asserting control over foreign and security policy in Pakistan are systemic.  The military has built a civilian-proof system over many decades.[79]”  This has created a military establishment with considerable influence over national and political issues, one that is unwilling to work at the behest of the democratically elected government but chooses instead to operate as a parallel power, often creating military campaigns or striking deals with militants without consulting Parliament or the President.  “[Pakistani] security agencies, which are not monolithic, have been willing to conduct operations against groups that have threatened Pakistan, but not those that advance what they see as Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and India.  This policy of sustaining the ‘good jihadis’ has strained Pakistan’s social fabric and endangered the state.[80]”

This divide between military and civilian interests leads to impotent agreements made for expediency more than effectiveness.  The Shakai Agreement was one of the first efforts to broker a peace settlement between the Pakistani government and insurgent groups in NWFP.   It included non-belligerence agreements between the army and insurgent groups in the tribal areas, but did not deprive those militants of their power in may, in fact, represent a setback for the Pakistani military.  “There were several problems with this deal.  It compensated the insurgents for their losses, but did not require them to compensate their victims.  They were also allowed to keep their arms.  Weapons were not ‘surrendered’ but rather ‘offered’ to the military as a token, ceremonial gesture.  The militants described the deal as a ‘reconciliation’, which is understood by tribals as the army’s tacit acceptance of their opponents as equally powerful and legitimate.  By forging this ‘reconciliation’, the army gave the insurgents previously unearned political legitimacy and permitted them to consolidate their hold over South Waziristan.[81]”  Some of the tendency towards quick-and-dirty solutions likely lies in the Pakistani army’s primary focus on India in a decades-long, seemingly intractable existential struggle between them.  “The army is a conventional force primarily geared towards a conflict with India, a configuration which it prefers.[82]”  Public opinion, however, may soon sway Pakistan’s military establishment into adopting more effective COIN strategies.  “The intensifying conflict between the military and the militants in the tribal areas, as well as the growing threat of terrorism in Pakistan in general, has caused a significant shift in Pakistani public opinion about the militants… Whereas two years ago only 28% of the Pakistani public supported military action against extremists, today almost 70% support military action against these groups.[83]”

Other actors in the security sector include the Frontier Corps (FC), Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Police as well as local and regional police forces administed at the local and provincial levels.  All of these forces remain underfunded, underequipped, and undertrained for the massive undertaking ahead in ending militancy and insurgency in Pakistan.  All of these forces have come under attack in their operations in the tribal areas, and many lives have been lost in the fray.  “The Frontier Corps is a federal paramilitary force that belongs to the Ministry of Interior, but is under the operational control of the military.  It comprises two separate forces, FC NWFP and NC Baluchistan with a combined strength of 80,000.  The former is overwhelmingly Pashtun, the cadres of the latter are not exclusively ethnically Baloch;[84]” “U.S. policy to assist Pakistan in eliminating terrorist bass in the FATA has thus far emphasized providing counterinsurgency training to the paramilitary Frontier Corps and development assistance to the people of the region… these efforts will not succeed unless the leaders of the Pakistani security establishment fully embrace such efforts,[85]” which apparently has not been the case. “Over the last several years some have argued that the FC NWFP should be the force of choice for operations in the tribal areas… But since at least 2004 there have been consistent reports that sympathetic elements of the Frontier Corps have been helping the Taliban.[86]”

            “The Frontier Constabulary is a policing organization raised to provide law and order in the settled areas outside FATA, as well as border-protection duties along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.  It currently also performs static security duties in Islamabad and throughout Punjab.  It has faced the brunt of the violence in settled Pashtun areas such as Swat… Constabulary personnel are generally ill prepared for this fight because they are poorly trained and inadequately equipped, with outdated arms and little, if any, effective personnel-protection equipment.  They have been killed in large numbers or simply deserted.[87]” “The North-West Frontier Province also has a provincial police force, the Frontier Police.  Like all Pakistan’s police forces, it is in dire need of better training and equipment, increases in personnel strength, and compensation reform.  Like the Frontier Corps and the Frontier Constabulary, the police have been a focus for insurgents who have, for example, violently taken over police stations in Swat and Buner and set up their own police operations.  Tehrik-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Mohammadi told the police in Swat to leave their jobs of face punishment, 700 of 1700 officers deserted their posts.[88]”  However, not all police and military forces are a lost cause, as some examples of reform have proven.  “Several efforts, such as the Motorway Police and the Lahore Traffic Police, demonstrate that a livable wage, coupled with a rigorous system of accountability, permits professional policing that fosters a belief in the system.  Because these police are not vulnerable to accepting bribes, they have conditioned the public over time to stop offering bribes to members of these forces.[89]”

Another powerful organization in the security sector is the ISI or Inter-Services Intelligence.  “During the 1979-89 Afghan War, when Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, benefitting from huge human and financial assistance, grew into a powerful political instrument.[90]”  While the ISI has been instrumental in supplying NATO and coalition forces with intelligence reports and other essential insights, some factions within ISI are believed or known to play both sides of the table.  “Recent reporting indicates that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) elements are engage with groups that support the Taliban and are killing American, NATO, and Afghan troops in Afghanistan.[91]” “The ISI is no longer certain the Coalition forces will prevail in Afghanistan and it is using militant groups in an attempt to expand its own influence.[92]”  Before 9/11, Pakistan was interested in exerting control over Afghani governmental players.  “The ISI and Pakistan’s elected government had been busy cultivating and supporting the emerging Taliban in Afghanistan in order to secure a puppet or at least a complaisant government in Kabul.  The Pakistani leadership was induced to terminate this relationship only after 11 September 2001, once the Taliban has apparently been defeated by a UN Backed coalition.[93]”  Even after 9/11, this duality remains.  “The military establishment has been accused of continuing to protect elements of the Afghan Taliban, both in the south and the east.  The Quetta Shura and Haqqani networks, which are on the frontline of the insurgency, are credibly believed to receive some degree of de facto protection from the Pakistani military.[94]”  This refusal to fully commit to ending the insurgency within its own borders and embrace changes in strategy from those used against India not only slows progress in dealing with al Qaeda and other militias, but negatively effects local populations and generates local animosity for national armed services.  “Pakistan has inadequate capacity to clear and hold areas and to win and sustain the support of locals.  This likely stems from Islamabad’s hesitation to embrace counter-insurgency doctrinally and operationally.  Consequently, operations have caused significant local devastation and displacement of populations in Bajaur and Swat, in particular.[95]”

Fundamentalist Islamic and Foreign Militant Groups

            The War on Terror has driven Islamic fundamentalist insurgents across the Durand Line into Pakistani tribal territory.  The appearance of foreign militant groups is not new; as mentioned before, the area has seen its share of invaders, refugees from Afghanistan and migrants many of whom have settled in the area or live with host families and adopted Pashtun culture.  Foreign militant groups were often welcomed in Pakistan as a supplementary or proxy force to fight for their national interests.  “Militancy in Pakistan is not a new phenomenon.  Since independence, the country has relied on a menagerie of Islamist militants and tribal armies to prosecute its foreign policies abroad, especially in India, Indian-administered Kashmir, and Afghanistan.[96]”  These new immigrants, however, have violated the code of Pashtunwali by overstepping the hospitality of their hosts, usurping control of local government and munitions stockpiles leftover from the Afghan-Soviet War. “Interestingly, the Pakistan Taliban took into possession a huge cache of arms and ammunition being stored and maintained by every clan/sub-clan and families living in the Waziristan region.  The Pakistan Taliban justified their action on the grounds that they are responsible for maintaining law and order in the region as well as settling disputes among families, clans, and tribes, and hence the local tribesmen do not need to keep weapons themselves.[97]”  The tribal militias have largely cooperated with the insurgents, either for reasons of ethnic unity, or for money, and so long as life remained unchanged or improved by the presence of these outsiders, the tribal people were willing to extend them hospitality.

            What the Islamists have been forgetting in recent years is the heritage of the tribes in expelling foreign invaders where they took advantage of Pashtun hospitality.  “Invaders have crisscrossed the tribal areas for hundreds of years, and the Pashtun tribes pride themselves for their reputation of independence and martial prowess.[98]”  Growing frustrations with the harsh rule of the interlopers combined with training and reinforcement provided by Pakistani or U.S. military efforts may embolden the tribes to rebel against their newest conquerors and regain autonomy on their lands, as they are unlikely to depend on the central government for their liberation.  “In South Waziristan, the government is losing its writ –emotionally and physically.  Thanks to its failed military adventure and half-hearted efforts to impose its writ, the government has lost support of local tribesmen… The tribal elders and the Jirga politics, which always played an important and effective role in maintaining order in the lawless tribal society, were being sidelined as the Taliban and its local supporters were attempting to impose their own code over the recognized tribal way of life…  Now the influence of the Taliban with its emphasis on Sharia will tear apart the social fabric of a tribal society and its tribal codes including the Pashtunwali.[99]”  What the Pakistani Taliban, immigrant Afghan Taliban, and their associated Islamic militias have done across these tribal areas is develop their own, “Talibanized” government; imposition of strict Sharia law, collection of taxes and protection money, bribing of tribal elders to ensure their cooperation or killing those who refuse to harbor terrorists, and establishment of a network of madrassas.  “The young generations are still being exposed to these teachings [to fight jihad]; however, instead of the Soviet Union being the enemy, the United States is not being portrayed as the adversary.  The innocence of another generation is being lost in the tribal areas and now with advancements in technology, the effect will be greater.[100]”

There are many groups who have sought refuge and new strongholds in Pakistan:

            Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Student Movement of Pakistan or Pakistani Taliban.  TTP is the main umbrella group for a multitude of militant groups in Pakistan, and an ally of al Qaeda focusing on resistance to Pakistani, American and NATO forces and enforcement of Sharia law.  “After the death of Nek Mohammed, Baitullah Mehsud emerged as a leader of the militants in South Waziristan… in autumn 2007, Mehsud announced that the various local Taliban groups had united under his leadership and adopted the name Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistan Taliban.[101]” “TTP is a conglomerate of nearly 40 groups operating in FATA and the NWFP.  Formation of the TTP is the logical culmination of Talibanization of large areas in FATA and NWFP, which began with the post-September 2001 influx of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other foreign militants from neighboring Afghanistan.[102]”  “It is worth noting that many tribes of varying size and strength inhabit every agency/district of FATA… Every tribe has its own Taliban factions that operate independent of the other.  Also, Taliban militants of one tribe do not operate on the territory of the other tribe with is the exclusive domain of that tribe only.  Nevertheless, the Taliban of each tribe has adopted similar policies and methods of collecting revenues, and some Taliban tribal factions are allowed to cross the tribal territories of other factions to reach areas of combat.[103]” The Afghan Taliban has sought an alliance with the TTP and the leaders of several militant groups and tribal Taleban factions (excluding most traditional tribal armies) have stated their desire to put aside their differences (“TTP consists of a number of factions, the leadership of which is not in agreement on many issues.  This stems from the distinct tribal identity of the factions where each tribe jealously protects its independence and interests.[104]”) in order to unite against American-led troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

            The Pakistani Taliban insinuates itself upon the people of KP (NWFP), FATA, and Balochistan as a kind of parallel, ultra-Islamic government.  “Over the past several years, the original Afghan Taliban and an indigenous Pakistani version of the Taliban have operated in FATA and offered themselves as an alternative to the government in Islamabad.  Because many Pakistanis both inside and outside the tribal areas, perceive America’s presence in the region to be a central source of regional instability, these groups and their allies are seen by some as a lesser threat.[105]”  Operation of secondary economies in the tribal areas supports anti-government activities and is funneled to the terrorists using alternative banking systems.  “Dealing with such a financial dynamic [as the militants have created] poses real challenges for the government of Pakistan.  In Pakistan, as with other developing economies, oversight of formal financial institutions against terrorist financing is rudimentary at best.  The Pakistan Taliban is collecting money from all the usual sources… however, in none of the cases is the money being collected connecting to the formal financial system like banks.  The money is being moved using non-traditional dynamics such as cash couriers and hawala.  There is thus no way the government can detect and interdict they money using classic AML/CFT (anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism) tools.[106]”  These funds are funneled into domestic and international terrorist operations and keep the pockets of the leaders of these insurgent networks well lined.  By exploiting the isolation and limited influence of the central Pakistani government, militias are afforded a place to rest, regroup, rearm, and join the fight.  “The insurrection in Pakistan’s tribal areas has been unexpectedly robust, lethal, and resilient, which has surprised many in Pakistan and the Western world.  The focus of the violence emanating from this region is not confined to Afghanistan or Pakistan alone, but spans the entire world, especially Europe and North America.  A number of external actors like Al Qaeda and its associates are exploiting the prevailing lawlessness in FATA for sanctuary and a base for their logistical, training, and operational purposes, while the local Taliban reap rich financial rewards in the mayhem[107]” while the locals remain at the lowest rungs of the Human Development Index.  “Militant groups freely meet, train, and raise funds throughout Pakistan.  High-level militants… have mysteriously escaped police custody to evade extradition, and others continue to amass crowds without interference by authorities.  Evan Taliban leader Mullah Omar is believed to be living in Quetta.[108]”

Pakistani militant groups working with TTP[109] on local, national, and international attacks include:

Punjabi Taliban: The Punjabi Taliban or Tehrik-i-Taliban Punjab are an alleged wing of the Taliban based predominately in Southern Punjab. The network is thought to be a loose conglomeration of Kashmiri militant groups based in Punjab who have been active in the Kashmir insurgency, as well as claiming responsibility for many attacks across Pakistan in 2009;

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Army of the Friends of the Prophet, a Sunni militant organization formerly registered as a political party but banned and branded as a terrorist organization;

Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan: Soldiers of Muhammad, a Shia militant organization formed in response to violence proffered by SSP;

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): Army of the Good, Army of the Righteous, or Army of the Pure, is one of the largest and most active militant Islamist terrorist organizations in South Asia operating from Pakistan, and one of those assumed to be supported by the ISI;

Lashkar-e-Omar The Army of Omar, an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization, a mixture of elements from three other terrorist groups: Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. It also includes members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and is recognized by many international governments as a terrorist organization;

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) Army of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a militant organization operating in Pakistan since SSP activist Riaz Basra broke away over differences with the leadership.  The group is considered a terrorist organisation , has ties to the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Sipahe-Sahaba, Ahlesunnat Wal Jamat, Jamiat Ulamae-Islam, Tehreek Tahaffuze-Khatme Nabuwwat, various local militant groups and loosely tied to al-Qaeda;

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) The Army of Mohammad, a major mujahedeen organization whose primary motive is to separate Kashmir from India, but also operates in Karachi and is associated with the murder of Daniel Pearl;

Jama’at-ud-Da’wah Pakistan (JuD) or Jamaat al Dawa al Quran (JDQ) renamed Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awal (TTQA) is a banned Islamic organization that is considered by the United Nations to be an alias of the banned terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is associated with the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and is also known for charity and relief work;

Khuddam ul-Islam is an Islamist militant group considered to be a splinter group of the extremist JeM, working alongside several other Sunni extremist organizations have been involved in over a dozen violent attacks, mostly aimed at Indian forces but, it has actively denounced US occupation in any Islamic country and has vowed to engage US forces and allies;

Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) Islamic Struggle Movement, an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist/militant organization originally formed during the Soviet-Afghan War by Fazalur Rehman Khalil and Qari Saifullah Akhtar.  Khalil later broke away to form his own group Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), which later emerged as the most feared militant organization in Kashmir;

Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) would become Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),  one of the most feared militant groups in Kashmir.  HuJI and HuM were both strongly backed by the Taliban, and therefore the groups profess Taliban-style fundamentalist Islam.

Tehreek-e-Nafaze-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM): Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, one of the groups currently harassing and attacking local police forces in the tribal areas.  TNSM is one of the groups that the Pakistani government has decided to cede their power to rather than continue fighting against.

Kashmiri Militants: Mainly involved in the separatist violence in the high mountain regions, “Islamabad also reined in Kashmir-focused groups at certain points over the past several years, but it has failed to shut down these groups decisively, even when some turned against the Pakistani state.[110]”  “Recent violence in Kashmir related to a controversial land deal has stoked Hindu-Muslim tensions in the region and could further complicate Indo-Pakistani peace talks. [111]”

Foreign militant groups working with TTP[112] on local, national, and international attacks include:

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): Leader Tahir Yuldashev[113] and his Uzbek fighters were once welcomed into the tribal areas of Waziristan.  Now it seems the IMU factions in some villages may have overstayed their welcome and are bearing the first anti-foreigner violence from locals “limited in terms of the local tribes which have turned hostile towards the presence of foreigners.  Only the Wazir tribes, and only a section of those, in South Waziristan has turned against the foreigners and not the other tribes… only the Uzbeks present in this tribal Agency seem to be the target so far.  Neither the Taliban nor al-Qaeda has been targeted so far.[114]”

Other Foreign Militant Groups: “Hundreds of Arab, Uzbek, Tajik, and Chechen militants who fled Afghanistan have also taken shelter in the South and North Waziristan Agencies.  These militants are not fighting on behalf of the local Taliban not only in Afghanistan but also against the Pakistani forces in Pakistan itself.[115]”

Al Qaeda: infamous group whose stated aim is the use of jihad to defend Islam against Zionism, Christianity, Hinduism, the secular West, and Muslim governments such as Saudi Arabia, which it sees as insufficiently Islamic and too closely tied to the United States “Prior to 9/11, al-Qaeda operated through networks of Pakistani militant groups, and the Taliban recruited members from madrassas and mosques supported by the Pakistani political leadership of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).[116]” “Al-Qaeda’s growing capabilities and the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be addressed effectively until the sanctuaries in Pakistan are shut down.[117]” “Pakistan has, at times, aggressively pursued al-Qaeda terrorists, killing or capturing more senior al-Qaeda leaders than any other nation.[118]”  Al-Qaeda has separately named branches in many middle eastern countries, many of which train in Pakistani camps and madrassas for their missions.

The Haqqani Network is an independent insurgent group in Afghanistan and Pakistan that is closely allied with the Taliban. The leadership is believed to be based in North Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan the Haqqanis are thought to have about 4,000 to 12,000 Taliban under their command.

Quetta Shura or Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) is a militant organization composed of top leadership of the Afghan Taliban, based since about 2001 in Quetta in Balochistan province of Pakistan.  The Shura was formed after United States led forces attacked Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001 and the senior leadership including Mullah Mohammed Omar escaped into Pakistan. According to Lt. Gen. David Barno, the retired former commander of American forces in Afghanistan “The Quetta Shura is extremely important, they are the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency.”

 

Tribes and Tribal Militias

            The Pashtun tribal belt spans the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan; relationships and illicit trade between tribes on either side of the border contribute to the porosity of the Durand line, a major difficulty in managing the war on terrorism and the flight of Afghani militants into Pakistan.  Given their isolation in rugged, mostly mountainous terrain FATA and KP (NWFP) have been excluded from action in and by the central Pakistani government.  Historically, this has worked for the population of the tribal belt, as operating autonomously and relying on familial ties makes Pashtuns particularly adept at managing their own affairs.  “Culture, religion, and national identity are less important to Pashtuns than their ethnic identity.  The Pashtun tribal belt is geographically vast and a multitude of tribes span the region.  One of the core key concepts of Pashtunwali is that it allows for local autonomy in its interpretation and implementation… the fact that there are variations in cultural practices within the ethnic group highlights the importance of ethnicity as a unifying identity.[119]”  “Pashtuns living in the tribal areas affirm their unity through a code of conduct referred to as “Pashtunwali” which related to concepts of hospitality, pardon, and revenge.  Pashtuns have also developed a “Jirga” process to help govern their affairs.  The Jirga is a dispute resolution mechanism that relied on decisions be adult male members of the community rather than formalized criminal statutes.[120]”  What insurgent militias have done, no different from what the central Pakistani government had done before it, was to ignore the cultural essentiality of Pashtunwali and substitute their own mechanisms for justice, education, policing, and managing conflict in the territories.  “Evidence suggests that some elements of the security establishment have not made the strategic decision to abandon the use of militant groups as a tool of foreign policy.  In fact, some observers believe that Pakistan has long cultivated the FATA as an area for staging militant operations and has intentionally maintained a separate, but unequal legal status in FATA for this purpose.[121]”

            The situation is similar in Baluchistan.  “Baluchistan is a province straddling Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan inhabited by twelve million Baloch people.  Historically autonomous and culturally distinct from other areas of Pakistan and Iran, Baluchistan has never enjoyed political or economic autonomy.  The province has been a source of constant conflict and instability for decades because of its geo-political position and natural wealth.[122]” .[123]”  Hidden away in the far South West of Pakistan, and used by the central government for its natural resources, with media sources driven out by the violence of the incoming Taliban forces, the occupation and abuse of Baluchistan as a base of operations goes on with little international notice. “The resurgence of the Taliban in Baluchistan and military operations against moderate Baloch political forces are further affecting the region’s political developments.  Issues of greater political autonomy, democratization, fair representation, and constitutional safeguards with international guarantees could satisfy the long-suffering Baloch people “The political representatives and the people at large have faced the worst human rights violations for many years.  On the pretext of countering militancy, killings, enforced disappearances and mass arrests have become the order of the day in the province.  All moderate democratic forces in the province are facing suppression at the hands of the Government… the military government seems determined to uproot all nationalist forces to pave the way for “Talibanization” of the province.[124]”  Limited attempts by the Pakistani Security Sector to retain or regain control in these areas have led to massive bombing campaigns and the razing of property wherever the militants have assumed control.  “Thousands of unarmed Baloch civilians, including women and children, are being forcibly displaced from their hometowns and no efforts are being made by the Pakistan government to support the displaced… 200,000 people have been displaced from the Kolu and Dera Bugti districts alone in 2006.[125]”

            Tribal militias or their Taliban tribal counterparts (now nearly indistinguishable in many places) have taken an active stance in ousting one of the foreign militant groups from their midst.  The IMU has been targeted and driven out of several tribal territories in South Waziristan with the limited assistance of military forces in the area.  “Since March 2007, there have been reports about an internal armed struggle between the local supporters of the Taliban and a section of foreign militants in South Waziristan… Uzbek militants are being targeted only in South Waziristan, there too only in a limited area…  One could safely conclude that the Uzbek fighters had fallen out of favor with not only their local hosts, but also with the Taleban and presumably al-Qaeda… there have also been reports about heavy artillery being used to bombard the bunkers of Uzbek militants situated in the hilltops… clearly the Pakistan government  is providing limited support to the local tribesmen.  It suits the military government, not to get involved directly, but indirectly to aid the local tribesmen to go against the foreigners.[126]” “The primary reason for the local hatred vis-à-vis the foreigners, is attributed to Uzbek fighters’ attempts to dominate the local tribesmen and to their involvement in criminal activities… a spokesman for the tribal laskhar that was formed to overthrow the Uzbeks had killed more than 200 tribal elders, besides other foreign fighters… It now appears that Yuldashev took the local hospitality for granted.  It was his lack of understanding of the local rules of the game that has alienated his fighters from the rest.  Unlike the Arabs or Chechens, who are also settled in other parts of the FATA, the Uzbeks came into contact with Pashtun tribal culture much later.[127]”  This should be a lesson to Pakistani and international forces who will be working in the area in the future – to forego traditional Pashtun culture is to set a military campaign up for failure.

            The history in these territories offers two potential sources of stability for the region – military and economic.  Militarily, while the tribal armies rarely engage in national scuffles, they are battle-tested and prepared to fight for their land and their families against invaders.  It will be crucial for the democratic government in Pakistan and her international supporters in NATO and the ISAF to engage with tribal leaders in their fight against terrorism internationally.  “With force multipliers such as unmanned drones and helicopter gunships, International Security Assistance Force troops are ostensibly better prepared to stabilize the region [than the Soviets were].  But these sorts of technological advances can only go so far.  The history of the region shows that [the] fiercely independent and battle-tested Pashtuns are extremely resilient in resisting conventional armies.  Time and again, Persian, Greek, Turn, Mughal, British, and Soviet invaders have been unable to subdue a virtually unconquerable people.[128]”  Cooperation with tribes who have resisted the influence of Afghan insurgents since 2001 will be a powerful card to play in the cat-and-mouse game ongoing in the region.  Lifting the local tribes out of poverty so that they can resist the temptation of militant funding will require effective economic development.  “A solution to managing the long, porous border is to transform it from hostile frontier into an economic gateway.  Enhancing licit trade and labor flows and enabling family and tribal coherence are important steps.  The cooperation of communities that straddle the border is also essential.  Therefore, the goals of the governments in Kabul and Islamabad must be more closely attuned to those populations[129].”

            The example for tribal assistance in the ousting of the fundamentalist element from their land has been set in Afghanistan: “President Hamid Karzai is also a Pashtun.  In addition to linking the country’s origin to an ethnic group, the Pashtuns rejected Taliban rule and have no desire to see a return to extreme religious laws.[130]”  “Rural agrarian communities rely on family and community for survival and security.  Many develop identities and cultural practices based on communal or collective interests.  According to Afghan scholar M. Jamil Hanafi: “The Afghan individual is surrounded by concentric rings consisting of family, extended family, clan, tribe, confederacy, and major cultural-linguistic group.  The hierarchy of loyalties corresponds to these circles and becomes more intense as the circle gets smaller… seldom does and Afghan, regardless of cultural background; need the services and/or the facilities of a national government.  Thus, in case of crisis, his recourse is to the kinship and, if necessary, the larger cultural group.  National feelings and loyalties are filtered through the successive layers.[131]”  The same can be said of the people of tribal Pakistan, and remembering this unique social configuration will be essential to broaching the conflict at hand.  More attention on these areas will be essential in determining the best approach to countering insurgency.  “In most rural areas, however, there are almost no international aid groups.  The inability to access large parts of the country means that there is very little information available to the international donor community about conditions in these regions or about the needs of the population.[132]”

Afghanistan, India and China

            Much of what is happening in the tribal areas of Pakistan can be attributed to the ongoing War on Terror in Afghanistan, “another reason why U.S. and NATO policymakers must be cautious in their approach towards Afghanistan is that its challenges extend across the border into Pakistan.  As long as militants continue to infiltrate the hundreds of unguarded security checkpoints along the Afghan-Pakistani border, the security environment in Afghanistan will continue to worsen.[133]”,  as the tribal belt straddling the contested Durand Line easily hosts and allows the transportation of men and materials back and forth between the two countries’ claims on that large Pashtun territory.  “Pakistan and Afghanistan are inextricably tied through shared borders, history, culture, and commerce.  This interdependence creates a significant opportunity for collaboration between these two nations in the interest of greater stability and prosperity.  However, mutual suspicions, geopolitical pressures, and a zero-sum mentality have led to a largely negative dynamic in the relationship.  Reversing this trend will be difficult, but it is essential to the broader goal of combating extremism and stabilizing the region.[134]”  The sustained NATO/ISAF presence in Afghanistan has pushed militants towards the relative safety of Pakistan, whose military forces are hesitant to fight against the former Afghan government that is the Afghan Taliban, or to engage in the tribal areas, whose Pashtun and Baloch cultures clash with the mainly Punjab military.  “One reason why the army has been averse to conducting operations in FATA and NWFP is the hostility of residents to what appears to be its Punjabi-dominated ethnic composition.  Due to this image as a ‘Punjabi force,’ many in FATA view it as a foreign force working with the United States against them. [135]” Another reason for Pakistani support lies in the assumed threat posed by India; “Continued Pakistani ambivalence toward the (Afghan) Taliban stems in part from its concern that India is trying to encircle it by gaining influence in Afghanistan.  Pakistani security officials calculate that the Taliban offers the best chance for countering India’s regional influence.[136]”

            While the people along the border of Afghanistan interact seamlessly due to their shared culture, the governments of Kabul and Islamabad remain wary of each other.  Pakistan is concerned that the alliance between India and Afghanistan is an attempt to surround Muslim sovereignty in preparation for some future extermination scheme “Pakistani fears of Indian encirclement contribute to support for militancy in Afghanistan, while India understandably continues to view Pakistan as a hotbed of terrorism.[137]”; the U.S.-Afghanistan-India relationship being as positive as it is on a diplomatic level, with a specific focus on militant groups in the region also concerns the Pakistani government and population “three quarters of Pakistanis say that the real purpose of the U.S.-led war on terrorism is to weaken the Muslim world and dominate Pakistan.[138]”, who rely on U.S. aid for national and military expenses and developments.  “The U.S. must convince Kabul that antagonistic relations with Islamabad are not in its national security interest.  U.S. diplomatic initiatives toward Pakistan must also demonstrate that a convergence of U.S., India and Afghanistan interests on terrorism does not mean the three countries are colluding against Pakistan or its core national security interests… the U.S. must find ways to give Pakistan a vested interest in Afghanistan’s stability so that it no longer sees the value of supporting the Taliban or other Pashtun Islamist extremists in the region.[139]”  Pakistani government officials should also realize that today’s Afghan Taliban is not the same independent and wholesome Islamic organization that they might hope, something the tribal people have already realized, but that the government seems reluctant to reject.  “The original Taliban, which means “students,” were Pashtun refugees who fled Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and occupation.  They lived in refugee camps in Pakistan and were education in conservative Islamic religious schools, madrassas, largely funded by Saudi Arabia.  After the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, years of internal conflict, fueled by war lord rivalries, created a traumatized and weary population that embraced the Taliban’s promise of a return to peaceful Islamic ways.  The Taliban were seen as honest, fierce and devout.  However, as their hold on the country increased and their religious excesses became apparent, many Pashtuns and the international community rejected them.[140]”

            Militants aren’t the only ones streaming across the border from Afghanistan.  Afghan refugees have been a mainstay in Pakistan since the Soviet-Afghan war, and renewed fighting from the War on Terror has driven a new wave over the Durand Line.  Internally Displaced Persons from counterinsurgency strikes in Pakistan have displaced several hundred thousand people, and the recent 2010 flooding created between 10million and 20million additional IDPs.  “The heavy fighting [in 2008] and the military’s destructive practices in Swat and nearby districts triggered a flood of internally displaced persons.  Refugee organizations estimated that over three million people were displaced because of the fighting.  Some went to camps, but most found refuge with host families, rented accommodation or makeshift shelters.  Local militants took advantage of the displacement to enlist the popular support, provide assistance to IDPs, and recruit locals.[141]”

            Historically strained, the India-Pakistan relationship is unlikely to move past their nuclear détente, as each country’s identity is based in some part on the longstanding nuclear rivalry and battle for territorial sovereignty in the Jammu-Kashmir region.  Progress is being made on the latter, as India and Pakistan have begun “secret” backchannel talks as of summer 2010[142], and as recently as December 2010, China[143] began advocating for renewed efforts for a peaceful resolution on the high mountain border area. “It is critical that Pakistan understands the international community, not just the U.S. has a stake in uprooting terrorism from its tribal border areas… For instance, Washington should seek deeper engagement with Pakistani ally China, which shares U.S. concerns that Pakistan is becoming a hotbed of terrorist and Islamist radicals in the region.[144]”  Pakistan’s relationship with China[145] is historically strong, as they have shared diplomatic ties, military technologies, and economic exchange since the 1950s.  When faced with threats from India, as during their three previous wars, China pledges allegiance to Pakistan and promises military support in the event of another war over Kashmir.  The involvement of a greater spectrum of Pakistan’s neighbors will be necessary to influence Pakistani policies that are counterproductive to national and international interests, and these efforts should include India.  “It is in India’s interest to ensure that its involvement in Afghanistan is transparent to Pakistan.  The U.S. cannot impose normalcy between the two states, but it can continually point out that both countries’ interests would be served – now more than ever – by building better relations because both face existential terrorist threats.[146]” “The Pakistani civilian and military establishment must realize that using the Afghan Taliban as a political tool in their overall security strategy vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan is having serious negative security repercussions for Pakistan itself.[147]”  In cooperation with NATO, the ISAF, and the U.S., Pakistan should engage with its allies in the region and those tied to Pakistan by religion; they should “work more closely with allies and regional countries to encourage Pakistan to stiffen its resolve against terrorism and extremism and to promote greater stability in the country.  [They should] raise Pakistan as an issue to a higher level in U.S. bilateral diplomacy, particularly with countries that have good relations with Islamabad, such as China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states.[148]”

United States Government and Military

            The United States has been involved in the affairs of Pakistan since independence, and Pakistan remains a major non-NATO ally today.  Common interests for the two countries lie in the stability of the region, and the U.S. supports Pakistan with economic and military aid.  The U.S. supported Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War and through Pakistan, supplied mujahideen in Afghanistan battling against communist forces. (A conflict that can teach the U.S. a lot about the potential for protracted battle in the region “U.S. Policymakers should be cautious about deploying more troops to the region.  The experience of the Soviet Union’s 10-year occupation of Afghanistan should demonstrate to leaders in Washington how easily a modern army can become bogged down in a bloody, frustrating, and protracted guerilla war.[149]”)  During the military coup years and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, the U.S. enforced sanctions against Pakistan which limited the amount of foreign assistance and military technology entering the country.  Since 9/11 however, Pakistan has been a major ally in the War on Terrorism, providing logistical and intelligence resources but not allowing American boots on Pakistani soil in any effort to stem the flow of insurgents from Afghanistan into the Pakistani tribal areas.  The amount of money flowing from the U.S. to Pakistan is difficult to estimate, as it comes in the form of direct military aid of more than $1.5B per year for the next ten years plus an additional $7.5B in non-military aid over the next five years, reimbursements for technology and labor used by Pakistani forces fighting insurgents within their own borders, and likely other means of funding not publicly disclosed.  “For many years, the U.S. government has shoveled billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan without appropriate oversight.  Until aid to Pakistan is more properly monitored, prospects for true improvement of the situation in the tribal areas seem dim.[150]”   With a new, democratically elected government in Pakistan, the U.S. diplomatic community is focusing on efforts to strengthen the relationship between the two’s governments and militaries, and on improving the image of the United States among Pakistani citizens.    “The United States must therefore lead the way in helping Pakistan help itself, and bring others with it. ”

            Analysis of policies employed in Pakistan have aimed at determining what has or has not been working in terms of U.S. aid in Pakistan, and how to improve those outcomes to increase security and stability, and also to ensure greater accountability and transparency in how those funds are used.  Policymakers must “focus the majority of U.S. economic aid on projects in basic education, health care, water resource management, law enforcement, and justice programs, with the goal of developing state capacity to effectively deliver these services to the population… such assistance, however, must be performance-based, ad must be accompanied by rigorous oversight and accountability.  The era of the blank check is over.[151]”  While large aid flows will continue into Pakistan in the coming years, it is in the regional and international best interests that those dollars have a greater effect in improving living conditions for the average Pakistani if the U.S. is to redeem its image there.  “Only about one-tenth of U.S. assistance to Pakistan has gone directly to education, health care, governance, and other socioeconomic projects.  These U.S. policy choices on assistance have not played out well on the ground in Pakistan.  The more public focus on military assistance played into the widely held belief in country that the U.S. is interested only in the war on terrorism and not in the Pakistani people.[152]”  “Fifty-two percent of the population blames the United States for the violence occurring in Pakistan compared to only 8 percent who blame al-Qaeda.[153]”

            The U.S. needs to recognize those areas where increased or sustained assistance works against the interests of counterinsurgency operations, whether or not the Pakistani military establishment is ready to accept those determinations.  “The United States has disproportionately funded the army and Frontier Corps, while paying scant regard to the police and civilian investigatory institutions.  Yet the counter-insurgency literature consistently finds that civilian-led rather than army-led approaches ultimately prevail.[154]”  In particular, the use of anti-terror aid money is in many cases being used to reinforce the anti-India armaments already in place along the Pakistani-Indian border and in the Kashmir region.  “Policymakers should maintain tighter oversight on the distribution of military aid and the sale of dual-use weapons systems to Pakistan, especially those that have limited utility for counterterrorism operations but instead feed Pakistan’s rivalry with India.[155]”  While no longer a military dictatorship, the Pakistani security sector remains a powerful instrument of policy, and perhaps one relied upon too strongly as a result of Musharraf’s years in power.  “By emphasizing its support for civilian government while simultaneously building a more trusting relationship with the military, the United States seeks to create a stable civil-military relationship that will not cycle back and forth between regimes.  Military aid/training is one mechanism that can provide leverage over the Pakistani military establishment in a more positive manner than simply threatening the stick of sanctions.[156]”  “How can the United States manage its relationship with the military? First, it needs to offer consistent support for democratic rule even when unpopular, inefficient, or acting against U.S. interests… Though it will trigger dismay from some sectors of Pakistani opinion, material aid and training should continue to be linked to military restraint in the political arena. ”

            A major concern for the United States is the negative image it has among Pakistanis, and how that negative image is being harnessed to further inflame and radicalize the population.  “U.S. engagement with civil-society groups in worth continuing, and support for democratic rule is generally more popular than backing a military dictator.  The United States appears to be paying much more attention to the media and opposition parties than in the past, which is a positive step.[157]”  Despite a shift in public opinion about the impact of the insurgency on the average Pakistani, with more of the population realizing that these fighters are not benign neighbors but a threat to life and security, “these shifting views of militants has not, however, led to more positive views of the United States.  Over 70% of Pakistanis oppose any U.S. military action in the tribal areas of the country, and a growing majority of Pakistanis (80%) oppose Pakistani cooperation with the United States in the war on terrorism.[158]”  So what is America to do, when action is desperately needed to fight international terrorism, but the population in the area of operation is hostile to any American intervention on their soil?  In terms of military intervention “policymakers should recognize that large-scale military action in Pakistan’s tribal areas will further radicalize the regions indigenous population and should be deemphasized in favor of low-level clear-and-hold operations, which employ small numbers of U.S. Special Operations Forces and Pakistan’s Special Services group.[159]” In terms of economic and social reforms “the United States needs to step back from goals of reforming Pakistani society and forging national harmony to instead seek strategic room to maneuver on a few key issues.  U.S. interests in South Asia are important – a stable Pakistan, an Afghanistan largely free of al Qaeda, a friendly India – but Washington’s involvement ultimately must be limited.  The United States can achieve core goals with a mix of containment, diplomacy, and aid, while avoiding expansive, enervating commitments of dubious value.[160]”  Either way, progress will be essential for regional success in the War on Terror; “Over the next year or two, a greater effort must be made by both Islamabad and Washington to disrupt the Taliban and al Qaeda safe havens in FATA.  Without success on that front, the U.S.-NATO mission next door in Afghanistan is likely to fail.[161]”

            So far, the Obama administration and the legislature have made headway in improving relations with Pakistan.   “The [Biden-Lugar] legislation aims to transform the relationship from what Senator Biden terms “transactional” to a deeper, broader effort that connects the Pakistani population to America.[162]”  The Pakistan Policy Working Group sees diplomacy as a window into Pakistan, recommending that we “invest in U.S. institutions and personnel in Pakistan to support long-term engagement in the region.  Expand the mission of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Agency for International Development in terms of physical structure and personnel and invest more in training diplomats and other government officials who will dedicate their careers to the region[163]” as continued efforts to support economic development through trade incentives and investment in sectors such as textiles can break the chains of poverty and offer Pakistanis more control over their lives.  “The Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation… in bringing economic and job opportunities to the troubled NWFP and eventually the tribal border areas… is a vital component of our non-military efforts to uproot terrorism from the tribal areas.[164]”  Transparent investment by the U.S. in development projects and economic growth will likely do more to change opinions than lip service.  “A profusion of friendly statements, advertising campaigns, and low-impact projects are no substitute for helping to construct core infrastructure, seriously engaging with the spectrum of political leaders rather than focusing on any “indispensable men,” and avoiding the impression of micro-managing Pakistani politics.[165]”

            Pakistan has proven itself difficult to operate in for external military forces.  Anti-U.S. sentiment makes even successful missions easy for locals to hate.  “Unilateral U.S. actions have successfully eliminated several terrorist targets, but have also resulted in civilian casualties and charges of violating Pakistan’s sovereignty, which have outraged the Pakistani public.[166]”  While retaining positive relations with Pakistan’s government and military are essential diplomatic issues for the U.S., if future efforts within Pakistan remain ineffective at stemming the insurgent tide, additional unilateral action may be necessary to ensure global security.  “Until the Pakistan government demonstrates that it is ready and willing to act aggressively against the terrorist targets that threaten the international community, the U.S. may find it necessary to conduct unilateral strikes on targets in the tribal areas.  However the U.S. will need to be circumspect on the extent to which it relies on such strikes, recognizing that each strike carries the cost of undermining U.S. long-term objectives of stabilizing Pakistan and preventing radical forces from strengthening in the country.[167]”  “From counterterrorism to nuclear proliferation to human-intelligence sharing and transporting of supplies for NATO operations, continued cooperation with the Pakistani government is critical for advancing U.S. policies in the region.[168]”

            Barred from most military operation on the ground in Pakistan, the U.S. military would like to engage in COIN operations in the tribal areas, with a focus on clear-hold-and-build strategies in concert with Pakistani forces (so far denied by Pakistani command) combined with general humanitarian aid work desperately needed by rural Pakistanis, even without the added challenge of a hidden insurgency in their midst.  However even these kinds of efforts are subject to criticism; “Many development NGOs argue that the military’s work on development projects blurs the line between civilians and the military, putting civilians at greater risk of violence.  Many within the NGO community are equally critical of how the military designs and implements development programs, which they argue reflect the strategic needs of the coalition forces more than the needs of local communities.[169]”  The alternative being considered is to publicly and transparently hand over supplies and funds directly to Pakistan and allow distribution by Pakistani officials, giving them the chance for acclaim but also forcing them to shoulder criticism if and when those supplies are misused, misallocated, or fail to reach the rural, tribal populations.  “Until the Pakistan government demonstrates that it is ready and willing to act aggressively against the terrorist targets that threaten the international community, the U.S. may find it necessary to conduct unilateral strikes on targets in the tribal areas.  However the U.S. will need to be circumspect on the extent to which it relies on such strikes, recognizing that each strike carries the cost of undermining U.S. long-term objectives of stabilizing Pakistan and preventing radical forces from strengthening in the country.[170]”  In essence, the U.S. needs to continue its aid to Pakistan to maintain a critical strategic ally in Central Asia, and that aid can be distributed through NGOs (“It is tempting to rely on international donor agencies to quickly deliver the services the public expects.  This approach, although likely to improve conditions in the group because it bypasses local government institutions, may, however, undermine the legitimacy and capacity-building of the local government, which is key to the long-term sustainability of development efforts.[171]“), through U.S. military aid (difficult as mentioned above), or through Pakistani government infrastructure, a broken, corrupt, and opaque system.  The American-Pakistani relationship is thus a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t situation will little prospect of resolution in the near future.

Conflict Profile: The Political, Economic, Cultural and Ecological Context in Pakistan

            The political situation in Pakistan is historically unpredictable, with cycles of democratic and military rule starting at independence and continuing until today.  In recent history, General Pervez Musharraf led the Pakistani government after a bloodless coup in 1999 in which he assumed vast executive powers.  In 2001 he became President and delegated some of those powers to elected Prime Ministers.  Musharraf nominally allied himself with the U.S. led ‘war on terrorism’ beginning in 2001, and assisted NATO forces with supply lines and military backing for their campaign in Afghanistan, however with the regional history of instability and shifting powers, he failed in practice to fully dedicate governmental and military efforts against all insurgent, terrorist, and fundamentalist groups.  “Some U.S. officials have found it difficult to understand that Pakistan could be supporting the Afghan Taliban while taking losses fighting the Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other foes of the state.  It is unclear whether Pakistani agencies are working at cross-purposes or the Pakistani leadership is intentionally playing a double game.[172]”  The necessity of this duplicity  lies in how historically unstable Central Asia has been in terms of leadership and alliances; deeply ingrained in region culture is the need to create potential future alliances with groups who might assume power in the future, namely for Musharraf, the Afghan Taliban.  The Pakistani public and government are unsure of how the situation in Afghanistan will evolve; this combined with anti-U.S. sentiments and resistance to U.S. assistance in establishing democratic rule and development within civil society actors causes a tendency to keep all options open.  “The Pakistani Taliban is undermining the state’s sovereignty, and Pakistani security forces have been unable to gain the upper hand.  The government has pursued peace deals in the region, which have given these groups a degree of legitimacy and have allowed them to operate more freely… The international community cannot accept the establishment of terrorist bases anywhere, including along the border with Afghanistan.  So far, Pakistani peace deals have reinforced, not uprooted, those sanctuaries.[173]”

            Recent developments in public opinion show a decrease in the popularity of insurgent groups, and increased support for Pakistani military response to their presence in the tribal areas.  Much of this sentiment has evolved from increases in acts of violence within Pakistan as well as terrorist activities in neighboring India which could sour relations between the two countries and lead to further hostilities.  For two nations primed for and prone to go to war with each other, the situation has become untenable.  Combined with a new government eager to appear strong on terrorism and cement positive relations with the U.S. and the international community, there is renewed capacity to mount a counterinsurgent force that might actually have an impact on ousting or capturing fundamentalists in KP (NWFP), FATA, and Baluchistan.  “The U.S. has an obvious stake in the success of elected government in Pakistan.  Popular frustrations could lead to domestic agitation and violence.  A deeply disillusioned public created opportunities for a widening appeal of extremist groups and the possible ascendance of jihadi elements.  If political fragmentation sparks divisions within the military, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could fall into unfriendly hands.[174]”  By accepting the assistance of U.S. Special Forces in adopting counterinsurgency tactics, aid from the U.S. government to upgrade military hardware essential to those strategies, and limited on-the-ground action of a collaborative force to include Pakistani, U.S., and NATO forces, Pakistan could potentially eliminate the national and international threat of terrorism within its own borders.  “The current struggle for Afghanistan and the borderland of Pakistan would be best waged through law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and as light a military footprint as possible.[175]”

            Longstanding poverty in Pakistan is a major problem underlying issues of security, stability, national unity, equality, and standards of living.  Lack of sufficient funding at the governmental level means an inadequate national infrastructure and inequitable sharing of human and natural resources.  Underfunded police forces lack the training and equipment needed to act effectively against civil unrest and terrorism.  Underpaid civil servants are subject to bribes and graft as a means of supplementing their income, weakening the integrity of local, regional, and national government.  Poor physical infrastructure means that rural populations are physically isolated from urban centers; provisions to support local schools and clinics rarely make the full journey from the central government to those in need, and as demonstrated by the 2010 flooding, humanitarian aid cannot reach those areas without a serviceable roadway.  National poverty, as indicated by Pakistan’s Low Income Country status, deepens societal divisions as scare resources are distributed in a system rife with nepotism; those ethnicities, religions, and regional groups lacking a powerful voice in the central government are likely to remain marginalized.  Poverty increases the level of insecurity in Pakistan, and in an unfortunate feedback cycle, the instability within Pakistan sustains its poverty; to break this cycle on either side – security or economy – could potentially invert this cycle, allowing security and economic growth to reinforce each other. “The distribution of wealth is not uniform across the constituents of TTP with Waziristan Taliban having the largest share of the booty… ultimately the thing that might keep the TTP together may not be the ideology so much but money, the same way as money propelled the movement into a position of strength in the first place.  Money is also a vulnerability that can be exploited to bring down the organization.[176]”

            Cultural tensions are a constant problem for Pakistan, and they result in conflict, violence, civil unrest, and inequality nationwide.  The founding dream of a peaceful Pakistan united by a common religion, and guided by unadulterated Islamic principles of a just and prosperous society is unraveled by deep seated divisions between tribes, ethnic groups, and their associated class systems.  Minority religious groups such as Christians and Hindus are not only marginalized but often targets of violence.  Sunni-Shia divisions are an additional source of religious tension, not unlike most Islamic countries.  Tribal areas have intentionally been left out of the central government, ostensibly to allow autonomous rule for ethnic Pashtuns and Balochs with their elaborate cultural systems of governance isolated by rugged terrain, but just as likely as a means of excluding large portions of the population from the limited national kitty.  Separatists in the Jammu-Kashmir region identify more strongly as Kashmiri than as Pakistani.  With the influence of Islamic fundamentalists, further divisions arise based on adherence with Sharia law or resistance to such austere cultural norms, and the underlying debate about what makes someone a good Muslim.  The debate over secularism versus Islamism in life and government forms another layer to the development of cultural divisions.

            As is seen in other ethnically and culturally diverse countries, multiculturalism doesn’t have to be a source of conflict for Pakistan.  As an Islamic Republic and a parliamentary democracy, Pakistan can and must embrace the peaceful tenets of pure Islam while also embodying the egalitarian principles of democracy.  Colonel Ellen Haring has identified some strategies for conflict resolution that can embrace cultural differences in the name of national security and prosperity.  “Identity-based conflict resolution theory recommends a number of strategies for reducing conflict.  The following strategies are recommended for this conflict: First, there must be a serious effort to embrace and accommodate the Pashtun ethnic cultural practices in order to reduce threat to ethnic identity.  Second, a concerted effort must be developed that returns power to tribal elders who will counter religious extremisms’ efforts to mobilize the Pashtuns around the grievances associated with ethnic identity threat.  Third, there should be a parallel project that delegitimizes Taliban authority.  Last there must be programs to develop a national identity that is inclusive of and recognizes the contributions of all ethnic groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[177]”  However, this approach would require honest dedication to the effort of conflict resolution at all levels of society, and extensive work at the civil society level to infuse these methods into the public.  Such an effort requires not only political will, but also funding and experienced conflict resolution educators, resources in scarce supply in Pakistan at this time.  It will take national and international political will as well as significant monetary investment, likely from an international donor or agency, to pull off a nationwide cultural retuning towards tolerance and moderation.

            Environmental concerns are an increasing problem for Pakistan.  Natural resource reserves lie in some of the more conflict-prone areas of Pakistan, with gemstones in Kashmir and petroleum reserves in Baluchistan.  As with any developing country, most rural Pakistanis rely on subsistence farming, making pollution, water, and land ownership major issues of contention.  Satellite imagery of the 2010 flooding shows massive redistribution of silt and devastation of crop lands that will likely interfere with the ability of farmers to grow crops in the upcoming growing season.  In a country where food insecurity and malnutrition is a problem in the best of years the damage caused by flooding will likely lead to a humanitarian emergency level food crisis in the coming months.  Extraction of energy resources in Baluchistan is an ongoing source of contention in Pakistan.  While the majority of the nation’s reserves lie under Baloch tribal lands, it is the urban centers and the more powerful provinces of Punjab and Singh that use most of those resources without compensating locals.  In a further effort to separate the Baloch people from their natural wealth, extraction and processing plants are staffed with workers from abroad, specifically excluding Balochs and denying them the potential for employment.  “Baluchistan is a province straddling Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan inhabited by twelve million Baloch people.  Historically autonomous and culturally distinct from other areas of Pakistan and Iran, Baluchistan has never enjoyed political or economic autonomy.  The province has been a source of constant conflict and instability for decades because of its geo-political position and natural wealth.[178]”

Another case illustration of the inequity in Pakistani society is seen in the use of Indus waters throughout Pakistan. A tenuous and carefully constructed Indus Waters Treaty represents efforts by the World Bank to allocate Indus tributaries to India and Pakistan.   “What had been a laboratory for devising water management solutions has become an arena of conflict over water both between India and Pakistan, and between ethnic groups and provinces in Pakistan… this lack of cooperative sharing of water leaves the ecological and social consequences of the Indus Waters Treaty to be negotiated and contested at the subnational level, which has considerable negative consequences for the ecology and societies of the Indus basin.[179]”  Developments along those tributaries including dams for power and water storage can be a source of tension between the two nations; so far, negotiations and outside influences have managed to keep things copacetic.  Internally however, Pakistan faces a major conflict between provinces over the unequal sharing of water by overuse upstream, denying the tribal areas their fair share; “The ongoing interprovincial argument over water distribution in Pakistan has potential – though entirely avoidable – repercussions for stability, both at the subnational and international levels… The [Kalabagh water storage] dam project is in cold storage, particularly on account of the combined opposition of not just Sindh but also of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.[180]”  As the water table is depleted, sea water is absorbed in its place causing the groundwater in the tribal lowlands of Baluchistan become saline and unsuitable for farming.  While power and opportunity are concentrated in the urban centers among ethnicities who have traditionally been in power such as Punjabis and Sindhis, the tribal areas are denied access not only to natural resource supplies and revenues and opportunities for employment, but even to the water needed to survive by subsistence farming.

Looking at the myriad conflict contexts in Pakistan, it is no wonder that it is seen as a failing state or a state in crisis.  Given its important central geo-political location, the many internal conflicts listed above, ongoing tensions with India, suspicion of Afghanistan’s leadership and intentions, fluctuating and somewhat isolationist national governance, and its status as a nuclear power, the conflict situation in Pakistan is, and should be, of the highest global concern.  Effectively addressing and ameliorating Pakistan’s problems requires an assessment not only of the various actors involved (above), but also an understanding of the various ways in which relationships and actions culminate in causing conflict.

 

Causes[181]

Structural Causes

            Structural causes of conflict are those factors which have become built into the politics, structure and fabric of society and may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict, including governance, economic, security, and socio-cultural factors.  Listed as specific examples of structural causes are illegitimate or poor governance, lack of political participation, lack of equal economic and social opportunities, or inequitable access to natural resources; Pakistan suffers from every one of these causes either regionally or nationally.

            Pakistan’s history of governance is one of constant infighting for power, allegations of corruption and criminal activity, periodic military coups and the accumulation of governing power in the military establishment, centralization at the expense of the periphery, and general toothlessness of the civilian leadership.  Given the limitations of government to reach all corners of the country and the historical reluctance of people from the tribal regions to engage in the central government, it is no wonder that the rural and tribal populations remain marginalized, isolated, and excluded from most economic and social processes.  Hegemony of the ruling classes adds to the divide between tribal and central Pakistan, further excluding the lower classes as well as rural populations and any of the extreme minorities of religion or ethnicity from political involvement, economic opportunity, and civil society.  A poor country with about 180 million people, Pakistan faces problems of resource availability beginning with basic needs such as food, clean water, and education; between corruption, servicing foreign debts, supporting the seventh largest military on earth, and hegemonic distribution policies, resources are not distributed equally throughout the republic, a frequent source of unrest, outrage, and conflict.

Proximate Causes

            Proximate causes of conflict are those factors which contribute to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, apparently symptomatic of deeper problems within the context of a given conflict.  Listed as specific examples of proximate causes are an uncontrolled security sector, light weapons proliferation, human rights abuses, destabilizing role of neighbor states, and the role of the diaspora community; here again, the conflict in Pakistan can be tied to all of these factors.

            The dual allegiance of the Pakistani security sector both with NATO and the U.S. against insurgent forces, and with some of those forces themselves has prolonged a conflict that might otherwise have been squashed with the combined efforts of international and Pakistani forces in the KP (NWFP), FATA and Baluchistan, and Afghanistan.  Weapons caches left over from the Mujahidin’s war with the Soviets have been supplemented by resource-rich al-Qaeda, foreign militants in the area to join the anti-Western jihad, weapons stores seized from the tribal armies, and a black market for weapons and explosives that is active within some of Pakistan’s cities.  Human rights abuses from violence against women to torture as an interrogation technique to executions of prisoners is seen in Pakistan on the governmental, paramilitary and militia levels.  As Pakistani and U.S. forces advance on militant positions and take out high value targets with drone strikes, an increasingly frustrated fundamentalist insurgency enforces harsher Sharia laws, executes suspected collaborators, and finds more creative way to strike out at the secular public.  The uncertainty of the Pakistani government about the stability of neighboring Afghanistan leads them to support the Afghan Taliban while striking out at the Pakistani Taliban.  China is a close Pakistani ally and provides military and nuclear technology to the government; nuclear tensions are a major factor prolonging the Indo-Pakistani antagonism.  China’s tensions with India make their allegiance with Pakistan more than diplomatic; China has pledged military support if India attempts to invade Pakistani territory.  Pakistanis living abroad contribute large remittances to their families, development projects, and political parties.  It is through international and diaspora funding that most Pakistani Islamic militant groups are able to pay their fighters, give generously to tribal leaders for their cooperation and silence, import and stockpile weapons, and operate divisions such as As-Sahab “the cloud”, the media arm of Al Qaeda which wages a propaganda war of its own.  Such propaganda serves to inflame the Pakistani public against the military, the central government, and the “interference” of the United States.  These diaspora monies are supplemented by taxes enforced through zakat,“ groups like LJ and HuM, which are now part of the TTP, are giving money that they are collecting in Sindh and Punjab provinces to the Pakistan Taliban as gifts or Sadaqa (donation) in return for sanctuary, training, and ideological support[182]” and direct criminal activity, “according to Karachi police, outfits like LJ, JeM, HuM and many other religious and militant groups are involved in robberies for raising money for their activities.[183]”

New Factors Prolonging Conflict

            Factors that cause conflicts to become protracted are a major contributor to the negative state of coexistence in Pakistan; potential prolonging factors include radicalization of parties in conflict, establishment of paramilitaries, development of a war economy, increased human rights violations, weapons availability, and the development of a culture of fear.  Each and every one of these factors is present in Pakistan, making the conflict ripe for further escalation and contributing to the intractable nature of the conflict in Pakistan.

            Islamic militants have infiltrated the tribal areas of Pakistan, bringing with them a fundamentalist Islamic culture that they are intent on imposing on the local people.  As their efforts are frustrated by counterinsurgent operations and civil society begins to reject the presence of their occupiers, these militias seek to exert and extend their control over the people by enforcing more severe forms of Sharia, terrorizing the local people in the name of their version of Islam.  As the region, never secure or peaceful by any standard, grows more and more unstable, Agents within the conflict respond to that uncertainty by developing militant wings or creating alliances of fighting groups; political parties have splinter factions used to bomb and attack rivals while Islamic forces in Pakistan have come together under the umbrella paramilitary group, TTP.  Human rights violations, mentioned before, have been increasing at the hands of the insurgents in retaliation for the success of U.S. drone strikes and Pakistani paramilitary and army operations in the tribal theater.  What for several years remained mostly as a détente between Islamists in the tribal areas and the Pakistani government and military in the capital territory and major provinces is now active antagonism, propaganda, violent takeover of cities with imposition of Sharia and operations against one another; much of the increase in fighting and efforts by the Pakistani regular and irregular forces is due to U.S. military aid, weaponry, and counterinsurgency intelligence and strategy.  Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by this fighting in the tribal regions; mass abandonment of homes and villages reflects the culture of fear that is growing among rural people, while incessant suicide bombings and attacks in major cities across Pakistan leave the urban population on edge.  As the Pakistani security sector remains uncertain about COIN strategies yet step up military action against militants embedded in some extremely rugged and difficult terrain to clear, these factors combine in an environment and culture where conflict is unlikely to end on its own, or soon.  The Pakistani conflict situation in the Baluchistan and the northwest provinces could potentially drag on for decades if effective strategies are not developed and employed at the public, legislative, military and diplomatic levels.

Triggers

            Triggers of conflict are those single events, acts, or anticipation thereof that will set off or escalate a conflict situation.  Listed as specific examples of triggers are elections, arrest or assassination of key leaders or political figures, natural disaster, sudden collapse of local currency, military coup, escalating unemployment, capital flight, and scarcity of basic commodities; in Pakistan’s history most of these triggers have led to riots, violence, terrorism and war.  Since 2001, major triggers have included frequent political developments in Pakistan including elections, rigged elections, coup d’états, arrest and prosecution of key figures, mysterious deaths and assassination attempts, both successful and unsuccessful; protest and rioting are not uncommon responses, nor are the development of opposition parties and opposition militants in response to these events.  In the past decade, Pakistan has seen its share of natural and human disasters; the 2005 earthquake, 2010 flooding, widespread hunger and low human development indexes and poverty keep people desperate, angry, displaced and dispossessed.  Inadequate government response enraged the people further, stirring anti-government activities and anti-Western sentiment with the catalyst of Islamist propaganda stirring the pot.  Economic considerations cause problems in Pakistan too, as poverty and hunger, unemployment and underdevelopment, injection of insurgent funding and media coverage of shady land deals all act to trigger local and regional conflicts between the people, the insurgents, and the security sector.

Factors Contributing to Peace

            When speaking of causation, it is clear that Pakistan makes a nearly perfect case study of conflict; almost every recognized factor that contributes to instability and violence can be found within her borders.  This begs the question: is there any reason to believe the conflict in Pakistan can be solved?  An arduous and lengthy task, yes, but there are factors indicating the potential for conflict reduction, given appropriate insight, effort, investment and dedication.  Factors that pave the road to peace include communication channels between opposing parties, demobilization processes, reform programs, civil society commitment to peace, and anti-discrimination policies.  The presence of these factors in Pakistan is somewhat limited at present, but governments, organizations, and individuals continue to be committed to the process.

            At the global level, Pakistan’s leadership has expressed interest in resolving the contention with India over Kashmir through bilateral talks, and like most countries in the region, they rely on the U.S. as a coordinator for diplomacy and joint military activities against terrorism.  “Washington has situated itself in the middle in an effort to create more alignments and to act as a regional coordinator.  This position may hold more peril than promise since it lets the regional actors make demands on the United States.[184]” Collective, intensive efforts are likely the only way of shaking off the fundamentalist hold from Pakistan.  Bilateral efforts to resolve the Line of Control issue in Kashmir serve to lower the intensity of tensions between India and Pakistan, freeing their governments to increase their cooperation and transparency about nuclear issues, Afghanistan, and terrorism.   Legislation in Pakistan to reduce the powers of the President, further democratize national policy, protect women, minorities, and tribal ethnic groups against discrimination; time will tell if these policies are enforced, and if so, how effective they are in promoting a culture of coexistence in Pakistan.  Nationally, the military and government have also begun to collaborate with tribal armies, finally working in tandem against their shared threats.  Past attempts to strike peace deals with the militants have proven ineffective, and any future deal that leaves the fundamentalists in power will only stoke the insurgency further.  Unless these armies are willing to disarm, peace treaties will not make a breakthrough in stability for Pakistan.  Civil society may be one of the strongest factors in stabilizing Pakistan and eliminating or deintensifying the conflict seated along the Durand Line.  Shifts in public opinion against the activities and presence of these groups allow local leaders and national government to step up activities against national and international fighting groups embedded in Pakistan.  Joint media peace efforts by Indian and Pakistani media outlets use the weapon of propaganda to promote peace and reconciliation in Kashmir.  Continued and increased efforts by civil society actors, NGOs, peace advocates, local and national government may prove the silver bullet for a conflict that just won’t die.

Dynamics

            Conflict Dynamics and trends are the resulting ways that the Actors, Profile, and Causes of a particular conflict interact to produce the situations and events specific to that context.  Each group of actors share a viewpoint that is distinct from the other groups, is based on their own interpretation of the situation, past and present, and informs their unique pattern of action in the conflict.  Describing the conflict dynamic identifies these viewpoints, as well as conflict trends, windows of opportunity to change the status quo, and begins the process of proposing scenarios as to how the conflict might play out.  A timeline[185] tracks major events contributing to Pakistani unrest, nationwide.

Opposing Viewpoints

            Major groupings of viewpoints include Islamic militant groups, tribal groups, central government, security sector, the Pakistani general public, and international (primarily U.S.) governments.  How each sees the context in light of themselves versus the other groups sheds light on the complexities faced in the fight to achieve peace and stability in Pakistan and the region.

            Islamists see Pakistan as an Islamic Republic overrun by a secular and Western tainted government.  They have been tossed out of their enclaves in Afghanistan, where they lived as they desired under increasingly harsh Taliban rule and Sharia law.  Now they want to rebuild that culture in its most extreme forms upon the many individual cultures of tribes in the Pashtun belt.  Any local who resists or assists the central government, and by proxy the U.S., is seen as a traitor and a non-Muslim subject to eviction or execution in the name of fundamentalist purity.

            Tribal people have lived in relative peace and security amongst themselves for generations, guided by Pashtunwali and the tribal Jirga process.  Intermixed with the Pashtun and Baloch people are a variety of foreign groups and their families, left in the region after uniting to fight alongside the Afghans to oust the Soviet threat in the 1980s.  Separated geographically and legislatively from central Pakistan, tribal peoples are politically and physically marginalized despite large humanitarian aid packages to the central government.  “To ensure that U.S. economic assistance for the FATA is effective, the U.S. should encourage the Pakistani government to begin meaningful discussions about political liberalization of the region.[186]”  Now these people find their land overrun by fundamentalist insurgents, initially proposing benign cultural changes and hospitality in exchange for large sums of money, but having evolved into outright occupation and terror by their occupiers.  Initial, bloody fights between Pakistan and these groups left many dead, many more violated, and hundreds of thousands displaced; the tribal belt was stuck between two foes and was taking the brunt of the collateral damage and collective punishment.  Now, with U.S. drone strikes shifting the balance of power and security of insurgents, tribal armies are becoming emboldened to fight back and reclaim their homes, and herald the strikes as arbiters of their liberation while the insurgents, becoming angry and desperate take out their frustrations violently on the public.  These rural people and isolated cities have reasons to be discontent with the central government and any forces on the ground, as they remain largely excluded from the process.  “A key challenge that integrating development strategies into COIN will face in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is how best to involve local communities in the design and implementation of the development projects… reestablishing human capital and restoring destroyed communal relations are essential to the long-term success of such programs.  The same is true in an environment where conflict has not yet ended.[187]”  Until the fight leaves their territory, latent aggravation will remain alongside historically grounded and striking levels of poverty and malnutrition.  “Placing more emphasis on the development of the agricultural sector, which employs about 80% [of the population] but until now has been largely neglected, could generate much needed employment and improve the living conditions of the population, thus raising people’s expectations for the future.”

            The central government of Pakistan is just regaining its democratic foothold after the martial law and Islamization brought by Musharraf, and the turmoil that was the early stages of that evolution with exiles and assassinations.  With power divided between the government and the entrenched security sector, there is only so much that the President, Parliament and PM Zardari can do vis-à-vis the security situation.  Toothless diplomacy has fallen out of favor, leaving NATO and the U.S. to deal directly with the military, which compounds the initial balance of power issue for Pakistan.  “The Obama administration has continued to directly engage with the army as a strategic interlocutor, undermining the attempt to re-balance the military’s role in politics.[188]” Yet the central government and individual leaders take the brunt of negative public opinion, outcry, and potential threats of removal from office or military coup, should public opinion become inflamed enough.  Pressure to ally with NATO forces is intense, and yet the memory of the effect Afghani governmental instability has on Pakistan leads the central government to waffle in its position on international forces fighting in Afghanistan.  Pakistan’s government sees itself in a nearly impossible position, wedged in the crux of a NATO, Islamist, Nationalist, Afghani, Indian web; leaders must read carefully if they are to remain in power and in favor long enough to make positive developments on behalf of their countrymen.

            Pakistan’s security sector includes the army, paramilitary forces, irregulars, and conscripted militant groups from Kashmir and the tribal areas as needed.  Aside from the delicate game they are playing between attacking the TTP and anti-Pakistan militias while supporting or ignoring Afghan forces, the military is in a relatively stable position.  With political hegemony, accumulated power, 22% of the national budget and direct channels to international governments, the remnants of martial rule keep Pakistan’s military establishment comfortable enough to reject external assistance (aside from training, equipment and intelligence), keep the central government on its toes, and hold decision making power with regards to troop deployment division between an anti-Indian position to an anti-terror position.  They see the U.S. as a strong and vital ally, but decry any U.S. activities that make it into the news as violations of sovereignty to save face, despite eight years of covert drone support at a Pakistani air base.  Reluctantly, the military has begun to regard the tribal militias not as separatists but as allied in the fight against terrorists.  The security sector will remain a key actor as they weigh the pros and cons of wholesale militant elimination versus an anti-TTP, pro-Afghan position versus a strategy of isolating the insurgency to the tribal areas and ignoring it.  Having nuclear capability makes the consideration of the military by allies and foes alike essential, and it keeps the military confident in its ultimate power to retain control of Pakistan.

            The Pakistani public has long been critical of the West, of U.S. involvement in Pakistani affairs, in the effectiveness of government; much of this tendency for outrage is nurtured by insurgent-funded propaganda and that of opposing political parties.  With an explosion of news sources and reporting on the situation, as well as the spate of attacks on central Pakistani targets, it seems the public has become a little more critical, cynical, and curious about what is actually happening around them.  While sentiments about the U.S. have not changed much, support for anti-al Qaeda and anti-militant operations has increased.  The government is still seen as toothless, but the activist public keeps their hopes up and their eyes open for change during this new parliamentary democratic era.  The military is still seen as scary, Punjab-dominated, and power hungry, but support for their missions into the tribal areas has gone up as advances are made in clearing and holding territory.

            Finally, the U.S. government and military are watching the situation closely.  The region is highly unstable, a breeding ground for fundamentalism, speckled with hideouts, caches and training camps, impoverished and deprived to a level that makes local resistance weak if honorable, centralized and militarized to the degree that talks with central government cannot guarantee action in the far flung corners and direct negotiations with the military are more effective, geostrategically important as a crux between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia while geographically some of the hardest territory to fight in, socially, culturally and ethnically complex with many languages, histories and traditional forms of government, and containing two nuclear powers who like to poke each other with sticks periodically; the ongoing conflict in the region is of the highest global importance.  Working with Pakistan is tricky, as the Islamic republic is fiercely protective of its national sovereignty; assistance must be handed over in bulk at the risk of corruption, offered and implemented in secret as the public is fickle, steered through a complex web of national and international civil society actors, or in the best case scenario with changing governments and opinions, reconfigured entirely for a new, effective and hopefully final approach in the war on terror.

Windows of Opportunity

            Newfound receptivity to pursuing military action in the tribal areas has cleared some areas, increased accuracy and frequency of U.S. drone strikes taking out key leaders of the insurgency, public opinion leaning against foreign militants, a fledgling democratic government eager to stabilize the nation and focus on development, increased order and reconstruction beginning in Afghanistan, progress on Kashmir, and even the disruption and inflow of humanitarian aid and development assistance brought by the 2010 flooding all represent windows of opportunity to swing the conflict through its most violent phases, eliminate or disarm and reform insurgents, and bring Pakistan into a period of de-escalation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  With proper coordination and assistance, Pakistan could harness these little slivers of opportunity collectively and use them in creating momentum and progress towards peace.

Scenarios

            The best case scenario or optimal outcome in Pakistan would see a coordinated international effort using COIN to locate and eliminated fundamentalist insurgent factions throughout Afghanistan with simultaneous international development and reconstruction projects beginning in the most remote, marginalized, and underdeveloped areas in Pakistan with a focus on sustainability and as much autonomy of control over basic services as possible.  This would be coupled with resolution or increased confidence regarding Kashmir.  This kind of approach would clear the countryside of violent and fundamentalist groups looking to control the population and use them as recruits, hosts, and human shields.  It would be implemented with regard and respect for Pashtunwali, the tribal Jirga, and the spirit and capabilities of tribal peoples, and in direct consultation with those people.  “Local communities do not always feel that they have been sufficiently consulted during the process of design and implementation.  Without such consultations and community input, many projects, however well-intentioned, remain alien and disconnected from the needs and realities of ordinary people.[189]”  A higher standard of living increases public confidence and personal agency, allowing tribal elders to maintain order and raise armies in defense against remnant militant groups; stability originating in the poorest and historically overlooked regions would spread to the four main provinces of Pakistan and in lifting the existential worries of terrorism, allow the new government to fully explore the possibilities of democracy including strengthened human rights laws, reform and the elimination of corruption, equitable and effective infrastructure projects, and advances in the delivery of education and healthcare.  Tensions and occasional conflict at the civil society level would remain as a normal feature of any evolving and growing culture, but wholesale war with India and terrorist threats would drop off of the radar.

            The status quo scenario, if current trends continue would see much the same activity in rural Pakistan as was seen in 2010, with the U.S.  launching drone strikes in the tribal regions every day or two, retaliatory and ideological bombings happening throughout Pakistan on roughly the same frequency, pockets of autonomy and resistance where tribal groups unite to repel insurgents, and spillover agitation in Kashmir with Islamic militants causing disruption balanced with renewed bilateral talks on the issue.  Pakistan would continue to be suspect of Afghanistan and India’s intentions there.  Public opinion would continue to gradually shift in favor of counterinsurgency as militant tactics become more brutal, but occasional anti-Western protests would result from the rhetoric and propaganda associated with the drone strikes and limited Special Forces operations.  Progress would be made on gaining back territory and diplomatic pressures would eventually lead to development projects in the more stable enclaves, and in a decade or so, stability and total elimination of extremism within Pakistan’s borders might be accomplished.  The downside of this outcome, however, is a protracted conflict at less than total war levels but punctuated with suicide attack, loss of life, human rights abuses, destruction of property, continued deplacement of people, continued hunger and poverty.  Monetary and human investments by Pakistan, the U.S. and NATO allies as well as Pakistani allies like China, the Gulf States and possibly Iran (depending on the situation there in the coming years) would continue to grow as the hunt for the leadership of al Qaeda and the terror cell making industry drags on.  Eventually either enough time will have passed, enough operations have been successful, and enough intelligently designed civil programs are implemented by the international war on terror that it will have slashed capacity and killed most of the insurgency, leaving only sporatic attacks by disorganized and underfunded splinter cells to contend with. Alternatively, this could be the next Vietnam, and the war on terror will abandon its COIN policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, adopting a policy that contains the Islamic militancy in known pockets such as Indonesia and Pakistan, and feeds national security industries worldwide as the constant chess game of intelligence and counterintelligence goes on indefinitely.

            The very worst case scenario or worse possible outcome in Pakistan would end in worldwide devastation.  Pakistan would continue refusing external help to fight their domestic portion of the war on terror.  The tensions in Kashmir would continue to build and result in border skirmishes and militant attacks.  Corruption within the army and ISI would increase, and Islamic groups would shed their differences to unite further in a coalition of terror; the combination of increased covert support of militants and strategic coordination of those groups would give them their window of opportunity to sweep across Pakistani territory, assimilating or killing the population, on their march to seize Islamabad.  A violent mileu of battles would ensue between conventional forces, irregular forces, paramilitaries, and tribal armies engaging a unified fundamentalist front.  From this point, several negative outcomes might result: Pakistan’s entire security sector would at last unify against a single force and retake the country in a process that would kill hundreds of thousands in the crossfire and leave the nation in wreckage; The U.S. and NATO would step in either unilaterally or at Pakistan’s behest, and security could be reestablished in much but not all of the country, however the resulting anti-Western attitudes would lead to a spike in terror worldwide; insurgents could push their way across all of Pakistan, taking out enough troops and irregular Pakistani forces along the way to render each side roughly equal in power and leaving the fate of Pakistan’s arsenals as the first spoil of war, in the hands of insurgent networks, there is no doubt that a dirty bomb or nuclear strike, and the retaliatory action to follow, would appear in the coming years.  In short, for the situation in the Indus Valley to go bad would have dire consequences, globally.

 

Conclusion

            The conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan represent the heart of worldwide fundamentalist Islamic violence and terror.  It is complex in the parties involved, the terrain it occupies, the diplomatic snags it creates, the already socioeconomically depressed and justice deprived environment it occurs in, and the actions taken by a vast array of actors.  There are fundamental disconnects between leaderships of the opposing parties that cannot be resolved at a conference or by a treaty; each side is fighting not only for dominance, control of territory, and control of the form of governance therein, but for their very survival.  Tactics, strategies, and operations are varied, complex, and take advantage of all available technologies.  Two nations with a tendency to harbor suspicions about each other and look for any excuse to brawl have dozens of nuclear weapons and sit at the epicenter of the mess and maintain a territorial struggle for control in Kashmir.  Decades of fighting in the region, first with the Soviets and now with the West has done little to change ineffective conventional approaches being used by Pakistan against a guerilla insurgent force.  The situation looks pretty bad.

            There is always reason to hope for a better outcome tomorrow; Pakistan is one case where the caveat remains – there is reason for hope, but only if a lot of parties with a lot of different interests and approaches originating in many different countries can get together, cooperate, coordinate, and commit to devoting the necessary resources, funding, and patient adherence to the cause that a conflict this historical, complex, and metastatic requires for resolution.  Every day brings new developments in public opinion, military action, and governmental diplomacy and legislation that can be harnessed to crate change in the region.  COIN strategies, clear-hold-and-build approaches, judicious use of force multipliers and intelligence, transparent cooperation and transparent, traceable use of aid dollars, the Biden-Luger legislation, successful reconstruction programs and government building in Afghanistan are all steps in the right direction.  It is up to a new generation of leaders and thinkers to keep adding to the list; we must be creative and daring in our ideas, dedicated and determined in our implementation, and supported fully by international and local leaders, especially those whose approaches are entrenched but unsuccessful.  This is the not-so-Cold War of my generation and with it logically comes a buildup of newly minted diplomats, local liaisons, language specialists, provincial reconstruction teams, and innovatively trained Special Forces; let us be wise enough to give this this attention and innovation it requires. 

Appendix I: Timeline of the Conflict in Pakistan[190]

August 1947           Britain partitions the Raj into secular India and Muslim Pakistan.  Violence and mass population movement results in approximately 500,000 deaths, more than 1 million refugees, and 75,000 women were abducted across the new border and raped.  Muhammed Ali Jinnah is Pakistan’s first head of state.

1947-1948               Control of Jammu and Kashmir was never resolved during partition; it had been scheduled for referendum after the end of mass hostility and migration.  In October 1947 the first Indo-Pakistani war begins with the Pakistani irregular forces against the Indian army.  May 1948 the Pakistani army is joins the fight. The United Nations arranges a ceasefire to begin on January 1 1949, and a peacekeeping force is established on the line.

1958                        India begins research and planning for a nuclear facility. By 1964 the U.S. and India are sharing technology.

October 1958        First military coup by General Ayub Khan; in 1960 he is declared President.

1965                        Pakistan begins its nuclear research program at the Institute of Science and Technology with U.S. support.

April 1965              The second Indo-Pakistani war begins when Pakistani and Indian border troops skirmish in Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan declares victory when Indian troops retreat.  In August, Pakistan conducts a covert operation in the region; India retaliates by crossing the border into Lahore in September.  22 days of fighting end in a UN brokered ceasefire.

January 1966          Pakistani and Indian officials meet at Tashkent and sign a peace declaration.

1968                        Pakistan and India refuse to sign Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and both continue to pursue their parallel nuclear research and weapons programs.

1971                        Bengalis in East Pakistan attempt secession and are fought by the West Pakistani forces; a civil war breaks out.  10 million people flee into India, and India invades to support the December 6^th declaration of independence by Bangladesh.  Pakistani surrender at Dhaka yields 90,000 Pakistani POWs in India.

December 1971     Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is appointed President and Chief Martial Law Administrator by General Khan.

1972                        The Simla Peace Accord committed India and Pakistan to bilateral working groups on the issue of Bangladeshi Independence and Kashmir.  The ceasefire line in Kashmir is renamed the Line of Control and both sides agree to respect it.  Pakistan officially recognizes Bangladesh in 1974.

1972                        Unrest in Karachi as laborers protest and occupy factories, police respond harshly to the protestors.

April 1972              The first meeting of the National Assembly is held; Bhutto is elected president under the beginnings of  constitutional rule.  Martial law is officially lifted in Pakistan

1973                        The Return of Pakistan POWs Accord is signed in New Delhi; prisoners held for over a year are repatriated.

1974                        India tests its first nuclear device in a “peaceful nuclear explosion” called Smiling Buddha.

1973-1977               Nationalist and separatist Baloch forces unite to fight against the Pakistani army in a Civil War

March 1977            General elections are held; the PPP wins 155 out of 200 seats and allegations of vote rigging incite rioting.

July 1977                General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff, stages a military coup, enforces martial law, suspends the constitution, bans political activities, enacts Hudood, and arrests Bhutto.  General Zia becomes president in 1978 and Bhutto is executed in 1979 after a sham trial.  Throughout his rule Zia took steps to Islamize the country beginning with Zakat taxation and culminating in Sharia Laws, and to expand the powers of the president through legislation.

1984                        Troop buildup and fortification on the Siachen Glacher, Northern Kashmir by Pakistan and India.  This area becomes known as the world’s highest war zone.  India continues to refuse external mediation citing the Simla Agreement.

August 1988           President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq is killed in a plane crash, there is suspicion of foul play.

November 1988    General Elections are held.  PPP wins 92 seats while an Islamic coalition wins 54.  Benazir Bhutto is the first women Prime Minister of Pakistan, sworn in on December 2^nd, two years after returning from the exile imposed on her family

1989                        Violence erupts in Kashmir in resistance to Indian rule by both separatists and those wanting to unite with Pakistan, while Muslim political groups claimed rigged local elections.  Over the next years the resistance movement would shift 1 a secular separatism to an Islamic struggle with emerging militant groups driven by the influx of Afghani jihadis.

1990-1999               Political Turmoil.  Allegations of corruption and incompetence lead President Khan to oust PM Bhutto and dissolve the National Assembly in 1990.  New PM Nawaz Sharif, who focused on economic liberalization and enforcement of Sharia is forced to retire with President Khan under military pressure in 1993.  Bhutto returns to power after general elections, but is dismissed again in 1996 by President Leghari.  1997 sees PM Sharif return with a PML victory.  Military interference in political and governmental affairs has become commonplace.

1995                        TNSM in Swat Valley demand imposition of Sharia law.  The Frontier Constabulary responds and violence ensues.

May 1998                The Indian and Pakistani arms race, accelerated over the 90s, culminates in nuclear testing by both sides; India performed underground tests in the deserts of Rajasthan while Pakistan conducted six tests in Baluchistan along with a 1999 test of a 1500km range missile named after a Muslim warrior who conquered India in the 12^th century.  Sanctions are imposed on both sides by the U.S., Japan, and European countries.  The U.N. condemns the tests.

February 1999       The Lahore Declaration: A historical bilateral summit is held in Lahore where Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers sign a memorandum of understanding regarding confidence building measures, transparency in nuclear testing to avoid accidental nuclear war, reaffirmation of the Simla Agreement and the U.N. Charter, condemnation of terrorism and a commitment to working towards peace and stability.

May 1999                The Kargil War: Violence breaks out yet again along the Line of Control in a two month long war; in the Kargil district of Kashmir Indian troops are deployed to reclaim territory quietly occupied during the winter by a mileu of Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ and Pakistani paramilitary forces under the direction of General Musharraf.  Aggressive shelling campaigns on both sides plus Indian aerial attacks and naval blockade of Pakistani supply routes lead to international media attention and eventual withdrawal by Pakistan to the LOC.

October 1999        PM Nawaz Sharif is ousted in a military coup by General Perves Musharraf, is tried and sentenced for hijacking and terrorism charges, and is later exiled to Saudi Arabia after a military pardon.  Musharraf’s coup is upheld by the Supreme Court and he is granted executive powers for three years.

June 2001               General Musharraf dissolves parliament and names himself President.  In July the Agra Summit is held between President Musharraf and Indian PM Vajpayee, but it yields no progress on Indo-Pakistani issues.

September 2001    Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Musharraf agrees to join the U.S. in the War on Terror, withdrawing official support for the Afghan Taliban and sending troops to the border.  TNSM leadership in Swat valley send 10,000 militants into Afghanistan to counter the U.S. forces.  Some U.S. sanctions against Pakistan are lifted.

December 2001     Troop buildup once again along the Line of Control; in October India shelled militant training camps in Pakistan in response to an attack on Srinagar.  December 13 saw an attack on Parliament in Delhi that was blamed on Kashmiri militants, and the buildup begins.  For years tensions are high and there is fear of yet another war.

January 2002          Musharraf makes public commitments to restoring democracy and fighting terrorism, banning LeT and JeM, and calling on India to resume a dialogue about Jammu and Kashmir.  India remains skeptical.  Later in 2002 Musharraf wins a referendum giving him another five years in power in an election widely believed to be rigged.

2002                        Musharraf test fires three medium-range missiles with nuclear capability, voices his commitment to responding aggressively to any Indian threat of war, and grants himself more extensive executive powers.  Britain and the U.S. have to step in in June 2002 to prevent escalation of the conflict to all-out war.  October sees the first general elections since the 1999 coup end in a hung parliament.  Individuals connected to the TTP increase imposition of hardline Sharia law.

June 2003               Musharraf and G.W. Bush meet at Camp David resulting in a 5 year, $3.5B aid package to Pakistan.  In the same month, NWFP votes in regional elections to introduce Sharia law in the province.  Violence in Swat escalates.

November 2003   Pakistan, then India, declares a unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir.  They then agree to repeal a two-year ban on air traffic between the two countries or over each other’s airspace.

April 2004              Parliament approves formation of a National Security Council led by the military, creating an official institution for the influence of the military in civilian affairs.  Two months later, Pakistan mounts a bloody military offensive against al-Qaeda militants and supporters near the Afghan border.

2005                        Pakistani government launches military crackdown on extremist forces in June.  On October 8^th a powerful earthquake strikes Kashmir and NWFP, killing tens of thousands of people.  Cleric Maulauna Fazalullah, having emerged as a strong militant leader with ties to the TTP turns his attention on spreading radical Islam and Sharia throughout Swat.

2006                        Unrest in the Tribal Areas: A U.S. missile strike in the NWFP targeting al-Qaeda leaders is criticized for collateral damage; Pakistani security forces continue their animosity towards Baloch tribes by killing Nawab Akbar Bugti, and resulting protests become violent; government raid on a militant Bajaur madrassa near Afghanistan kills 80 people and sparks anti-government protests in Pakistan.  Butto and Sharif sign a charter of democracy in London while both leaders remain in exile.

2007                        Escalation of Violence: A train running from New Delhi to Labore is bombed, 68 people die; Islamabad’s Red Mosque, Lal Masjid, becomes a problem and is held under siege as clerical leaders are accused of harboring terrorists, culminating in a military operation against the Mosque; Fazalullah urges his followers into jihad to avenge Lal Masjid, a wave of suicide bombings and other violent attacks sweeps across Swat along with destruction of girls schools and ejection of NGOs; in November the military uses helicopter gunships to bomb Swat villages in an escalation of operations against extremist militants, half a million people are displaced; tribesmen in North and South Waziristan engage against foreign militants in an effort to oust al-Qaeda and similar groups, hundreds are killed in the melee.

Fall, 2007                The end of Musharraf’s five year referendum brings much political scrambling and some violence as well;  he wins an election but is held up while the Supreme Court evaluates the legitimacy of his candidacy given his status as Chief of Army Staff. Bhutto and Nawaz return from exile.  Bhutto’s homecoming parade is targeted by a suicide bomb in a failed but bloody assassination attempts, dozens are killed; assassins are successful on December 27^th when a joint suicide bombing/shooting leaves Benazir Bhutto dead.

February 2008       General elections are held under tight security and scrutiny for transparency, leaving PPP and PML-N with 121 and 94 seats, respectively; they go one to form a coalition government.  In NWFP, the Malakind Agreement is reached.  2008                After ousting much of the militancy in Swat, the NWFP government launches a peace process that brings Taliban back into the area with the agreement that they will not keep militias and denounce suicide bombings and attacks against the military; these agreements are not kept by the Taliban forces.  In August, the military uses heavy artillery, tanks, and helicopters to fight militants in Swat.  Clashes kill hundreds, allegations of atrocities against women and beheading of accused spies by the militants increase, schools are destroyed and girls schools are terrorized.  60% of the population of Swat (1.8M) is displaced, and militants control a majority of the territory there.  Elsewhere in Pakistan, the Mariott Hotel is bombed by Islamic militants.  A terrorist attack in Mumbai leaves India crying for Pakistani action against militants.

August 2008           Musharraf resigns his post as president.  September would see presidential elections name Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, elected President.

2009                 Pakistan engages in its largest anti-insurgent strategy thus far, and vows to reinstate schooling for girls after declaration of a ban on girls’ education by Fazlullah in 2008 leads to nationwide protest.  “In Swat District in Malakand Division, security forces conducted operations against the TNSM militant group.  In the first phase of Operation Rah-e-Haq in late November 2007, local police led cordon-and-search operations to clear militants operating in the Swat Valley, but militants gradually re-infiltrated into key cities.  The fighting ended in February [2009] with an agreement between the government and the TNSM, the Malakand Accord, which institutionalized a disputed form of Islamic law in Malakand and part of Hazara Division.[191]”  Three months later, however, the Pakistani Army launched a massive and successful counter-insurgency operation in Swat and cleared out all known Taliban elements.

August 2009           Baitullah Mehsud, head of the TTP, is killed in a U.S. drone attack in South Waziristan.  Retaliatory bombings in October ordered by new TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud kill 120 in Peshawar and more in Lahore, Swat, Dera Ghazi Khan, Bannu, Islamabad, Kohat, Rawalpindi and others.

2010                        Drone strikes become the weapon of choice for the U.S. against militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan.  With 34 strikes in 2008, 53 in 2009, and 118 in 2010, militant locations in North Waziristan are the primary targets with occasional strikes in South Waziristan, the Khyber Agency, and Miramshah.  Public response from the Pakistani government is protest, however evidence has surfaced that indicates these CIA strikes are being allowed out of Pakistan’s Shamsi air bases with government approval and intelligence support since 2002. Recent analyses by news outlets indicate that the locals in Waziristan see these strikes as opportunities for liberation from their Taliban oppressors.

                                The South Asia Terrorism Portal displays a day-by-day accounting of military operations, insurgent attacks, arrests and weapons seizures, and other pertinent events in Pakistan as well as other nations in the region.  2010 listings show daily violence throughout Pakistan.  This listing shows not only huge numbers of violent acts throughout Pakistan, but also an increase in the creativity of methods used by militants and more frequent interventions by the security sector.

                                http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/timeline/index.html

August 2010           The worst flooding in 80 years devastates much of Pakistan and affects more than 20 million people.  The long term effects of this flooding, including the massive displacement of people, destruction of crop lands, and increased pressure on the humanitarian aid system in Pakistan have yet to be seen.  Government response was largely inadequate; a massive international effort coordinated by UNOCHR is launched.

October 2010        Musharraf issues a vague apology for his actions while in power, and starts a political party from his UK exile.

December 2010     A meeting of tribal elders in Mohmand is attacked near the Afghan border, killing 50.

Appendix II: Pertinent Definitions[192]

Conflict: fight, battle, war; competitive or opposing action of incompatibles; antagonistic state or action (as of divergent ideas, interests, or persons); mental struggle resulting from incompatible or opposing needs, drives, wishes, or external or internal demands; the opposition of persons or forces that gives rise to the dramatic action in a drama or fiction

Culture: the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations; the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group; the characteristic features of everyday existence (as diversions or a way of life) shared by a people in a place or time; the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization; the set of values, convictions, or social practices associated with a particular field, activity, or societal characteristic

Ethnic: heathen; of or relating to large groups of people classed according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural origin or background

Globalization: the development of an increasingly integrated global economy marked especially by free trade, free flow of capital, and the tapping of cheaper foreign labor markets

Hudood Ordinance: A Pakistani law that enforced Sharia under the Islamization of Zia-ul-Haq;s leadership.  Punishments enforced against women for offenses such as extramarital sex (zina), false allegations of extramarital sex (qazf), theft and prohibition of alcohol.  Maximum punishment was death by stoning but never or rarely used in favor of incarceration.  Whipping was prescribed for drinking, amputation of the hand was the punishment for theft.

Jihad: a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline; a crusade for a principle or belief

Madrassa: a Muslim school, college, or university that is often part of a mosque. (Madari/Madrasah/Masjid)

Purdah: seclusion of women from public observation among Muslims and some Hindus; a state of seclusion or concealment; literally translates to screen or veil

Sharia: Islamic law based on the Koran; literally translated into “way” or “path”

Social: of or relating to human society, the interaction of the individual and the group, or the welfare of human beings as members of society; tending to form cooperative and interdependent relationships with others of one’s kind; of, relating to, or based on rank or status in a particular society

Society: a voluntary association of individuals for common ends, especially an organized group working together or periodically meeting because of common interests, beliefs, or profession; an enduring and cooperating social group whose members have developed organized patterns of relationships through interaction with one another; a community, nation, or broad grouping of people having common traditions, institutions, and collective activities and interests

Ulema:  The body of mullahs, educated Muslims trained in religious law and doctrine and usually holding an official post

Violence: exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse; an instance of violent treatment or procedure; injury by or as if by distortion, infringement, or profanation; vehement feeling or expression, an instance of such a feeling; a clashing or jarring quality; undue alteration

 

 

Appendix III: Definitions Under Development[193]

Cultural Violence: aspects of a culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence, and may be typified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science; makes direct and structural violence look or feel “right,” or at least not wrong, changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least yellow/acceptable; occurs as a result of cultural assumptions that blind one to direct or structural violence

Ethnic Violence: also known as ethnic terrorism or ethnically-motivated terrorism, or communal or intercommunal violence; violence that is predominantly framed rhetorically by causes and issues related to ethnic hatred, commonly related to an interchangeable with political violence in cases when reference to ethnicity is considered improper; racist terrorism is a form of ethnic violence which is typically dominated by overt forms of racism and xenophobic reactionism, involving attacks on minorities and has an association with right-wing extremism; genocide is a sub-category

Islamization: has traditionally been used to describe the process of a society’s conversion to the religion of Islam. In contemporary usage, it can also mean the imposition of an Islamist social and political style on a society with a tradition of a more varied interpretation of Islam; General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, after assuming power, set the government on its public commitment to enforce Nizam-e-Mustafa (Islamic System) a 180 degree turn from Pakistan’s predominantly Common Law.

Jirga: is a tribal assembly of elders which takes decisions by consensus, particularly among the Pashtun people but also in other ethnic groups near them; they are most common in Afghanistan and among the Pashtuns in Pakistan near its border with Afghanistan. It is similar to that of a town meeting in the United States or a regional assembly in England, where important regional matters are addressed among the people of the area. The community council meaning is often found in circumstances involving a dispute between two individuals; a jirga may be part of the dispute resolution mechanism in such cases

Lashkar: a Persian word for army, a local militia

Madrassas in Pakistan: also called madaris; they cater not only to the religious establishment, though that is the dominant influence over them, but also the secular one, supplying physicians, administrative officials, judges and teachers; In 1947 there were only 189 madrassas in Pakistan, in 2002 the country had 10,000-13,000 unregistered madrassas with an estimated 1.7 to 1.9 million students, a 2008 estimate puts this figure at “over 40,000.”

Malik: The Arabic term came to be adopted as a term for “tribal chieftain” in in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan, especially among Pashtuns, for a tribal leader or a chieftain. Maliks serve as de facto arbiters in local conflicts, interlocutors in state policy-making, tax-collectors, heads of village and town councils and delegates to provincial and national jirgas as well as to Parliament.  In the Punjab, “Malik” was one of the titles used by local aristocrats, more formally known as Zamindars, under both the Mughals and the British, and to some degree still in present-day Pakistan. The title is given for large amount of ownership of land(landlords).

Structural Violence: a term attributed to Johan Galtung; A form of violence based on the systematic ways in which a given social structure or social institution harms people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs.  Institutionalized elitism, ethnocentrism, classism, racism, sexism, adultism, nationalism, heterosexism, and ageism are some examples of structural violence.  Structural violence and direct violence are highly interdependent: structural violence inevitably produces conflict and often direct violence, including family violence, hate crimes, terrorism, genocide, and war;  James Gilligan defines it as “the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the lower death rates experienced by those who are above them,” and describes the excess deaths as non-natural, ascribing them to the stress, shame, discrimination, and denigration that results from lower status.

Talibanization: is a term coined following the rise of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan referring to the process where other religious groups or movements come to follow or imitate the strict practices of the Taliban; term pre-dates the Islamic terrorist attacks of 9/11, used to describe areas or groups outside of Afghanistan which came under the influence of the Taliban, such as the areas of Waziristan in Pakistan; used in a Boston Globe editorial published on November 6, 1999, warning of the emerging threat of the Taliban regime almost two years before the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Ulama: also spelt ulema, refers to the educated class of Muslim legal scholars engaged in the several fields of Islamic studies. They are best known as the arbiters of shari‘a law. While the ulama are well versed in legal jurisprudence being Islamic lawyers, some of them also go on to specialize in other fields, such as hadeeth, tafseer or fiqh.  In a broader sense, the term ulama is used to describe the body of Muslim clergy who have completed several years of training and study of Islamic sciences, such as a mufti, qadi, faqih, or muhaddith. Some Muslims include under this term the village mullahs and imams, who have attained only the lowest rungs on the ladder of Islamic scholarship; other Muslims would say that clerics must meet higher standards to be considered ulama.

Appendix IV: Human Development Index and its Components[194]

Appendix V: Literacy and HDI Maps of Pakistan[195]

 

Appendix VI: Map of Taleban Influence in Northern Pakistan[196]

Appendix VII: Maps of Ethnic and Language Groups in Pakistan[197]

LANGUAGE GROUPS

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[1] Pakistan Herald (2010)  and Encyclopedia Britannica (2010)

[2] Government of Pakistan (2010e)

[3] United States Institute of Peace.  (2010d).  P 2

[4] Synnott, H. (2010). P 17

[5] US Library of Congress (2007)

[6] Synnott, H. (2010).  P 17

[7] WHO (2008)

[8] CIA World Factbook (2010)

[9] Government of Pakistan (2010c)

[10] CIA World Factbook (2010) and US Department of State (2010).

[11] Blood (1994), the CIA World Factbook (2010), Library of Congress (2005), and

[12] Synnott, H. (2010). P 18

[13] Synnott, H. (2010). P 18

[14] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 16

[15] Baloch, S. S. (2007).  P 3

[16] Wikipedia (2010).  History of Pakistan.

[17] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 9

[18] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 9

[19] List available at Government of Pakistan (2010b) http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/

[20] UNHCR. (2010). UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011

[21] See Appendices

[22] Foreign Policy (2010d).

[23] UN OCHA (2010b)

[24] Crisis States Research Center (2006).

[25] Foreign Policy (2010).

[26] Haque and Rehman (2010)

[27] http://www.cfr.org/publication/21941/pakistans_constitutional_reform.html

[28] Meyer-Resende and Roberts (2010)

[29] Wikipedia (2010).

[30] Synnott, H. (2010). P 19

[31] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 181

[32] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 9

[33] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 10

[34] General details and quotes taken from Wikipedia (2010) unless footnoted.

[35] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 10

[36] Official Website at http://www.ppp.org.pk/#ss

[37] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/31/pakistan.topstories35

[38] http://www.ppp.org.pk/mbb/speeches/speeche47.html

[39] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/21/AR2009062101793.html

[40] Official Website at http://www.pmln.org.pk/home/

[41] Official Website at http://www.pml.org.pk/

[42] http://criticalppp.com/archives/12721 Response posted by Natasha Raza on August 18^th 2010

[43] Official Website at http://www.mqm.org/

[44] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 14

[45] http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/pakistan/peacebuilding-organisations/

[46] Government of Pakistan (2004) Preamble and specific articles

[47] Synnott, H. (2010). P 21

[48] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 96

[49] Budget in Brief (5 June 2010), and are converted from Pakistani Rupees into US Dollars, using http://coinmill.com/PKR_USD.html

[50] CIA World Factbook (2010). External Debt

[51] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 9

[52] UNICEF (2010).  And CIA (2010).

[53] WHO (2008) Pakistan: Health Profile

[54] Blood. (1994) Pakistan – Health and Welfare

[55] Indeed, the CIA World Factbook (2010) indicates that Pakistan is ranked 153/177 in national education expenditures

[56] CIA World Factbook (2010)

[57] Information synthesized from the National Institute of Population Studies 2006-2007 document.

[58] Birn (2009) p134

[59] CIA World Factbook (2010)

[60] Krishnakumar, P. (2009)

[61] BBC News. (2010)

[62] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 13

[63] Samuel, D. (2010)

[64] Synnott, H. (2010). P 22

[65] Khokhar, M. (2007).  P 353, 355

[66] Khokhar, M.  (2007).  P 359

[67] Khokhar, M.  (2007).  P 361-362

[68] Khokhar, M.  (2007).  P 363-364

[69] Alderman et al (2003)

[70] Sheesh, K.Z. (2009) recounting program from UNESCO’s Education for All initiative.

[71] http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/pakistan/page.do?id=1011216

[72] http://www.molaw.gov.pk/

[73] http://www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/pakistan.pdf

[74] http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/good-news/pakistan-ratifies-key-un-human-rights-treaty-20080418

[75] Paczynska, A. (2009, November). P 13

[76] Paczynska, A. (2009, November). P 14

[77] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 31

[78] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 137

[79] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 14

[80] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 162

[81] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 170-171

[82] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 163

[83] Paczynska, A. (2009, November). P 14

[84] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 164

[85] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 15

[86] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 164

[87] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 164-165

[88] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 165

[89] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 19

[90] Synnott, H. (2010). P 18

[91] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 5

[92] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 5

[93] Synnott, H. (2010). P 18-19

[94] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 137

[95] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 162

[96] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 13

[97] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 99

[98] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 16

[99] Chandran, S. (2006).  P 7

[100] Khokhar, M.  (2007).  P 356

[101] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 174

[102] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 96

[103] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 97

[104] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 97

[105] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 534

[106] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 104

[107] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 95

[108] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 13

[109] All groups listed here and their associated information was taken directly or digested from their sites on Wikipedia (2010) unless noted otherwise.

[110] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 13

[111] Synnott, H. (2010). P 18

[112] All groups listed here and their associated information was taken directly or digested from their sites on Wikipedia (2010) unless noted otherwise.

[113] See also Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009). P 103-104

[114] Chandran, S. (2006).  P 8

[115] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 103

[116] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 13

[117] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 21

[118] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 13

[119] Haring, E. (2010).  P 4

[120] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 16

[121] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 15

[122] Baloch, S. S. (2007).  P 3

[123] Baloch, S. S. (2007).  P 3

[124] Baloch, S. S. (2007).  P 4

[125] Baloch, S. S. (2007).  P 8

[126] Chandran, S. (2006).  P 3-4

[127] Chandran, S. (2006).  P 5-6

[128] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 532-533

[129] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 21

[130] Haring, E. (2010).  P 5

[131] Haring, E. (2010).  P 5

[132] Paczynska, A. (2009, November). P 8

[133] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 533-534

[134] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 21

[135] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 163

[136] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 23

[137] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 140

[138] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 27

[139] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 23

[140] Haring, E. (2010).  P 4

[141] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 177

[142] http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/02/090302fa_fact_coll

[143] http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_india-pakistan-should-resolve-kashmir-issue-through-friendly-talks-china_1481956

[144] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 24

[145] http://www.cfr.org/publication/10070/chinapakistan_relations.html

[146] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 23

[147] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 21

[148] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 2

[149] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 532

[150] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 536

[151] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 2

[152] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 27

[153] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 27

[154] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 181

[155] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 531

[156] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 135

[157] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 138

[158] Paczynska, A. (2009, November). P 14

[159] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 531

[160] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 134

[161] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 537

[162] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 27

[163] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 1-2

[164] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 32

[165] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 143

[166] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 15

[167] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 19

[168] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 535

[169] Paczynska, A. (2009, November). P 8

[170] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 19

[171] Paczynska, A. (2009, Novermber).

[172] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 14

[173] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 14-15

[174] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 11

[175] The Cato Institute.  (2009).  P 535

[176] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 97

[177] Haring, E.  (2006)  P 6

[178] Baloch, S. S. (2007).  P 3

[179] United States Institute of Peace.  (2010d).  P 2, 8

[180] United States Institute of Peace.  (2010d).  P 8

[181] This section guided by the International Alert Conflict Analysis Document, Chapter 2

[182] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 101

[183] Acharya, A., Bukhari, S.A.A.S, Sulaiman, S.  (2009).  P 101

[184] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 140

[185] See Appendix I: Timeline

[186] Pakistan Policy Working Group.  (2008).  P 19

[187] Paczynska, A. (2009, November). P 4

[188] Staniland, P. (2011).  P 137

[189] Paczynska, A. (2009, November). P 4

[190] Compilation from BBC News: Pakistan Timeline, BBC News India Pakistan Timeline, IRIN Asia: Timeline on Swat Valley Turbulence, Insight on Conflict, Wikipedia: Timeline of Pakistani History and Washington Post: Timeline – History of India-Pakistan Conflict

[191] Fair, C.C. and Jones, S.G. (2009).  P 170

[192] Definitions taken in whole or in part from Merriam-Webster dictionary website: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

[193] Definitions taken in whole or in part from one or more articles listed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

[194] Custom graphs generated at http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/trends/ on 11 Dec 2010 using neighbor and reference countries

[195] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Pakistan and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Pakistani_Districts_by_Human_Development_Index

[196] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8046577.stm#malakand

[197] http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/maps/map_pakistan-major-ethnic-groups.html