THE STATESMAN, MAY 22, 1971
Editorial
THE BALANCE OF POWER
India’s diplomatic drive to make the world realize the world political implications of the events in East Bengal cannot be said to have had much success as yet. The massive movement of refugees should have made it clear that even in a narrow technical sense the East Bengal upheaval could not be regarded as a purely internal matter for Pakistan. Yet, until a few days ago, it was only the humanitarian aspect of the refugee problem that draw international attention India has lately been emphasizing the political implications, some directly affecting India’s security. But other Powers seem still to think that the problem is no more than one of human suffering and its alleviation: and the notion persists that the problem can be solved only in cooperation with the Pakistan Government. Islamabad’s envoys in Washington London have been talking of a political solution; and there is no reason to believe that the Pakistani diplomatic offensive has been wholly unproductive. Indeed, both Washington and London have given at least some consideration to Islamabad’s plea for assistance, as a means of not merely rehabilitating Pakistan’s economy but also providing immediate relief for the suffering millions in East Bengal.
Different countries may have different reasons for treating the Pakistan case with greater sympathy than it deserves, but New Delhi should have been more energetic from the beginning in emphasizing the dangerous political implications which it has now started talking about. Although the restraint that marked New Delhi’s initial reaction to the East Bengal crisis was widely appreciated, there is now reason to suspect that the cautious response was at least partly due to the absence of any clear thinking. Perhaps there was some wishful thinking that the people of East Bengal would win a quick victory, or, if the worst came to the worst, the military administration would quickly restore order; either way. there would be no long-term problem directly affecting India’s own interests. The consequences of protracted struggle, whatever its spread or effectiveness, do not seem to have been anticipated until they became a terrifying reality. Even after the refugee influx began, the Indian authorities were initially concerned almost exclusively with the problem of temporary relief: it is only during the past days that the long-term consequences have started attracting serious attention. But it is still not clear whether a policy has been formulated.
This is not to suggest that it is easy to decide upon a course of action. Any effective action to safeguard India’s specific interests in the eastern region could spark off a major conflict, possibly involving other Powers, at least in an indirect manner. But a difficult decision could be avoided only if the bigger Powers forced Islamabad to let the people of East Bengal decide their own future; the fact had better be faced that no political compromise can work after what has happened in East Bengal during the past two months. Yet the big Powers seem still to think that some kind of accommodation is possible, perhaps because they are not prepared to accept the alternative to a political settlement. Apparently, they fear the prospect of West Pakistan moving closer to China, as if Western and Russian help to Islamabad has done anything so far to discourage such movement.
Apparently it is also being argued that disintegration of Pakistan would upset the balance of power on the subcontinent and promote instability in the eastern region. Much mischief has been done in the name of maintaining an artificial balance of power; the tragic events in East Bengal are a direct consequence of the support which West Pakistan has received over the years for maintaining t his balance. And the argument that a free, and presumably weak, West Bengal would encourage subversive activity over a wide region is superficial. The scope for such activity would be much greater if the East Bengal freedom movement turned into an underground guerilla struggle for an indefinite period. Even if the West Pakistani military administration is able to re-establish full authority in East Bengal, pockets of guerrilla resistance will remain; the greater will be the chance of both their leadership and their objectives undergoing a radical change. Should such a situation develop, the Chinese might not remains a anxious to see Pakistan’s territorial integrity preserved as they seem now; whatever its recent statements may seem to imply. Peking has not really closed its long term options.