NEWS WEEK, OCTOBER 25,1971
AVOIDING DISASTER IN SOUTH ASIA
By William P. Bundy
The sheer horror of the Pakistan reign of terror in East Bengal and of the resulting refugee situation in India has been almost obsessive in recent months. It has, perhaps for others besides myself, drowned out real efforts to think through the future there. But such efforts are vital. For the next three months are absolutely critical: they are, in fact, likely to decide whether the horror can be brought under control and whether the even worse horror of outright war between India and Pakistan can be averted.
But, critical in what ways? And what do we do-“We” being the nations of the world, but above all, the U. S.?
The minimum objective is clear enough. A political situation which will stop and in time, reverse the refugee flow must be one that minimally satisfies the aspirations of the bulk of the people of East Bengal. Whether defined in practical or moral terms, this means at the very least bringing back Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and granting East Pakistan a far higher degree of autonomy than any West Pakistan leader, military or civilian, has yet visualized. Very likely it means an independent Bangladesh in time, but to attempt this at one bite would be to trigger a renewed blood bath, one cannot strike final solutions while passions are as hot as they are now. Time and a reduction of pressures on all three parties-the Pakistan Government, India and the Awami League leaders of East Bengal-are vital elements.
Build Up Of Pressures
The measure of the crisis, however, is that time is mow running against all three primary parties, and the pressures, far from being reduced, are building up. In addition to the trial of Mujibur Rahman himself, at least three fuses are lit and running, anyone of which could explode in the critical three months. One is the distribution of food within East Bengal. A second, closely related, is the peace of activity of the Indiasupported guerrilla movement there, the Mukti Bahini or Liberation Army.
A third fuse, set for perhaps eight to twelve months, is the economic situation in West Pakistan, which is heavily dependent on foreign aid. Beyond all this, and in the longer run perhaps the most ominous threat of all, is the effect of the crisis on Indian economic development. Mrs. Gandhi’s triumphant election last March seemed a last chance for India to get on top of its problems. And renewing India’s forward progress is critical to the survival of a united India.
Let us lake the four problems posed by the Bengal situation in order. Barely adequate food supplies-about half of them contributed by the U.S.-are now being delivered in East Bengal. The question is distribution, and whether politics will come ahead of feeding people, either though the West Pakistan military forces not acting fairly or through interference by the guerrillas. Belatedly perhaps, outside nations have done the right things and no one can only pray that widespread famine can be avoided till the new rice crop in late December.
Guerrilla Threat
The same is true of the guerrilla movement. But India’s support of the guerrillas and its resulting passionate rejection of U.N. observers in its refugee camps are understandable parts of a policy under which Mrs. Gandhi has so far courageously resisted pressures for outright war. But there is an element here of the same SCHADE FREUDE-that rejoicing in trouble and exploiting it-that Indians themselves so deeply resented from Pakistan when India was beset by China in 1962 and 1963. Moreover, readers of Neville Maxwell’s brilliant book describing Indian border actions before that conflict will be aware that Indian military and quasi-military actions can be both tough and well-concealed, and like other people’s, take on a momentum of their own. Mrs. Gandhi may not have anything like full control of the guerrillas, nor, indeed do the guerrillas will become progressively more extreme and out of control-and neither can hold back in Part for this very reason.
Thus the East Bengal situation is in large part beyond the reach of further help from outside. If. but only if. both Pakistani and Indian authorities exert a great deal of restraint, the situation may remain barely tolerable.
The real question is whether outside nations can help both nations to act with restraint. In the case of Pakistan, the United States may have retained some leverage by not blocking small-scale military deliveries arranged before March 25. but the price in Indian-American relations has been fearful, and the impact of American efforts to moderate Pakistani behavior has not been visible. (By definition, of course, it cannot be).
The gut issue now is whether economic aid to West Pakistan will continue after the first of the year, when pipeline deliveries of commodity aid run out. Here there is a chance for the U.S. to do two things at once-get away from its exposed position of acting alone and transfer the effort to retain outside leverage in Pakistan to the economic rather than the military sphere. The vehicle would be the World Bank consortium to aid Pakistan and the sign of action a decision by the President to accept the upcoming Congressional ban on military deliveries. But at the same time, the President should override (as the bill permits) the accompanying ban on economic aid- solely to permit necessary commodity aid worked out by the bank. Perhaps the lesser point in all this is leverage on a dug-in-Pakistan Government; the larger one is that two terrible wrongs-the horror in East Bengal and the refugee camps-do not justify a third: economic collapse in West Pakistan.
The accompaniment to such renewed ban on economic aid to West Pakistan would then be a much larger effort than has yet been made to India to overcome the economic effects of the crisis. This year the refugees will cost India much more than its total net foreign aid; the loss must be made up by additional foreign aid on the order of at least $500 million shared internationally. For without this, India, too cannot act rationallyand may not even for long survive.
In all this I have said nothing of the great-power aspect. For the moment the Soviet Union is exercising restraint while China may be waiting to pick up the pieces of an extremist Bengal. The history of the fighting between India are China shows how conflict in South Asia rebounds to the benefit of the one-sided exploiter of tension rather than to those whose simple aim is to preserve India intact and Pakistan in a form that meets the desire of its peoples.
Hard Alternatives
The real stake is people, and more clearly than in most situations, the extraordinary hard, perhaps impossible, job of peace starts with people. Specifically, Congress must pass rapidly the $ 250 million pending supplemental appropriation for refugee help in both India and Pakistan. Then, as it should have been in tile first place, internationalized on a new and massive scale-first the problem must be by the World Bank groups for both India and Pakistan and then to include much greater constructive contributions from the Soviet Union. If this is pie in the sky, then the alternative is. almost literally, the collapse of South Asia. With all deliberation. I am inclined to think this could be the worst crisis the world, has faced since 1945.
Letters – East Pakistan
The four letters to the editor under the heading “The tragedy of Bengal” (Aug. 23) indicate that some unfortunate misconceptions may have been stimulated by your cover story of August 2.
It is incorrect and unfair to accuse the U.S. of “condoning genocide” or of being “niggardly” in providing humanitarian aid to the victims of the recent events in East Pakistan. The U.S. has, on numerous occasions, expressed its deep concern for the victims of the tragic violence in East Pakistan, and it has taken the lead in response to a call by Secretary-General U Thant for relief to both the refugees in India, and the needy people in East Pakistan. Thus far the United States has committed about one quarter of a billion dollars for such humanitarian relief-far more than all other foreign countries put together-and the Administration has asked Congress for another quarter of a billion dollars.
It is incorrect, as one letter implied, that the U S. has granted generous military aid to West Pakistan: We have not provided any grant aid to Pakistan for any military.