“The Indian Communist party is, of course, up against the tough problem that as the self-appointed party of the proletariat industrial wage labour) it can speak only for a tiny minority in the country where factory industry is still in its infancy. Nor has it been gaining ground even in this field. Labour has found that the party is less interested in their general welfare than in their political backing. The party has therefore to look elsewhere to the educated unemployed, to landless labour in the countryside, to linguistic and communal groups who want special advantages.”
APRIL 11, 1961
The Communist Congress
THE MOST INTERESTING FEATURE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY Congress at Vijayawada is the open presentation of two rival programmes and policies by the leadership. The presence of Mr. Suslov, Secretary of the Russian Communist Party and close associate of Mr. Khrushchev, showed the importance attached abroad to the debate at Vijayawada. Mr. Suslov has stated that his country is now passing from Socialism to the third and final stage of building a Communist society (the first stage was “the dictatorship of the proletariat”). He refrained, however, from commenting on the resolution before the congress. The Dange-Ghosh resolution supports the foreign policy of Mr. Nehru and calls for a united front of leftists including the leftists in the Congress. The Ranadive-Bhupesh Gupta resolution calls for a leftist united front against the Congress to capture power to implement socialism. However, debate on these policies has been postponed in favour of discussing the two detailed programmes of objectives.
To the public it may appear rather odd that so much heat should be engendered over these resolutions, which appear in any case to be rather unreal. The only other major leftist parties are the Socialists, who will have nothing to do with the Communists. What, then, is Mr. Ranadive’s United Front to consist of? Perhaps a clue may be found in the Ranadive programme which calls for a Punjabi Suba, the establishment of responsible governments in the Centrally-administered Territories, and more assistance for the Scheduled Castes and tribes. In other words, every communal, linguistic or backward group is to get the benefit of Communist leadership and all these disparate elements are to be used to capture power”. The Dange-Ghosh tactic is equally devious. The party is to woo the leftist elements in the Congress itself, for as the draft frankly says a United Front would have no reality unless the vast following of the Congress masses and a section of the Congress leadership take their place in it. The hope apparently is that in view of the factious quarrels among Congressmen at present, there will be some opportunities to get the dissidents into united fronts led by Communists. The significance of support for “Mr. Nehru’s foreign policy” should also be appreciated. Mr. Nehru’s policy is Congress policy. But the resolution seeks to imply that it is the triumph of a leftist policy within the Congress.
The Indian Communist Party is, of course, up against the tough problem that as the self-appointed party of the proletariat (industrial wage labour) it can speak only for a tiny minority in the country where factory industry is still in its infancy. Nor has it been gaining ground even in this field. Labour has found that the Party is less interested in their general welfare than in their political backing. The Party has therefore to look elsewhere to the educated unemployed, to landless labour in the countryside, to linguistic and communal groups who want special advantages. The Party’s success in Kerala and Bombay showed that these methods can pay off, especially where local Congress Governments show weaknesses. The Party is very conscious of the examples of Russia and China. The Russian Communists in 1917 seized the chance offered by the Kerensky Government’s refusal to stop an unpopular and crippling war. The Chinese Party benefited by the failures of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, also after a major war. The rival resolutions before the Vijayawada Congress are to some extent reflections of current Russian and Chinese policies. The Chinese favour an aggressive and dynamic policy irrespective of the consequences. They believe this can be done because the “Socialist Camp” is superior in military strength to the free world. The Russians know that a big war would prove fatal to both socialism and capitalism. They suggest therefore that Socialism can be achieved everywhere without violence or civil war. The official policy of the Indian Communist Party favours the Russian line and Mr. Suslov is no doubt anxious to see that there should be no straying from this path.
So deeply involved are both wings of the Indian Party in this world-wide Communist controversy, that they fail to appreciate the realities of Indian politics. Our politics is determined by our freedom movement, the Constitution we framed and the economic policy we have felt it necessary to adopt. It is a system which includes parliamentary democracy. The fall of the Communist Government in Kerala showed however that a parliamentary majority is not necessarily the key to power, if other conventions and proprieties peculiar to India are not respected. The Russian model of planning has also proved very instructive and useful to us, but unlike the Russians or the Chinese, we believe that planning can be democratic. The Marxist belief that economic interests are supreme has been shown not to apply to India where both rich and poor are making voluntary sacrifices in order that the nation may prosper in future. The Indian Communist Party wishes to wreck this consensus by organising a war of class against class – a difficult task because we have as yet no rigid class system and do not wish to have one. The Party’s foreign policy is equally unreal. When it has been proved in every possible way that Indian territory has been occupied and that still more territory is being wrongly claimed, the Communist Party cannot, if it has a genuine national outlook, adopt the attitude of a third party who finds that much may be said on both sides of the dispute. Nor can it function as a defence lawyer for the Chinese. As long as the Party thinks in terms of Chinese or Russian policies and fails to function within the conventions and necessities of the Indian system, it will have no more than nuisance value in Indian politics.
Reference:
The First 100
A Selection of Editorials, 1878-1978, THE HINDU, VOLUME I