“When therefore the final settlement of the (Egyptian) question is blocked at the last stage by a power (Turkey) which did not care to co-operate and represent her interests in the settlement of the question during the progress of the negotiation, it will be open to England to say to the other powers who co-operated with her that she had tried her best to arrive at a proper understanding on the matter with Europe; that it is no fault of hers if that mode of settlement is blocked and that since she cannot leave Egypt to take care of itself there is no other course open to her but annexing it also to her already overgrown Empire, however reluctant she may be to do so”.
JULY 6, 1887
The Egyptian convention
THE INTEREST OF INDIA IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN question is the interest of having to pay for all the “little wars” of England carried on in the interests of her capitalists. The words “road to India” “key to India” and the rest have often furnished convenient pretexts to the ministry of the day for fleecing poor India of large sums of money to pay for the blunders and to pacify the British taxpayers. On that ground the maintenance of the consulate establishment at Teheran, the cost of the entertainment to the Sultan in English soil, Mr. Gladstone’s first crime in Abyssinia in 1869, his second crime in Egypt in 1882, have all been paid for by India. The first great act which endeared Lord Ripon to India is the fight he made to obtain the English subvention for the cost of the Afghan war 1878-1879. His second great fight for “evenhanded justice to India” of which his mind and heart were so very full was his protest against the call of his “great and honoured chief” to contribute to his Egyptian crime, in which his Lordship was not, however, very successful as India had eventually to pay £ 770,000. If between Mr. Gladstone and Lord Ripon, India has had once to pay more than three quarters of a million for an affair for which none is now more sorry than Mr. Gladstone, the interest of India will be apparent in any final settlement of that question. It is, therefore, a matter for very great regret, that at the finishing stage of negotiations, at the point of obtaining the ratification of the Sultan, the Egyptian Convention should be totally blocked. The power that has interposed this block is no other than Russia which is bringing great pressure to bear on the Porte against the ratification of the Anglo-Turkish convention and demands the payment of arrears of the war indemnity (for the Russio-Turkish war of 1876) still due! On the day of Her Majesty’s Jubilee, France and Russia both sent strongly worded notes to the Porte against the AngloTurkish Convention in which they threaten to declare war if the Sultan ratifies the Convention. The Sultan asked and the English Commissioner had agreed to extend the time for ratification until the end of the Bairam festival which was due on the 25th June last. But no intimation has yet been received of the Sultan having ratified the Convention; and we may be sure that His Majesty dare not do it against Russia and France. There is something very unfortunate, if not humiliating, in all this opposition and delay after the Convention had received the Queen’s ratification, and Sir H. Drummond Wolff notified to the Porte that he only awaited the Sultan’s irade for the exchange of the British and Turkish ratifications to be made We cannot but wish that Her Majesty’s ratification had been delayed till the reply of the Palace was received to the requisition for the Sultan’s ratification. The curse of the Sublime Porte has been its inability to learn that procrastination has been the cause of all its wars as the curse of the Stuarts and Bourbons was their inability to profit by experience. If the Sublime Porte had learned expedition in the despatch of business, perhaps Russia and France might have been left without an opportunity of sending the learned expedition in the despatch of business, perhaps Russia and France might have been left without an opportunity of sending the threatening note to declare war. But there is no reason to suppose that Russia has not been watching the progress of the Convention with equal anxiety as England, and has not bided her opportunity to make her hand felt at a time when it will be most painfully felt. For she has already instructed the Porte to say in reply to the requisition for ratification made by the sovereign that the Sultan would not ratify the Convention unless the same was modified. One of the changes which Turkey is made to propose is the impracticable and impossible proposal that Turkey alone should be entitled to send troops into Egypt to restore order in the event of internal disorder there. In the first place Turkey had the right to interfere in 1882, when she did not; and England was consequently compelled to interfere alone, as France then refused even to cooperate; and India paid the piper by men and money. As Turkey may or may not in future be in a position to interfere when the occasion comes, England cannot afford to look on calmly when affairs in Egypt again get out of order. In the second place, England did not undergo all the anxiety and expenditure and India did not send her men and money, simply to be told at last that Turkey alone had the right to interfere in case of future disorders there. Now that the block interposed by Russia and France is not likely to be removed by those powers in the way of the ratification of the Convention and the Egyptian question cannot and will not be allowed to lie unsettled, England has only two courses open to cut the Gordian knot – a bold annexation pure and simple – or, a more accommodating diplomacy in regard to the interests of Russia in South-Eastern Europe. The prolongation of the present undefined occupation will be rendered impossible. For obvious reasons, Turkey and France are at present both willing to do the bidding of Russia at any time in any manner in any question. Turkey dreads absorption and extinction. France wants Russia’s help very badly. When England displays, therefore, a disposition to drop the Egyptian question sine die, Russia will again be at work; “note” will be presented by the Porte; the French Press will clamour; and the French ambassador will “call” for the settlement of the Egyptian question. We may be certain that the question of annexation was carefully considered and solved before the commencement of the Wolff mission. But it is probable that her Majesty’s present advisers think that the policy of annexation has assumed a new aspect from the evident disinclination of the Porte and from the attitude of Russia and France to whom particularly every possible concession was made by England, in order to arrive at an understanding with Turkey. When therefore the final settlement of the question is blocked at the last stage by a power which did not care to cooperate and represent her interests in the settlement of the question during the progress of the negotiation, it will be open to England to say to the other powers who cooperated with her that she had tried her best to arrive at a proper understanding on the matter with Europe; that it is no fault of hers if that mode of settlement is blocked; and that since she cannot leave Egypt to take care of itself there is no other course open to her but annexing it also to her already overgrown Empire, however reluctant she may be to do so. It is, therefore, yet possible that that course may yet be decided upon by Her Majesty’s present advisers. But then besides the irritation it will necessarily cause to the other Powers who cooperated in the progress of the Convention now blocked, it will certainly entail the obligation to show Russia some accommodation in her exigencies in South-Eastern Europe. This brings us to the consideration of the second alternative to the settlement of the Egyptian question we indicated above. The reply of Russia to England and the other powers who cooperated with England would only be that if England removes the block in the settlement of the Bulgarian question according to Russia’s own fashion, Russia will remove not only her block in the settlement of the Egyptian question according to England’s own fashion, but also the Central Asian scares! There lies the key to the position of Russia, and the origin of the block in the Sultan’s ratification of the Convention, and the periodical Central Asian scares of which Lord Dufferin is now being treated to more than the usual extent.
Reference:
The First 100
A Selection of Editorials, 1878-1978, THE HINDU, VOLUME I