THE RUSSIAN REACTION
It would be interesting to know if the Communist Party of India now regrets having issued a statement President Nixon’s plan to visit China within 48 hours of the simultaneous announcement from Washington and Peking. The CPI Central Secretariat statement on July 18 saw in the plan a move to “provoke a war between the Soviet Union and China”; it also saw the Chinese leadership sinking “into the mire of shamefaced opportunism”. Moscow took more than a week to make what can be regarded as its first authoritative comment, although an article in the New Times had early warned the small and medium powers against pinning much faith on Peking’s intentions: the first public comment, in the Communist Youth League newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, had merely described Mr. Nixon’s announcement as “unusual, although not particularly unexpected”. It was only last Sunday that Pravda itself published a direct and detailed commentary on the Nixon plan. Predictably the comment, in the form of a signed article, was not wholly favorable, let alone enthuslastic; but it provided a marked contrast to the CPI’s angry outpouring. The article did not fail to point out the seeming contradiction between the professed policies and real intentions of both China and the USA; nor did it try to conceal the Russian fear that a SinoAmerican understanding might be used to put some kind of pressure on the Soviet Union. But the tone of the article was markedly moderate.
Indeed, it put on record the Soviet Union’s own desire to see normal relations established between China and the USA, since the long-term interests of all peoples of the world “require decisions promoting stronger peace and security and not political combinations aimed against other States“. The Russians, it was further stated, were ready “vigorously to cooperate with all States, including the People’s Republic of China”, for universal peace and other unexceptionable objectives.
There can be no doubt that the Russians have had serious misgivings about the Sino-American contacts; for months, in fact, they have been accusing China of “flirting” with the USA, as the Chinese have been alleging Russo-American collusion for a much longer period. A rapprochement between Washington and Peking might reduce Russian leverage in dealing with both; Moscow has special reason to be concerned over any loss or bargaining power in Sino-Soviet talks. But it cannot openly denounce moves for the normalization of Sino-American relations after having blamed the Americans for so many years for denying recognition to the People’s Republic and obstructing its entry into the United Nations. Nor can the Russians strike too discordant a note when responsible world opinion is mostly in favour of the Sino-American initiative. It is also possible that Washington has already given some private assurances to dispel Russian fears Similar assurances are Linlikely to have been obtained from China as well; but nothing that Peking has said or done since the announcement of the Nixon visit can have provided additional grounds for Russian concern. After all, the Chinese too are now busy trying to salvage their “anti-imperialist” reputation. Besides, Russia’s relations with Peking and Washington will not necessarily deteriorate after an improvement in Sino-American relations. Such are the compulsions of realpolitik that an understanding between Washington and Peking may not only be followed by fresh moves for a settlement of Sino-Soviet differences: it may make a settlement decisively easier. (Editorial]
Reference: Hindustan Standard 29.07.1971