US-Japan-China Relations And The Opening To China: The 1970s
Working Paper No. 5
Yoshihide Soeya, Ph.D.
Professor of Political Science
Faculty of Law, Keio University
Introductory Remarks
This is a preliminary overview of the state of knowledge on Japanese policy and relations with China in the 1970s in the context of US policy and relations with Asia, in general, and with Japan and China, in particular. Gaps in the knowledge as well as source materials are discussed both in the main text and in the footnotes. The overview presented here is by no means complete nor definitive, but is intended to serve as an initial basis for further discussion and inputs in the author’s ongoing study on the subject matter.
I. The Nixon Shock and Japan-China Diplomatic Normalization
US-China Rapprochement
The Richard Nixon administration, which came to power in January 1969, pursued three major diplomatic agenda simultaneously: the withdrawal from Vietnam, construction of détente relations with the Soviet Union, and rapprochement with China. In short, Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger thought that they would be able to withdraw from Vietnam in a credible fashion only if they succeeded in the creation of a “structure for peace,” sustained by sound relations with both of the two communist giants.
Rapprochement with China was to provide a breakthrough in this ambitious plan. The crucial turning point was the military clash between China and the Soviet Union along the border in March 1969. Kissinger recalls that Nixon and Kissinger did not fully appreciate its strategic implications soon after the incident. Hypersensitive reactions by the Soviet Union and North Vietnam, however, made them realize its significance: on March 11, to Kissinger’s remark that the incident was a Sino-Soviet problem, Russian ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin “insisted passionately that China was everybody’s problem,” and on March 22′, in negotiations with North Vietnam in Paris, Xuan Thuy “volunteered the surprising outburst that the United States had nothing to gain by seeking to take advantage of the divisions between the Soviet Union and China.”1 After this, China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam began to link with each other in a broader strategic picture.
The greatest asset for such US diplomacy was the intensifying Sino-Soviet rift. This placed North Vietnam in a difficult position between China and the Soviet Union, and served as a significant impetus for China and the Soviet Union to give a priority to improving relations with the United States over Vietnam. China needed the United States to cope with the Soviet threat; so did the Soviet Union in order to reconstruct its trouble-ridden diplomacy that was further aggravated by the intensifying conflict with China.2 The American design toward North Vietnam was to isolate Hanoi, and draw its belligerent leadership into a settlement of the Vietnam War through negotiations.
In August 1969, Nixon made an important initiative by conveying a message to China through the Pakistani channel to the effect that the United States would not isolate China in the intensifying Sino-Soviet confrontation.3 Already by February 1970, the Chinese leaders understood the American linkage, which was indicated by the Chinese thinking conveyed to the White House in February through the Pakistani channel to the effect that “the possibility of expansion of the Vietnam war is seen as having lessened. A war between China and the US is seen now as a very remote possibility.” To Kissinger, this meant that “Chou En-lai had understood us. He had even grasped by early 1970 what so many domestic critics had failed to acknowledge: that we were on the way our of Vietnam. And he coupled this with an unmistakable hint that China had no intention of entering the Vietnam war, or, for that matter, of attacking any other vital American interest.”4 In early December 1970, Pakistani President Yahya Khan conveyed a Chinese message to Kissinger welcoming Nixon’s special envoy to China. Kissinger responded in his message dated December 16 (conveyed to China on January 5, 1971) expressing the US readiness to hold high level talks in Beijing.5
On April 6, 1971, China made a dramatic move to invite the US table tennis national team that was in Japan to participate in the world table tennis contest, signaling that China was now ready to make a significant move. In late April, the Chinese reply dated April 21 to the Kissinger’s December message finally arrived, reaffirming Chinese “willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the US (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the US Secy. of State or even the President of the US himself for a direct meeting and discussions.”6
Thus, Kissinger secretly visited China on July 9-11, and finalized an arrangement for Nixon to go to China. On July 15, Nixon disclosed the Kissinger’s secret trip and announced that he would visit China before May 1972. North Vietnamese Premier Phan Van Dong visited China in November and requested the cancellation of Nixon’s China visit, but Mao Zedong flatly rejected the plea, advising instead to accept a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War with the South Vietnamese government kept intact.7 Nixon visited China in February 1972, and signed the Shanghai Communiqué declaring historic US-China rapprochement.
Upon hearing Nixon’s announcement on July 15, 1971, the Soviet Union strongly asked for Nixon’s visit to Moscow before his China trip, and began to exhibit apparent eagerness to conclude the ongoing SALT negotiations before the US-Soviet summit meeting. Washington declined this request, and frustrated Moscow requested Nixon’s official visit in May or June, soon after his planned trip to China.8 Moscow also declined Hanoi’s request to cancel Nixon’s trip to Moscow, and instead pushed for a solution of the Vietnam War through negotiations with the United States. Nixon visited Moscow in May 1972, and signed the SALT and the A# treaties that came to symbolize détente relations between the two superpowers in the 1970s. Isolated North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973.
In conducting such diplomacy, Nixon and Kissinger upheld a firm belief in national interests as the fundamental guiding principle of diplomacy and as a central organizing principle of major power relations. In the words of Kissinger, “Nixon sought to navigate according to a concept of America’s national interest… If the major powers, including the United States, pursued their self-interests rationally and predictably, Nixon believed–in the spirit of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment–that an equilibrium would emerge from the clash of competing interests.”9 Given the heightened tensions between China and the Soviet Union, such an equilibrium in the Sino-US-Soviet triangular relationship would give the United States a swing position, where the United States could enjoy both rapprochement with China and détente with the Soviet Union and thus a diplomatic leverage over both China and the Soviet Union.
In a significant way, it appears that Nixon and Kissinger attempted to achieve the same type of swing position in a smaller triangular between Japan, the United States and China. Our knowledge and source materials concerning this small triangle are not sufficient, and thus the following account should be read as a hypothesis which needs to be tested and substantiated further by what would become available in coming years under this project.
US-China Rapprochement and Japan-US Relations
Here, two sets of hypotheses are presented. First, while Nixon’s diplomacy toward Asia and Japan was driven by strategic consideration, the Japanese administration under Prime Minister Sato Eisaku accepted Nixon’s strategic demands on Japan as a concession to Sato’s goals of “autonomous diplomacy,” most symbolically shown in the case of the reversion of Okinawa. Second, when Nixon and Kissinger were talking about the Japan factor in the context of US-China rapprochement, they were looking at Japan at two different levels: Japan as a potentially independent actor in the power games among major countries, and Japan as an ally of the United States in Asia.
The core concept of the new US diplomacy in Asia was reflected in the Nixon Doctrine, initially expressed as an “informal” remark by Nixon in July 1969 in Guam10 and eventually formulated into a three-point policy in Nixon’s address to the nation in November 196911 and in his first foreign policy report to the Congress in February 1970.12 The three points read as follows:
· First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
· Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
· Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.13
The first and the second points assured US commitment to the treaty obligations and nuclear umbrella for the allied countries, while the third asked the allies to assume primary responsibilities for their own defense.
Accordingly, Japan was expected to strengthen its own defense efforts and to assume some extent of responsibility for regional security. The Sato-Nixon joint communiqué announced in November 1969 included important stipulations in this respect; the so-called “Korea clause” and “Taiwan clause” said, respectively, that “The Prime Minister . . . stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan’s own security,” and that “The Prime Minister also said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.” By the same token, the United States began to push for Japan’s increased defense efforts under the slogan of “burden sharing” in the 1970s.
The Sato administration, however, was not prepared to see the implications of these strategic developments from the dominant international logic. The most telling case was the reversion of the administrative right of Okinawa which was promised in the 1969 Sato-Nixon joint communiqué. From an American perspective, the reversion of Okinawa, the essential military base in the Far East, was acceptable only along the line of the Nixon Doctrine. It was natural, therefore, that the reversion would bring about Japan’s larger responsibility for the maintenance of regional stability as symbolized by the Korean clause and the Taiwan clause of the Sato-Nixon joint communiqué. Knowing that these clauses would cause an uproar in the Japanese Diet and mass media, however, Sato took them as “concessions” to the United States for returning Okinawa. The primary consideration on the part of Sato was to regain the administrative right of Okinawa as a demonstration of Sato’s dedication to “autonomous diplomacy.”
A nuclear-free Okinawa was important for Sato for these reasons of domestic politics and Sato’s personal ambition. Perhaps, Nixon and Kissinger understood these peculiar Japanese imperatives, and attempted to take advantage of them in order to gain as much political concession as possible on other outstanding issues, particularly the textile dispute.14
Another interesting set of issues pertains to the question of the US-Japan security relationship in the context of US-China rapprochement, particularly how Nixon and Kissinger conceptualized the role of Japan in a newly constructed international structure.
Nixon and Kissinger respectively write about the question in their memoirs as follows:
“If we were to leave Japan naked and defenseless, they would have to turn to others for help or build the capability to defend themselves. If we had not defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where they were concerned…..
…..it is the world as I see it, and when I analyze it, it is what brings us, China and America, together, not in terms of philosophy and not in terms of friendship–although I believe that is important–but because of national security I believe our interests are in common in the respects I have mentioned. “ (Nixon’ s remarks made to Zhou Enlai on February 18, 1972 in Beijing,)15
…..From an early hostility to the American alliance with Japan (still to be found in the Shanghai Communiqué), the Chinese leaders soon came, in part under our persistent persuasion, to view it as a guarantee of America’ s continued interest in the Western Pacific and a rein on Japanese unilateralism. Soon they strongly supported close relations betweenJapan and America.16
Both of these remarks did emphasize the “cork in the bottle” function of the US-Japan security relationship, where they saw common national interests with China. It is an interesting analytical question to ask how the US interest in “burden-sharing” with Japan and its concern about Japanese unilateralism coexisted in the US policy. Was this logic used by Nixon and Kissinger simply to convince the Chinese, or did they add this new meaning to the US-Japan security relationship in the emerging new context of US- Japan-China relations? It the latter case was true to some extent (as well as the former), in which context was Japan a serious source of concern and how did this perspective coexist with a policy to treat Japan as a US ally?
A hypothesis here is as follows: Nixon and Kissinger were concerned about Japanese unilateralism, if not as a realistic alternative in the immediate future, but as a conceptual possibility in their abstract approach to major power relations based on national interests as a guiding principle. It was a conceptual possibility because they were convinced that Japan, too (like the United States and China in this respect), was behaving on the basis of its own national interests and national agenda. Their reference to the nuclearization of Japan, let alone “remilitarization,” in various occasions was basically a reflection of this perspective on the centrality of national interests as extended to major power relations where Japan is, if only conceptually, a major factor.
In real life, however, Nixon and Kissinger did not trust Japan as an independent actor in international politics. It is important to emphasize in this connection that this reasoning was not simply an extension of the image of Japan from the past. The fundamental source of this distrust was again presumably conceptual. Conceptual, because they did not doubt the Japanese capability, as well as its intention in due course, to reemerge as a strong, independent actor in the world, and because they did not believe that an international system where Japan establishes itself as an independent actor would ever be stable. Kissinger, in particular, has remarked that the Japanese leaders cannot think strategically and conceptually. Such a Japan, for Nixon and Kissinger, did not deserve serious attention as a conceptual and strategic counterpart of the United States (but China did).
The US interests would be best met, vis-à-vis such a Japan, if a Japanese ambition to become a “remilitarized” independent actor is “contained,” and if the US succeeds in converting such Japanese potentials into an integral part of American strategy in Asia and the world. The US-Japan security relationship is the best scheme to achieve this dual goal.
The fundamental pitfall of this reasoning is that it fails to understand a spontaneous aspect of Japanese motivation to build a cooperative relationship with the United States. Many Japanese indeed have come to a conclusion that the security relationship with the United States is the best policy based on the calculation of national interests, as a spontaneous, positive choice of national strategy. For them, the “cork in the bottle” argument is a source of unnecessary confusion of the relationship.
Another related issue is the place of Japan in the context of Sino-American rapprochement. When Nixon and Kissinger made a reference to Japanese unilateralism and remilitarization, to what extent were they using Japan as a card against China?
A hypothesis here is that they were indeed playing a Japan card, and the purpose was to retain the swing position between Japan and China. There was a dual purpose here, too: not to allow China to play a Japan card vis-à-vis the United States, and to use good relations with both Japan and China against the Soviet Union in a larger strategic picture.
These strategies may be beautiful as American strategies, but were ugly from a Japanese point of view. This is why the US-Japan relationship hit the lowest point during the Nixon administration. Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization proceeded under these unfortunate circumstances.
Japan-China Diplomatic Normalization
Japanese Ambassador to Washington Ushiba Nobuhiko was informed of the Nixon’ s announcement on July 15 less than an hour before it.17 Prime Minister Sato is said to have learned of the announcement only several minutes prior it (on July 16, Japan time). This came as a great shock to Sato, since it had been agreed that both governments would remain in close consultation on the China question.
Although Sato decided to co-sponsor with the United States the dual representation formula for China and Taiwan in the United Nations in the fall of 1971, Sato became determined that Japan’ s diplomatic normalization with China should be achieved at the possible earliest moment. Nixon was concerned that if Japan moved too hastily Japan might give unnecessary concessions to China, particularly over the question of Taiwan. When Sato and Nixon met in California on January 6-7, 1972, Nixon warned against Japan being motivated by a sense of competition with the United States, while Sato stated explicitly that Japan was, planning to establish diplomatic normalization with China.18
Indeed, among Japanese policy-makers, there was a strong feeling that they were betrayed by the United States. A Foreign Ministry official who played a key role in normalization stated: “there was resentment over the fact that the United States had gone ahead of Japan in opening up contact with China. Unless Japan got ahead of the United States in the actual normalization, the people would not accept such a verdict.”19 For the Tanaka cabinet which succeeded the Sato administration, “it was a matter of survival in domestic politics to achieve normalization before the United States did.”20
Sato attempted to contact China in various means, but was met with a firm Chinese denial. In Japan, too, a dominant mood was that Sato had been around for too long and that he should step down with the reversion of Okinawa. Thus, upon the return of Okinawa on May 15, 1972, Sato announced his resignation on June 17. In the LDP presidential election in July, Tanaka Kakuei defeated Fukuda Takeo who had received Sato’s full support. On of the important factors was a policy agreement by Tanaka, Ohira Masayoshi and Miki Takeo in the middle of the LDP presidential election, to the effect that they would oppose Fukuda on condition that any of them would pursue diplomatic normalization with China if elected. On July 7, after the first cabinet meeting, Tanaka declared that he would hasten diplomatic normalization with China, to which Zhou Enlai responded positively two days later.
Thus, with the establishment of the Tanaka administration, diplomatic normalization was already a foregone conclusion. Tanaka was determined, and more importantly, the Chinese leadership was equally determined to grab the momentum of US-China rapprochement and achieve normalization as quickly as possible. It was well anticipated that if the process were prolonged, domestic opposition in both countries would gain influence.
The Chinese side presented its draft version of a joint communiqué to establish diplomatic normalization to Takeiri Yoshikatsu, chairman of the Clean Government Party, who visited China on July 25. It included the termination of the state of war, the recognition by the Japanese government of the PRC government as the sole legitimate government representing China, the understanding by the Japanese government of “the three principles for the restoration of relations” (issued as part of the joint communiqué between the Chinese China-Japan Friendship Association and the Clean Government Party in July 1971; see below), the “anti-hegemony” clause, the Chinese renunciation of the right of war reparation, and so forth.
These Chinese proposals were closely examined within the Foreign Ministry. At the end of July 1972, a small working group of officials was established in the Ministry, comprising of Takashima Masuo (Director-General of the Treaties Bureau), Kuriyama Takakazu (Treaties Division Chief), Yoshida Kenzo (Director-General of the Asian Affairs Bureau), and Hashimoto Hiroshi (China Division Chief). The Japanese draft of a joint communiqué was prepared by early September by the working group.21
In the meantime, Tanaka met with Nixon on August 31 and September 1, 1972 in Honolulu. Tanaka reaffirmed Japan’ s strong commitment to the US-Japan security relationship even after diplomatic normalization with China. In particular, Tanaka made it clear that the disruption of diplomatic relations with Taiwan would not mean any change in the status of Taiwan in the US-Japan security arrangements.22
Despite the presence of several complicated issues including the Taiwan question, however, the actual negotiation process between Japan and China was surprisingly short, with the joint communiqué to establish diplomatic normalization signed on September 29, 1972, less than three months after the inauguration of the Tanaka cabinet. Chinese concessions to the Japanese claims were the key to the speed.
The Japanese negotiators concentrated their main efforts to the question of compatibility between the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty signed in 1952 and the legal issues in the joint communiqué. The Japanese side insisted, for instance, that the termination of “the state of war” had already been declared with Taipei which Japan had recognized at the time as the sole legitimate government representing China, and therefore could not repeat the same word again. The Chinese compromised with the wording, the termination of “the abnormal state of affairs,” in the Article 1 of the joint communiqué. Another legal issue was the Chinese renouncement of the right to demand war reparation, which had also been stated in the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty. The Chinese compromise was to drop the term “right,” with the agreed Article 5 stating that the Chinese government “renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.”
The question over Taiwan was more complicated. The Chinese position had been conveyed to the Japanese side in the form of “the three principles for the restoration of relations,” which said: (1) PRC is the sole legitimate government representing China, (2) Taiwan is a province of China and an inalienable part of the Chinese territories, and (3) the Japan-Taiwan treaty is unlawful and should be abolished. The first point posed no problem, and the Article 2 of the joint communiqué declared: “The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.”
Regarding the second and the third points, the joint communiqué made only an indirect reference. While declaring in the preamble that “the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding ‘the three principles for the restoration of relations’ put forward by the Government of the People’ s Republic of China, ” the Article 3 stated that “The Government of Japan fully understands and respects” the stand of the PRC Government that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China,” and that the Japanese government “firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.” The Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation declared that the Cairo Declaration should be fully implemented which in turn had stipulated that Japan should return all the territories taken from China. By this stipulation, Japan assumed a stand (which was basically directed against the domestic audience) that Japan was in no position to speak about Taiwan. As regards the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty, there was no direct reference in the joint communiqué, and instead Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi stated in a press conference that “the Japanese government’s stand is that as a result of normalization with China the treaty ceased to be significant and came to an end,” implying that it had been in existence before then.
These concessions by the Chinese government over critical issues concerning the Taiwan question, a matter of principle for Chinese diplomacy, were a clear indication that the Chinese leaders were eager to establish normalization without much delay. Domesti-cally, they were concerned about political oppositions gaining strength. Externally, strategic considerations prevailed over legal details. This was demonstrated by the Article 7 of the joint communiqué which said: “The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” Despite the inclusion of the so-called “third country clause,” its anti-Soviet implications were obvious for the Chinese leaders.
The Japanese side took the “anti-hegemony” clause as quid pro quo for the Chinese concessions.23 It is not necessarily fair, however, to interpret these differences between China and Japan that China was driven by strategic considerations while Japan was simply concerned about legal details. Behind Japan’s preoccupation with legal details were political considerations toward influential pro-Taiwan forces within the LDP. The Japanese government also understood the anti-Soviet nature of the “anti-hegemony” clause, which was indicated by its insistence on the “third country clause.”24
Nonetheless, what stood out in the Japanese response was a lack of preparedness to view Japan’s position in the international dynamism evolving around Sino-Soviet rift, US-China rapprochement, US-Soviet détente, and the anticipated American withdrawal from Vietnam.
Prime Minister Tanaka later summarized his views toward Japan-China diplomatic normalization in three points. First, the China issue was “a domestic issue rather than a diplomatic issue,” and “the settlement of the China issue removes two-thirds of domestic problems.” Second, the combined population of the two nations “comprises one-fourth of the world’s population. Without the settlement of such relations, there would be no stability of Japan.” Third, “Japan should establish friendly relations with China alongside with maintaining the Japan-US security treaty. With the formation of the triangular relationship among Japan, the United States and China, peace in the Far East is secured.” 25 These remarks reveal that Japan-China diplomatic normalization was, first of all, a domestic problem for Tanaka. Then comes Tanaka’s fantasy in the special relationship with China. Regional security considerations form the last point.
The third point is by no means a comparable vision to that pursued by the United States or China, but reveals that Tanaka was excited about the fact that the Japan-US security relationship and Japan-China diplomatic normalization finally became compatible. Not only for Tanaka but for many in charge of policy-making, this was the most conspicuous change in postwar Japanese diplomacy. For one thing, its importance lay in domestic politics, because “two incompatible objectives that had divided Japanese domestic politics for more than two decades” were now reconciled.26 On the external front, Japan-China diplomatic normalization was considered to be a lead-off event of a more diversified diplomacy in the 1970s, which aimed at constructing diversified relations with Asian countries in a compatible fashion with the basic diplomatic stance of “collaboration” with the United States.
Before looking at this new diplomacy in the 1970s, an overview of Chinese approaches toward the Japanese business community is next in order. The China tilt by the Japanese business community was an important aspect of the process of Japan-China diplomatic normalization.27
Zhou’s Four Conditions and Japan’s Business Response
On April 19, 1970, in a meeting with a Memorandum Trade group led by Matsumura Kenzo, Zhou Enlai enunciated a new set of four conditions applicable to all Japanese firms conducting China trade. By this time, the United States and China had already began groping for a high-level meeting. As seen in the above, by early 1970, the Chinese leaders had already learned the US intention not to isolate China in the intensifying Sino-Soviet rift, and to bring the Vietnam War to an end. In this context, it can reasonably be inferred that Zhou’s four point statement in April 1970 was a highly political move intended to induce a China tilt among Japanese firms, and thus to generate a favorable atmosphere for diplomatic normalization.
On May 2, Woo Shudong, deputy chief secretary of the Canton trade fair, reiterated what came to be known as the “Zhou’s four conditions” to the Japanese firms participating in the trade fair.28 These conditions stated that China would not have trade exchanges with (1) trading firms and manufacturers supporting aggression by Taiwan and South Korea, (2) trading firms and manufacturers with large investments in Taiwan and South Korea, (3) enterprises supplying arms and ammunition to US imperialism for aggression against Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and (4) US-Japanese joint enterprises and subsidiaries of US firms in Japan.
The majority of friendly firms, which had been designated as such by China since the 1960s, did not face major problems because they had not done anything contrary to the conditions. Aside from these, there were three distinct groups of firms, which reacted differently to Zhou’s four conditions: (1) the firms which depended heavily on China trade and thus had a strong incentive to accept the conditions, (2) an in-between group, and (3) the firms which had a large trade with Taiwan, and thus were reluctant to accept Zhou’s four conditions.
The first type included firms in the steel and fertilizer industries. The steel industry had exported a total of 1,260 thousand tons of steel to China in 1969, second only to the United States, compared with 570 thousand tons to Taiwan. The leading four in China trade were Sumitomo Metal Industries, Nippon Kokan K.K., Kawasaki Steel Corporation, and Nippon Steel Corporation. All but Nippon Steel Corporation quickly accepted Zhou’s four conditions; Sumitomo Metal Industries on May 9, Kawasaki Steel Corporation on May 11, and Nippon Kokan K.K. on May 12.29
The case of Nippon Steel Corporation was more complicated because its chairman, Nagano Shigeo, was an influential pro-Taiwan business leader, and was chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In defiance of the Chinese demand, Nippon Steel Corporation attended the Japan-China(Taiwan) Cooperation Committee meeting in July.
The dependence of the fertilizer industry on the China market was still more conspicuous. In 1969, 76 percent of its exports went to China.30 It had no reason to hesitate, and on May 11, the heads of the six major fertilizer firms (Sumitomo Chemical Co., Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals, Mitsubishi Chemical Industries, Ube Industries, Showa Denko K. K. and Nissan Chemical Industries) gathered and decided jointly to accept Zhou’s four conditions.31
The middle group had various responses. First, among the top ten trading corporations, Nissho-Iwai Corporation, Sumitomo Corporation, Ataka Sangyo, and Nichimen Corporation accepted Zhou’s four conditions one after another in May 1970. These companies except Nichimen had not conducted China trade on their own; after accepting Zhou’s four conditions, they were only allowed to deal with China through their respective dummy firms, namely, Daiho, Daika Boeki, and Toshima Shokai. At this time, the Chinese still accepted trade through dummies, rather than pushing for the direct involvement of big trading corporations.
Second, three manufacturers accepted Zhou’s four conditions in May in the hope of not missing the China market: Hino Motor Co., Isuzu Motors, and Komatsu Manufacturing Co.32 These firms, like the trading companies mentioned above, had dealt with China since the 1960s, and more or less leaned to the China market due to economic considerations.
Things were different, however, for firms which had substantial stakes in Taiwan and South Korea. The case of the Toyota group illustrates this point. Toyota Jihan, a marketing firm within the Toyota Motor group, had taken the lead in the group’s move into the China market. Toyota Jihan told the Chinese side that it would accept Zhou’s four conditions in the fall of 1970. This offer was not approved by the Chinese side, however, because Toyota had been trading heavily with Taiwan and South Korea.33
About half a year later, the Chinese side made a move. On April 9, 1971, Wang Xiaoyun visited the Toyota factory and conferred with a vice-president of Toyota Jihan.34 Wang was then visiting nearby Nagoya as deputy head of the Chinese national team at the 31st World table tennis contest, which received a world-wide attention because of the “ping pong diplomacy” between China and the United States. Two weeks later, it was announced that Toyota Jihan had sent a message to China, which indicated that Toyota would continue to deal with Taiwan and South Korea on a commercial basis, but would not invest nor expand its business beyond the current level.35 China accepted this offer, and Toyota Jihan was able to send representatives to the spring Canton trade fair of 1971.
By this time, China had apparently relaxed the conditions so that maintaining a current level of involvement in Taiwan and South Korea could be interpreted as acceptable. China was now pursuing an active and flexible strategy of getting Japanese firms to switch sides. It must be noted that Wang Xiaoyun’s meeting with Toyota leaders, as well as with other business leaders in both Kansai and Tokyo (see below), coincided with the Chinese invitation for a US ping pong team to visit China. In addition, Zhou Enlai had issued an invitation to the White House by this time, welcoming the China visit by either Kissinger, Secretary of State, or President himself (dated April 21 and delivered to the White House by a Pakistani Ambassador on April 27, 1971).36
Subsequently, these developments as well as the subsequent “Nixon shock” in July and the Chinese membership in the United Nations in October opened the door further for the big four trading corporations to go into China trade, representing the third group of firms.
Among them, Ito-Chu was the first to return to the China trade. In January 1971, its president Echigo Masakazu had decided to go into China trade, and soon after begun to make an unofficial contact with China through an anonymous person. This person was Kimura Ichizo, managing director of the Kansai Headquarters of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT-Kansai). Kimura had conferred with Zhou Enlai at the beginning of 1971, and Zhou responded favorably to Kimura’s suggestion that he would endeavor to send Japanese business leaders to China.37 As seen below, plans for China visits by business leaders of Kansai and Tokyo indeed started to take shape soon after this meeting. Ito-Chu accepted Zhou’s four conditions on December 14, 1971, and conveyed its willingness to visit China through the JAPIT-Kansai.38 Ito-Chu executives eventually visited China on March 5, 1972, and it was designated a friendly firm as the first case among the big four trading corporations.
This attracted widespread attention because, to the surprise of the delegation, China did not ask that a dummy firm be used.39 China’s relaxed criteria for Zhou’s four condi-tions, allowing the current level of involvement in Taiwan and South Korea, opened the way for a Japanese trading firm to engage in both China and Taiwan trades directly. This event, a first in the history of postwar Japan-China trade, marked the end of the dummy system.
Next came Marubeni-Iida Corporation. It disclosed on March 3, 1972 that it had already expressed its willingness to go into China trade through the JAPIT-Kansai. It officially accepted Zhou’s four conditions on April 5, and sent a mission to China in June.40
The remaining two, Mitsubishi and Mitsui, simultaneously announced their acceptance of Zhou’s four conditions on June 14, 1972. It was reported that managing directors of both corporations had met to consult about the matter the day before.41
When Mitsubishi and Mitsui finally changed their attitudes toward China trade, the resignation of Prime Minister Sato was well anticipated (Sato, achieving the reversion of Okinawa on May 15, formally announced the resignation on June 17). The moves by these two giants in the trading business, therefore, contributed greatly to the rise of a national mood toward diplomatic normalization with China as well as the ascendance of Tanaka Kakuei as Sato’s successor.
The cases of Mitsubishi and Mitsui, however, formed an interesting contrast worth noting; it was not until September 29 — after diplomatic normalization — that Mitsui received an invitation to China, and it waited until October 10 to be designated a friendly firm42, while Mitsubishi received an invitation on July 31 and was granted friendly firm status on August 18.43
By this time, delegations from Kansai and Tokyo business circles had already visited China. It was thought that a delegation of the Mitsubishi group, composed of Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Mitsubishi Bank, would symbolize the last stage in creating a business environment favorable to diplomatic normalization. The logic here is that the group was close to the government, especially through Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (which is the largest producer of weaponry in Japan), and that the group had a close relationship with Taiwan.44
Earlier on November 11, 1971, just one day before the Tokyo business leaders’ delegation left for China, Makita Yoichiro, president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, disclosed that heads of the Mitsubishi group had been discussing a plan to visit China.45 On June 7, 1972, Fujino Chujiro, president of Mitsubishi Corporation, made it public that the Mitsubishi group started to approach China right after China was admitted into the United Nations, inquiring about the possibility of their sending a mission.46
A related source disclosed on July 11, 1972 that documents confirming the acceptance of Zhou’s four conditions by the group were sent to the CCPIT at the end of June together with a request for an invitation to China.47 This source was again Kimura Ichizo. Kimura stated in an interview that he once had a secret meeting with three heads of these companies and had them sign a memorandum declaring that they would accept Zhou’s four conditions. China responded to it quickly, extending an invitation to the group on July 31, and the mission left for China on August 17. This was taken in Japan as an excep-tionally quick reaction by the Chinese, since it usually took about three months before the Japanese side got a response of the kind.48
These moves by Japanese firms were further reinforced by the developments in the big business, thus advancing the China tilt in the Japanese business community toward diplomatic normalization.
Delegations of Kansai and Tokyo Business Leaders
It was at the beginning of 1971 that plans to send business leaders from Kansai and Tokyo started to materialize through mediation by the old Japan-China trade channels.49 Kansai business leaders were to lead off because they were politically less attached to the central government and many of them had kept traditional business interests in the China market. Dispatching of a Kansai business leaders’ delegation was decided as a core project of the JAPIT-Kansai in 1971.
The JAPIT-Kansai’ s first major step was to arrange a meeting on April 13 of several business leaders with Wang Xiaoyun who was in Japan as deputy head of the Chinese table tennis national team. As revealed five days later, Wang conferred with leaders of the Kansai-based Sumitomo group. Wang said that China looked forward to welcoming their visit at any time. Kansai Keizai Doyukai responded by establishing a “China Problem Discussion Group” on April 19. 50
These activities led the heads of Kansai’ s major business organizations to gather at the JAPIT-Kansai on May 6, 1971. They agreed to form a delegation among top leaders of the Kansai business, and to visit China in September or October.51 The trip was realized virtually as scheduled, which supports Minenaga Ryosaku, the delegation’s secretary general, that the Kansai delegation would have gone even if the “Nixon shock” had not occurred.52 For China, however, the “Nixon shock” was a foregone conclusion by this time.
The delegation, which left for China on September 16, 1971, included seven business leaders from five major economic organizations in Kansai: Saeki Isamu (chairman of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry; president of Kinki Nippon Railway), Nakatsukasa Kiyoshi (vice-chairman of the Kansai Economic Federation; president of Kanegahuchi Chemical Industry), Hyuga Hosai (vice-chairman of the Kansai Economic Federation; president of Sumitomo Metal Industries), Yamamoto Hiromu (chairman of the Kansai Committee for Economic Development; president of Sumitomo Trust & Banking), Saji Keizo (chairman of the Kansai Committee for Economic Development; president of Suntory), Nagata Takao (chairman of the Osaka Industrial Association; president of Shikijima Textile); plus Kawakatsu Den. Kimura Ichizo, who had arranged the visit with the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, joined the delegation as advisor.53
The single most important purpose of the delegation was to lay the groundwork for diplomatic normalization. On the day of its departure from Osaka, the delegation declared that, on the basis of recognizing one China, it would respect the five peaceful conditions and the three political principles.54 While Zhou’s four conditions were directed toward private firms and corporations, the five peaceful conditions and the three political principles were the tools to solicit the China tilt by the big business community. As seen below, this point was clearly stated to the Tokyo business leaders by Wang Xiaoyun in May, and by Wan Guoqun in August.
While in China, too, the delegation expressed its unanimous view that Beijing represents the legitimate government of China, that Taiwan is part of China, and that diplomatic normalization is a pre-condition for an expansion of economic exchanges.55
In contrast to this enthusiasm in Kansai, Tokyo business leaders were more cautious. When the delegation members upgraded the Kansai Doyukai’s China Problem Discussion Group into a national forum for business leaders in November 1971, Tokyo business leaders declined to join.56 The Kansai leaders’ forward posture was underscored by the fact that they endorsed China’s two sets of principles even before China was admitted into the United Nations, which was a surprise for the leaders of Tokyo business.57
A plan for a delegation of Tokyo business leaders had been under way in parallel with the Kansai initiative since early 1971. The plan for the Tokyo business leaders’ delegation gained momentum in a series of meetings in Tokyo between them and two Chinese high officials, Wang Xiaoyun and Wang Guoquan. As noted above, Wang Xiaoyun, who was leading the Chinese national table tennis team to Nagoya, had met with Kansai business, leaders on April 13, 1971. While Wang was in Nagoya, Kimura Ichizo arranged a secret meeting with Imazato Hiroki (chairman of Nikkeiren, the Japan Federation of Employers’ Organizations; president of Nippon Seiko K.K.). Imazato then arranged a meeting with Tokyo business leaders.58
On April l 9, 1971, a week after his talks in Kansai, Wang Xiaoyun conferred with a group of Tokyo business leaders in Tokyo. This group included Kikawada Kazutaka (chairman of Keizai Doyukai, the Japan Committee for Economic Development; president of Tokyo Electric Power Company), Iwasa Yoshizane (vice-chairman of Keidanren, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations; president of Fuji Bank), Nakayama Sohei (permanent director of Doyukai; advisor to Industrial Bank of Japan), Kawai Ryoichi (vice-chairman of Doyukai; president of Komatsu Manufacturing Co.), Suzuki Haruo (former vice-president of Doyukai; president of Showa Denko K. K. ), Yamashita Seiichi (managing director of Doyukai), and Imazato Hiroki, who hosted the meeting. Kimura Ichizo was also present.59 Although the majority of participants were from Doyukai, leaders of three out of the four major economic organizations, were present.
In this meeting, Wang Xiaoyun made it clear that the three political principles and the five peaceful principles were a set of conditions for normalization of relations between Japan and China.60 These points were later repeated by Wang Guoquan, vice-president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, who visited Japan on August 15, 1971 to attend the funeral of Matsumura Kenzo. On August 30, Wang Guoquan conferred with Kikawada, Iwasa, Nakayama, and Yamashita who had attended the meeting with Wang Xiaoyun in April, plus Nagano Shigeo (president of Nissho, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry; chairman of Nippon Steel Corporation). In this meeting, Kikawada expressed his “full support” of the five peaceful principles, and indirectly expressed an understanding toward the three political principles by saying that Japanese opinion was being consolidated in a favorable direction.61
Nagano’s presence was important in the Tokyo business community’s China tilt in several respects. First, it meant that at least one leader from all four major economic organizations was now involved with China. Second, on the same day as this meeting, Nippon Steel Corporation announced that it was now ready to accept Zhou’s four conditions. Nippon Steel Corporation had been the sole holdout among the five major steel corporations trading heavily with China. Three days later, Nagano himself announced he would abide by Zhou’s four conditions, and also decided to participate in a delegation to China.62
There can be no doubt that the entire climate of opinion in the business community had been greatly affected by the Nixon shock on July 16 (Japan time). But it is also worthy of note that Nagano had decided to comply with Zhou’s four conditions on July 11, five days before the Nixon shock.63 On the following day, he agreed with Inayama Yoshihiro, president of Nippon Steel Corporation, that their firm would no longer participate in the Japan-China(Taiwan) Cooperation Committee and Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee. Inayama therefore could announce, immediately on hearing the news from Washington on July 16 (Japan time), that his firm would not attend the two Cooperation Committees. The fact that Nagano, one of Japan’s top business leaders, had changed his strategy toward China even before the Nixon shock was greatly appreciated in Beijing, and explains why Wang Guoquan met with Nagano on August 30.64 The news that China was likely to accept Nagano was brought back by Kimura Ichizo on September 7.65
Lacking a consensus, however, the delegation had to deemphasize its political tone. First, all the members joined the delegation in a private capacity, rather than as repre-sentatives of business organizations or firms, and the delegation was called a “delegation of Tokyo business people.” Second, to downgrade its prominence, Shoji Takeo, a relatively minor figure, was selected as head of the delegation. He was former president of Japan Aviation Manufacturing Co., but had no current position in any business organizations or firms. Third, on November 10, two days before departing for China, the delegation members agreed that they would not take a joint position on any political issues.66
The nine core members of the Tokyo delegation, who left for China on November 12, 1971, were Shoji, Kikawada, Nagano, Imazato, Iwasa, Kawai, Nakajima Masaki (vice-chairman of Doyukai; president of Mitsubishi Steel Mfg.), Minato Moriatu (vice-chairman of Doyukai; president of Nikko Research Center), and Yamashita.67
The delegation was not pressed to declare a political stance in any of the meetings. Apparently, the Chinese leaders saw sufficient value in the visit itself. To draw Tokyo business leaders into the Chinese hands, who gave a priority to the Japan-US relationship from an overall economic perspective, highly political demands were counterproductive. It was more effective to emphasize the compatibility between Japan-US relations and Japan-China normalization, particularly at a time when US-China rapprochement became open. It was indeed in this strategic consideration that Zhou Enlai told Iwasa that “It is good and important for China, too, to see good relations between Japan and the United States. I beg your further efforts to maintain good and deeper Japan-US relations.”68
Thus, the China visit by the Tokyo business leaders was a highly political act, in that it made the China tilt by the Japanese business community decisive. Shoji Takeo’s oral report to the press on November 22 declared that Japan should exert itself to prepare conditions for diplomatic normalization as soon as possible.69 Given that the Chinese were determined not to negotiate with the Sato government under any circumstances, this flat statement on behalf of the Tokyo business delegation in effect left the Sato government no room to maneuver in China policy.
II. US-Japan-China Relations in the 1970s
Political Environment
In the new international environment since the US-China rapprochement and the US-Soviet détente, the US government attempted to avoid appearing to be aligning with either China or the Soviet Union against the other, and to encourage both China and the Soviet Union to see the United States as a leverage with which to gain its political advantage over the other. Toward the end of the 1970s, however, the American wish to gain a “swing” position was gradually eroded due to the Soviet adventurism in the Third World, and the increasing sense of frustration and doubt about the effectiveness of the détente scheme. As the United States set out to normalize diplomatic relations with China under the Carter administration, the US priority shifted to alignment with China and antagonizing the Soviet Union. In this process, Washington turned its back against Hanoi that had sought to establish diplomatic relations, thus interjecting the elements of the US-China Soviet triangular relationship in Southeast Asia.70 As seen below, negotiations over a peace and friendship treaty between Japan and China as well as an important diplomatic overture by the Japanese government toward Indochina, particularly Vietnam, were conducted in these changing international environments.
Under the Nixon and Ford administrations, US official stance to keep the “swing” position was persistent despite some emerging domestic pressures for the use of a China card against the Soviet Union embarking on intervention in Angola in 1975-76.
When China became increasingly critical about the Ford administration in 1975, which continued to improve relations with the Soviet Union by means of SALT II negotiations, grain sales, technology transfer, and the Helsinki accords in the summer of 1975, Kissinger visited China in October and President Gerald Ford himself in December. In the same month, the Ford administration agreed to the British sales to China of Rolls-Royce Spey jet engines and a Spey factory to build engine in China.71 This decision, however, was reflective of the policy of diplomatic balancing rather than a China tilt, as demonstrated by another decision in October 1976 to approve the sales of the Cyber-172 computer systems to both China and the Soviet Union.72
Not much development was seen in l976 due to the demise of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in January and September and the ensuing political turmoil in China (including the rise of the Gang of Four, the purge of Deng Xiaoping, the ascendance of Hua Guofeng to the top leadership and the arrest of the Gang of Four), and the presidential elections in the United States. With the advent of the Carter administration in January 1977 and the return of Deng Xiaoping to power in July, however, US-China relations, as well as the US-China-Soviet triangle relationship, shifted into a distinct post-Nixon/Kissinger phase.
By mid-1977, the new Carter administration decided that it would pursue diplomatic normalization with China by accepting the Chinese demand to put an end to US diplomatic relations with Taiwan.73 The Carter administration, however, continued to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union simultaneously, particularly over the SALT negotiations. It was in this spirit of not playing the China card that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a strong proponent of détente relations with the Soviet Union, was sent to China in August 1977.74 Met with the Chinese resistance to the US position, the trip proved unsuccessful.
In the meantime, the Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict in the Horn of Africa in January 1978 began to affect the strategic thinking of the Carter administration toward China and the Soviet Union. The turning point was President Carter’s decision to send his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to China in May. At this juncture, Carter apparently opted for the use of the China card to show a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union, but was still hopeful of an early conclusion of a SALT II agreement. This was demonstrated by his decision in mid-March to send Vance to Moscow and Brzezinski to Beijing.75 But both China and the Soviet Union (as well as Brzezinski himself) took the Brzezinski’s China trip differently. China was happy about Brzezinski’s emphasis on common strategic interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,76 and the Soviet Union saw the visit as the turning point in the policy of the Carter administration “from a relatively considered and evenhanded ‘ triangular diplomacy’ to a single-minded pro-Peking and anti-Soviet orientation.”77 Subsequently, US-China joint communiqué was signed in mid-December, announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1979.
In the course of these developments, East Asian international relations turned into a flux, particularly in Indochina. In the beginning, the Carter administration had probed diplomatic normalization with Vietnam. As a first step in this direction, it had lifted restrictions on travel by the Americans to Vietnam on March 9, 1977, and began talks with Vietnam on improving relations in Paris in May. Since the Brzezinski’s China visit in May 1978, however, it became increasingly clear that normalizing relations with Vietnam would antagonize China. Then, in October 1978, in order to complete the China transaction, Carter formally decided to suspend negotiations of diplomatic normalization with Vietnam.78
By the same token, the highly volatile strategic rivalry between China and the Soviet Union clouded the Indochinese situation toward the end of 1978. China stood firmly behind the Khmer Rouge government of Cambodia that had severed diplomatic relations with Hanoi in December 1977. In the spring of 1978, Sino-Vietnamese relations further worsened over the Vietnamese treatment of Chinese residents, and in July China decided to suspend all aid to Vietnam. Undoubtedly, the new development in US-China relations along the anti-Soviet line encouraged the Chinese tough stance toward the southern neighbor.
In the middle of the uncertain development in US-China-Soviet strategic relations, Vietnam, in its desperate efforts to reconstruct a war-devastated country, had sought to cultivate a neutral stance between China and the Soviet Union, simultaneously seeking diplomatic normalization with the United States. But the new development in the strategic triangular relationship since May 1978 crashed the Vietnamese hope. On June 29, shortly before the suspension of the Chinese aid, Vietnam joined COMECON, and on November 3, it signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.
This was followed by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. Vietnam of course had the Soviet backing, whereas China played the America card: when Deng Xiaoping visited the United States in January 1979, he stated that the Chinese “consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson,” and asked the United States to provide “moral support.”79
It was in the middle of this strategically turbulent decade that Japan tackled two of the most important diplomatic issues in the postwar years: a new diplomatic overture toward Southeast Asia with Indochina as a primary focus and the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty. What stood out in Japan’s approaches toward these two diplomatic agenda was the unwillingness to be involved in strategic rivalries among the United States, China and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Japanese government attempted hard to define the nature of these issues in its own wishful way and to seek Japan’s role in the perceived non-strategic context.
Japan ‘ s Diplomatic Response (1): Fukuda Doctrine
In essence, the basic stance of Japanese diplomacy toward China and Southeast Asia in the l970s was to retain its diplomatic “autonomy” free from the logic of strategic rivalries among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Such a diplomatic propensity was a peculiar creation of the postwar international politics and Japan’s domestic politics, which made Japan’s direct involvement in highly political dimensions of international relations an extraordinarily controversial issue in Japan’s domestic politics as well as in Asia, often paralyzing Japan’s policy-making process. In this context, the pursuit of “autonomous diplomacy” was not equal to the quest for an independent strategic role, but rather was reflective of a hope to remain independent of international relations that were a function of military-strategic considerations. Given the fundamental policy of “collaboration” with the United States, maintaining a balance between Japan’s “autonomous diplomacy” and US strategic interests was the basic necessity.
An illustrative case in Japan’s Southeast Asian policy was the announcement of the Fukuda Doctrine in August 1977.80 The Fukuda Doctrine refers to a policy statement made by Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo in August 1977, clarifying the central policy of Japan toward Southeast Asia. The major thrust of this policy, as its drafters recall, was to bring about greater stability in Southeast Asia by encouraging peaceful coexistence between ASEAN and Indochina, with Japan serving as a bridge between the two. Given Japan’s peculiar situation, the driving force of that policy was understood to be economic assistance.
Japanese initiatives toward Indochina stood out at the time, in part because the United States was rapidly becoming disenchanted with the region. In turn, America’s low profile convinced Japanese policy makers that it was time to formulate somewhat “auto-nomous” policy toward Southeast Asia without necessarily contradicting the fundamentally cooperative relationship with the United States. When the Carter administration set out to negotiate diplomatic normalization with Vietnam in the spring of 1977, the international environment appeared ripe to start a new Japanese diplomacy toward Vietnam. Simply put, Japanese policy-makers expected that improved relations between Vietnam and both Japan and the United States would encourage Vietnam to maintain an independent position between China and the Soviet Union. Such a positioning of Vietnam among major powers was understood to be the precondition for the success of Japan’s new diplomatic initiative toward Vietnam in particular, and Southeast Asia in general.81
Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, who formed the Cabinet in December 1976, had expressed from the early l970s his determination to lead Japan on a “historically unparalleled path,” attempting to make Japan an economic power without becoming a military power. The culmination of this vision was the announcement of an “omni-directional diplomacy,” by which Fukuda expressed his preference for a diplomatic role of Japan as a bridge between conflicting countries or sub-regions, without depending on military imperatives. For Hisashi Owada, who was seconded from the Foreign Ministry as Fukuda’s secretary, Japan as a world power should have a major doctrine. As Owada put it, the Fukuda Doctrine was “a serious attempt to define the future role of Japan with respect to this part of the world, and by extension, to a wider world, not in terms of abstract philosophy, but in terms of a specific policy direction for Japan to follow.”82
Thus, Japan’s policy represented by the Fukuda Doctrine had two distinct characteristics: first, it was fundamentally conditioned by Japan’s postwar aversion to involvement in politically sensitive issues, not to mention in areas where the elements of strategic and military rivalry among the major powers were salient; and second, it represented a Japanese aspiration for a larger political role in regional politics in the post-Vietnam War phase. As seen above, however, international realities gradually turned against Japan’s wishes in the second half of 1978, and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December frustrated them completely.
In the lead-up to the invasion, Hanoi engaged in exceptionally active diplomacy, and Japan was an important target. From December 1977 to January 1978, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh went to Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand; and in July 1978, Vice Foreign Minister Pham Hien visited Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. In September-October, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong visited all five ASEAN nations. In December, shortly before the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh visited Tokyo, and conferred with the newly established Ohira Masayoshi government. Tokyo understood these moves by Hanoi according to its own expectations, i.e., as demonstrations of Hanoi’s intention to pursue an “independent diplomacy” and its willingness to open dialogue with ASEAN. Although Tokyo started to feel some concern over the political situation in Indochina, it continued to take Hanoi’s pledges at face value and decided to give a 10 billion yen loan in July, and 14 billion yen loan in December. Tokyo was still hoping to carry out the Fukuda Doctrine, as demonstrated by Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao’s explicit request to Hanoi to purchase ASEAN’s products as much as possible.83 Thus, Japan was captive of its own aspiration. To be more precise, Japan’s strong aspiration for a political role, without being prepared to become a full-fledged political and strategic player, resulted in the policy-makers in Tokyo interpreting the situation according to their own wishes.
Japan’s Diplomatic Response (2): Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty
An even more vivid example of this pattern of Japanese diplomacy is the impact of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty signed in August 1978 in the middle of a rapidly changing international political situation. The treaty was controversial because of the so-called “anti-hegemony” clause that was widely understood to be anti-Soviet. The Japanese government, fully aware of its implications, initially resisted the inclusion of the clause. With the tenacity of the Chinese determination, however, it agreed to it but only in tandem with the so-called “third country” clause. The Articles 2 and 4 of the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People’ s Republic of China” signed on August 12, 1978 respectively read as follows:
The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.
This treaty is often interpreted as signifying Japan’s strategic China tilt along the line of the US strategy vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union. True, Brzezinski understood the Japanese move in this strategic context and even as signifying the Japanese government’s concurrence to his persuasion on his way back from China in May 1978.84 Also, both China and the Soviet Union interpreted the major implications of the treaty in the same vein. As stated, however, the Japanese motives lied elsewhere, and the Japanese government subsequently came to argue that the “third country” clause negated the treaty’s anti-Soviet nature and brought the treaty in conformity with Fukuda’s “omni-directional diplomacy.”
In fact, the Fukuda administration did not feel any US pressure in deciding to conclude the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty, whose central motives were to solidify friendly and stable relations with China and thus were basically “non-strategic” in thinking. There was no indication from the policy debate in Tokyo that the American attitude was much of a concern, and Fukuda decided by March 1978, well before Brzezinski’s trip to China and Japan, on the terms of negotiations over the “anti- hegemony” clause and the “third country” clause.85
Moreover, the Japanese government under the Miki Takeo administration had already agreed to the inclusion of the “anti-hegemony” clause in November 1975: it proposed to the Chinese its draft treaty including the “anti-hegemony” clause. In doing so, the Miki government had attempted to neutralize its anti-Soviet strategic implications by incorporating the four Japanese conditions, conveyed to Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Quanhua by Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi: (1) Hegemony will be opposed not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also anywhere else; (2) Anti-hegemony is not directed against a specific third party; (3) Anti-hegemony does not mean any common action by Japan and China; (4) A principle that is in contradiction to the spirit of the United Nations Charter cannot be accepted.86
In 1978, therefore, the issue was not whether Japan would comply with the “antihegemony” clause, but how China would agree to a “third country” clause desperately wanted by the Japanese side. When the Japanese government proposed its draft treaty in November 1975, the Chinese side was not yet ready to negotiate over a “third country clause.” 1976 was a year of political turmoil both in Japan and China: the Miki cabinet was preoccupied with the handling of the Lockheed scandal and had to resign after a fatal defeat in the lower house elections in December, and China was bogged down in the leadership struggle with the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. The return of Deng Xiaoping to power in July 1977 became an important turning point, Just as it did in the process of US-China diplomatic normalization.
The final negotiations in Beijing from July 21 to August 8, 1978 centered on the “third country” clause. The agreed clause in the treaty’s Article 4 was a result of the compromise between the Japanese proposal and the Chinese version which respectively read: “The present Treaty is not directed against any specific third country” and “The present Treaty is not directed against any third country that does not seek hegemony.”87 Thus, the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People’s Republic of China” was signed on August 12, 1978 by Sonoda Sunao and Huang Hua, Foreign Ministers of Japan and China.88
Subsequently, the Japanese government pretended, primarily to the domestic audience, that the “third country” clause effectively freed Japan from being entangled in the Sino-Soviet rift. The problem was, of course, that the realities did not unfold according to the Japanese government’s expectation. The Chinese acceptance of a “third country” clause was nothing but an indication of its eagerness to conclude the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty in the overall strategic consideration which was anti-Soviet in nature.
By the same token, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam were a decisive blow to Japan’s non-political posture. To Tokyo’s dismay, the Chinese ambassador to Japan asked the Japanese government in January 1979 to support the Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia in accordance with the “anti-hegemony” clause of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty.89 Soon after, the Soviet embassy in Tokyo issued a statement saying that if Japan stopped aid to Vietnam the USSR would regard it as a joint action with China based on the “anti-hegemony” clause of the treaty.90 In February 1979, the Vietnamese party newspaper NhanDan began to talk about a “Beijing-Washington-Tokyo axis,” and to criticize Tokyo.91
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the international community’s opposition to the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance became unequivocal. Thus, Japan was in fact entangled in Asian power politics, despite its “omni-directional diplomacy.” Under such circumstances, the logic of US-Japan alliance naturally stood out over Japan’s, aspiration for some “autonomous” role, and the Japanese government cooperated closely with the United States in its overall global strategy as well as regional policies in Asia.
Endnotes
1 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 172-173.
2 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985).
3 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 180- 181.
7 Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 442.
8 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 833 -837.
9 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 705.
10 “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen. July 25, 1969.”Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 544-556.
11 “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam. November 3, 1969,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: United States, Government Printing Office, 197l ), pp. 901-909.
12 Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970).
13 “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam. November 3, 1969,” pp. 905-906.
14 Wakaizumi Kei, Tasaku Nakarishi wo Shinzemu to Hossu [There were no other alternatives] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1994).
15 The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 567.
16 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1089.
17 Ushiba Nobuhiko, Gaiko no Shunkan [A Moment of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun-sha, 1984), p. 134.
18 The records of this meeting were recently obtained by the National Security Archive.
19 0gata, Normalization with China, p. 37.
21 On the bureaucrats’ role and involvement in the process, see Haruhiro Fukui, “Tanaka Goes to Peking: A Case Study in Foreign Policymaking,” in T. J. Pempell, ed., Policymaking in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 84-90.
22 ”Mainichi Shinbun-sha Seiji-bu [Political Section of the Mainichi Newspaper], ed., Tenkanki no Anpo [US-Japan Security in Transition] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun-sha, 1978), p. 208. US documents regarding US thinking and response to Tanaka’s policy toward China?
23 0gata, Normalization with China, p. 56.
24 While the background of the “third country clause” in the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978 is well known, that in case of the Joint Communiqué establishing diplomatic normalization is not necessarily so. Its genesis as well as the process of its inclusion in the Joint Communiqué needs to be scrutinized further through interviews of those involved in the process.
25 Yanagida Kunio, Nihon wa Moete-iruka [Is Japan Flaring?] (Tokyo: Kodan-sha, 1983),p. 266.
26 Ogata, Normalization with China, p. 51.
27 0gata Sadako, “The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the People’s Republic of China,” in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). For its Japanese version which expands the analysis by including a case study on Japanese capital liberalization and thus introduces a comparative perspective, see Ogata Sadako, “Nihon no Taigai-seisaku Kettei-katei to Zaikai: Shihon Jiyuka, Nitchu Kokko Seijoka Katei wo Chushin ni” [Japanese Foreign Policy Making Process and the Business Community: Cases of Capital Liberalization and Japan-China Diplomatic Normalization], in Hosoya Chihiro and Watanuki Joji, eds., Taigai-seisaku Kettei-katei no Nichibei Hikaku [Comparative Study of Foreign Policy Making Process between Japan and the United States] (Tokyo: Tokyo-daigaku Shuppan-kai, 1977).
28 Tagawa, Nitchu Kosho Hiroki, pp. 260-61; Kankei Shiryo, pp. 286-87.
29 Toyo Keizai, no. 3534 (23 May 1970), p. 78. Incidentally, these four were the top four steel producing firms in Japan in 1969 and 1970. See Tekko Shinbun-sha, ed., Tekko Nenkan, Showa 46-nendo-ban [Steel Yearbook, 1971] (Tokyo: Tekko Shinbun-sha, 1971), pp. 23-34.
30 Nitchu Keiho, no. 27 (March 1974), p. 251.
31 Fujita Isao, “Beichu Shinjidai-ka no Nihon Zaikai” [Japanese Big Business in the New Era of U.S.-China Relations], Keiei Mondai 10 (Winter 1972): 240.
33 Zaikai, 15 December 1971, p. 99.
34 Toyo Keizai, no. 3595 (8 May 1971), p. 68.
35 Asahi Shinbun, 23 April 1971.
36 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 713-714.
37 Interview with Kimura Ichizo; Zaikai, 1 June 1972, p. 15.
38 Asahi Shinbun, 4 March 1972.
39 Ito-Chu Interview; Asahi Shinbun, 14March 1972 (evening).
40 Asahi Shinbun, 4 March 1972.
41 Asahi Shinbun, 15 June 1972.
42 Asahi Shinbun, 11 October 1972 (evening).
43 Asahi Shinbun, 19 August 1972.
45 Asahi Shinbun, 12 November 1971.
46 Asahi Shinbun, 8 June 1972.
47 Asahi Shinbun, 12 July 1972.
48 Asahi Shinbun, 24 August 1972.
49 Minenaga Ryosaku, who was at the time secretary general of Kansai Doyukai (the Kansai Committee for Economic Development), echoed Kimura in saying that the Kansai business circle started to plan for a delegation to China after Kimura’s report of his meeting with Zhou Enlai in January 1971. Interview with Minenaga Ryosaku.
50 Asahi Shinbun, 18 April 1971; Toyo Keizai, no. 3595 (8 May 1971), p. 68.
53 Yoshimura Toshio, “Kansai Zaikai Hochu Misshon Doko-ki” [Travel Records of the Kansai Big Business Mission to China], Zaikai, 1 November 1971.
54 Asahi Shinbun,, 16 September 1971.
55 Yoshimura, “Kansai Zaikai Hochu Misshon Doko-ki,” pp. l19-21; Saeki Isamu, “Nitchu Seijo-ka to Zaikai no Yakuwari” [Japan-China Normalization and the Role of Big Business], Ekonomisuto 49 ( 19 October 1971), pp. 53-54.
56 Shimizu Chojiro, “Tenkan-suru Kokusai-seiji to Zaikai” [World Politics in Transition and Big Business, Sekai, no. 318 (May l972), p. 123.
57 Fujita, “Beichu Shinjidai-ka no Nihon Zaikai,” p. 249.
58 Shirai Hisaya, Kiki no Naka no Zaikai [Big Business in Crisis] (Tokyo: The Saiman Press, l 973), p. 92.
59 Toyo Keizai, no. 3595 (8 May 1971), p. 69.
60 Asahi Shinbun, 25 April 1971;Tanaka Hiroshi, “Chugoku Sekkin wo Mosaku-suru Zaikai” [Big Business in Search of Access to China, Ekonomisuto 49 (25 May 1971), p. 77.
61 Asahi Shinbun, 30 August 1971 (evening).
62 Asahi Shinbun, 3 September 1971.
63 Ibid.; Shirai, Kiki no Naka no Zaikai, p. 98.
64 Shirai, Kiki no Naka no Zaikai, p. 98; Zaikai, 15 October 1971, p. 41.
65 Asahi Shinbun, 8 September 1971.
66 Asahi Shinbun, 13 October 1971 (evening), 14 October 1971, 15 October 1971, 11 November l 971.
67 Asahi Shinbun, 12 November 1971.
68 Iwasa Saneatsu, Kaiso 80-nen: Grobarisuto no Me [Recollections of 80 years: An Eye of a Globalist] (Tokyo: Nihon Hosei-gakkai, 1990), p. 183.
69 Asahi Shinbun, 23 November 1971.
70 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation. The following account on the international developments draws heavily on this unless otherwise noted.
71 Ogata, Normalization with China, p. 58.
72 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 561.
73 Michel Oksenburg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,” Foreign Affairs 61 (Fall 198”), pp. 181-83.
74 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 78-83.
75 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantan Books, l982′), pp. 193-94.
76 For Brzezinski’ s account of his meetings with Chinese leaders, see Zbigniew. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Strause and Giroux, 1983), pp. 211-15.
77 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 711.
78 Oksenburg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,” p. 186. Ogata, Normalization with China, pp. 66-71.
79 0gata, Normalization with China, p. 53. US documents and oral interview concerning Deng’s visit to the US should be collected as much as possible.
80 For more, see Soeya Yoshihide “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” in James Morley and Nishihara Masashi, eds., Tentative Title (New York: to be decided, 1996).
81 According to Nakae Yosuke, who was Director-General of Asian Affairs Bureau, the Japanese government did not consult the United States in announcing the Fukuda Doctrine. (Tomoda Seki, Nyumon: Gendai Nihon-gaiko [Introduction to Contemporary Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron-sha, 1988), p.58.) If it is true, this was perhaps because the Japanese government did not think; that this diplomatic aspiration toward Vietnam contradicted US policy toward the region nor US-Japan relations. How the US administration perceived and responded to the Fukuda Doctrine, however, is worth further substantiation through gaining access to US documents as well as oral interviews.
82 0wada Hisashi, “Trilateralism: A Japanese Perspective,” International Security 5 (Winter 1980/81), p. 24.
83 Sudo Sueo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), p. 199.
84 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 216-18.
85 Ogata, Normalization with China, p. 88, p. 95. This process is certainly one of the most important focal points in understanding the dynamism of US-Japan-China relations in the 1970s, which needs to be scrutinized and substantiated by further interviews and documents.
86 Ibid., p. 84. Nagano, Ten’no to To Shohei no Akushu, p.164. Likewise, this is another key issue to be explored further.
87 Ogata, Normalization with China, p.91.
88 Sonoda Sunao saw the significance of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with China in three points. First, it opened a way for an expanded development of Japan-China relations. Second, it contributed to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Third, it expanded the basis of Japanese diplomacy. Sonoda Sunao, “Nihon-gaiko no Tenkan wo Kokoro-mite” [Attempting to transform Japanese diplomacy], Kikan Chuo Koron Keiei Mondai, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1980), p. 242.
89 Asahi Shinbun, January 17, 1979.
90 Asahi Shinbun, January 22, 1979.
91 Shiraishi Masaya, Japanese Relations with Vietnam: 1951-1987 (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990), p. 79, p. 129.