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Editorial
Bengal Chaos Could Lead to War

The Enormous and Increasing scale of the refugee exodus from East Pakistan to India confronts the world not only with the greatest humanitarian relief task since World War Two but also with a political crisis of growing magnitude. Already five or six million people-more than the entire population of one of the smaller European States-have fled from their homes through fear or hunger. Millions more may move by the autumn if famine occurs through a breakdown of minimal food distribution.
There is a growing danger that if the exodus continues, the whole of the Indian sub-continent may be dragged into war and unpredictable social convulsions. Because of the complex of American, Russian and Chinese interests involved, such a conflict could have international consequences almost as grave as those coming from a resumption of war in the Middle East. Even if the dangers of a nuclear confrontation might be less immediate than in the Middle East, there remains the possibility of a magnified version of the Korean or Vietnam conflict.
World public attention has understandably been focussed, so far, on the plight of the refugees and the emergency relief they need. This has tended to obscure the more difficult question of the longer term future of these millions of people. The Indian authorities have done their best to care for the refugees. but have made it plain that it is socially and economically impossible for them to stay in India indefinitely : if they are not to cause a crisis there they must return home.
Can conditions be created in East Pakistan that will give the refugees enough confidence to go back? That would mean replacing West Pakistan’s direct military rule by a civilian administration capable of inspiring at least a minimum amount of trust in most of the East Pakistani people, including the non-Moslems. If President Yahya Khan is unable to achieve this change, there is bound to be mounting domestic pressure on the Indian Government, either to try to impose a new political settlement there by its own direct military intervention or to give greatly increased encouragement to the Bangladesh guerrilla movement. Either course could lead to a war throughout the subcontinent. China might then be involved against India.

Mrs. Gandhi’s Fears
Mrs. Gandhi has hitherto wisely rejected military intervention. Apart from the uncontrollable consequence of any war, there is also a local or regional political dilemma for India. From one point of view, she might welcome a split of Pakistan, into a Western and Eastern State. But from another angle, a successful secessionist movement in East Bengal might have dangerous attractions for the Indian half of Bengal. The Indian Government is fully aware of the political volatility and Bengali separatism of its half of Bengal.
India’s overriding interest is to see the refugees return home and peaceful conditions restored in East Pakistan. It is an interest that deserves to be supported. But how? An early political settlement in East Pakistan would only be possible if it fulfilled two conditions; the continued unity of the Pakistan State; the withdrawal of the West Pakistan Army from direct administration in East Pakistan and its replacement by a locally trusted civilian government. This would entail negotiations between President Yahya Khan and the Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujib, now under arrest.
President Yahya Khan must somehow be persuaded both to undertake a serious political negotiation and to accept international help. International action, whether through the United Nations or outside it, needs to be directed first towards political mediation between West and East Pakistan and next towards agreement to allow a temporary peace force to act as a buffer along the Indo-Pakistan border and to help internal policing pending a more permanent political settlement.
President Yahya has begun to move, very slightly, along these paths in his latest proposals and by accepting the beginnings of a ‘presence’ in East Pakistan. But he needs to go much further and much faster if new and greater tragedies are to be averted.

Reference: The Observer, London, July 4, 1971