Mukti Bahini poised for big assaults
From TOOSHAR PANDIT, Mukti Bahini, the liberation force of Bangladesh, started at a disadvantage. When Yahya ordered a crackdown in March he had all the advantages of surprise attack. Men and officers of the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles and the police force who constitute the hard core of the Mukti Bahini resisted more in compulsion than for any other considerations. For them it was a fight for survival.
The resistance at initial stages was unplanned, disjointed and often erratic. Scattered groups of soldiers, policemen and armed civilians lacking in coordination fought isolated battles. But soon they forged themselves into a cohesive striking force operating under a unified and centralized command.
Mukti Bahini has now emerged as a highly organized force capable of holding out against a sophisticated Pakistani army for a prolonged period. It has not only absorbed the initial shock of a sudden attack but also denied Islamabad control over Bangladesh even after six months of blood-letting. This gives a measure of its capabilities.
The strategy and tactics of the Mukti Bahini, too, have undergone changes during the last six months. The Mukti Bahini fighters in their impatience over continued presence of an occupation army in Bangladesh at initial stage took to direct confrontation and could restrict the movement of Pak troops to cities and towns.
But ill-fed and ill-equipped liberation force volunteers were hardly a match for the Pak army supported by a modern Air Force and Navy. The idea of direct confrontation was abandoned and the Mukti Bahini decided in favor of guerilla actions.
The conditions in Bangladesh demanded such a change in strategy. Bangladesh has all the requirements of text-book guerilla warfare, a labyrinth of jute and paddy fields, banana grooves, jungles and swamps reminiscent of South Vietnam’s Mekong Delta; a 1500 mile border with India; and a population fully identified with the cause. Even Giap, Grivas or Guevara never had it so good.
All over Bangladesh, the resistance is slowly taking the form of a classic three stage guerilla warfare. The first stage is almost over. The Mukti Bahini is now poised for the second stage which calls for large-scale assaults on enemy strongpoints to pave the way for the final stage of securing effective control, all over the territory.
Any assessment of the success or failure of the Mukti Bahini must necessarily consider the objectives the guerilla forces hope to achieve. The Mukti Bahini has two immediate objectives. Firstly, to deny effective control to the occupation army over Bangladesh. Secondly, to raise the attrition rate beyond Pakistan’s endurance level.
The guerilla actions, the basic strategy of which has been to strike the Pak army in ambush and hit-and-run forays to sabotage communication links impair the mobility of Pak troops and deny them access to economic resources; and to single out collaborators and liquidate them have already paid rich dividends.
The guerillas have penetrated deep. They are also active in Dacca. They have succeeded in destroying many important installations. They have snapped several supply and communication links. The Pak economy is already under strain. Vital jute and tea crops, Pakistan’s chief foreign exchange earners not unharvested and West Pakistan’s vast consumer market in the East has been completely ruined. The guerilla frogmen have sunk at least six ships in Chittagong and Mongla ports. The shippers are now reluctant to carry cargo for Pakistan to Bangladesh ports.
Pakistani troops are already on the defensive. Their main concern now is to prevent Mukti Bahini from extending its area of operation.
Pak troops who had hoped to win their war of extermination without much resistance are worried at the prospect of a prolonged and protracted war. Besides inflicting a number of casualties in their ranks the Mukti Bahini has been able to greatly demoralize them.
A question which is frequently asked but hardly answered is : Will they make it : will they be able to secure a decisive victory?
To attempt an answer to the question one must take into account the fundamentals of guerilla warfare. Guerilla actions can be decisive.
The Mukti Bahini has the required strength as also the capabilities to strike a decisive blow when the time comes. The overall strength of the Mukti Bahini
Reference: Hindustan Standard, 11.10.1971