The Ayub Khan Era Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969 Lawrence Ziring

The Ayub Khan Era Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969 Lawrence Ziring

Chapter 2

Political Renaissance : Old Issues, New Dimensions

AFTER the constitution Commission submitted its report it remained for the President and his advisers to survey ite recommendations and decide how the new constitution would be drafted.₁ On October 26, 1961, the eve of the third anniversary of the revolution, President Ayub informed the nation that a document would be produced guaranteeing a strong, stable government. Before the month was out a two-man committee, of which Manzur Qadir was the dominant member, was appointed. Manzur Qadir had chaired one of the two presidential committees which were charged with systematically analyzing the Constitution Commission’s recommendations. His predilections, therefore, were well known. Not only was he close to the President’s thinking on the substance of a new constitution, he was also recognized as one of the few people whose advice the President respected. This also explains why Ayub bypassed his Law Minister and preferred that his Minister of External Affairs prepare the new constitution. Reference has already been made to S.A. Saeed’s embellished prose, but it is still revealing to note what he says about the relationship of the President and Manzur Qadir. It should be emphasized that this comment was published almost a year before the Foreign Minister received responsibility for drafting the new constitution. Saeed writes :

The understanding between the two is both deep and mysterious. If Ayub claims “a faculty of judging human beings,” Qadir has no less. Both understand the people of Pakistan so well that before the people would act or open their lips they can read what they intend, and deeper than that is the way Qadir understands Ayub. And this is the secret of their power.₂

It is an established fact that Manzur Qadir, like the President, could not reconcil himself to some of the fundamental features of the Constitution Commission’s report.₃ Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendations were purely advisory and hence not binding. The President and his martial law government at no time indicated that in establishing the Commission they relingquished the prerogative to disagree with its recommendations. This could be interpreted as an apologia for the President and what was to follow, but it is not meant to be one. Ayub Khan took great pains to explain his philosophy of government. From the inception of martial law he was heard to exclaim that the conditions neccessary for the establishment of a sophisticated democratic system were absent in Pakistan. Overwhelming illiteracy, widespread poverty, and an almost universal lack of national political consciousness dictated another course from the one seemingly determined by the British degacy. Ayub was convinced that there should be democracy but, in order for it to be truly effective, it had to be built from the ground up.₄ The President never questioned the integrity of the members of the Commission and he held its chairman, Chief Justice Shahabuddin, in high respect. All the same, the Commission’s recommendations were noticeably short of the Prsident’s initial objectives, far from his public statements, and completely in conflict with his own thinking. The single most important institution which the President sought to nourish, the only one which he felt could reach down and touch the largest portion of Pakistan society, was in his judgment irreverently treated. In arguing against writing the Basic Democracies scheme into the constitution the Commission declared :

We would have included it in the constitution under the heading “local government,” had it not been for the fact that, even for minor changes, which may become necessary as experience of the working of the scheme in gained, amendment of the constitution would be required. We would, therefore, regard it only as an existing law.₅

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Karl Von Vorys points out the “glaring” influence of the “modernized segment of the society on the Commission.”₆ The Basic Democracies system, conceived by President Ayub Khan with assistance from Manzur Qadir, had been and now was the prime target of articulate urban interests. Having been disenfrachised by the proclamation of martial law, the Constitution Commission appeared to afford the intelligentsia their last opportunity to alter the Basic Democracise system before it became enshrined in a constitutional document. Thus, despite the President’s insistence on sustaining and invigorating the Basic Democracies, it was with considerable distress that Ayub witnessed its virtual repudiation by the Commission. It was the electoral college of Basic Democrats which had elected President Ayub Khan, thereby theoretically, if not de jure, legitimating his rule. Now the Constitution Commission Report chose to reject this electoral college in favor of direct suffrage “restricted” to literates and property owners. If he had accepted the Constitution Commission Report Ayub would have been compelled to all but discard the Basic Democracies and accept limitations on his authority.

A member of the intelligentsia, the former Prime Minister Choudhri Mohammad Ali, was only one of the 6,269 respondents to the questionaire circulated by the Commission, but his reply was the most significant and received the greatest publicity. Appearing in The Pakistan Times of Lahore on June 13, 1960, it stressed the importance of reviving the parliamentary system. The presidential system, he cautioned, will lead to a “personal dictatorship.” Later Ayub would write of Choudhri Mohammad Ali as one of his “bitterest” critics, and that as “author of the 1956 Constitution : he felt robbed of immortality.”₈

Whlile the Constitution Commission went along with the idea of a presidential system, the legislative institution again would be dominant. The Commission was absolutely opposed to the banning of political parties and the continuance of martial law.₉ To the President and Manzur Qadir such recommendations implied the loss of the revolution and a reversion to the older pattern of government with all its latent conflicts. It was in the light that the Commission Report was eventually rejected. The President has been criticized for reneging on his original promise to give the people what they wanted in the way of a constitution; instead, it was said he placed himself in a position where only he knew what was best for the people. The passage of events may now show that the President was wrong by insisting on a drastic modification of the Commission’s recommendations, but he was at that time convinced that the future of the nation rested on mobilizing the rural people and the Basic Democracies scheme was the only divice ready at hand. At the same time, it would be wrong to conclude that Ayub was oblivious to the reactions of the sophisticated urban elite and its following. In his Constitution Speech on March 1, 1962, he said :

I am conscious of the fact that some sections of [the] intelligentsia and those with vested interests may have cause to complain. I do not see any reason why a suitable formula cannot be evolved later which will give them a feeling of full participation.₁₀ (Italics added.)

The President could not have been more explict. The intelligentsia would be asked and made to mark time while the government went about the business of inducing the rural population into a “new” political process. Those members of the intelligentsia who wished to contribute their time and energy in this acitivity would be welcome. However, so long as the masses remained politically immature, dissent and opposition to government policies would be constrained. The President could not be dissuaded from the view that the country required political stability and continuity of leadership before anything else. While respecting the parliamentary system, be could not bring himself to believe that Pakistan could afford another to at it; that is, without what he considered to be the precoditions for the constructive employment of a parliamentary system—representative institutions at all levels of society, trade unions and cooperatives on a country-wide basis, and other institutions which would give Pakistanis training in the fundamentals of give and take. In their absence, the parliamentary system meant a return to older conflicts and hence the eventual subversion of the nation.₁₁

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Controversies, Ayub was to acknowledge, were acceptable, but what he feared was interminable bickering and bitterness. If the country was to survive, let alone prosper, a system had to be development which would allow for maximum social mobilization. Ayub acknowledged that the political dialogue had to be extend, recruitment into the political process had to be broaddened—but not at the expense of material progress. The President emphasized that this was his constitution and that it was based on his own philosophy of government. Ayub concluded by nothing his experience and long association with the most senior members of the administration. He prided himself on knowing his countrymen. His grasp of national priorities developed from “wide study, deep and prolonged thought and a burning desire to help the people in building the country into a sound, vigorous, progressive and powerful State.”₁₂ He argued that his constitution be given a chance.

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SELLING THE 1962 CONSTITUTION

Advance copies of the Ayub Constitution had been circulated to members of the press, who prepared questions on those features which needed elaboration. His response to these queries came a day before his broadcast to the nation and the actual signing of the document. Before proceeding with his Gaullist version of a press conference, Ayub emphasized that his martial law powers would terminate the moment he affixed his signature to the new constitution. “As soon as I sign it, it becomes law and it can only be altered in accordance with the manner that any other law can be altered. Of course.”13 The President did his utmost to convince the journalists that he would be accountable to the people; but he also let it be known that the chief executive must be insulated from irreponsible and “illegitimate” harassment. Moreover, it was crystal clear that he would not tolerate the undermining of those institutions upon which the stability of his system rested.

Ayub cited the principal objections to the constitution such as the presidential system, the indirect franchise, and the non-justiciability of fundamental rights. He also acknowledged that his chief opposition might well be found in the attiutude of the press. The press would be permitted to express its views, but, he cautioned, “if the object is to pressurize me, then you are not going to succeed…. . I cannot retrace my steps. I suggest that you ask people, as I am asking you, to give this [constitution] a trial.”₁₄ He then gave this word that the constitution could be amended by the National Assembly without unreasonable interference by the executive :

I would go even further and say that our Constitution, and, for that matter, any constitution of a country which has to go or is going through a transitory evolutionary period, should be looked into carefully every 15 or 20 years. When the conditions of the society change, the Constitution must also reflect these changes. This is the only way you can prevent revolutions.15

The President was obviously trying to avoid an ideological commitment. His actions were conditioned by pragmatism. Change would be the result of trial and error and proven need. But he also clung to extremely strong convictions from which he could not deviate. For example, he was fully aware of the East Pakistan prefrence for a parliamentary and not a president system. But he feared the consequences flowing from Bengali entreaties. Urged by his interrogators to say what was on his mind, the President explained that the removal of “any vital element from this constitution” would cause the whole edifice to collapse. “If East Pakistan wants to have a Parliamentary form of Government and here [in West Pakistan] somebody else wants to have something else, really you have got to have two countries then!”16 The President insisted that only an enemy would want to see the separation of East and West

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Pakistan. Thus he felt reinforced in his view that only a presidential form of government could insure Pakistan’s unity and hence there could be no tempering with this feature of the constitution. On the other hand, suggestions for change within the framework of the constitution would receive a proper hearing and neither he nor his administration would prevent constructive criticism.

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NEW SYSTEM, OLD DILEMMAS

After the promulgation of the Constitution the country awaited the election of the members of the national and provisional legislatures. As the 1960 “vote of confidence” in the President was determined to have retroactive effect, and as the President was granted a five-year term under the Constitution, Ayub Khan would not stand fot election again until 1965. This first series of indirect elections under the new Constitution would be conducted solely for the legislatures and without political parties. The electorate, as in the case of the earlier presidential election, would be the 80,000 Basic Democrats and although Ayub addreesed the nation shortly before the election his remarks were really intended for them.

The speech was labeled by the President as “My Manifesto,” and it took the form of a statement of guidelines to be followed in electing suitable people to the parliamentary posts. He listed four objectives of national policy. First, Pakistan was an ideological state founded and nourished on Islamic tenets but not unmindful of its obligation to the country’s minorities. Second, the security, stability, and unity of Pakistan must be protected at all costs. Again he reiterated his belief that “East Pakistan and West Pakistan can remain free and sovereign only if they remain together. Separated, it may be a matter of a few years, if not a few months, before they disappera, disintegrate, or are destroyed.”₁₇ Third, the government’s resources would be harnessed in an effort to improve the material exixtence of the Pakistan people. The President emphasized that this was not only needed for progress at home but for prestige abroad. “A weak nation, like a weak man, may invoke pity but gains no respect.”₁₈ (Later actions were to show that the President was almost as keely interested in improving Pakistan’s international position as he was in modernizing the domestic condition.) And finally, democracy was declared to be the cornerstone of Pakistan’s political system. Democracy was identified as a fundamental principle of Islam and Muslims were enjoined to follow its precepts. With this in mind, the foundations for democratic developement were already laid “in the shape of the Basic Democracies.” Ayub explained :

Participation of the people in a sensible, undestandable and workable fashion has been introduced at all levels of government. As the national character solidifies, I have no doubt that the roots of these institutions will Insha-Allah, become deeper and firmer. The new Constitution—a pragmatic rather than a dogmatic scheme—is designed to fulfill this objective oa inducing a same and balanced political life in the country.₁₉

The President then identified the means for the fulfillment of these objectives. He cited support of the Constitution and the awakening of the masses through Basic Democracies₂₀ as well as changes in the socio-economic life of the nation, responsible leadership both at the public and private level, strong and stable government with efficient administration, justice and equity for all, and multidimensional programs for developement. Above all, he declared, there must be “a relentless passion for work, ceaseless work, and nothing but work.”₂₁

The polling for the mambers of the National Assembly were held on April 28th. This was followed on May 6th with the elections to the provincial assemblies. While 96.6 percent of the electors cast their ballots in the former election, 97.8 percent voted in the latter. It is important to note, however,

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that only a minority of those elected to the various legislatures received a majority of the votes cast. This was because of the number of candidates competing for each seat. On the other hand, a considerable number won their seats unopposed.₂₂ The elections were conducted without fanfare of demonstrations, and the absence of political party affiliations was deemed to be the reason for the tranquility. It need not be emphasized that martial law was still in force, which also helped to dampen the ardor of the more politically minded.

Despite the prevailling quiet, the government felt obliged to issue the Political Organisations (Prohibition of Unregulated Activity) Ordinance on May 9th. This new ordinance was mainly directed against the possibility of political turbulence in East Pakistan. Lieutenant General Azam Khan had been abruptly and unceremoniously removed from his governor’s post in East Pakistan and replaced by Ghulam Faruque. Already unhappy with the elections, this act added to the displeasure of the inhabitants of the eastern province. The arbitrary and coercive aspects of the Ayub regime were too visible, and few could detect any significant differences between the new system and the martial law which had preceded it.

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POLITICAL REALLGNMENT

On June 8, 1962, the National Assembly met in its first session. The place was Ayub Hall at Rawalpindi. President Mohammad Ayub Khan addressed the legislators and announced that martial law had been terminated. After almost forty-four months of quais-military rule the civilian leaders supposedly were back in authority. The new Constitution also came into effect on this date. In his speech the President repeated he would support all efforts aimed at ensuring the stability and development of the nation but that he would deal harshly with those who sought to disrupt the country by undermining the people’s confidence in their government. On this matter there would be no room for compromise. In order to facilitate the operation of the National Assembly, seventeen parliamentary secretaries (drawn from the membership) and and Chief Parliamentary Secretary and Chief Whip were appointed. They were to maintain close liasion between all Members of the National Assembly (MNSs), the Ministrers-in-Charge of Divisions and their administrative secretaries; essentially they were to assist the ministers in their parliamentary activities. The parliamentary secretaries were also entrusted with public relations duties for their respective divisions. Thus, like bureaucracy, the legislators were brought under administrative influence. This arrangement also insured needed expertise as well as coordination in the government process, especially where development acitivities were concerned. ₂₃

It is important to note that the central and provincial government secretariats were reorganized in this same period. In addition, many of the heretofore centrally directed activities were provincialized. The railways, the Water and Power Development Authority, and the Industrial Development Corporation were bifurcated, and Agricultural Development Corporations were established in each province. Each Provincial government was given its own Planning and Development and Basic Democracise departments while the central Government promised funds for numberous new projects. The Second Five Year Plan initiated in 1960 was suddenly everyone’s responsibility. With the President acting as chairman of the Central Planning Commission and the National Economic Council it was apparent that a concerted effort would be made at energizing the development program and accelerating economic progress. The Central Planning Board set up in 1953, which was responsible for drafting Pakistan’s First Five Year Plan (1955-60), was converted into the Planning Commission and Development Boards in the provinces. By 1961 the President assumed the chairmanship of the Planning Comission and the Deputy Chairman, a high-ranking CSP officer, was given the status of a Central Minister. At the same time, the Commission was given the status of a Division in the President’s Secretariat, and the scope of its functions and powers was enhanced by the inclusion of responsibility for implementation and reivew as well as formulation of national plans.

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The delegation of planning authority to the provinces followed after the promugation of the Constitution. Similarly, the Rural Works Program, which was launched in East Pakistan as a pilot project in 1961, became a coutry-wide operation by 1963.

The Preisdent’s cabinet underwent some sweeping changes in this same period. The new advisory group reflected the political climate which suddenly enveloped the country. Manzur Qadir retired from public life and resumed his legal practice in Lahore. Some believe he was simply exhausted and had requested the President to relieve him. Others thought his role as chief draftsman of the Constitution made it necessary for him to step down. Rumors also circulated that he disagreed with the President’s intention to politicize the administration and possibly yield to pressure and reinstate the political parties. The new cabinet indeed included a number of politician-types. A former Prime Minister.₂₄ Similarly, Abdul Monem Khan (soon to replace Ghulam Faruque as Governor of East Pakistan), Wahiduzzaman, Abdus Sobur Khan, A.K.A. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury, Shaikh Khursheed Ahmad, Abdullah-al-Mahmood, Abdul Waheed Khan, Al Haj Abd-Allah Zaheer-ud-Din (Lal Mia) were selected from among the victorious members of the National Assembly to fill the ministerial positions.

The President’s tactics were obvious, but also unconstitutional. Article 104 of the new Constitution specifically prevented a minister from serving in the National Assembly. The President ignored this section of the Constitiution, however, and proceeded to issue Order 37 which allowed the ministers to keep their legislative positions. When the President’s action was challenged in the High Court of East Pakistan it was ruled inconstitutional and later sustained by the Supreme Court. Although the ministers were thus declared to be ineligible for their legislative posts, their appearance in the Assembly as members of the government was judged permissible. Sitting in the front Treasury benches they were in a position to answer questions, rebut the opposition, or speak in support of the President’s legislative program.25

The inability of the President to modify the Constitution in this instance can be contrasted with the success of his growing political opposition. Aritcle 173 virtually banned the existence of political parties, and the issuance of the Prohibition of Unregulated Activity Ordinance prior to the convening of the National Assembly left on doubt as to the government’s original intentions. In this, the role of Manzur Qadir cannot be minimized. As already noted, the national and provincial legislators were elected on the basis of individual performance and/or personality.

The absence of political parties meant there could be no platforms and no responsible organizational prorams that the electors might consider; but it also meant the legislators would have great difficulty in organizing their affairs once the assemblies convened. This latter dilemma was especially evident when the speakers and deputy speakers had to be elected from among the members of the legislatures. The inital impulse, therefore, was to organize along provincial lines, and the members from East and West Pakistan huddled in separate caucuses to work out their respective strategies. This was certainly not what the President desired, and the fear that a continuation of the ban on political Parties would only lead to deepening cleavages and more intense conflict between the East and West Pakistani contingents compelled him to reconsider his position. Hence, when the President indicated a slackening in his hostility to the political parties, some organized but mostly ad hoc activity followed.

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THE OPPOSITION REACTS

The political discussion that followed centered on the Constitution; those opposing it condemned it on its face as being autocratic and undemocratic. The banning of the political parties, the continuation

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of the restrictions on the EBDO’ed politicians (those convicted under the Security of Pakistan Act), the forced detention of other political figures, the indirect process of elections, and the non-justiciability of fundamental rights were offered as justification of this judgment. The silence of the President on these expressions of political disfavor encouraged some of the more vacal members to seek legislation in the Assembly for the legalization of the political parties. In point of fact, the National Awami Party (NAP), Muslim League, Jamaat-i-Islami, Awami League, and Krishak Sramik Party were already operating with impunity outside the legislatures. On July 4, 1962, a bill providing for the formation and regulation of political parties was drafted by the government and referred to a select committee of the Asssembly.

The select committee was composed of persons representing different shades of opinion, and three days after becoming seized of the draft they returned it to the floor of the Assembly citing their inability to agree on a modus operandi. Nevetheless, on July 14th the draft bill, virtually unmodified, was put up to a vote and passed. On the next day the National Assembly passed another bill liberalizing the Preventive Detention Laws. The President gave his assent on July 16th and the Political Parties Bill became law. Despite many controversial features making it difficult for the opposition in the National Assembly to associate itself with the new law (i.e., the law prevented persons imprisoned for three months or more under the Security of Pakistan Act from participating in political activities, and it gave the government authority to declare other persons ineligible should they engage in acitivities considered detrimental to the health and security of the nation), the political parties were quick to legitimate their operations after its enactment.

Within a few days the Jamaat-i-Islami announced that it was back in business. In August the Nizam-i-Islam revealed its intention to engage in political activity. Although President Ayub acknowledged he was a prisoner of events and hence force to accept the return of the political parties, he was still convinced that the country would be better off without them. Nonetheless, on July 20th, accepting the fait accompli, he made a fervent plea for a broad-based nationalist political party which could unify the nation and direct its energies toward constructive endeavors. At the time it did not seem that he would consider joining any political party. In an article in Dawn on July 31, 1962, the President emphasized his concern that a party organized and led by himself would receive the opprobrium of the people in that it would be considered a “King’s Party”. However, Ayub urged his followers to get on with the job o building a party that would represent the government in the assemblies, and it was known that he urged government party leaders to take the name of the defunct Muslim League. The President was criticized for using the name of the Muslim League, but no one disputed the fact that it was important as a political symbol to the party in power which still sought to legitimate its activity.

Thus all the resources of the government were placed at the disposal of pro-government politicians in the legislatures. In effect, a political party was being formed in reverse order. On September 4, 1962, the Muslim League (Conventionists) became the official government party. The Conventionists comprised the ministers, a majority of members of the Assembly, and other followers of the government. Almost all were relatively new to politics and had not held posts in the pre-1958 Muslim League. Of the older, more seasoned Muslim Leaguers, those who were allowed to participate in politics formed their own Muslim League Party, which was distinguished by the term “Councillors.” The Councillors derived their name from the Muslim League Council, which refused to accept the Conventionists as genuine Muslim Leaguers.

Abdul Qayyum Khan, the last president of the Muslim League before the imposition of martial law, was imprisoned by the authorities a few days after the passage of the Political Parties Bill. He did not rejoin the Council Muslim League until February 1967 when his EBDO term expired. Therefore, the Muslim League Councillors selected former Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin to lead them. When he died in 1964, Nurul Amin took control of the party. Nurul Amin was also made leader of the National

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Democratic Front after the death of H.S. Suhrawardy in 1963. He was leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, helped form the Pakistan Democratic Movement, and led the Democratic Action Committee, coalition of eight opposition parties which sought to displace Ayub Khan.

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AYUB’S RESPONSE

The Conventionists had as their chief organizer Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, presideint of the Muslim League after the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah; but he was too old and too weak a figure to lead the party. On December 15, 1962, the only obvious chioce for a leader was identified, and President Ayub Khan was requested to assume the post. In being asked to take the assignment he was reminded that not only Jinnah but Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister, had held the presidency of the party while simultaneously administratering the affairs of state. The President agreed to consider the proposal but first stressed the need for the party to restructure itself; to lay down the guidelinse that it intended to follow. On May 23, 1963, Dawn of Karachi printed an article by the President stating that he had joined the Conventionists “as a two-anna member from both East and West Pakistan.”

In the same article the President made it clear that he would be more than just a symbolic leader, however. He proceeded to list the party’s objectives. They were :

1. Take such steps in religious educational, social, economic and other fields as would bring about unity of thought and action amongst people. Make them take pride in their homeland and its achievements and bring self-respect, self-reliance and a sense of responsibility and discipline.

2. Build a society with spiritual, moral and civic sense capable of moving with the modern age.

3. Encourage such activities as will enable us to enter the age of science and technology within the shortest possible time.

4. Encourage industrialisation to the maximum extent possible and modernize agriculture so as to get the maximum benefit from our lands and remove economic disparities wherever possible.

5. Take such measures as will enable the benefits of development to be shared by as many people as possible.

6. To do that, take steps to see that while private enterprise is encouraged, undue accumulation of wealth is not allowed in a few hands.

7. Establish Islamic political ideology, social justice and economic order and move in the direction of a welfare state in accordance with the resources of the country.

8. Meanwhile, encourage people to regulate charities on a local, collectitve and national basis so as to take care of the needy and deserving.

9. Stand by our solemn promise to assist the people of Jammu and Kashmir to attain their freedom.

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10. Conduct foreign relations in a manner that will gain us friends and ensure the maximum security and development of the country.

Seven months later in Dacca on December 24, 1963, President Mohammad Ayub Khan accepted the unanimous vote of the Pakistan Muslim League and became its president. Despite his aversion to politics, Ayub Khan hoped to prove that through organizational political he could rule a divided society without excessive coercion and without violence.₂₆

THE POLITICS OF CONTROL

Having given in to the demand to reinstate political parties the President let it be believe he would yield on other major issues as well. In his question and answer meeting with the press on March 1, 1962, President Ayub disclosed that he would appoint a Franchise Commission to investigate all sides of the issue surrounding direct or indirect clections. (A Franchise Commission had also been recommended by the Constitution Committee.) Taking cognizance of the opposition to the Basic Democracies electoral college with its power to elect the President and the members of the national and provincial legislatures, Ayub intimated that he would welcome a better system than the one he had designed—but he was assuredly skeptical. Commenting at the time he said :

They can produce two more qualifications and say that anyone who is educated beyond a certain level, or anyone who owns property beyond a certain level or pays taxes beyond a certain level, might be given the right to vote. What else can they say? Very well, as soon as you do that, you are going to create a tremendous imbalance between your city population and your rural population. You are going to disenfranchise 80 per cent of your people. You are going to set them at a disadvantage straightaway. One may well say that this is not an insurmountable problem because if a constituency has 500 voters, shall we say, by a certain criteria to elect one man and another constituency has 5,000 or 50,000 voters on the same criteria, it does not make all that difference. But then how are you going to select your President on that basis? Can you make certain that the number of voters in East and West Pakistan would be equal? Can you say that East and West Pakistan are going to be at par with each other in so far as the numerical strength of votes is concerned, and if they are not thus at par, then can you say that 100 East Pakistanis will count as 80 West Pakistanis? The position would obviously be absured. But I am going to set up a Commission and I will be interested to see what they bring up but I beg of you please to get it into your head that direct universal franchise in Pakistan, other than on the basis of which I am suggesting, is not a practical proposition for the present at least.₂₇ (Iatlics added)

In spite of his firm convention that the process of indirect elections was the only one presently suited to Pakistani society, Ayub gave in to the pressure of the intelligentsia. On July 30, 1962, he appointed a five-member Franchise Commission to investigate alternative propositions.

Akhter Husain, the chairman of the Commission, and his associated were requested to address themselves to two principal questions :

1. Whether the system of election of the President and Members of the Assemblies through Basic Democracies was [an] efficacious and appropriate instrument for a realistic representation of the people; and

2. If the Commission recommended universal suffrage, whether any qualifications of the electors should be imposed?

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The Commission submitted its report on February 12, 1963, with two members, including the chairman, dissenting. It was an embarrassing moment for Ayub Khan. The majority report, like the Constitution Commission before it, ruled against indirect elections and insisted that only universal adult franchise should be the basis of election for the President and members of the assemblies. The minority report was in keeping with the President’s ideas, however. With opinions of the members of the Commission divided (3—2), the Law Ministry was ordered by the President to appoint a Special Committee to examine all recommendations dispassionately and “keeping in view the socio-economic and administrative requirements of the country.”₂₈ Later, when the Special Committee submitted its report, no one was surprised to fine it in favor of the minority view that the indirect election should reamain. “Until such time as a majority of the people become literate, any election based on direct voting would be an unreliable index of responsible public opinon and will provide an opportunity to unpatriotic and hotile elements to create confusion and arrest the progress of the country.”₂₉

To this, five opposition members on the Special Committee courageously contributed a note of dissent which read in part : “We are finally of the opinion that the present system is a denial of the rights of the people and that it would only perpetuate a thinly veiled dictatorship in the country.”₃₀ Not everyone would go so far as to use the language that Maulvi Farid Ahmed employed in his personal note of dissent, but it illustrated the disillusionment and frustration of the opposition in this fretful exercise : “It is, perhaps, unique and unheard of in the annals of running the government and the appointment of Commissions that a Commission, the child of its own creation, has been neglected and consigned ingloriously to the gutter. This is a matter which the country should not fail to notice except with the gravest concern.”₃₁

It is open to question whether the President was wise in appointing the Franchise Commission. On the one side, he wished to show his proper intentions (the same was true when he appointed the Constitution Commission) but on the other, he was unprepared from the outset to listen to and accept recommendations running counter to his own judements. Also, with the Constitution already in force and with Basic Democracise being given increasing consideration, it was already too late to consider a new approach—that is, unless a drastic revision of the new political structure was contemplated. A somewhat independent but apologetic analysis of the Ayub Constitution concluded that :

While the present constitution has rightly taken steps against the political and economic instability as experienced in Pakistan in the past, it may be necessary in the course of the working of the constitution, to provide some additional safeguards against the danger of arbitrary government. With a sincere and well meaning President such as the present President of Pakistan there may not be any such risk.32

In the end, however, Ayub only added fuel to the fire set by his detractors, who now felt all the more justified in accusing him of dictatorial acts. If anything was gained from the episode it was that the President, for the time being at least, would insist and would be successful in having things done his way; but opposition to his ideas and policies was clearly on the upswing.

From the moment the political parties were permitted to operate President Ayub was on the defensive. Overtures went out to both Khwaja Nazimuddin and H.S. Suhrawardy to cease their criticism and join with the Conventionist Muslim League in the forging of a strong national party. Both men chose to rebuff the invitations, however. Suhrawardy had been arrested on January 30, 1962, under the Security of Pakistan Act, and his imprisonment without trial disturbed his followers as well as the volatile student community. Demonstrations erupted in and around Dacca and some of the other municipalities of East Pakistan in defiance of martial law which resulted in the jailing of a number of political leaders, When he was finally released from prison on August 19, 1962, Suhrawardy not only refused to accept Chaudhri

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Khaliquzzaman’s invitation to join the Conventionists (an interesting invitation in view of Suhrawardy’s EBDO status) but was intent on organizing the entire opposition against Ayub Khan. In order to do this he severed his ties with the Awami League and formed the National Demcratic Front (NDF). The NDF, according to Suhrawardy, was not a political party and therefore permitted him to skirt the disqualification order. He was to toil in its behalf until illness forced him to seek medical attention in Beirut, where he died on December 5, 1953. At the news of Suhrawardy’s death there was wide and persistent speculation in Pakistan that the President had him poisoned so he could no longer threaten his authority. In point of fact, Suhrawardy had been ailing for many years and his multifarious activities, both political and social, simply took their final toll. But there was no convincing those who both loved the former Prime Minister and despised the President.

Nazimuddin refused to join with the Conventionists for virtually the same reasons as Suhrawardy. Despite having been decorated by the President in the year following the revolution, Nazimuddin grew disenchanted with Ayub’s handing of the affairs of state. He was especially critical of the new Constitution and the presidential form of government, which he felt gave far too much power to the executive. And as for the Conventionists, he could not accept them as fellow Muslim Leaguers. Instead, he agreed to accept the leadership of the Council Muslim League. Nazimuddin joined both Suhrawardy’s NDF and, at the outset of the electoral compaign in 1964, the Combined Opposition Parties (COP). In October 1964, when he was being considered as the possible COP candidate for the presidency, death overtook him.

It is one of the ironies of Pakistani’s history that just when the political opposition returned to the main stage and a decisive election was in the offing they should be shorn of their national leaders. The only other personality who might have tested the President’s power was Tamizuddin Khan, Speaker in the National Assembly; but his sudden death in 1963 also removed his name from contention. It was no wonder, then, that the COP in looking for someone to stand against the President was compelled to request the assistance of Miss Fatima Jinnah.

There was simply no one else the numerous opposition parties could trust and rally around. But it was also a dismal commentary on the political shape of things in the opposition camp. In the two and a half years which extended from the promulgation of the new Constitution to the second election of the Basic Democracies in the autumn of 1964 and the election of the President on January 2, 1965, popular dissatisfaction would be obvious. However, mobilization of this discontent beyond the confines of the major cities was never significant. The opposition would offer the view that they had little chance of winning in the rural areas because of the strength of the rural power structure and the bureaucracy which favored the government. Although this is in part correct, it is also true that the opposition displayed very little ingenuity in wooing the rural Basic Democrats. Another argument offered by the opposition is worthy of further study. The Basic Democrats, they insist, were elected for the most part on independent platforms in 1964. It was only after the election that the government “enticed” them into joining the Muslim League Conventionists.

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THE POLITICS OF REGIONALISM

The unsettled stiuation in East Pakistan was particularly distressing to the President. His regime gave more attention to the provincial disparity issue than had any previous government, and the 1962 Constitution devoted a passage to this dilemma. It declared that all efforts would be made to satisfy the economic demands of the people of the East wing. But even increased investment of government money,

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the granting of greater provincial autonomy in virtually all the deveopmental and public utility spheres, and the determinaiton to “Begngalze” the administration, there was no quelling the anit-government disturbances. Govenor Ghulam Faruque was unable to fill the shoes of Lieutenant General Azam Khan and powerless to control the demands of the politicians, students, and laboring elements. He resigned in frustration hardly six months after assuming his office.

The new Governor was a Bengali, Abdul Monem Khan, and it was hoped he could calm the passions of his provincial countrymen. Abdul Monem Khan, a lawyer from the district of Mymensingh, had only membership on a school board to show for his expeience in public life before the onset of Basic Democracies. The Basic Democrats elected him to a seal in the National Assembly, and from there President Ayub took him into his cabinet as Minister for Health. It was from this position that he was called to assume the office of Governor of East Pakistan. His appointment came as a shock to members of the East Pakistani intelligentsia who suspected Monem Khan of dishonest practices. Given this record and his loyalty to the President, he could not be expected to earn the respect of the East Pakistanis. Needless to add, he was also incapable of coping with the province’s economic and social problems.

With its limited resource base East Pakistan will have difficulty in equalling West Pakistan’s development, no matter how much preference is given to the former. West Pakistan’s greater potential is obvious and investments already made will inevitably draw more in their wake. Hence the gap must widen, and as West Pakistan improves its standard of living repercussions are bound to be felt in East Pakistan. Thus the disparity problem will remain to plague any government despite all efforts and sincere intentions to correct the imbalance.

Disparity, whether it be considered a slogan or an unfortunate circumstance, will remain a grievance of significant political proportions. “We have been turned into a colony” is a familiar East Pakistani claim when a discussion of the Central Government is raised. The thrust of the East Pakistani argument is simple : East Pakistani’s jute is the nation’s chief earner of foreign exchange. Nonetheless, profits from the sale of the commodity are being spent to develop West Pakistan. In one sense the argument is valid; but the larger problems which cannot be answered are linked to East Pakistan’s absorptive capacity, its limited resources, and the overwhelming population pressure.

Even Pakistan’s faulty statistics cannot hide the fact that West Pakistan is six times again the size of East Pakistan, that the natural endowments of West Pakistan although not extraordinary are more impressive than those of East Pakistan, and finally, that the density of population in West Pakistan is under 200 persons per square mile whereas in East Pakistan it is now well over 1,000. Supposing the province were permitted to retain all the profits earned from its jute crop, the income received would still be insufficient to raise the standard of living of the average peasant; clearly, money is not the only factor—even if in Pakistan it is scarce in the extreme. It is cruel realism which dictates how a country allocates it priorities and scarce treasure. Only a firm hand and compassionate attitude can deal with the nightmare of underdevelopement and its inevitable consequences.

Ruling out the possibility of a clash which would terminate in the establishment of a separate sovereign entity in East Pakistan, and anonymous observer from Great Britain wrote in 1963 :

The future of an independent East Pakistan is not clearly visualized, but one thing is clear—there is no thought at all to any closer connexion with West Bengal; indeed fear of economic domination by the Hindu [and Indian] part of Bengal is one factor that will go to induce wariness when the pros and cons of separation are weighed.  

What can be to reinforce the unity of the country? Economically, not much;

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disparity has already gone too far to be removed and it will be immensely difficult even to prevent the gap widening further. One hope expressed in Dacca by those who are dismayed by the present trend is the emergence of a new and ideological party with mass support in both wings and a programme of radical social and economic reform. For the moment there is no sign of such an alignment. The Government might be tempted to lean Islam as the strongest unifying force, but already in Dacca even those who are anxious to preserve unity dismiss religion as an effective binding agent. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that Pakistan will move towards a looser association between the two wings, with a high degree of political and economic autonomy for each, and that in such a relationship the East Pakistanis would find new reasons for maintaining the nation as one.₃₃

In the early Sping of 1969 it appeared that the latter course was finally being pursued.

In a relatively unknown document prepared by five members of the Finance Commission in 1963 the disparity enigma was dissected. They found that it would take twenty-five years for the provinces to be brought abreast of one another economically; and that this target could only be achieved if development in the West wing was drastically curtailed. The intimation was that deceleration would have to be almost total.₃₄ Obviously this was an impossible proposal.

The momentum of development in West Pakistan could not be slowed without calamitous consequences. Nor would the government encourage such a suggestion. But reports like this made urgent a more equitable distribution of developement benefits. This meant the building of two new capital cities instead of just the one originally planned at Islamabad. East Pakistan was declared by the new Constitution to be the legislature capital and work was started on building a “second capital” outside the immediate limits of metropolitan Dacca. Similarly, if a fertilizer factory, steel mill, or sugar refinery was to be built in West Pakistan, East Pakistan had to be given one too. The furor over the building of nuclear power plants is another case in point. But no matter how much pressure the East Pakistanis place on their government, one fact remains self-evident. East Pakistan cannot yet compete with its sister province in the development race, and it will take decades before advances in West Pakistan materially improve the economic picture in East Pakistan.

Pessimistic though it be, the inevitable conclusion is that East Pakistan’s demands cannot presently be met no matter how much effort the Pakistan government gives to the dilemma, no matter how sincere its intentions.₃₅ Thus more political turbulence can be expected and more restrains will undoubtedly be imposed.

As recently as the winter of 1966, demands could be heard reverberating throughout Pakistan for an arrangement which would give the East Pakistanis greater control over their destiny. In the forefront of this movement was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the East Pakistan Awami League. His Six Point Program, which he presented to the Subjects Committee of the Conference of Opposition Parties in Lahore and which appeared in a letter to The Pakistan Times published on February 13, 1966, specified those areas which would free the East Pakistanis from the grip of the Central Government and hence from the dominance of the West Pakistanis. It argued in favor of still another constitution, not the restitution of the one promulgated in 1955. A new edifice would be constructed along confederal lines. The Central Government would be supreme in only two areas—defense and foreign affairs. And in the former category each province, now labeled states, would be free to raise and maintain paramilitary and territorial forces.

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The Central Government would give up its power to tax and the two states would have their own currencies which would be freely convertible. The Central Government would receive its working revenues from the states in the amount that the states deemed necessary. Each state would control its own foreign trade, and the exchange earned from this trade would be left at the disposal of the state earning it.

Mujibur’s Six Point Program frightened his associates in the West Pakistani opposition. Most of them feared the propasal contained the seeds of national disintegration and rejected it on that count alone. Others, perhaps more sympathetic, found it unaccountable on grounds that it would invite government reprisals against the political parties, and forty-four months of martial law had proved to be a sobering experience. No one in West Pakistan wanted a repetition of the 1958-62 period. And although they were prepared to risk arrest in order to publicize their demands, they were not interested in supporting a policy which, as Ayub suggested, might lead to “civil war” in the country.₃₆

In December 1966, and in the early months of 1967, the United States was accused of plotting to establish a “United States of Bengal.” The United States categorically denied any such clandestine action and it appears, given the prevalence of anti-Americanism, that this was one more attempt at discrediting a segment of the opposition. But a more bizarre charge was to be made in January 1968, when Mujibur Rahman and known as the Agartala Conspiracy. Charged with working with Indian agents, they were rumored to be planning the assassination of Ayub as a prelude to declaring East Pakistan an independent state. Arraigned before a public tribunal in mid-1968, their trial only highlighted the degeneration of the judicial, administrative, and poltical systems.₃₇

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Chapter 3

International Events : The Domestic Impact

IN THE AUTUMN of 1962 India and China engaged in a border clash which reverberated round the world. The Indians were no match for the Chinese armies which swarmed through and over the Himalayas and quickly put the hapless defenders to flight. As Chinese successes mounted, the Western powers, but expecially the United States and Great Britain, were drawn into the picture. India’s poor showing was attributed to an outmoded defense posture which relied too heavily on diplomatic niceties and very little on military muscle.₁ When the Chinese unilaterally withdrew their forces, a dazed Indian Government began to review the shambles of its foreign policy. At the same time it opened its doors wide to receive military hardware which the United States soon made available.

In Pakistan, this gesture of American goowill toward India was interpreted as ill will directed at a loyal and steadfast ally. India was Pakistan’s unreconciled enemy, and the arms shipments were described as a threat to Pakistan’s security. It has already been noted that President Ayub was endeavoring to weather to political storms which he himself had created by allowing the “free” play of political party activity. This new situation, far beyond his power to control, provided still another opportunity for his opponents to undermine his authority.

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Given the President’s adherence to the military pacts and his unconcealed friendship with the Western powers, especially his reliance on the United States, he was exposed to criticism from those who had long argued against sustaining these tight relationships and dependencies. Now the criticism grew louder and it obviously had considerable popular backing. The President was in a poor position from which to defend himself. His foreign policy had already undergone several reappraisals and, as noted, windows had been opened to the Communist world more than a year before. But now even more drastic changes were required.

On November 21, 1962, the President convened and emergency session of the National Assembly to consider the situation arising out of the Sino-Indian conflict and the arms that the latter country was receiving from the United States. It was Ayub’s considered opinion that the largescale supply of weapons to India disturbed the balance of military power in South Asia and posed a direct threat to Pakistan’s security. Although in 1959 President Ayub offered India a plan for the joint defense of the subcontinent, which even then appeared threatened by China, now he claimed that the “threat” was merely a ploy used by the Indians to acquire large quantities of free arms from the United States. Ayub could not forget that Prime Minister Nehru rejected his 1959 joint-defense offer out of hand; nor could he dismiss from his mind the feeling that Nehru had provoked China into the 1962 border conflict by calling upon his troops to clear the Chinese from lands they had occupied earlier in Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency.

When the Chinese voluntarily withdrew their forces to the original line of control, Ayub was even more convinced that the Chinese were less interested in invading India than in teaching the Indians a lesson.₂ Thus Ayub insisted that India was using “the Chinese bogey” to improve its war-making capabilities. The President concluded that India would never fight China as an ally of the United States that China would never launch an isolated full-scale attack on India. Hence the weapons which India received from the United States would only be used against those countries from which India had least to fear. And as Pakistan and India each considered the other its primary enemy, the expandiing of the Indian Armed Forces would embolden the Indians to possible adventures. Moreover, it would make it impossible for Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

The intertwining of international and domestic politics is neither unique nor a consequence of modernity. All governments throughout history have been prisoners at one time or other of international events. Pakistan is no exception. Every alert person in Pakistan knew Ayub Khan’s role in allying the country with the West—even if some could not understand his reasons. Many articulate individuals, especially those who were displeased with the manner in which Ayub came to power, concluded long ago that the President conspired with the United States in overthrowing the parliamentary government of Feroz Khan noon.

They believed that the imposition of martial law was merely a shield behind which the whole edifice of Pakistan’s Government could be dismantled, that the destruction of the political party system was necessary because Washington had decided the leftists in the National Awami Party, the Ganatantri Dal, the Awami League, and the Youth League—as well as Bhashani’s Krishak Samiti—were growing too powerful. Whether or not Ayub admitted the accuracy of this judgment was unimportant because he was compelled to follow the dictates of “his masters.” But, insist his antagonists, he also had little to lose and much to gain. Ayub Khan is pictured as having fancied himself a great leader and the rightful heir to Jinnah’s mantle. That he found the Americans useful explains their happy if limited alliance.

Ayub’s policies indentifying Pakistan with the West were never so pronounced as in May 1960 when the famous U—2 incident took place. The flight over the Soviet Union was reported to have originated from Peshawar, and when the Russian Premier announced that a “red ring” had been drawn around the frontier city most Pakistanis were understandably alarmed. What price must Pakistan pay for

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its alliances with the West? This was a question that was debated in the bazaars, universities, industries, and wherever the more “sophisticated” masses congregated. It was fortunate for the President that the incident occurred in a period of martial law when an absolute ban on political parties obtained. Had it been mid- or late 1962, the U—2 incident might well have led to serious demonstrations. As it was, people murmured their dissatisfaction with the country’s foreign policy but there was no overt reaction.

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THE OPPOSITION AND FOREIGN POLICY

Muslim pride was another reason for the discontent. Pakistan’s heavy dependence on the West in the economic sphere as well as the military, and the resulting impact on the political system and social life, rilled the sensitive, concerned elements in the population. It was their argument that this dependence prevented Pakistan from molding a society true to Islamic traditions. Maulana Maudoodi was only one of their spokesmen. Whereas Maudoodi emphasized religious aspects, intellectuals like Faiz Ahamed Faiz developed the same theme but his more secular propensities urged him to declare that broader aspects of Islamic and Oriental “culture” were also in danger.

At the Seventh Anniversary celebrating of the Pakistan Writers Guild, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, holder of the Soviet Union’s Lenin Peace Prize, struck this chord again. In a paper entitled “Some Culture Problems of Afro-Asian Countries,” published in The Pakistan Times Sunday Supplement of February 20, 1966, he made the following points :

The qualitative political change from colonialism to independence must be followed by a similar qualitative change in the social structure left behind by colonialism…. . Imerialist domination tried to weaken and destroy whatever was good progressive and forward-looking…. it tried to sustain and perpetuate whatever was bad, reactionary and backward-looking, ignorance, superstition, servility and class exploitation. What was handed back to the newly liberated countries, therefore, was not the social structure which it took over but the perverted and emasculated remnants of cheap, spurious, second-hand imitations of its own capitalist cultural patterns by way of language, custom, manners, art forms and ideological values….these problems can be effectively solved only when the political revolution of national liberation is followed by a social revolution to complete national independence.

To men like Faiz and Maudoodi the Christian West was a corrupting element, and they cuationed their followers that only with the banishment a Ayub Khan could “the decay and degeneration” of Pakistan’s Muslim society be arrested. Despite all these attacks on his authority, direct and indirect, Ayub stubbornly adhered to friendship with the West, however.

Relations with Pakistan’s allies were strained erarlier, as was noted in the bitter exchange between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1961; nevertheless, the denouement did not come until the extensive shipment of arms to India by the United States in 1962. Ayub could no longer aviod the issue of his Western entanglements. What he said about India and China he believed up to the day he left office : the years spent in building the Pakistani Army were not wasted; Pakistan’s enemy was no illusion. Ayub looked upon India as a threat to Pakistan’s integrity, and he was deeply worried about the growing disparity in military capability. Ayub also had to take cognizance of the existence of the political parties, most of whom persistently clamored for a withdrawal from the military alliances and a wider association

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with the Muslim countries (notably in the Arab world), and Communist or Socialist states.

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ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO : POLITICIAN WITH A DIFFERENCE

The sudden death of Mohammad Ali (Bogra), Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, on January 23, 1963, elevated Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to one of the highest offices in the President’s cabinet. His appointment could not have come at a more auspicious moment. Bhutto held a variety of portfolios in Ayub’s government after the declaration of martial law. From October 10, 1958, to his appointment as head of the Ministry of External Affairs on January 24, 1963, he occupied the top posts in the Commerce, Industries, Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Affairs, Natural Resources and Rehabilitation, and Works ministries. Born in 1928, he was just under thirty when he assumed his first cabinet position, and was the most youthful, energetic, and ambitious of the President’s confidants.

Bhutto was a bright, intelligent, and sensitive individual and the President treated him like a family member. And Bhutto returned this affection, practically worshipping Ayub. In a way, Ayub was betrayed by Bhutto’s youth. The President valued his presence in the cabinet because he worked arduously at his assigned tasks, but Ayub could not anticipate that Bhutto, in Pakistan’s age-graded society, would contest the dictates of his superior. Nor could he foresee how the personality of the young minister would mature in the hard realities of international and domestic politics; how his emotionally charged but articulate speeches would affect the Pakistanis who listened to or read them; or how one day he would disagree with the wisdom of his President’s decision and be forced into the vortex of a national controversy.

Born in Larkana District in Sind, the son of Sir Shah Nawaz Khan Bhutto, an influential landlord and former minister in the Bombay Government before Independence, he was scion of an aristocratic family whose importance was recognized in Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, and Rajputana in India. Z.A. Bhutto graduated from the University of California with honors in political science in 1950 and received an M.A. in jurisprudence from Oxford in 1952, In that same year he obtained his Barrister-at-Law certification from Lincoln’s Inn.

After completing his education Bhutto was appointed lecturer in international law in the University of Southampton in England. He returned to Pakistan in 1953, and after a brief stint as a teacher took up legal practice in Sind. In 1957 he was made a member of the Pakistani Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly and in 1958, just before the October revolution, led Pakistan’s delegation to the United Nations Conference on the “Law of the Sea.” Bhutto’s training and interests were in the field of international affairs, and it can be speculated that the President was grooming him for a post in the Foreign Ministry from the moment he selected him for his cabinet. The young man learned much in his more than four years as a cabinet official, and although the President might have preferred greater maturity before moving him into the Ministry of External Affairs, destiny ruled otherwise.

Mohammad Ali’s death left Ayub in a difficult situation. The government had assumed a posture which, while critical of the United States, enabled Pakistan to remain in the alliances. The President understood the implications of this policy and trusted no one but himself to sustain it. Mohammad Ali was an ideal choice in that he acted like a transmission belt. Twice Ambassador to the United States, congenial and accustomed to carrying out orders, he had implemented the President’s policies to the letter.₃ But it was not easy to find a successor. In selecting Bhutto, Ayub obviously believed he had an

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obedient subordinate. Although inexperienced, he seemed to be what the times required.

United States arms shipments to India intensified anti-American feeling in Pakistan and the President wanted someone with rapport among the students and urban intelligentsia. And Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s performance up through Ayub’s reelection in January 1965 leaves no doubt that he served a very useful purpose. Bhutto, unlike the President but undoubtedly with his consent, publicly castigated the United States. He also openly supported a number of new organizations such as the Pakistan Afro-Asian Society whose Anti-Americanism became its raison d’etre. While the President had no intention of duplicating his style, all this was considered good domestic politics. Nevertheless, a new problem had arisen. Bhutto accumulated a following of his own.

The new Foreign Minister was a true representative of the educated and determined younger generation. He was one of them, spoke their language, knew their thoughts, and shared their aspirations. It would not be in error to suggest that he, like so many young intellectuals, found socialist policies appealing—and this reinforced his prejudices against things Western.₄ Bhutto was often carried away by his own rhetoric, and his emotionally charged speeches were often more than Ayub had bargained for.

But even then the Foreign Minister was an asset. Through him the Ayub regime acquired a degree of creditability it could ill afford to discout. Bhutto played his role so well that some observers believed the President would eventually name him his heir apparent. Hasan Askari analyzes the leadership dilemma in Pakistan and concludes with the view that the Ayub regime “did succeed in giving us new ideas, new priorities and new men. The reason behind the EBDOing of the leading lights in the Opposition was to neutralize them for a certain number of years and in that period to groom up a new set of young leaders.” Although holding the opinion that the regime failed in this endeavor, Askari comments that there are one or two new luminaries. “The most probable heir for the mantle of Savior is Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Mr. Bhutto seems to be idolised by practically everyone.”₅

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THE KASHMIR DILEMMA

The Kashmir dispute remains the key to India-Pakistan relations. It caused the two countries to clash at the very moment of independence in 1947 and it has been responsible for the subsequent tense situation, the intermittent conflict, and the brief Indo-Pakistani War of September 1965. It is also interesting to note how the Kashmir dilemma weaves itself into the fabric of Pakistan’s domestic life. Ayub Khan emerged as commander-in-chief of the Army in 1950 in part because the government of Liaquat Ali Khan could not trust the “older” officers who insisted on renewing the war in Kashmir. It was left to Ayub to neutralize the conspiracy that these generals were hatching.

In like fashion, Kashmir played a prominent role in Ayub’s decision to oust the parliamentary government and abrogate the 1956 Constitution. Under the leadership of Abdul Qayyum Khan, the Muslim League in 1958 tried to make a comeback at a time of widespread political instability. Eassentially, the party sought to rally the public behind its banners by declaring that the Muslim League  would actively support the Kashmiris in their liberation movement. As commander in chief it fell to Ayub to order the Army to intercept and disarm paramilitary Muslim League forces. Under Army pressures, the government later agreed to force the Muslim League to disband its private force. It was the Kashmir dispute which again perplexed the government int he early sixties, but with the emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as Foreign Minister restraint did not seem to be a valuable tactic.

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Ayub Khan’s popularity sank to a new low at the start of 1963. Popular sentiment in Pakistan ran against the President when he failed to take advantage of the Sino-Indian border war and march his armies into Kashmir. Ayub was perceived as following the dictates of his United States advisers—a prisoner in his own country. Bhutto counseled resoluteness and advised the President to take a hard line on Kashmir, not only because a Muslim population was being denied the right of self-determination, but because it would immeasurebly improve the President’s image at home. And lest it be lost from view, the President’s primary objective lay in the establishment of institutions capable of putting the country on the road to eventual modernization. This elusive objective could only be attained if Ayub was supported and received the cooperation of the articulate reference groups.

As a military figure Ayub could never acquire popularity with the intelligentsia through political means. Nor would economic progress bring in its wake a satisfied and dedicated following. Only a military success could earn him this reward; and the battleground for such a test was readily available in Kashmir. Thus Bhutto could say :

I remember that when the struggle for the achievement of Pakistan was being waged, it was said that it should be a now or never struggle. The problem of Kashmir has now become so urgent, so critical in its consequences, that it should be thought of in the same way. Kashmir must be leberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning.₆

It is not intended to compare the “patriotism” of Ayub with the of his Foreign Minister. Both men were dedicated to the proposition that the Kashmiris must be given the opportunity to determine their own destiny. The major distinction to be drawn here is that Ayub Khan, as a practioner of military science, knew the hard realities of national capabilities and modern warfare. Emotional responses may momentarily intoxicate but they also blur issues. Ayub, by temperament, pondered the consequences of this pronouncements. But Ayub learned this the hard way. Bhutto, on the other hand, was less apt to practice caution or self-restraint. Bhutto wrote of Nehru that “he [Nehru] sprang out of that greatest of all contradictions called India and that is why Nehru was India.”₇ The man who spoke of Nehru in these terms must have given some consideration to his own leader. To Bhutto, Pakistan is not a contradiction, and if he observed closely he must have realized that neither was Ayub Khan.

Ayub was without mystique or popularity, possibly because he addressed himself to specific issues, praticed rationalism, and refused to be carried away by sentiment. It is not that he was so out of touch with his people; simply put, his pragmatism was too stark, perhaps too calculated for Pakistanis to appreciate. All the same, it is obvious that Ayub Khan personified Pakistan for a decade.₈

FOREIGN ENTANGLEMENTS

The new Foreign Minister soon realized he had taken on a terrible responsibility. Talks with India were underway, and he was called upon to take up where his predecessor left off. He played host to the Eleventh Session of the Central treaty Organization’s Economic Committee and welcomed the United States Assistant Secretary of State, who was in Pakistan to reassure President Ayub that American arms going to India would never be used against Pakistan. But what was undoubtedly his most celebrated activity was the journey to Communist China and the signing of the border agreement between the two countries on March 2, 1963.

Bhutto was neither responsible for the settlement nor the drafting of the document. The initial work and, by and large, the most difficult phase of the negotiations were carried through under Manzur

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Qadir. Mohammad Ali (Bogra) completed the arrangements. It was Bhutto’s task to represent Pakistan at the ceremony honoring the accord. Again, this is not to suggest that the Foreign Minister was a rubber stamp to the proceedings. As a long-time member of the President’s cabinet his advice had often been requested. On other occasions he was impetuous enough to present his views, requested or not. An although Manzur Qadir may not have always appreciated the advice of Z.A. Bhutto, the fact that the President listened was significant.

Bhutto encountered less resistance from Mohammad Ali, who was unimpressed with Qadir. (On one occasion Mohammad Ali publicly called Qadir a “Rasputin.”) Nonetheless, the fact remains that it was during Manzur Qadir’s tenure as Foreign policy came about. It is interesting to note, however, that it was Bhutto who received credit for Pakistan’s more independent foreign policy.

In one way or another foreign affairs dominates the Pakistani scene, and its impact on the political system cannot be minimized. On April 7, 1963, President Ayub explained the policy that his Foreign Minister would later develop. The President was doubtful, despite the assurance of numerous United States emissaries (W.W. Rostow visited with Ayub on April 5th), that American shipments of military hardware to India would not be employed against Pakistan. The President noted that this was an improper reading of Indian intentions and betrayed American ignorance of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. On the following day Pakistan presented its case to a meeting of the SEATO powers and the Foreign Minister emphasized that the balance of power in South Asia must be maintained if peace was to be preserved.

On his return to Pakistan Bhutto addressed the National Assembly and informed his countrymen that the government would not bow to India’s might, nor would Pakistan accept any solution for Kashmir which was not both honorable and just. By no means would the Pakistanis desert the Kashmiris in their struggle for self-determination. The Foreign Minister followed up this speech with a declaration on April 17th that Pakistan might have to consider taking a “fundamental decision” : specifically, to withdraw from the Western military alliances if long-term military aid to India was not coupled with a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

Pakistan had not taken advantage of India while that country was struggling with the Chinese in the Himalayas, and the Pakistan Government had a right to believe this act of forbearance would not be overlooked onec the hostilities were at an end. In fact, the Pakistani authorities thought this was the most opportune moment for the Western allies to put pressure on India for a Kashmir settlement. Even after the  Chinese withdraw and the United States military supplies began arriving in India it was thought the United States would insist on some reciprocal action. At the very least, India would be expected to reduce the tension existing between itself and Pakistan. But this did not happen and the Pakistanis were sadly disillusioned. Pakistan’s leaders therefore drew the conclusion that if a settlement was possible in Kashmir it would come only through Pakistan’s own initiative.

Initial efforts, therefore, were directed at negotiations. In addintion to the six rounds of ministerial talks which finally terminated without agreement on May 16, 1963, Pakistan presented it case to the CENTO Ministerial Council which met in Karachi that year. The American Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary were both present, and they learned from President Ayub that no Pakistani government could consider abandoning the Kashmiris. He also emphasized that increasing domestic pressures were causing the government to assume risks it had long sought to avoid. Picking up on this theme, Z.A. Bhutto told newsmen in Dacca on May 9, 1963, that Pakistan was firmly opposed to the partition of the Kashmir Valley or its joint control by India and Pakistan. In other words, the only way to solve the dispute was to agree to the plebiscite which the United Nations had recommended many years before. Pakistan’s stand vis-a-vis Kashmir had not really changed, but with the Foreign Ministry under the direction of Bhutto the impression grew that its line had hardened considerably.

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THE POLITICS OF THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

The Kahsmir dispute was a constant source of irritation and posed some perplexing questions for the Ayub Government. It was by far the most popular issue in West Pakistan. No government could afford to ignore this fact. At the same time solutions were virtually impossible to come by. Pakistan had tested many approaches in the years following independence.₉ First, it sought to gain the territory in a covert and later open struggle; second, it accepted the good offices of the United Nations; third, it allied itself with the Western powers and hoped alliance commitments would pressure India into a compromise solution; fourth, it went to war with India in September 1965; and finally, it now has associations with Communist China and seeks the support of the Soviet Union.10 Despite all these efforts, the situation which prevailed shortly after partition remains to haunt the Pakistan Government. And as the Kashmir problem continues to defy solution the temper and frustration of the Pakistanis is magnified.

In the absence of an outlet for their pent-up energies, Pakistani displeasure is usually directed at the government. In meeting periodic outbursts the authorities have been firm, but they cannot indefinitely promise that which to date has proven unattainable. It is time to ask whether Pakistan can really achieve its much publicized goal of freeing Kashmir from Indian control. Similarly, is the pursuance of such a liberation policy in Pakistan’s interest? What consequences might flow from the continued pursuit of this policy? What would happen if it were discontinued? How does the continued pursuit of such a policy affect Pakistan’s relations with the great powers? What does this portend for its relations with the United States? If it should decide to chance a rupture in its relations with the United States, how might this influence Pakistan’s political and economic development? These questions can only be raised here, but perhaps some of the answers may be seen in the events of the period 1963-69.

On December 14, 1963, Pakistan lodged a strong protest with India against the move to formally integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union. Ever since 1957 India had planned on giving Kashmir the same status as its other states, but internal opposition and Pakistan’s reaction always prevented the completion of this program. Now the Indian Government intended to go ahead with its original arrangements. However, on December 27th a sacred relic, a hair of the Prophet, was reported stolen from the Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar. In Kashmir, news of the theft resulted in severe disorders, and rioting soon spread to India and Pakistan. In the midst of mounting unrest the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League Executive called an emergency meeting in Azad Kashmir (the western area under Pakistan’s control) to consider the situation and its impact on Muslims all over the subcontinent.

Meetings were held in Pakistan to condemn the disappearance of the sacred relic and rumors circulated that right-wing Hindu organizations were behind the theft. Reports spread throughout Pakistan that Jan Sanghis and members of the Hindu Mahasaba had begun a reign of terror on Kashmir and some of India’s northern states, and were set on destroying Muslim life and property. At the same time riots broke out in East Pakistan, where a large Hindu minority resides. On January 2, 1964, the West Pakistan Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution expressing a deep sense of anger and sorrow at the theft of the holy relic and the attacks perpetrated on defenseless Muslims. Similar protests emanated from the Indian legislatures, where concern was voiced for the Hindus in East Pakistan.

On January 3rd Pakistan brought its case before the U.N. Security Council and cautioned against the consequences of the plan to merge Kashmir with the Indian union. Pakistan’s Chief Delegate Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrullah Khan insisted in a letter to the Council that Prime Minister Nehru was seeking to consolidate India’s hold over the dispute territory in defiance of U.N. resolutions which repeatedly called for a plebiscite. On the same day that he was restating his country’s case before the United Nations, Pakistan held a “Protest Day” as as expression of its resentment. When the exchange in the U.N. began to peter out, Foreign Minister Bhutto intervened personally, but to no avail.

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As in numerous meetings of this kind in the past, the Council listened attentively, deliberated, but was unable to convince the disputants that a compromise formula was in their mutual interest. On February 17th a frustrated Zulfikar Ali Bhutto requested an adjournment of the Security Council on the grounds that he had to consult his government. Chinese Communist Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai was scheduled to arrive in Pakistan, and it can be speculated that the Foreign Minister felt his cause would be better served in Karachi than in New York City. It should be mentioned that, ever since the Chinese attack on India, visits by Chinese leaders to Pakistan have been interpreted by the Indian Government as part of the general Pakistani strategy to intimidate or pressure them into arriving at a settlement of their outstanding differences. On February 23rd, after lengthy talks with President Ayub and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Chou-en-Lai publicly declared his country’s support for the Muslim Liberation Front in Kashmir.

With international pressure increasing for some interim, if not permanent solution for Kashmir, Prime Minister Nehru ordered the release of Sheikh Mohammad Adbullah, the “Lion of Kashmir,” after almost eleven years of continuous imprisonment. The freeing of the Kashmiri leader on April 8, 1964, sparked optimism in international circles that a solution for the long, bitter dispute would at last be found. Nehru’s action interpreted as a first giant step in the direction of securing a satisfactory solution. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s verbal invitation to Sheikh Abdullah to visit Pakistan, although disconcerting to conservative Indian opinion, was greeted with enthusiasm in other quarters. On receiving President Ayub’s formal invitation Sheikh Abdullah requested authority to leave the country. Permission was granted quickly, and on May 24th Sheikh Abdullah arrived in Rawalpindi where he was given a tumultuous welcome.

The Foreign Minister, who was again in New York City, hurried home in time to receive him. Pakistan and India never appeared so close to a via media on Kashmir as when Sheikh Abdullah announced in Rawalpindi on May 26th that Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub would meet in June in an effort to reach a satisfactory solution. But it is another irony of history that the destiny of nations often rests on the most fragile circumstances. Prime Minister Nehru had suffered a strok earlier in the year and although advised to relinquish his responsibilities and take an extened rest decided against leaving his post. Having reconsidered India’s foreign policy position in light of the country’s increasing domestic and international problems (and possibly feeling that the he did not have long to live) the Prime Minister, it can be surmised, concluded that a settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir was now absolutely essential. It could be suggested that Nehru had deceived himself as to Chinese intentions. Perhaps he realized that India could not continue to ignore the claims of both China and Pakistan. At least one of these neighbors might be friendly to India. At this late stage he appears to have selected Pakistan.

The release of Sheikh Abdullah and his freedom to visit Pakistan is a case in point. Abdullah, although not strictly speaking an emissary of the Prime Ministry, was nonetheless convinced that a settlement had to be arrived at which took into account opposing views and allowed for a meaningful and honorable compromise. It appears that President Ayub and Prime Minister Nehru held the identical opinion, that both were prepared to back away from their original positions. But the June meeting would never be held. On the day following Abdullah’s announcement, Prime Minister Nehru suffered another stroke and died almost immediately. Although Sheikh Abdullah returned to India to attend the funeral, followed later by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, this event represented a watershed in India-Pakistan relations.

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HOSTILITIES RENEWED

The new government of Lal Bahadur Shastri permitted Sheikh Abdullah to leave India again in order to visit the holy city of Mecca. but it was not expected that the Kashmir leader would exploit his

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new freedom so as to embarrass the Shastri government. Abdullah must have known that the new government could not relent on Kashmir without causing its own downfall, and he discarded the diplomatic niceties for a blistering attack on the administration. When he was pictured with Chinese leaders, India’s more vocal elements no longer pretended tolerance. Prime Minister Shastri was imposed upon to order Abdullah to return and answer for his crimes. At this point Sheikh Abdullah had the option of going to Pakistan or returning to India. Curiously, he chose to return to India. On his return to New Delhi in May 1965 he and his closest advisers were arrested and incarcerated. Abdullah would not be freed again until December 8, 1967. Nehru’s death created a leadership vacuum in India and the Shastri government was far too weak to deal with the Kashmir dilemma. What perhaps saved it from collapse was the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.

Pakistan’s reaction was not unexpected. Violent outbursts and condemnation of the Indian Government, which was accused of going back on its promises, once again reverberated through the country. It is also important to point out that the arrest and imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah and the rekindling of the Kashmir dispute coincided with Pakistan’s elections for the second generation of Basic Democrats, followed by the campaigns for the presidency and the legislatures. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Kashmir dispute should fit prominently in the electioneering. It was also impossible to keep the role of the United States out of the debate that ensured.

Anti-Americanism reached a new peak of intensity in late 1964 and the burden of criticism focused on U.S. military assistance to India. On the one side, the Pakistani opposition parties organized under the COP and, with Miss Fatima Jinnah as their agreed candidate standing against President Ayub, exploited this anti-Americanism. On the other, the government did virtually nothing to abate it and fact took a relatively similar position. The government claimed the COP was being sponsored by the United States through the CIA. It was the government’s argument, as expounded by Bhutto and other ministers in the central and provincial governments, that Pakistan’s new independent foreign policy disturbed the Americans; that they had actually engineered a plan to unseat President Ayub and thereby reverse this policy.

Bhutto and his confreres made mention of the air agreement between China and Pakistan as well as the boundary settlement.₁₁ They also cited the air pact with the Soviet Union, the barter agreement with Poland, and the trade agreements with Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as having distressed the United States Government.₁₂ Almost on the eve of the election for President, Ghualm Nabi Memon, West Pakistan Minister of Law, Information and Parliamentary Affairs, accused the United States of financing the election campaign of Miss Fatima Jinnah and her COP cohort. The Minister declared in a public address that the United States “was meeting the expenditure in West Pakistan” whereas “the Indian Government was footing the bills in East Pakistan.” Dawn of Karachi on December 30, 1964, insisted that the Americans were providing funds for the opposition campaign in East Pakistan as well. “The latest disclosures have made many Pakistanis ask whether Pakistan has now become the latest playgound of American’s ‘Invisible Government’—the CIA.” A few weeks earlier Miss Jinnah had been condemned  for suggesting that Pakistan, because of its government’s new foreign policy, had lost its, “only friend,” the United States. It may be interesting to point out that the U.S. was also accused of supporting opposition candidates in the Indian general elections in February 1967. The CIA was again the Prime target, and American denials registered no effect whatsoever. Irrespective of the outcome, the United States was caught in the middle of a tenacious political contest in which it had to suffer for the ills and weaknesses on both sides. Moreover, officials U.S. denials of the allegations usually fell on deaf ears.₁₃

At about the same time, Foerign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made a solemn promise to the Pakistani nation. Pakistan would continue its independent foreign policy and would renew its efforts to gain the freedom of the Kashmiri people. He publicly declared—as reported in the Morning News

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(Karachi) on December 28, 1964, six days before the presidential election—that after the polling on January 2nd the Pakistan Government would “take retaliatory steps to counter the Indian attempt to merge the occupied parts of Kashmir with India. And you will see better results in the very short future.” There is still no way of knowing if this was more than campaign oratory. Sitll, it proved to be a prophetic statement. It is also difficult to learn if the Preisdent sanctioned all the speeches made by his miniters. What is certainly obvious, however, is that he could not be expected to know what each and every one of his supporters would say in the course of the campaign. Nevertheless, the fact that Bhutto’s Kashmir statement was inflated into banner headlines emphasizes its importance.

In political campaigns much is said in the heat of battle and promises are clearly made to be broken. Nonetheless, politicians are on surer ground when they keep their pronouncements ambiguous. Certainly, this provides them with more flexibility and it leaves a way out from otherwise hard commitments. For the professional politician it is almost a rule of thumb to deliberately leave “solutions” for pressing and difficult issues fuzzy and inchoate. But the Pakistani Foreign Minister, like other politicians before him, chose to violate this political dictum and the President, whether he realized it or not, was committed to a policy which soon became irrevocable.

It is virtually impssible to gauge the level of importance of foreign issues in the presidential campaign which culminated in the reelection of President Ayub on January 2, 1965. Many observers seem to agree that the most vital issue before the Pakistanis, whether they voted or not, was the presidential versus the parliamentary system of government. Nonetheless, there is little question that the polictical ideologues in the NAP and the Jamaat-i-Islami considered foreign policy a key feature of the campaign.₁₄ Representing extremist components within the COP, they did not take seriously the government protestations condemning the United States. In their view these were smokescreen tactics, employed to delude the people. The government, they argued, was more than ever allied with the West.

The opposition continued to point to the government’s policy which kept the country tied, no matter how loosely, to Western alliances. Bhutto worked arduously to correct this impression, and publicly declared the pacts served to aid Pakistan in a number of ways not originally envisioned when they were first entered into. Membership in the pacts did not mean Pakistan identified itself with the West’s anti-Communist, activities. But, in all candor, Bhutto was embarrassed by Pakistan’s remaining a party to the Alliances. Moreover, early in 1964 he began to pressure President Ayub to reconsider Pakistan’s commitments.

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THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

White remaining in the Western alliances, Pakistan was compelled to cultivate “friends” in all parts of the world. In this regard, President Ayub emulated de Gaulle’s performance.₁₅ Thus non-participation in military exercises would be one way of minimizing alliance entanglements. Another would be delimitations on the use of Pakistani territory by allinace members. Still another would be the organizing of new groupings, free from Western controls or influence. Despite many provocations, Ayub did not subscribe to the undermining of the alliances. He knew full well, however, the need to develop new arrangements which might better guarantee Pakistan’s security. Here the parallel with de Gaulle’s method is striking.

Regional organizations insuring the freindly relations of Pakistan’s neighbors always held a prominent place in Ayub’s thinking. From the outset of his rule he sought to settle differences with India, e.g., the 1959 suggestion for join defense of the subcontinent. Despite many differences with Afghanistan

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he tried of the develop amicable relations. His decision to legalize Pakistan’s borders with China, Burma, and Iran were aimed solely at removing possible sources of conflict. The same can be said for his attempt to develop satisfactory arrangements with the Soviet Union. As Ayub was quick to point out, Pakistan’s foreign policy must reflect global changes and should be determined by geography, not ideology.

Pakistan is on reasonably good terms with China and since September 1965 has been the recipient of limited Chinese military supplies.₁₆ Its relations with Afghanistan have also improved. Through the good offices of the Shah of Iran, diplomatic relations were reestablished between Pakistan and Afghanistan on May 29, 1963. Although Afghanistan still covets Pakhtunistan its demands have been somewhat muted. Iran and Turkey joined with Pakistan int he establishment of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)₁₇ in July 1964, and the arrangement has drawn the theree countries into intimate contact. At the same time Pakistan remains in CENTO and SEATO, as does Turkey in CENTO and NATO despite that country’s growing disillusionment with the U.S. Similarly, Iran remains in CENTO. All three RCD countries have sought to change their policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Not only Pakistan but Iran and Turkey have “rationalized” their foreign policies and, in addition to exchanging visits at the highest level, are trading with and receiving assistance from the Soviet Union.

No wonder the then Secretary General of CENTO, Dr. Ali Abbas Khalatbary (himself an Iranian), was reported in The New York Time of February 19, 1967, as declaring that CENTO appears to have outlived its purpose. “It [CENTO] is like insuring your house against fire; the policy does not cover damages by earthquake or theft.”

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U.A.—PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND THE INDO—PAKISTANI WAR OF 1965

The Pakistanis believe their cause in Kashmir is just. Kashmir is dispute territory and has been so recognized by the international community. Thus they distinguish between their support for the Kashmiri Liberation Front and an overt attack upon what they perceive as India proper. Most Pakistanis freely admit and indeed publicize their support for the Kashmiri Muslims. Although the Pakistan Government hedges on whether or not it is responsible for arming and training forces for conflict in Kashmir, the activities of the Pakistan Army in the summer and fall of 1965, as in 1948, are known and substantiated. But it is hardly likely that Pakistan ever seriously contemplated launching a full-scale war against her South Asian neighbor.

That India did not hesitate to strike directly at Pakistan in 1965 indicates that she had other plans, however. Some would argue that this was a correct military response under the circumstances. It forced the Pakistanis to defend an area much larger than their forces were equipped to handle; more important, it prevented the Pakistan Army from continuing its offensive in Kashmir since the troops involved in that campaign of necessity had to be diverted to the Lahore and Sialkot fronts. India thus retained control of Kashmir. Although both sides paid a heavy cost in lives, the Pakistanis were more seriously affected. Pakistan’s heavy military hardware and weapons systems, with the exception of its aging aircrafts, were largely consumed in the war. Although some vehicles, tanks, and heavy arms could be salvaged, none of these vital items could be replaced locally. Only small-arms ammunition could be provided, and Pakistan could not supply the large-caliber shells needed for its fielpieces. Pakistan’s dependence on external means of supply were underlined by President Ayub’s appeal to President Lyndon Johnson. (One of President Ayub’s last calls to President Johnson came in April 1967 after the American decision not to resume arms shipments to Pakistan.) Ayub noted again that India is in a more advantageous position and the suspension of American military assistance to that country was not nearly as serious as the cut-off of shipments to Pakistan.

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The United States refused to be committed to a conflict which it felt should have been avoided, however. Nor did the United States Government want to choose between two countries with which it had no outstanding quarrels. Pakistan, of course, did not hold the same view.

It was an ally of the United States in a number of military arrangements and, although the alliances had always been interpreted as defense mechanisms against international communism, Pakistan had been invaded and the country anticipated that its partners would take some action in its behalf. But the United States and most other alliance members were determined to play an absolutely neutral role. In point of fact, thd United States insisted that all alliance members should abstain from the conflict. Hence even Iran and Turkey, which pledged material assistance to Pakistan, were more or less pressured into accepting the American policy.

SEATO announced in the first days of the war that the Indo-Pakistani hostilities were outside its jurisdiction. CENTO refrained from making a similar statement, and Turkey and Iran did mange to send some small arms despite American displeasure. These latter shipments had little bearing on the outcome of the conflict, however, and Pakistan faced the harsh and frustrating reality of watching its military stores diminish rapidly. The refusal or inability of Pakistani’s allies to shape the course of events in the subcontinent provided the Communist world with an opportunity to fill a vacuum. The Chinese ultimatum calling upon India to vacate a number of border posts in the Himalayas brought joy to every Pakistani heart. Indonesia, still under Sukarno’s leadership, offered help in the form of limited arms shipments and sent a contingent of doctors and nurses. The Arab world sent words of encouragement. (It is significant that the Pakistan Government returned this support with its own verbal offering when the Arabs confronted the Israelis in May 1967. The reported presence of Pakistani troops in Jordan in 1970 is clearly something which Ayub Khan would not have sanctioned.) The Soviet Union, while continuing to send weapons to India, offered its good offices and urged the belligerents to settle their differences amicably.

The intervention of the leading Communist powers had an immediate impact on Pakistan’s domestic life. Although President Ayub at first rejected the Soviet offer to mediate the dispute, he welcomed the Communist Chinese pressure on India because it forced India to do what Pakistan itself had done when the Indians struck at West Pakistan; that is, to divert its forces. While all assistance was gratefully received, Ayub worried about the future.

Without trying to ascertain whether or not the Chinese were bluffing it seems fair to state that Ayub did not want them to enter the subcontinent. Neither the phiysical presence nor the ideological influence of the Chinese was desirable or the long-term interest of Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan could not continue the war at the level of intensity at which it was being fought. But the population of West Pakistan, especially in those areas where the major battles were occuring, did not hold the same view. Nor did many in the ranks of the Armed Forces, but for different reasons. Few knew what was happening on the front linse. Only the highest ranking military leaders and civil servants knew how rapidly Army and Air Force stores were being consumed. Hence lower grade officers were eager to protract the hostilities, and the urban population was convinced Pakistan could win Kashmir. While the population of East Pakistan was less optimistic, West Pakistani sentiment exhorted the government to continue the struggle. “Now that the showdown has come let us see it through to a conclusion,” was the prevailing opinion. The more excitable elements went so far as to demand that everything be placed on the line. No risk was too great, no cost too high. “Even if Pakistan loses, India will not win.” Nothing else was of comparable importance. India had to be destroyed even if it meant Pakistan must be brought to ruin with it.

The military officers who differed with Ayub were not different from military officers in other parts of the world in similar situations. Although the battles were devastating to the forces under their

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command, no decisive struggle had been fought. It was also their view that Indian will would weaken in a protracted conflict and give Pakistan an opportunity to press home its demands. The feeling prevailed that something tangible had to be achieved given the large cost in men and materiel; and that this could only be done be continuing the fight with whatever was available. It was apparent that Pathan tribesmen were fighting on the Lahore front one week after the outbreak of hostilities. It can also be added that many officers were less wary of Chinese Communist intentions than Ayub Khan.

Most military leaders are rarely credited with political acumen, nor can they be blamed for not acquiring it. A sizable contingent in the officer corps welcomed Chinese intervention for they believed it would help balance the forces facing Pakistan. They were less concerned with the political implicatons of a new Sino-Indian clash. President Ayub, however, did not seek a military victory. His objective was a political settlement. He wanted the Kashmiris to have the opportunity to organize their own society but also wished to see India remain intact. An India in chaos could not leave Pakistan unaffected.

Ayub’s vision of a free, independent, and sovereign Pakistan left no place for Communist organization or ideology. Although disillusioned with the West, he argued against intimacies with communism. Islam would be as much in danger from communism as it was from extreme Hindu nationalism. Hence Ayub refused to entertain the thought of an alliance with the Chinese. Hasan Askari, no ally of Ayub, put the problem this way :

Just what are Chinese real intentions towards Pakistan? So far, they have been understandably on good behaviour. But for how long? The Chinese make no secret of their global intentions….

How long will it be before they begin to take a more than academic interest in our domestic politics? The Appeal of their particular brand of politics in undoubted. The Communists….are (especially in East Pakistan) Peking-oriented….any alternatives to the present mad rush into China’s arms would be an improvement. Right now we are allowing ourselves to be hustled into a position from which any future disengagement will be painful and embarrassing.₁₈

Ayub’s decision was discussed with opposition political leaders as well as his supporters in advance of the official pronouncement accepting the terms of the U.N. resolution calling for a cease-fire. Most accepted his position calmly despite their displeasure. Others however, were unconvinced, and the processions which were organized in Karachi and Lahore in the closing hours of the war were obviously politically inspired. In Karachi, where controls on public activity are traditionally more difficult to enforce, the demonstrations were transformed into rampaging, hysterical mobs composed mainly of youths. Carrying placards and shouting slogans against the acceptance of the anticipated cease-fire arrangement, human torrents swept through Karachi’s principal thoroughfares. On arriving at the United States Information Service Library, they proceeded to smash the windows before setting the building ablaze.

Not yet satisfied the crowed moved down Victoria Road and assmbled in front of the United States Embassy, which unlike the library was cordoned by police, and all efforts to storm the Embassy were thwarted. After bricks smashed the glass doors of the building and broke several windows, the demonstrators were beaten off by a fierce attack by police armed with lathis. Frustrated, the demonstrators moved back up the street and on passing the Metropole Hotel, which houses the Pan American Airways office, paused to vent what was left of their unexpended fury. Neither this outburst of popular disfavor nor the lesser ones in Lahore and Rawalpindi caused the President to reconsider his decision, however, On September 24, 1965, he called upon his troops to halt their operations and ordered the Governors of West and East Pakistan to impose a curfew on the population. Although clashes between

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Indian and Pakistani forces continued intermittently into December the war was officially over.

AFTERMATH OF WAR

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was dispatched to New York City with orders to insist that the United Nations Security Council honor its pledge and bring about an equitable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The Foreign Minister emotionally announced that Pakiatan was ready to withdraw from the United Naitons if the organization reneged on its promise; no time limit was specified, however. In Pakistan the people were urged to resume daily routines disrupted by the war. The bureaucracy heeded the wishes of the President though many officers were visibly disturbed. Others, it should be noted, were obviously relieved. The commercial and enterpreneurial elements were also glad that the hostilities had been terminated. But these were a very small, though important minority. The West Pakistan intelligentsia, the student community, the lower middle-class urbanites, were noticeably unreconciled.

Popular sentiment in the municipalities ran decidedly against the President. Adding to Ayub’s dilemmas was the knowledge that the two armies still faced one another and the cease-fire was tenuous at best. Domestically, the President had to contend with intemperate opinion and internationally, with the small United Nations Observer Force which desired a general withdrawal of the opposing armies. Moreover, he had to console his unreconciled countrymen and explain that he was not “selling out” the Kashmiris. No one in the West, and least of all the United States, could assist Ayub in dealing with these problems. With all other opportunities foreclosed the one remaining option was the offer of the Soviet Prime Minister for a meeting to be convened in Tashkent in which he and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri would attempt to restore the status quo ante.

Acceptance of the United Naitons resolution in toto would have been interpreted in Pakistan as bowing to Western influence; and with anti-American passions at a peak of intensity this was politically dangerous. But Soviet offers of mediation put matters in a different light. By agreeing to meet in Tashkent, Pakistan’s leftist opposition groups could be adequately neutralized. The remainning opposition, never a serious threat to the government, might then be isolated and controlled within the normal operations of the President’s emergency powers. Therefore Ayub and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto traveled to Tashkent on January 4, 1966.

In Tashkent, Ayub struggled to find a suitable formula for accepting the remaining clauses of the U.N. Resolution, particularly that which called upon the two armies to withdraw from their forward positions. As the days passed the Pakistani press and radio reported one story; the two leaders could find on common ground for agreement. Even an agreed agenda, it was said, could not be arrived at. All indications pointed to a breakdown in the negotiations and a possible resumption of the hostilities. Although arms shipments to Pakistan and India had been curtailed by the United States, it was known that India was still receving substantial quantities from the Soviet Union. Pakistan had begun receiving some military hardware from China and Iran; it also opened a campaign to recruit and train an infantry force far in excess of the numbers considered necessary before the September war. It appears now that Foreign Minister Bhutto counseled the President against accepting anything less than an agreement for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir.

In Bhutto’s opinion Pakistan could no longer rely on the United States or the Western nations. The American decision to force a postponement of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium in July 1965 was still another reason for the irritation. The events of the preceding months were proof-positive that India’s interests would never be sacrificed for those of Pakistan. Hence Chinese suppport should be exploited in

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order to gain some leverage with the Soviet Union. It this were done carefully the Soviet Union might conceivably curtail its arms shipments to India and in turn make Pakistan a recipient of its largess. Bhutto was adamant : Pakistan must seek Chinese assistance! Ayub gave considerable thought to Bhutto’s appraisal of the contingencies and his recommendations but at the last minute decided to disregard his advice. When the President revealed he would sign the Tashkent Declaration drafted by the Soviet Union, Bhutto asked that he be permitted to publicly disassociate himself from it. He also insisted on resigning from the cabinet. The President, however, refused to accept his resignation and ordered him to remain at his post. Depressed and powerless, Bhutto offered no resistance. When the President put his signature to the Tashkent Declaration the Foreign Minister is reported to have looked on dejectedly.

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Chapter 4

Post-Tashkent Politics

ALMOST two months after the termination of the Indo-Pakistani War and some weeks before President Ayub met with his Indian counterpart in Tashkent the mood of Pakistani society seemed poised for a resumption of hostilities. At no other time since the independence of the nation had there been so clear a display of unity. The following statement summed up the feelings of a wide segment of the public :

No Government in Pakistan ever had such a healthy climate and opportunity to mould the Pakistani people into a nation of which not only posterity will feel proud, but which would command the respect and admiration of the world at large. Such moments and opportunities in the lives of nations are rarely witnessed. It is a moment whose siginficance should be fully realised. It is a moment which should not be allowed to go unheeded. It is a moment of destiny for Pakistan.₁

News of the agreement in Tashkent shocked the Pakistanis, who had expected something quite different. Viryally everyone believed the talks would fail, and preparations were underway to welcome Ayub back to Pakistan as hero of the people. But when the news was relayed in the evening over Radio Pakistan there was only surprise and dismay, The following morning, when it was learned the Indian Prime Minister had suffered a heart attack and died shortly after the signing ceremony, the public’s attention was still riveted on the agreement. How were the Pakistanis ot mourn the passing of the Indian Prime Minister? Shastri was the villain of the piece and memories of the last few months could not be expected to fade. Had Pakistan made so great a sacrifice only to accept the restoration of the status quo ante? When the President finally returned to Rawalpindi there were no celebrations, no press conferences, and no high-level meetings. Ayub did not even seem inclined to explain why he chose to sign the agreement and went immediate seclusion. The reasons for the President’s silence are not known, but it can be conjectured that he was deeply affected by the sudden passing of Lal Bahadur Shastri. Undoubtedly he also wondered how the Prime Minister’s death would affect the agreement he had just signed. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto likewise refused to comment, and went directly to his ancestral home in Sind.

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THE STUDENTS

On Januray 13, 1966, The Pakistan Times of Lahore printed an article which stated : “The breakthough, kept secret until the last moment, came as one of diplomacy’s big surprises.” Moreover, Ayub’s reluctance to explain his reasons for accepting the Tashkent Declaration was more than the aroused Pakistanis could tolerate. Hence, after an impatient pause of almost forty-eight hours demonstrations

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erupted in several areas of West Pakistan. Not unexpectedly, the student community stood in the forefront of this activity and the public peace was shattered.

The most serious disorder occurred in Lahore, the most celebrated city in the seventeen-day war. Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was in force in Lahore as in other parts of West Pakistan, making it a violation to take out processions or hold public meetings of more than five people. Nevertheless, defying the order, students from Panjab University and other local colleges moved out to their school compounds and proceeded to march on the downtown area. Earlier a band of students, dressed in black and bearing banners calling upon the government to reconsider the position taken at Tashkent, camped outside the main gate leading to the Governor’s residence. Efforts to persuade the students to leave proved futile and police reinforcements arrived to bolster the detachment already on the scene.

Rioting began some time after noon. The police ordered a halt to the marchers convenging on the city, many of whom were joined by veiled women who carried children said to be the dependents of men killed in the war. Shouts of “Give us back our husbands, fathers, and brothers” pierced the air and the crowds became more difficult to manage. From Regal Chowk and Charing Cross the students marched toward Government House several hundred yards down the Mall Road where they sought to petition the Governor. It was at this juncture that the police asserted themselves.

All attempts to stop the students were answered with increased resistance and rowdiness. Soon the brick-throwing began and the police were ordered to counterattack by using their tear gas cannisters. The battle raged for several hours but damage to public utilities was not extensive, though a double-decked omnibus of the West Pakistan Road Transport Corporation was attacked, its windows smashed, and an attempt made to set it afire. The fluorescent tubes lighting the downtown area the traffic lights were also easy colleges where the police, on the defensive, resorted to shooting. An official government announcement stated that the first victim was a policeman and that the struggle grew as a result.

The rioting in Lahore continued into the night and when it was finally brought under control four persons were dead, many injured, and several hundred in jail. Panjab University, local colleges, and schools were ordered closed for an indefinite period; parts of the city were littered with debris and hastily scrawled obscenities were to be seen in a number of localities. One theme explained everything. The President, according to the demonstrators, had “sold Kashmir” to the Hindu “babus” and “warlords.” Many people were outraged, more were quietly bitter, but hardly a person could be found who was not prepared to voice his displeasure with the unexpected turn of events in Tashkent. In this instance, sympathy was with the students—they reflected the feelings of West Pakistan’s urban population.

Concerned with the violent reaction to the Tashkent Declaration and urged by his advisers to lay the matter before the people, President Ayub broke his self-imposed silence with a mid-day radio address to the nation on Januray 14th. Speaking in Urdu he explained that the Tashkent Declaration had in on way detracted from or damaged the country’s position on Kashmir. “The Kashmiris’ right to choose their future remained inviolable.” he reiterated. (All the President’s speeches were now delivered in Urdu. On the day the Indians attacked West Pakistan the President spoke to the nation in English, but a few days later the government decided that all future addresses would be in Urdu. It is also noteworthy that English-language news reports were eliminated from television programming and a few weeks later Radio Pakistan announced that English news programs would be reduced to two each day. By contrast, at the beginning of the hostilities there were English news programs almost every two hours.) The President declared that once the withdrawal of the armed forces had taken place, Pakistan would be in a position to request the Security Council to mediate the dispute.This was in keeping with the resolution of September

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20, 1965, he explained. But no matter what happens in the future, he continued, Pakistan would never abandon the Kashmiris and the country would never enter a “No-War Pact” with India “unless the Jammu and Kashmir dispute was settled honourably and equitably.”

Taking note of the sentiment aroused against his politics, the President remarked : “There may be some amongst us who will take advantage of your feelings and will try to mislead you. They are not more patriotic perhaps than you or me. The ordeal is not yet over.” Clearly, the President held to the view that the demonstrations were the work of his political antagonists. It was the judgment of most impartial observers, however, that he had failed to gauge the temper of the population; that, in fact, the violent reaction was a predictable response and was absolutely spontaneous. The politicians had reacted much more slowly to Tashkent and, though they had not created the disturbances, sought to reap some advantages from them.

After the President’s broadcast The Pakistan Timesw of Lahore ran a headline declaring : “All Misgivings Dispelled”; and followed with the comment that the “people left their radio sets with a sense of relief. satisfied when they heard their President declare that the Declaration had in no way harmed our view-point on the Jammu and Kashmir issue.” Despite these pronouncements by the government press it was obvious that everyone was not “relieved” and that popular misgivings were the rule rather than the exception.

Before the President’s radio address, no government official made any effort to calm the students or the population at large. But now, with renewed confidence, they agreed to face their constituents and discuss the issues. On January 22 West Pakistan Minister of Education Malik Khuda Bakhsh gave an audience to a deputation of students and informed them that their demands would be given sympathetic consideration by the government. The deputation of the Qaumi-Jamiat-Tulaba-e-Pakistan (National Assembly of Pakistani Students), led by its convenor Irshad Ali Khan, exchanged views freely with the Minister who advised them to seek their objectives without putting the national interest in jeopardy. He further noted that all the government asked of the students was that they should conscientiously and diligently pursue their studies. In return, the government would safeguard their interests. He added that a judicial inquiry into the firing by police would be held under a High Court judge and that the government would be lenient in its attitude toward those students whose passions caused them to break the law.

Already efforts were underway to redress student grievances. “Kindness is needed not persecution,” wrote Mohammad Idress in his weekly student column in The Pakistan Times (January 19, 1966), and the government was quick to heed his words. By January 22nd virtually all of the approximaetly 200 students arrested in the rioting were released on bail and the government announced it was contemplating reopeining the education institutions. By the end of January the institutions in Peshawar and Ralwalpindi resumed normal activity. Those in Lahore followed in late February. In Karachi they remained closed for a longer period. In East Pakistan, which was virtually unaffected by the student disturbances in the West wing, the educational institutions reamained open until a disturbance caused by student dissatisfaction with educational politics in Dacca University, unconnected with the government’s foreign policy, brought about its closing for an indefinite period.

It should be mentioned the schools throughout Pakistan had been more or less closed since the fall of 1964. The election campaingn had absorbed the attention of the students and they occupied themselves in making life miserable for the authorities.₂ The 1965 war followed on the heels of the summer vacation; the emergency caused a suspension in educational operations, to say nothing of the paralysis that gripped society generally. When the schools finally reopened in Novembar of 1965, the adverse reaction to the Tashkent Declaration once more forced their closing. The fact that the government considered it possible to open the schools at the end of January 1966 reflects its “success” in weathering

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a severe political storm.

Malik Khuda Bakhsh Bucha used the occasion to issue an official handout commenting on the situation which stated : “The character of the student is built either in his home atmosphere or in the educational institution where the students spend most of their time. Therefore the parents and teachers should provide the required conditions for the development of the personality of the students on proper lines.”₃ Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s celebrated member of the Court of International Justice and one of the nation’s leading personalities, varied this theme. Speaking in defense of the Tashkent Declaration, he chided the opposition politicians who were condemning it and added : “Politicians should think twice before inciting students and the people to lead processions against the Tashkent Declaration. Their angle of vision should be constructive and in the interest of peace.”

Douglas Ashford has analyzed the linkages between education and politics and uses the phrase “politically over-developed youth”₄ to describe student involvement in politics in the developing countries. “Political over-development” is a complex concept, but there is no mistaking the pivotal role played by the student generation in this century—and South Asia is no exception. Examples are numerous, but one of the earliest successful and most sustained performances was in reaction to the British policy to partition Bengal in 1905. Students sometimes seem able to do what politicians cannot, and it is often assumed that they are being used or exploited. But students are also eager to do battle. This was especially true in the struggle to free the subcontinent from British rule; and it is true today. The young, enthusiastic, often idealistic students take pride in their capacity to obstruct government—not simply because they have an immature distaste for authority or need an outlet for their energies, but because they feel a certain responsibility to the society of which they are a part :

Even those who are very apprehensive of the fact that a greater involvement in politics will lead to neglect of studies and possibly to indiscipline as well, will agree that at this moment when there is so much apathy among the masses, the students are the only segment relatively alert to the counrty’s social problems. By denying them the freedom of expression we’ll only be strengthening the hands of those who want to remove the last traces of freedom of expression in our country.₅

This face has never been clearly discerned by any of Pakistan’s governments, past or present, and the tendency has been to use the same old arguments and techniques in quelling student disorder. But there is a ray of light even at this late hour. The Report of the Commission on Student Problems and Welfare recognizes that in developing countries the students form a sizable section of the intelligentsia.

…and feels by reason of its education that it has the right to take a leading part in the building up of the political consciousness of the illiterate and uneducated masses.

After the damagogues and politicians proper, they form a very influential political element, whose support is sought for by almost all politicians, whether in power or out of power. Leaders of the opposition and Ministers alike woo students and seek to be popular amongst them, for in political campaigns they are found to be useful and loyal workers.6

But the Commission also demonstrates misunderstanding. They prescribe a remedy that would prevent the students from engaging in their “national pastime.” Little consideration is given to guiding them into constructive channels where they can actually make a positive contribution in raising the “political consciousness” of an inert population. Instead, the Commission earnestly believes that if “legitimate” student grievances are given attention—i.e., improved teaching, better living conditions, carefully carefully regulated tuition, and limitations on police behavior—they will quietly retire from the “political wars.” With the cooperation of the parents, guidance counselors, and the press, the students, the

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report leads one to believe, can be transformed into model citizens. This is obviously wishful thinking. Student involvement in politics is too deeply rooted in the traditions of the subcontinent to be eliminated in this fashion. It also explains why the report was greeted with such contempt.

Granted, there are also traditions which seek to remove the students from politics and these too are deeply rooted. It has been pointed out that : “The moral and political traditions of our society have always given it to the elders—in age or power—to dictate to young people, and in cases of disobedience to use the rod.”₇ One of these traditions eventually will yield to the other; and it would seem that the latter, despite its stubborn resistance, will be the inevitable loser. Youth is in widespread rebellion against the values and practices of its elders. “In a society where understanding is termed weakness, and tolerance is regarded as capitulation, it is natural that false notions of prestige should stand in the way of any settlement.”₈ All the same, youth can be expected to persist in its demands.

In Pakistan, the students seek the restructuring of society in order to improve opportunities for a more productive existence. They also seek to assure their individual satisfaction. Irrespective of their education and with few exceptions, the majority of these young people are unable to find work commensurate with their attainments. In most instances youthful members of society feel they are treated like second-class citizens.

…there are some fortunate people for whom the government have opened special institutions with the express purpose of “producing future leaders of the country.” [This was the British educational policy and the system evolved by the British is virtually intact today.] There go the sons and daughters of the rich and the privileged. After finishing their studies, replete with our idea of an English accent, these favourites will be sent abroad through government scholarships, through connections of their parents. On return they will be fixed up in jobs which their elders have already prepared for them. The openings in industry and trade will be filled by the proprietors, or the sons of senior civil and military officials. By accident of birth they move into positions of privilege without ability or effort, and without having any sympathy and feeling for the country which will now be called upon to bear the expenses of their lavish living.₉

This indictment is subjective and somewhat exagerated but it cannot be brushed aside. The statement contains well known truisms, even if it is only partially valid. The large majority of the student community has been alienated by authority—it always has been. However, the negative attitude displayed by government must give way to a new appraisal of student demands. Students will have to be treated with tact if something constructive is ever to emerge. Force has never succeeded, and will not succeed now or in the future. Using students to betray other students is also a futile policy. Silencing students is impossible short of absolute terrorism and repression. “The Government of Pakistan has not yet reconciled to the idea that the students, like other humans, have their problems and like other citizens have a right to talk about these problems.”₁₀

President Ayub hoped to establish workable instituitions that Pakistanis could also revere. He wanted to weld Pakistan into a strong and integrated nation. But he and his government, like those before him, overlooked the obvious. Institutions require time to achieve legitimacy and can only prosper if the people for whom they are meant take pride in operating them. It is the young enlightened generation that must be wooed, for it is they who ultimately determine the success or failure of officialdom’s design. It is this group that must be won over, who must see in their government’s program the prospects of a future—for themselves and their society. It was the Ayub government’s inability to deveop a flexible response to student demands that resulted in the disorders leading to the President’s resignation and the reimposition of martial law.

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The students had no confidence in the Ayub regime, and all government acts were interpreted as tactics aimed at neutralizing student activism. Conflict, not cooperation, became the norm. The Commission on Student Problems proposed reordering student government along the linse of Basic Democracies, but the students ferared this recommendation would place their unions under the control of the government bureaucracy.

The student government based on the Basic Democracies system was tried in Karachi and it failed miserably as it should have. Now by proposing it again the Commission is not only suggesting a denial of democratic process, but it is hurling insults at the intelligentsia as the very inventors of the B.D. system had made clear that their system was meant to “suit the genius” of the “illiterate masses.”₁₁

Students in Pakistan, as in other developing countries, are destined to play ever more significant roles in the process of change. The Pakistani student is reoslute and defiant, and future governments will have ot devote more thought to accepting student involvement in politics. As the students themselves have announced, whether their “role is going to be in conformity with the wishes of the Govrnment or in antagonism to it, depends largely upon the Government’s attitudes.”₁₂

ooo

THE POLITICIANS

Reaction of the political opposition to the Tashkent Declaration is edifying. On the one hand, there were those like Choudhri Mohammad Ali (Nizam-i-Islam) and Shaukat Hyat Khan (Council Muslim League) who condemned every feature of the agreement; on the other, there were personalities like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (East Pakistan Awami League) and Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (National Awami Party) who refrained from criticism. Bhashani’s NAP seldom argued the cause of Kashmir, and consistent with its previous stand, avoided taking sides in this clash. Maulana Maudoodi’s Jamaat-i-Islami also vehemently criticized the Tashkent Agreement. Although his party was extremely well organized it neither captured the popular imagination nor harnessed the sentiments of important and articulate interest groups. Explanations for these differences are not difficult to come by. Whereas the more conservative West Pakistani opposition emphasized the limited objective of removing the Ayub Khan regime it remained divided on questions of organization and program. The forces led by Bhashani, like those which rally round Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan, by contrast represent radical interests with rather explicit platforms. For them, President Ayub was only a preliminary target.

Both the NAP and EPAL seek comprehensive changes in the nation’s political system. Their goals are to revolutionize society’s lifestyle, particularly its socioeconomic structure. Theirs has been a positive program which seeks over-all social reform, and it is little wonder that they refused to be associated with the anti-Tashkent agitation.

Bhashani became a leading spokesman of Socialist-Communist causes from the moment he quit the Muslim League in the months following independence in 1947. He broke from the Awami League to form the NAP in 1957 when the late H.S. Suhrawardy, then Prime Minister and a co-founder with Bhashani of the former party, refused to heed his advice and take Pakistan out of the Western military pacts. Suhrawardy further infuriated Bhashani by keeping the Communist countries at a comfortable distance.

It is significant that Suhrawardy visited Communist China and entertained Chou-en-Lai in Pakistan during his tenure as Prime Minister. Like Ayub Khan, Suhrawardy did not find his relations with

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the West incompatible with those of the communist countries. Despite Pakistan’s apparently one-sided relationship with the West, the historic record reveals that succeeding governments have followed a curiously middle-of-the-road policy in foreign affairs. By Western standards, Pakistani leaders have also maintained a calm, statesmanlike demeanor in times of highly emotional international crisis such as the 1956 Suez War and conflict between Israel and the Arab countries in June 1967, and the split between Mujib and Bhashani has been sustained to the present period. While Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is often critical of the West, his detractors frequently accuse him of being in the pay of the United States. But both the EPAL and NAP represent leftist interests. Hence it is important to distinguish between them.

The East Pakistan Awami League is only loosely tied to its West Pakistan affiliate and stressed the replacement of Ayub’s presidential government with the pre-1958 parliamentary system. Principal emphasis has always been on greater regional autonomy for East Pakistan. In this respect, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is the most outspoken proponent of provincialism. The NAP, however, embraces all of Pakistan. While insisting on severing all ties with the western counrtries, it desires more intimate relations with socialist countries. It domestic program, unlike that of the Awami League, flows from this reorientation in foreign policy. Parochialism, as distinguishsed from “provincialism” mentioned above—the break-up of the single province of West Pakistan into its pre-1955 constituent parts of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province—is a prime feature. Divide and rule is a game that is still played in the subcontinent, and parochialism is provincialism carried to an extreme. President Yahya Khan’s decision to accept NAP demands to destroy the One Unit and return West Pakistan to its pre-1955 status is ominous when seen in this context.

The NAP program not only feeds local passions but bears a striking resemblance to the policies of the Indian Communist Party prior to 1947. At that time the CPI insisted that the only “real solution to the present communal differences lies in the creation of a socialist Republic of free States and a Central Union of them all.”₁₃ The NAP, like the other Pakistani opposition parties, seeks a return to the parliamentary system, at least for the time being. Prominent in their program is the call to nationalize industries and socialize the economy. As industry expands in Pakistan, the constantly increasing disparity in wealth is a made-to-order target for their political barbs, and it is no secret that a score of families dominate Pakistan’s industrial complex.

The NAP leaders could not overlook the fact that the Tashkent Declaration was drafted and signed in the Soviet Union; or for that matter that it had been countersigned by the Soviet Prime Minister. For Bhashani and his associates, Soviet assistance in helping reduce tension between India and Pakistan was the first step on the road to the recreation of Pakistani society. M.H. Usmani, general secretary of the NAP, praised the Soviet Union and voiced the opinion that the Tashkent Declaration would prove to be a turning point. Stressing the party’s program, Usmani remarked that the war between India and Pakistan had brought the common man into the national picture as never before.

It also showed that the “imperialist” countries were not friends of Pakistan and the arms race was suicidal to developing countries. “An independent economy was imperiative to defend national sovereingnty without having to depend on unreliable alliances,” he concluded.₁₄ Echoing him, Bhashani declared that the Tashkent Declaration had “slackened the hold of the imperialists” on Pakistan and brought about a closer relationship with the socialist countries. Bhashani offered the view that “imperialism” was the cause of all the sufferings of the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Citing the United States as the greatest threat to world peace, he has repeatedly called for a united effort to defeat it. The NAP has gone on record (The Pakistan Times, February 12, 1967) with the statement that it would go to the assistance of Communist China if it were attacked by the United States.

Undaunted by the dissension in their ranks, the more rightist political parties refused to alter their

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course, however. Tashkent seemed to be an issue worth exploiting and they diligently set about their task. Their tactics were simple and conventional. In spite of government directives imposing Section 144 in all the major urban centers of West Pakistan, the politicians held their public meetings and offered themselves for arrest when the police appeared. The feeling persisted that a politician could not earn his credentials until he proved his contempt for authority and served a period in jail. It is doubtful that this tactic had more than symbolic or sentimental importance, however. All the same, members of the Council Muslim League, Nizam-i-Islam, Jamaat-i-Islami, and West Pakistan Awami League pursued their original plans. Having violated Section 144, they went one by one to prison.

In Dacca, Nurul Amin—a moderate, former Chief Minister of East Pakistan, convenor of the National Democratic Front (NDF), and leader of the opposition in the National Assembly—called upon the authorities to end the state of emergency proclaimed during the war under which the politicians in West Pakistan were being arrested. While seeking the release of all political prisoners and the rescinding of Section 144 he avoided condoning the anti-Tashkent agitation, however. Nurul Amin intimated that the Tashkent Declaration was in the best interest of the country but he deplored the government’s action denying the right of dissent to those who opposed it. Still another opposition leader who sympathized with the dissenters while supporting the agreeement was Z.H. Lari, president of the Karachi Zonal Council Muslim League. Though acknowledging that some features of the arrangement were disappointing, he believed the government required time to work out the difficulties implicit in the dispute. Like Nurul Amin he condemned the government for preventing public expression on a vital issue. Nevertheless, he felt it was a question of war and peace and that it would be best to avoid taking a partisan stand. Apparently Lari was not speaking for the membership, however, and he was soon expelled from his party. Miss Fatima Jinnah was silent on Tashkent, Farid Ahmad, general secretary of the Nizam-i-Islam, came out in favor of the agreement. But both agreed with Nurul Amin and Lari that the government should avoid using repressive tactics.

The government at first treated the opposition leniently. Important West Pakistani leaders like Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan, Inayatullah, and Sardar Zafrullah Khan of the CML and Hamid Sarfraz of the Awami League (West Pakistan) were arrested by the police after violating the law; instead of being jailed they were driven out into the rural region and deposited in a distant location far from Lahore. This ignominious treatment exemplified the contempt in which they were held. It also suggested that the government had little to fear from these estranged politicians.

The remarkable stability of the administration in this period is reflected in the government’s insistence on holding the long-postponed elections for the chairmen of the Basic Democracies Union Councils in West Pakistan. Rumors circulated that the Basic Democrats had lost all interest in the system and would refuse to hold the election, but the polling was conducted without a bitch. Another illustration of the government’s strength was the signing of an agreement by Lieutenant General Bakhtiar Rana, one of the celebrated heroes of the Indo-Pakistani War, calling for the official withdrawal of Pakistani forces from those areas occupied during the hostilities. It is interesting to note that General Rana was Martial Law Administrator for West Pakistan during most of the forty-four months after Ayub’s take-over in October 1958.

Frustrated by the government and their own inability to agree on important issuse, the West Pakistani leaders announced that a National Confarence would be held in Lahore on February 5—6, 1966, to thrash out differences. But even before the conference convened it was announced that the central issue would be the Tashkent Declaration. On learning this the East Pakistanis, with the exception of a small contingent led by Mujibur Rahman, declined the invitation. The NAP insisted they were never invited, but the West Pakistani president of the Awami League (who went to East Pakistan in an effort to gather support for the meeting) said they had flatly refused to join. In fact, the Working Committee of the NAP

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in the Punjab and Bahawalpur passed a resolution condemning the Lahore meeting, nothing that not only would int disrupt the solidarity of the country but would also “further the sinister interests of the imperialists.” The clash between the right-wing and left-wing parties was clearly defined.₁₅ The moderate East Pakistani opposition may have declined the invitation because the Kashmir issue was too remote. At any rate, they believed issues with much higher priorities needed tackling. They did not want to risk going to prison for a cause they could not fully support.

The Jamaat-i-Islami, Nizam-i-Islam, Council Muslim League of West Pakistan, and Awami League of West Pakistan sponsored the meeting, maintaining their individual identities throughout the proceedings. As anticipated, Nurul Amin’s NDF and the NAP boycotted the conference. Even Choudhri Moahammad Ali’s request that they send observers went unheeded. With the absence of these “antagonists” it might have been expected that the convention could agree on a common program but this was not the case. The only East Pakistanis to turn up in Lahore were those led by Mujibur Rahman, and their demands were enough to fracture what little unity the conference could muster.₁₆

When the meeting was finally called to order more than 700 delegates were present but only 21 represented East Pakistan. It was something less than an auspicious beginning for what had been billed as a “unity conference,” and prospects were dim that a single national party could emerge from the deliberations. None of the delegates indicated a desire to risk sacrificing their extant organizations, no matter how feeble, for another of vague and nebulous proportions. The fear persisted that a new coalition party would be short-lived, thus making restoration of even the present political base questionable. Some delegates therefore suggested objectives falling short of actual unidication. A joint command was mooted for coordinating political activities but agreement proved impossible. The compromisers recommended something more “realistic” like a broad understanding on means to a common goal, but even this very limited objective was rejected.

Hence from the outset there was bickering and indecision. Each delegation’s leader harangued the government and condemned it for resorting to “undemocratic practices”; all the arguments had been heared before, however, and their impect was negligible. Also, publication of the speeches was banned by the government and thus they were to have little effect on the population at large.

The National Conference ended in two days. From most standpoints it failed to attain any of the objectives for which it had been organized. A proposal for launching a civil disobedience movement aimed at gaining the revocation of the Tashkent Declaration was presented by some members of the West Pakistan Council Muslim League and West Pakistani Awami League, but it was not taken up for want of a consensus. Some young firebrands held the view that the matter should be pressed with deliberate force anyway, but the more senior objectives through constitutional means. Later, however, the conference passed resolutions condemning the Tashkent Agreement and urged the goverment to abrogate it. Mujibur Rahman, having met with stiff opposition on his own proposals centered on giving more autonomy to East Pakistan, not only rejected these resolutions but marched his small delegation out of the conference and returned to his native province. To all intents and purposes the meeting was a dismal failure.

With the conference over and the opposition hopelessly divided, the government moved to silence some of the West Pakistani dissidents. On February 17 the government arrested three West Pakistan Awami Leauge and two West Pakistan Council Muslim League leaders in Lahore. The politicians were taken in custody under Rule 32 of the Defense of Pakistan Rules (1965) for what was called “persistently indulging in activities which were highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.” The leaders were : Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, president of the All-Pakistan Awami League; Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan, general secretary of the Council Muslim League; Malik Ghulam Jilani, a former member of the National Assembly, and Khwaja Mohammad Rafiq—both members of the Central Working Committee

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of the Awami League; and  Sardar Mohammad Zafrullah, president of the Lahore branch of the Council Muslim League. They were seized in the early hours of the morning under an order issued by the District Magistrate. A press note in The Pakistan Times (February 18, 1966) issued following their arrests read as follows :

Reports of prejudicial activities of these five persons, both individually and cojointly, were being received for some time past. In particular evidence is available to show that they had been persistently indulging in activities which were highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and peaceful conditions in the city of Lahore in particular and the Province in general. They had been advocating the use of force and violent methods, including the use of firearms. They had also started a regular campaign of creating discontentment and hatred among the public.

In order to prevent them form pursuing their unlawfule activities, it has been found necessary to order their immediate detention.

On hearing of the arrests, virtually all the opposition parties issued severe condemnations of the government. In such matters there was no disunity. Tufail Mohammad, president of the National Conference’s convening committee challenged the government to substantiate the bona fides of its actions in a court of law. He described the arrests as a “misuse of the powers assumed in the name of the defence of the sacred soil of Pakistan.”17 Mian Arif Iftikhar, MNA of NAP leader, condemned the arrests on behalf of his party. If the government had evidence let it proceed through proper judicial channels. He added : “The citizens of Pakistan would be right in supposing that after the great sacrifices made and the great trial undergone during the Indian aggression against Pakistan, they are at least entitled to discuss and debate and think about the war and its consequences for their country.” In his opinion, free discussion was essential to arrive at a rational appreciation of different views.₁₈

But even this event did not bring the opposition an inch closer to coalescing. On the same day that the leaders were apprehended, Khwaja Mohammad Safder, leader of the opposition in the West Pakistan Assembly, ruled out the possibility of a merger of all the opposition parties. The Council Muslim League leader insisted the amalgamation of the opposition parties would only mean the addition of one more party to the existing number. A complete merger was neither possible nor advisable; most people were decidedly against abandoning their traditional organizations because they served local interests. The alternative he suggested was a unified command of all the opposition parties which would be solely directed at achieving “national” objectives. He held the opinion that all the leaders could agree to such an arrangement, and went on to note that in their meeting at Lahore it was all but agreed that a fifty-man national council should be set up to be selected from each of the five major parties.

Safdar Admitted, however, that because of the special conditions laid down by Mujibur Rahman the establishment of such a unified command would have to wait until other leaders in East Pakistan were consulted. Khwaja Safdar complained bitterly about the “atmosphere of political suffocation prevailing in the country.” He cautioned that this hampered the growthe of political activity. The Council Muslim League leader who was touring various districts of the West Pakistan province in an effort to reorganize his party on a more popular basis agreed with a questioner that no political party, including his own, had roots among the masses. Lack of political unity and the absence of popular support neutralized the effectiveness of the parties and must have been very reassuring to the President.

Despite the entreaties of various groups and personalities, the administration methodically imprisoned many of those West Pakistani politicians who insisted on keeping the Tashkent issue alive. And once in jail they remained there irrespective of the legal exertions in their behalf. In fact, they were neither released nor put on trial. As is customary with political prisoners they were simply detained, thus

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frustrating their rank and file. And as the months passed, enthusiasm waned and the Tashkent Declaration ceased to be a real political issue. Shaukat Hyat Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, and Malik Ghulam Jilani gained their release only when the government felt they no longer represented a threat to the public peace. In mid-December, almost a year after their imprisonment, they were set free.

In the meantime, the administration was not idle. After first hesitating to deal forcibly with Mujibur Rahman, it soon became evident that his persistent efforts were beginning to gain adherents. In a sudden display of official determination Mujib was ordered arrested along with many of his followers. All were detained under the same Defense of Pakistan Rules. Among those imprisoned with the Awami Leaguers was Tafazzal Hussain, the editor of Ittefaq, a leading Bengali newspaper, which was also seized by the government. Two additional political leaders from East Pakistan, Mushtaq Ahmad and Zahur Ahmed Chowdhury, were likewise incarcerated. These two water later reported to be seriously ill (as were their counterparts Shaukat Hyat Khan and Malik Jilani in West Pakistan), but they remained in detention.

It is important to note that the government refrained from attacking the NAP, although that party virtually adopted Mujib’s Six Point Program for greater East Pakistani provincial autonomy and added six points of its own. The Twelve Point Charter of Demands prepared by the NAP was laid before the National Assembly on December 9, 1966. It not only demanded autonomy for East Pakistan but again called for the dissolution of the One Unit in West Pakistani. Furthermore, it urged the release of all political prisoners, the introduction of rationing throughout East Pakistan, restoration of the parliamentary system, introduction of direct elections on the basis of universal adult franchise, “full support to the heroic people of Viet Nam in their struggle for National Liberation,” withdrawal from the military pacts, and restoration of civil liberties and freedom of the press.₁₉

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AYUB KHAN’S DILEMMA

It might be asked why Ayub could not successfully move against all the opposition leaders, such as those representing the NAP. The following explanation could be offered. Only the NAP had a program that excited the disenchanted intelligentsia. It was the only party with the potential for receiving foreign assistance. Thus it was both politically dangerous and too “popular” to crush. (Popularity refers to the NAP program, not its personalities, however.) Although Ayub now hesitated to act against the NAP this was not the case when he took power in 1958. The NAP was one of the first organizations to feel his authority and its leaders were easily sidelined. Nonetheless, since 1962 leftist parties had become respectable and the NAP derived increasing benefits. The Communist Party, which was banned in 1955, has never been reinstated, however, and in many respects the NAP could be considered its proxy.

The furor the United States raised by supplying arms to India was accelerated to f frenetic pitch in September 1965. Both Communist China’s support of Pakistan and American neutrality reinforced the power and hence threat of the NAP. Similarly, the “good officers” provided by the Soviet Union made Pakistani society even more conscious of its immediate Communist neighbors. President Ayub was compelled to walk a domestic tightrope and this involved accepting the criticism of the NAP.

Rumors were rempant after Tashkent. One that was on the lips of most urbanites concerned the president’s cabinet. Speaking at a gathering of intellectuals at Ayub Hall in Rawalpindi on January 29, 1966, the President ridiculed all those who predicted that trouble would develop in his administration. Digressing from his speech, he pointed to the rumor citing differences between himself and Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The President acknowledged that it had been circulated by a number of

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newspapers in the country and he caustically remarked “how fertile some brians are.” His crities interpreted a recent visit to the Governor’s home at Kalabagh as a maneuver to oust the Foreign Minister. “All these rumors are absolutely untrue. This, however, shows that we are very good at manufacturing and I do hope that when manufacturing in general expands in our country we will be equally good at that.” President Ayub then commented that “such false stories did no good to the country.”

Shortly thereafter the Foreign Minister appeared to confirm the President’s comment. Speaking from Larkana, Bhutto did not mention his differences with Ayub or his intention to leave the government; instead he chose to restate the government’s policy on Kashmir. It was reported in The Pakistan Times (February 10, 1966) that “a just and honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue remained the only path towards the goal of a lasting peace and a relationship of true cordiality between India and Pakistan.” Bhutto was officially interpreted as answering the opposition attacks on the administration when he declared : “It is inconceivable for anyone to think that we can go back on our solemn pledge to assist them [the people of Kashmiri] in their liberation.” Unofficially, his remarks were viewed as subtle criticism of the President’s policies, however.

It was obvious to the public that a permanent split was only a question of time; and these views were justified a few months later when, in the summer of 1966, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto presented and Ayub Khan accepted his resignation from the cabinet. In his place the President put a virtual unknown, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, who was before his appointment Attorney General for Pakistan. Pirzada would in turn be succeeded in May 1968 by Mian Arshad Husain, Pakistani’s High Commissioner to India. In September another former stalwart, Malik Amir Mohammad Khan—while apparently on a routine visit to the President’s House at Rawalpindi—suddenly “resigned” and General Muhammad Musa, whose bags were already packed for the journey to Iran where he was to become Pakistani’s new Amabssador, was named to succeed him. It is said the Governor put his support behind rival candidates in some Karachi bye-elections and thus had angered Ayub. Malik Amir Mohammad Khan reitred in seclusion at Kalabagh where, on November 26, 1967, he was shot and killed by his son because of a personal quarrel.

Musa’s advancement to Governor of West Pakistan undoubtedly satisfied the Army; similarly, when Ayub relinquished his control over the Defense portfolio and named Vice Admiral A.R. Minister for Defense and Home Affairs he pleased another branch of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, the military, irritated over the Tashkent Declaration, was beginning to show more than simple concern with the President’s inability to acquire more and newer weapons systems.

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Chapter 5

Riots, Repression, and Retreat

 

DESPITE the trappings of civil government Ayub Khan’s authority rested on the loyalty and solidarity of the Armed Forces. He seized power with their assistance and successfully perpetuated his rule with their complicity. Had they remained neutral after July 1962 it is highly doubtful Ayub would have been returened to office in January 1965. It is not surprising, therefore, that the President’s fortunes should wane with the growing estrangement of the military. Ayub had to ward off threats posed by his erstwhile Foreign Minister and sundry leaders of the political opposition, but his primary challenge came from a bitter urban middle class which could only be held in check by a determined military establishment.

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THE DEVELOPMENT DECADE

Ayub Khan’s creative emphasis lay in economic development. Agriculture, along with industry and commerce, made significant strides during his tenure. A traditional subsistence, agrarian economy was restructured during the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65). The 3.4 percent annual growth rate for agriculture over the plan period compared favorably with the annual rate of 1.3 percent in the earlier period following independence. Food-grain output increased 27 percent and per capita income was up 14 percent. The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70) sought to sustain this momentum and aimed at a 5 percent grwoth rate. Although the Ino-Pakistani War and major droughts in 1965 and 1966 threatened agricultural objectives, the introduction of new wheat and rice varieties brought crop yields almost in line with projected goals. Statistically, the country was making progress, and the administration was hardly modest about its handiwork.₁

The Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75) was publicized by a demonstrably confident government which now talked of self-sustained growth. In addition to achieving self-sufficiency in food production, schemes were prepared to encourage more diversified farming, higher rural incomes, and a sharp reduction in unemployment and underemployment. Pakistan possessed little additional land which could be brought under irrigation, transportation, procurement and production of fertilizer, improved seeds, and agricultural extension encouraged new endeavor. Generous price policies were no less important, however.

Private initiative was stimulated and positive payoffs created incentives for further investment. The most surprising result in the early 1960’s was the proliferation of private tube-wells throughout West Pakistan.₂ Thus with government providing for major infrastructure, credit, subsidies, price stabilization, and demonstration and extension services, agricultural development was said to be entering a revolutionary phase. The Commission on International Development listed these striking statistics : ₃

RATES OF GROWTH IN AGRICULTURE

	1949-50/1959-60	1959-60/1967-68
West Pakistan
Wheat	1.1	4.0
All major crops	2.3	5.0
East Pakistan
Rice	0.3	2.4
All major crops	0.5	2.6

While listing accomplishements and identifying agricultural break-throughs, shortcomings cannot go unnoticed. Though agriculture accounts for 48.2 percent of the GNP (1964-65) and carries the burden of the nation’s foreign exchange earnings, yields remain among the lowest in the world. The average farm holding is a mere 6.8 acres which fact, coupled with the rapid increase in population (approximately 3 percent per annum), makes it difficult to be sanguine. Even with food production presently exceeding the population increase, prospects are not propitious. Furthermore, only a very small portion of Pakistan’s population has genuinely prospered.

Gustav Papanek’s reference to the “average” consumer whose lot was improved in the 1960’s is instructive. The “average” consumer represents a minute fraction of the people. Groups that did well are identified as civil servants, businessmen, landlords, and some peasants engaged in industial occupations.

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Agricultural workers are not in cluded. “Losers included the bulk of the population—families dependent on agriculture and particularly landless workers. They paid higher prices for manufactures, while agriculture prices remained relatively low.”₃

The agricultural story compares with and is related to advances in industrial development. Manufacturing accelerated during the Ayub decade. The way was eased for private investment. Liberal tax concessions were granted, and credit facilities were expanded through the establishment of the Industrial Development Bank and the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC). In general, the government permitted greater freedom of action by shifting from direct to indirect controls. As a consequence of the stress on industrialization and the apparent ease with which profits could be made, landlords, professionals, traders, civil servants, and retired military officers “increasingly clamored for permits that would let them in on an obviously good thing.”₅ Thus, as Papanek relates, the growing ranks of prestigious private industrial entrepreneurs was exceptionally rapid and, most important, the result of deliberate government policy during the Ayub ear.₆

The new industrialists included among their numbers members of Ayub’s immediate family. The President insisted there was nothing wrong in this but his critics could not be expected to remain silent. Resentment increased during the 1965 war with India when Ayub’s sons remained at their business posts while older retired officers were called up. Moreover, the relationship between government and business had altered drastically. “Businessmen and especially industrialists had become wealthier, more powerful and more sophisticated. Now that they owned newspapers and financed political groups, their support was increasingly valuable in political life.”₇ Intermarriages between leading industrial families and civil-service families become commonplace. Hence along with sizable increase in industrial capacity (an 8.6 percent rise in 1966-67) came a not unexpected reaction. The government-industrial relationship was a ready target for underpaid labor, the students, political dissidents, and lower middle-class income groups.

Pakistan was making significant gains all economic sectors, but precious little advange was filtering down to poor urban and rural people. Concentration of capital was justified on the grounds that profits were being plowed back into the economy,₈ but only twenty-four economic units controlled almost half of all private industrial assets. In addition, the resouces, experience, and contacts of the leading private families made them strong contenders for owndership when semi-governmental corporations put their plants on the open market. It is estimated that over two-thirds of the assets thus sold have been bought by the leading families.₉ This accumulation of wealth and power was naturally viewed with rising indignation.

Amid the squalor and wretched poverty of the Pakistani masses a new elite now flaunted its prowess and privileage. Judged to be in violation of Islamic principle, it was also politically unconscionable. Those who possessed wealth were perceived as having gotten it illegally. And Ayub Khan not only bore chief responsibility but was accused of filling his personal coffers. In contrast with the situation of the privileged few, the knowledge that industrial wages were stationary or declining, per capita income among the lowest in the world, food prices skyrocketing, and little being done to provide adequate urban housing, health, or welfare services exacerbated the situation.

Given the unchanging misery of the multitude of poor peasants, the decade of developement begins to look like something less than a statistical success. When Speaker of the Naitonal Assembly Jabbar Khan suggested that Ayub be given a life-presidency so that economic development might continue uninterrupted, more grist was provided for the mills of the discontented. It is not surprising to note, therefore, that the disturbances which eventually forced Ayub from office were precipitated by the government’s elaborate festivities saluting ten years of economic progress.

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It did not require a savant to recognize that the country was in deep trouble. Government propaganda could hardly be expected to placate those who did not share in the overly publicized economic revolution. As matters stood it was to prove extrmely abrasive.

The celebrations spread over a four-week period in October 1968. Estimated expenditures for the festivities are put at 150 million rupees ($30 million). The seeming interminable repetition of slogans and grandiloquent speeches were more than the dissident urban population, particularly the students, could toletate and toward the end of the month the disturbances began.

Onec the students expressed their displeasure, opposition politicians began holding public meetings to condemn the government for its lavish spending. The administration answered with the imposition of Section 144, making it unlawful to congregate in public places. But the politicians would not be silenced and actually were encouraged to press their criticism when the former chief of the Pakistani Air Force, Mohammad Asghar Khan, joined their growing ranks. The chorus of dissent reached a new pitch as members of the bar, journalists, teachers, doctors, and the knowledgeable urban lower middle class joined in.

When representatives of the ulema took up the tune it was only a matter of time before the factory workers chimed in. The student population stood in the vanguard, however, and it was not until their lines had been attacked and bloodied that the real rebellion got under way. The chant was deafening and in unison and it reverberated throughout West Pakistan : “Ayub Must Go!”

What followed was not very different from the disorder that overtook France some months before. Unlike de Gaulle, however, Ayub was ill equipped to cope with the situation and his political supporters began deserting him. Meanwhile, the civil service and the military questioned how long they could affort to bolster their unpopular leader. In de Gaulle’s case the political initiative remanined in his hands down to the loss of the May 1969 referendum. Ayub Khan, however, had to suffer the humiliation that comes with the collapse of personal prestige.

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THE AGARTALA CONSPIRACY

The regime’s weakness was demonstrated in the so-called Agartala Conspiracy. In December 1967 and January 1968 the government accused a number of East Pakistanis of a secessionist plot. In all, some forty-six persons were alleged to have been involved. Thirty-five were later formally charged and eleven pardoned when they promised to assist the prosecution. According to the government the plan involved an armed revolt with weapons supplied by India. Those detained were reported to have planned the establishment of an independent government with India’s protection and recogintion of a new state of East Bengal. The supply of arms supposedly had been discussed at Agartala across the East Pakistan frontier on July 12, 1967. Hence the designation given the conspiracy.

Apprehended were a number of nondescript Bengalis, mostly from the Pakistan Armed Forces. But the list of accused ded include three CSP officers, Navy Lieutenant Commander Moazzem Hussain, assigned to the Inland water Transit Administration (IWTA), and Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Of the CSP officers, one was K.M. Shamsur Rahman, the 1965 director of the Rural Academy at Comilla and a brother of a former Chief Minister of East Pakistan. Another was R.R. Quddus, who had been recently appointed vice principal at the Administrative Staff College. Ahmed Fazlur Rahman, who was reported on leave from duty since January 26, 1966, was the third CSP officer to be charged. The 1967 CSP Gradation List rated them 126, 98 and 94, respectively. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was already in

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prison, having been detained almost a year and a half before the allegations and arrests in this particular case. The appearance of Manzur Qadir, the President’s intimate associate, as a leading prosecution councel under lined Ayub’s intention to get a swift conviction. That he would be thwarted in this effort was not apparent when the trial got under way.

The government complaint read on June 19, 1968, specified how Army units in East Pakistan were to be paralyzed.10 The plan supposedly called for : (1) the enlisting of recruits; (2) securing arms; (3) creating civil disturbances; and (4) setting dates for the seizure of strategic points throughout the province. The conspiracy was said to have had its roots in September 1964 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman attended a meeting convened by Lieutenant Commader Moazzem Hussain. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was alleged to have agreed with the plans for organizing a revolutionary council and securing the necessary funds.

According to the government, at another meeting held in August 1965 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman obtained money from India which he gave to the conspirators. Afters Mujib’s arrests on May 6, 1966, the meeting continued in his absence and were attended by the First Secretary of the Indian High Commission, P.N. Ojha. Ojha was declared persona non grata and forced to leave the country when the administration moved against the alleged conspirators in January 1968. Upon hearing the charges, all the accused insisted on their innocence. In pleading not guilty Sheikh Mujibur Rahman noted that there certainly was a conspiracy underway, however. “It is a conspiracy against me,” he was reported as saying.

The Agartala trial was a severe test of the Ayub regime in East Pakistan. Involved in the proceedings was an all-out effort to discredit ans silence the man who at this date seemed to best typify Bengali sentiment. If the government could prove its case, Mujibur Rahman might well be written off as a leader of the political opposition in East Pakistan. But he had already spent five of the ten Ayub years in prison and had long ago earned his martyr’s status. The trial therefore could only reinforce his power and creditability. Mujib claimed a large following in the perennially dissatisfied eastern wing and his 1966 Six Point Program was a rallying ground for the disenchanted, just as the Twenty-one Point Program had been in 1953-54. In point of fact, the Twenty-One Point Program of the East Pakistan Awami League was the first to insist on regional autonomy (19th point) and all later opposition programs were merely shorter versoins of this seminal document. Hence the defense counsel’s assertion that Mujib and his co-defendants had been falsely charged in order “to sabotage the just demands of East Pakistan” was greeted with convinced enthusiasm.

Tension mounted in the province when the news was later circulated that prosecution witnesses had been brutally tortured and threatened with death if they did not testify in support of the government charges. As the trial dragged on through the fall and into the winter of 1969 it became apparent that the government’s case could not be substantiated. Despite the calling of 251 witnesses the state was unable to establish a winning case. Also, by this time East Pakistan was experiencing widespread student and labor disorder and West Pakistan was verging on anarchy. East and West Pakistan shared little in common, but their combined protests eroded the will of the regime to resist.

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THE RIOTS BEGIN

In West Pakistan the main issue was Ayub Khan. The principal thrust of the student demonstrators lay in dramatizing the tyranny of the Ayub regime. Repressive government tactics bore out the general complaint that the country’s youth was being punished in order to protect a privileged elite. While the public was being asked to be patient, to practice austerity, and generally sacrifice for national

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development, a prosperous minotity was free to stuff their larders. To correct this situation Ayub had to be unseated.

In East Pakistan the issues could not be reduced to an attack on Ayub Khan, however. There, the “great leader” mentality was practically nonexistent, and social issues overshadowed the actions of individual personalities. Believing that they had been systematically deprived of their birthright the East Pakistanis demanded nothing less than a new political system. No government after Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s death in 1948 could be said to have represented their interests. Their abject poverty, the superior attitude of the West Pakistanis, the failure to provide economic and military parity, and the continuing political dominance of the West wing gave credence to Mujib’s demands and also explains their over-all support.

When Ayub uner pressure declared on February 21, 1969, that the would retire after the expiration of his term, the East Bengali response was predictable. Ayub’s withdrawal was merely one step to a larger end. Hence the increased fury and frequency of the disturbances. It can be generalized that West wing politicians were reasonably content with Ayub’s announcement, but for the Bengalis the battle had only been joined. Now was the moment to insist on a new political arrangement, or so it seemed at the time. There appeared to be little sense in replacing Ayub with another personality so long as the East Pakistan—West Pakistan relationship remained unaltered.

Several days prior to the President’s announced retirement plans the authorities shot and killed one of the defendants in the Agartala Conspiracy trial. It was alleged that he tried to escape from custody. His funral on the following day precipitated a clash with the police which quickly escalated into large-scale rioting, arson, and looting. Residences of government ministers and administration buildings were beseiged. Ironically, the mayhem reached a pitch of intensity on the eve of the President’s proclamation bringing an end to the state of emergency that had been in force since the opening hours of the India-Pakistan War in September 1965. The formal end of the emergency brought the suspension of the Defence of Pakistan Rules which had been used to justify the imprisonment of hundreds of political dissidents.

Ayub was now forced to meet with the politicians. No longer in effective control, the President extended invitations to his opponents and requested that they meet with him in a round-table conference in Rawalpindi. The Agartala Conspiracy trial was ordered closed and the accused released. Mujibur Rahman and his followers had been vindicated and Ayub unceremoniously humiliated. Moreover, Ayub’s ever-diminishing power was now apparent. Government administrators now began looking for neutral ground and more and more disassociated themselves from Ayub’s policies. In this situation the opposition politicians were not to be stampeded into accepting the President’s invitation. The Agartala fiasco symbolized Ayub’s weakness. Now the politicians insisted that before agreeing to talk, the presidential system had to be scrapped and a new parliamentary and federal structure substituted for it.

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THE BHUTTO CHALLENGE

In February 1968 Ayub was felled by an attack of virus pneumonia which was later complicated by a blood clot on the lung. His physical disability coming on the heels of the Agartala incident produced the first genuine signs of instability. The President took a long time recuperating form his illness, and rumors circulated suggesting he had suffered a stroke and was partially paralyzed. His extended period of seclusion naturally led many to believe he would be unable to perform the tasks of the presidency and thus would be forced to name a successor. Unlike the civil service, whose over-all raction could be

45

described as guarded but hopeful that Ayub would resume his normal functions, political leaders thought otherwise.

Three months passed before the President could hold a cabinet meeting. His first public appearance did not come until mid-April when he greeted the Soviet Union’s Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin. Although appearing to be in good health there signs that his extended illness had taken a toll of his stamina. Some reports stated he had already decided not to seek another term and would eventually step aside for a younger, more durable personality. But he had also indicated that he could not trust Pakistan’s future to Bhutto or Mujibur Rahman. But if not these figures, who from among the country’s civilian leaders would be acceptable? At this point both advertised and unadvertised aspirants began jockeying for position.

Bhutto clearly did not count himself out of the running. Bhutto had left the President’s cabinet a disillusioned young man. Initially he maintained strict silence. Later, however, he voiced his opinion on he thought it could be revitalized only if a “Forward Bloc” were created within the organization. The Bloc would comprise thos individuals possessing revolutionary ideas and willing to initiate unorthodox programs. The “Forward Bloc” was not a new device in subcontinent politics. Usually employed by disenchanted elements within the dominant party it historically heralds the breaking away from the parent organization. Such was the case with Subhas Chandra Bose and the Congress Party in the period immediately following India’s involvement in World War II. Bhutto, like Bose earlier, insisted on a more radical course in the government’s policies. His call for a “Forward Bloc” was nothing less than an attack upon President Ayub, however. Although first insisting that he stood with his old leader, he later changed his position and remarked that it was only Ayub’s Election Manifesto (which he very likely had helped to draft) and the welfare state idea that the really supported.

In a visit to East Pakistan in November 1966 Bhutto had openly attacked Ayub’s policies and expressed his support of the Six Point Program of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Only a few months before, as Foreign Minister, the same Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had condemned Mujib and volunteered to debate the Six Point Program with him. But soon after throwing this challenge, Bhutto excused himself saying he had more pressing matters to attened to. Now, however, he was no longer a member of the President’s cabinet. Bhutto thus publicly defied Ayub by coming out in support of a program which the President had labeled parochial, divisive, and aimed at the destruction of Pakistan. Returning to West Pakistan Bhutto declared he would reserve the option to join another party or form a new one if the Muslim League failed to fulfill its pledge to the people. He noted, however, that there was still scope for a “Forward Bloc”.

On December 10, Malik Khuda Bakhsh Bucha, then president of the West Pakistan Muslim League took note of Bhutto’s demand. (Bucha was soon to be replaced as president of the West Pakistan Muslim League by Ahmad Said Kirmani, a lawyer and newly appointed Minister in Governor Mohammad Musa’s West Pakistan government.) The Pakistan Times (December 11, 1966) recorded Bucha as declaring emphatically that “there was no place for any ‘forward’or ‘backward’ bloc in the Muslim League.” Taking cognizance of Bhutto’s defection, Bucha said that “fissiparous tendencies in the Muslim League were noticeable at certain places” and they had the effect of dissipating party vigor and strength. He called upon the discontented to close ranks and offered his good offices in an effort to resolve outstanding differences. The party could not be dominated by any particular individual or group of personalities. Moreover, the Muslim League, said Bucha, refused to engage in political slogneering. “Gone are the days when a political party was meant only for electioneering and seeking votes.” Now the most urgent political work involved the social and economic betterment of the people. Bhutto was put on his guard. Either accept the view that the Muslim League party was an instrument for mobilizing the masses for development work or quit the organization.

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In the spring of 1967 Bhutto toured West Pakistan speaking out against the government on both domestic and international matters.It is interesting to note that a number of EBDO’ed politicians celebrated the termination of their restrictions at a lavish dinner in Karachi’s Hotel International on the evening of December 31, 1966. Although Bhutto was in the dining room, few of the politicians felt it wise to spend too much time at his table. While he failed in his attempt to form a Forward Bloc within the Pakistan Muslim League, Bhutto was not prevented from organizing his People’s Party, however. Prior to this event in July 1967, the government sought to discredit him by publishing documents which purported to show that the former Foreign Minister considered himself a citizen of India at least up to the year 1958. As has already been noted, the Bhutto family at one time possessed land which after partition was located in India. Bhutto, like so many other Pakistanis, registered applications with the Indian Government in connection with the eventual restitution of this property. The legal transactions were handled through the office of the Custodian of Evacuee Property. In this proceeding, however, it was alleged that Bhutto declared he had always been an Indian citizen. Moreover, it was only in 1958 after he became Ayub’s Minister of Commerce that he filed a petition with the Supreme Court of India withdrawing his appeal against the Custodian’s decision.

The question of Bhutto’s citizenship became a heated issue and the opposition asked why, if this information was known in 1965, Bhutto had been allowed to remain in office for still another year. To this the sponded that the details were not clearly known at that time. When prodded by the opposition to debate the matter with Bhutto personally, and also to agree to the holding of an inquiry into the antecedents of other ministers, Shahabuddin backed away.

Bhutto later denied the principal allegation, but admitted he had traveled to the United States on an Indian passport in 1947. He added that a Pakistani passport was issued to him in Karachi on July 12, 1949. Bhutto also verified he had laid claim to ancestral holdings in India. He emphatically rejected the allegation that he did so as an Indian citizen, however. Furthermore, he reported, the Pakistan Government had been kept informed of the negotiations. Late, under advice from his lawyer, he withdraw his case altogether.

The entire affair was reminiscent of the Suhrawardy episode in 1947—48. Suhrawardy, the last Chief Minister of Undivided Bengal and a loyal Muslim League, had been elected to Pakistan’s First Constituent Assembly only to be denied his seat on the grounds that he was still an Indian citizen. In later years Suhrawardy developed a formidable opposition party, the Awami League, and eventually succeeded in challenging and defeating his former Muslim League colleagues. The tactics to deny Suhrawardy a place in Pakistan’s political structure backfired, and it was doubtful that they could succeed in Bhutto’s case. All that was gained was the heightened opprobrium of the attentive public for those in authority.

It was three months after Bhutto’s exchange with the administration that he chose to create his People’s Party. With a political organization in tow Bhutto began looking for recruits over and above his eager student supporters. At a press conference in Karachi in October 1967 he said he intended to develop a program which would look like a socialist manifesto. Its main plank would be the nationalization of banks, in surance companies, heavy industry, and all public utilities. In the field of foreign policy Bhutto said his party would be independent and hence could insist on Pakistan’s withdrawal from both SEATO and CENTO. Moreover, closer links would be forged with Afro-Asia, but espacially with other Muslim states.

According to Bhutto, none of the existing opposition parties measured up to his criteria in leadership or programs. With elections scheduled for late 1969 and early 1970 there was little time to get his new organization in high gear, but he expected students and professionals to assist him in cultivating the opposition. With the divisions in the Awami League and Natioanl Awami Party, the inability of Mian

47

Mumtaz Daultana to increase the membership of the Council Muslim League, or Choudhri Mohammad Ali’s Nizam-i-Islam to influence the peasants, only the Jamaat-i-Islami of Maulana Maudoodi presented and organized front. Unfortunately, however, the latter’s program had little appeal for the Pakistani masses. Even the Pakistan Democratic Movement compromising the Council Muslim League, Jamaat-i-Islami, Awami League, and Nizam-i-Islam had goals which in Bhutto’s estimation were far too limited.

Even were these diverse parties capable of working together for a time, their basic differences would impede the building of a coherent political base. And without a stable foundation the restructuring of Pakistani society was impossible. Hence Bhutto’s decision to go ahead with an entirely new party and his determination to face Ayub at the ballot box.

Bhutto’s challenge could not be taken lightly. In an oblique reference to the former Foreign Minister, Central Communications Minister Khan A. Sobur rejected Bhutto’s call for a socialist state. According to Sobur, socialism had failed to develop India and it was unrealistic to assume it could work in Pakistan. Nothing that Bhutto had a fertile mind and intimating he was a charlatan and opportunist, he reminded his East Pakistani brethren that this was the same man who had condemned the Six Point Program, suggested that Pakistan should be a one-party state, and assisted in making operational the 1962 Constitution. Over and again, Ayub, his cabinet ministers, and party officials reminded their listeners that dissidents like Bhutto concealed nefarious motives and that such men preached the cult of parochialism, provincialism, and division and were to be rejected lest the country be torn apart. Interestingly, the localisms to which Bhutto and others like him appealed were not considered dangerous by the public, and the more the government sought to undermine their attractiveness the greater their strength grew.

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CRITICISM AND COUNTER-CRITICISM

In an effort to sidetrack government criticism the presient of the West Pakiatan Democratic Movement (PDM), K.M. Safdar, declared that the opposition would never contemplate dismembering Pakistan. The key to the PDM’s eight-point program was the restoration of the 1956 Constitution. The PDM supported the integration of East and West Pakistan and recognized the necessity for a strong center, but felt that the Central Government must be more representative of the country’s diversity and that this was only possible within a federal framework and under a parliamentary system. While not joining the PDM, Bhutto voiced virtually indentical views. He held that the government could not be stripped of all but its defense and foreign affairs functions as Mujibur Rahman had proposed. He did not hesitate to add that the Central Government needed the power to deal with emergencices. But apart from answering government critics, these responses also demonstrated the gap still separating the various opposition groups.

For all intents and purposes the opposition remained neutralized. With the exception of the Agartala trial the Ayub administration, even with the added problem of the President’s illness, seemed to be in no special danger. In the autumn, however, the celebrations marking the development decade commenced. What were only rumblings in the distance now merged into a tumultuous crescendo. The government was celebrating its own, not the country’s good fortune. The enormous sum of money spent for propaganda aroused the student who represented national opinion; there being no other outlet for their emotions, they look to the streets.

A report of the Pakistan Planning Commission cited in The New York Times on December 1, 1968, provided additional fuel for the alienated and frustrated young people. Despite the claims of foreign

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and domestic experts, economic development was not judged co-equal with social change. A salient if understated comment on the report read as follows : “The conflict between economic dynamism and social justice had become fairly sharp.” In Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi one could observe all the symbols of new wealth—new cars, luxury hotels, and ostentations housing for the privileged few. But for the impoverished multitudes and the unrewarded lower middle class there was only envy and bitterness. Although industrial production had risen by approximately 160 percent in eight years, the laboring class had yet to realize any significant advantage.

Similarly advances in agricultural production were confined to those with sizable holdings in West Pakistan. The 23 percent jump in grain production in 1968 did not in any way benefit the peasant masses. Government projectionsw aimed at a 7 percent increase in economic growth. At the same time, revenues allocated for the Armed Forces were estimated in excess of two and a half billion rupees ($500 million). With such an expenditure the material life of the masses could not be improved and educational and welfare services remained static.

The larger question raised by the Commission study involved the posibility of deliberately slowing down economic growth. Only then, it was felt, could the human dilemma be tackled. The contention that statistical grwoth was not enough was also the main argument of Ayub’s antagonists. Now that a respected agency of the higher bureaucracy found itself in agreement and suggested reevaluating government priorities, the opposition could not be expected to reduce their attack.

Student rioting increased in tempo, and the toll on human life and property escalated accordingly. Ayub pleaded again and again for calm and restraint. His words fell on deaf ears, however. On November 10, 1968, while Ayub was waiting to address a Peshawar meeting a young man standing approximately thirty yards from the speaker’s platform fired several shots in the direction of the President but missed his mark. The assailant was seized on the spot and Ayub proceeded to make his appeal for order, but his young countrymen were in no mood to listen.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto shared responsibility for the student disorders. Not only had he refused to aid the government in restoring law and order, but he had urged his young supporters to continue the fight until Ayub was forced from office. His standard reply to those wanting an end to the turbulence was “How can I do that when they are fighting against him. He had been unsuccessful in uniting the political factions opposing Ayub and in the present anomic situation a stint in jail might provide him with needed leverage. What the government lost in the way of prestige, Bhutto gained. Furthermore, the greater the degree of repression the larger the confirmation that the struggle was one in which good was pitted against evil.

Nonetheless, arrests multiplited. By November 15th some forty-five politicians were incarcerated. Unlike 1966, those seized represented Pakistan’s leftist parties, particularly the People’s Party and the National Awami Party. According to the government these groups pursued policies detrimental to the unity of the country. The NAP, for example, had resurrected its old demand that West Pakistan be broken up into its pre-1955 administrative units. With many of the prominent politicians in government custody a new personality now entered the arena.

On November 17, 1968, the former chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Air Marshal Mohammad Asghar Khan, announced he would actively campaign for the support of the political opposition. Charging the Ayub regime with corruption, nepotism, graft, and administrative incompetence the airman said he would began a nation-wide tour “to mobilize public opinion for the solution of problems facing the country.” Although long in retirement, even though only forty-nine, Asgahar Khan was the highest ranking military officer ever to come out in opposition to the President.

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Asgahar condemned the suppression of press and speech freedoms generally. And he noted that the administration could remain in power only so long as it enjoyed the capacity to coerce. Obliquely he called upon his brother officers to recognize the plight of the country, the unpopularity of Ayub Khan and the need for them to remain neutral in this propitious moment. There could be no mistaking his strategy. In the circumstances, Ayub could not govern without the direct support of the military.

With Asghar Khan in the field, the student ranks were swelled by other groups previously uncommitted but sympathetic. The jailing of political leaders was a last desperate act of a quickly declining administration. Pakistan’s multi-party political system a an amorphous congeries. Although the organizations have identifiable leaders they have always operated on a more or less headless basis. Hence the detention of the leaders did more to accelerate the movement than slow it down. Rebellious youth was in no need of leadership, for its objective was the destruction of the old system. What would follow did not seem to matter. With the national figures removed from the scene the crowds became more, not less, truculent.

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THE POLITICAL DEMISE OF AYUB KHAN

In the agony of a country no longer governable it is impossible to distinguish the guilt from the innocent. They usually perish together. Throughout Pakistan property lay in ruins and the semblance of civilized order was rapidly deteriorating. The rampaging throngs were unrelenting, however. While the Pakistan Democratic Movement was considering a boycott of the 1969-70 elections in order to dramatize their dissatisfaction with the government’s repressive tactics, Pakistani society appeared to be coming apart. No one controlled them. Hence no one could really speak for them either. The explosive fury of the people had reached a point of spontaneous destruction.

Some preferred to interpret the chaos in a favorable light; the country was passing through a catharsis; after the storm a new beginning could be anticipated. It is possible that this view was what compelled S.M. Murshed, a former Chief Justice of the East Pakistan Supreme Court, to enter the political scene. East Pakistan needed political representation in this uncertain period. Murshed reflected the pious belief that the prevailing anarchy would somehow cleanse Pakistani society. Pontificatingly he declared that the time was at hand for the creation of “a truly advanced society.”₁₁ Political amateurs like Asghar Khan and Murshed kept opposition hopes alive, but like their predecessors they refused to come to grips with the realisties of the nations life-style.

Ayub made some low-key attempts to put his house in order. Early in December he offered the olive branch to the rampaging students. Major concessions were announced in an effort to redress grievances of long-standing. A seven-year-old ordinance which permitted the government to withdraw college degrees from students engaged in actions determined to be anti-administration was repealed. Minimal qualification grades were lowered and students in the lowest academic ranking were to be given another chance to improve their standing. At the same time, Ayub defended the government’s prerogative to arrest anyone performing an unlawful act. This, he reiterated, meant politicians who directly or indirectly inflame public passions. In reference to the accusations that his regime was corrupt and undemocratic, he called the former “an incurable disease” and said the latter charge was completely unfounded. “Political parties are free to present their programs to the people. There is only one condition : these political differences should not assume the shape of lawlessness, violence, force and terrorism.”₁₂

Ayub’s sense of frustration was at its peak. He was convinced that Pakistan had made considerable progress during his ten years in office, and it was impossible for him to understand the depth of popular dissatisfaction.

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If in the face of evidence anyone shuts his eyes and says that he sees no progress at all; that no development has taken place; that, in fact, conditions are worsening, then there is no cure for the malady.₁₈ Ayub pulled out all the stops. He made references to the external threat and how Pakistan’s enemies can make capital of Pakistan’s disunity. But he was unconvincing. Even the President’s defiant response that he would not stand idly by and watch the efforts of the last ten years destroyed sounded hollow.

In December the demonstrations which at first were confined to West Pakistan spread to the eastern province.  Precipitated to an extent by the appearance of Asghar Khan, they were soon exploited by NAP and NDF members. Speaking in Dacca’s central mosque Asgahr Khan called upon Ayub to resign and his audience responded with wild cries of “Down with Ayub.” But the East Pakistani politicians did not want Asghar Khan leading their movement. This was clear from the outset. Neither he nor Bhutto were acceptable substitutes for Ayub Khan. They shared a common determination but the relationship was ephemeral. After all, Asghar Khan was a West Pakistani and a military figure. These were both attributes that the East Pakistanis had to weigh with dissident groups within the bureaucracy and Armed Forces, and this was to their advantage, but too much success could undermine East Pakistan’s seperate goals. Certainly it would make it less possible for Bengalis like Nurul Amin, S.M. Murshed, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to compete for high office. Thus the decision was made to take advantage of but not directly support Asghar Khan’s campaign.

Ayub was in East Pakistan at this time. He seldom ventured forth from Government House, however, and there were rumors that he we seriously contemplating retirement. Hid problem essentially revolved about the choice of a successor. Ayub trusted no one in the opposition camp. All, he concluded, would sabotage his ten-year effort at the first opportunity. Furthermore, his contempt for the politicians was undiminished. Their activities in the last few months confirmed his worst fears concerning their destructive propensities. The more he pondered the consequences of his retirement the more his mind turned toward a military solution.

The violence that erupted in West Pakistan in late October continued into 1969. In mid-January it spread and intensified. Student demonstrations resulted in numerous deaths in Dacca and a general strike paralyzed the city. Angary young people dominated the streets; their battle cry demanded Ayub’s resignation. In the tumult newspaper offices belonging to the government’s National Press Trust were burned, government installtions were attacked, and the National Assembly (which was in session at the time) was surrounded. In Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Chittagong, and elsewhere the story was the same. Crowds were running excitedly through the streets, taunting, burning, and looting. Effigies of Ayub were burned in dozens of places in both wings of the country. The fires that blazed in the battered cities and towns were often fed by gleeful students who took special delight in destroying the President’s newly published autobiography, Friends Not Masters.

Curfews were imposed in the major metropolitan areas in an effort to stem the rising tide of death and destruction. But to no avail. By this time law enforcement was on the verge of collapsing. The administrators and police sensed that the government had lost control of the situation and they began retreating from the scene of the disorders in a desperate effort to preserve themselves. In some ways the failure of local officials to face up to their responsibilities resembled the situation immediately preceding and following independence. Then the bureaucrats and police deserted their posts, leaving the vengeful mobs unrestrained. The result was incredible carnage. Although the magnitude of this latest series of riots was on a decidedly lower scale the pattern was familiar and the end was not yet in sight.

President Ayub dispatched his personal confidant and adviser, Fida Hasan, to East Pakistan to investigate the continuing strife. He was also charge with the futile task of trying to rally the demoralized

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and belegauered civil and police services. A career officer, it was thought he could inspire the adminstrators and possibly help in restoring their confidence. Fida Hasan explained that the President had decided to make new concession, the reforms to be in keeping with the demands of the rebellious public. But the situation was beyond recall. Rebellion, not reform, was the order of the day. Disillusioned government officers found theselves sympathizing with the opposition. Asghar Khan reflected their position when he declared : “In his person, President Ayub Khan rightly or wrongly symbolizes in the eyes of the people all that is evil in our society.” Nothing less than Ayub’s total surrender could possibly restore even a modicum of trnaquility.

Toward the end of January elements of the Pakistan Army moved into Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Dacca and Khulna—scenes of the more serious disturbances. More newspaper offices had been damaged and foreign installations assaulted. The authorities by this time had arrested thousands of individuals. And while no accurate figure could be given for the number of dead, the estimated toll ranged in the hundreds. The mobs had turned on Ayub’s supporters with the Muslim League offices being prime targets. A number of party workers were slain and others seriously wounded. Thus virtual marital law was put into effect in the heavily populated regions. Not since October 1958 had the military been asked to pacify so many areas at the same time.

With the rioting unabated the opposition organized an ad hoc coalition called the Democratic Action Committee, comprising eight parties. The DAC quickly drated a program of joint demands and presented them to President Ayub. Only Mujibur Rahman’s East Pakistan Awami League and the NAP declined to cooperate with DAC, but even these parties did not disagree with the purpose of the program. Above all, the DAC insisted on the restitution of the federal parliamentary system and direct adult franchise. Under pressure from his advisers Ayub agreed, if reluctantly, to examine the Committee’s proposals. His reply, however, was indirect and came in the form of an editorial in The Pakistan Times. In it Ayub said he was willing to meet with the politicians but hedged where the specific proposals were concerned. Pakistan required a stable political system and to Ayub Khan anything less than a strong presidency would mean anarchy, not democracy. The DAC had no need to compromise, however. They had already announced publicly that their demands were on-negotiable. Hence the President’s apparent willingness to duscuss “constitutional issues” was interpreted as a tactic to buy time and possibly get the oppsition leaders to reduce the level of hostility. But they certainly had no intention of playing into Ayub’s hands and repeated their all-or-nothing proposals.

The newfound semi-unity and determination of the oppsition paid quick dividends. In another broadcast to the nation on February 1st, Ayub stated he would put aside his “personal pride” and meet with his political detractors on their terms. He said : “I have on previous occasions expressed my views on amending the constitution. The constitution is not the word of God. It can be changed.” Commending on the necessity of holding constitutions with the representatives of “responsible political parties” he added : “We shall have no hesitation in agreeing to any settlement that is arrived at through mutual discussions.” A letter sent to Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, convenor of the DAC, at the same time invited all political leaders to a meeting to be held in Rawalpindi on February 17th. The tone of this letter was in sharp contrast to Ayub’s earlier remarks condemning the same individuals for their antisocial and antistate activities. Now, he acknowledged, he would be “stay in Rawalpindi as my guests during the conference.” The mighty had indeed fallen!

As a precondition for the talks the opposition now insisted that the state of emergency be lifted and all political leaders released from custody. This was necessary in order to clear the atmosphere, to make it more conducive to what expected to be hard bargaining. At this point Ayub again pulled up short. He was convinced that many of those detained were guilt of criminal acts. In disgust the exclaimed : “How can you release them in a hurry?” But there was also little reason to believe he could long refuse to

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satisfy these demands.

With the invitations extended, Ayub flew to East Pakistan for a meeting of his Muslim League party. Seeking to restore confidence and calm the fears of the membership he said he would not remove himself from the political wars—and thus allowed himself to be reelected for another term as president of the organization. It was a last symbolic gesture at maintaining the solidarity of his political following and it appeared to be ample proof that he had not yet decided to step down. Many Muslim Leaguers were unimpressed with Ayub’s performance, however. Defections mounted with each new disturbance. In the absence of bureaucartic and military support Ayub’s politicians could only think of running. The situation was now critical.

On February 18th the Ayub government capitulated and lifted the three-year-old state of emergency. The announcement came one hour before Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was scheduled to begin a hunger strike in protest against the same regulation. With the termination of the emergency, a ludicrous act in view of the turmoil that was opening society at the seams, Bhutto and other political detainees were set free. It was hoped these leaders, expecially Bhutto, would now take advantage to the President’s invitation for a round-table conference.

But even these developments did not end the civil disobedience. The Hyderabad bazaar was set afire, demonstrators were tear-gassed and beaten in Lahore, and Karachi was a virtual no man’s land. In East Pakistan two more newspapers were put to the torch and labor strife began in earnest. Business and public transportation were at a standstill in both provinces and total paralysis was beginning to set in. The period was one of uncontrolled passion. Bhutto’s return to the political arena spurred his supporters to expand their activities. Thousands assembled in Larkana to celebrate their leader’s freedom and vindication. Some days later, while riding in a triumphal motorcade through Karachi, Bhutto was implored not the negotiate the President. When elements loyal to the government tried to disrupt the festivities a melee followed. Undaunted, Bhutto preceeded to the Jinnah Tomb where he made another of his emotionally charged speeches. If the President thought Bhutto would sit down and discuss their differences he was badly misinformed. The former Foreign Minister made it clear be would bot accommodate his once-revered leader.

In Lahore Bhutto’s wife led one of the two large processions which again reminded the politicians that they should not be trapped into talking with Ayub. All the while the President remained secheduled in his residence in Rawalpindi awaiting an official response from the DAC. When it finally came it was decidedly less than what he had hoped for. The DAC, with some members pushing for and others opposing the conference, was forced to compromise. It was finally agreed that only Nasrullah Khan would attened. As for Bhutto, he and six other opposition leaders declared they wanted no part of any negotiations and would boycott the talks. Bhutto was quoted as saying Ayub could not be trusted. He was playing “a yes-and-no game, a cat-and-mouse game.” Bhutto refused to give the President the satisfaction of having outfoxed his antagonists. Nothing was to be done which would enable Ayub to regain his respectability. Ayub was still a power to be reckoned with, and only by sustaining social turmoil would the opposition politicians be in a position to loosen his grip.

Bhutto knew exactly what he wanted. Once committed to demolishing Ayub he could not relent. Reforms were totally unacceptable. In this he shared a common bond with the demonstrators who had already gone beyond the point of no return.

On February 12st the first significant impact of the disturbances rolled over a dazed Pakistan nation. Ayub Khan dramatically and without prior warning spoke to his disenchanted and frightened people. In a calm voice but betrying anguish he declared : “I shall not be a candidate in the next election.

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This decision is final and irrevocable.” But he obviously was not yet about to bow out of the picture. Again the Presindent was attempting to buy time. Alluding to the reluctance of the opposition to accept his invitation for a round-table conference, he offered the thought that “I shall have only one course open to me and that will be to place before you my contitutional proposals…. . As required by the Constitution these proposals would then go to the National Assembly for approval.” He concluded his speech with a flourish, exclaiming “offices and power are things transient. Pakistan will hold hold for ever.”

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THE OPPOSION REORGANIZES

The President’s decision to retire with the expiration of his term in January 1970 galvanized the opposition into feverish activity. It was now agreed that nothing would be lost by meeting with Ayub. Not only had the President agreed to step aside in the forthcoming elections but he had also ordered the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the other defendants in the Agartala trial. The release of Mujib added another dimension to the political confusion, however. While the rioting in the streets continuned, the leading politicians scurried around trying to shore up their ruptured organizations. None among them commanded a national following. Each suspected the other of deviousness. Hence an acceptable replacement for Ayub would not be a simple matter.

Nasrullah Khan was a colorless personality with minimum support in West Pakistan and none in East Bengal. Daultana, Choudhri Mohammad Ali, and Maulana Maudoodi though different had something in common. Each had passed that moment in time when they could have commanded a wide following. None were acceptable to the Bengalis. While Bhutto and Asghar Khan attracted much public attention, and perhaps were instrumental in forcing Ayub to retire, their capacity for leading a coalition government was questionable. Among the East Pakistani politicians, Bhashani was too old and certainly too radical for the more orthodox leaders. This left only Mujibur Rahman, and his protestating down through the years made his name anathema in many circles. To say that Ayub had filled and was now about to leave a political vacuum heightens the emphasis given to vice-regal politics in Pakistan. It also explains why the military-bureaucractic nexus successded in prepetuating itslf. And why this arragement usually proves acceptable to the Pakistani people.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s first public address upon being released emphasized East Pakistan’s desire for proportionate representation and genuine autonomy. There was no question but that most articulate East Pakistanis felt this was the ideal moment to press their major objectives. There is also little doubt that this is exactly what the rioting students and workers wanted their leaders to do. Ayub’s power may have eroded but there was still no indication that West Pakistani’s hold on East Bengal had weakened. If East Pakistan tempered its demands West Pakistan would refuse to make concessions. The Bengalis wanted one of their own to succeed Ayub. Hence the new importance given Mujib’s possible candidacy.

The postponed rount-table talks were finally held in Rawalpindi toward the end of February. After four days of deliberation Ayub capitulated and agreed to dispense with the indirect elections (the electoral college of Basic Democrats). Direct election based on universal franchise was to be written into law and put into practice in the forthcoming campaign. Moreover, the presidential system would be modified and the parliamentary institution resurrected. Mujibur Rahman expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome of the talks, however. The question of autonomy for East Pakistan remained unanswered. Furthermore, the new federal structure failed to spell out the fate of the One Unit. Was West Pakistan to remain a single administrative province or was it to be divided into its pre-1955 components? Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made it clear where he stood while the West Pakistani leadership vacillated. As a result Mujib announced he was removing his party from the DAC and made another of his celebrated

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withdrawals.

Asghar Khan was reasonably satisfied with the decisions taken at the meeting and sensing that the moment had arrived to become actively committed to the political struggles revealed that he would create a new political organization which would be “truly national in character.” It would be called the Justice Party.

Bhutto had boycotted the talks. When they were terminated he lost no time in registering his displeasure. Apparently in an effort to woo the East Pakistanis he called upon Ayub to submit his resignation and allow for the immediate formation of a National Caretaker Government. The Caretaker Government would arrange to hold the elections and also guide the elected representatives in the drafting of a new constitution. As he envisioned the new political system, East Pakistan would be given its autonomy within a federal structure. The federal structure, he noted, would also necessitate relative autonomy for the newly rconstituted provinces of Sind, Baluchistan, the North West Frontier, and the Punjab. Bhutto’s plan reserved a place for an elected President but, given the emphasis on federalism and parliamentary government, executive authority had to be shared. The Prime Minister would be responsible to the parliamant but must be an East Pakistani if the the President was from the west, or vice versa. The central legislature would be bicameral with each province having the same numbef of representatives in the upper chamber. The lower house, it was assumed, would be organized on the basis of population. Although the Bhutto plan refleted the objectives sought by East Pakistanis in the period 1947-56 it was greeted with considerable suspicion. In West Pakistan there was apprehensive.

Maulana Bhashani also absented himself from the Rawalpindi discussions. He indicated relative satisfaction but cautioned that “political freedom is meaningless without economic independence.” The NAP still wanted an end to alliance commitments and the nationalization of all private business, both foreign and domestic. Islamic socialism was to be insisted upon; the demand was non-negotiable. No compromise was possible.

As for Ayub, after years of toil he was now being forced to dismantle his once proud and seemingly impregnable edifice. The only solace Ayub received was in the comments of Nasrullah Khan and Choudhri Mohammad Ali. The President was cited for his “courageous and realistic” decisions. The latter declared : “History would record the height of the statesmanship Mr. Ayub Khan has shown.”

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THE MILITARY SOLUTION

Ayub had concealed his distress in his public remarks. While accepting direct adult suffrage he brooded over the future design of the federal system. As in 1958, he feared East Pakistani secessionist tendencies and he worried about the influence of the new movement to dismember West Pakistan. Whereas he was reconciled to removing himself from the political contest, he did not want Churchill-like to preside over the dissolution of the Pakistan nation. Soon after the conference adjourned Ayub called his advisors together. Spelling out his misgivings he urged the imposition of martial law. While there was general agreement in the military high command that drastic action was in order lest East Pakistan become another Biafra, decisive steps were possible only if the generals were not hobbled by an unpopular and repudiated leader. Just as Iskander Mirza got in Ayub’s way in 1958, so Ayub was an obstacle now.

Ayub was left with two bitter alternatives : (1) remain and observe his erstwhile enemies fight over the carcass of his defunct system, or (2) resign and give the military a free hand. Only the latter

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option promised a return to stable rule. It was also the only way to provide for continuity and preserve a semblance of the old order. Enervated and disillusioned, Ayub opted for the latter alternative, but even at this moment hesitated to commit himself.

The Democratic Action Committee was dissolved with the conclusion of the round-table conference. Nasrullah Khan, Nurul Amin, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Choudhri Mohammad Ali, Maulana Maudoodi, Khwaja Khairuddin, and Hamidul Huq Chowdhury met with the President before returning to their homes. Representing the moderates and determined to bring peac to their ruptured country they believed Ayub when he told them every effort would be made to hold the elections on schedule. Ayub noted that once the new parliament had been organized the remaining outstanding demands could be thrashed out. While these politicians appeared satisfied with the President’s assurance they were apprehensive over the intransigence shown by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bhutto, and Bhashani. The situation in East Pakistan was deteriorating steadily and none of these politicos seemed concerned with the consequences. The moderate politicians wanted to consolidate their newfound gains and this meant restoring the social order. If they did not concentrate on the latter they knew the military would have to. But the extremists were blinded by their success and their attitude remained defiant.

The All-Pakistan Student Action Committee meeting in Dacca endorsed a demand calling for a general strike. Maulana Bhashani announced the would convene a convention of his party on March 30th. He explained that the President’s declaration was insufficient and the peasants and workers of the Krishak Samity should be afforded the opportunity to express their views concerning the future course of action. In the meantime, Mujibur Rahman, who would listen to no one (including Bhutto and Asghar Khan), presented his own draft of constitution reforms to Ayub. In it he was alleged to have rejected any form of incrementalism. Thus East Pakistani affairs were in sharp contrast with those of West Pakistan. In the latter the turbulence had subsided appreciably. In the former the storm continued to rage.

All of West Pakistan was the enemy of the eastern province. “Awake Bengal, Arise Bengal” became a war cry. Ayub’s collapse, it was hoped, heralded the end of West Pakistan domination. In the districts of Dinajpur, Dacca, Mymensingh, and Bogra the the police were in retreat. And as the law enforcement agency crumbled Ayub’s supporters were exposed to the fury of the mob. A miniature civil only guessed at. Doubtless, the extent of the carnage will never be known, but no one could deny that indiscriminate killing had occurred.

On March 21st in a surprise maneuver Ayub replaced General Musa with Yusuf Haroon as Governor of West Pakistan. Almost simultaneously he selected M.N. Huda to succeed Monem Khan, who fled to the more friendly confines of Rawalpindi. Haroon, a leading industrialist and Huda, a professor of economics and East Pakistan Minister of Finance, represented different philosophies and backgrounds and in a more settled time might have made successful administrators in their respective provinces. In the present circumstances, however, neither had a chance—nor were they to be given one. Their selection at this late hour merely stands as evidence of Ayub’s desire to cline to power.

East Pakistan was now in chaos. Train service in Chittagong, Khulna, Mymensingh, and Dacca districts was suspended as a result of a continuing strike. Student delegations beseiged the provincial government with demands. Gazetted and non-gazetted staff of the East Pakistan Cooperative Directorate left their posts to march in the streets. Mujahids organized as militia were in armed revolt, and rumors circulated that they had linked forces with the National Awami Party. Factory workers had seized their managerial staff and in numerous instances forced them to increase their salaries. One of Pakistan’s leading industrialist, G.M. Adamjee, was coerced into increasing the wages of mill workers by a total of approximately six million rupees after his executive officer had been threatened with bodily harm. As a consequence of the strike, jute production was cut almost in half and industry throughout the province

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was coming to a standstill.

Still another dimension of the struggle in East Pakistan lay in the conflict between the NAP and the Jamaat-i-Islami. With the future uncertain, the Jamaat feared a Communist take-over in East Pakistan. Processions taken out in Kushtia, Barisal, Jessore, Chittagong, and several rural areas by the Jamaat attempted to warn the populace about the threat. “Down with the Communists,” “Long live Religion,” and “Make Pakistan an Islamic State” were typical slogans. The leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Maulana Maudoodi, was reported in an Indian newspaper as sayin the “tongues of those who speak of communism will be torn out.” In reply, Bhashani is supposed to have said : “The house of religious fanatics would be burned.”₁₄ In this conflict Mujibur Rahman was cast in the role of a moderate. Though outwardly neutral he appeared to favor the Jamaat to the NAP. Maudoodi was no threat and with the NAP in difficulty, Mujib’s Awami League could be expected to carry the field. But Mujib had misread Ayub’s intentions.

Ayub had studied the Awami Leaguer’s draft of amendments to reform the Constitution and was convinced that he should not be given an opportunity to gain political office. He concluded that Mujib would eventually win control of the province and with such leverage perhaps the country as well. Mujib wanted to shift the capital to East Bengal, give East Pakistan a majority of the parliament, and establish a separate and independent budget. Denied these changes he might well be inclined to mobilize East Bengal sentiment behind a movement to create an independent state.

The disorder that swept over rural East Pakistan was in some ways reminiscent of South Viet Nam. The indiscriminate slaughter of lower government functionaries, particularly those affiliated with the Basic Democracies and the President’s party, was cause for exceptional concern. Ayub did not hide the fact that “mob rule is the order of the day,’ and declared that he dare not hesitate in bringing it under control. Public executions began to mount and rural police officials, tax collectors, and Basic Democrats were the principal victims. The general intimidation of local officials was emphasized when student dissidents demanded the resignation of all those associated with the Basic Democracies. Nor were the killings confined to administration supporters. Attacks on authority were a convenient cover for local feuds which now escalated into violent acts of individual, premeditated murder. While the enlarging death toll was of immediate concern, the frenzied destruction of crops and property could not go unnoticed either.

The outnumbered, poorly trained and equipped police detachments were in no position to restore equilibrium. In most instances they chose not to interfere and desertions were commonplace. Left to defened themselves from known and unknown enemies, many preferred flight to self-defense. Others whose lives were spread were brought before “people’s courts” and summarily forced to sacrifice their property.

In the cities the story was the same. Governor Monem Khan remained secluded in his residence until March 19th when he flew secretly to West Pakistan. With the government’s power gone, strikes paralyzed the economy, murder and arson went unchecked, prices for scarce foodstuffs soared, and administrative services were at a standstill. East Pakistan had been brought to the brink of anarchy. Even the events of 1958 were eclipsed by those now convulsing the province.

On March 25, 1969, Ayub Khan, frustrated by the politicians, abandoned by the bureaucrats and police, and no longer commanding the loyalty of the Armed Forces, resigned the office he had held for ten years and five months.

Army Chief of Staff General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan took up the reins and immediately reimposed martial throughout the country. As in 1958 the Constitution was abrogated, the national and

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provincial legislatures dissolved, and all political parties banned. Members of the President’s cabinet and the two newly appointed provincial governors ceased to hold their offices under the proclamation. General Yahya Khan announced that his first objective was the restoration of “sanity” in the country. The air would be cleansed, authority reestablished, and political stability guaranteed before making any attempt to redress societal grievances.

In the circumstances, it is remarkable how smoothly the transfer of power was accomplished.  Ayub bad justified his rule on the need for poliltical stability. When it became clear he could no longer perform his task he was compelled to pass his responsibility to those who could. From his vantage point, the politicians were in no position to govern the country. In his last address to the nation he commented that to accept the opposition programs would spell “the liquidation of Pakistan.”

I have always told you that Pakistan’s salvation lay in a strong center. I accepted the parliamentary system because in this way also there was a possibility of preserving a strong center.

But now it is being said that the country be divided into two parts. The center should be rendered ineffective and a powerless institution. The defense services should be crippled and the political entity of West Pakistan be done away with.

It is impossible for me to preside over the destruction of our country.

…It hurts me deeply to say that the situation now is no longer under the control of the Governement. All government institutions have become victims of coercion, fear and intimidation.

…Except for the Armed Forces there is no constitutional and effective way to meet the situation.₁₅

In a letter to Genreal Yahya Khan, Ayub expressed his contempt for the politicians who in his judgment had placed their individual desire for power above the national interest.

It is most tragic that while we were well on our way to a happy and prosperous future, we were plunged into an abyss of senseless agitation. Whatever name may have been used to glorify it, time will show that this turmoil was deliberately created….. .

I have exhausted all possible civil and constitutional menas to resolve the present crisis. I offered to meet all those regarded as the leaders of the people. Many of them came to a conference recently but only after I had fulfilled all preconditions. Some declined to come for reasons best known to them. I asked these people to evolve an agreed formula.

They failed to do so in spite of days of deliberations.₁₆

Having provided the politicians with what he considered ample opportunity to cooperate with him in restructuring the political system, Ayub’s patience had evaporated. Humiliated by the politicians he now took his revenge. Ayub transferred authority to his brother in arms and the politicians once more scattered to their individual retreats. The demonstrations and rioting, which for more than four months had rocked the foundations of the state, suddenly ceased. Once more an artificial calm covered the land.

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SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURE UNDER

THE RURAL WORKS PROGRAMME

	1963-1964		1964-1965		1965-1966		Total
Sectors	Expenditure in Rs. .000	% of total	Expenditure Rs. .000	% of total	Expenditure Rs. .000	% of total	Expenditure Rs. .000	% of total
Social Welfare	9,418	12.6	5,250	5.8	5,760	6.7	19,168	8.3
Agriculture	2,632	3.5	4,856	5.4	2,580	3.0	9,518	4.1
Education	20,751	27.7	17,657	19.6	14,360	16.7	49,658	21.3
Communication	15,855	21.2	34,628	38.3	33,000	50.0	84,083	36.1
Irrigation	6,006	8.0	4,505	4.9	6,110	7.1	15,311	6.6
Health and Sanitation	15,083	20.2	15,910	17.6	12,900	15.0	41,163	17.7
Other Projects	5,101	6.8	7,613	8.4	1,290	1.5	13,754	5.9
Total	74,846	100.0	90,419	100.0	86,000	100.0	232,655	100.0

 

Subsequently, development projects were retarded or curtailed and the rural population lost whatever drive it had achieved earlier.

There can be no denying the physical gains produced by the Rural Works Program.₄₂ Psychological progress is more difficult to estimate, however. Figures can be cited detailing the miles of embankments erected in East Pakistan, the number of schools constructed in West Pakistan, and the like, but these developments in no way describe their impact on popular attitudes.

With some of the old Basic Democrats defeated and new ones still to take office, few people applied themselves to community tasks. In the meantime projects lay incomplete and money earmarked for new schemes went unused. In addition, the reputation the Basic Democrats had earned for their earlier leadership was sullied as many engaged in illicit or corrupt election acitivities. Hence it became increasingly difficult for the rural people to accept the Basic Democrats as genuine leaders and many refused to contribute either their labor, land, or money to community projects.

It should be noted that the Indo-Pakistani War in September 1965 also affected the Basic Democracies. The elections which brought the new provincial legislatures into being in May 1965 were not the last elections for the Basic Democrats. The first generation of B.D.’s remained more or less suspended until such time as the new bodies could meet and elect their chairmen. This proved to be a difficult tasks, as the chairman was usually an influential member and the only salaried person on the council. Furthermore, there was a considerable amount of controversy as to the delineation of constituencies, and in East Pakistan a case was before the High Court which sought to declare the whole Basic Democracies system unconstitutional.

Despite these difficulties the government plodded ahead but found it essential to postpone the elections of the chairmen until such time as the wards were established officially. It was then that the Indo-Pakistani War broke out. While the conflict raged on the borders of West Pakistan, the East Pakistan government sanctioned the creation of the ward commitees; the West Pakistan government did not follow suit until well after the cease-fire. But once this was accomplished the elections of the chairmen were

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pressed with even greater vigor; the fear persisted that the entire Basic Democracies system was becoming moribund.

After the Taskhent Agreement in January 1966 many Basic Democrats, especially in the urban areas of West Pakistan, gave serious thought to resigning their posts as a protest against President Ayub’s decision to withdraw the Pakistan Army from the Indian frontier and can the concentration of politico-administrative power be justified? When the great industrial and financial families are being pressured to relinquish their holdings there should be no reluctance in restricting the elite services. Pakistan’s new life-style should not only reflect a diffusion of ownership of enterprises but wider political opportunities for the country’s growing middle class.

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APPENDIX A

ALLOCATION OF MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS

(Central Government)

(October 28, 1958—March 25, 1969)

DIVISION	MINISTER
Cabinet	President  F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan
Commerce	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
	Muhammad Hafizur Rahman
	Abdul Qadir
	Wahiduzzaman
	Ghulam Farugque
	Nawabzada Abdul Ghaffar Khan of Hoti
Communications	Khan F.M. Khan
	Khan Abdus Sobur Khan
Defense	President F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan
	Vice Admiral A.R. Khan
Economic Affairs	Mohammad Shoib
	President F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan
Education	Habibur Rahman
	Akhter Husain
	Lt. Gen. W.A. Burki
	A.K.M. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury
	A.T.M. Mustafa
	Kazi Anwarul Haque
Establishment	President F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan
	Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh
	President F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan

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DIVISION	MINISTER
Finance	Mohammad Shoaib
	Abdul Qadir
	Mohammad Shoaib
	N.M. Uquaili
Food and Agriculture	Muhammad Hafizur Rahman
	Lt. Gen. Mohammad Azam Khan
	Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh
	A.K.M. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury
	Rana Abdul Hamid
	A.H.M. Shams-ud-Doha
Foreign Affairs	Manzur Qadir
	Mohammad Ali
	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
	S. Sharifuddin Pirzada
	Mian Arshad Husain
Health	Lt. Gen. W.A. Burki
	Abdul Monem Khan
	Wahiduzzaman
	Rana Abdul Hamid
	A.K.M. Fazlual Quader Chowdhury
	Wahiduzzaman
	Al-Haj Abd-Allah Zaheer-ud-Din (Lal Mia)
Home Affairs	Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh
	Zakir Husain
	Habibullah
Industries	Abul Kasem Khan
	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
	Abdullah-al-Mahmood
	Altaf Husain
	Ajmal Ali Chowdhury
Information and Broadcasting	Habibur Rahman
	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
	Akhter Husain
	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
	Habibur Rahman
	A.K.M. Fazlual Quader Chowdhury
	A.T.M. Mustafa
	Abdul Waheed Khan
	Khwaja Shahabuddin
Kashmir Affairs	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
	Akhter Husain
	Lt. Gen. W.A. Burki
	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
	Habibullah
	Ali Akbar Khan
	Vice Admiral A.R. Khan

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DIVISION	MINISTER
Labour and Social Welfare	Lt. Gen. W.A. Burki
	Abdul Monem Khan
	Wahiduzzaman
	Rana Abdul Hamid
	A.K.M. Fazlual Quader Chowdhury
	Wahiduzzaman
	Al-Haj Abd-Allah Zaheer-ud-Din (Lal Mia)
Law	Mohammad Ibrahim
	Manzur Qadir
	Muhammad Munir
	Shaikh Khursheed Ahmed
	S.M. Zafar
Natural Resources	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
	Abdullah-al-Mahmood
Parliamentary Affairs	Manzur Qadir
	Muhammad Munir
	Shaikh Khursheed Ahmed
Planning Rehabiltation and Works	President F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan (This division underwent various organizational changes during the period. The different forms it took and their allocations are indicated below.)
Rehabiltation	Lt. Gen. Mohammad Azam Khan
	Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh
Works, Irrigation, and Power	Abul Kasem Khan
	Lt. Gen. Mohammad Azam Khan
Water and Water Resources Works, Housing, and Water Resources	Lt. Gen. Mohammad Azam Khan Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh
Rehabilitation and Works Rehabilitation Works	Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Rehabilitation and Works	A.K.M. Fazlual Quader Chowdhury Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Rana Abdul Hamid
States and Frontier Regions	Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh President F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan

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APPENDIX B—BASIC DEMOCRACIES STRUCTURE

DIVISIONAL COUNCIL (16)

Chairman : Commissioner

Members : half or more elected, remainder officials

DISTRICT COUNCIL (78)

Chairman : Deputy Commissioner

Members : half or more elected, remainder officials

IN RURAL AREAS		IN URBAN AREAS
TEHSIL or THANA COUNCIL (630) Chairman : Subdivision Officer, Tehsildar or Circle Officials Members : half or more chairman of union council, remainder officials	CANTONMENT BOARD (29) Chairman : Official Members : half chairman of union committees, half officials		MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE (108) Chairman : Official Members : half chairman of union committees, half officials
UNION COUNCIL (7, 614) OR TOWN COMMITTEE (220) Chairman : elected Members : 10 to 15 elected		UNION COMMITTEE (888) Chairman : elected Members : elected
WARDS

NOTE : The municipal corporations of Karachi and Lahore are also represented at the divisional level and are administratively subordinate to the West Pakistan Department of Basic Democracies and Local Government. These two corporations have component union committees.

SOURCE : Guthrie S. Birkhead, ed., Administrative Problems in Pakistan (Syracuse : Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 32.

ooo

NOTES

 

PART ONE

1. AYUB KHAN : GENESIS, PHILOSOPHY, AND REFORMS

1. Samuel Huntinton, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1968), p. 251.

2. See Appendix A for the allocation of Ministrial Portfolios.

3. Shoaib and Bhutto were considered the most successful members of the President’s cabinet maily because they survived so long. Today (Karachi), April 1965, p. 11.

4. For an intimate account of Ayub’s early years see : Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography (New York : Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 1-8.

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5. Col. Mohammad Ahmed, My Chief (Lahore : Longmans, Green and Co., 1960), p. 28.

6. Major General Fazal Muqueem Khan writes that his “appointment was university acclaimed.” This statement does not seem accurate on studying the historical record. See : The Story of the Pakistan Army (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 138, and Ayub’s own account in Friends Not Masters, that “every officer felt that unless he was made Commander-in-Chief no one would believe that he had done well in life…. . Perfectly sensible people, Brigadiers and Generals, would go about bemoaning their lot. Each one of them was a Bonaparte, albeit an unhappy one.” Mohammad Ayub Khan, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

7. M.H. Bhatti, The Saviour of Pakistan (Lahore : Star Book Depot, 1960), p. 42.

8. See : Government of Pakistan, Correspodence Regarding No-War Declaration with Prime Minister’s Statement (Karachi 1950).

9. See : Government of Pakistan, Constituent Assembly Debates, March, 21, 1951.

10. Keith Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study (New York : The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 279.

11. Col. Mohammad Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

12. Mohammad Ayub Khan, op. cit., pp. 37-42.

13. Mohammad Ayub Khan, ibid., p. 186.

14. See : Z.A. Suleri, Pakistan’s Lost Years (Lahore : Progressive Papers Ltd., 1962.

15. Ibid., pp. 125-148.

16. See : Morning News (Dacca), June 24, 1958; July 7, 1958; September 7, 1958; September 9, 1958. The Pakistan Times (Lahore), September 24, 1958; October 5, 1958. K.B. Sayeed, “Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1959), and Wayne A. Wilcox, Pakistan : The Consolidation of a Nation (New York : Columbia University Press, 1963).

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