Bhutto and the Breakup of Pakistan – Mohammed Yunus
Bhutto and the Breakup of Pakistan
MOHAMMAD YUNUS
OXFORD
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Contents
Preface
1. The Final Days of United Pakistan 1
2. Bhutto’s Version of Pakistan’s Breakup 29
3. Bhutto’s Diplomatic Efforts in Muslim Countries 52
Epilogue 121
Appendix : Some Aspects of Military Cooperation between Pakistan and China 126
Index 135
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Preface
In order to supplement the information now available on the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, I wish to put on record what I happen to know of a behind-the-scene story of that fateful event.
These memoirs contain information of what was not revealed in the years gone by. They are not entirely exhaustive or completely accurate. The hope is that others who were involved in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 would rectify features that may suffer from the limitations of the account of one person involved in government in those crucial times. The purpose is that the account contained herein would be of help in putting together as coherent a picture of the demise of united Pakistan as possible. This is essential for subsequent, and hopefully, more mature historiography so that scholars interested in the South Asia region might have a clearer idea of what happened to the idyllic country of Pakistan and its reasons.
The day-to-day chronicle of how Pakistan lost the 1971 war with India, and along with it the union with East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) is a matter that has been addressed by many competent writers. In these memoirs, I wish to put on record the memories that linger on unrequited despite the time that has gone by. This includes the record that I kept of the explanation of Pakistan’s national disaster given by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as President of Pakistan to other heads of Islamic states. This record also contains the notes that I made on the spot of the comments of nine heads of states during their téte-à-téte with President Bhutto. The accuracy of these comments is limited to the capacity of my memory.
Besides producing this record, I have also provided an account of the diplomatic backdrop of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Included also are some personal memories that may help to illustrate the agony of those who were witness to the secession of a chunk of the country.
At the end, an appendix has been added to cover my memories of the initiation and development of military cooperation that forms the backbone of the unwritten alliance between Pakistan and China. The aim is to rectify some impressions that have been created by certain published accounts in this regard.
These memoirs are more descriptive than analytical. As far as possible, I have avoided ascribing motives to the personalities involved in the events that led to the breakup of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh. Some of my personal views have however found expression, as they are indeed a part of my memoirs.
Mohammed Yunus
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1
The Final Days of United Pakistan
These memoirs begin on a very particular day, 25, March 1971. On that day, General Yahya Khan, Martial Law administrator and President of Pakistan, ordered the arrest of the leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League had literally swept the polls in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the national elections in 1970. Mujibur Rahman was then brought to the capital, Islamabad, in West Pakistan (Now Pakistan) as a prisoner.
The news came as a shock to everyone. It was a veritable volte-face after the three years of unprecedented preference given by Yahya’s government to East Pakistanis in all government and semi-government appointments. That policy had been adopted by Yahya to assure the East Pakistanis that they were indeed equal to West Pakistanis in a united Pakistan.
Those in Islamabad who were close to governement circles, including myself, knew that on that day, the ‘hawks’ led by General Hamid, Chief of the General Staff, had taken over from the ‘doves’ headed by Generals Pirzada and Umar. Yahya had initially allowed the ‘doves’ to conciliate East Pakistan. It was on their directives that the policy of accommodation with East Pakistan had been followed from 1968 to 1971. Interestingly, the ‘hawks’ were the ‘sons of the soil’ while the ‘doves’ were ‘refugees’.
The guiding thought of the ‘doves’ was that West Pakistan had enjoyed the prime fruits of freedom from Britain in 1947. It had held the reins of power in the country for almost a quarter of a century. They advocated, thereofore, that it was now time for East Pakistan to have its turn. The ‘hawks’, on the other hand, did not believe that a favourable tilt towards East Pakistanis in government appointments would help convince the eastern wing of the country of being equal to the western wing and yield a Constitution acceptable to the country as a whole. Therefore, they firmly believed in the use of overwhelming force to put an end to the call of the Awami League for regional autonomy. Short-sightedly, they described the seething movement in East Pakistan for regional autonomy as a mere flash in the pan that could be doused by military force. Indeed, they blamed the ‘doves’ for letting the situation get out of control.
At that time I was serving as Director General for Middle Eastern and African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad. In that capacity, I used to participate in the policy meetings held almost every day in the Foreign Office in Islamabad. On 26 March 1971, an apparent calm prevailed in East Pakistan. That gave the ‘hawks’ the short-lived opportunity of boasting that they were in the right after all. In the Foreign Office, however, most of us were overwhelmed by a sense of doom. Contrary to the assessments of the ‘hawks’, East Pakistan was boiling with rebellion. The long simmering resentment caused by the feeling in East Pakistan of being neglected, if also not exploited, by West Pakistan had turned into a frenzy due to the arrest and deportation of their undisputed leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Mujib had indeed taken the lead through the Awami League in giving voice to the burning issues and resentment that beset the East Pakistanis.
Consequently, the situation was fast approaching the point of widespread popular revolt. East Pakistan was not only far away from West Pakistan but, to make matters worse, a thousand miles of bitterly hostile India lay athwart the two wings of Pakistan. The Foreign Ministry in Islamabad was daunted and full of apprehension. From the very next day, it began receiving reports couched in guarded tones from Pakistan’s diplomatic missions of a generally negative reaction abroad regarding Mujibur Rahman’s arrest. The diplomats of Pakistan, like everyone else, were scared of the ‘hawks’ in the Pakistan Army but their message to the home base was clear despite its carefully selected terminology. The world had openly condemned the arrest of the leader of the majority party and the suspension of the
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political process in Pakistan. Thus, the gaps in the diplomatic reports were filled by what was appearing in the international press.
No sense of doubt was left among the foreign policy caucus that Pakistan stood totally isolated. All the Foreign Ministry could do by way of formulating foreign policy in that critical situation was to send to its missions lifeless directives based on the army’s doctored version of what was going on in and around East Pakistan. The worst aspect of these directives was the attampt to cajole our diplomats to secure international understanding of the draconian steps that were being taken to suppress the general revolt in East Pakistan. The national press had also been directed by the Ministry of Information in Islamabad to do the same in order to ensure a national understanding, if not, consensus, of the measures adopted by the ‘hawks’.
Pakistan’s foreign policy and the public relations drive of those tragic days could, however, do absolutely nothing about the strongly negative direction that world opinion was taking regarding the crisis that the country was engulfed in. The government, feeling helpless, decided to direct the entire force of government policy towards keeping the West Pakistanis ignorant of the true facts, and assuaged with baseless stories of an atmosphere of returning calm and the restoration of law and order in East Pakistan. The spectre of Pakistanis of both wings joining together in a general uprising against the military government was the worst nightmare for the ‘hawkish’ policymakers.
Not the least troublesome for the Foreign Ministry was the fact that many of Pakistan’s diplomatic missions were headed and/or manned by East Pakistanis. No one could expect these officials to close their eyes and ears to what they saw in the press and heard from the Foreign Offices of the countries to which they had been accredited. They could not possibly agree with, leave alone approve, the outright suppression of not only the rights of East Pakistan but its very individuality. They had to brief the governments of the countries of their accreditation according to the directives sent out by Islamabad. In fact, most of them shared with their hosts their own heartaches and hopelessness. They could do little else because, while their conscience was tugging at their sleeves, the expanding popularity of the Awami League was calling uopn them to switch sides. Eventually, most of them abandoned their posts, some earlier, others later. Those few who stayed on were bound to West Pakistan by personal ties that they did not want to break. The impact of these defections on the Foreign Ministry was disabling. Forign policy formulation, diplomacy, even patriotism came suddenly to a screeching halt.
All eyes were turned towards the Pakistan Army; the only element in the body politic of Pakistan that continued to feel confident of managing the fast unravelling situation that had been created in East Pakistan by its actions since 25 March 1971. Senior civilian officials and entire ministries were reduced to having to refer to army headquarters for their day-to-day workings. The large number of generals available to the army had been allotted the function of overseeing every aspect of governmental activities. These generals exuded unruffled confidence in an environment of depression and loss of direction. Prompt directives poured forth from them in an unending stream creating an illusion of order and control. Their ready issuance was, however, due to the fact that their thinking was short-sighted and dictatorial rather than the result of careful deliberation and political savvy. Being inflexible, superficial, and high handed, their directives soon lost relevance and bureaucrats began to seek refuge in following orders in a blind-folded and speechless manner.
I had the advantage of having a close friend who was Deputy Chief of the General Staff in the army high command—and I learnt from him that three well-equipped divisions of the army were to be flown to East Pakistan in a great hurry. The generals estimated that an attack by India on East Pakistan was simply a matter of time and wanted to be prepared for it at all cost. Apart from military aircrafts, the entire fleet of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) was to be requisitioned for the operation.
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A move of such proportions could hardly be kept covert, and India found out about it very soon. The first step that India took was to ban Pakistani flights over its territory. Undaunted, the endless string of Pakistani troops were flown to East Pakistan via Colombo in Sri Lanka. That route almost tripled the distance for the hundreds of flights that were required to transport three army divisions to East Pakistan. Everything was multiplied by three : the flying time, the crew, the fuel, the number of aircraft sucked into the operation, and the cost. Despite the heavy odds, the operation was successfully completed before the summer was really over. Professionally it was an unprecedented achievement. Had it been conducted for a better cause, it would have gone down in the annals of military history as a remarkable episode. But it is now hardly mentioned.
Having prepared itself for an Indian attack, the army deployed in East Pakistan simply waited. The initiative had passed to India. The major task of the army was reduced to defending itself against stray guerrilla attacks and the ridicule it had to face day in and day out from the people of East Pakistan. The operation had begun with a high point in the morale of the troops but as the days passed, the military’s confidence was deflated by the popular uprising. Worse was to come. India was not going to initiate an attack before the winter. Due to the heavy downpour brought on by the monsoons and the delta of two mighty rivers that constituted East Pakistan, the ground in the region is too soft for bringing out armoured columns before winter when the terrain is comparatively firm.
The monsoon rains were particularly heavy in East Pakistan in 1971. The Pakistan Army was, however, ensconced in its hideouts, well satisfied with its operations. A lull descended over the subcontinent; it was looked upon by the ‘hawks’ as a sign of the army’s victory but was considered by the ‘doves’ as a lull before the storm.
In fact, the unified Islamic state of Pakistan had begun to crumble after the military action taken on 25 March 1971. In addition to arresting East Pakistan’s undisputed leader on that day, the frustrated personnel of the Pakistan Army were let loose on the people of East Pakistan. An order had been issued by the General Headquarters in West Pakistan to decimate the Hindu population of East Pakistan. The entire blame for the rebellion in East Pakistan had been pinned by the army on its Hindu population numbering well over ten million. Armed men suddenly turned into beasts. They were supposed to slaughter only the Hindus but they interpreted the order as a sanction for a free-for-all rampage that included loot, plunder and rapine, depriving the hapless victims of their property as well as their honour. In the heat of the mad hunt, the marauders failed to distinguish between Hindus and Pakistani Muslims since they both dressed in a similar manner. Hence, they all came to be regarded by the troops as ‘evil’.1
The horrendous personal accounts of the savagery that trickled through to West Pakistan were discounted by the generals as unfounded propaganda mounted by India against Pakistan. Some of the horror stories may not have corresponded fully with facts. But fact or fiction, their impact was devastating, particularly on the East Pakistanis living in Islamabad.
India had mounted a well-orchestrated campaign in the international media to use these actual or remoured atrocities as a demonstration of the military oppression in East Pakistan. Based on some hard facts that could not be denied, this proved to be a most effective propaganda campaign. It denuded Pakistan of the meagre legitimacy that might have been left in the unity of the east and west wings of the country. After all, the self-defeating plan of the Pakistan Army, to push Hindus out of East Pakistan, was there for everyone to see. Every day consolidated reporsts of the Indian propaganda campaign reached the Foreign Ministry policy caucus. The Indian propaganda machinery remained uncontested because Pakistan had already lost credibility abroad and the actual conditions prevalent in East Pakistan could not possibly be white-washed.
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Meanwhile, several daily PIA flights kept Dhaka and Karachi linked. As mentioned above, due to the Indian ban over Pakistani planes flying over their territory, they had to go 3000 miles around Sri Lanka in order to cover the distance of 1000 miles as the crow flies. These planes were filled with families of military and civil servants who were fleeing from the East Wing. These officers could sense that the breakup of the country was near. They would have also left if they could have abandoned their posts; some actually did. But it was not just the escapees who were on board these aeroplanes. Suitcases full of looted currency were transported from East Pakistan to West Pakistan.
The war between Pakistan and India was not to break out until late in November 1971. The looters and the rapists were, however, not on the front lines. Not all the army formations were involved in this inhuman exercise. The front line was manned by gallant soldiers who had been given orders not to yield an inch of territory and if neccessary to lay down their lives for the cause. When the Indian attack eventually came, they stood their ground right up to the end and heroic acts of valour were seen in the discharge of their duties. The defeat eventually suffered by the Pakistan Army was so sudden and complete that the supreme sacrifice of these gallant soldiers in the defence of their country has passed unsung and unnoticed.
The massacre of civilians in East Pakistan and the plunder of their honour and property by army personnel and non-Bengali Razakars (volunteers)2 outraged the world. Fearing these uniformed men, thousands of families, both Hindu and Muslim, fled from their homeland across the border into India. An explanation of this incomprehensible spectacle was demanded by the foreign consular officials stationed in Dhaka and also by the regional foreign office of East Pakistan. Upon enquiry the Director General in charge of that office told me that he was himself at a loss to comprehend what exactly was going on. In his turn, he asked the top general in East Pakistan for the required explanation. The answer he received was simply shocking both in its content as well as in the vulgarity of the language used. The Director General told me that the general in-charge said that they were flushing Hindu blood to turn them into Pakistanis.
Unable to face the consular corps in Dhaka, the Director General dumped his post despite orders to stay on and left for Islamabad never to return, abandoning the regional foreign office to its fate. In that act, the foreign consular representatives found the sorry answer to their queries. His action was considered by the foreign secretary as understandable and he was spread the ignominy of facing the charges of treason in a military court.
Hardly any representatives of the press were stationed in East Pakistan who could report what was going on in the country. But news was relayed internationally by the foreign concular staff who were in Dhaka during that period. They informed their respective governments of the state of affairs prevailing in that broken wing of Pakistan.
At an evening reception during those dark days, the British High Commissioner conveyed to me his dismay at the utter disregard by the revellers of the party at the reign of terror that had been unleashed in East Pakistan. He had been informed by his consul in Dhaka. When he told me the details, I was horrified. Despite working for the Foreign Ministry in Islamabad, I was not aware of these facts. Having made his feelings known to others present in the reception, the British High Commissioner left the party as a mark of disgust. Little did he know that most of those present had either no idea of the real situation or did not want to delve deeper into it. It was a greater irony that the reception was being held at the house of a Bengali who stopped at nothing to seek the favour of President Yahya to serve his own ends. In fact, as a mark of appreciation of the services that he had received, the military president had broken all protocol and graced the occasion personally.
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At the end of that reception, Yahya was surrounded by the press as he moved towards his car. They wanted to know what he was going to do about the threatening statements Indira Gandhi was making almost daily about the refugee influx into India, and India’s likely response to the challenge created by it. Naturally all the diplomats, keen to collect as much information as possible, also congregated around the departing General. Yahya, in those days, was almost always under the influence of alcohol. He turned around as if to ensure that everyone could see and hear him and said indecent things about Indira Gandhi. A pall of shocked silence fell upon the crowd and the General drove away from the reception apparently feeling quite pleased with himself for the ignominy that he had uttered. This incident portrays in some measure the level of degradation at which governance was conducted in united Pakistan in its last days.
Among those hundreds of thousands who had managed to flee East Pakistan after the crackdown began were those from the ranks of official services in East Pakistan. They helped establish a governement of free Bangladesh in exile. India wasted no time in making a powerful radio transmitter available to that government. Several times a day the voice of Shonar Bangla (Golden Bengal) broadcasted news, appeals to the world, and directives to the Bengali populace to come to the aid of their motherland and rise against the [West Pakistan] army. Bengali officials trapped in West Pakistan established secret listening posts to monitor the broadcasts and to spread them by word of mouth to those eager to know the truth. The movement for an independent Bangladesh had become one of the most powerful nationalist movements ever. Those like me who were in close contact with the government knew that the united Pakistan as they had known it was already dead.
There were several Bengali colleagues serving with me in the diplomatic service. In the begining, most of them were supportive of the unity of the country as they viewed the matter from a broad, international perspective. But after the arrest of Mujibur Rahman and the unleashing of the officially sponsored savagery against the people of East Pakistan, almost every one of them threw in the towel. Some were actually removed from sensitive posts as their loyalty became suspect overnight. Eventually, all the Bengali officers were given the euphemistic title of ‘Officer on Special Duty’ so that they could stay home and draw their basic salary to survive.
Among those officers there was one particularly close and dear family friend of mine. He shared his heartache with me, and confided to me his escape plans from West Pakistan, with complete comfidence that I was not going to betray him. His route of escape lay through Afghanistan and the dearly-paid-for mode of transport were Afghan transit trucks in which the escapees would lay hidden under such merchandise as would allow them to breathe during the tortuous journey. When the escape arrangements for him and his family had been finalized, he came to me with two large metal trunks stuffed with all the jewellery and other precious items that they possessed and requested me to keep them in my custody until such a time that they could collect them from me. He had assumed my consent as confidently, and I as readily agreed to take charge of their valuables until the situation became better. With tears in their eyes the family said a brusque goodbye and were gone. Those trunks remained with me all the while until I was given a special PIA assignment that took me to London where they also resided and was able to return their valuables to them, and of course to meet them again.
Through the summer of 1971, the military regime had done all it could do to be prepared for the Indian challenge whenever it came. But they could not do much more since the initiative was left to India. Several uneasy weeks went by while Islamabad waited. Heavy monsoon rains in East Pakistan made military operations untenable. Although the cooling of the weather brought some relaxation to taut nerves, Islamabad remained tense. No one had a clue of what was going on in Delhi. But Delhi was well-informed about the goings on in Islamabad. It was, to begin, a one-sided war.
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Islamic countries kept their friendship with Pakistan alive. They were quite aware of the situation but were dumbfounded at the nonchalance of the military regime in Islamabad. Friendly advice from foreign countries conveyed to the Foreign Ministry by Pakistan’s envoys was set aside because the foreign policy caucus knew that the generals, who also read the missives, were in no mood to pay heed to them. The ‘hawks’ could not afford to admit that they, too, had failed.
The Shah of Iran Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi was a good friend of Pakistan. Realizing the danger that Iran as well as Pakistan would face if the Soviet Union were to walk into the breach in South Asia, the Shah made a significant move to neutralize that danger in the summer of 1971.
The occasion was the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of Iranian monarchy. A great tent city had been created at the cost of $16 million in the plains of Shiraz that lay stretched at the foot of the Persepolis ruins to house the foreign heads of state who had been invited to the celebrations. The Shah had prevailed on Nikolai Podgorny, the Soviet head of state, to call on Yahya to establish an understanding between the two about the prevailing situation in East Pakistan. That the head of the Soviet state had agreed to call on the President of Pakistan was itself a significant indication that the Soviet Union wanted to play a role in the crisis in order to pre-empt China.
No record of the conversation that took place between Podgorny and Yahya in the latter’s tent is available to me since I was not included in the entourage. However, I was taken aback when I received the news that Yahya had cut short his visit to Iran and left without even saying good-bye to the Shah. That Yahya was in a rage was beyond doubt because he had proceeded immediately after the meeting with Podgorny to the parked special aircraft that had brought Yahya to Iran. Yahya had to wait for several hours until it could be prepared to fly along with his entourage who had to be immediately called back from wherever they were. Perhaps Podgorny had told Yahya that power should be handed over to Mujibur Rahman. If so, Yahya could have explained the complexities involved and shown some courtesy to a head of state, and that too of a superpower who had personally come to call on him. In view of the fact that the Soviet Union and India were rumoured to be contemplating concluding a treaty of friendship and consultations on mutual defence, it was imperative that Yahya should remain on good terms with the Russians.
In one mindless fit of anger, however, Yahya had spurned a super power and humiliated the Shah of Iran, Pakistan’s close friend. Pakistan was to pay for the disastrous consequences of its military President’s arrogant and foolish behaviour during its war with India.
As it would become clear later on, China too was to be added to the list of rebuked friends when, apprehensive of Soviet reaction, China withheld providing military aircraft3 that was needed in East Pakistan. As to that event, Yahya responded by declaring with foolish pride that Pakistan did not want any part of China in the impending war with India. It is reasonable to state that Pakistan’s isolation in the 1971 war was at least partly of its own making. Indira Gandhi had no trouble in ensuring that Pakistan remained completely isolated.
The Foreign Ministry, being exposed to diplomatic contact with the rest of the world, was filled with gloom. Principal officers of the ministry who received the foreign envoys seeking clarification of the incomprehensible developments did not know how to provide the requisite clarification. The officers knew they were prevaricating and the foreign envoys recognized that their interlocutors were not only clueless but also deeply depressed by what was happening to their country. Both sides could sense that what had been left unsaid was more significant than what was said.
In August 1971, towards the end of the monsoon, came the fateful news that India and the Soviet
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Union had concluded a pact with clear undertones of military cooperation. Whether to blunt Islamabad’s reaction, or duped by Moscow or probably both, the United States and Britain let it be known that they considered the pact as a device to hold India in check. Those in Islamabad who accepted this interpretation of the Indo-Soviet pact felt as if India had neutralized its own initiative. Little did they realize that the fate of united Pakistan had been sealed by that pact. Those who saw in the pact the recipe for Pakistan’s dismenberment kept their views to themselves. They could not dare to challenge the euphoria in West Pakistan of which the ‘hawks’ continued to remain the principle source.
It is incomprehensible but nonetheless true that the generals, both ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, were not merely spreading the propaganda of the invincibility of the Pakistan Army, they were indeed convinced that this was the case. Many civilian bureaucrats were taken in by their confidence and found in it a substiute, however poor, for the lack of certainty that Pakistan was indeed on the right path.
Meanwhile, the people of West Pakistan were being doused with a heavy dose of inspiring national songs that were intended to keep the national morale high through state-controlled media. It was indeed a sad spectacle. The national songs sung during the 1965 war with India had indeed done wonders to boost the morale of the masses as well as the army. But the lyrics commissioned by the army in 1971 were sung listlessly and sounded hollow, producing a delusive effect on national morale. This difference lay in the fact that in 1965, India had attacked West Pakistan and the people of West Pakistan were in favour of the army. But in 1971, India attacked East Pakistan and the people of East Pakistan were bitterly against the army. The role that civil agitation could play, especially in a civil war, was unacknowledged by the Pakistan Army.
International reality was vastly different from the euphoria in the operation theatre of General Headquarters. The two stood in sharp contrast to each other. China, the sheet anchor of Pakistan in the 1965 war, had been shunned by Yahya. In any case, China was going through its own cultural revolution and hence was isolated. It could barely sustain itself, leave alone balance the Indo-Soviet pact of military cooperation aimed clearly at Pakistan.
The people of East Pakistan were looking to India to deliver them from the clutches of the Pakistan Army. Meanwhile, the Indian armed forces were meticulously preparing for the final push into East Pakistan. All that West Pakistan was left with was a blind reliance on a supposedly invincible army : a myth that was meaningless without the support of the people, who were in fact, strongly opposed to it.
While Pakistan was in a state of self-delusion, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was touring the capitals of the great powers. Her message was that the Indians were being forced into the situation by the fallout of the deteriorating situation in East Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from the Pakistan Army were streaming into India in search of safety and protection. India’s resources had been stretched to the limit. Indira Gandhi wanted to make sure that when the Indian push into East Pakistan came, the world would be ready to recognize it as inevitable and consider it as retaliation rather than an aggression.4
In November, the great delta region of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers began to dry up as the monsoon rains ended and the relatively cooler weather approached. Gradually, the ground became firm enough for the Indian Army to commence operations against East Pakistan. As the first shot in the volley, the Indian Air Force (IAF) dug up the runways used by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in East Pakistan. Their purpose was to disable their rival from gaining aerial mastery in East Pakistan. Hence in one stroke, the air link between the two wings of the country was sundered and the Pakistan Army was left without air cover. India could have bombed the army from the air at will but this was not done presumably to avoid retaliation by the PAF in West Pakistan that had, till now, remained out of the war.
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The aim of the IAF was to deny the skies over East Pakistan to the Pakistan Air Force. On its part, the PAF in the west made no move out of fear that the IAF would wreak havoc on the army in East Pakistan. The Indian stratagem worked. India had succeeded in grounding the PAF in East Pakistan without sustaining any damage itself. The first phase of the Indian order of battle in East Pakistan had been implemented successfully.
The initiative had remained with India from the beginning of the crisis in East Pakistan. The remaining phases of the Indian plan also retained the advantage of the initiative. They went through without any hitch and, by the first week of December 1971, no prospect of recovery was left to the Pakistan Army. The gloom in the Operation Room in the General Headquarters was so complete that even day-to-day governance became ineffective. Hopelessness was written large everywhere—the focus of national efforts shifted towards the United Nations.
Pakistan now wanted the international community to repair the damage it had itself caused. Whatever the UN Security Council could do to salvage Pakistan’s sorry image was effectively neutralized by the Soviet veto. The main Soviet demand was that the political clock in Pakistan should revert to the result of the national elections, whereby, Mujibur Rahman had emerged at the head of the Awami League as the indisputable voice of East Pakistan and the majority leader in the National Assembly of Pakistan.
By the first week of December 1971, Yahya had sunk into a continuous drunken stupor. The generals who were running the show were themselves clueless as to what course of action they should take. They could hardly countenance a position in which their prisoner, Mujibur Rahman, would overnight assmue power over the country and sit in judgement over them. Countries friendly to Pakistan could do nothing to help overcome the effects of the Soviet veto. Syria, a member of the Security Council at that crucial time, walked into the breach. Although Syria was a Soviet ally, at the same time, it was keen to save Pakistan from disaster. Syria put forward a draft resolution, presumably cleared in advance with the Soviet Union, that provided in meticulous detail a formula to bring an end to the war-like situation; resumption of the political mandate by Mujibur Rahman, and the departure of Indian troops from East Pakistan.
The Foreign Ministry caucus came together to consider Pakistan’s response to the Syrian resolution. A colleauge who like myself had considerable experience of the proceedings of the United Nations and the Security Council, agreed with my belief that the Syrian formula was the last ray of hope for a united Pakistan. We made a strong plea for acceptance of the resolution with a few changes despite the known aversion of the Pakistan Army to it. The foreign secretary agreed to risk a telephone call to Yahya on the ‘Black Line’ that connected directly to the President’s office. He placed the proposed acceptance of the Syrian resolution gingerly before Yahya who exploded in a fit of rege—an unvarying state that had replaced Yahya’s reasoning powers. Yahya completely failed to grasp that the Syrian resolution was the last opportunity for Pakistan. In a huff, he directed the foreign secretary to pass the responsibility of decision-making over this issue on to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who he had sent to New York to present Pakistan’s case to the Security Council. I, along with my colleague heaved a sigh of relief. The opportunity did not seem to have been lost altogether. Bhutto was not new to UN forums. We hoped that he would make the best of a bad situation. Meanwhile, however, the Soviet Union had shot down the Syrian resolution. A second resolution was then tabled by Poland. However, instead of stating Pakistan’s position on the Polish resolution which was detrimental to the interests of Pakistan, Bhutto launched a strong attack on India and its supporters in the Security Council and stormed out of the Security Council chamber. This apparently impulsive behaviour left the field open to Pakistan’s adversaries to formalize Pakistan’s defeat through the worst possible resolution of the Security Council—Indian troops were left in control of East Pakistan.
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I have no intentions of pronouncing of judgement on, or interesting Bhutto’s motivation or state of mind that provoked such an action on his part that smothered the last hope of salvaging a united Pakistan. But what I do wish to record here is the account that a confidant of Bhutto and a close friend of mine gave on Bhutto’s reaction.
When Bhutto received the telegram asking him to adopt a position on the Syrian resolution, he interpreted it as a move to pin the responsibility on him. He said to those present who included my friend, that he was not going to fall a prey to that ‘trap’.
I was intensely disappointed along with my colleagues at the fate of the Syrian resolution and proposed to the caucus that China be approached to find a way to walk into the fray in order to restore some balance to the utterly hopeless and isolated situation into which Pakistan had slipped. Despite what he had said in a fit of pique, about not wanting China to play any part in Pakistan’s war with India, Yahya had no alternative but to accede to the proposal that China be approached. The ambassador of China to Pakistan, one of the architects of the unwritten alliance between the two countires, was sent for by the foreign secretary who conveyed the message to him on behalf of the President of Pakistan.
For two crucial days, the caucus awaited a response from China, apprehensive that its silence could be a reminder to Yahya of what he had himself so arrogantly stated about China’s role in East Pakistan. But the Chinese ambassador came to the Foreign Office and informed them that Mao Zedong had himself flown to Kashgar, which is close to the West Pakistan border with China, and was waiting to receive Yahya. Once again, the ‘Black Line’ was used in the presence of the caucus and the anxious foreign secretary informed Yahya with bated breath of Mao’s invitation. The caucus was completely taken aback by Yahya’s negative response that was voiced so loudly that it could be heard by all in the room. Yahya belittled Mao’s gesture, and another opportunity to salvage a united Pakistan was thrown to the winds. His foolish arrogance had prevailed once again to nail the fate of the country. In those days Yahya was almost always in a rage. What he actually said was that he was too busy working out the mechanics of the surrender in East Pakistan to go to Kashgar. Totally lost for words, the foreign secretary summoned the Chinese ambassador to the Foreign Offce and informed him that Yahya was not in a position to leave the country.
That China continued to support Pakistan in this trials and tribulations after the debacle in East Pakistan is a measure of the strategic importance that China attached to Pakistan in its own global policies. We hoped the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan knew and reported to Beijing that Yahya was not acting rationally in those days. Being a friend of Pakistan, he would have pinned the responsibility of the insult upon Yahya’s drunken state.
When the fate of Pakistan was sealed, the US sent a detachment of its Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean. I clearly remember the ripples of jubilation that ran through the Foreign Ministry and the General Headquarters. While some members of the caucus were enjoying the moment, one of the directors general asked what exactly the US ships could do in respect of the situation in East Pakistan. Unable to answer the question, a part of the caucus walked into the foreign secretary’s room and put the question to him. In his turn, the foreign secretary got on the ‘Black Line’ and posed the question to Yahya. The latter was irked at the question and yelled at the foreign secretary that how was he supposed to know. The jubilation suddenly died down. The US charge d’affaires was called to the Foreign Office and asked to seek clarification of the presence of the American fleet. This was the lowest point to which the prestige of any country, be it large or small, could sink as far as international relations were concerned.
Meanwhile, India had openly challenged the US fleet to expect full resistance to any intervention in East Pakistan. It had the backing of the Soviet Union in strategic matters. The United States, however,
11
never inteded to challenge the bifurcation of Pakistan.
Two crucial days again went by and a darkening gloom pervaded the capital. Finally, the US charge d’affaires called on the Foreign Secretary and told him that US ships had ome merely to display to US flag and to extend, if needed, protection to US nationals residing in this region. Little did the generals in the operation theatre know that Kissinger had informed Indira Gandhi during her visit to Washington, as he has himself recorded in his memoirs,5 that the US and Indian aims in East Pakistan were essentially the same though they disagreed about the modalities of achieving them. In other words, the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan was agreed upon between the two powers. While India desired to bring this about by force, the US had looked for a peaceful approach.
It is now clear that the US clarification was intended to leave no doubt in the minds of the generals that America would not intervene in East Pakistan on West Pakistan’s behalf. However, the US fleet’s arrival in the Indian Ocean had another strategic implication. It is now known that Washington had made it clear to Moscow that it would not stand by idly if India tried to defeat the Pakistan Army in the West Wing. Although, the balance of power had tilted in favour of the Soviet Union in South Asia the US fleet was sent to the Indian Ocean in order to leave no doubt in the Kremlin that the US was now involved in the military game.
The challenge posed by the Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean was not meant for India at all. It was in fact the US throwing down the gauntlet in the superpower game of spheres of influence in South Asia. The US knew that the emergence of an independent Bangladesh, though it would hurt Pakistan, would yield no special strategic advantage to the Soviet Union. The slipping of West Pakistan under Indian authority, however, was viewed as a definite threat to the US global strategic interest.
Meanwhile, Moscow advised Delhi to spare West Pakistan. Pakistan as it exists today was saved neither by the Pakistan Army nor by the unwritten alliance with China. The continued existence of a dismembered Pakistan was ensured by the United States. Once it became clear that West Pakistan had been spared, the Foreign Ministry received urgent instructions from the President that Bhutto should be told to return to the country and assume the presidency.
Having abandoned a united Pakistan’s cause at the Security Council, Bhutto stopped in Rome on his way back. When the foreign secretary called him there, Bhutto was apprehensive. First of all, he wanted to know whether he would be placed under arrest on his return to Pakistan. He was speechless when he was informed that an aircraft had been despatched to fly him to Pakistan and upon his arrival the reins of the country would be handed over to him.
On 20 December 1971, Yahya Khan handed over the office of the President of Pakistan and Chief Martial Law Administrator to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Yahya Khan was 54 years old when he resigned his civilian as well as military posts. He was immediately put under house-arrest by Bhutto. Soon thereafter, Yahya Khan suffered a disabling stroke. He died an invalid in August 1980. Apart from presiding over the breakup of Pakistan, Yahya Khan holds the dubious distinction of having snubbed the President of the Soviet Union; humiliated the Shah of Iran; spurned Mao Zedong; and used utterly disgraceful words of expression towards the Prime Minister of India. In other words, he ensured that all the four powers that surrounded Pakistan despised the country, and that half the country was lost before it managed to get rid of Yahya.
When Dhaka fell on 17 December 1971, the Foreign Ministry in Islamabad was stormed by the people residing near the ministry. The foreign secretary had gone to the President’s House and the entire caucus was absent except for myself and the additional foreign secretary. Hence, the director of the
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foreign secretary’s office and I were left to handle the situation. Since the entire crwod could not be called inside the ministry, they were asked to choose representatives from among themselves to voice their concerns in a meeting with the Foreign Ministry. The riotous mob selected their representatives who were furious. They wanted an explanation as to why Pakistan had surrendered without putting up a credible fight and what had the Foreign Ministry done to avert the painful outcome. The Foreign Ministry explained that it had indeed done its best despite the odds stacked against the country. At the behest of the Foreign Ministry, Saudi Arabia had sent $50 million; Jordan had agreed to send a squadron of F104; Afghanistan had mercifully held its forces back; Libya and Kuwait were considering ways of aiding Pakistan. The delegation then enquired that if such was the case, then why did Pakistan surrender. The Foreign Ministry responded that the answer to this question could only be provided by General Headquarters. The mob dispersed quietly, more depressed than angry at the state of affairs in the country. It could not gather the gumption to proceed to General Headqurters.
In East Pakistan, the jubilant Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army) turned its attention to looking for the detachments of the Pakistan Army and non-Bengali Razakars. While the Indian Army took almost the entire Pakistan Army in East Pakistan as Prisoners of War, the Mukti Bahini found the Razakars who were left with not protection of any sort, along with a few stray Pakistani troops. They wreaked their vengeance upon them for days, after which the Razakars were herded together in camps awaiting expatriation to West Pakistan.
Subsequently, 90,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War were transported to India to be used as a bargaining counter for thrashing out the new shape of the South Asian subcontinent, along with the future strategic implications. Eventually, Indira Gandhi and Bhutto met at Shimla where he was made a sign an agreement giving precedence to a bilateral approach to the Kashmir dispute. The Razakars languished in the camps and after a brief period of international attention, were forgotten both by Pakistan as well as international community.
The ‘East Pakistan Tragedy’ as it was labelled by Pakistan; and ‘War of Independence’ by Bangladesh, caused considerable anguish in Islamic countries. All the more so because they had assured Pakistan that it had their sympathies in defending the integrity of Pakistan. In order to reciprocate their sympathy and support, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had instituted a daily briefing of the Islamic envoys during the few days of the short war, which was presided over by myself and serviced by a colonel from the Army Headquarters. The briefing was a godsend for the envoys as everyone knew that the press in West Pakistan was heavily censored.
The colonel who came to brief the envoys exuded great confidence while elaborating upon the situation on the field of battle with the help of a map of East Pakistan. He would pause and take questions as a matter of course leaving behind an impression that the Pakistan Army was by no means out of its depth in East Pakistan. He seemed quite convinced of the strength of Pakistan’s position in the escalating war as indeed all other army and many civilian officers were, sustained in their belief by the calm confidence in the command headquarters itself. The events that pricked the bubble of confidence would become clear later on.
In the third or fourth briefing that proved to be the last, the colonel reported, almost obivious of the implications of the information he was passing on to the envoys, that India had air-dropped paratroopers behind the frontlines in East Pakistan. He went on to state confidently that there was nothing to worry about because the army was quite capable of making short shrift of that relatively small force.
After the colonel had left, some of the envoys with whom I enjoyed a personal rapport stayed on. The prognosis of the war with India in East Pakistan had changed completely for them as it had for me.
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Paratroopers could only be dropped by India into East Pakistan if it was fully confident of the fact that they would be welcomed and aided by the local populace. That exercise seemed to be more for liberation than for conquest. That the exercise was the unfolding of a preconceived plan was to become clearer to me later on.
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NOTES
1. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff who had accompanied his chief on his visit to East Pakistan, shared his horrifying experience with me upon his return to Islamabad. He told me that as the chief was inspecting the troops deployed to honour him, he stopped and asked a soldier whether he had killed any Hindus or not. ‘Many Sir’, came the enthusiastic answer. But, said the chief, ‘how do you distinguish between a Muslim and a Hindu here as both look so much alike?’ The soldier promptly replied that the suspected Hindu was disrobed to check whether he had been circumcised.
2. Bengalis : those who are from Bengal. The term is used here, as all East Pakistanis were not Bengalis.
3. Right up to the end of the Cultural Revolution and assumption of power by Deng Xiaping, the Chinese arms supply policy was based on Marxist idealism. For fellow revolutionaries or fellow travellers, the arms were supplied free by China was in the best interest of the revolution. This free supply of arms reached Pakistan in great quantities year after year. It included everything such as fighter aircrafts, tanks, field guns, strenght piercing ammunition for several divisions ete.
4. In international law, retaliation is that legal act of a state against the illegal act of another state. For this reason, retaliation is clearly distinguished from aggression. That is the reason why when the Indian attack materialized against East Pakistan in November 1971, Pakistan remained unable to have that attack recognized, leave alone condemned, as aggression, Indira Gandhi’s tour before tha attack on East Pakistan was launched had ensured that outcome.
5. Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Little Brown & Co, Boston, Massachusetts, USA, 1979.
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2
Bhutto’s Version of Pakistan’s Breakup
West Pakistan had two vulnerable borders : with Afghanistan in the west and with India in the east. But what became West Pakistan’s war was only with India. The great strategic advantage along Pakistan’s western border was due to the goodwill of Afghanistan which was the first Islamic country to be drawn into the vortex of the war between Pakistan and India in 1971.
AFGHANISTAN
During the Indo-Pak war of 1971, I was serving as Director General of Africa and the Middle East in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan. Before the outbreak of the war, I was working in consultation with the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Islamabad on a proposal to settle the festering territorial issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the issue of Pushtoonistan. My solution to the issue, which Pakistan was
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refusing to acknowledge as a disputed point between the two countries, was to specify a clear boundary line. The new boundary line was proposed to be fixed on the watershed between the two countries, a recognized principle of international boundaries, with mutually acceptable adjustments. The main consequence of the settlement was that Pakistan would pull its border post from Torkham1 back to the watershed on the mountain tops. In its turn, Afghanistan was to drop the demand for Pushtoonistan as a corollary of having signed a new border agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
General Yahya Khan, the President, who was himself in charge of the Foreign Ministry gave his blessings on the initiation of negotiations. The unrecongnized territorial dispute with Afghanistan had multi-layered implications for various ministries of the Pakistan government. In order to address these concerns, I organized a standing Inter-Ministerial Committee chaired by myself to prepare a comprehensive plan for the consequent negotiating position. I had kept the Afghanistan ambassador informed of the general ideas—and felt heartened by the response of the ambassador who remained constantly in touch with Kabul regarding the matter.
Hence the proposal for a final settlement with Afghanistan was nearing completion in a positive atmosphere in Islamabad as well as Kabul. The first draft of the summary of Pakistan’s negotiating position was nearly ready to be submitted to the Cabinet for approval when war broke out in December 1971. At the outbreak of war, I was challenged and questioned over the plan for a boudary demarcation with Afghanistan by a representative of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). I was queried whether I still stood by my view regarding Afghanistan’s attitude toward Pakistan. And if so, then I should put it down in writing that even in the changed strategic context, Afghanistan would not open hostilities on the western border while Pakistan was fighting with India on the eastern front. This assurance, I was told, was necessary in order that Pakistan’s plan of battle could be drawn up on the basis of a single, instead of a dual threat to its borders, if that indeed was the case.
I was nonplussed. If I gave assurance of this nature in writing and if Afghanistan did open hostilities during the unsettled situation created by the Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan could be caught unprepared for the attack as most of its forces would be facing towards India and no credible force would be left to protect the Afghan border areas. And such a situation could develop because of a piece of paper signed by me! I would indeed be made to pay dearly for the miscalculation—but then what of the security of Pakistan, I contemplated to myself. I was quite confident of the policy that King Zahir Shah was following toward Pakistan. Satisfying ISID’s concern was, however, another matter. Hence I proposed to the ISID representative that, instead of me writing the note, it might be wiser to test Afghanistan’s intentions. I could propose to Afghanistan that, until further notice, both countries agree to inform the other in case any one of them planned major troop movements on the other side of the common border. If the answer from Afghanistan was positive, one could proceed with confidence to defend the eastern front. If, however, the answer was negative, Pakistan would have to prepare for manning both the fronts. By taking this course of action it did not matter what views I held regarding Afghanistan’s policy towards Pakistan. Mercifully, the ISID representative saw the logic of the proposal and agreed to await Afghanistan’s response.
At that time King Zahir Shah was in London. The war was heating up in East Pakistan but the western front was quiet. General Yousuf, Pakistan’s High Commissioner in London, had served earlier on a ambassador to Afghanistan and knew the Afghan king rather well. I sent a telegram to General Yousuf requesting him to put the proposal before the king, which the high commissioner did without delay. The very next day, the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan received the king’s agreement to the proposal together with his good wishes for the outcome of the war. The message allowed the Pakistan Army to concentrate its forces on the border with India.
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Despite Zahir Shah’s cooperation with Pakistan the Soviets held considerable influence over the Afghan army. Afghanistan, in an effort to prepare itself against a possible war with Pakistan, had accepted the Soviet Union’s offer to train its troops. As time passed, these Soviet trained officers began to acquire higher ranks in the Afghan army. Many of them spoke Russian and were in close touch with Russian advisers. While India was making all efforts to breakup Pakistan, these officers were clamouring for action against Pakistan.
After a few days, when war threatened to flare up on the western border, the Indian Air Force (IAF) bombed a few places in West Pakistan. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) suspected that the IAF received radar support from the Afghan border in planning air action over West Pakistan. It was suspected that the Soviet advisers in Afghanistan in conjunction with the Indian high command were providing India this support.
I received another visit from the ISID representative complaining about the radar support—and I again contacted General Yousuf in London and asked him to get in touch with King Zahir Shah regarding this issue. The king denied any knowledge of Afghan involvement in the affair. As an earnest measure of his goodwill, the king requested the Pakistani envoy to provide him with information regarding the suspected location of the culprit radar station in order that he may take immediate action against the clandestine post. I informed the ISID representative regarding the king’s request, but he never came back with any information. The king’s stupefaction at the absence of any kind of reply or information—and his opinion regarding the competence of the PAF is a matter of guesswork.
It was mentioned earlier that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took the oath as President of Pakistan on 20 December 1971, after the birth of Bangladesh. He learned of the cooperation of King Zahir Shah during the war. Within a week, he called the king personally and told him that he was coming to Kabul the next day and that he hoped Zahir Shah would receive him. The king agreed to the visit and Bhutto flew into Kabul the next day and returned to Islamabad before the day was over.
There was grave concern in the Pakistan Army that Afghanistan would make common cause with India in pursuit of its own claim to Pushtoonistan while India was utilizing successfully what its strategists called the opportunity of the century to bifurcate Pakistan. India had consistently stood by Afghanistan against Pakistan over the Pushtoonistan issue.
I did not accompany Bhutto on that flying visit nor was any record of the conversation made available to me. Therefore, I cannot state definitely what was discussed on that occasion. Bhutto had gone to Kabul to thank Zahir Shah for the restraint exercised by Afghanistan during the war. Both were aware of the pressure that the Afghan army was continuing to put on the king to settle the territorial issue by force while Pakistan was in chaos. With the loss of East Pakistan, Bhutto was also not in a position to tackle the boundary issue with Afghanistan at this point of time.
Consequently, after a few weeks, Bhutto followed up on his visit by sending his wife Nusrat Bhutto along with a Pushtoonistan speaking cabinet minister to Kabul to plead with Zahir Shah for more time. I also accompanied the First Lady and the minister. The king invited the visiting delegation to a small private dinner. At the dinner, he expressed his willingness to delay the negotiations but asked the minister to speciafically ‘tell my brother that I do not have too much time’. Zahir Shah did not know what was in store for him in the near future.
Aziz Ahmed, a senior civil servant, was acting a Bhutto’s foreign minister after the war. He called me to his office and questioned me about what he termed as ‘the new policy toward Afghanistan’. My enthusiastic response met with a severe rebuff. Aziz Ahmed dismissed the entire approach as
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‘poppycock’ and stated that he would teach the Afghans the lesson that they deserved. Completely taken aback, I returned to my office without any clue as to what would be the future attitude adopted by Pakistan toward Afghanistan. Nor was I ever again taken into confidence about the adrupt change of policy toward Afghanistan adopted by Aziz Ahmed. Soon thereafter, due to an interesting circumstance which I will cover later, I was seconded to serve as the Director of International Affairs of PIA and packed off to London to negotiate new traffic rights on new routes to resuscitate the national airline. I am not aware whether the change of policy toward Afghanistan was authorized by Bhutto—but he must have been aware of it at least.
On his part, Zahir Shah knew quite well that the Soviet influence in the armed forces of Afghanistan had radicalized the power structure in the Afghan army. Communists do not respect monarchy. The king had, therefore, to strengthen the clout of the nationalist elite in the government. The erstwhile national cause of Pushtoonistan had been taken over by radicals. It had ironically become a liability for the king’s own future. If he could defuse it with some understanding with Pakistan on the border issue, he could take the wind out of the sails of the radical factions in the army.
There was, therefore, no doubt that if the offer of border negotiations was withdrawn by Pakistan, it would pull the rug from under Zahir Shah’s feet. Bhutto was aware of this and yet his foreign minister threw the entire new policy toward Afghanistan out of the window.
When the promise of border negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan did not materialize, despite the passage of considerable time, no doubt was left in the mind of Afghan policy-makers about the shift in Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan. Zahir Shah was dethroned in a palace coup headed by his own brother-in-law, Sardar Daud, with the support of the Afghan army on 17 July 1973. Afghanistan was declared a Republic. The Soviet-backed communist party of Afghanistan, Parcham (Flag), then began to come to the fore. The Soviet bid to control Afghanistan continued and, thereafter, went through several phases, eventually culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Afghan king was exiled.
IRAN
The fall of Dhaka on 16 December 1971, culminated with nine divisions of the Pakistan Army surrendering to a general of the Indian Army.
As stated earlier, the war between India and Pakistan had moved to the western front before the surrender on 16 December. The attack in the western sector was initiated by Pakistan. Why the operation backfired became clear to me later, when Bhutto explained the events of the war to the Shah of Iran. Before that explanation is covered, another fateful event of the war needs elaboration.
In the order of battle of the Pakistan Air Force, the air defence of Karachi had been left to the Iranian Air Force under the terms of a covert pact agreed by the two countries. Even I was not aware of it. When the Indian Air Force began to bomb Karachi, I was told to send a telegram to Tehran, proposing that Iran take over responsibility for Karachi’s air defence as allotted to it by the secret pact. When I expressed my ignorance of the contents of the pact, I was given a specific formulation which needed to be transmitted to the Shah of Iran. It contained a crypted message stating that the time had come to put the understanding reached with him into action. The Shah, however, declined to observe the pact, invoking rebus sic stantibus2—a principle of international law that makes international agreements subject to the essential conditions remaining the same. The reason for the change in the circumstances invoked by the Shah was the Indo—Soviet defence collaboration pact of August 1971 that would have exposed Iran to retaliatory measures by the Soviet Union if it took over the air defence of Karachi in pursuance of its
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obligations. The Shah was reminding Pakistan that the understanding had been reached in the context of a bilateral war between Pakistan and India. The Indo-Soviet treaty had changed that context entirely.
The impact of the Shah’s response on the PAF was devastating. Its chief of staff threw in the towel. Indeed, he was reported to be playing golf while the war was on. Curiously, however, the IAF exposed the city to little damage. Perhaps, as in East Pakistan, the main purpose of India was to discredit the Pakistan armed forces rather than wreak hovoc on its civilian population.
At the first available opportunity, the Shah of Iran flew to Islamabad for an airport meeting with Bhutto. The Shah wanted to take stock of the new strategic situation personally. Iran had to reorganize its relationship in the new context with Pakistan as well as with India and the Soviet Union. Only eight persons attended that meeting on both sides—I was one of them.
The meeting went remarkably smoothly. Bhutto never manetioned the breach of the strategic pact by Iran, thereby, putting the Shah at ease who relaxed and heard out Bhutto’s explanation and his thoughts as to what had happened to Pakistan. The detailed record that I kept of that meeting is quite valuable historically. It contains a wide-ranging account of the situation as it developed in Pakistan after the secession of Bangladesh, and provided the first glimpse into Bhutto’s mindset after he assumed the positions of president and martial law administrator. In view of its significance, the record is being reproduced here, as it was written at that time, with minor editorial changes :
Bhutto : We will always welcome your suggestions. There will be no misunderstanding. Communication must be kept open between us. We are both sensitive to outside interference but between Iran and Pakistan, there are no problems that cannot be discussed.
We have failed in a big way due to lack of contact with the people.
At the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan had no established institutions but the people responded enthusiastically [to the creation of Pakistan) and accepted everything without question. Progress was, however, barred in the name of Islam. After the passing away of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, there was no accountability in Pakistan. The situations deteriorated continuously until today [January 1972]. Regional autonomy has now come to have priority in Pakistani politics. Take Balochistan, for instance. It is the easiest province to govern, but today it has become a problem. We have to cooperate with local leaders restive for more autonomy and to solve the problem gradually with vision. Mrs Gandhi is already saying that she harbours no ill will against the peoples of West Pakistan and Balochistan, mentioning the two people separately.
Ayub Khan took over in 1958. He adopted only half measures. While he was politically heavy-handed, he introduced, nevertheless, the Basic Democracies system. The economic progress achieved during his time was superficial. It spread discontent and disparity. Twenty-two families became conspicuous and arrogant, that made them the target of public dislike.
We had to undergo great hardship to dislodge Ayub Khan.
I knew Yahya Khan. After taking over from Ayub Khan, he called me on 25 March 1969 and asked for my cooperation and [to] stop the anti-Ayub demonstrations that had gripped the country.
The creation of One Unit by Ayub Khan, throwing the four province of West Pakistan together into a single unit, was a blunder. It created the concept of two countries within Pakistan and brought about a mental and para-consitutional bifurcation of the country. I told Yahya Khan in March 1969, to breakup
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One Unit and to hold elections. I also suggested a conference of the leaders of all political parties. May aim was to bring about cooperation between the army and the political life in the country.
I met Yahya Khan again on his return from the Rabat Islamic Summit later in 1969. He told me that he did not understand politics and wanted to return to soldiering by speeding up the process of elections.
Then something happened. He started dragging his feet. Every effort was made to limit my party gaining seats. The view was propagated that PPP would not get more than 15 to 18 seats in national elections. Awami League’s seats were estimated at 50 to 60.
The Legal Framework Order (LFO) that heralded national elections and announced the parameters for framing the Constitution was defective from the start. It was in conflict with Awami League’s Six Points. After the elections, its weaknesses became even more apparent.
I advised Yahya Khan to respect the results of the elections held in November 1970, just as they were, if he wanted and really deserved to stay on as President of Pakistan. But he suspected my proposal. He told me one thing and told Mujib something else. In fact, Mujib was told, ‘let us get together and crush Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).
After elections, I asked Yahya Khan either to remove the 120-day limit laid down by LFO for framing the Constitution or to postpone convening the National Assembly session. Nothing happened however until Yahya Khan suddenly postponed convening the National Assembly on 1 March 1971. No new date was set for it.
I was called to Dacca on 19 March 1971. I had not been forewarned about the military action that was to be taken on 25 March. I did not even know that Yahya Khan had left for Karachi on the night of 25 March. I left on 26 March. General Omar was on the same flight with me. His attitude was that, after the army action in East Pakistan, they would have to mullify the election results. That seemed to me to be the worst thing that the army could do in the face of the prevailing circumstances.
I met General Peerzada on return to the capital and asked him to tell me what their plan was and to put his cards on the table. I suggested that political action had to follow military action immediately A few undesirable elements should be eliminated and some leading politicians won over. Awami League should be banned but the election results should not be cancelled. [Nothing was recorded about what Bhutto said about Peerzada’s response].
Thereafter army units were lectured to the effect that Awami League was a menace and had been dealt with. Bhutto was a similar menace and would have to be dealt with also. The extremists in my party were given money and encouraged to split up the party. I had heated discussions with Yahya Khan and walked out of the meeting. General Peerzada came out and persuaded me to go back.
In July 1971, I came to Teheran and poured my heart out to you. I had to tell you about the actual situation because you are a friend of Pakistan.
India was meanwhile making careful and thorough preparations. The Indo-Soviet treaty altered the situation in August 1971. It was taken by some as a restraining influence on India. That was a mistake. In fact, India was planning to attack East Pakistan, skilfully exploiting the East Pakistani refugee problem abroad and using it to discredit the Pakistan Army.
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China was cooling off toward Pakistan as our policies were baffling them. We were saying one thing and were doing something else. General Sher Ali was outspokenly anti-Chinese.
By-elections were held in East Pakistan. They were boycotted by the Awami League-Jama’at-e-Islami was given a number of unopposed seats in East Pakistan.
The Razakars, also under the inspiration of the Jama’at, began to suppress elements opposed to them, mainly leftists.
Then China stopped the supply of planes. I went to China in November when the war was on the horizon. They gave hints, polite and subtle, to warn us of the gravity of the situation. I returend empty-handed. Taking offence, Yahya Khan gave a statement that he did not want China’s physical involvement.
When the war was in full swing, I told Yahya Khan on 4 December 1971 that the country was going, that we had to act quickly, and that he had lost the sense of the situation. The action had to be political. He said, however, that they had made new military plans in East Pakistan, that they could hold out for a long time on that front, and that I would see what they were going to do in West Pakistan.
Then I left for Lahore. He called me back on 7 December and showd me a telegram from Governor Malik painting a dismal picture of the military and political situation in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan said, however, that since the telegram was not from General Niazi, it did not reflect the correct position.
The written record falls silent here because Bhutto revealed at this stage to the Shah the reason for Yahya’s optimism which is even today little known. In view of its historical significance as well as for the people of Pakistan, I have attempted to reconstruct the gist of Bhutto’s revelation from a memory that frustrates me as much now as it did then. In any case, I did record the episode when Bhutto repeated it for the benefit of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.
Bhutto explained to the Shah that the original plan for the defence of Pakistan was called ‘Operation Fortress Dacca’ that provided for Pakistan’s forces withdrawing inwards whenever necessary until the three divisions flown out to East Pakistan were concentrated, along with the divisions already there, into an unbreakable defence parameter. Then the war would be heated up on the Western front and the international community would be bound to untervene to stop the war and to restore the status quo ante.
Unknown to the generals who were to mount the operation, this plan had been leaked by someone in the Pakistan Army to India. In order to distupt it, India passed to Pakistan, through a double agent, a fake top secret record of a meeting of the Indian Cabinet that stated that India was not going to involve itself in a costly war in East Pakistan—all it was interested in doing was to hold a small part of it. A government of independent Bangladesh would then be established on this land in order, so to say, to create Pakistan’s own ‘Kashmir problem’ in East Pakistan.
As the fate of united Pakistan would have it, the Pakistan Army took the fake record at its face value. The Fortress Dacca Defence Plan was scuttled as India had wished it to be. That hard-headed plan was replaced by another that was put together in a hurry. It was a rather foolhardy plan called ‘Operation Fan Out’—and was put into effect immediately. It dispersed the available divisions and deployed them rather sparsely on the borders shared with India. In order not to let ‘Pakistan’s Kashmir problem’ to develop, these thinned out units were under orders to stand their ground until the very end. Meanwhile,
20
the western front would be activated by Pakistan with an aim to divert the main force of the Indian Army away from East Pakistan, enabling ‘Operation Fan Out’ to become viable.
As if to seal the fate of the united Pakistan, this plan too was passed on to the Indian Army presumably by the same agent who had passed on the previous plan. While India was fully aware of Pakistan’s order of battle, the Pakistan Army had been taken in by a ruse about India’s order of battle. Consequently, Pakistan became a sitting duck during the 1971 war with India.
Having thus made sure of the dispersal of the Pakistan Army, India opened its attack on East Pakistan on 21 November 1971. Pakistan Army units held on to the ground heroically. As stated earlier, their deeds have received national recognition despite the humiliating defeat that followed. Meanwhile, according to the Operation Fortress Dacca Plan, three infantry prongs were sent into India on the western front. The plan was that wherever India committed its forces, the best armoured brigade of the Pakistan Army would be sent there to engage it; push it back; and expand the invasion in the resultant mayhem.
Since this plan had also been divulged to India, the Indian Army knew exactly what not to do. They followed the counter strategy of not responding to any of the three prongs, waiting to let them become over-stretched and hence open to easier destruction. The prongs penetrated deep into India without any hurdles. This was celebrated in the national press as the manifestation of the valour of the Pakistan Army. Meanwhile, the prongs possessed little or no armoured backing and became increasingly vulnerable to be completely annihilated. Panic prevailed in the Pakistan Army High command and the prongs were hastily ordered back. As soon as the retreat began, India attacked with full force. Pakistan’s military plans failed in West Pakistan also. The Pakistan Army had no clue as to what or where to fight during the 1971 war. After the disastrous retreat of the three infantry prongs, no worthwhile plan was left to undertake either in East or West Pakistan. The only hope left was in the intervention of the international community. Bhutto was requested by Yahya Khan to proceed to New York to plead Pakistan’s case. At this point a short reference was made by Bhutto to the proceedings in the Security Council. He gave me more details of those preceedings in discussions with other heads of state. What little Bhutto said to the Shah of those proceedings was also left out of the record that recommences at that point :
Bhutto : Events evolved rapidly in East Pakistan thereafter and ended in surrender in East Pakistan on 17 December. Yahya Khan then tranferred power to me on 20 December 1971.
The country needs widespread reforms. I am determined to restore democracy. We do not have any popular institutions. I do not want to be blamed for having taken advantage of the situation for imposing myself on the country.
I do not want to go out in ignominy. What I want to do is to reduce class differences. integrate the army with the people, and reform the police. A grand reconciliation is my objective. If Parliament does not work, the people will have to evolve some other procedure. I am giving everyone a long rope in order to ensure cooperation. Then if I am obliged to take action, it would be decisive and would have been unavoidable.
Jail breaks are taking place and gheraos (hostile encirclement) are occurring. I am sending party workers to talk to factory workers. If they do not listen, I will go to the people and take action.
The problem in Balochistan is being created by four or five tribal leaders. They were pampered by previous governments. Ayub Khan did take some action but then Yahya Khan tried
21
the soft approach again. Police posts were removed. They were exempted from obtaining licences for possession of arms. So they brought in huge arms supplies in the country, supplied by hostile sources.
One source of the arms in Balochistan is Iraq. Juma Khan Baluch also broadcasts to Balochistan from Iraq. I talked to Baluch leaders and offered them positions in the Central Cabinet. The appointment of Raisani as Governor, however, infuriated them. He is related to Asadullah Alam, your Court Minister. On Raisani’s appointment, they started shouting slogans : “Russia Zindabad; Indira Gandhi Zindabad”. But I will go to the people and isolate and expose them.
We need time. Indeed we have to buy time to deal with India and Russia and to put things together at home. We are hoping for a change in the attitude of the United States. We need time to reorganize our relations with China. It can no longer take on Russia. India has opened a Pandora’s Box. East Pakistan will become a precedent for others to start similar activities in India.
I am prepared to swallow my pride in national interest but Mrs Gandhi wants us to lick dust. At times, I have also to make strong statements for boosting public morale, but I have offered to talk to India.
Iran can prove to be of help in making our position well understood. I want a new wind to blow in our relations with the United States. I have the same attitude towards the Soviet Union although it is a ruthless power. What it has done in a part of a coordinated plan of global expansion. First the Soviet Union formalized a tready with India. After that came the treaty with Iraq. They already have come to South Asia. They have a vantage point in the Middle East. They are present in the Mediterranean. They have a firm foothold in Cuba. What they have created is a veritable nutcracker.
China has always been good to us. They have never interfered in our internal affairs. We would not fool them or deceive them. I have to explain our position to them in order to avoid any misunderstanding and to maintain a relationship of mutual confidence and trust. I have already told the American ambassador of my coming visit to China.
Iran has a problem with Iraq. We should cooperate and coordinate our policies.
Shah : We [Yahya and the Shah] went together to Rabat. Throughout the journey, I stressed the need for reforms in Pakistan. We met again last summer. I told him again that reforms were long overdue. If you cannot introduce them, give power to the civilians and go back to the barracks. One day army may be useful.
Then came the army action in East Pakistan. I urged the need for political action suggesting that he should clear the elected representatives of the Awami League, disqualify only a few, and hold only a few by-elections. I also talked to the Russians and told them that they would have another Vietnam on their hands if they intervened.
Militarily, holding the main force of the army 1000 miles away and to hold on in East Pakistan was impossible. The whole policy was wrong. General Yahya Khan was a good man but who were the men taking decisions and pushing him? If they are not identified, they might do the same thing again. It was quite clear to ud—the way things were happening one after the other.
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The Indo-Soviet treaty was very significant. Even the Americans and the British said that it was meant to check India.
Grechko has been to Iraq and signed a treaty. Because of good relations with us, they are not saying much. Is it true what they are saying about Balochistan and Pushtoonistan? They can go through Afghanistan and Balochistan easily and realise their dream of being in warm waters. We shall then be cut off from you. We have to be vigilant and to watch our situation in Balochistan.
We do not have Khans in Irans. The lands have been distributed. But if a superpower wants to create trouble in Iran, it can.
To neutralize the Russian threat, we gave them gas and also offered a pipeline through Iran to Russia for Arab oil along with transit facilities for over-land trade between Russian and the middle eastern countries. I suggested to the governor of West Pakistan to conclude a trade and transit agreement with India that would allow Indian goods to pass through Pakistan and Iran onto Russia.
Russia can shoot its way through Iran but they will find a destroyed country. Russia will get a bad name and no advantage. The West will save Iran for its own reasons. Iran is the key to the Middle East, especially its oil. The oil needs of US, Japan, and Europe are increasing rapidly. We are increasing the scope of our relations with Japan.
America is now much more alert to your situation. With passage of time, they will be more responsive. India’s attitude has shocked them. The opening of the Suez Canal will bring the Russian Navy into the Indian Ocean. The presence of the US fleet in the Indian Ocean is a significant development.
We are also trying to buy some time, say five years, to secure the lines of communications in the Persian Gulf. A package deal has been reached with UK over the islands after negotiations lasting sixteen months.
Iraqis have massed their troops on our borders. The Soviet-Iraq treaty talks of total identity of views. It also provides for strengthening Iraq’s military forces. This is not an isolated move. It is a pineer movement. If they detach Balochistan, you will be separated from us.
In about five years, we hope to be quite powerful and strong. The present rate of economic growth in Iran is 10 to 11 per cent. It will be 15 per cent soon. We must buy time.
With settlement in Vietnam, the balance between Russia and USA will be restored. The action in Czechoslovakia and the subcontinent has raised Russia’s prestige. If USA does not react, countries close to Russia will be frightened and draw close to Russia on her own terms.
I have nothing to add to what you have said about Pakistan. You are right. Reforms are needed and indeed necessary. Your generals should go back to the barracks and sit there. Army and politics should run in separate channels. It is important to give to the people the sense of participation in the reforms as well in the programme for progress.
You have to make reforms. But unlike lran, you do not have oil. You need foreign investment. Large resources are needed for effective reforms. I hope you would pay attention to the economy of Pakistan. In order to keep in step with public opinion in Pakistan, you may like to hold a keep in referendum on the question of reforms.
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It will be wrong of me to encourage you to attack India, at least not until you have the means to be sure of the outcome. You have to wait until all winds have changed their direction. Do not neglect your armed forces but inculcating in them the idea of revenge will be dangerous. When you are strong, you can do what you like. You must of course fight to safeguard your honour. You should improve our relations with Russia. You have a glorious opportunity to renew your relations with USA and I know that they are looking forward to it.
We should keep constant contact open between us. It is in our interest to see a strong Pakistan with the hearts of its people full of hope. Your society should be based on justice and hope. When that happens, the attitude of the rest of the world toward you will also change.
You were not plundering East Pakistan. You were investing more there than you were taking out. Now the burden of development there will not be on you. If the situation develops favourably in East Pakistan, you should give them full responsibility. They way you will come out stronger from the present situation.
I am going back to Iran with renewed confidence in Pakistan. There is no bitter war-mongering here and what is more, there is no loss of morale. You should communicate this to your people. Do not expose your person to much. Most people may be with you but some lunatics may act desperately.
Telegrams on top secret matters should be replaced by personal emissaries.
The Shah was hinting that the telegram sent to him to assume responsibility for Karachi’s defence was counterproductive. The matter was left there. It would never be known whether the Shah’s response would have been different if an emissary instead of a telegram had been sent to him. He was placed in a difficult situation by the telegram that he thought, perhaps rightly, was already in the hands of those who would have been busy in cracking Pakistan’s secret codes. It is reasonable to believe that his closing remark was one of the reasons why he had flown to Islamabad post-haste. He would have been keen to assess how much damage had been done to Iran’s relations with Pakistan as a result of his refusal to stand by his commitment to assume the responsibility for Karachi’s air defence.
Soon after assuming charge, Bhutto was confronted with the recognition of Bangladesh by Western countries. They had all been prepared for this by Indira Gandhi’s summer visits and the consequent Indian diplomacy while Pakistan was isolated as well as voiceless. No serious attempt had been made by Pakistan to counter the Indian version of the crisis in East Pakistan. In any case, little could have been done in view of what had been going on in East Pakistan after 25 March 1971.
Apprehensive of losing the support of the Muslim countries also, Bhutto decided to embark upon of an unprecedented flying tour of over a dozen Muslim countries within a short time frame. He asked the Foreign Ministry, basically me, to prepare an itinerary as quickly as possible. I, along with a Director of PIA worked out an itinerary for Bhutto’s visit to eight lslamic countries within a week. Once he approved the itinerary, Bhutto just had the heads of the eight selected Muslim states informed of the dates of his visit. He had followed the same procedure to visit Afghanistan, and the Shah of Iran had followed suit. Although the heads of the Islamic states had not been given the opportunity to give their affirmation, all of them understood the situation and welcomed Bhutto with open arms.
The safari resulted in notes of discussions hurriedly written by me that remained among my personal papers for the last four decades. Now that the official report on the breakup of Pakistan3 has been made public, there is no reason for me to keep these notes away from the research that would hopefully be undertaken by historians to build a lucid account of the demise of a united Pakistan in 1971.
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NOTES
1. The Torkham outpost lies beyond the watershed. It was placed there by the Durand Line that was drawn by Britain in order to keep both sides of the Khyber Pass well under British control. Situated well beyond the deep valleys on the other side of the Khyber Pass, it allowed the British forces to keep watch over Afghan movements while shutting the Afghans off from any knowledge of what was happening on the British side. The reason was that, despite waging several military campaigns in Afghanistan at great cost, Britain had reamained unable to secure a foothold in that country. The second best course was to keep it under observation. Coupled with the payments made in annual ‘Durbars’ to the most loyal tribal leaders in order to keep them happy and strong, the Durand Line had succeeded in keeping Afghanistan within the British sphere of influence.
2. Latin for ‘things thus standing’.
3. Among the first things Bhutto did after assuming charge as President and the Chief Martial Administrator of Pakistan was the establishment of a commission under the chairmanship of Justice Hamoodur Rahman, an East Pakistani judge of the Supreme Court, to investigate and to submit a report on the national debacle. The report was duly prepared and submitted to Bhutto who decided not to release it to the press for fear of a public backlash. All subsequent governments, military as well as civilian, also kept the report under cover though it was read by all those who came to power, including Bhutto’s daughter Benazir. For their own reasons, on which it is not proper to speculate, they desisted from releasing what has come to be called the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report. Then after almost 40 years, the report was leaked to the Indian press obliging the military government of General Peerzada Musharraf to release its own version of the report.
০০০
3
Bhutto’s Diplomatic Efforts in Muslim Countries
TURKEY
The first country on Bhutto’s itinerary was Turkey. Iran and Turkey, both close allies of Pakistan, had been very cautious and aloof during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Of the two, Iran had already touched base with Pakistan through the Shah’s visit. Turkey was awaiting Bhutto’s opinion regarding the East Pakistan debacle. They were also keen to assess whether their alliance with Pakistan stood firm since Turkey, in spite of being an ally, did not do much to help Pakistan through the crisis. Although it was not a state visit, Bhutto was received with full honours by Cevdet Sunday, the President of Turkey. The ambiance was most friendly and the discussion between the two heads was as detailed as it was open-hearted. My notes on the lengthy discussion are still intact and are being reproduced below in full with minor editorial changes.
Sunany : Turkey is the first country that you visit after becoming the President of Pakistan. This is a manifestation of the importance that you attach to Pakistan’s friendship with Turkey.
Grave developments have taken place in your country that have saddened us. We are here for a heart-to-heart talk between friends. You will no doubt have a lot to tell us and we are anxious to hear it. Tell us how did the events develop so quickly.
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Bhutto : Thank you for receving me at a short notice. Things are happening so fast in Pakistan that I could not plan long in advance and yet I had to go to brotherly countries to seek their understanding. I apologize for making you wait in the cold.
Sunay : You don’t have to do that.
Bhutto : Our problems did not arise suddenly. They go back to pre-Partition days and also relate to what happened after Partition. The struggle for Pakistan could not materialize without the struggle of the people of East Pakistan being in the forefront. Only when they took the lead that Britain and Congress realized that Pakistan was inevitable. East Pakistan was more exploited by the British than any other part of Muslim India. They felt the pain more sharply. Scecondly, there is something historical about Bengal. On the basis of it experience, Britain coined the phrase : what Bengal does today, India does tomorrow. The Mughals had the same experience. All the revolts originate in Bengal. That is what I meant when I said that India would lament the day because there are many Bangladeshes in India itself.
When Pakistan came into being, the East Pakistanis were in a majority. The first problem that arose was over the question of the national language. It was thought that Urdu should be the national language. Bengali is not a common language like Urdu. But the majority was of Bengalis and they wanted their language recognized. So it was decided that Pakistan would have two state languages. This was the solution thought it was belated. East Pakistan also accommodated West Pakistan. Some West Pakistani politicians could not get elected to the Constituent Assembly to East Pakistan sacrificed its seats to get them elected.
As the country got going, the central government was in West Pakistan. The bulk of civil services and most of the armed forces were from West Pakistan. This was the result of centuries of tradition. Industry was also concentrated in West Pakistan that invested in East Pakistan and brought the profits over to West Pakistan. These problems grew slowly. Nevetheless, up to 1958, there was s Supreme Court and a National Assembly for debate.
Political parties evolved separately in East and West Pakistan. That created political problems. But there was no crisis and one could not even dream at that time that separation of the two wings was possible, let alone inevitable. The central government and the industrialists in West Pakistan, however, over-simplified the political problem by their belief that Islam would ensure the unity of the two wings indefinitely. But Islam is not a religion that sanctions exploitation of man by man. It rather seeks to end exploitation. The Mullahs played a dirty role. Anyone who talked of emancipation, the rights of East Pakistan, and reforms was branded by them as a kafir.1 They called me kafir because we were working for these ends and a durable relationship with East Pakistan.
I told the rulers of the country repeatedly that unless we were honest to ourselves and rectified the situation, a deluge might overtake Pakistan. My message was understood in East Pakistan. After leaving the government in 1966, I went to Dhaka in 1967 to see a cricket match between India and Pakistan. As I entered the stadium, there was a spontaneous applause that lasted several minutes. If I were to go today, however, they might shoot me. Such is the change that has occurred in Pakistan.
Before, 1958, the state substructure was still colonial but dormant. After 1958, however, it came right back. Martial Law was imposed in 1958. It abolished the assembly and the political parties. The only link that remained between the two wings was on an individual level. This could
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not endure as the country was divided by a thousand miles of Indian territory. The economy of our country did not have a social or egalitarian content; so exploitation became more brutal. This gave rise to labour enlightenment and student agitation. The students of East Pakistan were the first to call for separation and the movement grew.
The student problem in East Pakistan had a special twist. India was not sitting idle. Right from the day of Partition, India adopted a special policy toward Muslim Bengal. The 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan were used by India effectively. Hindu teachers and professors influenced the minds of the younger generations. India was active in fields other than education and culture. From the beginning, India allowed free trade between East Pakistan and West Bengal. Trade laws applied to West Pakistan were different. Similarly, Indian evacuee property laws applied to West Pakistan were different from those used in East Pakistan. Passport and visa policy of India toward West Pakistan was very strict but quite liberal in East Pakistan. India had several consular missions in East Pakistan. These missions were well-manned and very active in the respective regions.
Certain political decisions taken by the Ayub regime also contributed to the separation mentality. Civil services that were national in character, were reorganized on regional basis. Railways, for instance, that was administered by one central service was bifurcated by the Ayub government. The public sector of industry was also broken up into two parts. Gradually army presenece in East Pakistan increased as the crisis deepened.
The most important factor was the creation of One Unit in 1965 out of West Pakistan. Instead of five provinces, Pakistan now constituted two provinces divided by 1000 miles of India. This came to mean two states in course of time as polarization continued to increase.
Problems between Pakistan and India led2 to the 1965 war that affected only West Pakistan. Because East Pakistan had remained out of the war of 1965, India said that West Pakistan had done absolutely nothing to protect East Pakistan that had been left entirely at India’s mercy. This was not correct. India did not attack East Pakistan because it was afraid that China would intervene.3
After ceasfire, Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Declaration. There was massive resentament against that Declaration.4 Public demonstration took place. Some students were killed. As the agitation continued, opposition leaders held a conference in Lahore and invited political leaders from East Pakistan to participate. This is when Mujibur Rahman first presented his famous ‘Six Points’ that provided for a federal government in which foreign affairs, national defence, and a part of the currency function were to be common. Foreign trade and aid were to be made provincial subjects and the two provinces were to have their own militias. Leaders from West Pakistan, however, summarily rejected the Six Points.
Sunay : When was this conference held?
Bhutto : In February 1966. President Ayub found himself in a diffucult position. He started giving preference to Mujibur Rahman and allowed him to propagate his Six Points in order to divert attention from himself. In a few months, the programme began to catch on.
I was still Foreign Minister when I met Ayub Khan in April 1966 in Dhaka and told him that he was playing with fire. The issues raised in the Six Points would become very serious in a short period of time. The Bengalis already had the feeling of having been left behind and now
27
they had found a leader. Ayub asked me what I proposed. I told him that he should deal with the question politically and let me start a public debate to establish that the Six Points were not in the interest of Pakistan. He turned the suggestion down. Instead he said that he had perhaps given too much latitude to Mujibur Rahman and that he would now use the language of weapons.
Mujibur Rahman was arrested soon thereafter. Significantly, there was no agitation in East Pakistan to protest the arrest. On that basis, Ayub came to the wrong conclusion that the problem had been resolved.
I left the government in June 1966. Mujibur Rahman was in jail as a result of the Agartala Conspiracy case. Ayub Khan claimed that he had evidence of a conspiracy between Mujibur Rahman and India. There must have been some truth in the case because Ayub Khan said that he was prepared to have a public trial on the basis of available evidence.
I started a movement against Ayub Khan in September and was arrested in November 1968. The anti-Ayub movement, however, continued. His last effort to remain in power was the offer he made to Mujibur Rahman to become Prime Minister. No agreement could be reached between the two. Meanwhile, agitation in West Pakistan against Ayub Khan increased and he was obliged to hand over power to General Yahya Khan in March 1969.
The first thing Yahya did was to declare his intention to restore democracy. I was released from jail. Yahya pleaded with me to stop the political movement. I agreed on the condition that he promised to hold national elections soon. I told him at that time that the key problem was to determine the degree of political autonomy for the provinces. I suggested to him that he hold a referendum on the question after all leaders had expressed their views on it, otherwise, the National Assembly will never be able to reach an agreement on the subject. I also told him that he should not worry about the position of the armed forces as they enjoyed a traditional respect is the country. They could have a role on the Turkish pattern. They could lay down a basic framework of principles and then safeguard it but the political structure had to be worked by political leaders. That system would preserve the position of the armed forces and also bring about public participation in government.
Yahya told me that he would consider holding a political conference but instead he held consultations with individual political leaders. When I met him in April 1969, I was immediately driven to the conclusion that he had no intention of transferring power to an elected government. Instead he was interested in perpetuating himself.
In October 1969, the Martial Law authority issued a decree called the Leagl Framework Order (LFO). It laid down the programme for elections after one year during which political parties could campaign for themselves. The elected National Assembly was to frame a Constitution that the President i.e., Yahya Khan would have the power to veto in part or as a whole.
Then Yahya Khan invited the politicians to the marriage of his daughter and asked us what we thought of the LFO. While other leaders congratulated him, I told him that his scheme was just political masturbation. First, no country had a full year for the election campaign. It was strange to provide for that in a country that had never had national elections before. Tension would rise during the election campaign that would throw up all kinds of issues and the political problems would become very big. Second, the real issue of provincial autonomy had not been decided. Mujibur Rahman would increase hatred of West Pakistan on the basis of the Six Points
28
that had already become well-known. Those points would have then become the property and demand of the people. Even if Mujibur Rahman was not there, people would find another leader to fight for the cause.
In August 1970, the election date was postponed by one month due to heavy rains. Thereafter, a great cyclone struck East Pakistan but this time the elections were not postponed. Mujubur Rahman succeeded in turning the extensive cyclone damage to his advantage. He announced that, while the whole world was moved by the tragedy, no help had come from West Pakistan. All political parties in East Pakistan withdrew from the elections except Mujib’s Awami League and two small parties : Nizam-e-Islam and the Buddhists. The military regime calculated that Mujib would get only 50 seats from East Pakistan’s 169 seats. In fact, Awami League swept the polls and secured 167 seats. My party was supposed by the regime to get only 12 out of 144 seats but we won 88 seats. So, instead of many parties coming to the fore as expected by the regime, only two parties emerged from the elections, one in East Pakistan and the other in West Pakistan.
I met Yahya after the elections and was amazed to see that he was quite happy with the results. I told him that the holding of the elections had been a matter for rejoicing but the outcome was not too good for the country or himself. The burden rested on the shoulders of two persons and he was continuing to play one against the other. Yahya said that I should not be so pessimistic because he was convinced that Mujibur Rahman would compromise on the Six Points. I told him that he was mistaken but, in any case, I was going to see Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka and would ascertain his real position on the Six Points. If he did not readily compromise, as I was afraid he would not, then Yahya should give us sufficient time to work out the solution outside the assembly or extend the time limit of 120 days for the assembly to frame the new Constitution.
I saw Mujib on 27 January 1971 and asked him about the degree of flexibility he had on the Six Points. Mujib stated clearly that no change in the substance of those points was possible any longer because he had been given a massive mandate by the people of East Pakistan to implement that programme. Now if he tinkered with the Six Points, he would probably he assassinated. Then I told him that Yahya had told me that he [Mujib] would compromise on the Six Points. Mujib said that If Yahya was politically so naive as to believe that he [Mujib] could keep that promise after the popular mandate, then I should not hold him responsible for that.
Then I suggested to Mujib to agree to the extension of the 120-days time limit for framing the Constitution in order for me to get public opinion in West Pakistan [to] accept the Six Points as far as possible. Mujib said, however, that the assembly was due to meet on 15 February. With the majority that he had in the assembly, he would have the constitution framed quite quickly on the basis of the Six Points, and if Yahya resorted to the veto he had provided for in the LFO, them the Awami League’s representatives would turn the assembly into a Constituent Assembly, adopt the constitution and march on the Government House in Dhaka.5
On return to Islamabad, I told Yahya what Mujib had said. I asked him to postpone the assembly in order to give PPP time to win over public opinion for as many of the Six Points as possible. Yahya expressed understanding of my position but made no specific promise regarding the extension of time.
Thereafter, I went to the people and continued to move closer to the Six Points. I had
29
accepted all the points except foreign aid and trade. Suddenly, on 1 March 1971, Yahya postponed the assembly session that was to convene on 3 March, without setting any other date. There were demonstrations throughout East Pakistan. Some people were killed but on the whole, the army restrained itself. Gradually Mujibur Rahman started assuming power and issuing orders like a government. During the ensuing weeks, Razakars were killed in riots.
Yahya Khan then proceeded to Dhaka on 15 March and inivited me to reach Dhaka on 19 March for talks with Mujibur Rahman. We three met on 23 March. Mujibur Rahman proposed a new formula in the meeting. He suggested that the National Assembly be divided into two committees representing the two wings, each to frame a constitution. Thereafter, the National Assembly should meet to tie up the two constitutions together to form a confederation between the two wings. My response was that I could not bypass the National Assembly. He had a clear majority and he could put the proposal before the assembly. I could not commit myself to such a drastic procedure outside of the assembly. I would accept whatever the assembly decided.
Then Mujib and I met separately. He said that there was no point in taking the proposal to the assembly. He was convinced that Yahya would trick me first and then trick him next. I maintained, however, my position that nothing should be done outside the assembly. I met Yahya Khan on 25 March. One of my colleagues was to meet Mujibur Rahman in the evening. He returned without being able to meet Mujib and told me that Yahya had left Dhaka with Mujib who was under arrest. I could not believe that because I was to meet Yahya in Dhaka the next day. At 11 p.m., I found that Yahya had left Dhaka at 7 p.m. I managed to leave Dhaka the next day.6
On my return to the capital, I met General Peerzada and told him that the military action taken in East Pakistan against secession was justified in order to save Pakistan. At the same [time], however, I emphasized that elections had already taken place. A civilian government should be inducted immediately into office otherwise the situation would get out of hand, Without a political of economic framework to create a hope, the action would tend to become just a plain military action.7
Then Awami League started to encourage people to leave East Pakistan for India. On its part, India began to internationalize the issue. India also began training East Pakistanis militarily in large numbers. Mrs Gandhi began her travels around the world. While she managed to internalize the issue, the regime in Pakistan allowed the political vacuum to continue.
On 28 June 1971, Yahya announced another scheme, Instead of the assembly, he would give the consititution. By-elections were to be held to seats of the disqualified Awami League members. This was a new provocation. The Awami League boycotted them. The by-elections were openly rigged. Most of the candidates were returned unopposed.
In spite of these developments, the rural people remained committed to Pakistan up to September 1971. We could have saved the country, had power been passed on to us (PPP). After all its efforts, India had to invade East Pakistan to bring about the present situation.
As for the war, the Pakistan army was not really defeated.
[The record falls silent here since Bhutto’s narration of the course of events were the same as conveyed to the Shah of Iran].
30
After the ceasfire on 16 December 1971, things developed very fast. Yahya sent a plane for me to return to Pakistan which I did on 20 December.
I found the country on the verge of civil war. The feelings were very strong. The students, the army, and the people were burning with humiliation. Yahya was thinking of executing Mujib. I told him that enough damage had already been done to the country. Mujib’s execution would be a disaster. I asked him to step aside and took over. Since I thought Yahya had lost his balance, I got Mujib over to the capital.
When I met Mujib, he was bitter but he pledged that sooner or later, he would do his utmost to maintain the link between the two wings of Pakistan. He said that he would never be another Shaikh Abdullah. After all, he said, he had fought against the domination of his own people. How could he accept the domination of India?
It was a difficult decision for me to release him. But I consulted the people in Karachi and shared with them my intention of releasing him. On return to the capital, I met Mujib again on 7 January 1972 and told him that I was going to let him go. I would not contradict anything that he chose to say and would leave the form of the link between East and West Pakistan to him. Even enimies maintained links. We had lived together of a long time so we had economic and commercial links. We could build no them. Mujib promised that he would do whatever he could to maintain some links between the two wings.
That is why I am appealing to the world to give us some time as the problem has become very complicated. Hasty recognition would pre-empt my final efforts with Mujib. If India had gone in to liberate East Pakistan, why is it staying on there. We have told India that we are ready to negotiate. But India is imposing conditions. They want us to recognize Bangladesh first. What would be left to negotiate then? The British think in terms of their commercial interest in East Pakistan’s jute and tea. They are forcing the pace.
Russians are the most important factor. They have gained the most but that would be temporary. They went out of their way to help India in order to regain the prestige that they had lost in Cuba at the cost of Pakistan.
As a result, they have become more aggressive in the Middle East. They are trying to take advantage of the unfortunate differences between Iran and Iraq also. They want to gain mastery over the Indian Ocean before the hegemonies of the two Super Powers are finally defined.
I have told the Indians that in our common history, the clash between Muslims and Hindus had brought in Britain. Now again there was [a] third party taking advantage of the conflict between India and Pakistan. But my own attitude toward the Russians is non-provocative. I am prepared to go to Moscow at an appropriate time. We need time to rebuild Pakistan. I am prepared to close my eyes to provocations and have friendly relations with all countries. That does not mean that we shall sacrifice our principles or friends, not just for the sake of having a pacifist foreign policy.
We would like to see how the situation develops in East Pakistan. The world is interested in East Pakistan for another reason. They are wondering whether Communism in East Pakistan would be of the Russian or the Chinese kind.
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In the future, we do not want to be a liability to our friends. That we have been a liability in the past is due to our internal weakness. Though there is a dark cloud over our country at this time, it will pass. We will build a strong Pakistan in the service of world peace and our friends.
Sunay : Thank you for a detailed presentation. It was enlightening as well as useful for us. It is hardly a prophecy to say that East Bengali (sic) will be recognized by several countries. We wonder whether Mujib would try to establish some link with West Pakistan if he came to acquire some freedom of action. We understand from the Soviet ambassador that they do not oppose federal of confederal links being established. The Indian amabassador has left the same impression. The policy of keeping good relations with the Soviet Union is correct. Normalization of relations with India is also desirable but the pace of normalization has to be gradual.
We understand that your policy of severing diplomatic relations with countries that recognize East Bengal is intended to discourage hasty recognition. But rigidity would lead to isolation. The continuation of this policy runs counter to the establishment of some links with East Bengal. With 75 million Muslims, East Bengal is claiming to become the second largest Muslim country among the non-aligned countries after Indonesia. If that claim materializes, then good relations between Pakistan and East Bengal would acquire more importance. Otherwise, they would conclude a treaty with India against Pakistan.
On recognition, our position is very clear. Our recognition is out of the question today. Our future line of action depends on yours. We do not want to believe that the link between East Bengal and West Pakistan is broken forever. East Bengal is still under military occupation. It is not possible for us to judge whether the country has become an independent state. Therefore the first condition for recognition is that the occupying forces should be withdrawn from East Bengal. Secondly, one has to determine whether the leaders of East Bengal, once free of foreign influence, would be able to govern that territory effectively. There is no need for hasty recognition. We insist on the necessity of the withdrawal of Indian forces from East Bengal. This question would be put by us before the NATO council.
We have followed your efforts with interest. In addition to normalizing relations with the world outside, you are engaged in reforms. We sincerely hope that your efforts would be supported by the entire nation and wish you success in your endeavours.
Your Excellency, as a sincere friend of yours we would suggest that you go easy on an army that has suffered a setback. Too many changes might cause incidents. It is highly advisable for you to be cautious in this respect.
Your Excellency, Turkey desires nothing but restoration at the earliest possible time of tranquillity in [a] friendly Pakistan. We shall maintain friendly relations in every field. So far we have tried to meet your needs as far as possible within out limitations. You owe us nothing.
What are your views on RCD and CENTO? Turkey does not claim the CENTO provides for all the needs of Pakistan. It does not have each and every remedy for Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey and for all the threats they may face. There is no doubt, however, that due to CENTO, the three countries are in continuous contact with the United States and Britain in subjects of shared interest. This organization has rendered advantage to the three countries in the economic and the cultural fields. I believe that it would be advisable for Pakistan to maintain CENTO as long as we do not have a better substitute. It was set up against the common threat, whereas, the war between Pakistan and India is a bilateral question. The other two regional countries of the organization
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face no threat from India. That is why CENTO has stood aside during this confrontation. The alliance does not stipulate joint action against such a threat. I think that if such a stipulation were made, Britain would have never joined the organization because it would have forced them to choose between two members of the Commonwealth that Britain could not even think about.
As far as RCD is concerned, Turkey has contributed in a serious and constructive spirit to RCD. Turkey believes that RCD has a role to play in fostering closer relations between the three countries and promoting cooperation between them—and that we should not lose sight of objective realities. The principal objective of RCD is to strengthen economic development but not economic integration. In this spirit, our government is determined to promote economic relations between the three countries. If one attempts to make a general assessment of RCD’s achievements, one can say that they are not satisfactory in all respects. There are several reasons for this, in addition to the geography and logistical difficulties of transportation. I believe there is no identity of views regarding the main purpose of RCD. Its scope was expanded in a way that some of its activities are not of primary importance to the three countries. If we follow a realistic attitude and channel RCD’s activities for improving economic and trade relations, I believe that RCD could play a constructive role in promoting cooperation among its members. I would now ask the Foreign Minister to say a few words.
Turkish Foreign Minister : As long as there is occupation of East Bengal, there is no question of our recognition.
The second criterion for recognition is the ability to govern. We are working in all friendly and allied countries to slow down rapid recognition as far as possible. Our own recognition depends on you and nothing else.
Bhutto : There is no misunderstanding possible here. I understand perfectly and thank the President on behalf of our people. I do realize the implications of too rigid a position on our part but I am handing a very complex situation. I have to keep the expectations of our people in mind. They must know that we are doing everything possible. The time factor is therefore important.
It was not an easy task to release Mujibur Rahman so soon after the fall of Dhaka. It is also not easy to maintain a link with East Pakistan. In this regard, the factors that you have mentioned are kept in view. India holds seventy to eighty thousand Prisoners of War (POWs). If we release Mujibur Rahman and recognize Bangladesh at the same time, my people will feel that while we accepted the fait accompli, nothing was done for the POWs. Naturally the Indians are not going to hand back the POWs quickly. It would be very difficult to explain to the families of the POWs if we proceeded on that course of action in a hurry. It is essential to carry the people with us and they must know that we are doing everything possible to preserve the country’s unity.
The principles that we are following are the same as mentioned by you and the Foreign Minister. There are countries where we have not broken off diplomatic relations like Nepal and Burma. Only our amabassadors have been recalled from those countries. We do not want to find ourselves isolated.
As regards RCD, I have nothing against it despite its slow progress. We have no intentions of weakening the RCD and would like to see it strengthened. The question of CENTO has a background in our country. The feeling among the people against SEATO and CENTO has always been there but it became stronger after the 1965 war. There is no major political party in
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Pakistan that did not include leaving SEATO and CENTO a part of its manifesto. It is not only PPP but Mujib’s Awami League would have withdrawn from both the organizations. Even now his administration would follow a non-aligned policy.
I was asked today about the future of CENTO. My answer was that I shall occupy myself with the very basic questions at this time and would leave the rest of the questions to the National Assembly. I clarified that PPP’s manifesto was written before the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971. That treaty had introduced a new element that has to be taken into account by us and the National Assembly. Mujibur Rahman had not taken any action in respect to this issue. Until he takes a stand, I would also not take any action before consultations were held with him. So I have shown some flexibility in view of recent developments. I have to go to the people and try to change public opinion.
At the moment, I cannot make a positive commitment in this regard. It all depends on how we organize our security and also on how the US position develops. Even if we are pushed with our backs against the wall, even then I would not move unilaterally. I shall explain first to our friends, Iran and Turkey. If the United States restores the sale of arms to Pakistan, that would help if the United States wished to restore the balance. Our position has been badly damaged. Resumption of the sale of US arms would help influence public opinion in the matter.
As regards reforms in Pakistan, these are basic in order to revive the economy in order to stop communism from spreading. Keeping Mujibur Rahman in prison would only have hastened the process.
The reform of the armed forces in Pakistan is going on with the cooperation of the armed forces, not arbitrarily.
I have two small points to conclude with. We do not want to convert RCD into something against the principles of a member country. If we refer to culture, it is in a broad sense, not in the religious sense.
Regarding the military action taken by Yahya Khan, my point is that political action should have gone along with the military action. In any case, military action came too late and when it did come, it went into excess. I have sincerely believed that injustices have been done to East Pakistan. This approach coupled with the mandate given by the elections equip me with the basis of finding a solution between our two wings.
Turkish Prime Minister : Your visit to Ankara has been very useful. We have benefited from the explanation of the situation given by you. We share your understanding of the situation and your opinion about the future relationships. As we did in the past, so also today and in the future we shall do everything in our power to help and strengthen Pakistan.
Bhutto : Thank you.
MOROCCO
From Turkey, Bhutto flew to Morocco. No record of the discussion is available since I remained busy with the negotiations to finalize the joint communiqué. This was considered to be a major objective in all
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eight countries visited by Bhutto in the first round, in order to demonstrate that Pakistan was by no means isolated in the Muslim world. It would appear from the record of subsequent discussions that Bhutto came out with flying colours on that score.
ALGERIA
Houari Boumedienne, the Algerian President received Bhutto at the airport. The conversation that followed between the two heads of state was particularly lively. Following is the record of the discourse :
Boumedienne : I extend welcome to you on behalf of the people of Algeria. We wish you could stay longer, but we understand your preoccupations. You must come again.
Serious events have taken place in your country. We are keen to hear about them from you.
Bhutto : These are difficult times for my country. Though I should be in Pakistan at this time but I felt it was my duty to find time to go to those countries who had stood by us. I have come to thank you for the courageous position you adopted in our crisis.
The confrontation between Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent goes back to a thousand years. Despite being smaller in number, the Muslims managed to hold dominant power over the entire subcontinent from the sixteenth century till the begining of the eighteenth century. The rise of the Marathas revived the Hindus but British power intervened and assumed total control over India.
In 1947, the British left after partitioning the subcontinent. The birth of Pakistan was considered at that time to be the solution of the Hindu-Muslim conflict. In the movement for Pakistan, the sacrifices of Muslim Bengal were instrumental. Without those sacrifices, Pakistan would not have come into being. Bengal was among the worst exploitation regions by the British who were aware of Bengal’s genius. The British would say, ‘what Bengal says today, India says tomorrow’.
After independence, for twenty-five years the power of the state resided in West Pakistan. The civil services and the armed forces were also from West Pakistan much more than from East Pakistan, mainly because West Pakistan was more developed. This by itself did not create a problem. The most important element of conflict was the national economy. Investment capital in East Pakistan came mostly from West Pakistan. The East Pakistanis began to feel the pinch of exploitation.
After General Ayub took over power in Pakistan in 1958, free enterprise received a boost and the feeling of being exploited increased considerably in East Pakistan. Economic development without an egalitarian concept causes trouble. As a result, Ayub was ousted from power in March 1969 and Yahya Khan, who was Commander-in-Chief of the army at that time, took over power from him. Yahya promised national elections.
No general elections had been held in Pakistan until that time. The LFO was issued in October 1969 and political activities were allowed from January 1970 onward. One whole year was given for electioning. The elected National Assembly was to frame a constitution within 120 days, otherwise it was to be dissolved and fresh elections ordered. The unity of Pakistan and Islam were decreed to be the basic values for the constitution that could be vetoed by Yahya
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either in part or as a whole.
With the sudden burst of political activity, all political problems came into the field including those pertaining to regional rights, national language, economic development, students and labour. Yahya Khan asked me what I thought of the LFO. I told him that I feared that it would lead to serious crisis given the length of time for electioneering. Everyone was abusing everyone else and that had started a rising spiral of hatred in the country. The national problem had to be channelized in some way. Yahya said, however, that the raging controversy was a good thing because everyone was getting things off their chest.
During this period, Mujibur Rahman was pressing on with his Six Points. People in East Pakistan took those points to be the way to end the exploitatiion of the eastern wing by the western wing. They had no idea of the intricacies involved in the proposed arrangement. Six Points became a charismatic slolgan.
In November 1970, a great cyclone hit East Pakistan. Mujibur Rahman turned the damage done by it into a proof of the apathy of the central government in West Pakistan. Despite the havoc created by the cyclone, elections were not postponed and were held in December 1970. Mujibur Rahman made so much political mileage out of the cyclone that all parties in East Pakistan, except the small ones, withdrew from the elections. Consequently, out of the 169 seats in the Assembly for East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League captured 167. In West Pakistan, out of 134 seats, excluding the 10 seats for nominations from the tribal areas, PPP won 88 seats. Thus two parties emerged on the national stage, one in East Pakistan and the other in West Pakistan. Yahya Khan had estimated that 10 to 12 political parties would be represented in the National Assembly allowing him to manipulate them effectively. The political situation after the elections, however, turned out to be quite different.
In the new situation, Yahya approached Mujibur Rahman to cooperate with him in order that I could be stopped because I wanted radical reforms. He told me the opposite and asked for my cooperation because Mujibur Rahman, he said, was a secessionist. However, I went to Dhaka and asked Mujibur Rahman to compromise on the points pertaining to foreign trade and taxation. Mujib told me that Yahya had assured him that the National Assembly was going to be convened in March 1971, he did not have to compromise because no one could stop him from securing a constitution with the Six Points in it.
I returned to the capital and informed Yahya of Mujib’s views. I asked him either to postpone the date for conventing the Assembly or to extend the 102-day limit for framing the constitution as no agreement between the two wings could possibly be reached in that short time in the Assembly.
Then I began my effort to mobilize support in West Pakistan for as many points as possible. As the debate on the Six Points heated up in West Pakistan, Yahya suddenly postponed the convening of the Assembly without indicating the next date.
That gave rise to turmoil in East Pakistan. On 15 March 1971, Yahya flew to Dhaka for a meeting with him and Mujib. We met on 22 March. Mujib came out with a new proposal : two committees were to be formed for the two wings for drawing up two constitutions. Then the Assembly was to meet to give shape to a confederation between the two wings. Yahya Khan looked toward me for my reaction. I stated in that meeting that I could not agree to such a drastic
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procedure outside the Assembly. He could put his proposal before the Assembly. With the majority that he had, he could well hope to get it through. Should that happen, I would have no objection to the new procedure.
While these talks were going on, Mujibur Rahman was arrested on 25 March and flown over to West Pakistan with Yahya Khan. I returned to the capital the next day and told the military junta that if the military action was not followed by political action for handing over power to political parties, the military action would be lacking in legitimacy and would be discredited. Yahya told me, however, that the politicians had failed and he would take political action himself. He told me that if I was not careful, I would receive the same treatment as Mujib.
Meanwhile the military action in East Pakistan went into excesses. We protested repeatedly against the excesses to no avail. On 26 June 1971, Yahya declared his new political scheme. By-elections were to be held in East Pakistan for seats that had fallen vacant due to the disqualification of a number of elceted members. This was a new provocation to the people of East Pakistan and the turmoil increased.
India encouraged people to leave East Pakistan and began to train guerrilla forces from among the refugees. Mrs. Gandhi visited world capitals to get the Indian version of events accepted abroad. In August 1971, the Indo-Soviet treaty was concluded. It was called defence cooperation but its purpose was the opposite. I held a press conference in which I declared that India and the Soviet Union were preparing to take military action against Pakistan.
Despite all these developments, the rural population in East Pakistan remained in favour of a united Pakistan. Indeed Yahya thought that he could rely on that support but, in order to by-pass the opinion in rural areas, India invaded East Pakistan on 21 November 1971.
I went to the United Nations Security Council on 7 December 1971 to defend the national cause. The same day the General Assembly supported the unity of Pakistan by 105 votes with only a few abstentions. The Security Council, however, remained unable to act because the Soviet Union vetoed on resolution after another in order to prevent a ceasfire. Consequently, the war spread to West Pakistan. The Soviet Union supported India in full measure. Our defence alliances, SEATO and CENTO, did nothing. The United States was committed in Vietnam. China also did not intervene. Pakistan was left alone.
On 17 December 1971, a simple ceasefire was imposed on Pakistan. Public opinion in West Pakistan was incensed. The country came to the verge of civil war. There was widspread resentment in the army. I took over as President and Chief Martial Law administrator on 29 December 1971.
Yahya wanted to execute Mujibur Rahman but I told him that enough damage had already been done. Instead I brought Mujib over to the capital. He was in the dark about what had happened since his arrest. I put him in the picture. I told him that East Pakistan should maintain a meaningful link with West Pakistan, otherwise it would be in danger of being dominated by India. Mujib promised me on oath that he would retain some link but the needed time.
Then I secured public approval for the release of Mujibur Rahman and met him on 7 Januray 1972. I gave him a passport to proceed to London on the way to Dhaka where he declared that all links he had with West Pakistan had been severed.
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I have done everything possible to show our goodwill. I sent him food and offered to him officials from West Pakistan. The Soviet Union sent me a message on Mujibur Rahman’s release. I told them that it had not been easy and that they should not be hasty in recognizing Bangladesh until I had another meeting with Mujib either in Switzerland or Austria for reaching a final settlement with him.
India says it went in East Pakistan for the sake of the majority of the population. But now it wants to stay on to save the minority. With regards to negotiations, India says that it would negotiate with us only after we recognize Bangladesh. We believe negotiations should be started without any pre-conditions. As for the Soviet Union, they have already recognized Bangladesh.
Boumedienne : It is said that the strength of Pakistan lies in its army but press reports paint another picture of its performance. What about Pakistan’s allies during the time of danger. I enquired from the Turkish ambassador during the war, about the position his country had toward Pakistan. He said that the defence alliance was intended only to face larger dangers. What is now your position vis-à-vis Iran, Turkey, and the United States? Is there any hope of new relations between East and West Pakistan? Recognitions are incresing daily in numbers.
Bhutto : The general view is that the Pakistan Army is among the finest in the world. We have been victims of a system. The army ruled Pakistan for 13 years and got involved too much into politics. There was no accountability. Its leadership was indolent and corrupt. That was one reason for the dabacle. That is also why there i resentement among younger army officers.
Regarding future links between East and West Pakistan, certain countries do not want Pakistan to remain united. They know that if any links remained between the two wings, the Muslim character of the two would survive. With no links with West Pakistan, East Pakistan will become communist.
Boumedienne : But Mujibur Rahman is not a leftist.
Bhutto : He wants to be the Harold Wilson of East Pakistan but he would be finished very soon. Russians are trying to outdo the Chinese and that would be ensured if no links remained between the two wings. In the long run, the Chinese will outdo the Russians so the Russians want the foothold right away.
Boumedienne : Does this imply withdrawal of American forces from Asia?
Bhutto : Temporarily. India will be the loser in West Bengal and Assam. Russia has retrieved its failure in Cuba. Russia wants to show that it is them and not China that is the beacon for the Third World.
Boumedienne : Russia cannot convince the Third World of that.
Bhutto : We want time.
Boumedienne : Can anything be done by Algeria?
Bhutto : Firstly, Soviet pressure should be released through friendly countries. King Hasan said Algeria and Morocco could contact the Soviet Union.
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Boumedienne : We are still not clear about the aftermath of the war. Have the Indians any designs?
Bhutto : India is very active. It is concentrating on ensuring that Pakistan is split into two. We can handle India if the Soviet Union is kept out. There is no movement against Pakistan in Baluchistan but Moscow radio is propagating that there is.
Boumedienne : We were surprised that India and the Soviet Union went on doing things but you did nothing in any way.
Bhutto : All political contacts were cut. Two or three people are ruling in the Kremlin. I spoke with Kosygin. He kept on saying that the situation was very critical and that they were for unity.
Boumedienne : There are special links between Pakistan and Algeria. We are against all aggression and the division of the world. These are positions of principle. Military intervention in order to divide a country is very dangerous for smaller countries. That would be like the law of the jungle.
Bhutto : The Soviet Union desires to have access to the Indian Ocean. They now find the possibility of realizing an old dream. We are in a nut cracker. It is a forbidding situation.
Boumedienne : Is there a chagne in the Sino-Pakistan relations?
Bhutto : Not substantially. China is not in a position to take on the Soviet Union. Our main problem now is the withdrawal of Indian forces from East Pakistan.
Boumedienne : India wants East Pakistan as a market for duty-free imports from India. Your initiatives are useful. They create a new atmosphere and show India as an occupying power. There will be danger if large countries should recognize.
Bhutto : It is likely to be Britain and after them France.
Bouteflika (Algerian Foreign Minister) : France has stated that it would not recognize while there was occupation.
Boumedienne : I shall try to get in touch but I do not think much would come out of it.
Bhutto : If friendly countries put pressure upon the Soviet Union, they would not encourage India to commit aggression against West Pakistan. That will contribute to the stabilization of the situation.
Boumedienne : It shows that the Soviet Union is following an interventionist policy. Doubts have been introduced among Arab countries. We did not approve of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. Our relations are not so good. Cairo has taken a flexible position. It is under pressure from the Soviet Union.
Bhutto : Russia took a bold position in South Asia because they knew that the United States would not come in. In the Middle East, they will be cautious. The Egyptian leadership is quite disillusioned.
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Boumedienne : After the India-Pakistan war, they sent weapons to Israel.
Bhutto : We are, however, ready for negotiations with all concerned.
Boumedienne : What are you expecting from Algeria?
Bhutto : We do not want to be a liability to our friends. You have done a lot for us. We are touched and are beholden to Algeria. The best missiles are internal strength and we are now building them.
Boumedienne : I agree. The previous government in Pakistan did not face up to its responsibilities.
Bhutto : You know that India has problems with all its neighbours : Ceylon, Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, China.
Boumedienne : We are with you with all our energies and our hearts. Everyone here is deeply concerned with your situation. We are following all developments.
The situation is quite serious. There were exaggerated reports showing West Pakistan as colonizing East Pakistan. We believe all efforts should be made for maintaining links. We also think it is important to dress up the wounds. Sooner or later responsible people will realize that this has been a big mistake. They will realize that they had come under foreign influence and Indian and Russian domination.
Soviet pressures are irresistible. You should prepare an action programme including the long term. The balance of power is related to other’s powers as well. Asia for Asians should be the dominating idea.
Bhutto : I agree. You have comforted us and given us inspiration.
TUNISIA
Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisian President received Bhutto. Since I joined in the meeting after the discussions had begun, the following record commences from the middle of the meeting. The reason for this was that in other countries, I would negotiate the Joint Communiqué after the meeting, but here in Tunis, due to paucity of time, the working order had to be changed.
Bhutto : The Soviet Union was deeply involved in the Security Council proceedings and made us pay a very heavy price.
Bourguiba : We watched the developments with keen interest. This situation extends beyond the region. It involves the evolution of the balance of power after the Second World War. The Soviet Union wants to be in the Middle East and the subcontinent. We are particularly concerned in view of the US hesitation. They are stepping back in the region. This event is to be understood in that context.
Bhutto : We agree with this view.
Bourguiba : We hope that some understanding would develop between the two parts of Pakistan.
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They lived together for many years and have much in common. Therefore, we hope that the two parts would come back together. This would prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of the situation.
Bhutto : Our policy is proceeding on that basis. At present, there is a lot of resentment and the wounds of the tragedy are still fresh. Time will be the healer. There are many uniting factors between us. We shall put emphasis on these factors. Something may come if not today, then tomorrow, hopefully in the near future. If we do not succeed, it is inevitable that communism will come to East Pakistan, in Russian or Chinese style. It is not going to be a domain of India. There might be many Bangladesh type of developments in India itself. India cannot fill the vacuum in that region. Soviet Union itself will not allow India to take advantage of the development in that way.
Bourguiba : I can see that.
Bhutto : The Soviet Union wants to show that it is not a China or a Cuba and this it has done at the cost of Pakistan.
Bourguiba : The Soviet Union is following the policy of great powers, that is, to have a struggle among themselves through other countries.
Bhutto : We are like pawns in the game. Carthage was close to one empire and suffered. We are close to two.
Bourguiba : In order to solve the problem of East Pakistan, you may like to have free elections. That may erase the sad memories.
Bhutto : I assumed charge as President on 20 December and met Mujibur Rahman on 7 January. I released him unconditionally. Our policy is to do nothing which would cause misunderstanding or accentuate antagonism. We are taking other initiatives also. We are ready to send army or civilian personnel to assist Mujibur Rahman. We are sending 300,000 tons of rice to him.
Bourguiba : We are very happy to hear about these initiatives. These would bring back together a complicated situation.
Bhutto : We hold a reasonable position on future relations with East Pakistan. I want to have a dialogue with Mujibur Rahman somewhere outside East Pakistan because it is under foreign occupation. We want what they want as long as we have a face-to-face dialogue. India should vacate East Pakistan. Until then we appeal to the world not to precipitate matters. We were first put under military pressure and now we are being placed under diplomatic pressure to recognize Bangladesh without giving us the opportunity to meet. The Soviet Union is pre-empting that meeting in order to create a fait accompli although international law demands that no territory may be acquired by military aggression.
Bourguiba : The Soviet Union does not take international law too seriously. If an agreement is reached without the domination of East Pakistan by West Pakistan, it would allay Bengali fears and encourage federation between the two wings. Mujibur Rahman may welcome that and tell the Indians to leave.
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Bhutto : I am prepared to go even further provided we meet. I am prepared to do what Mujibur Rahman wants but there should be no intervention by others. I shall tell you what Mujibur Rahman said to me on 7 January.
(Here the record is interrupted to avoid a repetition of what Bhutto had told the other heads of state about his conversation with Mujibur Rahman on 7 Januray).
Bourguiba : I am very happy to hear this because the statements being made in Dhaka are full of hate.
Bhutto : That is because he is surrounded by Indians there. India attacked East Pakistan on the pretext that the majority wanted it. Now it wants to stay on because it says it wants to protect the minorities. This introduces new dangers in international relations.
Bourguiba : I agree with you. I feel that the situation may change, provided an agreement is reached with Mujibur Rahman. When there is no fear, he would send the Hindu troops away.
Bhutto : I agree. I shall try to find a common denominator that would be acceptable to him.
Bourguiba : The Tunisian prime minister and the foreign minister feel that if you declared your intentions and Mujibur Rahman responded, it could put a break on the tide of recognition that is gathering momentum. The world would know that the matter is not closed as the two are in contact with each other. This would enable us to intervene with our friends in the West to refrain from rushing into precipitate action.
Bhutto : I would welcome it but I do not want to weaken his position. He has India and the Soviet Union around him. I am not sure whether he is free to act. But as I told you, before leaving for Dhaka, he told me that he would try to maintain some links with West Pakistan.
Bourguiba : There are countries friendly to the Soviet Union. They may go ahead with the recognition. That is why we made the suggestion.
Bhutto : If these countries can be contacted, I shall be very happy.
LIBYA
Bhutto was received with much warmth and enthusiasm by Colonel Gaddafi. They immediately drove to the venue of talks. The conversation between the two heads of state was quite spirited. It was recorded by me which is reproduced below with minor editorial changes.
Bhutto : I apologize for having come at a short notice and thank you for giving me your time. I have taken great interest in the development of your country since you took over. I have great admiration for the way in which you have dealt with foreign interests in Libya. PPP’s thinking is close to your approach. That you are a young and dedicated leader doubles my interest in your progress.
My people are facing a grave crisis. But even with severe limitations, we are doing all that we can. As the time passes, we shall rebuild Pakistan.
We stand by you because we stand for principles irrespective of opposition. The
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problems of the present in our country can only be understood in the historical perspective. The South Asian subcontinent is very large in size and has a long history that gains relevance to the present times with the Aryan invasion about four thousand years ago. The Aryans established the caste system that supported the class structure from the top to bottom, the lowest being the untouchables. A divine code was introduced to protect that system that eventually spawned Hinduism. Anyone who was not Hindu was below even the untouchables. This system was challenged in course of time by Buddha. But the tide was reversed by a Hindu revival. Buddhism was uprooted and was banished from the land of its birth to other lands.
Several centuries later came the message of Islam through Mohammad Bin Qasim and started spreading as it was a message that preached the oneness of God, human equality, and simplicity in religion. This message took root. For many centuries, the subcontinent remained under the sway of Islam. Hindu power was replaced by Muslim power. Muslims did not convert forcibly so the majority remained Hindu. The Mughals were the the last Muslim empire in the subcontinent. Their decline began when the Marathas rose in the 18th century. The Marathas under Shivaji secured a large kingdom by conquest in the south.
In view of the instability in the subcontinent, the British and the French came in. Muslim power was not replaced by Hindu power. It was Britain that took power from the Muslims, suppressed them and encouraged the Hindus that brought about confrontation between the two communities. That confrontation lasted for 150 years.
Finally, Britain left two states behind, India and Pakistan. Though both the British and the Hindus were opposed to the creation of Pakistan, millions of Muslims risked their lives and Pakistan came into being in 1947.
I should note here that Bengal made the greatest sacrifice. This is important for the attitude of Bengali Muslims toward Hindus. According to the two-nation theory, the whole of Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Kashmir, and Hyderabad [Daccan] should have come to Pakistan. But the British gave Assam to India, divided Bengal and Punjub. Hyderabad had to fall to India and seeds of trouble were laid in Kashmir. The division was accepted by Pakistan as a compromise.
Since Partition in 1947, India has been trying to destroy Pakistan due to the same confrontation that started in the time of Mohammad Bin Qasim. However, Pakistan organized itself. The army and the people had the spirit to defend themselves. We broke out in Kashmir soon after 1947. We held our own. In 1962, the Sino-Indian war provided India with the pretext for obtaining massive arms supplies from the United States.
In 1965, India attacked us but we held on due to the valour of our troops. The United States cut off our arms supplies. The Russians, however, walked in and supplied large quantities of arms to India. Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Declaration although we had done well in the war. In that conference, Russia adopted a partisan attitude. Kosygin thumped the table and threatened us. Under the pressure, Ayub Khan signed the declaration. Since I was the one who was opposing the Tashkent Declaration, US and USSR saw to it that I was removed from office.
The people in Pakistan rose against the declaration. Ayub Khan turned for support against me to East Pakistan. Mujib’s Six Points were allowed to be propagated. Just to divert attention from the demonstration in West Pakistan, Ayub gave Mujib a free hand. Then he found that the Six Points were catching on in East Pakistan so he arrested Mujibur Rahman. There was no disturbance int East Pakistan as a result.
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In 1967, PPP was organized. A movement was started against Ayub in 1968. I was arrested in November 1968, but the movement continued. Mujibur Rahman was released from jail and Ayub offered him the prime minister’s office. That move fell through and the anti-Ayub movement continued. Ayub had to go in March 1969 and handed over power to Yahya Khan.
Yahya asked me for cooperation. I asked for national elections to which he agreed. The anti-Ayub movement was stopped. In October 1969, the LFO was issued that provided for elections after a year to an assembly that was to frame the constitution in 120 days that could be vetoed by Yahya either in part or as a whole. In January 1970, political parties were allowed to form. Fourteen parties came on the stage. Each one of them stated what they wanted. Mujib took up his Six Points again and argued that East Pakistan had become a colony of West Pakistan. Other parties also had some negative features in their political programmes.
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) maintained that massive reforms should be brought in under Islam. Most of these parties suggested to Yahya Khan that he should support Mujib against me. The rich industrialists said that they would be able to control him. But when the elections were held, two parties, PPP and the Awami League, secured overwhelming victory. Mujibur Rahman refused to compromise on the Six Points and declared they had become the property of the people.
On 25 March 1971, military action was taken in East Pakistan. Mujib was arrested. I told Yahya Khan that military action by itself would be disastrous. It must have a political direction that would bring in economic reforms to win over the hearts of the people of East Pakistan otherwise Pakistan would become a lost cause. Yahya Khan did not agree. He said that he would like to handle the situation in his own way.
Yahya Khan held by-elections in East Pakistan that were boycotted by the Awami League. That resulted in the exodus of refugees from East Pakistan; internationalization by India of the question; and the training in India of East Pakistan guerrillas.
We demanded the transfer of power to a civilian government. I was almost arrested. Yahya Khan, however, did not want to take political chances in West Pakistan. India exploited the political vacuum. Mrs Gandhi toured the capitals of world powers to amass support for India’s point of view. In August 1970, the Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed. It was not a defence treaty as it prepared India for aggression. In effect, India lost its non-aligned status as a result of that treaty.
On 21 November 1971, India invaded East Pakistan. The war eventually spread to West Pakistan. I went to the United Nations to plead Pakistan’s case but it was too late. The Soviet Union vetoed every single resolution and on 17 December, East Pakistan fell to India.
I returned to Pakistan on 20 December 1971 and assumed power. The unconditional ceasefire had been a shock to West Pakistan. The country was on the verge of civil war. The people, including the young, wanted Yahya’s head. That is why he had handed over power to me. He wanted to execute Mujibur Rahman. I stopped him from committing the disastrous blunder and brought Mujib over to the capital.
Mujib had no idea of waht happened. I informed him of the developements and told him I was going to release him without any conditions but he should allow me a few days to prepare public opinion in West Pakistan. I also appealed to him to maintain some link West Pakistan
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otherwise East Pakistan would lapse under Indian or Russian domination. He told me that I should give him time to take over power and to bring the situation under control. He would then try to maintain some links but he could not say that in public for some time.
I gave him a Pakistani passport and he left for London on his way to Dhaka. I am nor contradicting whatever he is saying. I have offered to him full cooperation, including sending civilian officers, armed forces, and food. They are our brothers. We have to wait for the wounds to heal. We need time. That is why I am saying that no one should hurry in recognizing Bangladesh. India should vacate East Pakistan and let the two wings talk to each other as free people and come to some settlement. Mujibur Rahman wants the venue to be Switzerland or Austria. I told him that I was prepared to go to Dhaka, if necessary. That is where we are at this time. I cannot say whether this meeting would take place or not but we should be given the time and the opportunity to arrange a meeting.
There was a big international conspiracy against Pakistan between India, the Soviet Union, and the Zionists. They turned international opinion against Pakistan. I have established a high-powered commission to examine the national debacle. Some of the top generals were also involved. The army was not allowed to fight in East Pakistan. No offensive was mounted from West Pakistan. The armoured divisions never moved out of their stations. We have removed many generals and admirals. We want the younger element to come in.
I have no false pride. I am prepared to go to Moscow. To muster international support I have come first to Muslim countries. I have mentioned the international conspiracy only to you.
Gaddafi : What is the demand (sic)8 from us?
Bhutto : We have no demands to make. We do not wish to become a liability to our friends. Pakistan wants to be a source of strength for the Muslim world.
Gaddafi : I am happy to welcome you. We are saddened by the circumstances faced by Pakistan. Our stand toward Pakistan is not due to the fact that it is a Muslim country or President Bhutto has taken over the Presidency of Pakistan. So what I say to you is not merely complimentary.
From the beginning we noted that this was an international conspiracy. We believe that the conflict between India and Pakistan has its roots in history. It is a religious struggle though it may assume different shapes and forms. Ever since the creation of Pakistan you have faced these problems but the dangerous thing is the entry of great powers in this conflict. The other power, China, stood with bound hands. There are some voices in Arab countries that criticize Pakistan for being a member of Western alliances that we heard when we were students. But now after what Pakistan has gone through, we find it stands alone. We found also that what was being said against Pakistan was wrong and we found ourselves going along with Pakistan.
We see some mistakes made in solving the crisis in Pakistan. As the crisis deepened we watched. There were mistakes committed but the invasion, the separation, and the interference were the major factors. From the beginning we could see that East Pakistan would be separated. The conspiracy in UN was also clear to us. So we stand with Pakistan.
We sent telegrams to third nations to intervene and stem the crisis. We advised these nations that the recognition of the separation of East Pakistan was a great mistake. I sent the telegrams to Tito as one of the non-aligned leaders. Another was sent to Yakubo Gowan as he had
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faced a similar crisis in Nigeria. A telegram was sent to Kaunda as a third world leader and also of the non-aligned block. We also sent a telegram to Afghanistan and asked them not to do anything that would worsen Pakistan’s position. Afghanistan was the only country to reply. They mentioned the problem with Pakistan over the border but agreed with our suggestion.
The stand of the Arab countries is not coordinated because the Arab region is not united due to the fact that social development in various Arab countries is different. Most Arabs, however, support Pakistan. Egypt, for instance, did not support us but Egypt’s heart is with Pakistan. But the official position was different due to the alliance with USSR. We believe you understand how things are to Egypt.
I can share with you a secret. We sent military aircaft to Cairo and I called President Sadat and asked him to load the aircraft with napalm bombs. He agreed but pointed out that the loaded aircraft could not be allowed to leave for Pakistan from Egypt. So he would send the aircraft to Libya from where it could go to Pakistan. So you can see that Egypt’s public stand does not correspond to reality. There are other international pressures also on Egypt.
Despite good relations with the Soviet Union, we criticized it in our broadcasts regarding its role in South Asia. The Soviet ambassador here heard those statements. We advised our representive to the United Nations to deplore the Soviet stand in that organization. He prepared a note and distributed it to other delegations. I myself wrote in the official newspaper in Libya and called Russia in imperialist country. We left no doubt that we did not agree with them.
This is a religious conflict whatever form it may take. We tried very hard to help Pakistan. Unfortunately the war ended too quickly to allow us to do anything. We believe the defence of Pakistan to be the defence of Libya. We shall take any stand politically that you would want us to as we consider it out duty.
We have a brotherly advice for you. This was not the last battle. We thought Kashmir could be conquered by Pakistan during the war. That can still be done. You have the advantage of having 60 million Muslims in India. There should be a programme for using them. I do believe that the principles of Islam should form the basis of your work. Without religion no stand will be viable because this is a religious problem.
We are proud of the way in which you are solving problems. We believe that to be the best way for the moment. But we do not have any hope that agreement would be reached with India or Russia. The Chinese should have come in to balance the equation. But we have to be very careful beacuse they do not help us for the sake of God. Their help is based on their own strategy. So our relations have worsened with them. We have disagreement with China. We ignored whatever they said to clear themselves for doing nothing and stated our position to them clearly.
We hope that the crisis experienced by you would be an example for other Muslim countries. Pakistan is a Muslim country that is suffering from confrontation with others. We believe this should unite the Muslim countries together. We are prepared to go all the way. Our hearts feel the sorrow like yours. This defeat is also our defeat and the conspiracy is also against us. We are with you constantly. We cannot forget Pakistan’s help to us.
Bhutto : You have proposed many things. Let us first establish our principles and the ambassadors and the foreign ministers can keep in touch.
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Gaddafi : Do you have major support in East Pakistan.
Bhutto : Yes, We do. That is why India had to invade to change the situation.
Gaddafi : Probably Pakistan faces less problems than India. It can take the initiative to gain strength through technology and become a modern state ahead of India. India seems to be going slow in modernizing itself. It is visited by famine. The population is backward. It is suffering from many social problems. It cannot development at the same pace as Pakistan. That is an advantage. That is the only way to win.
The conversation then drifted into detailed cooperation in the defence filed. The two heads of state identified what could be done together.
Gaddafi explained that Libya had established committees to ensure that the laws of Libya were in accordance with the Shariah. He asked Bhutto whether some Muslim jurists could come to Libya from Pakistan and Bhutto replied in the affirmative.
EGYPT
Anwar Sadat’s relations with the Kremlin were still warm when he received Bhutto. Sadat’s welcome to Bhutto was, however, sincere and unreserved. On his part, Bhutto was careful in his remarks. He avoided specific reference to the secret tactical details of Pakistan’s defeat. Following is a written record of the talks, with minor modifications.
Sadat : In the name of the people of Egypt, I welcome my brother. It is a pleasure to have discussions with them. I wish I could have welcomed him in better circumstances. Neverthelsee, it is a pleasure. Here you will find complete understanding. Egypt has lived and is living this tragedy. I thank my brother and all the people of Pakistan for the solid understanding they have always rendered to our cause. We feel as they feel and would always support thier cause.
I would have asked my brother to stay much longer but I Know your preoccupations. We know in Egypt that, despite all that has happened, President Bhutto is the man for the situation. It will always be a pleasure to receive him.
Bhutto : I am with you today at a moment most difficult and painful for my country. Several problems combined and hit us all at the same time. These problems had been growing over time. Some of us were fearing that these developments would take place. I met my brother during the Rabat Conference and again in 1971 and told him that calamity awaited us. The development was not sudden. I have come to Egypt as its role in the Middle East is decisive. Our destiny is linked though there are some transitory factors of difference. Our cultural ties bind us together.
You have given progressive leadership to Egypt. But for the reforms in 1951, there would have been no progress in this country. Your progress is our progress. As foreign minister, I tried to improve relations between our two countries. So there are objective reasons why this tour would not have been complete without Egypt.
Our problems are complicated. Internal problems have got involved with external factors. Of the three main external factors, the first is India. That is an old story. It pertains not only to Partition in 1947, but goes right back to the advent of Islam in the subcontinent.
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We had a war in Kashmir in 1948 and another in 1965 and in both we held on. So the Indian factor could not have been decisive in 1971 but the second factor i.e. the Soviet factor got involved with the Indian factor. The Soviet Union came out openly on India’s side with no apology and India attacked Pakistan equally unashamedly. There is no doubt about the gravity of the Soviet role.
The third factor was the Zionist factor with its strong press.
The internal factor was provided by the kind of government Pakistan had for the last 13 years. There was no comprehension of the political situation as the army looked at everything from the point view of force. Recently the government had got involved with bankers.
You know the background of East Pakistan’s demands for autonomy. The Six Points of which it consisted were debated. Essentially they represented the common man’s concern with bread and butter. I myself ascertained this. The Six Points meant bread and butter for the people, end of exploitation and progress. Then there were also forces in East Pakistan for which the Six Points meant secession.
Yahya Khan did nothing to stop the acrimony and hatred. Instead he gave a whole year for election campaigns during which he played one political part against the other PPP’s position on the Six Points was well-known. Mujibur Rahman was adamant and made no compromise. Then came his arrest on 25 March 1971.
I advised Yahya Khan that reforms were badly needed and that effective reforms could only come through civil government. But he said that they would do it in their own way. I told him in September that the situation would be out of hand by December 1971. That was not really a prophecy. The Indo-Soviet treaty, the internationalization of the issue, and the refugee problem were clear pointers in that direction. India’s statements and other statements left no doubt that India was waiting for winter to attack Pakistan. I left the country in disgust.
Then I was called back from Rome to go to China to remove misunderstanding. That did not help. China could not appreciate the short-sighted policies of the government in East Pakistan. Then came the military conflict with India while Pakistan was not ready politically, economically, or militarily. The generals were doing civilian jobs.
I was sent to the United Nations. The Soviet Union vetoed everything until the end. The people wanted Yahya’s head after the surrender. The army was seething with agner. There was danger of a civil war when I took over. I had many generals removed and got Mujib released after due preparations. I gave him a Pakistani passport to proceed to London on way to Dhaka. I offered to Mujib a carte blanche and told him that we would do whatever he wanted in order to maintain some links between the two wings of Pakistan. We would revive cooperation. Mujibur Rahman said that he needed to be given time. He said that he would not be like Shaikh Abdullah.
You know the developments after his release. We can start to build a relationship between the two wings but precipitate action will kill even that hope. If the developments after Mujib’s release represent a reality, we would also recognize it but we must be convinced that it is indeed what it seem to be.
I have told the Soviet ambassador that they had gained nothing from what had happened. I have asked the diplomatic corps to give the matter some time. All we need is understanding.
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Sadat : Thank you for your statement. I assure you of our full understanding. You will go from here in joy. It is a wise way in which you are taking the ship ashore.
There are many similarities in the problems of our two countries. Mrs Meir is to us what Mrs Gandhi is to you. We are suffering alike. You have our complete understanding and backing. May God help you.
We have been through difficult times and have been working hard. We lost everything in 1967 but now we are well equipped. For the last four years, we have been building our armed forces. It was a heavy task.
I am sure with your ability and statesmanship everything will become better in time.
Principally Bhutto requested Sadat to avoid precipitate recognition of Bangladesh and received the latter’s assurance on that score. Bhutto left Cairo convinced that Egypt’s stand during the Indo-Pakistan war was due to the compulsions of its own situation.
SYRIA
Hafiz Al-Asad : We are happy to receive you. You are a leader with grave responsibilities in difficult circumstances, you are welcome in Syria. We understand the present conditions in Pakistan and appreciate your efforts to solve them. Pakistan has always stood by us. So we shared the experience of Pakistan’s crisis. Our people have closely followed the developments in Pakistan. To solve the present difficulties requires experience and knowledge. President Bhutto has the necessity qualities.
Syria is also passing through difficult circumstances but we have done everything possible for Pakistan and will continue to do so. We were keen to receive you as visit will give us the knowledge of the crisis. We are interested in knowing the details.
Bhutto : Thank you for receiving me at short notice. I have come here firstly to thank you and your gallant people for support in the gravest crisis for Islam in the subcontinent. I have special admiration for Syria which is a torchbearer in the renaissance, politics, education, and civilization in this region. I shall try my best to promote collaboration between Syria and Pakistan.
I admit that we have suffered a very bad defeat. It was the result of the juxtaposition of external and internal causes. Externally, there was a conspiracy between the Soviet Union, India, and Israel. Internally, Pakistan had a wrong system that involved exploitation of the people and dictatorship of the generals who had no political knowledge or experience. They were interested only in capital generation. They concentrated on adding factories and paid no attention to the country. Internal decomposition set in as a result. Some of us saw the approaching catastrophe. Others did not. In 1969, I had told President Sada that we would be overtaken by disaster in two years. I reminded him of that meeting this morning. He remembered.
Islam’s advent in the subcontinent in the eighth century marked the beginning of the struggle between Hindus and Muslims. Hinduism had uprooted and replaced Buddhism. The apex of Muslim power in the subcontinent was reached in the thirteenth century and lasted until the eighteenth, when the Hindu Marathas began to replace Muslim power. But neither the Muslims nor the Hindus succeeded in the power struggle between them. Instead, Britain came in and
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replaced both. This time it might be Russia or China that would replace the sway of both Hindus as well as Muslims. India must think of this. She might not be able to do so, however, on account of the intoxication of military victory.
Britain did everything in its power to weaken the Muslims but the Muslim struggle culminated in the birth of Pakistan. The contribution of the Muslims of Bengal was crucial in this struggle. The reason for their struggle was essentially to get rid of Hindu domination of Bengal.
After the birth of Pakistan in 1947, mistakes were committed in running it, as a result of which power was concentrated in West Pakistan. For that reason, a demand for autonomy grew in East Pakistan. A compromise could have been reached between the two wings in 1968 that would have averted the crisis. But the real culprit was big capital that wanted to keep East Pakistan as a market. A compromise posed no problems to the progressive politicians but to the exploiters, it appeared to be the end of the world.
I told Mujibur Rahman not to abuse West Pakistan as such. We had to replace the system of exploitation and, if we did that, exploitation would automatically come to an end. Whatever was done for East Pakistan was, however, too little too late. India walked into the breach and exploited the differences between the two wings through the lure of money and sabotage.
Then India opened attack on West Pakistan in 1965 but we held on to our positions. Although the military situation was favourable for Pakistan, Ayub Khan went to Tashkent to meet the Indian prime minister. The Soviet Union imposed on the subcontinent terms favourable to India despite the position on the ground. Under Soviet pressure, Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Declaration. There was widespread resentment in West Pakistan.
Soviet and Israeli collaboration got me out of the government. Ayub got frightened of me and encouraged Mujibur Rahman in order to neutralize me but Mujibur Rahman started the Six Points. The essential feature of that plan was the demand for economic autonomy for East Pakistan.
The common man in that wing saw that plan as bread-and-butter and justice and the Six Points caught on within three months.
Since the political situation in West Pakistan had come under control, Ayub turned to East Pakistan and Mujibur Rahman. There was no agitation in East Pakistan against his arrest and the institution of legal proceedings against him.
Then I started a movement against Ayub Khan in September 1968. I was also arrested but the movement continued. In February 1969, Mujib was offered premiership by Ayub Khan if he could remain as the President. This was apparently distasteful to the army. Ayub Khan was forced to step aside in March 1969.
I was released and Yahya Khan sent a plane to my village to fly me to the capital. Yahya Khan told me that though Ayub Khan was stepping aside, he would not take over power unless I stopped the movement and gave him time. I told him that the essential condition for stopping the movement was that general elections should be held in the country. Yahya Khan agreed the movement was stopped.
In October 1969, the Legal Framework Order was issued. Political activities were to be
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allowed from the first of January 1970 and general elections were to be held at the end of the year. Basic conditions that sought to safeguard the unity and the personality of Pakistan had been laid down for framing a new Constitution.
Fourteen parties started political acitivities. Yahya Khan asked me what I thought of the Legal Framework Order. I told him that by 1969 all the contradictions in the political life of the country had come out into the open. The Order was going to allow the resultant acrimony to seethe among the people for one whole year and still hoped that the Constitution would be drawn up within the time limit of 120 days. I reminded Yahya Khan that the first Constitution had taken seven years. The second Constitution had taken four years. The second Constitution had taken four years. Now with all the acrimony between the two wings at full bloom for a whole year, how could anyone expect a new Constitution to be finalized in a mere 120 days. Even if, for argument’s sake, the effort to frame the new Constitution succeeded within the time limit, there was no justification for Yahya Khan retaining the power of vetoing it. Yahya Khan, however, decided to continue with the process as the army had envisaged it.
After the end of the monsoon, a devastating cyclone hit East Pakistan that took a horrendous toll of life and the meagre property that the peasants of the affected area had. The news spread quickly as the international press was already present in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan sat in Islamabad until the absence of a visit from him began to be widely resented in East Pakistan. He then arrived in East Pakistan and went to inspect the damage wearing breeches and knee-high polished boots. That visit did more damage than its absence had done.
Mujib turned the episode into a new point of hatred between the two wings. The people’s response to his leadership became universal. The government in Islamabad could do nothing to reverse the trend. Mujib’s movement became so powerful that all political parties except Mujib’s Awami League withdrew from the elections and the field was left free for the Awami League.
In the elections, Awami League secured 167 out of 169 East Pakistan seats. My party won 88 of 144 seats for West Pakistan of which 10 seats were to be filled by nominations. That effectively meant 98 seats for PPP or 70 per cent [actually 68.2 per cent] of Wes Pakistan seats. That result upset all the calculations of Yahya Khan. Then he began to pull stringes and played us two against each other.
I told Yahya Khan that Awami League’s Six Points had become a programme for secession but he said that he had been given to understand by the industrialists that Mujibur Rahman would compromise. Then he went to Dacca. Mujibur Rahman asked him to convene the National Assembly in Dacca on 3 March 1971. Yahya Khan, who had declared Mujib to be the next prime minister of Pakistan, agreed.
When he returned to Islamabad, I told him that there was already a shortage of time. The differences between the two wings were so great that it would be impossible to frame the Constitution in 120 days. He had therefore either to extend the period provided for the framing of the Constitution or to postpone the convening of the National Assembly.
On 27 January 1971, the governor of East Pakistan told him that time was needed for public opinion to settle down. The governor also suggested that either the time limit of 120 days should be extended or the convening of the assembly should be postponed.
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Mujibur Rahman said that he had Yahya Khan trapped. He would see to it that the assembly was held in Dhaka and force the Constitution based on the Six Points that, he said, had become public property.
Then I held a general meeting of the PPP in Lahore, that was attended by 500,000 people, to press my point of view.9 Yahya Khan felt the pressure and on 1 March postponed the assembly without fixing any date for it being convened. The announcement resulted in widespread demonstrations in East Pakistan and Mujibur Rahman took over virtual control of the province.
On 15 March, Yahya Khan went to Dhaka. I was invited to come to Dhaka on 21 March. On 22 March, Mujibur Rahman made a new proposal that envisaged convening two constitution committees in the two wings that would work out the Constitution in 120 days as they saw fit. The two constitutional proposals would then be placed before the National Assembly in order for it to work out the details of a confederation between East and West Pakistan. Mujib asked me to accept that proposal. I said that he could put the proposal before the National Assembly where he enjoyed a majrority instead of asking me to accept it. My acceptance would imply bypassing the National Assembly.
Then suddenly Yahya Khan struck. He had Mujib arrested on 25 March and returned with Mujib as his prisoner to West Pakistan.
I met with Yahya Khan on return to the capital. He appeared to act as if he had already solved the country’s problems. He said that the army had already wasted too much time waiting for the politicians to do something and now it was doing its duty to safeguard the country. I told him that military action had to be followed by political action and that I hoped that he would introduce effective reforms soon through a civilian government for otherwise deterioration would set in. Yahya Khan was, however, not convinced.
The military action in East Pakistan was followed by excesses committed by the army personnel in East Pakistan. I publicly condemned what was going on in East Pakistan. The excesses led to the waves of refugees streaming into India enabling her to internationalize the issue. Training of East Pakistan guerrillas was sped up and a government of Bangladesh was formed in exile.
On 9 August, the conclusion of a treaty between India and the Soviet Union was announced. But despite the treaty, the country could not be dismembered. The people in rural areas were strongly attached to the idea of Pakistan. India then proceeded with its shameless attack on 21 November.
I was sent to the UN Security Council to plead for the nation. On 7 December, 1971, a cease-fire resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union and the military situation deteriorated. On 17 December, Yahya Khan accepted ceasefire without any conditions amounting to surrender in East Pakistan.
The unconditional surrender came as a great shock to the people of Pakistan as well as to the armed forces. People could not understand why the army had surrendered. There were 80,000 well-armed troops in East Pakistan. No credible military effort had been made on the border of West Pakistan with India or in Kashmir. The armoured divisions of the Pakistan army did not move at all. The Pakistan Air Force struck India but the army did not move. I have established a Commission of Enquiry to unravel this mystery.
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Meanwhile the situation became critical in the country. Yahya Khan asked me to come back as he was going to step aside. I took over in those conditions on 20 December 1971. I brought Mujibur Rahman over to the capital. I dismissed some generals and admirals and introduced reforms in order to raise the people’s morale and build in once again.
Mujibur Rahman did not know what had taken place after his arrest. I told him that he could go back to Dhaka and asked him for time for preparing the public opinion for what was going to happen. He agreed.
On 7 January 1972, I had a detailed discussion with Mujibur Rahman. I told him that we had struggled together for independence and had lived together for 25 years thereafter. Despite what Yahya Khan had done, he should try to maintain some link, no matter how thin, with West Pakistan. I told him to select the common domonstrators between us. I would accept those since I knew we could rebuild the partnership between the two wings. I told him that the alternative to union between the two wings would be much worse. East Pakistan was surrounded by India to be used as a market as had been the case earlier. It would be like the situation of the small fish in a big pond with predatory fishes around. I told him to do exactly as he thought fit in order to rebuild East Pakistan. What he told me I shall tell you in private.
(Bhutto’s account of what Mujibur Rahman said to him was not recorded but it could not have been too dissimilar from what he told King Faisal in Jeddah the next day. That was recorded and will appear later on).
Mujibur Rahman is now issuing statements in order to improve the atmosphere (that is what the record says). He is in great difficulty. Communists are strong in East Pakistan taking orders from Russia and China. Many armed groups of communists have come into existence. The country is passing through conditions akin to famine. The economy has been shattered. Strong emotions have raised their head. He has, therefore, to wait for things to settle down.
No one in the world extends recognition when a country is under occupation. Let us have some time. Mujib and I can meet anywhere in the world. I told the Russian ambassador that following military coercion, Pakistan was now being put under diplomatic coercion. That was against all principles. I had already taken two significant steps. I released Mujibur Rahman and expressed readiness to talk to India. Russia should not make my position worse unnecessarily.
Indians had gone into East Pakistan looking for something else and were now staying on for another reason. It would be a dangerous precedent if one goes into a country on the basis of the wishes of the majority and stays on to protect the minority.
All we want is time. What I say does not mean that we do not want good relations with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we would do everything to avoid deterioration in our relations with that country.
Asad : Thank you for giving us the details. We did not know many aspects and you have answered many questions we had in mind. On our part, we have stood by Pakistan’s side and remain hopeful that Pakistan would find some kind of unity. Our support is out of our duty towards Pakistan. You have a vision of the future with friendly relations with all countries in good time.
It is not necessary to talk about Syria’s circumstances. You appreciate our situation just
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as we appreciate yours. We shall always stand by the side of Pakistan.
Bhutto : During my administration, we shall intensify our support for Syria. I know the situation well and there is no need for discussing it. We are with you. There is no difference between India and Israel.
Asad : We are convinced that you will support us. Our attitude is very clear. We shall never recognize Bangladesh and have informed others also of this position. We also advising our friends that there is no difference between Israeli and Indian aggression. Mistakes might have been committed by Pakistan but that does not justify military aggression. The responsibility in the matter belongs to the people of Pakistan themselves. In course of time, democratic movements could have put the situation right and mistakes could have been so rectified as to avoid secession. We have informed the Soviet Union accordingly.
The people of India are a friendly people and fighting could not be in the interest of developing countries. Good relations prevail between India and Syria but we cannot see any justification in the course of action adopted by India. We do not agree to such intervention even in any enemy country and more so in a country with whom we have historical relations.
Our attitude toward Bangladesh will be decided in agreement with you. There is no doubt that your attitude toward Mujibur Rahman was wise and we hope that it would be in the interest of the people of Pakistan.
SAUDI ARABIA
Bhutto was aware of the fact that Saudi Arabia had promptly given 50 million dollars when Pakistan approached them for aid during the heat of war and he was keen to express his gratitude to King Faisal. Upon his arrival in Saudi Arabia, Bhutto was warmly received by King Faisal. Following is a written record of discussions held between the two.
Faisal : Let me begin by saying that you are welcome here. This is your own country. There is no doubt that the relations between us are the very best because they are based on common faith in Almighty Allah. We hope that these relations will become stronger with each passing day.
Bhutto : I thank His Majesty for his characteristic kindness for Pakistan. From the beginning, the government and the people of Saudi Arabia have stood with us with great affection and sincerity. We are here among brothers. I feel embarrassed to say that we have not been able to repay what Saudi Arabia has done for us.
I have come to Saudi Arabia today when my nation is at a crossroad. It has been dismembered by international conspiracy. In fact, I have come here to have consultations with His Majesty and seek guidance from Almighty Allah for the future. I can assure His Majesty King Faisal that the future will show how much we honour our relations with the government and the people of Saudi Arabia and himself.
I would like to tell His Majesty how Pakistan faced its greatest crisis. I hope His Majesty would not mind if I went into details.
Pakistan was the creation of the Muslim struggle against Hindu and British domination.
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Ever since Mohammed Bin Qasim set his foot on the subcontinent, there has been a conflict between Muslims and Hindus. Much before that the Buddhist influence had also come as a challenge to Hindu domination but the Hindus had wiped it out. They felt confident that they could do the same thing with Islam but they were wrong because the roots of Islam were permanent and ordained by God.
Constant struggle ensued between Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent. Both had very deep roots but Muslims held sway for 700 years in the subcontinent. Due to this constant struggle between Hindus and Muslims, the British and the French stepped in. Britain took over the subcontinent not from the Hindus but from the Muslims. For that reason, they did everything to weaken the Muslims and to strengthen the Hindus. Nevertheless, in spite of British and Hindu opposition, Muslims gave one million lives and created Pakistan. In this struggle the Bengali Muslims had a great role to play. It was a joint struggle for Pakistan and we established Pakistan in 1947.
The mistake we made was that we thought that once Pakistan we established, we had reached our goal. But the British and the Hindus did not think that way. They continued their efforts to dismember Pakistan.
Mr Jinnah died one year after the creation of Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated two years after that. Until today, it is not known who was responsible for his assassination. But we know that it was welcomed by the Hindus and the British.
With the international conspiracy mounting and our people over-confident, the situation deteriorated. When the politicians failed to achieve equilibrium, the army stepped in under Ayub Khan in 1958. With all good intentions, the army tried short-cuts but that did not work. As a result of the central government being far away and the country being ruled by one man, East Pakistan began to feel a sense of isolation. Along with that, Indians became very active. There were 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan. India poured in money and material help to them. As the Hindus were generally teachers and professors, they captured the thoughts of the younger generation. By this time, the younger generation in East Pakistan has forgotten Hindu domination as they did not experience it themselves. It was through schools and universities that the Hindus in East Pakistan brought about a feeling against the unity of Pakistan in the new generations. In order to vilify the ideal of Pakistan, they emphasized the concept of Bengali nationalism. While things remained for a long time generally under control, the concept Bengali nationalism grew.
War broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965. His Majesty knows that we did well in that war. Had the great powers not intervened, there would have been no ceasfire. Kashmir was within Pakistan’s reach at that time. US was against China so they joined with USSR to impose ceasfire on the subcontinent. The Tashkent Conference then took place that deprived the people of West Pakistan of the fruit of the war. There was a spontaneous movement in West Pakistan against the Tashkent Declaration.
Taking advantage of the critical situation in West Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman introduced his Six Points. The objective of the Six Points was to leave only defence and foreign policy with the centre. Everything else was to be with the provincial government.
Ayub Khan arrested Mujibur Rahman in June 1966. Not a finger was raised when he was arrested. There was no movement or feeling for Mujibur Rahman. For three years, he remained in jail and no one protested.
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Then because of general discontent, the people of West Pakistan started a mighty movement against Ayub Khan. Many people were killed and jailed but finally in February 1969, Ayub Khan declared that he was resigning and released all political prisoners. That is how we were all released. Mujibur Rahman was not released from prison by the Bengalis but by the movement of West Pakistan.
Then General Yahya Khan took over in March 1969. He gave me a commitment to hold elections in the country and to restore democracy. There was an election campaign lasting one and a half years during which Mujibur Rahman spread nothing but hatred against West Pakistan. This is the time when he really acquired strength. Even the great cyclone in East Pakistan was blamed on West Pakistan and General Yahya’s apparent apathy toward the victims of the cyclone was exploited to the full as a part of Awami Leauge’s election strategy. As the result of elections, Mujibur Rahman acquired overwhelming majority in East Pakistan and I in West Pakistan.
There were three principal factors in Pakistani politics at this time : Yahya Khan in power, Mujib’s Awami League in East Pakistan and PPP in West Pakistan. In view of this outcome, we had discussions with Mujibur Rahman. We told him that for ensuring the unity of Pakistan we would make many compromises but the Six Points meant the end of Pakistan. But he was not in a position to compromise and was intoxicated by his victory.
Unfortunately Yahya Khan thought that if there was a deadlock between Mujib and myself, he could continue to rule Pakistan. Negotiations were conducted but without any result. Then without our knowledge, military action was taken in East Pakistan on 25 March. We were all in East Pakistan at that time. Mujibur Rahman was arrested and brought to West Pakistan. On the following day, I also returned to West Pakistan.
I had discussions with the military leaders and told them that while it was perfectly understandable to take action against those who would destroy the country, military action had to have political guidance and it must be carried out sensibly and not uncontrollably, otherwise disaster would follow. But as time passed, Yahya Khan got the impression that he had broken the back of secession in East Pakistan. He was so confident that he was thinking of taking similar action in West Pakistan against PPP. But his was superficial understanding because by that time India had taken charge of the military plan, and Israel of the propaganda plan, to dismember Pakistan. Whilw there was to be no immediate retaliation, India was to train guerrillas out of the refugees from East Pakistan for the final showdown.
There was a lull while India prepared for the execution of its plan but Yahya Khan misunderstood the absence of overt Indian action to be the result of having mastered the situation. Meanwhile thousands were being trained by India and people were being encouraged to leave East Pakistan. That is how the situation was internationalized.
Mrs Gandhi then went to Washington and Paris saying that India would be sunk with refugees in order to create justification for what was to be done by India eventually. The Zionist press gave full coverage to this view. After the synchronization of these two factors, the Soviet Union stepped in and concluded the treaty with India on 9 August. Even that was interpreted by some in Yahya’s government as well as by some other governments as a Soviet initiative to restrain India’s reaction to what was going on in East Pakistan.
To some of us who know our country well, the picture became quite clear. On 11 September, I said in a public meeting in Karachi that no one could save Pakistan from
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disintegrating by the end of the year. I repeated this on 8 October in Multan. On 11 October, I was called by Yahya Khan, who told me not be so pessimistic. I informed him in detail of the Zionist plan to dismember Pakistan. He told me that I was being so pessimistic because I did not know the power of the Pakistan Army. As commander-in-chief, he could tell me that the Pakistan Army would not allow the dismemberment of Pakistan. I told him that as the representative of the people, I knew the power of the army. It was undoubtedly one of the best fighting machines in the world but, for the last four years, the Pakistan Army had been indulging in politics on a fulltime basis and that was why I was apprehensive.
Some time at the end of October, Indians gave out a plan that was supposed to be a secret document but in fact it was deliberately made out to be so to mislead Pakistan. It was supposed to be the preceedings of a secret meeting of the Indian Cabinet that indicated that all that India wanted was to take a little bit of territory to hoist the flag of Bangladesh and to establish a provisional government on it. Taking the supposedly secret document that had been planted by Indian Intelligence as the basis of his own order of battle, Yahya Khan changed his entire military plan. The original plan was called the Fortress Dhaka Plan. With all the rivers situated in East Pakistan, that was a sensible plan but after the receipt of the planned information, he decided to defeat the entire frontier of East Pakistan. Not an inch of territory was to be surrendered. All the four divisions that were to defend Dhaka were made to spread out very thinly on the entire border of East Pakistan. They were put against 18 Divisions of the Indian Army who just jumped over them to go to Dhaka.
When the situation became grave, Yahya Khan called me and told me to go to the United Nations. I told him that it was too late, but I would go as I had to serve my country. There the Soviet Union vetoed one resolution after another. They did so until Dhaka fell on 17 December 1971.
I was summoned bcak to Islamabad. When I returned on 20 December, I found the country on the verge of civil war. The Muslims of Pakistan could not believe that they had been defeated because they had never before been defeated by Hindus. Strong demands were being made for the penalization of the culprits. When I saw Yahya Khan on 20 December, he was in tears. He said that the game had been lost and I must take over.
We took over a distraught country with all its values shattered and questioned. When I look back, I do not know how we managed to go through it. Our source of strength were the people but our greatest strength was the faith in Almighty Allah that He would save Pakistan.
We have brought about many reforms and rehabilitated the confidence of the people. Mujibur Rahman was a prisoner. Yahya Khan had ordered his execution. I brought him out of prison, put him in a state guest house and met him on 27 December. I told him everything. Suddenly he brought out the Holy Quran, placed his hand over it and swore that he wanted East Pakistan to remain a part of Pakistan. He said that he could never reconcile with the Hindus as he had fought with them ever since his childhood. He would never be the Shaikh Abdullah of Bangladesh.
Mujibur Rahman asked me to release him unconditionally and immediately. I told him that I did not distrust him specifically as he was swearing on the Holy Quran. But I said that he should appreciate that half the country was in India’s hands. India had taken 93,000 prisoners of war and was menacingly pointing toward West Pakistan. People were demoralized and there was a military defeat to deal with. He was the only trump card that I had. If I let him go, we would not
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have any lever left. But I told him that day that I would take the situation into account. I did not want the future to be based on trump cards, gambling for leverage. And so on 7 January 1972, we let the nightingale out of the golden cage.
When Mujibur Rahman reached Dhaka, he said that anyone who thought that the two wings would remain together should go to the lunatic asylum. We have not responded to him and have no intention of doing so. Naturally people in Pakistan feel very bitterly about the whole situation. They know Pakistan could not have been dismembered without Soviet support. Their feeling is very strong that the country should remain one. We can understand when other countries lecture us about reconciliation but this is something out of our own hearts.
When the Soviet Union went on insisting that we recognize Bangladesh, I told the Soviet ambassador : suppose Central Asia was to leave you, would you recognize that in a hurry? Besides that, if we readily agreed to such a precedent, no country would be safe. Most countries in the Third World have boundary disputes. What would happen if the East Pakistan episode was to be repeated? If we are taking some time and taking a mature view of the situation, we are not being unrealistic. We cannot embarrass our friends who have recognized Bangladesh. If it is to be, it should be an exception rather than the rule in international politics. We can see the other point of view. It is not that we are completely blind.
We know the sooner we have a chance of reconciliation, the better it would be. If we keep away and our Muslim brothers keep away from recognition, there will be a vaccum. We know that there is growing goodwill in East Pakistan for Pakistan. That is why we are sending rice to East Pakistan worth 11 to 15 million dollars. I have sent a message telling Mujib not to get influenced by India’s point of view, that we should meet in a neutral place and discuss our problems like brothers, face to face. I understand what he said here was in captivity and what he is saying in Dhaka is also because he is in India’s hands. So let us meet somewhere and exchange views without any interference.
If I meet Mujibur Rahman, I can tell my people that I had done all I could to keep the country together. In that situation, I might survive. But without that, it would be very difficult for me to make my people realize what the situation was. I cannot just get up one fine morning and announce that we recognize Bangladesh. His Majesty is a very seasoned political leader and I can tell him that, even in the best of circumstances, it would be very difficult to make my people accept Bangladesh. But with faith in Almighty Allah, after meeting Mujibur Rahman, I could tell my people that we had to recognize what had happened.
Should that turn out to be the case, we would keep you informed for otherwise it would be a betrayal of your trust. We shall take a joint decision with our Muslim brothers. The joint action will be closely worked out. I know that Your Majesty would not believe that they are circulating rumours that Pakistan is going to recognize Bangladesh and that you would be embarrassed but you should not put any credence to those rumours.
As for India, on 28 June we are meeting the Indian prime minister. We are prepared to have good neighbourly relations and peace. We are prepared to restore trade, telecommunication and other links step by step as far as we can go. But we cannot go to the point where basic principles get compromised. That means that we cannot compromise the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. This was a right recognized by Nehru himself, by the United Nations, and by all countries of the world. We did not give it. We cannot take it away. But we are prepared to tell them that we would not go to war no it. We shall settle it
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across the table. There was no time limit in that respect. That is the general position that we shall take. We are going to deal with a difficult lady. She is intoxicated by her victory. We shall do whatever we can. We shall have your guidance with us.
Faisal : We are greatly affected by what has happened in Pakistan. You have explained everything in detail. We know everything now. Whatever we did to help our brothers in the hour of need is a thing that we do not need thanks for. It was our duty. We thank Allah that he enabled us to offer help. There is no doubt that our only goal was to help maintain the unity of Pakistan and to unify Muslims together.
Needless to say, as Your Excellency has explained, Zionist criminals, communists, and Hindus plotted together to dismember Pakistan. And indeed it is painful that Muslims in their own relations with each other were influenced by their propaganda. There is also no doubt that in this situation Mujibur Rahman was a shame not only to himself but to all Muslims. No one had believed a Muslim would work against his brother in this way. But there are always exceptions in life. History is full of events that are against reason and logic. The least that we can benefit from this tragedy is that Muslims should unite and remain on guard against those who work against us. We have no doubt that the Muslims in East Pakistan are good and sincere Muslims but it is painful to think that the propaganda of India and some leaders of East Pakistan led so what has happened.
How could Mujibur Rahman swear on the Quran and the very next day deny it. There is serious doubt about his faith in Islam. We had heard earlier that Mujibur Rahman leaned toward the left but did not believe it. But now the events have corroborated what we had heard.
Now we support you in West Pakistan and good Muslims in East Pakistan on the condition that they do not allow themselves to be affected by Zionism and Communism. On the whole, we do trust them and Your Excellency’s leadership. We shall always work for unity of both parts of Pakistan. We shall always be with wou and support the plans to recover what is now called Bangladesh.
Do not think that we shall recognize them now. But whenever you arrive at an undetstanding and compromise with East Pakistan, we shall think over it. Naturally such a step would be taken with understanding, consultation, and joint study between us.
We shall never change the policy of being with you all the time. But we would say that you should be careful and warn you as a brother against all the leftist ideologies that are rampant all over the area. You should warn the people of Pakistan beacuse those non-believers interfere in societies and poison the minds of the youth in order to bring about revolution from the inside.
We know for sure that the people of Pakistan are good Muslims and they have wise leaders. They keep their faith and religion pure from the penetration of other ideologies. In our own country, there were people who were misled by others. We are concerned about the fate of Pakistan as we consider ourselves to be one people and one nation. Inshallah we shall pray for you and help you. In your victory is our victory and the victory of the whole Muslim world.
Bhutto : Let me say briefly that our nationals who are working here are your nationals at your disposal. If you do not want them, we do not want them. I spoke to them today very clearly that it is your decision who can come here and who cannot. We shall never suggest any other course in this matter.
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Faisal : We are greatful and have no doubt about your feelings and the policy of the government of Pakistan. We are pleased and satisfied with their services. If we need any more of them, we shall let your know.
Bhutto : It is your decision.
Faisal : We consider them to be our brothers and citizens of Saudi Arabia.
Bhutto : Our relations with Saudi Arabia are well-known. We do have good relations also in the Gulf but our relations with Saudi Arabia are the predominant feature of our policies in the region. We are not foolish people. We know the value of our tried and trusted friends. All we shall do is to link our friends in the Gulf together. If you hear any tales, please write to me. I shall send someone who will put the whole thing before Your Majesty. There are many competing interests, including British interests. So if you hear any stories do not place any credence to them.
Faisal : The countries in the Gulf are our brothers. If there are differences, there are differences among brothers. We have no doubts with regard to Pakistan’s policies in the Gulf vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. We know for sure that your only aim is for all of us to work together.
Bhutto stayed overnight in Saudi Arabia. While preparing the itinerary with the Director of PIA, I had suggested that it would be considered very odd, to say the least, if in touring the Islamic world in the dire situation in which Pakistan was at that time, Bhutto did not visit the holiest places (Makkah and Madinah) of Islam that were situated in Saudi Arabia. My suggestion was immediately accepted.
The doors of the Holy Kaaba in Makkah were opened for Bhutto, and the entire delegation prayed for Pakistan inside the holy walls of the Kaaba. This gesture caught on since every subsequent head of state after Bhutto has followed this precedent set by him in 1972.
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NOTES
1. One who refuses to believe.
2. That is what Bhutto stated as the reason for the war between India and Pakistan in 1965, though, as is now well-known, he was instrumental in the eruption of a war situation. As foreign minister in 1965, Bhutto had given the army the understanding that India would not attack West Pakistan across the border in retaliation as the ceasefire line between the two countries was not an international border. The then Commander-in-Chief, General Musa, did confront Bhutto in Ayub’s presence when India did in fact retaliate precisely in the same manner. Indeed, encouraged by the fact that the Pakistan Army had repulsed the Indian forces in a minor engagement in the out of the way Rann of Kutch, Bhutto considered that Pakistan was militarily superior to India in 1965 and that before India came up to or surpassed Pakistan’s military strength, Kashmir should be detached by force from India. That was the reason why Bhutto opposed the Soviet brokered settlement of Tashkent that became the chief reason of his removal from the Ayub cabinet in 1966.
3. That may not have been entirely the case. The fact is that when India opened the attack on West Pakistan across the central and southern border, Bhutto sent a top secret telegram to the ambassador in Beijing to ask Premier Zhou Enlai to make a move on the East Pakistan border against India and he stated that the manoeuvre had been agreed between Premier Zhou Enlai and himself. Being the Political Officer
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of the Embassy, I was the only other person who knew of the telegram, hence, I accompanied the ambassador to meet Premier Zhou Enlai. The premier expressed surprise at the statement that he had reached any such agreement with Bhutto. The ambassador then beseeched the premier that, in any case, Pakistan was in dire need of China’s help and requested the premier to extend that help. Premier Zhou Enlai told the ambassador that he would think of something. The next day China issued a warning to India to return the sheep that had been taken by the Indian side in a border skirmish leaving no doubt about China’s strategic position in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. Indeed, that was precisely the development that brought the Soviet Union and the United States together to try and stop the war between India and Pakistan forthwith for fear of China developing a strategic position south of the Himalayas. At that stage the United States preferred the Soviet Union to take the lead in South Asia in order to pre-empt China. Both India and Pakistan were quite clear about the fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States were behind the Tashkent conference called by the Soviet Union. Neither of them felt that they could possibly say no to the Soviet invitation.
4. The anti-Tashkent movement was in fact started by Bhutto after he was removed from Ayub’s cabinet. He insisted that Pakistan could have won the war but for the untimely Tashkent Declaration. However, I must put on record here that Bhutto’s assumption was not shared by the military command of Pakistan. I can with confidence say this because I was one of the three persons who received President Ayub Khan when he flew secretly to Beijing after the Tashkent Declaration to meet Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to thank them for China’s intervention in the 1965 war. The ensuing discussion in which I was also present provided the first concrete foundation to the unwritten alliance between Pakistan and China.
The US had imposed an embergo on all military supplies to Pakistan. That had created the shortage of ammunition during the war and the Americans knew that after another 16 days, Pakistan would have had no supplies left to carry on the war with India. The Chinese leaders sympathized with the President of Pakistan and offered the free supply of massive Chinese arms to Pakistan. There and then it was agreed that China would supply a full division equivalent of arms and ammunition to Pakistan in the immediate future. See the Appendix for information on subsequent military cooperation between Pakistan and China.
5. Bhutto did not mention that he had also offered that the Awami League and the PPP should form a coalition government in which he would be deputy prime minister. Mujib had declined the offer because he said that the Awami League was in a majority in the House and did not need a coalition government. Besides, he pointed out, the PPP had to provide the opposition to the government.
6. Bhutto did not mention what he had told Yahya Khan about his meeting with Mujib and what had been Yahya’s reaction despite the fact that the point was crucial for it was after this meeting that Mujibur Rahman was arrested, flown to Islamabad as Yahya’s prisoner, and the army was let loose on the civilians.
7. Here too Bhutto did not state anything about Peerzada’s reaction and whether any understanding was reached between them.
8. Gaddafi wanted to know how much financial support Bhutto wanted. The abrupt question irked Bhutto noticeably.
9. In fact, Bhutto publicly threatened the members of the National Assembly elected from West Pakistan that he would have their legs broken if they dared to proceed to Dhaka for the assembly session on 3 March 1971.
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Epilogue
In the second round of flying visits to Islamic countries, Bhutto visited Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia. As Ethiopia, not an Islamic country, was situated on the way to Somalia from Sudan, it was decided not to leave it out. The record of discussions with the heads of state of these countries is not available to me. It is doubtful whether it still exists somewhere.
What is available are the joint communiqués issued after each visit. The time available between these flying visits was so short that I had established an office in the forward part of the special Boeing 707. I would negotiate the joint communiqué during the visit; brign it back to the aircraft; have it typed out in the office; and take it to the press that was accompanying Bhutto and was seated in the tail of the fuselage. The press would wait for me since that was the only time available for their briefing, and questions and answers. The aircraft carried equipment to connect them to their press offices in Pakistan so that the people in Pakistan were able to follow Bhutto’s visits from country to country. The wide coverage of these visits restored the badly shattered morale of the people of Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Bhutto, who had been provided with a place to work and sleep in the middle of the aircraft, would pour over the brief pertaining to the next capital. His queries had to be satisfied as and when they arose. Altogether, Bhutto visited fourteen Islamic states during the two flying tours in this manner, including all the countries of the Middle East. Everywhere he found sympathy, understanding, and support for him as well as his request that the recognition of Bangladesh be delayed so as to enable Pakistan to open a dialogue with Bangladesh. He emerged triumphant from these tours full of confidence and aplomb that raised his prestige and made him a world statesman.
The pressure on me was truly intense during these tours. I had to miss most banquets. There were occasions when I would have literally gone without food if it had not been for the diligent hospitality of the accompanying PIA crew. The unending negotiations and press briefings that fortunately went on smoothly visit after visit produced a bizarre and unexpected result.
In accordance with the established practice, the managing director of PIA has to accompany the head of state on special PIA flights. During the journey, Bhutto asked Mian Rafique Saigol, Managing Director of PIA at that time, to come and sit with him in order to discuss the future of the airline. Bhutto wanted to know that, if a small country like Denmark could run an outstanding airline, why had Pakistan cut down its fleet and leased its aircrafts out to Yugoslavia. Saigol explained that almost 50 per cent of PIA flights had been operating between East and West Pakistan, which was suddenly no more the case. At Bhutto’s suggestion that PIA expand its services to other destinations, Saigol responded that to do this more traffic rights were needed. When Bhutto told him that he should go ahead and get those rights, Saigol remarked that for that he would need a negotiator. Saigol then told Bhutto that he would like me to do the job.
Bhutto’s agreement to Saigol’s request had a far-reaching impact on my life and career in the diplomatic service of Pakistan. I succeeded in meeting the challenge. Surplus aircrafts were brought back from Yugoslavia and PIA flights began to fly to Manila and Singapore in place of Dhaka. They would have gone further, all the way to Australia, but Quantas Airways declined to negotiate granting any traffic rights to PIA. There were many challenging developments in PIA’s relations with BOAC but I need not go into that here. It is not by way of regret that this unchartered and unrelated consequence of Bhutto’s flying diplomacy is being recorded here.
Bhutto’s presentation of Mujibur Rahman’s position as well as attitude eventually turned out to
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have been not quite factually accurate. I have no intention of questioning Bhutto’s motives. It could be that it was due to the challenges that he faced to create some semblance of stability in the country that his account of the events was more to suit the listener than the narration of historical events.
The tide of recognition of Bangladesh referred to by the Turkish president continued to gather momentum until the numbers became large enough to allow Bangladesh to apply for United Nations membership. Pakistan had to resort to asking China to veto that application in the Security Council. Despite the awkwardness of the request and the treatment meted out to Mao Zedong by Yahya Khan, China obliged.
There stalemate over the recognition of Bangladesh was broken by the undeniable force of historical reality overcoming a subjective wish. It was eventually agreed that the two wings of Pakistan become two countries without involving any issue of assets or liabilities. Thereupon Pakistan itself recognized Bangladesh, and after the residue of the war with India had been sorted out, the two countries exchanged diplomatic missions.
The day was to come when, after Mujibur Rahman had been assassinated in coup d’état in Bangladesh, his soldier successor General Ziaur Rahman visited Pakistan and proposed a defence pact between Bangladesh and Pakistan. It was explained to him that times had changed. Provoking India unnecessarily in these changed circumstances could be counter-productive and had to be avoided. The visiting President of Bangladesh was assured, however, that Pakistan agreed with Bangladesh in principle on the need for defence cooperation between the two countries. That could be met through an unwritten alliance between them. India must be aware of that understanding.
I have always maintained that in bifurcating Pakistan, India has aided it in making it a more viable state than it had been previous to 1971. Pakistan’s Constitution was finalized in the real sense only after the birth of an independent Bangladesh. The separate existence of the two Islamic countries in the South Asian countries corresponds roughly to the resolution adopted by the annual session of the Muslim League in Lahore on 23 March 1940. That date is celebrated as the Republic Day of Pakistan. The 1940 Resolution had indeed demanded the establishment of two separate and sovereign Muslim states in British India.
Interestingly, reference must be made here to two other historically significant facts. The first consists of the amendment of the 1940 Resolution of the Muslim League to provide for a single sovereign state of Pakistan. It was the two outstanding leaders of Muslim Bengal, Maulvi Fazlul Haque and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, who had moved the amendment in the meeting of the enlarged Central Committee of the Muslim League (in December 1946) to the effect that Pakistan should be one instead of two sovereign states after the departure of the British authority. The reasons for the amendment were not included in the motion. But those who witnessed the historic change remember well the irony that the two stalwarts from Muslim Bengal were apprehensive of a secessionist tendency developing in West Pakistan after independence. They wanted to keep Muslim West Pakistan with them. Their effort, however, eventually failed.
The second fact to be mentioned here pertains to the attempt at constitution-making during Ayub Khan’s regime. It is on record that a representative of Pakistan’s legal system was dismayed at the wrangling over provincial rights to be enshrined in the Constitution. He asked Ayub Khan whether he would allow East Pakistan to secede and to go its own way. Ayub Khan agreed and the judge mentioned the idea to Maulvi Fariduddin, an eminent legislator from East Pakistan. The latter retorted that if any secession had to be resorted to, it would have to be West Pakistan for East Pakistan was indeed the heart of Pakistan.
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Indeed, East Pakistan paid heavily for both, the 1946 amendment that created a united Pakistan, as well as for declining the offer that it could go its own way if it so desired. The responsibility for the pain and the suffering of East Pakistan should, however, not be placed entirely, if at all, at the door of the three stalwarts of Muslim Bengal mentioned above. This is indeed a subject of ongoing research that I would like to continue.
Those who had fought for an independent Bangladesh on a rational basis had a few sobering moments after their objective had been achieved. I remember two of my meetings in London with friends from East Pakistan who had in the days of yore served in the Foreign Service of Pakistan, Anwarul Haque and Ataur Rahman.
In one discussion, I gathered that the realization had dawned on the intelligentsia of Bangladesh that the rhetoric of exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan spread by the Awami League was one-sided if not entirely dishonest. The foreign exchange earnings for jute exports from East Pakistan were shown to have been absorbed by West Pakistan. The import by East Pakistan of rice from West Pakistan had, however, not been mentioned at all. The value of the rice was greater than the value of the jute. It may be recalled that the Shah of Iran had told Bhutto that West Pakistan had been freed of the burden it had been carrying in the form of East Pakistan.
In the second discussion, I was informed that Bangladesh had invited West Bengal to unite with it so that Shonar Bangla could be restored to its actual size and glory. The response received from West Bengal was that it was quite content to be a part of India. But if Bangladesh so desired, it could unite with West Bengal as part of India.
In conclusion, I will forever remember the evening when I was invited for dinner by old friends in Dhaka. The hostess remarked : ‘With the breakup of Pakistan all the fun and enjoyment had gone out of her life.’
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Appendix
Some Aspects of Military Cooperation
between China and Pakistan
Military cooperation between Pakistan and China began as a result of the discussion President Ayub Khan had with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai during his secret visit to Beijing after the end of the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965. The visit remained a closely guarded secret for almost two decades. Only a few, including myself, were aware of it. Qudratullah Shahab, Ayub’s principal secretary, was the first to divulge it in another context. Shahab did not accompany the president to Beijing. In his Urdu memoirs Shahabnama, he does not bring out Ayub’s parleys with the Chinese leaders and the resultant establishment of close military cooperation between Pakistan and China. This appendix attempts to fill that gap.
President Ayub was keen to explain to the Chinese leaders the reason why he signed the Tashkent Declaration that brought an end to the war between India and Pakistan in 1965. China could have played a role in this since China had made a move at the behest of Bhutto who was Pakistan’s foreign minister at that time.
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After being removed from the office of foreign minister, Bhutto was creating an impression, as did Shahab later on, that China was about to enter the war and come to the aid of Pakistan, but the country was left high and dry by Ayub when he buckled under superpower pressure at Tashkent. This account is inaccurate and in any case, it does not provide Ayub’s version of the episode.
The notes I had taken during the discussions held between Ayub and the Chinese leaders were left behind by me at the Pakistan Embassy in Beijing. However, I do remember the gist of thos discussions.
Ayub informed the Chinese leaders that the US Ambassodor in Pakistan had warned him earlier, in September 1965, not to cross the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Pakistan, however, believed that the ceasefire line was not an international border and hostilities across that line did not automatically entail a war between the two countries across the international border.
After hostitlities flared up in Kashmir and Pakistan made substiantial gains in the field, India launched a full-scale attack on Pakistan across the international border on 6 September 1965. The Pakistan Army blunted the attack and mounted its own offensive. On that very day, the US Ambassador called on him, cocked his head triumphantly and said : ‘They have got you by the throat, haven’t they?’ Ayub replied that he was outraged by such behaviour and that nobody had got anybody by the throat. Thereupon the US Ambassador informed him of the US embergo on all supplies of arms and ammunition to Pakistan.
That act signalled to Ayub that the United States did not stand with Pakistan in its war with India despite the understanding that had been given to him when he had agreed to join SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, both sponsored by the United States. Pakistan, Ayub said, had absolutely no reason to confront either China or the Soviet Union through the two pacts. Its only interest in them was the expected US support in case India attacked Pakistan. While Pakistan’s forward move in Kashmir was not an attack on India, India had opened an attack on Pakistan. The US Ambassador left no doubt, however, that the understanding given by the United States to Pakistan could not be invoked in the international war started by India. Nevertheless, Ayub said, he had refused to buckle under US pressure and the ambassador had left in a sombre mood.
Strategically, while India continued to have the Soviet Union on its side, Pakistan had lost the support of the United States in the war with India. In those circumstances, the amount of ammunition available to the two sides became a crucial consideration as Pakistan could not produce any of the heavy ammunition that it needed. Pakistan’s supply of ammunition had dwindled and was only sufficient for another sixteen days. At that time, the Pakistan army had the upper hand in the war.
The lack of ammunition on the Pakistan side was known to the United States. They knew that the embergo imoposed by them had worked exclusively against Pakistan. India had its own ordnance factories and there was no embergo on the supply of Russian ammunition to India. The United States considered it only a matter of time when Pakistan’s capacity to fight would come to an end. Then suddenly, China’s ultimatum to India seemed to tilt the balance against India. The US calculations were upset.
Pakistan had already refused to submit to US pressure. Therefore, the United States got together with the Soviet Union. With US blessing, the Soviet Union launched the Tashkent initiative. Kosygin was in complete control of all the levers when he exposed Ayub to blatant pressure. With the two superpowers breathing down Pakistan’s neck, Pakistan could not choose to fight on with no ammunition.
The real value of the strategic support that china extended to Pakistan in September 1965 lay in
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restoring the balance of forces that were completely tilted against Pakistan so far as ammunition supplies were concerned. China made possible for Pakistan to end the war honourably at a time when all the forces had been stacked up on the other side.
Contrary to the impression created by Shahabnama, the Chinese leaders responded quite positively to Ayub’s explanation. It was then that the strategic alliance between Pakistan and China actually took birth. A discussion commenced between the leaders of the two countries to determine how China could help Pakistan overcome the drying up of US arms supplies to Pakistan. It gave Ayub a clear indication that China was ready to confront the Indo-Soviet challenge on the side of Pakistan.
This was the first palpable proof of the serious nature of the rift that developed between China and the Soviet Union by that time. In July 1964, Deng Xiaoping, at that time Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, had broken off talks with the Russian Communist Party and had abruptly returned to Beijing. The entire Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, including Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai was present at the airport to welcome Ayub in order to leave no doubt as to the sincerity of Deng’s actions.
The Sino-Soviet rift was indeed one of the reasons why China had shown soliderity with Pakistan in September 1965. In putting an end to Pakistan’s isolation and the clear danger of its eventual defeat at the hands of India, China had put an end to its own isolation also. Hence, China and Pakistan were led to their enduring strategic alliance by the triangular nature of the relations between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. The manipulation of this historical event by Bhutto in his lobbying against Deng was masterful because the latter was not in a position to divulge his side of the story. It is against this backdrop that the account contained in Shahabnama should be comprehended.
President Ayub was taken by surprise by the offers that followed once tha basic understanding had been reached. Pakistan was to get, totally free of cost, a full division worth of heavy as well as light arms and ammunition; a squadron of Chinese fighter aircraft (MIGS); and technical and material assistance to establish defence factories for the production of its defence needs. And that was only the begining of the free supply of Chinese arms to Pakistan that lasted almost a quarter of a century. Throughout that period China and Pakistan were to face together a subsisting opposition from the United States, the Soviet Union, and India. Both were pinned against the wall but they were there for each other.
Ayub had no advisors with them, nor was he in need of any. He was overwhelmed by China’s offer. It seemed to be the answer to Pakistan’s friendlessness when it came to its conflict with India. Ayub accepted China’s offer without giving it a second thought.
No country with any credible strength has ever supported Pakistan against India, except China. Pakistan does possess friends but none of them are as sincerely interested in its territorial integrity as China. Pakistan, directly or indirectly, owes to China most of its present strategic defence capability.
Before commenting upon the existing pattern of military cooperation between China and Pakistan, I must mention an episode that occurred in which I was present when Ayub sent a high-powered military delegation to Beijing to follow up on the basic agreement reached by him and the Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. That delegatin was supposed to quantify the weapons and the ammunition that would be equivalent to a division worth of military equipment and firepower.
There are many conceptual differenecs between the two sides on the quantity of a division’s equipment and ammunition. The one that stands out in my memory pertains to the quantity of the small arms rounds proposed by the two sides. Pakistan asked for more than twice the number of rounds that the
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Chinese had proposed to provide. An animated discussion ensued between the two delegations. The high point of the discussion was reached when the Pakistan delegation explained the rate of firepower on which it had based its calculations. The head of the Chinese delegation responded that Pakistan’s rate of firepower pertained to an imperialist war rather than a defensive war against imperialism. He explained that, in an imperialist war, the troops had to fire continuously to deny the field to the enemy. On the contrary, in a defensive war the troops held their fire in order to entice the enemy into the field. The Chinese soldier fired only when his adversary was so close that the whites of his eyes were visible. The implication of the remark was that while Pakistan’s army had been trained by imperialist Britain, the Chinese army had developed its methods during the revolutionary war. This episode provides an insight into how much distance the two armies needed to cover before they were on the same platform military.
Being used to British and American equipment, the Pakistan delegation was not certain of the quality of arms and ammunition that they would be receiving from China. They wanted to be sure of the quality of China’s defence production before taking a step that was undoubtedly going to result in the stoppage of US military supplies to Pakistan. China threw open the gates of its most sensitive defence factories to the Pakistan delegation which I was also accompanying. Everyone was astonished at the standard that China had reached with Soviet Union’s help. On return to Pakistan, the delegation submitted a report that was positive enough to get the ball of military cooperation between China and Pakistan rolling.
Weathering all difficulties, defence supplies and technology from China continued to flow into Pakistan free of cost from 1965 to 1979 when Deng Xiaoping rose to power. Up to that time, China’s military supplies up to the summit of the revolutionary war had been provided for selling of arms was considered to be the practice par excellence of imperialistic powers. By 1979, however, China had learned that, instead of helping the recipients of their arms supplies, it was only sapping their capacity and desire to develop their own defence industries. Hence, in 1979 Deng Xiaoping put a sudden end to this practice. I had been accredited to China as the Ambassador of Pakistan in October 1978. At that time Beijing was agog with reports of a shakeup in the top echelons of the Chinese Communist Party and state. A few months into 1979, the army attache brought a note to me from China’s defence ministry which notified that all future arms supplies from China would have to be paid for in accordance with international prices. I mulled over this along with my own recommendations to the government of Pakistan. I realized that Pakistan’s defence budget, despite the high percentage of the national revenue that it consumed year after year, had for long been geared to obtaining arms and ammunition from China free of coast. How was the Pakistan Army going to pay for what it had for so long been used to receiving free from China. The result of this was a top secret despatch which was meant for General Ziaul Haq’s eyes only, who was at that time the President of Pakistan. My recommendation was that the Chinese note was indeed a blessing in disguise. Not having to pay for the arms, the Pakistan army had inflated itself at the top with unpreceedented perquisites for the numerous generals, on the one hand, and had done very little to enable itself to stand on its own feet. Therefore, I recommended that General Zia should respond to the Chinese note positively, and accept their demand in principle. Being strapped by annual budgets that did not provide for any such payments, however, Pakistan should propose that the cost of arms be raised to the international level in three or four graduated steps, allowing the Pakistan Army to provide for the payments in its annual budgets. Meanwhile, as China and Pakistan were strategic allies, China should pass on the requisite technology in that period in order to enable Pakistan to manufacture the arms in question itself.
Agreeing with my recommendations General Ziaul Haq responded immediately. The Chinese side received the proposal with obvious satisfaction. The note from the Chinese defence ministry was a circular to all recipients of Chinese arms. They did wish to reach a special understanding with Pakistan and were happy to receive a reasonable proposal from Pakistan.
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Interestingly, with the settlement reached between China and Pakistan on the cost of Chinese arms, military cooperation between the two countries, instead of diminishing, became stronger. By this time Pakistan has become capable, with China’s cooperation, to manufacture most of its defence requirements itself, including nuclear weapons, fighter aircraft, tanks, heavy field guns and all sorts of sophisticated ammunition.
The most significant aspect of the unwritten alliance between Pakistan and China is that it has undergone no substantive change even after the rise of China to the status of a world power.
Certain negative consequences followed for me after this episode. The letter that was meant for General Zia’s eyes only was leaked to some other generals. My criticism of the skewing of Pakistan’s defence budget because of the availability of free arms from China was not taken very kindly by some of them.
But never have I regretted having written that letter.
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