East Pakistan A Case Study in Muslim Politics Banerjee

East Pakistan
A Case Study in Muslim Politics

D.N. BANERJEE

VIKAS PUBLICATIONS

© D.N. BANERJEE, 1969

Debendra Nath Banerjee (1916)

PRINTED IN INDIA

AT THE NATIONAL PRINTING WORKS, 10 DARYAGANJ, DELHI-6, AND PUBLISHED
BY SHARDA CHAWLA, VIKAS PUBLICATIONS, 5 DARYAGANJ, ANSARI ROAD, DELHI-6

PREFACE

THIS BOOK IS A POLITICAL STUDY OF EAST PAKISTAN. It is, however, not meant to be an analysis of regional politics, whose impulses are born out of domestic compulsions and have come to life only after the birth of Pakistan.

To view East Pakistan’s political scene in its proper prospective, it is necessary to appreciate two of its basic facts. Firstly, the politics of the East wing has been greatly influenced by the pre-Partition Bengali Muslim politics with its own characteristic behaviour-pattern and political leadership. This has to be contrasted with the background of the Indian Muslim political thinking in its various phases. Secondly, the forces and conditions shaping politics in East Pakistan are, by no means, purely regional in character. They are influenced by the intimate contact and continuing struggle of the region against the central authority. This has led to an intense interaction between the central and the East Pakistani politics, so much so that a proper understanding of East Pakistani politics is essential for a correct assessment of the Pakistani politics.

This book deals with the subject in three parts. Part I examines the genesis and the growth of the Bengal Muslim politics. It is presented as a major constituent of the all-India Muslim politics, its mutual areas of contacts and conflicts. Its development is traced in the context of the evolution of the Muslim political thought over the years. This occurred in three main stages, viz. the birth and growth of Muslim political consciousness, the developing sentiment for separatism and, finally, the urgings of nationhood. In this development, the Muslim Bengal’s varied role in the history of the All-India Muslim League has been given special attention.

Part II deals with the post-Partition days. East Pakistan’s politics is studied in relation to the successive changes in the character of the central authority. In tracing this, the Bengali-Punjabi conflict has been discussed from its origin to its present form. Impact of East Pakistan politics on the all-Pakistan politics has been brought process. Ayub himself was reported to have described it as based on consent—
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since there was no outcry, nor violent resistance. This was small wonder. The regime relied on military court apparatus empowered to give sentences up to death penality for a variety of oppositionist acts…The regular courts were walled off from review. Obviously, such formidable sanctions even held in reserve would suffice to make claim of consent a jest.45

Thus it was clear that unalloyed power was in one hand, and that was essentially authoritarian in character. Like many dictators, General Ayub Khan avowed that his revolution was temporary. “Let me announce in unequivocal terms,” he said, “that our ultimate aim is to restore democracy.”46 In this new order, East Pakistan had no scope for participation. East Pakistanis were almost unrepresented in the military establishments, particularly in the Senior Officers’ Cadre. Their only forte was politics. The East wing, in the new Pakistani system, had to stand aside and wait for the return of the promised democracy.

45 “Reflections on a Revolution in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 255.

46 Richard Weekes, Pakistan—Brith and Growth of a Muslim Nation, p. 111.
০০০

CHAPTER SEVEN

MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION

ON 7 OCTOBER 1958, PAKISTAN ENTERED A NEW phase in its political history. Major General Iskander Mirza, the first President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, was engaged on that day in the redistribution of portfolios amongst the Cabinet Ministers and the Ministers of State consequent upon H.S. Suhrawardy’s withdrawal of cooperation to Feroze Khan Noon’s Ministry.1 At 10.30 P.M. on the same day, President Mirza issued a proclamation abrogating the Constitution of Pakistan, dismissed the national and the provincial governments, and their legislatures, and abolished all political parties. The rationale of this move, according to President Mirza, was that the Constitution was unworkable which posed a threat to Pakistan’s integrtiy. Complete secrecy of the move was maintained. But this was not the case for the group which was to take power. President Ayub makes it abundantly clear that on 4 October 1958 he knew that an era was coming to an end, as a few days earlier President Mirza had taken him into confidence and informed that the entire situation was becoming intolerable.2 It has been well said that the revolution in case of Pakistan required very little preparation and was only a military operation.3 The Army Commanders were alerted to limit the troop movements. Against this background, East Pakistan was kept totally in the dark. The suggestion that possibly Zakir Hussain, who was to become the Governor of East Pakistan, was taken into confidence, immediately following promulgation of the Martial Law, is essentially a conjecture.4

Consequent upon the promulgation appointing the Martial Law Administrator in overall command of all the Armed Forces of Pakistan, General Mohammad Ayub proceeded to act unilaterally inasmuch as in the proclamation of Martial Law and Martial Law Regulations, published in the Gazette of

1 Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan—A Study of the Martial Law Administration, 1967, p. 3.

2 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, 1967, p. 72.

3 Ibid., p. 71.

4 Herbert Feldman, op. cit., p. 155.
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Pakistan, Extraordinary on 15 October 1958, orders were issued on his personal authority as the Supreme Commander and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The fact that he derived his authority by virtue of appointment by President Mirza does not appear in the text of any of the Gazette notifications. By then, General Ayub had himself decided that he was the man of the hour. This can be clearly seen in what came to pass in a press interview of President Mirza. It was written : “General Ayub Khan, Chief of the Martial Law Administration, joined the President in the drawing room of Karachi’s White House half-way through the interview. He was in casual civilian dress—white cotton slacks, brown loafers, green diamond-pattern socks, and a striped tan silk sport shirt with tail hanging out. In a series of private conversations General Ayub Khan said, he repeatedly urged the President to take decisive action if Pakistan was to be saved from ruin through the misrule of corrupt politicians…General Ayub Khan said : ‘I said to the President : Are you going to act or are you not? It is your responsibility to bring about a change. If you do not, which Heaven forbid, we [the armed forces] shall force a change.’ ”5

It was significant that General Ayub, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, chose as “one of his first act to go to East Pakistan.” This was sought to be explained later on by President Ayub by saying that “where bulk of our people live.”6 But the fact of the matter was otherwise. Having been the first General Officer Commanding, East Pakistan, he was deeply conscious of East Pakistanis’ importance, particularly, in political matters. He found it necessary to make an on-spot study of the situation. The Martial Law Administrator in East Pakistan was Major General Umrao Khan, a likeable professional soldier hailing from Rohtak District (India). The arrest of politicians in East Pakistan created a sensation. Maulana Bhashani was detained under Security of Pakistan Act while prominent leaders like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Hamidul Huq Choudhury, Abul Mansoor Ahmad, and Abu Khalek were arrested under East Pakistan Anti-Courruption Ordinance of 1958.7 Several senior East Pakistani civil servants were also taken into custody.

On return from East Pakistan, President Ayub records that, in his absence, President Iskander Mirza conspired against three Army Generals which made him warm Mirza “no monkeying, no tricks, be very careful.”8 It is inconsequential to assess how an ineffective Major General Iskander Mirza could conspire against the Army Generals who were very much in the saddle by then. But the final act of political drama of Pakistan was still to be played. On 25 October 1958, President Mirza in his last bid to be in power constituted a 12-man Cabinet9 to replace the Advisory Council set up under Martial Law Administration.

4 Herbert Feldman, op. cit., p. 155.

5 Elie Abel, Times of India, 11 October 1958.

6 Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 73.

7 Herbert Feldman, op. cit., p.9

8 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 74.

9 The twelve were : General Ayub Khan (Prime Minister); Lieutenant-General Azam Khan (Rehabilitation); Lieutenant-General W.A. Burki (Health and Social Welfare); Lieutenant-General K.M. Sheikh (Interior); Abul Kasem Khan (Industries and Works); Habibur Rahman (Education and Information); Manzur Qadir (Foreign Affairs); Moulvi Mohamed Ibrahim (Law); F.M. Khan (Communications); M. Shoaib (Finance); Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Commerce); and Hafizur Rahman (Agriculture and Food).

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The hard-core of the Cabinet was provided by the Army Generals. The East Benagli contigent comprised inconsequential men including a member of the Bengali Civil Service. A notable exception was Maulavi Mohammad Ibrahim, the Vice-Chancellor of the Dacca University. The men chosen by Mirza came to prominence later under Ayub’s regime. The career of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto illustrates the point. Nine members of the Cabinet, including General Ayub Khan, went through the formality of being sworn in on the morning of 27 October 1958 but the very same night, at 10 P.M., the three military Generals went to President Mirza to ensure that he agreed to quit office. The volte-face by Mirza, on 7 October 1958, was repeated by President Ayub. Thus the failings in political behaviour did not end with Mirza. 27 October is now treated in Pakistan history as the “Day of Revolution.” Revolution is an undefined political process in the political grammar of an autocratic ruler. It carries an euphoria whereby any change is sought to be given the hightened status of a revolution. The takeover by General Ayub was explained in the controlled press by saying that the “revolution would sooner or later rationalize itself.”10 In reality, it was the end of a process. It started when Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed the Prime Minister and dissolved the country’s legislature, which could be termed as “revolutionary.” Ayub’s takeover was only the end-product of this process.

For East Pakistan, this was a hard blow in the context of Pakistan affairs. President Ayub’s regime relied on two instruments of power, namely, the Army and the Civil Service. Historically, for the Indian Army, under the British rule, the Punjab constituted the main area of military recruitment, both for officers and men. Similarly in the Indian Civil Service, the Muslim element was constituted almost exclusively of non-Bengalis—at the time of partition—only one Bengali Muslim was a member of the Indian Civil Service. The Muslims of Bengal had exercised power at two forums, namely, in the legislature and in the judiciary. Under Ayub’s regime both had ceased to be effective institutions. In this new situation, East Pakistan found itself deprived of all avenues of power.

Thus commenced the period when President Ayub came to run the country. His power was unabridged by any constitutional or judicial checks. In essence, the change brought about was not a traumatic experience for the Pakistanis, because the economic and social life remained undisturbed.11 The regime was not blood-thirsty or vindictive; it was tolerant and shorn of military rigidity. The only difference was that the rule was by fiat. It took the shape of ordinances, such as the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959, and the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Ordinance (EBDO), 1959. Even then, review boards were provided for, which conducted their proceedings in a quasi-judicial manner. To some, the presence of a military officer in the review board was taken to mean a limitation. But this was an extreme view. The provision of checks and balances through the review board is a clear indication that the regime was neither radical in its thinking nor revolutionary in its methods. It was only that the Army personnel had taken up civil assignments and, even then, the bureaucracy was functioning with due regards to the norms of traditional civil administration which it had inherited from the past.

The new ruler was brought up in the tradition of the British Indian Army. He was conditioned by the discipline of his service, and his thoughts were moulded by his experience therein. It is, therefore, not surprising that a simple system and orderliness were central to his way of things. In this, there was little of conflict between him and the Pakistani bureaucracy which continued to thrive and commissions began to proliferate. Regulations and Ordinances were designed to replace the statutes of legislature—a gleeful pass-time for any bureaucracy. If personal liberties were restricted under the Martial Law, it was only a formalization of what had already happened in the past, imperceptibly, as judiciary had long lost its substance in Tamizuddin Khan’s case.

10 Dawn, editorial, 28 October 1958.

11 Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics of Pakistan, p. 193.
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In the Martial Law Administration, it became more suppliant. The Supreme Court’s pronouncement that revolution or coup d’etat was a legitimate way of bringing about constitutional change12 left little substance and excellence in the judicial system which it had in olden days. The banning of the political parties was again not a sharp deviation. In President Mirza’s regime through intrigues and manoeuvres, the political parties were reduced to a state of ineffectiveness and inaction so that their formal removal made no real difference. Much was said of the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order of General Ayub. But it was no innovation. It is best to quote Zulfikar Ali Bhutto :

This EBDO philosophy is not the creation of this regime, it is not the creation of the Martial Law Government….The philosophy behind EBDO, the logic of disqualification formula dates back to the Quaid-i-Azam. The Quaid was the first to initiate this measure, and it was continued by the Quaid-i-Millat.13

Those who remembered PRODA could not deny it. But it must be added that the game of politics was not over with the commencement of Ayub’s regime. The disappearance of political parties and the dissolution of legislatures meant only removal of politics from their identifiable places. The politicians remained political creatures. Their silence did not mean their extinction.

One may, however, wonder as to the timing of the issue of the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Ordinance as on 7 August 1959. The political climate was placid then. There was, however, logic in this. The Martial Law Administration was planning to embark on a scheme of “basic democracy.”

The “revolution” of 1958 was engineered and executed in West Pakistan by non-Bengalis, with the possible exception of Zakir Hussain who later on became the Governor of East Pakistan. In the Martial Law Administration, the locus of power was truly and squarely with Ayub. With him the Punjab was the “citadel of Pakistan.” East Pakistan had to be managed by his confidant. Also there was the need for a Bengali element to form part of the Establishment. Under these circumstances, Zakir Hussain was chosen to be the Governor of East Pakistan. He was the police chief when Ayub was the G.O.C. of East Pakistan. The Martial Law Administrator took little note of East Pakistan’s susceptibilities in the matter. This was, however, no new experience. Right from Jinnah’s time, the central authority had come to ignore the East Wing which seemed to be acquiring a colonial status. On this occasion too, East Pakistan had no special reason to feel aggrieved. The recurrent political turmoil had habituated its elite to a permanency of crisis. Sensitiveness had given way to cynicism. Martial Law rule was no new threat but only an added experience.

In the first year of Ayub’s reigme, things were going his way. He felt sure of his ground. East Pakistan appeared inert and silent after the “October Revolution.” Ayub set himself the task of legitimizing his rule. Thus started a process of change. A system had to be evolved so as to change the image of his regime from that of a personal rule. In this he was treading on unfamiliar ground. The need arose not to fulfil a pledge to restore democracy “as soon as the situation permitted” but to win international respectability. In the West, military dictatorship was a dirty word. Z.A. Suleri’s despatch from London illustrates this point :

By the end of 1960, the President declared categorically to John Ardagh, the I.T.N. reporter, “full-fledged democracy will be working in the country….” To the charge that he might be described as a military dictator, the President had an effective rejoinder “bloody rubbish.”14

12 Herbert Feldman, op. cit., p. 11.

13 NAP Debate, Official Report, 10 July 1962, p. 1256.
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This was also necessary for securing foreign assistance for Pakistan’s economic and military build-up. This became clear from the July 1960 issue fo Foreign Affairs where he sought to describe the then state of Pakistan and concluded thus : “All these factors lead to one conclusion; that the English-speaking people ought to feel a special responsibility to assist Pakistan in attaining a reasonable posture of advancement.”15

On 26 October 1959, President Ayub promoted himself to the rank of Field Marshal. The next day, he took steps to Basic Democracy Order to celebrate the anniversary of his takeover. Basic Democracy was a five-tier system of local government. The unit was Union Council based on an elective principle. At higher levels it was a co-operative effort to run a local self-government system with officials and elected representatives acting in concert. But this was not to carry convicting with East Pakistan in spite of the fact that Union Boards had existed ever since Bengal Village Self-Government Act (Bengal Act V of 1919) had been put into operation.

Basic Democracy was, however, to bring about a change inasmuch as a dialogue was restored between the ruler and the ruled at various levels of administration even if issues were purely of local interest. The President, by an ordinace of 27 August 1959, had provided for the publication of electorate rolls by 31 March 1960. The election of Basic Democrats did revive village politics. It would have meant much more but for the precautionary measure under EBDO which kept out many eminent politicians. To many, Basic Democracy appeared to be a sad mockery of the accepted concept of democracy. Bengal had long experience of Village Self-Government Act and knew its working well enough to have any illusion in the matter. Yet, it was in East Pakistan that ex-Inspector-General of Police and a Judge of the High Court stood for election as Basic Democrats. The reason is simple. Basic Democracy was designed as a corridor to power. The new order opened the floodgates to political pollution and the end-effect was to stop people’s participation in any form of national government.

The election of Basic Democrats was of great importance to Ayub. The system of Basic Democracy was soon to assume its pivotal role as a political institution. Its purpose, a calculated design, was to unfold itself later.

On 7 January 1960, it was announced that the President had accepted the recommendation of the Cabinet to seek a vote of confidence. Accordingly, on 13 January, the President promulgated an order calling the Election Commissioner to hold a secret ballot amongst the 80,000 elected members of Basic Democracy to indicate their confidence in his leadership. The ballot paper was marked “Yes” or “No.” The national sampling for the Head of the State by Basic Democrats was a clever institutional arrangement, safe enough for the ruler to venture out for a “mandate.” Even then, President Ayub did not assume a pose of complacency so far as East East Pakistan was concerned. He diligently sought to project his image by touring extensively in a Pakistan Jamhuriyat special train accompanied by an impressive retinue of civil and military officials. The tour of East Pakistan was extended over a week from 21 January to 28 January. This whistle-stop affair was fashioned as an exhibition of paternalism for the rural people—the usual feudal approach. To the urbanites, the approach was more subtle and conciliatory, which could be read in Ayub’s address at the Dacca University Convocation on 21 January 1960, when he talked of oneness and “common ideology.”16

14 Pakistan Times, 19 February 1960.

15 Mohammad Ayub Khan, “Pakistan Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, July 1960, pp. 555-6.

16 Herbert Feldman, op, cit., p. 157.
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The result of the ballot was to be as expected. The Election Commissioner announced that an overwhelming majority of the members had expressed confidence in President Ayub.

On 17 February, Ayub took over as the first elected President of the country. He appointed a 11-man Constitution Commission for framing the Constitution of Pakistan. Representation was given to both the Wings. Though selected with care, yet East Pakistan members did not eventually all turn out to be “yes-men,” in spite of the fact that most of them had no political moorings or convictions. Among them were Azizuddin, a former Minister of Pakistan, and D.N. Barori, a Schedule Caste leader. Others claimed to represent the interests of agriculture, commerce, and legal professions. President Ayub had definite ideas about the role of Constitution Commission. Two months before its appointment, he made it clear that the Commission was not to lay down as to what was to be done. That was already known.17 It is, therefore, interesting to read how the controlled press sought to project the events of 17 February to the people : “February 17 could truly be marked as a ‘red letter day’ in Pakistan’s history for two reasons; first a great leader weilding absolute power chose voluntarily to subject himself to a vote of confidence and, secondly, without losing a single moment he appointed the Constitution Commission with a directive to complete the assignment as soon as possible.”18 It is doubtful if this sentiment was shared at all. However, a later comment throws a truer light on the matter. Farid Ahmad, an East Pakistani, said meaningfully in the National Assembly of Pakistan that, “for the first time….an individual has given a constitution to the people without an express mandate.”19 Words were few, but these spelt out clearly the unreality and illegality of what was to be one-man’s Constitution for 100 million people. Indeed, Ayub’s process of constitution-making was an innovation.

Framing of constitution by an officially nominated 11-man Constitution Commission, and selection of a President prior to such a Constitution coming into effect—based on a sample survey amongst Basic Democrats only—were “revolutionary” techniques unknown in any form of political culture. But there was no reaction because the political situation in Pakistan, be it in the East or the West, was inert. But more than that the situation was such that no political debate or opposition was possible. The foreign press alone could give some idea of the state of affairs. “Pakistan today is authoritative,” commemted the Times of London on 28 January 1960, while writing on “Pakistan without politics.” It added :

Let anyone who doubts it try his hand in opposition and see what happens. The press is subjugated and no amount of assurance that “constructive criticism” is welcomed can excuse this loss of freedom….Conditions are different in East Pakistan. Arriving by air in Dacca, the traveller senses a totally different country. More sophisticated, more cynical, cultivating its own conflicts, East Pakistan looks upon the new regime with mild curiosity and a slightly superior smile.20

In such a climate it is understandable as to how a strait-jacketed Constitution Commission could be set up and no voice of protest was raised.

The constitution-making, despite all such manoeuvres, did not allow for an automatic and unanimous acceptance of the President’s view in the matter. Justice Shahabuddin did not come up to the

17 Ibid., p. 196.

18 Pakistan Times, 19 February 1960.

19 NAP Debates, Official Report, 19 March 1963, p. 535.

20 “Pakistan without Politics,” Times, London, 28 January 1960.
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expectation of the President. A questionnaire was circulated fairly widely seeking representative views. This raised the dust of controversy and created a debate which proved provocative. The President’s view was being put across in the press periodically. In one despatch it was said : “He [Ayub] was of the view that democracy should not be rigid. It should not be a millstone around our necks.”21 Dawn of 8 April 1960 had a caption, “Country may face bloody revolution—Ayub warns against parliamentary system.” Such warnings failed to deter East Pakistan which availed of this opportunity to register its protest to Ayub’s regime and to the denial of demoicracy. Pakistan Observer, Dacca, gave wide publicity of the replies given by thirteen representative organizations to the Constitution Commission questionnaire. They stood for parliamentary form of government. Some of them argued that the Constitution of 1956 was never tried because general elections were never held.22 It is not so much important as to what was said but the fact that political debates had started which were a portent for the revival of political life.

In the West, Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, ex-Prime Minister, replied to the questionnaire by stating that the Constitution of 1956 was abrogated in its transitional phase as no elections were held. He prescribed ways and means for the establishment of an effective parliamentary democracy. His reply received wide publicity and attention. It is important to note that East-West polemics were forgotten in the heat of this controversy. President Ayub reacted sharply and came down heavily on Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali calling him “an old political hypocrite.”23 Z.A. Bhutto joined in the tirade against Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali in his own bitter manner. The Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir was bitter against the Dacca Bar Association’s assertion for return to parliamentary democracy. Thus political controversy came to the forefront which undoubtedly meant revival of political processing. 30 June 1960 was the last date for a reply to the Constitution Commission’s questionnaire. The administration was, therefore, hoping for an early end to such political debates. But when the Commission extended the date for receipt of reply to 31 July 1960, the Martial Law Administration decided to act and warned people against “playing politics” and threatened that the “full force of Martial Law will be brought to bear against them.”24

It is said that Chief Justice Shahabuddin protested vigorously and the warning was toned down by President Ayub, despite the aggressive mood of the Cabinet.25 Thus the Constitution Commission continued its work of analyzing the replies to the questionnaire and then held sittings in the East as well the West wing for hearing representative views, while acrimonious debates continued. The government spokesmen were loud in airing their views about President Ayub’s prescription.

In the meantime, a fierce controversy raged within the Constitutiion Commission and warnings were administered through the press. Even so, the Constitution Commission report was not a unanimous one—the note of dissent was by Habibullah Khan of West Pakistan. This could only be so if Ayub’s prescription had failed to be acceptable to the majority opinion. Thus the promise to frame a Constitution early receded and further processing became necessary.

21 Pakistan Times, 17 March 1960.

22 Edgar and Kathryn R. Schuller, Public Opinion and Constitution-making in Pakistan, 1958-1962, 1967, p. 67.

23 Ibid., p. 74.

24 Pakistan Observer, 3 July 1960.

25 Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, 1965, p. 211.
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Constitution-making had been a painful and exhausting process in the past because of divided interests of East and West Pakistan. The Constitution Commission set up by President Ayub was expected to avoid the bitterness and the acrimonies of the past. But this expectation was not fulfilled.

The Constitution Commission signed its report on 29 April 1961, and presented it to the President on 6 May 1961. The report did not obviously, conform to President Ayub’s formula. The need to process the report further led the President to set up the Cabinet Sub-Committee which, being in his entourage, was expected to say things in line with his views. But here also things went wrong, the reason being the East’s opposition. The President, in order to give the Cabinet an all-Pakistani character, had to draw from dissimilar political “constituencies,” namely, the East and the West Pakistan. However selective he might have been in his choice, political background of the people drawn from these two wings was different. Therefore, the East Pakistani Cabinet Ministers, by and large, saw the provisions of the Constitution in a different light. Law Minister Mohammad Ibrahim, who belonged to East Pakistan, had his own views on such issues as the presidential system, the federal structure, and the independence of judiciary. It was known that members drawn from West Pakistan, namely, Manzur Qadir, Z.A. Bhutto, and Mohammad Shaoib, towed the President’s line. It has been said, the “conflict became so sharp and irreconcilable” that Mohammad Ibrahim “refused to attend further meetings, left the capital, and withdrew to his home in Dacca.”26 Ibrahim was invariably supported by his two Bengali colleagues. Karol von Vorys notes that voting in the sub-committee “indicated a genuine difference of views.”27

President Ayub visited East Pakistan in May, on the supposed purpose of inspecting cyclone-affecting areas. However, he went out of his way to woo the East Pakistanis by promising to develop the economy of their area. He promised, during a press conference, that “no West Pakistani officer would be posted to East Pakistan unless absolutely necessary.”28

The so-called revolution of 27 October had brought in nothing revolutionary to the political culture of Pakistan. The foreign observers rightly noted that “the regime of President Mohammad Ayub Khan will mark its 3rd anniversary tomorrow in a mixed atmosphere of pride, hope, and frustration.”29 It was very true that expectations had turned into hopes. “Outlined by Constitution by mid-Nov.” headlined the Pakistan Times of 4 October 1961 and added, “party to run under licences if at all.” This clearly typified the mind of Pakistanis those days. No doubt, the elite was frustrated, but, unfortunately, this feeling was not allowed to sublimate itself through public expression, thus adding to the tension in the Pakistani scene.

Meanwhile, the Cabinet Sub-Committees concluded their work in October 1961. Presidential system of government was preferred. Even in this there was one dissent, presumably the Law Minister Ibrahim supported the parliamentary form.30

Next came the turn of administrators. Their committee was supposed to examine the Constitution

26 Ibid., p. 218.

27 Ibid.

28 Edgar and Kathryn Schiller, op. cit., p. 108.

29 New York Times, 27 October 1961.

30 Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 219.

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Sub-Committee’s report to assess its administrative feasibility. But this period was utilized to create a climate for Ayub’s Constitution to find general acceptability. Here East Pakistan came in for special attention. During the three-day visit, President Ayub held out assurances of redress of East Pakistan’s grievances. Much was being said of the economic development of the East wing.

The closing chapter in the formulation of the Constitution has been described thus :

The last stage in the genesis of the Constitution was reached when the Governors’ Conference opened on October 23, 1961. If there have ever been an intention to publish the outlines of the document, this was now formally reversed. Instead, the complete Constitution was promised for March 1962….The Conference demonstrated clearly that he was not surrounded by yes-men. By all indications, it was a rather stormy affair with personal recriminations given a free rein. At the focal point of the discussion, it seems, was not so much the specific institutional arrangement, although the proposed relationship between the Central and Provincial Government loomed large, but the post-constitutional reconstruction of constitutional life with such key questions as suffrage and political parties. The President who tended to support the more liberal element on the institutional structure appeared to have been fully committed to his system of Basic Democrats serving as the electoral college, and continued to remain suspicious of political parties.31

Despite some items remaining unsettled at the end of the conference, a Drafting Committee was appointed consisting of Manjur Qadir and Abdul Hamid, the Law Secretary. The Committee took three months to finalize its draft. In the Governors’ Conference at Dacca, the President approved the draft which was sent for printing on 7 January 1962. It was on 1 March 1962 that the President promulgated the new Constitution envisaging the presidential form of government in line with his thinking.

The reaction to the Constitution could not be judged in its proper perspective as the mass media was geared to “sell” the President’s Constitution. It has been said : “President Ayub Khan’s radio address announcing the new Constitution was the signal for a publicity campaign whose dimensions were almost unprecedented in South Asia.”32 Adoration of the President by loyalists in West Pakistan reached such a pitch that President sought “touba—forgiveness—from All Mighty” as he felt “such praises are enough to upset one’s mental equilibrium.”33

East Pakistan was said to be in a mood of “sullen silence.”34 But it was more than that. This was explained in the words of the editor of the Observer : “If I cannot report unfavourable reaction, I shall not report anything.”35 The Director, Bureau of National Reconstruction, sought to warn “that the offence of ‘propaganda’ against the Constitution was interpreted to include silence.”36

Before the final promulgation of the Constitution, Rawalpindi was in an uneasy state of mind.

31 Ibid., pp. 221-2.

32 Ibid., p, 230.

33 Ibid., p. 231.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid. P. 232.

36 Ibid.
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Despite the promised carrots, it did not feel secure in East Pakistan. It gave itself away when Suhrawardy was detained for one year under the Security Act on 30 January 1962 for acting “in a manner prejudicial to the security and safety of Pakistan.” Since Pakistan was on the threshold of its constitutional government, his arrest was a great surprise, as was observed by Daily Telegraph of 31 January 1962. Times (London) rightly described it in the editorial under the caption, “To deter others” : The arrest of Mr. Suhrawardy, just before a new Constitution is to be promulgated for Pakistan, is not fully explained by the vague official statement….Perhaps the prospect of a political quickening after the new Constitution finally emerges has sent Mr. Suhrawardy into detention. It would not be the first time that the Pakistan Government has made an exemplary arrest to warn off others.”37

Suhrawardy’s arrest caused the students in East Pakistan to go on a rampage. In panic, the administration threatened that all cases of contravention of Martial Law Administration would be tried by Military Courts. On 14 February 1962, Pakistan Times, quoting the statement of Lieutenent General Azam Khan, Governor of East Pakistan, reported unrest among students in towns, viz. Munshigunj, Narsingdi, Barisal, Pirojpur, Kushtia, Chittagong, Sylhet, Comilla and Noakhali. The Pakistani press of those days was to gagged that we have to glean the Western press for details.

Students of Dacca University demonstrated yesterday, calling for an end of Martial Law, wrecking a bus and even burning pictures of Ayub Khan. Quite like old days—nothing similar has happened since the President seized power in 1958. Politics since then has been almost an unmentionable activity. Even the new Constitution—now due to be announced this month—seems intended to keep politics at the minimum. But the students of East Pakistan—or at least some of them—have not bothered to wait for the Constitution : they have revived politics unblushingly and broken the taboo. Bengalis are famous for being politically minded to the point of turbulence and for a long time one of the wonders of the Martial Law regime was that the East Pakistan took it so quietly.38

Actually, the initial quietness in East Pakistani scene was more ominous than demonstrative discontent. The sullenness of inactivity in a politically vibrant people means only that the discontent element had gone underground which manifests itself in some undesirable form at an opportune moment. The rulers of Pakistan provided this opportunity through the arrest of Suhrawardy. There was on open defiance of all that was sought to be treated as sacrosanct by the Martial Law regime.

It has been said of the series of disturbances in East Pakistan, “in which students were prominent and in which political leaders, particularly of the Awami League party, were arrested,”39 that “students were being exploited for selfish and nefarious ends.”40 It is a well-practiced method to use student agitations to gain political ends. In the present case they were used to exert political pressure in relation to the Constitution which was under preparation.41

In some measure, the Centre’s attitude towards East Pakistan had been reconciliatory. At the

37 Times, 2 February 1962. (Italics added.)

38 Guardian (Manchester), 7 February 1962.

39 Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, p. 160.

40 Ibid., p. 161.

41 Ibid., p. 162.
11
beginning of February 1962, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was divided into two corporations and placed under the respective provincial governments. This was followed by two separate Railway Boards. Similar decentralization was effected in case of the Water and Power Development authority. Thus, East Wing was given, for the first time, certain measure of economic and administrative autonomy.

The purpose of these changes has since been conceded obliquely : “The tendencies in this direction became apparent early in 1962, and even before Martial Law was replaced by a constitutional form of government, and it seems probable that this concession, particularly agreeable to East Pakistan opinion, helped greatly to facilitate acceptance of the new Constitution.”42 How far this was successful remains a conjecture. The impact of Suhrawardy’s detention makes any assessment of the matter difficult. But the effect of the student agitation has been analyzed in retrospect : “The arrest of the late H.S. Suhrawardy in January 1962 led to violent student demonstrations in East Pakistan, which in turn persuaded Ayub to make tangible concessions in the form of greater allocations to East Pakistan and to insert a clause in the Constitution declaring that every effort would be made to bring about parity between the provinces in all spheres of the Central Government.”43

With the President signing the new Constitution on 1 March 1962, the Martial Law Government was on its way out. The Constitution did not generate any popular enthusiasm. Government spokesmen like the Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir tried to sell the Constitution through colourful verbiage. In East Pakistan, there was open hostility when students of the Dacca Medical College and the Engineering College went on one-day strike on 19 March, demanding the restoration of full democratic rights and a parliamentary government of federal type of Pakistan. The highly politicized intellegentsia of East Pakistan had found the students ready to articulate their demands.

President Ayub in a Radio broadcast on 22 March spelled out the objectives and requirements of Pakistan as he saw them. He spoke of “country in two parts” and counselled his countrymen to “constantly remember that all of us in Pakistan have a common destiny.”44 Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Azam Khan, Governor of East Pakistan, held a conference on 27 March of the heads of educational institutions, selected members of the public, and high officials, to consider the problems posed by the students. In anger, President Ayub Khan made the accusation, at this convocation address to the students of the Peshawar University, that “Calcutta and Kabul based forces of disruption lost no opportunity to strike at each and every point of our vulnerability.” The real casualty of all this was Lieutenant General Azam Khan who laid down his office as Governor on 10 May 1962. This was indeed a sad event for East Pakistan. Never had there been a Governor so popular with the East Pakistanis as him.

Very soon a new compulsion was to take away the political mind into a new sphere. Nominations for election to the National Assembly had to be filed by 4 April 1962. Ayub had already warned that “in

42 Ibid., p. 160.

43 Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 230.

44 Dawn, Karachi, 23 March 1962.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 29 April 1962.

12
coming elections, those elected will have to come up the hard way. There is no party automation to have them about in a diffused political market.”45

The result of elections to the National Assembly was a triumph for the veterans.46 Many of the known politicians such as Mohammad Ali of Bogra, Maulavi Tamizuddin, Habibur Rahman, Abdul Kasem Khan, and Sardar Bahadur Khan were returned. This clearly showed that, despite attempts at villification, politicians were not the discredited creatures. This turn of event came as a surprise. Carefully designed electoral system and all the effort in the conduct of election campaigns failed to bring about the change which the President had hoped and worked for. Comments by the foreign press ably sum up the situation thus : “Election to Pakistan National Assembly has thrown up something like an opposition. Most of the former politicians who offered themselves to the Electoral Colleges have been returned and the tidy pattern of ‘Basic Democracy’ devised by President Ayub Khan and his colleagues has been disturbed at the first opportunity. Political parties are still forbidden…and the leading exponents of party politics have been disqualified from public office. Enough remains to dominate tha new Assembly.”47 Times (London) noted : “President Ayub is not the first authoritarian ruler who has had to take account of the stubborn desire for representative government….Pakistan is not, after all, a colonial territory under tutelage. The political tradition is strong even if its last exercise was inefficient and corrupt.”48 Another British paper observed : “It is, therefore, significant—and doubtsless discouraging for President Ayub Khan—that the weekend poll has returned so many professional politicians of the old stamp.” It also commented on the failure of President Ayub’s design : “In spite of the dissolution of political parties and the close regimentation of what can scarcely be called an election ‘campaign,’ party organization has plainly played an active part.”49 These comments in the foreign press, obviously, could not be echoed in the Pakistani press. It had to abide by the dictates of the ruler. Pakistan Times of 30 April 1962 banner headlined the news of the poll : “Patriots elected MPs”; “Ayub assures full support”; and “Voters congratulated on performance.” Such artificial euphoria in the press was necessary as the public in Pakistan had to be doctored so as to believe that Ayub’s design was a success. The elections in Pakistan were never a matter of choice. Even so, the fact remains that the political culture of a country is not mutable through structural changes, some minor variations can be effected but the basic strands persist. This was the rationale of the election results in Pakistan. The political vintage of those returned to the National Assembly was known to all New York Times commenting on Pakistan elections, on 4 May 1962, pertinently recorded that “despite the ban on political parties for election, 44 per cent of the individuals named to the Assembly are members of the proscribed political groups and many are critical of the new Constitution’s curb on legislative and judicial authority.”

The warning signal was well taken by the ruler of Pakistan. “The Political Organization (Prohibition of Unregulated Activities) Ordinance of 1962” was promulgated on 10 May 1962 to prohibit formation or revival of political parties and collection of funds or acquisition of property for political purposes. This Ordinance thus extended the provisions of Martial Law Administration to remain operative in post-Martial Law regime which was about to commence. Pakistan Times, on 1 May 1962, in its editorial “Political Portents” spelt out the official thinking : “As a matter of fact the EBDOed leaders are very much alive and kicking. And indeed it is they who have a taken a lion’s share in running the election.” This only confirms what the foreign press had recorded in a different way.

The swearing in of the members of the National Assembly ushered in the new Constitution on 8

47 Times, editorial, 30 April 1960.

48 Ibid.

49 Daily Telegraph, editorial, 30 April 1960.
13
June 1962. Martial Law came to an end after a run of 44 months of its rule. On the same day, the Martial Law (Repeal) Order, 1962, was promulgated. The withdrawal of Martial Law was hailed as “Farewell to Arms”50 while those close to President Ayub exhorted “Follow his Lead.”51

50 Dawn, 9 June 1962.
51 Pakistan Times, 9 June 1962.
০০০

CHAPTER EIGHT

AYUB’S REGIME—PHASE 1

“FARWELL TO ARMS” ARE NOT APT WORDS TO start this new chapter of Pakistan’s political history. Long ago, President Ayub had discarded his Field Marshal’s hat. His response to political impulses had ceased to be that of a soldier. Years in office had exposed him to the pull of the political forces with perceptible effect. He had come to realize that a nation cannot be made to respond to barrack methods. The forces in the parade of the national life cannot be streamlined into a regimental order. Therefore, new arrangements had to be made and new alignments sought. So, the three Generals who were with him in the 1958 coup were eased out one after another. Lieutenant General Sheikh was sent on ambassadorial assignment to Japan. Lieutenant-General Azam Khan, who had endeared himself to the East Pakistanis and was a potential rival to Ayub, had to relinquish the Governorship of East Pakistan “at his own request.”1 Lieutenant General Burki, a medical man, was later to be deprived of his Cabinet post. He was given an innocuous role of an adviser to the President on a Central Cabinet Minister’s salary. Thus, with the coming into being of the Constitution, Ayub sought to appear as a “constitutional” President.

The return to constitutional government did not create a sense of fulfilment. President Ayub Khan gave away the position himself. In his first address to National Assembly of Pakistan, he said : “The Constitution that comes into force today represents my political philosophy in its application to the existing condition of Pakistan and it deserves a fair trial.”2 He expressed anxiety when he added : “I must say sometimes I feel concerned do note that some people are making it a fashion to talk too much about large-scale and fundamental changes in the Constitution.”3 Indeed, such talks were loud and clear in East Pakistan. The voice of dissent was carried from East Pakistan by no less a person than Maulavi Tamizuddin Khan who, in his first statement on arrival in West Pakistan, pleaded for amending the Constitution.4 Therefore, President Ayub was constrained to say : “I would like to remind you that the recommencement of the constitutional process does not mean the restart of political life from the state where it stood on 8 October 1958.”5 It was not a joyful start!

1 Times (London), 16 April 1962, quoting the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir.

2 NAP Debates, Official Report, 8 June 1962, p. 3. (Italics added).

3 Ibid., p. 4

4 Pakistan Times, 9 June 1962.

5 NAP Debates, Official Report, 8 June 1962, p.3.

14
President was uneasy in his mind. The Political Organizations (Provision of Unregulated Activities) Ordinance, 1962, had been promulgated in advance on 10 May to curb the activities of politicians. It was an unrealistic hope that a partyless National Assembly could function—a fact totally contrary to the political realities of the situation. EBDO might have put some of the politicians out of office, but political forces could not be removed by such means. The supposed indirect and partyless election was ineffective in changing the old order. The lawyers and landlords still dominated the legislature—the former in East Pakistan and the later in the West.6

The first event of signficance was the election of the Speaker and the Senior Deputy Speaker. The 72 emissaries of East Pakistan met and decided to vote for Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan as the Speaker. They had the support of the West Pakistan members of the National Assembly (MNAs). Thus in the first flush, there was a sense of unity amongst members of the National Assembly. The subsequent event, viz. the nomination for the Senior Deputy Speaker, brought an end to this unity. The members of the National Assembly from West Pakistan were divided on the question of support for Mohammad Afzal Cheema as against Raja Hasan Akhtar. A term of much use those days was “like-mindedness,” which really meant party alignment. Afzal Cheema was the Republican candidate while Raja Hasan Akhtar was the Muslim League nominee. Each of these groups returned to the old practice of enticing the East Pakistani members to their sides. At first, the East Pakistani members had decided to remain neutral, but soon the opportunist elements in the East Pakistani contingent were lured into an alignment. Mohammad Ali of Bogra with his fellow-travellers supported Mohammad Afzal Cheema. Mohammad Ali had no solid base in East Bengal. This was clear when he could not get support for his wife for a National Assembly seat reserved for women.7 The zamidar of Bogra was easy to win over as he was eager to seek and build up his stature with West Pakistani support. He was keen to be part of the Eastablishment. This was clear when, while congratulating the Speaker on his unanimous election, he went out of his way to felicitate the President : “Let it be said to the eternal credit of our President that he has restored constitutional government. There is perhaps no parallel in history where a man enjoying absolute power and authority has voluntarily relinquished his powers in favour of a measure of representative government.”8 Such high praise carried its own message.

The process of splitting the East Pakistanis took the old pattern. The lure of office and other forms of patronage divided the East Pakistani MNAs. Jubilantly, a West Pakistan paper wrote on the occasion : “One of the main features of today’s election was that East Pakistani members who had given an impression that they are a fully united block could not conceal their differences.”9 President Ayub knew the real position : “In Pakistan people thought it fit to aspire to become Minister the very day they are elected to the Assembly.”10 This fact of political life was used skillfully by him when he formed his new Cabinet. President Ayub had seen to it that the Constitution gave him the power to appoint Cabinet Ministers and Parliamantary Secretaries. The carrot of office was, thereofore, used to serve his end. President Ayub selected his East Bengali contingent of Ministers with great skill. Mohammad Ali of Bogra was an obvious choice. The others were Wahiduzzaman, a Faridpur Industrialist, Abdus Sabur Khan, a Khulna businessman, A.K.M. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury, a Chittagong political operator, and

6 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, p. 244.

7 Karl von Voys, Political Development in Pakistan, p. 243.

8 NAP Debates, Official Report, 11 June 1962, p. 19.

9 Pakistan Times, 12 June 1962.

10 Karl Von Voys, op. cit., p. 244.
15
Abdul Monem Khan, an ambitious politician and a deserter from Nurul Amin’s camp. Each had his own interest to be on the right side of the Establishment. They brought with them a section of East Pakistani MNAs who where hankering after extra privileges.

How East Pakistan viewed its representatives in the Cabinet can be read in the following description : “Those from East Pakistan were greeted with black flags, rotten eggs, angry slogans, and massive demonstrations upon their return to the province. In Chittagong and later in Comilla police had to intervene to extricate Fazlul Quader Chowdhury. Khulna greeted A. Sabur in a similar manner.”11

In such a situation, that a partyless National Assembly would come to function was a naive belief. The formation of the Presidential Cabinet also did not give stability to the Pakistani system. In a partyless system, a nominated Cabinet has no real meaning so far as legislature is concerned. President Ayub had, during the Martial Law Administration, unscrambled much of negative forces of obscurantism, chauvinism, and corruption. In this effort he discarded political parties as the “bane of Pakistan.” He mistook the wood for the tree. When he came to act as the Constitutional President, he had build for himself two political institutions, viz. the Constitution of 1962 and the Basic Democracy system. In the Constitution, he had freed the executives from any control by the legislators. In the Basic Democracy, executives were to provide the leadership except at the Union level. Thus the power elite was the bureaucracy, the other element being its military counterpart.

But the political party was an institutional arrangement for power also. President’s Constitution envisaged a partyless system. In retrospect President Ayub called this as a “miscalculation.”12 But it was more than that. He claimed to have found fundamentals of his Constitution “in the book of Pakistan,” based on the “knowledge of the people and the soil of Pakistan.”13 But he forgot the basic fact that “the West is all government and the East is all politics.” It is lack of this realization which led to the clumsy way in which the “miscalculation” was sought to be corrected. President Ayub in his first address to the National Assembly had very artfully said :

Being only concerned with means, fair or foul, of acquiring power, political parties have been our bane in the past. Nevertheless, if an absolute majority of you have strong views to the contrary, it is up to you to have the matter thoroughly investigated in an appropriate Bill. When any such Bill comes to me, it will receive my earnest consideration and I shall act accordingly to dictates of my conscience. Meanwhile, it is possible that you might group yourself on the basis of identity of attitudes. You have every right to do so. 14

Inspired report had already appeared in the trusted newspaper indicating President Ayub Khan’s willingness to lead a party of his own.15 This resulted in a lively debate between Pakistan Times, the official paper, and Dawn, still the mouthpiece of Bengali Muslim Leaguers. Dawn wrote : “A good many of the political busybodies whose names have come to be associated with the move to persuade the

11 Ibid., p. 258.

12 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 221.

13 Ibid., p. 207.

14 NAP Debates, Official Report, 8 June 1962, p. 5 (Italics added.)

15 Pakistan Times, editorial, 6 June 1962.

16
President to lead a party are those who do not enjoy much credit with the people,”16 and concluded with a prayer, “May God help him to take a correct decision and show him the right path.”17 Such controversies were not very relevant as the ruler had to take the decision. But the point of interest to note is that the political impulses were the same as of old. The 44 months of Martial Law Government had created no new national ethos nor cleared the murky politics of Pakistan.

The debate on the President and his political party was allowed to continue. The administration seemed to look upon the issue with detachment. But it served its purpose by preparing the public mind to the coming events. Exhortation and warning alternated. Dawn warned the President not to be led away by “friends” who were asking him to lead a political party but follow the Quaid-e-Azam’s way who had divested himself of the Muslim League’s Presidentship.18 This was a reply to the earlier exhortation by Pakistan Times in which it was stated that the President should guide the destiny of the country by leading an organization and be not confined to the ivory tower of being above politics.19 Such polemics were permissible at the theoretical level. But the issue was to become a live one in what came to pass in East Pakistan.

Politics was warning up in East Pakistan. It is said that “by end of June his [Ayub’s] Ministers—six of whom were member of the National Assembly—had convinced him that the Government should sponsor enabling legislation”20 for political parties. The compulsion was the move in East Pakistan of a new united front21 based on a statement of 24 June by former Chief Ministers Nurul Amin (Muslim League), A.H. Sarkar (Krishak Sramik), Ataur Rahman Khan (Awami League), and six other Dacca politicians.22 The Statement of the “nine” did not advocate revival of parties but sought removal of all restrictions on political parties who were to act in concert for convening a new Assembly to frame the Constitution. This was a basic shift where political parties were envisaged as instrument of power in the body-polity of Pakistan and not as a set of groups confined within the legislature. On 30 June 1962, a Bill seeking to form and regulate political parties was introduced by the government itself, called the Political Parties Bill, 1962, which permitted political parties with inbuilt regulatory provisions. These provisions could put any effective opposition party out of commission. Reaction to the Bill was not favourable. East Pakistan was particularly bitter. Its MNAs voiced their stubborn opposition in the National Assembly. Mohbubul Huq summed up East Pakistan’s protest by quoting in the National Assembly from Pakistan Observer’s report on a resolution of a Dacca meeting : “This meeting views with a sense of alarm the recent Government Bill on formation and regulation of political parties and providing therein restrictions on membership, calculated to restrict growth of democratic mass organizations, gag public opinion, and curb the unhampered functioning of democracy in the country.”23 It was a fact that regulatory measures

16 Dawn, editorial, 12 June 1962.

17 Ibid.,

18 Ibid., 19 July 1962.

19 Pakistan Times, 19 June 1962.

20 Asian Survey, Vol. III, No.2, February 1963, p. 109.

21 Statesman, 9 June 1962.

22 Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 2, 2 February 1963, p. 109.

23 NAP Debates, Official Report, 10 July 1962, pp. 1248-9.
17
were such as to make revival or formation of an opposition party almost impossible.

Protests inside or ouside the National Assembly meant little when the ruler had willed it otherwise. Ayub’s Constitution was so rigged as to ensure that the President was the power. The matter was put rather poignantly on 14 July 1962 by Farid Ahmad, an East Pakistani, on the closing of the National Assembly’s deliberations : “We have offered whatever little resistance we could under the Constitution and under the Rules.”24 Thereafter, Opposition, most of whom were East Pakistanis, withdrew from the House as a protest.

East Pakistan did not alter its stand. The President had started to “play politics,” so he was faced with the political agility of East Pakistan. It heated up the situation. East Pakistan, in furtherance of its objective, formed the East Pakistan National Democratic Front (NDF). This was to bring the Awami League, the Muslim League, the Krishak Sramik Party, the National Awami League, and the Nizam-i-Islam Party together for achieving the common goal of democratizing the Constitution and the government. It was envisaged that each party would retain its identity but would act in concert to achieve the professed common objectives. Its method was described mildly as “willing to wound, but afraid to strike.” This move was, however, considered dangerous by bureaucrats close to the President. The official view was projected in the trusted press : “The obstacle that the President’s followers might face in their efforts to form a broad-based, all-country party is the disposition of boycott which is crystallizing in the political circles of East Pakistan….This is a dangerous situation and threatens to force a gulf between the East and the West.”25 East Pakistan with its NDF and the statement of the nine created a sense of crisis. The political activity was thus restored to its former militancy in East Pakistan. To make it worse, H.S. Suhrawardy then joined the nine leaders in a common call for a new Constituent Assembly to enact a fresh democratic Constitution. This was indeed open defiance.

During this time, a student agitation erupted in East Pakistan disturbing the law and order situation—the supposed cause being the recommendations of the Education Commission. The political motivation for such an agitation was, however, clear. The Army had to be called out to quell the disturbances. Firing was resorted to in which two persons were killed and 255 injured. The import of these events was not lost. President Ayub issued a threat to Suhrawardy in a press conference on 28 September 1962 : “Whenever there is any destruction in the country or any threat to the safety and security of Pakistan, Suhrawardy will be in the lead. Had it not been for the large influx of refugees after partition, no government would have taken a risk of giving Pakistani nationality to Suhrawardy.”

President Ayub’s threat did little to deter Suhrawardy. On 30 September, he declared provocatively that one unit was not a settled fact and the revival of political parties at present was useless. His call was for the restoration of true democracy. About this time a meeting addressed by Suhrawardy at Gujranwala in the West was disturbed by a bomb explosion. This was seen as an attempt on his life. A protest meeting was held in Dacca on 31 September 1962. This was convened by important leaders of various parties as Nurul Amin, Abu Hassan Sarkar, Abdul Rashid, and Shaukat Ali Khan. The effect of all this was that Suhrawardy was gaining support of the leaders of the different parties in its stand against President Ayub and his courtiers. In such a situation detention became inevitable. Suhrawardy was arrested at the behest of the President without consulting Governor Azam Khan who, in protest, laid down his office.

The formation of the “King’s Party” was becoming an urgent need. As early as 20 July 1962, it

24 Ibid., 14 July 1962, p. 1569.

25 Pakistan Times, editorial, 24 July 1962.
18
was reported that President Ayub “would like ‘right-minded’ people from both wings of the country to meet at a convention and form a broad-based political party. The party, he said, should be nationalistic in outlook and progressive in approach to problems facing the country.”26 East Pakistan responded by reaffirming its stand against the revival of the political parties until democracy based on adult franchise was restored. The President tried to stall by setting up a Franchise Commission. But the mood of non-revivalists did not change. Meanwhile, President Ayub said that he hoped for the emergence of a broad-based all-Pakistan party which he could join.27 The idea of a convention was central to President Ayub’s thinking. Pakistan Times of 10 August 1962 dutifully reported : “Revivalists veering round to convention.” Dawn of 14 August 1962 carried a report from Dacca : “The Vice-President of the Pakistan Muslim League Akram Khan, today, formally announced the revival of the League and directed all branches to start functioning immediately.” East Pakistan was out to do mischief. So President Ayub had to come out himself. At a press conference held in Lahore, he expressed his displeasure at the manner in which political parties were being revived and was peeved with the Muslim Leaguers who were to hold the Council meeting at Dacca.28 In his view, the Council having been elected a decade ago was no longer representative.29 Instead, he wanted a broad-based meeting of like-minded people.30 The very next day it was reported : “The formation of a broa-based national party, which in all probability will be named Muslim League, was discussed at a special meeting of the Presidential Cabinet today. The meeting was presided over by President Ayub Khan.31

Things were moving fast. Maulana Akram Khan resiled from his position which brightened the prospect of the conventionists.32 The only question remained as to who was entitled to summon such a convention. A last moment plea was put out to give the non-revivalist in East Pakistan a chance by rescinding the EBDO.33

But a stage had been reached when patience seemed to have run out. Chowdhury Khaliquzzaman was brought out of wilderness and made to announce that “a convention of Muslim League leaders and workers would be held in Karachi on September 4 to form a broad-based Muslim League,”34 where “party Constitution may also be drafted.”35

What actually transpired has been described in The Round Table :

26 Dawn, 21 July 1962.

27 Pakistan Times, editorial, 10 August 1962.

28 Ibid., 16 August 1962.

29 Ibid.,

30 Ibid.,

31 Pakistan Times, 17 August 1962. (Italics added.)

32 Dawn, 18 August 1962.

33 Ibid., editorial, 19 August 1962.

34 Pakistan Times, 24 August 1962.

35 Ibid., (Itialics added.)
19
To begin with, although the list of the invited was rather impressively large—about a thousand—it was hardly representative. Apparently the organizers of the convention picked up their own yes-men to ensure that the proceedings of the convention were conducted in whatever manner they wished. Secondly, major decisions were taken in unseemly hurry. The newly drafted constitution of the League was rushed through the convention and the delegates had hardly the time to understand what was being proposed and what changes were being made in the Constitution of the League. Those of the delegates who dared to depart from the dotted line were heckled and manhandled and the entire dismal show came to an end after only two half-day sessions.36

Thus the “Sarkari” League, borrowing the “lustre” of the nomenclature Muslim League, came into being through official machinations, which, despite denial, was clear in “the open use of official government machinary to publicize the proceedings of the convention.”37

It has been assessed that the aim of this move was to forestall other Leaguers in case they attempted to rehabilitate the League by using the Council of the organization.38 But this design did not succeed. There was a sharp reaction, particularly, amongst East Pakistani Muslim Leaguers. They reacted by convening a meeting of Muslim Leauge Council at Dacca which was joined by prominent EBDOnians like Mian Mumtaz Daultana from the Punjab. Thus the forces which had impelled Maulana Akram Khan of East Pakistan to attempt to revive the Muslim League came to fruition. Khawaja Nazimuddin came back to political life to head the Councillor’s League, and Sardar Bahadur Khan, President Ayub’s brother, became its General-Secretary. The Muslim League (Council) thus came into being on 28 October 1962 at Dacca, the birth-place of the first Muslim League. The old guards of Muslim League had grouped themselves to oppose the new Constitution and support the National Democratic Front.39 Muslim League (Council) was more representative as it had a large number of leading League politicians.40 But this was not the only threat which was posed from Dacca.

The statement of 24 June of the Dacca “nine’ had given rise to anti-constitutional activities. But it was H.S. Suhrawardy who, after his release in August, gave the movement cohesion and institutional form. This he did by joining the “nine” in East Pakistan and thus setting up his firm base. “The NDF its main backing in East Pakistan.”41 This was due to Suhrawardy who toured extensively in East Pakistan where the response was overwhelming. It is claimed that his Dacca meeting attracted three lakhs of people.

He had to operate with care and caution. An astute politician and an able organizer that Suhrawardy was, he had taken care to announce on 4 October 1962 the “formation of the Front, as a

36 The Round Table, No. 209, December 1962, p. 76. (Italics added.)

37 Ibid., pp. 76-7.

38 Mushtaq Ahmad, op. cit., p 283.

39 Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 259.

40 Mushtaq Ahmad, op. cit., p. 284.

41 Ibid.,

20
‘movement’ to obtain restoration of democracy, not a ‘party.’”42 Such a posture was only to circumvent the ordinance of 10 May, banning operation of any new party. It was clear that H.S. Suhrawardy was keen to avoid any direct conflict which would enable the ruler to put his infant organization out of commission through arrests or intimidation.

So Ayub came to be opposed by two East Pakistanis—Suhrawardy with his NDF and Nazimuddin with his Council Muslim League. A foreign observer wrote of “Mr. Suhrawardy’s challenge”43 and summed up the situation thus : “President Ayub faces an awkward situation and Pakistan’s political future threatens to be confused, no matter how he responds to it.”44 President Ayub in his broadcast of 27 October, on the anniversary of the Revolution, lamented that “the entire process of party-making was tended to become a prisoner of personalities rather than a symbol of principles.” But party-making was Ayub’s need. The only difference was that Suhrawardy and East Pakistanis were more mature and subtle which made the position of the Establishment difficult.

“‘The nine-plus-one’ then solicited support in West Pakistan.’”45 Suhrawardy left for Karachi on 13 December 1962 after his tour of East Pakistan. He had completed the organizational work of Regional NDF in East Pakistan. He was to return to Dacca on 6 January 1963 for the national convention of NDF after he had built up the NDF in the West. This was alarming. Official view was projected in the editorial, “Affairs La Muslim League” : “Actually what has happened is that resumption of precisely the same factional game of intrigue and manoeuvrings which they played over a decade to the complete ruin and eclipse of the Muslim Leauge.”46

This created a ground for the President to act. So on 7 January 1963 two Ordinances were promulgated amending the Political Parties Act, 1962, whereby he took on himself the power to reduce or to waive disqualification of the EBDOed politicians and also redefine political parties to include any group, association with any political party, or political activities. In the new Ordinances, the government was empowered to direct the EBDOed politicians to refrain from addressing any meeting including press conferences or issuing statements of political nature for a period of six months. The tightening of grip over the activities of the EBDOed politicians showed that they were neither politically forgotten nor discredited enough for President Ayub to ignore them. The move was to liquidate the NDF and the EBDOnians acting under its cover. This move was seen by Dawn as a “descent to pettiness.”47 Suhrawardy had unfortunately fallen sick. Even then from his sick-bed in Jinnah Central Hospital, Karachi, he said : “This is the most blatant form of corruption on the one hand and coercion and suppression on the other.”48 “A cocktail which is a laboratory example of traditional intimidation and

42 Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 2, February 1963, p. 111.

43 Times, London, editorial, 1 October 1962.

44 Ibid.,

45 Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 2, February 1963, p. 111.

46 Pakistan Times, 1 November 1962.

47 Dawn, editorial, 9 January 1963.

48 Times, London, 9 January 1963.

21
seduction”49 was Daultana’s colourful description. The timing and the content of the two Ordinances are significant indicators of the type of political advice and expertise which were available to President Ayub. It was the heavy hand of Civil Service schooled in British India which was still a major lever of power. President Ayub in his distress had come to rely increasingly on the bureaucracy.

These Ordinances failed to deter. The meeting of the Opposition leaders was held in Lakham House, Suhrawardy’s residence in Karachi, on 19 and 20 January 1963. It was attended by representatives of the Jamait-i-Islam, Nizam-e-Islam, the Council Muslim League, the Awami League, and the National Awami League. It was called the West Pakistan NDF which was attended by Mohmud Ali, a close associate of Suhrawardy, from East Pakistan as an observer. The convention demanded the restoration of democracy. It set up a 10-man committee to organize NDF in West Pakistan to explore the possibilities of all democratic forces to work together. Thereafter, a convention was to be held in Dacca. It is interesting to note that it had become a political “must” in Pakistan that the opposition sought the shelter of East Pakistan to ogranize themselves. Somehow the air of Dacca seemed to be conspiratorial and rebellious. This had almost become an accepted fact and indicates the political culture of East Pakistan.

The 38 opposition leaders who attended the meeting at Suhrawardy’s house were arrested. Suhrawardy was seriously ill with heart-attack. Since the start of Ayub’s constitutional rule on 8 June 1962, politics had been resurrected with a gusto. There has never been a dull moment, thanks to East Pakistan’s skill in “playing politics.” Times of London dated 28 March 1963 commented thus : “The politics of Pakistan have at present two dominating themes; an attempt in the name of democracy to wrest power from the executive and return it to the legislature, and the insistence in East Pakistan that this wing of the country receive an equal share of all economic benefits distributed by the government.” Though true broadly, this was not the whole picture. Politics was much more complex then.

The National Assembly met at Dacca on 8 March 1963. The question of economic disparity between the two wings and discrimination in the Services dominated the spring session of the National Assembly of Pakistan. Much of the expertise in these matters was provided by the intellectuals of the Dacca University. It added a new dimension to the East-West polemics. East Pakistan politicians had started a new and meaningful line of attack on the Establishment which had tied itself down to the removal of disparity in per capita income in its Constitution. The debates were acrimonious. East Pakistan MNAs were openly bitter. Mashiur Rahman quoted from poet Rabindranath Tagore : “Oh, Saint, you have only coloured your garments. And not have conquered the heart with love and devotion”50 and tauntingly counselled the Treasury Bench to “try to fascinate the heart. Only colouring the garment will not do.”51 But it was not so much the opposition inside the National Assembly as the growing opposition outside which harassed the President.

It was this compulsion of growing opposition which led President Ayub to build up his political base. Pakistan Times of 24 February 1963 as usual gave prior notice of events saying : “Ayub may lead the conventionists.” The inevitable followed on 22 May 1963 when the President joined the political party, a “Red Letter Day in League’s history.”52 “Political observer said here tonight that the President appeared to have crossed the rubicon and his joining political party which has a majority in the House will

49 Ibid.

50 NAP Debates, Official Report, 21 March 1963, p. 656.

51 Ibid.

52 Pakistan Times, 23 May 1963.
22
have a definite effect on the body politics in the country.”53 A later commentary judged the matter in a different light :

The Convention Muslim League, the spilt part of the old Muslim League, has certainly gained weight by association with President Ayub. But essentially the party is a fissiparous body and most of its adherents are—with honourable exceptions here and there—rank opportunist who have made a life-time habit of becoming hangers-on of the powers that be.54

Meanwhile, the forces of opposition were to weaken. Suhrawardy fell ill and had to go abroad for treatment. His absence was a great blow to the oppositions’ efforts at unity. Towards the close of February 1963, East Pakistan NDF Committee came to be organized with Nurul Amin as the Convernor. However, the Committee was divided on the question of quantum of rerpresentation of each party. Maulana Bhashani, released in November 1962, had initially agreed to work with the non-revivalists but later took a revised line of action. He had visited West Pakistan an April 1963. Later events suggest that this visit augered well for Rawalpindi.

The President was meeting with an encouraging response from the East. So in the National Assembly, on 14 April 1963, the government sought to create a better feeling in East Pakistan by voting with the opposition resolution for setting up a Parity Committee for removing East and West imbalances in the Services. It was an unanimous vote.

East Pakistan politics was getting into difficulties. The unity of purpose in the opposition ranks was being erobed.55 Differences arose between two to the East Pakistani lieutenants of Suhrawardy over the issue of the revival of political parties. The dynamic General-Secretary Sheikh Mujibur Rahman revived the Awami League in defiance of Ataur Rahman Khan who held on to the non-revivalist philosophy of NDF. This splintered the East Pakistan Awami League further.

Meanwhile, the National Awami League was being wooed carefully. In August 1963, Maulana Bhashani visited West Pakistan again. He met President Ayub and Nawab of Kalabagh. What transpired remains a mystery. But later events give a clue. Maulana Bhashani led on official delegation to China towards the end of the year. Times of London, on 4 December 1963, commented pertinently thus : “President Ayub appointed him [Bhashani] to lead a delegation and that journey from which he returned this week appears to have changed all his ideas. The achievements of China (not a Communist but a Socialist country) had so impressed him that, realizing how backward Pakistan was in comparison, he was inclined, he said, to spend rest of his life in prayers. He was calling off civil disobedience movement.” Maulana Bhashani ceased to be in the opposition then.

The seed of opposition’s unity thus failed to germinate. But this was also the time when the President took to politicking—revival of the cult of Mirza. It did not go unnoticed. On 23 July 1963, Daily Telegraph wrote : “President Ayub chose to take over control of Pakistan (having thrice refused political invitation to do so earlier) because he thought that the state of Pakistan politics was rotten. It is still rotten….but the President now finds himself in the middle of it.”

This summation of the situation in mid-1963 may read harsh. But it is true. A closer look at the

53 Ibid.,

54 Z.A. Suleri, Politician and Ayub, 1964, p. 185.

55 Times, London, 8 July 1963.
23
Pakistani scene reveals that the event which forms the watershed in the Pakistan polity was not the imposition of the Martial Law rule or the restoration of the constitutional government, but when the President changed his cap to that of a politician. This made him confront East Pakistan. The East wing is a backyard of Pakistan. This is so in matters of military, civil, and economic power. But its place in politics has never been under-rated and its politicians relegated to a back seat in Pakistani politics. The periodic platitudes thrown out by the ruler of Rawalpindi such as press release of 8 February 1963 announcing the setting-up of a subsidiary capital at Dacca or for that matter the setting-up of the Parity Committee when on 13 April 1963 the government joined opposition in setting up this committee for the alleged purpose of removing East and West imbalances in the Central Services were viewed in their proper perspective, namely, the uneasiness in the ruler who deluded himself into the belief that such marginal gestures would soften the mind of East Pakistan. The effect was otherwise. In the East, Ayub lost his charisma.

The technique of coercion, concession, and back-stage intrigue was used to divide the NDF and the Muslim League. The strategy was well founded on President Ayub’s familiarity with the political persolities of East Pakistan. H.S. Suhrawardy and Khawaja Nazimuddin subcribed to different political philosophies and modes of action dating right back to pre-Partition Bengal. President Ayub had rightly located the credible threat to his regime in H.S. Suhrawardy and his Front. Khawaja Sahib was one of the few Bengali politicians who had been educated at Aligarh. This had influenced his political thought. Ayub knew him as “goody, goody,” and hence played soft towards him. He treated Khawaja Sahib as a personal friend. 56 So Khawaja Sahib and his Muslim League (Council) were held to be a containable threat.57

A different recipe was prescribed for H.S. Suhrawardy and his NDF. Here the task was to demolish the NDF which was the forum of EBDOed politicians. The government had armed itself with two Ordinance (8 January 1963) amending Political Parties Act, 1962. In February, Mahmud Ali Qazuri, an active member of the NDF in the West, was arrested. This was followed up by further arrests in May. The NDF was also deprived of its turbulent elements by the arrest of Mashur Rahman. MNA of East Pakistan and the deputy leader of the opposition, with his supporters, including Obeidur Rahman, a student leader of Dacca University.

During the Dacca session of the National Assembly, consideration of the Select Committee’s report on Fundamental Rights, drafted as the Constitution (First Amendment) Bills, was taken up. This was to rename the country as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and made Fundamental Rights enunciated in the Constitution justiciable but saved 31 laws made by Martial Law Administration from any judicial scrutiny. Tribal areas were kept out of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court. Significantly, one of the laws saved from being axed was the Political Party Act. In a nine-hour session (24 December) the Bill was adopted by a vote of 109 to nil—five in excess of the required two-thirds majority. It was on this occasion that Khawaja Nazimuddin ordered his supporters in the National Assembly to vote with the government, thus making it possible to have such a majority. This made the position of Sardar Bahadur Khan, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, untenable. He submitted his resignation. The motivation of Khawaja Nazimuddin—a highly religious person—in acting thus has never been properly explained. Perhaps the renaming of the country as Islamic Republic had its own compulsion. Moreover, as the only Bengali exposed to the Aligarh tradition he could not be virulently hostile to a fellow Aligarhman, Ayub, who called him his friend. In the hour of triumph, Ayub, took over as the President of the All-Pakistan Muslim League (Convention). In five years, the circle had

56 Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 261.

57 Ibid.
24
been completed. Politics was back on its pedestal with Ayub leading it. Ayub’s Constitution in reaching a workable state had recreated its own politics.

At the close of 1963, the opposition appeared to be completely crippled. The death of stalwarts like Suhrawardy and Tamizuddin Khan added poignancy to the whole situation. It appeared as if fate itself was indulging in a grudge.58

58 Guardian, Manchester, 6 December 1963.
০০০

CHAPTER NINE

AYUB’S REGIME—PHASE 11

THE YEAR 1964 WAS ONE OF PREPARATION. President Ayub had then to make sure of his political future. He had tried to build up a political structure with three components, viz. the Constitution, the Basic Democracy, and a “King’s party.” But these do not fit into a system. Functionally, Basic Democrats and the party cadre were mutually incompatible. The power elite—the military, the civil servants, and the economic groups—operated outside the political structure. The President was the repository of all powers. He made good use of such an arrangement.

The opposition in East Pakistan took an attitude different than before. Political debates became secondary. Discrimination in economic life and in the services was projected as the basic cause of conflict. Domination by the West was played up. The talks were of “two economies” and “plural society” which the regime, it was asserted, sustained and encouraged. Thus a sense of separatism was being built up by East Pakistani politicians. Therefore, on a visit to Dacca on 4 March 1964, Ayub chose to tell the East Pakistanis that “we belong to one single community of brotherhood and this should be remembered by all in our activities.”1

Efforts in East Pakistan were angled to establish its distinct identity and the claims arising therefrom. In a meeting, on 9 March 1964, the revived Awami League demanded full autonomy for East Pakistan. An angered President called members of the other parties kiraye ke tattu (hired mules),2 to which the former Bengali Judge and ex-Central Law Minister, Mohammad Ibrahim, replied by saying that he preferred to be a “hired mule in history” rather than be a member of the ruling Muslim League. President Ayub returned from East Pakistan with an uneasy mind.

The Establishment had a definite task to accomplish, viz. to ensure Ayub’s continuance in power. The government took its final decision on the recommendations of the special Committee of Central Ministry of Law on the report of the Franchise Commission. The Committee’s finding was “that universal adult franchise already conferred in the people should be exercised indirectly in view of the condition prevalent in the country.”3

1 Dawn, 5 March 1964.

2 Ibid., 7 March 1964.

3 Pakistan Times, 18 January 1964.

25
The straight-jacketing of elections based on indirect system made East Pakistan react sharply. On 15 March, demonstrations were held in many towns demanding adult franchise. The All-Party Action Committee, comprising the Awami League, the National Awami Party, and the Nizam-e-Islam, gave a call for the observance of “Adult Franchise and Direct Election Day” on 18 and 19 March 1964. After a long time, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Maulana Bhashani spoke from the same platform at Paltan Maidan, Dacca, demanding adult franchise and direct elections. As if, in reply, President Ayub said at Multan, on 18 May, that the circumstances were such that only indircet elections could ensure stability of government in the country.4 The real logic was that President had to make sure of his election in 1965. Ayub’s Constitution of 1962 had left open the question of franchise. It was undoubtedly a good strategy to tackle controversial questions piecemeal to prevent over-heating the opposition.

On 26 March 1964, the National Assembly took up the question of the electoral system and the indirect method of election for statutory sanction. The opposition, in its usual way, staged a walk-out when the final voting took place. Next to come was the Constitution (Second Amendment) Bill which advanced the presidential election by five months and fixed the life of the Electoral College at five years. It was claimed that the date of the presidential election was being advanced so that the President could assume office on 23 March 1965, the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Pakistan Resolution. It, however, did not carry conviction with the critics in the House who saw in it a sinister motive.

It was felt that the earlier election of the President would influence the subsequent elections to the National Assembly in favour of his party.5 The President was under great compulsion to reverse the order of his election vis-a-vis the National Assembly. This could be seen in the dubious method adopted to gain two-thirds majority. Z.A. Suleri speaks of the sitting members in the National Assembly belonging to the government party enticing the members of the opposition in order to obtain their support for the second Constitutional Amendment Bill by holding out promise of extension of the life of the Assembly by two years. “Indeed the government party had all the failings of its parent body.”6 Nothing had changed for the better in Ayub’s regime. Nine members crossed the floor to enable the Constitution (Second Amendment) Bill to be passed on 11 June 1964.7 During the debates, an amendment to the Bill for having in turn an East and a West Pakistani as the President was moved by an East Pakistani MNA and was rejected. This led the deputy leader of the opposition, Ramizuddin Ahmed, to say : “But the very fact that you did not accept our amendment regarding rotation of presidentship between East Pakistan and West Pakistan makes it quite clear that you want to dominate East Pakistan with the help of persons from West Pakistan.”8

Bitterly, Pakistan Observer of Dacca wrote : “The passage of the Second Constitution Amendment Bill may make them feel that God is in Heaven and all’s right with the world. But, in fact, it is not so. It has been a sorry spectacle of members being bought over, of crossing the floor, of betraying their solemn promises to the electorate.”9

4 Ibid., 19 May 1964.

5 Khalid B. Sayeed, Political System in Pakistan, p. 106.

6 Z.A. Suleri, Politicians and Ayub, p. 186.

7 Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 106.

8 NAP Debates, Official Report, 11 June 1964, p 670.

9 Pakistan Observer, editorial, 16 June 1964.
26
It remineded its readers that “this sort of political behaviour”10 was “one of the alleged principle reasons for scrapping of the Constitution of 1956”11 and went on to add : “We were promised the eradication of corruption in public life and from the administration. The country was waiting to see these promises fulfilled.”12

As elections approached, manoeuvring and manipulations gave way to pressure tactics and intimidation. In East Pakistan, the Circle Officers (Development) responsible for the allocation of development funds used their influence with the BDs to vote for the government party.13 The President himself intimidatingly said : “If the opposition candidates were elected, the nation would have dug their grave. The result would be, perhaps, a bloody revolution, unlike that of the Martial Law.”14 What was meant was clear. The army was brought out to patrol the countryside15 in East Pakistan on a plea that “the pressure tactics of the opposition might frighten the BDs into voting for the opposition candidate.”16 If this apprehension was true, it also underlined a basic fact as to where the mass-mind of East Pakistan lay and how far the BDs were the people’s representatives.

In such a situation, scepticism and sullen resentment were the prevailing mood in East Pakistan. On the eighteenth anniversary of the founding of Pakistan, it was asked : “Born as a democratic nation seventeen years ago, has it lost some of the inalienable fundamental rights without which democracy has no meaning?”17 The answer came from President Ayub on 16 August, when referring to the demand for restoration of democracy, he queried : “What more democracy do they want?”18 Such a pronouncement was possible as “Bonapartism” was on the ascent; the rule was by “pronounciamento.”

On 14 August, the President Ayub said artfully in Rawalpindi that he was not enamoured of office. But if the people want him, he was available for the next term.19 The Pakistan Muslim League (Conventionist) in its resolution of 19 August adopted Ayub Khan as the party candidate for the presidential election in 1965. Jubilantly, Dawn—being owned by Haroon had cast away its links with the Bengali tactician Fazlur Rahman—wrote editorially on 21 August : “But whatever the opposition factions may decide, the nation’s choice is already as good as made.”

Meanwhile, the opposition sought to rally through the formation of a Combined Opposition Party

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 239.

14 Ibid., p. 241. (Italics added.)

15 Ibid., p. 239.

16 Ibid.

17 Pakistan Observer, 14 August 1964.

18 Times, London, 17 August 1964.

19 Ibid.
27
(COP). This was as a result of the efforts of Khawaja Nazimuddin. The four-day session started on 21 July at Dacca and went into various questions such as the national movement for the restoration of democracy. But its main decision was to set up common candidates not only for presidentship but also “to contest unitedly elections to the electoral college and the national and provincial assemblies.”20 The broad measure of understanding was incorporated in a nine-point programme which unfortunately “was vague enough to mean all things to all parties.”21 This combination of opposition forces lacked verve and vitality. Its choice of Miss Jinnah as the candidate for presidentship showed limitation in its area of choice. It is true that the opposition sought to utilize the charisma of Jinnah’s sister, the Madar-i-Millat, but they also knew that in the land of Islam a lady as the President would not be fvoured in Pakistan. Some Ulemas did issue “fatwas” (religious decree) against a woman being the Head of an Islamic State. President Ayub displayed his esteem for Miss Jinnah in inverse when he said : “She is surrounded by perverse politicians who want to turn the country into a pagal Khana”22 (mad house).

The election of Basic Democrats in West Pakistan commenced on 31 October 1964. 10 November to 19 November were the polling days for 40,000 Basic Democrats in East Pakistan. Out of these, 2,800 were elected unopposed. The results in the two wings showed that the COP was not likely to be effective in their election efforts. The professed political philosophy of the COP went against the very concept of basic democracy. Therefore, their contest in the election for Basic Democrats was a contradiction which was to go against them. It is important to note that, while COP put up their party candidates for election as Basic Democrats, Ayub did not tie himself down by putting up nominees of his party. It is a good strategy not to make the election a contest on party lines. If basic democrats were organized on party basis, the President would have been subordinated to the party. In his system, he had sufficient power to win over the successful basic democrats to support him. After all, the party as well as the Basic Democracy were his creatures. Without him, they would cease to exist.

With the election of Basic Democrats being over, the campaign for the presidential election commenced. An official notification, which may sound very strange, was issued on 8 November 1964 that Field Marshal Ayub Khan had retired from the Army with retrospective effect from 16 February 1960 to satisfy the constitutional provision baring the President from holding an office of profit. This was a measure of abundant caution. The electioneering campaign had its usual rough and tumble. Khawaja Nazimuddin had persuaded Miss Jinnah to join the fray. He went all out to work for her. The strain of it killed him. Foreign comments immediately prior to the day of election are revealing. Jacques Nevard wrote :

In the last-minute campaigning President Ayub’s supporters are telling the nation that his re-election will mean stability and material progress while the opposition will bring only chaos. Miss Jinnah’s backers are stressing their view that President Ayub is a dictator and calling on electors to vote for Miss Jinnah and a restoration of democracy….There has been no debate on economic issues or foreign policy….The nearest any foreign policy question has entered into the election has been the ruling party’s repeated allegation that the United States has been helping finance the opposition.23

20 Ibid., 28 July 1964.

21 Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 2, February 1966, p.77.

22 Statesman, 1 November 1964.

23 New York Times, 1 January 1965.
28
The atmosphere in which the election was held has been described thus : “There is something unreal in the elections in Pakistan. Tomorrow 80,000 members of the Electoral College chose between two opposing systems of government but the excitement here is not open and public is suppressed, nervous, and suspicious. The government had made it known that the Army would be standing by.”24 Immediately, after Ayub’s victory, New York Times wrote : “It may seem strange to Westerners to see a nation vote for virtual dictatorship over the possibility of internal liberty and parliamentary democracy—which was what the rival candidate, Miss Jinnah, offered—but this was understandable in Pakistan.”25

The significance of the steps taken by Ayub has to be assessed in the light of this special feature. The fact of the matter is that an indirect election by 80,000 voters in a population of over 100 million took away most of its representative character. In such a context, the election results have no political significance in a long-term prospective. But as an event in the march of Pakistan’s history, it represents the then state of its political order. Freedom of vote was indeed rare. The state of affairs was fully exposed in Karachi when rioting followed a mass “victory parade” by the supporters of President Ayub.26 This was because “Karachi was one of the few places where Miss Jinnah received a slight majority of votes.”27 The price of opposition was indeed heavy.

Ayub Khan was elected President for another five years. The voting pattern was : Ayub Khan—49,951 (East Pakistan—21,012; West Pakistan—28,939); Miss Jinnah—28,691 (East Pakistan—18,434; West Pakistan—10,257).

The pattern of voting in East Pakistan needs some explanation in view of its hostility to the regime which appeared endemic in character. The expectation that, in East Pakistan, Miss Jinnah would sweep the polls was a simplistic view.28 It ignored the electoral system which was so carefully designed. It also forgot that East Pakistan had its tensions which are exploitable. Firstly, the electoral college of Basic Democracy has a membership of 40,000 only. The limited number makes it vulnerable to corruption and inducement. It has been correctly said that Ayub’s regime had poured money in the rural areas through the Rural Public Work Programme. East Pakistan had recevied Rs. 2,000 million in 1963-64 as compared to Rs. 100 million for the same programme in West Pakistan.29 This generosity towards East Pakistan in the pre-election year had a purpose as Basic Democrats were the agents for planning and execution of Rural Public Work Programme with plenty of scope for patronage and other benefits which could not fail to impress the BDs of the Electoral College. Secondly, the Basic Democrats had displaced the old local leadership consisting of mofussil lawyers, professionals, and village teachers who had fully entrenched themselves in the Union Boards set up under the Village Self-Government Act, 1919. Thus the new cadre had a vested interest in the power that had brought them into existence. Thirdly, such elements as Bihari refugees in the towns of Khulna and Jessore and the economic power in the East of Momens, Ismailis, and Bohras went in favour of President Ayub.

24 Times, London, 2 January 1965.

25 New York Times, 5 January 1965.

26 Times, London, 6 January 1965.

27 Ibid.

28 Asian Survey, Vol. II, 2 February 1966, p. 79.

29 Ibid., p. 79.

29
But these were not all. Last but not least, a great understanding of the situation in East was displayed when intra-regional disparity in East Pakistan was played up to influence the presidential election. Close observers knew that political leaders from the northern districts of East Pakistan had even talked of demanding a separate province on the ground that the politicians in Dacca and Chittagong had neglected the economic development of these districts. Ayub’s regime, by encouraging the development of the northern districts, created a distinct feeling that they could expect a better deal from such a government as that of Ayub’s. These were formidable factors which worked against Miss Jinnah. However, the fact that President Ayub had only a lead of 2,578 over Miss Jinnah in an electoral college of 40,000 is a matter of significance which can be explained only by East Pakistani’s overall distrust and disenchantment with Ayub’s regime which in many cases BDs could not ignore. There is much force in the statement, “confidence always had its own appeal in a leader but President Ayub has learnt too few lessons from the election campaign.”30 Actually, he had misread the meaning of his election success, particularly, in East Pakistan. While he had his power base in West Pakistan amongst the armed forces, civil services, and the economic interests, it was not so in the East. His victory over Miss Jinnah in East Pakistani poll was no measure of indicator of his power in that wing, as Basic Democrats would be irrelevant and ineffective in a true test.

The result of the president election was, however, important in one way. The President’s re-election lowered the COP’s morale. The logic for advancing his election before the National Assembly was thus vindicated. The COP in a mood of frustration failed to reach an agreement in their meeting at Karachi whether to boycott or participate in the elections to the national and the provincial assemblies. The pro-boycott group felt that the elections were bound to be “flagrantly rigged”31 as they had no faith in the BD system as well in the MECs who could be “intimidated,” “coerced,” and “bribed.”32 “On the other hand, the pro-participationists maintained that legislatures formed the most important forum for the constitutional struggle for democracy.”33 Such controversy at Karachi did not, however, lead to any breakdown, particularly because of the Awami League and the National Awami Party. Talks were resumed at Dacca five days later; the interregnum was meant “to study the trends in East Pakistan and hold consultations with leaders there.”34 Eventually, the impasse was resolved and the COP decided to participate in the elections. But “the Karachi and Dacca conferences had put a serious strain on the COP’s unity”35 and valuable time was lost in as much that “the COP could not seriously challenge the delimitation of constituencies”36 announced on 7 January. When it did abandon its negative posture it failed to have an agreed list of candidates for the election to the National Assembly, thus making it possible for more independents to be elected. For the national assembly, the election results showed that the ruling PML had a majority of 120 seats. The opposition secured 15 seats (COP—10; NDF—5) in East Pakistan and one in West Pakistan. The ruler’s party had thus triumphed. The only change in this order, however small, came from the East where Ayub’s party was not strong. This fact was seen in the election

30 Times, London, 7 January 1965.

31 Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 11, November 1965, p. 541.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., pp. 541-2.

34 Ibid., p. 542.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.
30
results to the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly, where the ruling party failed to get an absolute majority. It had only 66 seats; 58 went to independents and 25 to the opposition.37 Independents were, however, won over. Crossing the floor had been the hallmark of Pakistan’s pre-revolutionary parliamentary practice. The technique was fairly well known. It came to be operated with vigour and skill in East Pakistan even in Ayub’s regime.

President Ayub formed his Cabinet by stages. The hard core of the Cabinet, announced on 23 March, comprised the then loyalists, namely, Shoaib (Finance), Bhutto (Foreign Affairs), Shabur Khan (Communication), and Khawaja Shahbuddin (Information and Broadcastin). The Cabinet came to be expanded on 29 March, with the addition of Ghulam Faruque, Altaf Hussain, Kazi Anwarull Huq, and S.M. Zaffar. It is significant that the Bengali element of the Central Cabinet generally conformed to its old vintage.

With the conclusion of the elections of the President and the national and provincial assemblies, it seemed that no change was possible through the ballot box. The result of the election made it clear that, it was Ayub’s Pakistan and “his was the power to do what he wishes.”38 The Trust Press wrote : “Today, President Ayub will solemnly inaugurate the new National Assembly and set it on its course with a message indicating the tasks ahead. The occasion marks the beginning of a curcial phase in Pakistan’s history.”39 Gleefully, it affirmed that “the new political ideology is now firmly entrenched.”40 Thus the ruler felt that the floor had been swept clean and all was well at home. But it did not assess how much of the sweepings had gone under the carpet, particularly, in East Pakistan. In a sense of exuberance, it projected the next task : “The explosive state of Indo-Pakistan relations calls for complete national unity under the tested generalship of President Ayub.”41 Written editorially as “A New Chapter”42 on 12 June 1965, soon after the “generalship” neddled the “Kutch incident” as a trial run, and then embarked on the real effort in the September operations. The 22-day war with India in September 1965 only reduced the political opposition to a quiescent state. It was said in retrospect : “But all Pakistan seems to gain from the war are a few heroes, dead or alive, a more persistent courtship with China and a troublesome East-wing opposition.43

We are too near the canvas to interpret the meaning and the implication of shifts in the political scene in full details. Even so, the contours of events have meaning because of their sharp characters. The Tashkent Declaration brought in a student demonstration on 12 and 13 January 1966 with police firing at Multan and Lahore. President Ayub in a broadcast on 14 January said in anger : “Some people taking advantage of the present situation were misleading the people.” Miss Jinnah in her Idul-Fitar message said :

37 Ibid., p. 548.

38 New York Times, 5 January 1965.

39 Pakistan Times, 12 June 1965.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Observer, London, 11 September 1966. (Italics added.)

31
“What the blood of our brave soldiers achieved was thrown away at the Conference Table.” Z.A. Bhutto left the Cabinet and moved to the opposition. By contrast, over this issue, there was no such reaction in East Pakistan. Even a foreign observer wrote : “West Pakistan’s reaction to the Tashkent agreement was violently hostile.”44 But the political scene was different in East Pakistan. It was graphically described by Economist :

And, of course, it speaks Bengali, which—the difference from Urdu apart—means that its people belong to the most articulate, most politically conscious, and most permanently disgruntled group in the subcontinent.

This has been a familiar tale since Independence (or indeed since Curzon) and no Pakistani Government has been able to write an end to it. President Ayub’s administration can fairly claim to have done more than most. But in mid-February, while the West Pakistan opposition were still trying to hammer out a common line against the Tashkent agreement, an East Pakistani leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, crying nuts to his West wing colleagues, came out with his own far more explosive programme. The heart of his six demands was a federal constitution that would give the federal government control of nothing but foreign affairs and defence—and even then the two federating States would be entitled to raise their own “Territorials” and make their own agreements on foreign trade.45

Thus the sense of ease which the President had after his election was rudely broken by East Pakistan. The cry of six points brought Ayub to the scene. Speaking at Rajshahi on 16 March, President Ayub Khan warned the nation that the six-point programme of the opposition was aimed at achieving their dream of “greater sovereign Bengal”46 and went on to add that “fulfilment of this horrid dream would spell disaster for the country and turn the people of East Pakistan into slaves.”47 These words gave away the state of anxiety in President’s mind caused by the six-pointers of East Pakistan. In reply, Pakistan Obserser writing editorially on “A Crisis of Self-Confidence” said : “Stability cannot be ensured by calling in question the patriotism of a large section of our people belonging to a particular region.”48

On 20 March, at the closing Dacca session of the ruling Muslim League Council, President Ayub was constrained to say that “they should be prepared to face even a Civil War, if forced upon them to protect the sovereignty and integrity of the country”49 and went on to add : “Civil War was a dangerous thing. But if nation faced disruption, it has to be accepted.”50 President Ayub did not spell out the nature of the “Civil War” but in East Pakistan it sounded like hot words of warning to the six-pointers. Even this

44 Economist, 22 January 1966, p. 296.

45 Ibid., 21 May 1966, p. 820. (Italics added.)

46 Dawn, 17 March 1966.

47 Ibid.

48 Pakistan Observer, 31 March 1966.

49 Dawn, 21 March 1966.

50 Ibid.
32
did not daunt the demand for autonomy in East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the newly elected President of East Pakistan Awami League, in a meeting on the very day of March, called upon the people to prepare for “a relentless peaceful democratic movement.” He asked : “Why East Pakistan could not be helped at the national crisis in September last?” Otherwise, “how was it that the Foreign Minister came out with a statement that East Pakistan was saved because of China?” He feelingly said that the defence of East Pakistan could never rest on West Pakistan or on any foreign power. East and West Pakistan must be self-sufficient in defence. This demand for an independent defence capability for East Pakistan was a challenge to the power system built by President Ayub. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had to be arrested in May. Strong arms came into operation. Even then the call for provincial autonomy resulted in a general strike on 7 June, which later rolled into riots in Dacca, Chittagong, Narayangang, and Tejgaon. Ten persons were killed in the firing at Dacca and Narayangang, The car of a Parliamentary Secretary was burnt down. The unrest resulted in troops being called out, on 8 June, in Faridpur and Jessore. It was said of those days that “the main source of existing opposition”51 was “the discontent in East Pakistan. There, the regime is unquestionally in trouble, having added to its own difficulties by suppressing one of the leading opposition newspapers.”52

Political temper was mounting. The Awami League and the National Awami Party decided on 29 July 1966 to launch a massive movement in the middle of August to demand autonomy for East Pakistan. Six opposition parties, namely, the Awami League, the National Awami Party, the National Democratic Front, the Muslim League (Council), the Jamait-i-Islam, and the Nizam-i-Islam, on 31 July, planned a unified command and started a discussion for a campaign on the issues of direct election of the President and the restoration of parliamentary government in Pakistan. The things had gone so far as to bring President Ayub again on the scene. On 6 August 1966, Ayub came to East Pakistan and threatened tough steps to curb the campaign of the political parties for provincial autonomy. In a speech in Dacca, he warned that if the “disruptionists” exceeded all bounds “other methods would have to be adopted to put a stop to them.”53 The President, in his address to East Pakistani MNAs and MPAs at Dacca, was constrained to say : “Those who talk of secession are not friends of the country nor friends of East Pakistan. Let me warn you that there is a growing frustration in West Pakistan that, in spite of their sacrifices, the East Pakistanis are not pleased. This is a dangerous feeling.”54 It is doubtful if such words had any impact on East Pakistan where people were conditioned to such hostility. The President went on to claim : “If you allow me to say, there have been only two friends of the Muslims of Bengal. The first was Nawab Salimullah Khan and the second is myself. It was due to Nawab Salimullah that renaissance of the Muslims started. I, on my part, have taken all possible measures for the betterment of East Pakistanis.”55 He would indeed be a naive optimist who could hope that such a claim would carry conviction in East Pakistan. But these words—imbalanced and intemperate—gave away the disturbed state of the President’s mind in the light of the prevailing situation in East Pakistan.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto arrived in Dacca on 15 November 1966 to exploit this mood and harass the ruler. He was received by the members of the Awami League. He said in Dacca that he was looking

51 Economist, 9 July 1966, p. 135.

52 Ibid.

53 Pakistan Observer, 7 August 1966.

54 Dawn, Karachi, 21 August 1966.

55 Ibid.

33
forward to visit this province. Bhutto’s characterization of East wing as “the most important part of Pakistan”56 was calculated to fan the East Pakistani sentiments and reinforce its cry for provincial autonomy.

This demand for full provincial autonomy was even expressed by the Pakistan Students Federation of Great Britain when they demonstrated in front of the Lancester House where President Ayub was attending a dinner given by Prime Minister Wilson and a reception by Her Majesty’s Government. They were carrying placards containing slogans such as : “We demand full provincial autonomy” and “Release all political prisoners.”57 No wonder, Pakistan Observer of 12 December 1966 reported : “Now that EBDOnians are coming out of their shell and recovering from the state of suspended animation, they should realize that history has passed by them. They should, therefore, welcome new block, new ideas, new enthusiasm of revitalization, and to reinvigorate the political life of the country.”

It is not at all strange that President Ayub had repeatedly visited East Pakistan in the year 1966 where he had sought to warn, threaten, and cajole the “mischief-mongers.”58 He concluded his seven-day visit in December with a statement in Dacca. Pakistan Times of 19 December reported the President’s remarks : “He was sorry to say that he still heard voices demanding changes in the very basis of the prevailling system. If the people developed habit of change day in and day out the country will not be able to forge ahead.” The same paper spoke of President Ayub Khan’s appeal to the people to “do little of politics.” But this advice of the President to do “little of politics” goes against the very grain of East Pakistan. Geoffrey Tyson writing on “Ayub Khan, the Reluctant Dictator” noted : “The question of role of East Pakistan is fundamental to every department of the country’s life whether it is defence, economy, foreign affairs, or communications.”59 He added : “The President claims that Basic Democracy gives adequate expression to the particular brand of political ‘genius’ possessed by his fellow Pakistanis. Maybe he is right. But one of his major problems is that the inhabitants of East wing wish to exercise their political genius a great deal more vigorously than Basic Democracy will permit. The Bengali remains a highly political animal.”60 It was indeed a statement of fact.

At the close of the year the main pressure group in anti-Ayub stand were the politicians of East Pakistan and some who flew across from the West to join their compatriots in the East. East Pakistan, impatient, sometimes violent, kept up an insistent demand for autonomy. The imprisonment of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had done little to curb the demand that mainly turned on the “Six-Point Formula” of the East Pakistan Awami League. The heart of the matter was that Ayub had failed to contain the urges of political forces, particularly in East Pakistan, where, despite the whip and the carrot, the “political animal,” that a Bengali is, refused to do “little of politics” and continued to serve as the political nursery for the opposition.

The start of the year 1967 was a meaningful day for Pakistan. Politicians of vintage, long debarred under the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959 (EBDO), were once again free to return to active politics. This was expected to quicken the country’s political life. The exit of Bhutto from

56 Ibid., 16 November 1966.

57 Pakistan Observer, 11 November 1966.

58 Pakistan Times, 12 December 1966.

59 Statis, 18 November 1966, p. 1215.

60 Ibid, (Italics added.)
34
the President’s Cabinet had disturbed the younger generation, particularly, the students in West Pakistan. East Pakistan’s six-pointers posed a continuing threat. In the circumstances, resumption of political activity by the EBDOed politicians was a matter of deep concern. This was interpreted abroad variously, from “a small question mark” to “a new force in Pakistan polictics.”61

No doubt, there was some cause for anxiety. Early in the year, a dialogue had started between the EBDOnians from the East and the West wings in order to find an area of agreement so as to form a united opposition. Leading politicians like Mian Daultana and Mohammad Ali were on the move to join hands with Ataur Rahman Khan, Nurul Amin, and Abu Hussain Sarkar. In such a situation, the President’s seven-day visit to East Pakistan, at the end of March 1967, could not be looked upon as a routine tour. Events had shown that the opposition had always chosen Dacca as a sanctuary for their joint deliberations against the Establishment. The National Democratic Front (NDF) including its extension to the West wing by Suhrawardy (1962), and the Combined Opposition Party (COP) (1964), had been fostered and nourished in East Pakistan in their initial stages. The President’s visit, therefore, was a response anticipating political developments likely to follow the negotiations between the opposition leaders of the two wings. While addressing a Bengali audience in Urdu at Jessore, on 31 March 1967, the President charged the opposition with creating disruption and confusion.62 At Dacca, on 3 April, he went on to add that the demand for autonomy was a “camouflage for separation.”63 He seemed to be in a chastising mood, but he acted with finesse when he had the Editor of Iteffak, the official organ of the East Pakistan Awami League, released from detention. This move was made out as having been taken at the President’s own initiative, over-riding the advice of the local government. This was, therefore, interpreted as a conciliatory move by the President for opening a dialogue with the East Pakistan Awami League.64 Such a reading is not entirely conjectural; the technique of splitting the opposition in order to reduce its threat has been a well-tried tactics in the political history of Pakistan. Indeed, there was a pressing need for such a manoeuvre.

Apart from the move for unity among the opposition, the situation worsened with Bhutto’s attack on the regime. He called it a dictatorship and continued to denounce the Tashkent Declaration. Although Dawn dismissed it as “cries from the wilderness,” yet the spate of statements from members of the Establishment made it clear that Bhutto had made his point and had deeply disturbed the regime. The matter went so far as to make the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Shahabuddin, challenge Bhutto to a public debate in his home town of Larkana, and Bhutto countering the challenge by inviting him to a debate at Lahore. The President had good reasons to appease the other virulent element in the East, viz. the East Pakistan Awami League. He returned from East Pakistan with an uneasy mind and expressed at Lahore his dislike for agitational politics and emphasized the need for stability.65

The effort of the opposition to form one party eneded successfully with the formation of the Pakistan Democratic Movement on 2 May 1967 at Dacca. The five constituents of the Movement were the Awami League, the Muslim League (Council), the Jamait-e-Islam, the Nizam-e-Islam, and the

61Times, London, 14 December 1966; Christian Science Monitor, 23 January 1967.

62 Pakistan Observer, 1 April 1967.

63 Dawn, Karachi, 3 April 1967.

64 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LVI, No. 2, 13 April 1967, p. 55.

65 Pakistan Times, 6 April 1967.

35
National Democratic Front. Old stalwarts like Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Mohammad Ali, Nurul Amin, and Ataur Rahman Khan appeared on the same platform and drew up an a greed 8-point programme. The programme was a compromise between the demands of East and West Pakistan. The major objective was to agitate for a return to the parliamentary form of government, based on adult franchise. A federal structure at the Centre was agreed to with responsibility for such subjcets as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Currency, Federal Finance, and Inter-Wing Communications and Trade. It sought to meet the persistent pressure of East Pakistan in a limited way by agreeing to an attenuated form of regional autonomy in all other matters and provided for parity between the two wings in the services in the civil and the defence sectors, promised to establish a military academy and an ordnance factory, and to shift the headquarters of the Pakistan Navy to East Pakistan.66 Significantly, it did not touch the controversial subject of economic disparity between the two wings, or promise regional autonomy in economic and financial matters, which was the heart of the six points67 of Mujibur Rahman’s East Pakistan Awami Leauge. It is, therefore, not surprising that right from the start the hard core of the East Pakistan Awami League had some reservations towards the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM).

The manifesto of the PDM was rather ephemeral and bordered on ambivalence. However, it was made clear that the PDM could not and should not function as a political party. As such, each constituent party was free to have its own ideology in political and economic matters.68 Its press communique talked of injustice under the present regime, need for the reorientation of the foreign policy to strengthen fraternal relationships with the Muslim countries and the Afro-Asian world, and laid down the structure for the PDM. But when it came to spelling out the programme of action, it merely mentioned the need for them, positive, and definite steps.69 One may feel inclined to believe that the leaders of the PDM did not want to give away their plan of action at this stage, but later events showed that such an assumption had no real basis.

66 Pakistan Observer, 2 May 1967.
67 The six-point demands were :

(i) The Constitution of Pakistan must be federal, with parliamentary form of government and a legislature directly elected on the basis of adult franchise.

(ii) Federal subjcets to be limited to defence and foreign affairs only.

(iii) There should be (1) separate currencies for the two wings, freely convertible into each other or (2) in the alternative one currency subject to statutory safeguards against flight of capital from the East to the West wing.

(iv) Power of taxation and revenue collection to be vested in the federating States; the Centre to be financed by allocation of a share in the States’taxes.

(v) Separate foreign exchange accounts to be kept for East and West Pakistan; the requirement of federal government to be met by the two wings in equal proportions or on any other fixed basis as may be agreed upon.

(vi) Self-sufficiency for East Pakistan in defence matters; an ordnance factory and a military Academy to be set up in the East wing; the federal naval HQS to be located in East Pakistan.

68 Pakistan Observer, 5 May 1967.

69 Ibid., 2 May 1967.
36
Even so, the inauguration of the PDM caused sharp reactions at the official level and in the Trust Press. President Ayub had already described the activities of the opposition as “playing with fire.”70 On 10 May, in far-away Mardan, he told his tribal audience that the Pakistan Democratic Movement was designed to disintegrate the country. This clearly indicated the President’s displeasure with the new movement. Other government spokesmen joined the attack. The Communications Minister and Leader of the House, Sabur Khan, characterized the PDM as the “Pakistan Disintegrating Movement,”71 The loyal press also took up the cry and carried on an intensive campaign, denigrating the PDM leaders. Dawn in its editorial, “Unity to Destroy Unity,” expressed its wrath in no uncertain terms by describing PDM as the “Pakistan Disintegrating Movement,” a carryover of President Ayub’s Mardan speech. It drew consolation from the past at the sad end of the united opposition like the Jukto Front and the Combined Opposition Party. But it could not be complacent and added a note of caution that the movement “has to be kept under very close surveillance, more so because of its sinister timing.”

This display of anxiety and intolerance was in no measure an indication of the movement’s viability and effectiveness. Wisely, Pakistan Observer counselled that “the PDM had an uphill task” and pleaded for “hard painstaking, and sustained work ahead.”72 But the PDM’s activities showed that the advice was not heeded. It was also becoming clear slowly that the PDM would not include all the opposition parties.

Right from the start, the East Pakistan Awami League Working Committee adopted a cautious attitude towards the PDM by promising “responsive co-operation” for restoration of democratic rights. The final decision for drawing firm lines of action was left to its Council. The National Awami Party of Bhashani, with its pro-Peking leanings, had little cause to embarrsss Islamabad and it came out with a ready attack and charged the PDM as an organization of the feudalists and the capitalists.73 Thus, in time, the political climate did not prove as threatening as was anticipated by some or as most EBDOnians would have liked it to be. Islamabad slowly gained confidence, and a time came when the PDM was called a “house of cards” and paper tiger.”74 This shift in the mood was justified not only by the separate stand taken by the East Pakistan Awami League and the National Awami Party, but also by the modus operandi of the PDM leaders who, like old generals, struck to antiquated tactics. Periodic public meetings represented the only palpable effort on their part. The Secretary-General of the ruling Muslim League Party was so encouraged by the placid state of affairs as to declare that the PDM was dead and claimed that the Pakistan Muslim League remained the only organized party since Independence.75 A depatch from East Pakistan spoke gleefully of the fact that the NAP and the “six-pointers” of the East Pakistan Awami League had stood aside from the PDM and, therefore, the movement was nearly dead in the East wing.76 This period of gloom for the opposition was reflected in the East Pakistan press.77 Pakistan

70 Ibid., 11 May 1967.

71 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LVI, No. 7, 18 May 1967, p. 349.

72 Pakistan Observer, editorial, 3 May 1967.

73 Pakistan Times, 23 May 1967.

74 Dawn, 22 August 1967.

75 Ibid., 30 August 1967.

76 Pakistan Times, despatch by Minhaj Berna, 30 August 1967.

37
77 Pakistan Observer, 3 November 1967, and 14 November 10967.

Observer wrote in desperation : “L’etat c’est no longer moi, it is les people.” But actually the opposite was true. Pakistan was very much Ayub’s in those days.

Islamabad’s attention, therefore, turned towards the coming elections in 1969 and 1970. Promptly, action was initiated to amend the constitution whereby the strength of the legislatures was increased from 150 to 200 seats, while the Electoral College was expanded from 80,000 to 120,000—60,000 for each wing. The rationale for the move was explained by the President as a desire to secure an increase in popular participation in the politics of the country. S.M. Zafar, Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, went even further and claimed the move to be a continuing process, that it was in keeping with the growing political awareness and would ultimately culminate in adult franchise.78 Another significant arrangement was to annul Article 239 of the Constituion, restoring Punjab’s representation in the provincial legislature on the basis of its population. The increase in Punjab’s representation made Nurul Amin criticize it as “a violation of agreement on the parity between the two wings.” This brought forth a sharp rebuke from Z.A. Suleri who charged Amin with once again being “at the old game.”79 The rising tempo of preparation was also reflected when a staff reporter of Dawn quoted the Secretary-General of the Pakistan Muslim League (Conventionist) that President Ayub was being prevailed upon to run for the 1970 presidential election.80

In the closing days of 1967, Bhutto made a solo effort to threaten the Establishment when he launched his new party on 13 November 1967, and claimed that none of the opposition parties was capable of delivering the goods. The manifesto of Bhutto’s party carried the usual formulations for the restoration of democracy and adult franchise and working for a socialism of a new brand that would conform to the “conditions, traditions, and culture of Pakistan.”

But it was not so much his party’s programme as his own capacity to cause mischief that made the government react sharply. To checkmate Bhutto, the President made solicitous gestures towards Khuhro—the Khuhros and the Bhuttos being traditional rivals.81 But this was not thought to be enough. The West Pakistan Home Minister, an ex-EBDOnian, gave out that Bhutto may be arrested for misappropriation of public funds, when he had held office as a Central Minister.82

On 1 January 1968 commenced the celebration of the tenth anniversary of Ayub’s regime. The loyalist press sought to create a bouyant mood. On such an occasion, the Home Ministry’s cryptic press note, tucked away in a corner in a Trust paper, did not attract much attention, although it spoke of anti-national activity by persons connected with politics and government service and mentioned that some arrests had been made.83 On 6 January 1968, startled Pakistanis read in banner headlines that 28 persons had conspired to bring about the secession of East Pakistan. Indian instigation was also alleged and the

78 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 10, December 1967, p. 436.

79 Pakistan Times, 20 December 1967.

80 Dawn, 20 December 1967.

81 Times, London, 14 December 1966.

82 Far Eastern Economic Review, No. 2, Vol. LIX, 11 January 1968, p. 54.

83 Pakistan Times, 2 January 1968.
38
move was named the “Agartala Conspiracy.” Amongst the conspirators, two Bengali members of the Pakistan Civil Service and some Bengali defence personnel were named. It was further alleged that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the East Pakistan Awami League leader, already in detention, was implicated the conspiracy. The press note claimed that the movement had been “quashed.” One is driven to recall the Rawalpindi Conspiracy in this context.

Once Bhutto, during his visit to East Pakistan, had sought to meet Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in jail and he had also demanded his release. But now both were politically incapacitated. Bhutto was living under the threat of arrest, while the East Pakistan Awami leader, accused of being implicated in a specific case of anti-State activity, was put out of commission politically for a long time. The challenge to President Ayub’s system was well on its way to being contained.

Politics was thus being worked into an ordered shape. In the first three months of the year. Islamabad appeared to have come on the top with no tangible threat in sight; then the unexpected happened. Suddenly, in March, President Ayub was struck down by serious illness. In any other country such an event would have added to the imponderables of politics; it was much more disturbing in Pakistan because of two factors. Firstly, much of the President’s charisma had been built around his robust physique; secondly, the manner in which the news of President’s illness was treated, it appeared as if it was a “palace secret,” full of dark possibilities. The Secretary of Information and Broadcasting, Altaf Gauhar, may have had good intentions—to avoid creating undue alarm and the resultant adverse political repercussions—but the secretive approach had the contrary effect and created an atmosphere of doubt and suspicion. As a result a spate of rumours swept across the country.84 When the President made his public appearance during the visit of the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, in 1968, the damaging question had already been asked : “Who will goven when Ayub goes?”85

On 19 June, hearing in the case, The State vs. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others, began at the Signals Mess in Dacca Cantonment before a special tribunal. The number of accused had increased to thirty-five with the addition of one more member of the Pakistan Civil Service and six others. The trial was being held under a new presidential ordinance which, among other things, authorized acceptance of confessions and statements made to the police as admissible evidence against the accused. This was a departure from the long-standing practice in the criminal law of the Indian subcontinent and it brought forth sharp protests both from the Dacca and the Karachi Bars. Surprisingly enough, President Ayub, who had so far shown scant regard for lawyers, suddently gave in to these protests and the offending clause was annulled by another special Ordinance.86 The end of June also brought the news that the President was scheduled to visit London in July 1968 for a medical check-up.

The President’s health was a matter of serious concern for more than one reason. It had already raised the inconvenient question of succession in the public mind. The Times (London) correspondent had reported on 2 May 1968 that President Ayub had been medically advised to lead a less vigorous life. This was innocuous by itself, but for the President and his Eastablishment this was a matter of anxiety in view of the coming elections. In the Pakistan presidential election, candidates have to meet the Basic Democrats as members of the Electoral College at specified meetings. The question was : would President’s health stand the strain of such electioneering campaign? In such a situation it was rumoured that the Establishment was expected to negotiate with the opposition and strike a bargain so that the

84 Pakistan Observer, 8 June 1968.

85 Bernard D. Nossiter’s despatch from Rawalpindi, Indian Express, 1 June 1968.

86 Times, London, 28 June 1968.
39
presidential election would remain uncontested. The question was as to how to bring the opposition to the negotiating table. Bhutto was already in an intransigent mood. Both at home and abroad he was attacking the regime. In an exclusive interview with Observer on 6 July, in London, he characterized Basic Democracy as only another name for fascism. Next day, Pakistani students staged a demonstration before their High Commissioner’s office in London and threatened that there would be another demonstration later in July when President Ayub visited London for his medical check-up. Bhutto went all out to embarrass the regime, by saying that Ayub’s regime was perpetuating a colossal economic gap between East and West Pakistan and he went on to support the demand for self-government for East Pakistan. So President Ayub had to disturb his rest and come out with a statement denouncing agitational politics and defending his basic democratic system.

Meanwhile, in East Pakistan, Nurul Amin declared that Pakistan’s Constitution had broken down during the President’s recent illness when he could not attend to the duties of his office. The constitutional provision, in such a contingency, required the Speaker of the National Assembly to act as the Head of the State. This was not done and, therefore, the government of the time was unconstitutional. This was damaging enough, but its implications were made out to be more so. The method of succession—the constitutional provision having lapsed by default—was an open question.

President Ayub returned from London after his medical check-up in early August. A departure was made in the celebration of the Independence Day on 14 August as President Ayub did not make his usual public appearance, instead only choose to send a message on the occasion stating inter alia that national unity and discipline were the need of the hour.

It was a month later in September that President visited Dacca after a long absence. He had come to East Pakistan, it was stated, to reorganize his ruling party in preparation for the coming elections. But there was more to it than met the eyes. The situation in East Pakistan made him warm his audience that any change in the electoral system would bring disaster to the country. These were words of anxiety. Indeed political situation was worsening.

The celebration of the Development Decade had started off as a pre-election propaganda campaign. It was temporarily subdued during Ayub’s illness in April-May 1968. With his gradual recovery, the celebration of the Development Decade was held with due publicity by the Trust Press and came to a final close on 27 October 1968, the anniversary of Ayub’s Revolution. Soon after, things began to happen. On 1 November, in his home-town Larkana, police filed a case against Bhutto and his employee in the Court of Special Judge on charges of corruption.87 This was the fulfilment of the threat by the West Pakistan Home Minister. So Bhutto went on a rampage. In Dera Ismail Khan he talked in terms of bloodshed. Student-cum-mob violence broke out in Rawalpindi, on 7 November, and continued for three days. Politics had taken to the streets.

On 10 November, Ayub’s meeting at Peshawar was disturbed by the firing of a few shots.88 This was the immediate official version. Later came the story of an attempt on the President’s life. On 12 November 1968, police arrested Bhutto and 14 others including Wali Khan of NAP for disrupting peace and spreading lawlessness.

87 “The case under Sections 420, 471, 477(a) of PPC and Section 5)2) of the Prevention of Corruption of Act 1947 all read with Section 120 of PCC. The substance was the charge that the accused has wrongly obtained a tractor on subsidy basis thereby causing loss of 2 lakh and 13 thousand.” (APP report in Pakistan Observer, 2 November 1968.)

88 This fact was later ascribed to “clumsy reporting.” (Pakistan Times, Lahore, 21 November 1968.)
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Protest marches by lawyers was the other form taken by the politics of the streets. Lawyers were agitated over an alleged move to amend Articles 2 and 98 of the Constitution, curtailing the power of the High Courts, which would affect their profession adversely. In such a situation, other opposition parties could not remain silent, particularly when elections were ahead. The PDM came out but it took due care to respect the law on every occasion. Their marchers walked in a column of three or four abreast wherever orders banning assembly of five or more under 144 Cr. P.C. were in force.

The events of November were also marked by the appearance of new faces in Pakistan politics. Air Marshal Asghar Khan and ex-Chief Justice Murshed joined politics but avoided announcing their political philosophy. Air Marshal Asghar Khan claimed that neither did he belong to the right nor to the left but he was only a Muslim. General Azam who had withdrawn from politics after his failure to get Miss Jinnah elected was active again, and Ghulam Farruq, the ex-Commerce Minister, was reported to be back in politics. Thus many leading personalities were on the move but their activities lacked coordination and did not have any clear direction or meaning. This was to be so as the election was still one year ahead. The East was watching the situation with interest. It waited for Ayub’s arrival on 5 December. Then the lawyers and the students took parallel actions to those of the West. The only difference was the party leading the students and other violent demonstrators was that of Maulana Bhashani. The pro-Chinese Maulana, at eighty-two, appeared in person to head a procession. He and his men had acted as “splitters” from the days of Kagmari,89 in 1956, when East Pakistan Awami League had broken into two. Since then, he and his men had always acted mysteriously but never seriously challenged the Establishment. His role, therefore, had to be viewed with suspicion.

As in the West, the PDM stuck to peaceful and law-abiding methods. The Establishment had sought to assuage the feelings of students and the lawyers by removing the main irritants. Thus the university ordinance was suitably amended while President Ayub denied any contemplated move for amending Articles 2 and 98 of the Constitution restricting the powers of the High Court. Corruption was sought to be combated by amending Government Servant Conduct Rulers. All these might appear as weakening the administration before the so-called people’s will.

As the year 1968 drew to a close, strange things were being heard. President Ayub, talking to his partymen at Lahore, stated that he had not yet decided to contest the presidential election. The decision would be taken by Pakistan Muslim League (Council) in its session at Dacca next year. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who had found nothing basically wrong with Ayub’s…………

89 At Kagmari (Mymensingh District), in the then East Pakistan Awami League, Suhrawardy and Bhashani clashed on the pro-West foreign policy of the government. This ultimately led to Bhashani’s breaking away with a section of Awamis and forming the National Awami Party. A commentator said : “The wings of opposition seem suddenly to have blown up in Pakistan.”
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