Bengali Elites Perceptions of Pakistan Khawaja Alqama

Bengali Elites Perceptions of Pakistan Khawaja Alqama

CHAPTER ONE

ETHNICITY OR UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

“The purpose of this study is not to frame general theory regarding political development or national integration; rather. I try to show how difficult application of theories is in an empirical situation.”

1. Jahan

In this dissertation we intend to introduce the reader first to the theory of disintegration, which is contained between two extremes, two polar models, namely uneven development¹  and ethnicity. Then we proceed to analyse Hechter’s work on internal colonialism. We attempt to demonstrate that the concept of internal colonialism has the potential of incorporating and combining the main tenets of the most salient approaches to the theory of disintegration. We believe especially that Hechter’s three research hypotheses², when improved and expanded, can provide a powerful research framework which does due justice to the polar models, namely uneven development and ethnicity, and combines them in such a way that their individual significance for each case study can be clearly assessed on a comparative level.³

Our next aim is to apply Hechter’s revised and expanded research hypotheses to delineate and explain Bengali elites perceptions of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969. This, in turn, should enable us to determine the nature of the Bengali or elites’ disillusionment and the transformation of their perception of a united Pakistan and what they did about it.⁴

1          For the uneven development model refers inter alia to the following authors: Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973 [1957), Andre  Gunder  Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, (New York:  Monthly Review Press, 1969), Arghiri  Emmanuel, Unequal exchange.(London: New Left Books, 1972 [1969], Samir Amin, Unequal Development, (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976 [1973)

2          Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National development, 1936-1966. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 43.

3          A. Smith views  both- uneven development and rising ethnic unrest – as major threats to “the quest for national congruence”. A. Smith, The Ethnic Revival. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 193-197.

4          A. Gella, (edited). The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).

Was it (the disillusionment) predominantly the of uneven development?

Was it predominantly a problem of growing and suppressed identity?⁵

Was it primarily due to some other factor?

Or is it impossible to establish a single principal reason for the disillusionment of the Bengali elite so that only a combination of factors can explain this phenomenon?

Before proceeding any further, we have to state why we chosen certain topics for investigation and what we hope to achieve with our research. In the case of the theory of disintegration and the distillusionment of the Bengali elites with the process of national integration in Pakistan, the reasons for selecting this topic seem to be obvious require only a short explanation. This may be provided by quoting Rounaq Jahan. R. Jahan, who provided the scholarly community with the most authoritative account of the partition of Pakistan, laments the fact that it is extremely difficult to apply to theories to “an empirical situation”.⁶ An acute lack of testable hypotheses made it impossible for her to apply and either falsify or validate those theories which were pertinent to her own research topic.⁷ In short, Jahan was not able to test her own findings against already existing theoretical assumptions and, therefore, her excellent work remained incomplete. It is for this reason that her writings contained in the book entitled: Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, although sometimes of rarely encountered brilliance, did to advance the theory of distintegration-or any theory at all-and could not even provide a full understanding of the causes and processes which led to the partition of Pakistan in 1971.⁸

 

5          For definition and importance of individual identities see: D. Bell. The Coming of Postindustrial Society, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), and F. Barth, (edited)., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1969).

6          Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). p. vii.

7          An excellent example for ‘sound’ empirical research is K.W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, (2nd edition), New York: MIT Press, 1966.

8          W. Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?”. World Politics, vol. 24,

           pp.319-55.

We therefore feel justified in asserting that if we succeed in our research endeavors, we are in a position to increase by a small yet recognisable amount the explanatory power of the theory of internal colonialism and to elucidate the many remaining myths and mysteries which still surround the partition of Pakistan in 1971.⁹ In making Hechter’s model of internal colonialism a central feature of our dissertation, we have to introduce the reader to our interpretation of the theory of disintegration. Some scholars conclude “that internal colonialism and ethnicity can best be seen as the two polar models of” the theory of disintegration.¹⁰ We do not agree with this view and claim, as pointed out above, that the theory of disintegration is contained between two approaches, namely uneven development and ethnicity. Furthermore, we assert that internal colonialism contains elements from both the uneven development and the ethnicity model.¹¹

Our claim can be substantiated easily when we examine the central tenets of the approaches in question. In the uneven development model, separatism of the periphery is nothing more than the result of unequal economic development between core and periphery: an unequal development process which always favours the core areas at the expense of the peripheral areas.¹² Scholars interested in ethnicity on the other hand believe that “ethnic identity is the essential independent variable that leads to political assertiveness and militant separatism [by the periphery against the core) regardless of the existence of [economic] inequality or dominance”.¹³ According to the model of internal colonialism, “the very essence of politicised regional or ethnic assertiveness is due to a division between the political-economic-cultural centre and the periphery within

9          L. Ziring, Pakistan, the Enigma of Political Development, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1980), pp. 248-257. also see, Safdar Mahmood, The Deliberate Debacle, (Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976). Also see Brigadier Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977).

10       A.J.R. Groom and Alexis Heraclides, “Integration and Disintegration”, in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, (edited)., International Relation: A Handbook of Current Theory, (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), p. 185.

11       For the ethnic dimension in the internal colonialism model see also: Michael Hechter, “Group Formation and the Cultural Division of Labour”, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 84 (1978), pp.293-318, M. Hechter and M. Levi, “The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements”. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.2 (1979). pp.260-74.

12       For a rigorous analysis of core and periphery interactions see: I Wallerstein, The Modern World System, (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

13       A.J.R. Groom and Alexis Heraclides, op. cit., p.185.

a modern state”, this model also forecasts that “when an ethnic differentiation is added to regional [economic] inequality, disintegration is almost unavaoidable”.¹⁴

Thus this ethnic assertiveness or differentiation,

“is based upon the reality or myth of neighbours and rulers; and as a result, separation became not only can end in itself, but a means of protecting the cultural identity formed by those ties. The uniqueness of each ethnic community demands political separation, so that it can run its own affairs according to inner laws of the cultural community, uncontaminated and unmolested by external influences.”¹⁵

Inquiries into ethnic assertiveness or ethnicity became very popular, because many scholars began to realise that

“large and small states alike often possess sizeable minorities and most states have small ethnic minorities.”¹⁶

 Statistically this ethnic differentiation within existing ‘nation state’ looks rather impressive…!

“Take first of all the states with fairly large minorities. They include: Canada, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Trinidad, Bolivia, Guyana, Paraguay, Ecuador, Britain, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Cyprus, Iraq. Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Iran; Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand; and in Africa: Morocco, Algeria, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, the Congo, the Cameroons, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Senegal and many other new states. If we extend this list to include states which have small minorities like the Frisians in Holland, the Tyrolese and Friulians in Italy, the Lapps in Sweden, Karelians in Finland, the Gypsies, Amenians, Turks, Pomaks, Wallachians, Karakachani, Gaguzi and others in Bulgaria, the Sorbs or Wends of Lusatia in Eastern Germany, the Ainu of Japan, the hill peoples of northern Thailand, the Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua,

14       Ibid.,

15       Anthony D. Smith, op. cit., p.13.

16       Ibid, -9

El Salvador and Belize-few states today can claim to be ‘pure’ nations. with a completely homogeneous ethnic composition. Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Malta, West Germany (despite some few North Frisians), Norway and, with the exception of the Ainu, Japan, may be ethnically homogeneous; even Denmark has Eskimo and Faroese minorities, and Austria has its Slovenes. But, the fact is that very few of the world’s states are ethnically homogeneous, and many of them are distinctly polyanthi in composition. According to Walker Connor, of 132 independent states in 1971, only 12 were ethnically homogeneous, representing 9.1% of the total, while another 25 (or 18.9%) have a single ethnic community comprising over 90% of the states population. In addition those mentioned above, there have been smaller movements on behalf of the Manx, Cornish, Faroese, Shetlanders, Channel Islanders, Occitanians, Alsatians, French Basques, Galicians, Andalusians, Frisians, Vald’Aostans, Sardinias, Sicilianes, Tyrolese, Slovenes, Lapps, Estonians and Latvians and the Canary Islanders. Outside Europe, too, ethnic movements have arisen among smaller communities, as well as those listed above, they include the Azoreans. Anguillans, Bahamans, the Saharauis (Polisario), Berbers. Ovambo, Chagga, Konzo, Soli, Fang, Luba, Shona, Mandingo, Copts, Azeris, Sindhis, Naga, Mizo, Kazakhs, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Yakuts, Mongols, the Chakma of Bangladesh, the Batak, Meos, Uigurs and many others. Even in Latin America, the cult of indianismo and sertanism has made itself felt among the Indian populations of the Andean republics, Mexico and Brazil.”¹⁷

However impressive these statistics may appear on first sight, a note of caution has to be introduced in order to establish the relative place of ethnicity within the field of overall social economic and political forces. In the words of Zalmay Khalilzad:

 “Recently a number of analysts have pushed the notion of the politicisation of ethnicity to its extreme, predicting the fragmentation of many multiethnic politics. This has been especially true of studies dealing with South West Asia. While ethnic nationalism adds another dimension to and complicates many of the administrative and political dilemmas faced by multiethnic states, the fragmentation thesis nevertheless tends towards exaggeration and onesidedness.”¹⁸

17       Ibid., pp.9.11

18       Zalmay Khalilzad, “The Politics of Ethnicity in South West Asia: Political development or Political decay?”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 99 No.4, 1984-85.p.658. Zalmay classifies the following works in this category:

From the above statements we can deduce that the internal colonialism model contains both elements from the uneven development and the ethnicity approach and can never be considered of the theory of disintegration.¹⁹

To illustrate our position further, we may resort to a graphic  representation of our interpretation of the theory of disintegration.

Interchangeable

• Uneven Development
• Internal Colonialism
• Ethnicity

Fig. 1 The range of the theory of Disintegration:

The theory of disintegration is contained between two models, namely uneven development and ethnicity. Somewhere along this melange between uneven development and ethnicity, we have the model of internal colonialism. We should leave it to the author Michael Hechter himself, to introduce his model:

• Selig S. Harrison, Is Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation (New York and Washington DC, Cargeie Endowment for International Peace, 1981).
• Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (New York: Praeger, 1980).
• Stephen P. Cohen, “State Building and State Breaking in Pakistan”. (Paper presented to the Conference on Islam, Ethnicity and the State in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, sterling Forest, New York, 11-13. Nov. 1982).

19  If the reader still has problems in distinguishing between uneven     development and internal colonialism, then he should refer to the following book: op. cit., pp.26-45.

“The spatially eneven wave of modernisation over the territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage, there is crystallisation of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. The superordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilise and monopolise its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalisation of the existing stratification system. It attempts to regulate the allocation of social roles such that those roles commonly denined as having high prestige are reserved for its members. Conversely, individuals from the less advanced group are denied access to these roles. This stratification system, which may be termed a cultural division of labour, contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups. Hechter come to categorise themselves and others according to the range of roles each may be expected to play. They are aided in this categorisation by the presence of visible signs, or cultural markers, which are seen to characterise both groups. At this stage, acculturation does not occur because it is not in the interests of institutions within the core. Whereas the core is characterised by a diversfied industrial structure, the pattern of development in the periphery is dependent, and complementary to that in the core. Peripheral industrialisation, if it occurs at all, is highly specialised and geared for export. The peripheral economy is, therefore, relatively sensitive to price fluctuations in the international market. Decisions about investment, credit and wages tend to be made in the core. As a consequence of economic dependence, wealth in the periphery lags behind the core. To the extent that social stratification in the periphery is based on observable cultural differences, there exists the probability that the disadvantaged group will, in time, reactively assert its own culture as equal or superior to that of the relatively advantages core. This may help it conceive of itself as a separate ‘nation and seek independence. Hence, in this situation, acculturation and national development may be inhibited by the desires of the peripheral group for independence from a situation perceived to be exploitative”²⁰

For the benefit of the reader we provide the three hypotheses in Hechter’s own words:

20       M. Hechter, op, cit., p.43

Hypothesis I

“The greater the economic inequalities between collectivities, the greater the probability that the less advantages collectivity  will be status solidary, and hence, will resist political integration”.²¹

Hypothesis II

“The greater the frequency of intra-collectivity communication ,²²  the greater the status solidarity of the peripheral collectivity

Hypothesis III

“The greater the intergroup differences of culture,²³ particular in so far as identifiability is concerned, the greater the probability the culturally distinct peripheral collectivity will be status-solidary. Identifi cultural differences include: language (accent), distinctive religious practices,²⁴ and life-style.”²⁵

It can be easily detected that hypothesis I corresponds to a large extent to the uneven development model, while hypothesis III is extremely ethnicity-centered. Hypothesis II may have been inspired by the work of Karl W. Deutsch on nationalism and social communication.

We agree with many analysts that Hechter’s work deserves praise-but the above three hypotheses, the very essence of his writings, can and have to be improved. Even Hechter would agree with our suggestion of an improvement because he states quite categorically:

21       For an interesting account of status solidarity and status politics see: R. Hafstadter. The Paranoid Style in American Politics and other Essays (New York: Vintage Books, 1967) pp. 3-40.

22       D. Lemer provides the reader with a stimulating comparison between intra-and inter collective communication. D. Lemer, The Passing of Traditional Society.

 23      S. Moscati demonstrates convincingly the significance of cultural diversity in political life. S. Moscati, The Face of the Ancient Orient (New York: Anchor Books, 1962).

24       C.A. Frazer, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-52 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1969) and E. Sarkisyanz Buddhist Backgrounds of the

Burmese Revolution. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964).

25       M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, op. cit, p.43.

“Internal colonialism theory is not so much incorrect as it is incomplete. It is incomplete because it fails to recognise the possibility of segmental cultural of labour in addition to hierarchical ones. Hence it takes too narrow a view of the conditions that promote common material interests among culturaly distinct populations. But together with most other conflict theoretic explanations of group solidarity, it is also incomplete because is fails to attend to organisational mechanisms that are necessary to solve the free-rider problem[i]. The mere existence of common material interests is not a sufficient condition for the establishment of group solidarity or collective action, although it is a necessary one (Hechter et al., 1982). In the first place, nationalist organisations must gain sufficient resources[ii], to make their members more dependent on them than on rival political organizations. In the second place, to be successful such groups must have the means of monitoring their members compliance to the movement’s goals and procedures[iii]. Thus, If I were writing the book today, it would raise many of the same questions and provide some of the same answers, but it would have more microsociological [iv] analysis.”²⁶

Before proceeding any further, we should explicate in greater detail the terms ‘segmental cultural division of labour’ and ‘the free rider problem’.

Segmental cultural division implies that one ethnic minority (group) is able to monopolise virtually one sector of the economy for its own members from top to bottom.²⁷ Hechter cites the legal profession of  Scotland which was totally dominated by indigenous personnel excluding the non-Scots from such occupations. The problem of the freerider maybe formulated as follows:

26       Michael Hechter, “Internal Colonialism Revisited”, in Ronald Rogowski and Edward A. Tiyakian, edited., New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation, Boston’s Allen and Unwin, p.25.

[i] For the free rider problem, also see, M. Laver, The Politics of Private Desires,

(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), pp.39-71.

[ii] For resource allocation, also see, G.A. Almond and G.B. Powell. Comparative

Politics, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

(iii) Bureaucracies are often an excellent means of disciplining individuals into

compliance with a movement’s ideas and goals. H. Jacoby, The Bureaucratisation

of the World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

(iv) For microsociological analysis, see C. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu

Social Reform, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

27       In order to understand professional ‘ethno-nepotism’ see M. Heiberg, “Insiders/ Outsiders: Basque Nationalismi” European Journal of Sociology, vol XVI, pp.169-93.

“A truly rational actor will not join a a group to pursue collective  ends if by refraining to participate, he can reap the benefit of other people’s activity to obtain these ends. Instead he wil opt to be a free-rider when offered the slightest opportunity to do so. The paradox is that, to the degree individuals act as they are not likely to participate in groups, or to engage in collective action either on a class or a nationalist basis.”²⁸

Based upon our previous study of the theory of disintegration,²⁹ and Hechter’s self criticism we are now able to suggest tentative alterations in the three hypotheses and indicate the overall direction of are going to impose upon them. Of course, a lot more research has to be done before the three hypotheses acquire their final form.

In hypothesis I we attempt to emphasise the elements perception and economic inequality between the elites of the core and the periphery. By introducing elite perception and inequality in hypothesis we acknowledge the fact that the elites in the periphery may play a major role in the disintegration process. Therefore, we propose to reformulate hypothesis along the following lines:

Hypothesis 1

The greater the economic inequality between the elites of the core and periphery and the more the elites of the periphery perceive this as unjust, the greater the probability that the periphery may break from the core and seek independence.³⁰

In hypothesis II we envisage that the frequency of communication between the following groups may be of importance in the disintegration process:

28       Michael Hechter, op.cit., p.23.

29       In improving the hypotheses of Hechter, we had frequent recourse to the work of

Edward Page. In his detailed critical account of Hechter’s writings we found valuable suggestions of how to develop our own application of the internal colonialism model to Pakistan. His pungent criticism of Hechter’s misinterpretation of Rokkan and Parsons deserves praise. Both of them are not mere ‘diffusionist scholars. The mathamaitcal-statistical knowledge of Page and his ability of making sense out of Hechter’s often jumbled data collection allowed us to avoid errors in method and inferential judgements. For further information on Page’s writings see: Edward Page. Michael Hechter”: Internal Colonial Thesis: Some Theoretical and Methodological Problems (Strathclyde: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1977).

30       As the reader can see the revised hypothesis have been structured in such a way that they are decomposable: cach central feature of the hypothesis can be tested separately, that is economic inequality and perception of injustice.

-between the elite of the core and the periphery

-between the elite of the periphery and the masses of the periphery.

-and between the elites of the periphery and third parties which are hostile to the core.

Thus in this hypothesis we endeavour to trace the possible decline in solidarity between the elites of the core and those of the periphery, while at the same time we attempt to demonstrate that an increase in communication between the elites and the masses of the periphery may signal that the elites of the periphery are mobilising the masses of the periphery against the core. Hypothesis II also makes provision for the inclusion of outside interference in the disintegration process by mentioning especially the possible communication links between the elites of the periphery and third parties which are hostile to the core.³¹

Above all Hechter in alerting us to the free-rider problem, forces us to exmine how ethnic groups can reinforce positively the ivolvement of their members in group activities. The communication patterns in hypothesis II indicate how far the groups can control their members, be they elites or masses. The less communication outside a group exists and the more communication between the elites and the masses of the same ethnic group takes place, the more control the ethnic group over its individual adherents. The more the control, the less of a problem becomes the free-rider phenomenon for an ethnic group. A restriction of communication within the group implies not only control but also dependence, especially when we consider that man is a ‘social animal’³² has a need to communicate. The more restricted the number of available communication channels,³³ the more dependent an individual becomes upon the groups which provide these communications opportunities. We have to realise that man without the possibility to communicate is only half

31       For communication links between peripheral elites and third parties hostile to the core see the following works: Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh:Constitutional Quest for Autonomy, (Bangladesh: University Press Limited, 1979). Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (New York: Camegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981, Mizanur Rahman, Shelly Emergence of a New Nation in a Multi-Polar World: Bangladesh. (Dacca: University Press Limited< 1979). see specially chapter III, “India’s Role: Intervention or Humanitarian Help?

32       For the social nature of man see: G.W. Allport, The Nature of Personality. (Boston:

Beacon Press, 1960).

33       For a definition and evaluation of ‘communication channels’ see: F.E.X, Dance, (edited)., Human Communication Theory, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967)

Human.³⁴

Hechter actually echos our ideas when he states:

“But dependence per se an insufficient cause of compliance. Regardless of an individual’s dependence can only be assured when the group’s other members or leaders have the capacity to monitor his behaviour in order to discover when he is being compliant and when he is selective incentives are provided exclusively to reward the compliant and to punish the non compliant can free-riding be precluded. More formally, dependence and the group’s capacity to monitor the behavior of its members are both necessary conditions for solidarity, but neither is by itself sufficient. Solidarity can be achieved only by the joint effects of dependence monitoring capacity.”³⁵

Therefore we intend to reformulate hypothesis II along the following lines:

Hypothesis II

The lower the frequency of communication between the elites of the core and the periphery, the higher the frequency of communication between the elites of the periphery on the one hand and the masses of the periphery and the third parties which are hostile to the core on the other, the greater the probability that the periphery may break away from the core and seek independence.

In hypothesis III we emphasise the fact that there exists always the possibility that two cultures may not be compatible with each other, Thus, a non-compatibility clause has to be incorporated in this hypothesis, Furthermore, we insist that it may be very costly for the individuals involved to overcome cultural differences and non-compatibility. Those costs which are incurred may be a material or psycholigical nature.³⁶ Therefore, we suggest that hypothesis III may be reformulated along the following lines.

34      P. Hirst and P. Woolley, Social Relations and Human Attributes, (London: Taristock Publications, 1982), pp.23-61.

35       Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism Revisited, op. cit., p.24.

36       P. Hirst and P. Woolley op. cit., pp.164-196.

Hypothesis III

The greater the perceived cultural differences between the core and the periphery, as far as identifiability is concerned, and the greater the cultural non-compatibility between core and the centre, and noncompatibility, the greater the probability that the periphery may creak away from the core and seek independence.

In applying these three hypotheses to our case study of Bengali perceptions of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969, we should be able to delineate and explain the reasons for the disillusionment of the Bengali elites and the road to secessionist conflict.³⁹ Given that hypothesis I clearly represents the uneven development model, and that hypothesis Il may provide us with some hints about outside iterference or the mobilisation of the masses in the periphery by their elites, and that hypothesis III is extremely ethnicity-centred, we should be able to determine the bases and origins of the disillusionment of the Bengali elite.³⁸ Our next step has to be the operationalisation and application of these three hypotheses to the Bengali elite’s perception of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969. But before proceeding any further, we have to provide the reader with a working definition of elite. We define elites as associations of individuals who hold power

37       For an account of successful secessions (Divided Nations), see: G. Henderson, R. N. Lebow and John G. Stossinger, (edited)., Divided Nations in a Divided World, (New York: Mckay Co., 1974). Also see Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of  Self-determination, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1978). Harry Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession”, Political Studies, 1984, vol. XXXII, pp. 21-31. Anthony H. Birch, “Another Liberal Theory of Secession”, Political Studies, 1984, vol. XXXII, pp. 596-602. Harry Beran, “More Theory Of Secession: A Response to Birch”, Political Studies, 1988, vol. XXXVI, PP. 316-323.

38       Since it is not our purpose to resolve the definitional issue of elite here, it is better to go for an arbitary definition. There are also great difference among the social scientists and historians about the appropriate role of the elites, especially with reference to the Indian sub-continent. There are broadly two groups of scholars. One, known as primordialist, are of the view that political identities are given and embedded in the past of the concerned groups. Their political choice therefore is restricted. The most powerful advocate of this thesis in the Indian context is Francis Robinson. See his Separatism Among Indian Muslims, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), “Islam and Muslim Separatism”, in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp. (edited)., Political Identity in South Asia. (London: Curzon Press, 1979). pp. 78-112, and “Nation Formation: The Brass Thesis and Muslim Separatism”, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 15 (3) November 1977, pp. 215-234.

in the economic, political, military, cultural and religious spheres of their own respective societies.³⁹

We hope to obtain the necessary data for the operationalisation and application of our hypotheses by the following methods interviews and non-computer based analysis of government reports and statistics and political party publications, we believe it to be to assess the respective roles, economic discrimination and played in the disillusionment of the Bengali elites. First against the  Bhadralok of Bengal, and later against what they (the Bengalis)saw as the West Pakistani dominated central government.

Our next step therefore shall be to examine the role of elites in the creation of Pakistan. It will be demonstrated in chapter two that Bengali Muslim elites and masses equated economic and a oppression with Bhadralok rule – the reign of Hindu Zamindars in Benga. The Bengali had high hopes that in eliminating the Hindu zamindars, they, as the suppressed Muslim majority, would finally be the masters of economic, cultural, poliltical and religious fate, in an independent political entity called Pakistan.

The other group, namely “instrumentalist”, attaches a key role to the elites and argues that political identities are chosen from any array of possible identities and the competing elites select and manipulate political symbols to expand their political support. Moreover emphasis on one particular identity is usually the product of political and economic interests rather than the excitement generated by primordial ties and loyalties. Paul R. Brass is the chief exponent of this school of thought. See his, Language, Religion and politics in North India. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976); “Elites Groups Symbol manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of South Asia”, in Taylor and Yapp, Political Identity, pp. 35-77; “Ethnicity and Nationality Formation”, Ethnicity, vol.3. September 1976, pp. 225-241.

39       A Emajuddin has done research on bureaucratic elites in Bangladesh and Pakistan A. Emajuddin, Bureaucratic elites in Segmented Economic Growth: Bangladesh and Pakistan (Dacca: The University Press Limited, 1980). Also see Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, Bureaucratic Self-Preservation: Failure of Major Reform Efforts in the Civil Service of Pakistan (Dacca: The University of Dacca, 1980).

CHAPTER TWO

THE MUSLIMS OF BENGAL AND

 THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN

“Are the Muslims likely to be richer or poorer under Pakistan?’ (Beverly Nicolas)

“I’ll ask you a question for a change. Supposing you were asked which would you prefer … a rich England under Germany or a poor England free, what would your answer be?’ (Mohammad Ali Jinnah)

It can be assumed that scholars generally agree that 1905, 1947 and 1971 are milestones in the history of the Muslim’s sepearatist movement on the Indian subcontinent. The year 1905 is important because it was for the first time that Bengal was partitioned under British rule. The partition scheme was announced on 1st of September 1905. The partition of Bengal was popular with the Muslims who held special thanksgiving prayers.¹ But the Hindus viewed it as a policy of divide and rule. It was

1          Commenting on the attitude of the Muslim masses towards the Partition scheme, Susobhan Sarkar’s observation is, “The Muslim masses were largely neutral during the struggle as befitted their lack of political consciousness. Muslim leadership was pleased with the partition which held out hopes of preferment in the new province. Muslim apathy either way is also illustrated by the absence of any strong opposition to the repeal of partition announced by George V in his coronation Durbar at Delhi, 12th December 1911.” Susobhan Sarkar, On the Bengal Renaissance.(Calcutta: Papyrus. 1979), pp. 64-65. For a Muslim point of view on the issue of partition of Bengal see the following work, K. Salimolla, “The New Province: Its Future Possibilities”, Journal of the Muslim Institute, vol. i, no. 4 April-June, 1906.pp. 410-411. K.KAziz, Britain and Muslim India, (London: Heinemann, 1963).especially chapter 3 and 4, “The Partition of Bengal I and New Delhi:11”, pp. 36-61 and A R. Mallick, “The Muslims and the Partition of Bengal 1905”, in L.H. Qureshi and others (edited)., A History of the Freedom movement 1831-1905, vol.iii, part i. (New Delhi:Renaissance Publishing House, 1961), pp.1-28.

extremely popular with the Hindus. It was for the first time, since the British took over India thar the Bhadralok,²  who virtually dominated every aspect of life in Bengal, got the oppportunity to mobise against  the British their resources, both economic and cultural, that they had acquired through their contacts with the British rulers.

“From the eloquentpens of Rabinderanath Tagore. Bipin Chandar Pal, and Aurobindo Ghosh came a call for cultural self reliance: for a revival of indigenous institutions and use of traditional Hindu symbols to galvanise Bengal to action.³

On the one hand opposition to the partition scheme united the  elites (Bhadralok) but on the other hand it also opened their stark reality of how unpopular they were with other communities  specially with the Muslims of Eastern Bengal. The Muslim of Eastern Bengal. The Muslim politicians of Eastern Bengal welcomed the measure and viewed it as their only to escape from Bengali Bhadralok domination, both economic and cultural. Moreover, the use of Hindu symbols to galvanise Bengalis to action particularly offensive to the Muslims, especially when coercive methode were used to check the Muslim opposition. The  Muslims  quickly organise resistance, and in the words of John R. McLane,

“Politics in Bengal had not polarised along communal lines before 1905 despite the failure of the Congress to attract many Bengali Muslim. The partition of Bengal crystalised a Hindu Muslim division which hitherto had been more potential than articulate and organised.”⁴

2          The term Bhadralok when translated literally means, “respectable people”. British officials, and later contemporary scholars have used the term to refer to a “closed class” among Bengali Hindus. In the nineteenth century in Calcutta most of those who might be called Bhadralok were high caste, educated Hindus. For a detailed critical analysis of the term Bhadralok, see the following works, Leonard A. Gordon, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement 1876-1940, (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. l-11, and John McGuire, The Making of a Colonial Mind: A Quantitative Study of the Bhadralok in Calcutta 1857-1885, (Canberra Australian National University, Monographs on South Asia, no 10. 1983), pp. 1-5

3          J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth Century Bengal, (Berkeley. California: University of California Press, 1968), p.30.

4          John R. McLane, “Bengal’s Pre-1905 Congress Leadership and Hindu Society”. in Rachel van M. Baumer (edited). Aspects of Bengali History and Society (New Delhi:Publishing House PVT Lid, 1974), p. 149.

Suffice to say that the partition of Bengal was undoubtedly a blow to Calcutta’s Commercial and professional supremacy in Bengal. Creation of the new East Bengal province meant that some of the trade then coming to Calcutta would be diverted towards Chittagong. Moreover, Calcutta’s lawyers would also lose their clientele to Dacca which would become the capital and the legal centre of the new province. We will come back to this issue for a detailed discussion.

The year 1947, is important in the history of the Muslims of India, because on the 14th of August 1947, Pakistan, an Islamic State, emerged on the map of the world. The establishment of Pakistan is viewed by its advocates as the final fulfillment of a clear uninterrupted and separate stream of Muslim political consciousness in Indian history.

The year 1971 witnessed the disintegration of the biggest Islamic state. The disintegration of India in 1947 and the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, according to Robert Jackson, “was the expression of a particular historical experience-that of Indian Muslim. Its disintegration in 1971 was also a product of that experience”⁵

The main subject matter of this chapter will be to discuss the historical experience of the Indian Muslims prior to the establishment of Pakistan, in other words, the politics of Muslim separatism in Bengal under British rule. It is concemed with the sources of Muslim separatism, with particular reference to the role of the Muslims of Bengal support the demand for Pakistan? An analysis of the historical experience of the Muslims of Bengal may shed some light on our understanding of this key question.

As stated earlier, we will take 1905 as the turning point in the history of Muslim Bengal. However, at this stage it is important to sketch briefly the impact of the British takeover on the main communities in India, namely the Hindus and the Muslims. When in 1746 the East India Company succeeded the Mughals in the govermment of Bengal, it not only signalled for the Muslims the loss of their political power and prestige, they also slowly and gradually lost all their traditional occupations: the civil service, the army, industry and trade. The plight of the Muslims is well documented by Percival Spear:

5          Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan-Bangladesh. (London:Chatto and Windus, 1975).p. 9.

“The British at first retained the Muslim officials but from the time of Comwallis replaced them in their position in the law courts was steadily undermined as the British revised public law and introduced their own procedures in the courts. They were still the exponents of the official language of Persian. But this ceased to be of value when Bentick made English the language of official governmental in 1835. In the same year came the introduction of English education which soon became a qualification for a subordinate official career. Most Muslims were too conservative to learn English many considering it the highway to infidelity. But the Hindu literate classes were not; they had learnt Persian for a livelihood, in the past, so why not English, and they soon monopolised the subordinate services…. By 1860…the Muslim community in India lay apparently prostrate, with little but its imperial memories to sustain it.⁶

In the hundred years from the battle of Plassey. (1757) to the Indian Muslims list their political, social and economic supremacy on the subcontinent.⁷ While the British dominated the political scene, the Hindu Bhadralok of Bengal dominated the social and economic field.

“A hundred years ago the Mussalmans”, wrote Sir William Hunter, in a much publicised book, frequently quoted by the Muslim scholars of the Indian subcontinent, monopolised all important offices of state. The Hindu accepted with thanks such crumbs as their former conquerors dropped from the table. But Persian had ceased to be the official language under William Bentinck (1824-35) and the result was that Muslims had lost their forte in administration. In 1857 the Muslims made their last attempt to reassert their power through their participation in the Indian Mutiny of 1857.” ⁸

6          Spear Percival, A History of India. vol.ii. (London:Penguin Books, 1965).pp. 223. 224

7          Kalim Siddiqui, The Functions of International Conflict, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), p. 58

8          W.W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, (Lahore: Premier Book House, 1964), p. 161.According to Anil Scal, the statistic used by Hunter to explain the plight of the Muslims was essentially meant for the Muslims of Bengal only, see Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1968). A.K. Nazmul Karim, has recently argued that Hunter’s work was mainly concerned about decayed condition of the Muslim upper class in Bengal and it takes no account of the Muslims of ordinary birth’. For detail see, A.K. Nazmul Karim, The Dynamics of Bangladesh Society. (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980).pp. 39-41. Also see Khalid-BSayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 18-1948, (London: Oxfords University Press. 1968).

The British were shocked by the intense hostility of the Muslim community to British rule. They decided to punish the Muslims in such a way that they could never rise again. Muslims on their part found it extremely difficult to combine their faith with obedience to the infidels. So they decided to withdraw themselves from the mainstream of economic and political life.

The Muslim ulemas attributed the political, social and economic disaster that had beset the Muslim community to its religious degeneration.⁹ Religious reforms became therefore their main preoccupation. This preoccupation with religious reforms can best be documented by the activities of the Faraizi and the Tariqah-i-Mohammadiya movements.¹⁰ They were the two important religious reform movements in Bengal during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The major objectives of the movements were to purge Muslim society of its age-long un-Islamic beliefs and practices and, at the same time, both were determined to defend Islam against all outside interventions.¹¹ The dominant features of these movements were:

(1)       Popular Islam had to take on an identity which was no longer anchored in the local cultural traditions. These traditions were perceived to be identified with Hinduism and polythesim, and therefore totally antithetical to Islam.

(2)       Through the use of Pan-Islamic ideology and the increased employment of Persian Arabic words, a growing difference between the Muslims and the Hindus could be witnessed.

Thus there was a definite inclination among the Bengali Muslims to employ more Arabic and Persian in their spoken and written language.

“The more Arabic, Persian and Urdu works embedded in the Bengali matrix the better, for such words from the languages of Muslim religions and culture satisfied Muslim pride and served to establish the separate identity of their community.”¹²

9. Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity. (Delhi:Oxford University Press, 1981),p. 41.
10. See, Khan Miun-ud-din Ahmed, History of the Faraidi Movement in Bengal 1818

1906, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1965),

11. Rfiuddin Ahmed, op. cit., p. 41 12. Sufia Ahmed, Muslim Community in Bengal 1884-1912, (Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 30

Bengali Muslims would also no longer read Hindu Bengali writers such as Ram Mohan Roy, Iswar Chandra and Maduhusudan, because Bengali Muslims felt that in doing so, they were betraying their Muslim heritage and tradition. This reaction on the part of the Bengali Muslims was mainly due to the fact that the Hindus had taken over many positions in Bengal thereby relegating the Muslims to a status of economic, cultural and political inferiority. Muslims found it extremely difficult to reconcile themselves to the unpleasant fact that of the Mughal empire their system of education, with Persian as its  medium of instruction was of no use and would not help them anymore in obtaining jobs under British rule.

Consequently the relative position of the Hindus and the Muslims gradually changed. From the beginning the Hindus took full advantages of the new educational system which was introduced by the British. They immediately gained knowledge and steadily acquired wealth an while the Muslims declined in all walks of life. The living conditions of the Muslim of Bengal were by far the worst. In 1871 in Bengal, of the 773 Indians holding responsible govermment jobs, the Muslim though their members were approximately equal to those of in the province, occupied only 92 positions with 681 held by the Hindus.¹³ This educational and intellectual imbalance created in the early stages persisted for a long time and was very largely responsible for the conflict and tension that took place between the two communities during the long period of the British rule.¹⁴ It was in such a dark and gloomy setting that Sir Syed Ahmed Khan emerged as the champion the Muslim cause. He advised the Muslims to shed their prejudices and take up the learning of English. He was born in a Moghul family in Delhi entered the British judicial service as a clerk and subsequently rose to the position of sub-judge.¹⁵ During the mutiny of 1857 he saved the lives of many Englishmen, giving them shelter in his bungalow and thus gained their confidence. After the revolt was successfully crushed, the British rulers adopted a hostile policy towards the Muslims and viewed their Muslim subjects rightly or wrongly with suspicion. But such was not the case with Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. He now enjoyed the confidence of the rulers. So after the dust of revolt had settled he wrote a book, entitled The Causes of Indian Revolt. In the book he argued convincingly that:

13. Kahlid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan the Fomative Phase, op. cit., pp. 13-14
14. Ibid., p. 21.
15. For a detail study on the life and contribution of Sir Syed Ahmed in the development(unclear)Muslim separatism see Hafeez Malik, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Muslim modernization(unclear) India and Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

“There is no real communication between the goverment and the governed, no living together or near one another, as had always been the custom of the Mohammadans in countries which they have subjected to their rules.”¹⁶

He had also pleaded for the admission of Indians to the Legislative Council. The main objective of Sir Syed’s writing was to extricate the Muslims from the blame for the mutiny. Having made the first move for the reconciliation between the two communities, he then turned his attention to the Muslim community. He religiously preached loyalty to British rule and devotion to learning and study of English and western education and aloofness from politics.

This was not an easy task because long before the mutiny of 1857 the leadership of the Muslim community passed into the hands of orthodox religious activists such as Syed Ahmed Beralwi (1786-1831)who had waged a Jihad against the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Frontier. Moreover Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824) had issued the famous fatwa declaring that India had virtually come under Chrstian domination and therefore became a darul-harab (zone of war).¹⁷ Similarly in Bengal around 1831 there emerged the famous Faraizihah movement and the Tarigah-i-Mohammediya movements. The reformers believed that in Bengal in particular the majority of the indigenous population were converted to Islam, but still their way of life essentially remained mired in the local Hindu culture.¹⁸

So a serious attempt was made by religious to purify Islam and purge it of its local Bengali content. The religious leaders of the movements argued convincingly that the political, social and economic call to return to the primitive purity of Islam. Such slogans could easily inspire the ordinary believers. So Sir Syed had a difficult task to perform in diverting the Muslims attention from Islamic reformism to English education. English education was to be the vehicle, not politics, for the integration of the Muslim intelligentsia into colonial political and economic life. He warned the Muslims that if they did not take to the system of English education they would not only remain a backward commuity,

16. Hector Bolitho, Jinnah the Creator of Pakistan, (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 40.
17. For details see, LH, Qureshi and others (edited).. A History of the freedom Movement 1707-1831, vol. i, op.cit., p.576). Also see Ahmed Qeyamuddin, The Wahabi Movement in India, (Calcutta: Mukhopadhya, 1966).
18. See Rafiuddin Ahmed, op. cit., especially chapter ili, pp. 72-105.

but would sink lower until there will be no hope left to them.¹⁹

Sir Syed believed that the adoption of the new system of English education did not mean the renunciation of Islam; if the sank to ignorance. Islam would come under an eclipse if its followers wre ignorant and backward.²⁰

That was the pronounced view of Sir Syed’s biggest contribution to  the cause of Muslim education was the foundation of the Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1857 which later became famous as the Aligarh Muslim University. “Aligarh produced just enough graduates to look for jobs in the British established institutions and other urban occupations as they were gradually made available to Hindus and  Muslims.²¹ Thus the Aligarh Muslim University became the centre of westernised urban Muslim elites, which were later constantly in conflict with the Hindu elites.

Sir Sved also remained throughout his life opposed to the idea of Muslims entering politics, despite the fact that in his famous book, entitled The Causes of Indian Revolt, he passionately argued in favour granting admission to Indians to the legislative council. At the same time he strongly advised the Muslims to keep away from the Indian National Congress. Writing in 1888 on the state of Indian politics he had this to say about the Indian National Congress:

19     recurring theme in Sir Syed’s campaign for English education.

20     (unclear)

21     (unclear)

“I come now to the main subject on which I wish to address you. That is the Indian National Congress, and the demands which that body makes of govemment. Think for a moment what would be the result if all appointments were given by competitive examination… There would remain no part of the country in which we should see at the tables of justice and authority any face except those of Bengalis… The second demand of the Indian National Congress is that the people should elect a section of the Viceroy’s Council. They want to copy the English House of Lords and the House of Commons. The elected members are to be like members of the House of Commons; the appointed members like the House of Lords. Now, let us suppose the Viceroys Council made in this manner. And let us suppose first of all that we have universal suffrage, as in America, and that everybody, chmaars, and all, have votes. And first suppose that all the Mohomedan electors vote for a Mahomedan member and all the Hindu electors for a Hindu member, and now count how many votes the Mahomedan member has and how many the Hindu. It is certain the Hindu member will have four times as many because their population is four times as numerous. Therefore we can prove by mathematics that there will be four votes for the Hindu to every one vote for the Mahomedan. And now how can the Mahomedan guard his interests? It would be a game of dice, in which one man had four dice and the other only one. In the second place, suppose that the electorate be limited. Some method of qualification must be made: for example, that people with a certain income shall be electors. Now, I ask you, O Mahomedans! Weep at your condition! Have you such wealth that you can compete with the Hindus? … In the normal case no single Mahomedan will secure a seat in the Viceroy’s Council….”²²

Again in a letter to Badruddin Tayabji on 24th January 1888, he wrote:

“The fact that you took a leading part in the Congress at Madras has pleased our Hindu fellow subjects no doubt but as to ourselves it has grieved us much.

22. B.N. Pandey (edited). The Indian Nationalist Movement 1885-1947, Selected documents, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979), p.14.

I do not understand what words National Congress mean. Is it supposed that the different castes and creeds living in India belong to one nation, or can become one nation, and their aims and aspirations be one and the same? I think it is quite impossible and when it is impossible there can be no such thing as a National Congress, nor can it be equal benefit to all peoples.

You regard the doings of the misnamed National Congress as beneficial to India, but I am sorry to say that I regard them as not only injurious to our own community but also to India at large.

 I object to every Congress-in any shape or form whatever-which regards India as one nation, on account of its being based on wrong principles, viz that it regards the whole of India as one nation.²³

Sir Syed constantly harboured the fear that Muslims would be outnumbered by a permanent Hindu majority like the Irish at Westminster.²⁴ He also predicted the consequences of his own campaign for Western education. During the year 1867 he told a friend (a British officer)

“At present there is no open hostility between the two communities (Muslims and Hindus) but on account of the so-called educated people, it will increase immensely in future. He who lives will see.”²⁵  

Far off in Bengal, one of the Muslim majority provinces, very little in reality appears to be known of the teachings of Sir Syed. During his life time though Sir Syed spoke on behalf of the Muslims of the whole of India, his voice but faintly heard in Bengal.²⁶ Bengal had to wait thirteen years until 1899 (the year following Sir Syed’s death) for a session of the educational conference established by Sir Syed, to be held in Calcutta. “Consequently, the programme carried out since 1886 by the conference hardly influenced the Bengali Muslims until after 1899. Special efforts had thus to be made to spread his teachings and create interest in the educational conference established by Sir Syed. Once the link was established with the Muslims of Bengal they showed keen interest and welcomed the idea of the conference.²⁷

23. Ibid. pp. 15-16
24. Kalim Siddiqui, Functions of International conflict, op. cit., p. 64.
25. See H. Bolitho, op. p. 40.
26. Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., p. 86.
27. Ibid., especially chapter one, “The Educational Development of the Muslim Community in Bengal, 1884-1921”. part i and ii, pp. 6-98.

            Muslims of Bengal in fact were eager to co-operate with any movement, initiated by the Muslims, anywhere in India, which promised to help improve their condition: “It is to be noted that since the sitting of the Mohammaden Educational Conference of Northern India at Calcutta in 1899 there had grown up a closer co-operation between the Bengali Muslims and the Muslims of the other provinces, particularly with the promoters of the Aligarh Movement. That session, for the first time, fully involved the Muslims of Bengal in the activities of their fellow co-religionists in Northern India. As Nowsher Ali Khan Yusufzai pointed out, had the Bengali Muslims knowledge of Urdu been sounder the link would have been stronger and earlier forged. Such knowledge, he said, would have kept… the Bengali Mussalmans more in touch and intercourse with their co- religionists in other parts of India, surely would have helped greatly the formation of a separate national existence instead of their falling under the influence of the Hindus. The rise of an All-India Congress, on the other hand, compelled the Muslims of North India to think in terms no less wide, so that the fortunes of Bengali Muslims became their concern. Thus when they extended their co-operation, the leaderless Muslims of Bengal gladly accepted their offer and merged themselves with the Aligarh movement. Subsequent events show that this co- operation between the Bengali Muslims and those of Northern India proved to be beneficial to both sides. As Shahdin had said in the course of a speech delivered at the Calcutta session of the Mohammadan Educational Conference in 1899. This addition of the Bengal and Bihar contingents to our forces will be to us a most valuable occasion (accession) of strength and will launch us on a career of brilliant conquests bringing under our control territories which we hitherto thought were hopelessly beyond our reach. With this will begin a new chapter in the history of the movement, and for our national progress in India it will be dawn

28       Ibid., pp. 214-15. There are two important points to be noted in this long quote. First is the heavy emphasis laid on the importance of Urdu. Urdu was considered to be the only source for better understanding and co-operation among the Muslims of various regions in India. The need for sounder knowledge of Urdu was being stressed in a province where the majority of the Muslim population did not know how to read, write or speak Urdu. Of course in some big cities of Bengal, like Calcutta, Dacca, chittagong and Moorshedabad until recently in certain instance even now) people spoke some form of debased or corrupt Urdu. The upper class Muslims in Bengal spoke Urdu, but not with same purity as a native of Luck now or Delhi. w. Adam, based on his survey of big towns in Bengal, recommended Urdu or Hindustani school

            of a new era Shahdin’s dream was realised in 1906 when certain events gave the Muslims of India an opportunity to prove the effectiveness of theirunited strength.²⁸

In Bengal the Muslim community was hopelessly backward both in higher education and in junior schools. In the colleges the Muslims formed barely 5% of the pupils, in the high schools hardly 10%.²⁹ Alfred Croft also collected some figures reflecting disparity in education between the two communities.³⁰ In 1867 Muslim held 11.7 percent of government jobs in Bengal staffed by Indians. Twenty years later they had less than a decade later their share had dropped to just over 8 percent. In 1886- 7 there were only 53 Muslim officers in the uncovenanted judaical  and executive service of Benga, or one in  12 among Indians as a whole.

In the law, the only secular open to well born Mohammadans, Muslims had been in a relatively strong position during the first half of the century. Until 1857 there had been more Muslim pleaders in Calcutta than Hindus and Christians combined. Between 1852 and 1868, however, not one of the pleaders admitted to the rolls of the High Court in Calcutta was a Muslim. In 1869 among the attorneys, proctors and solicitors there were 27 Hindus, but there were no Muslims. In both administration and the professions Muslims were being forced out.³¹ Needles to say that English educational qualifications and standards were growing more and more important in occupations of this kind. By 1887, for example, according to Anil Seal, almost the uncovenanted officers in the judicial and executive service of Bengal had passed some University examination. and one third had degrees.³² Muslim backwardness in education, particularly in Bengal, was due to a number of factors; foremost among them were:

books for majority of Mussalman population of Calcutta, Moorshedabad and   Dacca. The other point to be noted is the explicit reference to the generally held view that the Bengali Muslims were under the influence of Hindu culture. (We will discuss these points in some detail at a later point). For details see the following works, A. K.Nazmul Karim, op.cit., pp. 149-151 and A R. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal 1757-1856, (Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1961), p. 267

29. Suifa Ahamed.op. cit, p. 49. On the condition of Muslim d-education also see Adam W. “Reports on the State of Education in Bengal 1835 and 1838”. (edited).. by A. Basu, (Calcutta University, 1941.)
30. For detail see, A Croft, Report, “Review of Education in India 1886 with Special Reference to the Report of the Education Commission”. Calcutta: 1888
31. Anil Seal, op. cit., p. 302
32. Ibid.

(1) Replacement of Persian and Urdu with English.

(2) Reluctance on the part of the Muslim community to learn English which was            considered to be the language of alien conquerors

(3) For the Muslim, education meant,

“first Religious education, secondly moral eduction and lastly professional education.”³³

 But finally when they realised their mistake and heeded to the advice of Sir Syed, the poverty of the community stood in its way, According to Anil Seal, the Muslim slowly began to realise that “the traditonal Islamic education taught at the madrassas at Calcutta, Hooghly, and Dacca did not qualify their students to compete with Hindus for the jobs on which their livelihood depended.”³⁴ So by the mid century those belonging to the higher and respectable Muslim families of Bengal began to show a growing desire for quality English higher education. However, what now prevented them from acquiring this kind of education was not religious prejudice but lack of financial means.³⁵

So let us now briefly turn our attention to the economic conditions of the Muslims of Bengal. In 1746 the Mughal govemment in Bengal was succeeded by the English East India Company and with the expansion their commerce and administration a social revolution began in Bengal. The company’s rule promoted the Hindu commercial class at the expense of the local branch of the established Muslim aristocracy. It should be noted that British colonial power did not create the Hindu zamindars in Bengal. Even during the heyday of Muslim in that area, Hindus were employed by the Muslim rulers to the most prominent and conspicuous administrative posts. The conquest of Clive and the permanent settlement of Cornwallis only confirmed and strengthened the position of the Hindu elites in Bengal.

 33      Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., p. 54.

34       Anil Seal, op. cit., p. 309. On Madrassa education see, A. R. Mallick. op. cit., pp. 231-82

35       See for example, Report of the Director of Public Instruction in Bengal. for 1871- 72, Calcutta, p. 73

“The working of the permanent step by step expropriated most of the Muslim landlords; the resumption proceeding  after 1828  acclerated their decay and by the later nineteenth century most of the land was owned by the Hindus.”³⁶

In the Eastern districts of Bengal, where the Muslims were in a great majority this was particularly evident. In Backergunge district, for example, Muslims were 64.8 per cent of the population but owned less than 10 percent of the estates and paid less than 9 percent of the total land revenue. In Mymensingh just under 16 percent of the population were Muslims, paying just over 10 percent of the district land revenue.³⁷ And as the imperial armies progressed Westward through Central and Northern India they were followed by administrators and judges. Indian assistants and clerks were immediately required for the administrative tasks to be  undertaken. As courts, hospitals and schools were established there were openings for lawyers, doctors and teachers, and, above all, the construction of the railway created demands for evenmore accountants and clerks.³⁸  All these places were filled by the Bhadralok of Bengal, coming mainly from the Bengali upper (Hindu) castes (Brahmins, Baidya and Kayestha). But to grasp these opportunities the Bengalis had first to learn the language of the new rulers. To fulfill this condition the  Bhadralok of Bengal displayed remarkable initiative in financing English primary and middle schools in the districts, and high schools and colleges in Calcutta.³⁹ Working knowledge of English not only secured jobs for the Bengalis , it also became a hallmark of Bhadralok status.⁴⁰ But the Muslims would have none of it. The educational backwardness of the Muslims, consequently deprived them of job opportunities in the govemment offices.

36       Anil Seal, op. cit. p. 301

37        lbid.

38        Broomfield, op. cit. p. 7

39        Ibid. p.8.

40       See John McGuire, op. cit., especially chapter 3 – “The Colonial Education System”, pp. 49-56. According to McGuire, it was Macaulay who saw in English education the key to the full colonisation of India. Macaulay argued that English should be used as a means of educating Indians in European knowledge. Such knowledge, he suggested would eventually lead them to demand European institutions, p.43. One the impotence of language as the key to successful cultural imperialism see Bemard S. Cohn’s excellent work. The Command of Language and the Language Command”, in Ranajhit Ouha (edited). Subaltern Studies, vol. iv, writings on South Asian History and Society. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp.276-329

The condition of the Muslims in the rural area, where the majority population lived, was no better and in fact was worse. In fact the majority of the Indian population lived in the rural areas and hence dependent on agriculture. This was true of Bengal as a whole, and sticularly so of the Eastern areas of the province. “Although the Muslims numerically in a stronger position, power and status in the society for the most part rested with the Hindus.”⁴¹ (Here it is interesting to point out that according to many authors of Indian history, a majority of indigenous population who converted to Islam belonged to the lowest castes is of Hinduism. Professed egalitarian principles of Islam may have attracted them to the faith of the Muslim rulers during the Muslim rule in India. However, their economic condition remained almost unchanged. The only comfort that they could draw from their conversion to Islam as religious identification with the belief of the ruling class). “Undoubtadly as a community, the Hindus were in a far more advantageous position than the Muslim, but in effect, such advantages were largely vested in certain social classes, particularly the Hindu Bhadralok, mostly belonging to the three upper castes, namely Brahmins, Baidyas and Kayesthas.⁴² The Bhadralok derived their dominant in society partly from their control of the large lands, in which they had a very high stake, and partly from their ritual statues.⁴³ The upper caste Bhadralok had a long tradition of literary culture and under the British this helped them acquire an easy and probably absolute supremacy in the educational as well as in the professions requiring literacy. “They provided nearly two thirds of all the literate people in the region and monopolised positions in the professions to a corresponding degree.⁴⁴ Likewise their monopoly in the land was equally strong. This can further be explained, if we examine carefully the condition of the Muslims of certain areas in Bengal where they had a clear majority. We find that almost in every case the Muslims were the tenants, and their zamindars, with few exception, were Hindus. For instance, in the district of Bogra the Muslims formed a little over 80 percent of the population. But most of the zamindars were Hindus.Only five Muslim zamindars of importance could be found in the whole of this district.⁴⁵

41       Rafiuddin Ahmed, op. cit., p. 3. Also see P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge university Press, 1972). p. 254.

42       Anil Seal, op. cit., pp. 41-3.

43       Gordon Johnson, “Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904 to 1908”, in John Gallagher et al. (edited)., Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 215-16.

44       Rafiuddin Ahmed, op. cit., p. 4.

45       Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., p. 100.

Likewise in the district of Rajshahi, in the year 1911, the Muslims formed 78 per cent of the population, the Hindus 21 per cent. But almost one in every twenty of these Hindus was a high caste Brahmin and quite a number of them owned vast properties in the districts and only two Muslim zamindars of any importance existed in this district. Needless to say that the authority of these landlords which they exercised over their tenants was very far from being limited to a purely agricultural question.⁴⁶

Commentingon the plight of the Muslims of Bengal in his influential work, The Indian Mussalmans, Sir William Hunter wrote:

“in every district the descendent of some little line of princes sullenly and proudly eats his heart out among the roofless palaces and weed-choked tanks… Their houses swarm with grown-up sons and daughters, with grand-children and nephews and nieces, and not one of the hungry crowd has a chance of doing anything for himself in life. They drag on a listless existence in patched- up verandahs or leaky houses, sinking deeper into hapless abyss  of debt, till the neighbouring Hindu money-lender fixes a quarrel with them, and then, in a moment a host mortgages foreclose, and the ancient Mussalman family is suddenly swallowed up and disappears for ever.”⁴⁷

Anil Seal’ observation on the educational and economic plight of the Muslims is that it was true in Bengal, a generally advanced region in terms of education and economic change, the Muslims were on the whole backward.⁴⁸ Amir Ali was strongly of the view that Muslim fortune could not be changed by the Muslims’ effort alone. Government help was essential, and if it was to be won Muslims needed a political organisation to make their cause effective. Loyalty to the crown alone would not significantly change their fortune.⁴⁹ Government help came in 1905 with the partition of Bengal followed by the formation of Muslim League in 1906 at Dacca.

46. Ibid.
47. Cited, in Hector Bolitho, op. cit., p. 53.
48. Anil Seal, op. cit., p.307.
49. Ibid… pp.310-312

As stated the partition of Bengal was a turning point in the politics of India. The partition of Bengal was vehemently opposed by the Hindus. They perceived the partition as a policy of divide and rule and an attempt on the part of the rulers to disrupt the growing Indian nationalism, the long cherished dream of the Congress, which was frequently. challenged with vigour by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. During the course of the anti-partition agitation the movement took a religious turn. This was necessary for the leaders of the movement, the Bhadralok, because they had hardly any contact with the Hindu masses, therefore had no legitimate political authority over those people. Only in depicting the Muslims and the then British rulers as the blood thirsty enemies of Hindu culture and traditions they, the Bhadralok, the leaders of the Congress, who claimed to be nationalistic in their outlook, had to submit to the exigencies of Hindu communal politics, thereby alienating Muslim masses and elites alike.

Recording his impression of the politics of Bengal during the 1905-11 period Nirad C. Chaudhuri wrote:

“A cold dislike for the Muslim settled down in our hearts, putting an end to all real intimacy of relationship. Curiously enough, with us, the boys of Kishorganj, it found visible expression in the division of our class into two section, one composed purely of Hindus and the other of Muslims. We never came to know all the circumstances of this division. Whether or not the Muslim boys had also expressed unwillingness to sit with us, for some time past we, the Hindu boys, had been clamouring that we did not want to sit with Muslim boys because they smelt of onions – compartmentalisation by communities came into our education before it was introduced into our politics.”⁵⁰

From 1906 onwards the politics of India were equally marked with conflict and co-operation between the two major communities, Hindus and Muslims. The Muslim League which was established in 1906, projected itself as the custodian of Muslim interests in India, challenging the claim of the Indian National Congress to be the representative of all the communities in India. The Indian National Congress on the other hand never seriously recognised the claim of the Muslim League to be the sole representative body of the Muslim community. However, in an attempt to build a facade of unity in order to confront the British rulers they conceded to the major demands of the Muslim League at various times in the history of the struggle for Indian independence. But when they were under pressure from the hard liners within their party’s rank and file the Congress quickly withdrew the concessions made to the Muslim community.

50       Nirad C. Chaudhuri, the Autobiography of an Unknown India, (New York:         Macmillan,1957), p. 233

Two important events in the history of the Indian  National Congress, concerning its relationship with the Muslim League, clearly demonstrated the inability of Congress to adopt a consistent policy towards the Muslim community in India. The year 1916 marked the high point of Hindu Muslim unity when the famous Lucknow Pact was signed between the two parties, Muslim League and Congress. Congress accepted separate electorate for Muslims and agreed that in the Muslim minority provinces of U. P., Bihar, Bombay and Madras. Muslims should have 30, 25, 33 and 15 per cent of the elected Indian membership respectively. In the Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, however the Muslims were given 40 and 50 percent respectively.⁵¹

In 1929 the Nehru report totally rejected the demands conceded in the pact of 1916. Here it is important to note that the pact of 1916  has been viewed by many observers of Indian history as a triumph for the moderates (western educated elites) politicians, both from Congress and Muslim League. They stood for the unity of India and would not make any major concession to the communal groups. But after the publication of Nehru report, which was produced in response to Birkenhead’s challenge that Indians were incapable of arriving at an agreed solution to the constituional problem of India, it seems that the inevitable parting of the ways between Hindus and Muslims had come and was to stay. Jinnah, “a moderate and a committed nationalist, and hailed in 1916 as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity”, made his last effort to preserve the Hindu-Muslim unity by suggesting amendments to the Nehru report in his famous fourteen points.⁵²

51. P Hardy, op. cit. p.187. It is important to point out that the Lucknow Pact, was very unpopular in Muslim Bengal. According to Broomdfield, “The Lucknow Pact was a remarkable diplomatic victory for the Muslims League, and it was hailed as such by the Muslim press, except in Bengal, where the concessions on Hindu representation in the local legislative council were denounced as a betrayal of the community’s interests…the young Muslim who apprehend that the Muslems out their community to the Hindus, and there was a reaction against collaboration. Those who apprehend that the Muslems will suffer political death if they do not unite with the Hindus are greatly mistaken, declaimed a Calcutta Urdu daily, The Risalat. “We have already stood alone 1.300 years. What is wanted is that, we should firmly abide by our religious laws and not become faint-hearted.” JH Broomfield, “The Forgotten Majority: the Bengal Muslims and September 1918”, in D A Low, edited, Soundings in Modem South Asian History, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.p 205.
52. See Sarogini Naidu, “Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity in Jamaluddin Ahmed. (edited). Quaid-I-Azam as Seen by his Contemporaries. (Lahore: Publishers United Lid., 1966),p. 159. Also see Hector Bolitho, op. cit., especially part one, “Young Avocet”.pp. 21-22

Jinnah’s fourteen points were an exercise in futility to revive the spirit of 1916.⁵³ According to RJ. Moore, “In the decade since the Lucknow Pact the process of devolution had taken heavy toll of the Hindu Muslim Unity.”⁵⁴ Commenting on the politics of devolution, David Page writes,

“The Montague-Chelmsford constitution [of 1919] produced two main trends in all Indian politics, a centrifugal trend and a communal trend. Between 1923 and 1927, every all India confrontation with the Raj was beset by provincial pressures, and the lesson which the all India politician learnt during these years was that he either had to bow before these pressures or to bow out or politics altogether.”⁵⁵

The reforms had given politicians some power in the provinces, it gave them nothing at the centre.⁵⁶ The strategy not only undermined the position of the politicians who had their eyes at the centre and were not satisfied with constitutional reform of 1919 but also helped the govemment in locking politics out of the centre.⁵⁷ When the reform was introduced in 1919 the Birtish govemment also announced that after ten years the govemment would again look into the question of constitutional progress.⁵⁸ But long before this period had expired, Indian Icaders had begun to talk about the need for more constitutional reforms.⁵⁹ They argued that the period suggested was too long and that India was fit for the next instalment of selfgovemment. By 1927 this demand had become so insistent that the govemment decided to set up a statutory commission

53       Dr. Mahmud Hussain, “The Lucknow Pact”. in Dr.I.H. Qureshi and others edited, op. cit., vol.ii. part 1. pp. 118-139 and Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858-1947),(Bombay: Asian Publishing House, 1959). Especially chapter xv, “HinduMuslim Unity: The Lucknow Pact”, pp. 129-135

54       RJ. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). P. 25.

55       David Page, Prelude to Partition, (Delhi: Oxford university Press, 1982), pp. 141-42

56       Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal,” Altemative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars”. Modern Asian Studies, vol.15, no. 3, 1981, p. 418.

57       Ibid., also see Dr. G. W. Choudhury. “Montague-Chelmsford Reforms”. in Dr. LH Qureshi and others (edited)., op. cit., pp. 175-204.

58       Waheed-uz-Zman, Towards Pakistan.(Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1964), p. 22.

59       K.K. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India,(London: Heinemann, 1963), p. 114.

to explore the possibility of further constitutional reforms.⁶⁰ Now was the opportunity for politicians like Mr.M.A Jinnah, Mr. Motilal Nehru to make a unified attempt to produce an all India strategy which would , with the co-operation of all parties facilitate the establishment of more Indian participation at the centre and pave the way for self-government in India.⁶¹ In the years before 1920 Mr Jinnah was one politician who enjoyed a unique position of a successful political broker in Indian politics. But after the introduction of the 1919 reforms (or introduction of Dyarchy in the provinces) his own position as a political broker was under threat. In 1927 when the Statutory Commission was appointed to eplore the possibility of further constitutional reforms, Mr.Jinnah used all his political skill to find a way of reconciling the conflicting demands of the Muslim and provinces and the Congress. The Congress was committed to a strong unitary centre, while the Muslim majority provinces, namely Punjab and Bengal, wanted a weak federal structure in a free an independent India.⁶²

Mr. Jinnah proposed a compromise on the basis of four points demand. These proposals were:

 (1) The separation of Sind from Bombay;

 (2) Reforms for the Frontier and Baluchistan;

 (3) Representation by population in the Punjab and Bengal;

 (4) Thirty three per cent Muslim representation in the central legislature,⁶³

Mr.Jinnah’s proposal clearly suggested that he was willing to give up separate representation in return for the concession mentioned above. His proposals were rejected by the provincial Muslim leaders of Bengal and Punjab. They refused to budge an inch on the issue of a separate electorate.⁶⁴  In 1927 he put forward four proposals, in 1928 they became

 60      Ibid.

61       See Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal, op. cit., pp. 415-454, and David Page, op. cit., pp.

106-107

62       Gowher Rirvi, Linlithgow and India. (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978).

especially chapter 24 3. pp. 17-89.

63       See the following works. Abdul Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India, (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967). pp. 188-195. Ram Gopal, op. cit., especially chapter xx, “Leaving Jinnah High and Dry. pp. 186-191.

64       (unclear)

six and in 1929, fourteen.⁶⁵ By 1929 it was no longer possible for political broker to occupy a central position in Indian politics.

“Here was the heart of Mr Jinnah’s dilemma. One either had to be in the Congress camp or the Muslim camp. It was this logic which ultimately turned Mr Jinnah into the Quaid-e-Azam of Pakistan.”⁶⁶

Before we proceed any further to examine the role of Mr Jinnah in the creation of Pakistan, let us examine the Muslim reaction to the Nehru report. The report was a very significant document because it was the first attempt of Indians to draft a constitution for a free India. “It was essentially a plan by nationalist Hindus for Indians to inherit a united centralised Raj, embracing the princely states as well as the British Indian provinces.”⁶⁷ Commenting on the report Professor Coupland writes, “Dominated by the tradition of unitary govemment established by British rule… the constitution could hardly be called federal.”⁶⁸ and according to David Page, “The Nehru report did did not discuss in detail the relationship between the central and the provincial govemment. But it is clear from the schedules of the subjects under their charge the national govemment was to be a uitary rather than a federal type, with residuary power in the hands of the central govemment.”⁶⁹

Muslim opinion, was, therefore, virtually unanimous in its rejection of the report.⁷⁰ Mr. Firoz Khan Noon, a member of the powerful unionist party of the Punjab, perhaps, provided the most systematic response to the Nehru report and summed up the fear of the Muslims in the following words,

65       “Jinnah’s demand embodied the essential principle behind the constitutional strategy that the Muslims had been developing since 1921 to secure their position in a free India: autonomous, communal provinces within a federal structure in which the Muslims would have weighted representation”. RJ. Moore, op. cit., p. 37. For a detail analysis or Jinnah’s fourteen points also see Waheed-uz-Zaman, op. cit., especially chapter 2. “The Parting of the Ways (1928-1935)”. pp. 36-76.

66       David Page, op. cit., p. 192

67       RJ. Moore, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

68       Coupland R, The Indian Problems 1933-1935, Part 1 of the constitutional problems in India, (New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 94.

69       David Page op. cit., p. 175

70       See the following works, Mushirul Hassan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1916-1928, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1979), and Ram Gopal, op. cit., especially chapter xx ii, “The Nehru Report: What it Missed”, chapter xxii, “Muslim Reaction to the Nehru Report_I”, chapter xx iv, “Muslim Reaction to the Nehru Report-II”, pp. 198-221.

“Why do Muslim fear over centralisation? It is because in the central legislature the Hindus will always be in an overwhelming majority and if they have the power to legislate for the provinces also then the Muslims majorities in Bengal, Punjab, North-West frontiers, Sind and Baluchistan  will entirely be imaginary. “⁷¹

The other fundamental Muslim object the issue of separate electorales which were granted to the Muslims under the  Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909.⁷²

During the high days of Hindu-Muslim unity in 1916, Congress accepted the Muslim demands for separate electorates and signed the famous Lucknow Pact with Muslim League.⁷³ However, in 1929 the authors of the Nehru report regarded the separate electorates as an obstacle to  the growth of Indian nationalism.⁷⁴ The Congress accepted all the  recommendations of the report and passed a resolution declaring that if the British govemment did not accept this report in its entirety ny the end of 1929, the Congress would start a non co-operation movement.⁷⁵ From this point onward the parting of the ways between the two communities looked almost inevitable. For the Muslims the Congress became completely a “Hindu party” and assumed in the eyes of the Muslim elites the character of chief opponent to their claim and aspirations. According to Page “the role of the imperial power in the consolidation of interests around communal issues was significant.” He writes.

71       Firoz Khan Noon, “Dominion Status or Autonomous Provinces”. (pamphlet). (Lahore 1928), p. 5.

72       For a detail account of Morely-Minto Reforms of 1909 see Latif Ahmed Kahan

Sherwani, “Morely-Minto Reforms”, in Dr.L.H. Qureshi and others (edited)., op. cit., voliti, pp. 62-87. Also see Matiur Rehman, From Consultation to Confrontation, (London: Luzac and Company Ltd., 1970), especially chapter v, “The Agitation Against Minto’s Electoral Scheme”. pp. 115-155.

73       Dr. Mahmud Hussain “The Lucknow Pact”, in Dr.I. H. Qureshi and others (edited). op. pp. 118-139. For Bengali Muslims reaction to the Lucknow Pact of 1916, see J.H. Broomfield, “The Forgotten Majority:the Bengal Muslims and September 1918”, in D.A. Low edited., op. cit., pp. 196-224

74       See Nehru Report, Allahabad: 1928,on the All parties Conference held in 1928 which appointed a committee to determine the principles of the constitution of India. The drafting committee consisted of Motilal Nehru, Sayyid Ali Iman, Tej Bahadru Sapru, Manual Singh, S. C. Bose, E. R. Pradhan and Shoaib Qureshi, Motilal Nehru was man hence the report was popularly known as Nehru Report.

75       (unclear)

“That by treating the Muslims as a separate group the imperial power divided them from other Indians. By granting them separate electorates it institutionalised that division. This was one of the most critical factors in the development of communal politics. After 1920, with the introduction of Dyarchy communal antagonism became a permanent feature of provincial politics, and the formation of all India cross communal alliances became first difficult and then impossible.”⁷⁶

By the end of 1920 Muslim politics had assumed a distinct entrifugal tendency. British policy makers attempted to contain such developments by constitutional manipulation. Between 1930 to 1931 three Round Table conferences were held to resolve the communal issue facing India. The second Round Table conference was the most important of the three, partly because the Congress was represented and partly because serious though unsuccessful effort was made to reach an agreement on the communal issue.⁷⁷ According to R. J. Moore, the Muslim delegates demand in the Round Table conference was revolutionary in its implication.

“It sought Swaraj (independence through the provincialisation of the Raj. The Muslims saw therein security against the possibility of large powers falling to a Hindu centre.”⁷⁸

According to the same author,

“An Indian office departmental note of 25 September commented that the most difficult communal issue was, whether the Muslims provinces, or the provinces in which the Muslims hope to consolidate their power, should be under any degree of control from a centre, which will be predominantly Hindu. Their primary object is no doubt, to establish a “Muslim India.” ⁷⁹

76       David Page, op. cit., p. 260. Proponents of the Pakistan movement would seriously contest Page”s line of argument. See for example Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1969), Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948, op. cit., and Dr. Shafique Ali Khan, Two Nation Theory. (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1973). These writers have contended that Two Nations were innate in Indian society since the medieval era. Islam and Hinduism remained two distinct, irreconcilable ways of life. The creation of Pakistan was a logical culmination of the irreconcilable clash of values.

77       See proceeding of the first session of the Round Table conference held on November 12 1930. It was attended by representatives of all parties in India with the exception of the Congress

78       R.J. Moore,op. cit., p. 219.

79       Ibid.

On the issue of separate electorates the stand of the Muslim delegates remained the same. Gandhi was willing  to concede electorates to the Muslims on the condition that the Muslims should endorse the demand for Swaraj first and then after the introduction of the  new constitution a referendum of Muslim vote on the issue of joint electorates should be held.⁸⁰ The Muslim delegates refused to accept the terms an conditions laid down by Mr. Gandhi. They understood very well the implications of his terms and conditions. In these circumstances a deadlock was inevitable.⁸¹ At the close of the second the Prime Minister wamed the delegates of the consequences of their failure to reach an agreement in the following words,

“There stands in the way of progress, whether for the provinces or the centre, that formidable obstacle, the communal deadlock. I have never concealed from you my conviction that this is above all others a problem for you to settle by agreement amongst  yourselves… If you cannot present us with a settlement acceptable to all parties… His Majesty’s Govemment would have to settle for you not only your problems of representation but also decide as wisely and as justly as possible, what checks and balances the constitution is to contain to protect minorities from an unrestricted and tyrannical use of the democratic principle expressing itself solely through majority power.⁸²

80       Commenting on Gandhi’s fundamental condition Mr Jinnah objected and asked Mr. Gandhi was not imposing this condition on the Hindu members of the various delegations attending the Round Table Conference. Why then should he impose it on the Muslims.” Quoted in, Aga Khan, The Memoirs, (London: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 229

81       The Congress party firmly believed that the Muslim delegates present in the Round Table conference were not the real representatives of the Muslim community. They (the Muslim delegates) only represented the views of the privileged Muslim class who feared Congress domination in a free united India. See, M.A.H. Ispahani, “Factors Leading to the Partition of British India”, in C.H. Philips (edited)., Partition of India: Politics and Perspectives 1935-1947. (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970), pp. 331-359.

82       Indian Round Table conference second session) proceedings, 1931. pp. 417-18. For a detail analysis of the Round Table conference see Waheed-uz-Zaman, op. cit., and (unclear) Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940, op. cit., especially chapter V, section The Communal Impasse”. pp. 218-222.

The last session of the Round Table conference was unimportant. Both the Congress and the Labour party were absent after the earlier Round ble conferences failed to make any headway on the vital question of commmunalism.⁸³ London then had to take the initiative in its own hands and on the 16th of August 1932 came the famous communal award of Macdonald. According to Deepak Pandey, with the announcement of Macdonald’s communal award of 16th August 1932, “the history of Indian nationalism underwent a subtle change. Though not noticeable immeditely after the introduction of the act, the provincial election held under itsprovision in 1937 and the result, thereof, made this change more apparent and clear.⁸⁴ According to Ayesha Jalal, “Macdonald’s communal award of 16th August 1932 left the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal in a strong position.”⁸⁵ In these two vital Muslims majority provinces the Muslims not only retained their separate electorates but they were given more seats than any other communities in the provincial assemblies.⁸⁶ We will examine, at a later point, in some details the provincial election of 1937 and its effect on the politics of British India. At this point it is important briefly to examine the position of the Muslim elites immediately before the election of 1937.

Prior to the election of 1937. provincial autonomy, granted under the Govemment Act of 1935 was a “pleasing prospect”, ⁸⁷ for the Muslim “collaborators” of Muslim majority provinces. After the election of 1937 Muslim attitude towards provincial autonomy and Indian nationalism

83       We will, at a later point, discuss in some detail the issue of communalism in British India Communalism, according to Romila Thapar, “has a specific meaning in the Indian sense… [14]” is a consciousness which draws on a supposed relinalism see R. Thapar’s “Imagined Religious Community: Ancient History and Modern Search for a Hindu Identity”, in Modern Asian Studies, vol 23, no. 2, 1989, pp. 209-231.

84       Deepak Pandey. “Congress-Muslim League Relations 1937-39: The parting of the Ways”, in Modern Asian Studies, vol. 12. no. 4, 1978, p. 629

85       Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman:Jinnah,the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 12-13.

86       Ibid.

87       Ayesha Jalal, op. cit., p. 13.

underwent a clear cut change.”⁸⁸ Prior to the election of 1937 Muslim elites tried hard to set their divided house in order. The Nehru report made this difficult task easier to achieve and ultimately paved the way for the rise of Muslim League as its formidable opponent.

One important result of the Nehru report was that it provideda powerful impetus for unity among the hitherto divided Muslims elites. In this connection an all party Muslim conference was held in Delhi under the chairmanship of Aga Khan. The main objective of the conference was to express the Muslim disapproval of the Nehru report and to present alternative constitutional proposals which the Muslims desired to see incorporated in any future constitution of India.⁸⁹ This unity was short lived. The Muslim League was also divided house with practically no organization in the provinces and no influence with the masses. This was the conditions of the Muslim political organization with the masses. This was the condition of the Muslim political organization towards the end of 1933. It was at this critical point in Muslim history of Indian that Iqbal requested and persuaded Mr.  Jinnah, who was then leading a selfexiled life in England to lead the Muslims.⁹⁰  Iqbal in a letter to Jinnah wrote.

88       Deepak Pandey, op. cit. p. 629. This view is generally accepted by most scholars writing on British India. See, for example, P. Hardy, op. cit., especially chapter 9 pp. 22-255, Gowher Rirvi, op. cit., chapter 4. pp. 89-128, Waheed-uz-Zaman, op cit chapter 3. pp. 77-122. and Abdul Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India: A Brief Survey 1858-1947, (Lahore: oxford University press 1967).

89       For an excellent account of the rise of the Punjabi elites, in the politics of India see, David Page, op. cit, especially chapter 3. “The Emergence of Punjabi Dominance, pp. 141-194. Also see David Gilamartin, “Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab”, modern Asian Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1979, pp. 485.517 and LA. Talbot, “The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab 1937-1946”, in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Policis, vol.xx, no. 1, March 1982, pp. 5-23

90       See Iqbal Muhammad, Letters of Iqbal to Mr Jinnah, Lahore: SH. Muhmmad Ashraf 1963). (originally published in 1943). The other person who persuaded Mr Jinnah, of a more personal level, to return to India was Mr.Lingat Ali Khan, who later became his right-hand, and after the establishment of Pakistan, its first Prime Minister. He met him in London and explained to him the degraded state of Muslims. The Muslims he said heeded someone who is unpurchaseable, you must come back. He added. “the people need you.” See H. Bolitho, op. cit., p. 105.

“…After a long and careful study of Islamic law. I have come to the conclusion that if this system of law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other altemative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of a Hindu-Muslim riot. I fear that in certain parts of the country, e. g. N. W. India, Palestine may be repeated. Also the insertion of Jawaharlal’s socialism into the body-politic of Hinduism is likely to cause much bloodshed among the Hindus themselves. The issue between social democracy and Brahmanism is not dissimilar to the one between Brahmanism and Buddhism. Whether the fate of socialism will be the same as the fate of Buddhism in India, I cannot say. But it is clear to my mind that if Hinduism accepts social democracy it must necessarily cease to be Hinduism. For Islam the acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam. The modern problems, therefore, are far more easy to solve for the Muslims than the Hindus. But as I have said above, in order to make it possible for Muslims of India to solve these problems, it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities. Don’t you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived? Perhaps this is the best reply you can give to the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru.”⁹¹

Letters with a similar theme continued until Mr. Jinnah was willing and ready to accept the leadership of Muslim League. It was a time when the Muslims were not only ill-organised and divided but also plagued by uncertainity about their immediate future within the context of an independent India. The majority of the Muslim elite and masses had lost their faith in Congress. The Muslim League was a divided house with no programme at all. In such a state of despondency Iqbal repeatedly informed Mr. Jinnah that the only way open to the Muslim League which would not end in disaster was to cease to be an upper class body and to transform itself into a mass political organisation. Only such political organisation could convince the Muslim masses that the days of abject poverty were numbered and that the strict application of Islamic (social) Laws would enable them to feed their hungry children.

91       Jamilud din Ahmed, Historic Documents, (Lahore: SH. Mohammad Ashraf, 1970).pp. 207-8.

The masses of course, had to be told that the solution of the issues of  Muslim poverty was only to be possible through the means of establishing an independent Muslim state, anchored in Al-Quran, which could provide and an end to Muslim poverty and misery. Iqbal in his letters to Mr. Jinnah thus pointed out that only an independent Islamic state in the Indian subcontinent could guarantee the economic and spiritual advancement of the Muslim community. Moreover, Iqbal found a solution to the perceived antagonism between Western social democracy and Islamic law by pointing out the social dimension of the Al-Quran. In lqbal’s interpretations the Al-Quran, which embodies the original purity of Islam , had a strong  commitment to the creation and preservation of social value that in the  end would benefit the poorest of Muslim masses.

Mr.Jinnah accepted the difficult task of re-organising the Muslim League. The firts step was to bring to an end the division in the ranks of Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah himself, in 1927, had presided over the split in the League on the issue of Simmon Commission. Mr. Jinnah was in favour of total boycott of the mission, whereas Sir Mohammad Shafi, Punjabi Muslim, and his group was in favour of total co-operation.⁹² The next step was to open negotiation with the provincial leaders representing different Muslim parties in the Muslim majority provinces. Mr. Jinnah had little success in the Punjab,⁹³ despite Ahmed Yar Khan Daulatana’s (Secretary of Unionist party) best effort to bring about some kind of understanding between Mr. Jinnah and Sikander Hayat, leader of the Unionist party. Sikander was ready for some kind of settlement but wanted Mr. Jinnah to keep out of the Punjab. ⁹⁴ Mr. Jinnah had some success in Bengal, when he arrived there on August 17th, 1936 at the joint invitation

92       For a detail study of Muslim League, as a political organisation, see the following works, Lal Bahadur, The Muslim League: Its History, Activity and Achievements, (Agra: Book Stall, 1954), and Rajput A. B. Muslim League Yesterday and Today, (Lahore: SH. Mohammad Ashraf. 1948).

93       Punjab was the bastion of feudal politics and a strong hold of Unionist Party, see LA Talbot, op. cit.,

94       For details on Jinnah’s negotiating strategy with the regional leadership of Muslim majority provinces see the following works: Z.H. Zaide, “Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy 1937-47”, in C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (edited), The Partition of India Policies and Perspective 1935-47. (London: George Allen and Unwin Lid, 1970); C. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, Karachi: Longmans, 1956), and Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), especially chapter eleven. “London – Lucknow (1934-37)”. pp. 134-153. Jinnah did not get his mandate in the Punjab, He left the Punjab. He left the Punjab swearing. “I shall never come to the Punjab again, it is such a hopeless place in Azim Husain, Mian Fazl-i-Hussain: A Political Biography. (Bombay (unclear)), p. 311.

of three groups, namely the United Muslim party, krishak Praja Samity and the presidency Muslim League. The main task of Mr. Jinnah was to bring the contending parties together under the banner of Muslim League. According to Zaidi “apparently an agreement between all the parties was arrived at”, but Fazlul Haq, the leader of the Krishak Praja party pulled out of the agreement. “Personal and provincial rivalries rather than differences with the Muslim League lay behind the trouble.”⁹⁵ In Sind and North West frontier province, as in other provinces, the Muslims were divided.”

It was against this kind of background that Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League went to contest the election of 1937. In fact the Muslim League had hardly been adequately reorganised when it fought the election for the first time on an all India basis. At the time of the election the League was neither so communal nor so militant as it was to be in the later days.⁹⁷ It was at best the only party of Muslim elites with some claim to an all Indian organisation, but had little in common with the poor Muslim masses.⁹⁸ It was still a party dominated by landlords and titled gentry, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, its secretary, was a Nawabzada and a landlord from the United Provinces, while Nawab Ismail Khan, another landlord, was president of the U.P. Muslim League. The Nawab of Mamdot was President of the Punjab Muslim League. The party was also studded with Kinghts, Sir Muhammad Seadullah, Sir Khawja Nazimuddin and Sir Abdullah Haroon were the provincial Presidents of the Muslim League in Assam, Bengal and Sind.

95       See, Z.H. Zaidi, op. cit., p. 248. Also see Momen Humaira, Muslim Politics in Bengal: A Study of Krishak Praja Praty and the Election of 1937. Dacca: Sunny House, 1972).

96       According to Ayesha Jalal factional politics were the order of the day in the Muslim majority provinces prior to the election of 1937. A Jalal’s work provides the most detail account of factional politics in the Muslim majority provinces. See her work, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, op cit, especially chapter 3″ Jinnah and the Muslim Majority Provinces”. pp. 82-125.

97       “From the time of the Congress election Triumph and the formation of the provincial ministries, The Ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity and the Muslim League became steadily more separatist in outlook”, RJ. Moore, op. cit., p. 311.

98       For a powerful description on the exclusiveness of the Muslim elites in the United Provinces see Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal, “Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between Wars”, op. cit., p. 419. Also see Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslim: The Politics of the United Provinces 1869-1923, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), especially chapter 8 and 9. Leonard A. Gordon is equally lucid in his description of the Muslim elites in Bengal, see Gordon’s, “Davided Bengal: Problem of Nationalism and Identity in the 1947 Partition”, in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 15-16, 1977-78, pp. 138-139. Hafeez Malik provides a good description of Punjabi Muslim elites in his work, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Muslim Modernisation in India and Pakistan, op. cit., especially chapter 4″Muslim Reaction to Modern Education”.

According to one account, landlords represented the largest single group in the Muslim

League council. Out of a total membership of 503, there were as many as 163 big landlords. The Punjab  contributed the largest share of  51 , followed by the United Provinces and Bengal. Proportionately Sind’s share was the highest . Out of its 25 members in the council, 15 were landlords.⁹⁹

According to Zaidi “Mr. Jinnah was conscious of the charges often leveled against the League that it had been aparty of toadies and rich landlords.”¹⁰⁰ 

The result of the election of 1937 brought the Muslim League leadership to its sense. The were exposed to the harsh fact of how ill organized they were as a political party. They were out of touch with organized the masses of their own community . The 1937 election for provincial assemblies gave no overwhelming victory to Congress.

Table-1

Provinces	Total no of seats	Seats won by Congress	Percentage of total
Madras	215	159	74
Bihar	152	95	65
Centreal Provinces
And Berar	112	70	62.5
UP	228	133	59
Orissa	60	36	60
Bombay	175	86	49
NWFP	50	19	38
Assam	108	33	30.5
Bengal	250	60	22
Punjab	175	18	10.5
Sind	60	7	11.5

Source: Gowher Rizvi,  op. cit., p. 26-27

99. Gowher Rirvi, op. cit. p. 21.
100. Zaidi, op. cit., p. 215. Also see, Jamilud din Ahmed (edited)., Speeches and Writings of Mr.Jinnah, (Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), vol. I, p. 39. Mr Jinnah was hardly a revolutionary or a socialist, he had therefore little difficulty in forming an alliance with the feudal class in the Punjab and other Muslim majority provinces According to Stanley Wolpert, “The one clear divergence between the League’s socio economic position and that of Congress, however, which reflected a basic difference in philosophy dividing Jinnah from Nehru and Subahas Chandre Bose was that the League’s firm opposition to any movement that aims at expropriation of private property. Even as Jawaharlal placed increasing faith in socialist solutions for India problem of poverty, Jinnah retreated more than ever behind the bastions of private property”. See, Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

Table-2

Provinces	Total Muslim seats	Seats won by League	Percentage Muslim seats
Madras	28	11	39
Bombay	39	20	51
Bengal	119	37	31
UP	64	27	42
Punjab	86	1	1.1
Assam	34	9	26.4
NWFP	36	–	–
Orissa	4	–	–
Sind	36	–	–
Bihar	39	–	–
CP	14	–	–

Source: Gowher Rizvi,  op. cit., p. 26-27

Commenting on Congress’ victory in the 1937 election S. R. Mehrotra writes, “with able leaders, an effective organisation and a simple yet attractive programme, the Congress won a notable victory at the polls early in 1937.¹⁰¹

Of the 1,585 seats in the provincial legislature the Congress contested 1.161 and won 716. The Congress victory was all the more impressive when it is taken into account that of the 1, 585 seats, less than half, 657 were general or open, not allocated to a separate, closed electoral group such as Muslims, Sikhs, Christian, European, Anglo Indian and landlords. Out of the eleven provinces in British India, the Congress achieved an absolute majority in six and was the largest single party in three others. The League’s performance in the election was disappointing. The Muslim League won only 109 of the 482 seats allocated to the Muslims, securing only 4.8 per cent of the total Muslim votes. The League fared particularly poorly in the Punjab, Sind and the North West frontier province (all Muslim majority Provinces). In these provinces the Muslim League was almost completely routed.¹⁰²

101     S.R. Mehrotra, “The Congress and the Partition of India”, in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright ed., op. cit., p. 189.

102     In these provinces Muslim led regional parties won the election. In the Punjab, for

example, the Nationalist Unionist party which had come into existence in the early twenties, swept the Muslim seats in the 1937 election. Although the Unionist party was an inter-communal body. Muslim feudal influence was predominant. Main Fazla i-Hussain, a big landlord was the king pin of the party from its inception until his death in 1936. He was succeeded by another big landlord, Sikander Hayat Khan, who became the first Chief Minister of the Punjab under the constitution of 1935. For a detailed analysis of Fazl-i-Hussain’s vital role in the feudal politics of the Punjab see Azim Hussain, op. cit., also see David Page, op. cit., especially chapter 43, “The Emergence of Punjab Dominance”.

In Bengal another Muslim majority province, the League fared somewhat better but it won only 37 out of 119 seats reserved for Muslims.¹⁰³ It is important to point out that the Muslim League had secured 27 out of 64 Muslim seats and in Bombay 20 out of 39. It is also important to point out that the Congress showing in the Muslim constituencies was not at all impressive. According to Mehrota.

“Its [Congress] performance in Bengal and North-West frontier province was not bad, but it cut a rather sorry figure in Sind and The Punjab. Its greatest failure, however, lay with the electorate. The Congress in 1937 had probably many more Muslims on its roll than did the Muslim League. And some of them were  individually quite distinguished, but except in the North-West frontier province, they were not very popular with the Muslim masses in general.¹⁰⁴ The Congress fan only 58 candidates for the 482 separate Muslim seats, and won 26.”¹⁰⁵

According to R.J. Moore,

“Nehru dismissed the phenomenon as due partly to Congress timidity in running so few Muslim candidates and partly to the doping of the apathetic Muslim masses with communal issues He dismissed the Muslim leaders as job seekers without answers to the problems of poverty, hunger, unemployment, and independence.” ¹⁰⁶

103     A majority of the remaining Muslim seats were won by Fazlul Haq’s Praja party. Fazlul Haq later formed a coalition govemment with the Muslim League.

104     Even in the North West Frontier province the Congress owed its success to Khudai

Khedmat Gar, a regional party, led by the famous Redshirt leader, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, who was also popularly known as the Frontier Gandhi

105     See S. R. Mehrotra, op. cit. p. 190. For a detail analysis of the election result of 1937 election see Gowher Rizvi, op. cit., especially, chapter two. “Election and Provincial Autonomy: Dominance of the Congress”.

106     R.J. Moore, Escape from empire, the Attlee government and the Indian Problem.

(Oxford Clarendon Press, 1983). p. 47

The overall performance of the Congress in the election, especially when contrasted with the meagre election results of the Muslim League infused into the Congress an air of arrogance when dealing with he Muslim League, particularly in the United Province, where as we have pointed out earlier, the League has emerged as an important factor in The provincial assembly. Moreover, due to Mr. Jinnah’selection campaign policy,¹⁰⁷  relation between the Congress and the Muslim League in the United Province were generally cordial during the election period. This gave Mr. Jinnah and his League the opportunity to open negotiation with the Congress to form a coalition govemment in that important province.¹⁰⁸ Negotiation took place, but no agreement was arrived at due to the tough condition laid down by the Congress for the formation of a coalition govemment. The terms offered by the Congress involved a merger and not a coalition. The Muslim League was to cease to function as a political party and to share fully its privileges and obligations. The Muslim League parliamentary board was to be dissolved in the United Province and no candidates were to be put up by it in any by election.¹⁰⁹ Chaudri Khaliquzzaman, the League leader in the United Province, and participant in the negotiation for the formation of a coalition govemment in U.P. characterised these terms as the death of his organisation and refused to accept them.

Commenting on the refusal of the Congress to form an alliance with the Muslim League in United Province Sir Penderal Moon is of the view that had the Congress not refused to form a coalition with the Muslim League, the course of Indian history might have been different. He further argues that the Congress leaders were “responsible”, though quite unwittingly, for the critical change in the Muslim sentiments from readiness to contemplate co-operation in an all Indian federation to insistence upon separation. “The Congress passionately desired to pre

107     In 1937 Mr Jinnah was still considered by many as moderate in his approach to Indian political problems. See for example, ZH. Zaidi, op. cit., and Ayesha Jalal, op. cit.. particularly chapter 2- “Jinnah and the League’s Search for Survival”.

108     Much has been written on the importance of United Province in the creation of Pakistan, see the following works, Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal, op. cit., Francis Robinson, op. cit., and F.C.R. Robinson, “Municipal Govemment and Muslim Separatism in the United province 1883 to 1916” in John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal (edited)., Locality, Province and Nation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 69-121

109     For details on this point see C. Khliquzzaman, op. cit. Also see Anita Inder Singh,”Prospects of Agreement and the Partition of India 1937-1947″, in NJ. Allen and other (edited).. Oxford University Papers on India, vol. 1. part 2, 1978, pp. 43.72. Deepak Pandey, Congress – Muslim League Relations 1937-39: The Parting of the

serve the unity of India. They consistently acted so as to make its partition certain.”¹¹⁰ Professor Mujeeb, is however of the view that, “the one all important reason for the upsurge of sentiment – which ultimately led to the partition was the reaction of the privileged and laded Muslim grandiose of the United Province to the realities of democracy in 1937.¹¹¹ Ian Stephens, however, disagrees with such a point of view and writes. “The effect of this, simultaneously on many Muslim minds throughout India, was of a lightning-flash. What had before been but guessed at, not leapt forth in horridly clear outline. The Congress, a Hindu dominated body was bent on the Muslims eventual absorption.”¹¹² Thus writes Brass, “Muslim separatism in United Province was in origin the ideology of an upper class and upper middle class elite attempting to preserve its  privileged position in society through political means.”¹¹³

One of the Congress leaders, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, while defending the Congress decision not to accept any form of coalition in the United Province placed the emphasis on the reasonability of the Congress to its electorate. He said, “The Congress had gone to the assemblies with a definite programme and in furtherance of a definite policy, and it could not, without being false to the electorate, admit into Ministry who did not accept that policy and that programme. The Congress decided to stick to the well known and well understood constitutional principle of having homogeneous ministries composed of its own members among whom Mussalmans were, of course included.”¹¹⁴ Nehru was even more empathic in denouncing the politics of pact and compromise. He announced “that the policy of pacts and compromise with commuanl leaders should

Ways, op. cit. pp. 619-654. Sunil Chander, “Congress, the Raj and Conflict in Provincial Autonomy 1937-39” in NJ. Allen and others, (edited)., op.cit., vol iv. parti and ii, pp. 51-72

110     E. Penderal Moon, Divide and quit, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961).p. 14.

111     M. Mujeeb, “The Partition of India in Retrospect”, in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wain

wright (edited)., op. cit., pp. 410.

112     Ian Stephens, Pakistan, (London: Emest Benn Ltd., 1967), p. 76.

113     P.R. Brass, “Muslim Politics in United Provinces: Social Contest and Political Strategy Before Partition”. Economic and Political weekly, vol. v, nos 3-5, 1970, p. 183. For a similar line of argument also see Imtiaz Ahmed, “Secularism and Communalism”. Economic and Political Weekly, vol. iv, nos 28-30, July 1969. pp. 1137-58 and R. Russel, “Strands of Muslim Identity in South Asia”, South Asian Review, October 1967, pp. 21-32

114     Prasad, India Divided. (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1947). pp. 145.46.

be abandoned the poor masses behind them should be approached directly.”¹¹⁵ He saw the Muslim League leaders, as a group of privileged individuals unable to provide any answer to the poverty of the Indian masses.¹¹⁶

Nehru strongly believed that only radical economic measures would help to obscure the issue of communalism in India. He was, therefore, strongly committed to a socialistic programme and thought that socialism was the answer to all the problems which afflicted the body politic of India.¹¹⁷ Dr. Rizvi has also recently argued in his work that

effect of the failure to form a coalition ministry in the United Province has been exaggerated by Indian historians. He is of that view that there

were other, more deep rooted causes for the League’s hostility to the Congress. Foremost among them was the economic issue.¹¹⁸

It is true that in the United Province most of the big landowners were Muslims. It is also true that the constitutional changes of 1909, 1919 and 1935 helped the Muslims elites of North Western India to retain their separate political identity bydint of separate electorates in the United Province and Punjab and in the new province of Sind and North West Frontier Province by their overwhelming populations majorities.¹¹⁹ R.J. Moore also makes a similar kind of argument and asserts that” until the Congress electoral triumph in 1937 the Muslim elite of North Western India had every reason to be satisfied with their policy of co-operation

115     For an interesting account of Congress Muslim mass contact movement, conceived soon after the election of 1936-37 see Mushirul Hasan, “The Muslim Mass Contact Campaign: An Attempt at Political Mobilisation”, South Asia. Journal of South Asian Studies, new series, vol. vii, no. 1, June 1984, pp. 58-76.

116     See Pattabhi Sitarammayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, (Bombay:Oxford University Press, 1947), vol.ii, p. 11, and Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political biography. (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 231.

117     For an excellent critique on Nehru’s commitment to socialism see Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. (London: Zed Books Ltd., for the United Nations University.) especially chapter v, “The Movement of Arrival: Nehru and the Passive Revolution”. pp. 131-166.

118     For detail sec Gowher Rizvi, op. cit., chapter 4, “The Growth of Communalism and

the Rise of the Muslim League 1936-43″, pp. 89-128.

119     For this line of argument the following works are pertinent, David Page, op. cit., and Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal. “Alternative to Partition”, op. cit.,

with the imperial power.¹²⁰ The Raj’s social conservatism underwriters in its constitutional arrangements had seemed to secure them against the dangers of Hindu dominance… This strategy was under threat, when, after its electoral success, the Congress threatened the social and constitutional  basis of Muslim security, especially in the North Western India.”¹²¹

How serious was this threat that the Muslim landlord of the United Province had to turn to the League for protection? After the election of 1937 when the Congress formed its ministry in the one of its first acts was the enactment of the United Province Tenancy Act which provided for greater security of tenure. Land reform was one of the important parts of the Congress economic programme during the election of 1937.¹²³

The landlords of United Province, were, however, confident that the Congress party would not take so drastic a step as to abolish zamindari, and even if the party went ahead with its programme the Governor would intervene. The Governor did not intervene. The Hindu landlords, thereafter turned to the Mahasabha.¹²³  and the Muslim landlords, to Congress’ chief

120     Anil Seal and David Page are the most passionate advocates of this line of

See Anil Seal, op. cit., and David Page, op. cit.

121     R. Moore, Escape from Empire, op. cit, p. 46.

122     During this period the writings of Jawaharlal Nehru not only showed a strong socialistic bias, but they also held out strong promises of a full scale war against the landlord exploitation of the people. See Nehru, Toward Freedom, (Boston: Beacon Press 1967). pp. 2034. See also Bipin Chandra, “Jawaharlal Nehru and the Capitalist C 1938”, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. x, no. 33-5, 1975.pp. 1307-25 and KN Chaudhari, “Economie Problems and Indian Independence”, in C.H. Philips and MD. Wainwright eds, op. cit., p. 298-300. Here it is important to point out that there was always a deep division within the Congress party on the vital economic issues. Land reform was one. According to KN Chaudhari there were three diviscemible division in the party, Gandhi and his followers came first, followed by Nehru and the idealists, and in the background were the most powerful conservatives. It is interesting to point out that in 1934 when a section of the Congress party under the leadership of Nehru was drifting towards a radical position on social and economic issues, Gandhi, in an interview to the Madras Mail, “not only supposed to have apologised for Nehru’s conduct but also defended the big Zamindari system”. K.N. Chaudhari, op. cit., p. 299.

123     Mahasabha was a Hindu communal party. It had close links with the all India Congress party until 1938. Only in 1938 did the Congress party defined both Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League as communal organisations and forbade any Congress members(unclear) to either of them and the Congress simultaneously. See Anita Inder (unclear) cit. p. 63

opponent, the Muslim League.¹²⁴ This was the situation in the United Province in 1937, where although the Muslims were in the minority, but majority of the landlords were Muslims. At this point let us find out how consistent was Congress policy on the issue of land reform in the text of the Indian subcontinent as a whole. After all, United Province was not the only area in British India where land reform was needed. This we must examine. Let us take Bengal as an example where after the election of 1937. Fazlul Haq and his Praja party formed a coalition government with Muslim League. Soon after forming the govemment, Haq introduced the Tenancy Amendment Bill which directly went against the interests of the Zamindars (landlords) of Bengal Congress remained neutral about the Tenancy Amendment Bill Again according to A.L. Singh, the Punjab Congress was neutral in the voting on the Alienation of Land (third amendment) Bill in June 1938, which went directly against the interest of urban money lenders. In the Punjab Congress was dominated by urban middle class Hindus.¹²⁶ Congress leadership, therefore had no answer to the League’s allegation that the Congress was radical on economic issues only in areas like United Province Bihar where Muslims land holders had considerable social and political influence, but not in the Muslim majority provinces, where Muslims comprised the majority of the peasantry.¹²⁷

Another burning issue in the British India politics was communalism. Congress was very strong in its condemnation of communalism in all its forms, but the Congress itself used religious leaders and symbols during the election of 1936-37 and 1945-46, while condemning the Muslim

124     For detail see Gowher, Rizvi, op. cit., especially chapter 4, pp. 92-95.

125     See Anita Inder Sigh, op. cit., pp. 62-63. In Bengal (a Muslim majority province)

most of the big land owners were Hindus, and majority of the cultivators were Muslims See also John Gallagher. “Congress in decline: Bengal 1930 to 1937”, in Modern Asian Studies, vol, 7, no. 3. 1973. pp. 589-645.

126     Anita Inder Singh, op. cit., p. 63. Also see Indian Annual Register, 1937, vol.2, p. 142

127     See M. Harcourt, “Kisan Populism and Revolution in Rural India: the 1942 Distur

bances in Bihar and East United Provinces”, in DA Low (ed).. Congress and the Raj. (London: Hinemann, 1977), pp.304.

league for using the same.¹²⁸ The Muslim League leadership on the other hand used the communal card to its maximum in order to establish itself as the sole representative of Indian Muslims. As we pointed after the election of 1937 Jinnah and his League was faced with an awkward situation. The election result clearly showed majority of the Hindus, especially those in the Hindu majority were behind the Congress, only a very small number supported the Muslim League.

The Hindus despite their numerous divisions,¹²⁹ under their leaders and effective organisation, demonstrated greater unity in political action that the Muslims. The election result also disturbed many of the

128     Anita Inder Singh, op. cit. p. 63. It will not be unrealistic to suggest the communialism is one issue which has figured prominently in Indian story. Consequently it is difficult to point out any single work or a number of works as the most authentic on the issue. Some good works on the issue are, Randhir Singh, “Theorising Communalism: A Fragmentary Note in the Marxist-Mode, Economic and Political Weekly. July 23 1988m,pp.154-1548. Dilip Simcon “Communalism in Modern India AT Examination”. Social Science Probing, vol. 4, no. 1, March 1987, pp. 47.71 Damhert. Richard D. Lambert, “Hindu Muslim Riots” unpublished PhD thesis, (University of Pennsylavania 1951) Dr. Lambert, points to the riots in the mid 1930s and says that from that point communal relations were irreparable John R. McLane, “The 1905 Partition of Bengal  and the New Communalism”. in Alexander Lipski (edited).. Bengal East and West (Michigan Michigan University Press, 1969), Dr. McLane points to the 1907 riots as crocial for the development of communal relations in Bengal. B.R. Nanda in “Nehru: The Indian National Congress and the Partiton of India”, in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (edited). The Partition of India, op. cit.pp. 148-147, puts the major emphasis in this article on Jawaharlal Nehru’s view on communal issue. He write “He [Nehru] himself was remarkably free from religious passion and prejudice”.p. 150.

129     See for example Broomfield, who gives an exhaustive account of the conflict between Gandhi and the Bengali leaders of Congress over various issue. The most important one was over The issue of combining non co-operation movement of 1919-20 with Khilafat movement, launched separately by the Muslims of India. The Bengal Congress men found it objectionable that Gandhi should insist upon coupling a communal issue, like the Khilafat movement with non co-operation movement, Bengali Bhadralok were especially concern about Gandhis mass contact programme and its likely effect in the politics of Bengal where the majority of the peasants were Muslims. They were apprehensive that Gandhi’s non violent mass agitation programme would lead to violence and that violence though directed towards the foreign rulers, might quickly change to violence against the socially privileged Bhadralok. They held much of Bengal’s land and a significant share of its wealth. But the Bengal leadership had to bow to the majority decision which was in favour of combining the two movements together, J.H. op. cit., pp. 165-168, also see John Gallagher, “Congress in Decline: Bengal 1930 to 1939”, in Modern Asian Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, 1973, pp. 589-645.(unclear) article provides an interesting account of the conflict between Gandhi and C.R.

comfortable assumptions of the Muslim regional leadership, especially in the Punjab, Bengal and Sind. The Muslim leadership of these regions had agreed to work the 1935 Act,¹³⁰ under the assumption that they would not only be able to dominate the Muslim majority provinces, but the division among the Hindus would enable the solid Muslim Bloc, elected the basis of separate electorates and communal award, to play an effective and even balancing role in legislatures of the Hindu majority provinces. The election result of 1937 destroyed this calculation. Muslim regional leaders of the Punjab, Bengal and Sind (all Muslim majority provinces) had to form coalition govemments in their respective provinces, they were constantly under pressure from the Congress and in the words of R.J. Moore, “A close-knit Congress party acted less as an opposition to the Muslim coalition than as a ministry manque, seeking as it did in Bengal and the Punjab, in Rajendra Prasad”s words, constantly to win over members of the govemment party and thus secure a majority for itself.”¹³¹

Before forming the provincial govemment the Congress also wanted a clear cut commitment from the viceroy that there will be no unnecessary interference from the Governor of the province in the day to day running of the govemment and that the Governor would not use his special ^powe132 of interference or set a side the advise of ministers in regard to constitutional activities.¹³³ After its electoral victory in the 1937 election the Congress party was therefore, for a short period, divided on the issue of whether or not to assume office in the provinces where they had won or to undermine the constitutional reform by refusing to

130     In the words of RJ. Moore, “Congress rejected the 1935 act root and branch and Nehru declared in 1936 that the Congressmen should enter the legislatures, not to co-operate in any way with the act, but to combat it and seek the end of the act “fundamentally bad, but argued that given the conditions prevailing at the present in this country the provincial scheme of the constitution be utilised for what it was worth.” Muslim opinion was in the main ready to try the act in the provincial sphere, see Wheed-uz-Zaman.. op.cit., p. 79.

131     RJ. Moore, escape from Empire, op. cit., p. 50

132     For the powers of the Governors, which were wide ranging, under the Government of India Act 1935, see Abdul Hamid, The Goverment of India Act 1935″, in Dr. L.H. Qureshi and others (edited)., op. cit., vol. ii, part ii, pp. 317-349

133 See M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitutions 1921-1947. vol. i. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 392-93.

form govemments.¹³⁴ Nehru urged that the Congress should refuse to accept  office.¹³⁵ The stalemate was broken by the Victory when he declared that under the new constitution, power and responsibility has been transfered to the elected ministries and expressed the wish that this transfer might be accepted without distrust.¹³⁶ The Congress acccepted office with mixed feelings, Congress’ main main fear was that the members or the Indian civil service might try  to obstruct the reform programme. But once the Congress was in power in seven provinces, it went ahead, without any bureaucratic obstruction, to implement its programme.

Muslim leadership in the Muslim majority provinces, was now on the defensive. They slowly began to realise that the safeguards provided by the act of 1935 were no longer adequate to protect their interests.¹³⁷ They began to see Congress rule as a real threat to their interests, to provincial autonomy. They soon turned their attention towards Mr. Jinnah . As we have pointed out earlier, after the election of 1937 Mr. Jinnah was faced with the hard reality that his party scarcely figured on the political map of British India, “But Mr.Jinnah was not the man to accept defeat,”¹³⁸ or in the words of B.R. Nanda, “to let history pass him over his head.”¹³⁹

 

For Mr. Jinnah the lesson of 1937 election was the necessity of building up the Muslim League as a powerful organisation. After the election Mr. Jinnah redoubled his efforts to make his Muslim the sole representative organisation of the Muslims of India. The first step

134     See, Sir Francis Wylie,”Federal Negotiations in India, 1935-39 and After”, in CH Philips and M.D. Wainwright (edited)., op. cit., pp. 517-526

135     Gandhi and the moderates, who were in effective control of the party, were keen to take office, “The Lure of Power is always sweet”, R. Rizvi, op. cit., p.31. Also see H.V. Hudson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 63-64

136     G. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 48.

137     See Ayesha Jalal, op. cit., especially 3- “Jinnah and Muslim Majority Provinces 82-125.

138     G. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 96.

139     B.R. Nanda, in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (edited)., op. cit., 158

in this direction was to reduce the membership fee to two annas.¹⁴⁰ Jinnah’s campaign to popularise the Muslim League among the Muslims met with a response which surprised both the British and Congress. It is said that one hundred thousand new members were recruited in the months immediately after the Lucknow session of 1937.¹⁴¹ Towards the end of 1937 Madras Muslim League claimed a membership of 43,290, while in 1940 it rose to 88,833.¹⁴² Between 1937 and 1940 the Muslim League attracted a large number of Muslims into its fold. Its organisation had started penetrating the countryside and numerous branches had been opened all over the country.¹⁴³ From 1937 onwards it grew from strength to strength.In the Central Province, which provided the core of Muslim League Leadership, the membership increased from 23,000 in 1938 to 56,541 in 1943. ¹⁴⁴ In Bengal the growth of Muslim League was noteworthy: in 1944 she League was claiming 550,000 members.¹⁴⁵ In Sind the membership rose to over 30,000 in 1944.¹⁴⁶

During the period 1937-43 sixty one(61) by elections were held for Muslim seats in the legislatures, and of those 47 were won by the Muslim League, 10 by independent Muslims, and only 4 by the Conress.¹⁴⁷ In a nutshell there was a phenomenal upsurge in the League’s

140     It is interesting to note that only in April 1936, prior to the election, the Muslim League had rejected a proposal to reduce its membership fee from one rupee to four annas. See, Indian Annual Register 1936, vol. I, p. 295.

141     Peter Hardy, op. cit., p. 227.

142     Dawn, 9th November, 1941. p. 4.

143     R. Coupland, Indian politics 1936-42, (London: Oxfords University Press, 1943), p.183. A. Aziz, Discovery of Pakistan, (Lahore: SH. Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1965), pp. 297-8.

144     Dawn, 24th October, 1943.

145     Ibid., 18th January 1944. In Bengal after 1943 Muslim League organisation was built up for the first time into something approaching a mass movement under its astute General Secretary, Abul Hashim. Hashim toured the province tirelessly finding men to organise the League in every district. In the few years before partition Bengali Muslims flocked to the League as never before and never again after 1947. For details see the following works, L.A. Gordon, op. cit., pp. 137-168 and Dr. M. Hussain, “Dacca University and Pakistan Movement”, in Philips and Wainwright, M.D. (edited)., op. cit., pp. 369-73.

146     Dawn, 14th May, 1944.

147      See G. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 124.

strength all over India. Here it is important for us to pause and ask as to how was Mr. Jinnah able to achieve to much in so short a period? According to many historians Jinnah and his Leasgue was helped in this task not by the course of events and the policies of both the Congress and the British govemment, but also by his skillful strategy.¹⁴⁸ Let us therefore examine Jinnah strategy. According to the biography of Nehru, Jinnah’s was to pounce upon and capitalise on every mistake of Congress and in this period the Congress made several mistakes.”¹⁴⁹ The first one according to many historians, was the tough conditions laid down by the Congress during its negotiation with the United Province Muslim League on the issue of formation of a coalition Govemment in the the United Province. The failure of the talks, we pointed out earlier, gave Mr. Jinnah the astute leader from Sind the opening for which he was looking. During the election campaign of 1937 he realised the hidden potential of the Muslim League. He then exploited to the maximum the hidden Muslim fear of Hindu Raj during the Congress rule. He felt that in utilising the Hinduisation campaign of Congress as a recurrent theme in his speeches, the Muslim League could only gain an identity and obtain status among the Muslim population of India. Therefore the Muslim League, in order to succeed, had to emphasise the Hindu element in Congress, Mr. Jinnah declared,:

As I have said before, there are four forces at play in this country. Firstly there is the British Government. Secondly there are the rulers and people of the Indian States. Thirdly there are the Hindus; and fourthly there are Muslims. The Congress Press may clamour as much as it likes; they may bring out their morning, afternoon, evening and night edition; the Congress leaders may shout as much as they like that Congress is a national body. But I say it is not true. The Congress is nothing but a Hindu body. That is the truth and the Congress leaders know it. The presence of the few Muslims, the few misled and misguided ones, and the few who are there with ulterior motives, does not, cannot, make it a national body. I challenge anybody to deny that the Congress is not mainly a Hindu body. I ask, does the Congress represent the Muslim? (shouts of “No, no” which were repeated as indicated below).

148     See Waheed-Uz-Zaman, op. cit., especially chapter three, “The Fateful Years (1936-39). pp. 77-122. Gowher Rizvi, op. cit., chapter four, “The Growth of Communalism and the Rise of the Muslim League 1936-43″, pp. 89.129. RJ. Moore, Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand”, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 17, 4, 1983, p. 529-561, and K.B. Sayeed, “The Personality of Jinnah and his Political Strategy” in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (edited)., op. cit., pp. 276-69.

149     Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. (New York: The Macmillan Company,1956), pp. 268-69.

I ask does the Congress represent th represent the Christians? (“NO”) I ask does the Congress represent the Scheduled Castes? (“No”) I ask does the Congress represent the non-Brahmans? (“No”) I say the Congress does not even all the Hindus. What about the Hindu Mahasabha? What about the Liberal Federation The Congress, no doubt, is the largest single party in the country. But it is nothing more than that. It may arrogate to itself whatever titles it like: the Congress High Command, in the intoxications of power, like persons who are drunk, may make any claim it pleases them to make. But such claims cannot alter the character of the Congress. It remains what it is-mainly a Hindu body,”¹⁵⁰ In another session of the League held at Lucknow in October 1937, he wamed the Muslim regional leaders, who had assembled there to express their solidarity with the Muslim League, in the following words, “offers of peace by the weaker party always means confession of weakness and an invitation to aggression. Appeals to patriotism, justice and fair play and for goodwill fall flat. It does not require political wisdom to realise that all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed by power. Politics means power and not relying on cries of justice or fair play or goodwill.”¹⁵¹ Jinnah was obviously referring to the Congress rule, and appealing to the Muslim regional leaders to bury their differences, close ranks and join the Muslim League to counter effectively Congress rule in India. He declared, “No settlement with the majority community is possible, as no Hindu leader speaking with authority shows any concern or genuine desire for it. Honourable settlements can only be achieved between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement.”¹⁵²

Mr. Jinnah’s audience were the Muslims, his message very clear, and that was, in order to match the might of the Congress, Muslims would have to unite. Regional leaders, in order to survive, have to come under the banner of Muslim League, and at least earn respect and recognition as equals, from the Congress. It was not an easy task. Mr. Jinnah needed the support of the regional leaders from the Punjab and Bengal, especially because they were the two largest Muslim majority provinces. In 1937 election provincial leaders of these two provinces had fought the election on the tickets of their own organisations and had previously refused to

150     B.N. Pandey, op. cit., p. 62.

151     Waheed-uz-Zaman, op. cit., p. 93.

152     Jamilud-din Ahmed, op. cit., p. 32.

come to terms with Mr. Jinnah. Congress rule made them nervoue.¹⁵³ Now they were willing to join him, because according to Ayesha Jala,”Congress triumph in the 1937 election, orchestrated by by its high command, heralded the coming victory of centre over province. It also signalled the collapse of many of the old provincial structure upon which the British strategy of retreat to the centre depended. This meant the the way was clear for the Congress just as much as the League had reason to want to break the residues of provincial autonomy, especially in the Muslim provinces, in pursuit of this aim.”¹⁵⁴

The leadership of the Muslim majority province were, therefore, quick to recognise their need to have spokesman at the own embattled provincialism had left Jinnah and his League as the only  plausible candidate for this role.¹⁵⁵” This role, Jinnah was most willing to play, but on his own terms. In the Punjab, the most important Muslim majority province, it was difficult for Mr. Jinnah to dictatate terms immediately after the election of 1937. But this was one province whose support Mr. Jinnah needed the most to be the sole spokesman of the Muslim at the centre.¹⁵⁶ Therefore soon after the election, Jinnah entered into a pact with Sir Sikander Hayat, under which the Muslim members of the Unionist party in the Punjab joined the Muslim League and agreed to accept its policy in all India matters. In return Mr. Jinnah consented to refrain (which did not last long) from interfering in the affairs of the

153     On 14th February 1939, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan wrote to Nehru, expressing the fear of the Muslims of the Punjab about the high handedness of the majority community in some Congress provinces”. Later, speaking at the Bombay Muslim League Conference held on May 6th 1939, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan used strong language against Congress rule. He said that the “Congress wanted to establish a Hindu raj and to undermine the position of Mussalmans and other minorities.’ See, Deepak Pandey. op. cit., pp. 648-649.

154     Ayesha Jalal, op. cit. p. 33

155     Ibid.

156     Commenting on the importance of the Punjab, especially after the introduction of the Govement of India Act 1935, Page writes, “Fazli Hussain’s Unionist Party (in the Punjab) was the most substantial provincial party in India and no other party was better placed to benefit from provincial autonomy, Provincial ambitions were thus strongest in the Punjab, Muslims during the crucial years of constitutional revision, owing to their superior political leverage, it was the Punjabi Muslims who playco the leading role in Muslim politics. Even the U.P. Muslims who habitually prided themselves on their sophistication and despised the Punjabi for his lack of it were obliged to recognise the facts of the situation.” David page, op. cit., p.144.

Punjab.¹⁵⁷ Jinnal had to stoop to conquer the Punjab. According to A. Jalal “Mr. Jinnah was a fighter and he was the master of a long slow game, an expert at seeing chances in the worst reverses.”¹⁵⁸ In Bengal,  his Muslim League entered into a coalition with Fazlul Haq Praja party. But Jinnah did not confine his party<s political activities to alliance formation with big landlords and piers (religious leaders). Jinnah wanted  a foothold in  the Punjab and the pact with Sir Sikander Hayat gave him the  room he needed in the Punjab in order to conquer it. Once Jinnah was accepted by Sir Sikander Hayat and his colleagues as their spokesman at the centre, he had little difficulties in making a headway in the Punjab.  He encourage young men like Mr. Daulatana in the Punjab, Abdul Hashim in Bengal and G.M. Sayed in Sind to use their crusading spriit for organizing the Muslim masses under the League flag. The Muslim students federation also played a crucial role to popularize the Leagues’s demand for Pakistan amongst the rural voters.¹⁵⁹

Mr. Jinnah then systematically began to attack the Congress policy in a communal language. A language with which, the “ambassador of Hindu Muslims Unity’ was not very well conversant, but had to learn fast to become the sole spokesman of the Muslim community.¹⁶⁰ He also

157     For details see, LA Talbot, op.cit, and Ali Imran, “Relations between the Muslim League and the Pujab national Unionist Party 1935-47”, South Asia, vol 6, 1976, pp. 51-65.

158     See A Jalal, op. cit., p. 33

159     See the following works, Dr. M. Hussain, “Dacca University and Pakistan movement, (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1978).

160     The by election to the Jhansi-Jalaun-Hamirpur Muslim seat in the united Province serves as a good example to explain our point about Mr. Jinnah’s newly acquired language. In this by-election Muslim League leaders led by Mr.Jinnah raised the cry of Islam in danger. The appeal issued by Mr.Jinnah in support of the League candidate did not contain a single reference to political and economic issues confronting the people of India. Nehru was appalled by the statement and made an amest request to Mr. Jinnah not to exploit religious emotion in politics. He said “… to exploit the name of God and religion in an election contest is an extraordinary thing…even for a humble canvasser… for Mr.Jinnah to do so is inexplicable.” See B.R. Nanda, Nehru, “The Indian National Congress and the Partition of India 1935-47, in C.H. Philips and wainwright (edited), op. cit., p. 158. Also see Gandhi’s Letter to Jinnah. In one of his letters to Jinnah written in 1938 Gandhi wrote, “In your speeches I miss the old nationalist. When in 1915 I returned from the self-imposed exile in South Africa, everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest of nationalists and the hope of both Hindus and Muslims. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah?…the proposals, to form a basis of unity between the two communities, has surely got to come from you”, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (edited). Quind-e-Azam Jinnah’s Correspondence (Karachi: Guild Publishing House, 1966). p. 37.

encouraged his provincial colleagues to do the same.¹⁶¹ In 1938 when the Congress had been in office for hardly eight months, the Muslim League appointed a committee to investigate the complaints of ill  treatment being meted out to the Muslims in the various provinces. The first report came out in November 1938, popularly known as the Pirpur Report.¹⁶² This was followed a year later, by another report by Fazlul Haque of Bengal.¹⁶³ These reports carried stories, mostly unverified, about the atrocities committed towards the Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces, where the Congress was in power. The main charges contained in these reports were concemed about the following issues

• Congress campaign of mass contact among the Muslims,
• The introduction of the wardha scheme of education,
• The use of Hindi,
• The singing of Bande Mataram,
• The hoisting of the Congress flag on public building,
• The playing of music before the Mosques and,
• The ratio in services between the two communities. ¹⁶⁴

161     AK Fazlul Haque was one among many Muslim leaders who Skillfully used communal language to organise the Muslim League in Bengal, he once said, in a public meeting, “you can very easily get the proof whether I am doing good to the country or otherwise. Whenever you will see that the Congress press has become vocal in my praise then you should understand that in some way or other I am doing harm to you. But whenever you will see that they are vilifying me, then you should understand that in some way or other I am doing some good to you without your knowledge.” Quoted by Mr. Md. Serajul Islam Mian, in the National Assembly of Pakistan, debates, vol. ii, no. 15, 18th June, 1964, p. 981.

162     See the report of the enquiry committee appointed by the Council of All India Muslim League, to enquire in to grievances in Congress provinces, Delhi: 1938.

163     AK Fazlul Haque. Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule. (Calcutta: Muslim League Publications, 1939)

164     For a detail analysis of these allegations see the following works, Coupland R. op.cit, p. 179.94. Deepak Pandey, op. cit., pp. 629-254. Anita Inder Singh, op.cit. PP43-72. and G Rizvi, op. cit., especially chapter four . “The Growth of Communalism and the Rise of the Muslim League 1936-43. pp. 89-128.

Muslim Leaguers, alleged that the Congress in its native joy with election victory, attempted to impose a Hindu Raj in India. The victorious Congress foisted Bande-Matarm as the national anthem upon the country as a whole. Congress easily ignored that Bande Mataram was essentially anti Muslim in its form and substance.¹⁶⁵ Moreover the Congress education scheme hastily adopted in the central province, was provided with a Hindu name and followed the Hindu tradition of education – the scheme of Vidya Mandir (temples of learning).¹⁶⁶ Above all it was declared that the name for national and inter-provincial languages should be Hindustani. Commenting on this issue Jinnah said that  (the Congress motive advocating Hindustani was to suppress Urdu.”¹⁶⁷ Jinnah a man with  perspicacious political foresight exploited these issues to gain country wide support of the Muslims to his cause. It is important to note that Jinnah and his League’s propaganda was meant for the Muslims, and in this they achieved a remarkable success. The Congress party, lacking the representatives of the Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces, where they formed the govemments, thus” offered Jinnah the handiest pegs on which he could hang all the grievances of the Muslims, real or fancied.”¹⁶⁸ For Jinnah and his League anything which widened the rift between the two communities and indicated that the two nation was unbridgeable proved Jinnah’s claim that there was a third party in India, namely the Muslims.¹⁶⁹

Mr. Jinnah was now on the verge of establishing the Muslim League as a viable alternative for the Muslims to the Hindu dominated Congress. In 1940 the Muslim League formally demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. The demand was based upon the theory

165     For details see G. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 100, and Deepak Pandy, op. cit., pp. 637-643 According to Deepak Pandey, “The song written by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, appeared in chapter x, of his book Anand Math, and the context in which it was written was essentially anti Muslim”. D. Pandey. Ibid. p. 640.

166     See G. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 99.

167     Deepak Pandy, op. cit., p. 639.

168     See G. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 97.

169     In 1937, immediately after the elections, Nehru declared that, “there are two partiesin India, the Government and the Congress-others must line up”. Jinnah replied, “I refuse to line up with the Congress. I refuse to accept this proposition. There is a third party in this country and this is Muslim India”. See Z.H. Zaidi, “Aspects of Muslim League Policy 1937-47”, in C.H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright (edited).. op. cit., p. 255.

that India consisted of two nations, namely the Hindus and the Muslims. After 1940 in the words of RJ. Moore, “In Jinnah’s hands the two nations theory became a psychological weapon to be wielded ruthlessly for political advantage. It was a tyrannical idea formulated to the prevail over the Congress totalitarian claim to be the Indian nation in microcosm. Jinnah used it to maximum effect in elimimating the dominant provincial leaders, most notably Sir Sikander Hayat, from participating in politics at the national level.¹⁷⁰ Soon after the Lahore Resolution was carried Sikander Hayat told the Governor of Punjab, of his difficulty in standing out against the League’s appeal for an Islamic nation.”¹⁷¹

The Muslim of India, the Muslims of Bengal enthusiastically responded to the call of their leaders. They saw in the demand for Pakistan an end to their political subjugation, and economic exploitation, in a Hindu dominated India. For the Muslims of Bengal the demand for separation was the re-articulation of their 1905 demands when the British rulers, under the fervent pressure of the Hindus, deprived them of the fruits of separate development- a separate development which would have freed the Bengali Muslims from the overwhelming domination “Bhadralok” class.

So in concluding this chapter we may point out that during the early stages of the British rule, the Muslims showed a marked unwillingness to learn English whose knowledge would have enabled them to enter the British higher education system in colonial Indian, a higher education system which was an excellent stepping stone for many jobs available within the colonial administration. It has been suggested that for Muslim the costs of learning English in psychological terms were higher than

170     The other person who could have challenged Jinnah’s leadership was A.K. Fazlul Haq from Bengal, but according to Humayun Kabir, “he was fickle and changed sides casily”. See Humayun Kabir, “Muslim Politics 1942-47”, in C.H. Philips and Wainwright, M.D. (edited)., op. cit., p. 391. Also see, J.H. Broomfiled, “Four Lives: History as Biography, South Asia, Journal of South Asian Studies, no. 1, August, 1971, pp. 78-83. According to Broomfield “Unpredictability was certainly one of his trits”, 7. 79. And according to Z R Khan, “From 1940 to 1947. Bengali Muslims felt safer with Jinnah’s Muslim League which was committed to creating a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. Fazlul Haque and Shurawardy espoused an altema course, namely the formation of a sovereign united Bengal, separate from India and Pakistan. The altenative formula failed to appeal to Bengali Muslims at this crucial ju ncture of the subcontinents political history.” See ZR Khan. “Islam and Bengali Nationalism”, Asian Survey, vol xxv, no 8, August 1985, p.842.

171     RJ. Moore, op. cit., p. 53

for the Hindus. For the Muslims it nearly amounted to a betrayal of their religious heritage. This was not so for the Hindu community whose religion displayed over time a remarkable ability to integrate foreign influences. Therefore, it came as no surprise that British trained  Hindus were able to monopolise many positions in the colonial offices which were open to monopolise many positions in the colonial offices which were open to the indigenous population. When in the 1850’s Muslim leaders  such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan exhorted the Muslims to learn English in order to be able to compete successfully against the Hindus for colonial office jobs, it was nearly too late.

            Despite tremendous efforts on the part of many Muslims, they were continually dominated by the Hindus, be it the orthodox Hindu Zamindar or the smartly ‘European’ dressed Hindu clerk in the colonial administration. This Hindu domination was very much evident in Bengal. To remedy this situation  Muslim leaders established in 1906 their own political party, the Muslim League which was now in direct competitionwith the Indian Congress Party .

 The partition of Bengal in 1905 was perceived as great opportunity by the Bengali Muslims to become the masters of their own territory. Bengali Muslims were now in a position to take over may administrative posts in their home areas. The annulment of the 1905 partition of Bengal in 1911 therefore, made the Bengali Muslims very bitter , all their economic gains were quickly lost. Moreover, the Nehru report of 1929, which cemented the Hindu hegemony over the Muslims, further increased the divisions which existed between the two religious groups. More and more it could be observed that economic differences were instrumental in splitting the Indian population along religious lines. Uneven (economic) development, favouring the Hindus, became the increasing fault line between the Hindu and Muslim elites, Above all, the Hindu leaders, in order to strengthedn their authority over the Hindu masses, began to use Hindu religious symbols in daily political life and during mass rallies such as the one in 1905, thereby (further) creating a distance between the Congress Party and the Muslim elites. The continued use of Hindu symbols in political life sharpened Muslim religious consciousness and led to the frequent employment of Islamic symbols during Muslim political activities in order to counter act the Hindu influences. Later on Jinnah, a moderate until 1929, began to exploit the deep-seated Muslim fear of Hindu domination by conspicuously pointing out to his community that, under Hindu domination, Islam will be relegated to a position of minor importance and even absolute nothingness. After the Nehru report the Muslim community under the leardership of

Mr. Jinnah , who was inspired by the writings of Iqbal , saw its only chance of survival and independence in the creation of an autonomous Muslim area free from Hindu interference and domination.

The Bengali Muslims who were often subjected to harsh Hindu domination were always eager to advance Muslim demands for increased autonomy. Their sufferings at the hands of the Hindus made them ideal candidates for greater economic and social justice. It may thus be pointed out that the domination of Hindu elites over the Muslim community, in Bengal as elsewhere, tore asunder the arrangements which had allowed the two communities to live together in harmony for a long time, separating them into two hostile camps. And in the Muslim camp, as can be seen later, the Bengalis were destined to assume a major role in the creation of an independent Muslim political entity.

We would like to end this chapter in recapitulating it in a general and abstract form. It can be pointed out that the centre (the British rulers) provided economic opportunities in India for the two perepheral communities, namely the Hindus and the Muslims. One peripheral munity, the Hindus, was willing to co-operate with the centre on an economic basis in providing the British rulers with trained manpower. This co-operation allowed the Hindu elites to develop their areas more quickly than the Muslims could do it. This uneven development between the two peripheral communities allowed the Hindu to dominate the Muslims. Furthermore, the Hindu elites, in alluding to religious differences between the two communities could easily cement their authority over the Hindu masses but further increased the gap and hostility that existed between the communities. In order to achieve a modicum of economic development and to get rid of Hindu domination, the Muslim leaders saw no other a alterative than to mobilise the sources and manpower of their community along religious lines. Thus, their pronounced demands for an autonomous Muslim area.

So what we had in colonial India during the period under investigation was the following:

The centre (the British rulers) relied mainly upon one peripheral community (the Hindus) to maintain and solidify their hold over India. The Hindu periphery, with the aid and co-operation of the centre, was able to dominate the Muslim periphery. There existed, of course, uneven development between the centre (British colonials) and the peripheries (Hinduan Muslims). But uneven development also separated the Muslim

community (periphery). Under the surveillance of the cetre the two peripheries were fighting for scarce resources, for example, white collar he colonial administration. So it seems only natural that the disadvantages periphery (the MUSLIMS) demanded some kind of protection against Hindu domination in the form of an autonomous area.

Provincial autonomy granted under the Govemmet of India Act 1935, was seen by the Muslim elites as the first step in this direction. They therefore, accepted the Act with very little opposition. But after the election of 1937, held under the Act, and with the coming of the Congress to power in majority of the provinces, the Muslim elites began to express their  uneasiness about the quantum of autonomy granted under the Act. It was at this critical phase of Indian history that Mr. Jinnah began to appeal the Muslims of India for unity and promoted the idea of Muslim nationalism. In the 1940’s Muslim nationalism became a powerful weapon hands of Jinnah to be used efficiently to unite the Muslims of India.

At this stage of the dissertation, we therefore believe that it is necessary to look very carefully at the phenomenon of nationalism. Nationalism or at least the unmitigated manifestation of militant nationalistic feelings marked the beginning and end of Pakistan. Jinnah forged the latent sentiments of the Muslim population in colonial India into a fervent desire for a national homeland with its consequent Islamic political institutions and processes. According to Mr.Jinnah, Muslims needed their own nation, their Islamic inspired brand of nationalism in order to escape from the uncompromising Hindu domination and oppression. Jinnah’s vision of an Islamic nation on the Indian subcontinent which was spiritually reified by the many eloquent discourses of Iqbal, the poet, gave rise to the creation of Pakistan. Yet, nationalism on the other hand, was also instrumental in destroying the unity of Pakistan and the solidarity among its different and diverse peoples. The Bengalis, tired of and disappointed by the Punjab-Muhajir exploiation and denigration sought refuge in their own form of nationalism. Thus nationalism had at its basis the vernacular language and the rather well-developed Bengali traditions of religious and political expression – which carried to their extreme differed to an astonishing degree from those of West Pakistan. Thus, without exaggeration, it can be pointed out that nationalism was the alpha (the rise) and the omega (the fall) of united Pakistan. This is why nationalism deserves a permanent place in our dissertation, both as an heuristic and descriptive concept.

CHAPTER THREE

NATIONALISM- MUSLIM OR  INDIAN?

If nationalism is the only discourse credited with emanci partory possibilities in the imperialist theater, then one must ignore the innsmerable subaltern examples of resistance throughout the imperialist and pre-imperialist centuries, often suppressed by those very forces of nationalism which would be instrumental in changing the geopolitical conjuncture from territorial imperialism to neocolonialism..”(G.C. Spivak)

What was the purpose of founding an independent political entity called Pakistan? Pakistan, as explained by its founding fathers, was created to provide Musilims living on the Indian sub-continent with an Islamic state which would endeavour assiduously to satisfy the economic, cultural and political needs of its population and thus protect the Muslim against a preconceived threat of a permanent Hindu domination in an independent united Indian sub-continent. According to Sir Puckle.

“Pakistan movement is the political reaction to Muslim apprehension that union of India, equipped with democratic Institutions, whether the govemment be unitary or federal, can mean nothing but perpetual Hindu domination and virtual Muslim economic serfdom.”¹ Puckle relates how Mr. Muhammad Ali, no friend to British rule in India, once said “Make no mistake about the quarrels between Hindu and Mussalman; they are founded only on the fear of domination.”² According to Saleem Qureshi, “This belief of the Muslim elites was not the product of hallucination or a persecution complex; instead it was based upon the persistent refusal of the Congress leadership to accommodate Muslim demands and mitigate Muslim fears of being reduced to a nation of hewers of wood and drawers of water.”³ A concrete proposal to resolve this fear came in 1930 from Iqbal, a Muslim poet and philosopher.

1          Sir Frederick Packle. “The Pakistan Doctrine: Its Origins and Power”, Foreign Affairs, col. 24. no.3. p. 535, 1946.

2          Ibid., p. 534. See Chapter II for details of how Jinnah was able to combine and explom these fears of Hindu domination to unite the Muslims of the sub-continent.

3          Saleem MM.Qureshi, “Pakistan Nationalism Reconsidered”. Pacific Affairs, vol. 45, 1972-73, p. 557.

Iqbal used the platform of a political party to broach the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of North West India;⁴ in 1938 the Sind provincial Muslim League at its meeting supported the idea of a separate homeland for Muslims for resolving the complicated Hindu Muslim entanglement, and in 1940 the Muslim League formally adopted this deman and as its creed.⁵ According to most scholars of subcontinental history, it was Iqbal who provided the most powerful intellectual Muslim stance on the issue of Muslim nationalism.⁶ In this section of our thesis

4          it has to be pointed out that many scholars have contested this generally held view in Pakistan that lqbal was the first person to have thought of searate homeland for the Muslims See for example Gowher Rizvi Limlithgow and India: A study of British Policy and the Political Importance in India 1936-43. (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978) p. 89.

5          According to P Hardy, the feeling of being a distinct nation developed among Indian Muslims only in the 1940’s. When it became clear that the British would soon leave Indian Prior to that, the Muslim nobility had little in common with the Muslim peasantry danisan castes P Hardy. The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). pp. 1-2. There seems to be some substance in Hardy’s claim. However, many writers have contended that two nations (Hindu and Muslim) were in Indian society since the medieval era Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, for example argues, “the from the very beginning the Muslims of India of both native and foreign origin were conscious of their separate identity. Hinduism and Islam remained two distinct, irreconcilable ways of life. The creation of Pakistan was therefore the logical culmination of this irreconcilable clash of values”. Ishatiaq Husin Qureshi. The Struggle for Pakistan, (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1969), pp. 3-16. Detailed arguments on this point can be followed in, R. Thapar and Harbans Mukhia (edited).. Communalism and the Writing of Indian History. (New Delhi: PPH, 1969), R.C. Majumadar (edited).. The Delhi Sultanate, (Bombay: Bharatiya, first published in 1964), A. Ahmed, Studies in the Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), and K.KAziz, The Making of Pakistan, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967)

6          According to T. Maniruzzaman, “It was Iqbal who first dreamed of a separate Muslim state in India, wrote many letters to Jinnah inspiring him to take up the cause of a separate Muslim state. But after his death no other Muslim intellectual took up the cause of the dynamic interpretation of the Shariat which Iqbal attempted in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam”. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Politics of Development: The Case of Pakistan 1947-58, (Dacca: Green Book House, 1971).pp. 23-24.

Dr. Wasim, writing on Pakistan’s intellectual heritage sees Iqbal as the master intellectual of Muslim India and then of Pakistan. Mohammad Wasim, Pakistan Under Martial Law 1977-1985. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987) p. 180 According to Anwar Hussain Syed, “In some ways, Iqbal is probably the most influential intellectual in recent Muslim history. In Pakistan, where heroes are in short supply, he continues to be a celebrity Newspapers publish articles about aspects of his lifeand work. Literary societies on college campuses praise him. Academies and Institutes publish journals

we will endeavour to examine in some detail Iqbal’s concept of Muslim the West. At this point in time it is therefore more appropriate to emphasise the important role Allama Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938) played in the movement for an independent Pakistan. At the  beginning of the twentieth century, Iqbal was even by the most critical standards the leading Muslim thinker on the Indian subcontinent. He, who studied law at Cambridge and philosophy (metaphysics) at Heidelberg, was the intellectual godfather of independent Pakistan. Iqbal had always been a remorseless enemy of British colonialism: in his younth he volunteered to join forces with the Hindu majority in their fight against the British oppression. But very soon he came to realize that Muslims and Hindus could never be brought together to form a vible political alternative to the existing colonial rule.⁷ Iqbal, with much  forsight, was ver conscious of the fact that Muslims and Hindus could not coexist

and sponsor reaserch to show the greatness of his art and thought”. Anwar Hussain Syed , Pakistan, Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, (New York: Praeger,1982) p.43

Ishtiaq Ahmed sees lqbal, “as a bridge between orthodox Islam and modernism”. He is of the view that. “Iqbal’s populism provided a grand ideology, a phantasmogorian which all sections of the Muslim community could find their images, and since he did not get down to concrete prescriptions about how to organize Muslim society, but remained at the level of optimistic speculation, the generality of his thought effected considerable controversy over his message. Besides referring to the Holy Quran and Sunnah, it is a common practice among writers to find support for their standpoints by referring to some corresponding opinion of Iqbal. His status in Pakistan is comparable to that of Abduh among the Arabs.” Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological controversy in Pakistan, (London Frances Pinter, 1987), p.75

The most convincing analysis on the importance of Iqbal among the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent has come from Sir Hamilton Gibb. He writes, “Perhaps the right way to look at Iqbal, is to see him in one who reflected and put into vividwords the diverse currents of ideas that were agitating the minds of the Indian Muslims. His sensitive poetic temperament mirrored all that impinged upon it the backward looking romanticism of the liberals, the socialist learning of the young intellectuals, the longing of the militant Muslim Leaguers for a strong leader to restore the political power of Islam.” Quoted in Aziz Ahmed’s Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)< p. 156.

7          As Iqbal said, “We suspect each other’s intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps, in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands, and conceal our egoism under the cloak of nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions.” Shamloo. (edited), Statements of Iqbal. (Lahore: Al Mama Academy, 1948), p. 10. “Shamloo”, was a pseudonym for S M Ikram, who was a civil servant at that time.

within a single state; they would engage each other in an incessant civil war whose bloodshed and destructiveness was beyound any historical precedent and could hardly be imagined. Islam and Hinduism were too different and too dominating in their own ways to seek a compromise formula which would allow both of them to govern as equal partners in an independent India. For the good of the people, making up the two hostile communities it was necessary to divide them into two sovereign nations: a territorial ‘cordan sanitaire’ had to be created around their difference. Therefore, with Lutherian candour, Iqbal presented his view of the envisaged division of the Indian subcontinent: “The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India. is… perfectly justified… I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian. Muslim State appears to me the final destiny of the Muslims at heart of North West India.”⁸

For the young western educated Muslims, Iqbal’s importance lies in his ability to fuse (democratic) socialism with Islamic doctrine. Why this fusion of Islam with socialism? Especially, when one knows the atheistic inclinations of socialism. Iqbal had only contempt for early capitalism which forced millions of human beings to live within moral squalor and financial misery. A capitalism which above all was also responsible for colonial oppression and exploitation. Thus, Iqbal turned to socialism to find a sound ideological basis for his reinterpretation of Islam.⁹ Moreover, Iqbal was convinced that the atheistic element in socialism could not persist, was an ephemeral phenomena. He states verbatim: “The present negative state of Russian mind will not last indefinitely for no system of society can rest on an atheistic basis.”¹⁰

 

  However, Iqbal on the other hand was no advocate of religious

8          Quoted in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, (edited)., Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947, volume 2 (1924-1947), (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1970), p. 159.

9          According to Aziz Ahmed, “Iqbal does not regard Islam and socialism as necessarily mutually exclusive or antagonistic: he regards the Islamic concept of equality and Muslim rejection of racialism as similar to that in socialist theory, and the socialist elimination of monarchical institutions as parallel of Muslim inconoclasm. In explainging the institution of ‘Zakat’ as a voluntary super-tax, Iqbal sees the possibility of eliminating the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few.” Aziz Ahmed, op. cit., p. 158.

10       See Riffat Hassan, “Development of Political Philosophy”, in Hafeez Malik (edited).. Iqbal Poet Philosopher of Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971),p. 154. 

 tyranny which often comes in the guise of an infallible human representative of an omnipotent God. The foibles and megalomania of religious leadership had to be controlled, reined in by an egalitarian and democratic system of socialism: “In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains… Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is (unclear) or the other as your point of view varies… The state according to Islam is only an effort to realise the spiritual in a human organisation. It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibilty.”¹¹    

Iqbal with his sense of moderation, thus tried to synthesise the best of socialism with the core values of Islam, and in doing so provided not only a grand ideology but also a platform for the establishment of an independent Muslim nation on Indian soil. Iqbal, in emphasising the social dynamism of Islam, condemned to oblivion the dry, stagnant, ritualised dogma of the ulama. Islam again was a force of change, a home for the Muslims who lived in subjugation to the British colonial rule, It is the (unacclaimed) merit of Iqbal to have transformed Islam into a modern political force which could serve as a basis for independent Pakistan. Jinnah, later, in his political battle with the Congress, skillfully combined Iqbal’s view of Muslim nationalism with the Muslim fear of permanent Hindu domination in an independent India to unite the hopelessly divided Muslim elites with their strong regional feelings or, in the words of Ayesha Jalal, strong particularism.”¹²

11      Sir Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (Lahore: SH. Mohammad Ashraf, 1960), pp. 154-5.

12       Here we have to explain what we mean by regional feelings. C.H. Philips in in introduction to his edited book entitled, The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858. 1947, (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1962), has argued that without Jinnah’s leadership it seems likely that regionalim, such as the proposal for a united and independent Bengal, which was discussed by both Hindu and Muslim leaders in 1947, would have competed seriously with Muslim nationalism as the political aim in the Muslim majority provinces. However, it has to be noted that although the question of a united and independent Bengal came under discussion after Lord Mountbatten took over as the Viceroy of India in 1947, it came at a stage when the communal politics of India were at a climax. Bengali ethnic nationalism (perse) was never there, because of polarisation of politics on communal lines. Shurwawardy supported the idea of a united Bengal, with full support of Jinnah, who according to Ayesha Jalal, was always opposed to the partition of Bengal. Sarat Bose and Kiran Shankar Roy(leader of the opposition in the Bengal assembly) responded favourably to the offer. However nothing came out of the talk, firstly because Congress and its leadership was opposed to it. Nehru warned the Bengali Hindus not ot be misled by Shurawardy. He said an independent Bengal would mean the dominance of the Muslim League and particularly, the whole  

            Mr. Jinnah’s first and foremost task during the period 1937-47 was to create a general ideological consensus among the Muslim elites and undercut the strong regional feelings. This was by no means an easy task. Since 1940 Jinnah constantly played on the theme of Muslim unity and was successful in convincing the Muslim masses that at such a crucial stage of natoinal struggle, when the future of Muslims in India was uncertain, Muslims could not afford to think in terms of parohial or provincial loyalties. It was stressed that Islam recognised no regional and linguistic forces. Thus in a short period of six years ” this heterogeneous aggregation, (the Muslims of India), under its elite leadership has been converted into a solid and unwavering nationalist movement.”¹³ We will come back to the issue of regionalism at a later point, and also examine how successful Jinnah was in creating ideological consensus among the ethnically diverse Muslim elites. According to Ayesha Jalal, Jinnah, at best, was “able to paint a thin veneer of solidarity and unanimity over 

of Bengal going into the Pakistani area. Moreover, the League’ sub-committee was divided on the issue. Four out of six members of the committee were opposed to an independent Bengal outside the pale of North-Western Pakistan. Shurwardy’s own position was also tenuous. Many saw him as responsible for fanning the communal tension of 1946. known as the Calcutta riot of 1946. According to Stanley Wolpert, “Lieutenant-general Sir Francis Tucker, in charge of India’s Eastern command, received intelligence reports that Shoreward told ån immense Muslim crowd gathered round Ochterlomy’s Monument that afternoon that the Cabinet Mission was a bluff, and that he would see how the British could make Mr. Nehru rule Bengal. Direct Action Day would prove to be the first step towards the Muslim struggle for emancipation. He advised them to return home early and said… that he had made all arrangements with the police and military not to interfere with them. Our intelligence patrols noticed that the crowd included a large number of Muslim goondas (hoodlums), and that…their ranks… swelled as soon as the meeting ended. They made for the shopping centres of the town where they at once set to work to loot and burn Hindu shops and houses… At 4.15 pm Fortress headquarters sent out the codeword ‘Red’ to indicate that there were incidents all over Culcutta”. See, Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan., (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985).p. 285. He was Jinnah”s most mercurial ally. On the issue of United Bengal and the role of Shurawardy, see the following work: Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985). Also see R.J. Moore, Escape from Empire: The Atllec Government and the Indian Problem, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). According to R. J. Moore, the origins and course of the movement for a separate Bengal await analysis. It is difficult to disagree with Moore’s view.

13       Saleem M. Qureshi, op. cit., p. 558.   

interests which were neither solid nor unanimous.”¹⁴ and according to Khalid Bin Sayeed, the Muslim League leadership during the preindependence period, “absorbed in the heat and excitement of  the struggle for Pakistan, after the creation of Pakistan, grossly under estimated the potency of regional and linguistic forces.”¹⁵

 But first let us briefly examine Iqbals view on the issue of Muslim Nationalism.¹⁶ As a young man, Iqbal, like Jinnah and Sir Syed¹⁷ was an ardent nationalist, committed to the unity and freedom of India. “The great golden past of India, transmitted by distance in time and space into the very perfection of enchantment, stirred his youthful imagination.¹⁸ In the poem entitled ” Tarana_Hindi (song about the Unity of India) he wrote “we are Indians and India is our motherland.”¹⁹ But this romantic view of Indian unity and nationalism was soon to be replaced by Muslim nationalism, both as a high ideal and as a course of action to be follewed by the Indian Muslims in the practical politics  

14        Ayesha Jalal, op. cit., p. 208.

15       Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan. (Boston: Houghton Miffilt Company, 1967), p. 66.

16       It will not be an over statement to say that the contemporary understanging of Nationalism far from complete. Some view nationalism as a reflection of the of mind” of the individual members of a political community while others have are that it is a manifestation of certain ideological current. For an academician it is object of inquiry, for a politician it can be used as a tool for political purpose, md as the purpose varies, so does the interpretation. For an excellent review of the literature, see Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, (New York: Harcourt, Jovanovich 1972), especially chapter I. Muslim Nationalism especially is elusive because it preceded the designation and demarcation of the territory of Pakistan.

17       Mohammed Ali Jinah devoted himself to Hindu Muslim unity, and to co-operation between the Muslim League and the Congress for almost three decades. The break occurred as a consequence of the 1936-37 provincial elections. Nehru’s insistence that the Congress was the only Nationalist party led Jinnah to “resist Hindu Raj”. Thereafter, the clear inference is the mistrust of Congress leaders. “From Martial Law to Martial Law, Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958”, by Syed Nur Ahmed, edited by Craig Baxter, from a translation from Urdu, by Mahmud Ali, (Boulder, Colarado: Westview Press, 1985, Pacific Affairs, vol. 58, no. 4, 1985-86, pp. 720-23.

18       Iqbal Singh, The Ardent Pilgrim: An introduction to the life and work of Muhammad Iqbal, (Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1951),p. 23.

19       Muhammed Iqbal, Bang-i-Dara,(a collection of Urdu Poems), (Lahore: SH. Muhamiliau Ashraf, 1949), p. 82. 

of India. During his stay in Europe, the birth place of modern nationalism, Iqbal realised that acceptance of nationalism would mean a negation of Islamic ideology. After a careful study of nationalism Iqbal was convinced that the European concept of nationalism fits the secularist model pro- pounded by most European scholars. John H. Kautsky, for example, defines nationalism as “an ideology and movement striving to unite all people who speak a similar language and who share the various cultural characteristics transmitted by the language in similar independent states and in loyalty to a similar govermment conducted in the peoples’ language.”²⁰

But this European model of nationalism divorce religious inspirations from secular motivations. This was totally unacceptable to him. As a high ideal Iqbal sees Islam and modern territorial nationalism as rival principles for organising the ultimate political group. “Nationalism brings people together, but it also divides them for its criteria of unity among people-race language and territory-cannot be met by outsiders. One cannot change at will the place of birth or the colour of his skin. Hence it keeps them divided.²¹ According to Iqbal, “its divisive facet generates pride in one’s own groups’s imperialistic control and exploitation of another.”²²

But this most pungent attack on nationalism is on the question of with secularism²³ and reduction of religion to a private affair.²⁴ Iqbal sees Islam more as a principle of social action than as a way of securing

20       Johan H. Kautsky, “Nationalism”, in H. G. Kebschull (ed)., Politics in Transitional Societies, (New York: Appletion Century – crofts, 1971), p. 112.

21      Qouted in Anwar Syed, Pakistan. Islam. Politics and National Solidarity. (New York: Praeger, 1982) p. 50.

22        Ibid., p. 50.

23       Secularism to this day remains a very contentious issue in the sub-continent. According to Ashis Nandy, “Secularism is a gift of post-medieval, European Christianity to this [Indian sub-continent] part of the world.” Ashis Nandy “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance”. Alternatives, XIII, 1988.p. 180. For an indepth analysis on theissue of secularism also see: T.N. Madan, “Secularism in its Place”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol 46, no 4, November 1987. Ralph Bultjens, “India: Religion, Political Legitimacy, and the /secular State”, Annals, AAPSS. 483, January, 1986.

24       “If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. the universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by nationalist systems of ethics and policy. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual, and has nothing to do with what is called man’s temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate 

eternal bliss in the hereafter. In a rejoinder to the renowned Muslim scholar, Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani (R.A), who endorsed the Congress concept of territorial nationalism. Iqbal argued that historically nations had been associated with countries and countries with nations. There was nothing wrong with loving one’s land of birth and residence, it was a natural instinct. But he strongly objected to Maulana Madanis proposition when it was sold to the Indian Muslims as a political concept, implying that they should put aside their faith, stop thinking of themselves as a separate nation, and sink their identity into a larger Indian nationhood Iqbal informed Maulana Madani that in doing so he eas only echoing the Hindu leaders, who gave Muslims the same advice, with a view to securing  their own permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.²⁵ Hence, in esposing Muslim nationalism in India, Iqbal’s main objective was to dissuade the Indian Muslims from submerging themselves in a Hindu dominated Indian nationalism. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, almost advocated the same view. 

Let us now consider briefly the basis of Muslim nationalism, as ideal type, as explained by Iqbal. According to Iqbal, “It was not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe… That we are members of a socity founded by the Prophet of Islam. Islam abhorrs all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of councrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life principles on the character of a particular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal nonspatial.”²⁶

 Iqbal was not only an idealist, he was also a practitioner and thus very well conversant with the politics of India. He also, therefore, suggested to the Muslims of India the practical course of action, as he

the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state are organic to each other”.Presidential Address at Annual session of Muslim League at Allahabad, 1930. Quoted in C.H Philiph and others, (edited).,The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947, (London: George allen and Unwin Itd, 1962), p. 236.

25       Statement on Islam and Nationalism in reply to a statement of Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani (R.A), published in Ehsan on 9th March, 1938 and quoted in, Shaml00, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, op. cit., pp. 223-229.

26       Quoted in S.A. Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, (Lahore: SH, Muhammad Ashraf, 1964)p. 376.  

deemed it fit, to be followed in order to secure their future in India. In his now famous and often quoted Presidential address to the Allahabad meeting of the Muslim League (1930), Iqbal started his speech with a philosophical note. He began by telling his audience that, “Islam as an ethical ideal as a politico-legal value system, had provided generations of Indian Muslims with those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well defined people. One might even say that Islam had functioned as a people building force, more effectively in India than in any where else in the world. Laws and institutions associated with Islamic culture had given the Indian Muslim community a remarkable degree of inner unity and homogeneity. Its future as a distinct cultural unit would depend on the maintenance of this Islamic connection. The Indian Muslims accord- to Iqbal, were far more homogeneous than any other group in the country. Indeed, he stressed, they were the only Indian people who can ily be described as a nation in the modern sense of the world. Even the Hindus, he said, had not yet achieved the cohesion necessary for being a nation, which Islam has given you [Muslims) as a free gift.”²⁷

 

He then informed the Indian Muslims that their Indian Muslim national personality could only be secured through the establishment of a Muslim India within India. Hence the demand for a separate Muslim state as the final solution to the communal problem of India was made. How different is the concept of Muslim nationalism, as expounded by Iqbal, from the concept of modern territorial nationalism Iqbal so vehemently opposed? In its theoretical form Iqbal’s concept of Muslim nationalism was ideological ²⁸ Ethnic, linguistic, and territorial affiliations

27       Quoted in Answar Syed, op. cit., p. 45, from the texts of Presidential Address delivered at the annual session to the All India Muslim League on 29th December 1930. B. Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. He argues that the ‘ism’ of nationalism has created a fales analogy with the ism of ideology. Nagionalism, or nationality is better classed with Kinship or religion because it is perceived as destiny rather than choice and thereby helps to provide transcendental explanations of human suffering, sacrifice, and especially death; see book reviews on “Imagined Communities, Reflections on the origin and spread of Nationalism”, by Anthony Reid in Pacific Affairs, vol 58, no 3, Fall 1985, p. 497.

28       Ideology is a “Representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence”. Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays.(London: NLB, 1971). Translated from the French by Ben Brewster, p. 152. It should be noted that Iqbal in his quest ot stress the socialist-materialist dimensions of Islamic Nationalism is very difficult ot classify among the mainstreams of nation-     

were not only irrelevant but repugnant to its spirit. But when it came to application all the discarded variables (territory, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, historical traditions) were put back to work. however, this contradiction according to both Dr. Waheed-uz Zaman and Anwar Syed,²⁹ may be more apparent than real. They argued that Muslim nationalism for Iqbal is based upon a Muslim community’s unwilligness to be ruled by a non Muslim political power.³⁰ Territorial, ethnic and linguistic appeals are to be rejected if they are being addressed by a non Muslim group to a smaller Muslim group. Muslim nationalism is pre-eminently ideological in actual or potential confrontations with the non Muslims. But when only a Muslim group is involved, territorial, ethnic and liguistic sympathies may be summoned in aid of ideology so as to strengthen the group’s inner cohesion necessary for plain survival as well as for undertaking significant collective action. Where Muslims are politically dominant, for Iqbal, Islam has no quarrel with territorial nationalism. Iqbal therefore, seems to be least worried about the tendency of some Muslim nations, such as Iran and Turkey, to embrace territorial nationalism. Nationalism becomes objectionable where Muslims are in a minority because his fear is that religion as such cannot be a living factor in national life.³¹ But where Muslims are in a majority and hence

alism: he lacks the communicative rigour of a Deutsch, he ignores the pathological sides of new nationalism, the fief of a Kedourie; he is far from the modernisation theories of a Lerner; and he vehemently disagrees with Gellner on the language issue

29       See Dr. Waheed-uz-zaman Towards Pakistan, (Lahore; United Ltd., 1964), chapter 4, and Anwar Syed, op. cit., chapter3.

30       According to Francis Robinson, there would appear to be a tendency amongst Muslims to organise politics on the basis of their faith. Where Muslims forms minority, there is a tendency to organise political activities as a separate political community, and then demand a separate state. One good example outside South Asia is the Moro liberation movement of the Muslim Filipinos, within South Asia, of course, there is no shortage of examples. There was a demand from the Moplah communityof Kerla in 1947 for the foundation of a Moplastan within the Indain Union. In Andrah Pradesh Majlis-e-Ittehadul-Muslimeen, formally requested in the late 1960’s that a separate state for all Indian Muslims should be established on the east coast between Uishakhapatnam and Madras. Francis Robinson stressed that formation of a political party is not restricted to Muslim society, but the formation of the separatist movement on the basis of religion and the assertion of the political identity on the basis of religion does seem to be a special characteristic of Muslims. Francis Robinson, “Islam and Muslim Separatism”, in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (edited), Political Identity in South Asia, (London: Curzon press 1979), p. 78.   

politically dominant, Islam for Iqbal not only accommodates nationalism, but the two may become identical. Iqbal goes to extent of suggesting that even if a Muslim state declares  itself to be secular, “ Its legislature cannot disregard,³² the conscience of the people which has for centuries been trained by the spirituality of Islam.”³³

To sum up Iqbal’s view on the concept of Muslim nationalism, it will be safe to suggest that Iqbal was mainly interested in liberating the Muslim majority areas of India from the Hindu rule, which could enable them to safeguard and promote their Muslim personality and, in addition, give them the opportunity to mobilize their life according to the spirit of Islam.³⁴ It was, therefore, necessary Iqbal thought, for the Muslim community to attain independence in political choice making and action.

 According to Dr. Zaman, Iqbal, intellectually, prepared the ground for Mr. M.A.Jinnah, who finally led the Muslims to the goal of Pakistan. Mr.M.A.Jinnah acknowledged his debt to the Poet Philosopher with the following words. “His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems  facing India.”³⁵

31       According to lqbal, “The religious order of Islam is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a policy on Indian national lines, if it mcans a displacement of the Islamic principles of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. Quoted in Aziz Ahmed, op. cit., p. 160.

32       Iqbal’s declaration here should be interpretated as his unwillingness to grant polites (statehood) a separate status independent of Islam. The label secular in a Muslim state has in its final consequence no substance: it is absorbed by an all pervasive religious sentiment and has no raisind’ etre of its own.

33       Reply to a question raised by Pandit. J.L. Nehru (popularly known as A Rejoinder to Nehru), (Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), pp. 116-19. Present example is that of Bangladesh, where the Bangladeshi leadership had to insert a clause clearly stating faith in the Almighty Allah as a fundamental principle of the constitution of 1977. Insertion of this clause was brought about mainly because of public pressure. For details see zilur R. Khan, “Islam and Bengali Nationalism”, Asian Survey, vol. XXXV, no 8, August 1985. It is important to point out that recently the Bengladesh Parliament has declared that Islam will be the state religion of the country.

34       Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, (Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1956), p. 6. Iqbal suggested rigorous re-interpretation of Islam to solve the problem of Muslim poverty in India For details see chapterlI.   

Before proceeding any further, it would be of interest to compare Iqbal’s interpretation of nationalism with the work of the following (mainstream) theoreticians of nationalism: H. Kohn, E. Gellner, E.Kedourie,  K. Deutsch, M. Hechter.³⁶

Like Iqbal, Hans Kohn, who exemplifies the historical approach to nationalist  movements, places nationalism into the phenomenological realm. Kohn to some extent “de-materialises” nationalism and emphasises its spiritual qualities. For Kohn: “Nationalism is an idea, an ideal-force, which fills man’s brain and heart with new thoughts, and drives him to translate his consciousness into deeds of organized action.³⁷

 

 Unlike Iqbal however, Kohan classifies nationalism as a secular force which is deeply rooted in language and territoriality. Kohn considers territorial unity and language identity as the nacessary prerequisites for the creation of nationalism, a nationalism which replaces religion as the main organizing medium of an integrating and integrated community. Iqbal on the other hand sees nationalism as the embodiment or extension of religion. The base of nationalism according to Iqbal is the Holy Qu’ran which is not delimited by language or territory and unites all Muslims across these artificial boundaries. Thus Kohn and Iqbal stand on this point in total opposition to each other. Kohn sees the advent and rapid rise of new secular forces in nationalism while Iqbal explains that nationalism is a part of religion. However, this conflict can be partially resolved and explained by pointing out the difference between Christianity and Isla Christianity renders its due to the temporal authorities while Islam as complete system integrates and subjugates the worldly rulers. Islam does not recognise the separation of politics (secular) and religion (spiritual). It perceives only one system, namely one that has been detailed in Al-Qu’ran and which is dominated in its entirety by religious inspirations and aspirations. Thus, what we should retain from this comparison between Kohn and Iqbal is that nationalism for both is located in the phenomenological realm, dominated by ideas and not material environ- ment. Despite the apparent differences between Iqbal and Kohn we may conclude that in their approaches to nationalism they have much in

35       Ibid.

36       We have included Hetcher among this group because this theory serves as the (unclear) framework for the dissertation.  

37       (unclear) The Age of Nationalism, (New York: Harper, 1962) p. 19.   

common and that they are separated by certain dissimilarities of two religions, namely Islam and Christianity.

In his theory of nationalism Gellner sees pre-industrial man embedded in a rigid, inflexible social structure which defines and determines the (traditional) role such an individual can play. However, the twin forces of industrialisation and modernisation destroy this existing pre-industrial order. The order or structure in question is then replaced by culture, a culture which is defind as follows: (It is] “essentialy the manner in which one communicates in the broadest sense.”³⁸ Therefore, “communication, the symbols, language(in the literal or extended sense) that is employed, became crucial.”³⁹ Gellner is also convinced that culture is equivalent to nationality. He insists that, “the classification of men by ‘culture’ is of course the classification by ‘nationality’.⁴⁰

 

Futhermore, Gellner believes that man is only truly human when he has achieved a certain level of literacy. In an urbanised industrial environment man as a human being has to be able to read and write. Language becomes all-important in creating culture which in turn then becomes nationalism. But why then, it may be asked, language in one area? Why are various nationalities crammed into a tiny comer of the world? Gellner’s answer is that modermisation and industrialisation are uneven and affect different language groups in a dissimilar way. That is why the language gap between different groups is re-enforced by an economic development gap. To overcome the vicissitudes of (uneven) economic development the masses of these language groups have a tendency to look to the indigenous intelligentsia for leadership, an intelligentsia which has suffered a spiritual crisis by the disappearance of the pre-industrial order. However, they, the intelligentsia, are the keepers of language – and with the help of the words that were able to ‘manu-facture’ culture which replaces the old order and serves as the foundation of nationalism. In short, Gellner is convinced that uneven development, an inevitable by-product of industrialisation and modernisation, reenforces the identity of language groups and nationalities which are led by their respective intelligentsia. Iqbal, of course, would have disagreed with Gellner that culture becomes all important for man living in an industrial

38       E. Gellner, Thought and Changes, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1964),p.155.

39       Ibid.

40       lbid.,p.157.  

environment. For Iqbal the purest and most noble form of language is contained in Al-Qu’ran. Individual languages are only media of  expression, forms but never substance. Substance is provided by religion; thus, language is shaped and dominated in its content by its religious ideas.

However, Iqbal also claims like Gellner that modern economic development may be uneven, that is always benefiting the Hindus at the expense of the Muslims. The religious gap is emphasised by the existence of an economic gap. For Iqbal, who sees any kind of culture as an integral part of religion, for example, Bengali traditions are unseparable from Islamic dogma, it seems natural that groups facing a crisis situation will form around religious difference and will use their religious distinctiveness as a rallying cry. The Muslims are united by the inspirations and ideals of Al-Qu’ran and not by language. Iqbal thus, unlike Gellner, shied away from secular culture and maintains the hegemonic claim of religion over all matters of life. But like Gellner, Iqbal forsees unevenness in the development process which forces the concerned groups to cluster around their leaders, the intelligentsia. But in Iqbal’s case the intelligentsia should always be closely attached to and inspired by Al-Qu’ran.

1. Kedourie also suggests that nationalism is foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness.⁴¹ However, this consciousness is embedded in a pernicious doctrine whose evil character is signified by its egoism and idealist, irrational emendations. Nationalism per seis subversive of any previously existing order and exacerbates old and creates new conflicts. For Kedourie, the French revolution has created the ‘individual’. an individual which now falls prey to the dogma of nationalism which in its ‘principled’ approach lacks the power of compromise. Man seems to be unwilling to compromise over principles. Language and race in their dogmatic expressions become the guiding criteria for war and peace between political entities, that is nation-states. These criteria overide all other differences and create a new international political order which is marked by instability and irresolvable conflict. In nationalist eras communities can no longer pursue pure interests because the nationalist dogama reigns supreme and goes even against important material considerations of those communities. Nationalism is, therefore, a doctrine and the harbinger of instability and war in the international system.

It is interesting to note that neither Kedourie and Iqbal consider

41       (unclear) Nationalism, (New York: Praeger, 1961), Third Edition.

language and territoriality as insurmountable differences when it comes to co-operative efforts between disparate and separate groups which do not speak the same language and occupy clearly delineated and differentiated pieces of land. Kedourie, in having no solution to overcome those territorial claims and differentiated pieces of land. Kedourie, in having no solution to overcome those territorial claims and language difference, only recognises the negative aspects of nationalism -while Iqbal, identifying religion as a unifying force, can classify territorial separateness and language dissimilarities as minor obstacles in the creation of a religious nationalism. Thus, in opposition to Kedourie, Iqbal sees nationalism as a religious movement, which in being not mired in territorial squabbles and language bickering can be defined as a medium for peace, prosperity and freedom. For Iqbal, the Holy Qu’ran provides the only blueprint for a successful nationalist movement. He agrees with Kedourie that language and territorial separateness are not enough to transform a community into a positive force in the international system. Thus, in having many reservations about the efficiency and justice of a secular nationalism, Iqbal in some ways resembles Kedourie – but Iqbal in the end provides a rather strong, positive and encouraging image of his own brand of nationalism.

 At first sight K. Deutsch with his interpretation of nationalism has nothing to do with Iqbal’s idea of a religious nationalism. For Deutsch nationalism may be defined as follows: Nationalism “essentially consists of wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders.”⁴² Deutsch then divides the above definition into five separate propositions which describe in detail his communicative approach to nationalism. These five propositions may be summarised as follows:

(1) A prerequisite for a sense of group integration is communication among its members.

(2) If communication among members is hindered relative to that among non-members, the likelihood that group integration will develop is also hindered.

42 K. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, (Cambridge: The Technology Press, 1960), p. 71,  

(3)       The degree to which communication among groups is hinderet depends upon the balance between the rate of social mobilization and the rate of assimilation. If the former exceeds the later, the rate of group integration will diminish and vice versa. The level of social mobilisation can be measured by several indicators, among them: the level of technological innovations, the shift to non-agricultural occupations, monotisation, literacy, urbanisation, transportation network, language, and finally trade.

 The rate of assimilation can be measured by the proportion of individuals in an area whose previous language and historical traditions were different from those of the majority. Languages and traditions the majority which are now considered by the minorities in question as their own and assimilate them into the ranks of the majority. ⁴³

(4)       Depending upon the balance of assimilation factors and mobilisation factors, modernisation either facilities or retards the level of communiction that is essential for the progress by which a people becomes a nationality  and a nationality becomes a nation state.⁴⁴

(5)       The group with the highest level of social communication is the most nationalistic.

As we said before, at first sight Deutsch’s interpretation of nationalism has nothing in common with Iqbal’s religious nationalism. However, if we go beyond the technical aspects of communication, we may find some common ground between Iqbal and Deutsch. Following propositions one to five of Deutsch’s exegesis of nationalism we may be able to trace certain similarities between Iqbal and Deutsch. In proposition one we find that group communication aids group integration. As Islam is a religion of deeds, communicative acts are considered to be very important. In fact, the word is seen as the forerunner of the deed. Islam thus emphasises communication as a means to form and to solidify the religious community, THE UMMA, which is the comerstone of all its efforts to bring about religious nationalism. In proposition two we are faced with the problem of obstacles to communication. Iqbal would fully subscribe to proposition two, indicating that non-communication among Muslim brothers and sisters would eventually lead to the disin-  

(unclear)

tegration of the UMMA. In proposition three Iqbal would clearly stress the assimilative power of Islam, the Holy Qu’ran provides all the guide- lines for the integration of new members. Religious communication and acts relegate all other social, political, ecomomic and technological factors to secondary positions of minor importance. In proposition four Iqbal would surely indicate that in Islam, religious communication, shall tip the balance of power in favour of assimilation over mobilisation.⁴⁵ Religion, Islam, shall act like a sponge, assimilating and uniting all mobilised individuals. To Iqbal it does not matter what kind of causes and factors make those individuals join the mobilised mass, they all will be absorbed by Islam. In proposition five Iqbal would add as an explanatory note that the Islamic community, THE UMMA, would be that group with the most frequent and intense level of communication.

 If we give Deutsch’s exegesis of nationalism a religious and deemphasise its modernist approach, then we come very close to Iqbal’s idea of religious nationalism. Because communication is a product of the mind, spiritual matters play an important role in Deutsch’s interpretation of nationalism. The belief in Almighty Allah God is the communicative link between Muslims and guides all their actions. Therefore,Muslims nationalism can never by-pass religion, it is enshrined in the word of Al- Qu’ran and the sayings of the Prophet (peace be upon him). Acoording to Iqbal, any kind of communication is a religious communication. Words outside religious considerations are meaningless for a Muslim; all his private and public life is accompanied by the Holy Qu’ran and the sayings of the Prophet(peace be upon him). Social communication is therfore, if it has to have any meaning at all, religious communication.

Finally, let us conclude this brief overview of some mainstream theories of nationalism with a look at Hechter’s Internal Colonialism, the theoretical piece de resistance of this dissertation. Iqbal, in examining Hechter’s conclusion, would immediately hierachisise along a religious continuum Hechter’s three hypotheses. Most important for Iqbal would be the religious difference among the various groups, relegating all other dissimilarities to a secondary position. Iqbal would not oppose Hechter’s

45       It should be noted again here that, for Iqbal, mobilisation of a Muslim always ends with his even stronger assimilation into the Umma, the Islamic community. It should also be noted that traditional societies can “modernise” through an increase in communication. Yet, their members have not undergone social mobilisation in the Deutschian sense which implies that those members should break away from their orignal (kinship) group and join a new gesellschaft. See, Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, (London: Eyre and Spottiwoode, 1969).   

ideas: he would just rearrange the priorities to suit his religious world view. Hechter’s linguistic and economic disparities would be embodied periphery (Islam). Iqbal could use Hechter’s idea (in an Islamized version) into the overall difference of a religious core (Hinduism) and  as an explanation for the creation of Pakistan.

Overall, one can thus say Iqbal, despite his identification with Althusser,⁴⁶ despite his ‘ideoreligious approach’, has often the tendency to find himself among mainstream nationalist theoreticians. The dividing line between Iqbal and the other theoreticians of nationalism,⁴⁷ is very often religion – which how ever in its absolute dominance is likely io obscure the commonalities between his and their approach to nationalism.

After having discussed at some length the political philosophy of Iqbal, it is important to point out that not every group and organisation, especially religious groups, supported the cause of Mr.Jinnah and Iqbal. It can be said that Iqbal’s appeal was limited to a minority educated class It was this class which later became the fire brigade of Mr.Jinnah’s campaign for Pakistan. It is also interesting to note that many powerful religious groups were opposed to the Muslim League’s demand for the creation of a separate Muslim homeland. Foremost among them was the Jamiat-ul- Ulema-e Hind, the leading organisation of the so-calledUlema of Deoband(U.P. India) who have been categorised as Islamic traditics alists.” A great deal of effort was devoted by the Muslim League Jesd ership to win over this group. Eventually they succeeded in doing thet Although only partially, on the eve of partition they obtained the conser of a section of the Ulema of Deoband which was led by Maulana Shabir Ahmed Usmani (R.A).

Likewise the Islamic Fundamentalists Jamate-i Islami led by Maulana Maududi were also opposed to the ideals of the Pakistan movement. Since the creation of an independent Pakistan they have gone to great length to conceal or explain away their earlier stance. But for one

46       Althusser like Iqbal sees a human being as an integral part of a community. Communal values and traditions are the essence of an individual: an individual is always subjected to a collective conscience. Thus, collective consciousness over rules individual wil. Whatever tolerance is granted to individual expression is within the accepted spectrum of collective consciousness.

47       Among whome: H. Kohn, E. Gellner, K. Deutsch, M. Hechter.

48       For details see, Z. Faruqui, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, (London: Asia Publishing House, 1963).

particular social group Iqbal’s concept of Muslim nationalism was particularly meaningful. That class was the product of the colonial transformation. It comprised those who had received an education that would equip them for employment in the expanding colonial state apparatus.  This was an ever increasing class consisting of the lower-rank government officials. Among them we also find clerks, technicians and members of independent professions like lawyers, doctors and teachers. Mr.Hamza Alavi has termed this class the “Salariat”. According to Alvi, “for the want of a better term I have referred to them as the salariat. The term middle class is too wide and petty bourgeoisie has connotations especially in Marxist political discourse that would not refer to this class.”⁴⁹

The point we are trying to make here is to emphasise the role of this social class in the creation of Pakistan and the pivotal role they played in an independent Pakistan. During  the Pakistan movement, they put all their weight behind Mr.Jinnah. Includedin this group were also the university students who according to Dr. Manir-uz-zaman were the most important “associational” group behind the Muslim League. Much has been written on the All India Muslim Students Federation in the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah especially fraternised with the Muslim students of Alligarh, Islamia College Lahore and Dacca University. They were all established dúring the Raj period and these were the places where Mr.Jinnah delivered some of his most important speeches. According to Dr. Manir-uz-Zaman it was the Muslim students who carried the slogans of an independent Pakistan to the remotest villages.⁵⁰ Their help in the election campaign of 1946 contributed greatly to the Muslim League’s success. However, in a society in which the rural votes predominate and are controlled by the landed magnates the Muslim salariat could make little progress in any elections until it reached an accommodation with the rural elites.

 It was not until 1938 that the Muslim League concluded an agreement with the regional power holders who ruled over Bengal, Sind and the Punjab. It was fragile alliance founded on the ephemeral basis of temporary mutual interests. Jinnah’s main offer to the regional landed aristocracy was to convince them that the post-independence government would not be in the hands of the Congress Party, a party committed to

49       Hamza Alvai, Pakistan and Islam : Ethnicity and Ideology, (unpublished 1987), p- 4. (Manuscript available from the author).

50       T. Maniruzzaman, The Politics of Development: The Case of Pakistan   1947-58, (Dacca: Green Book House, 1971).p.21.  

land reform and a strong (urban) centre. They, the rural elites, show rather vote for the Muslim League which in their dependency on them would thus ensure their survival as a coherent and strong class. In gaining the support of these rural elites, Mr.Jinnah had to confront a great number of powerful provincial politicians such as Mr.Sikander Hayat from the Punjab, Mr.G.M. Syed from Sind, Mr.A.K. Fazlul Haq from Bengal and some honoraries from the NWFP-who all were solidly entrenched in these Muslim majority provinces.

Mr. Jinnah considered that these politicians were unable to realise that Congress was in a position, once the British left, to suppplant the federal structure with a more centralised system. This, he felt, was underscored whith the damage a nationalist party can wreak on regional parties. Mr.Nehru saw provincial autonomy as the real threat to a united India. This perceived threat had been a persistent theme in his political speeches since his trenchant attacks on the1935 Constitution.⁵¹

It is not surprising that the provincial leadership of the Muslim majority provinces soon gave in to Jinnah’s leadership demands. They were, of course, not prepared to surrender their local autonomy to a centralist power. Mr.Jinnah and the All India Muslim League provided the various regionally based Muslim groups with a convenient voice at the centre of Indian politics in the dialogue with the Indian National Congress and the colonial masters. Jinnah’s strategy evolved and he became soon the sole spokesman of the Muslim community of India. In his quest for more political power, Mr.Jinnah began to use the communal language to unite the Muslims. After 1940 Mr.Jinnah was also to attract the Muslim upper classes whowere not without their economic difficulties. The slogan “Pakistan now” meant that Muslim Banks, Muslimindustries and Muslim commercial houses would be established in an independent Pakistan without the fear of Hindu competition, which would be removed permanently from their state. However, it cannot be overemphasised that Jinnah’s most passionate supporter remained the Muslim salarait class – a class which was absolutely central to the Pakistan movement.⁵² But ironically, the Muslim salarait was not evenly distributed in size and influence in

51      For details see chapter II.

52      Referring back to Hechter’s theory of intermal colonialism, we again have to stress *tharthe salariat class is an excellent example of an educated minority elite who cannot obtainva justrecompense from the centre. Therefore, it is no surprise that the salar class is at the fore of a secessionist-cum-independence movement. It should also be added that the salariat class could envisage to gain a lot in terms of new employment   

different parts of the Muslim majority provinces of colonial India. And its future fragmentation was written into the pattern of this uneven development.⁵³

The Bengali Muslim salarait was the largest in terms of absolute size as compared to Muslims of other provinces. Neverthless, its share of government jobs was proportionally much smaller than that of Hindus of Bengal, and Bengali Muslims were always an underprivileged majority.⁵⁴ They saw in Jinnah’s idea of an independent Pakistan their last hope to free themselves from total Hindu domination.

One passage from Jinnah’s interview given in 1946 during his visit to Calcutta is produced below to show how he articulated the hope of the Muslims of Bengal: Question: “Sir, they say that Pakistan will be a country for the rich ones only and not for the poor. Is it true?” Answer: “I [Jinnah] came to Bengal in 1937 and toured the interior; I saw the extreme poverty in the eyes of the Muslims. They were totally crushed by the Hindu zamindars, who held them in their grip of iron. They produced the golden fibre from the land of God and it was taken away by the Hindu Marwaris and the agents of English businessmen at low prices, and then it was sent to Calcutta and made colossal profits for them. The Muslims who had actually grown the fibre did not have even a proper chirt to his back, not enough food for his children who had grown thin and enaciated because of perpetual starvation. My heart bled for those brethren of mine. I thought and thought about how their lot could be improved and I came to the conclusion that nothing could be done unless political power in this area was ours. If the British left – and that area did not become Pakistan, then the Hindus will never allow us to make any laws to free the Muslims from the yoke of the cruel zamindars. So must we have Pakistan.”⁵⁵

from the creation of a new independent state entity called Pakistan, In short, the Muslim salariat had – out of self-interest – to fight for the Pakistan movement.

53       Uneven development causes secessionist movements, but uneven development within secessionist movements may also be the source of the downfall of these afore- mentioned associations.

54       Hechter would classify this phenomenon as a clear case of relative ecomomic deprivation – which could only be remedied by the minority taking recourse to drastic (secessionist) political action.

55        Quoted in Serajuddin Hussain, Days Decisive, (Dacca: L. Rahman, 1970),   p. 1.     

            Jinnah’s rhetoric and technique of political articulation produceds the desired result. During the election of 1946 when others (non-Bengali Muslims in other provinces) were not voting for Pakistan 99% (percent of the Muslim population of Bengal did vote for the purpose of achieve Pakistan.⁵⁶

In a nutshell, the central theme of this chapter is that the Pakistan movement was a movement in which diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions, representing different social strata and interests were allied in pursuit of one objective, the creation of a Muslim state. Jinnah’s political genius lay precisely in his ability to orchestrate a losse,(unclear) and unpredictable coalition of forces.⁵⁷ Comprised of diverse groups, both regionally and socially, the unity of the movement that ultimately resulted  in the creation of Pakistan was precarious one. According to Dr. Ayesha Jalal, Jinnah, more than anyone else knew, “that the greatest threat to  Pakistan’s survival would be internal , not external.”⁵⁸

 

He would need the authority of the Govemor General to control the provincialism of the Pathans, the Bengalis, the Sindhis and the Baluchis.⁵⁹ Joseph Rothschild also remarks that, “no society or political system is today immune from the burgeoning pressure of ethnic nationalism, with its possible legitimating or delegitimating effects. Communist and non-communist, old and new, advanced and developing, centralist and federalist stages must all respond to the pressure of this ascendast ideology.⁶⁰

  Let us therefore turn to Jinnah’s Pakistan and examine how the rulers there responded to the pressure of this ascendant ideology. But before engaging in this task, we should reiterate the importance of the

54      Referring back to Hechter, we can deduce from this voting behaviour  that the Muslim Bengalis felt more oppressed in economic and cultural terms than other Muslin minorities.

57       The theory of internal colonialism does not account very well for charismatic leadership. Therefore, this theory – or modle – is unable to capture and evaluate the greatness of Jinnah’s contribution to the establishment of an independent Pakistan.

58      Ayesha Jalal, “Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue”, Modem Asian Studies, Vol 19, no 1, 1985, p. 50.

59       Ibid.

60 Joseph Rosthchild,”Observations on thePolitical Legitimacy in Contemporay Europe”, Political Science Quaterly, vol. 92, fall 1977, p. 495. Also see his Ethno Plitics. (New Columbia University Press, 1981) 

salarait class in the nationalist – cum-independence struggle of Pakistan: The salarait class, be they clerks or even dentists, provides the skill on a communicative and organisational level which can make a nationalist movement succeed. The salarait class are motivated to fight for political independence because a new state means increased employment opporturities  for them, be it in the state bureaucracy proper or in the auxiliary welfare agencies.⁶¹

The salarait class is thus instrumental in great nationalist struggles, and played its necessary part- or more than that-in the creation of Pakistan. A salarait found be seen as the ‘avant-garde’ in the fight against internal colonialism, an ‘avant-garde’ which may have some reservations about Iqbal’s interpretation of religious nationalism and may only on the surface

61       Please consult Hechter’s hypothesis on economic deprivation. Only the creation of a new (minority) state and its concomittant establishment of a state bureaucracy can absorb the often unemployed members of the minority salariat in a formerly multi- ethnic state community.   

CHAPTER-4

POST – 1947 POLITICS IN JINNAH’S PAKISTAN

“Thing fall apart; the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy in loosed upon the world” (W.B. Yeats)

On the 14th of August 1947, largest Muslim state and in Mr Jinnah’s poignant phrase, “mutilated, moth-eaten and truncated”¹ Pakistan was established on the map of the world. Many people especially the Congress party, its chief rival during the pre-independence era, had doubts about its viability due to its geographical peculiarity. Mr.Nehru called the demand for Pakistan a, “geographical curiosity and a political absurdity.”²

Accoording to another observer, the creation of Pakistan was a “political monstrosity.”³ Commenting on the geographical separation of the two territorial units of Pakistan P.G. Griffith said, “It is difficult to believe that there will be any effective link between the two territories, and we ought perhaps to think not of Pakistan, but of two separate Pakistans.”⁴

According to Khalid-B-Sayeed, a number of political and economic experts expressed their doubts about the economic viability of Pakistan and therefore did not consider it to be a practical proposition.⁵ The author of the book, Verdict on India, Beverly Nichols, in an interview with Mr.Jinnah, in 1944 asked him, the following question on the economic future of Pakistan. “Are the Muslims likely to be richer or poorer under Pakistan?

1          David Loshak, Pakistan Crisis: (London: Morrison and Gibb Ltd, 1971), p. 23.

2          A.H.M. Zahedul Karim, “An Economic Hinterland: Geographically Disjointed and Lingua-Cultural Differences: Three factors for the disintegration of Pakistan and the Emergence of Bangladesh”, Asian Profile, col 15, no 1, February 1987, p.42

3. Aminur Rahim, “Terriotorial Politics and National Development in Pakistan (1947- 1969)”, Asian Profile, vol 10, no 3, June 1982, p.231

4. P.G. Griffiths, “India and the Future”, The Nineteenth Century and After, vol CXLII, (August 1974), p. 55. 4

5. Khalid-B-Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1967), p. 60.

Mr.Jinnah replied, I will ask you a question for a change. Supposing you were asked which you would prefer… a rich England under Germany or a poor England free, what would your answer be?”. Author, “It is hardly necessary to say.”⁶

Jinnah’s answer suggests that the supporters of the Pakistan movement, caught up in the heat generated by that movement during 1940- 47, refused to engage in any dialogue with sceptics and opponents of is reflected in the speeches of its leaders who assembled in Delhi during the Pakistan proposition.⁷ The great momentum created by the movement to live in peace. We do not intend to start a civil war, but we want a land are prepared to fight. Let me honestly declare that every Muslim of Bengal early April 1946. Mr. Hussain S. Suhrawardy of Bengal said, “We want where we can live in peace… I have long pondered whether the Muslims is ready and prepared to lay down his life, and turning to Quaid-i-Azam he demanded: I call upon you to test us.”⁸  

Choudhry Khaliquzzaman from United Province was the next speaker and he said, “Muslims will now decide their own destiny, we will lay down our lives for Pakistan.”⁹

Then the Nawab of Mamdot from the Punjab rose to speak and

6          Beverly Nichols, Verdict on India, (London: Joathan Cape, 1944), p. 190. For a detail argument on this issue also see the following works, S. Gopal (edites)., Selected Work of Jawaharlal Nehru, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), vol1. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), Especially chapter 22. Ayesha Jalal, “India’s Paritition and the Defence of Pakistan: A Historical Perspective”, Journal of Imperial of and Commonwealth History, vol XX, no 3, May 1978, and Kalim Siddiqui, The Fuctions of International Coflict, (Karachi: Royal book company, 1975), especially chapter 5.

7          See the following work for detail argument on this point S. Gopal (edited)., op. cit., M.A. Jinnah, “Two nations in India”, an article in Time and Tide, col xxi, no 10 (Lodon: 1940). Nazir Yar Jung, (edited)., “The Pakistan issue: Corresptondence between Dr. S.A. Latif and Mr. M.A. Jinnah on the one hand, and between Dr. S.A. Latif and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on the other, and connected papers on the subject of Pakistan”. (Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1943), and Ambedkar B.R., Pakistan or the Partition of India, (Bombay: Thacker, 1946), Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, (Princeton: PricetonUniversity Press, 1057).

8          Stanley Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 261-62.

9. Ibid,.

he said, “We are asked how we will defend Pakistan? I would say that if stalwarts soldiers of the Punjab could defend Britain against Nazi aggression they can also defend their own hearths and homes.”¹⁰

From the North West frontier the Pathan leader Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, rose to shout amidst thunderous applause: “Thank God, we have one flag, one leader, one platform and one ideal, Pakistan, to fight for. We are only waiting for the final order to do whatever is considered necessary for the attainment of Pakistan.”¹¹

 

 Young Shaukat Hayat” was there to assure Mr.Jinnah, his Quaid- i-Azam (great leader). “I speak for the Punjabi soldier, and I say that pledged to three-quarter million demobilised soldiers in the Punjab are pledged to achieve Pakistan.. you, sir, are holding us back, and we beg of you to give the word of command. Let us prove to the doubting how we can and how we mean to defend our Pakistan.”¹³

Then Sir Feroz Khan Noon, another representative of the feudal class, from the Punjab rose to comment: “Neither the Hindus or the British  know yet how far we are prepared to go in order to achieve Pakistan.”¹⁴

By any standard, it was an impressive demonstration of unity by the Muslim elites, representing Muslims from various regions of India According to Saleem Qureshi, “Within a short period of six years this heterogeneous aggregation, under its elite leadership had been converted into a solid and unwavering nationalist movement.”¹⁵

From 1940 onwards the attainment of Pakistan, a separate homeland for the Muslims, was sold to the Muslim masses by their leaders, as a panacea that would open the way to the transformation of the lives of

10       Ibid,.

11       Ibid.,

12       Ibid., It is important to point out that all the speakers mentioned here were Western educated and strong representatives of the feudal class.

13       Ibid.,

14       Ibid.,

15       Salcom Qureshi, “Pakistani Nationalism Reconsidered”, Pacific Affairs, vol 45, 1972-(unclear).

     

the Muslims of India.¹⁶ According to Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “The slogan for a separate state gave the Muslims of India an idea to live and die for. It fired the imagination of the people and revived the Islamic romanticism of the Khilafat days.”¹⁷

 Therefore, the mind of the supporters of the Pakistan movement was directed towards a single fixed goal achievement of Pakistan.The cry was at all cost. As stated earlier, the supporters of Pakistan brushed aside all serious questions raised by the opponents of the Pakistan movement and asserted in clear cut terms that the Muslims of India are a nation. Give us a state they argued, and we will show you that it will work.¹⁸ At this point it has to be emphasised that the most passionate supporters of the Pakistan movement were the Muslims of  Bengal. According to Mr.Iftekhar Ahmed, “It was in East Bengal, which was later to separate from Pakistan, that the support for Pakistan was greatest. The Bengali middle class was totally excluded from government service and the professions because of Hindu domination. It therefore stood to gain most by the creation of a Muslim territory and government, especially if it also included, as was then thought, West Bengal. In addition, the large majority of Muslims in East Bengal were poor peasants living under Hindu land- lords the Movement for Pakistan there became a radical populist issue.”¹⁹

            In fact, from 1938 onwards the Bengali middle class led by A.K. Fazlul Haq and his Krishak Praja party, first aligned themselves with and Jater joined the Muslim League, thus strengthening its base in Bengal.

According to Ayesha Jalal, “the Muslim League was a beneficiary of the groundwork prepared by decades of Praja Samity activites in those localities.”²⁰ Indeed,Fazlul Haq, leader of the Kirishak Praja Party, who

16       See Keith Cllard, Pakistan: A Plotical Study, (London: Geoge Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1957), p. 37.

17       Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Politics of Development: The Case of Pakistan 1947- 58. (Dacca: Green Book House United 1971), p. 20.

18       Also see Khalid-B-Sayeed for a similar line of argument, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, (London: Oxford University Pree, 1968).

19       Iftekhar Ahmed, “Pakistan: Class and State Formation”, Race and Class, vol xxxii, no 3, 1981, p. 251.

20       Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: JInnah the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, (Combridge: Cambridge University Press 1985),. pp 151-52. For a detail study on the role of Krishak Praja Party see Momen, Humaira, Muslim Politics in Bengal: A Study of Krishk Paraja Party and Election of 1937, (Dacca: Sunny House, 1972).  

later joined the Muslim League, was responsible for moving the famous Lahore resolution of 1940 from the platform of the Muslim League. The resolution stated, “The North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘independent states’ in which the constituent units  should be autonomous and sovereign.”²¹

Since 1940 the Bengali middle class began to influence the Muslim peasantry (especially in Estern Bengal) in favour of a Muslim state. The Congress party, with its core leadership representing the Hindu landed and business interests, was portrayed by the Muslim League leadership as a Hindu organisation.²² Through this strategy the Bengalis expected to secure a territory and government of their own and their own market in goods and services. After 1940, to the Bengali Muslims it appeared that in an independent Muslim state their interests would have a free and full play.²³ So they were in the forefront of the Pakistan

21       It is important to point out that the Lahore resolution of 1940, after the creation of Pakistan, became the bone of contention between its liberal interpreter from Bengal and orthodox interpreters from West Pakistan. For the Bengali elite interpretation of the Lahore Resolution see, R. Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p.21 and Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional quest for Autonomy. (Dacca: University Press Ltd, 1979). According to these authors, the resolution which was finally adopted called for “independent states” in the North-West and East. The idea of one Muslim state gained ground it became evident that Bengal would be partitioned and that the eastern region wou be territorially vulnerable as an independent state. Only in 1946 was the Labore resolution amended in favour of one Muslim state. For a West Pakistani interpretation of the Lahore Resolution see S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1968) and Dr Kaniz F. Yusuf Political Legacy of Jinnah, (London: The Pakistan Muslim League Publication, 1986). For conflicting views on the amendment controversy see, Khliquzzaman Choudhury, Pathway to Pakistan,(Lahore: Longmans, 1961), and Moudud Ahmed op. ci.,

22       For detail discussion on this point see ChapterlI.

23       In Bengal the number of Muslims in universities and colleges, including professional colleges, rose by about hundred percent between 1921/22 and 1926/27. By this time, however, opportunities were scarce, as jobs became fewer and competition tougher, See Iftekhar Ahmed, op cit., p. 250. According to Ram Krishna Mukherjee, “During the early 20th century Hindu middle class was solidly entrenched in Bengal’s economy. The corresponding Muslim interest could not compete with it even though it held political power since 1937. The urban population, educated community, landed interest and the bureaucracy of Bengal were still predominantly Hindu. Also regionally West Bengal (with its Hindu stronghold) held East Bengal (with its Muslim stronghold) as its hinterland”. Ram Krishna Mukherjee, “Nation Building and State Formation(unclear)

movement. Free against the Hindu landlords²⁴ and It was only from 1946 onwards that the real support from the Punjab the money lenders and the Muslims of Bengal now perceived themselves as the masters of their own fate. They were eager to develop their own area and bring economic progress to all of their land. But before they could determine the role they were likely to play in the serious task of nation building it was necessary to take stock of the situation that had emerged as a direct result of the division of India. After its creation the advocates of Pakistan could no longer avoid the questions raised by their opponents. The emotional fervour generated by the independence movement was soon replaced by a sombre mood in the face of the many difficulties encountered in the prosaic, yet difficult task of nation building. The immediate problem of Pakistan, as we pointed out earlier, was its geographical peculiarity.

According to Khalid-B-Sayeed, “Its territory cleft into two physically separate parts would have created difficulties even for a state blessed with far greater resources and much better administrative and political leadership.” ²⁵

 

But such was not the case with Pakistan. Economically “Pakistan took over the poorer areas of the subcontinent, areas lacking in industry, nopulation predominantly uneducated and unskilled. It was not self sufficient in any important manufactured product, and resources of fuel and power were pitfall inadequate.”²⁶

 

further their interests by responding to the call of the all India Muslim League, which was steadily gaining strength, after 1940, when it demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. For a detailed study of the Muslim middle class in Bengal also see; A.K. Nazmul Karim, The Dynamics of Bangladesh Society, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House PVTLtd, 1980), especially chapter four, “The Muslim Middle Class and the Muslim Political Elite in the Nineteenth Century”, pp. 177-233.

24       It was the Muslims of Bengal and the Bengal Muslim League who strengthened the cause of Pakistan. When Bengali Muslims lent full support to the creation of Pakistan, the other regions in the North-West including the Punjab were still specified about the whole thing came for Pakistan. Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p. 6.

25       Khalid-B-Sayeed, the Political System of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 60. Also see; Choudhury Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967), especially chapter9, “Problem of Partition”. Stanley Wolpert,op. cit., especially chapter 22-“Karachi, Pakistan Zindabad, (1947)”, pp. 332-354. Also see lan Stephens, Pakistan, (London: ernest Benn, 1963), and R. Symonds, The Making of Pakistan. (London: Faber and Faber, 1950).

26       K. Callard, op.cit., p. 19.   

On the whole it can be said that the areas which joined Pakistan after 1947 lacked the infrastructure needed for industrialisation. Commenting on the economic condition of Bengal, a British warned that East Bengal after partition might become a rural slum.²⁷ In comparison to East Pakistan, West Pakistan however had some industrial infrastructure, (see Table 1), like large port, big cities and a business governor had community (see Table 2).

Table 1

Infrastructure 1947	E.Pakistan	W.Pakistan
All weather roads	240 miles	5,050 miles
Railway line	1,618 route miles	4.999route miles
Canal irrigation	–	10 million hectares
Power Installed Capacity
Public Undertakings	10,700 kw	68,800 kw

Source:Quoted in M.Ahmad,op.cit.,p.14.

Table 2

Social and Business Background of the Twelve Big Houses
Name	Family Origin	Business Location pre-1947	Head QuartersLocation post-1947
Dawood	Kathiawar(Bantua)	Bombay	Karachi
Habib	Bombay	Bombay	Karachi
Adamjees	Kathiawar(Jetpur)	Calcutta	Karachi
Cresent	Western Punjab(Chiniot)	Delhi	Lahore
Saigol	Western Punjab(Chakwal)	Calcutta	Lahore
Valika	Bombay	Bombay	Karachi
Heysons	Madras	Madras	Karachi
Bawany	Kathiwar(Jetpur)	Rangoon	Karachi
Amin	Western Punjab	Calcutta	Lahore
Wazirali	Western Punjab(Lahore)	Lahore	Lahore
Fancy	Kathiwar	East Africa	Karachi
Colony	Western Punjab(Chiniot)	Lahore	Lahore

Source:Hanna Panapek,”Pakistan’s Big Businessmen:Muslim Sepratism Entreprenurship, and Partial Modernisation”,in Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol 21, no 1,(October:1972),p.27.

27       Dom Moraes, The Tempest Within: An Account of East Pakistan, (Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1971), p. 23. For a detailed account on East Pakistan at the time of partition   

Table 3

Per Capita Income Total Income
	Total Income		Difference	Per Capita Income		Disparity
	E.Pak	W.Pak	E.Pak	E.Pak	W.Pak
1949-50(GNP)	12360	12106	+254	287	338	18%
1959-60(GNP)	14489	17253	-2764	278	366	13%
1967-68	20235	2865	-8417	302	530	75%

Source:Quoted in M.Ahmad,op.cit.p.14.

Table 4

Gross Provincial Product (GPP)During 1949-50 and 1969-70 Factor Cost Per Capita GPP
Year	GPP Rs. Crores		Per Capita GPP Rs
	Bangladesh	W.Pakistan	Bangladesh	W.Pakistan
1949-50	1237.4	1209.1	293	342
1954-55	1381.6	1410.6	290	354
1959-60	1497.2	1646.7	278	366
1963-64	1867.1	2009.0	313	403
1964-65	1861.8	2244.1	301	443
1965-66	1953.7	2243.2	303	459
1967-68	2143.0	2708.2	320	494
1968-69	2237.5	2891.2	325	514
1969-70	2271.3	3156.3	321	546

Quoted in, T. M Khan and A. Bergen, “Measurement of Structural Change in Pakistan Economy: A Review of National Income Estimates”, in The Pakistan Development Review., vol, vi, 1966, p. 50.

In a way one can say that West Pakistan had a better start in economic terms and their Per Capita income (see Table ), was higher than in East Bengal in 1947.²⁸ In terms of G.D.P. (see Table 4), however,

 of 1947, also see, Rushbrook william, The East Pakistan Tragedy, (London: Tom Stacey, 1972), Especially chapter one, “East Pakistan: The Legacy of the Past”, pp. 13-27.

28 See Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p. 9. Also see; Dr. R. Matiur Rehmanm The Role of India and the Big Powers in East Pakistan Crisis of 1971, (London: Razia Rahman, 1984), p. 11. 

both the wings of Pakistan roughly started from the same position. The capital of the two wings, separated by 1000 miles, was in Karachi (later Islamabad). The army headquarters were in Rawalpindi, the air force headquarters were in Peshawar and the navy headquarters were in Karachi. All the important headquarters of the so-called modern state institutions were thus located in West Pakistan. Added to these advantages were the wealth and expertise brought by the rich immigrants from the Muslim minority areas of India. A great majority of these wealthy merchants decided to settle in West Pakistan²⁹ Commenting on this state of imbalance Mr.Moudud Ahmed³⁰ writes, “Pakistan had all the ingredients to allow concentration of both the political and economic powers in the hands of a coterie of leaders. She had an elite comprised of the feudal lords, the wealthy immigrants, civil servants and the army all located in the Western wing centering round the Punjab to decide the future destiny of Pakistan.”³¹ Commenting on the domestic politics of Pakistan during the first seven years of its existence, when the Muslim League v was in power, and virtually without opposition, Keith Callard writes, “A well defined group of men monopolised political office throughout the country and transferred from one field to another as occasion seemed to warrant. The conclusion seems unavoidable that a group of about twenty individuals made all important political and governmental decision at every level. In particular they controlled the posts of central cabinet ministers… The changes of 1953 and 1954 showed that differences within this group could no longer be assuaged by copromise.”³²

The above quotation surely gives an impression that, after Jinnah’s

29       According to Dom Mornes, the separation would not have mattered so much if the industrial complex aruound Calcutta had come to Pakistan, but, as it was there was little incentive for the rich Muslim immigrants from India to interest themselves in their Bengali brothers. Dom Moraes, op. cit., p. 23.

30       It is most important to point out that, it is difficult to standardise some Muslim names, for example, Ahmed, Muhammad, Rahman, because they are spelt differently by different people. We have also, retained the old spelling of the city of Dacca. The new official spelling is Dakha.

31       Moudud Ahmed, op cit., p. 10. Also see M.B. Naqvi, for a similar lline of argument. According to Naqvi,”The two wings are so unequal. The power structure of the country is based upon West Pakistan and is largely located there”. “Pakistan: Revolution Without a Plan”, Asian Review, vol. 2, no. 4, July 1969, p.272.

32       Keith Callard, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 

death, politicians belonging to the then ruling party, the Muslim League, were in total control of the political life. However, some of the well known writers on Pakistan politics do not agree with this point of view. One view is that politicians never really had a chance to govern Pakistan. They were themselves only the ‘hand-maids’ of another class. It is claimed reason the process of politicising the masses was never allowed to set in with any degree of earnestness and so it was possible that divisive forces overwhelmed an already weak and politically troubled Pakistan.³³

Moreover, the views of Mr.Moudud Ahmed expressed above, give a very different picture. His views convey the impression that from the start the arrangements were indicative of the political subservience of East Pakistan to West Pakistan. One can argue that such was not necessarily the case. politically the Bengalis had a clear-cut edge over the West Pakistanis. Pakistan was to be a parliamentary democracy where representation in the parliament was to be on the basis of population. Here the Bengalis were in the majority (see Table 5). Therefore the Bengali elites had nothing to fear and they pinned all their hopes on the political process of a working parliamentary democracy. Bengalis believed that due to their numerical strength in the parliament they would have ultimately a decisive voice in a democratic Pakistan and could over time remedy all social and economic inequalities which Pakistan inherited from the British Empire.³⁴

Table 5

Population
	Total Population (Millions) (Millions)		Population Density
	1951	1961	1951	1961
East Pakistan	41.9	50.8	701	922
West Pakistan	33.7	42.9	109	138

Source: Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p. 12.

33       For this line of argument the following works are important: Hamza Alavi, “The Army and the Bureaucracy”, in Pakistan International Socialist Journal, year 3, no 14, March- April 1966. Mohammed Mohabbat Khan, Bureaucratic Self Preservation, (Dacca: The University of Dacea, 1980). Emajuddin Ahmed, Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth: Bangladesh and Pakistan, (Dacca: The University Press Ltd., 1980), and C.P. Bhambhri and M. Bhaskaran, “Bureaucracy in Authoritarian Political System: The Case of Pakistan”, in S.P. Varma and P Narain (edited)., op. cit. 

34       See R. Jahan, op. cit., p. 49, and Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, Emergence of Bangaldesh and Role of Awami League, (New Delhi: Vikas Publilshing House PVTLtd., 1982).

During the period in question did the Bengali elites actually succeed in wielding power commensurate with their numbers? In order to answer this vital question we will have to turn our attention to the role of the forces centered in West Pakistan: the West Pakistani based military and bureaucratic institutions. But before we do that, let us diven our attention to another very important issue which surfaced immediately after the creation of Pakistan and more importantly during the life of Mr. M.A.Jinnah, the all powerful Governor General of Pakistan.³⁵

The Politics of Language: A Long View

The language issue shook the very foundation of Pakistan and according to one author, “The freedom struggle of Bangladesh originated from the Bengali language movement.”³⁶ T.V. Sathyamurthy also lends his support to this proposition when he argues that, “Even before the economic disparities between the Eastern and the Western wings of Pakistan thrust themselves to the forefront of political relations, the linguistic question loomed on the horizon as the single most important point of conflict.”³⁷

Stressing the importance of language, Bud B. Khleif writes that focus on language is the key to ‘ethnicassertiveness’ and the core of cultural identity.³⁸ He says, “The mark of authenticity, the sine qua non of identity, has become language. Language status reflects personal and group status an oppressed language is an oppressed individual, is an oppressed community. In-group affirmation is done through language, through making the native  language the tool of cultural regeneration of socio-economic and socio-

35      On the role and power of the Governor General see Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan: The Fromative Phase, op. cit., especially chapter 8, “Constitutional and Political powers of the Governor General”, pp. 233-257 and Ian Stephens, op. cit., Both Khalid-B- Sayeed and lan Stephens provide a useful account of constitutional changes which concentrated powers in the hands of the Governor General.

36       Rafiqul Islam, “The Bengali Language Movement and Emergence of Bangladesh”, contribution to Asian Studies, vol. xi, 1978.

37       T.V. Sathayamunthy,”Language, Religion and Political Economy: The Case of Bangladesh”. in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (edited)., Political Identity in South Asia, (London: Curzon Press, 1979), p. 225.

38       Bud B. Khleif, “Ethnicity and Language in Understanding the New Nationalim: 1e North Atlantic Region”, International Journal of Co-Operative Sociology, vol 23-24. 1982/83, p. 114.  

emotional rebirth.³⁹

Bengali was not a suppressed language, at least not, at the time when the British took over Bengal. According to R. Jahan, “Bengali language developed under the patronage of Muslim rulers and was greatly influenced by Islamic thought, albeit in the form of sufi mysticism.” ⁴⁰

It was also the language of the Bhadralok of Bengal. the estab- lishment of British rule, first in Bengal and then in the rest of India marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Bengali literature. As stated in the second chapter, the Bengali Hindus were quick to respond to the changes brought about by the British in the educational system. Their contact as a result of the changes, with the western world created in Bengal an intellectual awakening which has been called the ‘Bengali renaissance’. It introduced the English educated Hindu Bengalis to a world of new ideas. They soon began to write in Bengali prose, using a new style and exploring new subjects. As a result there emerged a host of powerful Hindu writers like, Ram Mohan Roy, Dina Bandhu Mitra and Rabindranath Tagore. The Bhadralok of Bengal. Their contribution not only transformed Bengali literature, but also raised it from rural folk literature to the level of world literature. However, it has to be noted that since it was the Hindu Bengalis who responded eagerly and availed the benefits of the educational system instituted by the British rulers in Bengal, so they were the ones who monopolised and contributed most in establishing a Western style literatur in the Bengali language.⁴¹ The Muslims rejected both English and Sanskritisised Bengali adopted by the Hindus. According to Mr. Enamul Haq, “The history of Bengali literature during the British period bears the mark of the mental resistance that the Muslims bore to the new change.”⁴²

According to Q.M. Hussain, “The Hindus of the period had

39   Ibid., p. 118.

40 R. Jahan op. cit., p. 13, also see     Mohammad Qazi Din, Bangla Sahityer Itihas, (History of Bengali literature),2 vols., (Dacca: Students Ways, 1968). Dr. Mohammad Shahidullah, Bangla Sahityer Katha, (History of Bengali literature), vol II, (Dacca: Renaissance Printers, 1965).

41 According to R. Jahan Bengali literatures secular renaissance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was very largely due to the contribution of Hindu authors op. cit., p. 13.

42 E Haq, Muslim Bengali Literature, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1957), p. 172.  

created a literature that entirely or almost entirely was an expression of the Hindu culture and ideology. As in politics so in literature the Muslim reaction took the shape of an outcry for Islam and the Muslims.”⁴³

Muslims of Bengal initially rejected both English and Sanskritisises Bengali and instead opted for Puthi literature. This Do-Bashi,⁴⁴  bilingual literature, according to Sufia Ahmed, can be traced back to its origin in the 16th century. But only in the nineteenth century did the output in this Mussalmani Bengali became significant. During this century a small group of educated Bengali Muslims who had no knowledge of English and had rejected Sanskritisised Bengali produced, according te Sufia Ahmed, thousands of books written in Puthi style.⁴⁵ According to the same author, there are still about ten thousands such books in Bengal.,⁴⁶ (An eye opener for those who wanted to Islamicise the Bengali language or bi- after the birth of Pakistan).

What is interesting to note about the efforts of the authors of these books is that they wrote in Bengali but made extensive use of Arabie and persian words wherever possible and literally feasible. Even the pages of the books were numbered from right like Arabic, Persian and Urdu.⁴⁶ “The more Arabic, Persian and Urdu works embedded in the Bengali matrix the better, for such words from the languages of Muslim religion

43 Q.M. Hussain, “Bengali Literature”, in S.M Ikram and P Spear, (edited)., The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford university Press, 1955), p 141.

44 The language was called Do-Bashi or bilingual because of the extensive use of Arahis and Persian words. This was also commonly known as Mussalmani Bengali,

45 Sufia Ahmed, Muslims Community in Bengal 1884-1912, (Dacca: oxford University Press, 1974), p. 306 The word puthi in literal English means manuscript. According to Q.M Hussain, Puthi filled the great cultural need of the common people who had no knowledge of Arabic and Persian. Q.M Hussain, Bengali Literature, op. cit., p. 140.

46 Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., p. 307.

47 For the Islamisation of Bengali culture and the impact of Persian on Mussalmani Bengali, see Muhammad Hussain, East Pakistan: A Cultural Survey, (Dacca: Ferozsons, 1955), p. 18. Also see S.F. Hassan Faizi, Pakistan; A Cultural Unity,(Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1970). For British influence on the Bengali Language see the excellent work of Bernard S. Cohn, “The Command of Language and the Language of Command”, in Ranajit Guha, (edited)., Subaltern Studies, voliv, writings on South asian history and society,(Delhi: Oxford university Press, 1985), pp. 276-329. Also see R.C. Majumdar, et al., An Advance History of India, (New York: Macmillan,(unclear)).   

and culture satisfied Muslim pride and served to establish the separate identity of their community.⁴⁸

According to M.A. Talib, Bengali has more than 6000 words in its vocabulary borrowed from Arabic and Persian.⁴⁹ The author refers to an interesting remark that the well known linguist Dr Muhammed Shahidulalh of Bangaldesh made about the influence of Persian on Bengali as the “Persian occupation over Bengali.”⁵⁰ Persian, Arabic and Urdu occupation of the Bengali language was enthusiastically accepted by the Bengali educated Muslims, because it helped them to retain their Muslim identity and at the same time enabled them to differentiate and distance themselves from Bengali literature produced by Hindu writers.

It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentienth  century that a few Muslim writers broke the tradition mentioned above and produced literary works in Sanskritisised, rather than Persianised Bengali. Once the tradition was broken, there grew up a host of Muslim writers who wrote with style and confidence in Sanskritisised Bengali on diverse subjects. One of the most important phenomena of this period was this rise of a group of Muslim writers who wrote in Sanskritisised Bengali but their writing was very communal. This group was known as Sudhakar.⁵¹ Their main objective was to counter the influence of Christianity and Hinduism on the common Muslim. It is popularly believed that the people on the lowest rungs of society were dissatisfied with their economic and social circumstances, and for pure survival, chose to convert to christianity. A similar kind of popular interpretation exists about the Bengali Muslims conversion to Islam in Dengal, Both Dr. Mohar Ali and Zillur Rehman have strongly argued against this popular interpretation of conversion to Islam in Bengal and

48 Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 307-8. For a similar line of argument also see, E Haq, op. cit. p. 175.

49 Mohd. Abu Talib, “Bangali in Bangladesh,”Contribution to, Asian Studies, vol xi, p. 70. 1978.

50 Ibid.,

51 Thr Dudhakar group represented the new political trend in Muslim Bengal. There were, however other writers outside the group who wrote in Sanskritisised Bengali. For details see the following works; Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981). and Mohd. Anisuzzaman, “The World of the Bengali Muslim writers in the 19th century (1870-1920)”, Seminar Paper, (University of Sussex, 9th May 1975).    

blamed an English anthropologist for popularising this theory.⁵²

Let us to back to the Sudhakar group and examine, briefly, the role of one of the most popular men in the group, Munshi Meherullah, who used to preach and debate openly in the fairs and markets of Jesor, against Christianity. It is reported by his biographer that, once in 1892, in Pirojpur, a subdivision in the district of Barisal, Meherullah had an open debate with Christian padres and preachers and tried to prove that  Islam was the best religion and that other religions, especially Christianity were inferior to Islam. According to his biographer, Meherullah is said to have defeated the Christian padres and preachers in argument and “brightened the face of Muslim community in Bengal.”⁵³

Munshi Meherullah was not only anti-Christian but was also deeply anti-Hindu and regrettede that, in various parts of Bengal, Muslims were influenced by Hindu manners and customs (to this day this remains the perception of West Pakistan elites about the Muslims of Bengal.)⁵⁴

But Meherullah was not the one to hold such a view the Muslims of Bengal. Both Hindu and Muslim historians on Islam have emphasised the humble origins of Bengali Muslims while referring to their cultural practices and their closeness the Hendu culture. The British historian and anthropologist, H.H. Risley and H. Beverly, were the first to promote this popular view of Bengali conversion to Islam.

According to Dr. Mohar Ali, H.H. Risley in his work, The Tribes

52 See Muhammed Mohar Ali, Histry of the Muslims of Bengal, Survey of Administration Society and Culture, vol Ib, (Riyadh: Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud Islamic University publication, 1985), especially chapter xxix, “Theories Regarding the Origin of Bengali Muslims”, pp. 750-760. Zillur R. Khan. “Islam and Bengali Nationalism, Asian Survey, vol xxv, no 8, August 1985, pp. 834-851.

53 Quoted in Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., p. 305. Sec especially chapter v, “Muslim Writings in Bengali 1884-1912”, pp. 305-369.

54 See Mohammed Umer Memon, “Pakistani Urdu creative Writing on National Disintegration: The case of Bangladesh”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol xliii, no I, November 1983, According to Zillur R. Khan, during the 1971 crisis”many West Palistani solders were given to understand by their officers that Bengali Muslims were but Hindus in disguise, and by waging war against these infidels they would serve th interests of Islam. Only when they faced reality, and came in direct contact with Bengali Muslim, did the Pakistani fighting men realise that they were locked into an untenable situation in which they were made to fight Muslims of equally good standing as themselves… perhaps the extreme demoralisation stemming from such realisation ultimately paved the way for the defeat of Pakistani fighters in East Pakistan 

and Castes of Bengal, vol I, “gave an anthropological touch to his treatment by reccording in the book the result of his measurement of nasal beights of the various classes of people including a number of Muslims on the basis of which he concluded that the Bengal Muslims were converts from the lowest classes of the Hindus.”⁵⁵

Both Hindu and Muslim historians not only accepted Risley’s thesis, but also helped in its promotion. Quotations from a number of well known subcontinental historians will help to explain how, under the influence of Risley’s naive thesis, the whole philosophy of ideological conversion, in Bengal, has been interpreted. According to the well-known Bengali historian Jadunath Sarkar, “The Muslim masses, Knowing only Bengali, heard the poems and stories in Bengali, witnessed performances based on these at Hindu festival, patronised by Hindu zamindars. Thus, the mental background of the Bengali Muslim was more Hindu than Muslim.”⁵⁶

Similar views about the Muslims of Bengal can also be found in the writings of S.M. Ikram, who wrote that both Bengali Hindus and Muslims used to read quite frequently the Bengali translations of the Mahabharata, and that the Muslims did not remember God or his Prophet (peace be upon him)⁵⁷. But, why only blame the Muslims of Bengal for

at the hands of the Indians in the1971 liberation war”, Zillur R. Khan, op. cit., pp. 836-37.

55 Mohar Ali, op. cit., p. 755. For a detail reading of Risley’s thesis, see his work, H.H. Risley, The Tribes and Castes of Bengal, vol I, (Culcutta: Virma K.L Mukhopadhyay, 1891).

56 Jadunath Sarkar,(edited)., History of Bengal, vol 2, Muslim period 1200-1757. (Patna: J. Prakashan, 1977). pp. 220-224; also see Jagadish Navayan Sarkar, “Islam in Bengal”, Journal of Indian History. vol 48: 144, 1970, p. 473.; also see Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., especially p. 155, where the author narrates an interesting dialogue he had with a well known West Pakistani lawyer,Mr. Manzur Quadir during the 1969 Round Table conference held at Rawalpindi, West Pakistan. According to the author Manzur Quadir invited the author to a dinner and at the dinner narrated to the author his experience and what he saw in the mass upsurge of 1969 in Dacca. According to the author,”A man of about 60 [Manzur Quadir) was telling me that now he saw what were the differences between Punjabis and the Bengalis and that Pakistan did not constitute a nation with one people. The Punjabi elite was indoctrinated by the concept of Millat – oneness, one God, one people and one country. Igbal and Ghalib [both from North of India] were the philosophers and pioneers of their culture and heritage. Whereas Bengalis had Tagore, Nazrul Islam, Jasimuddin and so many other. He (Manzur Quadir) said, you are completely different from us. So long I [Manzur Quadir) thought you were also guided by the thoughts and works of Iqbal and Ghalib.”  

being influenced by Hindu manners and customs. Similar allegations (unclear) also be made against the Muslims elites of Northern India, who have been portrayed as the true custodians of Islamic tradition and culture, having saved and preserved the best of the Muslim traditions through the use of the Urdu language.⁵⁸

Only recently, one Pakistani scholar has pointed out that, “the focal point of Hindu Muslim cultural synthesis was the Red Fort. [built during the time of Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan 1628-1658], where the Mughal Kings and Princes liberally adopted secular Hindu mores and folkways, and the citizens of Delhi emulated the royalty.”⁵⁹ The author out that “the then goes on to quote Sayyid Ahmed Dehlawi, (1846-1918) to describe the cultural ethos of Delhi’s Muslims. According to Sayyid Ahmetd Dehlawi, “All the customs of Muslim women, and because of them the customs of Muslim men, are almost all of Hindu origin. Some of the customs have been adopted without any change; for some, though original names have been retained, their styles have been changed. In some case change is only in names, some have been integrated even in religious matters with only a sight change in the nomenclature.”⁶⁰

Dr. Mohar Ali, in his recently published voluminous work on the history of the Muslims of Bengal, has gone a step further and suggested that, “although in general the Muslims of Bengal followed the injunction of Islam, certain innovations and un-Islamic practices were prevalent among them, particularly later in the period. The existence of such innovations and superstitions have too often been explained as the re of the Bengali Muslims being mostly converts from Hindus etc., who said to have retained many of the previous un-Islamic beliefs and practices.⁶¹

57 S.M. Ikram, Muslim Civilisation in India. (edited)., by Ainslie T. Embree, (New York Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 172-74 and pp. 282-83.

58 See Khalid-B-Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction to Change, (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 67.

59 Hafeez Malik, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Muslim Modernisation in India and Pakistan. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 25.

60 Ibid., also see Syyid Ahmed Dehlawi’s original work in Urdu, Rasum-I-Dehli: , (Delhi: Mukhazan Press, 1903), pp. 37-41.

61 Dr. Mohar Ali, op. cit., p. 799.  

He then argues that such a view is not only superficial and biased, but a closer look into the history of Muslim India “would at once show that the innovation and superstition that are noticeable among the Muslims of Bengal were in large measure imported by the immigrant Muslims themselves, though these received further accretions from local un-Islmic beliefs and practices.”⁶²

Here, let us take a pause, and ask ourselves why the Bengali Muslims and their language of thought and action received more adverse ideological interpretation than it deserved

For a plausible historical explanation to our question one can go back to the early days of British rule in India when the Muslim elites found their language of thought and action under threat and which was soon replaced by English, the language of the new ruling elites. the Muslim elites found it difficult quickly to come to terms with the new situation.⁶³ The best way, they thought, to retain their Muslim cultural identity, which they saw threatened, was through the use of Persian and the Urdu language. Muslim elites everywhere in India, including Bengal, began to identify themselves and became the exponents of Persian and Urdu culture. This trend was more pronounced in Bengal where the Muslim elites were in the minority.

Prominent families such as the Suhrawardy family, the Nawab families of Murshidabed and Tallygang in West Bengal, the Nawab family of Bogra and the Khawja family of Dacca in East Bengal, they all saw Urdu and Persian as the language of Bengali Muslims. The Bengali language itself was viewed by these people as essentially a language of the Hindu elites of Bengal.⁶⁴ The dilemma of the Bengali Muslims towards their language, according to Gordon,”must be seen in the context of wide spread cultural and political activity by Bengali Hindus. Alongside the Hindu ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there are few

62 lbid., p. 800.

63 See chapter 2.

64 See the following works; A.K. Nazmul Karim, op. cit., especially chapters 3 and 4, Rafiuddin Ahmed, op. cit., R.C Majumdar, Glimpses of Bengal in the 19th century, (Calcutta: Mukhopadhya, 1960), especially chapter 5 and 6

Muslims of comparable stature.⁶⁵

Asim Roy in his article “The Social Factors in the Making of Bengali Islam”, brings out this point very well. Roy delineates two strata of society which professed to be Muslims. One was that of Bengalis occupying the lower positions in the social hierarchy.⁶⁶ This segment of the population included, “The most active part of the delta of the Ganges, Meghna and the Brahma-putra, comprising most of the Eastern and South Eastern Bengal, agriculturists, wood cutters, fishermen, boatmen and the like… ⁶⁷

 The higher strata of Muslims in Bengal emphasised their r Bengali origin, having nothing but disdain for the Bengali language, direct proportion to the nearness in point of time and distance in point non- Nobility (in Bengal)”was determined by immigration from the West in of land of origin from Bengal to Arabia. ⁶⁸

The nobility had very little interest in local culture, traditions and rituals, looking to Mecca or Iran for their intellectual and religious inspiration. In contrast to the high class Muslims in Bengal, the lower segment of the Islamic population had a penchant for fusing local tra- ditions with rudimentary Islamic doctrines. In most cases they were unable to read Arabic or Persian, and had therefore no access to primary, or secondary sources, or even the interpretive works of Islam. That is why they often engulfed Islam in a cobweb of local rituals. This is outlined superbly by Roy: “The truth of their religion was to be vindicated not so much through theological or metaphysical polemics, as through the ability of its heroes to rise to superhuman and supernatural heights. The dogmas of Islam fell far short of meeting the demands of their passion for traditions in which they could hear about the glorious and miraculous

65 Leonard A. Gordon, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement 1876-1940. (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 9.

66 They were known as asrafs; see A.K. Nazmul Karim op. cit., pp. 144-148, also see, Mohd Anisuzzaman, op. cit,.

67 Asim Roy, “The Social Factors in the Making of Bengali Islam”, South Asia, Journal of South Asian Studies, no. 3, August 1973, p. 25.

68 Asim Roy op. cit., p. 30, also see A.M. Khan, “Rescarch About Muslims Aristocracy in East Pakistan: An Introduction”, Social Research in East Pakistan, (edited). by P. Besaignet, (Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 2964), p. 22.    

exploits of the champions of religion.⁶⁹

The Muslims in Bengal, unable to read Arabic or Persian, “Could not live in a cultural void, and they held on to what was already before them. The inexhaustible source of traditional Bengali ballads and folklore, and the religious and mythological traditions of diverse kind.”⁷⁰

The low class Muslims in Bengal thus natives Islam to make it relevant for their environment. In using Islam as a comfort against material and spiritual distress, they gave it an indigenous coating. In contrast to that, the high class Muslims of Bengal stressed the fact that they knew the original, unadulterated sources of Islam. They utilised their knowledge of Persian, Arabic and Urdu to demonstrate their spiritual closeness to Mecca and to distinguish themselves from the common men and women in Bengal. Their foreigness to the Bengali culture and language became a sign of prestige and distinction.

One of the consequences of such elite perception, according to Zillur Rehman, was “the neglect of Bengali literature by urban educated Muslims in the nineteenth and early twentieth century”.⁷¹ The other outcome MUs elite perception was the widening gap between the elites and the rural masses with regard to their commitment and contribution to the Rengali language. Asim Roy informs us that in the sixteenth and sevnteenth century, “It required formidable moral courage on the part of those Muslim authors of religious work in Bengali to defy this crushing weight of power and tradition. Only a few among them could shake it off completely, while most of them were apologetic for their deviation or sought to rationalise it.”⁷²

Saghir was the first one to break this subject and have come to realise that such fears are false. If what is written is true, it does not matter what language it is written in.”⁷³

69 Asim Roy, op. cit., p. 29.

70 Ibid.,

71 Zillur R. Khan, op. cit., p. 839. Also see, Zillur R. Khan, Martial Law to Martial Law: Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh, (Dacca: University Press Ltd, 1984), and Brass Paul and Franda Marcus (edited).., Radical Politics in South Asia, (Cambride: The MIT Press, 1973).

72 Asim Roy, op. cit., p. 28.

73 Ibid., 

According to Roy, Shaikh Muttalib failed to convey the same degree of conviction, and carelessness. He was apologetic and wrote, I am sure that I have committed great sin in that I have written the Muslim scriptures in Bengali. But this I am sure of in my heart, that the faithful will understand me and bless me. The blessings of the faithful shall involve great virtue, and merciful Allah will forgive my sin.”⁷⁴

Abdun-Nabi took a far more defiant attitude and wrote, “I am afraid in my heart that God may be angry with me for writing Muslim scriptures in Bengali. But I reject the fear and firmly resolve to write in order to do good to the common people.”⁷⁵

Sir Syed Sultan, according to Roy, not only took a firm stance on reason but also sought theological sanction. He said, “That the language that God has given to one is one’s ‘precious gem’, and adds, I know from Allah that He will to reveal the truth in the particular language of a land. The Paighamber/Prophet (peace be upon him) speaks one language and the people another. How are we to follow the dialogue.”⁷⁶

Perhaps Abdul-Hakim was the most courageously defiant of all when he said, “What ever language a people speak in a country, God understands all languages, whether the language of the Hindus or the vernacular language of Bengal or any other… Those who, being born in Bengal, are averse to the Bengali language cast doubt on their birth. The people, who have no liking for the language and the leaning of their country, had better leave it and live abroad. For generations our ancestors have lived in Bengal, and instruction in our native language is, therefore. considered good.”⁷⁷

The above quotations clearly suggest one thing, and that is that, Muslim scholars in Bengal were not at all encouraged to write Muslim scripture in native language during the period when the Muslims were in firm control of India. However, this attitude of the Muslim rulers during the Mughal period was in total contrast to the liberal attitude adopted by the Muslim rulers when they first entered India.

74 Ibid.,

75 Ibid.,

76 Ibid.,

77 Ibid  

Dr. Mohar Ali informs us that literary activities in the Bengali language started with the establishment of Muslim rule in Bengal. Prior to that, “No vernacular language could have found a scope for free literary expression under the Brahmical system which preceded the coming of the Muslims and which interdicted the study of any but the Sanskrit language. A well known Sanskrit Sloka (couplet) stated that if a person hears, the stories of eightteen Puranas or of the Ramayana recited in Bengali he will be thrown into the hell called Raurava,”⁷⁸

Therefore, according to Dr. M. Ali,”one of the most significant outcome of the establishment of Muslim rule in India was the, breakup of the Brahmanical monopoly of knowledge and literary activities and a general freeing of the Hindu intellect from the bondage of caste system.”⁷⁹ According to the same author, “some well-known Sanskrit work like Ramayana and parts of Mahabharata were translated into Bengali during Muslim rule.”⁸⁰

But during the Mugahl rule there was a total reversal in the attitude of the Muslim elites in Bengal towards the Bengali language. And according to A.K. Nazmul Karim, “Bengali literature lost patronage to such an extent in the Mughal courts in Bengal that the Bengali poets had to go to the independent Kings of Arakan, Tipperah, Asam, who ruled outside the jurisdictions of the Mughal empire to seek patron- age.”⁸¹

78 Dr. M. Mohar Ali. op. cit., p. 855. Also see the followung works; D.C. Sen, History of Bengali Language and Literature, (Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1911), p. 5 and Sukamar Sen, History of Bengali Literature, (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1960).

79 DR. M. Mohar Ali, op. cit., p. 855.

80 Ibid., pp. 856-858.

81 A.K. Nazmul Karim, op. cit,. p. 148. Since the creation of Bangladesh there has been a great debate going on among Bengali scholars about the effect of Muslim rule on Bengali literature Some scholars are of the view that it was the Muslim patronage which raised Bengali in literary status. Those who do not agree with the above view have also taken an extreme position aserting that the Muslim rule was altogether for the worse, that it was a check on the Bengali lilterary growth. According to A.K. Nazmul Karim, “During the Mughal rule, the officers of the revenue court would not, as a rule, even receive a pettion written in Bengali – it had to be written in Persian, which was the avenur to all plaaces of trust and enolument… .”Ibid. The present controversy, according to Karim is due to the failure on the part of some writers to appreciate the differential nature of the Pathan and the Mughal rule. According to Karim, although the Pathans were foreigners in Bengal. “they had  

During the Mughal rule in Bengal, Persian, and not Bengali, was the court language and when the British took over Bengal, it was generally accepted that Persian was the language of the Muslim elites in Bengal. These elites are also known as the Sharif or Ashrafs.⁸²

It is with reference to this class that Hunter in his famous book, The Indian Mussalmans, lamented so much about their economic decline.

established a local administration and had often fought with the Delhi ‘imperialists It is therefore not surprising that Bengali language and literature was patronised o for the independence of Bengal. This is how there was interaction with the local people. It is therefore not surprising that bengali language and literature was patronised at their courts.”Ibid.,p.147.

For further details on this interesting debate see the following works; A.K. Nazmal Karim, op. cit., especially chapter 3,”Some Aspects of the Muslim Social Structure of the Nineteenth Century”. pp. 127-176. Asim Roy, Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983). Dr. Muhammad Moharali, op. cit., especially chapter Xxxii, pp. 843-875. Enamul Haq, op. cit., pan iv, pp. 95-166 and Zillur Rehman Khan, “Islam and Bengali Nationalism”. Asian their courts.”- Ibid., p. 147, Survey, vol xxv, no8, August 1985. 82 Sharif literally means “respectable”. For a detailed conceptual analysis of the term see, A.K. Nazmul Karim, op. cit., pp. 128-145. Generally speaking Ashrafs or the landed gentry claimed foreign noble ancestry, while the Atraf, or the toiling masses and peasants could not lay any such claim to noble ancestry, see R. Levy, The social Structure of Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). Levy gives fold classification of the Bengali Muslim Society. According to Levy, “Amongst the BengalMuhammadans the Ashraf or upper class include all undoubted descendants of foreign Muslims (Arabs, Persian, Afghans and so on) and converts from the higher castes to the Hindus, like the higher Hindu castes they considered it degrading to acceet menial service or to handle the plough, and they look with contempt upon all other ranks of Bengal Muslims whom they call Ajlaf, ‘coarse rabble’. These include functional groups such as weavers, cotton-carders, oil-pressers, barbers, tailors, ete as well as all coverts of original humble caste. In some places a third class called arzal (Arabic: ardhal) or lowest of all is added. It consists of the very lowest caste such as the Halal Khor, Lalbegi, Abdal and Bediya, with whom no other Muhammadan would associate, and who are forbidden to enter the Mosque or to use public burial ground.” R. Levy, op. cit., p. 73. (Despite its egalitarianism, the followers of Islam unwitingly laid the basis for a new social distinction, ” closeness to the Prophet in blood and in faith.”See G.E. Gruenbaum, Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947), P. 199. Such a three or four fold classification may be useful for analytical purposes. But a closer Examination of the social structure of Muslim Bengal towards the end of the 19th century would reveal that innumerable social classes existed because of economic dislocation, especially of the upper class. Because of economic decline, many among upper Sharif category had to establish marital ties with non Sharifs. Among the Sharifs, those with better economic condition were in a position to maintain their social exclusiveness by having marital ties among themselves, and they also maintained their social distance from the rest of the Bengali Muslim community by speaking Urdu at home and using Persian as their ‘cultural” language.Our main purpose is to analyse the impact of the upper lass Muslims on the rest of the Muslim Bengali community.    

Hunter wrote, “One hundred and fifty years ago, it was almost impossible for a well born Mussalman in Bengal to become Poor, at present it is almost impossible for him to continue to be rich.”⁸³ A close examination of the quote from Hunter’s famous work, suggests very clearly, that Hunter was not writing about Muslim masses in Bengal, but about the elites. His reference is to the “well born Mussalman” and not the Muslim of ordinary birth. Commenting on the same issue, Karim writes,”Many a time when the Muslim leaders in Bengal have spoken about the ‘decayed condition’ of the Muslim community in Bengal, they have in reality meant the ‘decayed condition’ of the Muslim upper strata in Bengal.⁸⁴ It was again this class whose economic status was restored by the British rulers when they extended their hands of co-operation towards the British at the end of the nineteenth century.⁸⁵

Once their economic status was reaffirmed by granting them large zamindari, the Sharifs/Ashrafs were able to maintain their social distance from the rest of the Bengali Muslim community by speaking Urdu at home and using, now English, as their newly acquired language of power.⁸⁶ Commenting on the attitude of this class, Mr.Yaqinuddin Ahmed wrote in the Muslim Chronicle, in 1896, “The Muhammadans of Bengal had leaders who tried their utmost to belong to the north west. They talked Hindustani, imitated Delhi or Lucknow manners, but inspite of that they were Bengalis.⁸⁷

83 W.W. Hunter, The Indean Mussalmans, (Lahore: Premier Book House, 1964), p. 155. Reprint.

84 Karim, op. cit., p. 40. Also see Abdul Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India 1858-1947, (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967), especially chapter two, “The Partition of Bengal: Before and after”, pp. 43-79 and Matiur Rehman, From Consultation to Confrontation, op. cit.,

85 See Matiur Rehman, From Consultation to Confrontation, op. cit, especially chapter 1, “The Simla Deputation and the Formation of the All India Muslim League”, pp. 8-44 and Leonard A. Gordon, op. cit.,

86 For an interesting analysis on the use of English as a new weapon of power and status see the following work; John McGuire, The Making of the Colonial Mind: A Quan- titative Study of the Bhadralok in Calcutta 1857-1885), (Canberra: Australian National University Monographs on South Asia, no 10, 1983), and for a theoretical understand- ing of the use of languange as an instrument of power see, Bernard S. Cohn, “The Command of Language and The Language of Command”, Subaltern Studies, op. cit., P. 276.

87 Muslim Chronicle, 11th April 1986.   

Saeed, another writer, was even more powerful when he wrote on the same issue in 1880. His pleading was that Bengali should be ‘our, meaning the upper Sharifs vernacular. He said: “The Hindu dialect is becoming the literary language of Bengal, and Hindus are becoming the exclusive leaders of the indigenous literature of the province. Whatever, we may feel, think, or do, the Bengali will be our vernacular -this is now a physical certainty. It behaves us then to turn our attention at once to that language and try to introduce into its structure the peculiarities of wTote our diction and the peculiarities of our character.⁸⁸

Saced, and many scholars like him that we have quoted earlier, were quick to realise that the refusal and lack of desire on the part of the upper class Sharifs to adopt the Bengali language greatly affected the relationship between the upper class Sharifs and the masses. Saced himself wrote, “we do not learn the Bengali whilst our lower orders cannot learn the Persian, cannot learn even the Hidustani. There are thus no means of fellow-feeling or acting together. The knowledge we possess does not reach down to our lower neighbours-our character, ideas, and habits of thought so not effect them. This is the reason that our lower orders are moved and habits of thought do not effect them. This is the reason that our lower orders are moved and led en masse by men spring from themselves-men like Titu Miyan of Baraset and Dudu Miyan of Farridpur.⁸⁹ why did Muslim upper class, the Muslim preachers and missionaries, especially during the Mugahl period, adopted such a negative attitude towards a language which was spoken and understood by the majority of their co-religiounist. According to Z.R. Khan there are apparently tu reasons for it. First,”Muslim missionaries and preachers seemed to believe that Bengalisation of Islam would only serve to make Bengali Islam even more remote from the mainstream religion.”⁹⁰

Secondly, “Perhaps by monopolising religious knowledge. Muslim missionaries and preachers wished to have undisputed control over the interpretation and application of the Quranic laws to Bengali Muslim

88 Saced, The Future of the Muhammadans of Bengal. (Calcutta: Urdu guide Press, 1880). The review of the above book was published in the Culcutta Review, vol Ixxii, 1881, pp. iv-vii. The quotation (P. vii) in this reference as well as subsequent quotations were taken by the reviewer from the above book.

89 Ibid. p. vii.

90 (unclear) Khan, “Islam and Bengali Nationalism”, op. cit., p. 838.    

society.”⁹¹

As far as the upper class Sharifs and Ashrafs were concerned, they had two problems. They found it difficult or perhaps convenient not to give up their inordinate love for Persian. Then, when they opted for English, they realised how far behind they were left in the race of life by the Bhadralok of Bengal. It was not only difficult but almost impossible for the Muslim elites in Bengal to compete with the Bhadralok of Bengal.⁹²

The easy way out left then for the Sharifs of Bengal was to establish links with their co-religious elites elsewhere in India, and this is what they did successfully in 1906 when the Muslim League was formed in Dacca. The moving spirit, from Bengal, behind the creation of the Muslim League was Nawab Khawaja Salimullah of Dacca.⁹³

It is both interesting and at the same time intriguing to find group of upper class Muslim Sharif coutinued to exercise their dead weight upon the rest of the Muslim community in Bengal throughoout the whole of the nineteenth century and the first two decade of the twentieth century, despite the social distance created by the use of Persian and later Urdu languages. The influence of both Persian and Urdu was challenged indirectly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when a new Muslim middle class began to emerge on the political scene of Bengal.⁹⁴ By this time resistance to the teaching and learning of English among the Muslim was

91 Ibid.,

92 According to J. H. Broomfield, it was only “by the turn of the century there was a small group of Bengal Muslim ready to compete with the Bhadralok Hindus for access to the learned profession.” See, J.H. broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth century Bengal. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 45. also see, A.R. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal 1757- 1858,(Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1961).

93 For details see the following works, M. Rahman, From Consultation to Confrontation: A Study of the Muslim Leage in British Indian Politics 1906-1912, op.cit, Lal Bahadur, The Muslim League: Its history, Activities and Achievements, (Agra: Book Stall, 1954), and Rajput A.B, Muslim League: Yesterday and Today, (Lahore: SH. Mohammad Ashraf, 1948). According to both, Broomfield and L.A. Gordon, Khawaja Salimullah of Dacca, was the most influential Muslim political figure in Bengal. He died in 1913. J.H. Broomfiled, op. cit., p. 45. L.A. Gordon, op. cit., p. 159.

94 On the rise of the Bengali middle class see the following work. A.K. Nazmul Karim, The Dynamics of Bangladesh Society, op. cit, especially chapter 4, “The Muslim Class and the Muslim Political Elite in the 9th Century”, pp. 177-233.    

broken down.⁹⁵ The new elites also by-passed the tradition of writing in Mussalmani Bengali popularly known as Do-Bhashi. The task of the new elites, apart from stoutly defending their religious identity. Which was reflected in their writings, was also to popularise pure Bengali among the orthodox Muslims who resented this switch over to pure Bengali. In order to satisfy the orthodox group and enrich Islamic traditions in Sanskritisised Bengali a number of Persian and Arabic books were translated into Sanskritisised Bengali. The new elites, many of them attached to the Sudhakar group mentioned earlier, also brought out a newspaper, The group, according to Sufia Ahmed, “Played a very important role in   the creation of an Islamic literature in Pure Bengali.”⁹⁶

Many Bengali Muslim writers outside the Sudhakar group followed the tradition set by the Sudhakar group.Sheikh Fazlul Karim, Syed Ismail Housain Shirazi, Mozammel Haq, Qazem-al Qureshi are a few names which deserve mention.

The main theme of these writers was to eulogise the past glory and fortune of the Muslims, and express pain at seeing the degraded condition of the Muslims. Here it is important to point out that the number of Muslim writers writing in the 19th century in pure Bengali was very small, and not until the 1930s did the Bengali Muslim literary elite succeed in competing with Bengali Hindu literature in their o tributions to the language. Kazi Imadul Haq and Kazi Nazrul Islam could be cited as the early Muslim contributors. This change of attitude on the part of the Bengali Muslims was welcomed by the Bengalee newspaper and in a leading article that paper wrote, “In all direction we notice gratifying evidence of the determination of our fellow subjects to make names which deserve mention. Con-

95 According to Nazmul Karim, education was the key factor in the rise of the Muslin middle class in Bengal. “From the beginning of the twentieth century ‘education” increasingly came to mean Engalish education, so far as the Muslim community was concerned. The Hindu community had undergone that orientation about a century ago. It is through English education that the members of the middle class could get access to positions of power in society.” A.K. Nazmul Karim, op. cit p. 202, Saha K.B.”Middle class Unemployment in Bengal”, Calcutta Review, vol xiii, 3rd series, December 1924, Pp. 350-72.

96 Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., p. 315.

97 J.N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in India, (New York: Macmillan, 1919). PP. 1-28, also see A.C. Muinud-din, “Research in theIslamic Revivalism of the 19th century and its effect on the Muslim Society of Benagl”, in Pierre Bessaignet (edited). Social Research in East Pakistan.,(Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1960), Mona Anisuzzaman, op. cit., and Dinesh Chandra Sen, op. cit., 

up for the lost ground. In Bengal the Mohamedan revival bids fair to brighten the future of the Bengali language. During the past decades or two, there has arisen in our midst a small group of Mohamedan writers who have made Bengali their mother tongue and write it with unsurpassable facility and charm.”⁹⁸ Sufia Ahmed, in her book entitled Muslim Community in Bengal 1884-1912, has devoted a chapter on Muslim writing in Bengal during the period mentioned above. The author found 189 works on various subjects in Bengali, written by Bengali Muslims, in the British Museum and the India Office library. She put these works into the following categories:

Religious works 69

Prose, fiction 34

Volumes of poetry 16

Plays 2

Bengali grammer 2

Books dealing with social topics 17

History 19

Work that contained considerable political material 9

Indigenous medicine 3

She then goes on to analyse these works under the six main heading- religious, fictional, social, biographical, historical, and political.⁹⁹

The only conclusion that one can draw by reading these works under various headings, is the emphasis all the writers have put on Islam. Let us take the work of Abdur Rahim which comes under the category of historical work. He wrote a book entitled, Islam Itibrita,¹⁰⁰ (History of the Muslim World) written in 1911. The book deals with the reign of the first four Caliphs of Islam, the Abbasides period, the Ummayads period, Fatemids and the Ummayads rule in Spain. The sole objective of writing such a book, in the words of the author, was, “Unless a nation is aware of its national history it cannot improve its own condition. But most of our national history is locked up in the Arabic language. And as we are gradually giving less attention to the Arabic language our

98 The Bengalee, 16th March 1904.

99 Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 324-368.

100 Abdur Rahim, Islam Itibrita, (Calcutta: Publisher not available, 1911). Abdur Rahim was the Headmaster of the Noakhali Zilla School, when he wrote the book.    

national history is almost unknown to us”¹⁰¹

The author, therefore, thought it necessary to compile a history book in bengali by collecting materials from published authentic Arabic, Urdu and English sources for the benefit of the Bengali Muslims. It is also important to note the author’s use of the word ‘nation and nationality’, ¹⁰² Let us pick up another example from the political work category. Sheikh Abdus Sobhan, in his work, Hindu Mussalman, made the following remark about the Indian National Congress, “It is a great wonder that the organisation can be called the National Congress. Even granted that it were, the demands voiced by the National Congress, if translated into practice would be prejudicial to Muslim intersts. Even if the promoters of the movement are sincere… and believe in what they preach, Musilins however, will not join the movement. For the Hindus are strong, we are weak; the number of literates among them is large, among us literates are few, they are shrewed, we are simple, they are selfish, we are indifferent. I do not deny the existence of liberal minded Hindus. Bn one must agree with me that two or four, liberal minded persons amorg sixteen to seventeen crores of people cannot do much. Under such circumstances, should the organisation genuinely become a National Congress, then our future must inevitably be dark.”¹⁰³

 This quotation clearly demonstrates how deep the Muslim fear was against Hindu domination, both in Bengal, where the Muslims were the under-privileged majority, and the United Provinces where the Muslims were a privileged minority. It was from UP (United provinces) that the

101 Ibid., p. 3. Also see, Sufia Ahmed op. cit., p. 356.

102 It clearly reflects authors enthusiasms for the supposed link with world of Islam Pn. Islamism with its emphasis on close links with the larger world of Islam has alwaye remained a popular theme with the Indian Muslims. This popular notion also implies a quest for a trans-Indian identity. For a picture of Bengali Muslim attitudes towards the Middle East, also see Mustafa Nurul Islam, “Bengali Muslim public Opinion as Reflected in the Bengali Press 1901-1930”, (Dacca: Bangla Academy, 1973), chapter 1.

103 Quoted in Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., p. 365. Commenting on Sobhan”s view ahout the Congress, Sufia Ahmed writes that the criticism Sobhan voiced was probably rep- resentative of Muslim attitude generally in the whole of Bengal about the Congress. Also see R.K. Ray, “Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal 1875-1908″(Cam- bridge University Ph.D thesis, 1973). For an analysis of the Politicsation of the Muslim Peasants, see Partha Chatterjee, “Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal 1926-1935”, in Ranajit Guha, edited., op. cit., Also see John Gallagher, “Congress in Decline: Bengal 1930”, Modern Asian Studies, vol 7, no 3, 1973. pp. 589-645.   

first opposition to the Indian National Congress was voiced (see chapter two) by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. He strongly advised the Muslims to keep out of politics and not to join the Indian National Congress. Sir Syed argued that in any democratic configuration Muslims will be reduced to the status of a permanent minority under Hindu domination.¹⁰⁴ This Muslim fear of Hindu domination was later to be exploited brilliantly by Mr Jinnah.¹⁰⁵

Let us now take as an example another historical work written in 1905 in the Do-Bashi language- ¹⁰⁶ a language then still popular among clearly suggested that the idea of pan-Islamism appealed to the imagi- the common Muslims. the work was on the Greco-Turkish war. This work of the war, and incident in which a bomb was thrown at the Sultan by nation of educated Bengali Muslims. The author gives a detail account a Bulgarian, but the Sultan narrowly escaped the assassination attempt. While describing this incident the author writes, “O Muslims, please offer your grateful thanks to God through your humble prayers for if the Sultan (Khalifa) who is the saviour of our religion, had died then we would have been faced with a great calamity and the religion of Islam would have sunk.”¹⁰⁷ What conclusion can one draw from this summary review of the literature produced by the Bengali Muslim?

Firstly, one thing is immediately noticeable and that is that most of the writing reflected a similar trend: the chief concern of all writers was with Islamic themes with hardly any reference to the local culture or topics of local interest. According to one scholar, during the period

104 See Hafeez Malik, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan on Muslim Modernisation in India and Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), especially chapter 6, “Theory of Muslim Nationalism”, pp. 229-254.

105 See, M. A. Jinnah, “Two Nations in India”, Time and Tide, vol xxi, no 10, (London: 1940).

106 See Partha chatterjec, “Bengal Politics and the Muslim Masses 1920-47”, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. On the issue of Pan-Islamism see the following work, Aziz Ahmed, “Syed Ahmed Khan, Jamal-uddin Afghni and Muslim India”, Studia Islamica, vol, xiii, 1960 pp. 55-78, Aziz Ahmed, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), especially chapter vi – “Caliphate and Pan-Islamism”, pp. 123-140.

107 G. Shaer, Jange Rum O Yunan (Greco-Turkish War). (Calcutta: Publisher not avalible, 1905). p. 215. Shah Waliullah has discussed the theroy of Khilafat in great detail in his monumental work, Izalaat-ul-Khafa and Khilafat Khulafa, (Bareilly: Siddiqi Press, 1286), part one, pp. 326-35. Also see Maududi Abul ala Sayed, Khilafat-o-Mulikiat, (Lahore: Idara Tarjuman-ul-Quran, 1979), and G.A.Perwez, Islam: A Challenge to Religion, (Lahore: Idara Tulu-e-Islam, 1968).   

1873 and 1900, twenty nine per cent of the work produced by Bengali Muslim writers dealt with Islam in the Middle East, another seven per cent with the glories of Islam in India and thirty two per cent with related subjects.¹⁰⁸ Secondly, there was a notable change in the medium which the Bengali Muslim used. For the Bengali Muslims the Journey from, what Dr. Shahidullah called, “Persian occupation of Bengali”, via Do- Bashi/Puthi or Mussalmani Bengali to the pure form of Bengali or Sanskritisised Bengali was painful one. There was a stiff resistance to this change. But did this change or switch over to Sanskritisised Bengali bring the Bengali Muslim any nearer to their fellow Hindu Bengalis who spoke and wrote in the same language? According to one source, “This was not possible because except for superficial similarity of the language there was nothing common. ¹⁰⁹

According to the same source,”The chasm between English and American and other literatures written in English is not so deep and wide as it is between Bengali of the two communities. The fount of English and other literatures written in English is the same, where as the source of Bengali of the Hindus is largely Sanskirt and that of the Muslims, Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian and Turkish, a true hybrid. Apart from the very akin deep similarity there is nothing common, in the language and lit- erature of the Hindus and Muslim Bengalis.”¹¹⁰

The source then refers to Dr. Ali Ashraf who is supposed to have said, “The Muslims have consistently followed different historical trends responded differently to the same situations,¹¹¹ and have created different formal linguistic and themetic tradition.”¹¹² Dr. Sajjad Hussain, in as interview with the author during the field work to Bangladesh, made a similar point on the issue of Bengali identity. The question from the author

108 R. Ahmed, op. cit., p. II, also see, Mohd Anisuzzaman, op. cit.,

109 The source has to remain anonymous. The person interviewed, gave his views in the issue of language which still remains a sensitive issue with some, only when the researcher assured the concerned person that his name wiil not be mentioned anywhere in the thesis.

110 The source has to remain anonymous.

111 A good example of this is the Muslim response to the Swadeshi agitation of 1909. For details see L.A; Gordon, op. cit., p. 93, and John Mclane, “The Partition and the New Communalism” in Alexander Lipske, edited., Bengal East and West, (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1970).

112 Source, anonymous.   

concerned what is more important for a Bengali, his Bengali identity or his Muslim identity? The answer was, “We thought of ourselves as Bengali Muslims and were not conscious of any contradiction between our identity as Bengalis and identity as Muslims. We know that we shared the language with the Hindus but were fully aware that the idioms contained a large proportion of Arabic, persian, Turkish and Urdu and Hindi words which had for us become perfectly naturalised as a part of the vocabulary of Bengali language, but which the Hindus seldom used.”¹¹³ And according to the anonymous source,Bengali language. Rabindranath Tagore, for example, refused to accept Amma.(Mother) as a Bengali word. On one occasion, M.A. Azam tried to explain to Tagore that the word was used by Muslim almost everywhere in Bengal and it was a part of their every day language. Tagore argued that Amma was a foreign word. Its intro- đuction into Bengali as a Bengali word would be absurd. Tagore once criticised Nazrul Islam for having used the word ‘Khoon’, meaning blood in one of his poems. According to Dr. Sajjad Hussain, “That was the reason why the poetry of Kazi Nazrul Islam made such a tremendous impact on the Muslim mind in Bengal. He showed with unexample success how musical cadences could be created out of idioms the Muslims spoke.”¹¹⁴ The Bengali Muslims, perhaps, aspired to match the genius of the Persians who not only produced some of the best work on Islamic thought”¹¹⁵ in the persian language, but also moulded Islam to their cultural needs. But for the Bengali Muslims there was little support from their co-religionist, elsewhere in India, to follow an independent or the Iranian route.¹¹⁶

113 See our interview with Dr. Sajjad Hussain,

114 See our interview with Dr. Sajjad Hussain.

115 A very good example is the work of Maulana Jalal-uddin Rumi(R.A.), See his, The Mathanawi of Jalal-uddin Rumi(R.A.), edited, and translated by R.A. Nicholoson, 8 vols, (London: Luzac, 1925-50).

116 See David Page, Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-1932, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), espcially chapter 3, “The Emergaence of Punjabi Dominance”, p. 163, where Page picks up a long quote from Sir Malcolm Hailey’s paper, (a letter addressed to Sir Arthur Hirtzel, permanent secretary at the India Office) which brings out the Punjab elites views about their Muslim brethren in Bengal. “Hailey made plain also the very significant attitude of the Punjabi to their brethren in Bengal, you will notice that the dream of the future to which I have alluded (Federation of Muslim provinces in the North west, which may eventually embrace Afghanistan and perhaps Persia) does not include Bengal. For the Moment the Northern India Muslim has given up his co-reigionist in Bengal as hopeless and seems to expect no assistance from Bengal in th cause of Islam. “This was the resding of an important English bureaucrat who served in the Punjab for a   

All the evidence produced so far clearly suggests that the Bengali Muslim elites laid heavy emphasis on their Muslim identity.¹¹⁷ Some tried to do so by learning Urdu which they associated with the great tradition of Islam.¹¹⁸But the great majority, as we have shown earlier moved slowly away from this tradition and wrote on Islamic subject in Sanskritisised Bengali.¹¹⁹ This perhaps helped the Bengali Muslims to differentiate themselves from the Bengali Hindus. And also mindful of the dominant position of their coreligionists elsewhere in India and Bengal,¹²⁰ they tried, however ‘clumsily”,¹²¹ to give some cultural meaning to the Pakistan movement. Mr.Mansur Ahmed was one of them. According to him “Pakistan surely meant cultural autonomy. It was to be Bengali culture freed from Hindu linguistic and religious shackles. It was to be Muslim, but distinct from the culture of the West Pakistanis. So it was to be Bengali

long time about the Punjabi Muslim elites perception of Bengal. What is more Importat is the conclusion of D. Page, about Hailey’s observations, “Twenty years before the creation of Pakistan and 45 years before the creation of Bangladesh, these were prophetic insights”, p. 163. Page’s conclusion reminds us of a quote from B.S. Cota, The conflict of India was a conquest of knowledg. IN the official sources we can trace the change in forms of knowledge which the conquerors defined as useful for their own end.” Bemard S. Cohn, “The Command of Language and the Language of Command”, op. cit., p. 276.

117 Rafiuddin Ahmed, op. cti., especially iv – “A Crisis of Identity: Muslim or Bengali”, Pp. 106-132.

118 Craig Baxter, “Pakistan and Bangladesh”, in Frederick L. Shields (edited)., Ethnic Separatism and World Politics, (New Yourk, London: Universiyt Press of Amei 1984), р. 218.

119 See the following work, Sufia Ahmed op. cit., chapter v, 305-369. Leonard A. Gonden “Divided Bengal: Problem of Nationalism and Identity in 1947 Partition”, Journal of Communwealth and Comparative politics, vol 15-16, 1977-78, pp. 136-168.

120 In 1939, for example, speaking on the Calcutta Municipal (amendment) Bill, which sought to introduce separate electorates in the Calcutta Municipal elections, Abu Hussain Sarkar, a Congressman at that time and who later became Chief Minister of East Pakistan during 1955-6, expressed his resentument of non Bengali Muslims in the Calcutta Corporation in the following words. “Under the false cry of representing Muslim interest in the Calcutta Corproation, the non-Bengali elements are trying to perpetuate their hold in Calcutta, and that is also in the premier self-governing institution in Bengal. Unfortunately, Sir, the Urdu speaking non-Bengalis, the Iranis, the Suhrawardys, the Siddiquis, the Adamjees and the Currimbhoys – are in majority in Muslim Calcutta. Most of them are wholesale agents for selling cheap German, Japanese and Italian goods.” Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings, vol iv, fifth session, 1939, pp. 29-30.

121 LA. Gordon, “Divided Bengal: Problems of Nationalism and Identity in the 1947 partition”, op. cit., p. 150.    

and Muslim, but divergent from the culture of other Bengalis and other Muslims.” ¹²² Abul Mansur Ahmed and many others like him belonged to a slow but ever expanding middle class Muslim community in Bengal, a middle class which was under pressure from all sides, pressures we have already alluded to, and, therefore, this segment of the population was not very sure about its political future in a politically turbulent in India of the 1940s. Hence it was keen to define its identity, no matter how ‘clumsy’ or awkward the definition might turn out to be.

But all this went unnoticed, because of the heat of Islamic fervour generated by the Pakistan movement. “The masses in their devotion to Islam were content to follow the call of the Quaid-i-Azam.” ¹²³Jinnah’s declaration to the Muslim masses and leaders, was to rise above provincial wranglings in order to save the future of Islam in India.¹²⁴

The League and its leadership, according to Farzana Shaikh, “In order to sustain its claim to Muslim nationhood and independence, had appealed to traditional Muslim notions of political loyalty and consensus.

122 Quoted in, L.A. Gordon, “Divided Bengal: Problems of Nationalism and Identity in the 1947 Partition”, op. cit., page 150. According to R. Jahan, after the Bangladesh, “Though identity in Bangadesh is defined in terms of Bengali Nationalism, a territorial limit is put on that, so for all practical purposes the identity mostly connotes Bengali Muslim identity. The Bengali Muslim nationalist bourgeoisle, who were the major spokesmen of the Bengali nationalist movement, want to create a separate state of their own, free from competition, and exploitation by ousiders, which includes both the Muslims of Pakistan and Hindus of India and West Bengal. Hence they are as much in favour of separating their identity from Bengali Hindus as from the Muslims of Pakistan.” See R. Jahan, “India, Pakistan and Bangladesh”, in Frederick L. Shields, n cit., p. 339. Since the assassination of Mujib, the Bangldeshi leadership has tried 1o adjust their secularist position and to give it an Islamic state. The 1972 constitution incorporated as its basic principle: “The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which deriving its identity from its language and culture, attained a sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined struggle in the war of independence, shall be the basis of Bengali Nationalism.” Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh, Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, article 9, Dacca, Government of Bangladesh 1972. For more details on this issue of Bengali Muslim identity in the post Mujib era se, the following work, Zillur R. Khan, “Islam and Bengali Nationalism”, Asian Survey col xxv, no 8, August 1985, pp. 834-851 and M.G. Kabir, “Religion, Language and Nationalism in Bangladesh”, Journal of Con- temporary Asia vol 17, no 4, 1987, pp. 473-487.

123 Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase,op. cit, p. 210.

124 See, M.A. Jinnah, “Two Nations in India”, op. cit., also see Ahmed Jamiluddin, ed., Speeches and writings of M.A. Jinnah, vol I, (Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), vol II,(Lahore: SH. Muhmmad Ashraf, 1964).    

It had implicitly rested its case for a Muslim nation on the premise that all Muslims were bound by an unshakeable solidarity which transcended cultural, linguistic and regional differences. But in doing so, it had demanded that Indian Muslims conduct themselves primarily as Muslims, which implied in the first instance, the re-affirmation of their absolute loyalty to Islam. This, in the context of a predominantly non Muslim society, was regarded by many Muslims [especially the Muslims of Bengal]¹²⁵ as neither unreasonable nor impossibly at odds with whatever other loyalties they may have professed at the time.”¹²⁶ Immediately after the creation of Pakistan other forms of identity’ surfaced, which in the eyes of many Pakistanis, were not incompatible with Islam.¹²⁷ The first and the foremost among them was an unrelenting loyalty to their language and the failure of the central leadership of the Muslim League to come to terms with the regional and linguistic identity which the Bengali elites perceived as not being incompatible with their Islamic identity.

It can be argued that the central leadership of the Muslim league, who came mainly from the United Province,¹²⁸ found it difficult to get out of the all Indian Muslim League syndrome, and to re-adjust, and to redefine the role of the ruling party in terms of the political realities of the post 1947 period. It seems, they remained the prisoners of their past policies. The language controversy is a good example for substantiating the above argument. Let us therefore first examine the language controversies of 1948 and 1953.

The initial language controversy was triggered off during the second session of the Constitution Assembly of Pakistan, held on 25th of February 1948 when Mr. Dhirendra Nath Dutta, a Hindu member from East Pakistan, moves an amendment on the rules of procedure of

125 During the election of 1946, the Muslim League received 95% votes in Bengal, much higher than the votes cast in favour of Muslim League in other Muslim Majority provinces, including the Punjab.

126 Farzana Shaikh, “Islamamd the Quest for Democracy in Pakistan”, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol xxiv, no 1, March 1986.

127 On the issue of ‘other forms of loyalties’ see our interview with Dr. Sjad Hussain and other Bengali elites. The Bengali elites, interviewed during our fieldwork in Bangladesh, were unanimous in saying that they did not perceive any incompatibility between their Muslim identiry and Bengali Identity, especially after the creation of Pakistan.

128 See Ayasha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, op. cit., p. 137, also see T. Maniruzzaman, The Politics of Development: The Case of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 20. 

the Assembly, which specified that a member should address the house in either Urdu or English.¹²⁹ Mr. Dutta told the house. “Bengali is a provincial language but so far as our state is concerned, it is the language of the majority of the people of the state… Out of sixty nine million people in Pakistan, forty-four million people speak the Bengali language… The state language of the state should be the language which is used by the majority of the people of the state, and for that, I consider that Bengali language is a lingua franca of our state.. I am voiting the sentiments of the vast millions of our state, and therefore Bengali should not be treated as a provincial language. It should be treated as the language of the state. ¹³⁰

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan responded to the Bengali members demand in the following words, “Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this subcontinent and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu… Pakistan is a Muslim state and it must have as its lingua franca the language of the Muslim nation.”¹³¹ He then went on to add, “I had thought that the object of the amendment was an innocent one, in that it was intended to include Bengali among the media of expression of assembly but now the object seems to be to create a rift between the peoples of Pakistan and to take away from the Muslims that unifying link which can be achieved by a common language.¹³² “The Prime Minister was aware that he was answering a Bengali Hindu”.¹³³Commenting on Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan’s claim that Urdu was the language of the hundred million Muslims, Rafiqul Islam writes that, “Liaqat Ali Khan’s argument as emotional and fallacious, because the language of the hundred million Muslims of undivided India were never a monolingual. Indian Muslims are historically multilingual and the Bengali speaking Muslims have always out numbered the Muslims of other language groups of United 132 India.”¹³⁴

129 See, L. Ziring” Politics and Language in Pakistan: Prolegomena 1947-1952″, con- tributions to, Asian Studies, vol 1, January 1971, p. 113.

130 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, proceedings 1948, pp. 15-16.

131 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, proceedings 1948, p. 17.

132 Quoted in L. Ziring, op. cit., p. 113.

133 Ibid.,

134 Rafiqul Islam, “Bengali Language Movement and Emergence of Bangladesh”, contribution to Asian Studies, vol xi, 1978, p. 144. Also see Farzana Sheikh, op. cit., Pp. 80-82.  

The Assembly debate on the language issue brought immediate reaction from the student community in Bengal. The students demanded that Bengali be given national status. ¹³⁵ The students protest created a political crisis and developed violent forms on March 11, 1948 when fifty people were injured. The casualties were the direct result of a police attempt to break up a demonstration outside government building in the  East Pakistan capital.¹³⁶

The then Chief Minister of Bengal, Khawja Nazimuddin recognised the gravity of the situation and entered into a dialogue with the leaders of the Committee of Action, which was hurriedly formed to voice the feelings of the Bengali community on the language issue. After long negotiations, the chief Minister signed an eight-points agreement with the leaders of the Committee of Action on the 15th of March. The two important clauses of the agreement were the following: “(1) In the April [1948] session of the East Bengal Legislative Assembly a special reso- lution will be moved to propose to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to make Bengali one of the state languages of Pakistan and to give Bengali the same status with Urdu in the competitive examinations of the central services of Pakistan. (2) In the month of April another resolution will be moved in the East Bengal Legislative Assembly to make Bengali the official language of the province of East Bengal in Place of English besides that, Bengali will be the medium of instruction.”¹³⁷ According to Ziring, Khawja Nazimuddin after the signing of the agreement, declared, “He was satisfied that the demands in favour of the Bengali language were just and proper and that movement was not inspired by enemies of the state.”¹³⁸ According to the same author, “But ‘something happened’ in

135 For students reaction to the language controversy see the following work, Rafioul Islam, op. cit., pp. 143-152, L. Ziring, op. cit., pp. 109-122 and Kamaluddin Ahmed “Bengali Intellectuals and Social Change in Bangladesh”, in Yogendra K. Malik (edited), South Asian Intellectuals and Social Change, (New Delho: Heritage Publishers, 1982), pp. 235-256.

136 L. Ziring, op. cit., p. 115, also see R. Islam, op. cit., p. 144.

137 R. Islam, op. cit., p. 144. Also see Omar Badruddin, Purba Bengla Bhasha andolan O Tatkalin Rajniti, (Dacca: Mowla Brothers, 1970). It is important to point out that for the first phase of the language controversy we have relied mainly on our discussion with individuals who were very close to Khawja Nazimuddin (their names must remain anonymous) and three major works, those of L. Ziring, R. Islam and Badruddin Omar (in Bengali) which have provided the most detailed historical account of the controversy.

138 L. Ziring, op. cit., p. 114.   

the several hours which separated the signing of the agreement and theconvening of the provincial legislature. The legislature chose to ignore the entire proceeding.¹³⁹ When the students learned about it, the conflict was renewed. The language controversy had now progressed too far and was ceased to be a minor irritant.” ¹⁴⁰

According to Ziring and R. Islam. Khawja Nazimuddin displayed complete futility in handling this crisis, and his repeated fumblings pressed his regime even into deeper confusion and turmoil. “Only two days after accepting the seven [eight”¹⁴¹] points agreement and insisting that the language movement was not subversive he made a volt face. The continuing disturbances, he said, undoubtedly proves that language controversy is only a smoke screen employed by a group with object of undermining the state.”¹⁴²

From the above analysis, two important questions emerge. First, why did Khawja Nazimuddin make a volt face after signing the agreement? Second, what happened in the several hours which separated the signing of the agreement and the convening of the provincial legislative where the agreement was to be discussed for approval and recommendation, and then sent to the central government.

According to sources very close to Khawja Nazimuddin,¹⁴³ after signing the agreement he went into a close door session with his political advisers, cabinet members, who were mainly Bengalis and the top bureaucrats of the provincial governments who were all from West Pakistan. ¹⁴⁴ The general consensus that emerged out of the meeting was the following: According to the political advisers of Khawja Nazimuddin, the movement was an attempt by the anti Nazimuddin group in Bengal to undermine

139 lbid.,

140 lbid.,

141 According to R. Islam it was eight points, op. cit., p. 14

142 L. Zirings op. cit., p. 144. Also see, The Statesman, March 16, 1948 and March 18, 1948.

143 Sources have to remain anonymous.

144 On the representation of Bengalis in the bureaucracy see next chapter and also the first section of this chapter.  

his administration. The people who were behind this movement who were supporters of Mr. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy and disgruntled politicians left out of power.¹⁴⁵ The bureaucrats who had no sympathy with the Bengali language, argued that the movement was being financed from across the border and had no popular support. Nazimuddin was the strong representative of the Sharif culture in Bengal. All his Bengali political advisers were also in one form or another associated with the Sharif culture,¹⁴⁶ So Nazimuddun’s supporters and the bureaucrats advised him not to give in to political blackmail. What the political advisers of Khawja Nazimuddin and the bureaucrats refused to see was that the Bengalis were only asking for an equal status for Bengali along with the national language Urdu Benglis never thought that their language would be given a lesser status in Pakistan, for whose creation they had played a decisive role.¹⁴⁷

Moreover, the Bengalis were not only reacting to the declaration of Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, there were also other developments which agitated the minds of the Bengalis, who were already under represented in the important sectórs of state institutions, namely the armed forces and the bureaucracy. These developments were, 1.On the coin and stamps of Pakistan, Bengali, the language of majority people was not inscribed.¹⁴⁸

2.Bengalis also referred to an advertisement soliciting candidates for the Royal Pakistan Navy which required interested persons to take an entrance examination in either English or Urdu. ¹⁴⁹According to another

145 For details on factional pollitics in Bengal prior to the creation of Pakistan see Ayesha Jalal, the Sole Spokesman, op. cit., p. 151-163. Before the creation of Pakistan, in Muslim Bengalthere exised three groups. () Khawja Nazimuddin Group, (2) Suhrawardy Group and (3) A.K. Fazlul Haque Group. The first two belonged to the Sharif culture. After the election of 1946, Fazlul Haque went into temporary political eclipse. So it was the Nazimuddin Group who, with the full support of the centre came to power in Eastern Bengal after the partition of 1947. According to Jahan, Khawja Nazimuddin and Akram Khan, group was an essentiaily traditional, conservative group that rep- resented the landed interest of Bengal. See R. Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, op. cit., p. 39.

146 Craig Bzter, “Pakistan and Bangladesh”, in Frederick L. Shields (edited).,op. cit.,

147 lbid.p. 218.

148 L. Zirings, op. cit., p. 113.

149 lbid.,   

source, which must remain anonymous, “After the creation of Pakistan Hindus many posts in the lower and upper cadre of the administration were left vacant. All these [posts] were to be filled by Muslims. A test in Urdu was organised and on the result of that test all jobs were given to Urdu speaking people on the pretext that Bengalis did not know sufficient Urdu. Bengali Muslims thought and rightly so that they will never be able to learn that kind of Urdu to enable them to compete with those whose mother tongue was Urdu. ¹⁵⁰ This started the language riots.¹⁵¹ “All these factors were ignored and a message was passed on by the provincial bureaucrats to the central government asking for Quaid-i-Azam’s intervention on the vital issue of national language.

For informations on vital issues of national life, Mr.Jinnah relied heavily on briefings he had with top bureaucrats. ¹⁵² His own party, the

150 Bengalis in government services were already few in numbers. One reason being the requirement that all officers be fluent in English. Now if Urdu was made the only national language of Pakistan, a young Bengali would bave to master three languages in order to play a part in national affairs, Consequently the Bengalis, very early in the day, came to the conclusion that the central government housed in West Pakistan and staffed by West Pakistanis was seeking to keep Bengal a subject race. See Keith callard, Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, op. cit., p. 182 and L. Ziring, op. cit., p. 113.

151 Source, anonymous.

152 According to Khalid-B-Sayeed, “It might have seemed strange and surprising to some the ardent Muslim nationalists that the Quiad-i-Azam had appointed British officers Governors in three of the four provinces in Pakistan.” Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase, op. cit., p. 241. For the Muslim Leaguers, their great leades decision was not without a reason. However, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Kahn, leader of the Red Shirt movement and a strong opponent of the Pakistan movement criticised Jinnah’s decision and told the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, “Was there no Mussalman in Bengal or the Punjab who could become our Governors? I have to say, that to our misfortune, the British whom we had turned out have again been brought in and placed at our heads. Is this Islamic fratemity? Would we call it a brotherhood? This is Islamic Pakistan.” Constituent assembly (legislature) of Pakistan, debates, vol i, no 8, 5 March 1948, p. 239. Jinnah was heavily dependent on the provincial Governors. They were directly responsible to the Governor General for all their action and they had to write fortnightly letters to the Governor Gerneral. The system was started by Lord Linlithgow, continued by Lord Wavell and adopted in 1947 by Jinnah. Jinnah wanted strong administrators to run the day to day administration of the country efficiently and at the same time keep him conversant with the rifts, rivalries and intrigues of the politicians in the various provinces. Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase, op. cit.pp. 241-243. According to the same author “Under the dominating personality of Quaid-i-Azam and his successor Liaqat Ali Khan the civil servants effectively controlled the entire administration in the provinces, and the politicians were kept in power subject to their willingness to obey central government directives.” Khalid-B-Sayeed, Ibid., p. 261. Sayeed’s view quoted above gives the     

Muslim League, in organisatioal terms, was in bad shape and totally dependent on Jinnah’s charismatic leadership.¹⁵³ So when Mr. Sinnah received the message that his most loyal chief Minister in Bengal was in trouble, he was forced to respond. Mr.Jinnah was then 71 years old and he was in falling health. ¹⁵⁴ He told one of his friend who came to see him from Bombay “I am so tired Jamshed, so tired,”¹⁵⁵ None-the- less, his government insisted that he should fly to Dacca in March 1948 to address the majority of Pakistan’s population on the most volatile, divisive topic in Pakistani domestic politics. In March 1948, Mr.Jinnah came to Dacca and gave a series of lecture on the language issue. The first one, on the 21st of March was at the Paltan Maidan (field). He said, “Let me tell you in the clearest language that there is no truth that your normal life is going to be touched or disturbed as far as your Bengali language is concerned… But let me make it clear to you that the State language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State language no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function.”¹⁵⁶ In his speech, on March 24th at the convocation of Dacca University, Mr.Jinnah elaborated this argument: “There can, however, be only one lingua franca, that is, the State, and that language should be Urdu and cannot be any other. The State language, therefore, must obviously be

impression that Jinnah had little trust in his political colleagues in the various provinces. Stanley wolpert, has recently pointed out that, “Jinnah’s relation with his closest colleagues deteriorated rapidly in the final months of his life”. For details see S. Wolpert, op. cit. p. 360. On the role of bureaucracy, Hamza Alavi disagreed with Sayced’s line of reasoning and argued that the Palistani bureaucracy is an overdeveloped instiuttion inherited from the British and it was in total control both at centure and the provinces right from the start. See Hamza Alavi, op. cit., pp. 149-181.

153 See Keith callard, op. cit., especially chapter II, “The decline of the Muslim League”. pp. 34-76. Also see Mohammed Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-85 (Lahore: Vanguard Book, 1987), especially chapter 221, “Muslim League”, pp. 139- 144.

154 According to Hamza Alavi, Jinnah’s failing health gave the bureaucrats an open opportunity to use the power of the Governor General in whatever manner they wanted to. See Hazma Alavi, The State in Crisis, in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (edited), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, (London: Zed Press 1983), p. 79. Also see Hamza Alavi’s excellent article, on the role of the bureaucracy and the army during the period 1947-78. “The army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan”, op. cit., pp. 149-181.

155 See Stanley Wolpert, op. cit., p. 359.

156 Quotted in Philip Oldenburg, “A Place Insufficiently Imagined: Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971”, Journal of Asian Studies, vol XLIV. no. 4, August 1985.(unclear) 716.    

Undu, a language understood throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan, embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the language used in other Islamic countries.”¹⁵⁷

According to Oldenburg. “Jinnah was not really addressing the question of which language would be the State language of Pakistan when he went to Dacca in 1948. Rather he was addressing this question: Why has the demand that Bengali be made a state language arisen all of a  and above all a language which, more than any other provincial language, sudden?” ¹⁵⁸

In his March 21st speech Mr.Jinnah also said, and this is worth noting, “Our enemies, among whom I regret to say, there are still some Muslims, have set about actively encouraging provincialism in the hope  of weakening Pakistan, and thereby facilitating the re-absorption of this province into the Indian Dominion… A flood of false propaganda is being of daily put forth with the object of undermining the solidarity of the Mussalmans of this State and inciting the people to commit acts of lawlessness. The recent language controversy … is only one of the many subtle ways whereby the poison of provincialism is being sedulously injected into province… Is it not significant that the very persons who in the past have betrayed the Mussalmans or fought against Pakistan… should now suddenly pose as the saviours of your just rights and incite you to defy the government on the question of language?”¹⁵⁹ Jinnah’s use of the word ‘enemies’ suggest that he was briefed on the issue by the bureaucrats on a similar line, also used, to convince Khawja Nazimuddin the language issue was being supported from across the border. ¹⁶⁰

157 Ibid,.

158 Ibid., p. 719.

159 lbid,.

160 According to Khalid.B. Sayeed ,The Governor General also knew (but he does not tell us how he knew it, we have argued that Mr.Jinnah was briefed by the bureaucrats on the issue] that an agitation had been organised by the followers of Mr.Suhrawardy against the provincial government on the language issue. This agitation had also the support of a number of Muslim Leagers who had been former supporters of Suhrawardy in undivided Bengal. Mr.Muhammad Ali Bogra and Mr.Tafazzal Ali were leading figures in the agitation. Jinnah’s reference to the enemies within wes directed towards the supporters of Suhrawardy, who was still in India. How did Jinnah handled the enemies within?” Sayeed, informs his readers, “The Quaid’s technique was to weaken the agitation by depriving it of some of its leaders. Mr.Muhammad Ali Bogra, who later became the Prime Minister of Pakistan, was Posted to Burma as the Ambassador of Pakistan. Mr. Tafazzal Ali was offered a post in the Provincial Ministry”. See Khalid- B-Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, op. cit., p. 277/     

The bureaucrats were in control not only in the provinces but also at the centre while the politicians in the words of Hamza Alvi “acquiesced in this usurpation of power”.¹⁶¹

Jinnah in his speech also remarked that among”our enemies…there are still some Muslims actively encouraging provincialism in the hope of weakening Pakistan, and thereby facilitating the re-absorption of this province into the Indian dominion.”¹⁶² If the demand for Bengali was inspired by India and helped by some Muslims, then it clearly suggests that it was not a demand put forward by partriotic Bengali Muslims, who were in the majority and were willing to go with Jinnah’s assertion.¹⁶³ During the final stop of his tour to Bengal, Jinnah also entered into a dialogue on the controversial issue of language with the Committee of Action that had been negotiating the demand for Bengali with the Eat Bengal government. ¹⁶⁴ According to Kamruddin, convener of the com-

161 Hamza Alavi, op. cit., p. 79.

162 Quoted in P. Oldenburg, op. cit., p. 719

163 It is important to point out that the Indian conspiracy theory to undermine Pakistan by encouraging provincialism became very popular in West Pakistan, In the Pakistani political circles it was widely believed that India had only accepted the Partition to get rid of the British, and would attempt a merger as soon as the British troops had left. Khalid-B-Sayeed informs his readers that “Nehru told General Sir Frank Messury in 1945 that his deliberate plan wolud be to allow Jinnah to have his Pakistan, and gradually make things so impossible economically and otherwise for Pakistan tha they would have to come on their bended knees and ask to be allowed back into India” See, Khalid B-Sayeed, Pakistan the Formafive Phase, op. cit., p. 260. Accorditg to Dr. Matiur Rehman, the most passionate advocate of an Indian conspiracy theroy”Nehrs was responsible for the passage of a resolution by all India Congress Commiter the eve of Independence Day in which the hope was expressed that the sub-continer would be reunited. What happened between 1947 and 1971 was the working out over a period of 23years of the reservations with which the Congress accepted this settlement of 1947.” Dr. Matiur Rehman, The Role of India and the big powers in the East Pakistan crisis of 1971, op. cit.p. 5. See especially chapter one, where the author outlines in great detail his India conspiracy theory, pp. 5-35, “Goffess Kali feasts on Human Blood”, For a more sophisticated argument on Indian design to undermine Pakistan during its early days see Kalim Siddiqui, The Funcitons of International conflict: A Socio Economic Study of Pakistan, op. cit., especially chapter V- “Early Conflicts of its Consequences”, pp. 79-120 and Ayesha Jalal, “India’s Partition and the defence of Pakistan: An Historical Perspective”, op. cit., pp. 289-310.

164 In a course of discussion on the isssue of language with Mr. Fazlur Rehman, a Journalist who worked for the Dawn newspaper and Pakistan Observer (before the creation of Bangladesh), he argued that in 1948 the basis for any negotiation with any commititce of action did not exist, because the government of Khawja Nazimuddin was favourably diposed to the idea of declaring Bengali to be the Provincial Language of Bengal. He has gone to the extent of suggesting that there was no language issue, or controversy  

mittee, it was Mr.Jinnah who opened the discussion by arguing, “that there could not be a stable government without one state language for the whole county.” and that Mr.Jinnah pointed to the use of English in the United States.¹⁶⁵ The committee members argued with the examples of the U.S.S.R. and Switzerland. They went on to suggest that if two languages were not acceptable, then English should be retained, or if there was to be only one Pakistani language, then it should be Bengali, since it was spoken by a majority (56%) of the population. According to Ahmed, Mr.Jinnah did not like the argument and firmly said that Pakistan should accept Urdu because India had accepted Hindi. “He refused to argue further, some hot words were exchanged, and the talk ended in a fiasco.”¹⁶⁶

In a discussion with Dr. Mohar Ali, a well known historian from W on the issue of the language controversy, we brought to his attention the dialogue that Kamruddin and his group had with Mr.Jinnah on the issue of language. He expressed his doubts about the whole incident and argued that any individual or group could have argued with Mr.Jinnah on any issue during the post-Independence, euphoria period. People had enormous love and respect for him and total confidence in his leadership.¹⁶⁷ So Dr. Mohar Ali, rules out the possibility of any dialogue with either any inividual or group, ending in “hot exchange of words and in a fiasco.”

We would argue that it is most likely that a dialogue between Jinnah and the group led by Kamruddin Ahmed did take place, but most probably in a cordial and respectful atmosphere. It is also likely, we would argue, that the dialogue created some kind of doubts in Jinnah’s mind

as such in 1948. There may have been general discussion about the issue in some quarter but nothing more than that happened. He sees most of the writing on the language issue, especially for the year 1948, as an exaggerated account of Muslim Bengali’s history.

165 See Ahmed Kamruddin, A Socio Political history of Bengal and the Binth of Bangladesh. (Dacca: Zahiruddin Mohammid Inside Library, 1975), p.101.

166 Kamruddin Ahmed,op. cit., p. 101.

167 According to Khalid-B-Sayeed, the Bengalis accepted the Quaid-i-Azam’s statement on the language issue but did not necessarily agree that he was correct or just. “In Muslim countries an aged person is regarded with great respect. The Quaid-i-Azam [great leader] had not only won Pakistan, but also grown considerably old in winning it. “Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase, op. cit., p. 300. According to Keith Callard, “Jinnah was Pakistan, and people looked towards their great leader for guidance, and where ever he went he was received by vast crowds with adulation amounting almost of worship”, Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 19.  

about the language issue. A careful analysis of Jinnah’s speeches delivered during his visit to Bengal indicates that he was aware of the growing  feeling of provincialism in Bengal.¹⁶⁸ He was also aware that the grievances of East Bengalis with regard to their language and the alleged supercillous or haughty attitude of the Punjabi and Urdu speaking Muslim officers could not be brushed aside lightly.”¹⁶⁹ So he told the Bengalis, “Please do not think that I do not appreciate the position. Very often it becomes a vicious circle, When you speak to a Bengali he says: Yes you are right, but the Punjabi is so arrogant; when you speak to a Punjabi or non-Bengali, he says, ‘Yes, but these people do not want us bere, they want to get us out”. Now this is vicious circle and I do not think anybody can solve this Chinese puzzle. The question is, who is going to be more sensible, more practical, more statesman like, and will be rendering the greatest service to Pakistan? So make up your mind and from today pu allege Punjabi an end to this sectionalism.”¹⁷⁰

To take our argument a step further, it is important to point out that about ten years before the creation of Pakistan in the Lucknow session of the Muslim League in 1937 a resolution was put forward which recommended that Urdu should be made the lingua franca langunge, Bengali delegates were vehemently opposed to the idea of the Muslim League adopting Urdu as its official language. The Bengali delegates then argued that Muslims of Bengal constituted more than a third of the total population of India, and if Urdu were adopted as an official languageit would hamper the propaganda work of the Muslim League among  Bengali Muslims. Mr.Jinnah had to intervene, and he suggested that he was not in favour of the resolution in that form. The resolution as adopted read that the annual session of the Muslim League should only recommend to the All-India Muslim League, “to make all efforts possible to make Urdu the lingua franca of the Muslim League.”¹⁷¹

168 See Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State, (Folkestone: Dawson, 1979) especially chapter ten, “Ethnic Nationalism and Imperialism”, pp. 161-168.

169 Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase, op. cit., p. 276. The haughty attitude of the Punjabi and Urdu speaking bureauerats is a recurring theme in all the interviews we conducted during our field work to Bangladesh in 1986. See our interview with various Bengali political elites.

170 Quaid-e-Azan Speaks, (Karachi: Pak Publicity, n. d.), p. 129.

171 See, The Pioneer, (Lucknow: 17October 1937). Also seee Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan Theformative Phase, op. cit., p. 210.    

It is also important to point out that, as Pakistan became more more likely to come into existence in the early 1940s, the question of one or more national languages became less prominent.¹⁷² In fact, according to Philip Oldenburg, “A striking feature of the contemporary literature in the demand for the creation of Pakistan was that the discussion of the language of a soon to be independent Pakistan was conspicuous by its absence, ¹⁷³ The author then asks, “was this because everyone was in agreement about what the language would be?” A partial explanation of this vital question can be found in the writing of the author when he asserts that “the core of Pakistan as a nation was defined by religion alone…”This is probably the key sentence of the whole article. But unfortunately, the author does not expand on this theme, Iqbal, while rejecting the Western concept or nationalism, had argued that, “It is not unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe… That we are members of a society founded by the Prophet(P.B.U.H.) of Islam. Islam adheres all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life principles on the character of a particular people. In its essence, it is non- temporal, non spatial.”¹⁷⁴

After the creation of Pakistan, the “champions of Muslim nationalism” were promoting the cause of one language, one nation and argued that Urdu is the only language which “embodies the best that is in Islamic culture, and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the language used in other Islamic countries.”¹⁷⁵ The Bengali elites did not dispute this

172 Mohmammad Toha, leader of the Communist party of Bangladesh, informed us in an interview that some of the patriotic songs that the students in Bengal used to sing during the Pakistan muvement were in Urdu. According to him language was not an issue during the movement.

173 P. Oldenburgg, op. cit., p. 718. It is most likely that language at that particular period of time in history was not considered to be a real issue in comparison with getting the British to agree to Pakistan. This does not mean that no debate took place on the issue of language at all. It has got to be pointed out that the position of Urdu as a language within undivided India was very much a matter of heated debate, particularly in North India, the seat of Urdu Muslim elites. For an interesting debate on thestatus of Urdu in India, see Waheed-uz-Zaman, op. cit., pp. 98-101. Also see Aijaz Ahmed, “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the ‘National Allegory”, Social Text, vol 15, Fall 1986, pp. 65-88. I am indebted to Dr. Venket Rao, for bringing Aijaz Ahmed’s work to my attention.

174 For a detailed argument on this point see chapter Three.   

assertion, but they wanted Bengali to be given an equal status, because they thought that the achievement of Pakistan would not only secure the future of Urdu in Pakistan, ¹⁷⁶but also give them the independence and opportunity to develop their language and mould their Bengali Muslim identity free from the crushing influence of the Bhadralok of Bengal.¹⁷⁷ What the promoters of Urdu in Bengal and elsewhere in Pakistan failed to recognise was that, although the Hindu and Muslim Bengalis had lived together for centuries, like Hindu and Muslim communities elsewhere in India, there were definite and completely separate trends and approaches in the two Bengali literary cultures in which they expressed themselves. We have already outlined in some detail, this trend in the first section of this paper. Here, we will only emphasise that it was this kind of a quest for identity that gave birth to a Muslim separatist movemen in Bengal. And according to Mr.Kamaluddin Ahmed, “The majority of the creative (Hindu]intellectuals could not give up sub-cultural nationalism based upon religion. Most of the Hindu writers like Bharat chandra, Iswar Chandra, Vidyasagar, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Ramesh Chandra Dutta, and Bhuder Mukherjee were indifferent to Muslim society and  mainly depicted Hindu society and its civilisation and culture. Moreover, Hindu writers, while writing the history of ancient and modern Bengali literature, did not fairly project the contributions of the Muslims. On the other hand, most of the Muslim writers like Fakir Garibullah, Syed Hamza, Sheikh Abdur Rahim, Riaz Uddin Ahmed Mashadi and other ignored the Hindus and glorified theirown sectarian traditions and culture. In order to Islamise the Bengali literature they produces, Do-Bhashi/Puthi, were Arabic and Persian words were used indiscrimanately.” ¹⁷⁸

175 P. Oldenburg, op. cit., pp. 716-717.

176 According to Bilal Hashmi and H.N. Gardezi, “Urdu is one of the official langunges in Pakistan, but its future development in India seems somewhat doubtful.”The aurb then quote Naim to inform the readers that, “its (Urdu) fortunes… have suffered is India, where in the minds of Hindu nationalists it erroncusly became identified with the Muslim separatist movemsent. Though listed among the languages recognised under the Indian constitution, it has not been granted the status of a second state language in what has been its homeland, Uttar Pardesh.” See Bilal Hashmi, and Hasan Nawaz Gardezi, “Urdu the structural and Cultural Context of Intellectual”, in Yogendra K. Malik edited., South Asian Intellectuals and Social changes, (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1982), pp. 203-204. Also see C.M. Naim, “The Consequences of Indo Pakistani War for Urdu Language nad Literature: A parting of the Way”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol xxviii, no 2, February 1969, pp. 269-283.

177 See our interview with Dr. Sajjad Hussain.

178 Kamaluddin Ahmad,”Bengali Intellectuals and Social Change in Bangladesh”,in Yogendra (unclear) (edited).op.cit.pp.236-37.    

And according to Mr.Abu Zafar Shamsuddin, “The net result of these two distinct efforts in the literary and cultural field was infusion  of communal and sectarian feelings among the people. They began to religiously divided.” ¹⁷⁹

The Pakistan movement intensified the divisions on religious lines, and gave birth to a number of separate Muslim literary associations like Bengla Muslim Sahitta Samity, Muslim Sahitta Samaj and Pakistan Renaissance Society. So the Bengali Muslims had to fight a long commuanl battle to secure their Bengali Muslim identity. But the refusal, of the Central government of Pakistan, manned by the advocates of Urdu culture, to give Bengali an equal status with Urdu, meant for the Bengali Muslims, non recognition of their long struggle to preserve Bengali Muslim identity.

By denying Bengali language an equal status with Urdu, the promoters of Muslim nationalism unlocked a pandora’s box that they had so successfully kept closed during the Pakistan movement. The language issue became the most volatile and decisive issue in Pakistani politics, because of what Mr.Wadud Bhuiyan calls, “the one eyed policy of the central government”¹⁸⁰ towards Urdu language. At this point, let us revert back to the point we made earlier about Jinnah’s stand on the issue of language. Mr.Jinnah during his visit to Bengal in March 1948 made it clear, according to many writers to which we have referred to earlier, that Urdu should be the national language of Pakistan. Since 1940, Mr. Jinnah, as man and politician, was of vital importance to the majority of the Muslim population in India, and after the creation of Pakistan, in the words of Keith Callard, “He was Pakistan.”¹⁸¹ Therefore, all his speeches and utterances on any vital issue were of great significance for his people and subject to careful analysis by scholars. Most of the scholars, writing the history of Pakistan saw his statement on the future status of Urdu in Pakistan as the final verdict of the language issue.¹⁸² P. Oldenburg, for example, in a recently published article on the issue of language controversy in Pakistan questioned the nature of what he call, “that moral decision¹⁸³ to impose Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. According

179 AbuZafar Shamsuddin, Sociology of Bengal politics.(Dacca:Bangla Academy, 1973).p.95.

180 Mobd. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan,.op.cit.p.20.

181 Keith Callard,op.cit.p.19.

182 A few exapmles are, Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan: the Formative Phase, op. cit., pp. 276-277. Kamruddin Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 241-242. A.H.E. Zahedul Karim, op. cit., p. 43. Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p. 8.     

to the author, “Urdu was the first language of less than five percent of the people, though presumably it was understood by more than five percent.” ¹⁸⁴

Suren Navlakha has argued that any attempt, “to seek any explanation or justification for Urdu in statistical terms would be entirely misleading, for the basis of the decision to make Urdu the national language… lay neither in political rationality nor in any kind of momentary expediency. It was a pre-eminently moral decision which sprang from an urge testified in history and inspired by the ideals of a future society. an urge commonly held by the Muslims in the Eastern as much as the Western part of the country.”¹⁸⁵

What P. Oldenburg, Suren Navalkha and many other writers like them who have written in a similar vein on the language issue in Pakistan failed to see is that no decision was taken by Mr.Jinnah on the issue of language. He only made a statement on the issue and it remained a statement and nothing beyound it. Later when Mr.Khawja Nazimuddin ran into trouble on the same issue during his Prime Ministership, he used Jinnah’s statement as a shield to protect his own position. We will come back at a later point to assess the position of Mr.Khawja Nazimuddis on this issue. As far as Mr.Jinnah is concerned after leaving Dacca he never spoke on the issue again. He died on the 11th September 1948,

The point we are trying to make here is that if Mr.Jinnah was so unequivocal about the issue, that is the future status of Urdu in Pakistan, why did he not settle once and for all the most volatile and divisive issue in the Pakistani politics. After all Jinnah, in the words of Ayesha Jalal “knew better than anyone else that the greatest threat to Pakistan’s survival would be internal, and not external. Lacking a real political party organisation he needed a strong Pakistan centre to discipline the particularism of the Muslim majority provinces.”¹⁸⁶

183 P. Oldenburg, op. cit., p. 716.

184 Ibid.

185 Suren Navlakha, “Emergence of Bangladesh: A Study of Political development in Pakistan”, in Suren Navlakha, (edited)., Studies in Asian Development, no 2, (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1974).

186 A. Jalal,”Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor Generalship Issue”, op. cit, P. 50.   

In 1948, he was the powerful Governor General, and in the words of Khalid-B-Sayeed, ” He was a Governor General who was not only more  powerful than his other contemporary Governor General but also more powerful than his predecessor, the Viceroy of India.”¹⁸⁷

According to the same author, the cabinet of the first Prime Minister, Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan, by a resolution had authorised him to exercise all power on its behalf. he could overrule the cabinet. He had, again by a cabinet resolution, direct to all the secretaries and all the files.¹⁸⁸ Last but not least, on 11th August 1947, Jinnah was elected as President of the Constituent Assembly, the highest honour that any Assembly could confer on one of its members.¹⁸⁹

So Mr.Jinnah had practically no difficulty if he wanted to impose Urdu on the majority of the population of Pakistan who did not know the language. but he left the matter to be decided by the Constituent Assembly, where the Bengalis had a majority, and his political party, the Muslim League, enjoyed a virtual monopoly till 1953,

 

Representation of the various provinces in the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

East Bengal 44

West Punjab 22

Sind 5

North-west Frontier province 3

Baluchistan 1

Baluchistan States  1

Bahawalpur 1

Khairpur 1

N.W.F.P.States 1

Source: G.W Choudhury, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

187 Khalid-B-Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase, op. cit., p. 251.

188 Ibid., p. 259.

189 G.W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, (Dacc: Green Book House, 1963), p. 39, According to lan Stephens, “Almost any constitutional, or political, or social inno- vation that Mr. Jinnah chose to ask for, during those early days, her people would have accepted readily”. Ian Stephens, op. cit., p. 231.    

With the death of Mr. Jinnah in September 1948 according to many scholars, the political situation in Pakistan came to resemble Parliamentary government.¹⁹⁰ Lull Before the Storm-Liaqat Ali Khan Period,

Khawja Nazimuddin, the then Chief Minister of Bengal, was installed as the Governor General and he played the role of a constitutional head with considerable distinction,¹⁹¹ The Liaqat -Nazimuddin (1948-51) also marked the beginning of a serious effort to produce a constitution for the country. The question of which form of government was best suited for Pakistan and its constitution-making history have received extensive coverage in contemporary Pakistani political literature and we need not go into detail here.¹⁹²

We will touch only briefly upon the key issues, which divided the elites of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on ethnic lines while they were engaged in the task of constitution making. The major constitutional conflict that took place was over the following issues: language, the basis of representation in the federal legislature, the quantum of autonomy to be accorded to each province, and the status of the provinces in West Pakistan. The government of Mr.Liaquat Ali Khan decided to begin the process of constitution making with a dramatic and unifying resolution in the Constituent Assembly on the Islamic character of Pakistan. The following extract from the resolution is quoted at length to show the significance of religion in Pakistan and the importance of theologians ture, and we need not go into detail here, ULEMA in the Islamic Republic.

 Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limi prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; This Constituent Assembly renr senting the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan; Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people; Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed; Wherein

190 G.W. Choudhury, op. cit.. p. 43. Also see L. Binder, op. cit,.

191 (unclear)

192(unclear)

the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah; Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures; Whereby the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed; Wherein shall be guaranteed 141 law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality; Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes; Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded. So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards internationsl peace and progress and happiness of humanity.¹⁹³

A careful reading of the Pakistan’s political history since 1949, however, will indicate that the objectives resolution on 1949 was an attempt to kill two birds with one stone. The first task was to create an aura of confidence which at that time was at the lowest level due to the carly death of the father of the nation, Quaid-i-Azam.Mohammad Ali Jinnah. This could be achieved best, by reverting to religious appeal, which had worked so well during the Pakistan movement. The second task was to contain the mounting pressure of the ULEMA to frame the future constitution of Pakistan, strictly in accordance with the dictates the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him).¹⁹⁴ Mr.Jinnah and his Western educated colleagues in the Muslim League knew the influence of ULEMA and Pir among the Muslim masses. The Muslim League before the creation of Pakistan made frantic efforts to win over The ULEMA to its side. ¹⁹⁵After the creation of Pakistan they

193 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, debates, vol,no 1, (March: 7th 1949), pp.1-2.

194 See Asaf Husain, op. cit., p. 82. Also see Leonerd Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, op. cti.. for a detailed analysis on the role of the ulema in theconstitution making history fo Pakistan.

195 For the role of the ulema in the creation of Pakistan see the following works David Gilmartin, “Religious leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab”, Modern Asian Studies, vol 13, no 3, 1979, pp. 485-517. Mr. M.A. Jinnah was well aware of   

could hardly be ignored. To this day they remain a powerful pressure group in Pakistani politics.¹⁹⁶

Commenting on the importance of the theologias in Pakistan, Ian Stephens writes,”The chasm between the English speaking intelligentsia and the theologians is unique. Nothing comparable exists in Western countries, and many Western visitors to Pakistan scarely realise its existence. While there, they meet the westernised, fairly afflueat upper classes- and the poor. But they probably meet no theologians. Those people, however, the so called ULEMA, are there, and plainly, in a professing at any rate in part to have religion as its basis, they must be important.¹⁹⁷

 Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan was able to reach a compromise with the ULEMA, on the main text of the famous objective resolutions with the help of Maulana Shabir Ahmed Usmani (R.A.), the most outstanding figure among the ULEMA of Pakistan. He was also a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and had direct access to the then Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan. Second only to Maulana Shabir AhmedUsmani, and an ULEMA with even greater influence among the masses was Pir of MankiSharif, to whom, according to Binder, “must go much of the credit for winning the NWFP, [North-West Frontier Province] over to Pakistan, “I They both were extremely helpful to the Muslim League in containing the influence of the ULEMA who were opposed to the

the fact that the “only strong issue which the Muslim League could organise was religion”, Wayne A. Wilcox, “Ideological dilemma in Pakistan’s Political Structare”, in D.E Smith (edited)., South Asian Politics and Religion, (Princeton, NewJersy important. “197 Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 342-343,

196 See L. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, op. cit,.

197 lan Stephens, op. cit, p. 237.

198 L. Binder, op. cit., p. 138. In November 1945, Jinnah assured the Pir of Manki chu of the NWFP that “It is needless to emphasise that the Constituent Asembly which would be predominantly Muslim in its composition would be able to enact laws for Muslims, not inconsistent with the Shariat laws and the Muslims will no longer be obliged to abide by the un-Islamic laws.” The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan debate, vol v, 1949, p. 46. It is interesting ot point out that most of the prominent ulema in Pakistni politics were from West Pakistan. This is not to suggest in any case that they were not respected in East Pakistan. They were equally revered in East Pakistan.

198 Liaqat Ali Khan’s objectives resolution manocuver had been highly successful. Even for the dichard opponent of the Muslim League, the Jamaat-i-Islami declared that the objectives resolution was a turning point in the history of Pakistan. The Majlis-i-Shura of Jamat-i-Islami declared that the statement of good intentions on the part of the government of Pakistan was clearly on its way to becomign an Islamic State, and such deserved the allegiance of the members of the Jamaat. See L. Binder, op. Pp. 194-195. cit.     

creation of Pakistan. The importance of the objectives resolution was such  that it was later incorporated, with minor adjustment in the constitutions of 1956 and 1962.

 The first interim report of the Basic Principles Committee, including all members of the Constituent Assembly, entrusted with the task of constitution making, was published in 1950. The report came under severe criticism, not from the ULEMA, but from the Bengalis, who were in the majority in the parliament. The Prime Minister could not ignore their point of view. The bargaining position of the Bengalis, since the death of Mr.Jinnah had increased, and the Prime Minister had to come to terms with them. We will elaborate this point when we discuss the first interim report of the Basic Principles Committee. As long as Mr.Jinnah was alive, the question of Bengali domination, or even a general provincial revolt against the central authority was unthinkable. After Jinnah’s death organised opposition was possible. If any single individual should be given credit for the rise of the opposition in East Pakistan, it was Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani. The Maulana became a popular figure in the 1930s when he organised the peasant movement in East Bengal and Assam. He also actively supported the Pakistan movement led by the Muslim League. After the creation of Pakistan he along with many other Muslim Leaguers was frustrated by the closed door policy of the Muslim League.¹⁹⁹ It was under his leadership that the East Pakistan Awami Muslim league was born at Dacca, on June 23rd, 1949.²⁰⁰ The central leadership of the Muslim League was mentally not prepared to face any opposition at such an early stage of its political life. This was clearly indicated by Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, at Mymenshingh, East Pakistan in December 1950. He said, “Pakistan has been achieved by the Muslim League. As long as I am alive no other nolitical party will be allowed to work here.”²⁰¹ The Prime Minister was

199 See M. Rashiduzzaman, “The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan”, Asian Survey, vol x, 1970, pp. 574-587.

200 The Awami Muslim League consisted of those people who were not satisfed with role of the Muslim League in Pakistan. the leader of the Awami Muslim League claimed that Muslim League had no radical programme to improve the condition of the poor masses and paid scant attention to party organisation. Although the Awami Muslim League professed to be more progressive than the Muslim League, its structure was not fundamentally different. its first party manifesto clearly stated that the main objective of the party was to establish an Islamic social order. For a detailed analysis on the growth of Awami Muslim League see M. Rashiduzzaman, op. cit., pp. 574- 587. Also see Md Abdul wadud Bhuiyan, op.cit., especially chapter two, “The growth of the Awami League as an Opposition Party in East Bengal and the Demand for Provincial Assembly”.

201 M. Rashiduzzaman, op. cit., p. 574.   

so sensitive about the status of his party that he equated his party with the state ²⁰² But the opposition was there to stay. The opposition in Bengal organised a massive campaign against the Basic Principles Committee report. The major criticism against the report was that it was an unhappy mixture of a parliamentary and presidential system giving far too much power to the President. The report did not offer any effective autonomy to the provinces ²⁰³The Bengalis were extremely bitter about Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan’s uncompromising attitude on the issue of language. The report recommended Urdu to be the sole national language of Pakistan.²⁰⁴ Finally, the Bengalis felt that if the report was accepted the composition of the new legislature would transform Bengal’s numerical majority of the population into a minority of seats.²⁰⁵ Bengali opposition to the report was well organised. In Dacca, in the first week of October 1950, a Committee of Action for Democratic Federation was formed, The committee drafted an altemative counstitutional proposal for the future of Pakistan ²⁰⁶ The Democratic Federation Committee held a number of meetings to mobilise public opinion in favour of their altemative proposals. Here we

202 See Keith Callard, op. cit., pp. 42-43. Also see G.W. Choudhry, op. cit., pp. 43-4,

203 The quantum of provincial autonomy remained the major bone of contention in the Centre – province relationship until the breakup of Pakistan in 1971. According to Binder the strogest demands for provincial autonomy came from people who were out of office were about to be removed. See L. Binder, op. cit., p. 130. Binder does not elaborate upon his important observation.

204 Liaqat Ali Khan’s uncompromising attitude on the issue of language must have shocked the Bengalis because the Prime Minister was a member of the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan. According to G.W. Choudhury Bengalis sacrificed some of the seats in the Constituent Assembly to accommodate some top refugee leadership from India whose original constituencise were in India. “This was a unique example of the sense of patriotism and nationalism among the people of East Pakistan whoe legitimate demands and aspirations are often misunderstood.” See G.W. Choudhury op. cit., p. 36. For a totally opposite view on the issue see, Safdar Mahmood, on cit., p. 43.

205 For detailed reaction to the report see the following works; Moudud Ahmed, op. cit, pp. 17-28, Keith Callard, op. cit., R. Jahan, op. cit., especially chapter two – “Back- ground: East – West Imbalance”.

206 For details on the altemative proposal see Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 22-27. According to Moudud Ahmed, there was a great similarity between the proposal of the Democratic Federation and the six points programme of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman given in 1966. The constitutional proposals made by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to Ayub Khan in 1966 also included many provisions of the draft proposed in 1950. The author is of the view that all the proposals recommended by the Bengali elites at various times were (unclear) the framework of one Pakistan, pp. 26.   

have briefly discussed the reaction of the opposition to the Basic Principles  Committee’s first recommendation. How did the Bengali Muslim Leaguers react to the report? The Bengali Muslim Leaguers, it seems, were faced with a dilemma of serving two conflicting loyalties, the East Pakistani people and the all Pakistan Muslim League wedded to the central administration. Now was the time for the Bengali Muslim Leaguers to get out of this conflicting position and reaffirm the rule of the majority²⁰⁷ They did express their views against the report but with caution, because they were in no mood to rock the already fragile boat of their party. They urged the Prime Minister to reconsider the report. Mr. Nur Ahmed, for example, said,” “Unifortunately, with the publication of the interim report of the Basic Principles Committee, there has been a great agitation and very hostile comments even against the leaders of Pakistan. Sir, in some quarters these principles enunciated in the report, have been ascribed as most undemocratic, un-Islmic and most reactionary. Sir in East Bengal there is a growing belief I must say that it is wrong impression that there are principles in the report which, if adopted, will reduce the majority of East Bengal into a minority and it will turn East Bengal into a colony of Pakistan.”²⁰⁸

Liaqat Ali Khan had to bow before the pressure of Bengal. It can be said that he could not have done otherwise. The Bengalis enjoyed a majority in the Assembly party and it remained the dominant feature

207 It has to be pointed out that the presentation of the interim report was the first opportunity given to the public and to the majority fo members of Constituent Assembly Oppomine the outline of the coustitution that was taking shape. The proceedings of the Basic Priciples committee and its sub-committees remained confiedntial but ascasional briefing were made to the press about its current business. The Basic Principles Committee was as a whole too large to consider every aspects of constitution making it was therefore, divided into three sub-committees. They were (1) sub- committee on federal and provincial constitution and distribution of powers. (2) sub- committee on franchise.(3) sub-committee on the Judiciary. It is important to point out that the Basic Principles Committee did not contain a majority of Bengali members, and neither did its sub-committees. Take for exampls the sub-committee on federal and provincial constitution and distribution of power, in this committee there were nine Bengalis out of twenty members. Another important point that needs to be mentioned is the distinction between Bengali members and members sitting for Bengal seats in the Constituent Assembly. Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi and Dr. Mahmud Hussian for example were original members of the Basic Principles Committee, sat for East Bengal seats but their province of origin was the United Province. they were both academicians and central Ministers.

208 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, debates, vol viii, no. 21, p. 183, 1958.    

of parliamentary politics until 1956. Out of a total of 69 members²⁰⁹ in the Constituent Assembly, the Muslim League parliamentary party had 49 members and out of that total number 27 members of the League were from Bengal. The position of the Bengali delegation was then one whereby it could help the government of Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan to put through any measure at all, or, by cooperation with the perennial Hindu opposition from their own province, they could prevent any measure regardless of its origin from passing. The Bengali members of the ruling party were however, in no mood to rock the boat of their Prime Minister. They never took the initiatives into their own hands.²¹⁰ They were, however successful in convincing the Prime Minister that the report should be reconsidered. The Bengali Muslim Leaguers had to take note of widespread feeling among the people of East Pakistan on certain recommendations of the Basic principles Committee, we have alluded to earlier, and they sug- gested certain rather drastic amendments in the report. Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan responded to the popular feeling and announced in the Assembly in November1950, “that postponement was desired for the purpose of enabling the Basic Principles Committee to examine and consider any concrete and definite suggestions that might be made by the people with regard to the basic principles of the constitution.”²¹¹

Liaqat’s decision to withdraw the report was a triumph for the Bengalis.²¹² Mr. Shahhoodul Haque of Bengal said, ” postponement was favoured by all except those who wished to make political capital out of the wide spread storm of discontent that raged all over Pakistan… over the widely resented interim report.”²¹³

209 From time to time additions were made to the Assembly. At the end of its lif 1954 the Assembly had a total of seventy nine seats. The first Constituent Assembly never had a session in East Pakistan.

210 L. Binder, op. cit., p. 124. It was only in 1954, after the dismissal of Khawia Nazimuddin, that the Bengalis in collaboration with Sindhis and Pathans hastily attempted to curb the power of the Governor General by introducing legislation wich would have made it impossible for the Governor General to dismiss a Prime Minister The Assembly also repealed the PRODA legislation 1949 which had been effectively used as a political weapon against politicaians (its first victim was Ayub Khuhro of Sind). the response of the Punjabi bureaucrat Governor General was swift. He dissolved the cositutent Assembly on 24th Octoebr 1954. For deatil see Keith Callard, op. cit., chapter iii, “Constituent Assembly”, pp. 77-123.

211 G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., p. 71.

212 Ibid,.

213 constituent Assembly of Pakistan, vol viii, no 6, p. 182.   

The Constituent Assembly then appointed a sub-ocmmittee whose  task was to examine the proposals and suggestions from the people, “who genuinely desired to see the Constitution based upon the Objectives

resolution”²¹⁴

According to Binder, Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan’s decision to reconsider the interim report did not take into account Bengali elite objections. The Prime Minister withdrew the report in order to permit people to point out which provisions were not in accordance with the objectives of the resolution and which additional provisions should be added to bring the report into conformity with the principles of Islam. By doing so, Binder argues, Liaqat Ali Khan practically invited the Bengalis to join with the ULEMA (religious leaders) because his statement indicated that religious objections were the only important ones. This move, on the part of Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan was not in conformity with his policy to keep religion, or at least, the ULEMA out of politics.²¹⁵ Binder fails to see that Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan’s decision to withdraw the report and his reference to the objectives of the resolution in his statement of withdrawal clearly indicates that he was trying to play a safe game. He could not ignore the Bengali objections and at the same time he did not want to annoy the Punjabis and Muhajir bureaucrats on whom he heavily relied for political support. ²¹⁶

Any explicit reference to the Bengali objections would have convinced the powerful Punjabi and Muhajir civil servants at the centre that the Prime Minister was yielding to the pressure of the Bengalis. Under the circumstances the best way out of the Constitutional impasse was by reference to Islam. It is also important to point out the position of the various provinces on the key Constitutional issues, we have mentioned earlier, were known to the Prime Minister. The Punjabis wanted to support, enhance the federal aspect of the Central parliament, where as the Bengalis emphasised its democratic aspect. The smaller provinces of West Pakistan mostly concerned with maintaining their ‘independence’ of the were Duniab and their autonomy vis-a-vis the central government dominated by the Muahjirs and the Punjabi bureaucrats.²¹⁷

214 L Binder, op. cit,. p. 207.

215 lbid,.

216 See Hamza Alavi, op.cit.p.79. Also see, Gowher Rizvi, “Riding the Tiger: Institutionalising the Military Regime in Pakistan and Bangaldesh”, in Christopher Clapham and George Philip, (edited)., The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), р. 202.

217 See the following works, Feroz Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Problems of Nationl Integration”, in Asghar Khan (edited)., Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience,   

The Prime Ministers position on the federal issue is rather difficult to pin down, because he was trying to play the role of an (unclear) in the inter-provincial conflict. A cursory look at the interim report however, reveals that a subtle attempt was made to reduce the power of the Bengalis in the future parliament as compared with the Constitutional  Assembly. Here it is important to point out that Prime Minister was a member of the sub-committee on constitutions and power. But he saw the report before it was sent to the Constituent Assembly for detailed  discussion. It is most likely that the Prime Minister wanted to reduce his dependency on the Bengalis.²¹⁸ The reaction of the Bengalis must have surprised the Prime Minister, Apparently, he saw no difficulties in the acceptance of the report which according to Binder is an “indication of how incorrect were the Prime Minster’s assumptions about his own influence and the provincial loyalties of the members from East Bengal.²¹⁹ 

The withdrawal of the report was a personal embarrassment for the Prime Minister. In the past, the Prime Minister’s pre-occupation with external affairs gave him very little time to deal with internal political issues. The constitutional stalemate forced him to devote his attention to internal political problems. But before he could tidy up the internal political mess, his life was cut short in Rawalpindi, on the 16th of Octobe: 1957, by the bullet of an assassin. According to Binder, “In the death of the first Prime Minister Pakistan sustained a loss perhaps even greater than that of the founder of the state.²²⁰ Rise of the Vernacular Elite: Khawja Nazimuddin Period.

(London: Zed book Ltd), pp. 229-246. Feroz Ahmed, “Nationality: Refuting Mr Beoh Dawn, Karachi 24 and 25 October 1978, Khalid-B-Sayeed, “Pathan Regionalism, Pacific Affairs, vol LVII, 1964, pp. 478-506.

218 For details see L. Binder, op. cit., p. 204. Also see Constituent Assembly of Pk debates vol viii, no. 1, appendix 1, p. 21. The real difficulty lay in clause 30 31 of the interim report which dealt with constitutions, powers and function of t central legislative. According to clause 30 “There should be a central lezisla consisting of two houses: (1) The house of Units representing the legislatives of te Units. (2) The house of people elected by the people.” According to clause 31, cact province would have representation in the number of these representatives was no fixed. Clause 31 also mentions a house of the people whose representatives were tu be directly elected by the people. There is however, no assurance that provincil delegations would be in proportion to the population of each province.

219 L. Binder, op. cit., p. 202.

220 L. Binder, op. cit., p. 243.      

Khawja Nazimuddin was the Governor General of Pakistan at  the time of Liaqat Ali Khan’s assassination. Immediately after the assassination, of the Prime Minister, Khawja Nazimuddin, after prolong consultation with his party members agreed to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He held the office until April 1953. Nazimuddin’s decision to become the Prime Minister has been described by Craig Baxter as’ self imposed devotion.”²²¹ Keith Callard, however, is of the View that Nazimuddin’s decision to become the Prime Minister was a calculated move. Nazimuddin was a man of great political experience. He was once the Chef Minister of un-divided Bengal, and after the creation of Pakistan, he became the Chief Minister of the largest province of Pakistan; East Bengal. He, therefore, thought it proper that a Bengali should now succeed to the position of real authority.²²² “It was therefore decided that he should become Prime Minister and that Ghulam Mohmmad [a Punjabi] should be the new Governor General”²²³ why was Ghulam Mohammad, a bu- reaucrat, chosen to such a high office? Keith Callard has argued that “It is possible that Ghulam Mohammad was appointed in order that a strong Punjabi should be in a position to balance a Bengali Prime Minister.²²⁴ It is difficult to agree with Callard’s line of reasoning on the following grounds. In a parliamentary system, the role of a Governor General is normally that of constitutional head.²²⁵ He is not the real authority. If the choice was to recognise the Importance or the Punjab, then why a bureaucrat? Nazimuddin could have nominated a Punjabi politician from his own party to the high office. His own appointment as the Governor General, after the death of Mr.Jinnah, was a good precedent. According 1o sources which must remain anonymous, Khawja Nazimuddin enjoyed

221 Craig Baxter, “Pakistan and Bangladesh”, in Frederick L. Shield, (edited)., op. cit., p. 215.

222 Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 133. It is important to point out that most of the politicians in Pakistan have always strongly advocated parliamentary form of govenment as most suited for Pakistan. Accordng ot one observer “Talking of an Islamic system and thinking in terms of the Western system is an incongnuity ” which is visible all around us. The spirit soars to the lofty heights reached in Omar’s time, [second Calipha of Islam] but eyes are fastened on the spires of Westminster.” Quoted in Karl Von Vorys. Political development in Pakistan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 42.

223 Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 133.

224 Ibid., p. 134.

225 See Mehrunnisa Ali, “Federalism and Regionalism in Pakistan, Pakistan”, Study Centre, Research Series, vol I, University of Karachi, 1985, pp. 22-58.    

an excellent relationship with Ghulam Mohammad at the time he became the Prime Minister.²²⁶ Nazimuddinn was also aware of the strength of the bureaucracy at the centre. he was also aware of the difference that existed between Fazlur Rehman, a Bengali very close to Khawja Nazimuddin, and Ghulam Mohammad during the Prime Ministership of Liaqat Ali Khan.²²⁷

Khawja Nazimuddin needed the support of the bureaucrats to consolidate his position at the centre. At the same time, he wanted to avoid any confrontation within his own cabinet. Therefore, a careful decision was taken to promote the Finance Minister (Ghulam Mohammad) to the position of the Head of the State. ²²⁸ But, as we will see later, the decision to promote Ghulam Mohmmad backfired. According to Binder, “Nazimuddin’s Ministry was indeed the rule of Bengalis, but not of Bengal”²²⁹ It was also a period ridden with crisis, and in the words of Ian Stphans: “Perhaps, also, history has been unkind to him”²³⁰ Here it will not be an exaggeration to point out that not only history, but historians too, were unkind to Khawja Nazimuddin. According to G.W. Choudhury, the Nazimmuddin era, “Was noted for a policy of indecision, hesitancy and vacillation which was, manifested more markedly in times of crisis such as the anti-Ahmedia disturbances in the Punjab in 1953.”²³¹

And according to Ian Stephans, “Nazimuddin was a respected figure of a distinguished family. he had integrity and was liked. Moreover, he was known to be a devout practising Muslim. But it is obvious now that he lacked an essential quality for the Job: Force of Character.”²³²

Let us now examine the Nazimuddin era. Nazimuddin entered in to the office of the Prime Minister at a difficult point in time. Pakistan was without a constitution. Economically, the boom caused by the Koren war, so helpful to Pakistan’s finances, was ending, the harvest had been

226 Anonymous.

227 See G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., p. 42.

228 Source anonymous, “Ghulam Mohammad was extremely unpopular with the Bengalis”

229 L. Binder, op. cit., p. 245.

230 lan Stephans, op. cit., p. 238.

231 G.W. Choudhury, op. cit, p. 45.

232 lan Stephans, op. cit., p. 238.  

meagre particularly in the Punjab and there was the possibility of food shortages. Early in 1952, Khawja Nazimuddin, himself, raninto heavy trouble in his own home province, Bengal, where according to most accounts Nazinmuddin made a statement in favour of Urdu.²³³ This was the final phase of the language controversy in Pakistan. The preceding paragraphs show that the language controversy is and should be an important aspect of our thesis. Therefore, we will discuss the final phase of the language controversy in some detail.

Khawja Nazimuddin was one politician from Bengal, who was very well conversant with the explosive nature of the language issue. Immediately after the creation of Pakistan, as the Chief Minister of Bengal, he had to handle the sensitive issue of language. Later he had to seek the help of the Quaid-i-Azam to calm the Bengali anger and anxiety. As the Governor General of Pakistan, he saw the fate of the first Interim report on the constitution produced by Liaqat Ali Khan’s government. The report was uncompromising on the issue of language. The Bengalis organised a massive campaign against the report and it had to be withdrawn²³⁴ One may ask why did Nazimuddin against such a hostile background open a sensitive issue and that too in a public meeting at Dacca? Sources very close to Khawja Nazimuddin gave us in an interview the following account of the language controversy of 1952. According to the source, “Khawja Nazimuddin did not know how to read or write Bengali. his speech in Bengali was written in Urdu script by a bureaucrat while travelling from Karachi to Dacca. Most of the bureaucrats came from United Province where Urdu as a language came under threat from the Hindus. In Pakistan they hoped Urdu will have a secure future. They equated loyalty to Urdu with loyalty to Islam and Pakistan, It is important oint out that Khawja Nazimuddin before delivering his speech in

233    See for example, L. Binder, op. cit., p. 245. According to Binder, Nazimuddin announced in the capital of East Bengal that urdu would be the state Language. Other accounts too are not different from Binder’s. See the following works, Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p. 30, Md Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, op. cit., p. 25, Karl von Vorys op. cit., D. 90. For more references on the language issue see the second section of this chapter. L. Ziring is the only author, to date, who has given a detailed account of the language controversy of 1952. See his work, “Politics and Language in Pakistan: Prolegomena 1947-1952”, in contributions to Asian Studies, vol I, Janurary. 1971, pp. 122.

234    East Pakistan Muslim working committee in a meeting held on October 29, 1950 took serios note of widespread unrest among the people of Bengal in certain recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee and suggested drastic amendment of the report. See G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relation, 1959), p. 72/     

Paltan Maidan [ground] did not have a chance even to go through his own speech prepared by a bureaucrat. In his written speech what Khawja Naazimuddin mentioned was that Quaid-i-Azam desired that Urdu should be the state language of Pakistan.²³⁵

 

The person who wrote the speech for Khawja Nazimuddin later did try to defend himself when he said that, “a twist had been given to my speech about the state language and it was made to appear as an expression of my opinion.”²³⁶ He then went on to add that the matter was not a “live issue”, and discussion should cease.²³⁷ But Nazimuddin’s appeal fell on deaf ears. The language issue was a potent weapon in the hands of those who were not satisfised with the performance of the Muslim League government. The opposition decided to capitalise on the situation and quickly got into action, and informed the Press that it would stage a mammoth demonstration on the 21st February to project the views of the people of Bengal on the language issue. The arrangement, interestingly, coincided with the meeting of the East Bengal legislature, which was dominated by Muslim League, as well as the provincial Muslim League council. The provincial government of Muslim League, headed by the then Chief Minister Mr Nurul Amin panicked and took few immediate measures in the name of law and order, to stop the opposition leaders from staging any kind of demonstration on the streets. On the 20th of February section 144 was imposeed on the city of Dacca, which meant all processions, demonstrations and assembly of five of more individuals in any public place were prohibited. A daily English News- paper, the Pakistan Observer of Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhury, a former Muslim Leaguer, was banned. The official government communique said that the paper was being banned, because of the subversive role played

235 Source anonymous. According to Ziring, “Nazimuddin gave no more emphasis to this passage in his speech than he had to others and proceeded to coplete his presentation. If Nazimuddin had looked up from his paper, he would have noted that his Bengali speaking confreres were more than simply annoyed by his reminder. Neither Nurul Amin, the then Chief Minister of East Bengal nor any of his subordinates had been asked to proof the speech before he delivered.” L. Ziring,”Politics and Language in Pakistan: Prolegonera 1947-52″, contributions to Asian Studies, vol I, January 1971, p. 112.

236 Morning News (Dacca: February 4, 1952).

237 Ibid,. Nazimuddin’s statement indicates that he was not passionately committed to promote Urdu as the sole state language of Pakistan. In December 1952 when Nazimuddin presented the second Interim report on the future Constitution of Pakistan, the report avoided any reference to the state language controversy.   

by the editorial staff and its publishers on the issue of language.²³⁸

On the 21st February 1952, the situation in the capital of Bengal got out of hand when the police tried to prevent the students from violating section 144. The students refused to comply with the order of the district Magistrate. The students insisted on taking out a procession, and soon a demand for peaceful procession turned into violence. The authority then decided to resort instantly.²³⁹ The language movement had claimed its first martyrs. The provincial government of Mr. Nurul Amin, the then Chief Minister of Bengal, under stood the gravity of the situation and passed a resolution in the provincial legislature, which was then in session, asking the centre ot accept Bengali as one of the National languages. The passing of the resolution did little to end the chaos. The rioting continued. the army had to be brought in to control the situation. when the army appeared on the scene, order was quickly restored in the Bengal capital. Thus, the language issue had come of age. It was now a full blown political issue. The language controversy created myths and symbols.²⁴⁰ It gave the opposition leaders in Bengal a cause to unite.

The language controversy was also responsible for several other significant developments. The controversy seriously undermined the primacy of the Muslim League in Bengal. In the provincial election of 1954 the Bengal Muslim League was completely routed. Of the 237 seats contested, the combined opposition, United Front, secured 228 seats, the League secured only 9 seats. The Chief Minister of Bengal, Mr Nurul Amin, was defeated in his home town by a student leader. the Muslim League was stunned by the magnitude of its defeat.

The language controversy, in combination with the later conflictual issues of unequal economic development of the two wings and the lack of adequate representation of East Pakistan in the centre, civil service and armed forces was crucial to the development of linguistic nationalism

238 The newspaper was a strong supporter of the demand to give the Bengali language national status. See my interview with Moinul Hassan, managing director of the Daily Itefaq (a Bengali newspaper).

239 For a detailed description of the events of February 21, 1952 see report of the enquiry into the firing by the police at Dacca on 21st February 1952, by the Honourable Mr. Justice Ellis of the High court of Judicature at Dacca. (Governmen of East Bengal Press, Dacca, 1952), p. 12.

240 See R. Jahan, op. cit., p. 44.     

in East Pakistan. ²⁴¹ Nevertheless, the fifties were a period in which the Bengalis were negotiating the terms on which they would participate in the central government. There were clear cut signs of Bengali frustrations but not of despair. Nazimuddin was still in power at the centre. In the winter of 1952 his government produced before the Constituent Assembly the second draft of the constitutional proposal. The draft was undoubtedly an improvement in the eyes of the Bengalis over the first one.²⁴² The most important contribution of the second draft was the insertion of the principle of parity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan which was acceptable to the Bengalis but not to the Punjabis. The Punjabis argued that if the principle of parity was accepted, as envisaged in the Nazimuddin repont, then East Bengal would be given a special position compared to other provinces of Pakistan; whereas in a federation all the provinces should be treated equally. Let us therefore, briefly, examine the Nazimuddin formula on the vital issue of representation in the central Legislature. The Nazimuddin report proposed a bicameral legislature. The composition of the two houses there would be parity between the two wings. The real authority would however lie with the lowere house. The upper house or house of unit would have only the power of revision. In the upper house nine units were recognised for West Pakistan. Here was the the upper crux of the whole problem.

The Punjabis feared that if Nazimuddin’s reoprt was accepted then the Bengalis in alliance with the small provinces of West Pakistan would always dominate the central government. This was not acceptable to the political leadership of the Punjab, the most prosperous province

241 See R. Jahan, op. cit., for a detailed analysis on the rise of vemcular elite in Fr Pakistan, especially chapter two, pp. 9-50. Here it is important to point out the in Bengal the vemacular elites were united under the leadership of nonvemacular elie Mr. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy. Even Fazlul Haq who is considered to be a leader of the vemacular elite by R. Jahan, was bilingual. He could speak, read and write Urdu and Persian with gerat comfort. According to L.A. Gordon, “Fazlul Haq was a protege of the Nawab of Dacca (a powerful representative of the Sharif culture in Bengal). Haq, with the Nawab’s (Khawja Slimullah) help, held a governmen post from 1906 to 1916.” See L.A. Gordon, op. cit., p. 159. For Fazlul Haq’s rise to politics in Bengal see J.H. Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 64-65. Also see J.H. Broomfield, “four Live: History as Biography”, Journal of South Asian Studies. no. I, August 1971, pp. 78-83.

242 See the following work for an analysis of Nazimuddin report, Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., especially chapter two, pp. 1744. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, op. cit., chapter four, pp. 38-49, and L. Binder, op. cit., especially chapters eight and ten.       

of Pakistan. The Punjabis now wanted a unified West Pakistan.²⁴³  The Punjabis strongly felt that the only way to confront the Bengalis at the centre was by means of an integrated West Pakistan. The Punjabi press vigorously opposed the Nazimuddin formula. During that period Nazimuddin paid a visit to Lahore. He was then presented with a resolution of the Punjab Muslim League which states, “…this council is emphatically of the view that the discussions of the report of the Basic Principles Com- mittee in the Constituent Assembly should be postponed for a sufficient time to enable mature deliberation…”²⁴⁴

It is interesting ot point out that the Chief Minister of the Punjab,  Mian Mumtaz Khan Daulatana, signed the report, but later, in a statement to the press pleaded for a unitary government and expressed his doubt about the parity formula in the central legislature.²⁴⁵ Nazimuddin was now under pressure, not inside the parliament, but by outside interests and that, too, in the Punjab where a new crisis of a very sensitive nature had come into being. It was the anti-Ahmedi agitation. The anti-Ahmedi movement can be traced back to the pre-partion days.²⁴⁶ But to cut a long

243 The author of the scheme was Mian Mumtaz Khan Daulatana, a well educated landlord from the Punjab. He was brilliant manipulator. See Khalid-Bin-Sayced for an interesting account of Daulatana’s political intrigues. Khalid-B-Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan The Nature and Direction of Change.(New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 37. Daulatana’s schemes spelled out the strategies for bringing about the unification of west Pakistan. According to Mr Zahiruddin, a document prepared by Mr. Daulatana, clearly stated that “A fragmented West Pakistan has really nothing to ask from East Pakistan because the realities of the situation in any conceivable would already have given East Pakistan an irreconcilable superiority”. See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, debates, vol. I, September 7, 1955, p. 558.

244 Quoted in Binder, op. cit., p. 294. Also see Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Politics of Development, op. cit., p. 47.

245 lbid.,

246 The Ahmedis, who numbered about 200,000 are mainly concentrated in the central and Eastern parts of the Punjab. They believe that their Prophet Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, (1835-1908) had appeared to reform the original religion of Islam. Mirza Ghulam Ahmed proclaimed his faith towards the end of the nineteenth century. Since then Muslims felt outraged that one of the cardinal article of their faith, the finality of the Prophet-hood under Muhammad, (peace be upon him) who had brought the best and the most perfect faith, was being challenged. Therefore, in the eyes of the great majority of the Muslim community Ahmedis were apostle. See Khalid-B-Sayeed, politics in Pakistan: Nature and Direction of Chage., (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 37-38.  

story short, the agitation was renewed with new vigour in 1952.²⁴⁷ The argument of the supporters of the anti-Ahmadi or Qadianis movement was that, since the Ahmedis deny the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad(P.B.U.H.) they are not Muslims. Consequently they should be declared a mon Muslim minority community, and that they must be barred from all important policy making and administrative positions in the government. The agitators particularly demanded the removal of Mr.Zafarullah Khan from the post of Foreign Minister. It was also felt that the Ahmedis, besides propagating their faith, had established themselves story short, the agitation of in positions of importance in the civil service and military.²⁴⁸

Khawja Nazimuddin was a man of strong religious conviction, and therefore, he readily agreed that the Ahmedis were heretics, but he was hesitant to take any quick decision on the issue. Firstly, because according to lan Stephens, “its instigators undeniably were people perhaps still unpatriotic, who had been indifferent or hostile to the idea of Pakistan almost up to her birth: people such as the Ahrars, and MaulanaMaudoodi’s group the Jama’at-I-Islami.”²⁴⁹ Secondly, before taking any final decision Nazimuddin wanted to consult the ULEMA, which turned out to be a time consuming process. Finally, the role of Mian Mumtaz Daulatana, the Chief Minister of the Punjab must have convinced Khawja Nazimuddin and his Bengali advisors that Daulatana was deliberately soft on the supporters of the anti Ahmadi movement to undermine the rule of Nazimuddin at the centre.²⁵⁰ We have already alluded to the differences between Nazimudddin and his Chief Minister in the Panjab, Mr Daulatana, on the vital question of representation at the centre. At any rate, months of inaction on the part of Nazimuddin proved disastrous, Between March 3rd and 7th 1953 the law and order situation in Lahore city deteriorated

 247 The most exhaustive account of the Ahmediyya controversy can be found in the work of Leonard Binder, op. cit., chapter nine, “The Ahmediyya Controversy and its Consequences”, pp. 259-296, Also see report of the court of inquiry constituted under the Puanjab Act II of 1954, to enquire into the Punajb disturbance of 1952, (Lahore: Government printing Press, 1954). This report is popularly known as the Munir Report, because the President of the inquiry was Justice M. Munir.

248 Khalid-B-Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, op. cit., p. 38.

249 lan Stephans, op. cit., p. 239.

250 According to Khawja Nazimuddin, “Daulatana canalised the agitation towards Karachi because he had not been allowed to nominate a Punjabi to the Central Cabinet and because he disagreed with Nazimuddint’s federal formula, See, Punjab Disturbances, cit., p. 235.    

to a point of anarchy. It was during these crucial days that the Chief Minister of the Punjab, Mian Mumtaz Daulatana, issued a statément, “virtually capitulating to the demands of the demonstrators that the community should be declared a minority and that Ahmadi leaders like  Zafarullah should be dismissed.”²⁵¹

It was now time for Naimuddin to act and according to Ian Stephans, “In this final emergency Khawja Nazimuddin acquitted himself with credit. “²⁵² Several top religious leaders involved in the movement were arrested, and marital law was imposed in the city of Lahore. The measures brought the disorders to an end within hours. Khawja Nazimuddin by Mr. Noon. Khawja Nazimuddin returned to Karachi almost in triumph. then travelled to Lahore and got Mr. Dalatana dismissed and replaced He had every reason to feel confident. It appeared that Nazimuddin was Bow in full control, and that was perhaps the last thing that the civil servants and the armed forces ever wanted. Nazimuddin and his Cabinet were summoned to his official residence(G.G. House) by the Governor General who demanded the resignation of the Cabinet. Nazimuddin refused on the grounds that he enjoyed the confidence of the majority in the Legislative Assembly, and that only recently the Assembly passed his budget by an overwhelming majority. Then came the abrupt announcement from the Governor General. On April 17th, the Governor General Ghulam Mohammed issued a press communique, which said, “I have been driven to the conclusion that the Cabinet of Khawja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country. In the emergency which has arisen I have felt it incumbent upon me to ask the Cabinet to relinquish office so that a new Cabinet better fitted to discharge its obligations toward Pakistan may be formed.”²⁵³

The dismissal of Nazimuddin government, according to most vcholars was the last blow to the already mutilated body of democracy in Pakistan. According to G.W. Choudhury. “The Monarch’s prerogative to dismiss a cabinet has long ceased to exist in the British parliamentary system – the last occasion was when George III dismissed the Fox North Coalition of 1783-and to revive to in the present days is to go back to

251 Khalid-B-Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, op. cit., p. 38.

252 lan Stephans, op. cit., p. 239.

253 Press Comminuque, 17th April 1953.

254 G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., p. 46.    

the environment of the Hanoverian Monarchy.”²⁵⁴ The Governor General’s announcement therefore caused bewilderment in all quarters.

Let us now look carefully at the statement of the Governor General and analyse the major charges brought against Khawja Nazimuddis and his Cabinet. According to the press communique, “Nazimuddin and his Cabinet proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country.” Some scholars have also pointed out that the government of Khawja Nazimuddin did not prove equal to the difficulties facing the country. For example Keith Callard says, “It cannot be denied that the administration had failed to surmount all the many obstacles that lay in its way, “²⁵⁵ G.W. Choudhury, is even stronger when he points out that the Nazimuddin administration was noted” for a policy of indecision, hesitancy and vaccilation which was manifested more markedly in times of crisis such as the anti-Ahmedi disturbances in the Punjab in 1953.²⁵⁶ What were the difficulties Pakistan was facing at the time of Nazimuddin’s dismissal? They were; Firstly, Pakistan was still without a constitution. after 18 months in office Khawja Nazimuddin and his government had not provided a constitution for his country. But neither had Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan, after 38 months in office. Secondly, the allegation against Nazimuddin and his Cabinet was that of “indecision, hesitancy and vaccilation”, or in the words of Ian Stephans, “shilly-shallying” on the issue of anti-Ahmedi agitation. It is important to point out that the anti- Ahmadi movement was a sensitive politico-religious issue, and any decision could be taken on the issue, a careful analysis of the demands of the agitators was necessary. It was vital for Nazimuddin to consult the Ulema on this issue. Finally, the government of Khawja Nazimuddin, after exhausting every possibility of compromise, stood firm against the politico-religious agitators who led the anti-Ahmedi movement.²⁵⁷

It is also ironical to note that the new cabinet formed by Muhammad Ali Bogra included six ministers form the outgoing administration. Finally, it is said that during the Nazimuddin era the country was in a near famine situation. Commenting on this issue, Hamza Alvi writes, “Another attack was made on the Nazimuddin government by raising the spectre of an impending famine. The wheat crop that year had not been very good,

255 Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 135.

256 G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., p. 45.

257 Here it is important to mention that the anti-Ahmedi movement was finally resolved during the Bhutto era(1971-76), almost about 20 years after the dismissal of Nazimuddin government.

and a CIA sponsored press campaign was started to magnify the food shortage into a famine scare. This encouraged hoarding and food prices started rising. The Nazimuddin government in desperation turned to the U.S. for help, but even the promise of food aid from the U.S. was withheld until the Nazimuddin government had been ousted in April 1953. Within a week food aid was announced by the U.S. But the promised food did not actually begin to arrive from U.S. until after the bumper harvest of the following year. The fact that the famine scare was false and had been artificially generated was clear from the fact that the food situation did not deteriorate much further, the year progressed until the following harvest and Pakistan got by, despite the non-arrival of the promised food aid.²⁵⁸

What other reasons can there be for the dismissal of Mr.Nazimuddin?  A plausible explanation for the dismissal of the Nazimuddin government can be found in the autobiography of the former President of Pakistan, Field Marshall Ayub Khan. The author writes, “When I joined the cabinet [Ayub joined the cabinet of Muhammad Ali Bogra after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954] I wanted to work for two clear objectives: to save the armed forces from the interference of the politicians and to unify the provinces of West Pakistan into one unit.”²⁵⁹ Unification of West Pakistan into one unit also had a strong appeal among the  bureaucracy.²⁶⁰ Nazimuddin and his Bengali political advisors were totally opposed to the unification scheme²⁶¹ Nazimuddin and his group wanted to preserve the basis of a parliamentary structure which would allow the Bengalis to control the centre.²⁶² “The basis of such control would have to be the disunity of West Pakistan.”²⁶³

258 Hamza Alvi, “The State in Crisis”, in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid edited., op. 80-81. For more details also see, H.Alvi, “U.S. aid to Pakistan”, in Economic Weekly, special number, (Bombay: July 1963).

259 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),.p. 192.

260 for details see Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Politics of development, op. cit., especially chapter v, “Unification of west Pakistan and thr Constitutional Formula of 1956: Attempts to Build a Natioal Consensus”, pp. 51-63.

261 Nazimuddin in a debate, in the constituent assembly after his dismissal, accused, “that a small coterie out for power politics brought this thing(Zonal Federation) at the last minute to delay the farming of the constitution.” Quoted in Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Politics of Development,op. cit., p. 48.

262 This remained a dream until breaking up of Pakistan in 1971. Control by and complaint against the centre is a recurring theme in all the interviews we conducted during our field trip to Bangladesh.

263 L. Binder, op. cit., p. 346.     

Ayub’s second objective was to “save the armed forces from the interference of the politicians”. Mr.Nazimuddin was definitely “guilty” of interfering in the affairs of the armed forces. As the Chief Minister of Bengal, in 1948, he presented a list of demands on behalf of his province. First and foremost among them was that as far as Easten province is concerned, “we must have a fair and proper share in the armed forces of Pakistan.”²⁶⁴ The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mt Liaqat Ali Khan, saw this demand as parochial and rejected Nazimuddin’s complaints with the argument which was later to be used by all central governments to silence the voice of the provinces”…we must kill this  provincialism for all times.”²⁶⁵

Later, as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khawja Nazimuddin had taken vital decisions on the sensitive issue of defence, one was to transfer the Naval Headquarters to Chittagong and the other to starnt increasing the number of Bengali regiments in the Army. These decisions, however, could not be implemented due to his abrupt dismissal.²⁶⁶

 

However, what is most surprising about the dismissal of Khawja Nazimuddin is that he found himself almost alone in his protest against the undemocratic action of the Governor General, in whose elevation to the post of Governor General, Mr.Nazimuddin had himself played a vital role. Why was Nazimuddin all alone in his protest? His party was in power in all the provinces of Pakistan. Moreover, he was only dismissed as the Prime Minister of the country. He still retained the Presidency of the League.²⁶⁷ So how did the party react to the dismissal of its Prime Minister and party chief? The role of Muslim League as a political party at this particular point of time in history is best summed up by G.W. Choudhury. According to this writer, “If Ghulam Muhammed was guilty of subverting democratic institutions no less were the members of the legislature who submitted to his action and formally endorsed it by accepting the new Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who was flown from Washington,, and who was not even a member of the legislature. The legislature could

264 Quoted in, Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 174.

265 Liaqat Ali Khan, Constituent assembly of Pakistan, debates, vol i, (March: 1948), Pp. 140-41.

266 Anonymous.

267 The offices of the Prime Minister amd Muslim League President were join together during the time of Liaqat Ali Khan.       

have passed a vote of no confidence in the new Prime Minister. Similarly the ruling party, [Muslim League could have refused to accept him as its leader.²⁶⁸

But neither of these happened. All this clearly demonstrated where power actually resided. The Governor General not only nominated the Prime Minister but had also chosen for the new Prime Minister the team of minister, which included six from Nazimuddin’s cabinet.²⁶⁹“Thus at last, the bureaucracy in Pakistan had unambiguously manifested its political supremacy.²⁷⁰ The dismissal of Mr.Nazimuddin clearly demonstrated how insecurely the democratic institutions were based in the country. The Muslim League, as a political organisation, failed to respond to the challenge. The Demise of the Muslim League: A short Appraisal. “Prior to the election of 1937, it [Muslim League] was not a party at all. It was a collection of landlord factions which had been floating in the sea of national politics. For thirty years, that is from 1909 to 1936, it remained a party of nobles and professional elites. From 1937 to 1947 it came under the influence of the urban middle classes led by the Quaid- i-Azam which lent it an ideological and organisational maturity.however,this influence was temporary and ideological and organisational maturity. However, this influence was temporary and superficial.²⁷¹ By the time Pakistan emerged as an independent country, landlords had already managed to control the party’s top level leadership.²⁷² After independence, factional groupings of landlords became the mainstay of the Muslim League. They

268 G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

269 According to Ayub, (who in 1954 after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, joined Bogra’s Cabinet of Talent) Mohammed Ali Bogra was a protege of Ghulam Mohammed. See Ayub Khan, op. cit,. p. 50.

270 Hamza Alvi, op. cit., p. 81.

271 See Keith Callard, op. cit., especially’chapter two, “The Decline of the Muslim League”, pp. 34-76. Also see, K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-58, (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976.

272 Mian Iftikharuddin, a well known political leader in the Pubjab, became the Minister for Rehabilitation of refugees in the West Punjab government, after the creation of Pakistan. He was well known for his socialist views. He resigned within a year because his proposal for resettling refugees on the estates of the large landowners was turned down. After the creation of Pakistan, West Pakistan became a haven for landlords. The monopoly of the landlords in the rural areas was absolute.     

entered into coalitions with one another.²⁷³ Various groups were lured by the bureaucracy to form alignments in the centre as well as in the provinces.”²⁷⁴

Most of the scholars writing on the political history of Pakistan are of the view that, since the creation of Pakistan politicians belonging to the Muslim League spend little, if any time, in the organisation of the party. No convention of the party was held during the first nine years  of Pakistan.²⁷⁵(The convention is an Assembly of the members of the Central and Povincial League Councils.) The Council of the League in the main controlling and policy forming organ of the party. The Council consisted of four hundred people. Most of them were elected every three years by the provincial councils. The Council was supposed to meet at least twice a year, and one of the venues of the meetings had to be in East Bengal, but this article was never observed. The Council held seven meetings between 1948 and 1956, only one of which was held in Dacca,²⁷⁶ These few examples give some idea about the state of the ruling party during the period 1947-53.

The Muslim League leadership was totally dependent on the bureaucracy for the running of the day to day functions of the state and got little help from the party apparatus to govern the country. According to Asaf Hussain, Jinnah set the precedents which was later followed by Liaqat Ali Khan and Khawja Nazimuddin. It is, however, important to emphasise that all the above mentioned leaders depended on the bureaucracy for very different reasons.

Mr Jinnah was in a position to use the experties of a highly trained bureaucracy to set the house in order. He once told them that, “they constituted the backbone of the state. Govenments are defeated, Prime

 

273 Main Mumtaz Daulatana, a landlord from the Punjab was well known for forming highly intricate networks of pacts and alliances. For detail sese, Khalid_B-Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, op. cit., p. 37.

274 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law 1977-1985, 9Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), p. 140.

275 For more details on the role of Muslim League as a political party see the following works, Keith Callard, op. cit., especially chapter II, “The decline of the Muslim League”. pp. 34-76, Mohmmad Waseem, op. cit., chapter 21, “Muslim League”, pp. 139-144, and K. Aziz, op. cit,.

276 (unclear) Keith Callard, op. cit., pp. 40-41.   

Ministers come and go, but you stay on, and therefore, there is very great responsibility on your shoulders.”²⁷⁷ Yet, on another occasion, he wanted them to stay out of politics, dispel their past reputation of belonging to the ruling classes, and discharge their duty as servants of Pakistan.²⁷⁸ As we pointed out earlier, at the time of its birth, Pakistan was faced with enormous difficulties. Communal riots dent the country- side; millions of refugees were pouring into the new state. All these created a serious law and order situation. Faced with utter chaos, Jinnah turned to the bureaucracy, and not to his party, to save the state from falling apart. According to R.Jahan, “The prime necessity of the state’s survival great responsibility as an independent international entity often pushes the governing elite to concentrate on state building at the cost of nation building. While state building requires the creation and concentration of authority and an emphasis on the role of government in the social process, nation building especially in states with several subnational groups often calls for dispersal of power and an emphasis on responsiveness in the political process.”²⁷⁹

Muslim League governments, right from the start, opted for the former option and allowed power to accumulate at the centre. A good example is the introduction of a new section, 92A, in the 1935 Act which empowered the Governor General to suspend the normal constitutional machinery in a province in the case of an emergency, and to direct the of the provinces to assume on his behalf all power of the governor provincial government. Section 92A was invoked in various provinces with starling regularity.²⁸⁰ Another weapon with which the central government armed itself was the Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act 1949, popularly known as PRODA. The main victims

277 Jamiluddin Ahmed, (edited)., op. cit., pp. 528-29.

278 Ibid., pp. 501-2. It is important to note that this stern warning was given to the bureaucrats in Bengal, where people had already started complaining about the attitude of the bureaucrats in Bengal, where people had already started complaining about the attitude of the bureaucrats towards the common man. See our interview with Dr. Sajjad Hussain.

279 R. Jahan, op. cit., p. 3.

280 The sequence of dismissals is as follows: 1947 – Khan Sahib and Rashid of the Birth West Frontier province, (Khan Sahib was opposed to the creation of Pakistan), 1948- Ayub Khuhro of Sind, 1949- Khuda Bakhsh of Sind and the Khan of Mamodot of the Punjab, 1951- Ayub Khuhro of Sind,1953- Mumtaz Khan Daulatana of the Punjab, 1954- Pirzada Abus Sattar of Sind, Malik Firoz Khan Noon of the Punjab, and Fazlul Haq of East Bengal.    

 of PRODA were the politicians. Especailly, those who had incurred the displeasure of the central government.²⁸¹ Commenting c on this formal concentration of power in the hands of the Governor General, Hamza Alvi writes that it made the bureaucrats all powerful, because they were the ones who were in charge at the centre. They acted in the name of Mr.Jinnah, the ailing father of the nation, while the politicians watched helplessly this usurpation of power²⁸², After the death of Mr Jinnah, both Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan and Khawja Nazimuddin, made no effort to reverse or check this process. According to Hamza Alvi, after Mr.Jinnah, Mr Liaqat Ali Khan was one politician who could have made a strong bid to establish poliltical authority over the bureaucracy. “He was a man who had never greatly exerted himself in the field of administration and the making of financial and economic policies: He was quite content to leave such policy making to officials… His excuse for his minimal involvement in the stale was that his eyesight was very weak and he could not, therefore, s much time reading through files.”²⁸³ Gowher Rizvi is however of the view that Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan was responsible for involving in the decision making process, military officers and bureaucrats, a great majority of whom were, like him, refugees from the United provinces. He had antagonistic relations with the provincial politicians of his party. It was therefore during his era that the provincial cabinets in the Punjab and Sind were dismissed and placed under Governor’s rule.²⁸⁴

Khawja Nazimuddin was no different from his predecessor. He, too, paid no attention to the demands of the provincial leaders of the party for decentralisation of power. Many Muslim League leaders used the party platform to stress the need for decentralisation of power, because of the peculiar geographical nature of Pakistan. Mr. Nurul Amin the Chief Minister of Bengal and a close associate of Nazimuddin had this to say

281 Its first victim was Ayub Khuhro of Sind. For detail on PRODA see Keith callend op. cit., pp. 102-105.

282 Hamaza Alvi, op. cit., p. 79; also so see Khalid-B- Sayced, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, op. cit., p. 185. According to Sayeed, formal concentration of power in the hands of Jinnah started in 1940,”As one reads through the constitutions of 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1944, one notices a steady centralisation of power in the hands of the President and his working committee”.

283 Hamza Alvi, op. cit., p. 79.

284 See Gowher Rizvi, “Ridding the Tiger: Institutionalising the Military Regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh”, in George Philip and Christopher Clapham (edited)., op. cit., pp. 202-203.       

about the centralisation of power, “… After achievement of freedom there has been a race for centralisation of power both in India and in the central government of Pakistan. I consider this to be the most unsound and short- sighted policy. The provinces must be allowed to enjoy the full autonomous position, must be as free from the central government as it is thought practical. But particularly this province of East Bengal which is so far- flung from the capital of the central government must enjoy the fullest  autonomy.²⁸⁵

But little attention was paid to the demands of the provincial party leaders. When Khawja Nazimuddin became the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Bengalis hoped that their desire for greater devolution of power from the centre, particularly with regard to communication, trade and the production of salt would be met without any opposition. Mr.Nazimuddin staunchly refused even to discuss the matteer. He was also unwilling to abolish the federal tax on salt. In the political sector the Muslim League leadership avoided election wherever possible. This ultimately proved disastrous for the party when Khawja Nazimuddin became the Governor General of Pakistan. as his nominee Mr. Nurul Amin was appointed Chief Minister without any consultation with party members. Many party members felt that an election should have preceded the decision from Karachi. According to Khalid-Bin-Sayeed, Muslim League leadership did not realise that after the birth of Pakistan the party needed to be re-structured in such a way that it would develop, on the one hand, grass root support thoughout the country, and on the other, the skills and the machinery to run the government. This meant that beside being a well-organised party at the government level, the party would have to provide leadership both at the religious and ethnic level. “The Muslim League leaders simply did not have either the imagination or the resources to develop such a party.”²⁸⁶

Ethnic leadership was anathema to the Karachi-based central leadership of the Muslim League. Most of these men were refugee from the United Provinces of India. They therefore found it difficult to relate themselves to the ethnic demands of the various provinces. The Muslim League leadership did not realise that, arose between various ethnic groups as a result of the politics of the government in the matters of the

285 East Bengal Legislative Assembly proceedings, vol III, March 18, 1949, p. 263.

286 Khalid-B-Sayced, Politics in Pakistan, op. cit., p. 32.      

Muslim League leadership continued to use the slogan of Islam, as is evident from the election campaign of 1954 in Bengal, to remain in power. During the period 1949-1953, Mulsim League politics remained confined to the four walls of the parliament, and they were almost out of touch with the opinions and need of the common man²⁸⁷ According to Callard, “In fact a small, well defined group of men monopolised political office throughout the country and transferred from one field to another as occasion seemed to warrant. The counclusion seems unavoldable that a group of about twenty individuals made all important political a governmental decisions at every level. In particular they controlled the posts of central cabinet ministers, provincial governors and provinceal chief Ministers. “²⁸⁸ But not without the active support of the civil servants, who by 1953 were playing an active part in the political activities of the According to Kei and Muslim League.

The Beginning and End of the Politics of Expediency.

The dismissal of Mr.Nazimuddin in 1953 clearly demonstrated who was in the driving seat of Pakistani politics. After Mohmmad Ali Bogra took over from Mr.Nazimuddin he tried hard to overcome the constitutional deadlock. However, he had little success. During his short stay in power, two important political developments took place in Pakistan. First, the election in East Bengal, and ‘second, there was the dissolution of the Constituent ASsembly by theGovermor General. The results of the 1954 election were beyond belief for the United Front

287 Ibid., p. 35. According to the author during the period 1947-54, in Bengal the Mur League relied mainly on the more conservative Bengali landowners and lawyers, some of whom were Urdu speaking, but most of whom were losing touch with the lo middle class groups. The condition in the Punjab, as we pointed out earlier, was different.

288 Keith Callard, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

289 The failure of Mohammad Ali Bogra’s formula is largely attributed to the noa- cooperative attitude of the Punjabi group in the Constituent Assembly. they did not agree with the Bogra formula. While the Bogra formula was being discussed in the Assembly, the Punjabi members did not even care to attend the session. Although Bogra started as the protege of the Governor General, the West Pakistanis had doubts about his loyalty to the Governor General. According to Ayub Khan, Bogra soon after becoming the Prime Minister came under the influence of the closest associates of Nazimuddin in the Constituent Assembly. See Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 50. The Punjati also saw Mohammed Ali Bogra as a lame duck. The real powers centered around the Governor General and his powerful Prime Ministers like Choudhury Mohammad An and M.A. Gurmani. See Keith callard, op. cit., pp. 138-139.     

Opposition, as well as for the Muslim Leaguers.²⁹⁰ The Muslim League was almost routed from Bengal. The central government, still under the control of Muslim Leaguers and the bureaucrats, panicked, and Hamza Alvi Writes, “Troops and naval units were rushed to East Pakistan. General Iskander Miza was sent to Dacca to take charge of the situation.”²⁹¹

Fazlul Haque leader of the United Front was allowed to form a government was dismissed from office on May 30th 1954. The reasons for the dismissal of Fazlul Haq’s government was again the threat to the law and order situation in Bengal. During the months of April and May there were wide-spread riots in the Adamjee jute mill in Narayangang, an industrial suburb of Dacca. The riots were between the Benaglis and the non-Bengalis employed at the province’s largest jute mill owned by Adamjiee, a non-Bengali, industrialist group. According to Bhuiyan, the riot was inspired by the industrialists and the defeated League leaders an opportunity to undo the result of the 1954 election.²⁹² According to the same author, the Karachi branch of the Muslim League in a resolution demanded the promulgation of section 92A of the Government of India Act 1935, which empowered the Governor General to assume all powers

290 The United Front was the first of a series of coalitions, or political alliance, united more against the ruling party Muslim League than for any positive policies. It consisted of various antagonistic forces, like the Awami League, Kirishak Sramik party, the ram-i-lslam and the Ganatantri Dal, among whom factionalism was ripe from the N The coalition manifesto comprised a number of conflicting goals. This broad tern of opposition alliance later became a permanent feature in Pakistani politics. Some of the prominent groups which were formed in the sixties, seventies and eighties include the COP, Combined Opposition Party, DAC, Democratic Action Committee, hoth formed in the sixties against Ayub regime. In the seventies came the PNA, Pakistan National alliance, formed against Z.A. Bhutto. Last but not the least was the formation of MRD, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, against Zia ul Haq’s govern- ment. Virtually no work has been done on this negative aspect of alliance formation in Pakistan. All these alliances formulated a broadly based programme to incorporate different groups. A close look into the programme of these alliances shows that they were at conflict with each other. All these alliances broke up with the fall of each government, against whom the alliance were formed. The first alliance, the United Front, formed in 1954, broke up within two years. For the rise of the United Front see the following work, R. Jahan, op. cit., pp. 45-49; Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p. 31-43; and Md Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, op. cit., pp. 27-34.

291 Hamza Alvi, op. cit., p. 81.

292 Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, op. cit. pp. 30-31/ 293 Ibid..,     

in a province on the grounds of a grave emergency.²⁹³ The United From protested against such a suggestion, and alleged that the riots and disturbances were the result of a premeditated act, initiated and implemented at the behest of some high ranking officials in the mill, who were under the influence of the League. This incident in Bengal coupled with Fazlul Haq’s belligerent statements during a private visit to Calcutta gave the government in Karachi enough reasons to proclaim Governor’s rule in Bengal.²⁹⁴ While the elections and post election problems in East Bengal kept the central government in Karachi busy, yet another serious political development took place right under its nose. In the Constituent Asembly an attempt was made by the Nazimuddin group in collaboration with members of India Act 1935.

The move was spearheaded by Mr. Fazlur Rehman a close assocate of Khawja Nazimuddin.²⁹⁵ The Govermor General was quick to respond and the Constituent Assemly was dissolved on 24th of October aspect of Pakistani history. we need not go into the details. However it is important to point out that the decision of the Governor General was

294 It is widely accepted that A.K. Fazlul Haque during a private visit to Calcutta said that he did not believe in artificial boundaries, meaning thereby that he was not in favour of a divided Bengal. The government was already worried about Fazlul Haq’s extreme position on the issue of regional autonomy. He was summoned to Karachi to explain his position. Fazlul Haq, during his visit to the capital told the Governor General “We are true Pakistanis and stand for the unity and strength of Pakistan” Keesing’s Research Report 9, (Pakistan: New York Scribner’s 1973). p. 34. For A.K. Fazlul Haq’s position on the issue of provincial autonomy see Stanley Maron, “The Problem of East Pakistan”, Pacific Affairs, vol xxiii, 1955, p. 134. Incourse of a discussion with Mr. Fazlur Rehman a journalist from Bengal who worked for b Dawn of Karachỉ and Pakistan Observer of Dacca (now Bangladesh Observer) we asked about Fazlul Haq’s statement during his private visit to West Bengal (Calcutta He is of the view that it was a very casual statement not at all meant to stir countroversy. it was given in a good spirit while in the company of old friends in India. Some news papers in Bengal sensationalised it and it was interpreted as treasonable to Pakistan by hawks in Karachi.

295 Commenting on the role of Mr. Fazlul Rehman, The Times of Karachi, wrote, “Mr. Fazlur Rehman is not merely a member of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party which sustains the government, but he has, during recent months, emerged as its leading light. His powers are indeed amazing. It is he who is the real author of the constitution which will soon overtake the country. It is he who trounced the Punjabi stalwarts (with what sinister pleasure!) and put his foot down on the one-unit proposal as well as that of zonal federation. It is he who contrived the repeal of PRODA-Mr. Gazder only acted as a stooge to earn a reward which he has duly receive-simply because  (unclear).

challenged in the Sind high court by the President of the constituent Assembly, Mr. Tamizuddin Khan from Bengal.E Pakistan. The judgement of the Sind High Court went in favour of Tamizuddin Khan. Later the government of Pakistan appealed to the Federal Court, and the decisions reversed on the grounds that the lower court did not have proper jurisdiction to hear the case. The federal court upheld the act of dissolution on the basis of  of the ‘law of necessity’²⁹⁶

 

It is important ot point out that the Governor General’s decision to dissolve the Constituent Assembly remained essentially a legal battle between the Nazimuddin group and the Governor General. It had no serious political repercussions because the leaders of the victorious United Front party were demanding the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the formation of a new one directly elected by the people. The members of the United Front argued that those, representing Bengal in the Constituent Assembly, had lost their representative character due to the Muslim League’s overwhelming defeat in Bengal.²⁹⁷ The Punjabi  group in the Constituent Assembly supported the demand of the United Front party, because they feared that if the Constituent Assembly was not dissolved the Nazimuddin Group, in collaboration with members of the small provinces would approve a constitution based on Nazimuddin’s scheme of parity on the issue of representation in the legislative. There- fore, in dissolving the Constituent Assembly, the Governor General had to face very little, if any, political problems. After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Governor General, and later under 1956 constitution, the President Iskander Mirza, nde and unmade ministries, and invariably succeeded in obtaining the necessary majorities for the new incumbents.²⁹⁸ This process continued until 1958. However, during the period 1954-58, the Punjabi led central

296 For a detailed judgement of the case of Federation of Pakistan vs Mr. Tamizuddin Khan see the following works: G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, (New York: Institute of pacific Relations, 1959); Sir Ivor Jennings, con- stitutional Problems in Pakistan. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 307-8; ZR Khan and S A Khan, Constitution and Constitutional Issues, Comparative Studies, Analysis and Prospects, (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1983).

297 See Suhrawardy’s Statements, Dawn March 17, April 13, October, 9 1954. See also, the resolution of the public meeting at Dacca organised by the United Front party on April 4, 1954, reported in Dawn April 5.1954.

298 During 1950-58 Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers and one Commander-in-Chief, whereas India had one Prime Minister and several Commanders-in-Chief, Khalid-b- Sayced, Politics in Pakistan: Nature and Direction of Change, op, cit., p. 32.      

Government, in order to implement their plan of unification of West Pakistan, needed the support of the Bengalis. The best man to do this job was found in the person of Suhrawardy, the leader of the Awani League. Mr.Suhrawardy was included in the Cabinet of ‘talents’ formed under the leadership of Bogra immediately after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.²⁹⁹ The central governmet led by the Punjabis knew  that Suhrawardy was an ambitious and intelligent enough to respond quickly.³⁰⁰ Soon, an agreement was reached between Suhrawardy, the leader of the Powerful Awami League party, and the Punjabi leaders on four points:

 (1) Integration of West Pakistan,

(2) Parity between East and West Pakistan.

(3) Division of offices of Governor General and the Prime Minister

 between East and West Pakistan,

(4)  Regional autonomy for the two wings of Pakistan. ³⁰¹

Mr. Suhrawardy then proceeded to sell these four points to his party. At the start, his party members and the members of the united Front Alliance seemed completely unwilling to surrender the claim for numerical superiority of the province inherent in the four points agreement. According to Dr. Maniruzzaman, Suharwardy sat down with the working committee of his Awami League for six days, trying to convince the relevant section of his party to accept the formula of parity.³⁰² He argued, “Democratic rights do not mean representation in the legislature, in the

299 Others included in the Cabinet were the ‘reluctant’ Commander-in-Chief, Gesed Ayub Khan as the Defence Minister, General Iskander Mirza became the Interior Minister and two able politicians, who indeed in 1947-58 had been looked on almou as enemies of Pakistan, Mr. Suhrawardy, for supporting the idea of a United Bengal, and Dr. Khan Sahib of the Frontier, who was opposed to the creation of Pakistan.

300 Quoted by Mahumad Ali, on September 30, 1955, from the documents in which the Punjabi group led by Mr. Daulatana, spelled out their strategies for bringing about the unification of West Pakistan, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, debate, vol I, p. 1435. For the full text of the documents see Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Politics of Development, op. cit., appendix V.

301 See Mr. Suhrawardy’s speeches on September 12, 1955, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, vol i, pp. 683-684.

302 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Politics of Development, op. cit., p. 53.      

constituent assembly or in the legislature according to population, or that because we are superior in number we should get larger representation. Democracy does not mean only numbers. In the democracy you will have to give and take. Democracy means agreement between the people, and friendship and co-operation.”³⁰³ Suhrawardy finally succeeded in his purpose. His working committee came out in favour of parity. The A.K Fazlul Haque group of the United Front, however, remained opposed to the scheme, and accused the leader of the Awami League of selling Bengal  to the Punjabis.³⁰⁴

Suhrawardy’s strategy was to build up alliances with the most powerful ethnic group in Western Pakistan, the Punjabis;³⁰⁵ something which had not been attempted before. Nazimuddin and his associates were more inclined ot build up alliances with smaller provinces against the formidable Punjabi interests. It simply did not work.

 Suhrawardy’s strategy was to build up the Awami League as a national party and himself as the national leader. He was a non-vernacular national Bengali leader, his constituency was firmly entrenched in Bengal. This strategy required a constant balancing of conflicting forces. He trod into this path with ease. His first attempt to do so was in 1952 when he joined hands with several West Pakistani parties, Mamdot’s Jinnah Muslim League in Punjab (Mamdot was one of the biggest landlord in the Punjab), Pir of Manki Sharif’s (a religious leader), Awami League in the North- West Frontier Province and Awami Mahaz in Sind. The arrangement did not last long.³⁰⁶ However Suhrawardy’s attempt continued, and when he became the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1956, his party modified its strident demand for provincial autonomy during this time, and contributed to making this “a most creative period of integrative institution buliding. “³⁰⁷ Mr. Suhrawardy remained in power for a period of thirteen months. During

303 Ibid. p. 54. Also see Suhrawardy’s speech on September 12, 1955, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, debates, voll, p. 680.

304 Md Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, op. cit., p. 35.

305 It was calculated that Suhrawardy took a risk in order to gain support in the Punjab, where the majority of the politicians were in favour of one unit. But what Suhrawardy perhaps failed to take into account was that the Punjabis were a hopelessly divided ethnic group. A region strongly feudal in nature and where “parties and principles alike fade, then vanish. Only a confused turmoil of rival struggling personalities remains”, lan Stephens, op. cit., p. 242.

306 R. Jahan, op. cit., p. 48.

307 Talukadar Maniruzzaman, Politics of Development, op. cit., p. 136.      

these thirteen months, according to one writer, “It seemed that the Bengali elite had at last got a chance to participate in the Governing of the country. In actuality, however it was an uneasy coalition of the representatives of the entrenched bureaucratic and military interests of West Pakistan  and the Benagli elite.”³⁰⁸

The “uneasy coalition” soon ran into all sorts of trouble when Suhrawardy’s government took some firm steps towards removing dispartity between the two wings of Pakistan.³⁰⁹ The first step in this direction was to grant concession to East Pakistani importers, which also meant more foreign exchange allocation for the East Pakistani importers. This was resented in strong words by the President of the Chamber of Commerce and industries.³¹⁰ In an address of welcome to President Mirza at the annual dinner of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries, the President of the Federation attacked Suhrawardy’s policies and said,”Our politicains have made a mess of the situation and their party plicies have not only affected the political status of the country but also had a serious impact on the economic life of the nation… Partiy in the political sphere may be a workable compromise but its application to economic planning without considering other important ecomomic facts may lead us into

 308 Mizanur Rehman, “Bengladesh in the Politics of Separatism”, Collected seminar papers no. 19, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1976, p. 40.

309 Economic disparity did not become a full-blown controversy until 1954-55 around this period that economists from Bengal published some good work concernine economic disparity. See A. Sadeq. The Economic Emergence of Pakistan, Part (Dacca: East Bengal Government Press, 1954), Part II, (Dacca: The Provincial St tistical Board (planning department)1956). It is also important to point out that the 1956 Comstitution implicitiy recognised the existence of disparity in the country. Article 199 provided for the national economic council in which both the wings of Pakistan (East and West Pakistan) were to be equally represented for the formulation of the development policies and plans of the country. The article also emphasised the need to ensure that uniform standards are attained in the economic development of all parts of the country.

310 The head office of the commerce and Industries was in Karachi. This Federation represented the business interests of a West Pakistan based small community who controlled about 96% of Muslim owned private industries. Its managing committee became the most powerful pressure group during the Ayub era. See the following works: Asaf Hussain, op. cit., especially chapter 6, “The Industrial Elites”, pp. 93- 110 H. Papanek, “Pakistan’s Big Businessmen: Muslim Separatism, Entrepreneurship (unclear)Modernization”, Economic Development and cultural Change, vol 21, no. (unclear). pp. 1-32.       

blind alleys from where there may be no way out.”³¹¹

Suhrawardy defended his goverment’s policy and pointed out that 173 1 or area could bc developed at the expense of others.³¹² On the economic front, Suhrawardy’s government and the emerging vested business interest came to a head-on collision when the commerce and industry ministry proposed to set up a public shipping corporation for coastal trade between East and West Pakistan. The coastal trade was monopolised by a few Karachi based shipping magnates.³¹³ The President of Pakistan finally intervened in favour of the powerful business interests. The President was supported by the Republican party’s feudal landlords, who had earlier, in 1956, formed a coalition with Suhrawardy and the no particular region centre.

Suhrawardy finally resigned as Prime Minister on October 11th, 1957. Suhrawardy’s ministry, which may have been the most competent since the early period³¹⁴ must also be credited for solving one of the many controversial problems in Pakistan”s constitutional history; the issue of separate electorates. The 1956 constitution left open the vital question of how elections were to be held, that is whether the Muslims and non Muslims would have separate or joint representation in the legislature. Suhrawardy,. as a Bengali leader, saw the political advantages of the later system. He knew that in West Pakistan the minorities constituted only 2.8% of the population, Therefore, separate representation of minorities in West Pakistan would not mean any substantial decrease of Muslim

311 See, Dawn March 5 1957. This was the moving principle of Ayub’s strategy for the economic development of Pakistan 1958-69. See, Mahbub ul Haq, The Poverty Curnain: Choices for the Third World, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976), especially chapter 1″Seven Sins of Development Planners”, p. 12-26. According to M. Haq (who played a very crucial role in the development Planning of Pakistan during the Ayub era in collaboration with the Harvard University advisory board which was based in Pakistan till 1968) the seven deadly sins of economic development were: numbers games, excessive control (a hallmark of Ayub era), investment illusions, development fash- ions, divorce between planning and implementation, neglect of human resources and growth without Justice. M.Haq, The Poverty Curtain, op.cit, pp. 12-26. Also see Omar Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan 1947-85, (London: KPI Limited, 1988), especially chapter two, “Military Rule and Civil War”, pp. 27-56.

312 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Group Interests in Pakistan politics 1947-58”, Pacific affairs, vol 39, no. 1&2, spring summer, 1966-67, p. 90.

 313 Ibid., pp. 83-98. Also see Asaf Hussain, op. cit., especially chapter 6, “The Industrial Elites”, pp. 93-110.

314 See Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 226.      

representation in the National Assembly. But in East Pakistan the minority consisted of 18.4% of the population. Acceptance of a separate electorte for East Pakistan would mean that in the new National Assembly the minority would have 31 members from the quota of 155 alotted to East Pakistan on the basis of the parity formula, thus reducing the East Pakistan Muslims to a permanent minority vis-a-vis West Pakistan Muslims.³¹⁵ In October 1956 when Mr. H.S.Suhrawardy became the Prime Minister “a strange compromise”³¹⁶ was reached between Mr. Feroze Khan Noon’s Republican Party and Suhrawardy, under which elections in East Pakistan were to be held under a joint electorate system while those in West Pakistan would be held under separate electorate system. Later, in April 1957, the law was amended to provide for a joint electorate in both of the wings of Pakistan. After 1956, despite the ups and downs in Pakistani politics, it seems that there reigned, for a brief period, once again a kind of euphoria but it should not surprise us that it was short lived.³¹⁷

At this point, let us shift our attention to the politics of Bengal in 1957. The facade of unity erected by the United Front during the election of 1954 had fallen apart. Bengali politicians in order to remain in power had to carry the support of the centre; at whose whims governments in Bengal were dismissed and installed over-night. In March 1958, for example, the Governor of Bengal, Mr.A.K. Fazlul Haque was dismissed by Iskander Mirza, the President of Pakistan.

Mr. Ataur Rehman was succeeded by Mr. Abu Hussain Sarkar, who was in turn dismissed within twelve hours of assuming office, and Ataur Rehman’s cabinet was back again in power. The situation became so confused that the President imposed President’s rule in the provie on June 24th, 1958. “By now, mere stratagems to retain or capture office were practically the sole preoccupation of politicians central and pro vincial.”³¹⁸

315 For detail see, Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Politics of Development, op. cit., especially chapter v. pp. 51-63.

316 Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 226.

317 See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, who sees the 1956 constitution as a document of agreement among the diverse regional and ideological groups in Pakistan. This document laid a solid foundation of the Pakistani nationhood and set Pakistan on the track towards a two party system – an ideal inherited from the British democracy. See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Politics of Development, op. cit., p. 63. Also see chapter ix for a more detailed analysis of this point.         

The national finances were in a frightening disarray,³¹⁹ and the whole country was in the grip of a serious economic crisis. In the Wing of Pakistan đuring September 1958 an East  ugly incident took place in the reconvened Provincial Assembly, “provided one of the proximate causes of the ending of Parliamentary government the next month by General Ayub and President Mirza.”³²⁰

On the 20th of September 1958 when the Provincial Assembly of Bengal was reconvened, a meaningless political vendetta in the leg- islature resulted in the Awami League faction getting the speaker formally declared insane. Two days later, Fazlul Haq’s Krishak Sramik party, in an organised demonstration, turned the Assembly into a battleground where pieces of furniture were freely used, resulting in the death of the deputy speaker, who belonged to the Awami League. Within a few days the Assembly was adjourned and never met again. on October 7th, 1958, a group of Generals led by their Commander-in-Chief seized power, and by means of a proclamation issued through the President, abrogated the 1956 constitution,dismissed the central and Provincial governments ‘with immediate effect’, disolved the central Provincial legislatures, abolished all Political parties throughout the country and imposed martial law. Thus, bringing to an end the first phase of the ‘Drama of Politics’ in Pakistan. The end of this phase not only signalled the abolition of party politics but also the elimination of any democratic pretensions. The socalled drama of politics thus became the tragedy of democracy. One may cautiously pose the question of how much political and economic incom- petence and misunderstandings a democracy can survive…! The Pakistani Generals on the whole felt that their particular democracy had an ex- tremely low level of tolerance for political blunders and economic in- efficiency of any kind. And with very little hesitation, they entered at this propitious moment in time, on October 7th, 1958, the political arena to take over for a then indefinite span of time all leading political and economic roles. The play of the Generals could now begin, replacing the failed and ill-acclaimed “Drama of Politics”. The, Generals used for their play a script which would stress modernisation and economic develop- ment at all cost, even at the expense of democratic institutions and procedures. Therefore, the next chapter shall examine the economic impact of this modernisation drive, initiated by the Pakistani military command.

318 lan Stephens, op. cit., p. 246.

319 Ibid., p. 247.

320 Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 225.      

So, in concluding this chapter, we would like to recapitulate it in a more general and conceptualised form. As we pointed cout earliter . Pakistan inherited the poorest, or the most peripheral regions of British India. Within ‘this periphery of the periphery’ one can easily detect the symptoms of uneven development and plain underdevelopment in its most acute expression. This pattern of being peripheral was not confined to the economic and commercial sectors. It was also conspicuously evidens and manifest in all the impotant institutions that Pakistan took over from the British Raj, namely the bureaucracy and the armed forces. However, the Muslim League leadership caught up in the fervour and excitement of the Pakistan movment, paid only scant attention to the issue of economic development and modernisation. They, in avoiding any meaningful and substantial argument with their political opponents, eagerly promised to the masses of the Muslim majority Provinces that with the creation of an Islamic state all these economic problems would finally disappear or could be resolved at minimal cost. After the creation of Pakistan, the imminent and eminent problems faced by the emerging nation, it has been 176 out earlier. stated by many scholars, forced its leadership to look towards the bu- reaucracy for the consolidation of the state institutions. This of course, allowed the civil servants in the national bureaucracy to ad vance and reinforce their own already dominant position. The civil servants had a pronounced penchant for considering such economic policies which further accentuated the problems of uneven development and ethnicity. The civil servants, often trained in British institutions, could not provide the intellectual blueprint for the professed and often proclaimed egalitarianism of an Islami state. Iqbal, at least, talked and wrote about it, but did not provide the Muslim League leadership with a detailed Plan of action. The bu of the Muslim League leadership, caught up in a daily routine of running a nation, collaborated very quickly with the civil servants on the issue of ignoring economic inequalities and the problems of ethnicity.

Generally, it can be said that the most Pakistani Politicians had a sentimental commitment to Islam, but their political philosophy was influenced by European ideas and traditions, having little concern for them of egalitarian and socially-orientated development and progress. Their rather inept handling of the language issue gave rise to the formation of vemacular elites – which were swept to power on the strength of that single (unclear) in Bengal in 1954. Building on this success, the vemacular elite (unclear) raise the issue of economic disparity or uneven development(unclear) in the 60’s became the most divisive issue in the Pakistan(unclear).    

In 1961, Ayub belatedly recognised the existence of the serious and expanding Economic disparity between East and West Pakistan. And in March 1962, when the New Constitution was introduced, the removal of Economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan was made a constitutional obligation. According to article 145 (4) of the Constitution: “A primary object… in formulating the plans… shall be to ensure that disparities between the two Provinces, and between different areas within a Province, in realation to income per capita, are removed, and that the resources of Pakistan (including resources in foreign exchange) are used and allocated in such a manner as to achieve that object in the shortest posisble time, and it shall be the duty of each government to make the utmost endeavour to achieve that object.”³²¹

In October 1958, when General Ayub Khan took over the charge of the country in a bloodless coup d’etat, according ot one scholar, the whole economy of Pakistan could at best be described as stagnant: “Gross national product per capita stayed at the same low level throughout the period. In East Pakistan it even declined. Neither in East Pakistan nor in West Pakistan did the output in agriculture keep pace with the popu- 324 lation growth.”³²²

Let us therefore turn attention to the problems of Economic disparity and uneven development during the Ayub era. Problems which not only constitute an all-pervasive theme in Pakistani nation-building but which form the core of our theoretical dissertation framework- which was largely borrowed from Micheal Hechter. But before examining these essentially economic issues, we would like to briefly allude to the rel- evance of the findings of this chapter for the theory, the internal colonialism model. The model states in its cultural dimension that the greater the identifiable linguistic incompatibility between the core and the periphery, the greater the possibility that the periphery may break away from the core and seek independence. The chapter, in empirically verifying (at least) the cultural Part of the internal colonialism model. demonstrates that the suppression of its vemacular language (Bengali) by the core (West Pakistn) may be utilised by the periphery (East Pakistan) to rally its followers and to organise them as a separatist autonomous force. An autonomous force which will always give unqualified preference to vemacular

321 Rounaq Jahan, op cit., p. 69.

322 T. M. Khan and a. Bergen, “Measurment of Structural Change in Pakistan economy: A Review of National Income estimates”, The Pakistan development Review vol.vi. (Karachi: 1966), pp. 178-80.     

interests when they are in conflict with National language considerations, and thus, widens the cultural gap between core and periphery. linguistic differences, this becomes evident in the Bengali case, when they turn their undivided attention to Economic problems in the sixties, in an attempt to better the material living conditions of its members. And from this moment on Economic disparity and uneven development enter the ranks of the main protagonists in the struggle between the core and the periphery.     

CHAPTER FIVE

SECTION I

GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICS OF MODERNISATION:

THE AYUB ERA

 

“There exists a functional justification for inequality of income to eventual equalities may inevitably lie through initial inequalities. ” (Mahbub-ul-Haque, 1963)

“It is time to stand economic theory on its head, since a rising if it raises production for all and not consumption for a few .. The road growth rate is no guarantee against worsening poverty..Divorce between bution policies must be built into the very pattern and organisation of production and distribution policies is false and dangerous: the distri- production.” (Mahbub-ul-Haque, 1971)

As we are utilising Hechter’s Internal Colonialism Model as a framework and heuristic device for this dissertation, we have to pay special attention to the economic disparity existed between East and West Pakistan.¹ It is not only necessary to trace over time the difference in

1 Economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan was one of the most divisive d hotly debated issue in Pakistan during the sixties, Bengali elites held the West Pakistani dominated central government responsible for the economic disparity that existed between the two parts of Pakistan. According to Karl von Vorys, when ever central Government officials visited the East Wing, they were showered with questions on the issue of disparity and their credibility with the Bengalis rested primarily on their willingess to admit publicly the validity of this claim. For example in January 1962 when Mr Manzur Qadir, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister visited the Dacca University campus, students showered him with Questions on the issue of Disparity. The Foreign Minister refused to speak or answer any question other than these on topics of his portfolio. The meeting broke up in utter chaos. This kind of incident brought sharp reaction from the Government officials. Decrying the issue of disparity Said Hassan, Deputy Chairman of the Planing Commission, once declared in a radio broadcast: “The trend toward economic separatism must stop. This madness must end”. The response from a Bengali elite was swift. Mr. M. Ibrahim, a former Law Minister retorted back, and declared that economic disparity can no longer be buried or neglected. In order to cool the disparity issue Ayub admitted publicly that in the past East Pakistan had not received its due share. See Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, London and Karachi, 1965, pp. 100-101. For a lively debate on the issue of disparity also see, Pakistan Observer, of the following dates, February 24, 1963, p.1, March 3, 1963, p.1, March 12, 1963,        

wealth which characterised East and West Pakistan, but it is even more important to look beyond the purely economic and to identify the ideas and the people, the human structure which in the end determine economic policy and are responsible for regional differences.

 It can be easily seen from Table I that the disparity of per capita income between East and West Pakistan rose from 32 per cent in 1959/60 to 45 per cent in 1964/65 and then to 61 per cent in 196970. This demonstrates very clearly that in relative terms East Pakistan became relatively poorer and poorer when compared to west Pakistan.

TABLE 1

Per Capita GDP in East and West Pakistan at 1959/60 Constant Prices
YEARS	per capita GDP East Rupees	per capita GDP West Rupees	West-East Disparity Ratio	Disparity Inde
1959-60	269	355	1.32	100
1960-61	277	363	1.31	97
1961-62	286	376	1.31	97
1962-63	277	393	1.42	131
1963-64	299	408	1.36	113
1964-65	293	426	1.45	141
1965-66	295	427	1.45	141
1966-67	290	448	1.54	169
1967-68	307	468	1.52	163
1968-69	312	490	1.57	178
1969-70	314	504	1.61	191
Growth over decade	17%	42%
Growth in third plan period	7%	18%

 Source: Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan, Government of Pakistan Publication for the Planning Department, 1963, p. 7.

p.1. April 4, 1963, p.1. June 1, 1963, p.4, June 2, 1963, p.4, Also see Anisur Rahman, “East and West Pakistan, A Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning. Occasional papers in International Affairs, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Number 20, July 1968, pp.1-38

*The year 1959/60 is the base year. Therefore the value of 100 has been assigned it in the disparity index for that year. The value of 1.32 (disparity ratio) thus equals      

The numbers in Table I indicate strongly that it would be extremely beneficial to outline and analyse first the purely economic factors which are responsible for the unequal development of East and West These can be traced to disproportionate government expenditure Pakistan. in the two Regions and various economic policies by the government relating to planning and development strategy For analytical convenience in the following discussion a distinc- tion will be made between two periods, namely, the pre-plan (1948-49 to 1954-55) and the plan periods (1955-56 to 1969-70). Let us therefore first look at the pre-plan period. It is imperative to check the government policies and the growth of the private sector in West Pakistan. The pattern of the Central Government in East and West Pakistan from the very inception of Pakistan was such that most of the government expenditure both on administration and development was disproportionally higher in West Pakistan.² The relevant data in this respect can be seen from Table 2.

100 in the index of disparity. Using 1959/60 as the base, we can calculate all the index values for the other years in the following manner. (Disparity Ratio – 1) +100 (of year in question) (Disparity ratio of 1959/60 For example 1960/61 -1) (1.31 -1) +100 =97 (1.32 -1)

2 According to Asaf Hussain there were mainly three factors responsible for higher government expenditure both on administration and development in West Pakistan. They were, first, there was a lack of East Bengali entrepreneurs among the industrial elites. Secondly, the industrial elites were mainly from the Punjabi and Muhajir groups. Among the Punjabis, the Chiniotis predominated, while among the Muhajirs, the Memons, Bohras and Khojas (from Gujarat, Kathiawar and Surat in India) were the dominant group. Thirdly, the headquarters of their business concerns were located in Lahore or Karachi (both in West Pakistan). The political and economic consequences of these factors were important for its reinforced elites rule and led to uneven economic development of other regions (especially Bengal) in the country. See Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State, The case of Pakistan, (Folkestone: Dawson, 1979). p.94.   

Using Table 2, as our basis of analysis, we can state the Central Government non-development expenditure in West Pakistan amounted to over 80 per cent of the total expenditure during the pre plan period. Almost similar was the case in respect of development expenditure: in the public sector in East Pakistan this amounted to Rs. 70 million as against Rs. 200 million in West Pakistan. The situation in respect of private investment was still worse since private investment in West Pakistan amounted to Rs. 200 million as against Rs. 30 million in East Pakistan. Thus, East Pakistan had a share of only 20 per cent in the total development expenditure in Pakistan during this period.³ The disparity in government revenue expenditure as well as in development expenditure created conditions which coupled with the trade, fiscal, and monetary policies adopted by the Government before and after the Korean Boom,⁴ facilitated the growth of the private sector in West Pakistan at a rate much faster than that in East Pakistan. ⁵

3 According to Asaf Hussain, “The uneven economic development of Pakistan was n a coincidence”. The high West Pakistan industrial growth rate when compared vith East Pakistan had its roots in deliberate economic choices of the Central Goverament, and did not just happen. Yet, it created its own dynamic, its own demand which accentuated the industrial gap between West and East Pakistan. ibid,P. 101

4 For details on the Korean Boom and its effect on Pakistan’s economic policy see Kalim . Siddiqui, The Functions of International Conflict, A Socio-economic Study of P kistan, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), especially chapter V, “Early Conflies and their Consequences”, pp. 79-119.

5 Kalim Siddiqui has argued persuasively that economic difficulties combined with early conflict with India forced the Pakistan decision-makers to opt for the policy rapid industrialisation of Pakistan. The author points out that immediately after the partition of the sub-continent, India received 60% of Pakistan’s total exports and supplied 43% of Pakistan’s total imports. The trade pattern clearly indicated Pakistan’s dependency on India as a market for its raw materials and as a vital source of essential supplies. Pakistani decision-makers therefore argued that in order to reduce dependency on India for consumer goods Pakistan had to look for imports from third sources ce through domestic production. “Industrialisation would at once reduce dependence on India for the supply of consumer goods and would reduce the problem of selling raw materials abroad by expanding home demand for them. In economic policy therefore the conflict with India more than any other single factor, helped to elevate the industrialisation of the country to the level of a national interest second only to thai of defence and Kashmir.” Kalim Siddiqui, op. cit., p.97.

Table 2

REVENUE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN

East Pakistan

		Development Plan Expenditure				Outside Plan Expenditure
Period	Revenue Expenditure	Total	Public	Private		Works Programme	Total Development Expenditure(3+++5	Total Expenditure	Development Expenditure in Regions as per of All Pakistan Total
1	2		3		4	5	6	7	8
1950/51-1954/55	171	100	70	30	–	–	100	100	20%
1955/56-1959/60	254	270	197	73	–	–	270	524	26%
1960/61- 1964/65	434	925	625	300	–	45	970	1,404	32%
1965/66- 1969/70	648	1,656	1,100	550	–	–	1,656	2141	36%
West Pakistan Indus Basin Works Programme
1950/51-1954/55	720	400	200	200	–	–	400	1,129	80%
1955/56- 1959/60	898	757	464	293	–	–	757	1,655	74%
1960/61- 1964/65	1,284	1,840	770	1,070	211	20	2,071	3,355	68%
1965/66- 1969/70	2,223	2,610	1,010	1,600	360	–	2,970	,195	64%

Notes: (a)Revenue Expenditure in East Pakistan is the Expenditure of the East Pakistan Govemment excluding debt plus 15% Central Government expenditure, civil administration and 12% of its defence expenditure. The rest of Central Government expen. the expenditure of W.P. Government is shown as Revenue Expenditure in W. Pakistan. All transfer payments of Central Government ie.

(b)Public sector development of the Provincial Government plus that of Central Governmenton projects located in the Province,mainly based on Planning Commission estimates. Private development expendoture as estimated by Planning Commission. Source of Table 2, Pakistani Ministry of Economic Affairs, Central Statistical Office, Karachỉ ,Islamabad, 1974. debt services, grant-in-aid to provinces, and expenditure on foreign affairs have been excluded.     

Right from 1948, the government of Pakistan adopted a policy of industrialisation which aimed at the development of the industrial sector through the initiation of private enterprise. Accordingly, fiscal and commercial policies were geared to that end. The policy of Open General Licencing facilitated more growth of industrial investment in West Pakistan because of the migration of the trading classes from India to West Pakistan.⁶ The nonvaluation of the Pakistani rupee in 1949 resulted in its relative over valuation. Rigorous import control was introduced on the import of consumer goods consequent upon the Korean depression in mid-1952 However, the import of necessary capital goods was liberalised, thus creating favourable conditions for the growth of private investment in Pakistan. With higher prices of industrial consumer goods and low prices of capital goods and prospect of earning high margin of profit from investment in industrial production increased. On the other hand the restriction on imports reduced the scope and the margin of profit from the import trade. Many enterprising traders who had amassed windfall profits during the Korean Boom were quick to avail themselves of this  new lime of profitable investment in manufacturing.

Pakistani traders who eared windfall profits during the Korean Boom from the participation in the foreign trade of East Pakistan did not make much industrial investment in East Pakistan.⁷ Thus, in the first instance, the disproportionately higher level of public development and non-development expenditure produced a high multiplier effect on the growth of employment and income which facilitated the widening of the extent of the regional market in West Pakistan. In the second instance, favourable trade, fiscal and industrial policies created greater scope profitability of investment in that region, namely West Pakistan. Further more, the growth of financial institutions, with head offices in Karachi also facilitated the rapid growth of trade and investment in West Pakistan The rate of profit from those investments, especially in the industrial

6  More about this issue at a later point.

7 East Bengal during the British period remained as a hinterland of the Hindu Bengali landlords and businessmen from Calcutta. After the creation of Pakistan, Eastern Bengal without Calcutta did not mean anything to the immigrant trading class, who preferred to settle down in Karachi, the first capital of Pakistan. Moreover, it is important to stress that the areas which came to Pakistan after the partition of India in 1947, played a complementary role in the integrated British India economy. For example, Eastern Bengal supplied jute to the jute industry, all situated in West Bengal. For more details on this issue see Government of Pakistan, Economy of Pakistan 1948- 68, Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 1968.p. 74.   

sector, varied from 100 to 200 per cent during this period. The tax and other allowances ensured by the fiscal policy of the Government increased the scope of reinvestment. Since private investment breeds private in- vestment, a foundation for the cumulative growth of private investment over the subsequent years was laid in West Pakistan during the pre-plan period. A ‘growth foundation’ was totally lacking in East Pakistan.⁸ The economic plight of Bengal was not confined only to the industrial sector. The following table indicates clearly that overall East Pakistani economic growth was marked and negatively influenced by the relative stagnation 185 of its agricultural development.⁹

8         According to Asaf Hussain a good example of uneven economic development in Pakistan can be seen in the case of one city in West Pakistan, Karachi, which had a population of less than 4% of the national total. Of a total of 1940 million dollars invested in 1958, 1146 million went to Karachi. See Asaf Hussian, op. cit.,D. 103. et G.F. Papanek, “The Location of Industry”, The Pakistan Development Review, vol. x. no.3, 1970, p.300.

9         It is important to point out that since the inception of Pakistan, until 1962, the central 6. Government of Pakistan had neglected agricultural development, relegating responsibility for its performance to the inadequately endowed provincial governments. According to Omar Noman, “Official indifference towards the agriculture sector under estimated the extent to which the industrialisation drive could be hampered by agricultural stagnation”. Omar Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan 1945-85, (London and New York: KPI, 1988), p. 16. Also see Kalim Siddiqui who has argued that, “The Pakistani decision-makers may have feared that an increase in agricultural production would also increase the output of cash crops for which they would then have to find overseas markets. As it was their dependence on India to buy jute and cotton from Pakistan was considerable. They may also have wished to build up sufficient industry to consume locally produced raw materials before further expanding agricultural production. Another incentive to concentrate attention and resources on industry was the existence of large and ready demand for consumer goods, for the supply of which Pakistan was also dependent upon India. But evidence suggests that no serious thought was given to producing substantial agricultural surpluses to finance industrial devel- opment”. Kalim Siddiqui, op. cit., p. 96.      

TABLE 3

Comparative Regional Growth Rates in the Last Two Decades

1. Growth rates in East Pakistan 1950’s (Percent) 1960’s

(a) Agriculture                      1.9                           3.1

(b) Non-agriculture             2.9                           6.0

            (c) Overall                               1.9                            4.3

1. Growth rates in West Pakistan

(a) Agriculture                        1.4                        4.8

(b) Non-agriculture                 4.1                        7.7

(c) Overall                              2.7                           6.4

Source: Report on the Panel of Economists constituted by the President of Pakistan, Aga Muhammed Yahya Khan in 1970, Islamabad, 1970, p. 97.

In the sixties, the growth rate of West Pakistan rose convincingly from 2.7% in the 1950’s to over 6% in the 1960’s when the agricultural sector is added to the non-agricultural. The corresponding figures in East Pakistan show an increase from 1.9% to 4.0%. Generally, it can be pointed out that the growth of the non-agricultural areas is dominated by the rate- of investment in both areas of Pakistan. The more investment, the more growth! However, in the agricultural sector it has to be noted that relatively little investment coupled with a ‘high technology mix’ can a high growth. That is why in agriculture the growth rate in West Pakistan (US imported technology plus money) was so much higher than in Eau Pakistan (little technological improvement and investment). It is also very important to note that private investment concentrated mainly in We Pakistan. ¹⁰East Pakistan as an investment area was often totally ignored by West Pakistani and even East Pakistani businessmen for various

10 The tilt towards the Western wing was reinforced by the development institutions such as the World Bank, since it usually selected those projects which promised the highest rates of return and they tended to be in West Pakistan”. Omar Noman, op. cit., p. 41. Also see Asher and Mason, The World Bank since Bretton Woods, (Hoft: Rinchart and Winston, USA, 1974), p. 674.    

Reasons.¹¹ Taking into consideration that private investment has a higher rate of return, a much higher one than public investment. then it is not surprising that the economic disparity between East and west Pakistan increased sharply during the sixties. This was a time when a pronounced acceleration could be seen in public sector spending in East Pakistan. However, more important and working against East Pakistan was that high private investment in West Pakistan allowed that areato revolutionise its agriculture in introducing new (genetically-engineered) seeds and 187 seed-based technologies. This difference in private investment between East and West Pakistan was still prevalent in 1969/70. The private sector investment in East Pakistan was 30% of the total development spending in the province in 1969/70. During this period the ratio in West Pakistan was close to 60% of the total outlays in developmental investments. Like in every Third World country which subscribes to some kind of a market economy, the public sector plays only a secondary role in the actual production of foods and services. The main part of the public spending is intended for infrastructure development and the private sector is really in charge of the output of the agricultural, industrial and most of the service sectors. The extreme disparity in the levels of private investment between East And West Pakistan could be defined as the primary cause for the lagging behind of the East Pakistan growth rate. In all honesty, it has to be pointed out the most available private capital was located in West Pakistan and that even with the best of intentions on the part of the Central Government public investment could not act as a substitute for the lack of private investment in East Pakistan. The transferring of savings from the private sector for financing public

11 The following questions was put to 20 eminent Pakistani Economists in 1959. They (many of them Government servants) were asked: “Do you think the economic and commercial policies of the Government of Pakistan between 1947-58 were entirely controlled/partly controlled/wholly influenced/not at all influenced by the business communities of Karachi?

1. Entirely controlled 7
2. Partly controlled 8
3. Wholly influenced 2
4. Partly influenced 3
5. Not at all influenced 0

                                          20

 Kalim Siddiqui, op. cit., p. 105.         

sector outlays has never been an easy task. In West Pakistan public sector investment was grosso modo 6.5% of the Gross Provincial Product (GPP.) In contrast, the East Pakistan private sector invested at best 3% of the GPP. And therefore, even with a public investment rate of 10% of the GPP, the total investment levels do not compare favourable with that of West Pakistan. The question thus has to be asked why so little investmenu took place in East Pakistan. Assuming quite correctly that East and West Pakistan had little resources of their own, we can conclude that even private investment had its original source outside its final place of in- vestment. Therefore, Economists agree that a prominent factor which has contributed towards a permanent investment lag in East Pakistan was the lower net inflow of external resources into the East. Among the net inflow of external resources figures predominantly foreign aid in all its forms. Below follows a table which shows over time the net inflow of resources into East and west Pakistan.

Table 4

Net Resource Inflow into East and West Pakistan

 (RS. in million)

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	Total
1961-62	347	1671	2018
1962-63	488	1607	2095
1963-64	797	1864	2661
1964-65	950	2531	3481
Second plan (4 years)	2582	7673	10255
1965-66	736	1853	2589
1966-67	814	2088	2902
1967-68	862	2103	2965
1968-69	1016	1208	2224
1969-70(estimate)	1053	1552	2605

   Source: Report of the Panel of Economists constituted by the President of Pakistan, Mohammad Yahya Khan, in 1970, Islamabad 1970, 102.

As we know that both East and West Pakistan have been net definit regions in the sixties, there has been no question of one wing(unclear) the other. Both were net recipients of aid. Thus, the foregoing     

table clearly shows that East Pakistan did not receive an adequate share in the net inflow of external assistance into Pakistan. The main part of foreign aid remained in West Pakistan.¹² We believe that it is now essential to look beyond the purely economic and to turn our attention to the people and ideas, the political structure in which in the end was instrumental in creating the ‘wealth’ in West Pakistan and in maintaining the ‘poverty’ in East Pakistan.

The political system of Pakistan during the Ayub era was in many ways not very political but extremely bureaucratic, implying that bureau- cratic operation procedures decided who got what and when; that the bureaucracy executed and implemented. Therefore, it is interesting to examine who actually was in control of those organisations and bureaucracies which allocated Government expenditure to the various parts of Pakistan. Those bureaucracies were constituted by the top CSP (Civil

12 All US foreign aid went first into West Pakistan where it usually remained: its place of investment was mostly Karachi, Lahore, or Islamabad/Rawalpindi. Number of US officials stationed in Pakistan 1948-1971

Year	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
1948	19	0
1949	26	1
1950	28	2
1951	41	3
1952	43	3
1953	56	4
1954	116	5
1955	169	9
1956	190	21
1957	214	45
1958	231	45
1959	229	39
1960	216	39
1961	205	38
1962	239	40
1963	271	36
1964	269	44
1966	119	119
1967	166	68
1968	188	67
1969	193	58
1970	160	52
1971	146	32
Totals	3,675	692

Source: Adapted from R. LaPorte Jr., Power and Privilege, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 169.      

Service of Pakistan) and the Armed forces of Pakistan which together formed in more than one way the bureaucratic elite. These bureaucratic elites may be described and defined as follows: They “were an exclusive group not only in social terms (landowner and business ‘classes’), but also in regional terms, since most of them were from West Pakistan. From the time of Partition there was an imbalance in bureaucracy in respect of regional representation. This imbalance was not only between the two regions (west and East Pakistan), but also between the various regions of West Pakistan. The elite cadre of civil services from Sind constituted a bare 5 per cent of the total number, and that from the North-Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan was merely 7 per cent. But East Pakistan’s representation in the civil services was the poorest.”¹³ 

The CSP was thus a very ‘difficult’ territory for East Pakistanis who desired to serve their country in a bureaucratic function. However, an effort was made during the period 1950-1968 to recruit East Pakistanis into Civil Services of Pakistan.¹⁴

TABLE 5 East and west Pakistan representation in CSP,1959-67

		West Pakistan		East Pakistan
	Total No. of Officers	No. Total	%of Total	No.	%of
1959	24	12	50.0	12	50.0
1960	31	19	67.7	10	32.3
1961	27	17	63.0	10	37.0
1962	27	15	55.5	12	44.5
1963	31	18	58.1	13	41.9
1964	33	19	57.8	14	42.2
1965	30	15	50.0	15	50.0
1966	30	16	53.4	14	46.6
1967	30	17	56.7	13	43.3

Source:R.Jahan, op.cit.p.107.

13 (unclear)

14 (unclear)

But these newly recruited officers had to start from the very  bottom, swelling those echelons of bureaucracy which had absolutely no decision-making power. Table 6, which describes the East-West repre- sentation among Class 1 officers in some CSP Divisions during the year 1969, and demonstrates clearly the power imbalance of CSP personnel in favour of West Pakistan and to the disadvantage of East Pakistan:

 

TABLE 6

East-West Representation in Class I Officers in Some Divisions in 1969

Division of CSP	East Pakistan		West Pakistan
	(Number)	(Per cent)	(Number)	(Per cent)
Economic Affairs	20	44.0	29	56.0
Commerce	20	33.0	41	67.0
Finance	12	30.0	30	70.0
Agriculture	6	17.0	28	83.0
Industries	10	32.0	21	68.0
Cabinet Division	4	16.0	22	84.0
Establishment Division	11	30.0	25	70.0
Planing, Information and Broadcasting	6	26.0	7	74.0
Labour and Social Welfare	5	33.0	10	67.0
Defence	5	13.0	31	87.0

Source: R Jahan, op. cit., p. 99.

Table 6, thus suggests clearly that the East Pakistanis were under- represented in all divisions which were instrumental in determining the economic future of Pakistan. They had therefore nearly ‘no say’ in those divisions which decided who gets what and when: in Economic Affairs they were outnumbered 29 to 20, in Commerce they only had 33 per cent of the available posts, in Finance they only occupied 12 out of 30 positions, in Industries they were down to a meagre 32 per cent, in Planning they had to face a two third majority of the West Pakistanis, in Defence which was always a big domestic ‘spender’ they were restricted to holding 5 out of 31 positions.¹⁵

15 R Jahan, op. cit., p. 99.      

The under-representation of East Pakistan in the armed services was even more glaring and accentuated than in all other bureaucracies. Table 7 indicates clearly that the East Pakistanis had not made any significant inroads into the command positions of the Army, the Air force and the Navy. Table 7 documents the under-representation of the East Pakistanis in the armed services during the year 1964:

TABLE 7

East Pakistan’s Representation in the Armed Forces in 1964

The Army	Per Cent out of Total
1. Officers	5%
2. Junior Commissioned Ranks	7.4%
3. Other Ranks	7.4%
The Air Force
1. Officers	16.0%
2. Warrant Officers	17.0%
3. Other Ranks	30.0%
The Navy
1. Officers	10.0%
2. Branch Officers	5.0%
3. Chief Petty Officers	10.4%
4. Petty Officers	17.3%
5. Leading seamen and below	28.8%

Source: Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974, p. 177.

It can be said without exaggeration that no efforts were made to introduce more East Pakistanis into the armed services: no quota system was instituted to rectify the regional recruitment imbalances. The Army. Navy and Air Force commands were firmly convinced that the Bengalis could not meet the physical standards required of all entrants of the armed forces. Bengalis were generally perceived by the Punjabis and the Pathans as too weak and too soft to survive Military training: according to a remark by a Punjabi General they were not meant to be soldiers: moreover it was asserted that their very nature made them unfit for warlike activities,¹⁶ at (unclear) the (prejudiced) eyes of the Punjabi/ Pathan military complex!

16 (unclear)

The army thus remained the preserve and favorite playground of the West Pakistanis, namely, the Punjabis (ca. 60 per cent) and the Pathans (ca. 30 per cent). These two peoples conveyed the impression that they believed in their military superiority vis-a-vis the Bengalis. Only they, the West Pakistanis, were destined to defend the honour of Pakistan on the battlefield: for them, the Bengalis did not exist as a warfaring ‘class (caste). In this ‘mythological’ environment there was no place for Bengalis in the armed services – or at the very best only a few positions were open 10 the East Pakistani. On the whole, military recruiters just ignored the Bengalis and by-passed them in favour of the “Pathans” (Punjabi/Pathans).

Given that the bureaucratic elites came from the landowning and business classes and that they were regionally concentrated(Punjab/North West Frontier Province), it should not be a surprise that they made diligent and strenuous efforts to further the interests of their ‘class’ and regions.¹⁷ Here, we should also note another phenomenon. The emigrants who left India for Pakistan usually settled in West Pakistan. They very often had sizable assets to invest. These emigrants had a pronounced tendency to side rather quickly with the “Pathans”: what they needed was military protection and bureaucratic patronage. And the protection and the pa- tronage was readily available from the Punjabi/Pathan nexus, especially when it was encouraged by some small pecuniary gift.¹⁸ One can thus unashamedly say that the social and regional composition of the bureaucratic elite was such that the Bengalis – whichever way they turned – could only lose.” The Programme of Bengali impoverishment was already spelled out by the policies of the Central Pakistani bureaucratic apparatus.²⁰

It should be noted that the decisions of the Pakistani Central bureaucracy which created and maintained so much inequality between

17 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Group Interests in Pakistan Politics”, Pacific affairs, vol. 39, 1966-67, pp.83-98. For the theory behind ‘group interest’ see Joseph La Palombara, “The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non American Field Situ- ations”, Journal of Politics, vol. 22, 1960, p. 29.

18 See Asaf Hussain, op. cit., pp.64-68 and 98, Also see Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp.356-63.

19 Khalid-B-Sayeed, “Development Strategy Under Ayub”, Contribution to Asian Stud- ies, vol. 14, 1979, pp.76-86.

20 Ibid, especially pp.84-86.        

East and West Pakistan were easily defended against domestic and foreigs critics. The glaring economic disparity between West Pakistan and Eas Pakistan was often rather quickly labelled as a necessary element in the modernisation process of a Third World country:²¹ “We can not distribute poverty. Growth is vital before income distribution can improve.²² Westerm economists such as the Harvard Doyen Papanek encouraged countries like Pakistan to build first ‘islands of modernisation’ in their core areas and actually to neglect the other peripheral, less developed parts of their territories,²³ The envisaged ‘island of modernisation’ would ensure the survival of the state and encourage there further rapid economic growth. Growth therefore came always before equality. Equal distribution of income among the populace should rank very low on the economic agenda of a Third World country. This modernisation vision of Papanek fortified the Pakistan Government in its decision to concentrate its industries and business centers in the Western part. According to Papanek, immediate results could only be reaped by concentrating on an already existing infra structure.

As East Pakistan (Bengal), especially its Muslim population, had always been left underdeveloped by the British, one, as a good bureaucrat, had to look to West Pakistan – which at the time of the creation of Pakistan had at least the rudiments of certain industries and some rather significant commercial activities.²⁴The Papancks, Hannah Papanek, Gustav F.Papanek and their academic disciples- who were like their ‘masters’ stem followers of ‘the modernisation paradigm’ – thus unashamedly justified the bureaucratic decisions of the ‘Pathan’ elites, and these elites therefore never doubted their ‘sacred right’ to create inequality in the name of progress and modernisation. Or in Papanek’s own Words which justify the groush of West Pakistani industries at the expense of East Pakistan: “

 “However, Lahore and Dacca had significant personal disadvan- tages for outsiders. They were dominated by “natives” with a developed

21 P.Smauel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968).

22 Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Objectives of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75), Karachi, 1968,p.17.

23 Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 242. Also see Asaf Hussain, op. cit., specially chapter 10, pp.161-68, where the author gives a detailed account of the role and influence of Harvard advisory group, based in Pakistan, in shaping the economy of Pakistan.

24 See Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p. 9.      

social structure, a local language and culture. In Dacca, intellectuals, 195 professions and artists had a strong social position; In Lahore, landlords and civil servants were prominent. Neither seemed a congenial place to many of the immigrants. On the other hand, by 1951, over half of the Karachi population were refugees from India and a substantial Proportion of the remaining inhabitants had moved to the city from other parts of Pakistan. The location of the Central Government in Karachi added to the cosmopolitan, amorphous character of the city. The businessman coming to Pakistan, therefore, felt he would be only one stranger among many, a member of a minority group in a city composed largely of minority groups. Some of the refugees spoke Gujrati as their first lan- guage, English as their second. Almost none spoke Bengali and few Panjabi, the languages of Dacca and Lahore. They much preferred a city where there would be others of their group, where there was no well- structured society and where their concern with trade and industry and with profits would not be frowned upon by polite society.”²⁵

Papanek continues in saying that, “A second factor affecting the location of industry was the desirability of being close to government. Government decisions are crucial to the functioning of Pakistan’s indus- try. High profit or ruin hinges on government decision on a firm’s application for land or power, for permission to import machinery or float securities, for licences to import raw materials and spareparts, for protection from import competition and exemption from taxes. At least, until 1960’s, industrialists’ ability to deal with government was more important for their success than any other management function.”²⁶ For an impressive account of Papanek’s “location of industry” theory see table 2 in chapter four.

The preceding analysis allows us to claim that at least on the manifest level the Pakistan Government had created a replica of Hechter’s internal colonialism model. West Pakistan was given the role of core, and East Pakistan was doomed to play the part of periphery. West Pakistanis were given those kind of assignments which allowed the “holder’ to participate in major decision-making processes and ensured him or her rapid social and financial advancement. East Pakistanis, on the other hand, were channelled into those kind of positions which lacked real power, and exhausted themselves in a closely surveilled routine. Therefore, one may preffer the idea that the internal colonialism model

25 Gustav F. Papanek, The Location of Industry, The Pakistan Development Review, op. cit., p.293.

26 FIlbid., p. 294.        

may best explain the actual relationship between East and West Pakistan Thus, the modernisation oriented Pakistan Government policies encouraged a remarkable growth of private enterprise and private and public investment in West Pakistan between 1949 and 1955. This not only changed substantially the initial economic environment in West Pakistan, but also influenced the size, strategy, regional and inter-sectoral allocations of development resources in the First, Second and Third Plan. Therefore, let us look at these plans.

Since the formulation of all these plans, especially the first plan, was based mainly on the experience of the economic happenings in West Pakistan, the development strategy and the consequent policy measures were not commensurate with the problems of the economic development of East Pakistan.²⁷ The first plan (1955/56-1959/60) envisaged a total investment of Rs. 1160 million: Rs. 800 million in the public sector, and Rs. 360 million in the private sector. East Pakistan’s share in the public sector was about 36.3 per cent. No regional distribution of the allocation for the private sector was indicated in the plan. Thus, the planned development programme was totally disproportionate to the requirements of East Pakistan since it had a larger population with a high rate of growth, and had a little growth of industries and private enterprises in the pre-plan period. The surge of development in West Pakistan during the pre-plan period did influence the pattern of regional allocation in the First Plan. But the record of this period did not lead the Pakistani planners to a basic reappraisal of the need for regional balance in development.²⁸ Had it not been so, they would have made a proper analysis of the problems of economic development of East Pakistan in order to understand dissimilar character of the regional economies and to realise the implications of the retarded growth of East Pakistan in the pre-plan period.²⁹ Such an analysis would have enabled the planners to make appropriate allocations for East Pakistan. But this was not done, and the comments of East Pakistani Economists and officials were completely ignored.³⁰

27 See Raunaq Jahan, op. cit., pp. 68-98.

28 See Muhammad Anisur Rahman, East and West Pakistan: A Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planing, (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvad University, 1968).

29 Ibid.

30 See report of the panel of economists, op cit., especially part I, prepared by the East Pakistan economists, pp. 1-91.        

Furthermore, the allocation of public investment for East Pakistan showed the ignorance of the planners about the basic problems of economic development of that region. The building up of a requisite infrastructure was a precondition for the initiation of economic development in East Pakistan. The allocations for the development of the transport, communications, and water and power sectors were not given the priority they required. Relatively lower priority was assigned to the industrial sector, and no attention was given to the question of flood control in East Pakistan. In view of the modest growth of the industrial sector and little or no growth of private enterprise during the pre-plan period, massive efforts should have been made for the development of e infrastructure and agriculture in East Pakistan during the First Plan period in order to lay the appropriate foundation for the rapid development the of the industrial sector in the subsequent plan periods. These urgencies were paid scant attention.³¹

More important however, was the implementation of the First Plan in East Pakistan. As can be seen from Table 2, the actual development expenditure in the public sector of East Pakistan amounted to about 30 per cent of the total expenditure. Private investment, on the other hand, amounted to 20 per cent of the total private investment in Pakistan. Thus, the share of East Pakistan was about 26 per cent of the total investment, public and private, in Pakistan during the First Plan period. Consequently, per capita real income in East Pakistan declined further in the First Plan period.³²

The total revenue expenditure in East Pakistan amounts to Rs.254 million as against Rs.898 million in West Pakistan in the First Plan period. As mentioned above, the larger revenue expenditure with the larger development expenditure in west Pakistan created greater scope and profitability for further investment especially in the private sector. Officially, the blame for the low level of implementation of the First Plan in East Pakistan was laid on the lack of economic and administrative absorption capacity in that region. It was not realised that the conditions which created the so-called absorption capacity in West Pakistan did not exist in East Pakistan, nor were adequate efforts made through appropriate plan allocations and changes in trade, fiscal and monetary

31 R. Jahan, op. cit., pp.85-89 also see Anisur Rahman, op. cit., pp.7-10.

32 See Omar Noman, op. cit., pp.35-43.        

policies to create such capacities.³³ Imports in East Pakistan were restricted to less than 30 per cent of the total through the licencing policy of the Central Government. according to Bahnwar Singh,

“The import licencing and exchange control policies of the government also helped in the growth of an entrepreneurial class in West Pakistan. Table V shows that the value of actual imports from 1957-58 to 1964- 65 in West Pakistan has on an average been almost double to that of East Pakistan during the entire period. Almost the same is true of industrial licences issued for West Pakistan as compared to East Pakistan during this period (see table VI ). This overwhelmingly large share of important quota and licences for West Pakistan cannot be explained in any way other than the deliberate move on the part of the Government to discriminate East wing against the West wing. The ‘Category System’ and ‘Open General Licencing’ all favoured the investors in the West Pakistan. The location of administrative authorities in the Western Province meant a further relief to the investors (as they would need less time for approaching the government and could also manipulate more pressures as compared to their counterparts in East Pakistan) there where as the relative dif. ficulties in getting credit and licences for those investing in East Pakistan added to the effective cost of capital and thus reducing the profitability in this region.”

TABLE 8 (V) Actual Imports (Public and Private) by Area 1957-58 to 1964-65 (in million Rupees)

Period	West Pakistan		East Pakistan
	Value%		Value%
1957-58	1,314	64	736	36
1958-59	1,025	65	554	35
1959-60	1,806	73	655	27
1960-61	2,173	68	1,015	32
1961-62	2,236	72	873	28
1962-63	2,800	73	1,019	27
1963-64	2,982	67	1,449	33
1964-65	3,672	68	1,702	32

33 Source: Bhanwar Singh, op. cit., pp. 76-77 See speech of A.S.M. Suliaman in the National Assembly Debates, vol. II, June 22,(unclear) pp.1281-2.(unclear)     

34 (unclear)

TABLE 9 (VI)

Industrial Licences Issued by Area (January 1957 to June 1964) (percent of total)

Period		West Pakistan	East Pakistan
January-June	1957	71.08	28.92
July – December	1957	62.93	37.06
January -June	1958	78.42	26.58
July-December	1958	74.60	25.40
January-June	1959	77.38	22.62
July-December	1959	60.44	39.56
January-June	1960	68.38	31.62
July-December	1960	63.27	26.43
January-June	1961	61.84	38.16
July-December	1961	63.33	36.67
January – June	1962	69.06	30.94
July-December	1962	74.05	25.95
January-June	1963	75.29	24.71
July-December	1963	73.47	26.53
January-June	1964	67.10	32.90

Source: Ibid       

Permission to start off a great many development schemes and funds were not made in time, and the disbursements of central funds w delayed in such a manner that whatever funds were made available the government of East Pakistan was just unable to utilize a good pan of 20 were was basically them.” The administrative effort for plan implementation v limited by the absence of East Pakistanis at the top executive positions for the lack of the right kind of motivation of the Central administration both in Central and Provincial Governments.”The former was responsible the lack of requisite leadership in the provincial administration for the initiation of economic development in East Pakistan. And it is well knows that in Pakistan the initiation, formulation, and the implementation of development projects and policies were primarily undertaken by the bureaucrats in the top executive positions. In spite of the devaluation in 1955, the rupee remained highly over- valued. The licencing policy funnelled more than 70 per cent of total foreign imports to West Pakistan in the growth of interwing trade created a triangular pattern of trade between East and West Pakistan in which the former had until recently continued to have a surplus balance of trade. In the process there occurred a net transfer of real resources from East to West Pakistan.³⁷

This had important consequences for the economic development of both East and West Pakistan. First, higher imports of development goods, partly financed out of East Pakistan’s trade surplus, directly facilitated increased investment both in the public and private sectors West Pakistan. Second, because of the high rate of profit earned by the importers, it produced indirect effects on private capital formation through

35 For detail see report of the Panel of Economists op. cit., pp. 43-50, See also cur interview with Dr Sajjad Hussain, Ex-Vice Chancellor, Dacca University. He disagreed with this view.

36 For details see Anisur Rahman, op. cit., especially pp.15-16, “Location and Control of the Federal Government”. According to the author, “West Pakistan not only hosts the Central Government, but also holds nearly 90% of its position. Thus the region is in the enviable position of countrolling -through its hold overthe Central Government with all its economic controls – the allocation of strategic development resources available to the entire country”, -.17.

37 (unclear)

the reinvestment of importers’ profits. Third, to the extent that a major share of the central revenue came form import duties which were largely spent in West Pakistan, it contributed to the growth of Public investment and other expenditure in that region. On the other hand, it restricted the growth of the private sector in East Pakistan due to (a) limited opportunity for capital accumulation through profits from trade and (b) transfer of its savings to West Pakistan through its trade surplus.³⁸

Knowing the inertia of the Central Government, it should not come as a  surprise to see that the economic pattems set in the First Plan continued in the second (1960/61 1964/65) and Third (1965/66-19691 70) Plan. The shares of East Pakistan in Plan-allocations were about 47 and 30 per cent in Public and Private sectors respectively in the Second Plan. The Plan allocations does not include the investment in the Indus Basin Works in West Pakistan the actual expenditure on which amounted to about Rs.291 million. In spite of the fact that the Indus basin Works were technically termed as replacement expenditure, it cannot be ignored in a meaningful analysis of comparative economic growth, since replacement is a part of gross investment having income and employment creating effects. Moreover, the Power generation part of the Project clearly rep- resents net investment. The inclusion of investment in the Indus Basin Works reduces the relative share of East Pakistan in Public development expenditure in the Second Plan to about 39 per cent.³⁹

In actual implementation, the share of East Pakistan was about 32 per cent of the total Public and Private expenditure, including the Indus Basin. Similarly, the revenue expenditure which is important in creating profitability for investment, was estimated at 25 per cent of the total expenditure, that is, Rs.434 million in East Pakistan as against Rs.1284 million in West Pakistan, During the Third Five Year Plan the share of Fast Pakistan in the allocation to the Public sector excluding the Indus Works was about 54 per cent. The allocation for the Private sector was equally divided between East and West Pakistan. In terms of actual implementation the total development expenditure Public and Private in East Pakistan was about 36 per cent of the total expenditure including the Indus Basin, whereas Private investment in East Pakistan was about 24 per cent of the total private investment.

38 For a detailed analysis see, Gustav F. Papanck, Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), and Anisur Rahman, op. cit.

39 See R. Jahan, op. cit., p.76.

The disparity in development and non-development expenditure can be more appropriately appreciated if they are considered in per capita terms. In the pre-plan period on the average the per capita development and revenue expenditures were Rs.22.08 and Rs.37.75 respectively for East Pakistan as against Rs.108.03 and Rs.201.94 respectively for West Pakistan. The disparity in per capita expenditure continued to prevail in the subsequent three Five-Year Plan periods. Thus, in the Third Five Year Plan the per capita development and revenue expenditure were Rs. 240 and Rs.70.29 respectively in East Pakistan’s against Rs.521.05 and Rs.390.35 respectively in West Pakistan.⁴⁰ (See Table 10)

TABLE 10

Per Capita revenue and Development Expenditure in East and West Pakistan

Revenue Expenditure	Development Expeanditue(Rs. crores)	Average Population of the Period(Millions)		Per Capita Estintes(in rupees)
				Development Expenditure	Revente Expenditure
1	2	3	4	5	6
East Pakistan
1951/52-1954/55	171	100	45.3	22.08	37.75
1955/51-1959/60	251	270	52.0	51.92	48.80
1960/61-1964/65	134	970	59.4	163.30	73.00
1965/66-1969/70	648	1656	69.0	240.00	70.29
West Pakistan
1950/51-1954/55	729	400	36.1	108.03	201.94
1955/56-1959/60	898	757	42.3	178.96	212.20
1960/61-1964/65	1284	2,071	49.1	421.79	261.51
1965/66-1969/70	2225	2,970	57.0	521.05	390.35

Source: Pakistan Ministry of Economic Affairs, central Statistical Office, 1970, P. 39. We should note that the performance in East Pakistan during the Second and the Third periods was poor not only because total development expenditures were small but also because inter-sectoral allocations were inappropriate. To counteract the disparity in the conditions of economic report of the Panel of Economists op. cit., pp.83-91.

40 (unclear) report of the Panel of Economists op.  cit., pp. 83-91.

growth created up to 1959/60 between East and West Pakistan, it was clearly necessary to devote higher allocations to the public sector and to lay greater emphasis on the development of the physical and social infra-structure in East Pakistan. Although some correction had been made in the allocation for the public sector of East Pakistan in the Third Plan, the extremely unrealistic allocation of Rs. 1100 million in the private sector intended to conjure up the vision of a spurious increase in the size of the total Planned development for East Pakistan. Only a small part of the allocated Rs. 1100 million could be fully implemented. This was done in the full knowledge of the planners, and thus, without any consideration for the consequences of the non implementation of the private sector Programme on the planned targets for economic growth and employment in East Pakistan.

Furthermore, requisite policy measures were not adopted to speed up private investment in East Pakistan.⁴¹ For example, the level of imports continued to remain about 30 per cent of the total imports in Pakistan throughout the Second and the Third Plan Periods. Fiscal and monetary concessions for private investment introduced in the early sixties were either withdrawn or reduced from mid 1965. As a result, the level of private investment in East Pakistan continued to vary between 13 and 25 per cent to a level of investment which was too low to ensure the continued development of the East Pakistan economy at a rate which would satisfy the Bengali elites.⁴²

In concluding our analysis of the East and the West Pakistan economy we can state strongly that despite the formal commitment of the Government of Pakistan to reducing disparity, the extent of disparity in Per Capita income between East and West Pakistan had widened at an increasing rate from 1949 to 1970 and the commitment was only honoured in the breech. Disproportionately higher levels of development and non- development expenditure in the public sector of West Pakistan supported by fiscal and commercial policy throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s led to the creation of a thriving private enterprise in West Pakistan while the Eastern industrial sector of a private nature was almost totally neglected.

41 See Azizur Rahman Khan, “A New Look at Disparity”, Forum, Dacca: January 3, 1970, pp.30-37.

42 See The Pakistan Observer, (editorials), appearing in Dacca, editions of May 31 and June 22, 1968.

Our analysis shows clearly that the development of West Pakistan can be regarded as a typical example of how a few favourable conditions aided by massive and determined Government efforts can generate a high growth momentum and lift a backward economy to the level of almost self. sustained growth. It also demonstrates that the process of development in East Pakistan can be regarded and example of how the lack of requisite government efforts and slow change in the socio-economic environment can retard the economic development in a region. Pakistan thus became the Prime example of a country in which the core (West Pakistan) was developing while the periphery (East Pakistan) combination could only infuriate the Bengalis – a combination of over- and underdevelopment which could instill in the minds of the East was stagnating. This SRM Pakistanis the idea of a radical Political solution.

The whole process of uneven development between the West (core) and the East (periphery) was no longer a purely economic matter: the whole affair was highly politicised, asking for a (radical?) solution to an economic problem. However, as late as 1970 the Bengalis demanded through their political representation, the Awami League (A.L.), was far from radical, it was just democraic. The Bengali political leadership w convinced that the only remedy to this acute economic disparity between East and West Pakistan was a change in the Pakistani political system. Let us therefore examine the political system introduced in Pakistan after was the Military coup of 1958.

Ayub’s Political System

Karl Von Vorys has praised Ayub for having Planned a cource of action for Pakistan after examining “in minute detail the political structure of Pakistan.”⁴³ The Plan was prepared, according to Khalid-Bin Sayeed in London in 1954.”⁴⁴ Ayub was convinced, according to R.Jahan. “that in order to make Pakistan a sound, solid and cohesive nation a new political system would have to be built. This system would have to be a home grown plant and not an imported herb. It would have to suit the genius of the people.”⁴⁵ The system Ayub thought was most suited to the genius of his people were enunciated in his constitution of 1962. The

43 Karl Von Vorys, op. cit., p. 11.

44 Khalid-B-Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, (New York: Praeger, 1980), p.54.

45 Jahan, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

constitution of 1962 was strikingly similar in all its essential features to Ayub’s draft constitution of 1954.⁴⁶ The opinion expressed above clearly suggest that the armed forces had Planned a take over of the country much before the October 7, 1958 Military coup. Men on horseback were waiting for the right moment to strike. And the right movement came several months before the Military coup, when according to one report, politics in Pakistan had ranged between “grotesque and the macaber”.⁴⁷ The report however failed to point out that it was also a period when politicians were preparing themselves for the first General Election to be held in Pakistan since its independence. And there were many signs that had the election under the 1956 constitution taken place, “the Election process would have entailed a shift in power from the Muhajir – Punjabi executive to a Bengali dominated legislative Government.⁴⁸ Tocircumvent the process the civil servant in collaboration⁴⁹ with its “silent partner”, the armed forces decided to take over the reign of Government. The Chief Martial Law administrator General Mohammad Ayub Khan said the object of the military rule was to return the county to sanity.⁵⁰ He blamed the politicians for the mess in the following words. “Ever since the death of the Quaid- i-Azam and Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, politicians started a free for-all type of fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged a ceaseless and  bitter war against each other regardless of the ill effects on the country, just to whet their appetites and satisfy their base motives. There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit, and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they used Provincial feelings, sectarian, religious, and racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani. They could see not good in anybody else. All that mattered was self-interest. In this mad rush for power and acquisition, the country and people could go to the dogs as far as they were concerned.”⁵¹

46 Karl Von Vorys, op. cit., p.209, also see Mohammad Ahmed, op. cit.

47 “Cavalier Cromwell”. The Economist, 11 October, 1958.

48 Omar Noman, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

49 According to Mr. A. W. Bhuiyan, “Even long before the imposition of martial law, the army had been working as a silent partner in the civil-military bureaucratic coalition in whose hands the decision-making power of the Pakistan’s state was vested.” See Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, Emergnece of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, PVT Ltd., 1982), P.45.

50 Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, 1958-1964, (Karachi: Ferozsons, Ltd.), pp.l- 2.

51 Ibid,.

Once the Politicians were temporarily removed from the scene and the armed forces firmly entrenched in the saddle of power, Pakistan returned to ‘sanity’ and then entered into a new era of “constitutional autocracy,” ⁵² Ayub’s 1962 constitution introduced for the first time Presidential form of Government in Pakistan⁵³ where the President was all powerful and everything revolved around the President.⁵⁴ According to Khalid .B.Sayeed, the 1962 constitution “gave the President all the essential powers that he needed to keep the country firmly under his control and to pursue his developmental policies with a legislative constitutionally incapable of challenging the President’s authority or suggesting alterative policies.”⁵⁵

The 1962 constitution described the country as “a form of federation with provinces enjoying such autonomy as is consistent with the unity and interests of Pakistan as a whole.”⁵⁶ In the distribution of power between the center and the Provinces the constitution favoured the center. Governors of the various Provinces was appointed by the President, therefore in the performance of his functions he was subject to the direction of the President. (Article 80). Article 131 of the counstitution, according to R.Jahan, “Granted the center overriding power to legislate, for the whole or any part of Pakistan, when ever the national interest

52 Khalid-B-Sayeed, “Pakistan’s Constitutional Autocracy”, Pacific Affairs, vol. XXXVI, 1963-64, pp.365-77.

53 Ayub was never in favour of Parliamentary Democracy. In an article written for the Foreign Affairs he made the following observation about the parliamentary form government. “Yes they [politicians) were guilty of many misdeeds of omission d commission, but there is a fundamental point in which I have a feeling that they rather sinned aganinst than sinning. They were given a system of Government toeslle unsuited to the temper and climate of the country”, Ayub Khan, “Pakistan Perspec tives”, Foreign Affairs, vol. XXXVIII, 1960, p.550.

54 Ayub gave a religious coating ot his centralisation policy by pointing out that centralised political structure is indigenous to the Islamic peoples and is best suited ot their genius Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp.204-5. Fora detailed critical examinatio of the 1962 Constitution see R. Jahan, op.cit., especially chapter 7, pp.143-177. Khalid B-Sayeed, “Pakistan’s Constitutional Autocracy”, op. cit. pp.365-77. Sherivani Latif A., “The 1962 Constitution: Two Views The Constitutional experiment”, Asian Survey, vol. II, 1962, pp.9-14 and Singhah, D.P., “The New Constitution of Pakistan”, Asian Survey vol.1I, (1982), pp.15-23.

55 Khalid-B-Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp.(unclear) 

56 (unclear) Omar Noman, in practice, the “interests of Pakistan had a peculiar habit (unclear) with the interests of the power block”, dominated by the Punjabis and (unclear) Omar Noman, op. cit., p. 30. 56

in relation to security (including economic and financial stability, planning or coordination, or the achievement of uniformity in any matter in different parts of Pakistan so required.” ⁵⁷

Such an overriding power to an “unrepresentative central Government.”⁵⁸ was not only an anathema to the Bengali vernacular elites, but was also in contradiction to Ayub’s own view on the issue of Provincial autonomy expressed in his 1954 memorandum. In his memorandum of 1954 Ayub expressed the need for treating the Bengalis as equal partners. This he thought was possible only by granting the provinces “as much autonomy as possible and that in addition to the subjects already in their hands, communications, except interprovincial, industries, commerce, health etc., should be handed over to the provinces, leaving defence, foreign affairs and currency in the hands of the center.”⁵⁹ With his rise to power, Ayub’s views on the issue of provincial autonomy also changed. Ayub’s 1962 Constitution established a de facto unitary form of Government with a strong Central Government.

Ayub also introduced, what Omar Noman calls, “a peculiar forum of representational dictatorship”.⁶⁰ It was called the system of Basic Democracies in which the entire country was divided into 80,000 geographical units. Each of these units [constituencies] contained an average electorate of 1,000. Every constituency elected, on the basis of universal suffrage, a representative called a Basic Democrat, This limited and safe electoral colleges’ first task was to elect the President and then the members of National and Provincial Assemblies. The system was introduced in 1959. In February 1960,the Basic Democrats were, for the first time called upon to perform their first duty, and that was to elect the President of the country. They were asked to say yes or no to a simple question, “have you confidence in President Ayub.” ⁶¹ Commenting on this first Presidential election held in Pakistan, Omer Noman writes, “Ayub Khan was elected President by a 95% yes vote an exercise which made East European elections look glamorous.” ⁶² Apart from electing the President and members

57 R. Jahan, op. cit., p.145.

58 Omar Noman, op. cit., p.30.

59 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p.190.

60 Omar Noman, op. cit.., p. 27.

61 Ibid,.

62 Ibid.

of the two Provincial Assemblies, what other task had these Basic Democrats to perform? This we have to examine because Basic Democracies have been regarded by most Pakistani and foreign scholars, writing e Pakistan, as the main stay of Ayub’s political system. But before we exmine Ayub’s Basic Democracy system it is important to take a quick look at the state of bureaucracy, the most formidable ally of Ayub’, political system.

For a successful working of the system of Basic Democracies Ayub had to rely heavily on the civil servants who bccame the staunch ally of the system after digesting the early shocks of the military e of 1958. The armed forces in order to establish the bonafide of their ability to run the affairs of the country all by themselves, and with little suppon Coup from others, took some, what then appeared to be, harsh measures : the civil servants. For example, in 1959 the military Government a thirteen senior officers of the CSP of corruption, misconduct and inefficiency. They were forcibly retired.⁶³ Based on such evidence, schalars like Albert Gorvine and Bhuiyan have argued that “the union between the civil servants and the military service was something that occurred during the course not at the beginning of the revolutionary Government”⁶⁴ But his kind of tough attitude towards the bureaucrats did not last long. R.Jahan has pointed out that barely 5% of the 2,800 class one officers charged with corruption were found guilty, and of these less than half against accused were actually punished, The percentage punished among class two and three officials was even lower. Of 5,000 class two officers charged with corruption, 4% were found guilty, of whom fewer than one percent were punished. While of the 87,000 class three officials only 1.5% were punished.⁶⁵On the basis of such evidence it will be safe to argue that the armed forces early decision to clamp down against the bureaucracy was more an act of self defence against its dominant partner in the prerevolutionary period, than a grand strategy to clean the administration of corruption and bring structural changes in the bureaucratic set-un Pakistan inherited from the British Raj. The early ‘drastic’ or tough measures against the bureaucracy was a well calculated move against the old dominant partner, explicitly stating that the armed forces were in full

 63 (unclear)

64 (unclear)

65 (unclear)

control and in charge of the driving seats of Pakistani politics. Once this new reality was recognised by the bureaucracy, their position not only changed, but became one of a formidable partner who enthusiastically assisted the new military regime in the task of ‘nation building’, economic development and modernisation. Even during the early days of the so called ‘drastic measures’ the bureaucracy was well represented in Ayub’s cabinet,⁶⁶

The civil servants, especially the CSP, the most elitist cadre of the military rulers. They hastened to open the door of their smal! but the Pakistan’s bureaucratic structure, were quick to read the signals of powerful club for the military men, allowing a small group of army men. who had strong connections with the top echelon of the military hierarchy to join their club.⁶⁷  Shahid Javed Burki, an ex -member of the CSP club, provides a disturbing account of the power this small group had acquired over a short period of time. According to the authot: “Even though CSP [Civil Service of Pakistan] personnel constitute only 0.07% of the countrys total bureaucratic population, it is not at all surprising that they have been the subject of academic attention over such a long period. There are three

66 See, Safdar Mahmood. The Deliberate Debacle, (Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf. 1976), p 42. According to the author [Saldar Mahmood], during Ayub’s era representation of the Bengalis in the central cabinet declined and according to R.Jahan, Ayub’s key advisers throughout his rule were bureaucrats like Altal Gauhar. Fida Hasan. Mohd Shwaib, and M.M. Ahmed. See R Jahan, op, cit., p.56. [All from West Pakistan].

67 According to Burki, between 1960-1963 the CSP opened its door to a small band of fourteen military officers. Out of these fourteen, eight had close connections with the top echelon of the military hierarchy. See S.J. Butki, “Twenty Years of the Civil Service in Pakistan”, Asian Survey, vol. LX, 1969, p. 248. The CSP were quickly rewarded for their co-operation During the early days of the military rule, thirty three major commissions were formed by the military regime for the purpose of suggesting policy changes, in these commissions nearly sixty percent were members of the civil bureaucracy. Only 6.4 were military and five percent consisted of lawyers, judges. and scholars. Politicians comprised barely 1.4 percent of the commission’s member-ship. “In 1968, members of the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)  held not only most of the secretaryships at the center but also the following diverse and powerful posts: chief Justiceship of the Pakistan Supreme Court, chairmanships of the East and the West Pakistan. Water and Power Development Authority, the East and the West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, the Central Public Service Commission, the Tariff Commission the Atomic Energy Commission, the Export Promotion Bureau, the East and the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Bank, managing directorships of the Pakistan insurance Corporation and Trading Corporation, directorships of Radio Pakistan and the National Institute of Public Administration; office of chief Economist, the East Pakistan Planning Department, and chief controller, Imports and Exports.” See Jahan, op. cit. pp.58-59. Also see Ralph Braibanti. Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 1966). pp 311-14.

main reasons for this. First the C.S.P. is one of the hiers of the famous Indian civil service (ICS) created by the British and considered to te ‘streel frame”⁶⁸ of Britain’s administration in India. Second, of the two successor services, the Indian Administrative Service and Civil Service of Pakistan, only the latter had continued to work as a real elite group, the former has surrendered a substantial part of the power it inherited to its new political bosses. Long after independence, the members of the CSP continue to hold key positions in all tiers of Government, exercising an influence far disproportionate to their numbers. Third, in a rapidly changing environment characterised by one political revolution (October 1958) and two economic revolutions (1963-65 and 1967-68), the CSP has not only displayed a remarkable ability to survive but has, to the consternation of many grown enormously in both power and prestige.⁶⁹

68 The term ‘steel frame’ was used for the first time by Lloyd George in as in the House of Commons in August 1922.

69 Shaahid Javed Burki, op. cit., pp. 239-54. On the power and influence of the CSP also sec the following works. Khalid-B-Sayeed, “The Political Role of Pakistan’s Civil Service”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 31 (June 1958). pp. 131-46 and Ahmed Ali, Role of Higher Civil Servants in Pakistan, (Dacca: National Institule of Public Administration 1968). Here it is important to point out that since the creation of Pakistan in 1947 through 1964 several efforts were made to re-organisc the structure of the bureaucracy in Pakistan . From 1953 to 1964, 28 major reports totalling 3,261 pages and involving the participation of 146 commissions, recommended various reforms in Pakistan’s bureaucratic set up. Among the major 29 reports only a few are considered of great significance. They are the following (1) Egger report, Gladicux report and pay and service commission headed by A.R. Comeluis. Professor Rawland Egger was constracted by the Ford Foundation in Pakistan at the request of Mr Mohammad Ali Bogn, who, prior to his appointment as the Prime Minister in 1953, was serving as Pak, ambassador to the United States. He was requested by Mr. Bogra to study Pkivn. administrative system and suggest improvement and changes in the structure Egger’s view, the CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan] lived in the pastits practices ard policies were antiquated and obsolete. Commenting on the sensitive issue of tie relationship between politicians and CSP, Egger pointed out that “CSP should realise that in a democracy political control of bureaucracy is inevitable. CSP must adjust themselves to the role of providing aid and guidance for the ministers and of accommodating themselves to the fact that Public Administration is a part of the total pollitical process.” Rowland Egger, The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan, (Karachi: Inter-Services Press, 1953). pp. 10-11. The second report, in order of importance was that of Gladicux. Gladicux was invited to Pakistan by David Bell, the Chief of the Harvard University’s expert Panel assigned to the Planning Board of Pakistan. Gladicux’s principal target, too, was the CSP, which he characterised as inpet and unworthy of the high prestige that it enjoyed. He pointed out further, that those who controlled the system were at the same time its beneficiaries. In short. Gladieux observation about the Pakistani bureaucracy was not very different from that of Egger. According to Galdicux “the basic problems surrounding present day administration in Pakistan arises largely from the fact that an administrative system born as an instrument of colonial policy has been carried over with but few modifications

The Ayub era, in particular witnessed the unrivalled dominance of the  bureaucracy, This dominance of the bureaucracy during the era in question was, according to R.Jahan, mutual. According to the author, a close working alliance between the two was not merely out of institutional interests – during the fifties the military needs were quickly met by the civil service.⁷⁰ The views of the bureaucracy and the military were similar on many issues and sloutions to those issues too, were also similar.

Both the institutions gave priority to state building and strongly according was, believed in a policy of centralisation. They thought it was necessary for the industrialisation of Pakistan. The drive for the industrialisation of Pakistan was a decision taken by the bureaucrats during the early days of independence, when Pakistan was engaged in conflict with India on

and utilised as the machinery for democracy … The major weaknesses of the present administrative system with respect to national development stem largely form the fact that the  Governmet is still substantially dırected to the law and order function in its organisational, procedural, personnel, and fiscal aspects.” See, Bernard Giadieux, Reorganisation of Pakistan Government for national Development May 105 (Mimeographed). p.4. also see Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, op. cit., p. 95 Finally after the imposition of martial law in Pakistan in 1958, Ayub appointed the pay and Services Commission to examine and make recommenfations concerning the structure and organisation of the civil service of Pakistan According to Mr Khan, “By most accounts, the report was of a revolutionary nature as it questioned the viabillity upon which the administrative edifice of Pakistan was built… Above all, the report provided a blue print upon which a new civil service could be built.” See Mohabbat Khan. op. cit., pp. 102-103. According to the same author, the recommendations of the commission were so far reaching that they were considered impractical and were not accepted by the Ayub government, and the report remained unpublished until 1969. Ibid, p. 106. For an excellent examination of all the reports mentioned above see the following works. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1966). S.S. Haider, “Administrative Reorganisation in Pakisatn”, NIPA Journal 2, June 1964. S.M. Haider, “Reforms in the Civil Service”. in Public Administration and Administrative Law, (Lahore: Law Times Publications, 1973), and Mohammad M.Khan, op. cit., 1980.

70 R. Jahan, op. cit., p.5. For more details on this point see Ayub Khan’s Friends nut Master, op. cit., and Colonel Mohammad Ahmed’s op. cit..

various issues.⁷¹  Ayoub’s military Government took the task of industrialisation

of Pakistan seriously in the early sixties. Both viewed political elites with suspicion, especially, the Bengali political elites. ⁷² Ayub blamed the politician for the mess in the country. [See Ayub’s speech, quoted earlier, immediately after the military coup of 1958]. Iskander Mirzza, a strong man of the bureaucracy, and who later as President of Pakistan handed over the power to the military in 1958, had this to say about the politicians ”The masses of this country are overwhelmingly illiterate. They are not interested in politics. They are bound to act foolishly sometimes, as they did in East Pakistan, [reference is to the victory of United Front in the election of 1954 in Bengal against the Muslim League] and again their elected leaders did in the Constituent Assembly. It was thus necessary, in fact essential, that there should be somebody to rectify their blunders.⁷³

In 1958 after the armed forces took over power in Pakistan, they debarred most of the prominent politicians from active politics. The bureaucrats too, were, happy to see such actions taken against the politicians. During the fifties, the bureaucrats too, had used section 92A to debar politicians from active public life.⁷⁴ Ayub’s first cabinet did not include any prominent politician. Ayub made the following remark about his decision to disqualify prominent politicians from active politics. “The biggest weapon of a politician is his tongue which we have controlled. I think things are going to be quiet for a while”⁷⁵ Politically Pakistan remained quiet for a while. But what were the consequences of such a policy. The exclusion of politicians seriously undermined the representation of the Bengalis at the center. As discussed in the previous chapter it was only in the political arena ( that is, Parliament), that Bengali in the central cabinet further declined. Out of fifty eight ministers appointed from time to time in four cabinets, twenty two were Bengalis. Representation of the Bengalis in the central political elite therefore declined

71 For more details on this issue seen the first part of this chapter.

72 See R. Jahan, op. cit., p.56. Jahan is of the view that Ayub always viewed the Bengali vemacular elites with suspicion.

73 C.P. Bhambhri and M. Bhaskaran, “Bureaucracy in Authoritarian Political System in the Case of Pakistan”, in S.P. Verma (edited), Pakistan political System in Crisis, (Jaipur: Rajistan univeristy press, 1972), p.86. Also see Asaf Hussain op.cit., especially chapter four – “The Bureaucratic Elites”,pp.61-78.

74 For details see chapter 4.

75 The New York Times, October 19, ‘1958.

under the army bureaucracy rule. Situation did not change much even during Yahya’s rule. He appointed eleven ministers in his cabinet out of which five were East Pakistanis.”⁷⁶ The following table illustrates this.

Total number of Ministers/ Number of     Number                      Percentage of

Ministers of State/ Deputy       West                          of                    Bengalis

Ministers(at one time)               Pakistanis    Bengalis       Representation

• (2)                 (3)                  (4)

Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan’s Cabinet (15 August 1947 to 16 October 1951)

                 19                                                 13                               6                     31.2%

Khwaja Nazimmuddin’s Cabinet (19 October 1951 to 17 April 1953)

15                                                       9                                 6                     40%

Mr. Mohammad Ali Bogra’s Cabinet (17 April 1953 to 24 October 1954)

14                   9                     5                                                                     35%              

There deputy ministers afterwards became ministers of state and ministers in the same cabinet. the total also includes the Prime Minister. Also see Appendix I.

76 Safdar Mahmood, op. cit., p.42.

Total number of Ministers/    Number of        Number         Percentage of

Ministers of State/ Deputy            West                     of                    Bengalis

Ministers(at one time)               Pakistanis          Bengalis         Representatives

            (1)                                                      (2)                  (3)                              (4)

Reconstituted Cabinet (24 October 1954 to 11 August 1955)

            16                                                       9                     7                                 44%

Ch. Mohammad Ali’s Cabinet (11 August 1955 to 12 September 1956)

            17                                                       10                   7                                 41%

Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy’s Cabinet (12 September 1956 to 18 October 1957)

            14                                                       6                     8                                 57%

I.I. Chundrigar’s Cabinet(18 October 1957 to 16 December 1957)

            16                                                       9                     7                                 44%

Mr. Feroze Khan Noon’s Cabinet (16 December 1957 to 7 October 1958)

            27                                                       15                   12                               44.5%

Ayub’s Cabinet (1^st) (28 October 1958 to 17 February 1960)

            12                                                       9                     3                                 25%

(2^nd Cabinet) (17 February 1960 to 8 June 1962)

            16                                                       11                   5                                 26%

(3^rd Cabinet) (8 June 1962 to 23 March 1965)

            17                                                       9                     8                                 47%

(4^th Cabinet) (23 March 1965 to 25 March 1969)

            17                                                       11                   6                                 35%

Yahya’s Cabinet (4 August 1969 to February 1971)

            11                                                       6                     5                                 45.4%

*Cabinet was dissolved on 22 February 1971. Advisers, however, continued up to 20 December 1971.

Source: Safdar Manmood, The Deliberate Debacle, Lahore: SH Muhammad Ashraf, 1976, p. 42.

How the Bengalis reacted to the change in power structure brought about by the coup of 1958 will be discussed at a later point.

Let us now examine Ayub’s Basic democracy system which, as we pointed out earlier, has been regarded by many scholars as the mainstay of Ayub’s political system.⁷⁷ The system of Basic democracies won high praise from Western scholars. Samuel Huntington, for example saw in

77 For a detailed operation of the system see the following works. Lawrence Ziring. “The Administration of Basic Democracies”, in Guthrie S. Birkhead, ed. Administrative Problems in Pakistan. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 31-62. A.T R. Rahman, “Basic Democracies and Rural Development in East Pakistan”, in Mobd. Inayatullah, ed, Bureaucracy and Development Pakistan. (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962), pp. 326-352, and Government of Pakistan, Bureau of National Constructions: Four Studies in Basic Democracies. 1964.

it “the institutional link between government and countryside which is the prerequisite for political stability in a modernising country.”⁷⁸ According to a renowned Pakistani scholar, Huntington was ecstatic when he discerned the architectonic design and strategy of Ayub.⁷⁹ Huntington wrote, “more than any other political leader in a modernising country after World War II, Ayub Khan came close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycargus or great legislator on the Platonic or Rousseauian model.⁸⁰ Ayub Khan himself gave the following description of his system ” We have… kept the following factors in view in determining the system of Basic Democracies for our country. First, this type of democracy will not be foisted upon the people from above. Instead it will work from below gradually going to the top. Second, the people will not have to go far from their neighbourhood to elect their representatives. It is highly difficult for an electorate in the rural areas where literacy does not prevail to elect their representatives from forty to one hundred thousand persons in a constituency … The third factor which is of considerable significance is that the council which will be formed will be free from the curse of party intrigues, political pressures and tub-thumping politicians that characterised the Assemblies in our country in the past.”⁸¹ 

The critics of the system were not impressed and viewed it as a project imposed upon the people by a dictator in order to remain in power.⁸² Mr. Md. Yusuf Ali a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan from Bengal used the floor of the Parliament to make a blistering attack on the system. He said, “Mr. Speaker, Sir, the seed of a strange and unknown democracy that was sowed in 1958 by the undemocratic Government upon the wreckage of Parliamentary system of administration by killing it, has given birth to a new system which is now known as the “Basic Democracy”. In the name of this Basic Democracy, the ten crores of people of this country have been deprived of their Fundamental Rights and have been rendered rightless creatures. Nobody could dare raise his head on that day because of the sharp weapon of Martial Law Administration hanging over their heads – the common peace – living men

78 P. Samuel P. Huntingtion, op. cit., p. 252.

79 Khalid-B-Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, op. cit., p.55.

80 P.S. Huntington, op. cit., p. 25

81 Ayub Khan, Specches and Statements, op, cit., pp. 24-25.

82 R. Jahan, op. cit., p. iii. M. Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 75-81, and Omar Noman, op, cit., Pp. 27-33.    

of the country felt the horrible influence of power with an amazed look. And under the shadow of this Basic Democracy and having been fed by its flavour, the vested-interests have rendered the soil of his country completely flavourless and dry in the name of administration and exploitation – the fortunates have erected the monuments of wealth and good luck by destroying the economic back-bone of the common man and by drawing favour from the Government… The present administration has infatuated the whole nation by spreading a net of diplomacy and is marching forward towards an undecided dark future.”⁸³

Through the introduction of the Basic democracies system Ayub tried to “channel the energies of the people towards the single goal of economic development, and attempted to integrate the nation by creating confidence amongst the people about the destiny of Pakistan through maximising the rate of economic growth.” ⁸⁴ Thus, “The primary ideology of the Ayub regime was the ideology of development, of economic growth. It came straight out of the American liberal development idealogues, the modernisation theorists. Ayub depended on American liberals to plan Pakistan’s future and hired experts like the Harvard advisory group to do it.”⁸⁵ Internally, the organisational weapon Ayub used for the mobilisation was, of course, the civil service, his most formidable ally.⁸⁶ A quick look into the administrative structure of system will at once reveal how much the system was dependent on the Bureaucracy.

83 Md. Yusuf Ali, National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, vol II, no, 4, June Ist, 1966.

84 Talukdar Muniruzzaman, “Nationl Integration and Political Development in Pakistan”, Asian Survey, vol VII, no. 12, December 1967, p. 878.

85 See Nubar Housepian. “Pakistan in crisis: An interview with Eqbal Ahmed” Race and Class, Vol XXII, No. 2, 1980, p. 137.

86 Talukdar Muniruzzamn, National integration and Political Development in Pakistan, op. cit., p. 878. For a similar line of argument also see Omar Noman, op. cit, p. 14-17, and Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan, (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House. 1965).      

BASIC DEMOCRACY STRUCTURE, 1965

DIVISION COUNCIL (16)

Chairman:Commissioner

Members: half or more elected. remainder officials

DISTRICT COUNCIL,

Chairman: Deputy Commissionar

Members:half or more elected, remainder officials

In Rural Areas

TEHSIL OR THANA COUNCIL (630)

Chairman: Subdivision officer, Tehsildar or Circle officer

Members: half or more of union  councils, remainder officials.

In Urban Areas

 CANTONMENT BOARD(29)

Chairman: official

Members: half chairmen of union committees, half officials

MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE(108)

Chairman: Official

Members: half chairmen of union committees, half officials

 UNION COUNCIL (7,614)

OR TOWN COMMITTEE(220)

Members: 10 to 15 elected

UNION COMMITTEE (888)

Chairman: elected

Members: elected

WARDS

 

Source: Lawrence Ziring,”The Adminstration of BasicDemocracies”, in the Guthrie S. Burkhead (ed), Administrative Problems in Pakistan, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966),p.32 Here it is important to point out that with the introduction of the system of Basic democracy, Ayub’s government, according to RJahan, attempted to shift the focus of politics away from the urban areas to the rural areas, where, the majority of the population lived.⁸⁷ Jahan argues

87 This shift of politics away from the urban to the rural areas gave, according to Jahan, a new power base to the bureaucracy whose hold was fast eroding in the urban areas due to the quick rise of the entrepreneurial elites under the Ayub regime. Jahan op. cit., p. 59. It is very difficult to agree with Jahan”s point of view because she fails to see that in the fifties the Pakistnaini bureaucracy actively and assiduously encouraged the creation and fostered the growth of an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie and gave it every facility and concession. Jahan also fails to see that “Unlike the Indian bourgeoisie, which was entrenched in the ruling Congress Party. the indigenous bourgeoisie in Pakistan had not succeeded in establishing its class representation     

that there were a number of political reasons for such a move and they were that Ayub distrusted the urban middle class and the intelligentsia, particularly in Bengal and that he had a romantic view about the goodness of the simple village folk and described them as “by nature patriotic and good people, tolerant and patient and can rise to great heights

through a political party – poltical parties were dominated by land lords. The class representation of the bourgeoisie was secured primarily by virtue of its links and dealıngs with the burcaucracy.” The link between the bourgeoisie and the bareaucracy. according to the same author “had the effect of providing the latter with opportenities for bribery on a large scale, which not only underpinned their conspicuous consumption but also left them with surplus funds which found their way into invertments, not only in real estate, but also in business of all kinds, either in partnership with businessmen or, not infrequently, through their own concems set up in the sames of their wives or close relatives.” See Hamza Alavi, “The State in Crisis – Class and state” in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, (edited)., Pakistan The Roos of Dicta- torship. The PoliticalEconomy of a Practorian State, (London: Zed Press, 1983), p 49.50. Also see Asaf Hussain, who points out that the corruption of the bureaucracy was not a random occurence. The author’s close observations gave hirm an insigte of how it operated, at which levels and with what benefits. It was the Industrial elites strongest alliance forming linkage, with the political system Although the Ayst. Yahya and Bhutto regimes dismissed a number of corrupt officials, those replacing them often continued the same practices.’ Asaf Hussain, op. cit. p. 98. We can therefoee safely argue that with the introduction of the basic democracies system the power of the bureaucracy showed no sign of erosion. On the contrary the Basic democracy was the official channal for the bureaucracy to expand its base to the rural areas The bureaucracy used their new power base to avoid a possible clash between the twvO powerful classes in Pakistan, the well entrenched, rural based feudal class, which even today dominates the politics of Pakistan, and the fast rising industrial clites. According to one scholar, the economic policy of the Government of Pakistan in the 1950’s was to transfer income away from agriculture, to the new and rapidly growing manufac- turing sector. Asaf Hussain, op. cit., achieved by fixing low prices for agricultural products and high prices for consumer goods produced by industry. See M. H. Khoja, “Agricultural development in Pakistan” in A.M. Chouse, (edited)., Pakistan in the Development Decade: Problems and Per- formance, (Lahore: Economic Department Seminar, 1968), p. 251. Thie kind of government policy was bound to create tension between the powerful politicians, especially from the Punjab and Sind, who were rural based and the bureaucrats, uho were, especially at the top, immigrants. Most of the business community as we pointed out carlier,too, were immigrants from India. During the Ayub era, this tension was reduced when Ayub’s Governmnt paid due attention to the agriculture sector through, increasing mechanisation of farm technoligy, which helped the big land lords in improving the prođuctivity of their land. Ayub’s Green revolution was an impressive demonstration of his support for the landed bourgeoisie. It will not be an exaggeration to suggest that it was during the Ayub era that the interests of the two class, namely the industrialists and the feudal began to converge. Modernisation of the agricultural sector emcouraged “progressive feudalists to make capital investments in Industry. Many big land lords like the Noons, Qureshis and Qizilbashs from the Punjab, Talpurs, Soomros and Jatois from Sind, and Hotis from North-West Frontier have become feudal industrialists.” Asaf Hussain, op. cit.. p. 60. 97. According to another source this was     

when well led.”⁸⁸

The bureaucracy was entrusted with task of leading and creating “a new Cadre of responsible leadership from the bottom up, leaders who would gradually be given a great degree of participation in the political system. “⁸⁹” The activities of the future leaders, however, were to remain confined to their local constituency at the early stages of their political training to be carried out under the supervision of the bureaucrats. The Basic democrats were expected to be more directly involved, than their predecessors in the development affairs of their local areas.⁹⁰ They were involved in co-operative projects aimed at raising their humble living standards. RJahan has strongly argued that the Ayub regime usually undertook economic, rather than political, measures in response to political demands. This may be true particularly in the context of East Pakistan where the majority of the population lived and who were poor and politically conscious of their poverty.⁹² Akhter Hameed Khan in a memorandum to the President persuasively correlated the economic distress of rural East Pakistan with the political instability of the region. He argued convincingly… “Economic distress in the rural areas is the main cause of political instability: 1. 86% of the population is rural and professional people depend to a large extent on rural customers. 90% of the students come from village homes and are intensely sensitive to rural distress.

88       R. Jahan, op. cit., p. 64. Also see Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, op. cit. especially Vols I and II, and Ayub’s Friends not Masters, op. cit., p. 208.

89 R. Jahan, op cit., p. 112. Also see H. H. Kizilbash, “Local Government: Democracy at the Capital and Autocracy in the Villages” Pakistan Economic and Social Review. Vol XI, No. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 104-24. 

90 According toZiring “the system was a throwback to the conventional local Government that existed in India prior to the British restructuring of the Subcontinent’s admis istrative system.” L. Ziring, Pakistan the Enigma of Political Developmnent, op. cit., p. 181.

91 R. Jahan. op. cit., p.68.

92 M. Anis Rahaman, “East Pakistan: The Roots of Estrangement”, South Asian Review, Vol 3. No, 3, April 1970, pp. 235-39. Ralph Russell, “Strnds of Muslim Identity in South Asia”. South Asian Reviewm Vol 6, No. 1, October 1972, especially pp. 24- 29, and Trevor Ling, “Creating a New State: The Bengalis of Bangladesh” South Asian Review. Vol 5, No. 3, 1972, pp. 226-227.     

2.Unmeployment, loss of crops, low incomes, exploitation by the middle-men, money lenders, etc. have made the rural masses and their leaders bitter, they feel helpless, persecuted and hopeless.

3. Therefore, the rural people respond readily and eagerly to agitators like Bhashani and other angry young and old leaders Any dispassionate analysis would show that Muslim League Government in East Pakistan was overthrown by the rural vote in 1953, and the Awami League and other Governments would have been similarly dismissed unless they could find a suitable rural programme.”⁹³ Akhter Hameed Khan, therefore suggested economic, rather than political measures to meet the demands of the Bengalis. Ayub’s regime hoped and Akhter Hameed argued that many political benefits may be derived out of a successful economic programme. It was therefore thought that economic benefits would bring political stability in a politically volatile region and whereby “(a) Frustration, bitterness, cynicism will disappear… as millions of low income rural people go to work in the slack farm season.. (b) the protective works… will be omnipresent symbols of a good government, as well as of a busy and constructively organised people … (c) local institutions will be vitalised, for institutions are nourished by resources and programmes. The Public Works Programme will make Basic Democracies pulsate with life and energy; and (d) under the stress of constructive efforts, local leadership and managerial ability will grow … with the growth of responsible leadership will come political stability and popular support.”⁹⁴ In 1962-63 the Government of Pakistan initiated a massive rural public works programme in East Pakistan with the help of a grant allocated by the United States Government. The objective of the’ programme was

93 Akhter Hameed Khan, “The Public Works Progrmme and a Developmental Proposal for East Pakistn”, in Pakistan Academy for rural development. An evaluation of the rural Public Works Programme, East Pakistan, pp. 131-132.

94 Ibid    

to assist the rural population to help itself, thus enhancing its material w ell being. The Government claimed success for the work programme and the Basic democracy system. It is important to point out, at this stage, that few empirical work has been done to assess the claim of the regime. The works that are available express either extreme praise or extreme criticism.⁹⁵ According to one scholar, Ayub’s Basic Democracy’s major contribution lay in. “developing a pattern of official and rural leaders jointly working in productive operation e.g., the public works programme and thus diverting the energy of a vast number of rural leaders from traditional political activities e.g. petitioning, civil disobedience, and strikes to modern leadership roles such as organising programmes, mobilising rural masses, and working out local problems.”⁹⁶ The opponents of the system were not impressed. They were in fact outraged by the whole exercise and perceived the Basic Democracies system as an outright hypocrisy and the economic policy an attempt not to improve the conditions of the poor masses but to isolate the people from the leaders genuinely representative of the peoples will.⁹⁷ The opponents of the system in Bengal strongly felt that the system of Basic Democracies was devised to recruit a base of popular Bengali support for the regime and not to make Bengalis equal sharers of power at the center. ⁹⁸ The opponents further pointed out that the main beneficiaries of the system were the Basic Democrats and the rich farmers, as against the vast majority of the landless labourers.⁹⁹ Ayub’s regime remained undaunted by such criticism of the Bengali elites. Frustration began to build up and found its first organized constitutional outlet during the Presidential election of 1965. Prior to the election of 1965 the opposition in Pakistan was feeble, divided and ill-organised. 

95 Rehaman Sobhan, for example, provides the most unfavourable view of the work programme undertaken in the rural areas of East Pakistan. See, Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies Work Programme and Rural development in East Pakistan, (Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1968).

96  AT.R. Rahman, “Rural Institutions in India and Pakistan”. Asian Survey, Vol VIII, 1968. p. 800. Also see John Thomas for a favourable view of the system. John Thomas, Rural Public Work Programme, and East Pakistan’s Development Ph.D dissertation, Harvard university, 1968.

 97 L. Ziring, op. cit., p. 181. Also see Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan, (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963).

98 See our interviews with Bengali elites.

99 See N. Sanderatue, “Landowners and Land Reforms in Pakistan”, South Asian Review. vol. 17. no. 2, January 1974, and Omar Noman, op. cit., especially pp. 35-40.    

According to Wheeler “Their inability to compromise on a common and politically practicable programme made it possible for Ayub’s government to outmanocuvre them repeatedly.”¹⁰⁰ The announcement of the election gave the opposition the opportunity of their life to bury their differences, unite and close their ranks to fight, what they perceived to be a Constitutional autocrat. It was a difficult task, because according to Wheeler, “The only element in common among the diverse groups of the opposition prior to the 1965 elections was a sense of frustration born of their alienation from the existing constitutional order.”¹⁰¹

The opposition leaders were therefore quick to form a combined opposition party to challenge the leadership of Ayub Khan. Their next task was to put up a joint candidate, strong and acceptable to all parties to contest the election.¹⁰² A consensus on the Presidential Candidate, was finally reached on September 19, 1964, when Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the founder of Pakistan accepted the opposition parties’ request to contest the election for the office of the President. Her Presidential campaign generated great enthusiasm among the masses in both wings of Pakistan and she drew huge crowds in the public meetings.¹⁰³ Miss Fatima Jinnah addressed 43 and Ayub, 28, public rallies.¹⁰⁴ During the campaign however, the odds were heavily against the opposition. The opposition was opposed to Ayub’s Basic Democracies system, and in order to win the election the opposition had to approach the Basic Democrats, on whom depended the ultimate out come of the election. It is also important to note that the combined opposition was campaigning for the restoration of democracy and the abolition of Ayub’s Basic Democracies system. To the Basic Democrats, voting for the opposition candidate therefore meant, “to liquidate their own privileged existence.” ¹⁰⁵

100 Richard S. Wheeler, The Politics of Pakistan, A Constitutional Quest, (Ithaca and London: Comell University Press, 1970), p. 256.

101 Ibid. It is also important to note that division among the opposition leaders were probably more due to personality clashes than ideological differences. Very litle has been written on this aspect of Pakistani politics.

102 For details on the choice of candidate see R. Jahan, op.cit., pp.149-151 and R. Wheeler. op. cit., pp. 256-259. .

103 For details on the Presidential election campaign see the following works; Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 79-81, R. Jahan, op. cit., pp. 149-158, Karl Von Vorys, op. cit. pp. 279-85 and K.P Misra, M.V. Lakhi and V. Narain, Pakistan’s Search for Con- stitutional Consensus, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing house, 1968).

104 K. Von Vorys, op. cit., pp.279-285.

105 Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p.79.     

Ayub’s victory in the Presidential election was overwhelming in West Pakistan, 73%. In East Pakistan his victory was narrow, 53%. After the Presidential election the combined opposition failed to maintain the facade of unity demonstrated during the Presidential election. As a result its performance in the National Assembly election, which followed soon, was disastrous. In a house of 150 Ayub’s Pakistan Muslim League won 120 seats. The opposition secured only 15 seats, the rest went to the independent candidates.¹⁰⁶ The National Assembly of Pakistan, after the election, was totally dominated by all powerful President, Ayub kban, and his ruling party the Pakistan Muslim League. The outcome of the election was bound to increase the frustration of the Bengali elites, especially of those in the opposition. The Bengali elite’s frustration was soon given a powerful political expression, when Sheikh Mujib-ur Rehman announced his, now famous, six points programme. The programme was announced immediately after the 1965 war with India. According to Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “During the war with India in September 1965 East Pakistan was completely cut off from West Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan felt completely helpless.”¹⁰⁷ According to another source, “During the 1965 war Pakistan had only half a division of soldiers stationed in the East, a Region surrounded by the ‘enemy country’ from three sides. Bengalis were terrified by the thought that India could run over them any time – this made them feel more neglected than ever before.”¹⁰⁸ According to the same source during this period Economic disparity between two wings of Pakistan marked the widest gap.¹⁰⁹

Many Economists, during this period, particularly in East Pa-

106 For details sec Sharif al Mujahid, “The Assembly Election in Pakistan”, Asian Survey, vol. V. 1965, р.538-51.

107 Talukdar Maniruzzamn, “National Integration and Poliltical Development in Paki- stan”, op. cit., р.800.

108 Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., pp 80-81. Pakistan’s defence strategy was based on General Gracey’s famous dictum that, “the battle of East Bengal would be fought in the West Punjab”. Needless to say that the economic benefits of such a strategy was being enjoyed by the West Pakistanis. See Ayesha Jalal, India’s Partition and the Defence of Pakistan, an Historical Perspective, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. vol. XV, no. 3. Мay 1987. р.303.

109 Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., pp.80-81.      

kistan, began to talk about the two Economy theory for Pakistan.¹¹⁰ According to Talukdar Mainruzzaman, the helplessncss of the Bengalis during the war of 1965 with India and the increasing Economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan gave Mr. Mujibur Rehman, “a political entrepreneur par-excellence,”¹¹¹ the opportunity of his life to spark a political explosion among the politically discontented and economically frustrated East Pakistanis.¹¹² At a press conference. Mujib declared that “the question of autonomy appears to be more important after the war. Time has come for making East Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects.”¹¹³ He then announced his, now famous, six points “charter of survival programme” for East Pakistan which included:

1.Reintroduction of a Parliamentary form of Government and universal adult franchise.

2. A Federal form of Government with only two departments – Defence and Foreign Affairs – to be lodged with the central Government and all residual powers to reside in the two states · East and West Pakistan.

3. Separate currencies and state Banks for the two states.

4.All taxation to be controlled by the states, with the central Government dependent on a fixed levy from the states.

5. The independence of the two states in international trade, and

110 For a lively debate on the issue of the two economy theory see the following works: A. Sadeque, The Economic Emergence of Pakistan, Part 1, (Dacca: East Bengal Government Press, 1954), Part II, (Dacca: The Provincial Statistical Board (Planning Department), 1959). Muhammad Anisur Rahman, op. cit., Finally, our interview with Dr. Sajjad Hussain. According to Dr. Sjjad the brain behind the two Economy theory was Professor Razzak of Poliotical Science Department, Dacca University. It is important to add that majority of the West Pakistani leadership, including Ayub saw the two Economy theory as a prelude to the polotical disintegration of Pakistan.

111 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan”, op. cit. p.880.      

112 (unclear)

113 (unclear)

6. The development of a militia or Paramilitary force in East Pakistan,¹¹⁴ Those who opposed Mujib’s six points programme thought that he went too far in his demand for Provincial autonomy.¹¹⁵ The reaction of Ayub’s Government to Mujib’s demands was swift. In a meeting of his own party, (Convention) Muslim League in Dacca, Ayub declared that if necessary he would use the ‘language of weapons’ against the disruptive elements.¹¹⁶ Later the entire Government machinery was geared discredit Sheikh Mujib and his party. His six Points formula was branded as the work of the enemies of the State. The attempt to suppress Mujib and his party continued. We will come back to this issue at a later point and examine the policy of Ayub’s Government towards Mujib and is Awami League. First let us examine briefly the reaction of other parties in opposition to Mujib’s six Points Programme. Mujib’s own party, the Awami League, especially the West Pakistani components of the party, was opposed to the programme launched by Mujib. The President of the AIl Pakistan Awami League, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan bitterly criticised Mujib’s six points programme. This led to a permanent division of the party on regional lines. Most Bengali, within the party supported Mujib’s six points programme. Those from West Pakistan, were opposed to it. Most of the political parties belonging to the opposition also expressed their opposition to the six Points programme. The Council Muslim League viewed the programme as an attempt

114 See Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Our Charter for Survival: six Points Programme, (Dacca: Pioncer Press. 1966). See also Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., for a detailed analysis of Mujib’s six Points formula, especially chapter V, pp.87-98.

115 According to Najmul Abedin, the six Points Programme, fof Mujibur Rahnan] on the basis of which autonomy for East Pakistan was demanded may be cited as an example of “supra-regional autonomy.” At the conceptual level in order to understand the problem of separatism, Abedin, tries to draw a line between tegional autonomy and supra-regional autonomy. He takes Mujib’s six Points formula as a good exampie of supra-regona! autonomy, a term, he claims, has so far not been used by any scholar to understand the problem of separatism. For details see, Najmul Abedin, The Politics of Separatism – Some Reflection and Questions, The Round Table, April 1989. pp 223- 236. On the mystery surrounding the authorship of the six Points formula of Mujib, see our interview with Amena Begum, General Secretary of Mujib’s Awami League. She sees foreign hands behind the formulation of the six Points Programme Amena Begum resigned as the General Secretary of the Party in 1969 and later, during the election of 1970, contested directly against Mujib from one constituency.

116 See The Pakisatn Observer, Dacca, March 15, 19, 20, 1966.    

to break up Pakistan.”¹¹⁷ The Jamat-i-Islami declared that the programme was a separatist design.”¹¹⁸ The Nizam-i-Islam too rejected the programme The National Awami party (pro China) called the six points formula a CIA intiated scheme and saw no Economic solution in it to improve the  condition of the masses.¹¹⁹

Ayub’s regime as we pointed out earlier adopted a policy of total suppression towards Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League. The top party leaders of Awami League soon after the launching of the programme, were imprisoned on various charges. The Government also came down heavily against a Bengali Newspaper, the Daily Ittefaq, considered by many as the chief exponent of Awami League’s six Points Programme. The paper was banned, its bond of good behaviour forfeited,¹²⁰ and its editor Mr. Tofazzal Hussain, popularly known as Manik Mian, jailed. Every attempt was made to stifle the voice of the Awami Leaguers and discredit it as a party wanting to destroy the unity and integrity of Pakistan. The Government did achieve some measure of success in silencing the Awami Leaguers. Awami League as a political party apparently ceased to be threat to the regime for a while. All its top leadership was in prison. There was a lull before the storm. In the early part of 1967 when everything appeared to be under complete control of the Ayub government, the nation was informed about a plot, popularly known as the Agartala conspiracy, to undo Pakistan with

117 Pakistan Observes, Dacca, February 13, 1966.

118 Ibid.

119 See our interview with Mohammad Toha. The President Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani of the National Awami Party (pro China group) argued that in the six Points of the Awami league there was no prescription for removing the Economic exploitation of East Pakistan from the clutches of the imperialists. Maulana Bhashani also argued that the six Points smacked of disintegration and said that NAP would not participate in any effort ot weaken the integrity of the country. For details see, Mr. Rashiduzzaman, “The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crists”, Pacific Affairs, vol. XLII, no. 3, Fall 1970, p.379.

120 Ayub’s Government from the start adopted a repressive attitude towards the press On 16 April 1959 a Martial law ordinance empowered the Government to take over newspapers which “in the opinion of the Government, publilshed or contained maters likely to endanger the defence, external affairs or security of Pakistan”. For details see Omar Noman, op. cit.., p.29.     

the help of India.¹²¹ The Agartala conspiracy in short, charged thirty- three East Pakistani Politicians, Civil servants and army men with conspiring to bring about East Pakistan’s secession’s from the center in collusion with India. It is interesting to point out that the initial list published by the Government did not include the name of Sheiikh Mujibur Rahman. According to Mr. Moudud Ahmed, the only author to date, to provide a detailed account of the case, Mujib’s name was included in the list of collaborators at the instance of Mr.Monem Khan, a Powerful Governor of East Pakistan under Ayub regime.¹²²

According to many Bengali scholars the political objective of the Agartala conspiracy case was to destroy Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as a political force. ¹²³ According to Moudud Ahmed, it was hoped that “Once the people would come to know that Sheikh Mujib was conspirign to separate East Pakistan with the collaboration of India, he would lose his political ground for good and once that was achieved, the six Points Programme would die its natural death.”¹²⁴ Sheikh Mujib not only survived the political onslaught of the Government of the day but emerged out of the conspiracy trial as the most formidable political force in Bengal. He was soon conferred with the title of Banglabandhu (friend of Bengal) by his people. Ayub’s Government had to succumb to the will of the people. Ayub had to withdraw the Agartala conspiracy trial in order to enable Sheikh Mujib to attend the Roundtable conference, Ayub had called to bring to a peaceful end the revolt of the masses against his Government.¹²⁵ The Round Table

121 Even today little is known about his famous conspiracy case. According to Dr. Sajjad Hussain, the case was badly handled by the Govemment of the time. it gave wide publicity to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and he was converted into a hero. See our interview with Dr. Sajjad Hussain, also see Md. Abdul wadud Bhuiyan, op. cit., p. 108-160

122 For details see Mr. Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., especially chapter six, pp.99-131.

123 See for example, Zillur R. Khan, Leadership crisis in Bangladesh, (Dacca: The University Press Limited, 1984), p.14. Md Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, op. cit., pp.107- 108.

124 Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., p.99.

125 For a detailed account of the mass upsurge of 1968-69 see the following works. Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, op. cit., especially chapter 4, “The Radicalization of Bengali Politics and the Mass Upsurge in East Pakistan”, pp. 111-128. Safdar Mahmood, op. cit., and Richard S. Wheeker, op. cit., chapter 7. “Presidential Politics: 1958-1969”. pp.232-283.       

Conference did not produce the desired result.¹²⁶ In the Round Table Conference Sheikh Mujib refused to compromise on his six Points Programme. This attitude was in sharp contrast to his carlier position, when he lauched his six Points Programme in 1966. In a speech in Pabna town in 1966, Mujib had hinted that the six Points were negotiable. He also said that he was ready to withdraw his six Points demand if the capital of the country is shifted to Dacca.” ¹²⁷

After 1969 Mujib emerged as the champion of the Bengali cause, therefore his uncompromising attitude at the Round Table Conference. on his six Points is understandable.¹²⁸ He was too shrewd a Politician to commit political suicide at a time when the curve of his Political popularity was showing an upward trend. The Round Table Conference therefore failed to achieve anything concrete and Ayub finally decided to bow before the will of his people. In his parting address to the nation “he admitted that his system of Government though intended for the good of the people had not been successful. Bengalis were denied a share in the power, intelligentsia was neglected and the Assembly did not exercise sufficient power. He urged the opposition leaders to join him in working out a formula for a new Political system according to popular wishes.”¹²⁹ He however refused to be a party to any scheme or demand, he saw as liquidation of the Central Government and the army. In his abdication speech he clearly stated to his when he said, “… I have always told you the secret of continued existence of Pakistan is in a strong center. I accepted the Federal Parliamentary system because even in this system, there are possibilities of keeping a strong center. But now it is being proposed that the country be divided into two parts, the center be made weak and helpless, the defence forces be paralysed completely and West Pakistan’s political position be ended. I cannot preside over the destruc-

126 For an excellent account of the Round Table Conference see, S.M. Zafar’s (a member of Ayub’s cabinet) Through the Crisis, (Lahore: Book Centre, 1970).

127 See Bhuiyan, op. cit., p. 104. It is be noted that the shifting of the Capital to Dacca was not included in the six Points demand of Sheikh Mujibur-Rahman. The proposal for shifting the Capital of Dacca was included in the seven Points Programme of thechief of East Pakistan Council Muslim League, Khawaja Khairuddin.

128 According to Md. Bhuiyan, “soon after his release Mujib had sensed the mood in East Pakistan and realised that anyting short of full regional autonomy would not be acceptable to the People of the Province and any leader going against the popular wishes would definitely cut short his political career”. See, Bhuiyan, op. cit., p. 121.

129 See Md. Bhuiyan, op. cit., p.118.      

tion of my country.”¹³⁰ Therefore in order to avoid destruction of Pakistan and restore ‘sanity’ once again, in the body politics of the country, Ayub resigned in March 1969 and handed over power to another General, Yahya Khan. The failure of Ayub regime lay, not entirely in his inability to remove Economic disparity that existed between the two wings of Pakistan, but elsewhere. ¹³¹

Our own findings clearly indicate that Ayub’s centralisation policy totally alienated a strong section of the Bengali elites. Moreover, Ayub’s regime failed, despite the Constitutional commitment, to remove the ethnic imbalance that existed in the power structure of Pakistan. Last but not the least was Ayub’s inability to trust and negotiate some kind of political settlement with the radical autonomists. He even ignored the moderate autonomists, who were in opposition to Mujib’s six points programme in 1966. All opposition parties publicly criticised and rejected Mujib’s six Points Programme. Ayub failed to enlist their support at the right time and when he finally accepted the demands of the moderates in the opposition and opened the door to negotiation it was too late. Mujib could no longer be ignored. Ayub reluctantly had to withdraw the entire case and release Mujib to attend the Round Table Conference. This was necessary to give the Round Table and air of credibility.¹³² Mujib’s own position on his six Points Programme also changed.¹³³ During the mass

130 Ayub’s final address to the nation was published in all th leading dailies of both East and West Pakistan. See for example. Dawn, Karachi, 26 March 1969.

131 The fall of Ayub’s regime has been subjected to various interpretations. W M. Dobell sees Bhutto’s flamboyant and boisterous opposition as largely responsible for the collapse of the Ayub regime. W.M. Dobell,”Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan”. Pacific Affairs, vol. XLII, no. 3 Fall 1969, p.307. According to Wayne Wilcox Ayub lost control of the situation after his near-fatal illness in the spring of 1968. Wayne Wilcox, “Pakistan in 1969: Once Again at the Starting Point”, Asian Survey, vol. X, no. 2, February 1970, p.73. According ot Z.A. Suleri, a prominent journalist and a staunch supporterof Ayub’s regime, the bureaucracy played a vital role in the fall of Ayub regime. He is of the view that the bureaucracy deliberately over emphasise the economic achievement of Ayub era in order to cover up its deficiencies in the political field. For details see The Pakistan Times, September-January 1970-71. Talukdar Maniruzzaman provides his readers with an excellent socio-economic explanation for the fall of Ayub regime. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Crisis in Political Development and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime”, The Journal of Developing Areas, vol. V. January 1971. p.221-38.

132 Important leaders like Maulana Bahshami and Z.A. Bhutto refused to attend the Round Table Conference.

133 Mujib once said that the people of Pakistan always demanded a strong Pakistan and not a strong centre. See Md. Bhuiyan, op. cit., p.102.     

movement of 1968-69 Sheikh Mujib’s six points programme evoked tremendous enthusiasm among the people in East Pakistan. The programme not only strengthened the hands of the radical autonomists in Bengal bar also provided a material foundation to their otherwise vague ideological and political demands and helped the Awami Leaguers to mobilise the support of the most important strata on Bengali society behind their cause, the Bengali Middle calss, others simply followed. Here it is important to point out that the most enthusiastic supporter of the Awami League cause were the new class of eager East Pakistani entrepreneurs and Middle managers, fostered during the Ayub era of ‘Economic development and growth’.¹³⁴ If these entrepreneurs and managers encountered any kind of problem, they were rather quick to interpret all industrial and commercial policies of the Ayub Government as instruments for the economic exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan. ¹³⁵ They, in finding competition with West Pakistani industrialists often too hard and too costly, were among the first to support regionalism and the Awami League in order to put pressure on the central government. Regionalisation and autonomy for East Pakistan meant for Bengali entrepreneurs more export – import licences, increased quotas of foreign exchange and decentralisation of licencing and foreign exchange allocation bodies.¹³⁶ Thus, East Pakistan entreprencurs truely believed that in supporting Bengali regional political parties, above all the Awami League, thy would be able to obtain a bigger slice of the all Pakistani ‘ development cake’. ¹³⁷ The Bengali bureaucrats, too, supported the six Points programme because it advocated decentralisation of power and hence autonomy from centre’s fiscal control.” ¹³⁸ 138 The most powerful supporters of Mujib’s autonomy programme

134 See for example a series of articles by Abu Mahmood, published in The Pakistan Observer, in July 1964.

135 See, Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan”, op. cit., pp. 879-880.

136 See for example in the Pakistan Observer, of January 3, February 23, March 16, nd July 22, 1963, memorandam of the Chittagong. Khulna and Narayanganj Chambers of commerce and industry.

137 (unclear)the editorial in the Pakistan Observer, Dacca, May 31, and June 22, 1968.     

138 (unclear)

were the students. They played a very significant role during the mass upsurge of 1968-69.¹³⁹ During the Ayub era the universities in East Pakistan began to graduate a substantial number of science and social science students. They were soon all around hunting for Government or Government sponsored jobs. However, they had to face very often their rivals from West Pakistan. These rivals, frequently better educated than the Bengalis and close to the real centres of power, were always first in line for a job opening, leaving their East Pakistani counterparts with much frustration and no employment.¹⁴⁰ Bengali graduates soon realised that only the ‘panacea’ of some kind of autonomy for East Pakistan could provide them with a sufficiently high numbers of employment opportunities – employment opportunities which would always favour the Bengali applicant over the West Pakistan job seekers. Therefore, what this group of young men needed was a national political party with a strong Bengali flavour which strongly emphasised the needs of the young. These young unemployed graduates found in Mujib’s six points programme the answer to their ever increasing problems. In short it will be safe to argue that the six Points Programme was in essence the revolution of the petty bourgeoisie of East Pakistan who were disturbed by Ayub’s policy of Economic growth and development. (See Table 12)

139 It is important to note that in East Pakistan, Every political party had its parallel students organisation. The left wing East Pakistan Student Union was closely aligned with the National Awami party. This group was later divided into Menon (pro- Chinese) and Motia (pro-Moscow) factions in December 1968. The Awami Leage was supported by the East Pakistan Student League, the Pakistan Muslim League of Ayub Khan was supported by the National Student Federation and the Jamat -e-Islami, was supported by the Islami Chattra Sangah.

140 See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Political Activism of the University Students”, Journal of Commonwealth Studies, vol. 9, August 1971, pp.234-245. Also sec Md. Bhuiyan, op. cit., cspecially chapter 4, “The Radicalization of Bengali Politics and the Mass Upsurge in East Pakistan”, pp. 111-128.     

TABLE 12

Demographic Characteristics of the Awami League Nominees for the National Assembly in 1970 General Elections

Demographic Characteristics	Number	%of Total
Age:
60 and over	9	5
50-60	24	15
40-50	77	47
30-40	42	26
20-30	8	5
Not known	2	2
Total	162	100
Education
At least a B.A. degree	132*	81
Graduate of Secondary School	6	3
Matriculation or less	12	8
Madrasah (traditional Islamic education)	2	2
Not know	10	6
Total	162	100
Profession
Lawyers	77**	47
Doctors	7	4
Businessmen	31	19
Former Government servants	3	2
School teachers	6	4
University and college teachers	10	6
Trade union leaders	1	1
Student leaders	3	2
Journalists	5	3
Former military service	3	2
Not known	9	6
Total	162	100
Religion
Muslim	160	98.8
Hindu	1	0.6
Buddhist	1	0.6
Total	162	100.0

*Ten of the 132 nominees having graduate and post-graduate degree (6 per cent of the total) had higher education in foreign countries (8 Great Britain, one in Europe and one in the United States). ** Three lawyers had business concerns and one lawyer was a landholder. Source: T. Maniruzzaman, “Radical Politics and the emergence of Bengladesh”, in P. Brass and Marcus Franda (eds), Radical Politics in South Asia, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1974, p.40. Bengali entrepreneurs had to compete with already a well established West Pakistani business class in the continuously modernising Pakistani society. where the ruling class consisted of President Ayub and his advisors from the top echelons of the bureaucracy and the armed forces. In this ruling class Bengalis were hardly represented. ¹⁴¹ This we must examine in some detail. In order to do so we have relied on two primary sources: interviews with some Bengali elites who were actively involved in the politics of Pakistan during the Ayub era, and the National Assembly debates. The importance of the National Assembly of Pakistan during the Ayub era can hardly be exaggerated. It was the only platform, during Ayub’s ‘constitutional autocratic era’ where a small band of Bengali members of the National Assembly, belonging to the opposition, successfully exposed the credibility of Ayub’s constitutional commitment to remove disparity between the two wings of Pakistan in all the important sectors of Government institutions. The Parliamentary papers are also the only bonafide means to show the relative (economic and political) deprivation the Bengalis suffered at the hands of the West Pakistan ruling

141 It seems that the Bengali elites were not against modernisation per se. They were against inequality and West Pakistani domination. Under the leadership of Mujibur Rahman they asked for more investment in Bengal: they demanded that the government expenditures should be more equally distributed between East and West Pakistn. The term ‘growth should no longer be used to hide the exploitation of East Pakistan by the West Pakistani elites. The Awami League insisted that their followers should be given preference in obtaining top positions in the national bureaucracy in order to remedy the existing disequilibrium between East and West personnel. All in all, one can say with some justification that the Awami League intended to give the Pakistani modernisation prcess a ‘Bengali flavour’ They simply wnted a bigger slice from the modernisation cake. Sheikh MujiburRahman and his disciples envisaged a modernisation of Pakistan which emphasised the notion of equality at the expense of pure economic growth and whose politciaal ideals preferred democracy to an absolute, dictatorial order. In principle, the Awami League and with it East Pakistan espoused the concepts of progress, industrialisation and urbanisation – but not at all costs; and not within a context of internal colonialism. At least, a modicum of equality and justice had to be created and preserved in East and West Pakistan.     

elites. These documented incidences of Bengali exploitation by the central government look very credible and have an authentic air, because the documents have been edited by both West and East Pakistani officials. Hechter declares unambiguously that the internal colonialism model is based upon the notion that the ‘choice’ (top) positions in public and private institutions and enterprises are mainly reserved for the members of the core arca, while the people from the peripheral areas hardly have access to those kinds of cmployments. If we replace core areas by West Pakistan and peripheral areas by East Pakistan, we can then use the Parliamentary papers as a proof for the internal colonialisation of Bengal by the Punjabi-dominated central Government of Pakistan. It could then be hinted at that the Bengali case may be nothing more than a concrete example for Hechter’s model of internal colonialism. Pakistan, being a Muslim country and attaching also culturally a high value on Military virtues, always honoured the professional officer. It was always seen as a good professional advancement when somebody had the chance of joining the officer ranks of the armed forces; this was naturally seen as a ‘choice position’. The below following dialogues, recorded in the Parliamentary papers on 1 st of April 1964, show how difficult it was finally to get the East/West Pakistani ratio in the two wings of the armed forces. The question session of April 1st, clearly demonstrates how the Central Government avoided giving answers to important questions; and how finally on April 14th, they provided at least a meagre set of statistics which even so show the imbalances of East and West recruitment in the officer ranks of the two wings in the armed forces     

CHAPTER FIVE

SECTION II

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN, DEBATES

Dialogues of Ist April 1964, (as recorded in the Parliamentary papers) Mr. A.B.M. Ahmad Ali Mondal, (put by Mr. A.H.M. Kamruzzaman): Will the Parliamentary secretary to the defence divsion be pleased to state the ratio of East and West Pakistanis in the Army, Air Force and the Navy? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: It is not in the public interest to answer this question. Mr. Mizanur Rahman Choudhury: Sir, in this connection we wanted to know only the ratio of persons in the Army, Navy and the Air Force, not the number. Can I get this information? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: Mr. Speaker, Sir, it puts me in an awkward position, because you pulled me up last time I contradicted myself by answering a certain question in a different manner. But I am afraid, Sir, it is not in the public interest to disclose this information, and I cannot do it. Mr. A.H.M. Kamruzzaman: But ratio cannot be against the public interest, Sir. Mr. Mizanur Rahman Choudhury: It is simply the ratio we wanted to know. Mr, Speaker: Yes; the Parliamentary Secretary says that it is not in the public interest to answer. Mr. Mizanur Rahman Choudhury: Then may I know whether Parity has been observed in regard to these appointments. Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: There is no question of parity as far as the Defence Services are concerned. But the Government is doing its      

utmost to see that as many East Pakistanis as possible are recruited, but they are also keeping in mind the security and the defence of the country. and if as many persons as are offering themselves are fit enough, they will definitely be recruited in the Aremed Forces. Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahamd: Is it a fact that the Government is purposely avoiding the recruitment of East Pakistanis in these Forces? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: No, it is incorrect. Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahmad: Is it not a fact that thousands of boys are everyday appearing before the Recruitment Boards, but they have been denied recruitment? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: You see, the recruitment in the Armed Forces is purely on merits. I categorically state that there is no question of Parity as far as the Armed Forces are concerned. Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahmad: Is it also a fact that advertisements are not circulated in East Pakistani papers? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: It is also incorrect. Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahmad: Is it a fact that last time also the honourable Parliamentary Secretary admitted that not all the advertisements were published in East Pakistani papers? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: I repeat, Sir, that it was with regard to certain posts of clerks being recruited by the GHQ, on a temporary basis, and I said that for a temporary job no East Pakistani and for that matter no West Pakistani is prepared to go for a month or two to East Pakistan at eighty rupees and so those advertisements are not circulated in East Pakistan. Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahmad: Does the honourable Minister also believe that it is against public interest to recruit more East Pakistani Officers? Mr. Mmmad Qasim Malik: I have said before that as many East (unclear) possible are being recruited and the only thing which is(unclear) into consideration is the security of the country and fitness(unclear) is related with the security of the country.       

Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahmad: Does the Parliamentary Secretary think that by recruitment of more East Pakistani Officers there will be infringement of the security of Pakistan? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: I do not know what Mr Akhtharuddin wants to know. I have said that everything is done on the basis of merit. If on merits 100 per cent East Pakistanis are to be taken they shall be taken or if on merits 100 per cent West Pakistanis are to be taken they shall be taken. Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahmad: May I know from the Parliamentary Secretary whether this is the same plea which was used by British Imperialists? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: May I ask him not to compare Pakistanis with Britishers. The British thought that the Bengalis, I mean East Pakistanis, as they were known at that time, were Politically conscious, they thought that they were bigger patriots than the rest of the people and on account of that reason they did not recruit them in the Armed Forces. That is why that today you do not find many East Pakistanis in the Armed services. This is not the fault of West Pakistanis. Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahmad: Do you also hold the same arguments against the East Pakistanis? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: No, no. Mr. S. Zaman:Will the Parliamentary Secretary please state as to who decides the question of merits? Whether in that Selection Committee there is any East Pakistani?Is there any East Pakistani in that Board? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: It is the authorities concerned who do it. It is not the PIDC. Mr. S. Zamman: Sir, he is avoiding the question. My question is very direct, i.e., is there any East Pakistani on those Recruiting Boards? Mr, Qasim Malik: Yes, there are. Mr. S. Zamman: Are they the final authority? (No Reply)    

Mr. Amir Hayder Shah: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that there is no recruitment Centre in Hyderabad for Air Force applicants? Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: I need notice for that. Mr. Amir Hyder Shah: Recently in all the newspapers there has been advertisement and Peshawar, Karachi and Lahore have been mentioned as Centres but Hyderabad has not been included. Mr. Speaker: He says he wants notice. Mr. Amir Hyder Shah: I will bring an adjournment motion. Mr. Akhtaruddin Ahmad: Is it a fact that there is not a single East Pakistani Officer in the Inter Services Selection Board? Mr. Muhammd Qasim Malik: I need notice, Sir. Mr. Speaker: He wants notice. Next Question. And as a result of these dialogues the following statistics were included in the Parliamentary Papers on April 14th, 1964:

Table: Armed Forces The information is as follows:

(a)West Pakistani in E.P. Riffles	Percentage
(i) Officers	92 per cent
(ii) JCO’s	48 per cent
(iii) NCO’s	41 per cent
Other Ranks	81 per cent
(b) East Pakistanis in W.P. Rangers:
(i) Officers	Nil
(ii) JCO’s	.3 per cent
(iii) NCO’s	Nil
Other Ranks	.01 per cent
(c) East Pakistanis in Frontier Constabulary:
(i) Officers	6.66 рer cent
(ii) JCO’s	Nil
(iii) NCO’s and Other Ranks	Nil

     

All what these statistics really tell us, may be summed up in one rather ironically tragic sentence: The East Pakistanis, probably to the pleasure of India were not the favourite sons’ of the two wings of the armed forces.

Diplomatic Service:

Another ‘choice’ profession by any standards is the Diplomatic Service. After repeated questioning by East Pakistani Politicians, the following very revealing statistics about the Pakistani Diplomatic Service were published in the Parliamentary Papers of 18th December, 1967, and 9th December, 1968:

Mr. M. Arshad Hussain:

A list of Ambassadors/High Commissioners of Pakistan is placed on the Table of the House. It gives all the information asked for.

Table from the Parliamentary Papers of 9th December, 1968: Non-career heads of missions: Ambassadors

Name	Place of Posting
1. Mr.Hakim M. Ahson	Afghanistan
2. Maj.Gen. Nawabzada Mohammad Sher Ali khan	Indonesia
3. Мaј. Gen. N.A.M.Raza	Italy
4. Brig. M. Hayat	Saudi Arabia
5. Maj. Gen. Shaukat Ali Shah	Spain
6. Mr.Mohammad Hayat Junejo	Thailand
7. Mr. Jamshed K. Marker	Romania
8. Mr.M. Rabb	Lebanon
9. Mr.A.K.M. Hafizuddin	Switzerland
10.Mr. K.K. Panni	Argentina
HIGH COMMISSIONERS:
1.Mr. Mahmoud A. Horoon	U.K
2. Mr. H.K. Раnni	Сеylon
Total
Ambassadors/High Commissioners (non-career)	12
West Pakistan	9
East Pakistan	3

   

Table from the Parliamentry Papers of 9th December, 1968. Careers heads of missions: Ambassadors

Name                                                                                                   Place of Posting

1. Mr. Agha Hilaly U.S.A
2. Mr. Abdur Rahman Khan Germany
3. Mr. S.K. Dehlavi France.
4. Mr. Ikbal Athar Sweden.
5. Mr. J.G. Kharas Yugoslavia
6. Mr. Agha Shahi U.N.
7. Mr. Hamid Nawaz Khan Algeria
8. Mr. K.M. Kaiser Peking
9. Mr. Sultan M. Khan Returning to HQ.

10.Mr. Enver Murad                                                                         Austria.

11. Mr. М. Shafqat Czechoslovakia

12.Mr. M.A. Alvie                                                                              Netherlands

13.Mr. Abdul Ghayur                                                                       Philippines

14.Mr. Iftikhar Ali                                                                             Turkey

15. Mr. M. Мasood Iraq

16.Mr. Salaman A. Ali                                                                        U.S.S.R

17.Mr. S.M. Morshed                                                                       Japan

18.Mr. R.S. Chhatari                                                                          Jordan

19. Mr. A.H.B. Тyabji Могоссо

20.Mr. H.A. Abbasi                                                                           Tunisia

21. Mr. Kamaluddin Geneva

22.Mr. Ataullah                                                                                 Libya

23.Mr. S.R. Khairi                                                                             Sudan

24.Mr. Mohammad Shahryar Khan                                              Senegal

25.Mr. A.A. Sheikh                                                                             Syria

26.Mr. Abdur Rauf Khan                                                                   Nepal

27.Mr. S. Motahar Hussain                                                            Kuwait

28.Mr. Shah Nawaz                                                                            Iran

29.Mr. Hassan Imam                                                                         Burma

30.Mr. Riaz Piracha                                                                           Belgium

31.Mr. L.A. Akhund                                                                           U.A.R

HIGH COMMISSIONERS:

1. Mr. M.S.A. Baig Canada
2. Mr. Sajjad Hyder India
3. Mr. M.S. Sheikh Malaysia
4. Mr. Aslam Malik Australia
5. Mr. R.R. Noore Kenya
6. Mr. Ali Arshad Ghana
7. Mr. M.R. Ahmad Tanzania

Total

Ambassadors/High Commissioners (career) 38

East Pakistan     7

West Pakistan 31

Table II. 18th December, 1967. List showing the names of persons who have been given the diplomatic assignments from 1963 to 1966.

Name	Assignment	Posting	Domicile
1963
1.Mr. К.К. Раnni	Ambassador	Kenya	East Pakistan
2. Mr. Q.U. Shahab	-do-	Netherlands	West Pakistan
3. Mr. Abdul Fateh Memon	-do-	Saudi Arabia	-do-
4. Mr. G. Ahmad	-do-	U.S.A.	-do-
5.Mr. Inam Hussian	Third Secretary	Iraq	-do-
6. Mr. H.А. Chisty	-do-	Nigeria	-do-
1964
1.Mг. М. Аyub.	Ambassador	Belgium	West Pakistan
2.Ahsanul Haq	-do-	Indonesia	East Pakistan
3.Begum Shaista Ikramullah	-do-	Moгоссо	-do-
4.Mr. Hakim М. Ahsan	High Commissioner	Nigeria	West Pakistan
5.Mr. Amjad Ali	Ambassador	Parepun, New York	-do-
6.Mr. Sher Mohammad Khan	Consul	Jalalabad (Afghanistan)	-do-
7.Mr. N.A. Bhatti	Third Secretary	Peking	-do-
8.Mr. М.A. Qadeer	-do-	Calcutta	-do-
9.Mr. Ali Husain	-do-	Morоссо	-do-
10.Mr. Shamsuz Zuha	-do-	Jedda	East Pakistan
1965
1.Mr. Jamshed K.A. Marker	High Commissioner	Ghana	West Pakistan
2. Mr. М. Ibrahim	Third Secretary	Burma	-do-
3.Mr. Yusuf Abdullah	-do-	Thailand	-do-
4.Mr. Naziruddin	-do-	Saudi Arabia	-do-
5.Mr. S. Kabir Ali	-do-	Indonesia	-do-
6.Mr. Musharrafuddin	-do-	Kenya	-do-
1966
1.Mr. S. Osman Ali	Ambassador	Belgium	West Pakistan
2.Brig. M. Hayat	-do-	Saudi Arabia	-do-
3.Mг. А.К.М. Hafizuddin	-do-	Switzer land	East Pakistan
4.Mr. Reaz Rahman	PFS Third Secretary	Sweden	-do-
5.Mr. Mujahid Hussian	PFS Second Secretary	New York West Pakistan	-do-
6.Mr. Qadruddin	PFS -do-	Washington-do-	-do-
7.Mr. Amin Jan Naseem	PFS -do-	D.C. -do-	-do-
8.Mr. M.S. Akhtar	Third Secretary	Nigeria	-do-
9.Mr. Azam Kureshi	-do-	U.K	-do-
10.Mr. Amirul Islam	-do-	Rumania	East Pakistan
11.Mr. A.R. Mirza	Third Secretary	Turkey	West Pakistan
12.Mr. B.W.W. Walke	First Secretary	Ceylon	-do-
13.Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad	Third Secretary	Basra	-do-
14.Mr. Fazle Akbar	-do-	Kabul	-do-
15.Mr. Faisul Alam	-do-	Peking	East Pakistan
16.Mr Ishtiaq Hussain	-do-	Saudi Arabia	West Pakistan
17. (unclear)

Table III. 11th February. 1969. Names of permanent representatives of Pakistan in the United Nations from 1949 to May, 1968 with places of their domicile.

Name                                                                                         Domicile

1.Mr. Abdur Rahim Khan                                                     West Pakistan

2.Mr. Late Prof. A.S. Bokhari                                                         -do-

3. Mr. Mohammad Mir Khan -do-
4. Mr. G. Ahmad -do-

5.Mr. Late Prince Ali Khan                                         Generally resident Abroad

6.Mr. Said Hasan                                                                     West Pakistan

7.Mr. Mohammad Zafrullah Khan                                                  -do-

8. Mr. Syed Amjad Ali -do-
9. Mr. Agha Shahi -do-

Table IV. 11th February, 1969. Name of Officers and Staff of Pakistan in the United Nations with their place of domicile.

Name	Assignment	Place of domicile
1.Mr. Agha Shahi	Ambassador and Permanent Representative	West Pakistan
2.Mr. M. Yunus	Counsellor	-do-
3.Mr. Jamil U. Hasan	PFS -do-	-do-
4.Mr. Naseem Mirza	PFS -do-	-do-
5.Mr. Reza Rahman	PFS Second Secretary	East Pakistan
6. Mr.Inamul Haq	PFS Third Secretary	West Pakistan
7.Mr. M. Farooq	-do-	-do-
8.Mr. Nurul Hasan Rizvi	Addl. Asstt	-do-
9.Mr. Hassanullah Khan	-do-	-do-
10.Mr. Rafiq Ahmad Khan	Stenographer	-do-
11.Mr. Omar Sidique	-do-	East Pakistan
12.Mr. Кarim Bu	-do-	East Pakistan
13.Mr. Mubin Ahmad	Accountant	West Pakistan
14.Mr. Anwarul Huda	Assistant	-do-

These Parliamentary Papers show it that the East Pakistanis were largely outnumbered in a ‘choice’ profession, namely, the Diplomatic Service. Finance: In looking after the financial matters of the country, the Ministry of Finance, plays a key decision making role in virtually all development- related policy areas. The Parliamentary Papers of 2nd April, 1964, and the debates of 5th June 1967, on the issue of Finance Secretary and Joint Secretary clearly shows the disparity in the related areas, between the two wings. Below are the extracts from the debates of 5th June 1967; Dr. Aleem-al-Razee: Will the Minister for Finance be pleased to state the number of (i) Secretaries and (ii) Joint Secretaries in his Ministry and how many of them are from East Pakistan? Mr. Nurul Islam Sikdar: There is one Secretary, 2 Additional Secretaries and 13 Joint Secretaries in the Ministry of Finance and none of them are from East Pakistan. Several Members of the Opposition: ( After hearing the reply) Shame, shame. Mr. Afazuddin Faqir: In view of the fact that no East Pakistani is there in the rank of joint Secretary and Secretary in the Finance Department, will the honourable Minister contradict me if I say that neither any Minister, nor any Secretary so far has been appointed in the Finance Ministry because the Government do not trust East Pakistanis to be posted to those places because the finance is managed in a way to exploit East Pakistanis? Mr. A.S.M. Sulaiman:Will the honourable Minister please inform the House whether any East Pakistani was appointed as Secretary or Joint Secretary to the Ministry of Finance since 1958 till to-date? Mr. N.M. Uquaili: Sir, as far as I remember there was a Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Finance from East Pakistan and he was transferred to another Ministry sometime ago. Mr. A.S.M. Sulaiman: How long was he allowed to serve in the Ministry of Finance? (No reply)     

Dr. Aleem-Al-Razee: Did any East Pakistani ever hold the Post of Secretary in the Ministry of Finance during the last twenty years? Mr. N.M. Uquaili: You are already aware of it. The Parliamentary Papers of 2nd April, 1964, issued the following tables which detail the number and origin(East/ West Pakistan), of the officers and staff in the Ministry of Finance. These Tables clearly advice us that East Pakistanis were certainly not incharge of the ‘public finances’ of united Pakistan.

Table, 2nd April, 1964

The numbers of East and West Pakistanis

in all ranks in the Ministry of Finance.

Name of the Posts	East	West	Total
Secretary	–	1	1
Economic Adviser	–	1	1
Joint Secretary/Financial Adviser	–	8	8
Deputy Secretary/Deputy Financial Secretry	8	19	27
Deputy Secretary (on training abroad)	2	2	4
O.S.D. (with Deputy Secretary’s Status)	–	1	1
O.S.D. (Budget Manual)	–	1	1
Chief Accounts Officer	–	1	1
Assistant Economic Advisor	1	1	2
P.S. to Finance Minister	–	1	1
Section Officers/Assistant Financial Advisors	13	100	113
Cost Account Officers	–	2	2
Research Officers	3	7	10
Assistant Accounts Officers/O.S.D. (Budget)	–	3	3
Progress Officers	–	1	1
Superintendent/DAFA/OSD	–	12	12
P.S. to Finance Secretary	–	1	1
Assistant-in-Charge	–	6	6
Economic investigators	3	7	10
Assistants	11	127	138
Accountants	–	1	1
Stenographers	1	35	36
Stenotypist	18	77	95
U.D.C’s	7	39	46
L.D.C’s.	18	78	96
Staff car drivers	–	3	3
Despatch Riders	–	2	2
Gestetner Operator	–	1	1
Daftries/Record Sorters	27	29	56
Jamadars	–	1	1
Peons	14	177	191
Total	101	743	844
Gazetted	27	162	189
Non-Gazetted	74	581	655

Parliamentary Papers of 11th December, 1967. Debate and tables for Planning Commission Deputy Chairman. Mr. S.K. Khairuddin, (Put by Rana Ghulam Sabit Khan): Will the Parliamentary Secretary to the Cabinet Division be pleased to state: (a) the names of Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of Pakistan appointed so far, (b) the terms and conditions on which they have been appointed; and (c) whether any East Pakistani has ever been appointed as Deputy Chairman of the said Commission; if not, the reason thereof? Mr. Mohammad Qasim Malik: Mr. Speaker, Sir, I beg to withdraw the answer which has been given and without your permission, I would submit: (a) The following acted as Deputy Chairmen of the Planning Commission: Mr. G. Ahmad from West Pakistan was Chairman Planning Commission, during this period. After the President assumed the Chairmanship of the Planning Commission in, August, 1961, the following have acted as Deputy Chairmen of the Planning Commission:

Deputy Chairmen Planning commission

Mr. Said Hasan                  20.4.47 to 12.6.1969

Mr. Mumtaz Hasan             10.7.59 to 14.8.1961

Mr. Said Hasan                    15.8.61. to 31.5.1969

Mr. M.M. Ahmad*                1.6.66 to date   

*All from West Pakistan 

(b) the terms and conditions of employment of each Deputy chairmen are given in the Annexure. (c) No, these appointments were made on administrative grounds, by the President.

Parliamentary Papers of 12th February, 1969. Debates and Tables for Planning Officers

Mr. A.S.M. Sulaiman: Will the Parliamentary Secretary to the Planning Division be pleased to state: (a) the names of the Vice-chairman and Members of the Planning Commission from 1958 to 1968; and (b) the expenses incurred for the Planning Commission each year since 1958? Nawab Jam Sadik Ali: (a) Names of Deputy Chairman of planning Commission,, from 1-1-1958:

Table I.

Deputy Chairmen Planning Commission.

1. Mr. Said Hasan 20.4.57 to 12.6.1959
2. Mr. Mumtaz Hasan 10.7.59 to 14.8.1961
3. Mr. Said Hasan 15.8.61 to 31.5.1966
4. Mr. M.M. Ahmad* 1.6.66 to date

*All from West Pakistan

Table II. Names of Members of Planning Commission, from 1.1.1958: As Secretary-in-Charge of the Planning Division.

1.Mr. S, Azam Ali                                       10.5.60 to 31.3.62

2.Mr. D.K. Power                                       4.6.62 to 31.12.62

3.Mr. S.A.F.M.A. Sobhan                          1.1.63 to 18.1.66 (on leave w.e.f. 14.9.65.)

4.Mr. Muzaffar Hussain                          14.9.65 to 31.5.66

5.Mr. Qamar-ul-Islam                             1.6.66 to – date    

Table III Names of Members of Planning Commission:

As Secretary-in-Charge of the Planning Commission.

FROM EAST PAKISTAN:

1. Mafizuddin Ahamd 3.7.54 to 4.9.59
2. M.A. Majid  5.9.59 to 4.9.61
3. M.N. Huda  1.3.62 to 29.3.6
4. A.F.A. Husain  3.11.65 to-date

FROM WEST PAKISTAN:

5. G.S. Kehar 3.7.59 to 21.9.63
6. M.L. Qureshi  15.08.67 to-date 15.8.67

Parliamentary Papers of 14th December, 1967. Showing the Province- wise figures of Governors of State Bank of Pakistan from 1948 to 31st October, 1967.

Table 1. Governors State Bank of Pakistan.

Year	East	West
1. 7.1948	–	1
1. 1.1949	–	1
1. 1.1950	–	1
1. 1.1951	–	1
1. 1.1952	–	1
1. 1.1953	–	1
1. 1.1954	–	1
1. 1.1955	–	1
1. 1.1956	–	1
1. 1.1957	–	1
1. 1.1958	–	1
1. 1.1959	–	1
1. 1.1960	–	1
1. 1.1961	–	1
1. 1.1962	–	1
1. 1.1963	–	1
1. 1.1964	–	1
1. 1.1965	–	1
1. 1.1966	–	1
1. 1.1967	1	1
30.10. 1967	1	–

Attorney-General: The Attorney-General, another ‘choice position in Pakistani society, were always of West Pakistani origins. So the West Pakistanis were able to interpret the legal system in a way which favoured their interests. Below the reader finds debates and tables from the Parliamentary Papers of 7th December, 1967, which illustrates the West Pakistani domination of the Attorney-General’s office since its inception: Mr. S. K. Khairuddin, (Put by Mr. Mahtabuddin Sarkar) : (a) Will the Minister of Law be pleased to state the names of Attorney- General of Pakistan appointed from 1947 to 1957? (b) Was any East Pakistani appointed to that Post ? if not, what are the reasons thereof? Mr. Abdul Awal: The following have been Attorney-General for Pakistan since 1947.

Table I.

Attorney-Generals.

Name                                                                                                                        Domicile

(a) 1. Late Mr. M. wasim                                                                            West Pakistan.

2. Late Mr. Fayaz Ali -do-
3. Mr. Nazir Ahmad Khan -do-
4. Mr. Tufail Ali A. Rahman -do-
5. Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada -do-
6. Mr. Ghias Mohammad -do-

(b) None of them was from East Pakistan

Begum Mariam Hashimuddin Ahmad: Will the honourable Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to state whether it was illegal for a man from East Pakistan to hold this Post? Mr. Abdul Awal: The position is that there is no restriction as to whether he will be from East Pakistan or West Pakistan. A man who is found to be suitable and competent is appointed to the Post. There is no question whether he is from East or West Pakistan. Mr. Abdul Matin: Will the Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to state what are the requisite qualifications and criteria to acquire this Post of Attorney-Gerneral and to be appointed Attorney-General?     

Mr. Abdul Awal: A man who is qualified to be appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court can be appointed Attorney-General of Pakistan. Mr. Ismail Khan: One part of the question was not answered. Will the Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to give the answer to part (b)? The question is> If not, what are the reasons thereof? Was any East Pakistani appointed to that Post, if not what are the reasons? Why the reasons are not given? Mr. Senior Deputy Speaker: In answer to supplementary question put by Begum Mariam Hashimuddin Ahmad he has given the reasons. Mr. Ismail Khan: What are the reasons for which any East Pakistani was not appointed as Attorney General ,Pakistan. Mr. Senior Deputy Speaker: He has already given the reasons. Moulvi Ruhul Amin: Will the Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to assure the House that in case of future appointment he will consider the case of an East Pakistani, at least just for a change? Mr. Abdul Awal: There cannot be assurance for any post. People were appointed to the post from amongst the available advocates from East and west Pakistan alike and in future also when vacancy in the post of Attorney-Gerneral arises, the question of East and West will be consid- ered. Mr. Mohammad Abdul Matin: Will the Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to tell the House whether it is a fact that there is none available in East Pakistan or in Dacca High Court to be suitably appointed to the post of Attorney- General ? Does he want to say that the intelligence of an East Pakistani is far below the standard? Mr. Abdul Awal: I do not say that the intelligence of an East Pakistani in certain respects is more than that of a West Pakistani. The question does not arise now. Mian Md. Mansur Ali: In view of the reply given by the honourable Parliamentary Secretary of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, will he con- tradict me if I say that East Pakistan could not produce a suitable candidate Partition for the post of Attorney-General of Pakistan?  (unclear) Deputy Speaker: Disallowed. He has already answered the (unclear) 

Dr.Aleem al Razee: Will the Minister for Law be pleased to state the names and places of domicile of the persons who held the post of Attorney- General of Pakistan since 1958, to-date? Mr. S M. Zafar: The following have been Attorney-General for Pakistan since 1958:

Table 2 Table 7th December 1967 Attorrney-General for Pakistan since 1958 to date

Name                                                                                        Domicile

1. Late Fayaz Ali West Pakistan
2. Nazir Ahmad Khan -do-
3. Tufail Ali- A Rahman -do-
4. Sharifuddin Pirzada -do-
5. Ghias Mohammad -do-

This proof of total West Pakistani domination of the Attorney-General’s office was published in the Parliamentary Papers of December 7th, 1967. Information and Broadcasting: In a Geographically divided country like Pakistan, communication, especially National Broadcasting plays a major role in holding the country together. Thus, any employees connected with the Ministry for Information and Broadcasting enjoy above-average salaries and status. The Parliamentary Papers dated 17th December, 1968 show the East/ West Pakistan relationship of employees of the Ministry for Information and broadcasting. However, even more important is the ensueing debates between Eastern and Western proponents about the domination of East Pakistani by West Pakistani interests. Therefore, we include the whole section of the Parliamentary Papers of 17th December, 1968 to provide reader with the statistics and the debates which bear testimony to Bengali frustration and West Pakistani intransigence: Dr. Aleem-al-Razee: Will the Minister for Information and Broadcasting be pleased to state: (a) the number of officers so far appointed on ad hoc basis in his Ministry, wing-wise; and (b) their date of appointments and the Posts to which they were appointed together with their pay and allowance?    

Syed Ali Asghar Shah: (a) In all twenty-three officers were appointed on adhoc basis in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Out of these officers twenty were from West Pakistan and three were from East Pakistan. (b) A statement containing the required information is placed on the table of the house.

Table 1

Serial No.	Name of the Post	Name of Officer	Place of domicile
1.	Public Relation Officers(Information officer)	Mr. Bashir Ahmed	West Pakistan
2.	-do-	Mr. Zahid Malik	-do-
3.	-do-	Mr.B..A.. Tabassum	-do-
4.	Assistant Public Relation Officers	Mr.M. Saddiq Salik	-do-
5.	-do-	Mr. Afzal Haider Kazmi	-do-
6.	-do-	Mrs.Ishrat Rauf	-do-
7.	-do-	Miss.Farhat Afzal	-do-
8.	-do-	Mr. В.А. Тabassum	-do-
9.	Assistant Public Relation Officers	Miss.Latifa Kabir	East Pakistan.
10.	-do-	Miss.Rana Sherwani	West Pakistan
11.	Officer on Special Duty	Mrs.Sultana Husain	-do-
12.	Assistant Sec. (Film Advisory Council)	Mr. Ali Ahmed T.K.	-do-
13.	Research Officer	Mr.Abdul Wadood	-do-
14.	Assistant Research Officers	Mr. Syed Ahmed	-do-
15.	-do-	Mr.M.Khalil Qureshi	-do-
16.	-do-	Mr.AbdurRaufMalik	-do-
17.	Assistant Information Officer	Mr.Abdur Rauf Mallik	-do-
18.	-do-	Mr. Akthar Ali Khan	-do-
19.	Section Officers	Mr.A.H.Chadudhry	-do-
20.	-do-	Mohammad Nazimul Rahman	East Pakistan
21.	-do-	Mr.Bahir Ahmad	West Pakistan
22.	-do-	Mr.Mohammad Sarwar	-do-
23.	-do-	Mr.M.A. Quader	East Pakistan

Mr. Farid Ahmad: In view of the state of affairs that out of 23 only three are from East Pakistan, will the Minister for Information and Broadcasting who claims to be from East Pakistan – though he does not know the script of the people of this Province – consider the desirability of resigning in shame even at this late stage of his life? National Airlines (PIA) Again, in consulting the Parliamentary Papers of 30th May, 1968, we can demonstrate to the reader that the East Pakistanis were significantly, under-represented in another so-called ‘Choice’ or ‘ Glamour profession, namely, staff positions with the National Airlines, PIA. Below follows the reports and the statistics of the PIA employment records as they were presented in the Parliament on 30th May, 1968: Mr Farid Ahmed: Will the Minister of Defence be pleased to state whether it is a fact that there was a decision to recruit 75% new entrants in PIA, from among the East Pakistanis in order to achieve Parity in the matter of services in PIA? If so, has the decision been implemented and what are the results achieved so far? If not, what are the reasons therefore? Vice Admiral A.R.Khan: Yes, PIA has been making efforts to bring about Parity in recruitment. Detailed information about the recruitment in different cadres during the last three years was furnished to the House on 21st May, 1968 in reply to Starred question No.631. Mr.Farid Ahmed: Will the Minister for Defence be pleased to state: (a) the total number of persons serving in PIA in various cadres and the total emoluments paid to them; and (b) the number of persons form East Pakistan in those cadres, along with their total emoluments? Vice Admiral A.R.Khan: (a) and (b) A statement containing the required information about cadre strength is placed on the Table of the House. Details of emoluments drawn are being compiled and will be furnished to the House as soon as ready.    

Table Statement showing total number of persons serving in P.I.A.C. in different cadres

Pay Group	Total	East Pak
I	2,658	794
II	1,359	285
III(i)	1,675	513
III(ii)	2,465	599
IV	1,655	315
V	795	129
VI	321	63
VII	381	50
VIII	69	8
IX	39	5
X	10	1
Special	339	81
ТОTAL	11,766	2,843

Mr.A.S.M.Sulaiman:Will the Minister of Defence be pleased to state: (a) the amount of profit earned by the PIA, during the year 1967: the amount of subsidy paid by the Central Government to the (b) PIA, during the years 1965, 1966 and 1967; and (c) the various categories of staff recruited by PIA, from East and West Pakistan during 1965, and 1967? Vice Admiral A.R.Khan: (a) Rs. 336.77 lakhs. (b) “On account” payments against PIA, subsidy bills are as follows: 1964-65 Rs.251.00 lakhs.       

1965-66RS. 236.39 lakhs. 1966-67Nil so far. Rs..487.39 lakhs. (c) A statement is laid on the Table of the House. Table Staff Recruited by PIA, from East and West Pakistan during 1965, 1966 and 1967.

	1965		1966		1967		Total
Categories in terms of pay group	West Pak	East Pak	West Pak	East Pak	West Pak	East Pak	West Pak	East Pak	Grand Total
Special	12	11	15	7	33	3	60	21	81
X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
IX	2	–	4	–	2	–	8	–	8
VIII	–	1	6	–	2	–	8	–	8
VII	4	1	5	4	4	1	1	3	6
VI	10	5	20	5	16	5	46	15	61
V	14	2	11	–	22	3	47	5	52
IV	86	35	125	19	96	13	307	67	374
III(ii)	158	61	290	121	96	65	544	247	791
III(i)	304	61	393	95	178	35	875	191	1,066
II	66	5	101	45	30	19	197	69	266
I	165	60	439	184	164	59	768	303	1,071
Total	821	242	1,409	480	643	203	2,873	925	3,798

Mr. Muhammad Qasim Malik: The required information is placed on the Table of the House.     

Table Statement of appointments made in PIA, from July, 1966 to date.

(Category-wise and wing-wise)

Pay group	West Pak	East Pak	Total
IX	6	–	6
VIII	7	–	7
VII	1	3	4
VI	23	6	29
V	18	2	20
IV	162	20	182
III(ii)	237	107	344
III(i)	248	60	308
II	49	44	93
I	285	187	472
Cadet Flight Engineer	3	1	4
Pilot/  Cadet Pilot	7	1	8
Ground Engineers	1	–	1
TOTAL	1047	431	1478

2.The over-all percentage is 75.5% West Pakistanis and 24.5% East Pakistanis. Mr. Mukhlesuzzaman Khan: Will the Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to recall his previous statements made so many times about these PIA appointments. His assertion has been that on low-paid jobs East Pakistanis do not come. Now would he very kindly state the reasons of not getting the requisite number of East Pakistanis on the higher posts of pay group as mentioned in items IX, VIII, VII, VI, V, IV ETC. ? Mr.Muhammad Qasim Malik: I do recall my previous statements and the Point is that these groups include technical officers as well. Mr.Mukhleshuzzaman Khan: Are the East Pakistanis not technical minded? Mr.Muhammad Qasim Malik: East Pakistanis may be very technical minded, I do not deny that. But the Point is that these officers include that type of officers who have to Pilot aeroplanes or who have to fly them and look after their maintenance, and it is quite possible that PIA,was not able to get those persons of merit from East Pakistan., But, Mr.Speaker. I assure my friend that the Disparity which he finds here in this statement which I have placed on the floor of the House, the Government shall enquire into it why it is so. The so far quoted Parliamentary Papers have demonstrated that the Bengalis were dreadfully under represented in the choice professions. The Parliamentary papers thus constitute a case that with respect to united Pakistan the Hechter model of internal colonialism may be applied. To strengthen our argument of internal colonialism in Bengal, we look at two key areas of development: Electricity and Health. Again, we use here Parliamentary Papers as the purveyor and final arbiter of Bengali under-development and deprivation. Hechter insists in his model that when it comes to important services the core will always be advantaged at the expense of the periphery. In the following case of Hospital beds it is the number of beds that are important. In the further case it is the price differential of the cost of electricity which plays the vital role of under-privileging East Pakistan. Health: (Hospital Beds) Debate about beds in central hospitals, etc., as it was recorded in the Parliamentary Papers of 2nd April, 1964: Mr.A.B.M.Ahmed Ali Mondal, (put by Syed Hussain Mansur): Will the Minister for Health be pleased to state: (a) the total number of beds in the centrally managed hospitals in East and West Pakistan; and (b) the total number of doctors sent abroad for training from both the wings since 1959? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque:(a) 1,050. (b) 512. Mr.Mansural Haque: Will the Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to state where is the location of the Central hospital in East Pakistan? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: Kindly repeat your question.     

Mr.Mansural Haque: Where is the Central Government Hospital in East Pakistan located? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: There is no centrally managed Hospital in East Pakistan – 200 beds hospital at Dacca is being established. Mr.Mahbubul Haque: Is it a fact that out of 1050 beds in centrally managed Hospitals there is not one bed available in East Pakistan? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: Yes, a 200 beds Hospital at the subsidiary capital at Dacca is being established. Mr.Mahbubul Haque: I am not discussing tomorrow; I am discussing about today. Out of 1050 Beds, is there even one single bed available in East Pakistan? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: No. Mr.Mahbubul Haque: Will the Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to state whether out of 512 Doctors, who have been sent abroad for training since 1959, not even 10per cent are from East Pakistan? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: No, there are 213 from East Pakistan. Mr.A.H.M.Kamruzzaman: How many? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: 213. Mr.Md.Serajul Islam Mian:Will the Parliamentary Secretary be pleased to state how many centrally managed Hospitals are there in West Pakistan? Mr.Speaker: It is in the answer; it is there; you can find it out. Mr.Md.Serajul Islam Mian: Only beds are there. I want to know how many Hospitals are there, which are managed by the Central Government. Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: There are two centrally managed hospitals in West Pakistan. A Member: How many, two? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque:Yes.  

Mr. Md Serajul Islam Mian: And how many hospitals are there in Karrachi? Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: There is one, Jinnah Post Graduate medical Center. Mr.Mizanur Rahman Choudhury: May I know from the Parliamentary Secretary the reason why the Central Government did not feel the necessary of having one such hospital in East Pakistan? The reason… Mr.Speaker:Is that question necessary? He has already said that one hospital is being established in the subsidiary capital. Mr.Mansural Haque: After 16 years when 1050 beds have been provided in hospitals in West Pakistan, people in East Pakistan are not getting even one bed. Mr.Speaker: Already it has been answered. Mr.Mansural Haque: why no Central Government Hospital has been given to East Pakistanis? No Reply. Mr.Mansural Haque: It appears from the reply that there are as good as 1,050 beds provided in Central Government Hospitals in West Pakistan according to the Parliamentary Secretary but the proposed hospital of Central Government in Dacca will have 200 beds only. I would therefore like to know how he hopes to achieve Parity there. Mr.A.K.Fazlul Haque: At present there is no Central Government Hospital in East Pakistan. Mr.Mahbubul Haque: We do not want Parity in sickness. Electricity: Debate about the differential costs of electricity in East and West Pakistan as it was recorded in the Parliamentary Papers of 7th December, 1967: Dr.Aleem-al-Razee, (put by Mr.Mohammad Abdul Matin):Will the Minister for Natural Resources be pleased to state the cost of an unit     

of electricity for domestic and Industrial use in East and West Pakistan. Sardar Khizer Hayat Khan: The average selling prices of electricity for domestic and Industrial use per unit in East and West Pakistan are as follows:

TABLE. Electricity Cost.

	East Pak	West Pak	Karachi Electric Supply Corporation LTD.
Domestic use	31 Paisa	19.49 Paisa	16.6 Paisa
Industrial use	16 Paisa	10.79 Paisa	9.6 Paisa

Mr.Mohammad Abdul Matin:Will the Parliamentary Secretary please justify the reason for such difference and, I should say, gross Disparity of charging consumers in East Pakistan for domestic use 31 Paisa, in West Pakistan 19.49 Paisa and in Karachi 16.6 Paisa and for Industrial use in East Pakistan 16 Paisa, in West Pakistan 10.79 Paisa and in Karachi 9.6 Paisa – this is about 50% difference. Sardar Khizer Hayat Khan: Yes, this is correct that there are differences in prices in East and West Pakistan. But the honourable member will agree with me that the reasons for difference are such which are beyond the control of the Government and the main reason for higher price in East Pakistan is that the generating units in East Pakistan with the exception of Keptai are based on imported coal and oil, whereas the units in West Pakistan are based on hydro-electricity and gas. With the availability of gas in East Pakistan Government expects that the prices will be lower in East Pakistan. Therefore, this is very clear and the question of East and West Pakistan problems does not come in. Mr.Abdul Matin: Will the Parliamentary Secretary agree with me that this is the reason why Rooppur Project had to be deferred to put East Pakistanis in a difficult position? Sardar Khizer Hayat Khan: Sir I deny and contradict the assertion of the honourable member. May I bring to his notice that Government is aware and is trying is best to increase the production of electricity in East Pakistan and there are so many proposals under consideration of the Government and there are certain schemes, one with 44,000 KWs at Siddhirganj, one with 1,20,000 KWs at Ashuganj and with 1,10,000KWS  at Ghorasal? This will prove that Government is taking all possible measures to increase electricity in East Pakistan. Mr.Mohammad Abdul Matin: I think the Parliamentary Secretary will agree with me to defer construction of new plants at Karachi and to Concentrate on Rooppur to remove this Disparity in price. Sardar Khizer Hayat Khan: Mr.Speaker, Sir, I have already stated- and very clearly stated that Government is actively considering the question of availability of electricity and more and more production of electricity in East Pakistan. It is not the question of giving up or abandoning one unit for the other and I may assure the honourable member that Government will always do whatever is feasible and whatever is necessary and I may assure him that there will be nothing which will not be looked into on the question of availability of electricity in East Pakistan. Mr.Mohammad Abdul Matin: Will the Parliamentary Secretary please tell the House how long his sweet words will keep the People of East Pakistan happy? Sardar Khizer Hayat Khan: Sir, this Government of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan has never been giving only hopes. It has done certain acts and acts which have been proved and which are clear even to the naked eyes. Therefore, the question of giving hopes only is not there. There are certain results which have been made available and people are aware and honourable member is also aware of them. Mr.Speaker: Next question. The example of Bengali relative (Economic and Political deprivation) with regard to the West Pakistani elites as recorded in the various Parliamentary Papers, may be used as proof that the East Pakistani’s patience began to wear thin and, they talked more and more about regional autonomy and de-centralisation of, what they saw as West Pakistan based, central government in order to achieve economic development, political freedom and a modicum of justice. The very intransigent and evasive nanner, in which the West Pakistanis answered the Bengali questions must have fuelled the desire, of East Pakistanis and forced them to demand Regional autonomy based on the Lahore resolution of 1940. If we consider further that the Disparity in the various choice profession between East and West Pakistani personal was skillfully used by the opposition M.N.A to test the constitutional commitment by the Ayub government for the removal of all and every discriminatory recruitment procedure for the Bengali applicant, one immediately senses, that this very intransigent on the part of the central (West) Pakistani Government must have dealt the unity of the country a sever blow. The manner in which the Ayub’s Government shelved aside to a distant future the burning issue of Disparity, became not only a Political embarrassment to his ruling party but discredited him totally, in the eyes of the Bengalis. Especially, the ambitious and highly motivated Bengali middle class felt that Ayub constantly betrayed them and made no effort whatsoever to improve their Economic position. On the contrary Ayub’s “acolyte’ in the central bureaucracy made sure that every prestige occupation such as found in PIA or the foreign service, were and remained the primary domain of the educated West Pakistan. As in the Ayub period all power were concentrated in the hands of the President, he became the favorite target of Bengalis frequent attacks and his political system was viewed by the Bengali elites as a symbol of their Political and Economic subjugation. Therefore, they rejected branch and roots, Ayub’s self-acclaimed home grown political system. After 1966 the alternative in the eyes of the Bengali middle class was the six Points programme of Sheikh Mujibur-Rahman. Mujib’s six Points ‘charter of survival’, within the framework of a united Pakistan, was seen by the Bengalis as the only solution to end the Political and Economic “subjugation of the Bengali Muslims. As also shown in the interviews, the break-up of Pakistan was never in the agenda of Benagli’s struggle for political freedom. The Bengali elites were convinced that the only way to end Punjabi and North Indian immigrant domination at the centre was through a democratically elected Government in which, by virtue of their majority, they would emerge as controllers of the central Government. Thus it will not be an exaggeration to say that their campaign for democratic rule was intricately linked with the struggle to eliminate the supremacy of a privileged minority ethnic group.      

CHAPTER FIVE

SECTION III

INTERVIEWS; SUMMARY OF RESPONSES AND ANALYSIS

As an integral part of this dissertation, interviews have been conducted in an effort to use primary sources to ascertain the background and possible causes of the Political disintegration of Pakistan in 1971. We will provide the reader with a short curriculum vitals of each interview. Then, we will introduce the reader to the questionnaire which contains in all 26 questions. (Please see the appendix for the curriculum vital and the questionnaire). Of course, it should be immediately noted that very few interviewees answered all questions. Thus, we list the answers of each interviewee in their totality first. Having done this, we attempt to condense the essence of each answer into a few words or at most sentences. We proceed to list for each question all received answers to allow for comparison. Also for each individual question, we furnish the reader with a relevant summary to establish the overall trends, of the question concerned. Please allow us to stress the importance of the following interviews. These interviews were absolutely necessary in order to gain the necessary empirical data for our investigation into Bengali ethnic movements. Research into Bengali ethnicity is not available in published form; the concept of ethnic group is virtually unknown in the sub-continent’s literature. Nationalistic concerns have always dominated The sociology, political science and philosophy of India and “united Pakistan”. Only some Indian anthropologists¹ showed some interest in ethnic groupings. Yet, there was always a tendency to label ethnic groups as tribal, denying them thus any claim to modernity. ‘Modernity’ and ‘Ethnicity’ as a living political community did not exist in the minds of the anthropologists in question. Tribalism was always considered to be backward and in danger of being over taken by the powerful modern force of nationalism. These interviews seem to demonstrate that modernity and ethnic concerns go together, almost inseparabley. They do not have to be things apart. That is why the interviews in more than one way are the essential empirical basis of this dissertation – the data on which our final finding implicitly and explicitly rests.

1 See Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans, (London: Athlone, 1965).      

It should also be noted that Pakistani (Bengali)culture is basically oral in nature. Many ‘things’ can be said but not written – or are perese not put on paper. Oral cultures thus live by the spoken word and not by written signs. Interviews allow us to get to the individual, obtain his personal convictions. Oral cultures’ treasure the transport of words from mouth to ear (or tape recorder). Thus, we believe that the interviews provide an additional facet of Pakistani (or Bengali) Public opinion which cannot be found in written records. They complement already available books and articles. That is why – beyond the interviews and research experience gained – the author considers these interviews as important to his approach to further research on the Indian subcontinent. Interview Analysis: Trends in the Individual Answers to questions Question 1. what was the purpose of founding an independent political entity called Pakistan? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: states that “the issue of permanent majority and minority” concerned the Muslims in India. They feared that they would have “to lead a life of permanent minority and “this was not acceptable to” them. Mohammed Toha: insists that “the nature of Indian economy was feudal in nature. Hence they failed to unify India”. Moreover, “the Economy of India was local in nature, therefore, it could not be united on an economy basis”. Shah Azizur-Rehman: explains that the Bengali Muslims wanted “to establish a separate homeland for the realisation of the fulfillment of the Islamic ideology”, because “Muslims of Bengal were subjected to Economic aggression by the Hindus”. Amena Begum: points out that Muslims suffered the “atrocities of the hostile Hindu majority”. Further more, the Muslims in India aimed at the “preservation of the Islamic ways of life according to the teachings of the Holy Qu’ran and Sunnah for ensuring peace and progress”. Professor Rehman Sobhan: declares that the Muslims in India were 2 Walter J. Ong. Orality and Literacy: The Technologising of the Word. (London: Methuen, 1982).     

convinced “that they would face unequal competition in various important areas of life, namely economic and political”. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: refers to the fact that in Bengal Hindus gave the British imperial power their support which totally alienated the Muslims from the Congress. Mainul Hassan: believes that the division was the result of “the bitter experience Indian Muslims had with Hindu domination during the British rule”. Talfazrul Ali: explicates that “educational and economic advantages envoyed by the Hindus of Bengal convinced us that the only way we can break the Hindu monopoly was the creation of a separate state”. Summary of answers to question 1. All interviewed individuals insist that the Muslims in India feared Hindu domination in a newly created united India. This domination may be in the field of Economics or Politics or of an ideological-religious nature. The Muslims of the Indian sub- cntinent could only survive as a viable economic, political and religious entity in an independent – non – Hindu – state of their own. The conviction with which all the interviews made this point led me to conclude that an independent entity called Pakistan was an absolute must, a Political necessity without any other conceivable alternative. Question 2. whose expectations with regard to the development of Pakistan were not ret? eg. (a) Professional people, or (b) Religious leaders, or (c) Economic elies, or (d) Politicians, or (e) Masses (urban, rural or both). Dr. Sajjad Hussain: explains rather vaguely that certain expectations could not be met basically for two reasons: Too much time was wasted on making a Pakistani constitution and through British oppression the Bengali Muslims lacked the necessary qualifications to enter the Pakistani Civil and Military bureaucracies. Mohammed Toha: emphasised that “centralised economic policy proved to be fatal”. Centralisation did not allow the rising middle classes to participate in the ‘profitable’ making of Pakistan.    

Shah Azizur Rehman: feels that most sections of the Pakistan People were neglected and exploited by a small elite, and therefore no attempt was made to meet the expectations of the common people. Amena Begum: Listed that the expectations of the following social groups were not fulfilled: (a) “white collar” professional people (b) religious leaders (c) economic elites (e) masses (urban and rural) Professor Rehman Sobhan: believes that every listed segment of the population had unfulfilled expectations, especially the rural and urban masses. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: voices virtually the same opinion as Professor Rehman Sobhan. Moinul Hassan: Stresses the regional point of view on the problem of unfulfilled expectations: “economic and political power arrangements were such that the major share of state expenditure went to West Pakistan”. Taffazzul Ali: did not answer question 2. Summary of answers to question 2. To all interviewees it seems apparent that only a tiny elite was able to benefit from the creation of Pakistan. The hopes of all other segments of population remained virtually unfulfilled, sacrificed for the unlimited profit and pleasure of a small number of selfish individuals. And as, M.Hassan, likes to point out, the Eastern part of Pakistan had to suffer most from the ills of the newly created political entity called Pakistan. Question 3. Why could they not be met? Whose fault – if anyone’s was it? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: implies that it was nobody’s fault that the expectations of the Pakistani people could not be met. Development per se “is a painful process through which all nations have to go”     

Mohammed Toha: blames centralisation of power in a few hands for not meeting the expectations of the general public. Furthermore, there were too many qualified applicants for each advertised professional and bureauratic vacancy. Shah Azizur- Rehman: did not provide an answer to this question Amena Begum: points out that Pakistani politicians were unable to deal successfully with “problems at the grass root level”. Khandokar Mushtaqe Ahmed: insists that the Pakistani elites never bothered to look after the welfare of the common men. Furthermore, the Muslim League ceased to be mass organisation taking care of the needs of its members. Moinul Hassan: declares that the Geographic position of Pakistan may have contributed to its disintegration; West and East Pakistan were physically too far apart. Taffazzul Ali: did not answer this question. Summary of answers to question 3. Most of the interviewees persist in their opinion that the Pakistani elites, especially the West Pakistani leadership, were unsympathetic to the demands of the common men and a omen. They remained aloof from the misery and poverty of their compatriots and concentrated on aggrandising their already great fortunes. However, Mohammed Toha, in differing with most of his colleagues, sees the development process per se at fault. Development is always in his opinion a painful process…While M.Hassan on the other hand, looks at the Geographic separation of West and East Pakistan as the main cause of Pakistan’s economic dilemma. Question 4. Did the Bengalis have such high expectations that they could never have been met under the best of circumstances? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: is convinced that the Bengali elites had expectations that could not be met by the Pakistan Government under the best of circumstances. He refers especially to lecturers from Islamia College Calcutta and Bengali Congressmen. Mohammed Toha: believes that the East Pakistani demands on the new state bureaucracy were reasonable. However, the Bengalis suffered from a inferiority complex, because, in contrast to say the Punjabi elites, they had no capital and no feudal land holding. Shah Azizur-Rehman: did not answer this question. Amena Begum: notes the communication breakdown between the East and Western part of Pakistan. According to her, it is natural that certain expectations are not met. However, the interested parties should be furnished with an explanation why their demands cannot be satisfied. Professor Rehman Sobhan: Defends very strongly his point of view that the East Bengalis “did not have such high expectations which could not have been met” Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: Classifies Bengali expectations as reasonable. Moinul Hassan: also views Bengali demands in the economic and linguistic areas as not out of the ordinary. However, he considers that the West Pakistani military elite with their feudal mentality was the main cause of Pakistan’s disintegrative tendencies. Taffazzul Ali: did not provide us with a reply for question 4. Summary of answers to question 4:Most of the interviewees felt that the Bengali demands put forward to the central Pakistani Government were reasonable in nature. However, Pakistan’s political and economic environment was unable to deal with the following handicaps which in their final consequence fuelled the secessionist tendencies of the Bengalis: Pakistan was preoccupied with the issues of development and neglected the issues of social and cultural Parity and justice (Dr. Sajjad Hussain). The West Pakistani elites, especially the Punjabi dominated military government had difficulties in communicating with the Bengali elites and masses (Amena Begum and M.Hassan). The misunderstanding between East and West Pakistan was further accentuated by a Bengali (elite) inferiority complex which had its real basis in the Bengali inability to match the capital spending power of especially the Punjabi elites (Mohd. Toha).    

Question 5. Were their expectations manipulated? If yes – by whom? Was external (foreign) influence possible? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: voices the opinion that the Bengalis were influenced by the Indian intelligence and counter-espionage services. Mohammed Toha: in his dislike of the Awami League, sees that political party as the agent provocateur in East Bengal. Shah Azizur-Rehman: did not provide an answer to question 5. Amena Begum: refers rather vaguely to a “fifth column” created by foreign powers, …probably of Indian origin. Professor Rehman Sobhan: did not answer this question. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: ignored question 5. Moinul Hassan: identifies no undue or excessive interference by foreign nations in Pakistani domestic politics. Taffazzul Ali: did not furnish any explanations to question 5. He expressed his fear that “we are not yet free to express our views freely”. He therefore, answered only few questions. Summary of answers to question 5: The following political configurations or groups were identified as interfering in Pakistani domestic politics to fuel the secessionist zeal of the East Bengali population: The Awami League (Mohammed Toha) Political groupings and national services of Indian origin (Dr. Sajjad Hussain and probably Amena Begum). Question 6. Were the Bengalis unwilling to make major sacrifices for the maintenance of an Islamic state on the Indian subcontinent. Dr. Sajjad Hussain: explains that after the Quaid-i-Azam died, there was a leadership laouna. Nobody asked the Bengali populations to engage in meaningful sacrifices for the common good of Pakistan. Mohammed Toha:insists that “at the start” Bengalis “were willing to make all kinds of sacrifice. But later the position changed”. Shah Azizur-Rehman: felt that the West Pakistani elite was wilfully abusing the Bengali population in the name of Islam. The Bengali people were asked to make sacrifices for the sole benefit of the West Pakistani elites-which did not pay great attention to the development of East Pakistan. Amena Begum: implies that the Bengalis were more than willing to contribute to the further development of the whole of Pakistan. Professor Rehman Sobhan and Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed : did not answer question 6. Moinul Hassan: informs us that the Bengalis were willing to make immense sacrifices for the greatness of Pakistan. However, when they even asked for little, their “demands were viewed with suspicion”. Taffazzul Ali: did not furnish any commentary to question 6. Summary of answers to question 6: The interviewees virtually unanimously agree that the Bengalis were more than willing to make tremendous sacrifices for the greatness of Islam. However, the West Pakistani leadership failed to lead (Dr. Sajjad Hussain) and rarely bothered to make an effort to better the living conditions of the Bengali part of the Pakistani population (Shah Azizur-Rehman and M.Hassan). Question 7. What is more important for a Bengali, his Bengali identity or his Islamic identity? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: sees no contradiction between being a Bengali and a Muslim at the same time. However, he stresses the uniqueness of the Bengali language as an historically grown part of a Bengali Muslim’s identity. Mohammed Toha: insists that Bengali identity got precedence in the ultimate instance over Islamic identity. Shah Azizur-Rehman: is convinced that the Islamic identity is the most important for a Bengali, and that the Bengalis were forced to assume and develop their Bengali identity, because the West Pakistanis wanted to dominate them in an oppressively crude manner. Amena Begum:is persuaded that the Islamic identity is the main identity for a Bengali. Bengalis are by nature very religious. Professor Rehman Sobhan: stresses the importance of a Bengali identity for East Pakistanis. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: views question 7 as a “bogus question”. Islamic and Bengali identity are not incompatible with each other. Moinul Hassan: insists that all Pakistanis – whether East or west – are Muslims: no differences should be made on religious grounds. Islam is the dominant all-embracing state philosophy … be it in religion, politics, economics, and culture. Taffazzul Ali: states that the East Pakistanis are Bengali Muslims, the stress being put on the Islamic dimension of an East Pakistani’s identity. Summary of answers to question 7: Virtually all interviewees agree that the Islamic dimension of Bengali identity is extremely important for the East Pakistani population. Furthermore, no incompatibilities between Islam and Bengali culture have been specifically mentioned by the interviewer. however, Mohammed Toha and Professor Rehman Sobhan emphasis that Bengali cultural traditions always dominate Islamic teaching. But this domination is not incompatible with a firm belief in Islam. Bengali culture and Islamic rituals are very often one and compatible. Question 8. How incompatible are those identities in principle? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: Believes that the two identities (Islam and Bengali culture) are not incompatible. Mohammed Toha: is convinced that the two indenities (Islam and Bengali culture) are not incompatible. Yet, the Bengalis should not be abused to forego their legitimate interests in the name of a Punjabi inspired pseudo – Islam. Shah Azizur-Rehman: did not answer to question 8. Amena Begum: believes that the Islam unites and transcends all national particularities. Professor Rehman Sobhan: insists that the two identities (Islam and Bengali culture) “are not at all incompatible”. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed, M.Hassan, and Taffazzul Ali : did not provide an answer to question 8. Summary of answers to question 8: All interviewees who responded agree that Islamic traditions and Bengali culture are not incompatible. However, Islam should not be misused to cover individual and/or collective West Pakistani power designs (Mohammed Toha). Question 9. Which group articulated the Bengali expectations? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: insists that the Awami League became the champion of Bengali interests. Mohammed Toha: believes that all Bengali elites were involved in articulating Bengali expectation. Shah Azizur-Rehman:did not answer question 9. Amena Begum: points out that the Muslim Leaguers betrayed Pakistan, and so other Political groupings could aggregate and formulate the interests of the Bengali population. Professor Rehman Sobhan: feels that the educated classes put forward Bengali demands in the early stages of a united Pakistan. Later, the masses followed their leader and voiced their own demands in a more or less informal political setting (mass protests and demonstrations). Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: did not provide an answer for question   Moinul Hassan: is convinced that the middle classes, belonging to various political parties in East Pakistan, were instrumental in inspiring and formulating Bengali demands. Taffazzul Ali: did not furnish a reply to question 9. Summary of answers to question 9: The interviewees stress that many elites, including the middle class, were predominant in articulating Bengali expectations. Only Dr. Sajjad Hussain refers specifically to the Awami League as champions of Bengali interests. Therefore, we can assume that Bengali expectations were formulated and put forward on a near national consensus basis. Question 10. Who were the leaders of the Bengalis? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: believes that the Awami League led the Bengalis in their quest for greater political freedom. However, the Awami League in turn was supported by the Congress and the Communists. Mohammed Toha: implies that the Awami League led the East Pakistanis in their fight for a greater share of the Pakistani economic revenue. Shah Azizur-Rehman: did not answer question 10. Amena Begum: hints at a problem. She perceives as follows: “the people who had leanings towards alien interests unfortunately became the leaders of the Bengali” population. Professor Rehman Sobhan and Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: did not answer question 10. Moinul Hassan: tells that in 1954 the United front assumed the leadership of Bengali aspirations. These aspirations were then at a later stage represented by the Awami League. Taffazzul Ali: did not answer question10. Summary of answer to question 10: All answers nearly concur that the   Awami League – nearly by default of otherwise qualified leadership . led the Bengali population in their struggle for more political freedom and for more social and economic justice. Dr. Sajjad Hussain and Amena Begum insinuate that behind the Awami League one could find the support of the Communists and of alien powers – probably India. Question 11. Was it pressure from below or did it come from above which made the Bengali realise that their expectations were not met? Dr.Sajjad Hussain and Mohammed Toha: are convinced that the pressure came from above. Shah Azizur-Rehman:did not answer question 11. Amena Begum: also believes that the pressure came from above, from a frustrated and politically very conscious middle class. Professor Rehman Sobhan: explains that the top initiated the pressure and the bottom (the masses) followed its lead. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed : did not answer question 11. Moinul Hassan: explicates that the top, in articulating the demands of the masses, was pressurising the Central Government in West Pakistan for further concessions. Taffazzul Ali: did not answer question 11. Summary of answers to question 11: All interviewed individuals who responded agree that the pressure for change came from the top, but was well responded to by the masses. Question 12. Did the East Bengali elites feel that on a comparative level their expectations should have been better met? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: believes that the Awami League became greedy. They were never satisfied apparently. The Awami League exploited the economic backwardness of Bengal to achieve their own political objectives    

Mohammed Toha and Shah Azizur-Rehman: did not answer question 12 Amena Begum: insists that the Bengali elites were aware that were speaking in economic terms – relatively deprived. But many elites did realise the misery of the common Bengali citizen, the masses. This goes alike for East and West Pakistani elites. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed, Professor Rehman Sobhan, Moinul Hassan and Taffazzul Ali: did not answer question 12. Summary of answers to question 12: Those who responded agree, that the Bengali elites were aware of the fact that they were in comparison with the West Pakistani leadership and elite groups economically underprivilege, and to improve their own position and that of their region it was necessary to control the centre. Question 13. With whom did they compare their plight? West Pakistan india (West Bengal) Other countries Special groups, professional elites in West Pakistan (for example, “comparative deprivation”). Dr. Sajjad Hussain: believes that the Bengali elites noticed the rather enfavorable relationship between their salaries and those of West Pakistani “top quarter’ Generals and Civil servants. Mohammed Toha: informs us that East Pakistanis in general looked to West Pakistan to assess their relative income and wealth. Shah Azizur-Rehman: did not respond to question13. Amena Begum: points out that East Pakistanis compared their financial    plight with the West Pakistani population per se and in particular with special professional groups in West Pakistan. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed and Taffazzul Ali: did not respond to question 13. Summary of answers to question 13: Generally, East Pakistanis compared their financial situation rather unfavorably with those of the Western part compatriots. It seems that top quarter positions in the Army and Civil services served as special yardsticks for the financial desires and aspirations of the Bengalis middle classes (Amena Begum and Dr. Sajjad Hussain). Question 14. What did the concept of Parliamentary Democracy mean to Bengali elites and masses with respect to the fulfillment of their expectations? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: is convinced that the 1956 constitution was interpreted by the Bengalis as a good political compromise; at least on a theoretical basis, East Pakistanis could understand the advantages of a democratic system. Mohammed Toha: explains that East Pakistanis welcomed majority rule. Shah Azizur-Rehman, Amena Begum and Moinul Hassan: state categorically that the Bengali people always believed in Parliamentary Democracy. Prof. Rehman Sobhan, Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed and Taffazzul Ali: agree that the Parliamentary Democracy was suited for Pakistan. Summary of answers to question 14: All interviewees declare that the Bengali population appreciated the merits of a Parliamentary Democracy. Question 15. Did the West Pakistan is serve as a convenient scape-goal for many Bengali errors and failures? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: in affirming the scape-goat function of West Pakistan, accuses at the same time the Bengali elites of ‘lousy’ planning, and that they lacked an overall development strategy.     Mohammed Toha: is sure that the Bengalis saw in the West Pakistanis a convenient scape-goat for their own misjudgments. Shah Azizur-Rehman: answers in the negative to this question. Amena Begum: declares that only a small segment of the Bengalis blamed the West Pakistani elite for their own errors. Professor Rehman Sobhan: answers “No” to question 15; no scape-goat function was performed by the West Pakistani elites. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed and Taffazzul Ali: did not answer question 15. Moinul Hassan: points out that no West Pakistani scape-goat function was needed for the Bengalis, because their oppression and relative deprivation were extremely real. Summary of answers to question 15: It seems that parts of the Bengali community used the West Pakistani elites at certain times as a convenient scape-goat. However, this the scape goat function was not a determining factor in the overall relationship between East and West Pakistan, because the hardship and oppression of the Bengalis by their Western compatriots was too blatant. Question 16 How could the Bengali expectations actually have been met? Did the Bengalis make proposals? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: insists that within the existing Pakistani state structure Bengali expectations could not be met. Mohmmad Toha: believes that the East Pakistanis had difficulties in determining and voicing their demands. So how could those unvoiced demands be met? Shah Azizur-Rehman: sees Bengali expectations centered around the question of ‘Political autonomy’ Therefore, in his opinion, such a demand could have been granted by the West Pakistani elites.   Amena Begum: believes that the Bengali demands could be fulfilled by the Pakistani Central Government. Professor Rehman Sobhan: believes that the economic concessions would have pacified the East Pakistanis. The demands of the Bengali population were already formulated and put forward by their leadership Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed and Taffazzul Ali: did not answer question 16. Moinul Hassan: insists that Bengali political demands were reasonable. Summary of answers to question 16: The interviewees cannot agree whether or not the Bengali expectations could have been met: -For Dr. Sajjad Hussain it is a clear “No”. -For Mohammed Toha it is a qualified “No”. -For Shah Azizur-Rehman it is a “Political Yes”, because the Bengalis wanted Political autonomy. -For Amena Begum it is a “Yes”. -For Professor Rehman Subhan it is an Economics “yes”. -For Moinul Hassan its a political “yes”. Question 17. Was the Bengali mood one of patience and compromise? Did the patience begin to wear thin, because the Bengalis believed that the West Pakistanis were betraying them, ignoring their demands constantly? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: insists that “there was no patience at all, especially at the elite level”. Mohammed Toha: is convinced that the Awami leadership became rather quickly impatient with the policies of the Central Pakistani Government. Shah Azizur-Rehman, Professor Rehman Sobhan, Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed and Taffazzul Ali: did not respond to question 17.    

Amena Begum: is persuaded that “the Bengali people did show much patience and offered to compromise”. Moinul Hassan: emphasised that the Bengali people were always looking for workable compromises with the West Pakistani elites. Summary of answers to question 17: The answers to question 17 leave us the feeling that the Bengalis actually showed some patience within their eyes rather slow and inefficient-Central Pakistani bureaucracy. However, under the leadership of the Awami League (Mohammed Toha), the Bengalis got quickly tired of West Pakistani intransigence and were persuaded to support more radical policies. Question 18. What was more important in the relationship of East Pakistan with West Pakistan: Mutual trust? Fulfillment of East Pakistani expectations? or other factors? Dr. Sajjad Hussain and Mohammed Toha: explain that the absence of mutual trust really defined the East-West Pakistani relationship. Shah Azizur-Rehman, Amena Begum and Moinul Hassan: Insist that both, lack of mutual trust and non-fulfillment of East Pakistani expectations, were of equal importance. Professor Rehman Sobhan, Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed and Taffazzul Ali: did not respond to question 18. Summary of answers to question 18: What the answer to question. 18. really bring to the fore is the tremendous lack of mutual trust that existed between the East and West Pakistani people. Question 19. Do you believe that Bengali leadership could have made the West Pakistani leadership grant major concessions to the Bengalis to meet their demands? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: stresses that at the beginning of united Pakistan Bengal had an edge in terms of export goods in relationship to West Pakistan, and so the question of concessions actually arose very late. Mohammed Toha: implies that the Communist Party of East Pakistan would have pressed much harder for concessions than other Bengali Political parties. Shah Azizur-Rehman, Professor Rehman Sobhan and Taffazzul Ali: did not answer question 19. Amena Begum: insists that the Bengali leadership won some concessions for East Pakistan. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: complains bitterly that “leadership in East Bengal was mediocre in the 60’s.” Moinul Hassan: Insists that alternative leadership would have been available in East Pakistan. However, the Central powers in West Pakistan frustrated all peripheral efforts at reform. Summary of answers to question 19: It can be seen from the answers that all interviewees agree that it would have been difficult to win more concessions from a rather intransigent Central Government – which was dominated by West Pakistani interests. Question 20. Did you ever envisage in the 1960’s (Ayub’s era) an independent East Pakistan which could then guarantee to fulfill your ethnic and economic demands? Dr. Sajjad Hussain, Mohammed Toha, Amena Begum and Moinul Hassan: categorically state “No”. Shah Azizur-Rehman: insists that Political autonomy was envisaged by the relevant Bengali elites but hardly full independence. Professor Rehman Sobhan: explains that an independent East Pakistan

was never thought of or put forward in any explicit form”. The Bengalis always talked about autonomy”. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: believes that despite west Pakistani (unclear), the Bengalis wanted to remain within the fold of united Pakistan. Taffazzul Ali: did not respond to question 20. Sunmary of answers to question 20: The above answers shows that Bengalis always languished for some kind of Political autonomy; however, they never exhibited pronounced secessionist tendencies over prolonged period of time.They wanted to reamin Part of united Pakistan, and they insisted on mutually beneficial co-operation with their Western compatriots. Qoestion 21. were you disillusioned with united Pakistan, and if so, what was your road to disillusionment? Please explain. Dr. Sajjad Hussain and Mohammed Toha: deny that they were disillusioned with united Pakistan. Shah Azizur-Rehman and Amena Begum: were disillusioned, yet still believed in a political solution within the framework of united Pakistan. Professor Rehman Sobhan, Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed, Moinul Hassan and Taffazzul Ali: did not respond to question 21. Summary of answers to question 21: The answers to question 21. shows that even the very disillusioned Pakistanis did not want partition. They intended to work within the context of united Pakistan, looking for step- by-step improvement of the Central Government policies and bureaucracies   Question 22. What could have swayed those who were disillusioned in the direction of a united Pakistan? Dr. Sajjad Hussain: implies that a ‘little bit more humanity’ on the part of West Pakistan leadership would have saved a united Pakistan. There was too little personal contact between the East and the West. Mohammed Toha and Amena Begum: see more Democracy as a barrier to disintegration. Shah Azizur-Rehman: wanted communications and compromise between Bengalis and West Pakistanis to guarantec the unity of the country, Professor Rehman Sobhan, Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed and Taffazzul Ali: did not respond to question 22. Moinul Hassan: insists that the West Pakistani leadership wanted to get rid off East Pakistan. The Bengalis were seen as a political and financial liability. Summary of answers to question 22: It appears that a few talks and more Democracy would have gone a long way to save united Pakistan. Very few wanted the disintegration of the country into two parts, but it seems that the West Pakistanis were totally unwilling to negotiate with the East Pakistani leadership. Question 23. Do you believe that your road to disillusionment was shared by many other Bengalis, or did they have different experiences? Dr. Sajjad Hussain and Amena Begum: are convinced that many Bengalis were disillusioned with the policies of the West Pakistani-dominated Central Government. Mohammed Toha, Shah Azizur-Rehman, Professor Rehman Sobhan, Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed, Moinul Hassan and Taffazzul Ali: did not respond to question 23. Summary of answers to question 23: Dr. Sajjad and Amena Begum are convinced that the feelings of disillusionment with the policies of the Pakistani central government were nearly ubiquitous. Question 24. Do you consider your road to disillusionment as something inevitable?     

(unclear) Mohammed Toha: states that the “Central Government policy made it towards the end inevitable”. Shah Azizur-Rehman, Moinul Hassan and Taffazzul Ali: did not respond to question 24. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: declares that “we were disillusioned with the Ayub regime but never lost faith in an united Pakistan”. Summary of answers to question 24: The East Bengalis were deeply disappointed with the policies of the Central Government, but they wanted at nearly any cost to preserve the unity of Pakistan. however, it seems that they were unable for whatever reasons to even communicate with the West Pakistani leadership. The disintegration of Pakistan is seen as not inevitable, but it remains a fact which may now be regretted by many East and West Pakistanis. So at least it appears…! Question 25. Why did the Bengalis support in the first place the idea of an independent Pakistan? Dr. Sajjad Hussain, Mohammed Toha, Shah Azizur-Rehman, Professor Rehman Sobhan, Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed, Moinul Hassan and Taffazzul Ali: referred back to their answer to question 1. Amena Begum: states that the Bengalis wanted a home country to be free of British and Hindu oppression. United Pakistan appeared to the East Pakistanis as their road to freedom and justice. Summary of answers to question 25: It seems evident that the Bengalis wanted a home country to escape colonial and Hindu domination. For them Pakistan was the only viable alternative. Question 26.    

(unclear) Dr. Sajjad Hussain: states that “disintegration was due more to Indian conspiracy than to any discontent inside Pakistan”. Mohammed Toha: blames economic factors for the disintegration of Pakistan, namely the willful ‘under development’ of East Pakistan by the West Pakistanis. Shah Azizur-Rehman: is convinced that political and economic mis- management coupled with a stubborn refusal by the West Pakistanis to listen to Bengali demands led to the secession of East Pakistan. Amena Begum: laments the political domination of the “Punjabi clique” which resulted in the under development of the Bengali economy. Professor Rehman Sobhan: sees economic and political factors playing a role in the disintegration process of united Pakistan. The disintegration process of the country was also aided by the Geographic distance betwcen East and West Pakistan. Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: is convinced that “economic factors played an important role” in the secession of East Pakistan. Moinul Hassan: believes that the West Pakistanis treated the Bengalis as “inferior” and not “as good Muslims”. Tafazzul Ali: insists that the West Pakistanis did not want to share Political powers with the Bengalis. Summary of answers to question 26: It appears that the Bengalis were economically exploited by the West Pakistani leadership. This economic exploitation was even made worse, because the Bengalis had very little political influence in the Central Government and felt that the Punjabi military elite especially questioned their Muslim loyalty.    

(unclear) The Muslims in Bengal were terrified by the idea of a united Indian subcontinent, fearing Hindu domintation over their social economic and political life. Thus, they were always in favour of an independent Pakistan. They were quite willing to undergo tremendous sacrifices in the creation of an independent Pakistan. For them, a Muslim state offered a panacea against Hindu domination. The Bengalis were extremely disappointed in what they saw as West Pakistani Economic exploitation and Political suppression. They viewed the central, West-Pakistani Government as intransigent, quite unwilling to make even minor concessions to the East Pakistanis. However reasonable the demands in the Bengali’s eyes were, they were virtually always rejected by the Central Government. The Bengalis really insisted in theory and practice that they were good Muslims. They belived that the Bengali cultural background was totally compatible with Islamic teachings and preaching. Actually, Bengali traditions were an ideal seedbed for the advancement and development of a critical and justice minded Islam. The Bengalis yearned for more Political and economic independence. Yet, their primary goal was never secession from Pakistan. The break-up of a united Pakistan was very low on their list of priorities. All they actually wanted was a bigger slice out of the Pskistani gross national product. They believed that more money should be invested by the Central Government in East Pakistan. They always felt that they were treated as second class “economic citizens”. Yet, even for the most patient East Pakistani came the time where he understood that only force could remedy his Economic and Social plight. In the eyes of the Bengalis, the Central Government had no ears to listen to their demand: only drastic measures could force them to accept the apparently justified East Pakistani demands. It seemed that violent measures and social disobedience had to pave the way for negotiations between the East and west Pakistanis. However, secession or the splinting up of Pakistan was the last resort, to be avoided whenever possible.     

CONCLUSION

It can be stated without exaggeration that the creation of Pakistan (unclear) was seen by its political elites as the culmination of the desire (unclear) Muslims of India to establish their own separate homeland on the sub-continent A laboratory was to be created where Islam was to be practiced in its totality and presented to the works as a viable alternative to capitalism or communism.¹However, the promised land was economically poor, it was predominantly agricultural and industrially very backward. The conflict with India at a very early stage of the country’s birth was to a large extent influential in forcing the decision-makers in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to concentrate on the development of heavy industry. Pakistan, as we pointed out earlier in this dissertation, was heavily dependent on India for the supply of industrial goods. Thus, the drive for industrialisation became the major occupation of the Punjabi- Muhajir dominated civil service. The resource allocations in the 1950’s reflect this biased approach. In the 1949-50 Capital expenditure budget of 40.25 crore of rupees, 27.13 crore were allocated to defence, 5.53 crore to industrial development, and only 1 (One) crore to agricultural improvement and research.  The rather rudimentary development of modern industry in Pakistan was instrumental in turning the attention of the Pakistani elites – almost permanently – to this sector of the economy. Industry and every thing connected with it became the modern temple of the Islamic Republic. What should be noted here in the fact that by 1959, immigrants from India controlled over half of Pakistan’s industrial assets. During this period most of the industrial allocations by the Central Government went to Karachi or to the Punjab. In 1956 when the Bengali-led Central Government tried to reverse this trend, there was an organised protest which was skillfully launched and sustained by the Karachi based industrialists. As could be foreseen, the Government of the day was eventually sacked by the all-powerful President Iskander Mirza. It can be said without contest that this somewhat lopsided growth contributed to the already existing economic inequality between the Begalis and the rest of Pakistan, thus brining into play hypothesis I of the revised Hechter model: the greater the economic inequality between the elites of the core and the periphery and the more the elites of the periphery perceive this as

1. For a detailed analysis of the political dimensions of Islam see Kemal A. Faruki, Islam: today and Tomorrow. (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1974).

unjust, the greater the probability that the periphery may break (unclear) the core and seek independence. Growing economic inequalities existed between the Bengalis and Pakistan, and the former were fully aware of it. The industrialisation drive received its most impressive boost during the Ayub era when the model of economic growth and development was hailed as the panacea against all ills of the Pakistani society. The 1960’s thus were dominated by what were increasingly, for Pakistan, the ominous catch-words of “growth” and “modernisation”. Inequality among the various regions of the country was seen as a necessary evil, a precondition for successful economic growth – a necessary evil – and one should note this rather carefully which was at its worst within East Pakistan. The model of economic growth and modernisation within the context of Pakistan was closely associated with the work of G. Papanek, chief of the Harvard advisor group based in Pakistan and Dr. M. Haque. These unashamed advocates of the growth and mobilisation paradigm argued vehemently that developing countries could easily spirit away to the distant future any aspirations they had for reducing economic inequalities among their population. Papanek, in paraphrasing Adam Smith, suggested the social utility of greed whereby individual greed of the “robber baron” kind leads to a large national gross products which in the end benefit via the trickle-down effect all members of society. ² The economic consequence of such a development strategy was regional and class inequalities. Deprived of any political control during the Ayub era, Bengali elites perceived this development and growth strategy as nothing more than a ruthless illustration of West Pakistani dominance and oppression. The Bengali elites thus viewed with alarm and a certain Kind of bitterness the growing Disparity between the two wings of Pakistan. At the time of Ayub’s coup d’etat, the per capita income differences between the two wings of Pakistan was 30 per cent; of course, in favour of West Pakistan. However, by the end of the second five year plan (1965), the disparity of the per capita income had risen to 45 per cent. By the time Ayub handed over power to another General in 1969, the income gap had risen to a formidable 61 per cent deference. To put it very mildly, one can state that the Bengalis, vis-a-vis their more affluent compatriots in the West,

2. For an exceptionally blunt account of the “robber baron” philosophy see, Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971).

However, it should be noted that what proved to be the Achilles (unclear) the Ayub Government was not its economic policy, but the political (unclear) Ayub rather willfully imposed on Pakistan. Prior to the military (unclear) of 1958, the political system of Pakistan can be defined as a Parliamentary Democracy. Pakistani Politicians, at least a great part of them, always had a penchant for democratic institutions and ideas (see the interviews with the Bengali political leadership in this dissertation). Above all, from the point of view of Bengali politicians, their people enjoyed a majority in the Parliament. Despite Bengali under representation in the two most important government institutions, namely the bureaucracy and the Armed forces, the Bengalis were always hopeful that as long as the logic of majority rule was adhered to, they would have an important say in the national decision-making process and planning. But, they soon began to realise that a majority in the Parliament did not necessarily mean Bengali rule in the political system of Pakistan. The language controversy of 1948-53 brought the Bengalis up with a start. Here, a passing reference should be made to hypothesis III of the revised Hechter model where Hechter deals with relative cultural deprivation. In studying the Bengali experience and their consequences, we agree with Hechter that, in denying a people the right to utilise their vernacular language on a equal basis with national language, may inflict upon the individuals in question a pronounced sense of inferiority and anxiety.³ The language controversy and its final outcome, which was negative for the Bengalis, made them realise that there was a long battle to be fought before they could have any effective say in the political system where the logic of majority rule was often ignored.⁴ The Muslim League’s inept handling of the language controversy created a crisis of confidence among the Bengalis with regard to the political structure of Pakistan and its capability to administer a modicum of justice for all its citizens. Out of this profound crisis emerged the vernacular elites who became the most articulate exponents of Bengali interests and later Bengali nationalism. It will by no means be an over-statement to assert that the rise of the vernacular elites in Bengal marked the end of the Muslim League as a

3 For the suppression of a specific language and its subsequent damages on the individual’s psyche see. Abraham Maslow. Motivation and Personality. (New York Harper and Row, Publishers, 1954), pp. 107-178. 

4 For language as an effective instrument for nation-building and nation-destroying see Benedict Anderson, imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London Verso Editions, 983).pp. 17-40.     

(unclear)  Immediately after the creation of Pakistan, the Musim League was the political force in Pakistan capable of holding together the (unclear) ethnic groups within a national structure and policies whichrather confidently claimed to be able to accommodate the aspirations of all ethnic elites. However, the Muslim League was too complacent about its past performances and glory, and did not realise that in the Post-independence era a political party like itself had to be re-structured and modified. On the one hand, it had to consolidate very quickly the grassroot popularity it still enjoyed from the days of the Pakistan movement. on the other hand, it had to develop the administrative skill and the machinery to run the government efficiently. Thus, the Muslim League had to be transformed into a tight-knit organisation which could provide meaningful and future- oriented leadership within the religious and ethnic domain in a multi- ethnic Islamic state. The Muslim League failed lamentably to provide such kind of leadership to a people which was desperately searching for it. The Muslim League’s apparent and glaring inability to perform a role of leadership and efficient management of national affairs may have its roots in the imbalance and hierarchies of power within the Muslim elites of India. The core leadership of the Muslim League, as we pointed out carlier in this dissertation, came from the Muslim minority Provinces of North India; they controlled from the beginning all key positions within the party during the Pakistan movement. Their political supremacy was hardly questioned, especially, during the crucial years of the Independence movement. This was perhaps due to the intense feeling of fraternity and solidarity generated by the first successes of the Pakistan movement. A fraternity and solidarity which was always rekindled and kept alive at the expense of the Bengalis and their economic and cultural aspirations. The budding Bengali politicians had very little chance of ascending to the doors of power within the venerable halls of the Muslim League. Again, we notice in Hechter’s (unclear) (hypothesis I) that there exists a  (unclear)    

(unclear) fact, without undue exaggeration and rancour, that on Bengal, after 1954, the Muslim League, as an effective organisation of any political significance, ceased to exist. The vernacular (Bengali) elites had taken over and reigned supremely in that Part of Pakistan. After 1954, the central leadership of Muslim League, which was still in power at the centre with the help of the civil service,⁵ had to face for the first time the vernacular elites from Bengal in the merciless fight for political predominance. It can still be affirmed that during the first decade of independence not everything was lost for united Pakistan.⁶ As long as some semblance of democratic structures and ideas were preserved within Pakistani political life, the Bengalis fought hard to uphold their faltering hopes that within a reasonable period of time they could obtain a just representation within the national government and its adjacent civil service institutions. There is no doubt that during the first decade of independence there were clear signs of Bengali frustration But by no means despair. For the Bengali elites, the 1950’s were a period during which they had the arduous task of negotiating the terms with the Punjabi-Muhajir office-holders for their future participation in national government. The 1956 Constitution, which was considered by many to be a document of compromise between the vernacular elites from Bengal and the West Pakistani leadership at the centre, did provide a basic framework for incorporating the Bengali political elite within the national political system. The response of the vernacular elites to this welcomed spirit of accommodation was without reservation positive. They did immediately tone down their demands for maximum regional autonomy when they were given, at least for a short period of time, the responsibility to run the national government. Under the mutually agreed stipulations of the 1956

5 For a thought-provoking study of the power the Pakistani civil service had at its disposal see Ahead Emajudin. Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth: Bangladesh and Pakistan. (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1980), pp. 167-182.

6.This is also confirmed by the statements made by many of our Bengali interview partners.     

Constitution, national Elections were to be held in February 1959. The Bengali leadership was fervently looking forward towards this forthcoming elections. The electoral process, as it was envisaged in the 1956 Constitution, and if it had run its full course, would have entailed a dramatic shift of power, namely away from the Punjabi-Muhajir dominated executive to a Bengali led dramatic shift of power, namely away from the Punjabi-Muhajir dominated executive to a Bengali led legislative Government. With hindsight one can thus state today that this shift of power was totally unacceptable to the West Pakistani dominated civil service. They had all to lose and nothing to gain in the forthcoming election. They hastily used the Political uncertainty and amenity of that period, to which their own rather capricious contribution cannot be overlooked, as an excuse to hand over power to the armed Forces command. In 1958, when Ayub took over the fate of the country in a bloodless And organised coupd’etat, the Bengali hopes of ruling democratically a united Pakistan were buried for a long time to come with hindsight forever. Karl von Vorys is full of praise for Ayub. According to him, Ayub formulated a political (development?) plan for his country after having examined in minute detail and with great skill the political structure and needs of Pakistan long before he was forced to seize power. Yet, in reality, it took Ayub, after the successful coup d’eat, almost four years to impose his brand of Presidential Government on the Pakistani people. In his autobiography, Ayub indemnified a number of weaknesses of Pakistan as a cultural, political and economic unit.⁷ They were, according to him cultural and racial diversity, which he thought created divisiveness and secessionist movements despite the soothing and unifying force of a dogmatic Islam. Strangely enough, Ayub thought that what made matters even worse was the decision of Pakistani Politicians to retain for their country, a Parliamentary form of Government.⁸ Ayub was of the opinion that Parliamentary Democracy was instrumental in creating unrest and civil strife in an already ethnically divided country such as Pakistan. In promoting the proliferation of political parties and pluralist opinions, Parliamentary Democracy allowed politicians to exploit the naive people of the land whose rate of literacy was extremely low and whose level

7  Lawrence Ziring deals extensively with Ayub’s contributions to Pakistani political life. See Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1980).

8 Ayub, having acquired this autocratic mix of the military command structure and an extreme version of Taylorism, a management (measuring) system, had very little regard for the complexities and subleties of democratic institutions.     

of general education was nothing more than abysmal. The political system that Ayub created has been described by one Pakistani scholar as Constitutional autocracy. In this autocratic system, there were Constitutional provisions which gave the President the necessary power that he needed to keep the country firmly under his control. In order to pursue his economic de velopment and modernistaion programme, which was manifestly very dear to his heart, Ayub created a legislature which was incapable of challenging the President’s authority and of suggesting any alternative policies. Ayub was more than convinced that the solution to all problems which beset Pakistan was economic progress and modernisation.⁹ Ayub also introduced by means of his 1962 Constitution a peculiar form of representational Dictatorship which was popularly known as Basic Democracies.¹⁰ Under this scheme, the whole country was divided into 80,000 Geographical entities. Each of these mini constituencies contained an average electorate of 1,000. Each Constituency had the right to elect, on the basis of one man one vote, a representative called Basic democrat. These basic democrats, chosen by the illiterate masses, formed a rather safe electoral college for the (repeated) future elections of the all-powerful President. When, in 1958, Ayub took over power, he was very dismissive of the role Pakistani Politicians had played in the past; he blamed them for nearly all ills that plagued Pakistan at that moment in time. Therefore, in his first Cabinet, no Politician of any stature and experience was included. It will be no exaggeration to state that the Ayub era witnessed the further unbridled advance of bureaucratic institutions and the quasi-unrivaled predominance of the bureaucrats within Pakistan. Ayub was now totally dependent upon bureaucracy for the efficient running of the government. Soon after the coup d’etat, Ayub ordered the Armed Forces back to the barracks. Therefore, the bureaucrats with whom he had worked so successfully together in the past became his natural allies.¹¹ This alliance became a source of great embarrassment for Ayub when he visited Bengal. For Ayub knew very well that the Armed Forces and the Central bureaucracy were two institutions where the

9. Ayub was one of the first victims of Papanck’s dazzling display of his two robber baron” philosophy.

10. For a rather biased description of Basic Democracies see, Government of East Pakistan Works Programme Through Basic Democracies 1963-64, (Dacca: government of East Pakistan Press. 1964).

11 For his lifelong alliances and friendships see Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography. (London: Oxford University 1967).     

representation of the Bengalis was far below the promised national minimum. So, in order to please a politically volatile Bengal, Ayub during his visit to that region assured the Bengalis of a fresh Political start. In 1959, Ayub decided to reduce the physical standards (height) with respect to the recruitment of East Pakistanis to the army. This decision may have given the impression to the Bengalis that Ayub would be willing to institute Constitutional reforms in their favour. However, Ayub always made sure that his reforms smacked of a paternalism that would befit an enlightened colonial ruler. Ayub still looked upon the Bengalis as downtrodden, backward people who had to be seen as a “special burden” for West Pakistan. In employing the terminology of Hechter (hypothesis III), we can state that Ayub was convinced that Pakistani Nationalism and its conspicuous penchant for economic development (the national core ideology) were incompatible with Bengali ethnicity and its “promiscuous Hindu tendencies” (peripheral ethnicity).¹² However, it cannot be ignored that the economic policies of the Ayub Government were instrumental in increasing the number of incipient industrial entrepreneurs in East Pakistan. These fledgling industrialists, finding the competition with the well-entrenched West Pakistani enterprises too hard, suffered from an acute sense of insecurity and inferiority. and therefore, they quickly joined hands with the vernacular Bengali Politicians in their fight for more Political autonomy for that region. Their fight for more regional autonomy was somewhat transformed by the Bengali industrialists into an cffective instrument to put pressure on the Central Government to grant more economic concessions in the area of import licences and increased quotas of Foreign cxchange. Morcover, at a later stage of their struggle, the cry for regional autonomy helped the diverse elements of the Bengali populace to agree to a single Political platform, namely that of the Awami League. Only after the Agartala conspiracy was Sheikh Mujib seen by the Bengalis as the champion of their cause. The demand for more regional autonomy was, prior to the Agartala conspiracy, not very effective, because it was so ill-organised. Nevertheless, every Bengali Politician had to talk about it in order to remain credible in the eyes of the Bengalis. At this point in time, Bengali participation in the Central Government institutions was almost non- existent. Above all, the faint Bengali protest in the near-impotent National

12. Even in his autobiography, Ayub could barely concel his distrust of and distaste for the Bengali (Hindu) mentality.

Assembly could easily be ignored. The National Assembly was at best a debating society where the dishevelled flock of Bengali Politicians were able to vent their frustrations. It can be stated with some confidence that the turning point in the political life of the Bengalis came in 1966. A year after the 1965 war, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman presented his famous Six-Points Programme.¹³ This programme articulated skillfully the frustration and anger of the Bengali elites against a highly centralised Political system in which they had virtually no participation. The Six-Points Programme of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman demanded that kind of regional authority from the centre which just fell short of asking the Government to grant Bengal a separate state whose association with West Pakistan in its definitive form was still to be decided. The Six-Points Programme as a document summed up all the Bengali grievances, and by its very existence set in motion a process of violent confrontation between Bengal and the Punjabi- Muhajir dominated Central Government. The reaction of the Central Government to the Six-Points Programme was swift and merciless. Within three months of the Programme’s announcement, the Awami leader was arrested. Two years later, in a dramatic move, the central government arrested some Bengali bureaucrats and junior armed officers with charges of conspiring with India in an attempt to weaken the unity of Pakistan.¹⁴ Here again we see processes outlined which, if true, suggest that the periphery (the Bengali elites) turn for help to third parties (India) which are seen as hostile to the Central Government of Pakistan, the core. Sheikh Mujib’s name was not included in the initial list of conspirators. However, when, at a later point his name was added to this omnious list, the political drama of united Pakistan entered into its most critical, decisive phase. The Bengalis who were by their own compatriots classified as a backward race with Hindu leanings, were now being told that their beloved and admired leaders were involved in a conspiracy with India in an attempt to destroy the biggest existing Islamic state. The alleged traitors (the Bengali leaders) were to be put on trial by the custodians of Islam, namely the Punjabi-Muhajir dominated Central Government. Ayub’s regime had already made substantial contributions towards the disintegration of united Pakistan; yet, to put Sheikh Mujib on trial was like signing the death warrant of an already moth-eaten and weakened Pakistani unity. The trial,

13. For an evaluation of the Six-Points Programme see Anwar L. Qureshi, Mr. Mujib’s Six-Points: An Economic Appraisal, (Lahore: Haniyah Publilshing House, 1970).

14. The Punjabi-Muhajir military and business alliance had always this pre-conceived notion of the Bengalis as traitors, as Hindus in disguise.

popularly known as the Agartala conspiracy trial, converted the accused, Sheikh Mujib, instantly into a Bengali hero. It has to be pointed out again that there was nothing new about Mujib’s Six-Points Programme. Similar and virtually identical views had been expressed many times before by Bengali members of the National Assembly on the floor of the House. Only the timing of the announcement of the Agartala conspiracy was important. It came at a time when the country was in the grip of a serious Political crisis. People revolted everywhere in Pakistan against Ayub’s oppressive leadership and his dictatorial style. The Presidential system of Ayub, far from rectifying the glaring ethnic dsepravities (as we have demonstrated in our chapter on regional differences), had maintained and fortified the supremacy of the Punjabi-Muhajir elites. During the Ayub era the Bengalis were hardly represented in the key Positions of the Central Government. In the late 1960’s when the patience of the Bengali elites began to wear thin, worse was to come, their leaders were now being described by the Central government as traitors and collaborators with an enemy power (India). This was certainly not the kind of privilege the Bengalis had in mind when they had unequivocally opted for Pakistan in 1947. After all, and easily forgotten by the West Pakistanis, the Bengalis had played the most significant role in the creation of Pakistan. Despite the apparently extreme nature of Sheikh Mujib’s demands, Pakistan was still dear to the hearts of the Bengalis. All in all, it can be pointed out with some justification that the Bengalis only wanted a bigger say in the running of the country. They longed for a political system which emphasised the notions of cquality and solidarity at the expense of an ideology which was captive of pure economic growth and modernisation. They preferred, by all means a Parliamentary Democracy to an absolute dictatorial rule which strongly reminded them of Hindu domination and colonial rule. Therefore, it will be safe to suggest that in essence the Bengali struggle against the Ayub regime was for a well worked out and not thorough Regional autonomy and not for an independent state of their own.¹⁵ It should be emphasised that at the time of Ayub’s departure, the secession of Bengal was not a foregone conclusion. The inevitable parting of the ways came only after the Military crack-down on March 24th, 1971. We must now return to chapter I, where we posed a rhetorical question concerning the nature of the Partition of Pakistan:

15. This again is confirmed clearly by our Bengali interview partners.

was it predominantly a problem of uneven development? -was it predominantly a problem of ethnicity? -was the partition of Pakistan primarily due to some other factor? -or is it impossible to establish a main cause for the Partition of Pakistan and only a combination of factors can explain this phenomenon? It is our conclusion that only a combination of factors, actually two factors, independent yet interrelated, can account for the Partition of Pakistan. The two factors are: -uneven development and subsequent relative economic deprivation -oppressive measures against Bengaliculture and language; basically the suppression of an ethnic way of life In excluding nearly totally the Bengali elites from the benefits of economic development and modernisation, the Punjabi-Muhajir dominated Central Government forced that elite to turn to the masses of Bengal for support. In using the alleged inferiority of Bengali culture as a justification for denying those people economic advancement on a par with West Pakistan, the Central Government actually forged a powerful union between the elites and the masses of Bengal. The privileged status and the head-start enjoyed by the West Pakistani industrialists gave their Bengali counterparts the feeling that only an autonomous Bengal would allow them and their enterprises to develop their economic potential. Therefore, even on a more general level the Bengalis came to think that only within their own language and culture they had a chance to modernise their country, to preserve their democratic traditions and to obtain for themselves a modicum of personal success.¹⁶ In denying the Bengalis (the periphery) to fully participate in the economic and political life of a nation (Pakistan), the Central Government (the periphery) to fully participate in the economic and political life of a nation (Pakistan), the Central Government (the core) unwillingly re-directed the ethnic elite (the Bengalis) towards their own masses and led them to revalarise their ethnic culture and language at

16. Ethnicity becomes now for the disappointed Bengalis their panecea against all social and personal ills and See A. L. Epstein, Ethos and Identity. (London: Tavistock, 1978).

the expense of national unity. This, in case of the partition of Pakistan, we can conclude that uneven de velopment forced the elites of Bengal to forge alliances with their masses against the Central Government and to replace nationalism by a vibrant ethnicity making that ethnicity the glue which holds the elites and the masses together. These two phenomena, uneven development and ethnicity – like leeches of the greediest kind – feed upon each other until point of no-return is reached namely armed insurrection.¹⁷ It appears that the Pakistani experience presents itself as the ideal case study for applying the theorems of Hechter’s revised model on internal colonialism. Uneven development and oppression of an ethnic culture (Bengali language and traditions) by the Paunjabi-Muhajir dominated Central (core) Government leave the elites of Bengal (the periphery). which suffer actually from the syndrome of relative (economic) deprivation vis-a-vis their wealthier neighbours from the core area, no other choice than to collaborate with their masses against the interests of the core, the Central Government. This, of course, implies an increase in intra- ethnic communication at the expense of the inter-ethnic exchange of messages. The elites of the periphery may even turn for help to external, third parties, which was not proven in the case of Pakistan. Yet, there Is still a lingering suspicion that the Bengalis were at least in contact with the Indian government.¹⁸ Thus, the formerly positive communication between the elites of the internal colonialism model of Michael Hechter seems to explain rather satisfactorily the Pakistani experience – where uneven development and ethnicity were engaged in an internecine collaboration which finally ended in the demise of a united Pakistan. However it should be noted with care that this process leading in its worst final consequences to armed insurrection and secession is by no means an automatic and irrevocable process. In the case of Pakistan, the Central Government had many options and opportunities to preserve the unity of the country. Indeed, we would like to outline the rudiments of a strategy which may in the future prevent the Partition of countries such as Pakistan. Our strategy uses as a basis the following idea:

17. For why the Bengalis finally rebelled see on a more general – non-case specific – level, T. R. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

18.See my interview with Dr. Sajjad Hussain. Also see Mohd. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, Emergence of Bangladesh and the Role of Awami League, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1982), pp. 108-110.  

The primary task of a multi-ethnic country (such as Pakistan) is to create a national consensus and a working order among all the ethnic elites of the country. Based upon this notion of consensus and collaboration among the concerned ethnic elites, we develop – not unlike Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman – a six-Points strategy programme: (1) The creation of a representative government composed of all ethnic elites of the country in question (2)  The creation of a national consensus and a working order among all the ethnic elites (3) The introduction and promotion of integrative national institutions to which all the ethnic elites have an easy access (4) The mobilisation by the various ethnic elites of their masses for the goals and aspirations of the country in question (5) To ‘nip in the bud’ any secessionist moves of ethnic groups. However, this should not be accomplished by force but by positive sanctions¹⁹ (6) To make sure that economic benefits trickle down to the masses: all ethnic groups should benefit whenever possible on equal level -from economic development and modernisation. The distribution of the benefits within the various ethnic groups should be the responsibility of their respective elites. This six-Points strategy Programme is by no means a panecea. But, it leaves us with the hope that inclusion and not exclusion of ethnic groups within the national political structure is the key to unity of a multi-ethnic country. One may even assume with some justification that if justice and masses of those groups may even tolerate for a certain time a slow industrial growth rate and a rather hesitant pace of modernisation. It seems to be easier for an individual to be poor in a “just” society where your neighbour does not constantly and conspicuously boast of his ill-gotten

19. For living and existing without negative sanctions see M. Barkun, Law Without Sanctions. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Barkun’s theory can be applied at any level, be it national or personal.

gains. It appears that a state can only go up together: if it stands divided, it may give birth to a new nation or new nations which, it seems, makes everybody -or at least the majority of the concerned people -poorer. Thus, ethnic elites in a multi-ethnic state are forced to work together of the concerned people – poorer. Thus, ethnic in a multi-ethnic state are forced to work together for their own good and that of the country. They may fight at certain times for advancing their own particular ethnic interests, vet, they should never loose faith in each other’s capabilities of tolerance, mutual understanding and compromise. Otherwise, the road to partition is open, and this is usually a bumpy and rather dangerous one-way street…! Influenced by the six-Points strategy Programme, whose qualities we have lauded above, we envisage that future research has to be linked directly with practice. In ameliorating the six-Points strategy Programme by continued successful practice, we should gain the necessary experience which in turn should be fed beck into the theoretical domain in order to improve the existing theories of national integration of multi-ethnic states. That is why we are convinced that the theory and practice of national integration, the avoidance of the painful and costly process of disintegration and Partition of a multi-ethnic state, should be interrelated closely, and that good practice creates good theories and vice versa. Thus, we anticipate that future research in this area is very practice-oriented and always open to pragmatic suggestions, coming from those quarters who are engaged on a daily basis in the business of positively integrating a multi-ethnic state. In concluding this dissertation, we express the hope that our findings may aid the scholars and practitioners alike in their efforts to improve the living conditions for all ethnic groups in the respective multi-ethnic states. Our sincere wish is that the rather discouraging Pakistani experience should nowhere be repeated, and may serve as a bona fide example to interested Politicians that a manifest willingness to compromise at an early stage and to engage immediately in a mutual give and take process between the two hostile parties may be the best antidotes against any secessionist intentions of ethnic groups and may be able to ban the spectre of partition forever.   

АРPENDIX I

Curriculum Vitaels of each Interviewee.

Dr. Sajjad Hussain: is an ex-Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University.

Mohammed Toha: is a member of the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) of Bangladesh. As a student he participated actively in the Pakistan Movement.

Shah Azizur-Rehman: is ex-Prime Minister of Bangladesh. He was the Deputy Leader of the Opposition during the Ayub era (1955-69). His political views have always been considered to be of a rightist persuasion.

Amena Begum: was a close associate of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman. She was until 1970 the Secretary General of the Awami League. In 1970, before the general elections, she parted from Sheikh Mujib’s party.

Professor Rehman Sobhan: is an eminent Pakistani Economist. Under the Government of Yahya Khan, he was included in the ‘panel of economists’ who had to study, by order of the President, the economic disparity between East and West Pakistan. He always felt that the Awami League accusations of Bengali under development by the West were justified.

Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed: is ex-Prime Minister of Bangladesh. He is of a rightist persuasion with a religious bent. He was also the foreign minister of Bangladesh Government in exile during the crisis of 1971.

Moinul Hassan: is managing director and editor of the Bengali newspaper Itefaq.

Taffazzul Ali: is a senior Politician from Bengal. Since 1936 he was a member of the Muslim League. Prior to the Partition, he had the position of Deputy Speaker of the undivided Bengal Assembly. Anonymous. Anonymous. For all the interviews the following questionnaire was utilised. 

• What was the purpose of founding an independent political entity called Pakistan?
• Whose expectations with regard to the development of Pakistan were not met?

a                professional people

b               religious people

c                economics

d               elites, which elites

e                political elites

f                 social masses, urban rural or both?

• Why could not they be met? Whose fault if anyone’s fault?

• Did the Bengalis have such high expectations that they could under the best of circumstances never have been met?

• Were the expectations manipulated? If yes by whom? Was external (foreign) influences possible?

• Were the Bengalis unwilling to make major sacrifices for the maintenance of an Islamic state on the Indian sub-continent?

• What is more important for a Bengali, his Bengali identity or his Islamic identity?

• How incompatible are they in principle?

• Which group articulated the Bengali expectations?

• Who were the leaders?

• Was it pressure from below or did it come from above which made the Bengali people realise, that their expectations were not met?

• Did the Bengali elites feel that on a comparative level their       

expectations should have been better met?

• With whom did they compare their plilght?

West Pakistan

India (West Bengal)

Other countries

Special groups, professional elites in West Pakistan (for example comparative deprivation).

• What did the concept of Parliamentary. Democracy mean to Bengali elites, with respect to fulfillment of their expectations?
• Did West Pakistan serve as a convenient scapegoat for many Bengali errors and failures?
• How could the Bengali expectations actually have been met? Did the Bengalis make proposals?
• Was the Bengali mood one of patience and compromise? Did the patience begin to wear thin, because the Bengalis believed that the West Pakistanis were betraying them or ignoring their demands, constantly?
• What was more important in the relationship of East Pakistan with West Pakistan?

mutual trust?

or fulfillment of East Pakistanis’ expectations?

other factors?

• Do you believe that better Bengal leadership could have brought the West Pakistan leadership to grant major concessions to the Bengalis to meet their demands?
• Did you ever envisage in the 1960’s (Ayub’s era) an independent East Pakistan which could then guarantee to fulfill your ethnic and economic demands?

• Were you disillusioned with a united Pakistan and if so, whatwas your road to disillusionment? Please explain.

• What could have swayed those who were disillusioned in the direction of a united Pakistan?

• Do you believe that your road to disillusionment was shared by many other Bengalis, or did they have different experiences?

• Do you consider your road to disillusionment as something inevitable? Subjectively speaking who, or what could have swayed you in the direction of a united Pakistan?

• Why in the first place did the Bengalis support the idea of an independent Pakistan?

• What is the source of disintegration of Pakistan?

-can it be attributed to the two nation theory or was political or economic mismanagement responsible for it?

– any other factors?

Original Interviews

Khandokar Mushtaque Ahmed

Ex-Prime Minister of Bangladesh. He was a rightist with religious bent. He was also the foreign minister of the Bangladesh Government in exile during the crisis of 1971/ Please note K. Moshtaque did not answer all the questions. He picked up some questions from the questionnaire submitted to him earlier.

In answer to question 1

India was ruled by the Muslims for 500 (five hundred) years. Muslim’s root in India was well entrenched and it was not easy to pluck it off. Even today the Muslim identity in India has not been destroyed. India was then ruled by the British for 190 years. It was an Imperial Power and it needed indigenous support. In Bengal Hindus gave them the  necessary support to consolidate their position, because for the Hindus, and to be more specific, for the upper class Hindus it was change of masters. For the Muslims it was loss of power. Once accepted thc British rule other opposed and rejected the British rule. What was the result of this opposition – loss of honour, property was taken, social status was destroyed. Systematic humiliation of the Muslims was inevitable. State patronised the Hindus, especially in Bengal and neglected and oppressed the Muslims. Later the Muslims revolted and it was inspired by the Muslim clites. They wanted to regain their old honour. The Muslim masses supported them. Our allegiance to Islam continued uninterrupted. All this confirmed that we Muslims are a nation. Also do not forget the fact that the English mind was behind the creation of Congress. In Bengal Congress was never popular. Also compare the first resolution passed by the Congress and the first resolution passed by Muslim League. You will sec the difference. The Lahore resolution of 1940 clearly stated the objective of the Muslims. It stated that we are a nation. The concept of Tauheed was tied to it. Because then we did not think ourselves as Bengali or Punjabi. Followers of one God, one Book, one Prophet (P.B.U.H.). What is the best definition of a nation. In my opinion, if the people think that they are a nation, it is a nation.

In answer to question 2

All, including the masses.

In answer to question 3

Upper class elites and businessmen who got their share and never bothered about the people. The life of the common man did not change, not only in the Economic field but also in social field. Only 5% got everything the masses were exploited. After the achievement of Pakistan the responsibility of the Muslim Leaguers increased but this, they did not realise, they thought it was time to enjoy. Before the creation of Pakistan Muslim League was a mass organisation. But later it ceased to be so. It went into the hands of those who made no contribution in the creation of Pakistan, namely, the army and bureaucracy.

In answer to question 4       

No. They were willing to do everything for Pakistan. But not thout expectation. This is not some thing un-natural.

In answer to question 7

It is a bogus question. Why do you only ask a Bengali such a question? Islamic identity and Bengali identity is not incompatible. It is only incompatible in the eyes of those West Pakistani elites who wanted  to rule Pakistan and Exploit its masses. You know what I mean. 

In answer to question 20

1. However, the then Centra! Government was pursuing a wrong policy. Those who were then in power made no sacrifice for the creation of Pakistan. Don’t forget, that without Bengalis support there would have been no Pakistan. Bengalis made Pakistan. We overwhelm- ingly voted for Pakistan.

In answer to question 26

Economic factor played an important role. Distance was also a factor. But I would stress that the complex of the West Pakistani elites that they are better Muslims also contributed. Finally, don’t forget the feudal system in West Pakistan. East Pakistan was more democratic in nature. (I think his reference is to the social structure. We will discuss it in our conclusion).

In answer to question 19

Leadership in East Bengal was mediocre in the 60s. It helped Ayub to consolidate his position. He gave us Economic development but at the cost of Political freedom.

In answer to question 24

We were disillusioned with Ayub regime but never lost faith in a united Pakistan. But the 1971 military action destroyed all hopes for a united Pakistan.     

He ended the interview with a vague note. One villain is enough for the destruction of the country. When asked or pinpoint the villain, his response was, “draw your own conclusion”.

 

Taffazzul Ali

A senior Politician from Bengal. Since 1936 he was member of Muslim League. He was also the deputy speaker of undivided Bengal Assembly (prior to the partition of 1947). He went through the questionnaire and refused to answer all my questions. He was a very important source of information. his main excuse was that the Political situation of Bangladesh even today was not free enough to discuss all questions freely and frankly. When we tried to convince him that if he so desires his name will not be used, but he was not convinced. However, he picked up three questions and briefly answered them.

In answer to question 1

The Bengali Muslims had innate love for relation. Educational and economic advantages enjoyed by the Hindus of Bengal convinced us that the only way we can secure and break the Hindus Monopoly was the creation of a separate state. Injustice to the Muslims in the Hindu majority areas during 1937- 39 further opened our eyes. Muslims were totally disillusiouned. Finally when we voted for the division, we knew that East Pakistan would mean whole of East Pakistan and whole of Assam and West Bengal. We finally accepted the Partition scheme as the best of a bad shop. Here I would say that the greatest mistake of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was to accept Redcliff, an Englishmen as the arbiter, of the scheme of division, knowing it fully well that Great Britain was not a neutral party in the game. If we had taken a stand on this issue we could have forced Britain to alter its position and appoint fair minded outsiders to draw the Partition scheme.

In answer to question 26(unclear)     

broad outlook. The attitude of the bureaucrats, with few exceptions, was also bave a responsible for the break up of Pakistan. Central leadership was always in the hands of non Bengalis. They refused to share power with the Bengalis Sheikh Mujib’s six Points Programme was not for separation, be only went too far in financial matter. But it could have been negotiated.

In answer to question 7

We are Bengali Muslims. Let there be no doubt about it. May be we did not fulfill all our duties as Muslims. But who is to judge this? May be in Bengal some leadership at the top succeeded in misleading the people in the cultural and political outlook. Ceremony performed at the Shaheed day on the 21st February is an example of un-Islamic cultural practice.

Mrs Amena Begum

General Secretary Awami League till 1969

In answer to question I

One hundred million Muslims of India were subjected to (i) oppressions from the British Rulers who had earlier usurped power from the Muslim Rulers and (ii) atrocities of the hostile Hindu Majority under British patronage. The Muslims, therefore, decided to establish independent Pakistan for emancipation from double oppressions. It was envisaged that the minorities would be given adequate and same safe guards both in Pakistan and Hindustan as a permanent solution of the Hindu Muslim problem which took a toll of hundreds of thousands of lives/limbs under the British Raj. The other purpose was preservation and promotion of Islamic ways of life according to the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah for ensuring peace and progress of all the religions communities living in Pakistan.

In answer to question 2      

a          (unclear)

b         No

c          NO

d         White Collar Elites

e          No

f           No Masses urban, rural, both.

IN answer to question 3

In Pakistan, Political leaders could not or did not like to grasp the problems at the grass roots level. As a result imbalance was created between the rural people and the urban elite and between economics of East and West Pakistan. When Mr.Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy came up with his Parity formula, it was already too late to recover.

In answer to question 4

As the Bengali people had much more contribution towards the creation of Pakistan than their West Pakistani counter parts, it is natural that they had high expectations from Pakistan, some of which could be met and should have been met in phases, but were not done of course some of their expectations could not be met for practical reasons which should have been explained to them to serve the cause of democracy.

In answer to quesiton 5

The Punjabi power clique combined with Civil and Military bureaucracy tried to build an empire within an empire, and expectations of the Bengali people-majority in Pakistan-were the worst of casualties. it is quite natural that those who had opposed the creation of Pakistan would take advantage of the situation and would secretly employ and patronise their stooges to create a fifth column to destroy the Two Nation Theory which had culminated in the creation of Pakistan. I could see this game very clearly before other political leaders, and therefore tried in my own ways to prevent it. I tried my level best to pursued Sheikh Mujibur-Rahman to keep away from alien trap but he was so mad after power and authority that he would not listen. This  however resulted in my clash with Sheikh Mujibur-Rahman when I could otherwise get great favour from him. I challenged Sheikh Mujibur- Rahman in election not to win but to make the people aware of the coming alien dangers. I left the Awami League and tried to make the people aware of the coming dangers, while thousands thronged in the Awami fold for material gains. The people did not take my words but subsequently they realised their mistakes, when my public warnings came true one after another.

In answer to question 6

If they were unwilling to make major sacrifices for an Islamic state in the Indian Sub-continent they would not have voted overwhelm- ingly in favour of Pakistan in the1946 election, and they would not have agreed to one Pakistan state by modification of the Lahore Resolution in Delhi Convention.

In answer to question 7

 To a Bengali Muslim Islamic identity is more important. This Is proved by devoted and large scale religious activities in Bangladesh. unlike many other countries. But Bengali identity is also important to hìm. This is proved by fact that when his Bengali identity is looked dowa upon he gets furious.

In answer to question 8

They are not at all incompatible because in all Muslim countries there are Regional national feelings which do not stand in the way of Islamic bond of brotherhood.

In answer to question 9

Muslim League leaders of the then East Pakistan betrayed the cause of East Pakistan, as a result the people who were either opposed to Islamic philosophy or were indifferent to it, could become the so called champion of the Bengali interest.

In answer to question 10

The people who had leanings towards alien interest unfortunately became the leaders of Bengali interest.        

In answer to question 11

It was initially a pressure form the middle class group the most conscious group who became frustrated by the unfair distribution of the means of livelihood.

In answer to question 12

Yes, they felt it. But the elite could not visualise that neglect of the interest of the down trodden people of society could bring about sudden revolutions, leading to circumstances bcyond their control.

In answer to question 13

a          West Pakistan Yes 

b         Indian (West Bengal) No

c          Other countries No

d         Special groups Yes

In answer to question 14

The Bengali peoples due to past experiences in the sub-continent,were for parliamentary democracy. They believed that through unfettered parliamentary democracy they could gradually fulfill their hopes and aspirations.

In answer to question 15

The Bengali people leaders had of course their errors and failures, but only a section of those leaders used West Pakistan as a scape goat – the suffering multitude were however easily carried by them, and they did not have to face counter arguments. In answer to question 16 The Bengali expectations could have been met by phases, had there been sincere efforts. Definitely the leaders who represented Bengali interest made their proposals.       

In answer to qguestion 17

Yes, Bengali people did show much patience and offered to compromise. That is why being a majority they accepted the Parity formula. But gradually they were disillusioned when their reasonable demands were not conceded by West Pakistan.

In answer to question 18

Mutual Trust Yes

Fulfilment of East Pakistan expectations Yes

Other Factors No

 In answer to question 19

No all reasonable efforts of Bengali leadership went in vain. Facts of history bear them out.

In answer to question 20

No. In answer to question 21

Deprived from Democratic rights and suffering from economic disparity, the people of East Pakistan got disillusioned. We wanted step by step elimination of the causes of despair but never wanted disinte- gration of Pakistan.

In answer to question 22

Had a chance been given to Parliamentary Democracy to work even for some time after the last General Elections the course of history would have been very different.

In answer to question 23

Of course, there was general unanimity in disillusionment among the     Bengali people.

In answer to question 24

The people were disillusioned in generl, but it was not inevitable for disintegration of Pakistan, the 1971 catastrophe disintegrated Pakistan, Before that myself and most other leaders did not think of disintegration of Pakistan.

In answer to question 25

A dream of emancipation from the British Colonial rule and the exploitations and oppressions of the Hindus made them mad for inde- pendent homeland for Muslims.

In answer to question 26

The Political domination from the Punjabi clique, economic helplessness and a sensc of deprivation of the Bengali people can be said to have Ied to the disintegration of Pakistan.

In answer to alternative question 26

1 Yes 2 No.

Mr. Moinul Hassan

Editor and managing director (M.D.) of a Bengali newspatper Itefaq.

In answer to question 1

Muslims desire and demand to have a separate homeland of their own was the result of the bitter experience that they had against Hindu domination during the British rule. The Congress rule of 1937-39 was an eye opener for us. We in Bengal were convinced that Pakistan was the only solution to get rid of total Hindu domination which was over- whelming. To us Pakistan meant freedom from Hindu domination in the economic and cultural ficld.

In answer to question 2       

People of all classes for one or other reasons felt frustr:ated. They Jl. fel: they were not getting justice as a community. Reason for it, con- centration of power in West Pakistan. Economic and political power artangement were such that the major share of state expenditure went to West Pakistan. Distance also created problems, Central Government state expenses in West Pakistan did not give any benefit to the people in East Pakistan.

In answer to question 3

Power elites in West Pakistan. Central political leadership failed to show sagacity and broad mindedness which was essential for making a political entity like Pakistan work because of Geographical position of the two wings of Pakistan. The idea of one country was a defficult proposal from the beginning. In answer to question 4

It was not. We accepted Parity. People were reasonable. On the issue of language, for example, Bengali stand was only to give recognition to their language. Despite being in majority they did not demand Bengali to be the only language. I tell you it was the feudal mentality of West Pakistani leadership that destroyed Pakistan. Don’t forget that after 1953 Pakistan was ruled by the military, bureaucracy combination which had no legitimacy.

In answer to question 5

Political leadership in East Pakistan at times did raise the ex- pectations of the people and over emphasised the Disparity that existed in various fields including the Economic Disparity that existed between the two wings. But all this was a part of politics. It did not mean at any stage the breakup of Pakistan. Don’t forget even during the election campaign Sheikh Mujib talked about autonomy within the framework of one Pakistan.

 In answer to question 6

The Bengalis always took pride in the fact that they were the architect of Pakistan. Later they were sad and disappointed that they were being condemned as anti-Pakistanis and pro-Indians by those who never contributed the way we did in the creation of Pakistan. Our demands were     viewed with suspicion.

 In answer to question 7

We were Bengali Muslims that made us different from Bengali Hindus. What was true in 1947 for the creation of a separate state is still true. Religion should not be used as a cover for injustice to people meted out by the rulimg class of West Pakistan.

In answer to question 9

Middle class, belonging to various Political parties in East Pakistan.

In answer to question 10

In 1954 it was the united Front led by A.K. Fazlul Haque, Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and H.S. Suhrawardy. Later it was taken over by Awami League.

IN answer to question 11

Top. The leadership articulated the demand of the pecople. It was however not confined to few. As injustice was pervasive so was realisation all pervasive.

In answer to question 13

West Pakistan.

In answer to question 14

Participation through democracy. Bengali leadership believed that Parliamentary system was best suited to our federal set up.

In answer to question 15

No, it will be unjust to argue this way. The injustice and dep- rivation was too real which the West Pakistanis elites deliberately ignored.

In answer to question16

First the Bengali’s wanted democracy to function so that the      participation of the people could be ensured. It took 9 years to give the country a Constitution. That Constitution was the result of a political compromise. It did not last for more than 2 years. Bengali Prime Minister was not tolerated for more than a year. He was articulate and represented the people. The military finally intervened, directly, in 1958.

In answer to question 17

 An emphatic yes.

In answer to question 18

Both. Just arrangement for a just order was necessary. Our demand was autonomy and not domination over West Pakistan.

In answer to question 19

Better leadership was available (H. S. Suhrawardy). But power coterie in West Pakistan frustrated the efforts of the leadership. As a result In the course of movement situation got bitter and movement went into the hands of extremists. Remember Sheikh Mujib was a moderate leader so he allowed himself to be arrested in 1971 rather than going to India.

In answer to question 20

1. Note that even on March 7th, 1971 Sheikh Mujib had to conclude his public meeting by saying Pakistan Zindabad (long live Pakistan).

In answer to question 22

As I have told you, nobody in East Pakistan wanted the break up of Pakistan. Actually Political and military leadership in West Pakistan decided to dismember Pakistan. They made calculations and found it beneficial to do away with Pakistan. They perceived that the era of exploiting East Pakistan was over hence it was not worth it for them to have East Pakistan. Men like M.M. Ahmed and others convinced the West Pakistani power elites that East Pakistan was a liability for them.

In answer to question 26    

Condescending attitude of the military bureaueratic leadership of West Pakistan. They treated the common man as inferior. They thought that Bengalis were not good Muslims. Not fit to be good soldiers/officers. We were not patriots. In West Pakistan the leadership was not of the people. There was love and sympathy among the people of the two wings. The leadership from West Pakistan were neither representing their people nor their sentiment. Secessionist Movement started after the 25th March, 1971.

Mohammed Toha

Communist party of Bangladesh (Marxist and Leninist). As a student actively participated in the Pakistan movement.

In answer to question 1

India is a subcontinent and composed of a large number of linguistic and ethnic groups. It was only during the British rule that India  a united Geographical entity under a central government. This is not to deny that several attempts were made first under various Hindu rulers and then during the Muslims rule to unite India. But the attempt of the rulers of two community met with little success, this was primarily because of economic reasons. The nature of Indian cconomy then was feudal in nature. Hence they fail to unify India. The economy of India was local in essence, therefore it could not be united on an economic basis. After the British takeover, India for the first time came under one rule, i.e., under one Central Government ruled from Delhi. Hence we can say that the concept of a modern state came to India after the British took over. Britain for the first time introduced the bourgeosie economy,’ made, effective use of Railways and connected all parts of India and thus created a common economic market. They made the best use of iron and coal. Once the ground work for a modern state was laid, there emerged, with the British support, the first Political party called the Indian National Congress. The initial function of the Congress was to help in consolidating the British rule. But by the beginning of the 20th century Congress’ role began to change, simultaneously the attitude of the Muslims towards the British also underwent change. The Muslims were now more co-operative especially in Bengal. From 1905 onward Congress policy was more of controntation with the rulers, Muslims on the other hand were more inclined towards co-operation. In Bengal it was with the help of Hindu community that seed of conflict was sowed. Economic dispartity between the two community was now too colossal. Hindus now dominated every segment of the society, especially in Bengal. The concept of a Federal India with a weak Center was acceptable to all parties involve in the freedom of India. After 1937 Mr Jinnah proposed coalition Government in various parts of India which Nehru rejected. History otherwise would have been written differently The creation of Muslim League again with Bhtish support, helped the Muslim elites to consolidate their position. After 1937, Mr.Jinnah was convinced that, co-operation with congress was impossible so he took the taskof consolidating the Muslims Jinnah effectively exploited, in Bengal particularly the economic condition of the Muslims to gain support for the Muslim League. After 1940 the idea of Pakistan was put forward as an alternative to end the hopeless condition of the Muslims. The demand for Pakistan was given a religious bent. The rift in the field of culture and language was first created by the Hindus. The same weapon was later used, during the Pakistan movement, by the Muslim elites, So to a common man the creation of Pakistan meant an end to Muslim exploitation both in the hands of Hindu and British. Therefore the overwhelming majority of the people supported the demand for Pakistan.

 In answer to question 2

Centralised economic policy proved to be fatal. Centralisation of power in various sectors created sense of deprivation for all section of the people belonging to the rising middle class.

In answer to question 3

Again I would refer to the problem of centralisation of power. Expectations were high among the political elites and the rising business community and other professional groups during 1947-54. They had to compete for position and status with their colleagues from other parts of the country. Muslim League as a political party, with no economic           

programme, proved ineffective to the task. So the fault lies, with the party at center till 1954. After 1954 the country was ruled by the bureaucrats.

In answer to question 4

No. The masses at large had no high demands. But the Politicians of Bengal suffered from some kind of inferiority complex. vis-a-vis the ruler at the center. The reason for this was that those who represented Bengal, came from the middle class. Very few had feudal background and money to match the feudal aristoeratic background of Politicians from The only way to check the feudal landlords from West Pakistan was to mobilise the masses. Mr.Hemidul-Haque-Choudhry was the first West Pakistan. to revolt against rulers.

In answer to question 5

The expectations of the people were inflated by those who subsequently identified themselves as Awami Leaguers. Awami Leaguers were group of self seeking politicians who came from petit bourgeosie class. They spread all kinds of lies about the economic exploitaion. For example they said that papers was produced by East Pakistan but it is cheaper in West Pakistan. Moreover the Central Government policy gave Awami League an excellent opportunity to create rift. With mass support they wanted to strengthen their position at the center. They had no concrete economic programme.

In answer to question 6

At the start we were willing to make all kinds of sacrifice. But later the position changed.

In answer to question 7

Bengali identity got precedence in the ultimate analysis over Islamic identity. In answer to question 8 It is not incompatible. But for the Bengalis it was difficult to sacrifice everything in the name of Islam. Especially when Islam was not there.        

In answer to question 9

All section of Bengali elites.

In answer to question 10

As a political party Awami League first articulated it. But they did in to get to power. They had no programme.

In answer to question 11

Vertical process. Pressure from the top.

In answer to question 13

West Pakistanis.

In answer to question 14

Majority rule.

In answer to question 15

Yes

In answer to question 16

At the beginning the Bengali leadership was not very articulate. They only wanted equal and effective participation at the center.

In answer to question 17

The Awami League leadership became very impatient. At the early days the East Pakistani mind was clean and we were willing to co- орerate. Example: Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan and some others (Dr. I.H. Qureshi and Dr.Mahmood Hussain) were given seats in the Assembly from East Pakistan quota. Although they were not Bengalis.

In answer to question 18

Lack (unclear) trust, first then the central leadership failed to understand          and appreciate the demands of the Bengali elites.

In answer to question 19

Yes, Alternative leadership was available. But they were always suspected by the center. Our loyalty to Pakistan was always questioned (I think Mr Toha’s reference is to his communist party).

In answer to question 20

No

In answer to question 21

No. But religion should not have been exploited.

In answer to question 22

Perhaps a Democratic set up.

In answer to question 24

Central Government policy made it towards the end inevitable.

In answer to question 26

Uneven development was used by the petit bourgeosie and self seekers of Awami League to the ultimate separation of East Pakistan. After the creation of Pakistan, East Pakistan was more developed. Uneven devel- opment was created. The cry of uneven development only strengthened the hands of Awami League’s petit bourgeosie. They had no radical Programme to improve the condition of the poor majority.

 Shah Azizur-Rehman

Ex-Prime Minister of Bangladesh and deputy leader of the opposition during Ayub era (1958-69). He is also considered to be rightist.

In answer to question 1

As I understand it, first reason for the demand of Pakistan was the urge to establish a separate home land for the realisation and fulfillment of the Islamic idelogy.   Number two reason, economic compulsion. The Muslims of Bengal in particular were subjected to economic aggression by the Hindus which created sense of insecurity among the Muslims. The only solution to this was Pakistan – a separate homeland for the Muslims.

In answer to question 2

All section of people suffered from a chronic sense of neglect and felt exploited by the West Pakistanis elites/rulers.

In answer to question 6

In the long political conflict between the elites of West and East Pakistan on various vital issues Bengali Muslims lost sight of their ideological moorings and that was not without reasons. We felt that the ruling class in West Pakistan was only using the name of Islam to protect their interests. They had nothing to do with Islam. Their lifestyle was far  more secular than ours. As a result of all this there grew among the Bengali Muslims a crisis of confidance. To quote an instance, I was a strong Pakistani who fought for Paksitan, but during the crisis of 1971 the Pakistan army suspected even my loyalty. Without any reason they raided my house, looted my property and killed one of my inmates.

In answer to question 7

For a Bengali his Islamic identity was more important, but a continuous exploitation mainly in the economic field disillusioned the Muslims of Bengal and that generated mounting discontent which eventually led to separation. We wanted a political solution to the problem. We wanted to redress the wrong. But separation was imposed upon us by the army action of March 1971.

In answer to question 14

People always believed in Parliamentary democracy. Through democracy we wanted to get our political rights. We had a majority population, so we had a right to rule the country. Democracy was never allowed to function in our country.

In answer to question 15

not really. The West Pakistanis were the rulers, they made mistakes we only protested and asked for justice.

In answer to question 16

Yes, We asked for autonomy. Reasonable autonomy could have been granted. I believe that if our demand for autonomy had been accepted we could have avoided the break up of Pakistan.

In answer to question 21

I was disillusioned in 1969. But I firmly believed that through political negotiation we could settle any conflict. Even after the Army action of March 1971, we could have saved Pakistan Withdrawal of Tikka Khan and Gerneral Niazi and formation of a Civilian Government consisting of all East Pakistanis could have averted the crisis. We could have easily entered into a negotiation with the members of the then outlawed Awami League. But the West Pakistani rulers had, by then, no interest in a United Pakistan. They knew, that they were fighting a loosing battle.

In answer to question 22

As above. In answer to question 20 Till 1969 it was all right and no one talked about separation. Bengali leadershipalways talked about autonomy. there was some defferences about the quantum of autonomy. But conflict is a part of politics. The best way to resolve political conflict is through political negotiations.

In answer to question 17

We patiently waited for justice. But after the Army action of March 1971 it was all over. In answer to question 18 Both were important.

In answer to question 26        

Political and economic mismanagement, stubborn refusal to listen to the East Pakistan Point of view and finally unprovoked wanton Pakistani army excesses were responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan You will find more about his views in the Parliamentary papers. He was the deputy leader of opposition in the National Assembly of Pakistan during Ayub era.

Professor Rehman Sobhan

He was included in the panel of Economists set up during the reign of Yahya Khan to look into the question of Disparity between the two wings. He represented East Pakistan. He actively sympathised with the Awami L.eague Point of view, (I would call him a pseudo socialist – pardon my expression). He also participated, represting the Awami League, in the famous, Sheikh Mujib, Yahya Khan and Mr.Z.A.Bhutto negotiation before the army crack-down of March 26th 1971.

In answer to question 1

Muslim of the subcontinent felt that in a United India they would face unequal competition in various important areas of life, namely economic and political. So they embarked upon a policy of confrontation to extract concession from the two other parties in the game, Congress and the British. Muslim leadership accepted the confederal scheme of A.B.C. proposed in the Cabinet mission plan of 1946. The Congress totally misunderstood the issue of autonomy and adopted an uncompromising attitude towards the Constitutional arrangement envisaged in the 1946 Cabniet mission plan. So the political misjudgement on the part of the Indian National Congress in 1946 during the Cabinet mission proposal gave birth to the Political entity called Pakistan.

In answer to question 2

Every single group had unfulfilled expectation. Masses, urban, and rural.

In answer to question 3

Ruling class of West Pakistan. They committed serious political blunder by refusing to see our Point of view on various vital issues.        

In answer to question 4

No. They did not have such high expectations which could not have been met.

In answer to question 7

Bengali identity.

In answer to question 8

They are not at all incompatible.

In answer to question 9

Educated class. After 1969 it became mass demands.

In answer to question 11

It was a combination of both. One group articualated it and the masses responded. The masses faced Economic deterioration during the Ayub era.

In answer to question 13

West Pakistan. In answer to question 15

No.

In answer to question 16

Yes. Since the inception of Pakistan we made all kinds of pro- posals. We asked for majority rule. We made proposals on the issue of autonomy. On the question of allocation of economic resources. This was one area where all kinds of proposals were made. But since was concentrated at the center they paid very little heed to our demands.

In answer to question 20       

It was never thought of or put forward in any explicit form. We always talked about autonomy. There might have been a group, but nothing beyound that existed.

In answer to question 24

No. Access to power. Meaningful share in the Bureaucracy and other areas like the Armed forces and finally consolidation of political institution.

In answer to question 26

Combination of both. Geographical factor also played a vital role. Moreover, don’t forget that the majority Partner was deprived of both political and economic power. This could not go for a long time. Finally remember, the composition of India is such that its unity lies in its diversity and the diversity factor can flourish only through regional autonomy. When the concept of autonomy was denied in 1946 India was disintegrated/divided. Likewise when it was denied in 1971 there was a similar repetition.

Dr. Sajjad Hussain

Ex vice-chancellor Dacca University

In answer to question 1

Muslim League, under the leadership of Mr.Mohammad Ali Jinnah, after 1940 revised the issue of permanent majority and minority. In a united and independent India Muslims were bound to lead a life of a permanent minority. This was not acceptable to the Muslims. The desire or urge for a homeland was not essentially religious. was not religious in theocratic sense, because religious party like Jamiat- Ulema-Hind opposed the creation of Pakistan. What the Muslims of Bengal wanted was a free modern state within the framework of Islam. Muslims way of life was different from Hindus. Example – Muslims eat beef – Hindus worship cow. They don’t (unclear)   

In answer to quesiton 2

What Dr.Iqbal among others, has taught me is that Islam is not a mere other wordly religion but has a political philosophy, an economic philosophy and a social philosophy which can best be practised in a free state in which the principle of ‘ljtihad’ will not be repudiated. The Holy Quran has so often called upon us to exercise our judgement and reason that it is surprising, why we should have under the influence of ignorant interpreters come to think that blind conformity is all that we should aim at. To say that all expectations were not met is to mislead. Immediately after the creation of Pakistan, survival of the state should have been the first priority. All sensative issues were open, which could have been easily avoided. A lot of unnecessary time and energy was wasted in the making of the Constitution. The exercise was futilte and even counterproductive. Act of 1935 with some amendment could have easily fulfilled the task of Constitution. (On this Point Dr Sajjad referred to Ian Stephen for details). Regional dispartity was inherited from the British. In the Armed forces the imbalance was colossal. After the mutiny of 1857 the British Government totally stopped recruiting men from Bengal in the Armed forces. Punjab did not participate in the mutiny so they manned the British army. Likewise in 1947 there was not a single ICS ((Indian civil service) officer from Bengal. But immediately afer the creation of Pakistan, political leadership in West Bengal started sheding crocodiles tears about the condition of East Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam commented on the issue.

In answer to question 3

Expectations cannot be fulfilled over night. It is a painful process through which all nations have to go in order to meet them or fulfill them.

In answer to question 4

Yes. Not all Bengalis. But those who later worked for recession. Mainly lecturers from Islamia college Calcutta and Congressmen and Muslims associated with it tried to stem the tide of Pakistan in 1946 but soon realilsed that it was an impossible task. After the creation of Pakistan they continued to, in one way or the other, to (unclear)         

In answer to question 5

Yes blown out of proportion by Indian agents in East Pakistan. (Here it is important to point out that a large number of people in East Bengal believe in the popular Indian conspiracy theory, the late Dr. Matiar- Rehman’s books are based on this popular theme of Indian conspiracy).

In answer to question 6

No. But after the deth of Quaid-i-Azam there was a vacum of leadership. Nobody came forward to explain what kind of sacrifice people were to make. Among the leadership there was scramble for power and money. Bengali masses cannot be blamed for this.

In answer to question 7

We thought of ourselves as Bengali Muslim and were not conscious of any contradiction between identity as Bengali and identity as Muslilms. We knew that we shared the language with the Hindus but were fully aware that the idioms we spoke was different from the idioms that the Hindus used. Our idioms contained a large proportion of Arabic, Persian, Turkish Urdu and Hindi words which had for us become perfectly naturalised as a part of the vocabulary of Bengali language, but which the Hindus seldom employed. That was the reason which the poetry of Kazi Nazrul Islam made such a tremendous impact on the Muslim mind in Bengal. He showed with unexample success how musical cadences could be created out of the idioms the Muslims spoke. Example – Reference to the achievement of Kamal Ataturk of Turkey. The poem was written in Bengali. But the words employed are non-Bengali. According to Dr. Sajjad-Iranians and Bengalis accepted Islam to suit their own genius.

In answer to question 8 They are not incompatible.

In answer to question 9

Awami League group became the champion of Bengali expectations. But can the Awami Leaguers say that the Muslims would have been better off under united India? Are they better off today? (After the creation of Bangladesh). Expectations at national level cannot be met overnight. Bengalis are emotional people. They were carried away by slogans. Moreover, there was no alternative group to counter the false propaganda of Awami League.

In answer to question 10

Awami Leaguers. Behind Awami League was the Congress and the communist. (For communist activities read Talukdar Muniruzzaman’s article).

In answer to question 11

A situation created from the top. Frustration was artificial. (Then Dr. Sajjad refers to a conversation with Dr. Abdur Razzak, Professor of Political Science, Dacca University). In 1965 Dr. Razzak told Dr. Sajjad Hussian, I want you to write the history of Bengali speaking people. Pakistan was a dream and an experiment which has totally failed. Response of Dr. Sajjad, It is an experiment only 17 years old. You cannot create a model after every 17 years. According to Dr. Sajjad, Abdur Razzak is the pioneer of Disparity formula, which later became very popular with the East Pakistanis.

In answer to question 12

Awami League oriented elites wanted more and more. We had too much too soon.

In answer to question 13

West Pakistan. Particularly, top cadre in the army – top cadre in the civil service. Sheikh Mujib and his henchmen believed that lies does not matter. The Government in Islamabad was utterly indifferent to all this. For example – handlilng of Agartala conspiracy. Mr.Manzur Qudir who was representing the Government case, right at the beginning of the case referred to the existence of solid recorded evidence, but delayed it to the end and you know what happened towards the end? Because of political pressure, the case was lifted.

In answer to question 14

1956 Constitution was seen as a good political compromise. But once again it was not allowed to work.

In answer to question 15

Yes. Allocation of funds from the Center went back because of non use. Funds came too late was the common excuse given by men like Nurul Islam, an Economic planner from East Pakistan. In fact, the East Pakistanis intellectuals shouted a lot from the house top but failed to produce any broad plan for the development of East Pakistan. There was lot of rhetoric but no actual plan.

In answer to question 16

No. See the last answer.

In answer to question I7

No, there was no patience at all, especially at the elites level.

In answer to question 18

Absence of mutual trust. Hence the West Pakistanis failed. They did nothing to earn the confidence of the people of East Pakistan. Personal attitude of men like. Aziz Ahmed, Fazal Ahmed Karim Fazli destroyed the image of West Pakistanis despite the good work they did.

In answer to question 19

Initially East Pakistan had an edge over West Pakistan, so the question of concession did not arise at all at the beginning. In Economic terms West Pakistan had no export material where as East Pakistan had jute, tea, and hides. Earning of East Pakistan should have been utilised in East Pakistan.         

In answer to question 20

No.

In answer to question 21

No.

In answer to question 22

Dr Sajjad refers to an incident, that he encountered along with two other colleagues from East Pakistan during a visit to West Pakistan on the 31st of December 1970. Name of the two other colleagues are A.R.Malik and Dr. Raquib. They went to the famous shopping center in Lahore called Anarkali, there in a shop they were recognised as Bengalis. They were treated with respect and love and told – take everthing but don’t break this country.

Similar sentiments should have been expressed by the leadership of West Pakistan.

In answer to question 23

Yes.

In answer to question 24

Not inevitable.

In answer to question 26

Undoubtedly because of economic, political and cultural mismanagement. Disintegration was due more to Indian conspiracy than to any discontent inside, and the ease with which India was allowed to use its stooges to further the cause of disintegration.

Dr. Sajjad, like many other East Pakistanis strongly subscribes to the “conspiracy theory”, that is Indian infiltration and that Indian leadership never reconciled to the idea of a separate entity called Pakistan. Late Dr. Matiur Rehman also strongly believed in the conspiracy theory his book brings out this Point very well.        

APPENDIX II

Attonymous 1

Language is important to every individual. It is a fact that the mother tongue is not only important but it also is a very sensitive issue for both individuals and those who consider it as a regional issue. The aspiration and culture is always communicated through the media of language.

The entire educational institution in undivided Bengal was manned by Hindus from the primary level to the university standard. Hindus thought if Urdu was allowed to flourish, it would result in Islamic rennaissance. Again in early 19th century the court language of Bengal remained Persian. As power was rested from the Muslims by the British ruler, they saw to it that advancement of Muslims should be hampered in every segment of society, hence Muslims were forced to remain backward.

It should also not to be forgotten that Bengal was Partitioned in 1905 into Muslim Bengal and Hindu Bengal by Lord Curzon. The Hindu community agitated against the Partition and the government was forced to annul the Partition in 1911, because they wanted to block the advancement of Muslims in every sphere, education, economic development and socio administrative experience.

Muslim Bengal not only suffered more than the Muslims of the other area but they were so volatile that during the Mughal rule and even before that they always revolted against the Central Government of India. So it was the British policy to keep the Muslim of Bengal suppressed, as the saying goes, “What Bengal thinks today India thinks tomorrow”.

Bengal not only supported but voted overwhelmingly for Pakistan. It should not also be forgotten that the Muslim population of Bengal and Assam had more than one third of the total population of the Indo- Pak subcontinents Muslim population.

After the battle of Plassy the land reform initiated by the Britishers had almost made 80% of the Hindus land owner and zamindars, thus reducing the Muslim population to poverty. This was not the case in UP, Bihar,C.P, Punjab and other Provinces of the Indo-Pak sub-continent where the Muslims were dominant as land owners and socially they used to consider themselves the descendants of Muslim rulers.