THE LIMITS OF PROTEST
New Delhi’s Note of protest to Washington regarding U.S. arms aid to Pakistan is as forthright as it needs to be. be. It places on record, in the clearest terms, India’s disapproval of a policy seemingly indistinguishable from aiding and abetting Islamabad in its brutal suppression of Bangladesh. Mr. Swaran Singh elaborated on this point by describing Washington’s conduct as a condonation of genocide. Yet there is little reason to believe that the Note or any other similar representation will deflect the United Nations from its devious purposes. There are limits to what protests can achieve if unsupported by appropriate action; and this action-recognition of Bangladesh or limited military intervention is precisely what New Delhi, much to its credit, has scrupulously avoided. The reasons that have impelled it to so, those of abundant caution, are not dissimilar to those that have persuaded the United States to seek “leverage,” by providing aid. New Delhi’s avoidance of absolute commitments on Bangladesh in some degree disqualifies it from demanding from Washington what India itself seems reluctant to offer. This is by no means to concede that the American view of the Islamabad generals as a source of stability is justified. There can probably be no greater assurance of instability in Pakistan than the Yahya regime whose capacity to hold East Bengal is rapidly diminishing. The point is that meanwhile no alternative to this regime is in sight and to press for its collapse leading to Pakistan’s dismemberment, is something from which Mrs Gandhi herself has recoiled. Chaos will yield no dividends to anyone least of all to Bangladesh or to the subcontinent; and that is an unpalatable truth which is liable to be overlooked by supposing that Pakistan can be brought to heel through the simple expedient of withholding all aid. Driven to extremities Islamabad can be expected to invite the chaos which it is precisely the intention of the major powers and certainly of India to avoid.
Despite the plaudits with which President Podgorny’s statement of April 3 was received the Soviet posture has been as studiedly calculating as that of the United States. The latest comment by Izvestla speaks of the need for restraint by both Pakistan and India, a kind of equation to which New Delhi has never taken kindly. Yet the point of the comment is its overriding concern that the dangerous equilibrium on which the subcontinent’s peace depends is somehow preserved. If the long-term aspirations of Bangladesh are to be served the repercussions of instability in West Pakistan are no means of doing so. The Podgorny statement calls for no more than a “political solution” between West Pakistan and East Bengal, a commitment identical to that acceptable to the United States More light needs to be shed on Soviet economic and technical aid to Pakistan than has been available so far; but no particular insight is needed to conclude that Moscow and Washington are one in hoping to preserve a “balance between India and Pakistan. Moscow, never sparing in its criticism of American “imperialists” has not noticeably expressed disapproval of U.S. arms aid to Islamabad. The assumption, in New Delhi’s calculations, that Moscow is identified with a policy of pressurizing Islamabad to the point where it breaks is singularly naive. Both Washington and Moscow would doubtless welcome an alternative to the Yahya regime but an alternative cannot be found overnight; economic pressure moreover is a slow if certain process which must be allowed to do whatever it can to modify Islamabad’s policies or create the conditions in which opposition to these policies can be expected to emerge. Meanwhile, gestures to public opinion apart, New Delhi has pursued an even course on the Bangladesh issue: what is now needed is a clearer gaps of the common ground that exists between India’s interests and those of the major powers, despite superficial indications to the contrary and strive for a greater degree of coordination. A point to bear in mind is that big power inclination to restore aid to Pakistan will be all the greater if resistance in East Bengal is extinguished. Protests are all very well for the record and to appease an easily inflammable public opinion. But they are no substitute for a responsible and active diplomacy. (Editorial]
Reference: Hindustan Standard 14.7.1971