POLITICAL NOTEBOOK
New Delhi Climbs down
BY RANAJIT ROY
The Indo-soviet joint statement of July 11 came as an anti-climax to the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation between the two countries signed only two days earlier. When the treaty was announced with dramatic suddenness, it was thought it would immensely stengthen India’s position in relation to Pakistan and that it would act as deterrent to Islamanad’s belligerency. Hopes were raised that New Delhi would take a tougher stand towards Islamabad on the Bangladesh issue and that Mukti Fouj activities would be atepped up. It was in this context that the treaty received such overwhelming support in the country and the Bangladesh leaders so favorably reacted to it.
In Indo-Soviet relations the first result of the treaty is the joint statement. The two major world issues mentioned in it are Bangladesh and Vietnam. So far as Vietnam is concerned, there is nothing new. Both sides reiterated that the seven-point proposal made by the provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam could be the basis for a political settlement Neither Peking nor Islamabad will probably have anything to quarrel with in this formulation.
On the Bangladesh issue the joint statement is a far cry from the position India has come to adopt and proclaim publicly Proceedings in Parliament will show what our stand is. Mr. Jagjivan Ram is on record saying that there can be no solution of the problem other than an independent Bangladesh. He also is on record that “if necessary” India would help the freedom fighters with arms. There can be no doubt that New Delhi pleaded with the Soviet Union to see that the joint statement corresponded in some measure with India’s public, posture, If New Delhi did not do this, the inescapable conclusion will be that it has one stand for public consumption in India and another for talks with even our best international friends.
We could not persuade Mr. Gromyko to use the name Bangladesh or even East Bengal. We had to submit to him and use the hated term East Pakistan in the joint statement. Mr. Swaran Singh says that East Pakistan has been used because it is the internationally accepted term. Naturally, one must assume, when he himself used Bangladesh in Parliament-first under pressure of the Opposition and then spontaneously–he did not mean it but only humoured his audience. The Russians have made it abundantly clear in the joint statement that they have not moved an inch from the position Mr. Podgorny took in his letter of April 2 to General Yahya. In all essentials, the joint statement on Bangladesh is a rehash of what Mr. Podgrony told General Yahya four and half months ago. India has moved backwards diplomatically. Whether this backsliding affects other aspects of Indo-Bangladesh relations will be known in the coming weeks.
If the numerous statements made by our leaders in Parliament and outside have any meaning, New Delhi is convinced that Pakistan can never be one again and that the inevitable consequence of Islamabad’s action is an independent Bangladesh. There is not even the remotest reflection of this understanding in the joint statement. On the contrary, we have reiterated jointly with the Soviet Union for a political settlement that will “answer the interests of the entire people of Pakistan.” There is no evidence yet that Moscow has come to the conclusion that Pakistan has broken up or should break up. It may be that Moscow’s stand continues to be what it was in April when it held that those who spoke of the inevitability of separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan were serving the interests of imperialists.
At no stage in the Indo-Soviet negotiations were Bangladesh leaders taken into confidence although consultations with them would not have posed any problem. Not even a meeting between them and Mr. Gromyko or any of his advisers was arranged. New Delhi should be aware of the sour taste the joint statement has left in the Bangladesh leaders. They have a feeling of being let down. They are fighting an unequal battle with General Yahya’s minions and, positioned as they are, they depend on diplomatic and military support which can come only through India. There appears to have been a setback in guerilla activities in Bangladesh. This cannot be because the Bangladesh Government lacks manpower to recruit guerillas but because the training programme is behind schedule and because of a severe shortage of arms. Unless there is a turn for the better the psychological reaction in the people of Bangladesh and their leaders would not be some thing which India would like.
India has increased her military budget fourfold during the past decade. We are now spending something like Rs. 1200 crores a year. According to the London Institute for Strategic. Studies, whose assessments of the military strength of different nations is very reliable, India, in 1970-71, had an Army of thirteen Infantry Division, ten Mountain Division, one Armoured Divivision, one independent Armoured Brigade, six independent Infantry Brigades, and two parachute Bridgades, Pakistan’s Army consisted of eleven Infantry Divisions, two Armoured Divisions, and one Independent Armoured Brigade. The position has not much changed now except that Islamabad is raising two new Infantry Divisions at breakneck speed.
The above figures, quoted by General B. M. Kaul in his new book “Confrontation with Pakistan”, show that India has nearly a two to one superiority in military might. If it is possible for India to throw her entire strength against Pakistan, she can surely bring the war to a decisive conclusion. But for India the problem of China remains. Then ten Mountain Divisions we have are all on the northern borders to guard against the Chinese. Although predominant opinion in New Delhi is that Peking will not start another offensive against India and even that it will not commit its troops to pull Islamabad’s chestnuts out of fire in case of an Indo-Pakistan war. India is not prepared to take any risk by transferring any of the Mountain Divisions from the northern borders.
On this basis India cannot hope to have a decisive superiority over Pkistan in a war. A deadlock may be reached or any such war will be too prolonged for either India or Pakistan to sustain economically. In either case, international intervention cannot be avoided, and the results of such intervention may not be very palatable to India. The situation would change in India’s favour if the Mukti Fouj can bottle up the Five Divisions the West Pakistanis have in Bangladesh or if Russian manoeuvres on Chinese borders ensure that there is not much of a risk in our withdrawing some of the Mountain Divisions and deploying them against the West Pakistanis. These are the great imponderables in the existing situation. It does not appear India has yet got a firm assurance from Moscow from the military point of view. General Yahya Khan, while brandishing his sword, claimed that Pakistan was not alone. The Indo-Soviet treaty enables us to say that we too are not alone. That so far is India’s only gain.
It is being propagated by New Delhi that the treaty was under negotiation for two years. The strange thing is that nothing was heard about these prolonged negotiations until the treaty was announced. The fact is that Mr. Brezhanev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, did suggest “a system of collective security for Asia” on June 7, 1969, at the world communist conference held in Moscow. In that speech he launched a strong attack on China. He said: “We are strong enough to counter any threat of war, including the threat of nuclear was brandished at us by the People’s Daily two days ago. The nationalist policies of Mao Tse-tung and his group have endangered the socialist victories won in People’s China.”
At that time Moscow sought to sell the idea of Asian collective security to New Delhi. The Government of India was divided. Mr. Morarji Desai was one of those who preferred an arrangement that would have bound India to Japan and through Japan to the American system of pacts as a “Democratic counter-weight to Communist China”. This view he had been propagating since 1967. He was not alone in the cabinet supporting this line. There were others opposed to it. Mrs. Gandhi was then not in a position to clinch their issue and it appeared the “Brezhnev doctrine” was dead so far as India was concerned.
If the collective security proposal was all these two years under negotiation, surely by July 12 it should have reached the concluding stage, and we should, have known that Moscow had stopped arms supplies to Islamabad Russian arms committed to Pakistan before March 25 this year, had reached Islamabad after that date. Delhi sought information from the Soviet Embassy and was orally assured that no such supplies had gone to Pakistan. But there was nothing in writing. Despite the oral assurance, Mr. Swaran Singh told Parliament on July 12 that he was not in a position categorically to say that no Russian arms had reached Pakistan after March 25. The following day the Russians issued a statement saying that they were not giving arms to Pakistan since April last year. In fact Mr. Swaran Singh’s statement obliged the Russians to issue a communique setting speculations to rest.
The truth is that negotiations between India and the Soviet Union for a treaty began soon after Washington and Peaking announced on July 16 that Mr. Nixon would visit China next year. The Americans had already adopted anti-Indian stand on the Bangladesh issue and had not taken seriously our proposition that in case Peking sided with Pakistan in an Indo-Pakistan war, New Delhi would expect the USA to help India. Since 1963 we have tried to frighten Washington and draw the USA on our side by harping on the theme of growing Sino-Pakistan collusion. It should be obvious today that we have failed in this mission.
For the Government of India whether to open a dialogue with China or not has been a perennial question since 1965. Sharp differences in the cabinet, possible political repercussions in the country and the known antipathy of Moscow and Washington towards a move by India for reconciliation with Peking resulted in our making time. Once it became known that a disposable, public opinion in India began growing for a settlement of the Sino-Indian differences. Even newspapers, hitherto wholly opposed to any such move, started advocating it. Moscow must have taken due note of this.
The CPI forestalled even Moscow by issuing a statement on July 17 on the proposed Nixon visit to China. The statement contained a vitriolic attack on both Peking and Washington. Moscow soon started its propaganda blast against Peking. It began complaining of Peking’s collusion with Washington in terms reminiscent of China’s charge since 1962 against the Soviet Union. Moscow may have tried for an understanding with Washington for ten years, and Peking may be trying for that now. The differences between Moscow and Peking are growing wider and wider.
India and the Soviet Union have been forced to come closer-of which the treaty is evidence-by common hostility mainly towards China and also to some extent towards the USA. In the context of the treaty there can be no question of a reconciliation with China, not even of talks with that country. On the immediate issue of Bangladesh we have gone very far to satisfy the Russians who have not been required to burn all their boats with Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi should know that critics of the joint Indo-Soviet statement are not lacking in her own party.
Reference: Hindustan Standard 19.8.1971