Bangladesh, the agony and reappraisal
By Sankar Ghosh, The developments in Bangladesh are acting as a catalyst in West Bengal politics. Paradoxically, never before were the political parties in West Bengal so united and yet so divided on a single issue as on the struggle in Bangladesh.
In the beginning, whatever minor reservations these parties might have had were buried under the upsurge of popular support and confidence in the ultimate victory of the freedom-fighters. After two months, the euphoria has worn off to an extent, and the political parties have started re-assessing their stances. Their support of the cause has not waned, but each party is trying to be clear about the shape it would like events in Bangladesh to take when the military regime has been terminated. This exercise is necessary, for it is clear now that the developments in Bangladesh cannot be considered in isolation: what has happened there and what is in store will have grave impact on India.
The massive influx of evacuees is only one aspect of this impact. At one stage it was thought that the evacuees, if they ever come would not exceed two million; within a fortnight the estimate was raised to five million; and the latest guess is said to be around ten million. Even this may prove an under estimate, if the agony in Bangladesh is prolonged indefinitely.
Indeed, the long-term implications of the evacuee problem are so overwhelming that the Government of India refuses to consider them. It is not prepared to look beyond six months. The mystique of six months appears to be that in the meantime the UN General Assembly will have met and it will be known whether India’s diplomatic moves, buttressed by Mr. Swaran Singh’s globe-trotting, for a political solution of the Bangla Desh tangle will bear any result.
The Prime Minister has gone on record that she is in favour of a political solution. That such a solution cannot be on the basis of a sovereign Bangla Desh is obvious; the basis has to be an attenuated version of the six-point programme. Her persistent refusal to recognise the provisional government of Bangladesh is, in this connection, a significant pointer.
Once India recognises the provisional government, it cannot work for resumption of negotiations from the stage where they were interrupted in March. Non-recognition means that India has not yet despaired within the framework of Pakistan of an eventual agreement between President Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on a give-and-take basis. Recognition of the provisional government by India will signal that all hopes of such a solution have vanished.
The Government of India does not seem to be prepared at this stage to consider even what it will do if a political solution proves elusive. The alternative can be a military solution; but it is full of such unknown potentialities that India cannot but regard it as the last resort, despite what Mr. Khadilkar has been saying now and again. Maybe, India rules out a military solution altogether.
It is over this that the political parties in West Bengal are falling apart. The Congress (R) in West Bengal had lost no time in coming out in support of the independence movement in Bangladesh. It organised public meetings to demand all assistance for the freedom-fighters and to plead for immediate recognition of the provisional government as soon as it was formed. Its partners in the democratic coalition fell in line-even the Muslim League which had reservations about the sovereignty demand. Through the resolution adopted unanimously in the Assembly the State Congress (R) became a party to an explicit demand for arms assistance by India to the freedom fighters of Bangladesh.
The demands of the Congress (R) at the state level were at variance with the policy of the party at the Centre. Neither the State unit nor the Government it dominates was perhaps conversant at that stage with the thought processes at the Centre. Tactically, it was necessary for them to make these demands, for otherwise they, would have been out of step with the popular mood. But after the crystallisation of policy at the Centre, the party in West Bengal and its Government have suddenly become reticent. The Assembly resolution must have been, as a matter of routine, communicated to the Centre, but there has been no follow-up action. Obviously, the extravagance of the demands has been brought home to the sponsors.
The minor partners of the coalition have resigned themselves to this climbdown; the Muslim League has acquiesced perhaps with some glee for this is a sort of vindication of the party’s stand. This CPI is, however, an exception. Its insistence on a military solution is a clear indication that it is against a political solution. In an article on the New Age on 16 May, Mr. Bhupesh Gupta has stuck to the old demands of immediate recognition of the provisional government and arms supply to the freedom-fighters by India. Gupta says: “We have made our choice and it is that Bangladesh must be helped to stand up on its feet as an independent republic. There can be no question now of stopping half-way or of hesitating. Vacillation on India’s part will not only greatly damage the great cause of the people of Bangladesh; it will increase beyond measure the threat to the security of our own country and to the tuture of our sub-continent.”
It seems the CPI has opted for a military solution for two reasons. Its opposite number in Bangladesh, after years of underground existence, has come in the open with the beginning of the furmoil. The Communist party of East Pakistan has joined the struggle in earnest and there are areas where the party is the dominant influence among the freedomfighters. The party is looking forward to a rapid growth which will not materialise if an early political solution is evolved. A political solution at this stage can only mean an agreement between the military junta and the Awami League to the exclusion of others. This is not to the liking of the party as is evident from the somewhat critical attitude the party has developed lately towards the League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The party has given a call for a “common united front” of the political parties and organisations of Bangladesh, obviously because that will ensure eventually to the party a share of power.
The CPM is less directly involved, because it has no fraternal party in Bangla Desh. Its efforts to secure a foothold in Bangla Desh with the help of Maulana Bhashani have not succeeded gloriously, and the campaign it tried to whip up over the allegation of the Maulana’s detention by the West Bengal Government has proved a damp squib. The CPM is more critical than the CPI of the Awami League and its leader, but unlike the CPI, it has no party to back in the race for power. The CPM is supporting the struggle in Bangladesh because it is a “national revolt”, though it knows that no worker-peasant alliance has been built up there for successful completion of the democratic revolution.
In the beginning, the CPM had sought to project the developments in Bangladesh as a warning to the Centre of what might happen in this Bengal if the Centre persisted in its policy of what the party thought converting West Bengal into a colony.’ But it seems to have piped down in recent weeks. There are indications that the CPM may shift its emphasis gradually from the developments in Bangladesh to the condition of evacuees here which will, for some time at least, remain a sturdy stick to beat the Government of India with. Certain compulsions are working for it. Certain compulsions are working for it. The CPM’s efforts to make it up with China have received a jolt over Bangla Desh; the party is reluctant to widen the gap further. Another and a more important reason is said to be that a large number of non-Bengali Muslim workers belonging to the CPM trade unions are restive over the party’s stand regarding Bangladesh. The party cannot afford to alienate them, though it may feel that not to support the fighting people of Bangladesh is to renounce the heritage of the communist movement.
The CP (M-L) is in a different kind of predicament. A schism has developed in the party over the interpretation of the Chinese stand. One group holds that Chinese support to President Yahya Khan means that the conflict in Pakistan is between the national bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie. The party’s duty is, therefore, to render all aid to the former to defeat the latter whose spokesman is Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The other group holds that China’s support to Yahya Khan is only tactical; its sole aim is to keep alive the conflict between the ruling classes of India and Pakistan so that they may not come together to crush people’s movements in the two countries. This group refuses to make any distinction between the regime in West Pakistan and the Awami League; both represent the comprador bourgeoisie. In the circumstances, this group thinks that the duty of a Maoist party is to fight both in East Pakistan and set up, in the process, base areas of the party.
Existence of two different lines is not new for the party. What adds to the importance of the present schism is that the group advocating all-out support to President Yahya Khan is led by Mr. Ashim Chatterjee, righthand man of Mr. Charu Mazumdear, while the other view is being propounded by Mazumdar himself, Documents have been circulated by both, and the debate is still on though it is claimed that the Communist Party of East Pakistan (M-L) has, in the mean time, started acting on Mazumdar’s thesis.
Reference: Hindustan Standard 2.6.1971