1965: STORIES FROM THE SECOND INDO-PAK WAR
– Rachna Bisht Rawat
“Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men”
-General Patton
Rachna Bisht Rawat’s “1965: Stories from the Second Indo-Pak War” annals some of the stories of the Indian soldiers who fought in 1965 Indo-Pak War. The author narrates about the five major battles which marked the war. Stretching from Kashmir to Punjab, these battlefields were as diverse as jungles, mountains and sugarcane fields. In all, Indian soldiers proved themselves equal both to the enemy and the terrain.
BATTLE OF HAJI PIR
I. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
I. CAUSES OF THE WAR
The reason behind the occurrence of this war was Karachi Agreement of 1949 which gave access to Pakistan to use Uri Panch track whereas India was deprived of the same but neither India nor Pakistan was allowed to go within the 500 meters of the line. In 1965, Pakistan attempted infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir with large number of Guerrilla Forces in small parties across the Cease Fire Line thereby creating anarchical situation in Srinagar by defenestration of the administration and hence creating a puppet government. Their plan was that when the Indian Army would attack in response to it, the Pakistani government would attack in order to help the puppet government and Pakistani Army failed in their plan. When the situation of Anarchy was created by the guerrilla forces, the Indian Army responded to it by plugging the invaders point of entry. Later the Pakistani Army attacked on the Indian Positions. The Indian reaction was swift and included the epic capture of the strategic Haji Pir Pass as it was a constant source of problems since Pakistan-trained militants have been sneaking into the Kashmir Valley, Poonch and Rajouri districts.
II. PLAN OF INDIAN ARMY
Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh tasked 68 Infantry Brigade to clear the Haji Pir Bulge of the Pakistani. The plan was to capture the shoulders of the Haji Pir pass. The plan was that 1 Para would capture the western ridge of the pass whereas the 19 Punjab and 4 Rajputs would capture the eastern ridge and finally converge at Haji Pir.
III. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
Para 1 proceeded on their way in order to execute the plan but the weather became worse. The weather condition as very bad but still the soldiers were able to cross all the hurdles. While the soldiers were climbing up, the enemy started firing on them and hence Para 1 failed in their attack. The second attack was launched on the night of 27th August and the attacking companies were Dogras and Delta. The two attacking companies reached the base of the enemy and firing took place. The soldiers of 1 Para succeed and got control over Sank. In the morning of 27th August, the Indian Army got control over Sar and proceeded towards Ledwali Gali and they were successful in getting control over Ledwali Gali.
14 Punjab were successfully able to capture Pathra in their first attempt. 4 Rajputs were entrusted with the task of capturing Bedori in which they failed. They put up a very tough fight but they failed. The area was rocky due to which it was difficult to dig trenches whereas the Pakistani army made rough fortifications. Another attempt was made to capture Bedori by 7 Bihar for which a new route was planned through Kaunrali-Gagarhil-Bedori. 19 Punjab was asked to advance in that way.
19 Punjab faced lots of difficulties on their way through the new route. They faced lots of problem. But 19-Pujab did not flinch when the order come for them for another attack in Bedori. 7 Bihar also failed in their attack to Bedori. The route that 19 Punjab take to Bedori was so narrow that only one company could attack at time. A two phased attack was launched. The Indian army took over Bedori. They captured Kiran on 1st September.
On 9th September, an attack was made at Ziarat. 19 Punjab and 6 Dogras attacked Gittian. 19 Punjab was in the process of regrouping to launch an attack on Point 8777 but ceasefire was declared and the war was effectively over. The ultimate attack was planned. The troop walked down to Ledwali Gali and then they started climbing to Haji Pir Pass.
The soldiers came across a behak, hut, on their climb up to the pass which they find it suspicious and hence the troops surrounded it. The Pakistani Army came out of the hut. The soldiers were disarmed and used as load bearers. Finally the troop was successful in taking over the Haji Pir pass. But, they troops got down and prepared for retaliatory attack in anticipation that Pakistan may attack them.
IV. THE BATTLE OF CONTOUR RING
A twenty men platoon was set up in the ring contour area and the platoon came up with the news that there are large number of enemies who have started building up their troops at Ring Contour. The Indian Army decided to attack them and they were sudessful in it. Later, the Haji Pir was given back to Pakistan after Tanksheet declaration in 1966.
V. LT RANJIT SINGH DAYAL
He was actively involved in 1965 Indo-Pak War and was awarded Maha Vir Chakra, the second highest bravery award for displaying outstanding leadership and courage in the best tradition of the Indian Army. He led the 1st Para. He was a legend and captured Hajipir Pass in 1965 War.
II. ANALYSIS
Reactions of Pakistan troops, counter-attacks launched by them and the gallantry and leadership shown by officers like Major (Maj) Ranjit Singh Dyal and Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) N.C. Khanna, all have been mentioned in detail. The role played by other units (like 19 Punjab), including the artillery and other supporting arms, has also been covered. The narrative is coherent and enables the reader to follow the events as they took place.
BATTLE OF ASAL UTTAR
I. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
I. CAUSES OF THE WAR
Operation Grand was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor in order to cut off the communications in Jammu region. The Indian Army launched an operation in the Sialkot sector as also on to the eastern banks of Icchogil canal and they were closed to Lahore. These operations led to one of the biggest tank battles which was fought in Asal Uttar.
The operations were launched by 11 Corps with 15 Infantry Division, 7 Infantry Division and 4 Mountain to lean on the eastern bank of the Icchogil canal and hence destroy cardinal bridges. The operation was schemed in two phases by the 4 Mountain division.
II. PLAN OF THE BATTLE
In phase-I, 62 Mountain Brigade along with infantry battalion from 7 Infantry Division (1/9 Gorkha Rifles) and Deccan Horse were to capture territory up to the East Bank of the Icchogil canal in order to destroy bridges on the Icchogil canal. In phase-II, 7 Mountain Brigade along with one squadron of Deccan Horse was tasked secure east of Icchogil canal from Ballanwala to the bridges north of Theh Pannu.
III. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
62 Mountain Brigade reached Valtoha from Ambala on 5th September, 1965 in order to launch the operations on 6th September and they were successful in capturing their initial objectives. They were successful in their first phase. The Phase 2 of the operation under 7 Mountain Brigade. 4 Grenadiers was tasked with the capturing of the Pannu Bridge on the Icchogil canal. Their move was detected by Pakistan and hence they cannonaded them effectively. The troops waded through knee-deep water finally they were successful.
Initially, the Pakistanis were demented but regained their composure and counter-attacked all positions The Indian Army adopted a defensive position bestride Khem Karan- Bhikkiwind. Pakistan had a bold plan to be launched through this sector to reach the bridges at Harike and Beas and hence got multiple options of threatening Amritsar. Force level applied for the operations which comprised the enemy with three armoured brigades along with the armour component comprising of the Patton tanks whereas the Indian Army did not had such modern tanks.
Pakistan launched its offensive in two phases. In Phase-I elicited 11 Infantry Division in order to establish a bridgehead across the obstacle system in the area of Khem Karan by first light. In Phase-II, 1 Armoured Division was to erupt from the bridgehead in three axes
Pakistan failed in their incursion which was launched at 8:30 hours on 8th September. The next attack was launched by Pakistan units at 11:30 hours on 8th September which resulted in their partial success. The enemy attacked again at 14:00 hours but failed in it.
Attacks were made along both the axes but failed in it. In the battle, some Pakistani tank Commanders who had their heads out of the cupola were killed and the battalion dug in its heels due to which the Pakistani Army disengaged.
They tried to outflank the defenses from the west with two regiments of Patton and a squadron of Chaffees with a motorized battalion. They were encountered by the tanks of 3 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry that were disguised in the sugarcane fields. Further, 4 Grenadiers was attacked with a battalion of infantry and a few Patton tanks. The tanks managed to overrun the forward trenches. The enemy armour made an attempt on the eastern axis by penetrating close to Headquarters. 62 Mountain Brigade and 7 Grenadiers suppressed them fiercely due to which enemy armour finally compelling withdrawal by enemy armour countermanded from the war.
IV. CQMH ABDUL HAMID
CQMH Abdul Hamid, was a soldier in the 4th Battalion, The Grenadiers of the Indian Army, who died in the Khem Karan sector during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 in the Battle of Asal Uttar, and was the posthumous recipient of the Param Vir Chakra. He destroyed three tanks but later he was killed by the fourth tank.
II. ANALYSIS
This chapter also tells the reader about some of the terms used by the armies in order to coordinates their activities. One of them is “Red over Red”. It was used when the Patton tanks of the enemy came in order to attack the Indian Army. It means “SOS fire on own position when the enemy enters it”.
This chapter reveals kind nature of the Indian soldier even during the war. When the battle was over, the 4th Battalion located in Chenab saw the Pakistani Army coming with a lady, widower of Commander Artillery of Pakistani Army, and threw lady requested t Lt Janu to get the body of husband but the body was given to the higher authorities. But Lt Janu expresses his condolences and offer her a cup of tea disregarding the fact that she was wife of an enemy soldier.
The chapter covers the terrain, obstacle system, cultivation pattern and road communications linking important towns and villages (often with built-up areas).
BATTLE OF PHILLORA
I. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
I. BACKGROUND OF THE WAR
The Battle of Phillora was among one of the largest tank battle fought between India and Pakistan during 1965 Indo-Pak war. In this battle, Pakistan was on the batter side because it was being supported by America which provided it with Patton tanks because of Cold War politics which was going on whereas India did not had such weapons. On 3rd September, One Army division moved from Jalandhar to Pathankot to the border. They were joined by 4 Horse. On 7th September, 1 Armoured Brigade along with one Sherman regiment, 2 Lancers, and two Centurion regiments, 17 Horse and 16 Cavalry started moving towards Pakistan. 7 Horse and 16 Cavalry crossed the border and they were going well till 16 Cavalry reached Chobara Village. A tank of the Indian Army was shot by Pakistan. 4 Horse division replaced 16 Cavalry. 4 Horse stayed there and later it started raining. The road roads were made up of mud and hence it posed problems to Indian army and hence 4 Horse step aside to Koti Lalla.
II. BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE
The plan was that the Armoured Brigade is to step aside to the right side area of Kotli Lalla along with 16 Cavalry. The 17 Horse was in the centre and 4 Horse was in the left. The troops of 4 Horse have to cut off from Phillora from north-west and west, from Wachoke and Saboke, and support the 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade attack from north-west of Phillora. On 11th September, 1 Armoured Brigade advanced towards Rurki Lala and thereafter 4 Horse and 17 Horse area to encircle Phillora. 16 Cavalry was given the task to protect the members of Indian Army who suffered and prevent the enemy army attacks. C squadron moved towards Rurki Kalan and suffered enemy attacks. A Squadron was tasked to ensure the interception and destruction of enemy forces holding Chobara-Gadgor. The squadron destroyed eight Patton tanks and 4 jeeps filled with recoilless guns. Lt Colonel Bakshi along with his army moved towards Phillora through Phillora-Libbe road where they saw enemy troops. They attacked them before enemy could react. Pakistani army chased Indian army and later gave up. B squadron runs into enemy attacks while moving towards Kotli Bagga and tank battle took place. 17 Horse was able to advance through Libbe and to Phillora.
III. PHILLORA FALLS
4 Horse and 17 Horse formed a ring around Phillora and kept the defences fully engaged and destroyed the tanks and the Infantry tried to make a getaway. 43 Lorried Infantry, it has two division, 5 Jat and 5/9 Gorkha rifles attacked Phillora. 5 Jat crossed the starting point where it faced heavy attack. They were supported by 17 Horse.
IV. BATTLE OF PHILLORA
The troop proceeded and stayed in the forest till they get further order and proceed on night of 6-7 September. Infantry convoy moved forwards after capturing border outpost. Later, Pakistani army strafe the area.
5/9 Gorkha moved towards Libbe. It was planned that 5 Jat and 5/9 Gorkha will attack Phillora Crossroads, which was the divisional objective. They walked towards Libbe. The attack was to be launched once there was light but the 5 Jats did not reach to their place i.e. on the left of Sialkot-Phillora-Jafarwal road. The army did not have tanks. On 11th September, the Gorkha entered the village of Libbe. The enemy started fringing them but at the same time, the Infantry builded up behind them and finally Indian armoured forces encircling Phillora shoots some of them. 5/9 Gorkha Rifles was located and was ordered to attack Phillora with all the companies spread out. The soldiers were thirsty but they went to the well to get water but attacked by Pakistani army and the army got back immediately.
Gorkha attacked Phillora Crossroads and C and D companies attacked from the right of the Sialkot-Jafarwal road. B Company attacked from the left. Indian army was attacked by Pakistani tanks. Indian army went into the sugarcane fields to protect themselves.
The army found a Pakitani Patton tanks and they moved towards their aim and captured Phillora Crossroads. Later, Jat also arrived and were deployed in the east of the Crossroads and took the defensive role. The Pakistani helicopter arrived but shot down by 17 Horse. On 12th September, 1965, the Indian Army won the battle.
On 22nd September the UNSC passed a resolution and ceasefire was declared. India had to return the area it acquired in Pakistan.
V. LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARDESHIR BURZORJI TARAPORE
He led his regiment to capture Wazirwali on 13 September, and Jassoran and Butur-Dograndi on 16 September 1965.Though his own tank was hit several times, he maintained his pivots at both these places, supporting the infantry attacking Chawinda. Inspired by his leadership, the regiment attacked the enemy armour and destroyed approximately sixty Pakistani Army tanks, suffering only nine tank casualties. Tarapore was killed when his tank was hit and was enveloped in flames. He was awarded Param Vir Chakra for his action in the battle.
II. ANALYSIS
This chapter seems to be the one where the author put lots of efforts because the author narrates about each and every minute event that happened in the war. This chapter specifically talks about post war situation where the Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri talked each soldier. This chapter specifically talks about the task given to each commander.
BATTLE OF BARKI
I. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
I. BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE
16 Punjab, 4 Sikh and 9 Madras received the order to reach Khalra in order to take over the village of Barki, which is right up to the Ichhogil Canal, and hence threaten Lahore with the aim to prevent Pakistan to enter into Kashmir.
On 6th September, 4 Sikh and 6/8 Gorkha Rifles crossed the border and hold a firm base after occupying Pakistan’s border outposts and then clear the area up to Barki. Alpha Company and Bravo Company captured right side of border outposts. The left side was captured by 6/8 Gorkha Rifle. Huidara is between Khalra and Barki and there was a bridge between them which was destroyed by Pakistan to prevent the Indian Army from crossing the bridge. The engineers were called to construct the bridge and hence the Army was able to reach the other side of Huidara.
II. ATTACK ON BARKA KHURD
On 8th September, 4 Sikh was order to clear the village of Brahmanand. When the Indian army were close to Pakistan army, intense firing began and some the soldiers of Indian army died. 16 Punjab also faced heavy shelling. The units were tasked with securing right and left of Barki. 9 Madras launched an attack on Barka Kalan and they succeed in capturing the village. 16 Punjab attacked Barka Khurd in which they succeeded.
III. PLAN OF THE BATTLE
The plan was made to attack Barki in two phases. In Phase-I, 4 Sikh had to capture the village. 4 Sikh will follow Central India Horse and then Barki will be captured. Phase 2 will be launched after this in which 16 Punjab will capture both the banks of Ichhogil Canal. 16 Punjab’s third Companny will cross the bridge in order to establish bridgehead on the other side to stop counter-attack from the enemy.
IV. ATTACK OF BARKI
It was decided that Alpha Company and Charlie Company will attack Barki. Delta Company had to wait at 16 Miles, around 1.8 km from Barki and they will meet with Central India Horses. The civilian trucks laden with wooden planks will follow the tanks with the purpose that there was a drain on the way and the task of the Company was to ignore enemy’s fire and fill the drain with planks so that the tanks can cross over it. Delta Company will follow the truck and move forwards with them.
Alpha Company and Charlie Company rammed into the Pillboxes which Pakistan designed for the defence of Barki as it was the only way to neutralize Pakistani. The pillboxes were so strong that only anti-tank guns could make dent on the structure. The Indian Army crawled upto the pillboxes and disabled them manually by throwing grenades into the bunkers. The enemy fights desperately but finally Indian Army soldier won the battle.
At 16 Mile, the army waited for the tank but tank did not come and Indian Army started firing and within some time, the tanks arrived. It difficult for the army to advance due to continuous firing. The battalion mortars were directed towards the village. The artilleries were fired on the enemy. 4 Sikh moved its machineguns forward to engage the enemy machineguns in the pillboxes. The Indian army moved forward by fire-and-move tactics. The last 90 meters to Barki were the most difficult but finally the Indian Army won the battle. The battle was not over yet because once Barki was captured, the army had to capture the area further north in which they were successful.
V. SUBEDAR AJIT SINGH
Ajit Singh, 4 Sikh regiments, demolished several enemy outposts. They launched their assault when they were 380 m away from Barki. Subedar Singh was given the responsibility of destroying the gun. A burst of machine gun fire wounded him in the chest but he carried on defiantly and went near enough to throw a grenade that effectively silenced the machine gun. He was awarded Mahavir Chakra for his efforts in the battle.
II. ANALYSIS
Two events, that is, how the unintentional flooding caused by a damaged drain slowed down the advance of Pakistan’s armoured division and how the ambush of the Pakistan GOC impacted on the offensive plan, have been well narrated.
BATTLE OF DOGRAI
I. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
I. CAUSES
The Battle of Dograi, was fought in Dograi, a township that perched on the East bank of the Ichhogil Canal. There was a considerable defence potential for the enemy near the canal and the canal acts as shield for Lahore from the Indian troops. Therefore, the ultimate aim behind capturing Dograi and bridges on the canal because it was an action towards the protection of Indian and thus it was necessary to the progression of operations towards Lahore.
II. FIRST FAILURE OF THE INDIAN ARMY
3 JAT, a troop of Indian Army cross the border of North of Wagah and cleared all the enemy resistance and hence made the way for the further progress fot eh operation towards capturing of Lahore. Later, the soldiers got attacked by the Pakistani Army on GT Road but despite this, the Indian soldiers took the task of further advance till Ichhogil canal.
They succeeded in reaching Ichhogil Canal and hence captured the East bank. Later, they moved towards south and captured Dograi. The other two companies of the Indian Army crossed the canal and captured Batapore and Attoke Awan. The sliders were looking for the logistical support to continue their objective. Due to certain mishappenings which proved to be fatal for the soldiers, 3 JAT was ordered to forsake their reap by leaving the places they occupied and hence their success turned to a failure.
Many attempts were made to capture Dograi again but it resulted in a failure. On 19th September, 54 Infantry Brigade was assigned with the task of recapturing Dograi.
III. SECOND ATTACK WAS SUCCESSFUL
The operation was launched in the night of 21st September. The plan of the operation was to be launched in two phases. 13 Punjab was tasked to capture Mile 13 and 3 JAT had to take Dogari from north. 13 Punjab achieved a partial success but it was not enough in order to execute the Phase 2 plan.
3 JAT, prostrated upon the fringe and rearmost of the positions of the enemy at Dograi. The Pakistani army was taken by surprise. Along the eastern bank of the Ichhogil canal, there were lots of machine guns which were placed. Indian army lost many of its soldiers but due to their determination i.e. close the gap from the Forming Up Positions from the where the enemy was firing as soon as possible. When the soldiers of the Indian Army closed up with the enemy on their objective, there was fierce hand to hand fighting between the soldiers of the two countries because it was difficult to get the soldiers out of trenches. The enemy did not want to leave the trenches whereas the soldiers of Indian army get into their trenches and pushed them. There was completely dark all around and hence the army of the both the countries mixed up with each other. Finally, Dograi was captured after close confrontation between the armies of the two countries. , the Jats and Pakistanis were all mixed up.
IV. BRIG DESMOND EUGENE HYDE
Brigadier Desmond Eugene Hayde, a strapping Anglo-Indian commanding officer of 3 Jat, which won the famous battle of Dograi, not once, but twice. Hayde led his battalion to glory with his indomitable spirit and obvious love for the brave Jats. The conversations he has with his Jat troops on the eve of battle is the stuff that passes into legend, to be recounted in messes on cold, wintry nights. He led his company of 550 men and defeated an enemy force that was double the size of his own battalion. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for his contribution in the war.
II. ANALYSIS
The author’s way of writing this chapter is unique in itself because a co-relational perspective of continuity and transformation in the Indian Army. It covers the relevance of Dograi and the two battles fought for its capture in 1965, thereby drawing lessons in the context of military continuity and transformation.
CONCLUSIONS
The pitched battles were fought from Kashmir’s Haji Pir pass to the paddy and sugar cane fields of Punjab. Having unprecedented access to Army records and war diaries coupled with extensive interviews with the survivors some of whom were in their eightees five decades after the conflict lends authenticity to the author’s painstaking efforts of providing a firsthand account of the conflict in five different and diverse theatres of war.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Each chapter, too, includes descriptions of particularly noteworthy acts of valour that earned men recognition (or, in some cases, not: at the Battle of Asal Uttar, three grenadiers, Shafiq, Naushad and Suleiman, shot dead a Pakistani GOC—probably the only foot soldiers ever to have killed a General in battle).
While the detailed descriptions of the battles may not appeal to readers uninterested in military history, what makes this book memorable are the stories of these men. Each chapter ends with a long section on one man who exemplified courage in that battle: CQMH Abdul Hamid, for example, who destroyed seven Patton tanks at Asal Uttar before being killed. Or Lt Col Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore, whose courage and hands-on attitude won him the undying respect of his men.
Dotted with reminiscences of veterans, of relatives and widows who lost their men in these battles, this book brings alive the men who fought the battles of 1965. They, and the anecdotes that appear here and there, are what make this book not just a commemoration of 1965, but more: an affectionate, warm tribute to these men. There is pathos here, of course, and bravery, even humour. There is a glimpse of the other side of battle: the days of trudging through rain and mud, the lack of sleep and water. Of surviving on sugarcane for six days because there was no other food. Of villagers helping out with food and friendship (or, in one ironic incident, Pakistani villagers not realizing that the tanks rolling down their village lanes were Indian, the soldiers in them the enemy).
War tales are perhaps the easiest and the most difficult to tell. They are full of courage and cowardice, grit and determination, victory and defeat. The fog of war ensures that truth is the first casualty and reminisces are invariably inaccurate. So when Rachna Bisht Rawat, (an army brat and an army wife) admits that she was pressed for time to write 1965: Stories from the Second Indo-Pak War, she is speaking the truth.
A historical book is rarely a literary exercise, and her emotional attachment to the subject makes it even more difficult to accept the book as an authentic record. The stories are of the men who actually fought on the ground. You won’t find the politics of war or the military strategies devised at the highest level discussed here.
The narrative looks one sided at times since the perspective is that of the Indian side alone. Nevertheless, it doesn’t dilute the stories. The author is successful in portraying what it is to be a soldier, especially during conflict, and deserves praise for putting together the book within a tight deadline. There are several gut wrenching moments and they have been narrated so well that you feel like you were there. She has also presented the mistakes committed or rather the mistakes which happened from the Indian Army as well. Despite of these mistakes the army still managed to secure the objectives (twice in case of 3 Jats). Not just officers but the courage of sepoys is also mentioned duly which sometimes does not get required attention while telling war stories.
This is a short book on Indo – Pak war 1965 which covers only few fronts and not entire war and no word on the role of IAF and PAF or Indian Navy. This is very unfortunate that India is a very big country and there have been many war veterans from Indian Army but they have not tried to write their memoirs. A few journalist have tried who have no flair of the war and whose version is based on interviews and extracts from few books. This book is one of them, but the writer has worked hard to interview those who were connected 1965 war. This has made the book fascinating.