THE STATESMAN, AUGUST 20, 1971
AFTER THE TREATY
Those who hoped that the Indo-Soviet treaty would made New Delhi more assertive in safeguarding India’s interests in the context of the Hast Bengal events and their consequences must now be sorely disappointed. The disappointment of those who consider toughness to be a self-sufficient virtue need not be taken seriously, but there are others who thought that the treaty would enable India to demand with greater firmness than before that the Bangladesh issue be settled immediately and in the only manner in which it can be truly settled. India’s right to demand a settlement could never be questioned, nothing else can relieve this country of the intolerable burden of refugees. Nor could it ever be reasonably argued that a settlement could be reached except with the elected representatives of the East Bengali people. On different occasions New Delhi has made both those points. If Pakistan paid little heed until August 9, it might have been thought that this was because New Delhi’s demand was not backed by sufficient force. Immediately after the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty many people seemed to think that this deficiency had at last been removed. Among them were people who had reservations about the long-term implications of the treaty but still gave it a limited welcome in the hope that it might strengthen India’s hands in securing a political settlement in East Bengal. As yet there is no evidence that New Delhi’s hands have been so strengthened. In fact, even the demand for a settlement seems to have lost some of its urgency.
That the treaty has muted irresponsible talk of war is an entirely healthy outcome, even if it seems strange that an assurance of potential military support should subdue hawkish rhetoric. Russia’s reported Warning to Pakistan against threats of war may induce some restraint in Islamabad, which in turn should removed the need for angry counter warnings by India. All in all, the treaty may already have served a useful purpose by defusing gathering crisis. But this was not the use envisaged by the treaty’s ardent supporters. Indeed, the treaty has not been followed even by the recognition of Bangladesh which many thought would be the most likely and least belligerent follow-up action. By refraining from hasty or assertive action on the strength of potential external support New Delhi has perhaps shown greater maturity than some people gave it credit for, but it is now widely suspected that this restraint was a precondition for the promise of Soviet support.
Whether and to what extent the treaty has restricted India’s freedom of action can only be a matter of speculation. But it needs to be pointed out while restraint is desirable even if imposed from outside India cannot look forward to a settlement in Bangladesh merely by averting a war with Pakistan. Nor has she any reason to hope that the military junta in Islamabad will come to its senses at international persuasion, under halfhearted pressure or because of internal economic and other difficulties. Within her limited options perhaps the most promising course is to give all possible help to the forces fighting for the freedom of Bangladesh, they can still make General Yahya learn a lesson or two. Unfortunately, the Mukti Fauj is still severely handicapped for want of sufficient arms and ammunition; and the monsoon, when the guerrillas could be most effective, will be over in a few weeks. It is to be hoped that the apparent failure to come fully to the freedom fighters aid is not a consequence of the treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union.