FRONTIER. APRIL 24. 1971
Across The Border
TRENDS IN EAST BENGAL
By Sumanta Banerjee
In the welter of romantic reports about Bangladesh in our Bengali newspapers, the political significance of the happenings in East Bengal is lost.
The heroic resistance against the Pakistan army is spearheaded by young members of the East Pakistan Rifles. East Bengal Regiment, Mujahids. Ansars and students. The leaders of the Awami League, elected by the people to the National and Provincial Assemblies are nowhere to be seen near the battlefronts. They are in Calcutta, Delhi. Agartala or Bongaon-busy setting up committees or forming a government.
Although All India Radio and Government statements are determined to describe the liberation forces as Mujib’s army, the fighters whom I saw in Jessore, Khulna and other areas could not care less about who was their leader. For them it was a battle of resistance to one of the most ruthless forces in the modern world. With Second World War 303 rifles and a few light machine guns, they are fighting against tanks heavy mortars and often air raids.
A couple of EPR boys whom I met in a deserted village near Jessore town regretted that the leaders had failed to arm the villagers who otherwise might have stayed on in the villages and helped the liberation forces.
When I came back from the front to the headquarters of the Awami League at a safer place near the Indian border and asked the local leader why the peasants were not armed, he said they could not be as otherwise they would indulge looting and fighting among themselves.
The middle-class distrust of the peasantry has kept the majority of the rural poor at a distance. They seemed to be uninvolved in the war evident from their immediate decision to evacuate villages whenever the Pakistan forces were sighted nearby.
A liberation war cannot be fought only by a few EPR boys and student volunteer, however heroic they might be. The bulk of the people the peasantry-will have to be drawn into it.
While the Awami League leaders still believe in keeping the masses at a distance, and winning the war in the conventional way by defeating the army on the battlefield, those who are fighting the war-the EPR and the volunteers, are fast realizing the need for guerilla warfare. This explains the sharp differences in the behavior of the leaders’ and the fighters.
Almost every Awami League leader with whom I talked expected help from India in the shape of heavy artillery, tanks and other modern weapons to match the strength of the Pakistan army. They are approaching the Government for such help. Standing in sharp contrast with this behavior was the attitude of young a mechanichardly 25-who had crossed over from Dinajpur to spend a day in India and collect explosive necessary to blow up a bridge. More practical and Pragmatic then the leaders, he described how the fighters are learning from their past mistakes and shifting to guerilla tactics, like laying booby traps to ambush tanks.
Politics
Apart from the differences over fighting tactics. Political differences are developing. Resentment against the Awami League MPAs and MNAs, particularly among the rural poor, is growing. They feel that they have been deserted. Among the fighting forces also there is a feeling of being let down. They think that they were not asked well in advance to be prepared for a war. The way the senior officers of the EPR and ERR were allowed to be eliminated by the Pakistan army, even when the negotiations were on between Mujibur Rahman and Yahya Khan, indicates that the Awami League leaders were not seriously thinking in terms of a military war.
From all indications it appears that the Awami League leadership has exhausted its capabilities. It reached its zenith with the success of the non-violent noncooperation movement. In mobilising the masses behind the call for non-cooperation, it demonstrated its mettle and proved to be superior even to Gandhi. In our noncooperation movement during the anti imperialist struggle, there was hardly any case of defiance like the instance of judges refusing to swear in a Governor imposed by an alien power. The sense of nationalism was complete.
The Awami leaders succeeded in mobilising the masses behind the slogan of nonviolent non-cooperation, but were not expected to rally them for armed resistance. Their middle class temperament stood in the way of arming the people. They depended instead on the remnants of the ready-made machinery of the Stale-thc EPR and the ERR. Trained in conventional warfare and direct confrontation, but deprived of the necessary command and equipment, the EPR and ERR could hardly resist the superior Pakistan army.
Thus with the end of the non-cooperation movement and the invasion of the Pakistan army, a new phase started in East Bengal politics-the phase of armed resistance-which the Awami League leaders failed to lead properly.
In spite of our Government’s wishful thinking and publicity for Sheikh Mujib’s Government-in-exile, the leadership of the new stage of movement in Bangladesh is fast changing. Sincere elements in the Awami League are getting disillusioned about the leaders. A prominent leader of the Jessore area, whom I met in Calcutta a week ego, told me how he had waited for days for the top leaders- to come to a decision and for the West Bengal Government to help his boys fighting in Jessore, in vain, and had finally decided to contact “other sources” in Calcutta before leaving for Jessore.
What are the other political forces in Bangladesh? Despite the subtle propaganda in our newspapers that Maulana Bhasani’s National Awami Party is not participating in the war, NAP is very much on the scene. 1 met a prominent leader of the party and ordinary members who are fighting in Dinajpur.
It should be remembered that long before Mujibur. Bhasani had giving the call for Independent Bangladesh. NAP claims that although the electorate voted for Mujibur Rahman, they were taken a step ahead from the demand for autonomy to the demand for full independence by NAP. The rallies they held during the negotiations exerted pressure on Mujibur and prevented a compromise, NAP leaders claim.
But NAP admits that it was also caught unawares by the Pakistan army. It should share with the Awami League the blame for keeping the masses unprepared for a war.
Co-ordination
NAP has decided to set up a co-ordination committee of other left forces and keep in touch with Mujib’s Government-in-exile and prepare for a long-drawn war. It describes the present struggle as a national liberation war and seeks to draw all the classes into it. Instead of depending on conventional warfare like the Awami League, NAP is preparing for guerilla war. The NAP leader whom I met was tin: only political leader from East Bengal to tell me pointblank: “We do not expect any help from you. It is our war and we will fight it. For heaven’s sake, ask your political parties to keep away from our politics.”
NAP. it appears, has succeeded in getting cooperation from three Noxalite groups of East Bengal. The Toaha group, which heads the official Communist Party of East Pakistan(Marxist-Leninist) is still out of the co-ordination committee.
The CP (ML) in East Bengal is thinking on different lines, although it is participating in the liberation war. It describes the war as a “false nationalistic war in collaboration with imperialists.” The definition is probably directed against the Awami League leadership. The party emphasizes class struggle-annihilation of landlords and shardening of the conflict between the jotdars and the rural poor. It seeks to expose Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League leadership.
In this connexion. NAP differs from the CP (ML). While NAP feels that the main contradiction is between the Bengalis as a nation and the invading Pakistan army, the CP- (ML) stresses the contradiction between the feudal structure in the villages and the toiling masses. They feel that with the desertion of the rural poor by the Awami leaders, it would be easier for them to expose the Awami League and politically educate the peasantry.
According to the CP (ML), the fight against the Pakistan army and the local feudal landlords would continue simultaneously. They hope that the peasants who are fleeing villages today will return tomorrow and take up arms, snatch them if necessary, to defend themselves. Political power will be set up in these centers of armed struggle.
It is difficult to predict at this stage what exactly would be the course of future events in Bangladesh, or which party would be in the leadership. But it is clear that parties of the petit bourgeoisies will gradually lose their hold and give way to other forces, depending on the initiative of the more militant groups. With the onset of the monsoons, there might be some lull on the battlefronts. During this period, NAP and other forces might try to coordinate their activities and set up resistance groups and prepare for guerilla warfare. In course of such resistance, the class conflicts being visualized by the CP ( ML) will sharpen.
Meanwhile, our newspapers would be deprived of the chance of dishing up sensational stories. There will be no more spectacular victories. The fight will go on beyond the sight of visiting newsmen. The freedom fighters will be spared the dangers thrust upon them by irresponsible reporting by our journalists, and the local population will be cured of the euphoria created by false news of victories in our newspapers.