THE FRONTIER, APRIL 10, 1971
Editorial
WATCHING THE WAR
From reports coming from border areas East Pakistan or Bangladesh, the trends of the fighting going on there are now a little more understandable than they were a week ago. Eyewitness accounts from hidden reporters and refugees add up to a carnage- bombing of towns, mass killing, raping, looting and terrorizing of civilians by West Pakistan troops which accord less with the picture of a startled Administration trying to quell secessionist mobs than with the insensate behavior of an’ occupation army.
On the other hand, the earlier reports from the Free Bengal Radio and Indian newspapers to the effect teat the West Pakistani troops have been all driven into cantonments mow appear to be more wishful thinking than normal war propaganda. It is more probable that an army of 80,000 soldiers who cannot move out in a vast countryside crisscrossed by rivers and canals to its advantage, has deliberately concentrated in cantonments and comes out to destroy the hostiles as and when it finds it less expensive in fuel and ammunition. Its logistics have been complicated by the absence of firm expectations of fulfillment of contracts with Burma and Ceylon which seem to have backed out.
The most heartening surprise sprung during the last fortnight has been the fortitude and resilience shown by the people. They were not covered by the military strength. The popular fighting force is constituted by the First Bengal Regiment. East Pakistan Rifles and the police. The Bengal Regiment must be owing its name to Bengali officers and not jawans; therefore the strength of the rebel regiment is doubtful. Moreover, during the negotiation between General Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujib, these officers and jawans were stealthily disarmed and disbanded; it is hardly possible that they could have taken with them many arms and much ammunition without causing disruption of the negotiations. And compared to the modem armament of the Pakistani army, the weapons in the bands of the police, mujahids and Ansars primitive. The question therefore uppermost is not how long the rebels will be able to stand in open confrontation but how they dared to take the offensive, if they bad taken it at all, at some places. As the war goes on they may be able to snatch lighter weapons through ambush but acquiring heavy arms through defeating the enemy is another matter.
The speeches that the Sheikh was making during the fortnight preceding March 25 urged people to prepare themselves against military onslaught. But the way be had conducted his payment and supporters, who constituted 70 per cent of the adults in Bangladesh, leads one to imagine that armed resistance was not on the Awami League cards. The way many of the party leaders are reported to have been captured and shot dead do not show that they were prepared. It takes time for such a patty to get ready for armed struggle. Quite a few of the emissaries of the party crossing the borders betray their petty-bourgeois character: nationalism resembling communalism and lack of organization for popular armed resistance. Many of them talk to their own villagers in a lordly way and intensely distrust the communists who are fighting along with them the same enemy. They would not like anyone in Bangladesh not affiliated with the Awami League to get help from across the borders.
In the absence of extensive and authentic reports from the war-raven country, it is not yet time to discern the pattern of resistance. Who are really giving the military junta a hell of a lime? There can’t be a homogeneous picture but significant traits must lie emerging as days pass. And that must be the reason why the Big powers are watching the scene with restraint. They are waiting to see who eventually come out as the decisive factor. India has from the beginning been supporting Bangladesh because nothing would be more to her advantage than disintegrated Pakistan; and a Bangladesh under the control of the Awami League would be a double advantage.