You dont have javascript enabled! Please enable it! 1956.08.24 | Mr. Desai's ordeal | THE HINDU Editorial - সংগ্রামের নোটবুক

“Mr. Morarji Desai’s probity and high idealism are as well known as his inflexibility of purpose and his efficiency as an administrator. We may be certain that he would not have embarked on the hazardous fast had he not been convinced that less desperate measures would not avail against the unhappy trends revealed by the recent disturbances in Gujarat…. But it seems to us that in the interests of the people themselves and in order to further his own efforts to wean them away from headstrong courses, he should now give up his fast.”

AUGUST 24, 1956
Mr. Desai’s ordeal

MR. NEHRU, WE WOULD FAIN HOPE, IS WARRANTED IN HIS belief that the Ahmedabad situation is improving and that Mr. Morarji Desai will be enabled to break his fast in a day or two. The doctors’ bulletins on Mr. Desai’s health are fairly alarming. And, so far as one can judge from the published reports, the student element which has been foremost in fomenting the opposition to bilingual Bombay has not appreciably relaxed its efforts. The Prime Minister seems to have stated that “the purpose for which Mr. Desai had gone on fast would be achieved in a day or two”. That purpose was to make those concerned see the error of their ways in denying Mr. Desai a peaceful hearing when he came to Ahmedabad to explain the reasons that had led him and his colleagues to support the bilingual solution. Mr. Desai’s thesis was that the citizens of Ahmedabad would have flocked to hear him in large numbers if picketers had not forcibly prevented them. In this picketing and unlawful coercion the Prime Minister sees the hidden hand of the Opposition Parties. Mr. Desai himself thinks that violence such as had broken out in Ahmedabad when Parliament approved the bilingual solution must be stemmed in the larger interests of the people. He has said that though he was himself generally opposed to political fasts he felt he had to lay this tribulation upon himself in order to move the hearts of the errant. Mr. Nehru, though he too has often strongly expressed himself against facile resort to fasting and satyagraha, seems unwilling to interfere because he thinks it is a matter of conscience in this case.
Mr. Morarji Desai’s probity and high idealism are as well known as his inflexibility of purpose and his efficiency as an administrator. We may be certain that he would not have embarked on the hazardous fast had he not been convinced that less desperate measures would not avail against the unhappy trends revealed by the recent disturbances in Gujarat. He understands the Gujaratis as no other living leader does and we have no doubt that his affection for them is only equalled by his understanding. It is therefore easy to read his state of mind. But it seems to us that in the interests of the people themselves and in order to further his own efforts to wean them away from headstrong courses, he should now give up his fast. It may be regarded as having already largely achieved its purpose because violence has died down. No doubt student organisers of the opposition to bilingual Bombay are still active. They are staging counter-fasts and promoting monster petitions. But if no special attention were paid to these things they might in the normal course subside into fairly harmless constitutional modes of protest that could be dealt with on that basis. While it is important to maintain law and order, the Government have to be specially considerate in dealing with excited students. Unscrupulous politicians may have worked upon their feelings of generous idealism but harsh handling of student ebullience can only confirm them in their intransigence.
Even more significant is another observation made by the Prime Minister. He said that the phenomenon of a people, who generally backed the Government on other big issues, having kicked over the traces in this matter of reorganisation of States “should make one sit up and think as to what after all should be the exact relationship between the people and the elected representatives on the one hand and the Government on the other”. It, in fact, is the crux of democracy that “nothing should be done”, as Mr. Nehru said, “to allow a hiatus to grow between the Government and the people”. If the bilingual solution had been explained to the people of Gujarat in time by leaders like Mr. Morarji Desai, they, being canny folk, might have accepted it in spite of the proposal to include Vidharbha and thus reduce the relative strength of the Gujaratis in the new State. Unfortunately, in the sudden access of enthusiasm generated by what looked like an ideal solution promoted by the initiative of back-benchers and members of all parties it was a little too readily assumed that Gujarat would not demur to what Mr. Morarji Desai had accepted. That and the sudden disappearance of a separate State for themselves which the people of Gujarat had been taught to look forward to caused an understandable soreness which was no doubt taken advantage of by hooligans and malcontents. The moral is that, while no statesman can afford to mortgage his judgment to the man in the street from the mistaken notion that he is exercising a delegated power, no political party can afford to take the people for granted. Mr. Morarji Desai is, of all leaders of Gujarat, the best qualified to restore the relations between the Government and the people to the normal. We trust he will give up his fast, as a lessening of the present emotional tension is the indispensable preliminary.

Reference:
The First 100
A Selection of Editorials, 1878-1978, THE HINDU, VOLUME I