You dont have javascript enabled! Please enable it! 1952.11.12 | Kashmir | THE HINDU Editorial - সংগ্রামের নোটবুক

“Since Pakistan’s aggression and her (Kashmir) consequent accession to India, the latter has taken over the defence of the state and must continue to discharge it till the danger of aggression disappears. But the action of Pakistan first in invading the state and then being in unlawful possession of a portion of her territory, shows that the danger of resumption of aggression is very much present and will continue so long as Pakistan’s troops or those trained and controlled by her (however camouflaged as “Azad” forces) continue in being.”

NOVEMBER 12, 1952
Kashmir

IF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RESOLUTION ON KASHMIR NOW BEFORE the Security Council had merely recorded the progress made so far by the U.N. Mediator – such as it is – and appealed to India and to Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations for a settlement, India would have had no objection, because she has always been anxious to arrive at an understanding with Pakistan. But the resolution goes further and queers the pitch (generally against India); for, it circumscribes the scope of the negotiations not only by laying down the limits to the strength of the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line but decides beforehand that they shall consist of troops on both sides and shall be concerned with the maintenance of the security of the State, as distinct from the maintenance of law and order during the plebiscite. Worse still, it lays down a time limit for the negotiations, carrying with it the implication that, if they prove infructuous, the Security Council would feel free to take its own decision in the matter. Apart from the fact that this savours of arbitration, which India has unequivocally rejected, it practically concedes the various claims made by Pakistan, ranging from equality of status with India to near-parity with India in the matter of the character and quantum of the forces to be retained after demilitarisation. Furthermore, by placing a time limit, it has obviously yielded to the clamour in Pakistan against the alleged dilatoriness of the Security Council and the importance of the “time factor”; it is significant that Pakistan’s official news agency early last week “recalled” that her Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrullah Khan, had carried with him to the last Geneva meeting of the Security Council a brief from his Government to press the Security Council for a “clear-cut” decision and to impress on it the “importance attached by Pakistan to the time factor as far as a settlement of the Kashmir dispute is concerned.” In fact, we are told by the news agency, before Dr. Graham began his most recent series of tripartite talks in Geneva, Pakistan had suggested a “time limit of one month for the talks.” What Dr. Graham, drawing on his experience of the complicated nature of the problem, was reluctant to do, Sir Gladwyn Jebb (and there is no mistaking his authorship of the resolution) has done by fixing precisely the one-month time limit demanded by Pakistan. Nor is this the only respect in which his resolution goes back on the conclusions reached both by Dr. Graham and the United Nations Commission on Kashmir – conclusions which have borne out India’s contentions.
Take this question of the responsibility for the security of the State from external aggression and a threat of possible invasion. India’s contention has always been that, by virtue of the continuing sovereignty of the Kashmir Government (which has been clearly conceded in the relevant U.N. Commission resolution) that Government bears the sole responsibility for security over the whole of the State. Since Pakistan’s aggression and her consequent accession to India, the latter has taken over the defence of the State and must continue to discharge it till the danger of aggression disappears. But the action of Pakistan, first in invading the State, and then being in unlawful possession of a portion of her territory, shows that the danger of a resumption of aggression is very much present and will continue so long as Pakistan’s troops or those trained and controlled by her (however camouflaged as “Azad” forces) continue in being. Hence India must not only insist on the withdrawal or disbandment of these latter but must keep the minimum of her own armed forces consistent with her duty to defend the State from a possible invasion. On the Pakistan side no such considerations arise because, firstly, she has no legal status in Kashmir, and, secondly, she herself being the aggressor, there is no question of her taking any responsibility to guard the State against aggression! Of course, Pakistan has repudiated this position during the later stages of the U.N. negotiations and actually claimed the right to have the same number of troops as India after demilitarisation. Incidentally, she has been emboldened to take up this position by the persistent failure of the Security Council to deal with her on the basis of her being the aggressor, for which there is plenty of evidence in the facts and findings of the various U.N. Commissions and representatives.
Be that as it may, so late as September 4, presenting his final proposals for a settlement at Geneva, Dr. Graham himself described the responsibility and functions of the respective forces to be left on either side of the cease-fire line as follows: On the Pakistan side there shall be “the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite.” On the Indian side there shall be “the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.” The words we have italicised bring out clearly that, in Dr. Graham’s view, India should, unlike Pakistan, have the right to keep her armed forces because the security of the State is her responsibility and not that of anybody on the other side of the cease-fire line, least of all, of Pakistan. India responded to these proposals handsomely. She agreed that they were “conceived in the right spirit” and as a basis for the evolution of a suitable definition of the function of the forces on both sides of the cease-fire line, they contained the germs of a settlement. The Pakistan delegation, however, demanded that the phrase, “with due regard to the security of the State” should be deleted from the para describing the functions of the forces on the Indian side. Dr. Graham reported that no agreement could be reached on his last draft proposals, which he was not prepared to revise on the lines suggested by Pakistan. Again Sir Gladwyn Jebb has come to the rescue of Pakistan by specifying in his resolution a definite number of troops both for Pakistan and India and by laying down that they should be “of the same kind.” By way of rubbing it in, he has asserted that “the British Government had never thought that the proposal to limit forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line to an armed civil police force, while leaving military forces on the Indian side, was consistent with a really free plebiscite.” In other words, he questions the bona fides of India’s insistence on keeping her troops in the State. How can India, with any sense of self-respect, even look at a resolution, one at least of whose sponsors has already taken a pontifical attitude about a fundamental issue? She has done the only thing by totally rejecting it.

Reference:
The First 100
A Selection of Editorials, 1878-1978, THE HINDU, VOLUME I